[JPRT 107-32]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress S. Prt.
JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
1st Session 107-32
_______________________________________________________________________
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2000
VOLUME II
----------
R E P O R T
SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone (202) 512�091800 Fax: (202) 512�092250
Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001107th Congress
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr, Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Isdland
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
------
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York TOM LANTOS, California
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
PETER T. KING, New York BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado BARBARA LEE, California
RON PAUL, Texas JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
NICK SMITH, Michigan JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
DARRELL E. ISSA, California SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana DIANE E. WATSON, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Staff Director/General Counsel
Robert R. King, Democratic Staff Director
Kristin Gilley, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Foreword......................................................... vii
Letter of Transmittal............................................ ix
Preface.......................................................... xi
Overview and Acknowledgments..................................... xiii
Introduction..................................................... xvii
Volume I
Africa:
Angola....................................................... 1
Benin........................................................ 16
Botswana..................................................... 25
Burkina Faso................................................. 36
Burundi...................................................... 46
Cameroon..................................................... 59
Cape Verde................................................... 85
Central African Republic..................................... 91
Chad......................................................... 103
Comoros...................................................... 115
Congo, Democratic Republic of................................ 122
Congo, Republic of........................................... 156
Cote d'Ivoire................................................ 166
Djibouti..................................................... 193
Equatorial Guinea............................................ 204
Eritrea...................................................... 215
Ethiopia..................................................... 228
Gabon........................................................ 253
Gambia, The.................................................. 262
Ghana........................................................ 272
Guinea....................................................... 294
Guinea-Bissau................................................ 310
Kenya........................................................ 317
Lesotho...................................................... 345
Liberia...................................................... 353
Madagascar................................................... 367
Malawi....................................................... 374
Mali......................................................... 382
Mauritania................................................... 391
Mauritius.................................................... 407
Mozambique................................................... 415
Namibia...................................................... 433
Niger........................................................ 446
Nigeria...................................................... 455
Rwanda....................................................... 479
Sao Tome and Principe........................................ 493
Senegal...................................................... 496
Seychelles................................................... 507
Sierra Leone................................................. 513
Somalia...................................................... 524
South Africa................................................. 537
Sudan........................................................ 557
Swaziland.................................................... 579
Tanzania..................................................... 588
Togo......................................................... 608
Uganda....................................................... 622
Zambia....................................................... 642
Zimbabwe..................................................... 656
East Asia and the Pacific:
Australia.................................................... 683
Brunei....................................................... 693
Burma........................................................ 700
Cambodia..................................................... 723
China (includes Hong Kong and Macau)......................... 736
China (Taiwan only).......................................... 824
East Timor................................................... 836
Fiji......................................................... 846
Indonesia.................................................... 858
Japan........................................................ 899
Kiribati..................................................... 912
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of....................... 914
Korea, Republic of........................................... 927
Laos......................................................... 938
Malaysia..................................................... 950
Marshall Islands............................................. 985
Micronesia, Federated States of.............................. 989
Mongolia..................................................... 992
Nauru........................................................ 999
New Zealand.................................................. 1002
Palau........................................................ 1008
Papua New Guinea............................................. 1012
Philippines.................................................. 1017
Samoa........................................................ 1036
Singapore.................................................... 1040
Solomon Islands.............................................. 1054
Thailand..................................................... 1062
Tonga........................................................ 1076
Tuvalu....................................................... 1079
Vanuatu...................................................... 1082
Vietnam...................................................... 1085
Volume II
Europe:
Albania...................................................... 1107
Andorra...................................................... 1118
Armenia...................................................... 1121
Austria...................................................... 1137
Azerbaijan................................................... 1147
Belarus...................................................... 1164
Belgium...................................................... 1192
Bosnia and Herzegovina....................................... 1200
Bulgaria..................................................... 1223
Croatia...................................................... 1241
Cyprus....................................................... 1260
Czech Republic............................................... 1271
Denmark...................................................... 1290
Estonia...................................................... 1294
Finland...................................................... 1302
France....................................................... 1306
Georgia...................................................... 1318
Germany...................................................... 1341
Greece....................................................... 1355
Hungary...................................................... 1371
Iceland...................................................... 1383
Ireland...................................................... 1390
Italy........................................................ 1399
Kazakhstan................................................... 1407
Kyrgyzstan................................................... 1434
Latvia....................................................... 1450
Liechtenstein................................................ 1457
Lithuania.................................................... 1462
Luxembourg................................................... 1471
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of....................... 1474
Malta........................................................ 1485
Moldova...................................................... 1489
Monaco....................................................... 1503
Netherlands, The............................................. 1506
Norway....................................................... 1513
Poland....................................................... 1517
Portugal..................................................... 1535
Romania...................................................... 1542
Russia....................................................... 1555
San Marino................................................... 1605
Slovak Republic.............................................. 1608
Slovenia..................................................... 1621
Spain........................................................ 1626
Sweden....................................................... 1637
Switzerland.................................................. 1645
Tajikistan................................................... 1656
Turkey....................................................... 1670
Turkmenistan................................................. 1707
Ukraine...................................................... 1718
United Kingdom............................................... 1742
Uzbekistan................................................... 1760
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of.............................. 1780
Near East and North Africa:
Algeria...................................................... 1823
Bahrain...................................................... 1836
Egypt........................................................ 1848
Iran......................................................... 1869
Iraq......................................................... 1890
Israel and the occupied territories.......................... 1908
Jordan....................................................... 1950
Kuwait....................................................... 1968
Lebanon...................................................... 1983
Libya........................................................ 1998
Morocco...................................................... 2007
The Western Sahara........................................... 2050
Oman......................................................... 2055
Qatar........................................................ 2064
Saudi Arabia................................................. 2071
Syria........................................................ 2087
Tunisia...................................................... 2100
United Arab Emirates......................................... 2120
Yemen........................................................ 2131
South Asia:
Afghanistan.................................................. 2157
Bangladesh................................................... 2175
Bhutan....................................................... 2201
India........................................................ 2212
Maldives..................................................... 2263
Nepal........................................................ 2271
Pakistan..................................................... 2286
Sri Lanka.................................................... 2325
Western Hemisphere
Antigua and Barbuda.......................................... 2351
Argentina.................................................... 2356
Bahamas...................................................... 2371
Barbados..................................................... 2377
Belize....................................................... 2383
Bolivia...................................................... 2390
Brazil....................................................... 2403
Canada....................................................... 2431
Chile........................................................ 2440
Colombia..................................................... 2453
Costa Rica................................................... 2498
Cuba......................................................... 2506
Dominica..................................................... 2526
Dominican Republic........................................... 2530
Ecuador...................................................... 2551
El Salvador.................................................. 2563
Grenada...................................................... 2577
Guatemala.................................................... 2581
Guyana....................................................... 2615
Haiti........................................................ 2625
Honduras..................................................... 2642
Jamaica...................................................... 2662
Mexico....................................................... 2671
Nicaragua.................................................... 2701
Panama....................................................... 2719
Paraguay..................................................... 2734
Peru......................................................... 2745
St. Kitts and Nevis.......................................... 2776
Saint Lucia.................................................. 2779
St. Vincent and the Grenadines............................... 2784
Suriname..................................................... 2789
Trinidad and Tobago.......................................... 2796
Uruguay...................................................... 2802
Venezuela.................................................... 2809
Appendixes:
A. Notes on preparation of the reports....................... 2829
B. Reporting on worker rights................................ 2831
C. Selected international human rights conventions........... 2833
D. Explanation of chart in Appendix C........................ 2836
E. FY 2000 U.S. economic and military assistance--actual
obligations................................................ 2837
F. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting
record..................................................... 2849
G. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting
table...................................................... 2851
H. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights...... 2854
FOREWORD
----------
The country reports on human rights practices contained
herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance
with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative
requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended.
The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations
that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not.
They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the
consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance
legislation.
Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Henry J. Hyde
Chairman, Committee on International Relations.
(vii)
?
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
Department of State,
Washington, DC, February 25, 2001.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I
am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2000, prepared in compliance with sections
116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended.
We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we
can provide any further information.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure.
(ix)
PREFACE
----------
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS
I am pleased to transmit to the United States Congress this
25th edition of the Department of State's Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices.
For the past quarter of a century, these reports have grown
in breadth and stature every year. As such they reflect our
country's deep and abiding commitment to universal human rights
and the unprecedented growth in democracy, freedom, and human
rights throughout the world.
The year 2000 saw many improvements in human rights--from
the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana to the
defeat of an entrenched dictator in Serbia and the election of
a new president in Mexico. At the same time, the continued
deterioration of conditions in China and Cuba and the abusive
policies pursued by the regimes in Iraq and Sudan and a number
of other countries offer proof that the battle to promote
universal human rights is far from finished. We who believe in
human freedom and the rule of law must not lose sight of the
challenges that lie before us.
This year's report covers 195 countries. No country, our
own included, can claim a perfect human rights record; nor
should any seek exemption from international scrutiny. Each
nation must be accountable for the way it treats its citizens.
The purpose of these reports, therefore, is to provide to the
best of our ability a comprehensive and accurate report on the
human rights conditions in every country.
The interest in these annual Country Reports can be seen in
the hundreds of thousands of hits our web site at www.state.gov
will receive from every part of the world over the next few
days, and in the countless discussions, both public and
private, that will follow. The Report for the year 2000 thus
takes its place within the context of a new and revolutionary
era of global human discourse. It is my deepest hope,
therefore, that these reports can stimulate new dialogue and
provide new encouragement for all countries to strengthen their
commitments to universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.
I would like to thank all those who had a hand in preparing
this year's Country Reports--whether overseas or in the
Department of State. Without their dedication and hard work, a
report of this quality and scope would simply be impossible.
Colin L. Powell,
Secretary of State.
OVERVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
----------
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS
Why The Reports Are Prepared
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department
of State in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and section
504 of the Trade Assistance Act of 1974, as amended. The law
provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, by February 25 ``a full and
complete report regarding the status of internationally
recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A)
in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B)
in all other foreign countries which are members of the United
Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human
rights report under this Act.'' We have also included reports
on several countries that do not fall into the categories
established by these statutes and that thus are not covered by
the congressional requirement.
The responsibility of the United States to speak out on
behalf of international human rights standards was formalized
in the early 1970's. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation
creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of
State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In
1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for
Women's Rights. Congress has also written into law formal
requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into
account countries' human rights and worker rights performance
and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an
annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only
countries receiving U.S. aid, numbering 82; this year 195
reports are submitted.
How The Reports are Prepared
In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen
further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections
in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to
corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts
were made to link mission programming to the advancement of
human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, reflecting both a
broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking
issues of human rights, worker rights, and democracy. The 2000
human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by
hundreds of State Department, Foreign Service, and other U.S.
Government employees.
Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the
reports, gathered information throughout the year from a
variety of sources across the political spectrum, including
government officials, jurists, military sources, journalists,
human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This
information-gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign
Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying
and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of
human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of
individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human
rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their
governments.
After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were
sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in cooperation with other
State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate,
analyze, and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on
their own sources of information. These included reports
provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign
government officials, representatives from the United Nations
and other international and regional organizations and
institutions, and experts from academia and the media. Officers
also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee
issues, military and police matters, women's issues, and legal
matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant
information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly
as possible.
The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for
shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance,
training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve
as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private
groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized
human rights.
The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover
internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and
worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. There rights include freedom from torture or
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or
clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of
the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.
Universal human rights aim to incorporate respect for human
dignity into the processes of government and law. All persons
have the inalienable right to change their government by
peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of
expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion,
without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national
origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a
necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the
reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights,
including the right of association; the right to organize and
bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory
labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age
for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.
Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
the editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of:
Editor in Chief--William E. Dilday; Editor in Chief Ex
Officio--Marc J. Susser; Senior Advisor--Leslie A. Gerson;
Managing Editor--Jeannette P. Dubrow; Technical Editor--Larry
Arthur; Senior Editors--Frank B. Crump, Susan F. Kovalik,
Gregory P. Moody, Diana D. Perry-Elby, Rachel D. Settlage;
Editors--Sara M. Allinder, Stefanie R. Altman, Liana Brooks,
Cynthia R. Bunton, Michelle Eyrich Day, Claire Ehmann, Imogen
Fua, Stanley Ifshin, David T. Jones, Lisa N. Kaplan, Amy E.
McKee, Martine K. Miller, Donald E. Parker, Jennifer M.
Pekkinen, Yvette Saint-Andre, John J. Sheerin, Jolynn M.
Shoemaker, James C. Todd, William J. Tomlyanovich, Stephen W.
Worrel; Assistant Editors--Eric M. Barboriak, Melanne A. Civic,
George T. Constantine, Douglas B. Dearborn, Thomas F. Farr,
Carol G. Finerty, Stephen M. Epstein, Nancy Hewett, Peter
Higgins, Alden H. Irons, Herman Keizer, Susan E. Keogh, Richard
Marshall, Janet L. Mayland, Edmund McWilliams, Susan
O'Sullivan, Maria B. Pica, Tamara J. Resler, Daniel J. Schuman,
Christopher Sibilla, Wendy B. Silverman, Danika Walters, James
D. Wulff; Editorial Assistants--Phillip L. Antweiler, Timothy
Brittingham, Paige E. Chabora, Andrew Chen, Lewis K. Elbinger,
Charles W. Evans, Dr. Sudha Haley, Rashid U. Haq, Kristy L.
Hofkens, Adrienne Lauson, David G. Leyden, Coleman Mehta,
Philip A. Mirrer-Singer, Mark N. Templeton, Steven A.
Wagenseil, Melissa A. Waters, Gerri L. Williams, Anne Zollner;
Technical Support--Mitchell R. Brown.
INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR THE
YEAR 2000
----------
I. The 25th Edition of the Country Reports
For the past quarter of a century, the Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices have chronicled the ebb and flow of
human rights, bearing witness to the conditions that affect
people's lives in every nation of the world. Yet despite all
the suffering--or perhaps because of it--the cause of human
rights is stronger now than ever.
The expansion of democracy and human freedom that the world
has experienced over the past 25 years has many causes. This
expansion rests on the fundamental belief that there are rights
and freedoms to which every human is entitled no matter where
he or she resides. This idea is so powerful and so universal
that it gains strength with every passing year.
The primary focus of the Country Reports always has been
events in the countries that the reports cover. If newspapers
are the first drafts of history, the reports are surely the
second drafts, carefully researched cross-sections of the good
and bad that transpire around the world every year. But the
reports are not just history. They are documents backed by the
full weight of the U.S. people and Government. They speak for
those who have no voice, bearing witness for those who have not
had access to free trials, nor have enjoyed other fundamental
human rights and protections. As the reports have done since
their first appearance in March 1977, they represent the
nation's commitment to respect for universal human rights and
its interest in promoting these rights in every country of the
world. The reports are a tangible manifestation of the
Department of State's intense focus on human rights issues.
II. The Year in Review
The year saw a number of advances in human rights,
democracy, and fundamental freedoms. The Yugoslav people voted
Slobodan Milosevic out of office in September, ending more than
a decade of authoritarian rule and offering hope for a new,
more tolerant and democratic era in Yugoslavia. Nigeria
continued to make progress in its transition to democracy,
while a peaceful transfer of authority took place in Ghana
following generally free and fair elections. Ethiopia and
Eritrea signed a peace accord in December, ending a conflict
that created at least a million internally displaced civilians
in both countries. The election of Vicente Fox marked the first
time in modern Mexican history that a member of an opposition
party was elected President. Peru's decision to renew its
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights appeared to represent a renewed
commitment to the rule of law. And South Korean President Kim
Dae Jung's engagement policy led to some easing of tensions
with North Korea.
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan reiterated the United
Nation's support for the promotion of human rights and
instructed its agencies to place emphasis on both reporting and
programming initiatives that strengthened respect for human
rights. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia continued to try alleged war criminals, including a
war crimes trial based on charges of rape and other sexual
violence. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda also
continued to try persons for genocide-related crimes. At the
regional level, a number of institutions continued to work to
strengthen democratic norms and practices. The Organization of
African Unity denied a seat at its summit to Cote d'Ivoire due
to its 1999 coup. The Organization of American States (OAS)
sent a mission to Peru in the wake of elections that
international and domestic observers deemed to be seriously
flawed. The Government subsequently announced new elections
that are scheduled to take place in April 2001. The OAS mission
also sponsored a dialog among government, opposition
politicians, and civil society representatives aimed at
reforming the country's beleaguered democratic institutions.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe engaged
in active and public human rights reporting in Kosovo and
monitored elections in a number of countries. A number of
member states of the Council of Europe began to publish reports
of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
At the international level, the global spread of democracy
was affirmed in both governmental and nongovernmental arenas.
The Governments of over 100 countries that have chosen a
democratic path and that represent every region of the world,
level of development, and various historical experiences,
convened a June ministerial meeting in Warsaw, Poland, under
the rubric of a Community of Democracies. Participants endorsed
the Warsaw Declaration, which committed their Governments to
uphold democratic principles and practices. The Community of
Democracies meeting sought to enhance cooperation among
participating Governments through several avenues, including an
informal caucus at the U.N. General Assembly to share
information and support democracy-related issues and
resolutions within the U.N. system.
At the same time these positive trends took place, China's
poor human rights record worsened during the year, as the
authorities intensified their harsh measures against
underground Christian groups and Tibetan Buddhists, destroyed
many houses of worship, and stepped up their campaign against
the Falun Gong movement. China also sharply suppressed
organized dissent. In Burma the military continued its severe
repression, holding Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for
much of the year, detaining her supporters, imprisoning many
religious believers, and coercing numerous persons, including
children, into forced labor. North Korea's situation remained
among the worst in the world: The Government stifled all
dissent and widely curtailed freedom of religion, political
prisoners were held in forced labor camps, and malnutrition
remained widespread. In Afghanistan the Taliban continued to be
a major violator of human rights, severely restricting women's
and girls' access to education, medical facilities, and
employment. Iraq remained under the complete domination of one
of the world's most repressive regimes, as security forces
routinely executed, tortured, beat, raped, or otherwise
intimidated and abused any perceived political opponents.
Cuba's overall human rights record remained poor, as the
Government retained tight surveillance over anyone considered a
potential opponent. The human rights situation in Belarus
worsened in a number of areas, as the Lukashenko regime took
severe measures to neutralize political opponents and repressed
all calls for democracy. Turkmenistan remained one of the most
totalitarian countries in the world, as the Committee on
National Security maintained tight control over the country,
and a personality cult centered around President Saparmurat
Niyazov continued. In Israel and the occupied territories,
following the outbreak of violence in September, Israeli
security forces sometimes used excessive force in contravention
of their own rules of engagement, killing approximately 300
Palestinians and injuring thousands in response to violent
demonstrations and other clashes in Israel, the West Bank, and
Gaza. Palestinian security forces and members of Fatah's Tanzim
killed numerous Israeli soldiers and civilians in the cycle of
violence.
Continuing internal conflict marred the human rights
situation in a number of countries. In Colombia both
paramilitary and guerrilla groups continued to commit acts of
violence and other serious abuses in many parts of the country,
with numerous massacres of civilians and the murder, kidnaping,
and intimidation of human rights defenders, trade unionists,
journalists, and other targeted groups. War, exacerbated by
external intervention, continued to wrack the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, enabling perpetrators of human rights
violations to enjoy virtual impunity in large portions of the
country. The Government of Sudan continued its bombing of
civilian population centers, support for slave taking, and
forced religious conversions, while preventing international
humanitarian assistance from reaching large portions of the
country. Numerous credible reports of human rights abuses by
Russian forces in Chechnya, which included extrajudicial
killings, torture, and rape, provoked widespread condemnation
and calls for accountability; the Chechens committed numerous
abuses as well, such as the execution of prisoners. In
Indonesia security forces were responsible for numerous
instances of indiscriminate shootings of civilians, torture,
beatings, and other abuses in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and elsewhere,
and the Government was ineffective in deterring social,
interethnic, and interreligious violence in the Moluccas and
Sulawesi.
III. Developments in Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor
Global Democratic Trends: The year witnessed new strides
towards the globalization of democracy. Many, if not most,
governments, civil society leaders, and multilateral
institutions now pursue and promote open economies and freer
societies. A majority of people in the world now live in
democratic countries or countries that have begun to implement
some democratic and political reforms. The overall trend
remains one of positive, incremental change, despite some
reversals.
Elections bolstered democratic transitions in Croatia,
Ghana, Mexico, Suriname, and Yugoslavia during the year. An
active civil society and increasingly independent media helped
to ensure the success and transparency of these elections.
Setbacks included continuing conflict in the Middle East and
Africa, a coup in Fiji, and a breakdown of the Government and
law and order in the Solomon Islands. In China, despite
widespread Government abuses, important aspects of civil
society continued to develop. Seriously flawed elections took
place in other countries, most notably in Azerbaijan,
Kyrgyzstan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Haiti.
On the nongovernmental side, increased global networking
among organizations and private citizens mirrored the growth of
active civil societies at the national level. The World Forum
on Democracy, held jointly with the Warsaw Community of
Democracies Ministerial in June, brought together an
unprecedented international gathering of scholars, civic,
religious, labor, and business leaders to assess the challenges
to democracy. The Forum provided to the ministerial assembly
recommendations that included convening the informal caucus of
democracies that was launched at the United Nations in the
fall. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
from over 80 countries also met in Sao Paulo during November to
consider how to meet the challenges to democracy. They
developed a list of practical steps NGO's could take in their
own countries to support the democratic process.
Integrity of the Person: In Algeria reports of abuses such
as torture and arbitrary detention continued to decrease during
the year; however, extrajudicial killings by security forces
and terrorist groups claimed the lives of many hundreds of
persons. The torture of political opponents is widespread in
Uzbekistan. Cameroon's security forces reportedly killed many
dozens of persons over a 6-month period in the city of Douala,
and the abuse of detainees throughout the country remained
endemic. The brutality associated with the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone abated somewhat; however, there
continued to be reports of serious abuses, such as
extrajudicial killings, rapes, and beatings in the 60 percent
of the country that the Government does not control. The RUF
also committed human rights abuses in Guinea. The Libyan
government resorted to intimidation to control the political
opposition, as security forces arbitrarily arrested and
detained individuals who frequently were held incommunicado or
tortured.
Press Freedom: Freedom of the press remains nonexistent in
such countries as Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and Turkmenistan. There
were severe restrictions on the press in Sudan, Uzbekistan, and
China, except in Hong Kong. The disappearance of Ukrainian
Georhiy Gongadze, whose alleged remains were found late in the
year, raised serious concern about press freedom in Ukraine. In
Russia Kremlin efforts to gain control over a major independent
television network posed a threat to hard-won press freedom as
well. In Iran dozens of newspaper offices were closed, and a
number of Iran's most prominent journalists and editors were
arrested or harassed as hard-line elements within the
Government sought to silence their critics. However, there was
some easing of press restrictions in Syria, and the press in a
number of countries in North Africa continued to demonstrate
more freedom.
Religious Freedom: The year saw the continuation of
religious repression and discrimination in every region of the
world. Based on the Department's Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom 2000 (issued in September and covering the
period July 1999 through June 2000), all five countries
designated as ``countries of particular concern'' by the
Secretary of State in 1999--Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and
Sudan--were redesignated. This designation reflects the
particularly severe violations of religious freedom by the
Governments of those countries. In each the situation remained
serious; in some--notably China--religious repression
increased.
In Uzbekistan, despite the release of some religious
prisoners, the Government continued to incarcerate and abuse
others because of their religious beliefs and practices. In
particular some Muslims were vulnerable to mistreatment because
of their alleged association with terrorists. The Government of
Turkmenistan failed to allow non-Sunni Muslims and non-Russian
Orthodox Christian believers to register, despite earlier
promises to do so, and continued its crackdown on Protestant
worshipers and its suppression of practitioners of other faiths
for not being registered. In Russia there were concerns about
the uniform implementation by local officials of federal
regulations requiring the reregistration of religious groups
and organizations. In Georgia there was increased
discrimination against some religious minorities, including
Jehovah's Witnesses. In Laos some religious prisoners were
released, but the practice by certain local officials of
forcing Christians to sign renunciations of their faith
continued, as did the harsh treatment of Christians in prison.
In Saudi Arabia non-Muslim public worship is prohibited,
and the Government detained and subsequently deported several
persons whom it considered to have violated the prohibition.
The Government supports the Sunni Muslim majority, and
discrimination against members of the Shi'a minority persists.
Pakistan's blasphemy law continued to be abused and directed
against the country's religious minorities, in particular the
Ahmadiya and Christian communities. In Europe some states have
adopted or are considering discriminatory legislation or
policies that tend to stigmatize expressions of religious faith
by certain groups by wrongfully associating them with dangerous
``sects'' or ``cults.''
On a more positive note, religious life in a number of
countries of the New Independent States continued to progress
during the year, as some governments tried with varying degrees
of success to bring local and regional officials into line with
national policy. In Azerbaijan the treatment of religious
groups continued to improve, as it has since President Aliyev's
public commitment to religious liberty in 1999.
Women: The year saw women's human rights attract more
international attention than in the past, but actual gains
worldwide were limited. In Egypt women were granted the right
to divorce on grounds of incompatibility. In Rwanda a law was
passed that improves women's rights in inheritance, family
matters, and credit. Despite some progress made in these and
other areas, serious problems remain. In many parts of Africa,
female genital mutilation continued to damage the physical and
psychological health of women and girls. Societal
discrimination prevented women in many countries from taking
advantage of economic opportunities. In Afghanistan the
Taliban's restrictions on education and work continued to
confine women to the home. Traditional patriarchal societies
continued to devalue women and girls. In China coercive family
planning practices continued to harm women and female children,
despite some government experimentation with noncoercive
practices. In a number of countries in the Middle East and
South Asia, so-called honor killings and dowry deaths continued
to be major problems.
Violence against women remained a pervasive problem,
cutting across social and economic lines. Domestic and sexual
violence against women is found on every continent. While
governments publicly condemned violence against women, too few
took concrete steps to address it.
Children: Children are among the most vulnerable of any
group in society and face particular threats to their human
rights. Around the world, children face dangerous and unhealthy
conditions, working in factories, fields, and sweatshops, as
domestic servants, or, in some cases, as prostitutes. The
trafficking of children for forced labor, prostitution, and
pornography is a growing and lucrative business for criminals.
In many cities large numbers of street children lack shelter,
food, education, and support and are vulnerable to many forms
of abuse, despite the best efforts of governments and NGO's. In
countries such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and
Uganda, armed rebels force children to serve as soldiers or
recruit them with promises or threats. In many countries,
children are denied access to education--in some cases because
they cannot afford the fees for books and uniforms, in others
because they must work to support their families--thereby
severely reducing their chances for a better life. Many
governments deny girls the opportunity to attend school or
complete their schooling.
Some improvements in the lives of children took place
during the year, as some governments took steps to aid children
and strengthen protection of their rights. For example, in
Venezuela some 500,000 children attended school for the first
time when the Government prohibited registration fees. The
Government of Tunisia sponsors an immunization program that
targets preschool age children and reports that over 95 percent
of children are vaccinated. At the end of the year, the
Moroccan UNICEF chapter and the National Observatory of
Children's Rights began a human rights awareness campaign
regarding the plight of child maids that received widespread
media exposure. The Minister of Justice in Benin established a
National Commission for Children's Rights, which held its
initial session in July; the Benin Government also has made
serious efforts to combat child abuse and trafficking in
children. In March several government agencies in the
Philippines signed a memorandum of agreement on the handling
and treatment of children involved in armed conflict, which
treats child insurgents as victims to be rescued and
rehabilitated, rather than as enemies to be neutralized and
prosecuted. The United Nations opened two important documents
for signature during the year: the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child Concerning Children in
Armed Conflict and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child Concerning the Sale of the Child. NGO's
also are extremely active in the field of children's rights
throughout the world, advocating legal reform and providing
services.
Worker Rights: During the year, there were countervailing
negative and positive trends affecting worker rights. Among the
positive developments, over 50 countries ratified the
International Labor Organization's (ILO) Convention on the
Worst Forms of Child Labor (Convention 182), the most rapid
international approval for any convention in the organization's
81-year history. The U.S. Trade and Development Act of 2000
encouraged international community ratification of the
convention by linking ratification to continued eligibility for
Generalized System of Preferences status. The act also
incorporated worker rights criteria into trade preference
eligibility for African and Caribbean Basin programs.
For the first time, the ILO adopted a resolution that
called for measures to secure compliance with fundamental
worker rights. In November the ILO's Governing Body judged that
the Government of Burma had not taken effective action to deal
with the ``widespread and systematic'' use of forced labor. It
called on all ILO member states to take appropriate measures to
ensure that Burma does not perpetuate or extend its system of
forced or compulsory labor.
Among negative trends during the year was the impunity with
which a dramatically increasing number of trade unionists were
killed, tortured, and intimidated in Colombia. Elsewhere a
growing trend toward the negotiation of individual contracts
between companies and workers and the resort to the formation
of ``cooperatives'' in place of trade unions deprived workers
of the protection afforded by union representation and of
protection under national labor legislation.
Trafficking in Persons: Trafficking in persons poses a
serious challenge to human rights. This rapidly growing global
problem affects countries and families on every continent.
Traffickers prey upon women, children, and men from all walks
of life, and of every age, religion, and culture. Traffickers
particularly exploit women and children who suffer from poverty
and are marginalized within their own societies--the most
vulnerable segments of the population. Trafficking has grown
significantly in recent years and serves as one of the leading
sources of revenue for international criminal organizations--in
part because it is low-risk and high-profit. In some countries,
local police and immigration and customs officials are involved
or complicit in trafficking. Traffickers deprive their victims
of their basic human dignity, subject them to inhuman and
degrading treatment, and treat them as chattel that can be
bought and sold into forced and bonded labor across
international and within national borders. Victims often find
themselves in a strange country, unable to speak the language,
and without identification or documentation. Many are subject
to violent and brutal treatment by their captors. Some come
from countries in which the police and other authorities are a
source of repression rather than a source of help, and they are
reluctant to seek assistance. Many are threatened with
retribution against themselves or their families should they
try to escape. Many victims face additional risks from
dangerous working conditions, including the threat of harm from
exposure to dangerous pesticides or sexually transmitted
diseases.
The underground nature of trafficking makes it difficult to
quantify. Reliable estimates range from 700,000 to 2 million
persons trafficked globally each year. Victims are trafficked
into sweatshop labor, prostitution, domestic servitude, unsafe
agricultural labor, construction work, restaurant work, and
various forms of modern-day slavery. Governments around the
world have taken steps to combat these heinous practices,
enacting legislation to criminalize trafficking and strengthen
penalties against it, and taking steps to aid victims. In
December 81 countries signed the Trafficking in Persons
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the U.N.
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. More
countries are expected to sign the Trafficking Protocol in the
coming months. NGO's are especially active in the
antitrafficking field; their efforts globally include awareness
campaigns, the provision of medical and psychological support
and shelter for victims, as well as job training.
Corporate Responsibility: In recent years, partnerships
among governments, businesses, and civil society to promote
human rights, support civil society, and address corporate
responsibility needs have expanded. Two of the best-known
examples are the Sullivan Principles and the U.N. Global
Compact, which encourage corporations, on a voluntary basis, to
recognize international human rights, labor, and environmental
standards. During the year, a group of major oil, mining, and
energy companies; human rights and corporate responsibility
organizations; and an international trade union federation
worked with the U.S. and British Governments to forge a set of
voluntary principles on security and human rights. The
principles provide a mechanism for a continuing dialog on
important security and human rights issues.
IV. History of the Human Rights Reports
The first edition of the Country Reports was a product of
its times. While the United States had been at the forefront of
the international human rights movement since the end of World
War II and the creation of the United Nations, the Cold War and
the gradual ending of colonialism dominated the first decades
of that movement. However, the early 1970s gave rise in the
Congress and throughout the country to new concepts and
measures of accountability. An important force behind this
changing environment was an ever-growing community of NGO's
whose global outlook, commitment to human rights, and access to
the media helped shape public opinion and government
decisionmaking.
In 1973 Representative Donald Fraser held hearings on human
rights in the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
International Organizations. That same year, a sense of
Congress resolution was passed urging the Nixon Administration
to link U.S. foreign assistance programs to respect for human
rights within those recipient countries. The Congress amended
the Foreign Assistance Act 3 years later to require the
Secretary of State to transmit to Congress ``a full and
complete report'' every year concerning ``respect for
internationally recognized human rights in each country
proposed as a recipient of security assistance.''
Thus in March 1977, the first volume of Country Reports was
submitted to Congress. The report covered 82 countries. Because
it focused on nations with whom the United States had formal
security assistance programs, most of them were longstanding
allies and friends. The initial report was brief--only 143
pages--and at the end of each entry was a rating, taken from
Freedom House, judging whether the country was free, partly
free, or not free.
Like any innovation, the new report had its critics. To
some the very existence of such a document harmed relations
with the very nations with which the United States had
established the best ties. To others the report fell short of
full disclosure. Such criticism has helped improve the reports
ever since. They now cover virtually every country of the world
and include a level of detail that would have stunned earlier
readers.
For the 1978 report, 33 additional countries that received
U.S. economic assistance were added to the original 82. The
next year, the Foreign Assistance Act was amended again to
require an entry on each member of the United Nations. The 1979
report thus expanded to 854 pages and covered 154 countries,
including for the first time discussions of Cuba, the Soviet
Union, and the People's Republic of China.
By then the basic format of the report had been
established, although it would undergo many modifications over
time. The first section was Respect for the Integrity of the
Person, and it included, as it still does, subsections on
torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial;
and invasion of the home. The second section was entitled
Government Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of such Vital
Needs as Food, Shelter, and Health Care. Third was Respect for
Civil and Political Liberties. This section included separate
subsections on freedom of speech, press, religion, and
assembly; freedom of movement within the country for travel and
immigration; and freedom to participate in the political
process. Fourth was Government Attitude and Record Regarding
International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged
Violations of Human Rights.
In 1980 a subsection was added on disappearances. The
following year's report saw a recasting of the section on
fulfillment of vital needs as Economic and Social
Circumstances. The 1982 report added subsections on political
and extrajudicial killing and disappearances and expanded the
discussions on freedom of speech and the press, peaceful
assembly, religion, movement, and the political process. The
following year, the right of citizens to change their
government was added. In 1986 a new section entitled
Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or
Social Status was introduced, along with another section on the
Status of Labor.
In 1989 a subsection was added on the use of excessive
force and violations of human rights in internal conflicts. The
labor section was revised to include specific discussions of
the right of association, the right to organize and bargain
collectively, minimum age for employment of children, and
acceptable conditions of labor. The 1993 report saw an
expansion of the discrimination section to include specific
discussions of the rights of women, children, the indigenous,
people with disabilities, and national, racial, and ethnic
minorities. In 1993 the reports appeared on the Department of
State's web site for the first time, an event that dramatically
increased the number of individuals who had immediate access to
them. Additional coverage on refugees and asylum was added 3
years later. In 1997 the subsection on forced and bonded child
labor was upgraded substantially. In 1998 the report was
published for the first time in two volumes.
Later in 1998, Congress passed the International Religious
Freedom Act, which mandated annual reports on the state of
international religious freedom in every country. The first of
these reports appeared in September 1999, the same year that
Congress requested that a new section be added to the reports
on trafficking in persons. The reports that year also included
a new focus on access to political prisoners and genocide.
Michael E. Parmly,
Acting Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
EUROPE
----------
ALBANIA
Albania is a republic with a multiparty parliament, a Prime
Minister, Ilir Meta, and a President, Rexhep Meidani, elected by the
Parliament. The Prime Minister heads the Government; the presidency is
a largely ceremonial position with limited executive power. The
Socialist Party (SP) and its allies won 121 of 155 parliamentary seats
in 1997 general elections held after a 5-month period of chaos and
anarchy due to the collapse of pyramid schemes. Observers deemed the
elections to be acceptable and satisfactory under the circumstances.
Local elections were held in October and, despite some procedural
shortcomings and some irregularities, were conducted in a tense but
generally peaceful atmosphere and were judged by the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to have showed ``significant
progress'' toward meeting international standards. The Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary; however, continued political
instability, limited resources, political pressure, inexperienced and
untrained personnel, and widespread corruption weaken the judiciary's
ability to function independently and efficiently.
Local police units that report to the Minister of Public Order are
responsible principally for internal security. One of the most serious
problems involving public order and internal security is the fact that
the police officers largely are untrained and often unreliable. The
international community continued to provide training, advice, and
equipment to improve the quality of the police forces; however,
unprofessional behavior and corruption remained a major impediment to
the development of an effective, civilian police force. The Ministry
also has a small force of well-trained and effective police officers
organized into special forces units to combat organized crime. The
Government further consolidated public order throughout the country
during the year, building on the progress that had been made in the
previous year; however, serious problems remain in the area of
policing. The police are affected by, and are sometimes part of, the
country's widespread corruption. The National Intelligence Service
(SHIK) is responsible for both internal and external intelligence
gathering and counterintelligence. The military has a special 120-man
``commando'' unit, which operates in an antiterrorist role under the
Minister of Defense. During times of domestic crisis, the law allows
the Minister of Public Order to request authority over this unit; this
was done as a precautionary measure during the October local elections.
The police committed human rights abuses.
Albania is a poor country in transition from central economic
planning to a free market system, and many questions related to
privatization, property ownership claims, and the appropriate
regulation of business remain unresolved. More than 20 percent of the
rural population lives under the official poverty line; in urban areas
the figure is 11 percent. Overall, 17 percent of the country's
population lives below the official poverty line. The country continued
to experience slow but stable economic progress. Inflation was
negligible during the year. The gross domestic product (GDP) grew by
about 7 percent to an estimated $3.8 billion (532 billion lek). The
official unemployment rate was 17.5 percent, a slight decrease from the
18 percent of the previous year. With two-thirds of all workers
employed in agriculture--mostly at the subsistence level--remittances
from citizens working abroad are extremely important, as is foreign
assistance. The GDP may be underestimated because considerable income
is thought to be derived from various organized and semiorganized
criminal activities. A variety of other unreported, noncriminal gray
and black market activities, such as unlicensed small businesses, along
with the Government's inability to collect fully accurate statistics,
also contribute to the GDP's underestimation.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in some areas; however, numerous, serious problems remained. The
opposition Democratic Party (DP) alleged that the Government was
responsible for the killing of one of its members during the year.
Police killed a DP demonstrator when a crowd of DP members attacked the
police station and other public buildings in Tropoja. The police beat
and otherwise abused suspects and prisoners. The DP often credibly
complained about incidents of police harassment of its members and of
the dismissal of some of its members from official positions for
political reasons. The police at times arbitrarily arrested and
detained persons, and prolonged pretrial detention is a problem. The
judiciary is inefficient, and subject to corruption. Executive pressure
on the judiciary remains, but decreased slightly. There were complaints
of unqualified and unprofessional judges and credible accounts of
judges who were intimidated or bribed by powerful criminals. The
Government occasionally infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
Government respect for freedom of speech and of the press improved
slightly; however, police at times beat and detained journalists, and
academic freedom was constrained. Violence and discrimination against
women and child abuse were serious problems. The Government took some
steps to improve the treatment of ethnic minorities; however, societal
discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, particularly
against Roma, persisted. Child labor was a problem. Vigilante action,
mostly related to traditional blood feuds, resulted in many killings.
Trafficking in women and children was a serious problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed cases of political killings by the Government, despite
repeated claims by the DP that its members were harassed, beaten, and
sometimes killed by government agents.
In May a DP activist in Vlore was killed by unidentified persons
immediately following a party rally. The DP claimed that government
agents were responsible; however, the Government claimed it was a
revenge killing by criminals. The Albanian Helsinki Committee expressed
concern over the killing and appealed to government authorities to make
all efforts to solve the case. There were no reports concerning a
governmental response in this case.
In November police killed a DP demonstrator when a crowd of DP
members attacked the police station, courthouse, and other public
buildings in Tropoja.
The public prosecutor in Gjokastra investigated the cases of
Kastriot Brega and Bardhyul Balliu, who died while in police custody
and found insufficient evidence to justify prosecuting the officers
involved. In 1999 the DP claimed that over 21 members, supporters,
local government officials, and former national party officials were
killed during 1997-99. The DP claimed that at least three of its
members were killed during 1998: The chairman of the local branch of
the Democratic Party of Kish-Arra village of Shkoder, the deputy
chairman of the polling station in the Gjinar commune of the Elbasan
district, and the chairman of the DP branch of Boric village in Malesia
e Madhe. The DP accused the Government of failing to investigate these
crimes, noting that no suspects were tried for the murders. The
Democrats asked for the creation of an independent investigatory group
that would oversee the investigation of these crimes (which the DP
considers to be political). The Government did not create such a group
but an investigation was continuing at year's end.
The Council of Europe continued to express concern over the
Government's lack of progress in investigating the 1998 assassination
of senior DP Member Azem Hajdari. A police investigation was launched
in December 1999 and some progress was reported, but the case had not
been resolved as of year's end.
The country continued to experience high levels of violent crime.
Many killings occurred throughout the country as the result of
individual or clan vigilante actions sometimes connected to traditional
``blood feuds,'' or in conflicts involving various criminal gangs.
b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution stipulates that ``no one can be subject
to torture, or cruel and brutal treatment;'' however, the police often
beat suspects in the process of arresting them, and the Albanian
Helsinki Committee reported that the police beat or otherwise
mistreated prisoners. The Penal Code makes the use of torture a crime
punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment. According to the Albanian
Helsinki Committee, major police stations were the sites of the worst
abuses of detainees, and all stations were overcrowded.
There were a number of reports of police violence. Four DP
activists from the Lezhe region were pulled over and beaten by masked
special police forces on a road north of Tirana in March. In April the
daily Gazeta Shqiptare reported a number of police abuse cases in
Elbasan, Lushnja, and Fieri, where more than 20 persons were taken into
custody and subjected to beatings and maltreatment. In May the daily
Albania reported the serious maltreatment of a number of persons
arrested on charges of theft of public property. While police generally
handled the DP demonstrations following the October elections in a
restrained manner, there were instances where police beat and
mistreated DP supporters (see Section 2.b.).
In November Amnesty International (AI) reported that police
arrested DP supporter Besnik Papa and held him at a police station in
Tirana, where allegedly he was beaten so severely that he required
hospital treatment.
Several credible sources cited the police station at Elbasan as a
source of a number of physical abuse cases. There are at least five
cases of abuse pending against police officers; however, none of these
cases had been prosecuted successfully by year's end.
Police at times beat journalists (see Section 2.a.).
There were no reports of investigation nor action taken against
police who beat multiple persons in the towns of Spotalte and Cerrick
in 1999.
There were no reports of investigation nor action taken in the
December 1998 case in which Besnik Jak, the leader of the Tirana
University student hunger strike, was beaten while in police custody,
nor in the 1999 case of Besim Biberaj, who suffered multiple broken
bones as a result of beatings while in custody at a Tirana police
station.
Police receive some training and equipment, but there is a
continuing need for further training and for improving investigative
skills. Foreign governments continued police training programs that
aimed at improving technical expertise, operational procedures, and
respect for human rights, but the overall performance of law
enforcement remained weak. In preparation for the October local
elections, training was provided to police on how to deal with election
security and how to respond to the needs of election observers.
According to the Ministry of Public Order, more than 1,300 policemen
received some training during the year, and 116 policemen received
training abroad.
Police corruption remains widespread. Sources in the Ministry of
Public Order stated that more than 190 police officers were fired from
their jobs during the year because of incompetence, lack of discipline,
or violations of the law.
Prison conditions remained poor and most prisons are overcrowded;
however, efforts were made to improve the situation during the year.
While the Government financed most improvements, it also has received
international assistance. During the year, construction began on a new
prison in Peqin, financed by the Italian government, which will house
250 to 300 inmates.
Overcrowding in prisons resulted in poor living conditions. In
addition, because of overcrowding, prisoners are also held in prisons
in Greece and Italy. According to Greek Ministry of Justice sources,
more than 3,500 Albanians are in pre-detention centers and more than
1,500 are serving sentences in Greece, 120 of whom are juveniles. Over
1,500 prisoners are serving sentences in Italian prisons. Juveniles
sometimes share cells with adults are a result of the shortage of cell
space. Women are held separately from men.
The country has no juvenile justice system. Children's cases go
before judges who have not received any education in juvenile justice,
and juveniles live in detention facilities with adults. Over 100
children are serving sentences in adult prisons. In September an 8-year
school for juveniles who are serving prison terms was opened. This is
the first school of its kind in the country. Family visitation is
allowed in prisons.
The Government cooperated with the International Committee of the
Red Cross and with other nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). There
were no reports of refusal to permit access for prison inspections by
either domestic or international groups.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Article 27 paragraph 1
of the Constitution forbids arbitrary arrest and detention. However,
police at times arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The 1995
Penal Procedures Code sets out the rights of detained and arrested
persons. By law a police officer or prosecutor may order a suspect into
custody. Detained persons must be informed immediately of the charges
against them and of their rights. A prosecutor must be notified
immediately after a suspect is detained by the police. Within 48 hours
of the arrest or detention a court must decide, in the presence of the
prosecutor, the suspect, and the suspect's lawyer the type of detention
to be imposed. Legal counsel must be provided free of charge if the
defendant cannot afford a private attorney; however, this right to
legal counsel is not known widely and police often fail to inform
suspects of it. As a result of a lack of resources, access to legal
information remains difficult for citizens, including legal
professionals and, sometimes, judges.
There have been numerous cases in which persons have been
unlawfully detained longer than the Penal Code's 48 hour limit. For
example, two persons, Hysen and Valbona Ymeri, were detained in
Lushnja, but their paperwork was not sent to the prosecutor's office
until 6 days later.
International organizations claim that prostitutes and trafficked
women have been kept in detention for more than 2 days without charges
being brought against them (see Section 6.f.).
In September 1999, a DP newspaper alleged that three persons from
the northern city of Kukes were held in police custody for more than 16
months without trial. No further information on this case was available
at year's end.
Bail in the form of money or property may be required if the judge
believes that the accused otherwise may not appear for trial.
Alternatively a suspect may be placed under house arrest. The court may
order pretrial confinement in cases where there is reason to believe
that the accused may leave the country or is a danger to society.
The Penal Procedures Code requires completion of pretrial
investigations within 3 months. The prosecutor may extend this period
by 3-month intervals in especially difficult cases. The accused and the
injured party have the right to appeal these extensions to the district
court. In practice lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. Delayed
investigations also are a serious problem, and many persons are
detained for periods that exceed the time limits set by law.
There were no clear cases of detainees being held for strictly
political reasons. However, the DP continued to claim that the Chairman
of the Legality Party (the Monarchists), Ekrem Spahia, and 12
supporters were being tried unfairly for participation in the events of
September 14, 1998, which followed the assassination of the DP
parliamentarian, Azem Hajdari, by unknown persons (see Section 1.a.).
Spahia and the others were released during the year; however, their
trials still were pending at year's end.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, continued political instability,
limited resources, political pressure, and endemic corruption weaken
the judiciary's ability to function independently and efficiently.
Corruption remains a serious and widespread problem, especially with
the growth of organized crime, and judges are subjected to both bribery
attempts and intimidation. In May the High Council of Justice removed
two judges from Tirana for disciplinary violations. International legal
experts commented that the judges' removal was characterized by greater
respect for due process and legal procedures than past similar
instances.
Many court buildings were destroyed in the civil unrest in 1997,
and although all have reopened, important records and legal materials
were lost permanently. Long case backlogs are typical. The removal of
court budgets from the control of the Ministry of Justice to a
separate, independent body, the Judicial Budget Office, and the
establishment of a school for magistrates in 1999 were useful steps
towards strengthening the independence of the judiciary. A board
chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court runs the Judicial
Budget Office. All other board members are judges.
The judicial system is composed of district courts of the first
instance, military courts, six courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court.
There also is a separate and independent Constitutional Court. The
Supreme Court hears appeals from the Courts of Appeal, while the
Constitutional Court reviews those cases requiring constitutional
interpretation.
The President heads the High Council of Justice, which has
authority to appoint, discipline, and dismiss judges of the courts of
first instance and of the courts of appeal. Judges who are dismissed
have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. In addition to the
President, the Council consists of the Minister of Justice, the head of
the Supreme Court, six judges (chosen by sitting judges), two
prosecutors (selected by the prosecutors), and four independent lawyers
named by the Parliament.
The President of the Republic nominates the President and Vice
President of the Supreme Court, and the Parliament elects all of the
Supreme Court's justices. The President selects four of the nine
members of the Constitutional Court; five are elected by the
Parliament. Parliament has the authority to approve and dismiss the
judges of the Constitutional Court and the members of the Supreme
Court. According to the law, dismissal only may be ordered after
conviction for a serious crime or for mental incompetence. There were
no new developments in the 1999 appeal of the former Chief Judge of the
Supreme Court, who was dismissed from his position 3 years before the
expiration of his mandate.
Constitutional Court justices serve, in theory, maximum 9-year
terms, with three justices rotating every 3 years. Justices of the
Supreme Court serve for 7 years.
Under the 1998 Constitution, the President appoints the prosecutor
general with the consent of the Parliament. The President appoints and
dismisses other prosecutors on the recommendation of the prosecutor
general. The prosecutor general restructured his office in December
1999 into divisions that focus on specific crimes.
Parliament approves the courts' budgets and allocates funds. Each
court may decide how to spend the money allocated to it. The Ministry
of Justice provides and approves administrative personnel. The Ministry
of Justice also supervises bailiffs' offices.
Due to limited material resources, in many instances the court
system is unable to process cases in a timely fashion. Public opinion
holds the judiciary, in particular, responsible for the Government's
failure to stop criminal activity. Tension continued between the police
and the judiciary, despite some improvement in relations between police
and prosecutors, especially outside Tirana. Each side cites the
failures of the other as the reason criminals avoid imprisonment. The
courts accuse the police of failing to provide the solid investigation
and evidence necessary to prosecute successfully, and the police allege
that corruption and bribery taint the courts.
The Constitution provides that all citizens enjoy the right to a
fair, speedy, and public trial, except in cases where the necessities
of public order, national security, or the interests of minors or other
private parties mandate restrictions. Defendants, witnesses, and others
who do not speak Albanian are entitled to the services of a translator.
If convicted the accused has the right to appeal the decision within 5
days to the Court of Appeals.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms
provides for the inviolability of the individual person, of dwellings,
and for the privacy of correspondence; however, the Government
sometimes infringed on these rights. During the year, a number of
persons complained to the Albanian Helsinki Committee that police,
during their weapons collection campaign, did not use proper legal
procedures to conduct house searches. Citizens also complained to the
Committee that many of these searches were conducted late at night
without any authorization. At least one individual complained to the
Ombudsman that he was not adequately compensated for some land taken
for public use. The Ombudsman referred the case to the Constitutional
Court.
There were no reports of wiretapping by Government authorities
during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Law on Fundamental Human
Rights and Freedoms provides for freedom of speech and of the press,
and the Government generally respected these rights; however, police at
times beat journalists. The media are active and unrestrained but have
developed little sense of journalistic responsibility or professional
integrity. With few exceptions, the print media lacks a mature, trained
professional staff.
Sensationalism is the norm in the newspapers, and the political
party-oriented newspapers in particular print gossip, unsubstantiated
accusations, and outright fabrications. Some publications appear to be
making efforts to improve professional standards and to provide more
balanced and accurate reporting.
Attacks on journalists continued--both beatings by the police and
attacks by unknown assailants. In March according to the daily
Shekulli, a policeman in Korca beat a journalist from the independent
radio station ABc. The journalist claimed he was beaten because the
policeman considered him to be a spokesman for the opposition. In April
while taping a fight between a group of citizens and members of the
National Guard, a cameraman and journalists were spotted and beaten by
Guard members. In May two journalists from TV ATN 1 were detained
illegally by police officers and beaten while in detention.
Political parties, trade unions, and various societies and groups
publish their own newspapers or magazines, and competition with
commercial publications is very keen. An estimated 200 publications are
available, including daily and weekly newspapers, magazines,
newsletters, and pamphlets. Five newspapers and two magazines are
published in Greek in the south (see Section 5). The difficult economic
situation and readers' distrust of the press again resulted in a
significant drop in newspaper sales during the year. The total daily
circulation of all newspapers dropped from about 65,000 copies to less
than 50,000 copies. This came after a drop in 1999 from 75,000 to
65,000 copies. According to a recent survey of the Albanian Media
Institute, 60 percent of the persons interviewed believed that media
stirred up trouble in the country; only 23 percent said that the media
played a positive role. The opening of many new private radio and
television stations is another reason for the drastic drop in
circulation. According to the same survey, 65 percent of the public
prefers to get its news from the private electronic media.
Albanian Radio and Television (RTVSh) is the sole public
broadcaster in the country. RTVSh is composed of national television
and national radio. National television broadcasts 17 hours a day and
covers over 91 percent of the population. Public television broadcasts
2 hours a day via satellite. National radio broadcasts in two channels
for 18 hours a day. Its signal covers 90 percent of the country's
territory. Broadcasting issues are governed by the National Council of
Radio and Television, a 15-member body elected by the Parliament. Radio
Gjirokastra broadcasts a 45-minute program for the Greek community in
the country every day (see Section 5). The Albanian Media Institute
survey found that 58 percent of those questioned believed that
regardless of the improvement in the programming of the public
television channel, it still is regarded as a mouthpiece for the
Government.
Over 75 private television stations and 30 private radio stations
operate. The National Council of Radio and Television Broadcasters
(NCRT) awarded broadcasting licenses, but several broadcasters failed
to pay for their licenses or abide by the regulations governing the
licenses. In 1999 the Government established new licensing and
oversight procedures to promote a more stable broadcasting environment.
The NCRT made licenses available to existing local television
broadcasters that were operating previously in an unregulated climate.
In December the NCRT licensed 2 national television stations, 45 local
television stations, 31 local radio stations, and 1 national radio
station. The wide availability of satellite dishes provides citizens
with easy access to international programming.
The broadcast media exceed the print media in influence, audience
penetration, and caliber of news reporting and public affairs
programming. However, political affiliation is pervasive in
programming. The OSCE reported that one new nationwide television
station, TVArberia, provided for balanced and fair election reporting
during the local elections in October. However, the majority of
stations were blatantly one-sided in their political coverage.
Academic freedom continues to be limited. University professors
complain that some faculty members are hired or fired for political
reasons and that students who have the right political connections get
preferential treatment regardless of their personal qualifications.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Law on
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the right of
peaceful assembly and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. According to the law, organizers must obtain permits for
gatherings in public places, which the police may refuse to issue for
reasons such as security and traffic. In practice rallies and
demonstrations were very common, the Government made no concerted
efforts to prevent them, and the police generally maintained order with
due respect for citizens' rights; however, during DP demonstrations
before the October elections, the police beat and mistreated some DP
supporters (see Section 1.c.). Police killed a demonstrator in November
when a group of DP members attacked the police station, courthouse, and
other public buildings in Tropoja. In some cases, individuals claimed
that the police or secret agents of the SHIK intimidated them because
of their participation in opposition rallies, while others claimed that
they were fired from their jobs because they participated in opposition
rallies.
The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the
right of association, and the Government generally respected this
right. A political party must apply to the Ministry of Justice for
official certification. It must declare an aim or purpose that is not
anticonstitutional or otherwise contrary to law, describe its
organizational structure, and account for all public and private funds
it receives. Such certification is granted routinely.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
According to the 1998 Constitution, there is no official religion and
all religions are equal. However, the predominant religious communities
(Muslim, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) enjoy de facto recognition by
the authorities that gives them the legal right to hold bank accounts,
own property and buildings, and to function as legal entities based on
their historical presence in the country.
Religious movements--with the exception of the three de facto
recognized religions--can acquire the official status of a legal entity
only by registering under the Law on Associations, which recognizes the
status of a nonprofit association irrespective of whether the
organization has a cultural, recreational, religious, or humanitarian
character.
The Religious Council of the State Secretariat has been replaced by
the State Committee on Cults, which is not composed of representatives
of religious groups. The Government does not require registration or
licensing of religious groups; however, the State Committee on Cults
maintains a working knowledge, but not official records, of foreign
religious organizations. The chairman of the committee has the status
of a deputy minister.
Foreign clergy, including Muslim clerics, Christian and Baha'i
missionaries, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), and many others freely carry out
religious activities. The State recognizes the de facto existence of
the Bektashis but they did not have the right to their own
representative in the former State Secretariat of Religions. There is
no indication of Bektashis' activities being placed under the
supervision of the Sunni community.
According to official figures, there are 29 religious schools in
the country with some 2,745 students. The State Committee has the right
to approve the curricula of religious schools.
The Government has not yet returned all the properties and
religious objects under its control that were confiscated under the
Communist regime in 1967. In cases where religious buildings were
returned, the Government often failed to return the land surrounding
the buildings. The Government also is unable to compensate the churches
adequately for the extensive damage that many religious properties
suffered. The Orthodox Church has complained that it has had difficulty
in recovering some religious icons for restoration and safekeeping.
The Albanian Evangelical Alliance, an association of more than 100
Protestant Churches, has complained that it has encountered
administrative obstacles to building churches, accessing the media, and
receiving exemptions from customs duties. The growing evangelical
community continues to seek official recognition and participation in
the religious affairs section of the Council of Ministers.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and
Freedoms provides for freedom of movement within the country and for
freedom to leave the country and return, and the Government respects
these rights in practice.
A problem that arose as a result of uncontrolled internal migration
is local registration and status. As a result of such internal
migration, thousands of citizens are denied access to certain basic
services such as education and medical care. In many educational
institutions, students must have, among other documents, an official
document from the district authorities that acknowledges that they are
inhabitants of the district. The lack of such documents prevents many
students from attending school. The effects of uncontrolled internal
migration became apparent during the October local elections when tens
of thousands of inhabitants were registered in more than one place,
resulting in many inaccuracies in the voter lists.
Citizens who fled the country during or after the Communist regime
are able to return, and if they lost their citizenship, they are able
to have it restored. Citizens born in the country who emigrate may hold
dual citizenship.
The Constitution gives foreigners the right of refuge in the
country, and a 1998 asylum law includes provisions for the granting of
refugee status, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1961 Protocol. The Government accepts
the entry of refugees, does not expel those with valid claims to
refugee status, and works with the international community to provide
housing and support for them. The Government provides for first asylum,
but no appeals procedure mechanism was in place at year's end.
The country hosted approximately 4,000 registered refugees during
the year. The refugee population overwhelmingly is Kosovar; only 28
refugees identified themselves as coming from outside the borders of
the former Yugoslavia. Humanitarian relief organizations provided
social service support for the refugee community and coordinated
further assistance through a network of NGO's that provide health care
coverage, insurance, and limited training. The Government continued to
play a key role in facilitating and coordinating the work of these
groups. The vast majority of refugees continued to live with host
families. There were approximately 500 registered Kosovar refugees and
a small number of other refugees left in the country at year's end.
Organized criminal gangs have made the smuggling of illegal
immigrants--Albanians, Kurds, Pakistanis, Chinese, Turks, and others
from the Middle East and Asia--a lucrative business. Italy is the most
common destination. The Government has taken a number of measures to
stop the flow, but a lack of resources and corruption among law
enforcement forces, hinders its efforts. Italian military and border
patrol squads operate in various coastal zones in Albania in an effort
to stop the flow of illegal immigrants. In September following an
incident in which two Italian Guardia di Finanza police were killed
while combating traffickers, Parliament enacted a new, stronger law
that, if implemented, should make it easier for police to seize the
speedboats used primarily for illegal smuggling of persons. It enables
the police to confiscate speedboats, on land or water, that are used in
illegal activities and those that are unregistered. Individuals who
have become stranded in Albania while trying to use this illegal
pipeline are eligible for a ``care and maintenance'' program run by the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Albanian Red Cross
and can have their cases evaluated by UNHCR officials. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution states that ``Governance is based on a system of
elections that are free, equal, general, and periodic;'' citizens
elected a government in 1997 in what international observers considered
to be a satisfactory process, given the proceeding months of chaos and
anarchy.
In October despite procedural shortcomings and some irregularities
in a few localities, citizens took part in local elections in a tense
but generally peaceful atmosphere that were judged by the OSCE to have
shown ``significant progress'' toward meeting international standards.
International monitors considered the second round of voting ``less
transparent and inclusive'' due to the failure to address inaccuracies
in the voter lists, invalid ballots, and election complaints. Serious
irregularities, including intimidation of election commission members,
the destruction of one ballot box, and fraud in three other voting
centers were reported in Himara.
The Constitution prohibits the formation of any party or
organization that is totalitarian; incites and supports racial,
religious, or ethnic hatred; uses violence to take power or influence
state policies; or is nontransparent or secretive in character.
No legal impediments hinder the full participation of women and
minorities in government, and the major political parties have women's
organizations and have women serving on their central committees;
however, women continue to be underrepresented in politics and
government. In the Parliament, 10 of 155 members are female (1 of whom
serves as deputy prime minister). In the current Government two
ministers are female. Ethnic Greeks constitute the largest minority.
They are represented in the current Government and participate actively
in various political parties.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally permitted human rights and related
organizations to function freely. The Albanian Helsinki Committee, the
Albanian Human Rights Group, the Society for Democratic Culture, the
Albanian Media Institute, the Albanian Institute for Contemporary
Studies, and the Women's Center were among the most active domestic
NGO's involved in human rights activities. Despite the assistance of
international donors, the work of all of these organizations is
hampered by a shortage of funds and equipment; the Government
cooperated only minimally with these local groups.
A wide variety of international human rights NGO's visited or
operated within the country with the cooperation of the Government and
generally without restriction. These organizations are free to publish
and disseminate their findings, including criticisms of the Government.
In February Parliament elected the country's first national
People's Advocate (Ombudsman). The Ombudsman's office, with the support
of western governments and the OSCE, has already reviewed over 250
cases of alleged human rights abuses. These include citizen complaints
of police and military abuse of power, lack of enforcement of court
judgments in civil cases, wrongful governmental dismissal, and land
disputes (see Sections 1.c. , 1.e. , and 1.f.). The Ombudsman's office
has had some success in cases, but it still is too early to judge
whether it will genuinely be effective.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions prohibits discrimination
based on sex, race, ethnicity, language, or religion; however, women
and some minority groups complain that discrimination continues in
practice.
Women.--Violence against women and spousal abuse are serious
problems. In the country's traditionally male-dominated society,
cultural acceptance and lax police response result in most abuse going
unreported. Rape is punishable by law, as is spousal rape; however, in
practice spousal rape is not reported or prosecuted. The concepts of
spousal rape and sexual harassment are not well established, and,
consequently, such acts often are not considered crimes. No government-
sponsored program protects the rights of women. An NGO maintains a
shelter in Tirana for abused women, but the facility has the capacity
to house only a few victims at a time. The same NGO also operates a
hotline that women and girls can call for advice and counseling. The
line received thousands of calls during the year. In 1999 the Advice
Center for Women and Girls, an NGO, conducted a poll that showed that
as many as 64 percent of females claimed to be victims of domestic
violence.
Many men, especially those from the northeastern part of the
country, still follow the traditional code known as the ``kanun,'' in
which women are considered and treated as chattel. Also under the
kanun, it is acceptable to kidnap young women for brides. This practice
continues in some areas of the northeast.
Women are not excluded, by law or in practice, from any occupation;
however, they are not well represented at the highest levels of their
fields. The Labor Code mandates equal pay for equal work, but no data
are available on how well this principle is implemented in practice.
Women enjoy equal access to higher education, but they are not accorded
full and equal opportunity in their careers, and it is common for well-
educated women to be underemployed or to work outside the field of
their training. An increasing number of women are beginning to venture
out on their own, opening shops and small businesses. Many are
migrating along with men to Greece and Italy to seek employment.
Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of prostitution is a
serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
Children.--The Government's commitment to children's rights and
welfare is codified in domestic law and through international
agreements. The law provides for the right to at least 8 years of free
education and also authorizes private schools. School attendance is
mandatory through the eighth grade (or until age 18, whichever comes
first). However, in practice many children leave school earlier than
allowed by law in order to work with their families, especially in
rural areas. According to recent statistics issued by the Ministry of
Public Order and the Commission for Reconciliation of Blood Feuds, more
than 2,000 children are endangered by blood feuds involving their
families.
Child sexual abuse rarely is reported, but authorities and NGO's
believe that it exists. According to the Ministry of Public Order, more
than 300 cases of child sexual abuse were reported during the year.
According to the Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CRCA),
more than 2,000 children between the ages of 13 and 18 are involved in
prostitution rings. According to the same organization, a large number
of children (as many as 4,000) work as child prostitutes in Greece, and
trafficking in children is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
Criminals may kidnap children from families or orphanages to be sold to
prostitution or pedophilia rings abroad. Within the country, Roma
children often work as beggars and the police generally ignore the
practice. In Tirana and other cities, it is common to see children
selling cigarettes and other items on the street.
People with Disabilities.--Widespread poverty, unregulated working
conditions, and poor medical care pose significant problems for many
disabled persons. The disabled are eligible for various forms of public
assistance, but budgetary constraints mean that the amounts that they
receive are very low. No law mandates accessibility to public buildings
for people with disabilities, and little has been done in this regard.
Religious Minorities.--Relations among the various religious groups
are generally amicable, and tolerance is widespread. Society largely is
secular. Intermarriage among religious groups is extremely common.
Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that Orthodox
churches were the targets of vandals.
The Archbishop of the Orthodox Church concluded that attacks on
church property in the past were a result of vandalism rather than
religious repression.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government played a
constructive role in maintaining the nation's generally positive record
on the treatment of minorities. While no recent official statistics
exist regarding the size of the various ethnic communities, ethnic
Greeks are the most organized and receive the most attention and
assistance from abroad. There also are small groups of Macedonians,
Vlachs, and Roma.
Greek-language public elementary schools are common in much of the
southern part of the country, where almost all ethnic Greeks live.
However, there are no Greek-language high schools. There is a Greek
chair at the University of Gjirokaster. The Greek minority association,
Omonia, continued to press the authorities for more measures to protect
the rights of the Greek minority, including the creation of additional
Greek-language classes in some parts of the south. In May a fact-
finding mission of the Albanian Helsinki Committee visited the ethnic
Greek area of Dropulli. Every village in this zone has its own
elementary-middle (8-year) school in the Greek language, regardless of
the number of students. Five newspapers are published in the Greek
language in this area, in addition to 15 Greek papers and magazines
distributed throughout the southern Albanian region. Radio Gjirokastra
broadcasts a 45-minute program for the Greek community. Every teacher
who teaches in the schools of the Greek minority zone receives, in
addition to the salary given by the Albanian Government, a substantial
monthly compensation of about $140 (50,000 drachmas) from the Greek
Government. Likewise retirees who belong to this community, in addition
to the pension received from the Albanian Government, get substantial
monthly compensation from the Greek Government.
Classes in the Macedonian language are available to students in the
districts of Pogradeci and Devolli, on the border with the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Macedonian Government provides
texts for these classes free of charge. A considerable number of
students from this area study at the universities of Skopje and Bitola.
A small group of ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs live in the northern
part of the country. A fact-finding mission of the Albanian Helsinki
Committee visited the area in April and found that these communities
have decreased in number because many of their members emigrated to
Montenegro. This minority is not subject to any discrimination. People
from this area receive scholarships from the Montenegrin Government for
their children to study in Montenegro. No discrimination was reported
against the Vlachs, who speak their own Romanian-related language as
well as Albanian, or against the Cams, non-Orthodox ethnic Albanians
who were exiled from Greece in 1944. Both groups live mainly in the
south.
Two distinct groups of Roma, the Jevg and the Arrixhi (Gabel), are
established in the country. The Jevg tend to be settled in urban areas
and generally are more integrated into the economy than the Arrixhi.
Roma are the most neglected minority group. Broadly speaking they
suffer from high illiteracy, poor public health conditions, and marked
economic disadvantages. Roma encounter much societal discrimination.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form
independent trade unions. The 1993 Labor Code established procedures
for the protection of workers' rights through collective bargaining
agreements. Two major federations act as umbrella organizations for
most of the country's unions: The Independent Confederation of Trade
Unions of Albania (membership around 118,000) and the Albanian
Confederation of Trade Unions (membership around 100,000). Both
organizations again experienced a drop in membership during the year.
Some unions chose not to join either of the federations. No union has
an official political affiliation, and the Government does not provide
any financial support for unions.
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions and other legislation
provides that all workers, except the uniformed military, the police,
and some court officials have the right to strike. The law forbids
strikes that are declared openly to be political or that are judged by
the courts to be political.
Unions are free to join and maintain ties with international
organizations, and many did so during the year.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Citizens in all
fields of employment, except uniformed members of the armed forces,
police officers, and some court employees, have the constitutional
right to organize and bargain collectively. In practice unions
representing public sector employees negotiate directly with the
Government.
Labor unions do not operate from a position of strength, given the
country's very high level of unemployment. Effective collective
bargaining in these circumstances is difficult, and agreements are hard
to enforce.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Law on Major
Constitutional Provisions and the Labor Code prohibit forced or
compulsory labor; however, trafficking in women for purposes of
prostitution is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.). The law also
forbids forced or bonded labor by children; however, there were reports
that children are trafficked and forced to work abroad as prostitutes
or beggars (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age of employment at 16
years and limits the amount and type of labor that can be performed by
persons under the age of 18. Children between the ages of 14 and 16
legally may work in part-time jobs during summer vacation. Primary
school education is compulsory and free through age 18 or the eighth
grade, whichever comes first; however, in rural areas, children
continue to assist families in farm work.
The Ministry of Labor may enforce minimum age requirements through
the courts, but no recent cases of this actually occurring were known.
In Tirana and other cities, it is common to see children selling
cigarettes and other items on the street. The Government has not yet
signed ILO Convention 182.
The law forbids forced or bonded labor by children; however,
trafficking in children is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for all
workers over the age of 16 is approximately $50 (6,380 lek) per month,
which is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Many workers look for second jobs, which are
difficult to find. Remittances from those working abroad are very
important for many families. The law provides for social assistance
(income support) and unemployment compensation, but these are very
limited, both in terms of the amounts received and the number of
persons actually covered. The average wage for workers in the public
sector is approximately $100 (13,201 lek) per month.
The difference between the monthly average wage of persons who live
in the rural and urban areas is considerable: Persons who work and live
in urban areas earn almost 50 percent more than those who live and work
in rural areas. Data from the National Institute of Statistics
indicated that in rural areas more than 20 percent of persons live
under the official poverty line, while in urban areas the figure is 11
percent. Nationwide over 17 percent of the population live under the
official poverty line. No data are available for private sector wages,
but they are believed to be considerably higher than in the public
sector.
The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although in practice hours
typically are set by individual or collective agreement. Many persons
work 6 days a week.
The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, but
it has limited funds to make improvements in the remaining state-owned
enterprises and a limited ability to enforce standards in the private
sector. Actual conditions in the workplace generally are very poor and
often dangerous. In 1999 there were five deaths recorded in the
construction industry; the victims' families did not receive any
financial support from the state social security administration because
the workers were not insured. The Labor Code lists the safety
obligations of employers and employees but does not provide specific
protection for workers who choose to leave a workplace because of
hazardous conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not criminalize
trafficking in persons, although anti-kidnaping laws may be used to
prosecute such cases; however, trafficking in women for the purpose of
prostitution and trafficking in children are serious problems. While
the exact number of Albanian women that are trafficked is unknown, an
Albanian NGO estimates that there were about 30,000 working abroad as
prostitutes, in Turkey and other countries during the year. The country
also is one of the major transit countries for the trafficking of women
from Moldova and Romania in particular, and from Bulgaria, Russia, and
Ukraine. These women are brought into the country, mainly through
Montenegro, then clandestinely transported to neighboring countries
such as Italy and Greece. Trafficking in children also is a serious
problem. Criminals may kidnap children from families or orphanages to
be sold to pedophilia rings abroad.
Police treatment of women trafficked from Albania and third
countries remains a problem. There is a lack of appropriate facilities
for such women, and trafficked women often are detained in police
stations for extended periods of time (see section 1.d).
Trafficked women periodically are arrested and prosecuted for
prostitution. The Italian Guardia di Finanza (Fiscal Police), which
patrols the Adriatic for traffickers, claims to turn back between five
and eight scafis (rubber boats used by traffickers) each night,
although not all of these necessarily involved trafficked women.
The Government has begun to initiate limited law enforcement and
legal reforms to combat the problem; however, porous borders, poorly
trained and corrupt law enforcement and judiciary officials, legal
loopholes, and lack of government will have hampered these efforts. The
Prosecutor General's Office confirmed that very few cases against
traffickers were presented during the year.
Several NGO's address the problem of trafficking on case-by-case
basis; however, given the scope of the trafficking problem and limited
resources to address individual reintegration, most victims of
trafficking receive little or no assistance. The reintegration of
trafficked women to their homes sometimes is problematic. In some
cases, women simply are returned to the family members who sold them to
traffickers in the first place, or to the same situation from which
they were trafficked, which often leads to these women being re-
trafficked. In addition victims of trafficking often are forced or
deceived into bonded labor and live in violent and abusive conditions,
which leaves them with physical and mental scars. As a result,
sheltering, counseling, and reintegrating victims is a difficult
undertaking.
The International Organization for Migration and the International
Catholic Migration Commission have established an inter-agency referral
system that enables a group of organizations to jointly provide return
and reintegration assistance to women who are victims of trafficking.
From January through June, 65 women were returned through the program.
This system also provides a framework to assist with temporary shelter
and return assistance for trafficking victims from other countries that
want to return from Albania to their home countries.
__________
ANDORRA
The Principality of Andorra is a constitutional parliamentary
democracy. Two Princes with joint authority, representing secular and
religious authorities, have headed the Principality since 1278. Under
the 1993 Constitution, the two Princes--the President of France and the
Catholic Bishop of Seu d'Urgell, Spain--serve equally as heads of
state, and are represented each in Andorra by a delegate. Elections
were held in 1997 to choose members of the ``Consell General'' (the
Parliament), which selects the head of government. The judiciary
functions independently.
Andorra has no defense force and depends on neighboring Spain and
France for external defense. The national police, under effective
civilian control, have sole responsibility for internal security.
The market-based economy is influenced significantly by those of
its neighbors France and Spain. After some years of a serious
recession, the economy is undergoing a period of economic expansion.
Commerce and tourism are the main sources of income. Because of banking
secrecy laws, the financial services sector is growing in importance.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of
dealing with individual instances of abuse.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions.
In June an attorney filed a complaint against the director of the
police, 2 police commissioners and 11 members of the police force,
alleging he was arrested illegally. This case was still pending at
year's end.
In spite of the request of the Council of Europe's Committee for
the Prevention of Torture, the Government has declined thus far to
modify the law to provide arrested individuals access to an attorney
from the moment of arrest. Legislation now provides legal assistance
only 24 hours after the time of arrest.
In May the country became part of a network of 47 states with
prisoner transfer arrangements permitting qualifying prisoners to serve
their sentences in their own country.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The highest judicial body is the five-member Superior Council of
Justice. One member each is appointed by: The two Princes; the head of
government; the President of the Parliament; and, collectively, members
of the lower courts. Members of the judiciary are appointed for 6-year
terms.
The judiciary provided citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
process.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides citizens with safeguards
against arbitrary interference with their ``privacy, honor, and
reputation,'' and government authorities generally respect these
prohibitions. Private dwellings are considered inviolable. No searches
of private premises may be conducted without a judicially issued
warrant. Violations are subject to effective legal sanction. The law
also protects private communications.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system, combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice. Since adoption of the 1993 Constitution, the Government has
registered various parties; some of them have dissolved.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Constitution acknowledges a special relationship between the Roman
Catholic Church and the State, ``in accordance with Andorran
tradition.'' The Catholic Church receives no direct subsidies from the
Government, although some payment is provided to the church for
maintenance of birth and death records. Catholic religious instruction
is available to students in public schools on an optional basis,
outside of both regular school hours and during the time frame set
aside for elective school activities, such as civics or ethics. The
Catholic Church provides teachers for these classes, and the Government
pays their salaries. The Government professes willingness to provide
instruction in other religions on the same basis, if parents so
request; however, at years end no parent's requested instruction in any
religions other than the Catholic religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It
is government policy not to expel persons having valid claims to
refugee status, and there were no reports of such expulsions. The issue
of first asylum did not arise during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Although
progress has been made and there are no formal barriers, few women have
run for office. One out of 28 Members of Parliament is a woman, and 1
woman holds a cabinet level position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government accepts international and nongovernmental
investigations of allegations of human rights abuses. Approximately 10
human rights associations exist in the country, the most active being
the Association of Immigrants in Andorra (AIA) and the Association of
Andorran Women (AAW). The first defends the rights of foreign
residents. The second actively supports women's rights. The latter
collaborates with the Department of Public Health and Social Welfare to
help battered women, single parent families, and others in need. In
spite of demands from the two organizations, the Government has
declined to create a department specifically for women's issues.
In one case, a citizen filed a complaint with the European Court of
Human Rights when the judge in his case disallowed his appeal to the
Constitutional Court. The appeal contended that his trial was not
sufficiently impartial. However, the court, after studying the case,
did not accept the complaint and stated that no violation of human
rights had occurred.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution declares that all persons are equal before the law
and prohibits discrimination on grounds of birth, race, sex, origin,
religion, opinions, or any other personal or social condition, although
the law grants many rights and privileges exclusively to citizens. The
Government effectively enforces these provisions.
Women.--There is no specific legislation regarding violence against
women. Article 8.2 of the Constitution is applied in such cases. The
AIA and the AAW received more than 60 complaints of physical and
psychological violence against women, as compared with 4 in 1999. The
associates maintained that the number is increasing. They also asserted
that such domestic violence existed at all levels of society. Women
suffering from domestic violence requested help from Women's
Associations, but very rarely filed a complaint with the police. No
complaints are known to have been filed with the police by year's end.
In theory there is no legal discrimination against women, privately
or professionally; however, the AAW reported that in practice, there
have been many cases of women dismissed from employment due to
pregnancy. Discriminatory wage differentials were reportedly common,
with some women's wages an average of 32 percent lower than their male
counterparts' earnings. The Association actively promoted women's
issues through information exchanges and limited direct support to
those in need.
Children.--The Government's commitment to children's welfare is
demonstrated by its systems of health care and education. Free public
education begins at age 4 and is compulsory until age 16. The
Government provides free nursery schools, although the existing number
falls short of the need.
On September 7, the Government signed an optional protocol of the
Convention of the Rights of Children related to selling of children,
child prostitution, and child pornography.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. The law mandates access to new buildings for people
with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in
practice.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Spanish nationals are the
largest group of foreign residents, accounting for approximately 43
percent of the population. Other sizable foreign groups are Portuguese,
French, and British. A small but fast growing group of immigrants,
especially from North Africa, work mostly in agriculture and
construction.
Although the Constitution states that foreign legal residents enjoy
the same rights and freedoms as citizens, some immigrant workers
believed that they did not have the same rights and security. Recent
legislation has improved the quality of life for immigrant workers.
Nevertheless, many immigrant workers hold only ``temporary work
authorizations.'' These permits are valid only as long as the job
exists for which the permit was obtained. When job contracts expire,
temporary workers must leave the country. The Government prohibits the
issuance of work permits, unless workers can demonstrate that they have
a fixed address with minimally satisfactory living conditions.
More than 4,000 immigrants do not have work permits or residence
permits because the quota for immigration is not as high as the number
of workers needed and employed in the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes the right
of all persons to form and maintain managerial, professional, and trade
union associations without prejudice. In accordance with constitutional
provisions, a registry of associations was established in 1996 and is
being maintained. Strikes were illegal under the old system, and the
new Constitution does not state explicitly that strikes are permitted.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution states that both ``workers and employers have the right to
defend their own economic and social interests.'' Parliament is charged
with adopting legislation to regulate this right in order to guarantee
the provision of essential services, such as the vital services of
doctors, nurses, and police. Antiunion discrimination is not prohibited
under the law. Approximately 600 associations exist in the country and
have registered within the Government's Register of Association by
year's end, this figure includes cultural associations, workers
associations, foreign associations, colleges and attorney's, colleges
of physicians, and a police trade union. No unions have emerged among
workers in the private sector. No figure is available regarding the
percentage of unionized labor. A partial reason for this circumstance
is that no statue regarding labor relations and unionization has been
elaborated. Even the police union functions more as a professional
association than as a syndicate.
In November the Government signed the European Social Charter.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not
prohibit forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children
specifically, but such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Children under the age of 18 normally are prohibited from
working, although in exceptional circumstances children ages 16 and 17
may be allowed to work. The Labor Inspection Office in the Ministry of
Social Welfare, Public Health, and Labor enforces child labor
regulations. The law does not prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children specifically; however, such practices are not known to occur
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The workweek is limited to 40
hours, although employers may require overtime from workers. The legal
maximums for overtime hours are 66 hours per month and 426 hours per
year. An official minimum wage is set by government regulations. Other,
higher wages are established by contract. The minimum wage is
approximately $3.45 (674 pesetas) per hour and approximately $599
(116,827 pesetas) per month. The minimum wage barely provides a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. The Labor Inspection Office
enforces minimum wage observance. Workers can be dismissed with 15
days' to 6 months' notice, depending on how long they have been working
for the company. A minimal indemnification of 1 month's salary per year
worked is paid if a worker is fired without justification.
A dismissed worker receives unemployment and health benefits for
only 25 days. A board composed of Andorran nationals, although they
represent only a small portion of the work force, controls retirement
benefits. The Labor Inspection Service hears labor complaints.
The Labor Inspection Service sets occupational health and safety
standards and takes the necessary steps to see that they are enforced.
During the past year, the Labor Inspection Service filed 145 complaints
against companies for violating labor regulations, and it has the
authority to levy sanctions and fines against such companies. The law
authorizes employees to refuse certain tasks if their employers do not
provide the customary level of protection. No legislation grants
workers the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, from, or within the country. Nor is the country a transit point
for traffic in persons. However, the law does provide punishment for
traffickers of illegal workers.
__________
ARMENIA
Armenia has a Constitution that provides for the separation of
powers; however, the directly elected President has extensive powers of
appointment and decree that are not balanced by the legislature or an
independent judiciary. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who
is in charge of the Cabinet. Robert Kocharian was elected President in
a multi-candidate election in 1998 after former President Levon Ter-
Petrossian was forced to resign by his former political allies in the
Government and Parliament. There were flaws in both rounds of the 1998
presidential elections. Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) observers witnessed very substantial irregularities and
concluded that the elections seriously challenged international
democratic norms in regard to most key criteria. These irregularities
inflated the number of votes for Kocharian. Nonetheless, the 1998
elections, the May 1999 Parliamentary and October 1999 municipal
elections, and several 2000 by-elections showed continued improvement
over past elections with respect to voting practice and vote-counting,
as well as the ability of a pluralistic group of candidates to campaign
freely. Although irregularities marred both the parliamentary and local
elections in 1999, OSCE observers categorized the former as a relevant
step toward compliance with OSCE commitments, but stated that they
still failed to meet international standards, with problems in many
precincts such as inaccurate or obsolete voting lists, the presence of
unauthorized personnel during the voting and counting processes, and
possible irregularities involving voting of military personnel. Some
local observers reported that 1999 municipal elections and by-elections
in 2000 also were flawed by poor voter lists and by disappearance or
non-distribution of unmarked ballots. The Parliament differs from
previous ones in two important ways: First, members are required to
serve full-time and not to hold jobs outside the legislature, and
second, the number of seats was reduced from 190 to 131. The current
majority, made up of a coalition called Unity, includes the two largest
parties, the Republican Party and the Peoples' Party. Unity is assisted
by a group of loosely organized independents who call themselves the
Stability Bloc. This Bloc split in December with a minority faction
renaming itself the ``Democrats.'' Some deputies from Unity left the
group during the year over policy differences and formed a bloc called
Hayastan, which opposes the Government on some issues, and reduced but
not eliminated Unity's majority. The legislature approves new laws,
must confirm the Prime Minister's program, and can remove the Prime
Minister by a vote of no confidence. Both the Government and the
legislature can propose legislation. The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice, judges are subject to
pressure from the executive branch and corruption.
The Ministries of Internal Affairs and of National Security,
formerly one ministry which split in 1999, are jointly responsible for
domestic security, intelligence activities, border controls, and the
national police force. Members of the security forces committed human
rights abuses.
The transition from a centralized, controlled economy to a market
economy continued to move forward, although the industrial sector still
is not functioning at peak capacity and its output remains low.
Unemployment remains high, resulting in a high degree of income
inequality, but the exact figure is difficult to quantify. This is
because a significant amount of economic activity, perhaps as much as
40 percent, is not captured by government accounting or taxation;
unemployment is approximately 12.1 percent according to the Government;
however, other services estimate the unemployment rate to be
approximately 50 percent. Women form a disproportionately large number
of the unemployed. Most small and medium-sized enterprises have been
privatized, as has most agricultural land. All landowners now have
received titles to their land, which are protected by the Constitution.
The passage of a bill establishing a strict and transparent system for
bidding on privatization of the electrical distribution network in
August, was seen as a major step forward in establishing a system for
fair and transparent privatization of state enterprises. Out-migration
remains a serious problem. The gross domestic product (GDP) increased
about 2.5 percent, to about $600 per capita. Inflation fell to below 1
percent for the year. Foreign assistance and remittances from Armenians
abroad play a major role in sustaining the economy, although the
financial crisis in Russia, where many Armenians have gone to look for
work, cut deeply into the flow of remittances. The Government is
working to resolve its current budget deficit through increasing the
tax collection rate, as well as by continuing cuts in most areas of
government spending.
The Government's human rights record was poor in several important
areas, and although there were improvements in a few areas, problems
persist in numerous areas. Substantial intervention by local power
structures in the election process continues to restrict citizens'
ability to change their Government peacefully. There were no reports
that members of the security forces committed extrajudical killings due
to severe beatings and mistreatment in detention. However, there were
no reports of government action against individuals who may have been
responsible for the reported 54 deaths in custody in 1999. Members of
the security forces routinely beat detainees during arrest and
interrogation, arbitrarily arrested and detained persons without
warrants, and did not respect constitutional protections regarding
privacy and due process. Impunity remains a problem, and the Government
rarely investigates abuses by members of the security forces. Prison
conditions did improve; however, they still are harsh and life-
threatening. Lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. During the year,
parliamentary commissions were allowed to visit military camps and hear
complaints about abuses from recruits. The judiciary is subject to
political pressure and does not enforce constitutional protections
effectively. There are some limits on press freedom, and many
journalists practice self-censorship. State television, which refrains
from criticizing government policy, remains the major source of news
for most of the population, but independent television and newspapers,
along with private radio stations, offer substantial competition. The
nongovernmental media often criticize the country's leadership and
policies. Burdensome registration requirements hinder freedom of
association. The law places some restrictions on religious freedom,
including a prohibition against proselytizing by religions other than
the Armenian Apostolic Church. Registration requirements for religious
groups kept Jehovah's Witnesses from operating legally, and 41
Jehovah's Witnesses are in jail for refusing military service. The
Government places some restrictions on freedom of movement.
Discrimination against women, the disabled, and minorities remains a
problem. The plight of street children is a significant problem.
Trafficking in women and girls also is a problem.
After President Kocharian's election in 1998, a number of
commissions were established, and a constitutional referendum was
proposed, with the goal of improving human rights and reforming the
judiciary. By year's end, none of the proposed recommendations had been
implemented, and no referendum had been held.
In October 1999, five terrorists entered the National Assembly and
killed the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly, six
other deputies or members of the Government, and wounded at least five
more persons. An investigation of the killings, conducted by the Deputy
Prosecutor General, resulted in the detention of 19 persons, including
a deputy of the National Assembly, the then presidential chief of
staff, and the deputy chief of state television. Five persons
subsequently were released after spending several months in jail when
evidence proved insufficient to charge them. Another detainee died in
prison in September, apparently of accidental electrocution. The trial
of the remaining accused was scheduled to begin in late October but was
postponed at the request of defense attorneys and is scheduled to begin
in February 2001.
Defense attorneys and the press accused the Deputy Prosecutor
General of using coercion, including physical abuse of the accused, to
extract evidence, and President Kocharian expressed concern that the
rights of the accused be respected.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings. The Government took no action by year's
end regarding 54 cases of deaths in custody in 1999, which the
International Helsinki Federation had asked it to investigate. The
cases of Stepan Gevorgian and Arsen Stepanian were closed during the
year due to lack of evidence.
There were a significant number of deaths of military servicemen
reportedly due to mistreatment and training related accidents (see
Section 1.c.).
According to an August announcement by the prosecutor general's
office, in 1999 there were 54 deaths in custody due to beatings and
mistreatment in detention. No information on such incidents were
available by year's end. Norayr Yeghiazarian, a detainee awaiting trial
in connection with the October 1999 shootings in Parliament (see
below), was found dead in his cell in September. The Ministry of
National Security announced, and other prisoners in his cell confirmed,
that he was accidentally electrocuted through improper handling of an
electrical appliance.
Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening, and medical
treatment is inadequate. There were a number of deaths in prison due to
disease (see Section 1.c.). The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) signed an agreement with the Government in June to open a
tuberculosis facility for inmates.
Former Minister of Interior and Mayor of Yerevan Vano Siradeghian
was charged with 10 counts of murder and plotting to commit murder and
his trial began on January 10. On April 1, the National Assembly voted
to strip Siradeghian, a National Assembly deputy, of his parliamentary
immunity. Siradeghian disappeared on April 3 and is believed to have
fled the country. In a court case related to Siradeghian, an armed gang
led by Armen Ter-Sahakian went on trial in May. All of the gang members
were former Interior Ministry employees and confessed to various
misdeeds prior to the trial. In their confessions, the nine accused,
claimed to have been members of a hit squad that carried out several
murders on Siradeghian's orders, including the murder of Armenian
Railroads Director Hambartzum Ghandilian, Ashtarak district executive
committee chairman Hovhannes Sukiasian, and the attempted murder of
Vladimir Grigorian, Head of the Prosecutor General's investigative
department. They also confessed to extortion, robbery, and illegal
possession of weapons. All were found guilty in August. Ter-Sahakian
and Alik Grigoryan were sentenced to death, while the remaining six
accused received prison terms from 4 to 11 years. The death penalty
currently is in abeyance and is expected to be abolished soon, in such
a case it is expected that the two death sentences would be commuted to
lengthy imprisonment.
Another court case related to Siradeghian involved the trial of a
group of 11 persons led by Vahan Harutyunian, former Deputy Minister of
Interior and ex-Commander of Internal Troops. All of 11 were found
guilty of murder, attempted murder, abuse of power, and complicity in
murder. The prison terms for six of them varied from 6 to 15 years,
while five subsequently were released under the terms of two amnesties
passed by the National Assembly in 1997 and 1998. Several of those
convicted announced that they would appeal.
On October 27, 1999, five terrorists opened fire on a session of
Parliament with automatic weapons. They killed the Prime Minister, the
Speaker of Parliament, the two Deputy Speakers, the Minister for
Special Projects, and three deputies, and wounded the Minister of
Privatization and four other deputies, some critically. According to
reported statements by the gunmen both before and after they
surrendered to security forces, their motives appeared to be both
political and personal.
The Deputy Prosecutor General (who is also the military prosecutor)
was placed in charge of the investigation of the shootings. By the end
of 1999, 19 persons, including a National Assembly deputy (who was
stripped of his immunity by a vote of that body), the then-presidential
chief of staff and advisor, and the deputy chief of state television,
had been imprisoned under legal provisions permitting the detention of
criminal suspects whether or not they had been accused legally. The
investigation was criticized by attorneys for the accused, by the
media, and by representatives of human rights organizations for alleged
human rights abuses, including physical and mental coercion of the
detainees. Gagik Jahangiran, the military prosecutor investigating the
case, repeatedly rejected calls for the creation of a special
Parliamentary investigation to ensure an impartial investigation.
During the year, four of the accused, including the presidential
advisor, the Parliamentarian, and the deputy chief of state television,
were released, and charges against them dropped. The military
prosecutor admitted that the evidence was insufficient to hold them.
One detainee was released on bail for health reasons, and another
prisoner was found dead in his cell in September (see above). The
trials of the 13 accused are scheduled to begin in February 2001 due to
requests by the attorneys for the accused that they have time to
evaluate the evidence.
No progress was announced in the investigation of the December 1998
killing of Deputy Minister of Defense Vahram Khorkhoruni. In September
1999, the death of Deputy Minister of Interior and National Security
and Head of Internal Troops Artsrun Margarian, who was found shot in
February 1999, officially was ruled a suicide. In March a guilty
verdict was reached in the case of Dr. Hrant Papikian, who was held in
connection with an alleged previous attack on Margaryan; Papikian
appealed to the Court of Cassation, which reduced his sentence to 10
months; and since he already had served that amount of time, he was
released on March 22.
Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict occasionally resulted in deaths and injuries to civilians.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In July the Government unilaterally released five Azeri prisoners
of war (POW's) under OSCE/ICRC auspices; Azerbaijan reciprocated by
unilaterally releasing two Armenian POW's. In August Armenia released
another recently captured POW, and announced that it now held only one
Azeri soldier, who did not wish to be repatriated (which the OSCE
verified), and one Azeri civilian, who was believed to be a criminal
fleeing Azeri police.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and laws prohibit torture; however, the
practice of security personnel beating pretrial detainees during arrest
and interrogation remains a routine part of criminal investigations,
and prosecutors rely on such confessions to secure convictions. Most
cases of police brutality go unreported, due to fear of police
retribution. Impunity remains a problem.
In 1999, there were 54 cases of death in custody due to beatings
and other abuse (see Section 1.a.).
Attorneys for the 19 detainees held in the October 1999 killings in
Parliament claimed in the media that the accused were being held in
inhuman conditions and were beaten during interrogations.
Representatives of the government-appointed Commission on Human Rights,
after several attempts, were able to see the detainees and were told by
the men that they had been coerced physically and mentally into
confessions. The Commission reported no obvious evidence of physical
abuse. A parliamentary commission was allowed to see imprisoned Deputy
Mushegh Movsesian and confirmed that he showed signs of having been
abused physically. The four detainees released in mid-year told media
that they had been mistreated. Former presidential Chief of Staff
Alexan Harutyunian said that as part of his release agreements, he had
promised not to talk to the media about the details of his case.
Although defense lawyers may present evidence of torture in an
effort to overturn improperly obtained confessions, and according to
law all such charges must be investigated, judges and prosecutors
routinely ignore such complaints even when the perpetrator can be
identified.
The Government has not conducted investigations of abuse by
security services except in rare cases where death has resulted and
under pressure from human rights groups. The number of deaths of
conscripts from training accidents and physical abuse decreased by 18
percent compared with 1999, according to government figures. While this
number cannot be verified, based on information from a human rights
group, the figure of 16 to 20 noncombat deaths per month from all
causes during the year appears to be accurate. Amnesty International
stated that a conscript arrested for being absent without leave was
beaten so badly in August 1998 that he subsequently died. The case
currently is pending in the Echmiatsin regional court. There are no
separate military courts (see Section 1.e.). Military cases, many of
which are settled administratively, that do go to trial in civilian
courts are handled by the military prosecutor's office.
The Ministry of Defense cites reasons of ``national security'' in
declining to provide exact details on some cases, citing the fact that
the country remains technically in a state of war with Azerbaijan.
During the year members of the Yezidi ethnic-religious minority
continued to complain that ``hazing'' and beating of conscripts, common
throughout the former Soviet Union, especially are severe for Yezidi
conscripts (see Section 5). In July parents of recruits killed or
injured during the training process held demonstrations for several
days near the presidential palace and met with officials of the
presidency (but not with the President himself) to discuss their
complaints.
In April police reportedly did not intervene to prevent harassment
and abuse of members of Jehovah's Witnesses by local hoodlums (see
Section 5.). Yezidis complain that police fail to respond to crimes
committed against Yezidis.
Homosexuals complain that police physically and mentally abuse
them, especially if they have no means to pay police extortion. Persons
accused of homosexuality in the military generally are believed to
suffer beatings and other physical abuse above and beyond that
inflicted on other recruits.
There were unsubstantiated reports that security authorities
confine persons in mental institutions as a form of detention (see
Section 1.d.).
Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Facilities are
often overcrowded, and food is inadequate to preserve health unless
supplemented by assistance from families. Medical and sanitary
facilities in prisons are inadequate. Tuberculosis and other
communicable diseases are common, and there were a number of deaths
from such diseases during the year. Although, in principle, an
agreement has been reached to transfer responsibility for prisons from
the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice with a goal
of improved oversight, no formal action to that effect was taken by
year's end. Physical abuse by guards and other prisoners is a problem.
In August the Prosecutor General's office announced that 54 prisoners
had died in prison of in 1999, the highest count for any year since
independence in 1991. The Government's Human Rights Commission visited
the main prison in Gyumri in October and reported that it found
conditions there to be ``shocking'' with the prison filthy, cold, and
in poor repair. Officials were indifferent to the welfare of the
prisoners. The Commission reported that complaints mailed to them by
prisoners were intercepted and given instead to the prison's warden.
According to his lawyer, the Ministry of Internal Affairs staff
continued to physically abuse former Minister of Education Ashot Bleyan
while he awaited trial on corruption charges (see Section 1.d.). While
Bleyan's appeal that his case be dropped was refused, in July the
Presidential Human Rights Commission recommended that Bleyan be
detained under more humane conditions.
The ICRC had free access to detention facilities run by the
Ministry of Interior. In these facilities, the ICRC is able to visit,
according to its standard modalities, any prisoner in whom it has an
interest, whether in prisons or in local police stations. The ICRC also
had free and regular access to remaining POW's from the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict in the prison of the Ministry of National Security
and in military police stations. The ICRC also had access to POW's in
Nagorno-Karabakh. In July and August, Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged
POW's under OSCE and ICRC auspices (see Section 1.b.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Authorities continued to
arrest and detain criminal suspects without legal warrants, often on
the pretext that they were material witnesses. The police frequently
imprisoned detainees without notification of their family members.
Often several days pass before family members obtain information about
an arrest and the person's location. Security agencies often restrict
access of lawyers and family members to prisoners until the preliminary
investigation phase is complete, a process that can last weeks. During
the investigation of the October 1999 shootings, five persons were
arrested and held for a period of approximately 5 months in the
Ministry of National Security's special detainment facilities. They
then were released and charges against them were dropped (see Section
1.a.).
The Government allowed ICRC representatives and a parliamentary
investigating committee to visit those detained in relation with the
October 1999 shootings. The detainees also were permitted contact with
lawyers, although their attorneys complained that this contact was
insufficient and restricted. However, requests by a local human rights
monitoring group to visit the men to check allegations of physical and
mental abuse against the prisoners were denied.
The transitional provisions of the Constitution provide that
Soviet-era procedures for searches and arrests were to continue until
the new Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code came into effect in
January 1999. Although the Criminal Procedure Code entered into force,
the Criminal Code remains under consideration in Parliament (see
Section 1.e.). A suspect may be detained for no more than 12 months
pending trial, after which the suspect must be released or tried;
however, this latter provision is not always enforced. There is no
provision for bail, although detainees may sign a document and remain
at liberty under their own recognizance pending trial.
Former Education Minister Ashot Bleyan was held by law enforcement
officials for several months after being charged in 1999 with
embezzlement of public funds intended for the purchase of textbooks
(see Section 1.c.). Bleyan's lawyer charged, both in 1999 and during
the year, that his client has been abused physically and kept in harsh
conditions in an attempt to force a confession. Bleyan's July appeal to
have his case dropped was denied, but the Presidential Commission on
Human Rights recommended in July that his conditions of imprisonment be
eased. After an 8 month trial, Bleyan was sentenced to 8 years in
prison in October for embezzlement of state property. Bleyan has
claimed that the charges against him were fabricated for political
reasons (see Section 1.e.).
On October 30, Arkady Vardanyan a Moscow-based Armenian businessmen
who is a Russian citizen, led a demonstration in Yerevan of
approximately 10,000 persons calling for the removal of the Government.
After the demonstration, Vardanyan was taken into custody and sentenced
to 11 days detention on the charge that he had a permit for a
demonstration but not a march (see Section 2.b.). After 11 days,
Vardanyan was not released; however, one of his attorneys that was
arrested with him was released. The Prosecutor General's office
announced that Vardanyan was being charged with seeking and advocating
the overthrow of the Government by violence. A trial date has not been
set. Russian consular officers are allowed access to Vardanyan in
prison in order to ensure that his rights are respected.
At year's end, 41 Jehovah's Witnesses were in detention for refusal
to serve in the military services (see Section 2.c.).
Armed forces recruiters sometimes take hostages to compel the
surrender of draft-evading or deserting relatives (see Section 1.f.).
A local human rights group has made unsubstantiated allegations
that there are cases in which security authorities use confinement in
mental institutions as an alternative form of detention.
The ICRC reported that civilian and military personnel on all sides
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still occasionally may engage in
cross-border hostage-taking, sometimes to win release of a friend or
relative held on the other side but more often for financial gain. The
ICRC, in coordination with the OSCE, has facilitated a number of
prisoner exchanges, most recently in August, but has no access to
undeclared hostages.
There were no reports of forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution nominally
provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, courts are
subject to pressure from the executive branch and to corruption. The
Constitution's provisions do not insulate the courts fully from
political pressure. Other legal and constitutional provisions make
judges and prosecutors dependent on the executive branch for their
employment. The inherited Soviet system views the court largely as a
rubber stamp for the prosecutor and not a defender of citizens' rights.
Though legislation passed in 1998 reduced significantly prosecutor's
supervision of civil cases, prosecutors still greatly overshadow
defense lawyers and judges during trials. Under the Constitution, the
Council of Justice, headed by the President, the Prosecutor General,
and the Justice Minister, appoints and disciplines judges for the
tribunal courts of first instance, review courts, and the Court of
Appeals. The President appoints the other 14 members of the Justice
Council and 4 of the 9 Constitutional Court judges. This authority
gives the President dominant influence in appointing and dismissing
judges at all levels. Judges are subject to review by the President
through the Council of Justice after 3 years, unless they are found
guilty of malfeasance.
The 1995 Constitution required a new three-level court system. The
highest court, the Court of Cassation, began functioning in the summer
of 1998. Judges for the two lower-level courts, the appellate court and
courts of the first instance, began functioning in January 1999. First
instance courts try most cases, with a right of appeal to the Court of
Appeals and then to the Court of Cassation. The Constitutional Court
rules on the conformity of legislation with the Constitution, approves
international agreements, and decides election-related legal questions.
It can accept only cases proposed by the President, by two-thirds of
all parliamentary deputies, or election-related cases brought by
candidates for Parliament or the presidency. Due to these limitations,
the Constitutional Court cannot ensure effectively constitutional human
rights safeguards.
The selection of judges was based on: Their scores on a multiple
choice test to determine their fitness to be judges under the new
system based on previously published information regarding the new
legal codes, and their interviews with the Minister of Justice. Next,
the list of nominations was approved by the Council of Justice and,
finally, by the President. About 55 percent of the appointed judges in
1999 had been judges under the old structure. Based on the results of
this 4-stage selection, 123 judges were appointed to the new courts in
January 1999. Unless they are found guilty of malfeasance, their tenure
is permanent until they reach the age of 65.
The judicial system continued to be in transition. As part of the
package of judicial reform legislation mandated by the Constitution, in
1999 both prosecutors and defense counsels began a process of
retraining and recertification in order to retain their positions,
which still is occurring.
A proposed new Criminal Code, which is intended to clarify
contradictory provisions of the law and create a more unitary, modern,
and workable legal system has not yet been approved. The new draft
Criminal Code consists of general and special parts; the general part
passed second reading in Parliament in November 1997, but the special
part, presented for a second reading in November 1998, failed to obtain
a quorum and had not been reconsidered by year's end. Two other new
codes, the Civil Code and the Criminal Procedures Code, were passed in
the summer of 1998.
The new criminal procedure code does not allow detainees to file a
complaint in court prior to trial to redress abuses by the procuracy,
police, or other security forces during criminal investigations. Under
the new code, the police may detain individuals for up to 12 hours
before notifying family members, witnesses have no right to legal
counsel during questioning while in police custody--even though failure
to testify is a criminal offense--and detainees must seek permission
from the police or procuracy to obtain a forensic medical examination
to substantiate a report of torture.
Under the proposed new judicial code, prosecutors are expected to
continue to have more influence than judges do.
A commission to amend the Constitution's chapter on the judiciary,
the second such body to undertake this task, reportedly is working on
measures to increase judicial independence that are critical to the
success of judicial reform. In July the President discharged by decree
old members and appointed new members to the commission. Such
constitutional revisions must pass both Parliament and a national
referendum.
The military legal system operates essentially as it did during the
Soviet era. There is no military court system; trials involving
military personnel take place in the civil court system and are handled
by military prosecutors. Military prosecutors perform the same
functions as their civilian counterparts; pending the passage of the
new Criminal Code, they operate in accordance with the Soviet-era
Criminal Code. In 1998 the military prosecutor abolished military ranks
for the prosecutors in his service. In November 1999, the military
prosecutor was named deputy prosecutor general and placed in charge of
the investigation into the October 1999 shootings in Parliament.
All trials are public except when government secrets are at issue.
Defendants are required to attend their trials unless they have been
accused of a minor crime not punishable by imprisonment. Defendants
have access to a lawyer of their own choosing. The court appoints an
attorney for any defendant who needs one. Defendants may confront
witnesses and present evidence. The Constitution provides that those
accused of crimes shall be informed of charges against them; however,
the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence is ineffective,
and acquittals are rare once a case comes to trial. Defendants and
prosecutors have the right of appeal.
There were no reports of political prisoners; however, supporters
of both Ashot Bleyan and Arkady Vardanyan claimed that the two were
political prisoners. Bleyan was imprisoned on charges of embezzlement,
and Vardanyan was detained on charges of attempting to overthrow the
Government by force.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unauthorized searches and
provides for citizens' rights to privacy and confidentiality of
correspondence, conversations, and other messages. The security
ministries must petition a judge for permission to wiretap a telephone
or intercept correspondence. The judge acting alone must find a
compelling need for the wiretap before granting the agency permission
to proceed. No evidence of illegal wiretapping came to public attention
during the year.
The law requires security forces to obtain a search warrant from a
judge before conducting a search. Security forces were refused warrant
issuance due to lack of evidence in several cases; however, in practice
there were charges that searches continued to be made without a
warrant, both in regard to the October 1999 killings in parliament and
in the arrest of Arkady Vardanyan (see Section 2.b.). The Constitution
provides that the judiciary must exclude evidence obtained without a
warrant. Legislation passed in 1997 to improve security of bank
deposits has been enforced.
There continued to be violations of the right to privacy during
army conscription drives. Armed forces recruiters sometimes take
hostages to compel the surrender of draft-evading or deserting
relatives. There are credible reports of improper, forced conscription
of ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, who by law are exempt from
military service. The parents of such refugees are reluctant to
complain because they fear reprisals against their sons. There were no
reported cases of punitive conscription of males who offended local
officials. Sweep operations for draft-age men have ceased to be carried
out, although police sometimes maintain surveillance of draft-age men
to prevent them from fleeing the country.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press; however, while the Government
generally respects freedom of speech, there are some limits on freedom
of the press, and journalists practice self-censorship. There is no
official censorship, publications present a variety of views, and the
opposition press regularly criticizes government policies and leaders,
including the President, on sensitive issues such as the Nagorno-
Karabakh peace process and privatization.
However, to avoid retribution experienced in years past on the part
of powerful officials and other individuals, most journalists practice
self-censorship, particularly in reporting on major corruption or
national security issues. Journalists remain cautious in their
reporting, and the range of subjects the Government considers sensitive
for national security reasons is relatively large. Some members of the
press, but not all, have access to army facilities and places of
detention. Even in cases where they do have such access, permission for
media to visit them involves a prolonged and cumbersome bureaucratic
process.
Newspapers, with the exception of Hayastani Hanrapetutyun (a joint
venture between Parliament and its staff) and Respublica Armenia (which
ceased publication in June), are privately owned. The state printing
house and distribution agency both now function as commercial
enterprises, with no visible government intervention.
The editor of the sensationalist political tabloid Oragir and its
successor Haykakan Zhamanak, Nikol Pashinian, was found guilty in 1999
of libel, slander, libeling a public official, and contempt of court
(for not publishing a retraction demanded by a court) and sentenced to
1 year of corrective labor and ordered to pay a fine of $25,000 (13.5
million drams). Pashinian appealed the judgement and did not pay the
fine; other Armenian journalists, who up to then had been largely
nonsupportive of his case, passed a resolution denouncing the
punishment as unduly harsh and for several weeks rallied almost daily
in front of the President's office demanding a more lenient sentence.
In January Pashinian's sentence was reduced to a 1-year suspended
sentence by an appeals judge who said the original sentence in fact was
too harsh.
No legal actions were announced during the year regarding the
beatings of the Haykakan Zhamanak staff on December 23, 1999. The
offices of Haykakan Zhamanak were invaded by approximately a dozen men
who beat and kicked Pashinian and other male members of the staff. The
gang reportedly was led by a local businessman who was angered by an
article in Haykakan Zhamanak that accused him of corruption. Pashinian
afterwards announced that he would not file charges against his
assailants, but that he expected them to apologize to all journalists
for the attack. No legal action was taken in the case of arson at the
Yerevan office of the Russian newspaper Novoye Vremya in December 1999.
A police investigation was unable to reach any conclusions, and the
case was closed during the year.
Newspapers operate with extremely limited resources, and none are
completely independent of patronage from economic or political interest
groups or individuals. Due to prevailing economic conditions, total
newspaper circulation is small (40,000 copies, by the Department of
Information's estimates, or about 1 copy per 100 persons). The state-
owned newspaper printing and distribution companies have been
privatized, except for a small government stake.
State institutions that previously had tended to exert control over
the media have lost most of their functions. The Department of
Information, created in 1997 to replace the disbanded Ministry of
Information, continued to exist, but with no clear purpose beyond
allocating small government subsidies to newspapers and occasionally
interceding with the state-owned newspaper distribution agency to
forward a share of its receipts to the newspapers. A board created in
late 1997 with representatives from the President's Office, Government,
and Parliament, to supervise the transformation of the state-owned
press agency, printing, and newspaper distribution into commercial
enterprises, has not been active during the past 3 years.
There were no complaints of official government pressure on
independent news media; however, the President's office continued to
influence state television news coverage significantly. In March
opposition parties demanded that the President remove the Chief of
State Television for allegedly slanting coverage of the investigation
into the October 1999 attack on Parliament, but the President's office
refused to concur. The most widely available of the two state-owned
television channels takes policy guidance from the Government; it
presents mostly factual reporting but avoids editorial commentary or
criticism of official actions. During elections the coverage of
political parties on state television and other media generally was
balanced and largely neutral. Singlemandate candidates were not
entitled to free programming, but there were no restrictions on paid
time. In Yerevan and major regional media markets, private television
stations now offer independent news coverage of good technical quality.
Most radio stations are private. Opposition parties and politicians
receive adequate news coverage and access on these channels.
Legislation has not been passed yet to regulate the current arbitrary
and nontransparent process of license issuance.
Draft broadcast and media laws, the subject of intensive discussion
among journalists, were revised extensively, and the draft of a new
media law passed in Parliament in October was later signed by the
President with reservations. While the new media law meets many
previously expressed demands by media and human rights groups about
assuring freedom of the media, it still contains loopholes that could
be used to impose greater control of the media by government bodies. In
response to media and the human rights group's concerns about these
areas, the President announced that he would submit those chapters of
the law to the Constitutional Court so that the possible loopholes
could be closed. One new measure announced in October 1998, a 25-fold
increase in licensing fees for television broadcasters, was expected to
have a serious effect on struggling private stations; at the time of
this announcement, these stations appealed for the measure's
cancellation. After the President's intervention, the overall increase
in licensing fees was significantly lowered to five-fold. The few
international newspapers and imported magazines are not censored. There
are no restrictions on reception of satellite television and other
foreign media, and this material is not censored.
The Government partially respects academic freedom. There are more
than 80 private institutions of higher education. The curriculum
committee of the Ministry of Education must approve the curriculum of
all schools that grant degrees recognized by the State, seriously
limiting the freedom of individual schools and teachers in their choice
of textbooks and course material; according to the Ministry, only 15
schools have applied for such licensing.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice; however, there
are some important exceptions. There are cumbersome registration
requirements for all political parties, associations, and
organizations. The process of registering an organization is time-
consuming, and some human rights or political organizations have been
compelled by the Government to revise their bylaws several times in
order to have their registrations accepted. No human rights or
political organizations reported problems with registration during the
year. During the period of political turmoil after the October 1999
shootings, several opposition groups held antigovernment demonstrations
without government intervention. During the July demonstrations by
parents of killed or injured military recruits (see Section 1.c.),
three demonstrators were detained for allegedly assaulting a security
officer, but were released in a few hours.
On October 30, Arkady Vardanyan, a Moscow-based Armenian
businessmen who is a Russian citizen, led a demonstration in Yerevan of
approximately 10,000 persons calling for the removal of the Government.
Some of these persons subsequently marched to the President's office.
Prior to the demonstration, Vardanyan was detained at his home, taken
for questioning, and later released. Vardanyan's family and lawyers
charged that security forces forced their way into the house and
ransacked it. After the demonstration, the house again was searched by
security forces and Vardanyan was taken into custody and sentenced to
11 days detention on the charge that he had a permit for a
demonstration but not a march (see Section 1.d.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the law specifies some restrictions on the religious
freedom of adherents of faiths other than the Armenian Apostolic
Church, which has formal legal status as the national church.
The 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience, which was amended in 1997,
establishes the separation of church and state, but grants the Armenian
Apostolic Church special status. The law forbids ``proselytizing''
(undefined in the law) except by the Armenian Apostolic Church and
requires all religious denominations and organizations to register with
the State Council on Religious Affairs. Petitioning organizations must
``be free from materialism and of a purely spiritual nature,'' and must
subscribe to a doctrine based on ``historically recognized holy
scriptures.''
A Presidential decree issued in 1993 supplemented the 1991 law and
strengthened the position of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The decree
enjoins the Council on Religious Affairs to investigate the activities
of the representatives of registered religious organizations and to ban
missionaries who engage in activities contrary to their status. The
Council on Religious Affairs took no action against missionaries during
the year, and even members of Jehovah's Witnesses, which are not
registered, were allowed to engage fairly openly in missionary
activity.
In 1996 Parliament passed legislation tightening registration
requirements by raising the minimum number of members required for
registration from 50 to 200 adults. The law banned foreign funding for
churches whose centers are outside the country. The 1996 legislation
also mandated that religious organizations, except the Armenian
Apostolic Church, need prior permission from the State Council on
Religious Affairs to engage in religious activities in public places,
travel abroad, or to invite foreign guests to the country. Despite
these mandated restrictions, in practice there is no restriction on
travel by the religious personnel of any denomination, including those
that are unregistered. Members of unregistered minority religious
organizations are allowed to bring in small quantities of religious
literature for their own use, but large shipments by unregistered
groups are prohibited.
One group of Russian ``old believers'' and some congregations of
Yezidis remain unregistered, according to the State Council on
Religions, because they do not wish to register; these groups have not
complained of religious discrimination.
As of year's end, registered religious groups had reported no
adverse consequences from the 1996 law. The ban on foreign funding has
not been enforced and is considered unenforceable by the Council on
Religious Affairs. The Council has such limited resources that it has
not performed any acts except the annual reregistering of religious
groups. No registered religious group was denied reregistration under
the amended law. All existing registered denominations have been
reregistered annually except the Hare Krishnas, whose members by 1998
had dropped below even the previous membership threshold of 50.
However, the Council on Religious Affairs continued to deny
registration to Jehovah's Witnesses, no longer on the grounds that the
group does not permit military service, but because its ``illegal
proselytism'' allegedly is integral to its activity and because of the
dissatisfaction and tension caused in some communities by its public
preaching. The State Council on Religions and Jehovah's Witnesses
continued to negotiate changes in the group's charter that would bring
it into compliance with the law, but in May the State Council again
refused to register the group, and a June statement by the head of the
council accused Jehovah's Witnesses of continuing to practice ``illegal
preaching. ``
Forty-one members of Jehovah's Witnesses remained in detention,
charged with draft evasion or, if forcibly drafted, with desertion. A
regional Jehovah's Witnesses official said that this higher number was
because Jehovah's Witnesses receiving draft notices now are reporting
directly to police and turning themselves in as draft evaders, rather
then being inducted and then claiming conscientious objector status.
Around 41 members of Jehovah's Witnesses reportedly were in hiding from
the draft. Alternative nonmilitary service is not available under
current law to members of Jehovah's Witnesses. The President's office
stated in March 1999 that a law was being drafted that would regulate
alternative service for Jehovah's Witnesses and other conscientious
objectors, but no action has been taken by year's end.
According to the law, a religious organization that has been
refused registration may not publish newspapers or magazines, rent
meeting places on government property, broadcast programs on television
or radio, or officially sponsor the visas of visitors. Members of
Jehovah's Witnesses continue to experience difficulty renting meeting
places and report that private individuals who are willing to rent them
facilities frequently are visited by police and warned not to do so.
Lack of official visa sponsorship means that visitors of Jehovah's
Witnesses must pay for a tourist visa. When shipped in bulk,
publications of Jehovah's Witnesses are seized at the border. Although
members supposedly are allowed to bring in small quantities of printed
materials for their own use, officials of Jehovah's Witnesses reported
that mail from one congregation to another, which they said was meant
for internal purposes rather than for proselytizing, still was
confiscated by overzealous customs officials. Despite these legal
obstacles, members of Jehovah's Witnesses continue their missionary
work fairly visibly and reported a gain in membership during 1999.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
repatriation; however, the Government places restrictions on some of
these rights. The Constitution and laws require that passports be
issued to all citizens except convicted felons; however, in cases of
permanent residents who wish to relocate abroad permanently, an exit
stamp may be denied to those persons who possess state secrets, to
those subject to military service, to those who are involved in pending
court cases, and to those whose relatives have lodged financial claims
against them. The exit stamp is valid for up to 5 years and can be used
as many times as an individual chooses to travel. Men of military age
must overcome substantial bureaucratic obstacles to international
travel. The Government does not restrict internal movement, and
citizens have the right to change their residence or workplace freely.
They must negotiate with a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy to
register these changes, but this practice is now more of a nuisance
than an impediment. In addition, registration of a residence is a
difficult process, particularly for those who live in a rented
dwelling.
Since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted between Armenia and
Azerbaijan in 1988, ethnic minorities on both sides have been subject
frequently to discrimination and intimidation, often accompanied by
violence intended to drive them from the country. Almost all the ethnic
Azeris living in Armenia at the time, some 185,000 persons, fled to
Azerbaijan. Of the 400,000 ethnic Armenians then living in Azerbaijan,
330,000 fled and gained refugee status in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The National Assembly passed a law on citizenship in 1996 that
provides for refugees of Armenian ethnicity to gain citizenship,
provided that they are stateless and have resided in the country for
the past 3 years. In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for
the law and began new efforts to encourage refugees to accept Armenian
citizenship. Although around 25,000 have done so, most are reluctant to
become citizens, fearing the loss of free housing, military service
exemptions, and other benefits accorded refugees.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting ethnic Armenian refugees.
The refugee law has no provisions in the law for granting refugee
and asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
respects the right of first asylum in principle, but in the absence of
a law specifying procedures for formal recognition of political asylum,
the small number of Sudanese and other migrants not of Armenian
ethnicity only rarely can obtain residence permits, and their legal
status remains unclear.
Border officials have no training on asylum issues. In some cases,
persons denied permission for legal residence are subjected to fines
for illegal residence when they attempt to depart the country. There
were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Serious flaws in the 1998 presidential election continued to
restrict the constitutional ability of citizens to change their
government peacefully. Serious breaches of the election law and
numerous irregularities in the 1995 parliamentary elections, and the
1996 and 1998 presidential elections, resulted in a lack of public
confidence in the integrity of the overall election process.
In both rounds of the 1998 presidential elections, OSCE observers
witnessed very substantial irregularities and concluded that the
elections seriously challenged international democratic norms in regard
to most key criteria. There were unusually high voter turnouts in
certain areas, particularly in the second round, and these increases
corresponded directly to high vote percentages for then Acting
President Kocharian. Based on detailed analysis of the results tracked
by observer reports in certain districts, it appears that ballot box
stuffing, discrepancies in vote counts, a large number of unauthorized
persons in polling stations, and other fraud perpetrated by local power
structures inflated the number of votes for Kocharian by well over
100,000 votes in the second round, which he won by approximately
290,000 votes. Some military units were compelled to vote without
exception for Kocharian, and officials used pressure to encourage a
large turnout for the ``official'' candidate. Voters enjoyed a full
spectrum of choices among candidates; all presidential candidates were
provided opportunities to present themselves to the electorate through
the provision of free and paid access to state media. However, state
television provided coverage biased heavily in favor of the acting
president. The electoral process fell far short of the authorities'
commitments to their citizens. There were no legal consequences for
electoral fraud. The Government pursued only minor violations, and no
penalties were announced. There was no criminal investigation of the
amply documented ballot box stuffing.
The 1999 parliamentary and municipal elections and several by-
elections during the year represented a step toward compliance with
OSCE commitments, but failed to meet international standards fully. For
example, the May 1999 parliamentary elections showed continued
improvement toward compliance with OSCE commitments, but still failed
to meet international standards. Nonetheless, during the election
observers from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) categorized the 1999 Parliamentary elections as a
relevant step towards compliance with OSCE commitments and noted
improvements in the electoral framework and the political environment
of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression were
respected during the campaign. The May 1999 elections took place under
a new electoral code that represented an improvement compared with
previous legislation and incorporated some recommendations of
international organizations. For example, the code provides for the
accreditation of domestic nonpartisan observers. It abolishes one level
of election bureaucracy (the community election commissions), and
provides for the courts to address electoral complaints during the
campaign rather than after results are announced. However, the
authorities never submitted the draft code to ODIHR for comments prior
to its adoption as had been promised.
Despite the provisions of the new code, election administration was
uneven on election day. In many precincts, election officials,
candidates' proxies, and domestic observers worked together to provide
transparent voting and counting procedures. The areas of most concern
witnessed by OSCE/ODIHR observers included the poor quality of the
voter lists, which were often outdated or inaccurate, mistakes in
registration and voting by military personnel, problems in the
formation of the election commissions and the status of their members,
and the presence of unauthorized personnel in precincts during voting
and counting procedures. Thousands of voters had to appeal to local
courts on election day in order to cast their votes, after finding that
their names had been left off local voter lists. Opposition parties
such as the National Democratic Union, the Self Determination Union,
the Communist Party, Hayrenik, and Azatutuyun criticized the exclusion
of numerous residents from the lists. The Central Election Commission
blamed the omissions on the negligence of some civil servants. Twelve
criminal cases related to parliamentary election fraud, involving 16
persons, currently are under investigation by the Prosecutor General's
office.
In a July 1999 by-election in Yerevan's Achapniak district,
violence erupted when armed supporters of one of the candidates beat
and opened fire on supporters of another candidate. The Central
Elections Commission suspended this vote and declared it invalid. A
criminal investigation was started, resulting in the arrest of 12
persons; the police still are seeking 10 more persons allegedly
involved in the Achapniak violence. According to the Prosecutor
General's office 12 persons eventually went to prison for the
Achapianak disturbances. Of those, 8 were sentenced to 2 years each,
while the remaining 4 got probationary terms of 16 to 20 months and
were released on probation. The Achapniak by-election subsequently was
held again with the two candidates involved in the altercation taken
off the ballot and took place without incident.
In the October 1999 municipal elections, the three major problems
were: The politicization of election commissions, obsolete or incorrect
voter lists, and the use of old seals (the election law mandates that
new ones be provided by regional election commissions for each
election, as a check on ballot box stuffing), presumably because the
funds were lacking to buy new seals.
Several Parliamentary by-elections and a mayoral election in the
town of Goris were held during the year. Most of the byelections were
carried out peacefully. After hearing extensive evidence about
irregularities in Yerevan's Arabik district, the Constitutional court
ordered the cancellation of the results in the July by-election. The
election was held again, and a different candidate won. An appeal by
the winner of the first election was considered but subsequently
rejected by the Central Elections Commission.
In Goris where the incumbent mayor had been removed by the
provincial governor in June for alleged impropriety in the conduct of
his office, the ousted incumbent, who lost the July election, claimed
that there were significant irregularities, including ballot-box
stuffing. The incumbent appealed the results; however, the appeal was
denied in December.
The Government has confirmed that a national census, previously
suspended for budgetary reasons, is expected to take place in 2001.
There is to be a test census in three regions in early 2001. This has
raised political concerns about the integrity of the process that is to
create new electoral districts, since existing voter rolls and other
population records are outdated and seriously flawed throughout the
country.
Under the Constitution, the President appoints the Prime Minister
and plays a role in the final selection of qualified candidates for
judgeships. The Constitution provides for independent legislative and
judicial branches, but in practice these branches are not insulated
from political pressure from the executive branch.
The Government appoints the 10 regional governors (marzpets) and
the mayor of Yerevan. The Constitution gives local communities the
right to elect local authorities. However, local elected officials have
limited powers and are overshadowed in practice by the appointed
governors, who can remove them from office.
The National Assembly consists of 131 deputies; 56 are elected on a
proportional basis and 75 on a district-by-district majoritarian basis.
Regular sessions are held twice a year: the first from mid-September to
mid-December, and the second from early February until mid-June. Given
the press of legislative business connected with the total reform of
the legal system, special sessions frequently are called, but may not
last more than 6 days.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women and
minorities in government and politics; however, due to traditional
social attitudes, both groups are underrepresented in all branches of
government. There are no female cabinet ministers, although there are
several female deputy ministers. Only 4 of the 131 deputies in the
Parliament are women. There are no minority representatives in the
Cabinet or in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and
NonGovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are several human rights NGO's organizations that are active
and operate openly, criticize abuses publicly, and publish their
findings on government human rights violations. In general public
access to information on human rights cases usually is adequate, with
extensive media coverage of significant court cases, but there was less
openness after the October 1999 shootings by civilian and military
prosecutors. However, nongovernmental human rights organizations often
report funding difficulties, and at least one, the well-respected
Helsinki Association, had to close its offices for part of the year due
to lack of funds. The Helsinki Committee continued to operate and did
receive permission to have access to detention facilities, and has made
several visits.
As part of the commitments it made in advance of joining the
Council of Europe (COE), the Government permitted monitoring of its
human rights practices by the COE and reaffirmed this right for the
ICRC, which retains full access to civilian detention facilities.
An office created by the prosecutor general in July 1997 to
communicate with international observers was responsive to requests for
information, although information about criminal cases stemming from
elections remained relatively general and incomplete.
Current electoral law allows local and international observer
organizations to monitor all elections, and such organizations reported
no impediments to being allowed to observe the 1999 elections and this
year's by-elections.
In 1998 President Kocharian appointed a prominent opposition
politician to head a new human rights commission headed by Paruyr
Hairikyan within the President's office. The commission exists
essentially as a reference bureau and has no formal legal powers;
however, it has had a modest impact in getting authorities to review
official actions on issues ranging from apartment allocations to police
behavior, in some cases winning official reconsideration. It refers
such cases to the appropriate agency, but it does not follow up on
specific issues. During the year, the commission visited those accused
in the October 1999 killings, visited the Gyumri jail, and frequently
visited military units to hear human rights complaints by soldiers. The
Parliamentary Commission on National Security, Defense, and Interior,
headed by Vahan Hovhanissian, has taken on a greater role this year by
making regular visits to military units to hear complaints by soldiers
as well.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, gender,
religion, disability, language, or social status; however, cultural and
economic factors prevent women, ethnic and religious minorities, and
persons with disabilities, from participating fully in public life. The
religion law discriminates against some religious groups.
Women.--There is no specific law banning violence against women,
and few cases of rape, spousal abuse, or other violence against women
were reported; however, their number likely is higher than the
statistics indicate. Domestic violence cases usually are not reported
to the police, and women are not protected from it. Several
nongovernmental organizations exist in the Yerevan and Gyumri areas,
which provide shelter and assistance to battered women.
During the year, the Prosecutor's Office registered 15 cases of
rape. The law (the old Soviet Criminal Code) cites specific punishments
for rape, forced abortion, forbidding a woman from marrying, and
discrimination in hiring due to pregnancy.
Prostitution is not illegal, and according to anecdotal evidence,
most prostitutes stopped by police for street-walking, simply are sent
to a hospital or physician for a medical check-up. Although, the
Criminal Code does not forbid prostitution itself, keeping brothels is
prohibited. According to an investigation conducted by journalists,
more than 1,600 prostitutes were registered by the police, around 800
in the Yerevan area. A study of Yerevan prostitution done by an
international NGO showed that while some operate by telephone, the vast
majority are what is known as streetwalkers, with their ``class'' and
desirability defined by the area of the city in which they operate.
An international NGO reports that the problem of battered wives is
much more widespread then the Government or local human rights groups
will admit. Domestic violence cases usually are not reported to the
police, and women are not protected from it. Many cases are not
reported to police in some cases because women are afraid of physical
harm if they do so, afraid that police will refuse to take action and
instead return them to their husbands, and in others because they are
embarrassed to make ``family matters'' public. Several NGO's in the
Yerevan and Gyumri areas provide shelter and assistance to battered
women; however, embarrassment and concerns for family honor make the
problem particularly sensitive and difficult to quantify. Even women's
groups and health professionals decline to offer specific figures, but
do not indicate that such violence is especially common. At least four
cases were reported in the press of women who died as a result of
domestic violence. During the year, 13 persons were prosecuted for
attempted rape.
In view of the phenomenon of Armenian women working as prostitutes
in Russia and the Middle East, it is likely that trafficking in women
and girls (particulary from the country) is more of a problem than the
Government and women's organizations have recognized openly. Twenty-six
cases of trafficking in women or procuring are now in the courts (see
Section 6.f.).
Police authorities announced in 1999 that there were numerous cases
of organized procuring under investigation, but since the main
initiators lived abroad, mostly in the Middle East, police were unable
to arrest them.
Males often play a dominant role in many societal institutions.
Although women have been present in the work force for several
generations, tolerance for broadening gender roles and for any gender
behavior is low especially in the regions. In the workplace, women
receive equal pay for equal work, but generally are not afforded the
same professional opportunities given to men and often are relegated to
more menial or low-skill jobs. The 1972 Law on Employment prohibits
discrimination in employment, but the extremely high unemployment rate
makes it difficult to gauge how effectively the law has been
implemented to prevent discrimination. Formerly, labor unions protected
women's rights, in the workplace at least nominally, but the weakness
of unions has rendered them less effective in this role (see Section
6.a.). According to official statistics, women make up 63.8 percent of
those officially registered as unemployed (approximately 181,000).
Currently there are more women receiving university and postgraduate
education than men. This may in part be accounted for by the Nagorno-
Karabakh situation, which necessitates a high number of males in
military service, and in part by the economic situation, which has
caused males to emigrate in search of employment.
Children.--The Government does not have the economic means to
provide fully for the welfare of children. Education is free,
universal, and compulsory through age 14, then optional through age 16
(complete secondary education). However, many facilities are
impoverished and in poor condition, and teachers are forced to tutor
pupils privately to supplement salaries that are low and irregularly
paid. Some teachers are known to demand bribes from parents in return
for good or passing grades for their children. Free children's health
care is available for all children through the age of 8 for treatment
of some diseases and for emergency cases, but is often of poor quality,
with an increasing trend toward overt or concealed payment of fees for
service.
Girls and boys receive equal educational opportunities. The
Government focuses its efforts regarding children's rights and welfare
on measures to insulate large families--those with four or more
children--from the effects of the country's current difficult
circumstances. The Government similarly directs foreign humanitarian
aid programs toward most socially vulnerable families and single parent
families. Despite social programs, the problem of street children
remains significant. However, the family tradition is strong, and child
abuse does not appear to be a serious problem. Trafficking in girls is
a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for the right
to social security in the event of disability. The 1993 Law on Invalids
provides for the social, political, and individual rights of the
disabled, but does not mandate the provision of accessibility for the
disabled. During the year, expenditures for the health sector increased
to $3.2 million (1.7 billion drams) from the projected level, which
affected persons with disabilities, who are supposed to be treated
free. According to the former Minister of Social Security, the social
sector budget was budgeted at $2.8 million (1.57 million drams). In the
current economic circumstances, and in an effort to meet international
financial institution guidelines on reduction of the budget deficit,
the Government has had difficulty fulfilling its commitments in this
area.
The Government's enforcement of the rights of the disabled remains
rudimentary. Legal safeguards for those with psychiatric problems are
inadequate to protect patients' rights. There is societal
discrimination against the disabled. Hospitals, residential care, and
other facilities for the seriously disabled do not meet international
norms. There were unsubstantiated reports that security authorities
used confinement in mental institutions as an alternative form of
detention (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
Religious Minorities.--There was no reported violence against
minority religious groups. However, newer religious groups are viewed
with suspicion, especially by some mid-level clergy in the Armenian
Apostolic Church and their supporters in the bureaucracy.
In April Jehovah's Witnesses returning from a religious service in
Yerevan reported being verbally and physically abused by local thugs
while police watched but did not intervene. In August the mayor and
town council published a decree expelling two members of Jehovah's
Witnesses from the town of Talin, near Yerevan, for alleged
``agitation.''
As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, anti-
Muslim feeling persists among the populace, and the few remaining
Muslims keep a low profile. There is only one mosque open for prayers.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is approximately
95 percent ethnic Armenian. The Government does not discriminate
against the small, officially recognized ``national'' communities,
although the economic and social situation of such groups has
deteriorated substantially since independence in 1991. Groups that the
Government includes in this category are Russians, Jews, Kurds,
Yezidis, Georgians, Greeks, and Assyrians. As a result of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, there is no significant Azeri minority (see Section
2.d.). Several hundred Azeris or persons of mixed Azeri heritage still
living in the country maintain a low profile in the face of societal
discrimination.
The Constitution grants national minorities the right to preserve
their cultural traditions and language, and the 1992 Law on Language
provides linguistic minorities with the right to publish and study in
their native language. There are token publications in minority
languages, but the Government has devoted minimal resources to
maintaining minority language schools. The large network of Russian-
language schools has diminished significantly in recent years. In
practice virtually all students, including members of the Yezidi and
Greek communities, now attend Armenian-language schools, with very
limited classes available in their native tongues. In the Yezidi
community, a high percentage of pupils do not attend school, partly for
family economic reasons and partly because of discrimination from
ethnic Armenian students and teachers.
Yezidi leaders continued to complain that police and local
authorities subject their community to discrimination. The Yezidis,
whose number is estimated at 54,000 by Yezidi leaders, speak a Kurdish
dialect and practice a traditional, nonChristian, non-Muslim religion
with elements derived from Zoroastrianism, Islam, and Animism. They
cite numerous incidents of unfair adjudication of land, water, and
grazing disputes, nonreceipt of privatized agricultural land, an
unusually high number of beatings of Yezidi conscripts in the army (see
Section 1.c.), and lack of police response to even serious crimes
committed against Yezidis. The Yezidi complaints likely reflect
societal discrimination as well as the more general problem of poorly
functioning local Government bodies.
In March the country's first Congress of National Minorities since
1991 was held. At the conference human rights did not appear to be a
major concern. Yezdis and Ukrainians complained of unfair treatment in
regard to forced military service. Most representatives demanded more
government aid for native-language newspapers and for broadcasting
minority directed programs on television.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides employees
with the right to form and join trade unions and the right to strike.
The Constitution stipulates that the right to form associations--
including political parties and trade unions--may be limited with
respect to persons serving in the armed services and law enforcement
agencies. A 1993 Presidential decree prohibits the Government and other
employers from retaliating against strikers and labor leaders, but
workers have little confidence in this protection. In practice labor
organization remains weak due to high unemployment and the weak
economy. Workers have neither the financial resources to maintain a
strike nor enforceable legal protection against retaliation, and
existing unions play a relatively passive role. However, there were no
reports of retaliation against strikers or labor leaders. The
purportedly Independent Labor Federation created in December 1997 took
no action during the year.
The absence of active unions and of accurate employment data
precludes a reliable estimate of the percentage of the workforce that
is unionized.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations;
however, none have done so to date.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is not practiced. The Constitution provides all citizens
with the right to a just wage no lower than the minimum set by the
Government. Although the 1992 Law on Employment provides for the right
to organize and bargain collectively, voluntary and direct negotiations
do not take place between unions and employers without the
participation of the Government, because most large employers remain
under state control. The near collapse of major industrial production
has undercut the organization of labor unions.
The Government encourages profitable factories to establish their
own pay scales. Factory directorates generally set the pay scales
without consultation with employees. The Arbitration Commission
adjudicates wage and other labor disputes.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the 1992 Law on Employment prohibit forced and bonded labor, including
that by children, and it generally is not known to occur; however,
trafficking in women and girls is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--According to the 1992 Law on Employment, 16 years is the
minimum age for employment. Children may work from the age of 14 with
the permission of a medical commission and the relevant labor union
board.
The Law on Employment is enforced by local community councils,
unemployment offices, and, as a final board of appeal, the arbitration
commission. Children under the age of 18 are not allowed to work in
difficult or dangerous jobs, night labor, or jobs that require over 6
hours of work per day, although waivers in the latter two cases can be
applied for by children 16 years or over.
According to the Ministry of Social Welfare some children are
involved in family businesses, as well as some other business
activities, up to the age of 12 years, in sectors like agriculture
where it is not forbidden by law. Children are forbidden specifically
from engaging in arduous or dangerous employment, even if it is their
families business without permission by the Ministry of Social Welfare
which is granted only on a case by case basis. Forced or bonded labor
by children is prohibited, and it generally is not known to occur;
however, trafficking in girls is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the minimum
wage by decree. In October 1998, Parliament quintupled the national
minimum wage to less than $10 (5,000 drams) per month; however, the
minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for
a worker and family. The majority of the population lives below the
officially recognized poverty line as a result of economic dislocations
caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 1988 earthquake, the
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the resulting blockade by Azerbaijan and
Turkey, and disruptions in trade. However, a significant amount of
economic activity takes place unrecorded and untaxed by local
authorities. The extent to which this improves the overall economic
situation is unknown.
The majority of industrial enterprises are either idle or operating
at a fraction of their capacity. Some furloughed workers still are
receiving minimal partial compensation from their enterprises, but most
are no longer receiving any payment if they are not working. The
standard legal workweek is 40 hours; many persons work multiple jobs.
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to clean and safe
work places, but Soviet-era occupational and safety standards remain in
force. Labor legislation from 1988 places responsibility on the
employer and the management of each firm to ensure ``healthy and
normal'' labor conditions for employees, but it provides no definition
of healthy and normal. The employment situation is such that workers
are reluctant to complain or remove themselves from hazardous working
conditions due to the risk of losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons specifically, although it does prohibit exploitation by
force of persons for financial gain, and trafficking in women and girls
from the country is a problem. However, specific information on
trafficking is difficult to obtain and there is little information
about trafficking within the country. The Criminal Code specifically
prohibits the keeping of what generally are considered to be brothels.
Prostitution itself is legal. Armenian women work as prostitutes in the
Middle East and Russia, and in the past there have been reports of
trafficking in women and girls to these countries. It is likely that
trafficking in women and girls is more of a problem than the Government
and women's organizations have recognized openly. According to
international NGO's, the Government appears to be focusing more on
prostitution within the country then on trafficking. There were reports
that older girls in local orphanages were approached with offers to
engage in prostitution, either locally or abroad. Police officials
announced the investigation of numerous cases of procuring but said
that they were unable to arrest the main offenders because they resided
in the Middle East rather than in Armenia (see Section 5). Cases of
trafficking in women currently in court are being prosecuted under the
Criminal Code prohibition on brothels.
__________
AUSTRIA
Austria is a constitutional democracy with a federal parliamentary
form of government. Citizens choose their representatives in periodic,
free, and fair multiparty elections. In February a new right-of-center
coalition came to power, comprised of the conservative People's Party
(OVP) and the far-right Freedom Party (FPO). The judiciary is
independent.
The police are subordinated to the executive and judicial
authorities. The national police maintain internal security. The army
is responsible for external security. The police are generally well
trained and disciplined, although some members of the police were
responsible for instances of human rights abuses.
The country's highly developed, market-based economy, with its mix
of technologically advanced industry, modern agriculture, and tourism,
affords its citizens a high standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. There were some reports of abuse by
police, which involved occasional beatings but mainly involved verbal
abuse and threats. Inclusion of the FPO in the Government was met with
widespread, generally peaceful protests in Vienna and other large
cities throughout the country. Many human rights organizations and
minorities feared that the country's general climate of tolerance and
respect for ethnic and religious diversity would worsen. This resulted
in a sharp increase in attention to and scrutiny of the country's human
rights situation by foreign governments, the Council of Europe, other
European Union (EU) member states, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's). A number of reports published by such observers expressed
concern about ambiguous racist and/or xenophobic comments of senior FPO
leaders, which it was feared would legitimize intolerance aimed at
minority groups. In September a group of 3 human rights experts
selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, as
accepted by the other 14 members of the EU, released a report on the
situation of minorities, refugees, and immigrants in the country, which
concluded that appropriate legal protection was available for these
groups. The new Government passed a comprehensive prominority rights
bill providing expanded constitutional protections for the six
officially recognized minorities. Violence against women is a problem,
which the Government is taking steps to address. Trafficking in women
for prostitution remains a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In May two drug-related deaths of foreign-born suspects while in
pretrial custody temporarily revived a debate about police brutality.
On May 3, a 26-year-old Nigerian asylum applicant, Richard Ibekwe, also
known as Peter Weah Richard, died while in pretrial detention for
suspected drug offenses. Witnesses reported that police officers beat
Ibekwe in the course of his arrest 2 weeks prior to his death. On May
5, a 40-year-old Slovakian also died while in police custody. Official
autopsies confirmed that both men died of drug overdoses. Due to
allegations of police brutality, an internal investigation into
Ibekwe's death was begun. The results were still pending at year's end.
In May 1999, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while
being deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped
shut to control his violent behavior (see Section 2.d.).
In March 1999, Franz Fuchs was convicted for killing 4 Roma in 1995
and injuring 15 other persons in a letter bomb campaign conducted
between 1993 and 1997 (see Section 5).
A French appeals court is considering an Austrian government
request for the extradition of the terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez
(alias ``Carlos the Jackal''). Austria formally has sought the
extradition of ``Carlos'' since French authorities captured him in
1994. He is wanted on charges of manslaughter, kidnaping, and blackmail
in connection with the terrorist attacks at Vienna's Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) headquarters in December 1975.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the Constitution prohibits such practices,
government statistics for 1999 showed 365 complaints against federal
police officials for ``unjustified use of force,'' compared with 356 in
1998. Of the 365 complaints, 292 resulted in investigations, compared
with 288 in 1998. Four officers were convicted of excessive use of
force in 1999; one officer was convicted in 1998. Types of abuse ranged
from slander to kicking and hitting, resulting mainly in bruising. Some
of the violence appeared to be racially motivated. An Interior Ministry
survey on the ``ethics of police conduct'' among policemen revealed
that half of the 2,000 policemen interviewed stated that they would not
report their colleagues in cases of misconduct.
In January two U.S. citizens involved in a dispute with a Viennese
nightclub alleged mistreatment by the police. Injuries included wrist
nerve damage and slight bruising. One of the men is HIV positive and
was denied access to his medication during his approximately 12-hour
incarceration. The two alleged that such mistreatment was directed
against them because of their homosexuality and nationality.
Investigation into this case was suspended by the public prosecutor's
office due to lack of evidence. In a separate case, a drug suspect who
was allegedly beaten during arrest later died in custody (see Section
1.a.).
In May 1999, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while
being deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped
shut to control his violent behavior. Two of the three police officers
who accompanied him were suspended, and a committee was created with
the goal of ensuring that the police and gendarmerie respect human
rights while carrying out their duties (see Section 2.d.).
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. In
individual cases, investigating judges or prison directors have
jurisdiction over questions of access to the defendant.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects
this prohibition.
In criminal cases the law provides for investigative or pretrial
detention for up to 48 hours; however, in cases of charges of
``aggressive behavior,'' an investigative judge may decide within that
period to grant a prosecution request for detention of up to 2 years
pending completion of an investigation. The grounds required for such
investigative detention are specified in the law, as are conditions for
bail. The investigative judge is required to evaluate an investigative
detention after 2 weeks, 1 month, and every 2 months after the arrest.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The Constitution provides that judges are independent in the
exercise of their judicial office. Judges cannot be removed from office
or transferred against their will. There are local, regional, and
regional higher courts, as well as the Supreme Court as the court of
highest instance. The system of judicial review provides for extensive
possibilities for appeal. Trials have to be public, and have to be
conducted orally. Persons charged with criminal offenses are to be
considered innocent until proven guilty. While the Supreme Court is the
court of highest instance for the judiciary, the Administrative Court
acts as the supervisory body over the administrative branch, and the
Constitutional Court presides over constitutional issues.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, and the Government generally respects this right
in practice; however, stringent slander laws tend to discourage reports
of police brutality, and foreign observers--including the European
Court of Human Rights--have concluded that the use of libel procedures
to protect politicians may hamper freedom of speech and the press. A
conviction for libel by a criminal court cannot be appealed to the
Constitutional Court. In most cases, judgments are handed down by a
court of appeals, which does not rely on case law. Several FPO
politicians have been accused of paying police officers to obtain
confidential information in order to discredit opponents of the FPO. An
investigation is underway under the auspices of an independent
committee. A number of officers have been suspended pending the
completion of the investigation. Since 1986 Joerg Haider, the former
FPO leader and current governor of Carinthia, has engaged in over 350
libel suits against media outlets and individuals. Following the
negative reaction to the FPO's inclusion in the Government, Haider
called for the prosecution of deputies critical of the Government under
a provision of the Criminal Code. Justice Minister Dieter Boehmdorfer
(FPO) received extensive criticism for his initial support for this
measure. Publications may be removed from circulation if they violate
legal provisions concerning morality or public security, but such cases
are extremely rare.
The Government monopoly in national radio has been dismantled. A
1993 law permitted licensing of regional private radio stations. There
are currently 36 commercial and 9 community radio stations. By the end
of 1999, 75.2 percent of citizens listened to state-run radio stations,
and 17 percent listened to private stations. While a law establishing
terrestrial frequencies for private television stations is expected to
be passed in 2001, the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF)
currently retains its monopoly on terrestrial television broadcasts.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and association, except for Nazi
organizations and activities (an exception stipulated also in the
Austrian State Treaty of 1955). The Law on the Formation of
Associations states that permission to form an organization may be
denied if it is apparent that the organization would pursue the illegal
activities of a prohibited organization.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion of individuals and the Government generally respects this
right in practice. However, the status of religious organizations is
governed by the 1874 ``Law on Recognition'' of churches and by a
January 1998 law establishing the status of ``confessional
communities.'' Religious recognition under the 1874 law has wide-
ranging implications; for example, the authority to participate in the
state-collected religious taxation program; to engage in religious
education; and to import religious workers to act as ministers,
missionaries, or teachers. Although in the past nonrecognized religious
groups have had problems obtaining resident permits for foreign
religious workers, administrative procedures adopted in 1997 have
addressed this problem in part. Officially, 75.3 percent of the
population are Roman Catholic, and there are 11 other recognized
religious organizations.
Religious organizations may be divided into three different legal
categories (listed in descending order of status): Officially
recognized religious societies, religious confessional communities, and
associations.
Under the law, religious societies have ``public corporation''
status. This status permits religious societies to engage in a number
of public or quasi-public activities that are denied to other religious
organizations. The Constitution singles out religious societies for
special recognition. State subsidies for religious teachers, at both
public and private schools, constitute one of the benefits provided to
religious societies that is not granted to other religious
organizations.
Previously some nonrecognized religious groups were able to
organize as legal entities or associations, although this route has not
been available universally. Some groups even have done so while
applying for recognition as religious communities under the 1874 law.
Many such applications for recognition were not handled expeditiously
by the Ministry of Education and Culture; in some cases, years passed
before a decision was made. Following years of bureaucratic delay and
an administrative court order instructing the Education Ministry to
render a decision, in 1997 the Ministry denied the request for
recognition of Jehovah's Witnesses. Jehovah's Witnesses appealed this
decision to the Constitutional Court.
In January 1998, a law went into effect that allows nonrecognized
religious groups to seek official status as confessional communities
without the fiscal and educational privileges available to recognized
religions. Religious confessional communities, once they are recognized
officially as such by the Government, have juridical standing, which
permits them to engage in such activities as purchasing real estate in
their own names and contracting for goods and services. To apply groups
must have 300 members and submit to the Government their written
statutes, describing the goals, rights, and obligations of members,
membership regulations, officials, and financing. Groups also must
submit a written version of their religious doctrine, which must differ
from that of any existing religion recognized under the 1874 law or
registered under the new law, for a determination that their basic
beliefs do not violate public security, public order, health and
morals, or the rights and freedoms of citizens. A religious
organization that seeks to obtain this new status is subject to a 6-
month waiting period from the time of application to the Ministry of
Education and Culture. The new law also sets out additional criteria
for eventual recognition according to the 1874 law, such as a 20-year
observation period (at least 10 of which must be as a group organized
as a confessional community under the new law) and membership equaling
at least two one-thousandths of the country's population. Many
religious groups and independent congregations do not meet the 300-
member threshold for registration under the new law. Only Jehovah's
Witnesses currently meet the higher membership requirement for
recognition under the 1874 law.
In a decision issued in March 1998, the Constitutional Court voided
the Education Ministry's decision on Jehovah's Witnesses and ordered a
new decision based on the January law on the Status of Confessional
Communities. In July 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses received the status of a
confessional community. According to the 1998 law, the group is now
subject to a 10-year observation period before they are eligible for
recognition.
The nine religious groups that have constituted themselves as
confessional communities according to the 1998 law are: Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Baha'i Faith, the Baptists, the Evangelical Alliance,
the Movement for Religious Renewal, the Pentecostalists, the Seventh-
Day Adventists, the Coptic Orthodox Church, and the Hindu religious
community. After initially filing for confessional community status,
the Church of Scientology withdrew its application from consideration.
The Ministry rejected the application of the Sahaja Yoga group; in 1998
the group appealed the decision to the Constitutional Court. A decision
was still pending on this case at year's end. Proponents of the law
describe it as an opportunity for religious groups to become officially
registered as religious organizations, providing them with a government
``quality seal.'' However, numerous religious groups not recognized by
the State, as well as some religious law experts dismiss the purported
benefits of obtaining status under the law and have complained that the
law's additional criteria for recognition under the 1874 law obstruct
claims to recognition and formalize a second-class status for
nonrecognized groups. Experts have questioned the law's
constitutionality.
After the Education Ministry granted Jehovah's Witnesses the status
of Confessional Community, the group immediately in 1998 requested that
it be recognized as a religious group under the 1874 law. The Education
Ministry denied the application, on the basis that, as a confessional
community, Jehovah's Witnesses would need to submit to the required 10-
year observation period. The group has appealed this decision to the
Constitutional Court, arguing that a 10-year observation period is
unconstitutional. A decision was still pending at year's end.
Also in 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses filed a complaint with the
European Court for Human Rights, arguing that the group has not yet
been granted full status as a religious entity under the 1874 law,
despite having made numerous attempts for more than 2 decades. A
decision was still pending at year's end.
Religious organizations that do not qualify for either religious
society or confessional community status may apply to become
associations. This status is granted relatively freely, although
associations do not have legal standing and are unable to purchase
property, churches, or engage in other activities permitted to the
other two legal categories.
The Government continued its information campaign against religious
sects that it considered potentially harmful to the interests of
individuals and society. In September 1999, the Ministry for Social
Security and Generations issued a new edition of a controversial
brochure that described numerous nonrecognized religious groups in
negative terms, which many of the groups deemed offensive. This
brochure includes information on Jehovah's Witnesses, despite its
status as a confessional community. On April 6, the new Minster for
Social Security and Generations, Elisabeth Sickl (FPO), announced plans
to support the training of ``specialists'' among teachers and youth
leaders in order to sensitize them to the dangers posed by some
nonrecognized religious groups to the young. She also pledged to
include representatives from provincial governments in an
interministerial working group to decide on measures to ``protect
citizens from the damaging influence of sects, cults, and esoteric
movements.'' These statements were interpreted in some circles as
evidence that the Freedom Party's participation in government may
strengthen efforts to curb the role of nonrecognized religious groups.
Sickl left office in October. Her successor has made no public
statements on this issue. The federal office on sects continues to
collect and distribute information on organizations considered sects.
Under the law, this office has independent status, but its head is
appointed and supervised by the Minister for Social Security and
Generations.
In April 1999, the Conservative People's Party (OVP) convention
formally accepted a decision made by the party's executive board in
1997 that party membership is incompatible with membership in a sect.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict
movement, including emigration. Citizens who leave the country have the
right to return at any time.
The new coalition adopted the policy of the outgoing SPO-led
cabinet that the Government needs to focus on integration prior to
considering any new immigration. In June Economics Minister Martin
Bartenstein (OVP) issued a decree liberalizing existing employment
restrictions for certain groups of legal aliens, paving the way for
their integration into the labor market. Also in June, the
Constitutional Court rejected the current upper age limit of 14 for the
visa category of family reunification as too restrictive. The
Government did not decide on its response to this decision but is
considering adopting the EU standard of age 16 as the cutoff for this
category. In the first 6 months of the year, the number of illegal
aliens seized by police was 20,606, an 18.4 percent increase over the
same period in 1999.
The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government
subscribes to the ``safe country'' concept, which requires asylum
seekers who enter illegally to depart and seek refugee status from
outside the country. In response to continuing criticism by the office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations, the Government passed an amendment to the
1991 asylum law in 1997 designed to bring some improvements to the
``safe country'' rule and the appellate procedure. The Government
cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations
generally approve of the 1997 asylum law, but there is still some
dissatisfaction with its implementation. A January amendment to the
1997 asylum law, which authorizes the Ministry of Interior to draw up a
``white list'' of ``safe third countries,'' drew sharp criticism from
human rights and refugee advocacy groups. There is widespread
opposition to this concept based on the fear that it compromises the
principle of individual investigation of claims. This principle was
upheld in a February 1999 ruling of the administrative court and again
in a March 2000 ruling. In both cases the High Court reversed a denial
of asylum made on the basis of the ``safe third country'' rule.
Making government care available to all needy asylum applicants
until their claims are processed was a focal point of the year's agenda
of the UNHCR regional office. In principle asylum applicants are
entitled to federal assistance for food, shelter, and medical care.
However, the Federal Care Provisions Act specifically states that there
is no corresponding legal right for applicants. The result is that
asylum applicants denied assistance have no legal recourse if denied
these benefits. The Government grants assistance to only one-third of
all asylum applicants who face financial hardship; one-third are forced
to rely on charitable assistance, and the remaining applicants
abandoned their applications and are believed to have left the country
to apply for asylum elsewhere. Individuals found to be bona fide
refugees by government authorities are not sent back to the countries
from which they fled. Asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected by
the Federal Asylum Office may appeal to the independent Federal Asylum
Senate; the Administrative Court is the court of last instance.
Of the estimated 95,000 Bosnian refugees who arrived between April
1992 and July 1993, the Government provided temporary protected status
(TPS), similar to first asylum, to 47,000, which made them eligible to
receive government assistance without having to file asylum
applications. Most of the other 48,000 refugees were deemed to have
other means of support, either from families already present in Austria
or from nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The overwhelming number
of all Bosnian refugees has been integrated into the labor market. They
now hold ``gastarbeiter'' status, which means that their residency
permit is evaluated each year on the basis of the country's overall
labor demand. Many of the refugees have chosen voluntarily to return to
their homeland, a process that still continues. The Government's
program of assistance for Bosnian war refugees in TPS expired on July
31. As of that date, approximately 300 Bosnian refugees formerly in TPS
remained in the country and are now being supported by the social
welfare system.
During the Kosovo crisis, Austria accepted an estimated 10,000 to
15,000 refugees. A total of 5,080 Kosovar Albanians were evacuated
directly from Macedonia and admitted to Austria under cover of TPS.
Also, the immigration law was modified to allow Kosovar Albanians
already in the country in a variety of statuses to extend their stay.
In December approximately 1,593 Kosovar Albanians of the total of 5,080
refugees under TPS remained in the country. They receive public
assistance under a care program similar to the one set up during the
Bosnian crisis. The Interior Ministry has agreed to extend the July
2000 deadline for the repatriation of approximately 1,200 Kosovar
refugees in three categories: 1) those needing protection, 2) those
supported financially by relatives residing legally in Austria, and 3)
Kosovars who earlier were granted temporary protected status or asylum
and already were integrated into the labor market. The Government has
said that the 226 Kosovars in need of protection would be permitted to
stay in the country for at least another year, whereas the other two
categories are to be granted humanitarian residence status temporarily
until new immigration quotas become formally available in 2001.
Preliminary figures for asylum applications during the year
indicate a decrease by almost 10 percent from 1999 figures to 18,290.
In 1999 there were 20,096 asylum applications, a significant increase
over the 1998 total of 13,805. In 1999 3,434 applications were accepted
and 3,573 were denied, compared with 500 approvals and 3,491 denials in
1998. The 1999 approval figure includes asylum seekers from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (2,953), Afghanistan (108), Iran (99), Iraq
(80), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (26). The record 1999
approval rate of 49 percent (compared with 11.5 percent in 1998) is
attributed to the Kosovo conflict. Improved border controls resulting
from the 1997 full implementation of the Schengen Agreement have led to
an increase in asylum applications. Aliens who formerly used the
country as a transit point increasingly are filing asylum applications
upon arrival.
In May 1999, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant, Marcus
Omofuma, died while being deported to Lagos via Sofia, Bulgaria (see
Section 1.a.). Because of Omofuma's violent, uncooperative behavior,
accompanying Austrian police physically restrained him, including
taping his mouth shut to silence his loud outcries. Omofuma lost
consciousness during the flight and was pronounced dead upon arrival in
Sofia. The incident prompted a complete review of internal procedures
regarding deportations. Two of the three police officers who
accompanied Omofuma were suspended. The Interior Ministry created the
Human Rights Advisory Council, composed of representatives from the
Justice and Interior Ministries, as well as NGO's, to ensure that the
police and gendarmerie respect human rights while carrying out their
duties. In addition, the Ministry announced a new policy requiring that
all potentially violent individuals be deported via chartered aircraft,
rather than on commercial flights. The investigation into the Omofuma
case is ongoing. Civil charges, filed on behalf of Omofuma's daughter
stating that Omofuma's human rights were violated, are also pending.
In August the Human Rights Advisory Council released a report
criticizing the conditions of deportation detention for minors as not
meeting minimum international standards. The council's report to the
Ministry of Interior lists 43 recommendations aimed at correcting the
implementation of current legal provisions or at amending the law.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully. Citizens exercise this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. National elections were held in October 1999, in which the
Social Democrats (SPO) won 65 seats in Parliament; the Freedom party
(FPO) 52; the People's Party (OVP) 52; and the Green Party 14. On
February 4, the OVP and FPO formed a right-of-center coalition
government, headed by the OVP.
Women play an active role but are underrepresented in government
and politics. Approximately 27 percent of the Members of Parliament and
5 of 16 cabinet members are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. In some cases, they have been dissatisfied with the
information that the authorities have supplied in response to specific
complaints. There have been no reports of discrimination against
organizations that report on human rights.
Following the inclusion of the FPO in the Government, several NGO's
expressed concern that the country's climate of tolerance and respect
for ethnic and religious diversity would worsen. During the summer, a
group of 3 human rights experts, accepted by the other 14 EU member
states, conducted a review of the rights of minorities, refugees, and
immigrants in the country. Their report, published in September,
concluded that appropriate legal protection was available for
minorities.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law provides for protection against any of these kinds of
discrimination in employment, provision of welfare benefits, and other
matters, and the Government generally enforces its provisions
effectively. There were allegations that police abused homosexuals (see
Section 1.c.).
Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. An estimated
300,000 women are abused annually. Police and judges enforce laws
against violence; however, less than 10 percent of abused women are
estimated to file complaints. Overall, the Association of Houses for
Battered Women estimates that one-fifth of the country's 1.5 million
adult women has suffered from violence in a relationship. In July 1999,
legislators passed an amendment to the 1997 Law on the Protection
Against Violence in the Family, extending the period during which
police can expel abusive family members from family homes. Between
January and June, the injunction to prevent abusive family members from
returning home was applied in 1,687 cases. The Government also sponsors
shelters and help lines for women.
Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.). While
prostitution is legal, trafficking for the purposes of prostitution is
illegal.
Most legal restrictions on women's rights have been abolished. In
1994 the European Court of Justice ruled that the country's law
prohibiting women from working nights was not permissible and gave the
Government until 2001 to adapt its legislation to gender-neutral EU
regulations. Legislation went into effect in January 1998, requiring
that collective bargaining units take action by 2001 to eliminate
restrictions on nighttime work for women.
In October the Freedom Party replaced Social Security and
Generations Minister Elisabeth Sickl with FPO Member of Parliament
Herbert Haupt. The Government received extensive criticism for
replacing the head of this ministry, which oversees women's affairs,
with a man. A Federal Equality Commission and a Federal Commissioner
for Equal Treatment oversee laws prescribing equal treatment of men and
women. Sixty percent of women between the ages of 15 and 60 are in the
labor force. Despite substantial gains, women's incomes continue to
average 30 percent less than those of men.
In September the U.N. Committee on Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women released a report criticizing the new Government's
treatment of women, including its decision to abolish the Federal
Women's Affairs Ministry and fold its portfolio into the newly created
Ministry of Social Affairs and Generations. The Committee was
especially concerned about immigrant women's access to employment.
As of January 1, 1998, women were allowed to serve in the military
voluntarily. On April 1, 1998, the first two women began training. On
December 1, 1998, the first women, both doctors, were taken into the
military. The long-term expectation is that women may make up about 5
percent of the military. As of August, there were a total of 104 women
serving in the military. This includes 6 officers, 2 of whom currently
are serving in peacekeeping operations abroad, and 13 noncommissioned
officers (NCO's). There are 7 women currently undergoing officer
training and 52 training to be NCO's. The remaining 26 are training as
high-level athletes. There are no restrictions on the type or location
of assignments given to women.
Although labor laws provide for equal treatment for women in the
civil service, they remain underrepresented. To remedy this
circumstance, a 1993 law requires hiring women of equivalent
qualifications ahead of men in civil service areas in which less than
40 percent of the employees are women; however, there are no penalties
for failing to attain the 40 percent target. Critics of the Government
raised the issue of sexual equality in a proposed ``objectivity law''
on personnel appointments in the civil service. They are asking for
provisions that provide parity between men and women on personnel
appointment panels.
Women may be awarded compensation of up to 4 months' salary if
discriminated against in promotions because of their sex. The Labor
Court also can order employers to compensate victims of sexual
harassment.
Women's rights organizations are partly politically affiliated, and
partly autonomous groups. In voicing their concerns, they receive wide
public attention. Despite fears of women's rights groups, the new
coalition asserted that these groups would continue to receive
government subsidies.
Children.--Laws protect the vast majority of children's rights
established in international conventions and in some respects go beyond
them. Each provincial government and the federal Ministry for Youth and
Family Affairs has an ``Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents''
whose main function is to resolve complaints about violations of rights
of children.
While 9 years of education are mandatory for all children,
beginning at age 6, the Government also provides free education through
the level of technical or vocational programs or university.
Educational opportunity is equal for girls and boys. Comprehensive,
government-financed medical care is available for all children without
regard to gender.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children, although
heightened awareness of child abuse has led the Government to increase
its efforts to monitor the issue and prosecute offenders. The growing
number of reported incidences of child abuse is considered a result of
increased public awareness of the problem. According to the Penal Code,
sexual intercourse between an adult and a child (under 14 years of age)
is punishable with a prison sentence of up to 10 years; in case of
pregnancy of the victim, the sentence can be extended to up to 15
years. In 1999 the Ministry of Justice reported 690 cases of child
abuse involving either intercourse with a minor (paragraph 206 of the
Penal Code) or attempted intercourse with a minor (paragraph 207). Of
these, 519 cases were investigated. In 1998 there were 745 cases
involving the same sections of the Penal Code, of which 554 were
investigated, resulting in 252 convictions.
Stricter regulations on child pornography went into effect in 1997.
Under the new laws, any citizen engaging in child pornography in a
foreign country becomes punishable under Austrian law even if the
actions are not punishable in the country where this violation was
committed. The laws also entail more severe provisions for the
possession, trading, and private viewing of pornographic materials. For
example, exchanging videos is now illegal even if done privately rather
than as a business transaction.
People with Disabilities.--The law protects disabled individuals
from discrimination in housing, education, and employment. In July
1997, Parliament passed an amendment to the Constitution explicitly
requiring the State to provide for equal rights for the disabled ``in
all areas of everyday life. `` The law requires all private enterprises
and state and federal government offices to employ 1 disabled person
for every 25 to 45 employees, depending on the type of work. Employers
who do not meet this requirement must pay a fee to the Government, and
the proceeds help finance services for the disabled such as training
programs, wage subsidies, and workplace adaptations. However, the law
has received some criticism, since many observers believe that
penalties are too low to discourage companies from bypassing the
requirement. No federal law mandates access for the physically
disabled; some public buildings are virtually inaccessible to those
unable to climb stairs.
Mentally retarded women can be sterilized involuntarily at the
request of parents; in the case of minors; or, by request of the
responsible family member or by court order, in the case of adults. One
political party has called for restrictive legislation to make it more
difficult to sterilize mentally retarded women; however, no legislative
action has ever been taken on this proposal.
Religious Minorities.--Members of various nonrecognized religious
groups complained of discrimination and harassment by the public. The
head of the Lutheran Church in Burgenland, Gertrude Knoll, who spoke
out against intolerance and xenophobia at a February political
demonstration, was subjected to hate mail and threats against herself
and her family. It was widely assumed, but never proven, that FPO
supporters were behind the hate campaign.
The leader of the country's Jewish community reported that persons
within the community who took a stand against racism and xenophobia
(including himself) were subjected to verbal and written threats. The
FPO's attitudes against foreigners and minorities reportedly led some
members of the Jewish community to consider leaving the country.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--While statistics for the first
half of the year showed a marked increase in the number of official
complaints of neo-Nazi, right-wing extremist, or xenophobic incidents,
the Interior Ministry estimates that figures for the calendar year
indicate a slight overall decrease compared to 1999. In 1999 the
Ministry recorded 311 rightwing incidents, 15 anti-Semitic incidents,
and 52 xenophobic incidents, which led to a total of 25 convictions. In
1998 there were 244 reported rightwing incidents, 31 anti-Semitic
incidents, and 8 xenophobic incidents, with 41 convictions. The
Government expressed concern over the activities of extreme-right
skinhead and neo-Nazi groups, many with links to organizations in other
countries. Despite ongoing budgetary austerity, the Government retained
the previous year's funding levels for ethnic minorities in the 2000
budget.
In August the domestic media reported that the European Commission
Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) issued a confidential report to
the Government recommending the swift implementation of additional
measures against racism, xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance.
Members of the Commission reportedly expressed ``deep concern about the
extensive use of racist and xenophobic remarks by Austrian
politicians.''
In July the Government passed a comprehensive prominority rights
bill providing expanded constitutional protections for the country's
six officially recognized minorities. In response to a longstanding
demand by minority representatives, the governing coalition committed
to ``honor and promote its historic minorities'' as a constitutionally
anchored policy goal. In a related development, the Government approved
the placement of bilingual town signs in Croat- and Hungarian-speaking
areas of Burgenland province, an action pending since 1955. The
Government also agreed to continue funding, albeit at lower levels,
privately run minority radio stations. In Carinthia Governor Haider
promised to fulfill a longstanding demand by the resident Slovene
minority for a dedicated seat in the provincial assembly. Haider also
promised to implement additional prominority measures in the province's
preschool system. Minority representatives acknowledged all these
measures, but some critics contend that the recent spate of prominority
measures is clearly a result of EU sanctions.
In October 1999, authorities arrested 69 suspected neo-Nazis in the
province of Upper Austria. The group had contacts with neo-Nazis in
several other countries. In a separate action in November 1999, 17
skinheads in the same province were charged with violation of the law
against neo-Nazi activities.
In March 1999, Franz Fuchs was convicted of conducting a
xenophobic, deadly letter bomb campaign between 1993 and 1997. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment but committed suicide in February.
During the national election campaign, the Freedom Party exploited
the fears of many citizens that EU expansion and a continued influx of
asylum seekers and refugees from the Balkans and other areas would
result in uncontrolled immigration. The Vienna FPO chapter widely
distributed placards carrying anti-immigrant slogans, including a call
to stop ``overforeignization.''
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and
join unions without prior authorization, under general constitutional
provisions regarding freedom of association. In practice trade unions
have an important and independent voice in the political, social, and
economic life of the country. Fifty-two percent of the work force are
organized into 13 national unions belonging to the Austrian Trade Union
Federation (OGB), which has a highly centralized leadership structure.
Association of national unions with the OGB is voluntary. Individual
unions and the OGB are independent of government or political party
control, although formal factions within these organizations are allied
closely with political parties.
Although the right to strike is not provided explicitly in the
Constitution or in national legislation, it is universally recognized.
Historically strikes have been comparatively few and usually of short
duration. A major reason for the record of labor peace is the
unofficial system of ``social partnership'' among labor, management,
and government. At the center of the system is the Joint Parity
Commission for Wages and Prices, which has an important voice on major
economic questions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
right to organize and bargain collectively. Almost all large companies,
private or state-owned, are organized. Worker councils operate at the
enterprise level, and workers are entitled by law to elect one-third of
the members of the supervisory boards of major companies. Collective
agreements covering wages, benefits, and working conditions are
negotiated by the OGB with the National Chamber of Commerce and its
associations, which represent the employers. The Joint Parity
Commission sets wage and price policy guidelines. A 1973 law obliges
employers in enterprises with more than five employees to prove that
job dismissals are not motivated by antiunion discrimination. Employers
found guilty of this offense are required to reinstate workers. Labor
and business representatives remain in a longstanding disagreement over
how to comply with the obligation under the International Labor
Organization's Convention 98 to provide legal protection to employees
against arbitrary dismissals in firms with five employees or fewer.
Typically legal disputes between employers and employees regarding
job-related matters are handled by a special arbitration court for
social affairs. The OGB is exclusively responsible for collective
bargaining. The leadership of the Chamber of Labor, the Chamber of
Commerce, and the OGB are elected democratically.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
prohibited by law and generally is not practiced. Trafficking in women
for the purpose of forced prostitution remains a problem (see Section
6.f.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
enforces this prohibition effectively.
Former forced laborers have filed suits against Austrian companies
that used forced labor provided by the Nazi government. In October an
agreement was signed between the Government, attorneys representing
former forced and slave laborers, and representatives of foreign
governments, providing for compensation for former forced and slave
laborers. In July Parliament unanimously passed legislation authorizing
the payment of $418 million (6 billion ATS) for victims of forced and
slave labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum legal working age is 15 years. The Labor
Inspectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs effectively enforces the
law. The Government has adopted laws and policies to protect children
from exploitation in the work place. The law prohibits forced and
bonded child labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition
effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated national
minimum wage. Instead, nationwide collective bargaining agreements set
minimums by job classification for each industry. The generally
accepted unofficial minimum gross income is $11,200 (168,000 ATS) per
year. Every worker is entitled to a variety of generous social
benefits. The average citizen has a high standard of living, and even
the minimum wages are sufficient to permit a decent living for workers
and their families.
Although the legal workweek has been established at 40 hours since
1975, more than 50 percent of the labor force is covered by collective
bargaining agreements that set the workweek at 38 or 38+ hours.
Extensive legislation, regularly enforced by the Labor Inspectorate
of the Ministry of Social Affairs, provides for mandatory occupational
health and safety standards. Workers may file complaints anonymously
with the Labor Inspectorate, which may bring suit against the employer
on behalf of the employee; however, this option is rarely exercised, as
workers normally rely instead on the Chambers of Labor, which file
suits on their behalf.
The Labor Code provides that workers have the right to remove
themselves from a job if they fear ``serious, immediate danger to life
and health'' without incurring any prejudice to their job or career.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no single law covering
trafficking in persons generally, but several laws contain provisions
that apply to this problem. Trafficking for the purpose of prostitution
is illegal, and the law provides for a jail sentence of up to 10 years
for convicted traffickers. Prostitution itself is legal. Another law
covers trafficking in persons for purposes other than prostitution.
NGO's report that enforcement is weak and that convicted traffickers
generally receive sentences of less than 3 years imprisonment. A
leading domestic NGO reports that the country has shifted from being a
transit country to a major final destination, primarily for women from
Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union who are
trafficked into prostitution and other forms of forced dependency.
Convictions for trafficking in women and children increased by 162
percent. Police estimate that one-fourth of trafficking in women in the
country is controlled by organized crime. Austria is particularly
attractive to traffickers due to its geographic location and to the
fact that citizens of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary do not
require visas to enter the country. On March 24, the Interior Ministry
announced draft legislation to enact stronger penalties against alien
smuggling. The maximum penalty for the most serious offenses would
increase from 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. In the first 6 months of the
year, the authorities arrested 133 smugglers of persons.
A witness protection program granting temporary resident status to
women willing to testify against their traffickers went into effect on
January 1, 1998. In the past, because so few witnesses agreed to
testify against their traffickers, prosecution was difficult, and those
trafficked often simply were expelled from the country. The witness
protection plan is aimed at generating more support from witnesses;
however, victims still rarely agree to testify, due to fear of
retribution. The temporary resident status allows victims to stay in
the country only during a trial; no provisions are made for them to
stay in the country following their testimony. Virtually all victims
are deported. Various NGO's, with the support of the Government, have
begun to broaden their assistance and strong support for battered
spouses to include those women seeking to flee from the prostitution
traps created by criminal elements. There is one NGO center that
provides comprehensive counseling, educational services, and emergency
housing to victims of trafficking.
__________
AZERBAIJAN
Azerbaijan is a republic with a presidential form of government.
Heydar Aliyev, who assumed presidential powers after the overthrow of
his democratically elected predecessor in 1993, was reelected in
October 1998 in a controversial election marred by numerous, serious
irregularities, violations of the election law, and lack of
transparency in the vote counting process at the district and national
levels. President Aliyev and his supporters continue to dominate the
government and the multiparty 125-member Parliament. Parliamentary
elections held in November showed some progress over the flawed 1995
elections in that political pluralism was advanced; however, there were
numerous serious flaws; and the elections did not meet international
standards. Serious irregularities included the disqualification of half
of the prospective candidates in the single mandate elections, a flawed
appeals process, ballot box stuffing, manipulated turnout results,
premarked ballots, severe restrictions on domestic nonpartisan
observers, and a completely flawed vote counting process. The
Constitution, adopted in a 1995 referendum, established a system of
government based on a division of powers among a strong presidency, a
legislature with the power to approve the budget and impeach the
President, and a nominally independent judiciary. The judiciary does
not function independently of the executive branch and is corrupt and
inefficient.
The police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of
National Security are responsible for internal security. Members of the
police continue to commit numerous human rights abuses.
Azerbaijan continued to affirm its commitment to an economic
transition from central planning to a free market; however, reforms
stagnated in practice. Economic growth has been spurred by substantial
foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector, but it is offset by
widespread corruption and patronage. While government statistics
pointed to continued economic growth during the year, the real economy
continues to be affected by a low level of foreign business activity
due largely to low oil prices in 1999, a lack of oil industry
infrastructure, widespread corruption and a deteriorating business
climate. Consistently high oil prices appear to be reversing that
trend. The country has rich petroleum reserves and significant
agricultural potential. Oil and oil products are the largest export,
followed by cotton and tobacco. Other key industries are chemicals and
oil field machinery. The government signed new oil production sharing
agreements with foreign oil companies and a group of eight oil
companies formed a sponsors group and began engineering studies for the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline. Agriculture employs 36
percent of the labor force and makes up 22 percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP). The leading crops are wheat, fruit and
vegetables, cotton, tobacco, and grapes. Privatization of industry was
postponed while the government rewrote its privatization laws to bring
them up to international standards. On August 10, President Aliyev
issued a decree to implement the new privatization law adopted by the
Parliament in May. Large enterprises remain almost exclusively under
government control and operate at a fraction of their capacity. The
accumulation of large wage arrears is common. Private retail
enterprises, cotton gins, and grain mills are proliferating. More than
90 percent of the nation's farmland is now in private hands, but new
small farmers have poor access to credit and markets, and commercial
agriculture remains weak. Per capita GDP is approximately $500 per
year. Much of the labor force is employed in the state sector where
wages are low. The overall economic situation of the average citizen
remains tenuous, although in urban areas a growing moneyed class with
trade and oil-related interests has emerged. According to official
statistics, the economy now is only 60 percent of the size of the
economy in 1991. According to the World Bank, 60 percent of the
citizens live in poverty. Severe disparities of income have emerged
that are attributed partly to patronage and corruption.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
were improvements in a few significant areas, serious problems remain.
The Government continues to restrict citizens' ability to change their
government peacefully. Police tortured and beat persons in custody,
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, and conducted searches and
seizures without warrants. In most instances, the Government took no
action to punish abusers, although perpetrators were prosecuted in a
handful of cases. Prison conditions remained harsh, and some prisoners
died as a result of these conditions. Lengthy pretrial detention is
still a problem. The judiciary is corrupt, inefficient, and subject to
executive influence. Corruption continued to pervade most government
organs, and it is widely believed that most persons in appointed
government positions and in state employment purchased their positions.
During the year a total of five presidential pardons and amnesties
resulted in the release of approximately 300 prisoners, including some
political prisoners. The Government holds about 50 political prisoners.
The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights. The Government
continues to limit freedom of speech and of the press. Although the
Government abolished censorship in August 1998, government officials
throughout the year sought to intimidate independent and opposition
newspapers by suing them for defamation. As a result, journalists
practiced self-censorship. Nevertheless, scores of opposition and
independent newspapers continue to publish and discuss a wide range of
sensitive domestic and foreign policy issues. Criticism of the
Government and of the Aliyev family is not uncommon; however,
journalists were subject to violence on occasion by unknown assailants
who sought to stop media criticism of the Government. The Government
continued to deny broadcast licenses to all truly independent
organizations that applied to open television and radio stations. The
Government also tightly controls official radio and television, the
primary source of information for most of the population.
The Government restricted freedom of assembly and association.
Although local authorities in Baku permitted several demonstrations to
take place, the locations negotiated with the city government were not
those preferred by the opposition and were subject to heavy police
surveillance. Baku authorities broke up unsanctioned demonstrations and
pickets throughout the year. Opposition political parties tried to hold
smaller-scale meetings and seminars throughout the country; although
many do take place, local authorities refuse to sanction some. The
Government continues to refuse to register some political parties.
There are currently 38 registered political parties, 20 of which are
considered to be opposition parties. The Government registered the
opposition Azerbaijan Democratic Party after a long delay in February.
After a series of crackdowns on religious groups in the summer and fall
of 1999, the Government improved its record on religious liberty
following President Aliyev's public commitment to do so in November
1999. The Government acted to redress earlier harassment by lower-level
government and security officials, including arrests, deportation
orders, and a failure to register religious groups. However, harassment
of some non-traditional religious groups by lower-level and local
government officials continued. The authorities broke up religious
observances, and bureaucratic harassment, including lengthy delays in
registration, continued for some religious organizations. The
Government at times restricted freedom of movement. The Government
controlled the electoral process. Although parliamentary elections held
in November showed some improvement over the flawed 1995 elections,
numerous serious irregularities marred the process. The Government
criticized certain domestic human rights activists. Domestic human
rights NGO's routinely experience problems with registration. Violence
and discrimination against women and discrimination against certain
religious minorities are problems. The Government limits some worker
rights. Trafficking in persons, particularly women for the purpose of
forced prostitution, is a problem.
After years of interethnic conflict between Armenians and
Azerbaijanis, Armenian forces and forces of the self-styled ``Republic
of Nagorno-Karabakh'' (which is not recognized by any government)
continue to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory. A cease-fire
was concluded in 1994, and the peace process continues. Beginning in
1999, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia held a series of direct
meetings to discuss a compromise resolution. These meetings have yet to
yield concrete results. Exchanges of fire occurred sporadically along
the Azerbaijan-Armenian border and along the line of contact with
Nagorno-Karabakh, causing numerous casualties. Military operations of
1989-94 continue to affect the civilian population to this day. There
were four civilian and four military casualties during the year caused
by landmines. In 1999 three persons were killed and five were wounded
by landmines. These landmines were laid near the disputed area by the
governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Karabakh Armenian
authorities. There are approximately 800,000 Azerbaijani refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDP's) who cannot return to their homes
in Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories and approximately
300,000 Armenians who cannot return to Baku and other cities in
Azerbaijan.
The Government of Azerbaijan does not exercise any control over
events inside of Nagorno-Karabakh. Little information is available on
the human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh due to limited access to
the region by foreign diplomatic officials. In March Nagorno-Karabakh
``President'' Arkady Ghukasian was injured by gunfire while travelling
from his office to his residence. Samuel Babayan, the former chief of
the ``Nagorno-Karabakh Defense forces'' and former ``Minister of
Defense'', his brother Karen (currently mayor of Stepankert), and 25
others were taken into custody in connection with the shooting. On
March 28, authorities arrested Vahram Aghajanian, a journalist who
writes for an opposition newspaper in Nagorno-Karabakh, and accused him
of slandering the ``Prime Minister.'' He was held without charge for 2
weeks after his arrest, and then given a 1-year sentence for defamation
of character. In April he was released from prison after an appeals
court suspended his 1-year sentence. There were some reports that the
Armenian Apostolic Church enjoys at least quasi-official status, and
that the practice of some other religious faiths, such as evangelical
Christianity, is discouraged.
Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict continue. They result in injuries and deaths among combatants
and occasionally civilians. The taking of prisoners, including
civilians, occurs. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh
and the occupied territories continued to prevent the return of
hundreds of thousands of IDP's to their homes.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, including Freedom
from:
a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or extrajudicial killings by government officials.
There were a few reports of deaths of prisoners due, at least in
part to prison conditions while in official custody. Several prisoners
were killed during a reported uprising at a prison in January 1999 (see
Section 1.c.). The Government still has not released a report on the
prison uprising.
Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict occasionally resulted in deaths and injuries to civilians.
There were four civilian and four military casualties due to
landmines during the year. In 1999 three persons were killed and five
were wounded by landmines laid near the disputed area of Nagorno-
Karabakh. These mines were laid by the governments of Azerbaijan and
Armenia and the Karabakh Armenian authorities.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
During the year, 16 Azerbaijani and 2 Armenian POW's were released.
The Government of Azerbaijan claims it has released all Armenian POW's.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) repeatedly asked
the concerned parties for notification of any person captured in
relation to the conflict, access to all places of detention connected
with the conflict, and release of all such persons. The ICRC also urged
the parties to provide information on the fate of persons reported as
missing in action. Since 1997 the ICRC has collected from concerned
family members the names of approximately 2,300 missing Azerbaijani
nationals allegedly held by Armenia.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture is illegal; however, there are credible reports
that prison guards tortured inmates, and that the police beat prisoners
during arrest, interrogation, and pretrial detention. On September 1,
the Government enacted a new criminal code that bans acts of torture
and makes perpetrators liable for up to 10 years imprisonment. A
definition of torture, in line with that contained in the U.N.
Convention on Torture, was also adopted. The Government does not hold
most members of the police accountable for their actions, and impunity
continues to be a problem. In most instances, the Government took no
action to punish abusers, although perpetrators were prosecuted in a
handful of cases. In a 1999 report, Human Rights Watch noted that the
most severe and routine physical abuse of detainees takes place just
prior to and during the preliminary investigation, as police and other
investigators ``isolate detainees from all contact with the outside
world, and beat and coerce confessions from suspects and statements
from witnesses.''
Prison conditions are harsh. The quality of food, housing, and
medical care is poor. Prisoners must rely on their families to provide
food and medicine. There are widespread and credible reports that
authorities deny or give inadequate medical treatment to prisoners with
serious medical conditions. Tuberculosis is a problem. Approximately
2,000 prisoners have been treated for tuberculosis. Due to the absence
of systematic screening of the prison population, patients often start
treatment when they are already seriously ill and there is only a 55
percent cure rate. Authorities severely limit opportunities for
exercise and visits by lawyers and family members of prisoners in
security prisons. Some prisoners are kept in ``separation cells'' often
located in basements, in which prisoners reportedly are denied food and
sleep in order to elicit confessions from them with no physical
evidence of abuse. Men and women are housed in separate prison
facilities. On March 20, President Aliyev signed two human rights
decrees. One permitted the ICRC to begin prison visits, which allowed
the ICRC access to all places and to all detainees within its mandates,
both sentenced and unsentenced. The second decree provided for
adherence to the U.N. Convention on Torture.
The first visit of ICRC representatives took place on June 23 to
Gobustan prison. ICRC visits to the Bailov Detention Center in Baku
began on September 6. The ICRC also still had access to prisons where
persons of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were detained. Local human
rights organizations were able to continue their visits to prisons;
however, one local organization has been denied access since July.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Authorities arbitrarily
arrest and detain persons without legal warrants. Often authorities do
not notify family members after arrests. Frequently it is days before
family members are able to obtain information as to whether authorities
have arrested someone, and where authorities are holding the detainee.
Family members do not enjoy the right of visitation. Authorities
generally deny bail to detained individuals and often do not inform
detainees of the charges against them. While the situation appears to
be improving gradually, lengthy pretrial detention is still a problem.
In July 1999 the Constitutional Court ruled that detainees could have
access to a lawyer from the time of detention rather than only after
they have been charged with a crime, but access to lawyers is often
poor. In the past, police sometimes detained relatives of suspects
being sought in an attempt to force the family to reveal a suspect's
whereabouts (see Section 1.f.).
Twenty-three members of opposition parties were still in custody at
year's end for their alleged participation in an unsanctioned
demonstration in Sheki on November 18. Some of these demonstrators
violently attacked government buildings and law enforcement officials.
Throughout the year, opposition members were detained for participating
in unsanctioned demonstrations and later released by police without
further charges.
Members of opposition political parties were more likely to
experience official harassment than other citizens. In response to
publication of a series of articles insulting the residents of the
autonomous republic of Nakhchivan published by Yeni Musavat in
February, five opposition politicians and the author of the articles
were detained by officials in Nakhchivan (see section 2.a.). All were
subsequently released.
In July police arrested four participants at an unsanctioned
demonstration in support of opposition Azerbaijan National Independence
Party leader, Etibar Mammedov. Two of the four were imprisoned while
awaiting their trial, which was delayed numerous times. All eventually
were fined and released.
Police forcibly dispersed an unsanctioned demonstration on April
29. The demonstrators made up of a cross-section of opposition party
members attempted to assemble at a downtown Baku square to demand free
and fair parliamentary elections in November. The Government refused to
issue a permit for the demonstration and ordered police to break up the
rally. A number of protesters and journalists covering the
demonstration were injured; dozens were arrested and detained before
being released without charges (See sections 2.a. and 2.b.). In 1999,
police beat, harassed detained, and arrested members of evangelical
Christian and other groups, and seized their documents and property.
This year there were few reports of such incidents, and there has been
substantial improvement in the treatment of evangelical Christian
groups (see Section 2.c.).
In July police arrested and detained worshippers of a Pentecostal
church in Baku (see Section 2.c.).
In August Ramiz Hasanov, head of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party's
(ADP) Ganja Branch, was arrested for allegedly concealing knowledge of
a coup d'etat planned by Ganja's ex-police chief Natiq Effendiyev. No
trial date was set by year's end. There were credible reports that
local authorities harassed ADP party members while they campaigned for
the party in the period prior to parliamentary elections.
In August a member of the Nakhchivan branch of the opposition
Musavat Party-demanding free and fair parliamentary elections in
November-attempted to hijack a domestic flight from Nakhchivan to Baku.
He was subsequently disarmed and arrested after the plane landed safely
in Baku. Days later, Yeni Musavat opposition journalist Rauf Arifoglu
was arrested for allegedly concealing a weapon, which many believe may
have been planted by police, and for concealing prior knowledge of the
hijacking attempt. Arifoglu was detained for six weeks and later
released in October. A trial date for Arifoglu was not set by year's
end. Local police detained several members of the opposition Popular
Front Party in Nakhchivan under suspicion for complicity in the
hijacking. All later were released. Local police also arrested a Yeni
Musavat reporter soon after his arrival in Nakhchivan to cover the
hijacking. Police did not disseminate any information about the
journalist's whereabouts until his release 2 days later (see Section
2.a.).
Rza Guliyev and Etibar Guliyev, nephews of exiled opposition
politician Rasul Guliyev, were both convicted of large-scale
embezzlement in 1999 and 2000, and are currently serving 7 year jail
sentences. The actions taken against Guliyev's nephews appeared to be
politically motivated. Rasul Guliyev was forced to resign as Speaker of
the Parliament in 1996 and now is living abroad. He is accused by the
government of large-scale embezzlement and an arrest warrant has been
issued based on the results of an investigation by the Prosecutor
General's office. Guliyev claims that he and his attorney are unable to
see these charges.
On September 1, the Government promulgated several new legal codes,
replacing codes from the Soviet era. These included: a new criminal
code, a family code, a civil code, a civil procedures code, and a code
on administrative violations. Officials cooperated with foreign
advisers to develop the new codes in accordance with Western European
standards. However, the Government had not implemented completely some
of these codes by year's end.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice judges do not function
independently of the executive branch. The judicial system is subject
to the influence of executive authorities. The President appoints
Supreme and Constitutional Court judges, subject to confirmation by
Parliament. The President directly appoints lower level judges with no
requirement for confirmation. In April qualifying exams for judges were
administered for the first time. Over half of the approximately 1,000
test takers passed the written portion of the exam, which international
legal observers say was conducted fairly. However, there were numerous
reports of fraud during the oral portion of the test, where many
positions were allegedly bought and sold. The judiciary is widely
believed to be corrupt and inefficient.
During the year, the Constitutional Court formed in 1998 made a
number of decisions, which demonstrated a more independent body. In
February it reregistered the opposition Azerbaijan Democratic Party
following a long and drawn-out appeal by the party. In August it also
decided to declare unconstitutional the retroactive application of a
clause in the election law that required parties to be registered 6
months in advance of the announcement of the elections. In November it
voided the results of the Parliamentary elections in four additional
districts (the Central Election Commission (CEC) originally recommended
the results in 7 districts be voided).
Courts of general jurisdiction may hear criminal, civil, and
juvenile cases. District and municipal courts try the overwhelming
majority of cases. The Supreme Court also may act as the court of first
instance, depending on the nature ad seriousness of the crime.
The Government organizes prosecutors into offices at the district,
municipal, and republic level. They are ultimately responsible to the
Minister of Justice, are appointed by the President, and are confirmed
by Parliament. The Constitution prescribes equal status for prosecutors
and defense attorneys before the courts. In practice, prosecutors'
prerogatives outweigh those of defense attorneys. Investigations often
rely on obtaining confessions rather than obtaining evidence against
suspects. No judge has dismissed a case based on a prisoner's claim of
having been beaten.
Cases at the district court level are tried before a panel
consisting of one judge and two lay assessors. The judge presides over
and directs trials. Judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in
convictions back to the prosecutor for ``additional investigation.''
Such cases either may be dropped or closed, occasionally without
informing either the court or the defendant. The Constitution provides
for public trials except in cases involving state, commercial, or
professional secrets, or matters involving confidentiality of personal
or family matters.
The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence in
criminal cases and for numerous other rights, including an exclusionary
rule barring the use of illegally obtained evidence and for a suspect's
right to legal counsel and to be informed immediately of his legal
rights, and of the charges against him. However, the Government has not
made significant efforts to enforce these rights throughout the
criminal justice system. Defendants may confront witnesses and present
evidence. The court appoints an attorney for indigent defendants.
Defendants and prosecutors have the right of appeal. The Government
generally has observed the constitutional provision for public trial.
Foreign and domestic observers generally are able to attend trials.
The Law on Advocates and Advocate Activity entered into force on
January 27. It contains some useful features, such as rules on
professionalism, and a call for people to pass a bar exam. Many legal
observers find the law difficult to understand and question whether its
implementation will improve the rule of law. The International League
for Human Rights (ILHR) considers the law a step back, because they
believe it restricts the independence of lawyers and the ability of
independent lawyers to defend victims of human rights abuse by
requiring defense lawyers in criminal cases and pre-trial detentions to
belong to the collegium of advocates. The collegium remains the
principal regulatory body of the legal profession under the new law.
The Government held approximately 50 political prisoners at year's
end. Some political prisoners were released following five presidential
pardons and amnesties during the year. The Government continues to
assert that it holds no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for secrecy of
correspondence and telephone conversations, subject to limits provided
by law in criminal investigations or in prevention of a crime. The
Government infringed on these rights. The Constitution allows searches
of residences only with a court order or in cases provided by law.
However, citizens widely believe that the Ministry of National Security
monitors telephones and Internet traffic, especially those of
foreigners and prominent political and business figures. Police often
conducted searches without a warrant, and investigations sometimes
resulted in confining the individuals to their city of residence or a
brief jail sentence for questioning. There were credible allegations
that police continued to intimidate and harass family members of
suspects (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
There were credible reports that individuals linked to opposition
parties were fired from their jobs (see Section 2.d.). In September,
the wife of an ADP leader in Khanlar province was fired from her job
for collecting signatures for the party's proportional list candidates
running in the November parliamentary elections. In Gabala two ADP
members were summoned by local authorities and instructed to stop
collecting signatures or they would be fired. In Sheki two ADP members
were arrested while collecting signatures and then later released. Low-
level harassment of certain religious groups continued, despite an
overall improvement in religious liberties (see Section 1.c. ,1.d. ,
and 2.c.).
In June 1999 a court ruled in favor of a group of Muslim women who
sued for the right to wear Islamic headscarves in passport photos. In
September 1999, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court ruling;
the case remained on appeal in the prosecutor general's office at
year's end (see Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press and specifically outlaws press
censorship; however, the Government in some cases restricts these
rights in practice. The Government did not take any overt measures to
reinstitute press censorship, which was abolished in 1998; however,
actions taken by several prominent government officials, including the
ongoing series of libel suits resulting in large fines (which would
immediately bankrupt any independent or opposition newspaper), created
an atmosphere in which editors and journalists exercise self-
censorship. Most of the excessive fines were appealed; however, in
those cases in which there were rulings, most appeals were denied.
Prominent opposition politicians and independent newspapers criticized
the government without reprisal.
On February 11, President Aliyev signed a new law on media into
effect. Although an improvement over the previous law, in many respects
it falls short of international standards. In particular, one section
of the law permits the Government to shut down any newspaper that has
been convicted of a crime (mainly libel) three times within the period
of one year. During the year, this part of the law was used in an
attempt to shut down one newspaper, Uch Nogte. The paper continued to
publish until it won an appeal, which overturned the verdict.
While the press debated a wide variety of sensitive topics
throughout the year, other factors restricted the public's ability to
be informed about and discuss political issues. Editors complain that
they feel under continuous and growing pressure to moderate criticism
of the Government and of figures associated with the ruling circle.
During the year, direct criticism of President Aliyev became less
frequent. On May 8, Elmar Husseinov found the office to his weekly
journal, Monitor Weekly (formerly Monitor), sealed by the Baku tax
inspectorate, allegedly for printing articles critical of Aliyev. Most
newspapers are printed in the Government's publishing house. The
Government's near monopoly of publishing facilities and its control
over the price of newsprint give it leverage over the press, a critical
matter given the precarious finances of most opposition newspapers.
Some editors complain about having their print runs limited by the
state printing press, and many cite the threat of increases in paper
and printing prices as a constraint on the freedom of the press.
The spate of lawsuits by prominent government officials against
opposition or independent media outlets also had a negative effect on
freedom of the press in practice. Courts invariably ruled in favor of
the government plaintiffs, while ruling against opposition plaintiffs
pursuing similar charges against progovernment media outlets in most
cases. It appears that the extremely high financial penalties levied by
the courts were designed to repress criticism rather than to foster
responsible journalism. The provision in the new media law that permits
the Government to shut down a newspaper after it loses three lawsuits,
adds a powerful weapon to the Government's arsenal of intimidation.
Libel suit fines worsened the atmosphere for press freedom. Telescope
and Alem Newspapers were fined about $1,000 (5 million and 4.5 million
Manats respectively). Sara Television (which was shut down in the fall
of 1999 on the grounds that Azerbaijani law prohibits foreign ownership
of domestic television stations) was fined $55,000 (250 million
Manats). The Minister of Culture brought suit against Hurriyet
Newspaper and won a $220 (1 million Manats) fine. There were over 25
legal actions taken against journalists and media outlets during the
year, according to the Committee to Protect the Rights of Journalists.
Media outlets were fined a total of $175,600 (803.5 million Manats).
These sums are very high, given the country's poor economic situation;
however, none have been paid. The chairman of Azeravtonagliyyat State
Concern (a government-run enterprise) claimed his honor and dignity
were offended and filed a lawsuit against the independent Avropa
newspaper. During the appeals process, the fines against the newspaper
were reduced. Avropa was subsequently charged with tax evasion--the
second of three charges required to shut it down. Media outlets
credibly claimed publicly and privately that the threat of fines and
lawsuits forced them to exercise self-censorship.
Journalists were subject to violence. More than 60 separate
incidents of harassment or intimidation of journalists were reported
during the year, according to local sources. Among the incidents
reported were threatening telephone calls, assaults by unidentified
persons, beatings by policemen during demonstrations or picketing, and
attacks on premises and property. For example, in February a mob
attacked the local headquarters of the opposition newspaper Yeni
Musavat in the autonomous Nakhchivan Republic. The riot allegedly was
triggered by an article highly critical of local authorities and
residents of Nehram, hometown of former Parliament foreign affairs
committee chairman, Rza Ibadov. Police did not intervene to halt the
attack. However, several policemen including senior police officials
responsible for that area, were later fired, and others were suspended
or reprimanded. Also in February, an independent Sara Television's vice
president was injured seriously in an assault by an unidentified
person. Despite promises of rapid action, police did not determine the
identity of any of the assailants. While the Government denies any
relationship with the assailants, the incidents involved opposition
journalists who were warned to stop criticizing government officials or
policies. In a separate incident in November, a group of women from
Mastaha village in Nakhchivan entered Yeni Musavat headquarters to
protest an article that criticized a local official. The women
subsequently filed a lawsuit against the newspaper claiming its staff
had assaulted them during the confrontation. Yeni Musavat brought a
countersuit against the women, to which the courts had responded by
year's end.
On April 29, police beat 17 journalists covering an unsanctioned
opposition demonstration in Baku.
On August 29 Rauf Arifoglu editor-in-chief of Yeni Musavat, was
arrested on charges of attempted hijacking, terrorism, and illegal
possession of arms (see Section 1.d.).
Media outlets seek powerful patrons and align themselves with
political parties and government factions to give themselves financial
and legal protection. Current economic difficulties have contributed to
the vulnerability of the media as former advertising revenues,
primarily from foreign companies, have decreased. Most media have
chosen to sacrifice their editorial independence to survive. However, a
large number of newspapers continued to publish. One reliable source
put the number of registered newspapers at 600, and the number actually
publishing at least once a month at nearly 100. These included
independent newspapers and newspapers with overt links to major and
minor opposition parties. Government-run kiosks and 27 independent news
distributors distributed opposition and independent newspapers. A
number of editors continued to complain that the government-run kiosks
refuse to carry their newspapers or claim to have sold all received
copies while, in fact, retaining many unsold copies in stock.
The Government tightly controlled official radio and television,
the source of information for much of the population because newspapers
too expensive for most persons. Television and radio stations require a
license to operate, and the Government used this requirement to prevent
several independent stations from broadcasting. Since 1993 no truly
independent broadcaster has received a frequency from the State
Commission on Radio and Television frequencies and the Ministry of
Communications. There are a limited number of private television
stations, whose broadcasts can be received only in Baku or in local
areas outside the capital. Only one of the private stations is not
directly under the control of a government official, and it is believed
widely that this station also has compromised its independence.
Independent radio, preferred by the overwhelming majority of listeners,
largely is oriented to entertainment, but one independent station
broadcasts on political topics. Opposition parties had limited access
to the official electronic media. The Government periodically used
state television to conduct campaigns of denunciation and harassment
against political parties and leaders critical of the Government.
Various talk shows, such as ``Nezer Nugtasi'' and ``NEBZ'' broadcast by
privately-run, independent television channels, aired views of both
government and opposition officials. A series of spacebridge shows
which linked Azerbaijani and Armenian officials to discuss the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict began in the fall. During the parliamentary election
campaign in November, local broadcasters aired several western-style,
political roundtables, which featured representatives from the
government and opposition discussing various news issues of the day.
The state television channel provided representatives of each
participating political party in the election at least one late evening
addition to time purchased from the independent television stations for
short campaign slots by party leaders; however, these broadcasts were
blocked in certain outlying areas of the country.
On July 14, the Government cut electricity from the independent
channel ANS for 15 minutes in order to censor an interview with Chechen
field commander Shamil Basayev. The Government asserted that it
censored the 15-minute interview because it contained terrorist
propaganda.
In late August and early September, the State Television and Radio
Company, AzTV, conducted a campaign against the Musavat Party and its
leader, Isa Gambar, following the hijacking by a Musavat party member
of an Azeri airliner on a flight from Nakhchivan to Baku (see Section
1.d.). The campaign featured coverage of meetings at collective farms,
hospitals, clinics, and other state enterprises where the Musavat Party
was criticized for its alleged complicity with terrorism.
At year's end, there were eight independent television stations
operating outside of Baku. Four additional independent stations that
were closed in 1999 reopened during the year; however, their legal
status remained unclear. The state commission on radio and television
frequencies had not granted these stations frequencies by year's end,
which are required for official registration with the Ministry of
Justice. Without registration, these stations are subject to closure at
any time by the local or national authorities.
In October the Ministry of Communications shut down the privately
run ABA Television for 10 days, in connection with allegations of tax
evasion. The investigation was initiated one and a half years ago and
continued at year's end.
In November Yeni Musavat, the newspaper of the opposition Musavat
Party was found guilty of publishing an article insulting the Saatly
district electoral commission. The court fined the newspaper $200 (1
million Manats). Yeni Musavat had claimed that the outcome of the 1995
parliamentary poll in Saatly, in which President Aliyev's brother
Djalal was elected, was falsified. The suit against the newspaper was
brought by Ragim Azizov, who was appointed as the Saatly election
commission chairman only after the 1995 election.
Three Russian and three Turkish television stations and radio
programs are rebroadcast locally through Azerbaijani facilities and are
seen and heard in most parts of the country. Radio free Europe/Radio
Liberty and the Voice of America broadcast without restriction. There
are no restrictions on reception of foreign stations via satellite.
There is one 24-hour French language radio station in Baku and a
British Broadcasting Company station that offers news programs in
Russian, English, and Azerbaijani. The Government granted new broadcast
licenses to a few foreign radio stations, plus several regional
television stations directly under the control of the local executive
commission. The Government has not acted for more than a year on the
applications to broadcast of more than 10 independent broadcasters.
The Government allowed limited Internet access. There are 5
Internet service providers and 4 vendors sell accounts. Both providers
and vendors have formal links with the Ministry of Communications. In
September the Ministry abruptly shut down one provider for unknown
reasons. The shutdown allegedly involves the refusal to pay new, higher
fees for the use of Ministry of Communications telephone lines, but it
is widely believed that the real issue was the Ministry of
Communication's desire for a monopoly over this market. The Ministry of
Communications and certain individuals either in the Ministry or
closely aligned with it apparently seek to maximize both government and
personal revenues from this lucrative and growing source of income.
Internet costs average $.30 (1,400 Manat) per hour (one-tenth the cost
in 1998). Although few citizens can afford home computers or access
fees, Internet cafes, which are widespread in Baku and other cities,
offer affordable internet access. Many persons believe that the
Government monitors Internet traffic, especially that of foreign
businesses and opposition intellectuals and leaders (see Section 1.f.).
Appointments to government-controlled academic positions are
heavily dependent on political connections. Nevertheless, several
professors with tenure are active in opposition parties. There were no
complaints of violation of academic freedom or of censorship of books
or academic journals.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts
this right on occasion. Authorities frequently prevented political
parties critical of the Government from conducting indoor meetings as
well as outdoor gatherings. The Government did allow some opposition
parties to organize so-called ``pickets'' (demonstrations with less
than 50 participants) and to stage larger rallies far from the city
center. Authorities cited security considerations repeatedly to ban any
larger demonstrations in the center of town throughout the year. During
the year, authorities cancelled numerous protests and rallies. At
year's end, the Government held 23 persons who were detained during
demonstrations which took place in Sheki on November 18.
The Government detained persons at unauthorized rallies and
meetings throughout the year, but most were released without charges
after a brief period of detention. Police forcibly dispersed an
unsanctioned demonstration on April 29. The Government allowed several
opposition demonstrations to take place in Baku during the spring and
summer. For example, Government sanctioned opposition rallies were held
on August 5 and 12. In August and September, journalists and members of
NGO's held unsanctioned rallies in Baku to protest the imprisonment of
opposition newspaper editor Rauf Arifoglu (see Section 1.d.). Police in
Baku intervened on October 28 to prevent 40 members of the Civil Unity
Party, which supported former President Ayaz Mutalibov, from holding a
protest demonstration in the city center. The party's leaders were
warned earlier not to have the demonstration, which was intended to
protest the refusal of the authorities to register the party. Several
would-be demonstrators were beaten and injured. Opposition
demonstrators were prevented from assembling in downtown Baku on
November 25, because their rally had not been sanctioned by the local
authorities. On November 18, demonstrations took place in several
cities around the country including Baku, where approximately 4,000
persons gathered to protest the flawed parliamentary elections. Outside
Baku some rallies drew over 1,000 demonstrators, who protested not only
the elections but energy shortages in the region. In the regions where
protesters received permission from local authorities to demonstrate,
the protests proceeded peacefully. However, protesters without permits
were dispersed by government authorities, with some arrests in the
regional capitals. Protests in Agdash and Sheki led to violence, as
police and demonstrators clashed. There were also protests in the
regions over the reintroduction of energy cutbacks that had been
suspended before the elections.
The Government repeatedly turned down requests for demonstrations
in support of former Communist leader and President Ayaz Mutallibov,
who now lives in Russia. Heads of local governments in several
different sections of the country repeatedly refused the requests of
opposition Members of Parliament, such as Popular Front first deputy
chairman of the ``reformers'' faction Ali Kerimov, to hold organized
meetings with constituents and interested citizens. On several
occasions, central government authorities intervened to overrule the
local authorities and allowed Kerimov and other opposition Members of
Parliament to hold meetings.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, in
practice the Government continued to restrict this right on occasion.
The Government requires political parties to register. There are
currently 38 registered political parties. Some of these are affiliated
with or support the President's party. At least 20 registered parties
are considered opposition parties. In February the Government
registered the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, which is lead by former
Parliament speaker Rasul Guliyev. Other unregistered parties have not
met the legal requirements for registration. Nevertheless, unregistered
political parties continued to function openly. Members of unregistered
political parties can run for president but must be sponsored by a
registered party or an independent ``voters initiative group.'' Members
of unregistered parties may run for Parliament, but only as
independents in a direct constituency, not on a party list. A party
must be registered to run a list of candidates. Members of unregistered
parties can run in municipal elections only as independents, or as
nominees of a registered party or another voter initiatives group.
Credible reports of acts of harassment (including beatings) of
opposition political figures continued. There were credible reports
that individuals linked to opposition parties (and their relatives)
were fired from their jobs. Shahid Abbasov, chairman of the local
branch of the Musavat Party in Nakhchivan, was abducted on October 19
and beaten by masked men who demanded that he stop criticizing the
chairman of Nakhchivan's parliament. The Government has not yet
returned the Popular Front's headquarters nor many of its regional
offices, which were seized in 1993.
Explicitly ethnic or religious based parties have not been
registered.
The Government generally allowed private associations to function
freely. The Ministry of Justice requires private organizations to
register but does not always grant this registration freely and
expeditiously. There are credible reports that the Government refuses
to register many new human rights NGO's. Nevertheless, unregistered
associations functioned openly. Many of the most active NGO's are
affiliated with opposition political parties. The President signed a
new law on ``public associations'' in October.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides that persons of
all faiths may choose and practice their religion without restrictions,
and the Government generally respected these rights for most citizens;
however, Government authorities continued to harass on occasion foreign
and Azerbaijani members of nontraditional religious groups. Such
harassment was less frequent than in the previous years. Until late in
1999, the Government frequently used clauses in the Law on Religious
Freedom and other laws to restrict religious activity by foreigners and
nontraditional religious groups, particularly in the fall of 1999, when
police and security officials disrupted a number of services, detained
ministers, and ordered foreigners deported. Although President Aliyev
has enunciated a clear policy of respect for religious freedom, lower
level officials continued to attempt to restrict religious activity by
local nontraditional groups.
Following a spate of attacks on members of non-traditional
Christian groups in the summer and fall of 1999, President Aliyev in
November 1999 announced to the National Security Council, and later in
a nationwide television broadcast, that the Government henceforth would
abide by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
standards of religious liberty. In conformity with his directives,
government officials subsequently took steps to rectify some past
violations of these standards, including the registration of a number
of religious organizations that previously had been denied
registration, and the reinstatement of selected group members who had
been fired from their jobs for their religious affiliation. However the
Religious Affairs Department, the government office charged with
implementing the country's laws on religion, continued to delay
selectively the registration of a few groups and to intervene
selectively in the importation of religious literature.
The most common restriction on religious freedom results from the
requirement in the Law on Religion that all religious organizations be
registered by the Government in order to function legally. In principle
a group obtains approval from the Department of Religious Affairs and
then applyies for formal registration with the Ministry of Justice. The
Government stated that by year's end it had registered 39 Muslim and
``other'' religious groups. However, in practice, the process suffers
from a lack of transparency, particularly within the Department of
Religious Affairs. This office, an independent entity subordinated
directly to the Council of Ministers, has been a bottleneck in the
registration process. As a result, several Christian groups still
experience problems with registration.
Registration enables a religious organization to maintain a bank
account, legally rent property, and generally to act as a legal entity.
Lack of registration makes it harder, but not impossible, for a
religious group to function. Unregistered groups often continue to
operate, but participants are subject to arrest, fines, and--for
foreigners--deportation. Religious groups are permitted to appeal
registration denials to the courts, but the only group to do so to
date--the Pentecostal ``Word of Life'' Church--lost its case in May
1998. In 1998 Human Rights Watch alleged that the officials responsible
for registration took bribes to facilitate registration. The Catholic
Church was registered in April 1999. Following the President's public
commitment, the Government, specifically the Department of Religious
Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice, took action on several
applications by religious groups for registration that had been
languishing, in some cases for years. The Evangelical Cathedral of
Praise and the Nehemiah were registered in December 1999, as were the
Jehovah's Witnesses. Prompted by the President's statements, some other
religious groups that had been operating under continual low-level
harassment because the Religious Affairs Department earlier had denied
them registration were finally registered. In March the Community of
Mountain Jews and the ``Love'' Baptist Community were registered.
However, a small number of religious groups remain unregistered and
continue to suffer from low-level government harassment.
In July police broke up an officially registered Pentecostal church
service at the home of a member. Worshippers were detained and harassed
for several hours before being released. The next day, the police
apologized for their actions; however, the woman owner of the home in
which the service took place was subjected to harassment by court
officials who ordered her to stand trial for violating outdated
administrative codes. The judge dismissed the case as unconstitutional
and inconsistent with the 1996 law on religious freedom.
Some government bias against foreign missionary groups persisted.
There were instances early in the year in which authorities harassed
groups for disseminating religious materials without all the required
permits. Since their registration in December 1999, Jehovah's Witnesses
have been able to hold large gatherings for the first time in 3 years.
However, on April 1, in what the Jehovah's Witnesses themselves refer
to as an isolated incident, a meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was
dispersed by police who claimed that they lacked permission from the
mayor's office. The manager of the venue subsequently declined to
permit them to use it again.
The Law on Religion subordinates all Islamic religious
organizations to the Azerbaijan-based spiritual directorate of Caucasus
Muslims. In June 1999, a court decided in favor of a group of Muslim
women who sued for the right to wear Islamic head scarves in passport
photographs. In September 1999, the Supreme Court overturned the lower
court ruling; the case was on appeal in the Prosecutor General's office
at year's end (see Section 1.f.).
The Law on Religion also permits the production and dissemination
of religious literature with the approval of the Department of
Religious Affairs and with the agreement of local government
authorities. The Government interpreted this provision to mean that
only religious groups can engage in such activity and argues that
booksellers and other entrepreneurs are forbidden to import and sell
religious materials. For example, in September customs officials at the
Azerbaijan-Russian border confiscated a new shipment of religious books
for the owner of a legally registered bookstore in Baku. Officials
alleged that the bookseller did not have the right to ``import such
books into the country.'' Only half of these books were released
subsequently to the bookseller at year's end.
There is official concern about ``foreign'' (mostly Iranian and
``Wahhabist'') Muslim missionary activity, which in part is viewed as
seeking to spread fundamentalist Islam, which is viewed as a threat to
stability and civil peace.
In those portions of Azerbaijan controlled by ethnic Armenians, all
ethnic Azerbaijanis have fled and those mosques that have not been
destroyed are not functioning. Animosity toward the Armenian population
elsewhere in Azerbaijan forced most Armenians to depart, and all
Armenian churches, many of which were damaged in ethnic riots that took
place over a decade ago, remain closed (see Section 5). As a
consequence, the estimated 10,000 to 30,000 Armenians who remain in
Azerbaijan are unable to attend their traditional places of worship.
The Jewish community has freedom to worship and conduct educational
activities and, during the year, enjoyed the public support of the
Government.
Places of worship seized by the former Soviet Government during the
Communist era from the Catholics, the Lutherans, and the Baptists have
not been returned to those groups.
Some government officials share the strong popular prejudice
against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have converted to Christianity and
other religions (see section 5). For example, an ethnic Azerbaijani was
subjected to administrative fines by local officials in Baku in July
1999 for possessing Christian literature, and another ethnic
Azerbaijani reported that he was arrested, beaten, and imprisoned in
August 1999 for changing his religious affiliation and becoming a
member of Jehovah's Witnesses. No such incidents have been reported
since the President's decree in October 1999.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of citizens to choose freely their place of domicile and to travel
abroad and return, and the Government generally respects these
provisions; however, at times the Government restricted freedom of
movement. At times it limited the movement of members of opposition
parties. The internal residence regime (``propiska'') still is imposed
on internally displaced persons, who are required to register their
location with the authorities, and may reside only in approved
locations. Residents of border areas in both Azerbaijan and Iran travel
across the border in this restricted zone without visas. Foreigners and
citizens require a visa to travel to the Autonomous Republic of
Nakhchivan.
The Government officially recognizes freedom of emigration. Jewish
emigration to Israel and other countries is not restricted by the
Government. The remaining Armenian population in Azerbaijan (other than
Armenians residing in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan) is
approximately 10,000 to 30,000, almost exclusively persons of mixed
descent or in mixed marriages. While official government policy is that
ethnic Armenians are free to travel, low-level officials seeking bribes
harassed Azerbaijani citizens of Armenian origin who sought to emigrate
or obtain passports.
There were no draft notifications that restricted movement during
the year. Draft-age men must obtain documents from military officials
before they can leave for international travel. Travel restrictions
sometimes are placed on military personnel, or persons possessing
sensitive national security information.
The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's)
from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is approximately 800,000; 200,000 of
these are refugees and over 600,000 are IDP's. Armenians have settled
in parts of the occupied territories. However, Armenians have not
allowed the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis who were forced out
of the now-occupied territories to return to their homes. The
Government provides little assistance to these persons, and
international support to the refugees is declining. Most of these IDP's
continue to live in camps and other temporary shelters, at below-
subsistence levels, without adequate food, housing, education,
sanitation, or medical care. The parties to the conflict have cut
normal trade and transportation links to the other side, causing severe
hardship to civilians on all sides.
The Constitution provides for political asylum consistent with
international norms. The Government depends on international assistance
for refugees and IDP's. It cooperates with international organizations
to provide aid for them. The Government cooperates with the office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. These organizations
report full and unrestricted access to the refugee population.
The Government provides a minimal allowance to the IDP's themselves
in the form of a bread allowance of $4 (18,000 Manats) per month per
family as well as an additional $2 (9,000 Manats) per month for each
child. Many of the IDP's complain of ``processing fees'' by local
officials in the amount of approximately 10 percent, further reducing
their already minimal allowances.
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. In May
1999, the Parliament passed a new law on refugees; however, this has
not yet been implemented. There are no procedures for granting first
asylum. There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a
valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution and election law allow citizens to change their
government by peaceful means; however, the Government continues to
restrict citizens' ability to change their government peacefully by
interfering in elections. Azerbaijan is a republic with a strong
presidency, and a legislature that the Constitution describes as
independent. However, in practice the legislature's independence from
the executive is marginal. The Parliament exercises little legislative
initiative independent of the executive. Opposition parties continued
to be active inside and outside the Parliament, agitating for their
views in their newspapers and through public statements. As a result of
the flawed November parliamentary elections, the New Azerbaijan Party
led by President Aliyev, held the overwhelming majority of seats in the
125-member Parliament (71 seats plus 25 seats belonging to nominally
independent parties loyal to the president). Opposition members held 16
seats in the newly elected parliament at year's end, according to
official results. However, opposition members temporarily boycotted
parliamentary sessions to protest election results and called for new
nationwide elections. In response to international criticism, the
authorities voided results in 11 disputed districts and announced
repeat elections would take place in those districts in January 2001.
The Government, with assistance from the OSCE's Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, (ODIHR) drafted new
legislation for the Central Election Commission (CEC), in advance of
the parliamentary elections, which included a provision to provide a
veto for opposition members on the CEc. The Government also drafted and
passed a new election law incorporating most OSCE/ODIHR recommendations
for reform into the final text. The omission of several important
recommendations, however, sparked a temporary boycott by the opposition
in the CEc. Shortcomings of the law included: signature requirements
and verification procedures for candidates; absence of provisions for
domestic non-partisan observers; and a lack of transparency of the vote
tabulation procedures at the territorial election commission (TEC)
level. In response to the boycott, the Government revoked the
opposition's power to veto CEC decisions. Opposition members later
resumed participation in the CEc.
The November parliamentary elections showed some improvement over
previous elections since 1993 in that political pluralism was advanced,
but they did not meet international standards due to numerous serious
irregularities. During the preelection period, parties and candidates
had better opportunities to conduct campaigns. Opposition parties were
represented on election commissions at all levels; however, opposition
representatives were marginalized or bypassed from the decision making
process on sensitive issues by the CEC majority. On several occasions
the CEC adopted critical decisions outside official sessions and
without the approval of the required two-thirds majority. The Central
Election Commission originally disqualified the Musavat Party and the
Azerbaijan Democratic Party claiming that their registration documents
were falsified. However, on October 8, following international
criticism and a letter from President Aliyev, the CEC reversed its
initial ruling and issued a statement consenting to the registration of
slates of candidates from eight opposition political groups, including
these two opposition parties. All political parties that sought to
actively contest the election were able to register for the
proportional ballot, in which 25 out of 125 Members of Parliament were
elected. In the single-mandate elections, in which 100 of 125 Members
of Parliament were elected, half of the prospective candidates were
disqualified from registering, and the appeals process was flawed.
Individual candidates were harassed, and some were beaten up or
detained. Potential candidates reported that individuals who signed
their petitions were asked to remove their names by police.
International observers reported that election day was marred by
numerous instances of serious irregularities. These observed
irregularities led to serious doubts about the accuracy of the
officially recorded vote totals. Observers reported ballot stuffing,
manipulated turnout results, and premarked ballots. The Party observers
frequently suffered intimidation, harassment, and sometimes arrest,
while carrying out their legitimate activities. Unauthorized local
officials often controlled the process and sought to influence voters.
In several instances, international observers were denied access to
polling stations and frequently were expelled from election commission
premises. Observers from domestic NGO's and several opposition parties
participated on election day. In a reversal of earlier practice, an
October law on non-governmental organizations banned election
monitoring by representatives of NGO's that received more then 30
percent of their budget from foreign sources. This appeared targeted at
preventing For The Sake of Civil Society, the only NGO capable of
mounting a nation wide monitoring effort from doing so. Main opposition
parties told international observers and journalists that their
monitors reported widespread procedural violations and called for
repeat nationwide elections. On November 7, the CEC announced that it
would investigate and take immediate measures concerning all cases of
violation of law and other shortcomings observed by the international
and local observers on election day. At year's end, repeat elections
were scheduled to occur in eleven districts.
The 1998 presidential election was an improvement over the previous
elections, especially in regard to reduced multiple voting and the
presence of domestic observers. However, some domestic and
international observers witnessed ballot stuffing and irregularities in
vote counting, and some were barred from observing the vote counting.
Neither domestic nor international observers were allowed to monitor
the compilation of the national vote totals. Precinct vote totals were
never reported. The observed irregularities and lack of transparency in
vote counting led to serious doubts about the accuracy of the 76
percent of the vote officially recorded for president Aliyev. In August
1999, newspapers quoted the chairman of the CEC as admitting that
Aliyev's vote total was overstated by 12 to 15 percent. International
observers, including the OSCE/ODIHR, concluded that the election did
not meet international standards.
The 1995 Constitution required that the country's first ever
municipal elections be held by November 1997. However, the elections
were delayed repeatedly until December 1999. The municipal election
process was deeply flawed and were criticized heavily by observers,
including the Council of Europe, which noted numerous instances of
ballotbox- stuffing, voter intimidation, and other violations. The
legislation governing the elections reflected some recommendations of
international observers, but several serious problems were not
remedied. The process of selecting territorial and precinct electoral
commissions to oversee the municipal elections and the process for
registering candidates were marred by widespread irregularities
favoring the ruling party.
There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in
politics; however, they are underrepresented in elective offices, since
traditional social norms restrict women's roles in politics. The
practice known of family voting, where men often cast the votes of
their wives and other female members of their families exists but is
declining in the country. There are 11 female Members of Parliament and
2 women with ministerial rank.
There are no restrictions on the participation of minorities in
politics as individuals; however, explicitly ethnically or religiously
based parties have not been registered. Members of indigenous ethnic
minorities occupy some senior government positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several human rights organizations monitor the human rights
situation in the country. For the most part, the Government posed no
obstacles to the presence of international human rights groups. Some of
these groups investigate human rights abuses and disseminate their
findings through the media. However, the Government has been critical
of certain domestic human rights activists who have raised politically
sensitive issues.
The Government has demonstrated some willingness to discuss human
rights problems with international and domestic NGO's. The ICRC has had
access to prisoners of war as well as civilians held in relation to the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In June the ICRC began its first visits
to special security and other prisons (see Section 1.c.).
Government officials occasionally criticize human rights activists.
The Government registered the Azerbaijan Human Rights Center (AHRC) in
November 1999 and until the summer of 2000; Eldar Zeynalov, Chairman of
the AHRC, was routinely granted access to prisons. No official reason
has been given for the recent denial of access. The center operates
normally, and Zeynalov continues to publish articles regularly about
the human rights situation in the country including lists of
individuals he believes to be political prisoners, and he has faced no
legal action. Zeynalov opened a new chapter of the organization in the
western part of the country in August. At year's end the Government
sharply criticized several human rights activists for allegedly
providing inaccurate lists of political prisoners to visiting Council
of Europe parliamentarians.
The Ministry of Justice regularly denies registration to human
rights NGO's, some of which are linked to opposition political parties,
although it has not tried to halt their activities. Registration
enables a human rights organization to maintain a bank account legally,
rent property, and generally to act as a legal entity. Lack of
registration makes it harder, but not impossible, for a human rights
group to function.
The ICRC conducted education programs on international humanitarian
law for officials of the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and for
university and secondary school students.
In August 1999, the Government created the Commission on Human
Rights, funded by a $400,000 U.N. Development Program (UNDP) grant,
which is headed by Justice Minister Fikret Mammedov. The Commission has
not yet taken any significant actions. The Ministry of Justice also in
August established a new human rights office within the ministry, but
by year's end had not defined its agenda.
A foreign NGO representative working on democracy promotion was
murdered on November 30 in Baku. Local officials are cooperating with
International law enforcement officials on the ongoing investigation.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights without respect to
gender, race, nationality or national origin, religion, language,
social status, or membership in political parties, trade unions, or
other public organizations; however, in the wake of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, there is widespread anti-Armenian sentiment in
society. Preventing discrimination is not a major Government priority.
Women.--Discussion of violence against women is a taboo subject in
Azerbaijan's patriarchal society, but it remains a problem. In rural
areas, women have no real recourse against violence by their husbands,
regardless of the law. Rape is severely punished, but, especially in
rural areas, only a small fraction of offenses against women are
reported or prosecuted. According to official statistics, there were 44
reported rapes during the year; the Society for the Defense of Women's
Rights (SDWR) claims that rape is on the increase and that the official
number is underreported, especially from conservative rural areas.
There are no government sponsored or funded programs for victims of
violence. There are no specific laws concerning spousal abuse or
spousal rape.
Prostitution is a significant problem, particularly in the capital
city of Baku. Most women become prostitutes in order to support their
family members, and sometimes it even is encouraged by the family due
to the large amount of money to be made. In February 1999, the Society
for the Defense of Women's Rights (SDWR) held a conference to highlight
concerns over the growing incidents of prostitution and sexually
transmitted diseases. At the conference, it was reported that there are
more than 30 illegal houses of prostitution in Baku alone, the majority
of which are allegedly run by high-ranking officials in government and
frequented by members of the prosecutor's office and the police. Women
engaged in prostitution are not liable to criminal charges since
prostitution is considered a personal matter.
Pornography is prohibited, and the age of sexual consent is 16.
Trafficking in women is a problem, and the country is a source and
transit point for trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, including the
right to participate in all aspects of economic and social life;
however, societal discrimination is a problem. In general women have
extensive opportunities for education and work. However, traditional
social norms continue to restrict women's roles in the economy.
Representation of women is sharply lower in higher levels of the work
force. There are few women in executive positions in leading economic
enterprises.
Twenty-four women's NGO's are registered, compared with 18 in 1999.
The Society for the Defense of Women's Rights (SDWR) spends most of its
time fighting unique post-Soviet problems. It has helped divorced
women, widows, and wives whose husbands are in prison, all of whom have
become socially and legally vulnerable since the fall of the Soviet
Union. It assisted widows whose landlords privatized their apartments
and then evicted them. The SWDR also worked with divorced women who
feel that they have been treated unfairly by divorce courts. Several of
the 24 women's NGO's deal with the problems of prostitution and
trafficking in women(see Section 6.f.).
Children.--The Constitution and laws commit the Government to
protect the rights of children to education and health; however,
difficult economic circumstances limit the government's ability to
carry out these commitments. Education is compulsory, free, and
universal until the age of 17. The Constitution places children's
rights on the same footing as those of adults. The Criminal Code
prescribes severe penalties for crimes against children. The Government
provides minimum standards of health care for children, although the
quality of medical care overall is very low. The Government has
authorized subsidies for children in an attempt to shield families
against economic hardship in the wake of price liberalization, but
these subsidies do not come close to covering the shortfall in family
budgets. There are a large number of refugee and displaced children
living in substandard conditions in refugee camps and public buildings.
Children sometimes beg on the streets of Baku and other towns.
There is no known societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--The Law on Support for the Disabled,
enacted in 1993, prescribes priority for invalids and the disabled in
obtaining housing, as well as discounts for public transport, and
pension supplements. The Government does not have the means to fulfill
its commitments. There are no special provisions in the law mandating
accessibility to buildings for the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--There is considerable popular concern about
the conversion of ethnic Azerbaijanis to faiths considered alien to
Azerbaijani traditions. Proselytizing by foreigners is against the law;
however it does occur and there is widespread popular hostility towards
groups that proselytize (largely evangelical Christians, but also
Muslim missionary groups), and toward Muslims who convert to other
faiths. Opposition to proselytizing within the population thus far has
been limited to verbal criticism and appears focused against two
groups. The first consists of evangelical Christian and so-called
``nontraditional'' religious groups. There is some evidence of
widespread prejudice against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have converted to
Christianity. During the year, articles periodically appeared in pro-
government and independent newspapers and electronic media crudely
depicting Christian missionary groups as a threat to the identity of
the nation. The perceived threat from such groups is primarily cultural
rather than religious. Often these articles attempt to associate
evangelists with the foreign intelligence agencies, portraying them as
part of a plot to undermine or control Muslim Azerbaijan.
Occasionally popular reaction goes beyond verbal criticism. In
August 1999, a crowd of Muslims reportedly broke into a Baptist summer
camp in Nardaran, threatening inhabitants and causing significant
property damage. Police made no attempt to intervene and said that they
found no evidence of the incident.
There has been significant improvement for the Jehovah's Witnesses
this year. Since their registration in December 1999, church members
have been able to conduct prayer services freely and proselytize with
minimal interference by the authorities. In September 1999, several
members of Jehovah's Witnesses reportedly were subjected to humiliation
and degradation when a factory manager assembled the plant's work force
and berated the members of Jehovah's Witnesses for betraying their
country by adopting a new religion. During the event, the father of one
of the members of Jehovah's Witnesses publicly disowned her for
adopting the new religion. In November 1999, the factory reinstated the
members with full back pay (see Section 2.c.).
There is societal hostility toward Muslim groups, mostly from Iran,
which seek to spread political Islam. Newspaper articles appear
periodically depicting certain foreign-backed Muslim missionaries as a
threat to stability and civil peace, and in some cases, as part of an
Iranian strategy to destabilize and ultimately establish control over
the country.
Reflecting the intense popular hostility toward Armenians that
prevails in the country and the forced departure of most of the
Armenian population, all Armenian churches, many of them damaged in
ethnic riots which took place over a decade ago, remain closed. As a
consequence, ethnic Armenians who remain in Azerbaijan, estimated to
number between 10,000 and 30,000, are deprived of an opportunity for
public worship. A similar situation exists in the Armenian-controlled
portions of Azerbaijan, from which the Armenians forced approximately
800,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis to flee their homes and where those mosques
that have not been destroyed are not functioning.
Jews generally do not suffer from societal discrimination; however,
according to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, two Baku synagogues
were desecrated in the fall of 1998. No arrests have been made.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The outbreak of hostilities,
anti-Armenian riots, and economic collapse in the final years of the
Soviet union led to the expulsion of almost all Armenians and the
departure of Russians and others. An estimated 10,000 to 30,000
Armenians still live in Azerbaijan, mostly women with ethnic
Azerbaijani or Russian husbands. Most seek to shield their national
identity. Some have changed their nationality, as reported in their
passports, to Azerbaijani. With the nearly complete departure of the
Armenian population, the number of problems reported by this ethnic
minority has decreased. Armenians have complained of discrimination in
employment and harassment at schools and workplaces and of the refusal
of local government authorities to pay pensions. Armenian widows have
had permits to live in Baku revoked. However, some persons of mixed
Armenian-Azerbaijani descent continue to occupy government positions.
Indigenous ethnic minorities, such as the Talysh, Lezghis, Avars,
and Georgians, do not suffer discrimination. However, Meskhetian Turks
displaced from Central Asia, as well as Kurdish displaced persons from
the Armenian-occupied Lachin region, complain of discrimination.
In the area of the country controlled by insurgent (Armenian)
forces, the Armenians forced approximately 800,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis
to flee their homes. The regime that now controls these areas
effectively has banned them from all spheres of civil, political, and
economic life.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
of association, including the right to form labor unions; however, one
or another sub-branch of the government-run Azerbaijani Labor
Federation organizes most industrial and white-collar workers. The
overwhelming majority of labor unions still operate as they did under
the Soviet system and remain tightly linked to the Government. Most
major industries remain state-owned.
An independent Union of Oil Workers that was displaced by a pro-
government union in 1997 has not been revived. In 1997 the State Oil
Company (SOCAR) formed a pro-government union, the Azerbaijan Union of
Oil and Gas Industry Workers, which took over the former Independent
Oil Workers Union without a vote of the union membership. It continues
to operate without a vote of its rank and file workers. An independent
group of oil workers, the Committee to Defend the Rights of Azerbaijani
Oil Workers, operates outside of established trade union structures and
promotes the interests of workers in the petroleum sector.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no
legal restrictions on strikes or provisions for retribution against
strikers.
The Azerbaijan Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) has 1.5 million
members, of which approximately 800,000 are active members. The
Government-run Azerbaijan Labor Federation has 300,000 members. Trade
unions are prohibited by law from engaging in political activity (even
though, as individuals, members of trade unions can participate in
political activities).
Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate with
international bodies; in November the ATUC became a member of the
International Confederation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1996 law
provides for collective bargaining agreements to set wages in state
enterprises. A labor inspectorate was established in 1997. However,
these laws have not produced an effective system of collective
bargaining between unions and enterprise management. Government-
appointed boards and directors run the major enterprises and set wages.
Unions effectively do not participate in determining wage levels. In a
carryover from the Soviet system, both management and workers are
considered members of the professional unions.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
allows forced or compulsory labor only under states of emergency or
martial law or as the result of a court decision affecting a condemned
person, and the government has not invoked this clause; however, women
are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section
6.f.). Two departments in the General Prosecutor's office (the
Department of Implementation of the Labor Code and the Department for
Enforcement of the Law on Minors) enforce the prohibition on forced or
compulsory labor. There are no constitutional provisions or laws
specifically prohibiting forced and bonded labor by children; however,
such practices are not known to occur. There were no reports during the
year of compulsory cotton picking by children or adults.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Primary school
education is compulsory, free, and universal. Children are normally in
school until the age of 17. The law allows children between the ages of
14 and 15 to work with the consent of their parents and limits the
workweek of children between the ages of 14 and 16 to 24 hours per
week. Children at the age of 15 may work if the workplace's labor union
does not object. There is no explicit restriction on the kinds of labor
that 15-year-old children may perform with union consent. The Labor and
Social Security Ministry has primary enforcement responsibility for
child labor laws. With high adult unemployment, there have been few, if
any, complaints of abuses of child labor laws. The law does not
prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children; however,
such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the
nationwide administrative minimum wage by decree. It is $3.00 (12,500
manats) per month. This wage is not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. The recommended monthly
wage level to meet basic subsistence needs was estimated to be $50
(215,000 manats) per person. Since practically all persons who work
earn more than the minimum wage, enforcing its low level is not a major
issue in labor or political debate.
The disruption of economic links with the rest of the former Soviet
Union continues to affect employment in many industries. Idle factory
workers typically receive less than half of their former wage. Under
these conditions, many workers rely on the safety net of the extended
family. More workers and unemployed persons turn to second jobs and
makeshift employment in the informal sector, such as operating the
family car as a taxi, selling produce from private gardens, or
operating small roadside shops. Until the Russian financial crisis many
persons (estimates range from between 1 to 2 million) supported
themselves on remittances from relatives working in Russia, primarily
as street traders. This source of support was reduced severely during
1999 and has not rebounded, although reliable statistics as to the
precise amounts involved are not available. Combinations of these and
other strategies are the only way for broad sectors of the urban
population to reach a subsistence income level.
The legal workweek is 40 hours. There is a 1-hour lunch break per
day and shorter breaks in the morning and afternoon. The Government
attempts to enforce this law in the formal sector, but does not enforce
these rules in the informal sector where the majority of citizens work.
Health and safety standards exist, but usually they are ignored in
the workplace. Workers cannot leave dangerous work conditions without
fear of losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Azerbaijan is a source and a transit
point for trafficked men, women, and children. Azerbaijanis themselves
are trafficked into northern Europe, particularly to the Netherlands
and Germany, where many unsuccessfully sought asylum. Women usually are
sent to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Western Europe, mainly
Germany, to participate as workers in the sex industry (for example, in
strip clubs) and as prostitutes. Women from Iran, Russia, and sometimes
Iraq, are transported through Baku to the UAE, Europe, and occasionally
the United States for the same purposes. Under the new criminal code,
the act of forcing an individual into prostitution carries a 10 to 15
year jail term, which is a harsher sentence than the previous code.
A locally based international organization currently is promoting
an awareness campaign about the exploitation of women. Several of the
country's women's NGO's claim to deal with the problems of trafficking
in women and prostitution. There is no mechanism to return trafficked
women to Azerbaijan and no support services for female victims of
trafficking.
__________
BELARUS
Belarus has a form of governance in which nearly all power is
concentrated in the hands of the President and a small circle of
advisors. Since his election in July 1994 to a 5-year term as the
country's first President, Alexsandr Lukashenko has consolidated power
steadily in the executive branch through authoritarian means. He used a
November 1996 referendum to amend the 1994 Constitution in order to
broaden his powers and extend his term in office. Lukashenko ignored
the then-Constitutional Court's ruling that the Constitution could not
be amended by referendum. As a result, the current political system is
based on the 1996 Constitution, which was adopted in an
unconstitutional manner. Most members of the international community
criticized the flawed referendum and do not recognize the legitimacy of
the 1996 Constitution, legislature, or Alexsandr Lukashenko's
continuation in office beyond the legal expiration of his term in July
1999. Parliamentary elections were held in October, the first since the
1996 referendum. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE)/Office of Democratic Institution and Human Rights (ODIHR)
concluded that the elections fell short of international standards and
were neither free nor fair. Although the amended Constitution provides
for a formal separation of powers, the President dominates all other
branches of Government. The legislature that ended its work in November
2000 was not elected directly, but was created out of the remnants of
the former Parliament, which Lukashenko disbanded soon after the 1996
referendum. The Constitution limits the legislature to meeting twice
per year for no more than a total of 170 days. Presidential decrees
made when the legislature is out of session have the force of law,
except--in theory--in those cases restricted by the 1996 Constitution.
The 1996 Constitution also allows the President to issue decrees having
the force of law in circumstances of ``specific necessity and
urgency,'' a provision that Lukashenko has interpreted broadly. The
judiciary is not independent.
Law enforcement and internal security responsibilities are shared
by the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD), both of which answer directly to the President. Civilian
authorities do not maintain effective control of the security forces.
Under Lukashenko's direction, the presidential guard--initially created
to protect senior officials--continued to act against the Lukashenko's
political enemies with no judicial or legislative oversight. On May 25,
1999, the Law on the State Guard officially entered into force. The
law, which had been operative on a de facto basis for a number of
years, gives the President the right to subordinate all security bodies
to his personal command. Members of the security forces have committed
numerous human rights abuses.
The country's political leadership opposes any significant economic
reforms and remains committed ideologically to a planned economy. The
authorities claimed that the gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6
percent, but most independent analysts doubted that figure and said
that any growth that has occurred was the result of ``aggregate
production'' fueled by continued massive credits to the debt-ridden
state sector. Officials claimed that per capita GDP remained constant
at approximately $1,400, but in real terms it was much lower. The
majority of workers are employed in the state industrial and
agricultural sectors, where wages are lower than the national average
and wage arrears are chronic. Although the unreliability of official
statistics makes it difficult to assess accurately economic conditions,
living standards for many segments of society continued to decline.
Authorities reported that average monthly wages were just over $70 a
month by year-end, although independent analysts reported the figure
was lower. Residents of small towns and rural areas, where incomes are
particularly low, sustain themselves through unreported economic
activity and small gardens.
The Government's human rights record was very poor and worsened
significantly in many areas. The authorities severely limit the right
of citizens to change their government, and Lukashenko took severe
measures to neutralize political opponents. The authorities did not
undertake serious efforts to account for the disappearances that
occurred in the previous year of well-known opposition political
figures. Security forces continued to beat political opponents and
detainees. There were reports of severe hazing in the military during
the year. Prison conditions remained poor. Security forces arbitrarily
arrested and detained citizens, and the number of apparently
politically motivated arrests increased, although many of those
arrested soon were released. Prolonged detention and delays in trials
were common and also occurred in a number of politically sensitive
cases. The security services infringed on citizens' privacy rights and
monitored closely the activities of opposition politicians and other
segments of the population. Severe restrictions on freedom of speech,
the press, and peaceful assembly continued, and the authorities did not
respect freedom of association. The authorities continued to impose
limits on freedom of religion and restricted freedom of movement.
Government security agents monitored closely human rights monitors and
hindered their efforts. Domestic violence and discrimination against
women remained significant problems. Pressures against the Roman
Catholic and Protestant churches as well as societal anti-Semitism
persist. Authorities continued to harshly restrict workers' rights to
associate freely, organize, and bargain. Trafficking in women is a
problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Extrajudicial Killing.--here were no reports of
political or other extrajudicial killings.
There were several cases of opposition figures who disappeared in
recent years (see Section 1.b.). The opponents of the regime have been
missing for such a long period of time, with no credible effort on the
part of the Government to account for their whereabouts. Human rights
monitors believe that they have been killed for their involvement in
political activities.
b. Disappearance.--There have been several cases of opposition
figures who disappeared in recent years.
On July 7, Dimitry Zavadsky, a cameraman for the Russian television
network ORT, disappeared at the Minsk National Airport while waiting
for Pavel Sheremet, another ORT journalist, to arrive from Moscow. When
Sheremet arrived at the airport, Zavadsky was missing, but his car was
found locked in the airport parking area. In 1997 Zavadsky and Sheremet
were arrested by Belarusian authorities for crossing the Belarusian-
Lithuanian border illegally while filming a documentary critical of the
Lukashenko regime. In a politically motivated trial, Sheremet and
Zavadsky were given 2-year and 18-month suspended sentences,
respectively. Authorities accused the opposition of organizing
Zavadsky's disappearance, calling it a provocation, and later
threatened Sheremet with potential charges of slander for an interview,
published in the independent press, in which Sheremet blamed Lukashenko
and security services for Zavadsky's disappearance. A criminal
investigation of the disappearance was opened, but no progress had been
reported by year's end (see Section 2.a.). In November ORT Journalist
Pavel Sheremet reported that several current and former police
officers, including members of the elite Almaz Unit of the Ministry of
Interior, have been arrested as suspects in the Zavadsky case. The
authorities have not confirmed that those arrested are suspects in the
Zavadsky case, nor have they confirmed their identities. Lukashenko
fired the head of the KGB and the Prosecutor General following the
release of a letter, reportedly written by a KGB officer, alleging that
Zavadsky was killed by a group of former and current security service
officers. The letter also alleged that senior authorities prevented
investigators from fully examining the case. Lukashenko claimed that
the letter was a fabrication and promised to renew the investigations
into the disappearances; however, no further progress was made at
year's end.
On May 7, 1999, former Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Zakharenko
disappeared shortly after he told his family in a telephone
conversation that he was on his way home. Zakharenko, a close associate
of the then-detained former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir, disappeared
after voting began in an opposition presidential election initiative,
in which Chigir was one of the principal candidates. An investigation
began 6 months later, and there is still no evidence that the
authorities have taken concrete steps to resolve the case. The
Government also failed to present any information on the investigation
despite a request from the U.N. Working Group on Involuntary
Disappearances. The authorities also have harassed and hindered the
investigations of Zakharenko's disappearance by independent
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). In December Zakharenko's wife
and children received political asylum in a Western European country,
where they had been residing since August, after accusing Lukashenko of
direct involvement in Zakharenko's disappearance.
On September 16, 1999, following a meeting earlier during that day
broadcast on state television in which Lukashenko ordered the chiefs of
his security services to crack down on ``opposition scum,'' 13th
Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Viktor Gonchar disappeared, along with
his local business associate Anatoliy Krasovsky. A high profile
antigovernment politician, Gonchar was considered an active fundraiser
for the opposition. Shortly before his disappearance, Gonchar
telephoned his wife to inform her that he was on his way home. Broken
glass and blood were discovered later at the site where relatives and
friends of the men believe the vehicle in which the two were travelling
may have been stopped. As with the disappearance of Zakharenko, there
is no evidence of progress by official investigators to resolve these
cases.
In June Interpol officially notified Belarusian law enforcement
agencies that former national bank Chairwoman Tamara Vinnikova, who
disappeared in April 1999 from an apartment where she had been under
house arrest since 1997, was located in a Western European country.
Vinnikova reported in several interviews with the press that she went
into hiding to escape suspected conspiracies against her life.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The 1996 Constitution provides for the inviolability of
the person and specifically prohibits torture, as well as cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment; however, police and prison guards beat
detainees and prisoners. Law enforcement and prison officials may use
physical force against detainees and prisoners only if the latter are
violent, have refused to obey the instructions of the prison
administration, or have violated ``maliciously'' the terms of their
sentences. However, human rights monitors have credibly reported that
investigators coerce confessions through beatings and psychological
pressure. Although such behavior is against the law, the authorities
seldom, if ever, punishes those who commit such abuses. Guards use
force against detainees to coerce confessions as well as during routine
activities. Police also beat demonstrators (see Sections 1.d. and
2.b.). On November 20, the U.N. Committee Against Torture issued
conclusions and recommendations on the third periodic report on the
country. The Committee cited concern over the deterioration in the
human rights situation and noted numerous continuing allegations of
torture and inhuman treatment or punishment committed by state
officials or with their acquiescence. These violations appeared to have
been committed against political opponents of the regime and peaceful
demonstrators.
On January 14, Oleg Volchek, a human rights monitor and chairman of
a nongovernmental commission investigating the disappearance of former
Internal Affairs Minister Yury Zakharenko, filed a complaint with the
Minsk city prosecutor after a lower court refused to bring criminal
charges against police who beat him following his arrest on July 21,
1999. Volchek was so severely beaten that he was treated for the
injuries he sustained. The police, who denied involvement in the
beating, claimed that Volcheck attacked them and sustained his injuries
when he fell and hit his head on a table. Volchek's attorney and other
human rights monitors believe that the authorities attempted to cover
up the beating. Volchek's appeal to the Minsk City Court also later was
denied.
On March 1, opposition activists Tsimafey Dranchuk, Leanid
Malakhaw, and Filip Klikushyn were arrested for demonstrating in front
of the Presidential Administration Building and, on March 3, were
sentenced to 5 days imprisonment. While being transported from the
courthouse to a detention facility, 18-year-old Dranchuk was beaten by
militia officials which resulted in serious head injuries. On March 5,
he was taken to a Minsk clinic, where his injuries were diagnosed as
severe by doctors. Malakhaw and Klikushyn reportedly were beaten by the
authorities at the same time as Dranchuk, although they did not sustain
serious injuries. They went on a hunger strike to protest their
sentences and abuse. Their hunger strike did not produce any result and
they were released after 5 day's detention.
On March 25, in a violent crackdown, uniformed and plainclothes
security forces beat and detained demonstrators gathering on Yakub
Kolas Square in downtown Minsk. According to human rights observers,
over 300 demonstrators were arrested and detained. Many of them were
beaten severely (see Section 2.b.). Yuri Belenky, deputy chair of the
conservative Christian Party of the Belarusian Popular Front, was
severely beaten and later hospitalized. Security forces reportedly hit
Belenky in the face with a truncheon, put his jacket over his head,
knocked him off his feet, and continued to kick him. Belenky was
detained for 3 days, after which time a government doctor diagnosed him
with a concussion. Belenky's appeals to prosecutors and the courts to
bring charges against the security forces responsible for the beating
were denied.
According to the Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) of the OSCE,
in an ``unwarranted and superfluous show of force'', five demonstrators
who participated in the April 26 Chernobylsky Shlaykh (the Chernobyl
Path) march were ``forcibly and violently'' detained by the militia
(see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
``Dedovshchina,'' the practice of hazing new recruits through
beatings and other forms of physical and psychological abuse,
apparently has not abated. In the first 5 months of this year,
according to government statistics, 30 cases were reported. Efforts by
family members and human rights monitors to investigate these cases and
other reports of Dedovshchina were blocked by government authorities.
Prison conditions are poor and are marked by severe overcrowding,
shortages of food and medicine, and the spread of diseases such as
tuberculosis, syphilis, and HIV/AIDS. Conditions at prison hospitals
are poor, according to human rights monitors. Detainees in pretrial
detention facilities also reported poor conditions and denial of
medical treatment, which contributed to their declining health while
they awaited trial. Although official statistics on prison overcrowding
are not available, OSCE AMG officers who visited a detention facility
in Vitebsk during June 1999 noted that in 1 cell, 16 female prisoners
shared 10 beds, while in another, 14 prisoners between the ages of 14
and 17 shared 8 beds.
In 1999 a government amnesty was announced for lesser offenders
designed to decrease the prisoner population. Another amnesty was
approved by the National Assembly on June 30. Acting Minister of
Internal Affairs Mikhail Udovikov announced on June 9 that 9,700
prisoners had received early release or a reduction in their sentences
under the 1999 amnesty and that the amnesty could be applied to 10,700
prisoners in jail and 2,400 on parole at that time under the new
legislation. Prior to the new amnesty, there were approximately 61,000
prisoners, according to Udovikov. It is unclear to what extent the new
amnesty was implemented. According to Udovkiov, the amnesty only
applied to war veterans, underage persons guilty of minor crimes,
pensioners, and the disabled. Those guilty of economic crimes could
only receive amnesty after payment of financial restitution.
Male and female prisoners are housed separately. Following an
inspection of a correctional facility for women in Gomel on June 1999,
Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakov noted in an interview with
the official press that, although it was intended to house only 1,350
inmates, it then held 2,800. NGO's reported that prison conditions did
not improve during the year.
On March 1, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and political prisoner
Vladimir Kudinov was transferred to solitary confinement in a
punishment cell for 7 days for alleged misconduct, which included
reportedly stopping morning exercises and having left a smoking area
too early (see Section 1.d.). Kudinov previously was punished for
participating in a chess tournament without prison approval and for
other violations of ``internal routine.'' Kudinov also was denied,
without explanation, visits by family and a priest. According to human
rights monitors, these punishments were imposed to exclude Kudinov from
the list of those eligible for amnesty or early parole.
On July 11, Ivan Lemyashewski, the former head of a group of
advisors to the Council of Ministers, issued an open letter to
Lukashenko calling for an end to the politically motivated harassment
of his family. On June 21, Lemyashewski's son, Ilya, was shot in the
chest by a masked man. The shooting followed an earlier attempt by
security forces to recruit Ilya to spy on his father. When he refused,
Ilya reportedly was warned that ``grave consequences'' would follow.
Lemyashewski's car was reportedly tampered with, resulting in an
accident, and the family reported receiving numerous threatening
telephone calls. The threats and attacks apparently were in retaliation
for his resignation from the Government (see Section 2.a.)
Human rights monitors sometimes were granted access to observe
prison conditions, although the authorities did not honor some requests
to meet with individual prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile.--The authorities have
amended only slightly the Soviet-era law on detention, and during the
year security forces continued to arrest arbitrarily and detain
citizens, most often in connection with demonstrations, some of which
were not authorized. Politically motivated arrests continued, although
most of those arrested were released within a few days.
The Criminal Procedure Code provides that police may detain a
person suspected of a crime for 24 hours without a warrant, within
which time the procurator is notified. The procurator then has 48 hours
to review the legality of the detention. If the procurator deems the
detention legal, a suspect can be held for a maximum of 10 days without
formal charge. However, usually once the decision is made to hold a
suspect, formal charges are filed. Once a suspect is charged, a trial
must be initiated within 2 months, although in some cases the
procurator general can extend pretrial detention to 18 months to allow
for further investigation. Alternatively, a suspect who has been
charged can be released on a written pledge not to flee, in which case
there is no time limit on pretrial investigation. The law allows
detainees the right to apply to the court (rather than the procurator)
to determine the legality of their detentions. However, in practice
suspects' appeals to have their detentions reviewed by the courts
frequently are suppressed because detainees are at the mercy of
investigators, and detention officials are unwilling to forward the
appeals. There is no provision for bail under the current legal code.
By law detainees may be allowed unlimited access to legal counsel,
and, for those who cannot afford counsel, the court appoints a lawyer.
However, investigators routinely fail to inform detainees of their
rights and conduct preliminary interrogations without giving detainees
an opportunity to consult counsel. The information gained then is used
against the defendant in court. Even when appointed by the State,
defense attorneys are subordinate to the executive branch. Access by
family members to those detained is restricted severely in practice and
they frequently are not notified when a family member, even a juvenile,
has been detained.
On January 19, Aleksandr Abramovich, leader of the Borisov branch
of the Social Democratic Party, was arrested by police near the Minsk
city court before the beginning of the trial of former Prime Minister
Mikhail Chigir ( see Section 1.e.). Abramovich was holding a sign
calling for an end to the prosecution of opposition leaders. Abramovich
was sentenced to 7 days in jail. In February Abramovich again was
arrested and sentenced to 35 days in jail for staging three
unsanctioned demonstrations: One against the war in Chechnya, one
against the trial of Chigir, and one against the trial of a local
businessman. On April 25, Abramovich again was arrested during a rally
held in Borisov to mark the 14th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident.
At the rally, Abramovich criticized the Government and was arrested
immediately after he ripped apart a picture of Lukashenko. Abramovich
was sentenced to 5 days in jail for ``petty hooliganism.''
On February 4, police in Grodno arrested Vladimir Sowtsa, a member
of the United Civic Party and an activist in the local union of
entrepreneurs, for spreading leaflets about a nationwide strike, which
began on February 1. Sowtsa was detained for several hours and then
taken to a court where he was fined $7.50 (6,600 rubles) and later
released.
On February 29, while collecting signatures on a petition against
the country's union with Russia, two activists of the Belarusian
Popular Front were detained for several hours by police and later
charged with illegal distribution of printed materials.
On March 1, Filipp Klikushin, Leonid Malakhov, and Timofei Dranchuk
were arrested by police for staging an unsanctioned protest near the
Presidential Administration in central Minsk in support of those who
had disappeared (see Section 1.c.).
On March 23, five youth activists, two of whom were under 18 years
of age, were detained by police for distributing leaflets announcing
the freedom day march on March 25 marking the 1918 founding of the
Belarusian National Republic. One of the activists, Sergei Shevlakov,
reported that his family was not notified of his detention until almost
4 hours after the incident, in violation of the administrative offenses
code. All five reportedly were verbally threatened and abused by police
while in detention.
On March 25, approximately 700 demonstrators gathered on Yakub
Kolas Square in Minsk for the ``day of freedom'' march. On March 24,
Minsk city authorities banned the demonstration, despite requests from
foreign and domestic human rights observers to allow the demonstration
to proceed peacefully. Shortly after the demonstrators gathered on the
square, military and police special forces, dressed in riot gear, waded
into the crowd using clubs and began to beat and detain demonstrators.
According to local human rights lawyers, over 300 demonstrators were
arrested and prosecuted for their participation in the event. Many
leading opposition politicians were arrested in connection with the
demonstration and sentenced to 5 to 7 days imprisonment (see Section
2.b.).
On March 25, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and independent journalist
Valery Shchukin, was arrested by police in Vitebsk while covering an
opposition rally marking the 1918 founding of the Belarusian National
Republic. Shchukin was tried and sentenced to 10 days in jail for
participating in an unsanctioned demonstration. At the same event,
Vladimir Pleshchenko, a local opposition activist, was arrested and
later sentenced to 10 days in jail. Roman Solovyan, also a local
opposition activist, was arrested and sentenced to 5 days in jail.
On April 26, Anatoly Fyodorov, a local leader of the Belarusian
Popular Front, was arrested by police for organizing an unauthorized
demonstration in Mogilev on the 14th anniversary of the Chernobyl
disaster. Also on April 26, opposition activists Yury Kuzmitsky, Denis
Yeryomenko, and Sergei Terekhov were arrested while participating in
the Chernobilski Shlyakh demonstration. Kuzmitsky, who severely was
beaten by police, was sentenced to 5 days detention for participation
in the demonstration. Yeryomenko was convicted of illegal use of flags,
pennants, emblems, symbols, or placards for carrying a caricature of
Lukashenko. Terekhov was sentenced to 3 days' detention for ``speaking
of the President in foul language'' (see Section 2.b.).
On May 1, 14 opposition and human rights activists were detained by
police in Mogilev during a May Day rally in the town's central square.
The activists were carrying white-red-white flags and opposition signs
and were taken to a police station where they were detained for several
hours.
On May 21, Aleksandr Abramovich, Anton Tsylezhnikov, and Alesya
Ysyuk were arrested by police in Borisov while demonstrating in support
of former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir. Abramovich and Tsyalezhnikov
were sentenced to 15 and 10 days' incarceration respectively, and Ysyuk
was fined $404 (390,000 rubles).
On June 20, United Civic Party activists Aleksei Radzivnow and
Vladimir Romanovski were detained by police for staging a protest
against restrictions on political activity near the Minsk Government
Building in downtown Minsk; they were released later the same day.
On June 29, Alexander Abramovich again was arrested and sentenced
to 12 days in jail for a demonstration on June 19 in Borisov in which
protestors chained themselves to a flagpole and demanded the
resignation of the chairman of the Borisov City Executive Committee.
On July 27, Katsyaryna Haravaya and Igar Paremski were arrested and
sentenced to 5 and 7 days in jail, respectively, for staging an
unsanctioned demonstration in Gomel in which they protested against the
establishment of a ``fascist regime'' in Belarus.
Unidentified, nonuniformed officials working for the security
services regularly apprehend participants in antigovernment
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). There are credible reports that
plainclothes security officials sometimes infiltrate antigovernment
demonstrations in order to either report on opposition protestors or
provoke clashes between demonstrators and police. Security officers on
occasion also preemptively have apprehended organizers and individuals
considered to be potential participants prior to demonstrations,
including those that had been sanctioned by theauthorities.
On February 10, in an article in the independent newspaper
Narodnaya Volya, Oleg Baturin, a senior official in the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, reported that a clash between demonstrators and
security officials at the freedom march I on October 17, 1999, was
provoked by plainclothes security officers under orders from the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. Following publication of the article,
Baturin and his brother, fearing for their personal safety in Belarus,
claimed political asylum in Poland. On July 19, Baturin sought refuge
at a Western embassy in Minsk and claimed that he had been abducted by
unknown assailants, who he later identified as Belarusian security
service agents, and was returned forcibly to Belarus. On July 21,
Baturin was granted safe passage out of Belarus, to take up political
asylum in another country. While some of the facts of Baturin's
kidnaping remain unclear, most independent human rights observers
believe that his charges against the authorities were the reason for
his mistreatment.
Security force officials regularly detained journalists and NGO
officials during the year (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
Following demonstrations security officials have held some
detainees incommunicado. In addition to the hundreds of antigovernment
protestors whom authorities held for several hours or days, there were
several prominent political detainees whom the Lukashenko regime held
for prolonged periods of time in pretrial detention, some for over a
year.
On November 11, 1997, former Minister of Agriculture Vasily Leonov
was arrested on charges of large-scale embezzlement and bribery. Leonov
was held for over 2 years in pretrial detention, during which he
suffered two heart attacks. Leonov also went on a hunger strike to
protest the refusal of prison authorities to provide him with medical
supplies brought by his relatives. On January 14, Leonov was sentenced
to 4 years in prison and confiscation of property for large-scale
embezzlement and bribery (see Section 1.e.).
In February 1998, police arrested Andrei Klimov, a successful
entrepreneur and member of the Parliament that was illegally dissolved
in late 1996, on charges of embezzlement and other financial
irregularities. Klimov's supporters and human rights observers believe
that his arrest and prosecution was politically motivated because
Klimov is an outspoken critic of President Lukashenko and had
participated in a commission that examined violations of the law and
the Constitution by the President. Klimov's period of pretrial
detention was extended on several occasions. He was severely beaten by
prison guards on December 13, 1999, following his refusal to leave his
cell as a sign of protest. The presiding judge ordered that he be
brought to the courtroom. He was beaten by guards and forcefully
dragged into the courtroom in torn clothing and without any shoes.
Although he was clearly in need of medical attention, an ambulance was
not called until several hours later. On March 17, Klimov was convicted
of large-scale embezzlement and forgery and sentenced to 6 years'
imprisonment and loss of property (see Section 1.e.).
Statistics on the current number of persons in pretrial detention
and the average length of pretrial detention were not available. Acting
Minister of Internal Affairs Mikhail Udovikov, in a speech to
Parliament on June 9, said that approximately 100,000 people were in
pretrial detention or under some form of punishment. In comparison in
August 1998 there were approximately 11,000 persons in pretrial
detention.
The authorities do not use forced exile, although there were
credible reports that the security services threatened opposition
political activists and trade union leaders with criminal prosecution
or physical harm if they did not cease their activities and depart the
country.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is not
independent and is unable to act as a check on the executive branch and
its agents. Reforms adopted to support the independence of the
judiciary in 1995 remained unimplemented. The 1996 constitutional
referendum further subordinated the judiciary to the executive branch
by giving the President the power to appoint 6 of the 12 members of the
Constitutional Court, including the chairman. The remaining six are
appointed by the Council of the Republic, which itself is composed of
individuals appointed by the President or elected by individuals
influenced by the President. The President also appoints the chairmen
of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic Court. The President also
has authority under the Constitution to appoint and dismiss all
district and military judges.
The criminal justice systems follows the former Soviet model and
has three tiers: District courts; regional courts; and the Supreme
Court. Several modifications have been made, brought about by the new
Constitution, including direct presidential appointments. The
Constitutional Court was established in 1994 to adjudicate serious
constitutional issues, but, dependent on the executive branch, it does
not challenge presidential initiatives. In addition the Constitutional
Court has no means to enforce its decisions.
Judges adjudicate trials; only in capital offense trials in which
the defendant pleads not guilty and demands a jury trial do juries
determine innocence or guilt. Judges are dependent on the Ministry of
Justice for sustaining court infrastructure and on local executive
branch officials for providing their personal housing. In addition
judges owe their positions to the President. Although the Procurator's
Office denies it, there were widespread and credible reports that
``telephone justice'' (the practice of executive and local authorities
dictating to the courts the outcome of trials) continues.
On May 18, in a speech to the Belarusian-Russian Union
Parliamentary Assembly, covered by the media and widely criticized by
human rights monitors as evidence of the absence of judicial
independence, Lukashenko denied allegations of human rights abuses in
Belarus and said they were ``far-fetched and overblown beyond reason in
the West...We have no such violations.'' He acknowledged that a
``number of once famous persons,'' such a former Prime Minister Chigir
and others, had been prosecuted over the past few years. However,
``they were caught stealing and got what they deserved...Everybody is
equal before the law...Overseas politicians lack objectivity because
they surround criminals, thieves, and hooligans with a halo of
political martyrs.''
Prosecutors, like the courts, are organized into offices at the
district, regional, and republic levels. They ultimately are
responsible to and serve at the pleasure of the Procurator General who,
according to the Constitution, is appointed by the Council of the
Republic. Prosecutors are not independent and do not have authority to
bring charges against the President or the presidential administration.
On May 24, Constitutional Court Chairman Grigory Vasilevich told
journalists that a local prosecutor had been correct in rejecting a
complaint brought earlier against a presidential administration
official. According to Vasilevich, Article 125 of the 1996 Constitution
charges the Procurator General and other public prosecutors with the
task of ``control over the compliance of the ministries, other agencies
subordinate to the Council of Ministers, local representative and
executive authorities, enterprises, institutions, nongovernmental
organizations, officials, and private figures to laws, decrees, edicts,
and other legal acts.'' Procurators do not have authority to bring
charges against an official of the Presidential Administration, he
said, because it is under the authority of the President, and not the
Council of Ministers.
In May 1997, Lukashenko issued presidential Decree No. 12,
``Several Measures on Improving the Practice of Lawyers and Notaries,''
which, according to international legal experts and human rights
monitors, seriously compromised the independence of lawyers from the
authorities. The decree, which ostensibly was issued in response to
allegedly exorbitant attorneys' fees, subordinated all lawyers to the
Ministry of Justice, which controls the licensing of lawyers, and
placed the bar association under much greater Ministry of Justice
control.
In August 1999, while on an inspection tour in the Brest oblast in
the western part of the country, Lukashenko told local reporters that
he personally exercised control over ``certain'' ongoing judicial
cases, including that of former Prime Minister and opposition leader
Mikhail Chigir. Lukashenko stated, ``I have them under control, I am
not going to allow any injustice there myself.'' On August 30, 1999
during a government interagency commission on crime covered by the
official media, President Lukashenko reportedly stated, ``It is natural
for the Head of State to exercise control over one criminal case or
another...especially in our country, where the Head of State controls
all the branches of power--legislative, executive, and judicial.''
Human rights monitor and defense attorney Vera Stremkovskaya was
threatened with disbarment following her public criticisms of the
Lukashenko regime while on visits abroad in 1998 and during the year.
In an attempt to hinder Stremkovskaya's activities, Ministry of Justice
officials also have launched investigations and issued warnings to her
human rights NGO (see Section 4).
The Constitution provides for public trials, although exceptions
can be made in cases established by law (for example, in cases of rape
or on grounds of national security). Defendants have the legal right to
attend proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence on their
own behalf. However, these rights are not always respected in practice.
The right to be represented by counsel also is not always respected in
practice. While the 1996 Constitution establishes a presumption of
innocence, in practice defendants frequently must prove their
innocence. According to statistics from the Belarusian Helsinki
Committee, in 1998, criminal charges were brought by prosecutors
against 59,700 individuals. Of these, only 272, or less than one-half
percent were found to be not guilty.
Both defendants and prosecutors have the right of appeal, and most
criminal cases are appealed, according to legal sources. In appeals
neither defendants nor witnesses appear before the court; the court
merely reviews the protocol and other documents from the lower court's
trial. Appeals rarely result in reversals of verdicts.
Antigovernment protestors arrested after demonstrations were
subjected to assembly line-style trials, often without the right to
counsel or the opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses.
On January 14, former Minister of Agriculture Vasily Leonov was
sentenced to 4 years in prison and confiscation of property for large-
scale embezzlement and bribery. Under the provisions of amnesty
legislation, Leonov was released from prison on October 5 after nearly
3 years imprisonment. Leonov allegedly accepted bribes of furniture
worth approximately $52 (42,459 rubles) and foodstuffs worth $90
(73,383 rubles). Leonov had been arrested on November 11, 1997; he
arrest was videotaped and broadcast on national television. In the
videotape, police officers were shown taking U.S. dollars out of
Leonov's desk. The following day, referring to Leonov's arrest,
Lukashenko said law enforcement agencies would ``root out corruption''
without respect for rank. Legal experts and human rights monitors noted
that the trial was rife with abuse of legal procedure, including the
use of evidence taken under duress and later recanted, in violation of
the Criminal Code.
On June 8, Mogilev regional authorities announced the sale of
property belonging to Leonov, confiscated by the Government following
his conviction. The house and accessory buildings were offered for sale
at a total of $4,500 (approximately 4,320,000 rubles). According to the
human rights organization Charter '97, the authorities published the
announcement of the sale in state-run newspapers without waiting for a
hearing on a lawsuit brought by family members to block the sale.
Authorities also reportedly refused to let the Leonov family buy the
property back.
On March 17, a Minsk court sentenced 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy
Andrei Klimov to 6 years in prison on fabricated charges of alleged
malfeasance and large-scale embezzlement in the handling of government
contracts at a property development firm which he had run. Klimov,
whose trial began in July 1999, had been in pretrial detention since
February 1998 (see Section 1.c.). International and local human rights
observers believe that the trial and conviction were politically
motivated to punish Klimov for his involvement in a 1996 impeachment
drive against President Lukashenko. On August 22, Klimov's appeal was
denied by another Minsk court without comment. Human rights monitors
believe the appeals court overlooked numerous procedural violations in
rejecting the appeal.
On May 19, the political show trial of opposition leader and former
Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir concluded with his conviction for
exceeding his authority as Prime Minister in granting a delay in
payment of customs duties to a company. The court sentenced Chigir to a
3-year prison term suspended for 2 years. The court also ordered him to
pay $220,000 in damages. The OSCE and other legal observers noted that
the judgement involved irregularities in legal procedure and was
designed to prevent Chigir from posing a challenge to the Government in
presidential elections scheduled for 2001. Chigir had been arrested on
March 30, 1999, just prior to a public ceremony to register his
participation in an opposition-organized presidential election
initiative aimed at drawing attention to the upcoming end of
Lukashenko's legal 5-year term in office. It also followed several
warnings from government security officials to Chigir that he cease his
political activities. Despite protests from the OSCE and a number of
foreign governments, Chigir remained in pretrial detention from March
30 until November 30, 1999.
On May 30, speaking at a meeting of participants of a government-
organized ``social-political dialogue,'' Lukashenko said Chigir's
sentence was lenient. Speaking to the head of the OSCE AMG, Lukashenko
said ``on your instructions, if you want, as a result of your pressure,
although I did not welcome it, your client (Chigir) was forgiven a lot
... Were it not for the OSCE, Chigir would have to serve at least 5
years first in a cell and then somewhere in a prison.'' Lukashenko's
comments were condemned widely by local human rights monitors as
further evidence that Chigir's trial was politically motivated because
of his opposition to the Lukashenko regime. On August 18, the Supreme
Court, following appeals from both Chigir and the procurator, returned
the case to the city court for further investigation. In her appeal,
Chigir's attorney, Yulia Chigir, cited numerous procedural
irregularities, including the unlawful time limit placed on the defense
to familiarize itself with the lower court protocol. On December 5, the
Supreme Court vacated the sentence against Chigir and returned the case
to the procurator's office for further investigation. The panel of
judges ruled that the investigators and the judges in the previous
trial failed to fully examine the facts of the case. At year's end, no
trial date was set.
On June 19, Nikolai Statkevich, chairman of the Belarusian Social
Democratic Party, and 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy Valery Shchukin were
convicted of active participation in group actions disturbing the peace
and were sentenced to 2-year and 18-month suspended sentences,
respectively. Statkevich and Shchukin had been arrested immediately
following the march for freedom on October 17, 1999, which resulted in
clashes between protestors and riot police. Statkevich also was charged
with active participation in group actions disturbing the peace for an
unauthorized demonstration held on June 27, 1999. The trial, which
began on April 24, was marked by violations of judicial procedure. In
many cases, witnesses were unable to identify Statkevich or Shchukin
and appeared to have been coached. Most human rights observers
considered the trial to be politically motivated. On August 25, the
Supreme Court, citing procedural and investigative irregularities,
upheld an appeal brought by Statkevich and Shchukin, vacated their
sentences and returned the case to the Minsk city court for
investigation and a new trial.
On July 12, 1999, Vladimir Ravkov, vice rector of the Gomel State
Medical Institute, was arrested along with 17 other members of the
institute, on corruption charges. Of the 18 arrested, only Ravkov
remained in jail pending trial at year's end. Investigators have
refused to allow Ravkov's wife, Natalya Ravkova, to defend him in
court. Prison administrators reportedly denied Ravkov adequate medical
treatment. Human rights monitors reported that this case appears to be
politically motivated because of past criticism by the Gomel Medical
Institute of government neglect of Chernobyl-related problems.
On October 20, Julia Chigir, wife of Mikhail Cigir, was found
guilty of violent resistance to a police officer and given a 2 year
suspended sentence. On May 19, Julia Chigir bit the ear of a police
officer when he forcibly attempted to block her entrance and that of
her supporters, into a Minsk City courthouse on the day of Mr. Chigir's
sentencing. The OSCE and human rights monitors noted that the court's
ruling contradicted eyewitness accounts of the events on May 19 and
that the ruling was politically motivated.
Although the authorities have allowed representatives of the OSCE
AMG to visit Supreme Soviet Deputies Klimov and Kudinov and former
Agriculture Minister Leonov, authorities have refused permission to
other foreign diplomatic and human rights observers to visit the same
prisoners (see Section 1.d.). On July 5, the Procurator General's
Office denied the OSCE AMG permission to visit Vladimir Ravkov, the
jailed vice rector of the Gomel State Medical Institute, whose arrest
appears to be politically motivated and who is reported to be in poor
health.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against
illegal interference in a citizen's personal life, including invasion
of privacy, telephone, and other communications; however, the
Government does not respect these rights in practice. Although the
inviolability of the home also is provided for by the Constitution,
which states that ``no one shall have the right to enter, without legal
reason, the dwelling and other legal property of a citizen against such
a citizen's will,'' in practice government monitoring of residences,
telephones, and computers continued unabated. The KGB is believed
widely to enter homes without warrants, conduct unauthorized searches,
and read mail. Political, human rights, and other NGO's state that
their conversations and correspondence are monitored routinely by the
security services. Some opposition figures report a reluctance to visit
some foreign embassies due to fear of reprisal.
Nearly all opposition political figures assume that the authorities
monitor their activities and conversations. The Lukashenko regime does
nothing to refute these assumptions. Militia officers assigned to stand
outside diplomatic missions are known to keep records of visits by
political opposition leaders. In addition even regime officials do not
appear to be exempt from monitoring.
In June United Civic Party Chairman Anatoly Lebedko, a vocal
opponent of the Lukashenko regime, discovered a listening device
connected to a telephone in his apartment. Independent analysts believe
that the device was made and planted in the apartment by the security
services.
Security officials routinely raided and searched the apartments of
opposition politicians, often without a warrant. For example, on April
19, police and KGB officers conducted an unlawful search of the
apartment of Galina Yurina, an opposition activist, confiscated
leaflets for an upcoming opposition-organized demonstration as well as
personal items and detained Yurina for several hours. On August 23,
Yurina was stopped by security officials, and leaflets advocating the
boycott of parliamentary elections were seized from her car without a
warrant.
Security forces sought to recruit Ilya Lemyashewski, son of the
former head of a group of advisors to the Council of Ministers, to spy
on his father. On June 21, after his refusal to do so, Ilya was shot in
the chest by a masked man (see Section 1.c).
On July 31, 75-year-old Vasily Starovoitov, the former director of
the Rassvet agro-industrial enterprise, appealed to police to file
criminal charges against two men who attempted to enter his house and
threatened him on July 28. Starovoitov had been released from a
corrective labor camp in November 1999 after 2 years' imprisonment for
allegedly embezzling state credits. Domestic human right groups believe
that Starovoitov was arrested to draw attention away from a poor
harvest on heavily subsidized state farms. Two men reportedly
telephoned Starovoitov and said that they wanted to deliver a message
from imprisoned former Agriculture Minister Leonov (see Section 1.e.).
Shortly after the call, two men approached the door of Starovoitov's
house and identified themselves as police and KGB investigators and
threatened Starovoitov with violence if he did not let them in. The
police were called and the intruders were arrested. The incident was
under investigation at year's end.
The KGB, the MVD, and certain border guard detachments have the
right to use wiretaps, but under the law must obtain a prosecutor's
permission before installation. The prosecutor's office exercised no
independence and therefore the ``due process'' provision regarding
wiretaps is effectively meaningless. The Presidential Guard (or
security service) formed in 1995, reportedly continued to conduct
surveillance activities of the President's political opponents. There
is no judicial or legislative oversight of the Presidential Guard's
budget or activities, and the executive branch repeatedly has thwarted
attempts to exercise such oversight.
In 1999 the National Assembly revised the administrative offenses
code to increase the penalties for those who obstruct KGB officers. For
example, an article of the legislation prohibits preventing KGB
officers from entering the premises of a company, establishment or
organization, and for failing to allow audits or checks to be made, as
well as for unjustified restriction or refusal to provide information,
including access to company information systems and databases. This
revised code remains in effect.
In 1997 the Ministry of Communications renegotiated contracts for
supplying telephone service. The new contracts forbid subscribers from
using telephone communications for purposes that run counter to state
interests and public order. The Ministry has the right to terminate
telephone service to those who breach this provision.
Presidential Decree No. 218, issued in 1997, prohibits the import
and export of printed, audio, and visual information that could
``damage'' the economic and political interests of the country (see
Section 2.a.). This decree remains in effect.
On November 23, 1999, Lukashenko signed Decree No. 40, which allows
the authorities to nationalize the property of any individual if the
President determines that the individual has caused financial damage to
the State. There were reports that this decree had been used,
particularly against businessmen. Authorities also threatened to seize
the property of former Central Bank Chair Tamara Vinnikova.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, as well as the freedom to receive, retain, and
disseminate information; however, the regime restricts these rights in
practice. The executive branch continued its suppression of freedom of
speech. Despite the constitutional provisions, a 1998 government decree
limited citizens' right to express their own opinions. Although
independent media remain widely available in Minsk, as part of a
continuing crackdown on opposition activity, the authorities stepped up
its campaign of harassment against the independent media. The
authorities continued to restrict severely the right to a free press
through near-monopolies on the means of production of newsprint, means
of distribution on national level broadcast media, such as television
and radio, and by denying accreditation of journalists critical of the
regime. The authorities also kept up economic pressure on the
independent media by pressuring advertisers to withdraw advertisements,
as well as by fines and other administrative harassment. Employees at
some state-run enterprises are discouraged from subscribing to
independent newspapers and journals.
In 1996 Lukashenko signed a decree ordering that all editors in
chief of state-supported newspapers would henceforth be official state
employees and would become members of the appropriate local level
government council. Another decree granted the Ministry of Press the
authority to assign graduates of state-supported journalism schools to
work in state-owned media organizations as a means of payment for their
schooling. These decrees remain in effect.
Presidential Decree No.5, issued in 1997, prohibits a range of
broadly defined activities and limits freedom of expression. For
example, the decree prohibits individuals from carrying placards or
flags bearing emblems that are not registered officially with the
state, as well as emblems, symbols, and posters ``whose content is
intended to harm the state and public order, rights and legal interests
of the citizens.'' The decree also bans activities that are
``humiliating to the dignity and honor of the executive persons of
state bodies.'' This decree has been used to prosecute and fine those
carrying symbols emphasizing the country's independence, such as the
red and white flag.
The Defamation Law makes no distinction between private and public
persons for the purposes of lawsuits for defamation of character. A
public figure who has been criticized for poor performance in office
may ask the prosecutor to sue the newspaper that printed the criticism.
In June 1998, the lower house of the National Assembly approved a bill
that stipulated that public insults or libel against the President
could be punished by up to 4 years in prison, 2 years in a labor camp,
or a large fine. However, there were no reports that anyone was
arrested or charged subsequently for this offense, and the bill
apparently was devised principally as a means of intimidation. Its
provisions remain in effect.
In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree that prohibited
and restricted the movement of certain goods across customs borders.
The decree specifically prohibited the import and export of printed,
audio, and video materials, or other news media containing information
``that could damage the economic and political interests of the
country.'' Some bulletins affiliated with the opposition published
outside of the country appeared to be targeted by the decree. Although
in previous years there were a number of incidents in which customs
officials confiscated opposition materials at the country's borders,
there were no recent reports of such incidents.
In January 1998, more stringent regulatory provisions, introduced
by amendments to the Law on Press and Other Mass Media that were
adopted by the Council of the Republic in December 1997, went into
effect. The new regulatory provisions grant greater authority to the
authorities to ban and censor critical reporting. For example, the
State Committee on the Press was given authority to suspend for 3
months publication of periodicals or newspapers without a court ruling.
On December 17, 1999, Lukashenko signed new amendments to the law
``On Press and Other Media.'' The amendments ban the media from
disseminating information on behalf of political parties, trade unions,
and NGO's that are not registered with the Ministry of Justice.
On April 7, a new presidential decree came into effect on ``the Use
by Legal Entities of the Name of the Republic of Belarus.'' The decree
allows only legal entities specially authorized by the President to use
the name of the country in its title. According to the decree and
independent legal experts, the independent press is barred from using
the country name in its titles.
Independent newspapers are available widely in Minsk, but outside
of the capital most towns only carry local newspapers, only some of
which are independent. On January 20, authorities forced the Orsha-
based Filon Kmita Center to stop publishing its daily newspaper,
Kutseyna, after the paper was denied official registration. Kutseyna
was known for its critical reports on the Government. Despite repeated
appeals from foreign and domestic human rights observers, the paper was
not registered and did not reopen.
In February the editors in chief of the country's six largest
independent newspapers sent an open letter to Prime Minister Uladzimir
Yarmoshyn demanding the end to the discriminatory measures that the
state uses against them. The letter noted that the state postal service
recently raised distribution rates for independent papers by 400 to 600
percent, while the State-owned publications received distribution
discounts. It also stated that the large increases undermine the
freedom of the press.
On April 24, the Grodno City Executive Committee refused to
register the independent newspaper Reporter, which often is critical of
theauthorities, on the grounds that the editors could not prove that
they were occupying legal office spaces. Later, a second application
for registration also was rejected by the City Executive Committee
without further explanation. On August 25, it was reported that the
city executive denied registration for a third time. In its rejection
notice, the city executive reportedly stated that there was ``a
sufficiency of newspapers in Grodno and no need for another one.''
On May 11, the Supreme Economic Court of Belarus rejected an appeal
by the independent newspaper Nasha Niva of a warning issued by the
State Press Committee in March. The newspaper was warned for publishing
a reader's letter which the committee said expressed ``intolerance
toward the Russians'' in violation of Article 5 of the Media Law, which
bans the use of the media for inciting ethnic enmity or discord. The
letter, entitled ``I Envy Chechnya,'' was critical of Russian
atrocities in Chechnya and supported the defense of Belarusian language
and culture. On May 15, Nasha Niva was warned for a second time for
publishing an article entitled ``Infection of Fascism: Lukashenko is
Copying Hitler'' by Semyon Sharetsky, the 13th Supreme Soviet chairman
currently in self-imposed exile in Lithuania. The warning reportedly
was issued under Article 5 of the Media Law for the ``inadmissibility
of abusing the freedom of mass information.'' Article 16 of the media
law states that a newspaper can be closed after receiving more than one
warning within a year.
On May 29, two leading independent newspapers critical of the
Government, Narodnaya Volya and Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta (BDG),
received warnings for alleged ``abuses of the freedom of mass
information'' under Article 5 of the Law on Media. The BDG was warned
for publishing an article on February 22 by Semen Bukchin entitled
``Prayer in a Birkenau Concentration Camp.'' The State Press Committee
alleged that the article created ``tensions in Polish-Jewish''
relations. A second warning was issued to BDG for publishing a response
to Bukchin's article, which ``offended the citizens of the Russian
Federation.''
Narodnaya Volya was issued a warning for an article by Ivan
Makalovich which contained the question ``Should we Ask NATO for
Help?'' A second warning was issued for printing an article by Sergi
Popkov, deputy head of the conservative Christian Party of the
Belarusian Popular Front (CCP). According to the State Press Committee,
the CCF was not registered with the Ministry of Justice, and therefore
the article should not have been published.
On June 2, the Mogilev-based independent newspaper De Facto was
issued a warning by the State Press Committee for publishing the same
article by Semyon Sharetsky entitled ``The Infection of Fascism:
Lukashenko is Copying Hitler'' that Nasha Niva was warned for in May.
According to the State Press Committee, Sharetksy's article ``incites
ethnic hatred.''
On September 5, authorities banned the first national nonstate
press festival, scheduled to be held on September 8 and 9 in Vitebsk.
No reason was given for the authorities' decision and festival
organizers planned to reschedule the festival for late September in
another city. The Belarusian Association of Journalists said the ban
was part of a government effort to inhibit the work of the independent
press.
On September 13, the office of the Magic publishing house was
raided, and the owner and President Yuri Budzko was charged with
``propagandizing an electoral boycott.'' The Magic publishing house is
the printing press for the country's leading nonstate newspapers.
During the raid, copies of the independent newspaper Rabochy were
seized and its editor Viktar Ivanshkevich was arrested. On October 11,
Magic's bank accounts were frozen prior to a tax inspection. In
September police seized 100,000 copies of a special edition of the
Belorussian Free Trade Union newspaper Rabochy and arrested the
newspaper's editor in chief Victor Ivashkevich, the newspaper's legal
advisor Dmitry Kostyukevich, and Yuri Budko the owner of the Magic
publishing house where the newspaper was being printed. The newspaper
called on voters to boycott the October elections to the National
Assembly. Ivashekvich and Kostyukevich were charded and later convicted
and fined under Article 167 of the Administrative Code for publicly
calling on an election boycott. The charges against Budko were
dismissed by a separate court.
On October 16, tax authorities raided the offices of Magic and
seized the company's printing equipment. In connection with the
investigation and seizure, the company's bank accounts were frozen on
October 11. The equipment originally had been leased by Magic from the
Belarus-Soros Foundation (BSF) and then later from the open society
institute, which received ownership of the equipment when the BSF
ceased its operations in 1997. The tax authorities seized the equipment
to cover fines owed by the BSF for alleged tax violations. On December
18, the Belarusian Supreme Economic Court upheld the seizure of the
equipment. Most independent human rights monitors believe the
authorities selectively enforced the law in this case to hinder the
printing and distribution of independent media critical of the current
authorities.
Independent journalists were frequently barred by government
authorities from covering events or arrested in the course of doing so.
On March 1, officials of the presidential security service detained
three journalists covering an unsanctioned opposition demonstration
near Lukashenko's residence. The three journalists, reporters from
Radio Liberty and the independent Belarusian news service Belapan and a
Reuters photographer, were detained for several hours and later
released.
On March 16, six journalists from the satirical journal Navinky
were detained by plainclothes police after participating in the Freedom
March II demonstration in Minsk (see section 2.b.). The journalists
were held for several hours without explanation and released the
following morning.
On March 25, in a violent crackdown on an opposition-organized
rally to commemorate the 82nd anniversary of the Belarusian National
Republic, 35 foreign and local independent journalists were beaten and
detained. Journalists reported that they were not given an explanation
as to why they were being detained, and, in some instances, the police
used violent force to arrest the journalists. Journalists reportedly
were searched, equipment was confiscated, and film exposed. The
journalists were released later the same day.
On April 28, Yahor Mayorchyk, a freelance reporter for Radio Free
Europe/Radio liberty (RFE/RL) was summoned to a military enlistment
office where he reportedly was interrogated by KGB officers for 90
minutes. The KGB officers reportedly threatened that if Mayorchuk did
not cooperate with the KGB, ``the same thing would happen as to
Babitsky.'' The KGB officers were referring to RFE/RL journalist Andrei
Babitsky, who was arrested by Russian authorities in Chechnya for his
coverage of the war there, held captive for 40 days, and faced trumped
up charges of treason.
On May 1, two independent journalists were arrested while covering
an opposition demonstration in Mogilev. Igor Irkho, a journalist with
the De Facto newspaper, reportedly was assaulted physically by the
police and had his camera damaged. He and Alexander Alexandrovich, a
reporter for the Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta, were detained for several
hours by local militia before being released.
On May 2, five journalists from the Reporter newspaper gathered in
Lenin Square in Grodno to protest the city government's refusal to
register their paper. Minutes after gathering on the square, the
journalists were arrested by local police and detained for several
hours.
On October 20, tax authorities launched an investigation into the
accounts of the independent newspaper De-Fakto. On November 20, De-
Fakto was fined over $1,770 (2 million rubles) for alleged unpaid taxes
and fines. On October 25, the State Committee on Press issued a warning
to the Belarusian Language Society for an article that appeared in its
newspaper, Nasha Slova, by an unregistered organization, the Grodno
Association of Democratic Veterans of War and Labor. On November 21,
the State Committee on press issued a fourth warning to the independent
newspaper Pahonya, based in Grodno, for publishing a statement by an
unregistered organization, the Grodno initiative, an association of
local opposition organizations. After two warnings, legal proceedings
can be initiated to close a newspaper. Also, under the administrative
code, publishing materials on behalf of unregistered organizations is
punishable by a fine and, if repeated, by up to 15 days imprisonment.
On November 15, the bank accounts of Novaya Gazeta, in the town of
Smorgon, were blocked. Human rights monitors said these incidents were
part of a government-wide pattern aimed at restricting the activities
of independent press.
On December 12, police in Osipovichy, raided an apartment where
Nikolai Tomashov, editor of the independent newspaper Panorama, and
journalist Igor Simbirov were working on the next issue of the
newspaper. Simbrov was beaten by police, a search was conducted and
documents and a computer were seized. Simbirov and Tomashov were then
taken to the procurator's office where they were charged with
slandering government officials.
Until government authorities shut it down during 1996, Radio 101.2
had been the sole Belarusian-language independent station in the
country. The Belarusian Patriotic Union of Youth, a government-
subsidized presidential youth organization, was permitted to take
control of Radio 101.2. An independent Belarusian-language crossborder
radio station, Radio Ratcija, based in Poland, began operation during
the year. However, in April the Foreign Ministry's special commission
for accrediting foreign journalists refused to register four of the
radio station's journalists based in Belarus.
State-controlled Belarusian Television and Radio (B-TR) maintained
its monopoly as the only nationwide television station. Its news
programs regularly featured reporting that was biased heavily in favor
of the current authorities, sharply critical of opposition politicians,
and failed to provide an outlet for opposing viewpoints. Local,
independent television stations operated in some areas and relatively
were unimpeded in reporting on local news. However, most of these
stations reported that they were under pressure not to report on
national-level issues or were subject to censorship.
On March 10, Yaraslaw Beklyamishchaw, director and host of the
``Krok-2'' talk show on B-TR, was dismissed from his position after
inviting opponents of the Government to appear on his program. One of
the guests on the program was Yury Khashchavtski, producer of a
documentary film about Lukashenko entitled ``An Ordinary President.''
The official reason for his dismissal was ``a flagrant violation of the
rules of presentation of the program on the air and its noncompliance
with the cue sheet.'' Beklyamishchaw sued B-TR for unlawful dismissal,
and on June 14, B-TR agreed to an out-of-court settlement of the case.
In March 1998, the Presidential Administration issued an internal
directive entitled ``On Strengthening Countermeasures Against Articles
in the Opposition Press.'' The directive, which remains in effect,
specifically lists 10 independent media organizations covered by these
provisions and prohibits government officials from making comments or
distributing documents to nonstate media. It also forbids state
enterprises from advertising in nonstate media. Although the directive
does not restrict directly independent media or impinge on the right of
citizens to receive information, it does restrict government officials
in speaking to the independent media and gives further advantages to
the state press.
In July Dimitry Zavadsky, a cameraman for the Russian television
network ORT, disappeared at the Minsk National Airport while waiting
for Pavel Sheremet, another ORT journalist, to arrive from Moscow. When
Sheremet arrived at the airport, Zavadsky was missing, but his car was
found locked in the airport parking area. In 1997 Zavadsky and Sheremet
were arrested by Belarusian authorities for crossing the Belarusian-
Lithuanian border illegally while filming a documentary critical of the
Lukashenko regime. In a politically motivated trial, Sheremet and
Zavadsky were given 2-year and 18-month suspended sentences,
respectively. Government authorities accused the opposition of
organizing Zavadsky's disappearance, calling it a provocation, and
later threatened Sheremet with potential charges of slander for an
interview, published in the independent press, in which Sheremet blamed
Lukashenko and Belarusian security services for Zavadsky's
disappearance. A criminal investigation of the disappearance was
opened, but no progress had been reported by year's end (see Section
1.b.).
A 1997 Council of Ministers decree nullified the accreditation of
all correspondents and required all foreign media correspondents to
apply for accreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the
application form for accreditation requested biographic information, as
well as a record of the applicant's journalistic activity. Journalists
who were residents of Belarus also were required to register with the
state tax authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has used its
authority to deny accreditation to four journalists from Radio Ratcija,
and there were reports that other journalists from foreign media
outlets have been threatened with a loss of their accreditation for
reporting on opposition-related activities.
In January the authorities and the state-run media began a campaign
of harassment against poet and writer Vasil Bykov. Bykov, a leading
proponent of ``Glasnost'' in the 1980's and a literary prize winner,
recently had returned to the country after several years. According to
the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, Bykov fled to Germany as a result of
the harassment. On January 28, the OSCE representative on freedom of
the media, Freimut Duve, wrote a letter to the Belarusian Minister of
Foreign Affairs urging the Government to end its campaign of harassment
against Bykov. In his letter, Duve said ``today in Belarus we have
favorable conditions for the return of the ideology that dominated
during Soviet times.''
On August 11, 1999, the international NGO Reporters sans Frontiers
described the Government as an enemy of the Internet. A public
statement issued by the organization noted that citizens were not free
to explore the Internet independently. Although there are several
Internet service providers in the country, they are all state
controlled. The Lukashenko regime's monopoly on Internet service
results in high prices, poor quality, and limited service and allows
for the monitoring of practically all e-mail. Although the authorities
have full control, it does not appear to be cutting off access
entirely, and those who do have access appear to be able to contact a
full range of unfiltered web sites. A June survey by an independent
polling organization found that less than 3 percent of the population
has access to the Internet.
The Lukashenko regime restricts academic freedom. A sharply
critical Human Rights Watch report released in July 1999 detailed
government restrictions on academic freedom. The report noted that the
authorities had suppressed research on controversial topics,
recentralized academic decisionmaking, and maintained a ban on
political activity on campuses. At the same time, a ``systematic
crackdown'' on political dissent on campuses had targeted outspoken
students and lecturers who were threatened with expulsion, often for
their off-campus political activity. The report also asserted that
state university authorities issued reprimands and warnings to
politically active lecturers, independent historians, and other
academics. It stated that university employees who challenge the status
quo are told to curtail political activities or change the focus of
their academic inquiry. University administrators target research into
politically sensitive issues, such as the Belarusian independence
movement during the Soviet era, a theme that is seen to challenge the
State's policy of integration with Russia and is discouraged heavily.
In June four students of the Minsk State Linguistic University were
prevented from taking final exams because they refused to become
members of the Belarusian patriotic Youth Union, a pro-Lukashenko
student association that has been connected to violent attacks on
opposition activists in the past.
The Lukashenko regime continued to harass students engaged in
antigovernment activities, such as demonstrations. Some students were
expelled for their participation in demonstrations. In June the
Belarusian State University initially rejected the graduation thesis of
Pavel Severinets, the leader of the Malady Front, the youth branch of
the Belarusian Popular Front. Severinets wrote and defended his thesis
in the traditional version of the Belarusian language. After appeals
from human rights groups, Severinets' dissertation was approved.
Over 30 university students, who were expelled for their
participation in street demonstrations, were assisted in continuing
their studies in the Czech Republic by private NGO's. Sergei Martselev
and Nikolai Privarnikov were expelled from the international relations
faculty of the Belarusian State University for their participation in
demonstrations in 1999. Vadim Kinopatsky was expelled from the
Belarusian Agro-Technical University, also for his participation in
demonstrations in late 1999.
In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree, effective as of
the 1997-98 academic year, requiring students who receive free
university education from the state to accept jobs assigned by the
authorities upon graduation. Although it remains unclear how
universally this decree is enforced, there were reports that graduates
in the medical and teaching professions were required to accept
government jobs upon graduation. On April 11 and 12, approximately 20
student activists from the National Association of Belarusian Students
held a demonstration at the Minsk State Medical Institute to protest
the assigning of graduates to jobs in areas contaminated by radiation
from the Chernobyl disaster.
On September 8, the Ministry of Justice issued a second warning to
the National Association of Belarusian Students (NABS) for using
unregistered symbols. According to the Ministry, the color and size of
the association's letterhead was incorrect. On March 23, the NABS was
warned by the Ministry of Justice for using the word ``Miensk,'' an
older spelling of Minsk, in its documents. Two warnings in 1 year is
sufficient for the authorities to initiate proceedings to close the
organization down. The second warning was nullified by the Supreme
Economic Court on September 22. Most human rights observers believe the
warnings were part of a larger crackdown on independent NGO's (see
Section 4).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Lukashenko
regime severely restricts this right in practice. Organizers must apply
at least 15 days in advance to local officials for permission to
conduct a demonstration, rally, or meeting. The local government must
respond with a decision not later than 5 days prior to the scheduled
event.
Aleksandr Lukashenko issued Decree No. 5 in 1997 in part to
regulate what he termed the ``orgy'' of street protests taking place.
The decree further limits citizens' ability to assemble peacefully by
restricting the locations where rallies may take place and allowing
local authorities to put strict limits on the number of participants.
The decree also prohibits the display of unregistered flags and
symbols, as well as placards bearing messages deemed threatening to the
State or public order (see Section 2.a.). The decree, along with
subsequent amendments adopted by the acting legislature, imposes severe
penalties on those who violate the law, particularly the organizers of
events. The decree allows for either monetary fines or detention for up
to 15 days, but courts frequently impose high fines that those
convicted cannot pay. When individuals fail to pay fines, authorities
threaten to confiscate their property. The courts punished organizers
of rallies with fines of several times the average monthly wage.
Public demonstrations occurred frequently in Minsk but were always
under strict government control, including through open videotaping of
the participants by the police and plainclothes security officers.
Demonstrations also occurred in other parts of the country but were
less frequent especially in areas in the east close to the border with
Russia. Following some sanctioned and unsanctioned demonstrations,
police and other security officials continued to round up, beat,
detain, and try to coerce confessions from some demonstration
participants (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
On January 18, Yawhen Asinski was sentenced to 2 years of
corrective labor for participating in an opposition organized march on
October 17, 1999. Asinski initially was charged with participating in
group actions disturbing the peace, a charge punishable by up to 2
years in prison. That charge later was dismissed, and he was convicted
of violent resistance to a police officer on duty when video evidence,
displayed at the trial, showed that Asinski was not an active
participant in the demonstration.
On February 3, police in Minsk arrested five participants in an
unsanctioned demonstration near the Russian Embassy against Russian
atrocities in Chechnya. On February 5 and 9, seven participants in
unsanctioned demonstrations against the Chechnya conflict also were
arrested. Philip Klikushin and Leonid Malakov, who were arrested on
February 9, reported that they were beaten by police.
On March 1, three opposition activists were arrested by
presidential security services while staging an unsanctioned
demonstration near Lukashenko's residence on the anniversary of the
arrest of Victor Gonchar (see Section 1.b.). As soon as the activists
assembled, they were arrested along with three journalists covering the
event (see Section 2.a.).
On March 17, an estimated 30,000 demonstrators participated in the
Freedom March II. While security services maintained a strong presence,
the event proceeded peacefully. However, Minsk schools and universities
reportedly required students to be present at evening school events,
apparently in an effort to prevent them from participating in the
demonstrations. Following the demonstration, President Lukashenko spoke
to reporters while visiting Brest on March 16 and said that ``people
holding a grudge'' against the Government, such as ``market
speculators,'' dominated Freedom March II, which was billed as a youth
demonstration against the Government. Following Lukashenko's remarks,
the deputy chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee said that
organizers of the demonstration failed to keep their promise not to
block traffic and banned all further street demonstrations in Minsk.
While the ban only was enforced selectively, Minsk City authorities
frequently denied permission for demonstrators to march in the city,
except to a park on the outskirts of the city.
According to local human rights lawyers, more than 300 of some 700
demonstrators, including 35 journalists were arrested and prosecuted
for their participation in the March 25 Day of Freedom March (see
Section 1.c., 2.a., and 1.d.). All the detainees were forced into
police vehicles and taken to an Interior Ministry facility in Minsk.
Some were searched illegally, and they were not allowed to contact
colleagues, family, or friends. Film shot by press photographers
reportedly was confiscated and exposed.
On April 18, local authorities in Borisov banned an opposition-
organized demonstration scheduled for April 25, to commemorate the 14th
anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe. On April 20, the Minsk City
Executive Council followed the Borisov City Council's decision and
banned opposition organizations from staging demonstrations or marches
in downtown Minsk on April 26, known as the Chernobylsky Shlyakh
(Chernobyl path). On April 25, 1 day before the scheduled event, Minsk
authorities reversed their decision and approved the march route from a
park near the city center to a park on the outskirts of the city. Over
30,000 demonstrators participated in the march on April 26. According
to the OSCE AMG, organizers of the march responsible for the sound
equipment were detained for several hours following the conclusion of
the demonstration.
Also on April 26, a small group of demonstrators remained at the
park after the initiation of the march. According to the OSCE AMG, in
an ``unwarranted and superfluous show of force,'' special units of the
militia conducted a ``brutal raid'' on the group in which five
demonstrators were detained forcibly and violently. The demonstrators
were later released. On April 27, opposition activist Yury Kuzmitsky
was sentenced to 5 days' imprisonment for his participation in the
demonstration under charges of minor hooliganism. Denis Yeryomenko was
convicted of ``illegal use of flags, pennants, emblems, symbols or
placards'' for carrying a caricature of Lukashenko. On April 28, Sergei
Terekhov was sentenced to 3 days' imprisonment for ``speaking of the
President in foul language'' at the demonstration.
In Mogilev on April 26, over 100 demonstrators marched in an
unsanctioned demonstration commemorating the Chernobyl disaster.
Anatoly Fyodorov, the local leader of the Belarusian Popular Front, was
arrested and charged with organizing an unsanctioned demonstration. On
May 1, in Mogilyev, dozens of opposition activists and 13 journalists
were arrested when they attempted to stage a counter-demonstration to
the officially sanctioned pro-Lukashenko rally held in the town square.
Four organizers of the demonstration were later prosecuted for
organizing an unsanctioned demonstration.
On April 28, the Minsk City Executive Committee banned all street
demonstrations on May 1, Labor Day. The May 1 holiday has been a
traditional day for pro- and antigovernment demonstrations. The
opposition Social Democratic Party and the opposition Belarusian Party
of Communists applied for permission to demonstrate in the center of
Minsk but were denied. Later, the pro-Lukashenko Communist Party of
Belarus, headed by the deputy head of the Minsk City Executive
Committee, was given permission to hold a demonstration in the center
of Minsk.
On May 7, the Minsk City Executive Committee banned a rally at
victory square in the city center, organized by the opposition
conservative Christian Party to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the
victory over the Nazis. On May 10, the Minsk City Executive banned the
opposition Belarusian Social Democratic Party from holding poetry
readings in Yanka Kupala Park in the city center.
On May 19, Dimitry Marchuk and Yan Grib, two opposition activists,
were arrested while demonstrating outside the court house at the
sentencing of former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir. (see Section 1.e.).
The demonstrators, who were chanting ``freedom to Chigir,'' were
charged with using foul language, detained for several hours, and later
fined. On May 21, local activists from the Belarusian Social Democratic
Party demonstrated on the central square in Borisov in support of
former Prime Minister Chigir. Aleksandr Abramovich, Anton Telezhnikov,
and Alesya Yasyuk were arrested by local militia and charged with
organizing an unsanctioned demonstration. Abramovich was sentenced to
15 days' imprisonment, Telezhnikvo to 10 days imprisonment, and Yasyuk
was issued a $404 (390,000 rubles) fine (see Section 1.d.).
On May 30, opposition activists Alexei Balashov and Sergei Garstuk
were detained by police for hanging a white-red-white flag with a black
mourning strip on Lenin Square in downtown Brest in commemoration of
the 53 people killed in a stampede in a Minsk metro station in 1999.
The activists were detained for several hours and charged with
violating the law on mass gatherings and assemblies.
On June 19, Aleksandr Abramovich again was sentenced to 12 days'
imprisonment for staging an unsanctioned demonstration in Borisov on
June 15, in which demonstrators chained themselves to a flagpole in
front of the city government building and demanded the resignation of
the city executive chairman.
On June 20, United Civic Party activists Vladimir Romanovsky,
Galina Goncharik, Lyudmila Bozhok, and Aleksei Rodionov were arrested
for holding an unsanctioned rally near the Minsk city government
building to protest the city government's repeated banning of
opposition demonstrations. Romanovsky later was fined $400 (390,000
rubles) for organizing the rally. Deputy Chairman of the Minsk City
Executive Committee, Viktor Chikin, warned the trio that UCP activists
needed to apply for permission to hold such demonstrations and further
warned there would be harsher punishment if they continued to violate
the laws on assembly.
On July 10, Minsk city authorities banned an annual Catholic
procession in the center of Minsk commemorating the feast of Corpus
Christi. The march, which regularly attracted up to 5,000 participants,
had been held annually since 1991. A second appeal by the organizers
also was denied. The denial of the march was considered by many human
rights observers to be part of a larger crackdown on non-Orthodox
religious groups (see Section 2.c.).
On July 18, three activists of the Belarusian popular front were
convicted by a court in Zaslavl, in the Minsk region, and issued
warnings for ``attempting to organize a meeting with the community''
and for ``violating street demonstration regulations'' on July 4. On
July 4, the activists were attempting to organize an unsanctioned rally
when they were arrested by police. On July 27, activists of the
Belarusian Social Democratic Party staged an unsanctioned protest in
front of the Gomel regional executive committee offices against the
establishment of a Fascist regime in Belarus. Yekaterina Gorovaya and
Igor Romanov were arrested by local police and sentenced to 5 and 7
days' imprisonment, respectively, for organizing an unsanctioned
demonstration.
On August 3, Alekandr Abramovich and local activists of the
Belarusian Social Democratic Party held a rally in the center of
Borisov to protest authorities efforts to curb dissent and urge
authorities to resume the supply of hot water in the city. Police
arrested Abramovich and four others. Abramovich was sentenced to 15
days' imprisonment for organizing an unsanctioned protest. In the first
9 months of the year, Abramovich spent over 100 days in detention for
allegedly violating regulations on assemblies and demonstrations.
On August 6, local authorities in the town of Byarza, in the Brest
region, banned the local branch of the Belarusian Popular Front from
holding a public meeting with town residents. Authorities in nearby
Belaazyorsk also banned a similar meeting the following day.
On September 16, human rights and opposition activists staged a
demonstration in Minsk on the anniversary of the disappearance of
Victor Gonchar and Anatoly Krasovsky. The demonstrations was banned by
the city authorities. At the conclusion of the demonstration,
plainclothes men and uniformed police beat and detained several
participants, including journalists monitoring the event. Charges
against the participants later were dropped.
Prior to the parliamentary elections on October 15, law enforcement
authorities banned small and large demonstrations across the country
advocating an election boycott and arrested and fined hundreds of
activists promoting the boycott (see Section 3).
The Belarusian authorities increased harassment of homosexuals. On
February 21, Minsk police raided and closed, without explanation, a
disco club known as a meeting place for homosexuals. On September 7,
Minsk city authorities banned a Gay Pride-2000 parade in downtown
Minsk, scheduled for September 9. On September 7, Minsk authorities
also closed another night club where festivities were being held to
mark the opening of the Gay Pride-2000 weekend. In 1999 the Ministry of
Justice denied registration to country's only lesbian and gay rights
NGO.
Authorities provide for freedom of association; however, the
authorities do not respect and severely restricts this right in
practice. According to members of parties in opposition to the
President, authorities frequently deny permission to opposition groups
to meet in public buildings. Employees at state-run enterprises are
discouraged from joining independent trade unions (see Section 6.a.).
The authorities regularly harass members and supporters of opposition
parties and confiscate leaflets and publications. Officials have warned
alumni of foreign-sponsored education programs against continued
affiliation with their programs' sponsoring agencies.
On January 26, 1999, Aleksandr Lukashenko issued Decree No. 2,
requiring all political parties, trade unions, and nongovernmental
organizations to reregister with authorities by July 1. Such public
associations completed a lengthy reregistration process in 1995. The
timing of the decree, which increased the scope of operations and
number of members that organizations would need to demonstrate to
qualify for reregistration, apparently was intended as a method of
political intimidation at a time of increased opposition activity. On
July 1, 1999, regulations that prohibited private organizations from
using private residences as their legal addresses were announced. In
view of government control or ownership of many office buildings, the
regulations had the effect of complicating the reregistration process.
After the reregistration process had begun, the authorities
announced that organizations would have to alter their charters to
indicate recognition of the 1996 Constitution and that the words
``popular'' or ``national'' could not be used in their titles. On
December 17, 1999, an amendment to the Law on Public Associations went
into effect that prohibits political and social organizations from
using the words ``Belarus,'' ``Republic of Belarus,'' ``national'' or
``popular'' in their titles. Also in December 1999, Lukashenko signed
into law a bill on amendments to the Administrative Offenses Code that
would make any work on behalf of an unregistered NGO punishable by
fines. Although most of the major political parties and unions that
applied were allowed to reregister, according to the Assembly of
Belarusian Prodemocratic NGO's, only 1,268, or 57 percent of the NGO's
in existence when the reregistration law went into effect were
reregistered by the summer of 2000. A total of 202 NGO's were rejected
by the Ministry of Justice for reregistration on various grounds, and
31 were still in the process of reregistering at year's end.
On April 11, the Gomel regional court ordered a local association
for the unemployed, founded in 1992 by human rights monitor Yevgeny
Murashko, to be closed for failure to comply with the January 1999
decree on NGO reregistration. On May 16, Malady Front, the youth wing
of the Belarusian Popular Front, applied for registration under the new
legislation. On August 17, the Ministry of Justice notified the Malady
Front that its application was still ``under consideration,'' the
application later was rejected.
On July 17, the Francisak Skaryna Belarusian language society (BLS)
was issued a warning by the Ministry of Justice under Article 28 of the
Law on Public Associations for misuse of the organization's seal.
On July 19, the opposition United Civic Party received two written
warnings from the Ministry of Justice also for misuse of blank forms
and seals. One warning was issued because the party's e-mail address
was printed too close to the seal on the party's letterhead. A third
warning was issued on July 31 to the party for allegedly illegally
establishing a party cell at a chemical factory. By September the party
had been issued a total of five warnings. Although two warnings are
sufficient for the Justice Ministry to close an organization, the
warnings appeared to be attempts to intimidate and harass opposition
political organizations, and no attempts had been made to close the
organizations as a result of these warnings.
Authorities continued to attempt to limit severely the activities
of NGO's (see Section 4).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the authorities restrict this right in practice.
Although Article 16 of the 1996 amended Constitution, which resulted
from an illegal referendum, reaffirms the equality of religions and
denominations before the law, it also contains restrictive language
that stipulates that cooperation between the State and religious
organizations ``is regulated with regard for their influence on the
formation of spiritual, cultural, and country traditions of the
Belarusian people.''
Since his election as the country's president in July 1994,
Lukashenko has pursued a policy of favoring the Orthodox Church as the
country's chief religion and harassing other non-Orthodox religions.
Lukashenko and the authorities encourage a greater role for the
Orthodox Church. The President grants the Orthodox Church special
financial advantages that other denominations do not enjoy and has
declared the preservation and development of Orthodox Christianity a
``moral necessity.'' On April 30, Lukashenko said on state radio that
``nobody will disturb our Orthodoxy'' and pledged that the State ``will
do everything for the Church to be a pillar of support for our State in
the future.'' In December 1999, Lukashenko said that politicians and
the Head of State bear responsibility for preserving Christian values,
for maintaining religious peace in society, and for harmonious
cooperation between the State and the Church. Lukashenko also said that
the Church should be more active in promoting the unity of Slavic
nations because Slavic integration is in the interests of both the
State and the Church. In 1998 Lukashenko pledged state assistance to
the Orthodox Church and stressed that Orthodoxy would remain the ``main
religion.''
The State Committee on Religious and National Affairs (SCRNA),
which was established in 1997, categorizes religions and denominations.
Some are viewed as ``traditional,'' including Russian Orthodoxy, Roman
Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam (as practiced by a small community of
ethnic Tatars with roots in the country dating back to the 11th
century); some are viewed as ``nontraditional,'' including some
Protestant and other faiths; and some are viewed as ``sects,''
including Eastern religions and other faiths. The authorities deny
permission to register legally at the national level to some faiths
considered to be nontraditional and to all considered to be sects.
Without registration it is extremely difficult to rent or purchase
property in order to hold religious services.
The authorities deny some minority religious faiths permission to
register officially and treats them as sects. In 1998 SCRNA official
Vyacheslav Savitskiy announced that ``11 destructive religious
organizations, which have been denied registration after expert
examination, illegally function in the country.'' In April 1999, a
conference organized by the Orthodox Church and the National Assembly
discussed the need to introduce legislation to combat ``destructive
sects'' that operate illegally in the country. More recently the
authorities continued to deny repeated attempts by the Belarusian
Orthodox Autocephalous Church (BOAC) to register. Following a raid by
local police on a private house where a prayer service was being held,
Ivan Spasyuk, a BOAC priest, went on a hunger strike on November 7,
1999, in order to protest the authorities' refusal to register his
parish in the Grodno region. On November 28, 1999, at the urging of his
family and parishioners, Spasyuk called off the hunger strike. Local
courts so far have refused to hear appeals made by the BOAC to overturn
the Lukashenko regime's decision not to register their churches.
Because of ongoing registration problems, including the inability to
register a seminary, the BOAC is unable to train a sufficient number of
priests to meet the growing needs of its parishioners.
A number of Protestant faiths confront a situation in which they
are refused registration because they do not have a legal address and
are refused property that could qualify as a legal address because they
are not registered. The Full Gospel Pentecostal churches regularly are
refused registration in this way. Article 272 of the Civil Code states
that property may only be used for religious services once it has been
converted from residential use. However, the authorities decline to
permit such conversion to unregistered religions. Religious groups that
can not register often are forced to meet illegally or in the homes of
individual members. Several charismatic and Pentecostal churches have
been evicted from property they were renting because they were not
registered as religious organizations. A number of nontraditional
Protestant and other faiths have not attempted to register because they
do not believe that their applications would be approved. The
publication of religious literature for unregistered religions likely
would be restricted in practice, especially at state-controlled
publishing houses. However, there were no reports of restrictions on
the importation of religious literature. State employees are not
required to take any kind of religious oath or practice elements of a
particular faith. However, the practice of a faith not viewed to be
traditional, especially one not permitted to register, could
disadvantage possible advancement within the bureaucracy or state
sector.
Citizens are not prohibited from proselytizing; however, the
authorities enforce a July 1995 Council of Ministers decree that
controls religious workers in an attempt to protect Orthodoxy and
prevent the growth of evangelical religions. A 1997 Council of
Ministers directive prohibits teaching religion at youth camps. In
February 1999, the Council of Ministers passed Decree No. 280 which
expanded upon these earlier regulations. The decree appears to
stipulate, among other things, that among foreign religious workers,
only male clergy may engage in religious work upon invitation from a
religious organization already officially registered, a provision that
could be invoked to prohibit female religious clergy, such as Catholic
nuns, from engaging in religious activity. However, this provision has
not been tested in the courts.
During the year, the authorities stepped up its efforts to curb the
role of foreign clergy. In April the Council of Ministers introduced
changes to its regulations, that allow internal affairs agencies to
expel foreign clergymen from the country by not extending their
registration or by denying them a temporary stay permit. Under the new
regulations, these authorities are allowed to make decisions on
expulsion on their own or based on recommendations from religious
affairs councils, regional executive committees, or from the religious
affairs department of the Minsk City Executive Committee. Appeals to
judicial bodies are not provided for.
As part of efforts to curb the influence of foreign clergy, on
March 18, two law enforcement officials entered the Roman Catholic
church of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross in Brest, during a church
service, and arrested Catholic Priest Zbigniew Karolak, a Polish
citizen, for allegedly violating visa regulations and charged that his
religious work was ``illegal.'' Regional government officials had
criticized publicly Karolak for his ``undermining views.'' In addition
a court in Brest issued warnings to four supporters of Karoljak for
staging an unauthorized demonstration following the priest's arrest.
Karolak departed the country in June, following warnings from
authorities that he would be removed by force if he did not depart the
country. Subsequent to Karolak's departure, a Brest regional court in
November overturned the legality of the deportation order and a police
order barring Karoljack from entering the country for 10 years. In
February the Belarusian pastor of a Pentecostal church was warned by
SCRNA authorities that a public sermon was performed in his church by a
citizen of Ukraine in violation of the law on religion and that a
future violation of the law would lead to a revocation of his church's
registration.
Foreigners generally are prohibited from preaching or heading
churches, at least with respect to what the authorities view as
nontraditional faiths or sects, which include Protestant groups.
Foreign missionaries may not engage in religious activities outside the
institutions that invited them. One-year validity, multiple-entry,
``spiritual activities'' visas, which are required officially of
foreign missionaries, can be difficult to get, even for faiths that
registered with the authorities and have a long history in the country.
Foreign clergy or religious workers who do not register with the
authorities or who have tried to preach without government approval or
without an invitation from, and the permission of, a registered
religious organization, have been expelled from the country. Approval
often involves a difficult bureaucratic process.
Officially sanctioned newspaper attacks on minority faiths
increased. For example, on April 19, the Narodnaya Gazetta, a state-
owned and published newspaper, carried an article with the headline
``The Prospect Looms for Belarus to Become a Protestant Republic, or We
are Incessantly Being Urged to Deny the Faith of our Ancestors.'' The
article stated that Protestant groups engage in fanatical rituals,
including the ritual use of human blood and human sacrifice. The
article claimed that Protestant groups present a threat to the country
and urged the Government to take steps to protect Orthodoxy. In a
similar article in January, state-owned Narodnaya Gazetta criticized
the leader of the BOAC, Ivan Spasyuk, accusing him of criminal
activities and characterized the church as the ``spiritual followers of
Hitler.'' Attacks on Protestant faiths have also appeared on state-
owned television. In November and December, a documentary entitled
``Expansion'' was aired on state television, which alleged that
Protestant community carried out fanatical rituals. Protestant pastors
appealed to the courts to stop the television programs, but they were
denied.
Societal anti-Semitism persists, and the Lukashenko regime has done
little to counter the spread of anti-Semitic literature. In January the
World Association of Belarusian Jewry and the Human Rights Center
stated that Lukashenka was anti-Semitic and said that the government
had refused to establish Jewish schools, help maintain Jewish
cemeteries and historic monuments, or create memorials to Belarusian
Holocaust victims. In May the Minsk city court refused to hear an
appeal brought by Jewish organizations to stop the publishing and sale
of the book ``War According to Mean Laws,'' published by the Orthodox
printing house, which, among other anti-Semitic writings, included the
``Protocols of the Elders of Zion'' and blamed Jews for societal and
economic problems in the country (see Section 5). There has been a
noticeable lack of government action in redressing instances of anti-
Semitic vandalism in previous years. In April tax inspectors prohibited
the central synagogue in Minsk from distributing Matzoh for Passover
among members of the Jewish community. The tax inspectors reported that
the synagogue would need to obtain a special license, register as a
taxpayer, and open a store that would meet certain additional
requirements, thereby effectively making distribution during the
Passover celebration impossible.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--According to the Constitution, citizens
are free to travel within the country and to live and work where they
wish; however, the authorities restrict these rights in practice. The
authorities issues internal passports to all adults, which serve as
primary identity documents and are required for travel, permanent
housing, and hotel registration.
In June 1999, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional an
article of the Administrative Code barring enterprises, establishments,
and organizations from employing persons without a ``propiska'' (pass)
or the compulsory registration of their residence address. Under
article 182 of the Administrative Code, employers faced fines for
giving jobs to persons who had no stamp in their passport indicating
that their residence and their new place of employment were located in
the same city or district. However, it remains unclear to what extent
this court decision actually has affected local security officials. In
practice the right to choose one's residence remains restricted. In
November 1999, the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced a three-stage
program to replace the ``propiska'' system, but there were no reports
that this program was implemented.
Official regulations on entry and exit require citizens who wish to
travel abroad to receive first a ``global'' exit visa in their
passport, valid for between 1 and 5 years. Once the traveler has these
documents, the law does not restrict travel. The authorities have
delayed issuing ``global'' exit visas to some opposition activists in
an effort to hinder their political activity abroad.
Following the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in 1996, the
Lukashenko regime took measures aimed at limiting the travel of
opposition politicians who refused to submit to the legislature created
by the November 1996 referendum. Parliamentarians who did not join the
new legislature could no longer travel on their diplomatic passports,
despite the fact that these individuals had been assured that they
would retain their status as deputies until their terms of office
expired. Although their diplomatic passports were not confiscated, the
border guards reportedly had a blacklist of opposition members who were
to be denied exit from the country if they used a diplomatic passport.
Subsequent to the 1997 refusal by border guards to allow former Supreme
Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich and Parliamentary Deputy Anatoly
Lebdeko to travel abroad on their diplomatic passports, a number of
members of the former Supreme Soviet have either acquired regular
passports and have been allowed to travel abroad or have departed from
Russia using their Belarusian diplomatic passports. The Government has
delayed issuing passports to several opposition politicians, sometimes
for several months, in an effort to restrict their travel abroad for
political activities.
According to official data, the State did not deny any citizen
permission to emigrate. However, legislation restricting emigration by
those with access to ``state secrets'' remained in effect, and any
citizen involved in a criminal investigation also was ineligible to
emigrate. Prospective emigrants who have been refused the right to
emigrate may appeal to the courts.
The Constitution gives aliens and stateless persons the same rights
as citizens, except in cases established by law, international
agreement, or the Constitution. The Constitution also allows the state
to grant refugee status to persons who were being persecuted in other
states for their political and religious convictions, or because of
nationality. There is no law on first asylum, nor has it signed
readmission agreements with any of its neighboring states.
The authorities cooperate with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. In 1997 the authorities implemented for the first time the
1995 law on refugees, granting refugee status to a group of Afghans.
The UNHCR reported that throughout the year, 169 applications were
submitted for refugee status and 219 applications were rejected at the
registration stage. The Deputy Minister of Labour told journalists in
July that 2,000 aliens applied for refugee status in Belarus since 1997
and 385 applications were approved. Of the 385 applicants 294 were from
Afghanistan. The Ministry reported that illegal aliens in the country
were estimated to number between 150,000 and 200,000 during the year.
The UNHCR noted in its July report that the Minsk city and Minsk
region migration services regularly refuse to accept illegally arriving
new refugee applicants and instruct such persons to apply with
migration authorities in other regions. Regional migration services
also continued to deny registration of refugee applications for refugee
status of those asylum seekers who came though countries considered as
safe (mainly Russia).
The UNHCR had no reports of any case of bona fide refugees being
forced to return to countries in which they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government.
The Lukashenko regime severely limits the rights of citizens to
change their government. In October parliamentary elections occurred
for the first time since the disputed referendum of 1996. The elections
followed a year of intense domestic and international activity that
sought to create conditions for democratic elections. According to
OSCE/ODIHR, these elections failed to meet international standards for
democratic elections. In particular the elections fell far short of
meeting the minimum commitments for free, fair, equal, accountable, and
transparent elections. Despite some minor improvements since previous
elections, the process remained seriously flawed.
In the October election, 769 candidates were nominated for the 110
seats. Of the 769, 551 were eventually registered by the District
Election Commissions (DEC's). The Government severely restricted public
participation on the electoral commissions. The Central Election
Commission (CEC) accepted 23 more, who appealed their initial rejection
by the DEC's and the Supreme Court accepted the appeals of 5
individuals who were rejected by the CEC. A total of 578 candidates
ultimately registered, 11 later withdrew, and one had his registration
cancelled. Candidate registration procedures were abused systematically
to prevent undesirable candidates, especially those opposed to the
regime. Campaign activities were regulated excessively and heavily
biased state-controlled media severely limited candidates access to the
media and voter choice. Political coverage during the election period
in both the electronic and print media was dominated by the president
and executive branch. During the election, provisions for early voting,
mobile ballot boxes, vote counting and the aggregation of results fell
far short of minimum transparency requirements for independent
verification. There were widespread reports of citizens employed in
state enterprises, students and teachers, and those in the military
being forced to vote or risk losing their position. Voter turnout in
many constituencies fell below the required 50 percent threshold, but
electoral authorities falsified and amended voter lists to raise
turnout to the required minimum.
Numerous rallies and boycotts were held throughout the campaign;
some were peaceful, and others were disrupted by government authorities
(see Section 2.b.). During the election campaign, coverage of politics,
including the election was very limited. Political coverage in both the
electronic and print media was dominated by the President and executive
branch.
The possibilities of electoral choice had been limited severely by
earlier changes promulgated by Lukashenko in the country's initially
democratic constitution. In November 1996, the executive branch
conducted a controversial constitutional referendum that was neither
free nor fair, according to credible international observers, including
representatives of the European Union and the OSCE. Many members of
Parliament and of the Constitutional Court actively opposed
Lukashenko's proposals for both substantive and procedural reasons. The
justices asserted that the referendum gave Lukashenko control over the
legislative and judicial branches of Government and extended his term
in office. They also criticized it on procedural grounds as an
unconstitutional means to eliminate the Constitution's checks and
balances and grant the President virtually unlimited powers.
In the period leading up to the referendum, opponents of
Lukashenko's proposals were denied access to the media, election
officials failed to record the names of early voters, and no texts of
the proposed Constitution were made available to voters until several
days after citizens began voting. As a result of these irregularities,
the head of the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced prior to
the event that he would not be able to certify the results of the
referendum. Lukashenko promptly fired him, although the Constitution in
force at the time gave the Parliament the exclusive authority to
appoint and dismiss the CEC chairman. Members of the security forces
forcibly removed the head of the CEC from his office. Shortly
thereafter Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir resigned in protest at
Lukashenko's refusal to cancel the widely criticized referendum.
Most members of the international community chose not to send
election monitors to observe the referendum because of the illegitimacy
of the entire process. International human rights organizations
protested the conduct of the referendum.
The Constitutional Court formally ruled that the issues posed in
Lukashenko's referendum could not be decided legally through a
referendum and that its results should be purely advisory, consistent
with the Constitution. However, after winning the referendum--according
to the authorities' own official count--Lukashenko began to implement
it immediately. The new Constitution established a bicameral
legislature. Its 110 member house was formed out of the membership of
the existing Supreme Soviet; deputies volunteered or were lured by
promises of free housing and other benefits to serve in the body. The
64-member upper house was created by a combination of presidential
appointments and elections by the 6 regional or oblast councils and the
Minsk city council. The transition left 86 electoral districts
underrepresented because the new Constitution reduced the number of
representatives, and also because a full Supreme Soviet had never been
seated, largely due to the executive branch's restrictive intervention
in the 1995 parliamentary elections.
On August 31, 1999, legislative amendments to the 1996 Referendum
Law, which the OSCE AMG declared were not in accordance with
international standards, came into force. The amended law provides that
referendums may be initiated by the President, the President's National
Assembly, or 450,000 signatories of a petition--including a minimum of
30,000 in the City of Minsk and in each of the country's six oblasts.
The law makes 10 percent of all signatures subject to verification, and
all signatures may be invalidated if the commission finds just 1
percent (4,500 signatures) to be faulty. It also gave the President the
prerogative to decide on the validity of referendum results.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
there are no legal restrictions on their participation. With the
exception of the judiciary, social barriers to women are strong, and
men hold virtually all of the leadership positions. In the legislature,
women held 10 of 97 seats in the lower house and 19 of 62 in the upper
house. The deputy chair of the upper house is a woman. The Minister of
Social Security is the only female member of the Council of Ministers.
The head of the Government's Central Election Commission also is a
woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights.
Several domestic human rights groups are active in the country;
however, members of domestic human rights groups reported that the
authorities hindered their attempts to investigate alleged human rights
violations. The authorities monitored NGO correspondence and telephone
conversations. It also attempted to limit severely the activities of
NGO's through a time consuming reregistration process, denial of
registration, questionable tax audits, and other means (see Section
2.b.).
On May 20, the Minsk office of the Association for Legal Assistance
to the Population, a local NGO providing legal assistance to opposition
activists and the families of persons who have disappeared, was robbed
under suspicious circumstances. Computers with files related to the
investigation of the disappearance of former Interior Minister Yury
Zakharenko, among other items, were stolen (see Section 1.b.). Most
human rights observers believed that the robbery was perpetrated by
members of the security services. On May 29, in a similar incident, the
offices of the Human Rights Center, headed by human rights lawyer Vera
Stremkovskaya, was burglarized, and files of human rights violations
stolen. There were no reports that authorities made credible efforts to
investigate these incidents.
On August 26, the Ministry of Justice issued a warning to the Human
Rights Center for using unregistered symbols. It issued similar
warnings to other influential local human rights organizations,
including Viasna (Spring), the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, and
Charter '97. On August 27, the Youth Organization Civic Forum was
issued a warning for printing an article about poor living conditions
at university dormitories in its newspaper. Civic Forum previously was
issued two warnings for misuse of symbols. These warnings were part of
an overall effort by authorities to hinder the work of human rights
organizations critical of the Lukashenko regime.
The country's poor human rights record continued to draw the
attention of many international human rights organizations. In general
the authorities have been willing to discuss human rights with
international NGO's whose members have been allowed to visit the
country; however, the authorities have increased its harassment of
international NGO's working in the country. One way in which the
authorities regularly harassed NGO's was through taxes. In February the
International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) Pro Media office, an
international NGO working on freedom of media issues, reported a
pattern of harassment from the tax police, involving independent media
outlets with which it was working: Some organizations working with
IREX/Pro Media were fined or had their bank accounts frozen. Tax
authorities have seized the Foundation's Magic Printing Press as well
(see Section 2.a.).
On May 31, an employee of the Belarus office of a Western legal NGO
foiled an attempted burglary of its Minsk office. When asked to provide
identification, one of the three burglars claimed that they represented
official law enforcement agencies. Although the local police were
contacted, they refused to provide assistance, and no further
investigation into the incident was made by the authorities. The NGO
believes the burglary attempt was connected to their efforts to advise
and support human rights and rule of law projects. In 1998 after
protracted negotiations, the authorities approved the opening in Minsk
of the OSCE's AMG office. Although the authorities often have
disregarded OSCE intervention on human rights cases and its advice on
draft legislation, the OSCE's presence in Minsk provides a potentially
important forum for dialog on these issues. In September 1999, through
OSCE-brokered meetings initiated by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's
Belarus ad hoc committee Chairman Adrian Severin, government and
opposition representatives began a dialog to try to resolve the
country's ongoing constitutional and political crisis. By the end of
1999, the process had been brought to a standstill and in February 1999
the Lukashenko regime withdrew from the dialog and created a sham
sociopolitical dialog with handpicked proregime NGO's. The new dialog
likewise did not produce any results. On March 25, while observing an
opposition demonstration in Minsk (see Section 2.b.), an officer of the
OSCE AMG was arrested forcibly and detained for several hours, despite
the fact that he clearly identified himself as a diplomatic observer
and claimed diplomatic immunity.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status.
The Constitution states that all citizens are equal before the law
and have the right, without any discrimination, to equal protection of
their rights and legitimate interests. However, the Constitution does
not prohibit specifically discrimination based on factors such as race,
sex, or religion. The Law on Citizenship, grants citizenship to any
person living permanently on the territory of the country as of October
19, 1991. Those who arrived in the country after that date and wish to
become citizens are required to submit an application for citizenship,
take an oath to support the Constitution, have a legal source of
income, and have lived in the country for 7 years.
Women.--Although statistics are not available, domestic violence,
including spousal abuse against women, is a significant problem,
according to women's groups. However, spousal abuse is punishable under
the Criminal and Administrative Codes.
Non-severe beating is punishable by a fine or up to 15 days
imprisonment. More serious offenses are punishable under the Criminal
Code by up to 15 years in jail. Women's groups indicate that police
generally are not hesitant to enforce the laws against domestic
violence, and that the courts are not reluctant to impose sentences.
The main problem is a general reluctance among women to report
instances of domestic violence. Violence against women was not the
subject of extensive media coverage, marches, or demonstrations during
the year.
Although the authorities and local human rights observers report
that prostitution does not yet appear to be a significant problem in
the country, there is much anecdotal evidence that it is growing. Local
street prostitution appears to be growing as the economy deteriorates,
and prostitution rings operate in state-owned hotels. Young women
seeking to work or travel abroad also are vulnerable to sexual
exploitation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs claims that very few
women are deported back to the country for engaging in prostitution;
however, it acknowledges that Russian criminal organizations may
actively try to recruit and lure Belarusian women into serving as
prostitutes in Western Europe and the Middle East. Trafficking in women
is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment reportedly is widespread, but no specific laws
deal with the problem other than laws against physical assault.
The law requires equal wages for equal work; however, such is not
always the case in practice. Women have significantly fewer
opportunities for advancement to the upper ranks of management. Women
report that managers frequently take into consideration whether a woman
has children when considering potential job candidates. At a roundtable
on April 20 on ``The Problem of the Trade in Women in Belarus,'' it was
reported that the average length of unemployment for women was 18.4
months versus 5 months for men. In 1999 the Government reported that
approximately 64 percent of those considered to be long-term unemployed
are single mothers.
The level of education of women is higher than that of men. Women
make up approximately 58 percent of workers with a higher education and
approximately 66 percent of workers with a specialized secondary
education. In these sectors, between two-thirds and three-fourths of
employees (mostly women) live beneath the official poverty level. Women
legally are equal to men with regard to property ownership and
inheritance.
Women's groups are active; most focus on issues such as child
welfare, environmental concerns (in the aftermath of Chernobyl), and
the preservation of the family. There is an active women's political
party. A private university in Minsk established the country's first
gender studies faculty in 1997.
Children.--The authorities are committed to children's welfare and
health, particularly as related to consequences of the nuclear accident
at Chernobyl, and, with the help of foreign donors, tried to give them
special attention. By law everyone is entitled to health care,
including children. There does not appear to be any difference in the
treatment of girls and boys. Children begin school at the age of 6 and
are required to complete 9 years, although the authorities make 11
years of education available at no cost and began to develop a 12-year
education program. Higher education also is available at no cost on a
competitive basis. Families with children receive token government
benefits, such as discounted transportation. According to a 1999 World
Bank study, the majority of those living in poverty are families with
multiple children or single mothers.
As part of the Lukashenko regime's efforts to promote a union with
Russia and to reduce the influence of opposition movements, the
authorities continued to discourage the promotion of, or the teaching
of, students in the Belarusian language by limiting the availability of
early childhood education in Belarusian. In its June report, the
Belarusian Helsinki Committee reported that only 30 percent of students
in primary schools are instructed in Belarusian. In Minsk only 11 of
the 242 middle schools teach in the Belarusian language. In other
regional cities, the numbers were significantly lower. The authorities
continued to claim that the only schools that have been closed which
taught in the Belarusian language are those that experienced
diminishing enrollment.
There does not appear to be a societal pattern of abuse of
children.
People with Disabilities.--A 1992 law mandates accessibility to
transport, residences, businesses, and offices for the disabled;
however, facilities, including transport and office buildings, often
are not accessible to the disabled. The country's continued difficult
financial condition makes it especially difficult for local governments
to budget sufficient funds to implement the 1992 law. The central
authorities continue to provide some minimal subsidies to the disabled.
However, continued high inflation and sharp decline in the value of the
ruble greatly reduced the real worth of those limited subsidies.
Religious Minorities.--Societal anti-Semitism exists but usually is
not manifested openly, although antiminority faith sentiments are
rising (see Section 2.a.). In the past, Lukashenko and other officials
have used coded anti-Semitic language in their attacks on perceived
opponents.
No arrests were reported in the April 1999 arson attack on the
synagogue in Minsk or in a number of cases of desecration of Jewish
cemeteries in 1997 and 1998. Some instances of vandalism appeared to be
related to anti-Semitism. On May 11, the Minsk city court upheld the
dismissal by an inferior court of a suit filed by Jewish organizations
and individuals against the authors and publishers of the book ``The
War According to Mean Laws.'' The book published by the Orthodox
Initiative and distributed in Orthodox bookstores, includes the
``Protocols of the Elders of Zion'' and other anti-Semitic articles and
blames Belarusian Jews for social and economic problems in the country.
A Minsk district court ruled in March that the book contained
``scientific information'' and dismissed the suit. The Union of
Belarusian Jewish Associations and Communities and the World
Association of Belarusian Jews, both of which joined in the suit,
consider the book anti-Semitic and punishable under the Criminal Code
for inciting religious and ethnic hatred (see Section 2.c.). On
December 27, unidentified assailants threw firebombs at a synagogue in
Minsk. A security guard was able to extinguish the fire before serious
damage occurred. No progress has been reported on the incident.
Action by the authorities has been noticeably lacking in redressing
instances of anti-Semitic vandalism in previous years. According to the
Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish Congress, a number of
small, ultra-nationalist organizations operate on the fringes of
society, and a number of newspapers regularly print anti-Semitic
material. One of these newspapers, Slavianskaia Gazeta, although
distributed locally, reportedly was published in Moscow. Anti-Semitic
material from Russia also circulates widely.
Many persons in the Jewish community remain concerned that the
Lukashenko regime plans to promote greater unity with Russia may be
accompanied by political appeals to groups in Russia that tolerate or
promote anti-Semitism. Lukashenko's calls for ``Slavic solidarity'' are
well received and supported by anti-Semitic, neo-Fascist organizations
in Russia. For example, the organization, Russian National Unity, has
an active local branch. Its literature is distributed in public places
in Minsk. The concept of a ``greater Slavic union,'' the leadership of
which Lukashenko seeks, is a source of concern to the Jewish community
given the nature of support that it engenders.
The country's small Muslim community, with roots in the country
dating to the Middle Ages, does not report significant societal
prejudice. However, on August 9, 1999, the Slonim mosque--the first
mosque to open in the country during the last 60 years--was vandalized
just prior to the holding of a Tatar youth convention in the city. The
are no further developments on the investigation of the incident.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution upholds the right of
workers, except state security and military personnel, to form and join
independent unions on a voluntary basis and to carry out actions in
defense of worker rights, including the right to strike; however, these
rights are not respected in practice. The independent trade union
movement still is in its infancy. The Belarusian Free Trade Union
(BFTU) was established in 1991 and registered in 1992. Following the
1995 Minsk metro workers strike, the President suspended its
activities. In 1996 BFTU leaders formed a new umbrella organization,
the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BCDTU), which
encompasses 4 leading independent trade unions and is reported to have
approximately 15,000 members.
The authorities have taken numerous measures to suppress
independent trade unions. Members of independent trade unions, were
arrested for distributing union literature, had union material
confiscated, were denied access to work sites, were subjected to
excessive fines, and were pressured by their managers and state
security services to resign from their jobs because of trade union
activities. Although the BFTU later was registered, its local unions
were denied registration by local authorities in many towns, including
Bobruisk, Grodno, Mogilev, and Orsha among others. In the Brest Oblast,
only 5 of 12 local unions of the BFTU were registered by June, and in
numerous instances union activists and members were fired, without
cause, for their union activities.
On January 26, 1999, Lukashenko signed Decree No. 2 ``On certain
Measures to Improve the Activities of Political Parties, Trade Unions,
and Other Public Associations Activities,'' which among other
requirements, requires trade unions to have a minimum of 10 percent of
the workers of an enterprise in order to form and register a local
union. The Decree also obliged existing registered unions to reregister
and meet the new requirements. Free trade union leaders reported that
this decree has had the effect of making registration, and therefore
union activities, nearly impossible in many of the larger state-owned
enterprises. Some local unions have been denied registration under this
decree.
In February the management of the Mogilev Automobile Factory (MAZ)
unilaterally suspended its collective bargaining agreement with the
local union of the BFTU, evicted the organization from its office, and
confiscated office equipment. Several BFTU activists were dismissed by
MAZ management in connection with their union activities.
The authorities continue to discourage employees at state-run
enterprises from joining independent trade unions. In July 1999,
Lukashenko signed Decree No. 29 on ``Tightening Labor Discipline.'' The
decree, which has as one of its aims the placement of all workers on
individual rather than collective contracts, was criticized heavily by
both independent and official union leaders, who believe that it was
designed principally to enable the Presidential Administration to
increase its control over the labor sector.
The Official Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus (FTUB), formerly
the Belarusian branch of the Soviet Union's All-Union Central Council
of Trade Unions, consists of approximately 4.5 million workers
(including retirees) and is by far the largest trade union
organization. According to official union federation figures, 92
percent of the workforce is unionized. Although wary in the past of
challenging the regime seriously, some FTUB leaders have become
increasingly vocal in their criticism of the policies of the Lukashenko
regime. In retaliation the Government has subjected some FTUB officials
to threats and harassment.
On July 20, the Presidential Administration released a statement
condemning ``attempts by some union leaders to thrust a groundless
thesis that the Government violates unions' rights upon Belarusian
public opinion and the international community.'' The statement accused
unions of engaging in ``political activities . . . which cause direct
damage to the labor movement and aggravates the socioeconomic problems
of society.'' In a July 27 speech to an agriculture conference,
Lukashenko criticized the trade unions, the FTUB, and FTUB President
Goncharik personally, for a ``lack of constructive activity'' and
blamed them for the loss of trade privileges with another country. On
July 31, as part of the authorities' campaign of harassment of the
FTUB, FTUB bank accounts were frozen following an unexplained
investigation of the union's records by the state committee for
financial investigations. FTUB accounts were frozen again on September
28 by tax authorities conducting an unspecified investigation. The
account later was released. In an October 11 speech to the FTUB
Congress, Prime Minister Yermoshyn told trade union leaders to ``stop
agitating people and get to work'' and accused the FTUB of engaging in
politics rather than focusing on the needs of workers.
During the year, members of the Independent Trade Union of Belarus
faced continual pressure at their workplace to join state unions or
lose their jobs. Typically members of the Union smuggled copies of the
newspaper Rabochi into their workplace under their clothing. On
December 16, police detained 7 members of the Interdependent Trade
Union of Steel Workers and confiscated 3,000 copies of Rabochi outside
the entrance to the Minsk Automobile Plant.
On September 14, FTUB members reportedly were pressured by the
management of Dzerzhinsky, a subsidiary of the state-owned electronics
manufacturer Integral, to break with their union and join a management-
established and -run union. The FTUB reported that union members at
other Integral plants have been similarly threatened. Under reported
pressure from management and government authorities, employees at
Tsvetotron, a state electrical equipment factory, voted to quit the
union of electrical workers, a member of the FTUB.
Tight control by the Lukashenko regime over public demonstrations
(see Section 1.d. and 2.b.) makes it difficult for unions to strike or
to hold public rallies to further their objectives. For example, a
demonstration planned for November 15, organized by workers of the
Minsk Tractor Works and the Minsk Engine Works to protest low pay and
wage arrears was banned. Other demonstrations similarly were banned
throughout the year. A strike organized by market vendors and
entrepreneurs in February against new tax regulations, although
ultimately successful, was marred by numerous arrests, confiscation of
union literature, and anti-strike pressure from local officials. Market
vendors staged a similar strike on November 23. Union members sometimes
undertook work stoppages, usually in response to late payment of wages.
On July 3, noting that the authorities failed to respect the rights
of workers, suppressed trade union rights and harassed union leaders,
and that the authorities had not taken sufficient steps to conform to
internationally recognized labor rights, a foreign government suspended
the country's trade benefits.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Legislation
dating from the Soviet era provides for the right to organize and
bargain collectively. Some analysts believe that the presidential
decree on labor discipline (see Section 6.a.), which aims at placing
all workers on individual rather than collective contracts, could
significantly threaten the principle of collective bargaining. Since
the economy still is largely in the hands of the State, unions usually
seek political redress for the economic problems. Workers and
independent unions have recourse to the court system. The authorities
and state-owned enterprises have hindered the ability of workers to
bargain collectively and, in some instances, arbitrarily suspended
collective bargaining agreements (see Section 6.a.).
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, except in cases when the work or service to be
performed is fixed by a court's decision or in accordance with the law
on the state of emergency or martial law; however, there were some
reports of forced labor. For example, on July 12, town authorities in
Ivatsevichy, in the Brest region, sent letters to local industrial
enterprises and state institutions ordering them to increase the
``voluntary'' participation of their employees in harvesting of
livestock fodder by 20 percent. Workers who refused to ``volunteer''
for the harvest were ordered to pay a fine of $5 (5,000 rubles) or
approximately 15 percent of their average monthly salary. The order had
the effect of forcing local individuals to work in the fodder harvest.
The constitutional provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies
to all citizens, although its application to children is not specified.
With the possible exception of juvenile prisoners, forced and bonded
labor by children is not known to occur.
d. State of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment.--
The law establishes 16 as the minimum age for employment. With the
written consent of one parent (or legal guardian), a 14-year-old child
may conclude a labor contract. The Prosecutor General's office
reportedly enforces this law effectively. The constitutional provision
prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens, although
its application to children is not specified.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Real wages improved slightly
over the last year to approximately $40 (48,000 rubles) to $60 (72,000
rubles) a month. The minimum wage of $3 (3,600 rubles) a month does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and a family.
Agriculture workers are paid approximately 39 percent less than the
average monthly wage. The country's continuing economic problems make
it difficult for the average worker to earn a decent living. Major wage
arrears continued to grow, especially in the agricultural sector.
The Constitution and Labor Code set a limit of 40 hours of work per
week and provide for at least one 24-hour rest period per week. Because
of the country's difficult economic situation, an increasing number of
workers find themselves working considerably less than 40 hours per
week. Factories reportedly often require workers to take unpaid
furloughs due to shortages of raw materials and energy, and a lack of
demand for factory output.
The law establishes minimum conditions for workplace safety and
worker health; however, these standards often are ignored. Workers at
many heavy machinery plants do not wear even minimal safety gear, such
as gloves, hard hats, or welding glasses. A State Labor Inspectorate
exists but does not have the authority to enforce compliance, and
violations often are ignored. The high accident rate is due to a lack
of protective clothing, shoes, equipment, nonobservance of temperature
regulations, the use of outdated machinery, and inebriation on the job.
On January 4, Aleksandr Lukashenko issued a new decree, despite the
protests of independent trade unions, lowering the level of disability
allowances paid by the State or state enterprises in the result of
workplace injuries. Under the decree, industrial injury suits also are
to be covered by the Civil Code, rather than the Labor Code.
Independent union leaders believe workplace injuries should be reviewed
under the Labor Code, under which compensation is more generous. There
is no provision in the law that allows workers to remove themselves
from dangerous work situations without risking loss of their jobs.
f. Trafficking In Persons.--There is no specific law against
trafficking in women. The authorities are just beginning to recognize
the problem of trafficking in women. In 1999 a Board of Morals and
Illegal Distribution of Drugs was created by the Ministry of Interior,
but the work has been hardly efficient. In partnership with the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP), the Gender Information and Policy Center
(GIPC) was established by the Ministry of Social Welfare which also
deals with this issue. The country is both a source and transit point
for women and girls being trafficked to Central and Western Europe for
purposes of prostitution. Information from such scattered destinations
as the Netherlands, Lithuania, and Bosnia, refer to Belarus among the
source countries for women being trafficked to or through their
countries, and other anecdotal evidence suggests that the Russian Mafia
is active in trafficking young women, who end up as prostitutes in
Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Western Europe. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs acknowledges that Russian criminal organizations actively may
try to recruit and lure women into serving as prostitutes in Western
Europe and the Middle East.
Women seldom report incidences of trafficking to police because of
a generally negative public opinion about law enforcement authorities,
shortcomings in legislation, and the insufficient protection of victims
and witnesses.
In April a seminar was held in cooperation with the Ministry of
Interior and NGO's in which NGO's elaborated on programs devoted to
warning the public about the problem. The Belarus Young Christians
Women Association (BYCWO) implements a project aimed at informing women
of the risks associated with employment abroad and the minimization of
possible dangers for women. No information is available on state or
non-governmental initiatives to help victims return to their countries.
Crisis centers established by some NGO's do provide psychological
assistance to victims of violence. Such centers, however, do not have
specialists dealing with victims of trafficking.
__________
BELGIUM
Belgium is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch
who plays a mainly symbolic role. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet),
led by the Prime Minister, holds office as long as it retains the
confidence of the lower house of the bicameral Parliament. Belgium is a
federal state with several levels of government, including national,
regional (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels), and community (Flemish,
Francophone, and German) levels. The judiciary is independent.
The Government maintains effective control of all security forces.
The Police Judiciaire and the Gendarmerie currently share
responsibility for internal security with the municipal police, but the
two organizations are to be merged at the federal level, and the
Gendarmerie and municipal police are to be integrated at the local
level under a reorganization plan scheduled to be implemented in 2001.
The country is highly industrialized, with a vigorous private
sector and limited government participation in industry. The primary
exports are iron and steel. The economy provides a high standard of
living for most citizens.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of
dealing with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking
steps to combat violence against women and trafficking in persons.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials employed them.
In addition to the integration of the police forces, a
reorganization plan calls for the creation of an independent oversight
body for the federal police and also for the creation of a new
anticorruption unit.
Prison conditions vary. Newer prisons meet international standards.
Older facilities meet or nearly meet minimum international standards
despite their Spartan physical conditions and limited resources. In
August the prison system, designed to hold some 7,500 prisoners, held
8,395. The Government instituted a pilot project intended to reduce
overcrowding in prisons by using electronic surveillance at home for
prisoners near the end of their sentences.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes these
prohibitions. Arrested persons must be brought before a judge within 24
hours. Pretrial confinement is subject to monthly review by a panel of
judges, which may extend pretrial detention based on established
criteria (e.g., whether, in the court's view, the arrested person would
be likely to commit further crimes or attempt to flee if released).
Bail exists in principle under the law but is granted rarely. The
Government does not separate convicted criminals and pretrial
detainees. Pretrial detainees receive different privileges from
convicted criminals, such as the right to more frequent family visits.
Approximately 40 percent of the prison population consists of pretrial
detainees. Arrested persons are allowed prompt access to a lawyer of
their choosing or, if they cannot afford one, to an attorney appointed
by the State.
In July the Government came under intense criticism for the
detention of Fehriye Erdal, a Kurdish woman accused of involvement in a
terrorist attack in Turkey in which a prominent businessman was killed.
Erdal was arrested in Knokke in October 1999 and charged with weapons
violations. The Government refused the Turkish Government's extradition
request for Erdal because of the possibility that she could face the
death penalty in Turkey. The Government also refused to try her on the
terrorism charges in Belgium because of a technicality in the
international agreement requiring such action. After a month-long
hunger strike, Erdal was released from prison in August and placed
under house arrest pending a trial on the weapons charges. The trial
was not expected to begin until early 2001.
In June over 800 British football fans were arrested for disturbing
the peace during outbreaks of hooliganism at the Euro 2000 soccer
championship. Most were deported immediately to the United Kingdom but
five were held for trial under the new summary trial act (see Section
1.e.). Credible reports indicate that some innocent bystanders were
caught up in the police action and held incommunicado for as long as 36
hours without adequate food or water.
The law prohibits exile, and the Government does not employ it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system is organized according to specialization and
territorial jurisdiction, with 5 territorial levels: Canton (225),
district (27), provinces and Brussels (11), courts of appeal (5), and
for the whole Kingdom--the Cour de Cassation. The latter is the highest
appeals court.
Military tribunals try military personnel for common law as well as
military crimes. All military tribunals consist of four officers and a
civilian judge. At the appellate level, the civilian judge presides.
The accused has the right of appeal to a higher military court.
Each judicial district has a Labor Court, which deals with
litigation between employers and employees regarding wages, notice,
competition clauses, and social security benefits.
The judiciary enforces the law's provision for the right to a fair
trial. Charges are stated clearly and formally, and there is a
presumption of innocence. All defendants have the right to be present,
to have counsel (at public expense if needed), to confront witnesses,
to present evidence, and to appeal.
As part of an ongoing program of judicial reform, the Government's
summary trial act became effective on April 1. This act, which covers
crimes punishable by 1 to 10 years' imprisonment, allows a prosecutor
to issue an arrest warrant for the immediate appearance in court of an
offender caught in the act of committing a crime. The warrant expires
after 7 days and the court must render its verdict within 5 days of the
initial hearing. The first conviction under this act, against a British
citizen accused of hooliganism during the Euro 2000 soccer championship
(see Section 2.b.), was overturned on appeal, and the defendant was
retried under regular procedures. Several human rights organizations
claim that summary trial violates the presumption of innocence and
jeopardizes the right to a full and fair defense. By year's end, the
courts had not ruled on the legality of the summary trial act.
In 1999 the Government created a High Council on Justice to
supervise the appointment and promotion of magistrates. In early 2000,
the Council formally was instituted, and members were elected. The
Council is designed to serve as a permanent monitoring board for the
entire judicial system and is empowered to hear complaints against
individual magistrates.
Following a review of the judicial system, the Government
implemented several reforms that granted stronger rights to victims of
crime. These measures allow victims to have more access to information
during an investigation, as well as the right to appeal if an
investigation does not result in a decision to bring charges. As part
of its program of judicial reform, the Government undertook to open
``justice houses'' in each of the 27 judicial districts. These
facilities combine a variety of legal services under one roof,
including legal aid, mediation, and victim's assistance. As of
September, 14 of the proposed justice houses had opened. Personnel at
some of the justice houses complained publicly about high workloads and
staffing shortages.
In 1999 Parliament enacted legislation that further defines crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide and also imposes penalties
for such crimes. In 2000, as a result of the new law, the courts became
a forum for trying alleged human rights violations by high profile
participants in past and present conflicts in Central Africa, the
Middle East, and South America.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanction. However, there were reports that Muslim women
in traditional dress or headscarves in some cases were subjected to
discrimination in admission to school (see Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these
freedoms, and the Government respects these rights in practice. An
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
The Government operates several radio and television networks but
does not control program content. Boards of directors that represent
the main political, linguistic, and opinion groups supervise programs.
A government representative sits on each board but has no veto power.
Private radio and television stations operate with government licenses.
Almost all homes have access by cable to television from other Western
European countries and elsewhere. Satellite services are also
available.
There are restrictions on the press regarding libel, slander, and
the advocacy of racial or ethnic discrimination, hate, or violence. A
1999 law prevents political parties that espouse discrimination from
receiving federal funds.
In August in response to a request from the League for Human
Rights, the Namur district court issued an injunction to halt
distribution of a subscription-only newsletter that published the names
of 50 convicted or accused pedophiles. The publisher also was ordered
to remove the list from his Internet site and pay a fine of $22,200
(BFr 1 million) for every copy distributed in any form. The court ruled
that publication of the names constituted an invasion of privacy.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
respects this provision in practice. Citizens are free to form
organizations and establish ties to international bodies; however, the
Antiracism Law (see Section 5) prohibits membership in organizations
that practice discrimination overtly and repeatedly. In May the Ghent
appeals court overturned a 1999 district court ruling that the ``Hells
Angels'' are a private militia and should be disbanded. However,
several members of the group were convicted of criminal offences.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Government does not hinder the practice of any faith. The law accords
``recognized'' status to Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism,
Anglicanism, Islam, and Greek and Russian Orthodoxy, and these
religions receive subsidies from general government revenues. Taxpayers
who object to contributing to religious subsidies have no recourse. By
law each recognized religion has the right to provide teachers at
government expense for religious instruction in schools, but not all
avail themselves of this right. For recognized religions, the
Government pays the salaries, retirement, and lodging expenses of
ministers and also subsidizes the renovation of church buildings.
The Government also supports the freedom to participate in
nonconfessional philosophical organizations (laics). Laics serve as a
seventh recognized ``religious'' group, and their organizing body
receives funds and benefits similar to the six recognized religions.
In spite of Islam's status as a recognized religion, spokesmen for
the Council of Muslims report that women and girls in traditional dress
or headscarves in some cases are subjected to discrimination in
employment and school admissions.
The lack of independent recognized status generally does not
prevent religious groups from freely practicing their religions.
In September 1999, 110 national police officers raided Church of
Scientology facilities and the homes and businesses of about 20 members
of the Church. One member's home in France was raided simultaneously by
the French authorities. At year's end, an investigation continued, and
no arrests had been made.
In April the Belgian authorities began refusing visas to
missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to
enter the country for missionary work. Similar visas had been processed
for decades without problems. In July the Ministry of Interior
instituted temporary procedures designed to ensure the issuance of
visas to these missionaries and undertook to establish permanent
procedures by October 2000. At year's end, visas were being issued,
albeit at a much slower pace than in the past. The Government still had
not devised new permanent procedures for visa issuance but was
continuing its talks with church leaders to solve the problem.
The Evangelical Association (a group of evangelical Christian
organizations) continued to claim discrimination due to the
Government's refusal to grant it recognized status separate from the
Protestant religion. Despite the Government's refusal, it is
negotiating with the group in an effort to ensure that the Evangelical
Association enjoys the same benefits as recognized religions. The
Government is mediating discussions to enable the Evangelical
Association to obtain representation in the leadership of the
recognized Protestant church.
In 1998 Parliament adopted recommendations from a 1997 commission's
report on government policy toward sects, particularly sects deemed
``harmful'' under the law. The report divided sects into two broadly
defined categories: It characterized a ``sect'' as any religious-based
organization, and a ``harmful sect'' as a group that may pose a threat
to society or individuals. One of the primary recommendations was to
create a government-sponsored Center for Information and Advice on
Harmful Sectarian Organizations. The center began limited operations in
October 1999 and is now fully operational and open to the public. The
Government tasks the center with collecting publicly available
information on a wide range of religious and philosophical groups and
providing information and advice to the public regarding the legal
rights of freedom of association, privacy, and freedom of religion. The
center is authorized to share with the public any information it
collects on religious sects but, despite its name, the regulations
prohibit it from categorizing any particular group as harmful. In May
the Government announced the composition of an interagency coordination
group designed to work in conjunction with the center to coordinate
government policy on sects. The coordination group's first meeting was
held in October. The Government also named a national magistrate and
one magistrate in each of the 27 judicial districts to monitor cases
involving sects.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
In January (as a result of a December 1999 act of Parliament) the
Government announced a ``regularization'' program for three categories
of undocumented aliens: Those who had applied for asylum at least 4
years earlier and had received no answer or a negative answer; those
whose medical condition made a return to their country of origin
inadvisable; and those who could not return to their country of origin
for political reasons. Undocumented aliens who could demonstrate
evidence of a lasting integration into their community also were
allowed to apply. Successful applicants were to be granted legal
residence status. During the application period, January 10 to 30, the
Government received 32,662 applications representing 50,600
individuals. Human rights groups criticized both the border controls
that were imposed during the application period to prevent undocumented
aliens living in other countries from applying and the slow pace of the
approval process. The Government initially promised to complete the
review of all applications by July 2001; however, by December it had
processed only 1,570 of the 32,662 files.
In March Parliament amended the nationality code to facilitate
acquisition of Belgian citizenship. Under the terms of the amended
code, foreigners can apply for naturalization after living legally in
the country for 3 years. Stateless persons and refugees can apply after
2 years. Moreover, foreigners who have maintained their residence in
the country for 7 years may acquire citizenship simply by declaring
their intent to their local municipal authorities. Adult foreigners
living outside the country may declare their Belgian nationality as
soon as one parent legally has acquired it.
The law includes provisions for granting refugee or asylee status
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government
provides first asylum and reported receiving 42,691 new asylum
applications during the year compared with 35,777 during 1999. Only
about 10 percent of applications normally are approved. The number of
asylum applications continued to rise dramatically throughout the year.
For example, the Government received 5,300 applications in the month of
October.
The Government, in partnership with the International Organization
for Migration (IOM), provides relocation assistance to unsuccessful
asylum applicants who agree to repatriate voluntarily to their country
of origin. Unsuccessful applicants who do not leave voluntarily are
subject to deportation. During the year, more than 10,000 unsuccessful
asylum applicants were repatriated to their country of origin, either
voluntarily (5,382) or through forced deportation (4,835). This total
is double the number of repatriations in 1999. According to the
Government, no unsuccessful applicants are repatriated forcibly to
countries where they can demonstrate a credible fear of persecution.
In response to complaints about slow processing time and the large
backlog of asylum applications, the Government adopted a ``last in,
first out'' policy in processing new applications. This policy is
intended to reduce processing time for current applicants.
The special asylum status granted to Kosovar refugees expired in
September 1999. The Government, with the cooperation of the IOM,
provided financial assistance to Kosovars who voluntarily returned to
their homes. The rest were permitted to apply for asylum through the
regular application process.
Undocumented asylum seekers arriving by air whose claims do not
appear legitimate are not allowed to enter but are held in a closed
detention center at the airport for up to 5 months while awaiting
deportation or voluntary repatriation. The children of such asylum
seekers do not attend school. Those applicants whose claims appear to
be legitimate are released to 1 of 27 open asylum centers for shelter
and assistance. These centers have a total capacity of 5,000 beds. The
centers, funded mainly by the Government and the Belgian Red Cross,
have been overtaxed by the increasing numbers of asylum seekers, and
the Government has solicited assistance from municipalities to handle
the overflow. Municipal assistance commissions are expected to provide
an additional 1,400 beds.
In November a working group created by the Minister of Interior to
reform the Government's immigration and asylum procedures issued its
report. Its recommendations included: Ending financial aid to asylum
seekers (only aid in kind--food and shelter--will be provided);
increasing by 10,000 the number of beds available at open shelters;
establishing 10 registration offices at the borders (applicants will
have to apply immediately upon entering Belgium and also will have to
supply information on the route they followed to get to Belgium);
creating a ``fast track'' processing procedure for applicants whose
claim appears on the surface to be noncredible; and increasing funding
and manpower for the regularization effort. The Government's goal for
implementation of the new procedures, many of which must be approved by
Parliament, is January 1, 2002. Some human rights groups criticized the
new policies as being ``repressive and restrictive.''
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens ages 18 and older exercise this right in
practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis
of universal and compulsory (under penalty of fine) suffrage. Direct
popular elections for parliamentary seats (excluding some Senators
elected by community councils and others elected by Senate members) are
held at least every 4 years. Opposition parties operate freely.
In 1998 the European Court of Justice censured Belgium for its
failure to comply with a European Council directive requiring member
states to accord to all citizens of European Union (EU) countries
resident in another EU country the right to vote in municipal
elections. In 1998 Parliament amended the Constitution to extend that
right to EU citizens and passed implementing legislation in January
1999. By the July 31 closing date for registration, a total of 87,858
non-Belgian European Union citizens had registered to vote in the
October 2000 municipal elections.
The Federal Government is responsible for such matters of state as
security, justice, social security, and fiscal and monetary policy. The
regional governments are charged with matters that directly affect the
geographical regions and the material well-being of their residents,
such as commerce and trade, public works, and environmental policy. The
linguistic community councils handle matters more directly affecting
the mental and cultural well-being of the individual, such as education
and the administration of certain social welfare programs.
Women are underrepresented in government but hold some senior
positions. Of 18 federal ministers, 3 are women. In the Federal
Parliament, 36 of 150 house members and 20 of 71 Senators are women.
Federal law requires that one-third of all candidates in national and
local elections be women.
The existence of communities speaking Dutch, French, and German
engenders significant complexities for the state. Most major
institutions, including political parties, are divided along linguistic
lines. National decisions often take into account the specific needs of
each regional and linguistic group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Numerous human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
While the law already prohibits discrimination based on these
factors, in December the Council of Ministers, in order to consolidate
and clarify existing laws, voted to introduce legislation in Parliament
to outlaw all forms of discrimination. The Government enforces
antidiscrimination law. With Dutch, French, and German as official
languages, the country has a complex linguistic regime, including
language requirements for various elective and appointive positions.
The law prohibits the official financing of any racist or xenophobic
party or any party that does not respect human rights.
Women.--A 1998 study commissioned by the Ministry of Employment and
Labor (which is also responsible for equality issues) reported that the
number of women who acknowledged suffering from repeated domestic
physical or sexual violence at some point in their lives rose from 6.3
percent in 1988 to 16.8 percent in 1998. The same study found that
women between 30 and 39 years of age made more official complaints
about physical violence in 1998 than their counterparts a decade
earlier (although part of this increase was attributed to a greater
willingness to come forward).
A 1998 law defines and criminalizes domestic violence, with the aim
of protecting married and unmarried partners. Women's groups believe
that the 1998 law is an important step in recognizing domestic violence
as constituting an offense distinct from other forms of aggression. The
law allows social organizations to represent victims of domestic
violence in court provided that they have the victim's consent. A 1999
law allows police to enter a home without the consent of the head of
household when investigating a domestic violence complaint. According
to its proponents, the police do not use the law enough. The Government
still has not implemented other provisions of the 1999 law that require
it to establish and maintain a database of accurate statistics on
domestic violence.
A number of shelters and telephone help lines are available
throughout the country. In addition to providing shelter and advice,
many offer assistance on legal matters, job placement, and
psychological counseling for both partners. Approximately 80 percent of
these organizations' budgets are provided by one of the three regional
governments.
The law prohibits organizing prostitution or assisting immigration
for the purpose of prostitution, but not prostitution itself. A 1995
law defined and criminalized trafficking in persons, but cases of
trafficking in women continued (see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment is illegal. The Government has implemented
procedures to monitor sexual harassment claims. Victims of sexual
harassment have the right to sue their harassers under existing law.
According to a 1999 revision of the law on equal opportunity in the
workplace, sexual harassment can be a form of sexual discrimination.
The act outlaws discrimination in hiring, working conditions,
promotion, wages, and contract termination. Despite these laws, most
cases of sexual harassment are resolved informally. A study by the
Ministry of Defense found that 54 percent of women in the armed forces
had been subjected to abusive language, 36 percent had experienced
unwelcome physical contact, and 4.6 percent reported being the victim
of sexual harassment involving physical violence.
Equal treatment of men and women is provided for in the
Constitution, federal law, and treaties incorporated into law. The
Government actively promotes a comprehensive approach to the
integration of women at all levels of decisionmaking. The Division of
Equal Opportunity, a part of the Ministry of Labor, focuses
specifically on issues affecting women, including violence against
women, sexual harassment, and the participation of women in the
political process. At mid-year the unemployment rate was 10.1 percent
for women compared with 7.2 percent for men. The net average salary for
a woman is only 84 percent of the national net average salary. In 1996,
the last year for which comparative statistics are available, women in
blue collar jobs earned 79 percent of the salary of their male
counterparts. The average salary for women in white collar jobs was
only 70 percent of the salary of their male counterparts.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded system of public
education and health care. It provides compulsory education up to the
age of 18. The Francophone and Flemish communities have agencies
specifically dealing with children's needs.
Government and private groups provide shelters for runaways and
counseling for children who were abused physically or sexually.
There are comprehensive child protection laws. Children have the
right to a voice in court cases that affect them, such as divorce
proceedings. The law states that a minor ``capable of understanding''
can request permission to be heard by a judge, or that a judge can
request an interview with a child. The law is designed to combat child
pornography by the use of high penalties for such crimes and for those
in possession of pedophilic materials. The law permits the prosecution
of Belgian residents who commit such crimes abroad and provides that
criminals convicted of the sexual abuse of children cannot receive
parole without first receiving specialized assistance and must continue
counseling and treatment upon their release from prison.
In March Parliament amended the Constitution to include an article
on children's rights. The new article stipulates that every child has
the right to respect for his or her moral, physical, mental, and sexual
integrity.
Belgium is both a transit point and a destination for trafficking
in children (see Section 6.f.).
Child Focus, the government-sponsored center for missing and
exploited children, reported that it handled 1,503 cases in 1999 and
722 cases in the first 4 months of 2000. Nearly 12 percent of the cases
reported from January to April involved sexual exploitation.
Child prostitution is of limited scope.
There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
People with Disabilities.--The law provides for the protection of
disabled persons from discrimination in employment, education, and in
the provision of other state services. The Government mandates that
public buildings erected since 1970 be accessible to the disabled and
offers subsidies to induce the owners of other buildings to make
necessary modifications. However, many older buildings are not
accessible.
The Government provides financial assistance for the disabled. It
gives special aid to parents of disabled children and to disabled
parents. Regional and community programs provide other assistance, such
as job training. Disabled persons are eligible to receive services in
any of the three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, or Brussels), not just
their region of residence.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Belgium is a pluralistic
society in which individual differences in general are respected, and
linguistic rights in particular are protected. Some 60 percent of
citizens are native Dutch speakers, about 40 percent are French
speakers, and fewer than 1 percent are German speakers.
The Antiracism Law penalizes the incitement of discrimination,
hate, or violence based on race, ethnicity, or nationality. It is
illegal for providers of goods or services (including housing) to
discriminate on the basis of any of these factors and for employers to
consider these factors in their decisions to hire, train, or dismiss
workers.
In 1999 the Government-sponsored Center for Equal Opportunity and
the Fight Against Racism, which is tasked with investigating complaints
of discrimination based on race, handled 919 complaints, 18 of which
led to court action. In March 2000, the Government extended the mandate
of the center to include all forms of discrimination. In its 2000
report, the center drew attention to discrimination against non-
Belgians in certain categories of public service jobs. The report also
referred to a study on behalf of the International Labor Organization
(ILO), which revealed persistent discrimination against immigrants in
private sector employment. However, the center reported that it found
very little discrimination in eligibility for, and the payment of,
social security benefits.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Under the Constitution, workers have
the right to associate freely, which includes the freedom to organize
and join unions of their own choosing. The Government does not hamper
such activities, and workers fully and freely exercise their right of
association. About 60 percent of workers are members of labor unions.
This number includes employed and unemployed workers. Unions are
independent of the Government but have important links with major
political parties. The Government does not require unions to register.
In its 1999 report, the ILO's Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations reiterated its criticism
that the Government should adopt legislation establishing ``objective,
predetermined, and detailed criteria'' to enable employers'
organizations and trade unions to have access to the National Labor
Council. Because of restrictive interpretation of the legislation in
force, only the Christian, Socialist, and Liberal trade union
confederations have access to the National Labor Council. This
criticism was not repeated in the organization's 2000 report, although
the Government took no action on the issue.
Unions have the right to strike, and even strikes by civil servants
and workers in ``essential'' services are tolerated. However, seamen,
the military, and magistrates have no right to strike. In 1999 the
Gendarmerie obtained a limited right to strike as part of the police
reform package; this provision is to be implemented by April 1, 2001.
Even though many strikes begin as wildcat actions, strikers are not
prosecuted for failure to observe strike procedures in collective
bargaining agreements. Crimes committed during a strike action, such as
causing bodily harm or damage to property, are clearly illegal strike
methods, which the authorities prosecute.
Federal police have the right to strike. The Government has the
authority to order necessary forces back to work during a strike in
order to maintain law and order.
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in its
``Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 2000'' again
mentioned that for several years employers made applications to civil
courts to end strikes. The report added that, more recently, judges
tended to rule that labor conflicts are not within their jurisdiction.
This stance reinforced the widely accepted practice that any discussion
of the right to strike is a subject for collective bargaining between
workers and employers and not a legal matter. Although draft laws were
submitted, no action has been taken by Parliament to end the legal
confusion.
Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and
are free to affiliate with international labor bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is recognized, protected, and
exercised freely. Every other year the employers' federation and the
unions negotiate a nationwide collective bargaining agreement, covering
2.4 million private sector workers, that establishes the framework for
negotiations at the plant and branch levels. In 1998 employers and
unions agreed on a nationwide collective bargaining agreement that
focused on collective bargaining at the branch and plant levels and
limited compensation increases to 5.9 percent for the 1999-2000 period.
The agreement covered cost of living adjustments, wage increases, and
job creation measures.
The law prohibits discrimination against organizers and members of
unions and protects against the termination of contracts of members of
workers' councils, members of health or safety committees, and shop
stewards. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are
required to reinstate workers fired for union activities. Effective
mechanisms such as the labor courts exist for adjudicating disputes
between labor and management.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and generally it is not known to occur;
however, trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The law also prohibits
forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces this
prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15, but
education is compulsory until age 18. Youths between the ages of 15 and
18 may participate in part-time work/study programs and may work full
time during school vacations. The labor courts effectively monitor
compliance with national laws and standards. There are no industries
where any significant child labor exists. The Government prohibits
forced and bonded child labor and generally enforces this prohibition
effectively (see Section 6.c.); however, trafficking in children is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum
wage for workers over 21 years of age is approximately $1,030 (BFr
46,338): 18-year-olds must be paid at least 82 percent of the minimum,
19-year-olds 88 percent, and 20-year-olds 94 percent. The minimum wage,
coupled with extensive social benefits, provides workers with a decent
standard of living. Minimum wages in the private sector are set in
biennial, nationwide collective bargaining meetings (see Section 6.b.),
which lead to formal agreements signed in the National Labor Council
and made mandatory by royal decree for the entire private sector. In
the public sector, the minimum wage is determined in negotiations
between the Government and the public service unions. The Ministry of
Labor effectively enforces the law regarding minimum wages. By law the
standard workweek cannot exceed 39 hours and must have at least one 24-
hour rest period. Many collective bargaining agreements set standard
workweeks of 35 to 38 hours. The law requires overtime pay for hours
worked in excess of the standard. Work done from the 9th to the 11th
hour per day or from the 40th to the 50th hour per week is considered
allowable overtime. Longer workdays are permitted only if agreed upon
in a collective bargaining agreement. These laws and regulations are
enforced effectively by the Ministry of Labor and the labor courts.
The law calls for comprehensive provisions for worker safety.
Collective bargaining agreements can supplement these laws. Workers
have the right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their
safety or health without jeopardy to their continued employment, and
the law protects workers who file complaints about such situations. The
Labor Ministry implements health and safety legislation through a team
of inspectors and determines whether workers qualify for disability and
medical benefits. The law mandates health and safety committees in
companies with more than 50 employees. Labor courts effectively monitor
compliance with national health and safety laws and standards.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law defines and criminalizes
trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women and children is a
problem. Under the law, victims of trafficking who provide evidence
against the trafficker are granted temporary residence permits and are
eligible to receive aid from government-funded reception centers. Since
1994 the majority of cases were victims of either sexual or economic
exploitation. The victims of sexual exploitation increasingly are women
under age 18. A magistrate is designated in each judicial district to
supervise cases involving trafficking in persons. A national magistrate
is in charge of coordinating the various antitrafficking initiatives.
An antitrafficking unit also has been established in the Gendarmerie.
In each of the three regions (Wallonia, Flanders, and Brussels), the
Government has designated (and subsidizes) a nonprofit organization to
provide assistance to victims of trafficking. The Center for Equal
Opportunity and the Fight Against Racism (see Section 5), which is
tasked with monitoring the treatment of trafficking victims, complained
that the designated nonprofit organizations lack the funds and staff to
assist properly the growing number of victims. The Government reported
significant increases in witness testimony and the successful
prosecution of traffickers. An average of 130 victims have taken
advantage of the residency program in recent years.
Belgium is both a transit point and destination for trafficking in
women and children. In September 1999, the three government-designated
nonprofit organizations involved in assisting victims of trafficking in
persons reported 185 active cases of trafficking in women from over 30
countries. The largest number of victims were Albanian. Cases on 28
children from 7 different countries also were active; the largest
number were from Albania and Macedonia. According to statistics
compiled by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, nearly 2,000
unaccompanied minors requested asylum in 1999, most from the former
Yugoslavia and central Africa. Because of the difficulties involved in
traveling to Belgium from those areas, the International Organization
for Migration believes that many of these unaccompanied minors were
brought in by traffickers or assisted by professional smugglers.
In June 58 Chinese immigrants were found dead of suffocation in a
truck at the British seaport of Dover. They apparently had boarded the
truck in Belgium before it departed by ferry from the port of
Zeebrugge. Police suspect that an organized smuggling ring was
involved. The Government was criticized in Parliament for failing to
provide effective immigration control at Belgium's seaports and
airports. During the first 6 months of the year, 1,105 illegal aliens
were apprehended as they attempted to transit the port of Zeebrugge,
compared to 1,440 for all of 1999. In November the Government announced
its program for reforming asylum and immigration procedures (see
Section 2.d.).
In an ongoing program began during the year, the Government, under
the auspices of the Ministry of Interior, dispatched attaches to
several source countries to provide in-depth analysis of the
trafficking situation in those countries. These attaches, whose stays
can last anywhere from a few weeks up to 2 years, also are responsible
for coordinating antitrafficking information campaigns to warn locals
about the potential consequences of being the victim of a trafficking
organization.
The Government has worked closely with the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) to develop innovative programs to
combat human trafficking and to assist its victims. For example, the
Government has provided funding for information campaigns in countries
of origin to warn women of the dangers of trafficking. It also has
provided funding to the IOM to assist the voluntary return of victims
to their home countries and to assist them in readjusting once they
have returned home.
In 1996 the authorities uncovered a suspected pedophile/child
pornography and trafficking ring. Five suspects remained under
investigation, including the accused ringleader, Marc Dutroux. In
December the Government announced that his trial would not begin until
September 2002. Lengthy delays in bringing this case to trial have led
to widespread public cynicism and suspicion about the investigation of
this case in particular and about the judicial system in general.
__________
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords) ended the 1991-95 war and created the
independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, previously one of the
constituent republics of Yugoslavia. The agreement also created two
multiethnic constituent entities within the state: The Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS).
The Federation, which has a postwar Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) and Croat
majority, occupies 51 percent of the territory; the RS, which has a
postwar Bosnian Serb majority, occupies 49 percent. The Constitution
(Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords) establishes a statewide government with
a bicameral legislature, a three-member presidency (consisting of a
Bosniak, a Serb, and a Croat), a council of ministers, a constitutional
court, and a central bank. The Accords also provided for the Office of
the High Representative (OHR) to oversee implementation of civilian
provisions. The High Representative also has the power to impose
legislation and remove officials who obstruct the implementation of the
Dayton Accords. The entities maintain separate armies, but under the
Constitution, these are under the ultimate control of the presidency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Municipal elections held in April and general
elections conducted in November were generally free of violence,
although there were some voting irregularities in both elections.
Multiethnic parties committed to building on the foundation established
at Dayton, such as the Social Democratic Party (SDP), made inroads
against the support for the nationalist, ethnically based parties in
the November elections, resulting in a state House of Representatives
almost evenly divided between the two groups. In the RS, the ethnically
based Serb Democratic Party (SDS) maintained its dominant position,
while the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (HDZ) remained strong in Croat-majority municipalities. The
Party of Democratic Action (SDA) remained the largest nationalist
Bosniak party. Although formally independent, the judiciary remains
subject to influence by political parties and the executive branch and
is unable to prosecute complex or even simple crimes fairly and
effectively.
One of the two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was established in March 1994 and
transformed the government structure of the Bosnian territories under
Bosniak and Croatian control. The President of the Federation appoints
the Prime Minister subject to parliamentary approval. The Federation
Parliament is bicameral. Federation structures continue to be
implemented only gradually. Major steps were the creation of canton
governments, the unification of Sarajevo under Federation control in
spring 1996, and the 1996, 1998, and 2000 elections of the Federation
Parliament. However, serious ethnic and political rivalries continue to
divide Croats and Bosniaks. Parallel Bosniak and Croat government
structures continued to exist in practice.
The Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the other entity
that makes up Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1997-98, most of the RS
political and administrative agencies moved from Pale, a stronghold of
former Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic,
to Banja Luka. The President and Vice President were elected in
November for 4-year terms. The RS National Assembly is unicameral and
elected on a proportional basis. The November general elections in the
Republika Srpska were relatively free and fair, and resulted in the
nationalist parties, led by the SDS, increasing their strength at the
expense of the pro-Dayton moderates.
Demilitarization of the city of Brcko, which was made a ``self-
governing neutral district'' in March, was completed in February. A
districtwide multiethnic police force also was established. The
internationally appointed supervisor is empowered to address such
issues as taxation, law enforcement, district management, and
composition of the district assembly.
The State-level Constitutional Court declared during the year that
a number of provisions of the entity constitutions were
unconstitutional; they had been challenged in a lawsuit filed by
Presidency member Alija Izetbegovic in 1998. The court ruled
unconstitutional provisions in both entity constitutions that
designated a specific ethnic group or groups as ``constituent'' in that
entity, making clear that the three major ethnic groups--Serbs, Croats,
and Bosniaks--as well as ``others,'' are constituent in both entities.
The decision also invalidated parts of the entity constitutions that
named an official language or script, or that called for government
support for one church, among other provisions. The decisions
established the principle of ethnic equality in the country; however,
this decision of the court has not yet been implemented in practice.
The Constitution gives the Government of each entity and the
individual cantons within the Federation responsibility for law
enforcement in accordance with internationally recognized standards.
The Stabilization Force (SFOR), led by NATO, continued to implement the
military aspects of the Dayton Accords and to attempt to create a
secure environment for implementation of the nonmilitary aspects of the
settlement, such as: Civilian reconstruction, the return of refugees
and displaced persons, elections, and freedom of movement of the
civilian population. The International Police Task Force (IPTF), which
was established by the U. N. under Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords,
monitors, advises, and trains the local police. The IPTF also may
investigate human rights abuses. Local police in both entities have
violated international standards and discriminated on political,
religious, and ethnic grounds; however, these cases decreased compared
with 1999. During the year, police in both the Federation and the RS
used internal affairs units to investigate and dismiss officers for
committing abuses. Police continued to suffer from the legacy of a
Communist system, with ``special'' or secret police operating in all
areas. These forces operated outside the normal police chain of
command, exceeding ethnic quotas and reporting directly to the senior
political leadership. In addition to locally recruited police forces,
each entity also maintains an army. Security forces committed human
rights abuses, primarily police brutality, in many parts of the
country.
The economy remains weak and dependent upon international
assistance. Gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated at $5 billion;
per capita GDP doubled, at approximately $1,350. GDP continued to be
lower in the RS than in the Federation. The entity governments have
made only minor structural reforms in privatization, banking, and
taxation. Official unemployment estimates range from 40 to 50 percent,
and many individuals are forced into the informal economy for work.
Workers in the ``gray'' market typically receive no benefits, but those
with formal employment often are paid only partial salaries and months
late. Pensions and other benefits are also paid only in part and are
delayed 6 months or more due to a lack of government resources. The
continued return of refugees from abroad is expected to compound the
problem of job creation and to reduce remittances. International
assistance provided loans to the manufacturing sector and guidance on
structural reform.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. The
degree of respect for human rights continues to vary among areas with
Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb majorities. There was one
death in custody (a suicide), and isolated instances of political,
ethnic, or religious killings continued. Killings due to bombs also
continued. The police continued to commit human rights abuses during
the year, and serious problems persisted. Police continued to commit
abuses in many parts of the country, principally the physical abuse of
detainees. Members of security forces also abused and physically
mistreated other citizens. Police also used excessive force, or did not
ensure security, to discourage minority resettlement in majority areas.
Prison conditions met prisoner's basic minimum needs for hygiene and
access to medical care; however, overcrowding and antiquated facilities
continued to be a problem.
In the RS, police detained suspects for long periods of time before
filing charges; lengthy prearraignment detention was a problem in
numerous cases in the Federation as well. However, there were fewer
cases of arbitrary arrest and detention than in the previous year.
Confusion over the rules governing local arrest, detention, and
prosecution of suspects for The Hague-based International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) led in some instances to
questionable detentions in both the Federation and the RS. The RS
continued its de facto refusal to take action against any Serbs
indicted by the ICTY. In contrast, RS authorities have made arrests of
Serbs based solely on warrants issued by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia); however, in a recent case the authorities
later released the suspects.
The judiciary in both entities remained subject to influence by
dominant political parties and by the executive branch. Overlapping and
poorly defined layers of judicial responsibility and outdated
procedures made the administration of justice sporadic and vulnerable
to manipulation. In many areas, close ties exist between courts of law
and the ruling parties, and those judges and prosecutors who show
independence are subject to intimidation by the authorities. Even when
independent decisions were rendered, local authorities often refused to
carry them out. Authorities in all areas infringed on citizens' privacy
rights.
Authorities and dominant political parties exerted influence over
the media, and freedom of speech and of the press was restricted to
varying degrees in the different entities. Government threats against
journalists increased during the year. Academic freedom was restricted.
Authorities continued to impose some limits on freedom of assembly and
association. Religious discrimination remained a problem. Both
governments and private groups continued to restrict religious practice
by minorities in majority areas. Although freedom of movement continued
to improve, some restrictions remained in practice. At times, mobs
blockaded roads, restricting freedom of movement.
Discrimination against women persists, and violence against women,
in particular domestic violence, is a persistent yet underreported
problem. Severe discrimination continued in areas dominated by Serb and
Croat ethnic groups, with some discrimination in Bosniak-majority
areas, particularly regarding the treatment of refugees and displaced
persons. The political leadership at all levels, in varying degrees but
more so in the RS than in the Federation, continued to obstruct
minority returns in certain localities. Local authorities and mobs (in
most cases believed to be organized or approved by local authorities)
harassed minorities and violently resisted their return. The
destruction of minority-owned houses continued in some areas of the RS
and in Croat-controlled areas of the Federation. Marginal economic
conditions and discrimination in the educational system also
complicated returns. Enactment of property legislation proceeded in
both entities under pressure from the international community, but
implementation was sporadic and slow. Mob violence was a serious
problem in the eastern RS. In December, several returning Bosniaks were
wounded and one killed by mine explosions, raising suspicions that the
mines had been laid to deter return. There were several killings of
Bosniaks in the northern RS in the fall that may have been ethnically
motivated. Ethnic discrimination remains a serious problem.
Prostitution is widespread, and trafficking in women and girls to and
within the country is a serious problem.
During the year, there were increased efforts on the part of SFOR
to apprehend alleged perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more
aggressive approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY,
which began in the summer of 1997, resulted in the apprehension of 5
indictees out of the 96 publicly indicted by the Tribunal (one
committed suicide rather than submit to arrest). This brought the total
number of indictees taken into custody since the Tribunal's inception
to 48. At year's end there were 38 persons in ICTY custody either
awaiting trial, involved in ongoing trials, released provisionally, or
awaiting transfer to begin serving their sentences. Three indictees
already are serving sentences. There were 27 public indictees still at
large at year's end. ICTY trials during the year resulted in six
convictions and one acquittal.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by police; however, there was one death
in custody. Violent incidents continued throughout the year, many
between members of different ethnic groups or political parties.
A prisoner died in Mostar West prison where he was being held on
charges of aggravated assault. An investigation by the IPTF's Human
Rights Division determined the death a suicide and found no evidence to
suggest police abuse or irregularities.
Federation authorities made several arrests in connection with the
March 1999 killing of Federation Deputy Interior Minister Jozo Leutar.
In spite of ethnic divisions within the police and political
interference from some quarters, the investigation, one of the most
politically contentious in Bosnia, was continuing in cooperation with
officials in third countries at year's end. By contrast, a series of
attacks on Croat policemen in Travnik in 1999 remains unsolved, mainly
due to political interference.
Many, if not most, of the perpetrators of killings and other brutal
acts committed in previous years remained unpunished, including war
criminals indicted by the ICTY, individuals responsible for the up to
8,000 persons killed by the Bosnian Serb Army after the fall of
Srebrenica, and those responsible for up to 13,000 others still missing
and presumed killed as a result of ``ethnic cleansing'' in Bosnia. The
local prosecution of war crimes cases has proceeded slowly due to
political interference, but Bosnian authorities made some progress
during the year with the arrest of several suspects that have been
charged and are to be tried in the Bosnian courts.
There was an increase in the number of arrests by Federation police
of war crimes suspects for local prosecution, particularly in Croat
areas of the Federation. Officers of the Federation Interior Ministry
arrested suspected Croat war criminal Dominik Ilijasevic August 28 in
Kiseljak. Erhad Poznic and Ivan Suljo, former Croat special police
officers charged in connection with the disappearance and presumed
execution of 13 Bosniak prisoners of war in Mostar in 1993, both
surrendered voluntarily to cantonal authorities in September. In
addition, Dragan Stankovic, a Bosnian Serb indicted for local
prosecution for actions targeting the Bosniak civilian population in
Foca in 1992, was arrested by cantonal police in Gorazde on September
20, while crossing through Federation territory. A Croat police
official in Travnik surrendered himself to a Sarajevo court in March
following his reported indictment on war crimes charges. The court
subsequently released the officer, ultimately explaining that he had
been questioned as a witness in an ongoing war crimes investigation.
During the year, there were continued efforts on the part of SFOR
to apprehend alleged perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more
aggressive approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY,
which began in the summer of 1997, resulted during the year in the
apprehension of 5 indictees out of the 94 publicly indicted by the
Tribunal. All were detained forcibly, and none voluntarily surrendered
to NATO troops. On October 13, Janko Jancic committed suicide rather
than submit to arrest by SFOR troops. This brought the total number of
indictees taken into custody since the Tribunal's inception to 48. At
year's end there were 38 persons in ICTY custody.
On January 25, SFOR troops detained Mitar Vasiljevic, allegedly a
member of the paramilitary ``White Eagles,'' who is accused of killing
over 100 Bosnian Muslim civilians in the Visegrad area. On March 5,
SFOR arrested Dragoljub Prcac. Prcac is accused of being the deputy
commander of the Omarska concentration camp, whose 3,000 Bosnian Muslim
and Bosnian Croat captives were held in inhuman conditions. Momcilo
Krajisnik, a senior Bosnian Serb politician before, during, and after
the war, was arrested on April 3. Krajisnik is charged with genocide,
crimes against humanity, and other war crimes for his direction of
efforts to ethnically cleanse the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. SFOR arrested Dragan Nikolic on April 21; he is charged
with crimes against humanity and other violations committed while he
was in command of the Susica concentration camp and for participating
in inhuman acts against more than 500 civilians. The alleged commander
of the ``Keraterm'' concentration camp, Dusko Sikirica, was arrested by
SFOR on June 25. Keraterm camp held over 3,000 Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat captives in inhuman conditions. Of the 27 publicly
indicted persons still at large at the end of the year who remain in
the country, the majority reportedly live in the RS. Although RS
cooperation with the ICTY has improved, RS authorities made no effort
to arrest indictees. The ICTY during the year issued 6 convictions and
1 acquittal. This brings the total number of convictions to 13 since
the ICTY's inception.
In January, Zeljko Raznjatovic, also known as ``Arkan,'' a
notorious paramilitary commander from the Croatian and Bosnian wars who
was indicted by the ICTY, was shot and killed by unknown assailants in
the lobby of a hotel in Belgrade. In Prnjavor in the RS, a Bosniak man
was killed in March in a hand grenade explosion on his property (see
Section 1.c.). An unknown assailant shot and killed Ljubisa Savic, also
known as Mauser, the former RS Minister of Interior Chief of Uniformed
Police, on June 7 in Bijeljina. Savic was indicted for alleged unlawful
conduct during a murder investigation by the Sokolac prosecutor in
March (see Section 1.c.). His death was seen by many as the result of
conflicts between Serb political factions and criminal elements. In
mid-December, in Glogova, near the Serb hard-line town of Bratunac, a
Bosniak was killed when a mine exploded while he was clearing his
property. After an investigation, RS authorities concluded that the
mines were recently placed as a booby trap to prevent return (see
Section 1.c.).
There were no developments in the IPTF investigation of the death
in police custody of a Bosniak returnee who had killed the leader of an
Orthodox religious association in 1999.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances during the year. There still are an estimated 20,000 to
30,000 persons missing from the wars in 1991-95.
The OHR in late 1997 negotiated an agreement among the Bosniak,
Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb commissions for missing persons to
expedite exhumations across the interentity boundary line (IEBL). The
OHR reported that the remains of 1,308 persons had been recovered
during the year. These numbers were significantly lower that the
previous year because the Government did not provide promised funds for
exhumation until May. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) reported that since 1995 it received requests from family
members to trace 20,484 people missing from the war years, including
16,979 Muslims, 719 Croats, 2,537 Serbs, and 249 others. A total of
2,231 of these persons were accounted for (292 of whom were found
alive). The ICRC noted that the Working Group for Tracing Missing
Persons, which serves as a channel for passing tracing requests to
local authorities, had ceased functioning in July, due to lack of
cooperation from local authorities and a dispute over the rotating
chairmanship among the Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian Croat
representatives. The group had not resumed work by year's end and
negotiations currently are underway to reform the working group.
In August the Missing Persons Institute (MPI) was inaugurated to
coordinate the recovery and identification of remains, provide support
to families of the missing, and apply political pressure to Bosnian
officials to provide information on missing persons. MPI is a state
institution that assumed many of the functions previously carried out
by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), which
continues to conduct regional identification activities in the
countries of the former Yugoslavia. In August MPI began the first
systematic in-country DNA identification program and began collecting
blood samples from living family members of missing persons to assist
in the identification of recovered remains. In its first month of
operation, the DNA program tested 28 presumptive identifications, which
were based on circumstantial evidence such as clothing and personal
items found on the body. The testing confirmed 19 identities and
excluded 9.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the right to freedom from
torture and cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; however, in all
areas of the country, police and prison officials abused and physically
mistreated persons at the time of arrest and during detention.
A pattern of poor police protection and of violence against
minority communities continued in several areas. Police in Stolac,
Drvar, Gacko, and Srebrenica proved unwilling or unable to contain the
numerous instances of arson designed to intimidate returnees. While
there was some improvement in the behavior of local police in the RS
and the Federation toward returning minorities, there still were
numerous instances of poor police protection in several areas. In
February the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) called for
increased police patrols after an attempted arson attack on a Bosniak
home in the settlement of Ilici in southwest Mostar. In March the OHR
suspended the deputy police chief and three policemen in Kopaci, a
suburb of Gorazde in the eastern RS, who, despite being stationed
around a Bosniak house, failed to prevent a Serb from throwing a
grenade at it. In Srebrenica, police failed to apprehend anyone
responsible for more than 12 burnings of houses occupied by minority
families in June and July. In July in Janja police stood by and watched
as rioters burned three houses and damaged 15 others during a protest
against Bosniak returns that was sparked by the scheduled eviction of
three Serb families. The subsequent police investigation was marked by
significant omissions, and police refused to identify suspects during
court hearings. In the Federation, returning Serbs in Drvar were
subjected to physical attacks and intimidation during attempts to evict
temporary Croatian occupants.
At times some police officers impeded the enforcement of the law by
their unwillingness to carry out eviction orders for persons illegally
occupying homes of internally displaced persons (IDP's). Government
leaders in both the RS and the Federation often used a variety of
tactics, including public statements, to inhibit the return of IDP's
(see Section 2.d.).
The IPTF made significant progress in its efforts to restructure
and increase professionalism in the police forces. The IPTF completed
its programs to provide human dignity and basic skills training to all
Federation police officers and neared completion of officer training in
the RS. The IPTF continued its certification of Federation and RS
police and also decertified officers on a variety of charges. This
process involved written and psychological examinations, as well as
background investigations. In addition, an IPTF unit in The Hague
checks the names of all police officials through the ICTY database. In
August the RS police academy graduated its third multiethnic class.
Minority officers are beginning to be deployed in areas where minority
returns are occurring. All Federation canton governments have agreed to
an ethnically mixed police force in principle; however, many cantonal
governments continue to resist integration in practice. In the
Federation police include Croat, Bosniak, and Serb officers and
generally reflect the appropriate ethnic mix within each canton.
However, Bosniak and Croat police in the Federation often operate under
separate, parallel budget and command structures, divided along ethnic
lines. Police in the RS generally do not meet target standards of
ethnic representation, as mandated by various agreements. Cooperation
between the RS and the Federation Interior Ministries often is better
than cooperation between federation cantons. The integration of women
into the police forces is uneven but improving, with substantial female
representation in the Brcko district and in recent police academy
classes in both the RS and the Federation.
IPTF certification of officers proceeded more slowly in the RS, but
there was progress on significant law enforcement reforms. An
interentity agreement negotiated under U.N. auspices allows the
voluntary redeployment of officers across entity lines to redress
ethnic imbalances. By year's end, 33 officers had volunteered for
redeployment (22 from the Federation and 11 from the RS). Police
officials attempted to recruit more minority candidates; individual
cantons in the Federation held positions open for minority candidates.
Since 1999 international monitors have been establishing an IPTF
physical presence within police facilities to ensure proper IPTF
monitoring of police reforms. Authorities in the RS are implementing a
policies and procedures manual that institutes, among other reforms, a
public information bureau and internal affairs unit. Under these
reforms, the RS authorities continue to remove officers accused of
graft or brutality. Professional standards units have reviewed over
1,000 cases, substantiating approximately 35 percent of complaints
received and administering punishments ranging from fines to
suspensions. A total of 20 officers were removed and 16 cases were
registered for criminal prosecution.
On January 14, the IPTF Commissioner removed the provisional
authorization to exercise police powers from seven police officers in
the Federation. The removals were enforced for violations ranging from
illegal deprivation of liberty to assault on civilians in custody and
assault while off duty. In one case, an officer shot and injured a
civilian while intoxicated. There were scattered reports of police
brutality throughout the country, although local professional standards
units were increasingly active in holding law enforcement officers,
including senior officials, accountable for their actions.
In June the Human Rights Chamber ruled that the Federation army had
violated the human rights of two Serbs who were shot and detained while
driving near Sarajevo in 1996. The two were detained at various
locations for over a month before appearing before a judge and were
released 15 days later by the then-Higher Court of Sarajevo. A month
after their detention, the Army launched an investigation a month after
their detention into whether they had committed war crimes. The Chamber
ruled that the treatment of one of the two men during detention
constituted torture and that both men suffered inhuman and degrading
treatment and punishment because they were Serbs. During the year,
there were no reports of the Army detaining civilians.
On March 1, the Sokolac prosecutor indicted nine former RS police
officers for their alleged unlawful conduct during the investigation
into the murder of the Deputy Chief of the Pale Public Security Center
(PSC), Srdan Knezevic, in August 1998. Among those indicted were the
former RS Minister of Interior Chief of Uniformed Police (who was shot
to death by unknown persons in June), Head of the Pale PSC Crime Unit,
and the Chief of Staff of the Pale PSC. The charges included unlawful
deprivation of freedom, extraction of statements by duress,
maltreatment during the discharge of duty, illegal search, failure to
render aid, and unauthorized photography. Several of the indictees had
been cited by the IPTF for illegal deprivation of liberty, torture, and
ill-treatment of 14 suspects and witnesses, as well as coercing several
detainees into confessing and into signing incriminating statements.
Sporadic violence against international community representatives
continued throughout the year. On January 31, a hand grenade was thrown
at the IPTF police station in Pale in the RS, damaging three vehicles.
On April 3, a hand grenade was thrown at a SFOR patrol near Modrica in
the RS. Two cars and a shop were damaged. On June 21, a landmine
damaged an SFOR armored personnel carrier near Gacko in the RS. Three
SFOR soldiers were wounded in the incident, which followed protests
against minority refugee returns to the area. On July 24, six rocket-
propelled hand grenades were fired at the living quarters of the Joint
Commission Observer in Zvornik. The attack was similar to one carried
out in May 1998. The attack damaged the house, but did not result in
any casualties. RS police arrested two suspects, and still are
searching for another. On August 3, a false bomb threat was made
against offices in Zenica that house international community
organizations, local government, media, and NGO's. In August, an IPTF
monitor was assaulted and slightly injured in the Zvornik area by
unknown assailants.
Federation and RS government officials also were attacked. The
private business premises of Mostar mayor Safet Orucevic were damaged
in a rock throwing incident on May 15. An improvised explosive device
detonated in a Travnik municipal office in June, injuring one employee.
An official vehicle used by the RS Minister of Information was
destroyed by an explosion in Banja Luka on June 15. In July municipal
officials in Maglaj complained of death threats during the eviction of
foreign-born Islamists who illegally were occupying homes owned by
displaced persons. A car belonging to the head of the local refugee
government department in Modrica in the RS was heavily damaged by a
hand grenade on August 7. Early in the year, a cantonal judge in
Sarajevo received death threats during the deportation proceedings of a
naturalized Bosnian citizen who was wanted on international terrorism
charges. In August the interior minister of Central Bosnia canton
received threats following the arrest of a Croat war-crimes suspect.
There was no progress reported by year's end in the Foca police chief's
investigation of the attack of the Foca IPTF station. There was no
progress reported by year's end by the RS police on the investigation
of the death of municipal council member Munib Hasanovic.
A number of housing authorities responsible for implementing
property law were threatened or assaulted. The head of the Banja Luka
housing authority resigned after receiving death threats. He had been
under pressure not to carry out evictions of Croatian Serbs and war
veterans illegally occupying property owned by displaced persons. On
April 10, the head of the housing authority in Bijeljina was stabbed
and seriously wounded. Police determined that the assailant was a
displaced person who was dissatisfied with the manner in which his case
had been handled. The perpetrator was arrested and sentenced to 60 days
in prison. On April 29, the head of the Stolac Housing Board was beaten
by an alleged illegal occupant, who also attempted to stab him. Local
police did not respond adequately and the IPTF subsequently issued two
noncompliance reports against local police and continued to monitor the
investigation. On December 7, the head of housing in Pale resigned
after receiving threats for implementing property laws.
A few violent incidents marred the municipal elections on April 8.
Two such incidents were directed against the international community,
while others resulted from intraethnic conflict between political
parties within ethnic communities (see Section 3). There were no
violent incidents involving international community representatives
during the November elections, as had been the case in past elections.
Individual and societal violence motivated by ethnic conflict
continued to be a serious problem, and numerous bombings, shootings,
and assaults caused deaths, injuries, and significant material damage;
however, violence decreased compared with 1999. Such violence often was
connected to the return of refugees and displaced persons to their
prewar homes in areas where the returnees are now a minority. A growing
level of violence associated with criminal activity compounded the
problem.
There continued to be numerous violent incidents directed at
returning refugees. In Posavina, a Croat returnee's windows were broken
by Croat HDZ hard-liners. There have been reports of intimidation
against Serbs in Drvar. On January 18, the newly renovated house of a
returning Bosniak refugee in Aladinici, near Stolac (currently a Croat
majority area), was burned. The next night another Bosniak house, still
under construction, was destroyed. In early March, three Bosniak houses
in Janja were set on fire and three of the inhabitants injured. In
March a group of Serbs in Vlasenica in the RS beat a number of Roma who
had been deported from refugee camps in Italy. On March 11, a group of
Serbs threw a hand grenade at a house holding more than a dozen Bosniak
heads of families in Kopaci, the Serb suburb of Gorazde. The Bosniaks
were the first returnees to the suburb and previously had been camped
nearby in tents for more than 5 months, waiting for Serb authorities to
evict illegal Serb occupants from their property.
Also in March, there were several attacks against returning
Bosniaks near the RS town of Prnjavor. On March 21, a hand grenade
severely injured a Bosniak male who had returned with his family to the
settlement of Babanovac only 1 week earlier. On March 23, another
Bosniak family physically was threatened and told to leave the area. On
March 24, a hand grenade exploded and killed a Bosniak returnee who was
burning trash on his property in the Prjnavor settlement of Lisnja (it
remains unclear whether the grenade was placed deliberately in the fire
to harm the Bosniak or merely was there by accident).
In April a group of approximately 100 Bosnian Serbs stoned 6
Bosniaks who were rebuilding their houses in Brcko. On April 26, a mine
exploded in the house of a Croat returnee in the Modrica area of the
RS, damaging the dwelling but injuring no one. On May 11, several buses
carrying 180 Bosniak women to a memorial ceremony to mark the 8th
anniversary of a massacre in the Bratunac area were stoned by an angry
mob of Serbs. At least 10 Bosniak women were injured slightly by broken
glass. RS authorities charged 29 Serbs for disturbing the peace several
days later (see Sections 2.b. and 5). In late May there were minor
attacks on Bosniak returnees and Croat IDP's outside of Stolac. The
next day the governor of the canton visited the return site to
criticize the incidents.
On June 21, an unidentified person fired at the office of the
Association of Refugees from Derventa in Bijelo Brdo. On June 25, a
hand grenade exploded under the truck of a Bosniak returnee to Janja in
Bijeljina municipality. The explosion damaged the house and garage.
Arsonists set fire to more than a dozen Bosniak returnee homes in
and around Srebrenica in the summer in an effort to intimidate
returnees. No one was injured but property was significantly damaged
and, in some instances, destroyed. One fire was timed to coincide with
the July 12 ceremony at Potocari marking the 5th anniversary of the
Srebrenica massacre. Several of the homes had been renovated recently.
None of the perpetrators were arrested.
On July 24 a crowd of 250 Serbs, protesting against the eviction of
Serbs in Janja, rioted in a Bosniak neighborhood of the town, burning 2
Bosniak houses, destroying several vehicles, and stoning 6 other
dwellings. Two hand grenades exploded during the incident, injuring
several people. Local police and SFOR looked on without intervening.
Approximately 11,000 Bosniaks lived in Janja before the war; only 700
had returned by July.
In mid-August a bomb destroyed a cafe in downtown Glamoc that was
owned by a Bosniak returnee. Three days later the owner's father's
rebuilt home was set on fire. The OHR dismissed the Croat mayor of
Glamoc on September 8, partly due to his inaction regarding these two
incidents.
On August 23, a group of Serb IDP's angry over their displaced
circumstances blocked the Zvornik-Vlasenica road for several hours.
When police broke up the blockade, they were assaulted by the crowd and
12 police officers were injured.
On September 9, a Bosniak house in Srebrenica, which had been empty
after a Serb had vacated it, was set on fire.
On September 12, the vehicle used by the head of the Banja Luka
branch of the RS Ministry for Refugees was destroyed in an explosion.
The explosion appeared to have been an attempt to intimidate the
official, who is in charge of evicting illegal occupants and returning
refugees to Banja Luka.
In mid-December, there were two mine incidents that may have been
deliberate attempts to deter Bosniaks from returning. In the destroyed
village of Glogova, near the Serb town of Bratunac, a Bosniak was
killed when a mine exploded while he was clearing his property. After
an investigation, RS authorities concluded that the mines were recently
placed as a booby trap to prevent return. In southern Bosnia, outside
the Serb town of Gacko, a landmine exploded under a car carrying
Bosniaks to the refugee village of Fazlagica Kula. The occupants were
severely wounded, but survived. The OHR suspects that the mine was set
recently. These landmine incidents prompted OHR to make a statement
criticizing what appeared to be increasing violence against returnees.
There was no progress in the local authorities' investigation of a
car bomb that injured a Bosnian Croat police officer in Travnik in
1999. There was no investigation into 1999 incidents of arson of homes
of Bosniak returnees in Borovnica. There was no progress in the
investigation by canton and Federation antiterrorism officers into a
bomb explosion at the home of Ivan Saric, former middle Bosnia canton
governor, in a village outside Gornje Vakuf in 1999.
While prison standards for hygiene and access to medical care meet
prisoners' basic needs, overcrowding and poor, antiquated facilities
are chronic problems. There was one report of a death in custody in
Mostar West prison (see Section 1.a.).
International community representatives were given widespread and
for the most part unhindered access to detention facilities and
prisoners in the RS as well as in the Federation.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were fewer cases
of arbitrary arrest and detention in both the Federation and the RS
compared with 1999. In prior years, police in both entities enjoyed
great latitude based on Communist-era criminal procedure laws that
permitted them to detain persons for up to 6 months without bringing
formal charges against them. The Federation revised these laws in 1998,
removing this power from police and vesting it solely in the
investigative judge. The Communist-era detention laws remain in force
in the RS.
Federation law permits prearraignment detention of up to 24 hours;
in the RS prearraignment detention may extend for 3 days. International
monitors report numerous instances in which these deadlines have been
violated. In one case, a detainee was held for 11 days in the
Federation before appearing before a judge. Some accused persons have
been in detention for several years while awaiting a final action by
the appellate court. The absence of psychiatric facilities in the
Federation and RS has led to persons being detained rather than
properly treated.
Human rights NGO's contend that there are cases in which persons
who ostensibly are detained on criminal charges actually are
incarcerated for political reasons. For example, Ibrahim Djedovic, a
parliamentary deputy for the Democratic National Union (DNZ), which the
ruling Bosniak SDA views as a renegade party due to its activities
during the war, was arrested and jailed in May 1997 for war crimes,
after he arrived in Sarajevo to take up his parliamentary seat. The
ICTY investigated Djedovic and decided not to arrest him for his
alleged activities. Most local and international observers believe that
Djedovic was arrested due to his political affiliation and not because
of alleged war crimes. Although the Sarajevo cantonal court convicted
and sentenced Djedovic to 10 years in 1998, he was released in March
after winning an appeal and returned to his seat in the Federation
Parliament.
There were no reports that forced exile generally was used as a
legal punishment. There were no reports during the year of attempts by
local Croat authorities to expel returning Serbs in some Croat-
dominated areas of the Federation, as had been the case in the past.
However, Croat hard-liners in Capljina continued to intimidate Serb
returnees. The Croatian Government also continued to deny electricity
to Serb returnees in Ivanica, a small town in Bosnia near Dubrovnik.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Both the Federation and RS
Constitutions provide for an independent judiciary; however, the
executive and the ruling nationalist political parties continue to
influence the judicial system. Party affiliation and political
connections weighed heavily in the appointment of prosecutors and
judges. The legal system is unable to adequately protect the rights of
either victims or criminal defendants because of its inefficient
criminal procedure codes and complicated trial procedures.
The judicial hierarchy in the Federation varies among its different
constituent cantons. In the seven mixed or Bosniak cantons, original
court jurisdiction exists in both municipal and cantonal courts, with
more serious offenses typically tried in the cantonal courts. Appeals
are taken to the Federation Supreme Court. However, in the three Croat-
dominated cantons, the municipal courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses, and appeals are heard by the cantonal
courts. The Croat-dominated cantons refuse to recognize the appellate
jurisdiction of the Federation Supreme Court; however, no litigant has
attempted to appeal to the Federation Supreme Court yet. The differing
judicial practices in the cantons of the Federation present obstacles
to prosecutors, criminal defendants, defense attorneys, and civil
litigants and their attorneys.
In August 1999, the OHR imposed a law allowing the Federation
Supreme Court to claim immediate jurisdiction as the ``court of first
instance'' in cases involving terrorism, organized crime, smuggling,
and intercantonal crime, which would be difficult for lower courts to
try because of pressure from political parties. However, no such cases
had been tried in the Supreme Court by year's end.
The Federation Constitution provides for the appointment of judges
by the President, with the concurrence of the Vice President and the
approval of the Assembly, to an initial term of 5 years. Judges may be
reappointed following this initial term to serve until the age of 70.
The RS judicial hierarchy includes a Supreme Court to provide for
the unified enforcement of the law and a Constitutional Court to assure
conformity of laws, regulations, and general enactments with the
Constitution. The RS has both municipal and district courts, with the
district courts having appellate jurisdiction. Judges are appointed and
recalled by the National Assembly and have life tenure.
In June 1999, judicial associations in both entities adopted
identical codes of ethics for judges and prosecutors. In August 1999,
the OHR imposed laws strengthening the Federation prosecutor's office
and protecting the identity of witnesses in sensitive cases in the
Federation. There have been no test cases to date, however. The
international community continued training programs in the Federation
to familiarize judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the police
with the Federation's reformed Criminal Code, which entered into effect
in November 1998. The RS has not adopted similar criminal law reforms
yet. Some NGO's expressed concern over the judicial selection process
in eight federation cantons, especially in Sarajevo and Tuzla. Legal
experts argued that the laws on judicial selection in those two cantons
were inconsistent with the canton and Federation Constitutions.
Both the Federation and RS Constitutions provide for open and
public trials and give the accused the right to legal counsel.
The Dayton Peace Accords also created the Human Rights Commission
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consists of the Human Rights Chamber
and the Human Rights Ombudsman. The Chamber may consider alleged
violations of the European Convention on Human Rights if the matter is
within the responsibility of one of the parties to the Dayton Agreement
and occurred after its signing. Decisions of the Chamber are final and
may not be appealed to the Constitutional Court. The Ombudsman may
investigate allegations of human rights abuses either on his or her own
initiative or in response to any party, or may refer matters to the
Chamber.
Human rights organizations reported that judicial institutions in
both entities were controlled or influenced by the ruling parties.
Likewise, the various prosecutorial offices throughout the two entities
remained subject to political pressure. There were numerous anecdotal
reports of politicians pressuring judges to rule in favor of the local
party members in cases before the courts. Courts often were reluctant
or unwilling to try cases of human rights abuse referred to them. A
lack of resources and a huge backlog of unresolved cases provided a
convenient excuse for judicial inaction. Even when the courts rendered
a fair judgment, local officials often refused to implement their
decisions. This was especially the case for those who won decisions
mandating eviction of illegal occupants from their property, although
this improved somewhat during the year under pressure from the
international community. In addition, organized crime elements sought
to pressure judges, especially in central Bosnia and Herzeg-Neretva
canton.
The Federation and the RS maintain separate structures of courts
and prosecution agencies, with little or no cooperation across the
entity line. Although there have been isolated instances in which the
1998 Memorandum on Inter-Entity Legal Cooperation has been used
successfully, little sustainable progress has been made in creating
viable and effective structures for such cooperation. For example,
there is no mechanism between the Ministries of Interior to enable
arrest warrants to be executed throughout the country.
In the Federation, the High Representative implemented the Law on
Judicial and Prosecutorial Service on May 17. In the RS, the National
Assembly adopted the Law on Courts and Court Service and the Law on the
Public Prosecutor's Office. These laws provide a merit-based,
nonpolitical structure for the appointment and dismissal of judges and
prosecutors and provide uniform standards for their professional
conduct. The laws provide for a review period, during which all
prosecutors and sitting judges who fall below the standard of
professionalism set out in the laws will be removed. Review commissions
were established in June and began reviewing files in September.
The caseload of the Human Rights Chamber continued to grow rapidly
(see section 4) as more citizens turned to the Chamber to redress human
rights violations after national institutions and domestic courts
failed to provide an effective remedy.
In February the Human Rights Chamber ordered a retrial for Sretko
Damjanovic, who was convicted by a military court in Sarajevo in 1993
of war crimes against the civilian population. The Chamber ruled that
Damjanovic had not been granted a fair trial in the proceedings that
led to the rejection of his petition for a retrial. In May and October
1997, the Sarajevo Cantonal Court had denied his request to reopen
proceedings and his appeal was finally rejected by the Federation
Supreme Court in February 1998. The Chamber stated that the cantonal
court's reasoning for rejecting the appeal was ``grossly inadequate and
devoid of the appearance of fairness'' and that Damjanovic did not have
a fair chance to appeal to the Federation Supreme Court.
In February the Sarajevo Cantonal Court acquitted Bosniak Ibrahim
Djedovic of charges of war crimes. Djedovic had been convicted and
sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in October 1998, after a trial that
was viewed by international observers as unfair.
On August 4, Sarajevo Canton police arrested former Interior
Minister and Bosniak organized crime figure Alija Delimustafic on
``abuse of power'' charges filed by the Federation Prosecutor.
Delimustafic is purported to have ties across the political spectrum.
Some observers believe that his arrest and arraignment indicate that
the Bosnian judicial system is attempting to address the most serious
corruption cases. Others are doubtful that the law enforcement
community will have the political support to successfully prosecute the
case.
No new trial was held in the May 1999 RS Supreme Court case in
which the court ruled that three Bosniaks were wrongfully convicted of
1996 murders of four woodcutters.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to ``private
and family life, home and correspondence'' and the right to protection
of property; however, authorities in all areas infringed on citizens'
privacy rights.
In the RS, police routinely conduct searches of private homes
without obtaining search warrants, citing emergency provisions in the
law even in routine cases. This problem has not been observed in the
Federation.
Since the war, large numbers of citizens have been unable to
reclaim their real property, either private or collectively owned, to
which they had occupancy rights under the Communist system. Enactment
of property legislation has proceeded in both entities under pressure
from the international community. In October 1999, the High
Representative issued several directives intended to accelerate
evictions and enable more returns. However, implementation of the
revised property laws has been extremely slow. In the Federation, as of
the end of October, 54 percent of the property claims had been
adjudicated and 25 percent of the property returned. As of the same
time in the RS, only 28 percent of the property claims had been decided
and 11 percent of property returned. By some estimates, resolving
property claims in the RS at the current rate will take another 10
years. The political leadership at all levels in both entities, but
especially in the RS and in Croat areas of Herzegovina, continues to
obstruct minority returns by delaying needed reforms and not
implementing evictions and other property-related decisions. In
Sarajevo, delays persisted due to the large backlog of cases, but
political manipulation and obstruction decreased. During the year,
approximately 10,000 Serbs returned to Sarajevo Canton, usually because
of evictions of illegal occupants from their homes.
Throughout the country, membership in the political party
affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest way to
obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of
socially owned enterprises (see Sections 2.b., 3, And 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides a
general statement supporting freedom of speech and of the press. Actual
laws regarding freedom of the press are delegated to the cantons in the
Federation and to the central authorities in the RS. Freedom of speech
and of the press was respected partially in the Federation and in the
western RS, but to a lesser extent in the eastern RS. Within the
Federation, press freedom was restricted more severely in Croat-
majority areas. The primary restraints on press freedom are control of
the principal media by governing political parties and the politicized
use of tax and financial inspections instigated by the dominant
nationalist parties. In Croat-majority areas of the Federation, party-
controlled media are the dominant electronic media and source of
information. While there were some improvements in the development of a
free and independent press, most media continued to be biased
noticeably. In addition, threats to journalists from Government and
extremist groups increased during the year.
Some opposition and independent newspapers operate in the Bosniak-
majority areas of the Federation and in the RS, principally in Banja
Luka. Dnevni Avaz, which in the past was controlled largely by the SDA
party, is the daily with the highest circulation. It has noticeably
distanced itself from the SDA during the year. Dani and Slobodna Bosna
are the most influential independent magazines in the Federation. One
of the few independent magazines in the RS is Reporter, a weekly
published by a former correspondent of the Belgrade-based independent
magazine Vreme. Nezavisne Novine is an independent newspaper published
previously only in the RS, but is now distributed in the Federation.
There are two printing facilities in the Federation; the
government-controlled Oko company and the facility owned by the
newspaper Dnevni Avaz. After a series of labor strikes at Oko in late
June, Dnevni Avaz took over printing of almost all publications
previously printed by Oko until the strike ended several months later.
In the RS, the state-owned printing company, Glas Srpski, has a virtual
monopoly.
The ruling parties exerted economic pressure by refusing to allow
state-owned companies to advertise in the independent media. Some
independent media in the two entities, for example, Dani and Reporter,
assist in the distribution of each other's publications in their
respective entities.
The number of registered threats against journalists increased
during the year. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE)-sponsored media helpline, established in November 1999,
registered 128 cases of possible violations of the rights of
journalists from November 1999 through October. Complaints of abuses to
the helpline increased markedly during the April municipal elections
and the November general elections. Intimidation of journalists and
media outlets most commonly took the form of verbal or written threats
to stop a particular line of inquiry or a concerted effort to harass
media outlets through the misuse of government agencies, by performing
tax audits or cutting off power and telephone lines. Groundless
defamation lawsuits also were used against journalists, as well as
actual physical attacks.
In a survey conducted among representatives of 50 media outlets
attending a countrywide journalist conference, 62 percent responded
that they personally had experienced intimidation and interference with
their work, including direct and indirect pressure applied by both
political parties and elected or appointed officials.
In April a journalist for Dnevni Avaz was assaulted by the driver
of Federation Prime Minister Edhem Bicakcic, allegedly because of
critical articles about the Prime Minister. Bicakcic initially refused
to take responsibility for the actions of his driver or to discipline
him, but after strong pressure from the international community, he
took mild disciplinary action.
Zeljko Kopanja, the editor in chief of Nezavisne Novine who lost
both legs in a car bomb in October 1999, was threatened several times
during the year by unknown persons. In June RS authorities arrested six
individuals, including two former members of the RS police
antiterrorist brigade, for attempted blackmail of Kopanja; however,
they had not been charged in connection with the bombing by year's end.
On June 10, Edin Avdic, a journalist from the weekly Slobodna
Bosna, was assaulted at the entrance to his home hours after he
received verbal threats from SDA Chief of Cultural Affairs Muhamed
Korda. The journalist claims Korda warned him to stop writing articles
about the cultural activities of the SDA. Avdic claimed that his
attackers repeated the warning and added that next time he would be
killed.
On August 12, Srpsko Oslobodenje journalist Ljubisa Lazic was
assaulted on the premises of Radio Srpsko Sarajevo by Marko Asanin,
president of the regional board of the Srpsko Sarajevo Independent
Party of Social Democrats (SNSD). According to Lazic, the attack was
allegedly the culmination of a series of threats and harassment by
Asanin, who at one point attempted to have local media excluded from
sessions of the assembly of the Srpsko Novo Sarajevo municipality.
On September 20 in Doboj, municipal SDS leader Milan Ninkovic
publicly threatened Radio ZOS director and Oslobodenje correspondent
Azemina Mulahuseinovic during an interview on NTV Doboj. On October 9,
Deputy Manager of Glas Srpski Anton Kasipovic sustained serious head
injuries during an assault by unknown persons. The police conducted an
investigation but there was no progress at year's end.
In April leaflets were distributed in the hard-line Croat town of
Livno insulting the editor in chief of the independent radio station
Studio N and one of its journalists. The pamphlet accused the two of
being ``miserable mercenaries'' and ``spitting and vomiting on
everything that represents Croat legal authority in Livno.'' Studio N
had been the object of politically motivated pressures in the past,
including the March 1999 beating of the wife of the journalist
mentioned in the pamphlet.
On June 6, tax authorities raided the daily Dnevni Avaz. Agents of
the Federation Tax Administration initially arrived without explanation
or a court order. These provisions were eventually met, but only after
distribution of the newspaper was delayed. The Tax Administration
subsequently presented Dnevni Avaz with a bill for $450,000 (928,000
KM) for unpaid taxes in 1998, which the newspaper contested and claimed
it is unable to pay. The raid followed the newspaper's transformation
from partisan reporting in favor of the nationalist SDA party to more
neutral reporting. The newspaper's transformation began in late 1999,
before the April municipal elections, in which the SDA fared poorly.
Editor in chief Mensur Osmovic said the newspaper had received threats
from the SDA leadership for months and claimed that the main reason for
the audit was Dnevni Avaz's articles about corruption implicating SDA
leaders. Federation Prime Minister Edhem Bicakcic publicly attributed
SDA losses in the elections to loss of control over the media and
explicitly said Dnevni Avaz had to be brought under control.
There was a decrease in the selective application of the slander
laws by authorities to punish opponents since the High Representative
suspended criminal penalties for libel in July 1999. Previously the
possibility of imprisonment for slander and libel often was used to
threaten journalists. In December 1999, the Federation presented a
draft Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by Defamation and Libel,
which was criticized severely for the excessive fines it sanctioned.
The law had not yet been adopted at year's end. Although fewer
allegations of defamation are reaching the courts, the overall number
of cases remains high, due to a slow rate of resolution and court
backlogs.
In March Slobodna Bosna editor Senad Avdic, who was convicted of
defamation in June 1999, appealed his case. Bakir Alispahic, a public
official, successfully charged Avdic with defamation over articles
stating that Alispahic was a party to illegal financial transactions
involving several banks, including Narodna Banka. Avdic has requested
that his case be retried subsequent to resolution of a case involving
Narodna Banka, which revealed evidence that may support his claims.
The Independent Media Commission (IMC), established by the High
Representative in 1998, is empowered to regulate broadcasting and other
media in the country. In this capacity, the IMC licenses broadcasters,
manages and assigns spectra for broadcasting, sets licensing fees, and
enforces adherence to the code of practice. The IMC has broad authority
to punish violations to the code of practice. It may issue warnings,
impose fines, suspend or terminate licenses, seize equipment, and shut
down operations of any broadcaster or media outlet in violation of the
code of practice. The IMC issued numerous fines for violations of
broadcasting standards to stations in both entities during the year.
The largest television broadcasters are Radio Television Bosnia and
Herzegovina (RTV BiH) in the Federation and Radio Television of
Republika Srpska (RTRS) in the RS. The international community launched
the Open Broadcast Network (OBN) in 1997 as a cross-entity broadcaster
and source of objective news and public affairs programming. However,
only a minority of viewers cites the OBN as their key source of news.
Independent television outlets include TV Hayat, Studio 99, OBN Banja
Luka affiliate Alternative TV (ATV), and several small television
stations located throughout the country. Some of these broadcasters
originally were municipal stations. They have not yet been fully
privatized, and their legal ownership status remains unclear.
The High Representative's decision of July 1999 to restructure the
broadcasting system of Bosnia and Herzegovina still has not been
implemented fully. The restructuring was to liquidate the existing
broadcaster, Radio Television Bosnia and Herzegovina, and create a
statewide public broadcasting corporation, the Public Broadcasting
System of Bosnia and Herzegovina (PBS BiH). Plans to incorporate
elements of the OBN into the new PBS BiH still have not been
implemented due to difficulties linked to producing a quality PBS news
and public affairs program.
The July 1999 decision also established Radio Television of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RTV FBiH) as the public
broadcasting company of the Federation. RTV FBiH is to broadcast on two
channels offering a blend of Bosniak and Croat programming. The High
Representative's decision specifies that ``programming must be based on
truth, must respect human dignity and different opinions and
convictions, and must promote the highest standards of human rights,
peace and social justice, international understanding, protection of
democratic freedoms and environment protection.'' The OHR appointed all
21 members of the Board of Governors, including the 7 members who were
to have been chosen by Parliament. SDA officials attempted to delay the
transition to RTV FBiH and have attempted to exert influence on members
of its new Board of Governors.
The August 1999 decision by the High Representative imposing
amendments to the RS broadcasting law has not been implemented fully.
These amendments required Serb Radio Television (SRT) to change its
name to Radio Television of Republika Srpska (RTRS). The High
Representative required RTRS to comply with the country's broadcasting
laws, regulations promulgated by the IMC or its successor, and the laws
of the RS. On July 27, the High Representative dismissed the RTRS Board
of Governors for obstructing international efforts to improve RTRS
programs and management. The High Representative mandated that the new
Board work with RS authorities and international experts to develop new
legislation for the RTRS to bring it into conformance with
international standards for public broadcasting.
Until February Mostar-based Erotel TV conducted an extensive
operation that retransmitted programs from state-run Croatian
Television. The IMC declared Erotel broadcasts illegal in November
1999, but Erotel refused to go off the air until the IMC, with SFOR and
OHR assistance, forcibly shut down Erotel's transmitters on February
17. Nationalistic Croat television continued to be broadcast by HTV-
Mostar, which is owned by the three Croat municipalities in Mostar and
is financed by the HDZ.
Radio broadcasting in the Bosniak-majority areas of the
Federation--particularly in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla--is diverse.
Opposition viewpoints are reflected in the news programs of independent
broadcasters. Independent or opposition radio stations broadcast in the
RS, particularly in Banja Luka. Nez Radio and Radio Pegas report a wide
variety of political opinions. Local radio stations broadcast in Croat-
majority areas, but they are usually highly nationalistic. Local Croat
authorities do not tolerate opposition viewpoints. One exception is
Studio 88, in Mostar, which broadcasts reports from both sides of that
ethnically divided city.
Academic freedom was constrained. In the Federation, Serbs and
Croats complained that SDA party members receive special treatment in
appointments and promotions at the University of Sarajevo. The
University of Banja Luka limits its appointments to Serbs. All
institutions suffer from a lack of resources and staff. The University
of Mostar remains divided into eastern and western branches, reflecting
the continued ethnic divide in the city. However, the East Mostar
University, despite persistent reports of ethnic discrimination, has
significant ethnic diversity in its student body and staff. The rector
of West Mostar University, Marko Tadic, was forced out of office by the
university board of directors following his efforts to reform the
University, which has been politicized and dominated by Croat
nationalists since the war. Tadic had introduced strict standards for
hiring and retention of faculty, removed photos of Croatian generals
and other nationalist symbols, initiated contact with the Bosniak
University in East Mostar, and proposed a review of the legitimacy of
degrees issued during and immediately following the war.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, authorities imposed
some limits on this right in practice. Opposition political parties
freely staged rallies and campaign events during the April and November
elections in Bosniak-dominated areas, although several parties decided
not to operate in Croat-dominated areas out of concern for their
safety. In the November election campaign, the SDP and other
multiethnic parties increased their campaign activities in the RS;
however, in general few non-Serb opposition parties or candidates
campaigned in the RS (see Section 3).
Refugees returning to visit homes in the RS or commemorate war dead
were harassed and subject to violence in several incidents. On May 11,
several buses carrying 180 Bosniak women to a memorial ceremony to mark
the 8th anniversary of a massacre in the Bratunac area were stoned by
an angry mob of Serbs. At least 10 Bosniak women were slightly injured
by broken glass. RS authorities charged 29 Serbs for disturbing the
peace several days later (see Section 1.c.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and a wide
range of social, cultural, and political organizations functioned
without interference; however, authorities imposed some limits on this
right and indirect pressure constrained the activities of some groups.
Although political party membership was not forced, many viewed
membership in the leading party of any given area as the surest way for
residents to obtain, regain, or keep housing and jobs in the state-
owned sector of the economy (see Section 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, including private and public worship, and in general,
individuals enjoyed this right in predominately mixed and religious
majority areas. However, the efforts of individuals to worship in areas
in which they are an ethnic and religious minority were restricted by
government and institutional harassment, and sometimes by societal
violence. Some incidents resulted in damage to religious edifices and
cemeteries.
Administrative and financial obstacles to rebuilding religious
structures impeded the ability of minorities to worship and even
impeded their return in many areas. RS authorities have obstructed
attempts to rebuild the 83 mosques in the RS that were destroyed during
the war. A June 1999 Human Rights Chamber decision ordering the RS to
swiftly grant the Islamic community the necessary permits for
reconstruction of seven of Banja Luka's destroyed mosques largely has
been ignored. RS authorities refused to issue necessary permits for the
reconstruction of any of the mosques or other Islamic community-owned
buildings in Banja Luka, particularly the symbolically important
Ferhadija Central Mosque. The RS government allowed the Muslim
community to block off the site, but has not yet allowed reconstruction
to begin. In December Ivan Mandic, an HDZ hard-liner and the head of
Mostar Municipality Southwest (MSW) refused to grant permission for
reconstruction of Baba Besir Mosque, one of three mosques in MSW that
were destroyed during the war. Reconstruction of a mosque near Zvornik
began in May, and Islamic leaders declared reconstruction of a mosque
in Kozarac complete in August.
In December the Human Rights Chamber concluded that local
authorities in Bijelina had prevented reconstruction of five mosques
that had been destroyed in 1993 and had allowed buildings to be
constructed on two of the former mosque sites, a parking lot on one,
and flea markets on the remaining two. RS authorities had ignored an
order by the Chamber in 1999 to halt construction on one site. The
Chamber ordered that permits be granted for reconstruction of the five
mosques. No action by the authorities has been taken by year's end.
In February the Human Rights Chamber determined that the municipal
government of Prnjavor, in the RS, had discriminated against its
Islamic community by closing the local Muslim cemetery. The municipal
government had ordered a Bosniak to move his deceased wife's remains
from the Muslim cemetery to a ``new'' Muslim cemetery. At a February
1999 Human Rights Chamber hearing concerning the case, evidence
indicated that there was in fact no new Muslim cemetery in the area and
that no reasonable grounds existed for closing the old Muslim cemetery
(nearby Catholic and Orthodox cemeteries remained open). Prnjavor
municipal authorities were ordered to allow burials within a month. By
the end of the year, Prnjavor authorities had complied with the order
and removed the ban on Muslim burials.
Public schools offer religious education classes, which, in theory,
are optional. However, schools generally do not hire teachers to offer
religious education classes to students of minority religions. In some
cases, children who choose not to attend the religion classes offered
are subject to pressure and discrimination from peers and teachers.
Schools in Sarajevo canton, except for non-Bosniak schools, offer only
Islamic religion classes. In Croat-majority West Mostar, minority
students theoretically have the right to take classes in non-Catholic
religions; however, this option does not exist in practice. Orthodox
symbols are present in public schools throughout the RS. For a variety
of reasons, minority families with children have been slow to return to
the RS. Consequently, municipalities have not been compelled yet to
address the issue of minority religious education. On May 10, the
Education Ministries of both entities and the Deputy Federation
Education Minister agreed on a standard curriculum, which requires all
schools to teach the shared cultural heritage of all three communities.
In Bosniak-dominated Zenica, the Catholic school closed temporarily
in March after school officials received a bomb threat. Although local
authorities later discovered that the threat was a hoax, Zenica's few
remaining Catholics are concerned for their safety. On June 25, an
explosive device destroyed a Catholic chapel in Zivinice.
In Croat-dominated areas of Herzegovina, Muslims feel pressure not
to practice their religion in public and have been the subject of
violent attacks. For example, in the Croat- dominated western Bosnian
town of Glamoc, a building housing all of the local Muslim
organizations and the apartment of a Muslim cleric was bombed and
damaged seriously in April.
In April RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik shared the stage at an
interfaith conference in the RS government's headquarters in Banja Luka
with the newly appointed Mufti of Banja Luka and three other Muslim
clerics. In Mostar religious leaders representing all groups except
Catholics attended celebrations for Muslim, Jewish, and Orthodox
holidays.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for ``the
right to liberty of movement and residence,'' and freedom of movement,
including across the IEBL, continued to improve; however, some limits
remained in practice. The IPTF and SFOR completed the dismantling of
all permanent police checkpoints in 1999, greatly enhancing freedom of
movement.
Freedom of movement improved significantly with the introduction of
universal license plates in 1998. The new plates do not identify the
vehicles as being registered in predominantly Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, or
Bosnian Croat areas.
Accurate statistics on refugee returns remained difficult to
obtain. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
between the end of the war in 1995 and October 31, 364,391 persons who
left the country had returned. More than 174,000 returned from Germany
alone, due to the German Government's policy of actively pressuring
refugees to return to Bosnia. Most of those returning from Europe were
unable to return to their prewar homes in the RS. Efforts by hard-line
Croats to resettle returning refugees and consolidate the results of
ethnic cleansing have ceased for the most part. The UNHCR reported that
during the year there were 67,445 registered minority returns
countrywide. Although the return figures are much less exact for those
returning from other places within the country, the UNHCR reported that
336,504 IDP's returned to their prewar homes between the end of the war
and October, or roughly 20,000 during the year. While different refugee
organizations provide different estimates on the numbers of minority
returns, they all agree that the rate of minority returns during the
year was more than twice that of 1999.
In the spring, the international community began a concerted effort
to compel the entity authorities to implement the property laws.
Pressure from OHR (more than 20 obstructionist officials were dismissed
in late December 1999) and a publicity campaign in the local media
reinforced the message that illegal occupancies could not continue
indefinitely. By the spring, with the pace of evictions growing
rapidly, particularly in the RS, the number of returns also increased.
Families and individuals increasingly abandoned occupied property
voluntarily, with some returning to their heavily damaged or even
destroyed dwellings. Although many of such returnees were Bosniaks,
substantial numbers were Serbs and Croats. According to the UNHCR,
35,836 Bosniaks, 11,591 Croats, and 18,852 Serbs returned to areas
where they are in the minority.
Pressure from evictions, combined with an increased sense of
security in most areas of the country and an awareness that
international assistance was not inexhaustible, prompted an increase in
returns during the first half of the year. By April the rate of return
was three times higher than for the same period in 1999. Although the
pace decreased somewhat over the summer as it became apparent that
reconstruction assistance would not be able to match the number of
returnees, the rate of returns during the year was more than twice that
of 1999. Thousands of returnees lived in tents or improvised shelters
in their former villages and towns, hoping for assistance in rebuilding
their homes.
However, many problems remained to prevent returns, including the
obstruction by hard-liners of implementation of property legislation,
political pressure for individuals to remain displaced in order to
increase ethnic homogeneity of the population in a specific area, and
the lack of an ethnically neutral curriculum in public schools (see
Section 5). For example, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC)
reported that Roma from the RS (most of whom are Muslim) who were
forced out of their homes allegedly have had serious difficulties
returning to their prewar homes. The ERRC reported that Roma have had
to pay financial compensation, ranging from $1,500 to $5,000 (3,000 to
10,000 KM) to Serbs occupying their prewar homes in order to move back.
The ERRC also reported that some Roma's homes are occupied by RS
government bodies.
The 1998 Sarajevo Declaration was intended to showcase Sarajevo as
a model city in terms of tolerance. The declaration was to provide for
improvements in areas that hindered return: Legislation, housing,
security and public order, employment, and education, with a goal of
20,000 minority returns for the canton during 1998. This number of
returns was not reached until February. During the year, with the
implementation of the October 1999 revised property laws, the rate of
evictions in the city increased considerably and the pace of decisions
increased; however, a large backlog of cases remains. Many of those
evicted returned to their destroyed property in the eastern RS, where
some received reconstruction assistance.
During 1998 the Federation army unlawfully took control of 4,000
former Yugoslav military (JNA) apartments that had been abandoned and
repaired by a Dutch company. Prewar residents continue to wait to
return to these apartments, while authorities encouraged occupants to
begin the purchasing process. After inadequate action by local
authorities, several of these cases were brought before the Human
Rights Chamber. No returns to former JNA apartments have taken place.
There have been no reports to indicate progress in resolving this issue
during the period covered by this report.
The continued influence of ethnic separatists in positions of
authority also hindered minority returns. Much of Croat-controlled
Herzegovina and towns in eastern RS remained resistant to minority
returns. IDP's living in those areas, even those who privately
indicated interest in returning to their prewar homes, frequently were
pressured to remain displaced, while those who wished to return were
discouraged, often through the use of violence. In particular, IDP's in
the hard-line RS areas of Bratunac and Srebrenica, mostly from
Sarajevo, were intimidated from attempting to return (see Section
1.c.). For example, in June Serb IDP's living in Kotorsko blocked the
main Sarajevo-Brod highway for several hours after Bosniaks began
returning to the village to clean their property. The Serbs were angry
because they were unable to return to their homes in Vozuca, which
continue to be occupied by Bosniak refugees from Srebrenica. Several
days after the blockade, Bosniaks blocked another portion of the
highway to call attention to Serb harassment and intimidation, which
was obstructing their return to Kotorsko. In mid-July several hundred
Bosniaks blocked a main road near Maglaj, in central Bosnia, to protest
the impending eviction of Muslim fundamentalist families occupying Serb
property in the village of Bocinja. The blockade lasted for several
days. However, within weeks of the end of the blockade, authorities
began evicting Muslim families from Bocinja without incident.
Despite these obstacles, ethnic minority refugees and IDP's began
returning to their destroyed villages in increasing numbers in some
areas of Herzegovina and the eastern RS. For example, in the spring
Bosniaks began returning to Zepa, the outskirts of Foca, and even
villages near Visegrad. In the summer, several Bosniaks returned to
Srebrenica town, and dozens more returned to several outlying villages.
Elsewhere in the RS, Bosniaks began returning to the center of Prijedor
and Doboj. Serb returns accelerated in the Capljina area of
Herzegovina. However, local government officials continue to obstruct
minority returns to Drvar and to harass Serb returnees.
Government leaders in both the RS and the Federation often have
used a variety of tactics, including public statements, to inhibit the
return of IDP's (see Section 1.c.).
The increased number of ethnically integrated police forces helped
improve the climate for returns, although security remained inadequate
in some areas.
The continued depressed state of the economy throughout the country
and the consequent lack of employment opportunities for returnees
remained a serious obstacle to a significant number of returns. As a
result, most minority returnees were elderly. This placed a burden on
receiving municipalities. Younger minority group members, who depend on
adequate wages to support families, generally remained displaced,
especially in cases in which they had managed over the past 7 years to
find work.
Officially, the Government grants asylum and refugee status in
accordance with international standards. The Government generally
cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. During the year, approximately 3,000 refugees from
the Kosovo conflict continued to reside in refugee camps in Bosnia.
Some are planning to return to Kosovo, with some seeking asylum abroad.
Approximately 5,000 to 10,000 Serbs who fled Kosovo or Serbia during
the Kosovo confrontation are believed to be in the RS in private
accommodation. Less than 1,000 Sandzaks are believed to still reside in
private homes. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
a place where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Although a permanent election law is not yet in place, the Dayton
Accords commit the parties to ``ensure that conditions exist for the
organization of free and fair elections, in particular a politically
neutral environment'' and to ensure the right to ``vote in secret
without fear or intimidation.'' The Dayton Peace Accords gave the OSCE
primary responsibility for the organization and supervision of the
country's post-war elections. The OSCE organized and supervised general
elections in 1996, 1998, and November; municipal elections in 1997 and
April; and special elections for the RS National Assembly in 1997. The
OSCE released a draft of the election law in December 1999 that would
transfer responsibilities for running elections to the Government, but
it has not been adopted yet by the Parliament.
In July President Alija Izetbegovic announced that he would resign
from the three-person Bosnian presidency in October. Because the
Bosnian Constitution did not specify the succession procedure, the
parliamentary assembly adopted a controversial law establishing a
procedure that gave final decision to the indirectly elected House of
Peoples over the House of Representatives. Wolfgang Petritsch, the High
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, imposed an amendment to
rectify this shortcoming. The Bosniak speaker of the Parliament, Halid
Genjac, was named to serve as Izetbegovic's temporary replacement. At
year's end, a permanent replacement had not been elected.
The November general elections were held without violence, although
there were incidents of voter intimidation, multiple voting, and
illegal preelection campaigning. The OSCE issued 28 decisions
sanctioning or censuring parties or individuals for violations of
election rules, ranging from slogans fostering ethnic hatred to
obstructing audits of party financing. While most voting irregularities
were not significant enough to influence the outcome, an HDZ-organized
referendum held on election day provided a platform for nationalist
rhetoric that likely increased support for nationalist parties,
particularly among Croat and Bosniak voters. Voter turnout during the
April and November elections was around 65 percent. Compared with
previous years, there was a large decrease in the number of absentee
ballots during both elections; however, such a decrease most likely was
a result of refugee returns to Bosnia and a lower level of interest
among voters abroad. By the end of the year, the process of
implementing results of the November general elections was still
underway.
Municipal elections held in April largely were peaceful; however,
several incidents, some violent, occurred. Two incidents were directed
against the international community, while others resulted from
conflict between political parties within ethnic groups. A Bosnian Serb
male, acting alone, attacked an IPTF member with a stick near a polling
place in Bijeljina in the RS. The OSCE reported that there were no
major attempts at fraud, manipulation, or disruption of the election
process, but observers noted widespread problems with incomplete voting
lists that discouraged or prevented some citizens from voting. While
nationalist parties in Serb- and Croat-dominated areas continued to
attract the support of a significant portion of the electorate, the
moderate, multiethnic parties, such as the SDP, gained strength. A
number of electoral reforms that are contained in the draft election
law, including provisions for preferential and open list voting,
multimember constituencies, and new campaign finance regulations, were
applied during the April municipal elections.
Implementation of the results of the April municipal elections was
smoother than in 1997, according to the OSCE. A greater familiarity
with the laws at the local level improved the process, although 5
months after the elections, 20 of the 146 municipalities had still not
completely implemented the results. The OSCE screening of candidates to
eliminate those candidates who illegally occupied refugee homes, held
conflicting positions, or who previously had been removed from office
by the High Representative, partially contributed to the delay.
Obstructionism caused delays in some municipalities, such as in Vares,
where the SDA repeatedly nominated unacceptable candidates who were
rejected by the OSCE.
Continued party control of the media and security apparatus
precluded full citizen participation without intimidation, especially
in Bosnian Croat areas and parts of the RS. To varying degrees, all
major parties attempted to exclude other parties in areas they control.
This was especially true in areas controlled by the SDS or the HDZ.
However, observers believe that recent changes to the media law in the
RS and the new media law in the Federation have improved the situation
somewhat (see Section 2.a.).
A democratically elected, multiethnic local government is to
administer the Brcko municipality as a district under the direct
oversight of the Brcko supervisor. Until new laws are issued or
existing laws adapted, the supervisor retains discretion as to which
laws, Federation or RS, are to apply in Brcko. A new district statute
was issued by the supervisor on December 7 1999, and a districtwide
multiethnic police force was established officially in January.
Women generally are underrepresented in government and politics,
although a few women, such as the former President of the RS, have
occupied prominent positions. In the three legislatures, women were
underrepresented seriously. To address this concern, election rules
established by the OSCE prior to the 1998 general elections required
parties to include no fewer than 3 members of each gender among the top
10 names on their candidate lists. However, in the state-level House of
Representatives (lower house), 2 of 42 deputies are women, compared
with 12 before the November elections. There were no women in the
state-level House of Peoples (upper house), whose representatives are
appointed by the entity legislatures, prior to the November elections;
the current upper house still was being formed by year's end. In the
Federation legislature, 21 of 140 deputies in the House of
Representatives are women. In the RS unicameral legislature, 15 of 83
deputies are women, compared with 19 before the most recent elections.
During the April municipal elections, the Provisional Election
Commission mandated that one in every three candidates be a woman. 590
women were elected, constituting 18 percent of successful candidates.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The authorities generally permitted outside investigations of
alleged human rights violations. International and local NGO's involved
in human rights appear to operate with relative freedom. The OHR
reports that foreign government and NGO human rights monitors were able
to travel without restriction in all areas of the country.
International community representatives were given widespread and for
the most part unhindered access to detention facilities and prisoners
in the RS as well as in the Federation.
While monitors enjoyed relative freedom to investigate human rights
abuses, they rarely were successful in persuading the authorities in
all regions to respond to their recommendations. Monitors'
interventions often met with delays or outright refusal.
The caseload of the Human Rights Chamber and the Office of Human
Rights Ombudsperson, two institutions created under Annex 6 of the
Dayton Accords to investigate and adjudicate human rights violations,
continued to expand during the year. During the first 11 months of the
year, the Chamber's caseload increased to 6,353 registered cases and
the Chamber issued 632 final case decisions. The pace of decisions
issued by the Chamber increased due to the body of jurisprudence that
the Chamber established in its previous 3 years of existence and to
which the Chamber is now able to refer. In addition, the Chamber's
increased experience in adjudicating human rights cases has led to more
efficient operation. While governmental cooperation with the Chamber is
still weak, the Federation made progress in implementing Chamber
decisions, including many occupancy-rights cases and compensation-
awards cases. While the efforts by the Federation to implement Chamber
decisions have generally brought it into compliance with almost all
decisions, the RS has made minimal or no effort to implement decisions
of the Chamber. The cases implemented in the RS so far have required
relatively simple actions by the Government, such as canceling eviction
orders for residents who still were living in contested houses. In
February the RS National Assembly passed a law establishing an
ombudsperson committee for the RS, a three-person, multiethnic
institution; the first three Ombudspersons were appointed at the end of
April.
Cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague is a key factor in the
implementation of the Dayton Accords and the establishment of respect
for human rights. In 1998 RS Prime Minister Dodik altered the RS policy
of defiance of the Tribunal and the Dayton Accords by instructing his
officials to cooperate with the ICTY; however, no action was taken in
practice. A majority of the 26 ICTY public indictees who remain at
large reportedly live in the RS, some allegedly in Prijedor and Foca.
RS authorities made no effort to arrest these indictees.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The parties agreed in the Dayton Accords to reject discrimination
on such grounds as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, or association with a
national minority. Nevertheless, there were many cases of
discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Credible NGO observers
reported that violence against women, including spousal abuse and rape,
remained widespread and underreported. A report by the International
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights estimates that about 30 percent of
women in the country are victims of domestic violence; however, there
is little data available regarding the extent of the problem.
Throughout the country, rape and violent abuse are considered criminal
offenses. The laws prohibit rape in both the Federation and the RS.
Spousal rape and spousal abuse are also illegal in the Federation.
However, domestic violence usually was not reported to the authorities;
a sense of shame reportedly prevents some victims of rape from coming
forward to complain to authorities.
The police have little or no training in investigating cases of
domestic violence, and there were reports of police inaction in cases
of domestic violence and sexual assault. According to human rights
groups, in one case, a police officer from Zvornik was accused of
raping two teenage girls. The father reported the incident to the local
police station, but the officers on duty did not record the complaint.
When the police finally interviewed the victims, the accused officer
was allowed to be present in the room. The IPTF has requested an
independent investigation. The OHR reported that in one case, police
answering a call about domestic abuse noticed injuries on the woman and
her minor daughter, but offered only to take them to the hospital. The
woman, who had previously reported other incidents of abuse to the
police, later committed suicide. In Canton 4, a police officer hung up
on a midnight call from a daughter calling for help when her father
threatened her mother with a knife. No record of the complaint was
made. The IPTF has called for an investigation and for disciplinary
action against the duty officer.
Trafficking in women from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union for the purpose of forced prostitution is a serious and growing
problem (see Section 6.f.).
It is illegal to run a brothel, but local police primarily arrest
women engaged in prostitution rather than procurers or those managing
the brothels. As a result, women who have been coerced or forced into
prostitution have little recourse (see Section 6.f.).
There is little legal discrimination against women, and women serve
as judges, doctors, and professors; however, a male-dominated society
prevails in both entities, particularly in rural areas, with few women
in positions of real economic power or political power.
Women have been discriminated against in the workplace in favor of
demobilized soldiers, and a small but increasing number of gender-
related discrimination cases have been documented. Anecdotal accounts
indicate that women and men receive equal pay at socially owned
enterprises but not necessarily at private businesses. Women are
entitled to 12 months' maternity leave and may be required to work no
more than 4 hours per day until a child is 3 years old. However, women
in all parts of the country encounter problems with regard to the
nonpayment of maternity leave allowances and the unwarranted dismissal
of pregnant women and new mothers. A woman with underage children may
not be required to perform shift work.
Children.--The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child is
incorporated by reference in the Dayton Accords and has the effect of
law in both entities. The end of the fighting brought a major
improvement in the human rights of children. During the war nearly
17,000 children were killed, 35,000 were wounded, and over 1,800 were
permanently disabled.
Social services for children are in extremely short supply.
Disabled children lack sufficient medical care and educational
opportunities. Education is free and is compulsory through the age of
15 in both the Federation and the RS. The most serious issue is the
ethnic division of the education system. Students in minority areas
frequently face a hostile environment in schools that do not provide an
ethnically neutral setting. At times minority children are barred from
attending school at all. Local education officials excuse such abuses
by claiming that minority children should have their own schools and
curricula. Obstruction by politicians and government officials has
slowed international efforts to remove discriminatory material from
textbooks and enact other needed reforms.
Steps were taken during the year to integrate minority students
into some schools. In May approximately 85 Bosniak children who had
been attending home schools in Stolac were integrated into the Stolac
Elementary School, which previously had taught only Croat children.
Similar integration took place in Vares. However, segregation and
discrimination are entrenched in Bosnian schools, particularly in
religious education (see Section 2.c.). For example, in Sarajevo only
Muslim religion classes were offered in public schools, which denied
children of other faiths the opportunity to study their own religious
traditions in school. In August Romani refugees from Kosovo protested
the local authorities' decision that Romani children from the
Smrekovica refugee center in Breza could not attend the local primary
school. Although the UNHCR had arranged for 60 Romani children from the
camp to enroll in a local primary school, the mayor intervened to
prevent the children from enrolling, allegedly because of a lack of
space at the school. In a compromise, two rooms in the camp were
converted into classrooms; however, at year's end the children still
were barred from the local school.
There was no societal pattern of abuse against children.
Nonetheless, they continue to suffer disproportionately from the
societal stress of the postwar era. There have been credible but
unconfirmed reports that children are trafficked to work in begging
rings (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). Trafficking in girls for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The Federation Government is required by
law to assist disabled persons to find employment and to protect them
against discrimination. In the RS, discrimination against the disabled
also is prohibited by law. Currently there are few jobs available, and
thousands of newly disabled victims entered the job market after the
war. The Government has limited resources to address the special needs
of the disabled. There are no legal provisions mandating that buildings
be made accessible to the physically disabled. There are a number of
international NGO's that assist the disabled in the country.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are identified
closely in the country. The Interreligious Council, established in 1997
and composed of the main leaders of the country's four major religious
communities--Muslim, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Jewish--
continued its efforts to promote national reconciliation. The OSCE and
the OHR facilitated many interfaith meetings at the local level as
well.
However, throughout the country, religious minorities were
pressured and were intimidated by the ethnic/religious majority.
On June 25, a Catholic chapel in Zivinice in the RS reportedly was
destroyed by an explosive device. Also in June, unknown persons broke
into the home of a Catholic priest in Derventa parish.
RS authorities continue to impede the rebuilding of the mosques in
the RS destroyed during the war, despite requests from the Muslim
community for reconstruction (see Section 2.c.). Religious minorities
throughout the country occasionally faced limited interference from the
authorities in their right to worship freely. However, Catholic priests
reported that they were able to conduct masses in the RS with little or
no problems.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Claimed ``ethnic differences''
were used to justify the war and remain a powerful political force in
the country. Although some politicians still support the concepts of a
``Greater Serbia'' and a ``Greater Croatia,'' mixed communities exist
peacefully in a growing number of areas, including Sarajevo and Tuzla.
The SDS, HDZ, and to a lesser extent the primarily Bosniak SDA sought
to manipulate the movement of persons and the access to housing and
social services that they control to ensure that the ethnic groups with
which they are associated consolidate their position in their
respective geographic regions. Some hard-line local authorities in the
eastern RS sought to keep information regarding the right to return and
conditions in return sites from reaching displaced persons in their
areas, so as to dissuade them from attempting to return to their former
homes.
In 1998 the RS passed new property legislation establishing a
claims process at the municipal level. The High Representative extended
the deadline to file claims on socially-owned apartments until April
19. In addition in October 1999, the OHR issued a series of decrees
amending a number of property laws in both entities to provide all
citizens just and equal protection of their property rights, which is
considered essential in order for IDP's to return to their former
homes.
Despite hopeful signs in some areas, harassment and discrimination
against minorities continued throughout the country, often centering on
property disputes. These problems included desecration of graves,
arson, damage to houses of worship, throwing explosive devices into
residential areas, harassment, dismissal from work, threats, assaults,
and, in some cases, killings (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
On April 11, a group of Bosniaks attacked five Romani men in
Banovici, reportedly because the Bosniaks believed the Roma had voted
for a nonnationalist political party in the municipal elections.
Amnesty International reported that local police present at the scene
made no effort to protect the Roma.
Ethnic tensions remained high in Brcko. In mid-October, about 1,000
Bosnian Serb students staged violent protests for 3 days to demand
separate schools from those of Muslims and Croats. The protests began
after a group of Bosnian Serb students beat a Bosniak student; after
the beating, Bosniak students demanded better security and Serb
students began calling for separate schools. Currently, Serb and
Bosniak students share high school buildings but attend classes in two
shifts.
Bosnian Serb and Croat politicians seek to increase the ethnic
homogeneity of the population in areas they control by discouraging
IDP's of their own ethnicity from returning to their prewar homes if
they would be in the minority there. Hard-liners also encourage members
of their groups currently living in areas where they are minorities to
move to areas where their ethnic group is the majority. Hard-line
Bosnian Croats continued to discourage some Croat returns to central
Bosnia and actively have recruited displaced Croats to resettle in
Herzegovina; however, this intimidation has decreased and 4,147 Croats
returned to Central Bosnia Cantons during the year. Although the new RS
Government officially supports the right to return, it continues to
obstruct returns on many levels. Bosniak authorities appear tacitly to
support some Bosniak resettlement efforts, including resettlement of
returnees, in ``strategic'' areas of the Federation where Bosniaks are
in the minority.
In some cases, opponents of refugee returns used violence,
including sporadic house burnings, and orchestrated demonstrations in
an effort to intimidate returnees. In mid-December in the RS, the house
of a Bosnian Croat returnee from Croatia was stoned by hard-line Croats
opposed to his return. While incidents of violence have decreased due
to improved security and freedom of movement, other forms of
discrimination have not. In particular discrimination in employment and
education are now key obstacles to sustainable returns. Widespread
firing of ethnic minorities during and after the war has not been
reversed in most cases, and members of the ethnic majority in a region
often are hired over former employees who are minorities. Favoritism is
also shown to veterans and families of those killed during the war.
There recently have been more reported cases of employment
discrimination based on political affiliation.
Vague provisions in the labor law passed in the Federation in
October 1999 allowed employers to create barriers for minorities
seeking to regain employment. Amendments passed in August clarified the
law; however, the authorities did not enforce it consistently and
discrimination persists. There were no provisions in RS law to prevent
discrimination in hiring and firing outside the Constitution until
passage of a labor law in September. Several court cases regarding
discrimination are pending; however, workers seldom obtained protection
from the courts, which barely function.
Throughout the country, membership in the political party
affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest method to
obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of
socially owned enterprises. Membership also was influential in
obtaining or keeping housing (see Section 2.b.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitutions of the Federation
and the RS provide for the right of workers to form and join unions, as
do recently passed labor laws in both entities. There are no legal
restrictions on who may join unions, and the right of minority workers
to join unions is protected in both entities. However, in practice
union membership in the RS is overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb and in the
Federation overwhelmingly Bosniak. Bosnian Croats have informal labor
organizations in areas where they are the dominant ethnic group, but
generally are represented by the Federation union. A joint-entity union
has been established in the district of Brcko. Union membership is
mandatory for officially employed workers in the RS; in the Federation,
approximately 70 percent of the official workforce is unionized.
Unions legally are independent of the Government and political
parties, but are highly politicized. There are no legal restrictions on
forming new unions; however, in practice one union confederation in
each entity represents all workers. A new confederation of trade unions
tried to register with the Federation, but was unsuccessful due to
political interference by the established confederation. In the RS, the
sector-based branches of the union confederation have become
increasingly independent, and one branch successfully has broken off
from the umbrella organization.
Unions have the right to strike and increasingly have used that
right to pressure for payment of overdue salaries or wages, protest or
demand changes in management, and voice their opinion on economic
reform and government policy. Indeed, protest is often the only way to
compel the payment of salaries or wages. Most strikes are legal;
however, the Government claimed that some were illegal (on the grounds
that they were not announced far enough in advance, or 48 hours) in an
attempt to avoid negotiations. A Law on Strikes governs strike activity
in both entities, and retaliation against strikers is prohibited. There
were several major strikes, including those by teachers and health care
workers, due to arrears in salaries of several months or more.
The Government was found to be in violation of ILO Convention 111
(on employment discrimination) and 158 (on termination of employment)
in November 1999 because of its failure to act in the case of workers
at Aluminj Mostar who were dismissed because of their non-Croat
ethnicity during the war. Aluminj Mostar has protested the ILO ruling,
arguing that it did not have the opportunity to respond to the union
complaint.
Both the Federation and RS passed comprehensive labor legislation
in August and September as part of loan conditions established by the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This legislation brings
the legal code in line with most international standards; however,
implementing provisions were not in place by year's end.
Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and
affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is provided for in the Law on Working Relations in the RS
and in a comprehensive collective agreement in the Federation; however,
collective bargaining rarely is used. The substantial number of
government employees, particularly in the RS, permits the Government to
remain highly influential in determining the overall level of wages in
each entity.
The Law on Labor in both entities prohibits discrimination by
employers against union members and organizers, in accordance with ILO
standards. However, discrimination continues (see Section 5).
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children; however, women and girls were trafficked for the purpose of
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f). The country is a major transit
point for illegal immigrants; the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) confirmed one case of a man being trafficked for forced
labor and held against his will (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children in the
Federation and in the RS is 15 years. The law on labor prohibits
children from performing hazardous work, such as night work. Child
labor is not known to be a problem; however, children sometimes assist
their families with farm work and odd jobs. Children are covered under
the Constitution's prohibition against forced or compulsory labor, and
such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.). There have
been credible but unconfirmed reports that children are trafficked to
work in begging rings (see Section 6.f.). Trafficking in girls for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage in the
Federation is $100 (200 KM); in the RS it is $32 (65 KM). The minimum
wage was insufficient to provide for a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Many workers have outstanding claims for payment of
salaries and pensions.
The legal workweek is 40 hours, and overtime pay is required by
law; however, ``seasonal'' workers may work up to 60 hours per week.
Rest and vacation rules exceed international standards. For example,
women are allowed 1 year of maternity leave.
Occupational safety and health regulations generally are ignored
because of the demands and constraints imposed by an economy devastated
by war. Neither entity has completed passage of new laws to enforce
international worker rights standards. Workers cannot remove themselves
from hazardous working conditions without endangering their continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a serious and growing problem. The
country is mainly a destination point, and to a lesser extent an origin
and transit point, for women and girls who are trafficked for the
purpose of forced prostitution. Most victims are from Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. A significant number of women are
manipulated or coerced into situations in which they work in brothels
in conditions close to slavery. The country is extremely vulnerable to
trafficking in persons, because of weak laws, almost nonexistent border
controls, and corrupt police who are bribed easily. As many as 5,000
trafficked women may be working in the country. Previous estimates of
the problem by the Office of the U. N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) were overinflated due to unavailability of hard
statistics; however, credible sources report that the problem is
growing. From March 1999 to January 2001, there were 384 confirmed
cases of women trafficked for sexual exploitation; 236 women were
returned to their home countries. The IPTF reports that they have
encountered approximately 4,000 women in their raids of bars and
estimate that 10 percent of the women have been trafficked. The IOM
confirmed two cases of Bosnian women who were trafficked to other
countries. Organized crime elements control the trafficking business.
The majority of trafficked women in Bosnia come from Moldova,
Romania, and Ukraine, but also come from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Bulgaria. The ages of the trafficked women averaged 22.8 years,
ranging between 16 and 33 years of age. Less than 5 percent of the
women were minors. Many of these women were lured by the promise of
well-paying jobs abroad, and came in hope of improving their
socioeconomic situation. Many women responded to advertisements that
offered work in Italy or Germany as dancers, waitresses, and domestic
servants. Most of the trafficked women cross through Yugoslavia or
Hungary before entering the country. Many of them are sold in Belgrade,
and from there are smuggled across the Drina river at Zvornik and
Bijeljina into the country. Some traffickers brought in the women and
girls specifically to work in the country's brothels. For a variety of
reasons, traffickers stranded or abandoned some women en route to other
countries. Some women are trafficked to Croatia to work as prostitutes
there or to be trafficked to other countries. Trafficked women often
are sold several times between different bar owners after arriving in
Bosnia. Prices vary between $500 and $1,500 (1,000 to 3,000 KM) per
woman, and the women often are expected to repay their ``owners'' this
amount out of their allotted share of the earnings. There have been
reports of trafficked women being physically and sexually assaulted,
denied food, and threatened. A significant proportion of the
traffickers is female.
There have been credible but unconfirmed reports that children
(boys and girls) are trafficked to work in begging rings, mainly in
Sarajevo (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
It is illegal to run a brothel, but local police arrest primarily
women engaged in prostitution rather than procurers or those managing
the brothels. As a result, women who have been coerced or forced into
prostitution have little recourse. Authorities generally treat
prostitution as a minor violation committed by the woman involved;
however, the police do not charge employers or customers with any
crimes. In most cases, the police do not conduct thorough
investigations against the bar owners and others involved in the
recruitment, transportation, and movement of such women, and
prosecutions of those involved are rare. Women convicted of
prostitution may be fined, imprisoned for 60 days, or deported. In the
fall of 1999, the OHR issued directives governing police raids on
brothels to ensure that trafficked women were provided assistance.
While these directives reportedly have been followed, raids are
infrequent. The country's deportation laws permit local police to
release trafficked individuals in neighboring jurisdictions or across
the border in Croatia. Police in Bihac, Gradacac, and Tuzla have broken
up trafficking rings in recent years and deported the women. It is
estimated that there are some 300 to 600 brothels in the country.
Brothel operators reportedly earn $50 (100 KM) per hour per woman; in
some cases women forced to work in brothels reportedly receive as
little as $13 (25 KM) per month for personal expenses and are forced to
find other money (often through begging) for essentials, including
condoms. Other prostitutes reportedly earn $100 (200 KM) per month.
Police in the Federation and the RS arrested and deported Russian and
Ukrainian women working as prostitutes.
Police officials in Brcko have been removed from office for
involvement in prostitution, and there are allegations that police
officers in other cities also may be involved. A May report by UNMBIH
and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
documented evidence of complicity by local police, international
police, or SFOR in 14 out of 40 cases that it investigated between
March 1999 and March 2000. In one case, an SFOR civilian paid $3,057
(7,000 KM) to purchase two women from a brothel owner. On the basis of
his misconduct, the man was relieved of his duties and barred from the
SFOR area of operations; he left the country and no further action was
taken.
In many cases women are afraid to testify against their traffickers
and the judicial system offers them little protection. There are no
witness protection programs for women who testify against their
traffickers. There have been confirmed reports of witnesses being
threatened in court despite the presence of local police and
international representatives. Local officials have been slow to bring
charges of intimidation.
The country is also a major transit point for illegal immigrants,
and the IOM confirmed one case of a man being trafficked for forced
labor and held against his will (see Section 6.c.).
The Government has done very little to combat the problem of
trafficking. However, the IOM and several NGO's, both local and
foreign, are addressing the issue. The IOM has established a program to
repatriate trafficked women who seek to return home. As of November,
nearly 160 women had been repatriated through IOM's program. There are
a number of shelters that house trafficked women while they await
return to their countries of origin.
The IPTF works with local police forces to free trafficked persons
and to crack down on traffickers. However, there have been very few
arrests to date. On October 30, Sarajevo Interior Ministry officers
raided a nightclub and arrested 3 persons allegedly involved in
trafficking the 17 women who were found there.
__________
BULGARIA
Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a democratically
elected government. President Petar Stoyanov of the Union of Democratic
Forces (UDF) began a 5-year term of office in January 1997 following
his election in late 1996. UDF leader Ivan Kostov currently serves as
Prime Minister. The judiciary is independent but suffers from
corruption and continues to struggle with structural and staffing
problems.
Internal security services are the responsibility of the Ministry
of the Interior and include the National Police, the National Service
for Combating Organized Crime, the National Security Service (civilian
domestic intelligence), the National Gendarmery Service (paramilitary
police), and the Border Police. Although government control over the
police is improving, it still is not sufficient to ensure full
accountability. The Special Investigative Service (SIS), which provides
investigative support to prosecutors on serious criminal cases, is a
judicial branch agency and therefore not under direct government
control. Some members of the police committed serious human rights
abuses.
The country is in transition from an economy dominated by loss-
making state enterprises, concentrated in heavy industry, to one
dominated by the private sector. Around 80 percent of state assets
destined for privatization--including enterprises in the chemicals,
petroleum processing, and metallurgy sectors--have already been sold in
a process that featured uneven degrees of transparency. Principal
exports are agricultural products, tobacco products, chemicals and
metals, although light industry--including textiles and apparel--is
growing in importance. The private sector accounts for approximately 60
percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Following a severe economic
and political crisis in early 1997, a reformist government introduced a
macroeconomic stabilization program based on a currency board. The
program succeeded in bringing down inflation from triple digits in
1996-97 to only 6.2 percent in 1999. The economy grew by 3.5 and 2.4
percent in 1998 and 1999, and the Government forecasts more robust
growth over the next several years. Between 4 and 5 percent growth was
forecast for the year. The annual per capita GDP of $1,600 provides a
relatively low standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, several serious problems remained in some areas,
while there were improvements in a few others. The authorities were
responsible for extrajudicial killings; police were responsible for the
deaths of at least five persons during the year, and a Bulgarian
military officer was accused of responsibility for the death of a
conscript recruit. Security forces beat suspects and inmates and often
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Problems of accountability
persist and inhibit government attempts to end police abuses.
Conditions in many prisons and detention facilities were harsh, and
there remained some instances of prolonged pretrial detention, although
the Government has noticeably improved its performance in preventing
defendants' period of pre-trial detention from exceeding the statutory
limit (normally 1 year). The judiciary is underpaid, understaffed, and
has a heavy case backlog; corruption is a serious problem. The
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. There were no reports
of police abuse of journalists, although there were several unexplained
incidents of violence against journalists by unknown parties.
Constitutional restrictions on political parties formed on ethnic,
racial, or religious lines effectively limit participation for some
groups. Police, local government authorities, and private citizens
continued to obstruct the activities of some nontraditional religious
groups. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious
problems. Discrimination and societal violence against Roma were
serious problems, resulting in one death. Because of a lack of funds,
the social service system did not assist homeless and other vulnerable
children adequately, notably Romani children. Security forces harassed,
physically abused, and arbitrarily arrested and detained Romani street
children. Child labor was a problem. Trafficking in women and girls was
a serious problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, law enforcement or military
personnel killed at least six persons, of which one was a member of the
Roma ethnic minority.
The Ministry of Interior Act regarding the use of firearms by law
enforcement officials permits them to use firearms to apprehend persons
committing crimes or who have committed crimes, even if the crimes are
only minor. Law enforcement officers also may use firearms to stop the
escape of a person who has been arrested for any crime.
On March 4, a police officer shot and killed Boyan Yovchev in
Varna. The police officer was indicted by the military prosecutor for
negligent homicide, which carries a maximum penalty of 5 years
imprisonment. The defendant reached a plea bargain agreement, received
a 2-year suspended sentence, and was fired from the police force.
On June 14, Miroslav Marinov died in the hospital from injuries
sustained while in police custody in Vratsa. Marinov had been released
from police custody shortly before his death, and reportedly told
family and friends before he died that he had been beaten severely by
police. A police inquiry in response to the complaint concluded that
there was no evidence that police officers were responsible for
Marinov's death; no charges were filed.
On July 5, Trycho Lyubomirov, a 19-year-old Roma man suspected by
police of car theft, was shot and killed by police in Sofia, reputedly
while attempting to flee police custody. Witnesses alleged that
Lyubomirov was in handcuffs at the time that he was shot, according to
human rights monitors. A police officer involved in the incident was
charged by the military prosecutor with negligent use of a firearm,
which carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment. The case was
awaiting trial at year's end.
On August 5, Emil Arnudov of Asenovgrad was beaten severely by two
on-duty policemen after he allegedly caused a disturbance in a bar. He
died of his injuries on August 15. One policeman was charged with
homicide by the military prosecutor as a result of the incident, and
remains in custody pending trial. The second policeman was cleared of
responsibility. The regional police chief received a reprimand.
On November 17, Rebin Yumer Mohamed, a 16-year-old Iraqi national
of Kurdish heritage, was shot and killed by border police in an attempt
to illegally cross the border into Bulgaria. Authorities stated that
the boy was hit by a stray bullet, after a border patrol officer fired
warning shots into the air. Mohamed was 1 of approximately 100 Kurdish
refugees who were apprehended attempting the crossing. The shooting was
ruled justifiable by the military prosecutor.
On November 21, Dimitur Dimitrov, a conscript soldier, died of
asphyxiation while running laps while wearing a gas mask. He reportedly
had been ordered to do this by his commanding officer as punishment for
tardiness. An investigation into the incident was pending at year's
end.
On July 28, Dimitrichka Marinova, a 41-year-old Roma woman, was
shot and killed by a private security guard in the town of Dolni
Chiflik, while trespassing in an apricot orchard. Police initially
reported the shooting as accidental. The guard was later convicted and
received a 2-year suspended sentence in a plea bargain agreement.
The case of the 1999 killing of Gancho Vuchkov was closed without
an indictment. There were no developments in the 1999 killing of Tancho
Vasev. There were no developments in the investigation of the death of
Kostadin Sherbetov, who died in police custody in 1999.
The police officer sentenced in the 1998 killing of Yordan Yankov
had his prison sentence reduced on appeal to a suspended sentence. The
monetary damage penalty was allowed to stand. There were no
developments in the 1998 killing of Tsvetan Kovatchev.
Two police officers involved in the 1997 beating death of Mincho
Surtmachev each had their sentences reduced on appeal. One was
acquitted and released by the court, while the second received a 4-year
sentence, of which he served 2 1/2 years and then was released. The
court confirmed the monetary damage award to the victim's family of
approximately $3500 (7000 leva). These cases are now closed.
Two suspects are known to remain under active investigation for the
1996 murder of former Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov. Police arrested
one man suspected of being the killer, who remains in police custody
while the case is being investigated. Angel Vasiliev, who is suspected
of ordering the murder, has been released from police custody after
spending 1 year in jail, but reportedly remains under investigation.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, despite this prohibition,
police commonly beat criminal suspects and members of minorities, at
times to extract false testimony. In particular security forces
physically abused street children, the majority of whom are Roma.
Police are allowed to shoot any fleeing criminal suspect. On
January 11, police shot and seriously injured Stefan Yordanov, a Romani
man, in Burgas District. A nongovernmental organization (NGO) filed a
complaint with the Regional Military Prosecution of Sliven; however,
the Sliven prosecutor refused to open an investigation.
On April 29, according to unconfirmed NGO reports, a 16-year-old
Rom, Tsvetalin Petrov, suffered third-degree burns after allegedly
being doused with an inflammable liquid and set on fire while in
custody in the Vidin police station. Petrov had been arrested for
breaking and entering and theft near Vidin. Police claimed Petrov was
set on fire by an unknown perpetrator. An investigation is pending with
the military prosecutor's office.
On May 10, Atanas Dzhambazov, a 14-year-old Roma, was shot and
wounded in the head and arm by a policeman while trespassing on the
grounds of a factory near Sliven. Dzhambazov was taken to the hospital
by relatives after allegedly being left at the scene by the police
officer. An August 20 decision by the Sliven Military Court found the
policeman, Surchanoy, guilty of negligence and imposed a fine of about
$250 (500 leva). A civil lawsuit was pending at year's end.
On August 6, an NGO reported that police officers severely beat
Orhan Ahmedov and Marin Georgiev, two Romani men from Varbitsa. Ahmedov
and Georgiev filed a complaint at the Sliven Regional Police
Department. The next day the two men obtained medical certificates
documenting their injuries and filed a complaint with the Regional
Military Prosecutor's Office of Sliven. In August the Military
Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal investigation; the case remained
pending at year's end.
There were no reports of police abuse of journalists; however,
there were several unexplained instances of violence against
journalists by unknown persons (see Section 2.a.).
According to Ministry of Interior (MOI) data, 20 cases of police
brutality were confirmed for the period January 1 to June 30, out of a
total of 179 complaints of police brutality filed. The police generally
have refused to make investigative reports available to the public. The
MOI statistics reflect only those complaints registered by the alleged
victims. Human rights monitors report that they receive many more
complaints from persons who are too intimidated to lodge an official
complaint with the authorities.
Reports continue that criminal suspects in police custody run a
significant risk of being mistreated, most often during the initial
interrogation. The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) conducted a
survey in prisons of incarcerated persons arrested after January 1 and
found that 49 percent (compared with 51 percent in 1999) of interviewed
prisoners reported that police officers used physical force against
them during arrest; 44 percent (compared with 53 percent in 1999)
reported mistreatment at police stations. Romani prisoners reported
being abused more frequently than other prisoners. Very seldom are
allegations of police abuse properly investigated nor are the offending
officers consistently punished. In particular the Military Prosecutor's
office has not investigated incidents of alleged police abuse
thoroughly or expeditiously.
Crime and corruption remained primary concerns of the Government
during the year. It is too early to judge the long-term effects of
changes in the Criminal Procedure Code, which became effective on
January 1. These changes reduced the size of the SIS while reserving to
it the responsibility for handling the most serious crimes. At the same
time, many investigative duties were devolved to the police and the
Government made a significant effort to provide training in
investigative techniques to police officers. The criminal justice
system is still in transition and questions about its effectiveness
remain: It is not always clear exactly what duties the SIS has in fact
retained, and there is little evidence that devolution of powers to
police yet has resulted in increased numbers of completed
investigations.
Observers have noted modest improvement in the efficiency of moving
cases through the criminal system, although many serious systemic flaws
remain. The police struggled without result over the difficult issue of
how to resolve a large backlog of outstanding investigation cases, some
as much as 10 years old, which they inherited from the former pre-
reorganization investigative service.
There were several incidents of violence and harassment by private
citizens of Roma during the year (see Section 5).
Many observers allege that some members of the police, particularly
in remote areas, are complicit in trafficking in persons, mostly women
and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c.,
6.d., and 6.f.).
Conditions in some prisons are harsh and include severe
overcrowding, inadequate lavatory facilities, and insufficient heating
and ventilation. The SIS's parallel network of jails and prisons
contains many of the harshest detention facilities. NGO prison monitors
reported that brutality committed by prison guards against inmates
continued to be a problem. Prison authorities sustained their battle
against tuberculosis (TB), instituting a new procedure for regular
testing. The overall magnitude of the TB problem remained steady during
the year. The process by which prisoners may complain of substandard
conditions or of mistreatment does not function effectively.
The Government generally cooperated with requests by independent
observers to monitor conditions in most prisons and detention
facilities. However, unlike last year's relatively free access to SIS
detention facilities, which was granted for the first time in 1999,
human rights observers began to encounter significant procedural
roadblocks to obtaining access. These administrative obstacles, while
not denying access outright, dramatically increased the difficulty and
amount of staff time on the part of observers necessary to secure
access. Human rights monitors continued to enjoy good access to regular
prisons. Observers still are prohibited from interviewing detainees in
the SIS facilities, unlike in regular prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides for protection against arbitrary arrest and detention;
however, police often arbitrarily detain and arrest street children,
the majority of whom are Roma.
The Constitution provides for access to legal counsel from the time
of detention. However, a 1999 survey of prisoners conducted by the
Bulgaria Helsinki Committee (BHC) found that 54 percent of prisoners
complained that they had no lawyer present during preliminary
investigations. BHC believes this figure remained broadly valid during
the year. Police normally obtain a warrant from a prosecutor prior to
apprehending an individual; otherwise, in emergency circumstances
police may detain individuals for up to 24 hours on their own
authority; however, authorities must rule on the legality of such
detention by the end of that time period. If the person is released
without being charged before the 24-hour period elapses, there is no
judicial involvement in the case. Human rights observers charge that
police commonly handle minor offenses by arresting the suspect, beating
him, and releasing him within the 24-hour period. Defendants have the
right to visits by family members, to examine evidence, and to know the
charges against them. Charges may not be made public without the
permission of the Prosecutor General. In the interests of a speedy
trial, investigations now are prescribed by law to last no more than 2
months under normal circumstances, although this period may be extended
to 6 months by the head regional prosecutor, and up to 9 months by the
Prosecutor General.
The Government noticeably improved its record during the year in
observing the statutory limit of 1 year of pre-trial detention (or 2
years in the case of the most serious crimes). While human rights
lawyers noted some continuing violations of this policy, increasingly
these situations have become uncommon exceptions rather than common
practice. A legal consensus also seems to have emerged that the pre-
trial detention limits apply cumulatively to all of the separate
periods of detention, in cases where defendants' cases have been sent
to the courts for review, and returned to prosecutors for further
investigation. This is a change from earlier practice, when such a
situation restarted the clock on the defendant's pretrial detention. A
remaining loophole is that many cases may be formally deemed to be in
the ``on-trial'' phase for an extended period of time. This occurs when
a case file has been presented to the court by prosecutors, but has not
yet been acted upon by the judge. Cases may, not uncommonly, languish
for months in this situation, while the defendant remains in custody.
The Ministry of Justice reported that as of year's end, there were 947
accused persons in pre-trial detention, 1,110 defendants incarcerated
while in the ``on trial'' phase, and 7,514 convicted prisoners. Among
the changes recently made to the Criminal Procedure Code was increased
oversight by judges of pre-trial detention and conditions of bail.
Under the new rules, only judges may determine the necessity of holding
suspects in custody and to set bail.
In the event of a conviction, the time spent in pretrial detention
is credited toward the sentence. The Constitution provides for bail,
and some detainees have been released under this provision, although
bail is not used widely.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the Constitution, the
judiciary is granted independent and coequal status with the
legislature and executive branches; however, the judiciary continues to
struggle with problems such as low salaries, understaffing, antiquated
procedures, corruption, and a heavy backlog of cases. Partly as a
legacy of communism and partly because of the court system's structural
and personnel problems, many citizens have little confidence in the
judicial system. Human rights groups complain that local prosecutors
and magistrates sometimes fail to pursue vigorously crimes committed
against minorities. Many observers believe that reforms are essential
to establish a fair and impartial, as well as efficient, judicial
system. The Government began an ambitious training program to upgrade
the expertise of the judiciary with the help of international donor
organizations during the year.
The court system consists of regional courts, district courts, and
Supreme Courts of Cassation (civil and criminal appeal) and
Administration. A Constitutional Court, which is separate from the rest
of the court system, is empowered to rescind legislation that it
considers unconstitutional, settle disputes over the conduct of general
elections, and resolve conflicts over the division of powers between
the various branches of government. Military courts handle cases
involving military personnel (including police personnel) and some
cases involving national security matters. The Constitutional Court
does not have specific jurisdiction in matters of military justice.
Local observers contend that organized crime influences the
prosecutor's office. Few organized crime figures have been prosecuted
to date, but in 1997 the Government made the battle against organized
crime a priority and reformed the Penal Code to that end. The Ministry
of Interior has requested and received assistance from Western
countries in its efforts to close legal loopholes and strengthen
enforcement capabilities against criminal economic groupings engaged in
racketeering and other illegal activities.
Judges are appointed by the 25-member Supreme Judicial Council and,
after serving for 3 years, may not be removed except under limited,
specified circumstances. The difficulty and rarity of replacing judges
virtually regardless of performance often has been cited as a hindrance
to effective law enforcement. The 12 justices on the Constitutional
Court are chosen for 9-year terms as follows: One-third are elected by
the National Assembly, one-third appointed by the President, and one-
third elected by judicial authorities.
The Constitution stipulates that all courts shall conduct hearings
in public unless the proceedings involve state security or national
secrets. There were no reported complaints about limited access to
courtroom proceedings. Defendants have the right to know the charges
against them and are given ample time to prepare a defense. The right
of appeal is provided for and is used widely. Defendants in criminal
proceedings have the right to confront witnesses and to have an
attorney, provided by the state if necessary in serious cases.
Human rights observers consider ``Educational Boarding Schools''
(formerly known as ``Labor Education Schools'') to which problem
children can be sent as little different from penal institutions.
However, since the schools are not considered prisons under the law,
the procedures by which children are confined in these schools are not
subject to minimal due process. Several human rights organizations have
criticized this denial of due process. Children sometimes appear alone
despite the requirement that parents must attend hearings; the right to
an attorney at the hearing is prohibited expressly by law. Decisions in
these cases are not subject to judicial review, and children typically
stay in the Educational Boarding Schools for 3 years or until they
reach majority age, whichever occurs first. In late 1996, the
Parliament enacted legislation that provided for court review of
sentencing to such schools, set a limit of a 3-year stay, and addressed
other problems in these institutions (see Section 5). Human rights
activists dismiss this court review provision as a formality, since the
child is not present to speak on his or her own behalf (nor is the
defense lawyer or the child's parents).
There was no progress in a case begun in 1993 relating to the
forced assimilation and expulsion of ethnic Turks in 1984-85 and 1989.
Further action on this case now appears unlikely ever to take place.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home, the right to choose one's place of work and residence, and the
freedom and confidentiality of correspondence, and government
authorities generally respect these provisions.
One NGO complained that the Minister of Interior's discretionary
authority to authorize telephone wiretaps and electronic listening
devices without judicial review in certain instances is excessive.
Although it is unknown to what extent this authority is employed,
highly-publicized media accounts during the year highlighted the
Government's employment of electronic surveillance. A public scandal
ensued when a listening device was discovered in the home of the
Prosecutor General, although the government denied that the device had
ever been actively employed.
The Bulgaria Helsinki Committee also has alleged that warrants to
investigate suspects' private financial records sometimes are abused to
give police broad and openended authority to engage in far-ranging
investigations of a suspect's family and associates. There are regular,
albeit not conclusive or systematic, reports of mail, especially
foreign mail, being delayed or opened.
Traffickers in persons use threats against women's families and
family reputations to ensure obedience (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. A variety of media outlets presents a
broad spectrum of opinion; however, the Government exerts an undue
influence on the media via official channels such as the National
Council for Radio and Television (NCRT), a quasi-governmental body that
governs national media and regulates private broadcasters, and through
less direct means such as steering advertising revenue away from media
outlets that are critical of government policies. Surveys show that
significant numbers of journalists feel constrained in their reporting
because of government influence. One-third of journalists surveyed
claimed that they had received outside pressure of some sort, whether
from government officials or business interests, in response to
material they had written or broadcast. Prosecutors are regarded widely
as wielding an intimidating influence over journalists who are critical
of the judicial process. A variety of newspapers are published freely
by political parties and other organizations representing the full
spectrum of public opinion. Journalists frequently color their reports
to conform with the views of their owners.
There were several instances of violent attacks on journalists,
including physical assaults and bombings of newspaper offices, although
no individuals have been seriously injured. In none of the cases have
the perpetrators or their motives been uncovered. In February a
reporter for the news weekly Kapital who frequently reports on the
judicial system and on military affairs had his car blown up in front
of his home; no one was injured in the explosion.
Libel is punishable under the Criminal Code. In March the
Parliament enacted modified amendments to the Penal Code, after
President Petar Stoyanov had vetoed the original version in January.
Responding to the President's concerns, the Parliament reduced the
fines for libel and defamation by half to approximately $7,000 (15,000
leva). Even this reduced fine remains a heavy penalty in the context of
the country's economy. The new provisions did eliminate imprisonment as
a penalty for libel. Journalists charged with libel or defamation also
have reduced rights of appeal for libel sentences under the new law.
Libel remains, under the new law, a criminal offense, as opposed to a
matter of civil law, and makes losing defendants criminal convicts.
However, press freedom monitors reported that the courts generally are
embracing a more enlightened view of libel than in the past and are
recognizing the principle of ``true facts and free comment'' as being
legitimately within the bounds of journalistic expression.
In February the Interior Minister filed a libel suit against the
editor in chief of the Kyustendil-based newspaper Nova Bulgaria, which
had alleged in print that the Minister, prior to assuming office in the
Interior Ministry, had defended a company involved in illegal
activities. The Minister later withdrew the charges.
In June Parliament enacted a new Law on Access to Public
Information, with the ostensible purpose of establishing broader public
access to government information. The law has been criticized widely;
however, for being vague in its provisions and enabling arbitrary
denials of information. A majority of journalists believe that the new
law actually hampers rather than facilitates public access to
information.
There are 261 electronic media outlets in Bulgaria, which
represents a 60 percent increase in the number of radio and TV stations
since last year. The number of television outlets that broadcast news
and public affairs programming has more than doubled from 54 in 1999 to
124 during the year, and the number of radio stations reached 123. In
April the Government awarded a license for the first privately-owned
television channel with nationwide coverage to the Balkan News
Corporation, a company owned by Rupert Murdoch. The appearance of the
new station, though still in its infancy, reanimated the competitive
market for broadcast journalism talent in the country, and has spurred
new programming initiatives from Bulgarian National Television (BNT).
In August the State Telecommunications Commission (STC) launched a
competition for a second nationwide private TV channel. The new license
was awarded in October. The STC also launched a competition for
licensing the first nationwide private radio station. The procedure for
licensing private radio stations is undergoing regulatory changes
expected to be finalized in early 2001. Some private radio stations
complained that government policies allocating transmission strength on
the monopoly state-owned radio transmission network gives the Bulgarian
National Radio programming an unfair advantage.
Television and radio news programs on the state-owned media present
opposition views, but opposition members claim that their activities
and views are given less broadcast time and exposure than the those of
the ruling party. There are no formal restrictions on programming; both
television and radio provide a variety of news and public interest
programming.
Bulgarian National Television launched Turkish-language newscasts
for the first time on October 2, for the benefit of the country's
ethnic Turkish minority. Local affiliates of Bulgarian National Radio
broadcast limited Turkish-language programming in regions with ethnic-
Turkish populations.
Foreign government radio programs such as the British Broadcasting
Corporation, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of
America have good access to commercial radio frequencies.
Private book publishing remained unhindered by political
considerations.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities require
permits for rallies and assemblies held outdoors, but most legally
registered organizations routinely were granted permission to assemble.
Vigorous political rallies and demonstrations were a common occurrence
and generally took place without government interference.
The Government has undertaken to respect the rights of individuals
and groups to establish freely their own political parties or other
political organizations; however, there are constitutional and
statutory restrictions that restrict the right of association and limit
meaningful participation in the political process. For example, the
Constitution forbids the formation of political parties along
religious, ethnic, or racial lines and prohibits ``citizens'
associations'' from engaging in political activity. This provision is
designed to prevent the development of parties based on a single ethnic
or other group that could prove divisive for national unity by stirring
up ethnic tension for political purposes. Nonetheless, the mainly
ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is represented in
Parliament. The other major political parties generally accept the
MRF's right to participate in the political process. Additionally, the
mainly ethnic Roma ``Free Bulgaria'' party has been allowed to operate
freely and has achieved some success in local elections.
The Constitution also prohibits organizations that threaten the
country's territorial integrity or unity, or that incite racial,
ethnic, or religious hatred. The Government has refused since 1990 to
register a self-proclaimed Macedonian rights group, OMO- Ilinden, on
the grounds that it is separatist. Aside from its symbolic importance,
lack of registration denies the group the status of being a legal
entity. This makes it impossible for the organization (in its own name)
to make contracts, hire staff, rent or buy office space or meeting
space, or other such normal administrative functions. There were no
reports of any prosecutions for membership in this group.
On February 29, the Constitutional Court, Bulgaria's final
authority on the matter, ruled that the political party United
Macedonian Organization (OMO)-Ilinden-Pirin (not the same organization
as the similarly named OMO-Ilinden noted above, although there are
links between the groups) was unconstitutional on separatist grounds.
The court ruled that leaders of OMO-Ilinden-Pirin have advocated the
secession of the Pirin-Macedonia region of southwest Bulgaria and its
annexation by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. OMO-Ilinden-
Pirin leaders plan to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.
Notwithstanding the Constitutional Court decision, the Government
allowed OMO-Ilinden-Pirin to hold public celebrations on Macedonian
holidays in April and again in August; however, a similar event was
prohibited in September by an order of the regional prosecutor's
office.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice for
some non-Orthodox religious groups. The legal requirement that groups
whose activities have a religious element register with the Council of
Ministers restricted the activities of some religious groups prior to
or in the absence of registration. Affected groups included the
Unification Church and the Church of the Nazarene (which has tried
repeatedly to register for more than 5 years). Furthermore, several
municipal governments established local registration requirements for
religious groups, despite the lack of clear legal authority to do so.
In some cases, local authorities used the lack of registration as a
pretext for interference with some groups and employed arbitrary
harassment tactics against others. Some church groups circumvent the
administrative obstacles created by a lack of registration by
registering as NGO's. Technically it remains illegal for a church to
conduct any religious activities through its NGO-registered
organization, although the Government sometimes tacitly allows such
groups to conduct worship so long as they keep a very low profile.
There are periodic reports of police using lack of local or national
registration as a pretext to confiscate signboards and materials,
detain or expel religious workers, and deny visas or residence permits
to foreign-national missionaries. During the year, the ability of a
small number of religious groups to conduct services freely came under
occasional attack, both as a result of action by local government
authorities and because of public intolerance.
The Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the
``traditional'' religion. The Government provides financial support for
the Eastern Orthodox Church, as well as several other religious
communities perceived as holding historic places in society, such as
the Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Jewish faiths. These groups benefit
from a relatively high degree of governmental and public tolerance.
Religious freedom NGO's note with concern a tendency by certain
municipalities to enact regulations that may be used to limit religious
freedoms if a perceived need arises. For example, the Sofia
municipality forbids references to miracles and healing during
religious services, a provision that many fear may be employed as a
pretext to ban or interrupt services by charismatic evangelical groups.
The regulation cites a Communist-era law dating from 1949, which
technically still is in effect and which forbids foreigners from
proselytizing and administering religious services in the country. The
decree, although subsequently modified in response to NGO objections,
is still criticized by religious rights groups as containing provisions
that are either discriminatory or ambiguous and open to abuse. Other
municipalities have enacted similar regulations. The City Council in
Burgas maintained its refusal to register the local branch of Jehovah's
Witnesses, despite the fact that they were registered by the central
government. The council asked the group to prove that they had not been
banned in any European Union country in order to be registered. Plovdiv
municipality passed an ordinance that forbade the distribution in
public places of ``religious materials or pornography.'' The 1949 law
also has been criticized in its own right as an outmoded potential
impediment to free religious activity. However, despite the law's
continued technical validity, foreign missionaries can and do receive
permission to proselytize in the country. A new law on religious
activity was pending in Parliament but had not yet been moved to the
floor of the National Assembly for a vote by year's end.
In March two members of Jehovah's Witnesses in Turgovishte were
detained briefly by police and charged with disruption of public order
under a city ordinance for public proselytizing.
In April several missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints (aka the Mormon Church) in Plovdiv were challenged by
police while distributing literature and were required to go to the
police station. They were charged with distributing brochures without a
license. Also in April, border police refused a member of the Jehovah's
Witnesses entry into the country, reportedly on the grounds that she
had been deported from the country in 1997 for practicing her then-
unregistered faith.
In May a volunteer worker for the Christian Unity Foundation was
beaten severely in Maritsa when he attempted to conduct a scheduled
screening of a documentary-style film of the life of Jesus Christ. The
film itself was stolen from his car. The attack was carried out by six
to eight youths, under the apparent direction of a Bulgarian Orthodox
priest.
On June 21, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses were expelled from
the city of Petrich for distributing literature without being
registered with the municipality, although the church does have central
government registration.
In July and August, the Mormon Church encountered a number of
politically inspired legal and administrative obstacles at the local
and regional levels to its efforts to build a new church and
administrative center in Plovdiv. One political party in particular,
which has several seats on the city council in Plovdiv, led protest
marches as well as filing several administrative challenges to the
construction. Ultimately with the support of the local mayor, the
building was completed.
On December 13, about 2,000 Orthodox clergy and Church members
marched in Sofia to protest the Government's refusal to register the
Holy Synod headed by Patriarch Maxim. The Government refuses to
register the synod citing an administrative court ruling that there are
two Orthodox Churches in the country.
There were no developments in the ongoing lawsuit of the Gabrovo
schoolteacher who claims that she was pressured to resign because of
her Pentecostal faith.
A number of religious groups have complained that foreign
missionaries and religious leaders experience difficulties in obtaining
and renewing residence visas in the country. The issuance of residence
permits appears to be subject to the whim of local authorities. Human
rights groups also have protested the cancellation of residence status
of several persons on undisclosed national security grounds, alleging
that the action was a pretext for religious discrimination.
For most registered religious groups there were no restrictions on
attendance at religious services or on private religious instruction. A
school for imams, a Muslim cultural center, university-level
theological faculties, and religious primary schools operated freely.
In December 1999, the Ministry of Education announced that schools
would begin offering classes on Islam in regions with a significant
Muslim minority, and in December 2000 the implementing decree took
effect, with classes beginning in 80 schools starting in January 2001.
However, some ethnic Turkish activists have complained that the
implementing decree requires that these classes be taught in Bulgarian
rather than Turkish. Since 1997 religious classes on the Bible have
been available to students whose parents approve such instruction.
Bibles and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language were
imported and printed freely, and Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish
publications were published on a regular basis.
Although previously during compulsory military service most Muslim
conscripts were placed in construction units rather than serving in
combat-role military units, these units were converted into a state-
owned construction firm in August, which no longer employs conscript
military labor. It is unclear how this will affect military assignments
of Muslim conscripts (see Section 5).
There were no indications that the Government discriminated against
members of any religious group in making restitution to previous owners
of properties that were nationalized during the Communist regime. The
Government in general actively has supported property restitution for
the legally recognized organization representing the Jewish community,
although the return of two lucrative commercial Jewish communal
properties continues to encounter administrative obstacles and legal
challenges.
At the Department of Theology of Sofia University, all students are
required to present a certificate of baptism from the Orthodox Church,
and married couples must present a marriage certificate from the Church
in order to enroll in the Department's classes. It remains impossible
for non-Orthodox applicants to be admitted to the Department of
Theology.
The Government refused to recognize an alternative Patriarch
elected by supporters in 1996, and the schism that opened in the
Orthodox Church in 1992 continued, despite the death of this
alternative Patriarch in April 1999. The Government nevertheless
encouraged the feuding factions to heal their prolonged rift. By year's
end, these efforts had not met with success.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country and the right to leave it, and these rights
are generally not limited in practice; however, there are two
exceptions. One exception relates to border zones where access is
limited for nonresidents (the border zones extend 1.2 to 3 miles inward
from each border). Another exception is the Ministry of Interior policy
that denies issuance of an international passport to any Bulgarian
citizen who has ever been convicted of any crime, with no statute of
limitations. This policy effectively prevents such persons from
travelling abroad.
Every citizen has the right to return to the country, may not be
forcibly expatriated, and may not be deprived of citizenship acquired
by birth.
The Government grants asylum or refugee status in accordance with
the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Law on Refugees, which went into
effect August 1, 1999, regulates the procedure for granting refugee
status as well as the rights and obligations of refugees. The Agency
for Refugees, formerly the National Bureau for Territorial Asylum and
Refugees, is charged with following this procedure and cooperating with
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
The Government provides first asylum. In recent years, domestic and
international human rights organizations have expressed concern over
the Government's handling of asylum claims and reported that there may
have been cases in which bona fide refugees were turned away at the
border. No such cases were reported during the year. However, because
NGO's lack institutionalized access to the country's borders, it is
often difficult for them to monitor the Government's handling of asylum
cases. For the first 6 months of the year, the Ministry of Interior
reported that 703 persons applied for refugee status. Authorities
granted 76 applicants refugee status, while 14 persons were granted
temporary humanitarian status. Refugee applications came predominantly
from citizens of Armenia (186), Afghanistan (178), and Iraq (130).
The Agency for Refugees reports that it has received 5,938
applications for asylum from its inception in 1993 through December. Of
these, 902 persons currently are listed as holding approved asylum or
other humanitarian residence status. Domestic and international human
rights organizations complain that the adjudication process is slow,
but the UNHCR notes that the Agency for Refugees has begun a major
restructuring project to reduce the adjudication time to a period of 3
months. The restructuring project itself is expected to take 4 years.
In 1997 and 1998, the UNHCR, in cooperation with an NGO, opened three
transit centers near the Greek, Turkish, and Romanian borders and
assisted the Government with opening a small reception center in Banya.
Plans to open a reception center at the Sofia airport continue to be
delayed due to a lack of funding. However, the UNHCR currently is
working on plans to open a transit center in Kapitan Andreevo, on the
border with Turkey.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government and head of
state through the election of the President and of the members of the
National Assembly, although the constitutional prohibition of parties
formed on ethnic, racial, or religious lines has the effect of
circumscribing access to the political party process for some groups
(see Section 2.b.). Suffrage is universal at the age of 18.
No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in
government and politics; however, they are underrepresented. Women hold
just under 11 percent of the seats in the current Parliament. However,
a number of women hold elective and appointive office at high levels,
including three cabinet-level posts and several key positions in
Parliament. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leader of the
United Democratic Forces parliamentary group (the dominant party in the
Government) are both women.
No legal restrictions hinder the participation of minorities in
politics, apart from the prohibition of ethnically, racially, or
religiously based parties. However, while ethnic Turks' representation
in the National Assembly is close to commensurate with their share of
population, there was only one Romani Member of Parliament. Both groups
are underrepresented in appointed governmental positions, especially
leadership positions.
Roma groups are demanding that existing political parties adopt
platforms pledging more representation and other improvements for Roma
in return for Roma support.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights groups operate freely,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Human rights observers reported uneven levels of cooperation from
various national and local government officials during the year. The
new Law on Access to Public Information has opened new channels of
information which have sometimes proved quite helpful to human rights
monitors. In other cases, NGO's have found government offices
completely unresponsive to information requests under the public
information law. Human rights observers also have experienced some new
difficulties in getting information previously easy to obtain, from
prosecutors for example, and have reported greater procedural
difficulties than in the previous year in gaining access to SIS
detention facilities.
The police demonstrated a new level of cooperation with human
rights NGO's in providing human rights training to police officers. The
National Police Service invited the Bulgaria Helsinki Committee (BHC)
to conduct a human rights awareness training seminar with 500 senior
police officers (precinct commander and above), with the active
participation of the deputy commander of the National Police.
Subsequently BHC, the Human Rights Project (HRP), and representatives
of the Council of Europe, conducted a smaller training seminar on
International Law and Police Practice. In general human rights monitors
detected a new receptivity and a more meaningful dialogue on the part
of the Government and police officials toward human rights concerns,
with one NGO crediting the Interior Minister personally with
demonstrating greater openness and attention to the issue. However,
this change at senior levels, has not yet resulted in noticeable
changes in police practice at the working level.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and
protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination
still exists, particularly against Roma and women.
Women.--Violence against women is a serious and common problem, but
there are no official statistics on its occurrence. The Animus
Association Foundation (AAF), an NGO that offers assistance and support
to female victims of violence, estimates that one in five women suffers
from spousal abuse. Spousal rape is a crime, but it rarely is
prosecuted. According to a survey by a local polling agency, 80 percent
of rapes involve a known assailant. The law exempts from state
prosecution certain types of assault if committed by a family member,
and the Government generally does not assist in prosecuting crimes of
domestic assault unless the woman has been killed or injured
permanently. Courts and prosecutors tend to view domestic abuse as a
family rather than criminal problem, and in most cases, victims of
domestic violence take refuge with family or friends rather than
approach the authorities. Police often are reluctant to intervene in
cases of domestic abuse, even if a woman calls them seeking protection
or assistance. No government agencies provide shelter or counseling for
victims. In Sofia the NGO Nadya De Center provides shelter to battered
women, and AAF opened a new crisis center that provides short-term
emergency shelter for female victims of violence. There were 15 crisis
centers around the country which provide assistance to women victims of
violence at year's end.
NGO observers report a generally improved public attitude toward
issues of violence against women in recent years. After several years
of activism on the part of various NGO groups, the taboo against
acknowledging and talking about domestic violence and violence against
women has been broken. Observers also note some increased sensitivity
on the part of police to the issue. AAF reports that it now
periodically receives client referrals from police, which was unknown
in the recent past.
The courts prosecute rape, although it remains an underreported
crime because of the stigma which society attaches to the victim. The
maximum sentence for rape is 8 years; convicted offenders often receive
a lesser sentence or early parole. According to the Ministry of
Interior, 254 rapes and 30 attempted rapes were reported during the
first half of the year.
During the year, AAF reported that it handled 1,089 cases of
domestic violence, 86 cases of sexual violence, and 534 cases or
inquiries related to trafficking in women. AAF directly counseled 24
actual returned victims of trafficking. The large increase in the
number of cases related to trafficking in women is the result of a
major information campaign, organized by the International Organization
for Migration, which has publicized more widely the AAF's counseling
services (see Section 6.f.). However, the actual incidents of each form
of violence is certainly much higher, as these represent those cases in
which the victims (or, in some trafficking cases, an overseas women's
group) was willing and able to contact AAF. The Association also
operates a 24-hour hot line for women in crisis that is staffed by the
Association's volunteer counselors, backed up by 13 full-time
professional therapists.
In 1997 the Government enacted a law against trafficking in women,
and trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see Sections
6.c and 6.f.).
Sexual harassment is a problem; it is not illegal.
Many of the approximately 30 women's organizations are associated
closely with political parties or have primarily professional agendas.
Some observers believe that women's organizations tend to be associated
with political parties or professional groups because feminism has
negative societal connotations. Of those organizations that exist
mainly to defend women's interests, the two largest are the Women's
Democratic Union in Bulgaria, heir to the group that existed under the
Communist dictatorship, and the Bulgarian Women's Association, which
disappeared under communism but has reemerged with chapters in a number
of cities.
The Constitution forbids privileges or restrictions of rights on
the basis of sex, and women are not impeded from owning or managing
businesses, land, or other real property and do not suffer from
discrimination under inheritance laws. However, women face
discrimination both in terms of job recruitment and the likelihood of
layoffs. Official figures show the rate of unemployment for women to be
higher than that for men. Women are much more likely than men to be
employed in low-wage jobs requiring little education, and the National
Statistical Institute reports that as of November, the average salary
of a woman was 76.8 percent of the average salary of a man. Statistics
show that women are equally likely to attend universities, but they
have less opportunity to upgrade their qualifications and generally end
up in lower-ranking and lower-paying positions than their male
counterparts. Fewer girls than boys are attending school, especially
among minorities. Women generally continue to have primary
responsibility for child rearing and housekeeping even if they are
employed outside the home. Since 80 percent of employed women work in
the lowest-paying sectors of the labor force, they often must work at
two jobs in addition to their household duties in order to provide for
their families. Female-headed households frequently live below the
poverty line. There are liberal provisions for paid maternity leave;
however, these actually may work against employers' willingness to hire
and retain female employees. This is especially noticeable in higher-
paying positions in the private sector, where many women with
engineering degrees are compelled to work as secretaries.
No special government programs seek to address economic
discrimination or integrate women better into the mainstream of society
and the economy, although much NGO activity is focused on these
activities.
Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting
children's welfare but, with limited resources, falls short in several
areas. For example, it maintains a sizable network of orphanages
throughout the country. However, many of the orphanages are in
disrepair and lack proper facilities. Human rights monitors are sharply
critical of the serious deficiencies in all government-run institutions
for children, including orphanages, ``educational boarding schools''
(reform schools), and facilities for the mentally handicapped. These
facilities are plagued by inadequate budgets, poorly-trained and
unqualified staff, and inadequate oversight. NGO monitors further
allege that even food budgets are highly deficient, with many
institutions dependent on the uneven flow of private donations to feed
their charges.
Government efforts in education and health have been constrained by
serious budgetary limitations and by outmoded social care structures.
The Constitution provides for mandatory school attendance until the age
of 16. However, fewer girls than boys are attending school, especially
among minorities.
On September 15, approximately 300 Romani children from the Nov Put
Romani neighborhood began the school year by being bussed to one of
seven mixed regular schools in the town of Vidin. Starting in the
school year 2000/01, Romani children from the settlement have attended
nonsegregated schools as a result of local and international
nongovernmental initiatives. Educational standards in the all-Romani
school in Nov Pat are low, according to NGO reports.
There are few provisions for due process of law for Romani and
other juveniles when they are detained in Educational Boarding Schools
(formerly Labor Education Schools) run by the Ministry of Education.
Living conditions at these reform schools are poor, offering few
medical, educational, or social services. Generally, staff members at
many such institutions lack the proper qualifications and training to
care for the children adequately. Degrading and severe punishment, such
as the shaving of a child's head, reduction in diet, severe beatings,
and long periods of solitary confinement, are common at the schools. In
1996 the Ministry of Education acknowledged problems at the schools and
attributed the cause to a lack of funding. In late 1996, Parliament
enacted legislation providing for court review of sentencing to such
schools and addressing other problems in the reform school system (see
Section 1.e.), but these provisions do not seem to function. The
decision to commit a child to an Educational Boarding School is made by
a local Commission for Combating Juvenile Delinquency, which is
generally not held accountable in any meaningful way to any higher
authority. Standards differ among these local commissions in how
closely prescribed procedures are followed. Human rights monitors
report that in many localities, contrary to law, a child may be held in
such a facility for months on the basis of a police referral, before
the local commission convenes to make a decision on the case. The
U.N.'s Common Country Assessment for Bulgaria reports that children in
these facilities ``might be subject to physical abuse'' and upon
leaving these homes ``may be emotionally scarred and ill-prepared to
face the outside world.''
The vast majority of children are free from societal abuse,
although some Romani children are targets of frequent skinhead violence
and arbitrary police detention; the homeless or abandoned particularly
were vulnerable. There are reports that family or community members
forced some minors into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
Police made little effort to address these problems. Some observers
believe that there is a growing trend toward the use of children in
prostitution, burglaries, and narcotics distribution. Trafficking in
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections
6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--Disabled persons by law receive a range
of financial assistance, including free public transportation, reduced
prices on modified automobiles, and free equipment such as wheelchairs.
However, as in other areas, budgetary constraints mean that such
payments occasionally fall behind. Disabled individuals have access to
university training (since 1999 students with disabilities must pay the
university's initial application fee but are exempt from semester fees
if accepted) and to housing and employment; however, architectural
barriers are a great hindrance in most older buildings, including
schools and universities. Problems of general unemployment and economy
undermine initiatives aimed at advancing equal opportunity for the
disabled. The great majority of the disabled are unemployed.
Labor laws intended to protect the interests of the disabled and
create greater employment opportunity sometimes have a mixed effect. On
one hand, the law provides incentives for small firms to hire disabled
workers. For example, the Bureau of Labor pays the first year's salary
of a disabled employee. On the other hand, workers with disabilities
are entitled to shorter working hours, which often leads to
discrimination against them in hiring practices. According to the law,
any enterprise employing more than 50 persons must hire a certain
number of disabled workers (between 3 and 10 percent, depending on the
industry). Those who fail to do so must pay a fine, the proceeds of
which go to a fund for the disabled. Nevertheless, due to low fines and
delays in the judicial system, compliance rates are extremely low.
Recent public works have taken the needs of persons with
disabilities into account. Sofia's new subway system was designed with
wheelchair access to stations. Nevertheless, enforcement of a 1995 law
requiring improved structural access for the disabled has lagged in
existing, unrenovated buildings.
Policies and public attitudes prevalent during the Communist era,
which separated mentally and physically disabled persons, including
very young children, from the rest of society have persisted. Some
complain that the effective segregation of disabled children into
special schools has lowered the quality of their education. However, in
a recent positive development, construction of a training and
rehabilitation center for the disabled youth in Pomorie began in 1999.
The center aims to improve the overall physical and intellectual state
of disabled youth and to encourage them to acquire new skills and
participate more actively in the social life of the country.
Religious Minorities.--Discrimination, harassment, and general
public intolerance of ``nontraditional'' religious minorities (i.e.,
the great majority of Protestant Christian denominations) remained a
problem, although the number of reported incidents decreased during the
past 2 years. Strongly held suspicion of evangelical denominations
among the Orthodox populace is widespread and pervasive across the
political spectrum and has resulted in discrimination. Often cloaked in
a veneer of ``patriotism,'' intolerance of the religious beliefs of
others enjoys widespread popularity. Such mainstream public pressure
for containment of ``foreign religious sects'' inevitably influences
policymakers. Nevertheless, there were fewer reported incidents of
harassment of religious groups during the past 2 years as society
appeared to have become more accepting of previously unfamiliar
religions.
Certain religions, including both groups denied registration and
those officially registered, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, faced
discriminatory practices, as did other groups, which despite full
compliance with the law, were greeted with hostility by the press,
segments of the public, and certain government officials (see Section
2.c.).
Non-Orthodox religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses, the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and the Open Bible
Fellowship, have been affected adversely by societal attitudes.
Numerous articles in a broad range of newspapers as well as television
documentaries, drew lurid and inaccurate pictures of the activities of
non-Orthodox religious groups, attributing the breakup of families and
drug abuse by youths to the practices of these groups and alleging that
evangelicals were drugging young children.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Turks constitute almost
10 percent of the population. In the 1992 census, 3.7 percent of the
population identified itself as Romani; however, the real figure
probably is closer to 6 or 7 percent, since many persons of Romani
descent tend to identify themselves to the authorities as ethnic Turks
or Bulgarians. Ethnic Bulgarian Muslims or ``Pomaks'' are a distinct
group of Slavic descent, constituting 2 to 3 percent of the population,
whose ancestors converted from Orthodox Christianity to Islam. Most are
Muslim, although a number have become atheists or converted back to
Christianity. These are the country's largest minorities. There are no
restrictions on speaking Turkish in public or the use of non-Slavic
names.
Voluntary Turkish-language classes in public schools, funded by the
Government, continued in areas with significant Turkish- speaking
populations, although some observers complained that the Government was
discouraging optional language classes in areas with large
concentrations of Muslims. The Ministry of Education has estimated that
approximately 40,000 children now study Turkish. Some ethnic Turkish
leaders, mainly in the MRF, demanded that Turkish-language classes be
made compulsory in areas with significant ethnic Turkish populations,
but the Government has resisted this effort.
Roma activists and NGO's were disappointed broadly with the
relative lack of progress demonstrated by the Government in
implementing its framework program for Roma integration, the Program
for Social Integration of Roma, which was unveiled in 1999. Aside from
the hiring of a number of individual Roma representatives in various
institutions of local, regional, and the national government, there has
been little discernible progress in delivering on the program.
Attacks by private citizens on Roma continued, and Roma continued
to suffer incidents of discrimination. There were numerous accusations
of police and private citizen assaults on Roma.
In the village of Mechka, near Pleven, the February murder of an
ethnic-Bulgarian man poisoned relations between the ethnic-Bulgarian
and Roma communities. Ethnic Bulgarian residents widely blamed the Roma
for the killing, as well as for a spree of petty crimes, which had
swept the neighborhood for several years. For several weeks, ethnic
Roma were prevented from entering the city center, and a complete
boycott against doing any business--buying or selling--with the Roma
persisted for some months. This boycott created economic hardship for
the Roma community, particularly because of the lack of opportunities
to sell the dairy products, which form the livelihood of the Roma
villagers in Mechka. The situation was further exacerbated when a Roma
man in the act of breaking into a carpentry shop was shot in the leg by
a booby trap, which had been set by the shop owner. The shop owner was
arrested for the illegal use of a firearm. However, by September the
situation in Mechka had calmed considerably and returned more or less
to normal, after police arrested two non-local ethnic-Bulgarians for
the February murder. Human rights NGO's closely following the case
commended the Pleven police for handling the investigation in a
professional and restrained manner, despite the highly inflamed local
passions. Although the Roma villagers complained that they were
detained disproportionately for questioning in the murder
investigation, there were no allegations of any mistreatment or abuse.
According to unconfirmed NGO reports, on August 23 in Gradishte,
two Roma men, Paskal Paskalev and Ognyan Milenov, were hospitalized
after Tsvetan Tsvetanov shot them with a homemade shotgun. Tsvetanov
later claimed he shot the men accidentally while shooting at stray
dogs, although the victims allege that Tsvetanov attacked them in their
woodworking shop.
On November 11, in Botevgrad, Asen Sashev, a 14-year-old Roma
youth, was shot and injured by his neighbor Marko Markov during an
altercation. Markov, a fireman, shot Sashev with his government-issue
handgun. The Sofia Military Court ruled Markov blameless in the
incident; an appeal to the Military Appellate Court was pending at
year's end.
Beginning on November 4, 1999, and continuing throughout the year,
a group of ethnic Bulgarian residents of a Burgas neighborhood
persisted in a petition drive and periodic calls for the expulsion of
Roma and the demolition of Romani houses in the neighborhood.
Police harass, physically abuse, and arbitrarily arrest Romani
street children (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). There was one arrest in
the 1998 attack on eight Romani boys by skinheads in Sofia. Little
progress has been made in other cases of violence against Roma during
previous years, and these largely remain in the investigatory phase.
As individuals and as an ethnic group, Roma faced high levels of
discrimination. Roma encounter difficulties applying for social
benefits, and rural Roma are discouraged by local officials from
claiming land to which they are entitled under the law disbanding
agricultural collectives. Many Roma and other observers made credible
allegations that the quality of education offered to Romani children is
inferior to that afforded most other students. The Government largely
has been unsuccessful in attracting and keeping many Romani children in
school. Schools in most Romani neighborhoods suffer from chronic
absenteeism and very low graduation rates. However, an ethnic
reintegration effort began in schools in Vidin in September. The
program, with the help of international donor funding, uses a voluntary
busing plan to enroll Romani children in various higher-quality,
predominantly ethnic Bulgarian schools around the district. Many Romani
children arrive relatively unprepared for schooling; many of them are
not proficient in the Bulgarian language. Poverty has led to widespread
school truancy as many children in Romani ghettos cannot afford shoes
or basic school supplies and instead turn to begging, prostitution, and
petty crime on the streets. A social milieu that often does not highly
value formal education also is a contributing factor. Lack of effective
government infrastructure and programs and economic and social factors
thus combine to deprive increasing numbers of Romani youths of an
education and a better future. Early indications are that some recent
initiatives undertaken by the Government and by Romani NGO's are
achieving some small successes in mitigating these problems, for
example by providing free lunches and subsidizing textbook and tuition
costs.
Workplace discrimination against minorities continued to be a
problem, especially for Roma. Employers justify such discrimination on
the basis that most Roma only have elementary training and little
education.
Previously it had been common for ethnic Turkish and Romani
conscripts to be shunted into military construction battalions during
compulsory military service. This practice raised serious concerns both
of discrimination and forced labor, particularly since the units
sometimes accepted commercial construction contracts in addition to
military construction projects. However, in August the Government
completed the transformation of these units into a state-owned company
that no longer employs conscript labor. It remains to be seen how
future ethnic minority conscripts will be integrated into the
mainstream of the military. There are only a few ethnic Turkish, Pomak,
and Romani officers in the military, and an insignificant number of
high-ranking officers of the Muslim faith.
Ethnic Turkish politicians maintain that, although their
community's popularly-elected representation in the National Assembly
is roughly commensurate with its size, ethnic Turks are
underrepresented significantly in appointed positions in the state
administration. Ethnic Turks and Roma are also seriously
underrepresented in the ranks of the police agencies, and virtually
non-existent in senior law enforcement positions.
Both ethnic Turks and Bulgarian Muslims complain that the
procedures for restoring their original names (after their forcible re-
naming to Slavic names during the 1970s and 80s) is excessively
burdensome and difficult to accomplish.
Several thousand persons, mainly in the southwest, identify
themselves as ethnic Macedonians, most for historical and geographic
reasons. Members of the two organizations that purport to defend their
interests, OMO-Ilinden and TMO-Ilinden, are believed to number in the
hundreds (see Section 2.b.). The Government does not recognize
Macedonians as a distinct ethnic group, and the group is not enumerated
in official government statistics.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of all workers to form or join trade unions of their own choice,
and this right was generally exercised freely. Estimates of the
unionized share of the work force range from 30 to 50 percent. This
share continues to shrink as large firms lay off workers, and most new
positions appear in small, nonunionized businesses.
The two largest trade union confederations are the Confederation of
Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria (CITUB) and Podkrepa, which
together represent the overwhelming majority of organized workers.
Trade unions are required to demonstrate their membership strength
through a periodic census of their members; however, employer
representative organizations are not similarly required to demonstrate
whom they represent in the trilateral process. The unions have called
for new legislation requiring employer organizations also to
demonstrate membership strength.
Doctors and dentists expressed dissatisfaction with a new union
structure that they claim the Government imposed upon them in 1998, an
action which some maintain violates an ILO convention. The trade unions
allege that this organization is not truly a labor representative
organization, but simply a government- mandated fee collection agency.
They also believe it impedes the opportunity for a genuine trade union
to represent medical professionals.
The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the right to strike when other means
of conflict resolution have been exhausted, but ``political strikes''
are forbidden. Workers in essential services (primarily the military
and the police) also are subject to a blanket prohibition against
striking, although such workers on occasion held an ``effective
strike'' in which they stop or slow their activities for 1 or 2 hours.
The CITUB confederation argues that the number of workers classified as
essential and ineligible to strike is excessive and unfairly restricts
the right of many ordinary civil servants to exercise their worker
rights.
The Government generally does not interfere with legal labor
strikes, and a number of work stoppages took place.
The Podkrepa labor union has complained that an amendment to a 1990
law, passed in March 1998, facilitated the Government's ability to
declare a strike illegal. Under this amendment, workers no longer have
the right to appeal when a strike is declared illegal. Podkrepa
maintains that this provision is unconstitutional and violates an ILO
convention. The union has raised these concerns repeatedly to the
Government in the context of negotiations over proposed changes to the
Labor Code. A complaint has been made to the ILO Committee of Experts.
Another serious concern for the labor movement is the widespread
use of temporary contracts to evade the worker protections of permanent
staff. Many workers, who are effectively permanent staff, are hired
under short-term contracts that are renewed at the end of each month or
each quarter. When an employer decides to fire someone, it is legally
simply a non-renewal of contract, rather than a severance action that
would entail payment of benefits.
No restrictions limit affiliation or contact with international
labor organizations, and unions actively exercise this right.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
institutes collective bargaining, which was practiced nationally,
regionally, and on the local level. The legal prohibition against
striking for key public sector employees weakens their bargaining
position; however, these groups were able to influence negotiations by
staging protests and engaging in other pressure tactics without going
on strike. Labor unions have complained that while the legal structure
for collective bargaining was adequate, many employers failed to
bargain in good faith or to adhere to agreements that were concluded.
Labor observers viewed the Government's enforcement of labor contracts
as inadequate.
The Labor Code's prohibitions against antiunion discrimination
include a 6-month period for redress against dismissal as a form of
retribution. However, there is no mechanism other than the courts for
resolving complaints, and the burden of proof in such a case rests
entirely on the employee.
In several instances, an employer was found guilty of antiunion
discrimination, but the employers appealed the decisions. The backlog
of cases in the legal system delayed further action, effectively
postponing, perhaps indefinitely, redress of workers' grievances.
The same obligation of collective bargaining and adherence to labor
standards prevails in the six export processing zones, and unions may
organize workers in these areas.
On November 1, about 5,000 demonstrators in Sofia protested draft
changes in the country's labor legislation that many workers felt would
reduce their rights.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The Slavovitsa
Boys' Reform School, which had been found to use forced child labor to
produce goods for sale, has been closed by the Ministry of Education.
The previous practice of shunting minority and conscientious
objector military draftees into work units that often carried out
commercial construction and maintenance projects was a form of
compulsory labor; however, these units have been converted into a
state-owned enterprise which does not use conscript labor (see Sections
2.c. and 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age for employment at 16
years; the minimum age for dangerous work is 18. Employers and the
Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MLSP) are responsible for
enforcing these provisions. Child labor laws are enforced well in the
formal sector, but NGO's believe that children increasingly are
exploited in certain industries (especially small family-owned shops,
family farms, construction, and periodical sales) and by organized
crime (notably for prostitution and distribution of narcotics). A soon-
to-be-published ILO-commissioned report on ``Problems of Child Labor in
the Conditions of Transition in Bulgaria'' reports on the results of a
study conducted during the summer. The study found that 6.4 percent of
children between the ages of 5 and 17, or about 80,000 children, were
involved in paid employment in the informal sector. Of these, 55
percent were between the ages of 15 and 17, while 45 percent were
younger than 15 years old. These figures exclude children performing
unpaid work within the household or on a family farm. Underage
employment in the informal and agricultural sectors is believed to be
increasing as collective farms are broken up and the private sector
continues to grow. In addition children are known to work on family-
owned tobacco farms, and local NGO's reported children working on
nonfamily-owned farms for meager monetary or in-kind wages (e.g.,
food). NGO observers also report that institutionalized children often
hire themselves out to do agriculture labor for a modest income, during
periods when they are allowed out of the residential facility.
Forced and bonded labor by children also is forbidden by law;
however, trafficking in young girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national monthly minimum
wage is approximately $31 (73 leva), which is not enough to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family (the average
industrial wage is approximately $107 or 246 leva). Nonpayment of wages
and wage payments in arrears has been a growing problem with certain
employers, including state enterprises. The CITUB labor confederation
estimates that there is an overall backlog of $50 million in unpaid
wage arrears owed to public sector workers and workers in enterprises
which are wholly or partly state-owned. The Constitution stipulates the
right to social security and welfare aid assistance for the temporarily
unemployed, although in practice such assistance often is late.
The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours with at
least one 24-hour rest period per week. The MLSP is responsible for
enforcing both the minimum wage and the standard workweek. Enforcement
generally is effective in the state sector (aside from wage arrears),
but is weaker in the private sector.
A national labor safety program exists, with standards established
by the Labor Code. The Constitution states that employees are entitled
to healthy and nonhazardous working conditions. The MLSP is responsible
for enforcing these provisions. Conditions in many cases worsened due
to budget stringencies and a growing private sector that labor
inspectors do not yet supervise effectively. Protective clothing often
is absent from hazardous areas (goggles for welders and helmets for
construction workers, for example). The overall standard of living of
workers stabilized in 1998 after suffering a severe downturn during the
economic crisis of late 1996 and early 1997. The pervasive economic
crisis and imminent, long-overdue privatizations continue to create a
heightened fear of unemployment, leading to a reluctance on the part of
workers to pursue wage and safety demands. Joint employer/labor health
and safety committees to monitor workplace conditions, required by new
legislation passed in 1999, remained in developmental stages at year's
end.
Under the Labor Code, employees have the right to remove themselves
from work situations that present a serious or immediate danger to life
or health without jeopardizing their continued employment. However, in
practice refusal to work in situations with relatively high accident
rates or associated chronic health problems would result in the loss of
employment for many workers.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--In 1997 the Government enacted a law
against trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women and girls
remains a serious problem. The country is both a source and a transit
country for human trafficking. A 1997 amendment to the Penal Code on
trafficking in women introduced longer prison sentences (to existing
kidnaping penalties already in force) in those cases where the victim
is under 18 years of age, is offered to another person for sexual
abuse, or is trafficked abroad for sexual abuse. However, no suspected
traffickers have been brought to trial, possibly because victims are
afraid to confront their former criminal controllers when there are no
government- sponsored programs to assist or protect victims of
trafficking. Some judges and prosecutors also report that they feared
reprisals from organized crime figures. There are two police units that
specifically address the problem of trafficking in persons. One is part
of the border police and the other is in the Ministry of Interior's
organized crime fighting agency. High-level Ministry of Interior
officials cooperated closely with foreign governments and the
International Organization for Migration to support a research project
and information campaign to combat trafficking.
La Strada, a Netherlands-based NGO, reports that Bulgarian women
constitute one of the largest groups of victims of forced prostitution
in Western and Central Europe. Approximately 10,000 Bulgarian women,
many under the age of 18, may be involved in international trafficking
operations, but no official statistics are available. Village girls as
young as 14 years of age have been kidnaped and smuggled over the
border. This is a very lucrative business for Bulgarian criminal
organizations, and there have been widespread albeit unconfirmed
reports of local police involvement in trafficking in some areas.
Victims of trafficking range from those who were duped into the belief
that they would have good and respectable employment, to those who
expected to work as prostitutes but were unprepared for the degree of
violence and exploitation to which they would be subjected. A factor
contributing to the high number of trafficking victims from the country
is the high unemployment rate among young women. Furthermore, because
it may be very difficult for young women to obtain visas to work in
Western Europe, false job agencies that promise to simplify the process
can be very successful in luring trafficking victims. The process of
transforming girls into prostitutes generally takes place before they
even leave the country. The women typically are taken to a large town,
isolated, beaten, and subjected to severe physical and psychological
torture. Some trafficking victims from countries to the east are kept
in Bulgaria for several weeks where they are subjected to psychological
and physical abuse to make them more submissive before they are shipped
to their destination points. Once the women leave the country, their
identity documents are taken away, and they find themselves forced to
work as prostitutes in cities across Europe. Victims routinely report
that traffickers took away their passports and visas, and forced them
to stay illegally in countries. The women may be required to pay back
heavy financial debts to the agency that helped them depart the
country, leaving them in virtual indentured servitude. Traffickers
punish women severely for acts of disobedience. Traffickers also use
threats against the women's families and family reputations to ensure
obedience.
Relevant authorities and NGO observers report that thousands of
Bulgarian women have been trafficked to Poland, the Netherlands and the
Czech Republic, while others are trafficked to Germany, Belgium,
France, Canada, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo),
Romania, Hungary, Macedonia, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. Women
reportedly have been trafficked into Bulgaria from the former Soviet
Union and Macedonia, also for forced prostitution. The country also is
a transit point for traffickers bringing women to Greece. The northeast
and southwest border regions are where most trafficking occurs, since
women are sent more easily to former socialist countries with less
strict visa requirements.
The AAF reported handling 24 cases of returned victims of
trafficking in women during the first half of the year.
Technical and bureaucratic obstacles hamper governmental assistance
to female victims of violence. Many victims of trafficking and forced
prostitution are too young to have worked previously; the lack of
previous work experience disqualifies them from receiving social
security assistance. If they are runaways with no registered address to
which they can return, they are ineligible for humanitarian assistance.
They also are largely ineligible for government assistance programs,
most of which are in some way tied to previous employment status.
Victims are not encouraged to file complaints, as there is no mechanism
in place to protect witnesses.
Prevailing public attitudes often stigmatize victims, although
there are some signs that this may be changing slowly. There is one
NGO-sponsored 24-hour hot line for women in crisis, including victims
of trafficking, with trained volunteers as well as professional
therapists to counsel victims. The NGO also coordinates with government
agencies and other NGO's to find assistance for trafficking victims.
On April 18, the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
launched a trafficking awareness campaign. The campaign publicized the
availability of NGO counseling facilities, and AAF reported an increase
in cases related to trafficking during the year.
The Government increased its efforts during the year to address the
problem of trafficking on an interagency effort involving all relevant
government agencies, including law enforcement and social policy
agencies. The Government also has increased its international
cooperation in this area, both through the Southeast Europe Cooperation
Initiative (SECI) Anti-Crime Center in Bucharest and in bilateral
efforts.
__________
CROATIA
The Republic of Croatia is a constitutional parliamentary democracy
with a strong presidency. President Stjepan Mesic of the Croatian
People's Party (HNS) was elected in February to a 5-year term to
replace President Franjo Tudjman who died in office in December 1999;
Ivica Racan is the Prime Minister. International observers
characterized the elections as ``calm and orderly,'' noting that in
general, ``voters were able to express their political will freely,''
although some problems remained. The President serves as Head of State
and commander of the armed forces, nominates the Prime Minister who
leads the Government, and approves certain appointments in local and
regional government. On January 3, an opposition coalition defeated the
ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party in voting for the lower
house of Parliament. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) observers stated that the parliamentary elections
represented ``marked progress'' toward meeting OSCE standards. The
combination of a new President and a new democratic coalition in
Parliament helped to increase the transparency of the role of the
President and to end the blurring of the powers of the Presidency with
those of the Government and the ruling party. The judiciary increased
its independence as the Government reduced efforts to exert political
influence over court decisions. The judiciary continued to suffer from
bureaucratic and funding problems, as well as instances of political
influence at the local level.
The Ministry of Interior oversees the civilian national police, and
the Ministry of Defense oversees the military and military police. The
national police have primary responsibility for internal security but,
in times of disorder, the Government may call upon the army to provide
security. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control
of the professional security forces; however, the police occasionally
committed human rights abuses.
The new Government embarked on essential economic reforms, but the
transition to a market-based, free enterprise economy continued to
proceed slowly. While agriculture is mostly in private hands and the
number of small enterprises is increasing, industry and media
enterprises largely are either still controlled by the State or
deliberately were transferred under the Tudjman regime in
nontransparent, noncompetitive processes to individuals sympathetic to
the HDZ. In July an investment law was passed to remove some obstacles
to foreign direct investment. Government spending, although lower than
in previous years, remained high. Unemployment reached 22.4 percent at
year's end, was much higher in the war-affected areas, and may rise
further as nonproductive, formerly state-run enterprises are
liquidated. The standard of living for most of the population has yet
to recover to prewar levels. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
was $4,100 (33,210 kuna). Nonpayment of wages continued to be a serious
problem. Banks began lending again following a liquidity crisis of
previous years. Economic growth resumed after several years of decline,
and the exchange rate and prices remained stable. Income from tourism
was up over 30 percent over 1999, nearly reaching prewar levels.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; its human rights record improved during the year, but serious
problems remained in some areas. The Government's conduct of the
January and February elections improved citizens' ability to change
their Government peacefully. Police occasionally abused prisoners. The
Government continued to charge and arrest persons for war crimes
committed during the 1991-95 conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. Lengthy
pretrial detention, particularly for ethnic Serbs indicted for war
crimes, continued to be a problem. The judiciary remained a problem as
a pattern of arrests of ethnic Serbs for war crimes apparently based on
extremely weak evidence continued from previous years. The courts
continued to be subject to occasional political influence on the local
level and suffered from bureaucratic inefficiency, insufficient
funding, and a severe backlog of cases. The Government's respect for
citizens' privacy rights improved; however, the restitution of occupied
property to (mostly ethnic Serb) refugees returning to the country
remained problematic.
The Government's respect for freedom of speech and press improved
markedly, but some problems remained. Reports of the harassment of
journalists and censorship virtually ceased. However, reform in public
broadcasting has been slow, and an estimated 900 libel lawsuits against
journalists remained pending due to backlogs in the judicial system.
Parliament did not pass legislation to amend the law on state-owned
television and radio (HRT) during the year. The Government respected
academic freedom. The Constitutional Court struck down laws that
allowed excessive governmental interference in the operation of
associations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Respect for
freedom of religion improved somewhat during the year; however,
restitution of nationalized property remains a high, and unaddressed,
priority for several religious communities.
The Government took some steps to facilitate the return of refugee
citizens (mostly ethnic Serbs) and the return of persons internally
displaced by the 1991-95 conflict, including the establishment of a
coordinative commission to address issues in war-affected areas and the
reform of laws that previously discriminated against ethnic Serb
refugees. Although the number of refugees returning to their homes
accelerated during the year, serious problems remained. The
coordinative commission lapsed into inactivity by year's end, and no
significant progress was made on the restitution of private property or
resolution of the right to previously socially owned property, and this
continued to be the greatest obstacle to refugee returns.
Two rounds of presidential elections and one round of parliamentary
voting were conducted in a calm and orderly fashion, and the Government
addressed some irregularities and improved the process with each round.
However, the OSCE noted continuing problems: While many refugees in
neighboring countries, mostly ethnic Serbs, continued to be unable to
assert their citizenship and exercise their right to vote, the Law on
Citizenship grants voting rights to ethnic Croats born abroad but who
have no permanent residence in Croatia.
The Government's record of cooperation with international human
rights and monitoring organizations improved somewhat, although
problems remained. The Council of Europe, citing progress on human
rights, decided to terminate its permanent monitoring of Croatia in
September, and the OSCE terminated its police monitoring group in the
Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia) in October. In the first half of the
year, the Government took steps to improve cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
however, cooperation slowed in the second half of the year, and the
Government was reluctant and slow in providing timely access to
witnesses and documentary evidence. Some of the Tribunal's requests for
cooperation remained outstanding at year's end. The Government's
Ombudsman for Human Rights met periodically with human rights groups
and investigated, upon receipt of complaints, individual cases of human
rights violations.
Violence and discrimination against women remained problems. Ethnic
minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma, faced serious discrimination.
While some progress was made, ethnic tensions in the war-affected areas
remained high, and abuses, including ethnically motivated harassment
and assaults, continued to occur. There were two ethnically motivated
murders during the year. The country is a transit point and lesser
source and destination country for trafficking in persons.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There were no
reports of political killings.
There were two ethnically motivated killings of Serbs during the
year (see Section 5).
In August Milan Levar, a former police officer who previously
provided information to the ICTY about the 1991 massacre of civilians
in the town of Gospic, was killed at his Gospic home. Government
leaders condemned the killing, but an intensive police investigation
had not led to any arrests by December.
During the year nine persons were killed by landmines laid by
Croatian and Serb forces during the 1991-95 war. Three persons also
were killed in related demining incidents. The Croatian Center for
Demining reported that from 1991 through the end of the year, 1,320
mine incidents were recorded in which 365 persons were killed (see
Section 1.c.).
In July the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights released
its second report on human rights violations during the 1995 military
operation ``Storm'' in which Croatian forces recaptured rebel Serb
areas in the Krajina region. The report identifies over 600 ethnic Serb
civilians who were killed or reported missing in ``sector north.'' No
indictments have ever been brought for the events described in the
report.
Courts continued adjudicating war crimes cases arising from the
1991-95 conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. In an improvement over the
record of the previous Government, which prosecuted very few ethnic
Croats and then in often politicized trials, several ethnic Croats were
detained during the year for war crimes or other crimes committed
during the conflict. Five persons, including Tihomir Oreskovic, were
arrested in September on suspicion of war crimes committed during the
1991 Gospic massacre. A sixth suspect was arrested in December. At
year's end, four were in pretrial detention and two were released but
remained under investigation. In September two military intelligence
officers were arrested in Zadar for suspicion of involvement in the
1993 Ahmici massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Four others were
arrested but later released on suspicion of providing the officers with
false identities to facilitate their escape. At year's end, the two
arrestees remained in detention as the investigation proceeded. In May
the long-delayed retrial of soldier Mihajlo Hrastov began. The Supreme
Court in 1993 ordered the retrial after Hrastov was acquitted in 1992
of the massacre of 13 Serb prisoners in Karlovac in September 1991. At
year's end, the trial was adjourned while the prosecution sought
witnesses to the massacre. Also at year's end, the retrial was
beginning in the case of 6 soldiers originally acquitted in the 1995
massacre of 16 elderly Serbs in the villages of Varivode and Goscici.
In November the Supreme Court admitted committing an error in 1997 when
it amnestied Antun Gudelj, who had been convicted of the July 1991
murder of moderate Osijek police chief Josip Reichl-Kir (see Section
1.e.).
Trials of ethnic Serbs continued; however, a pattern of arresting
Serbs for war crimes based on extremely weak evidence continued from
previous years (see Section 1.e.). In May a Vukovar court convicted 11
ethnic Serbs of 22 indictees for war crimes committed during the fall
of Vukovar in 1991; 21 of the defendants were tried in absentia (see
Section 1.e.). The only individual to defend himself in person was
Stefan Curnic, who was convicted and received a 15-year sentence.
International observers assessed the evidence against Curnic as
credible but noted that he had been incarcerated since December 1998
without a trial (see Section 1.d.). In July five ethnic Serbs (the
``Sodolovci group''), whose 1999 conviction for war crimes was
overturned by the Supreme Court and remanded to a lower court for a
retrial, were acquitted for lack of evidence (see Section 1.e.). In
Osijek in October, 15 ethnic Serbs (the ``Baranja group'') were
arrested on 1991 war crimes indictments despite the fact that those
indictments had little or no supporting evidence. Eight of these
individuals remained incarcerated at year's end. There were at least 19
arrests of ethnic Serb refugees returning to Croatia after they had
been cleared for return, in violation of return procedures established
between the Government and UNHCR (see Section 2.d.).
Progress was made on the exhumation of graves and identification of
persons missing from the 1991-95 war at a number of sites in the
Danubian region. Throughout the country, the bodies of 3,197 victims
have been exhumed from mass and individual graves since the war (see
Section 1.b.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
Government figures in December showed that 1,567 persons (mostly
ethnic Croats) remained missing in cases unresolved from the 1991-95
military conflict. However, this number does not reflect approximately
900 additional persons (mostly ethnic Serbs) believed to be missing
since mid-1995, who were reported to the Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) or to international organizations.
There has been significant progress on the recovery and identification
of the remains of ethnic Croats; but efforts to identify missing ethnic
Serbs continued to be hampered by political and bureaucratic obstacles.
Throughout the country, 3,197 victims have been exhumed from mass and
individual graves since the war, including 73 during the year. The
remains of 110 persons were identified positively during the year. In
July and November the government commission charged with responsibility
for locating missing persons held a meeting with its Yugoslav
counterpart to exchange information on the missing and detained; these
meetings had been suspended since March 1999. In September the
Government formalized the status of the commission by legalizing it as
a government office with a separate budget. The September changes also
integrated the Danubian Subcomission for Missing Persons into the
office as a working group. In the past, the lack of transparency
regarding the commission's authority and budget hampered its efficient
operation.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, mistreatment, or cruel
or degrading punishment; however, police occasionally abused prisoners.
In October the OSCE terminated its uniformed Police Monitoring
Group (PMG) in the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia), assessing that
the local police performance was satisfactory and the security
situation in the region was stable. The PMG was replaced by a smaller
cadre of civilian police observers. There were periodic reports of
ethnic tensions between ethnic Serb and Croat police officers in the
Danubian region. For example, one ethnic Croat police officer ``dry-
fired'' his unloaded pistol into the face of an ethnic Serb colleague.
The officer received a short suspension from duty, and credible
observers expressed concern that mid-level police supervisors failed to
take the incident seriously or adequately punish the perpetrator.
However, upon being informed of the incident, the assistant Interior
Minister ordered a thorough investigation. The commander of the station
where the incident took place was replaced by year's end.
The number of reported ethnic incidents in the Danubian region fell
to less than half its 1999 level. This development largely was due to a
real decrease in the number of ethnic incidents. However, there were
reports of the failure of some police officers to regularly classify
ethnic incidents as such, and of a reluctance of ethnic Serbs to report
harassment because of a sense that such incidents have become
commonplace. Continuing problems include poor police investigative
techniques, acute social sensitivity to ethnic issues, indecisive
middle management in the police, and pressure from hard-line local
politicians. These factors impede development of local police
capability. In the Danubian region in particular, and depending upon
the ethnicity of the complainant, inconsistent police response to
housing disputes remained a problem. In May in consultation with OSCE,
the Interior Ministry began a reform and restructuring of its field
police presence that is intended to close 106 substations and, through
attrition, reduce the country's uniformed police-to-population ratio to
a level closer to that of other European countries. In December the
Government passed a new law on police, creating the position of
Director of Police and providing senior police officials more authority
to implement reforms at the precinct level.
During the year, 13 persons were injured by landmines laid by
Croatian and Serb forces during the 1991-95 war. Five persons also were
injured in related demining incidents. The Croatian Center for Demining
reported that from 1991 through the end of the year, 1,320 mine
incidents were recorded, in which 1,281 persons were injured (see
Section 1.a.).
In October judge Marko Rogulja, an ethnic Serb judge on the Vukovar
municipal bench in the Danubian region, was threatened by a mob (that
included the county prefect) shortly after he had issued a decision to
evict an ethnic Croat police officer from a home he was occupying that
was owned by an ethnic Serb. The eviction never was carried out and the
case later was transferred to another judge. No public officials,
either at the municipal or national level, made any public statement
about the incident or otherwise condemned the harassment of a judge.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. Police
reportedly occasionally abused prisoners. Jails are crowded, but not
excessively so, and family visits and access to counsel generally are
available, albeit not consistently at all phases of the criminal
proceedings (see Section 1.d.).
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides for rights of accused persons, but the Government does not
always respect due process provisions for arrest and detention. Police
normally obtain arrest warrants by presenting evidence of probable
cause to an investigative magistrate. Police may make arrests without a
warrant if they believe a suspect might flee, destroy evidence, or
commit other crimes; such cases of warrantless arrest are not uncommon.
The police then have 24 hours to justify the arrest to a magistrate.
Detainees must be given access to an attorney of their choice
within 24 hours of their arrest; if they have none and are charged with
a crime for which the sentence is over 10 years' imprisonment, the
magistrate appoints counsel. The magistrate must, within 48 hours of
the arrest, decide whether to extend the detention for further
investigation. Investigative detention generally lasts up to 30 days,
but the Supreme Court may extend the period (for a total of not more
than 6 months) in exceptional cases. Once the investigation is
complete, detainees can be released on their own recognizance pending
trial unless the crime is a serious offense, or the accused is
considered a public danger, may influence witnesses, or is a flight
risk.
Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem, particularly
for ethnic Serbs accused of war crimes. Suspects generally are held in
custody pending trial, and there have been several cases of pretrial
detention lasting for several months or years, including individuals
awaiting the prosecutor's appeal of their acquittal. For example, in
the case of Stefan Curnic, who was convicted for war crimes,
international observers noted that he had been incarcerated since
December 1998 without a trial (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). The
practice of posting bail after an indictment is available but is not
common.
The Government continued to apply the 1996 Amnesty Law (which
amnestied acts of rebellion by ethnic Serbs) in an arbitrary and unfair
manner. While some improvement was noted early in the year, in October
the state prosecutor directed local prosecutors to reopen old war
crimes cases and execute dormant arrest warrants, although there
appeared to be no new evidence to justify the arrests. As a result,
although there only were 7 such arrests during the first 9 months of
the year, there were at least 36 during the final 3 months. For
example, in October 15 ethnic Serbs were arrested in Baranja in the
Danubian region (8 of whom still were incarcerated at year's end) for
1991 indictments for war crimes, despite the fact that those
indictments had little or no supporting evidence (see Sections 1.a. and
5). Because the arrests were not based upon new evidence, they violated
letters of agreement between the U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern
Slavonia (UNTAES) and the Government reached under the auspices of the
1995 Erdut Agreement. Government officials later justified the arrests
by calling these agreements ``gentlemen's agreements'' and ``merely
verbal agreements.''
Several ethnic Serb defendants continued to be held in detention
for extended periods as their cases slowly progressed through the
overburdened judicial system. In April in the Lepoglava Prison, 27
ethnic Serb prisoners engaged in a 2-week hunger strike to protest
shortcomings in the application of the Amnesty Law, particularly the
slow pace of their proceedings and the Government's failure to
reexamine previous convictions based on unfair procedures or weak and
contradictory evidence.
There were at least 19 cases of ethnic Serb refugees being arrested
upon return to the country, in violation of clearance procedures agreed
upon by the Government and the UNHCR. In four of these cases the
subject later was released after being amnestied under the Amnesty Act
or when charges were dropped. In August Dusan Jokic was arrested on a
warrant for a 1995 robbery conviction while on a U.N.-organized visit
to his prewar home in Obrovac. In September charges were dropped under
the Amnesty Law and Jokic was released. Also in August, Slavko Drobnjak
was arrested in Petrinja based on a previous conviction in absentia for
1991 war crimes. In October Miljan Strunjas was arrested in Karlovac, a
week after returning to the country, on suspicion of committing 1991
war crimes. International observers did not question the Government's
right to prosecute criminals but expressed concern that arrests of
persons who had been cleared for return and informed by authorities
that there were no outstanding charges against them would harm the
process of refugee returns. In the autumn, the Government streamlined
its clearance procedure to process requests more efficiently for
refugees intending to return.
In the Danubian region monitors noted that police occasionally
called ethnic Serbs to police stations for ``voluntary informative
talks,'' which amounted to brief warrantless detentions intended to
harass Serb citizens.
Two Serb police officers in Borovo Selo and Ilok (both in the
Danubian region) were arrested in 1999 for war crimes despite the fact
that they previously were cleared for police duty by the Ministry of
Interior. One of the officers was convicted of war crimes and sentenced
to 15 years in prison. The other remained in investigative detention at
year's end, pending trial. At least four Serb police officers were
arrested during the year on war crimes charges and remained in
detention. There were no reports of Serb officers fleeing to Yugoslavia
when they learned they were the subject of investigations.
The Constitution prohibits the exile of citizens. In 1998 the
Government established procedures for Croatian Serbs who fled the
country during the conflict to have their citizenship recognized,
obtain personal documentation, return to Croatia, and reclaim their
property and social benefits. Implementation of these procedures
continued to be slow and uneven (see Section 2.d.). During the year,
27,900 persons who were refugees in Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
were able to return to Croatia in returns organized by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The pace of organized returns during
the year was 50 percent higher than in 1999, in large part because of
the new Government's commitment to facilitate the process. Of
approximately 250,000 ethnic Serbs who fled their homes, organized
returns since the end of the conflict in 1995 through December totaled
37,144. In addition an estimated 30,000 persons returned outside of
official programs.
Ethnic Serbs requiring personal documentation to return to or
regularize their status within the country continued to report
difficulties, delays, and contradictory requirements from local
officials charged with issuing documents. However the number of such
reports was lower than in the past. Several NGO's reported that despite
the central Government's commitment to facilitate the documentation
process, obstructions often were caused by recalcitrant local
officials.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is autonomous and
independent under the Constitution; however, it suffers from instances
of political influence at the local level, and a large backlog of over
1.1 million cases and funding shortfalls remain.
The judicial system consists of municipal and county courts, the
Administrative court, and the Supreme Court. The independent
Constitutional Court both determines the constitutionality of laws,
governmental acts, and elections and serves as the court of final
appeal for individual cases. A parallel commercial court system
adjudicates commercial and contractual disputes. The State Judicial
Council (consisting of a president and 14 members serving 8-year terms)
is a body independent of both the judiciary and the Ministry of
Justice. It is charged with the appointment and discipline, including
removal, of judges and public prosecutors. The lower house of
Parliament nominates and elects persons for membership on the Council.
The 11 judges of the Constitutional Court are elected for 8-year terms
in the same manner, while all other judges are appointed for life.
In the past, the State Judicial Council was criticized for the
politicization of its decisions. In March the Constitutional Court
struck down some provisions of the Law on the State Judicial Council
and criticized the Council for failing to abide by several court
decisions and for lack of transparency in making judicial appointments.
The Constitutional Court also directed the Council to repeat the
confirmation process for 16 judges (including 5 Supreme Court
nominations) that were improperly rejected by the council. However,
because four members resigned from the Council during the year in
protest over its politicization, the Council was not able to convene to
act on this court order. Amendments to the Law on the State Judicial
Council passed in December, in response to the Supreme Court ruling,
were designed to depoliticize the Council and judicial appointments
and, by extension, improve the quality and the number of sitting
judges. The amendments empower the Minister of Justice (rather than the
Council) to nominate and discipline Court presidents. They also
introduce more transparency into the appointment and discipline of
judges by, inter alia, providing for the Constitutional Court to review
such proceedings.
Judges are constitutionally prohibited from being members of any
political party. Under the new Government, the judiciary has been
subject to less political influence than was the case under the
previous regime, although reports of political influence at the local
level continued. The politicization of hard-line judges appointed by
the previous Government, who at times made decisions in a
nontransparant manner seemingly at odds with the evidence or the law,
also continued to be a problem. The Constitutional Court in particular
has demonstrated during the year a commitment to impartial and
nonpolitical rulings that have helped to overcome the legacy of the
previous regime and to lay the foundation for an increased respect for
the rule of law.
The greatest problems facing the judiciary are inexperienced judges
and bureaucratic inefficiencies and funding shortfalls which, over the
years, have created a massive backlog estimated at over 1.1 million
cases, some dating back 30 years or more. Cases may drag on for years.
The inexperience of young and recently appointed judges continued to be
a problem. There continued to be areas of the country without a
permanent judge. In August and September, three convicted felons were
released because they did not receive their second instance (Supreme
Court) decisions within the statutory limit of 30 months. Justice
Ministry and Supreme Court officials noted that cases often would
languish for extended periods at the first instance court and then be
passed to the Supreme Court just days or weeks before the 30-month
limit expired. Compounding this problem were scheduling inefficiencies
at the Supreme Court, where there is a 10,000 case backlog and only 35
judges who do not have access to modern court technologies and case
management techniques. As a result of these prisoner releases, the
Supreme Court streamlined its procedures in the autumn and no more such
releases were reported. According to the president of the Association
of Croatian Judges, the Government failed to provide the financial
means necessary for the regular operation of the courts.
Although the Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial
and a variety of due process rights in the courts, citizens were
sometimes denied fair trials. Courts tried and convicted in absentia
persons for war crimes. In May a Vukovar court convicted 11 ethnic
Serbs out of a total of 22 Serb indictees for war crimes committed
during and after the fall of Vukovar in 1991; 21 of the defendants were
tried in absentia. The only individual to defend himself in person was
Stefan Curnic, who was convicted and received a 15-year sentence.
International observers assessed the evidence against Curnic as
credible but noted that he had been incarcerated since December 1998
without a trial (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). In August and October,
authorities arrested at least 19 ethnic Serbs for war crimes, in an
apparent breach of established return procedures (see Sections 1.a. and
1.d.).
In July five ethnic Serbs (the ``Sodolovci group''), whose 1999
convictions for war crimes were overturned by the Supreme Court and
remanded to the Osijek court for a retrial, were acquitted for lack of
evidence. The 1999 convictions were, according to international
observers and ethnic Serbs, based on improper judicial procedures and
weak evidence. In October the Minister of Justice reported that 69
ethnic Serbs were in Croatian jails for charges relating to wartime
events, including 61 held for war crimes.
In November the Supreme Court admitted committing an error in 1997
when it amnestied Antun Gudelj, who had been convicted of the July 1991
murder of moderate Osijek police chief Josip Reichl-Kir. At year's end,
the Constitutional Court had not ruled yet on whether to order Gudelj
rearrested and retried.
Little or no progress was made in thousands of cases of illegal
occupancy in which the legal property owner (typically a returning Serb
refugee) had a positive court decision and legal right but was unable
to recover occupied property. Judicial decisions overwhelmingly favored
ethnic Croats in property claims involving returning refugees and
displaced persons. In those cases in which the court ruled in favor of
a non-Croat, only a handful of judicial orders for the eviction of a
Croat occupant of a Serb-owned home have ever been carried out by the
police (see Section 1.f.). Many cases of illegal occupancy involve
current or former members of the Croatian military or police forces,
and local authorities systematically refused to act against them on
behalf of lawful owners. The only recourse for the lawful owner was to
return to court to demand implementation of the first decision, a time-
consuming and costly procedure that only rarely resulted in
implementation.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution declares the home inviolable;
however, at times the Government infringed on these rights. Only a
court may issue a search warrant, which must justify the search. Police
may enter a home without a warrant or the owner's consent only to
enforce an arrest warrant, apprehend a suspect, or prevent serious
danger to life or property. The Government's respect for citizens'
privacy improved measurably; however, the restitution of occupied
private property to (mostly ethnic Serb) refugees returning to the
country remained a problem. Very few property owners and apartment
tenants were able to recover their prewar dwellings.
Despite a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling that several elements of
the Law on the Temporary Takeover of Specified Property were
unconstitutional, the vast majority of the thousands of ethnic Serb
property owners who fled homes that later were occupied by ethnic
Croats remained unable to access their property. A 1998 program for the
return of refugees and displaced persons, which included mechanisms for
property restitution and reconstruction, did not have the full force of
law. The program was implemented very slowly, and only a handful of
cases of property restitution were recorded during the year, as both
national and local authorities declined to take steps to displace
temporary occupants in favor of the original owners. Backlogs in the
judicial system represented a further impediment to timely resolution
of housing disputes. Governmental promises made in the autumn to reform
and streamline the housing commissions were unfulfilled at year's end.
Further, only a handful of claims by ethnic Serbs for reconstruction
have been considered.
Despite orders from the national Government, local authorities
(including local housing commissions) often did not take steps to
regulate occupancy rights or to initiate lawsuits against individuals
who refused to vacate occupied premises. This situation largely
remained unchanged from the previous year. Thousands of returning
ethnic Serb displaced persons and refugees continued to remain shut out
of their homes, although in many cases the occupier's house had been
reconstructed so there was no impediment to the occupier's return home.
In some cases, the Government failed to furnish reconstructed houses
with basic utilities, discouraging returns. In other instances,
returnees who gained access to their property were held responsible for
water and power bills accumulated by temporary occupants, and
authorities refused to reconnect the services until the bills were
paid. Local housing commissions often were purposefully dysfunctional
and failed to resolve housing disputes, or when functional legally were
powerless to implement their own decisions under an existing legal
framework that still was unaddressed by the Government.
An ongoing problem was the continued occupation of homes belonging
to Croatian Serbs by refugees from neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Yugoslavia, as well as ``priority category'' ethnic Croat citizens,
i.e., active duty or former members of the military, widows, and
orphans. Meanwhile, ethnic Croats wishing to return to their homes in
the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia) generally were able to recover
their homes by evicting ethnic Serbs occupying them. Many Serb
returnees were unable to move into looted and devastated homes that the
Government defined as habitable. Of the total 7,123 applications for
repossession of property recorded by the government Office for
Displaced Persons and Refugees at the end of August 1999, less than
one-fourth were listed as returned to their owners. No update was
available at year's end.
No progress was made to resolve the thousands of cases of persons
(mostly ethnic Serbs) who lost their claims to their prewar socially-
owned apartments due to their absence for more than 6 months during the
conflict. Ethnic Serbs were affected disproportionately because no
mechanism existed by which they could return to the country in order to
claim their property or because they had lived in the occupied parts of
the country and missed the chance to purchase their prewar apartments.
Incidents of grenade attacks against property and arson related to
housing disputes were reported during the year (see Section 5).
The Constitution provides for the secrecy and safety of personal
data, and this provision generally was respected. In line with a March
Constitutional Court ruling, the Parliament in May adopted amendments
to the internal affairs law that revoked the Interior Minister's
sweeping discretionary powers to wiretap. The amendments grant
wiretapping authority only in cases where the Criminal Code may be
violated or there is a threat to the country's sovereignty, and they
establish an independent board to oversee all wiretapping. In July the
three members of the independent board were appointed; they are
nonpartisan nonparliamentarians who will report to the parliamentary
Intelligence Committee. In September the Interior Minister announced
that several intelligence officials were disciplined and prosecuted for
illegal wiretapping.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of thought and expression, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice, although some problems remained. The
Constitutional provisions specifically include freedom of the press and
other media, speech, and public expression, as well as the free
establishment of institutions of public communication. Since the new
Government took office in January, there has been a marked improvement
in respect for freedom of speech and the media.
Reports of harassment including threats, wiretapping, surveillance,
and beatings of journalists largely ceased. Official harassment in the
form of job loss, banishment from the air (for nonpayment of excessive
fees), and overzealous tax enforcement has stopped. Self-censorship
(not covering controversial stories for fear of libel lawsuits) largely
has ceased. No incidents of censorship of the electronic media were
reported. The government campaign of harassment of the independent
media through the use of libel suits stopped, although the estimated
900 libel cases from previous years (including 70 lawsuits filed
against the satirical weekly Feral Tribune) have not concluded due to a
slow and overburdened judicial system.
In February the Constitutional Court struck down legal provisions
that allowed defamation cases against journalists to be tried under
``urgent proceedings,'' meaning that the case would come to trial
within 8 days, seriously prejudicing the defendant's ability to prepare
a case. In May the Constitutional Court struck down a law that allowed
prosecutors to file criminal charges against journalists for defamation
of certain senior state officials. In June Parliament passed a bill
amending the law to bring it in line with this ruling by formally
rescinding the provision the court had struck down. However, by year's
end, the Government still had not amended the Penal Code articles
authorizing the prosecution of journalists who publish ``state
secrets,'' articles that were abused in the past. The Government
continued to control the regulatory framework and licensing of radio
and television, including the selection of members of the managing
council and the Council for Radio and Television. By year's end, the
Government had not passed legislation to address these issues. While
management changes at government-controlled radio and television (HRT)
in the spring improved the quality of news programming, the Government
was slow to fulfill its overall reform commitments (primarily due to
the difficulty in reducing the bloated HRT workforce). A truly
independent nationwide television station did not yet exist by year's
end.
The population continued to rely on government-run radio and
television for news; however, a network of independent local television
stations is producing Vijesti, a competing nightly news program. As a
result of the 1999 Telecommunications Law, ``networking'' allowed
independent media to achieve national coverage. Croatian Cable Network,
an independent network of 8 television stations, was able to broadcast
Vijesti, offering the first real competition to HRT'S Dnevnik program.
The latter still was the most widely watched national news program, and
was more balanced than in the past. HRT continued to enjoy an
overwhelming advantage as the recipient of the bulk of advertising
revenues and subsidies from government taxes on television users. These
subsidies create an unfair advantage for the HRT over any independent
television station that tries to compete, since the independents'
ability to purchase programming, etc., is far less than that of the
HRT. Similar problems exist in radio broadcasting. The Catholic Church
operates the only private national radio station, but it invites other
denominations to participate in ecumenical programming (see Section
2.c.). The new Government (unlike the previous regime) did not close
independent media outlets for nonpayment of (often exorbitant)
licensing fees.
Nearly all distribution of newspapers and magazines continued to be
controlled by Tisak, a once-profitable firm that operates 1,700 news
kiosks. Due to mismanagement, Tisak faced bankruptcy proceedings and
still owed large debts to print media publishers. These debts, and the
fact that the bankruptcy case is unlikely to be resolved quickly, put
severe financial pressure on newspaper and magazine publishers. The
trial of Tisak chief Miroslav Kutle for forgery and abuse of power in
Tisak's collapse was ongoing at year's end. Tisak is now administered
by the Government's Privatization Fund and there are no longer
complaints that Tisak manipulates the distribution of print media by
leaving some areas oversupplied with publications and others
undersupplied. Foreign newspapers and journals continue to be available
in the larger urban areas throughout the country; however, because of
their high cost they remain largely inaccessible to many.
Academic freedom was respected. Under the new Government, there
have been no reports of restraints on academic freedom through control
of research funds or otherwise. The previous dean of the University of
Zagreb's philosophy faculty, a hard-liner closely associated with the
previous Government, was replaced in October.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
respected this right in practice. A 1999 law permits assembly for
registered demonstrations at approved locations, and while this law was
less restrictive, it does not make transparent the process for
approving or denying the registration of an assembly, there were no
reports that it was used discriminatorily.
In March, thousands peacefully marched to protest the 45-year
sentence served on General Tihomir Blaskic by the ICTY.
The Constitution provides for the right of association. In February
the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the 1997 Law on
Associations that had increased the Government's ability to restrict
the right of association through interference in the registration and
operation of associations and nongovernmental organizations. Parliament
did not pass new proposed legislation by year's end to comply with this
ruling and to reduce governmental interference and make registration
less onerous.
The Government continued to operate an office for cooperation with
NGO's that coordinates NGO efforts with government initiatives on human
rights and civil society. Budget cuts reduced this office's
disbursements to NGO's and civic organizations from $3.7 million (31.6
million kuna) in 1999 to $2.5 million (20.5 million kuna) during the
year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
conscience and religion and free public profession of religious
conviction, and the Government respects these rights in practice. No
formal restrictions are imposed on religious groups, and all religious
communities are free to conduct public services and to open and run
social and charitable institutions. Roman Catholicism is the majority
faith, and there are smaller Eastern Orthodox, Christian, Muslim, and
Jewish communities. Croatian Protestants from a number of denominations
and foreign clergy and missionaries actively practice and proselytize.
The overall situation for freedom of religion improved somewhat
during the year. Government officials have expressed publicly a
commitment to improving the climate for religious freedom, but their
approach during the year was ad hoc, addressing problems as they arose
rather than setting uniform nondiscriminatory standards for all
communities. Early in the year, the Government established a
``Commission for Relations with Religious Communities'' whose purview
includes the rights of minority religions, religious instruction in
schools, and restitution of nationalized property. This commission
replaced a similar office under the previous government. However,
leaders of minority religious communities, who would like to use the
commission to secure the same benefits as those enjoyed by the Catholic
Church, reported that no substantive progress was made by year's end.
While there is no official state religion, the Roman Catholic
Church is one of the most powerful national symbols and enjoys a
historic relationship with the state not shared by other denominations.
Approximately 85 percent of the population are Catholic. This
relationship is codified in the ``concordats'', a series of 1997
bilateral treaties between the Government and the Vatican that regulate
many aspects of church/state relations from the recognition of
marriages to state subsidies for the church. The Catholic Church
receives state financing to support pensions for priests and nuns
through government-managed pension and health funds. Other religious
communities still do not have such an agreement with the State, nor is
there a law that regulates these issues. (Orthodox priests and imams
have been paying their contributions to the health and pension funds
from their own resources, in order to be covered by a pension plan.) In
July the Catholic Church signed an agreement with the state-run
broadcaster (HRT) to provide regular, extensive coverage of Catholic
events (as much as 10 hours per month). Other denominations receive
about 10 minutes broadcast time per month. Separately the Catholic
Church operates the only private national radio station, but it invites
other denominations to participate in ecumenical programming (see
Section 2.a.).
The previous HDZ Government implemented restitution of religious
property in a discriminatory manner. The Government signed a concordat
with the Vatican in 1998 that provided for the return of all Catholic
Church property confiscated by the Communist regime after 1945. This
agreement stipulates that the Government would return seized properties
or compensate the Church where return is impossible. Some progress has
been made with some returnable properties being restituted, but there
has been no compensation to date for nonreturnable properties.
No such agreements exist between the Government and other religious
groups. The Orthodox community filed several requests for the return of
seized properties, and some cases have been resolved successfully,
particularly cases involving buildings in urban centers. However,
several buildings in downtown Zagreb have not been returned, nor have
properties that belonged to monasteries, such as arable land and
forest. In December 1999, the Government returned to the Jewish
community a site in downtown Zagreb where the main synagogue was
located until its destruction in World War II. However, other Jewish
properties, including some Zagreb buildings, have not been returned.
The Jewish community identifies property return as one of its top
priorities.
Catholic marriages are recognized by the State, eliminating the
need to register them in the civil registry office. The Muslim and
Jewish communities, seeking similar status, have raised this issue
repeatedly with the Government, but there has been no resolution by
year's end.
Zagreb Archbishop Josip Bozanic took office in 1997 and has sought
a role for the Catholic Church independent of the Government. Bozanic
has been active in publicly promoting ethnic reconciliation and the
return of refugees. The Catholic Church consolidated its privileged
position among the several religious communities, but at the same time
has improved ecumenical dialogue, particularly with the Serb Orthodox
Community. In February Orthodox and Catholic bishops met in Yugoslavia,
in June Orthodox Patriarch Pavle visited Croatia and met with Bozanic,
and in August they met again in Belgrade.
Notions of religion and ethnicity are linked closely in society,
but the majority of incidents of discrimination are motivated by
ethnicity rather than religion or religious doctrine. There were
persistent reports of vandalism to Serb Orthodox cemeteries and
structures, as well as to a Jewish community center (see Section 5).
The Ministry of Defense employs 19 Catholic Priests to tend to
Catholics in the military. However, neither Orthodox nor Muslim clerics
were given this opportunity. A Catholic priest is present and gives a
blessing at the oath-giving ceremony upon entering the army, but other
clerics have not been invited to participate. The Government requires
that religious training be provided in schools, although attendance is
optional. Schools filling the necessary quota of seven minority
students per class are allowed to offer separate religion classes for
these students. In classes not meeting this quota, minority students
may fulfill the religion requirement by bringing a certificate that
they received classes from their religious community. Generally the
lack of resources, minority students, and qualified teachers impeded
religious instruction in minority faiths. Jewish officials noted that
basic information provided to students about Judaism was inaccurate,
and their offers to improve the material continued to go unheeded.
Foreign missionaries occasionally reported difficulty in obtaining
appropriate working visas, but under the new Government immigration
authorities have made a conscious effort to process their visa requests
more expeditiously than in the past. Missionaries do not operate
registered schools, but the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(Mormon) community provides free English lessons, normally followed by
religion class. The Muslim community has a secondary school in Zagreb,
but the Ministry of Education continued to refuse to recognize its
diploma; a lawsuit to resolve the matter was pending at year's end.
About 20 students per year graduate from the school.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution generally provides for
these rights, with certain restrictions. All persons must register
their residence with the local authorities. Under exceptional
circumstances, the Government legally may restrict the right to enter
or leave the country if necessary to protect the ``legal order, health,
rights, or freedoms of others.''
There were at least 19 arrests of ethnic Serb refugees returning to
Croatia after they had been cleared for return, in violation of return
procedures established between the Government and UNHCR (see Sections
1.a. and 1.d.).
There were no reports that the Government revoked citizenship for
political reasons. The Government's procedures to verify and document
the citizenship of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs who fled the
country after the military operations in 1995 improved slightly during
the year; however, this process for the most part has remained slow and
uneven. International observers assessed that delays and obstacles more
often were created by limited resources and overburdened consular
offices in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia than by willful
discrimination.
During the year, 27,900 persons who were refugees in Yugoslavia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina were able to return to Croatia in returns organized
by the UNHCR (see Section 1.d.).
A significant number of internally displaced persons remains in the
country, although not all are under the Government's direct care. While
the government reported some 57,000 persons (34,000 internally
displaced and 23,000 refugees, mostly from Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Yugoslavia) with refugee or displaced person status at year's end, this
number does not reflect fully an additional 140,000 former refugees
(nearly all ethnic Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina) who have become
citizens of Croatia.
International monitors and NGO's assessed that the emigration of
ethnic Serbs from the Danubian region to third countries continued, but
at a much slower pace than in previous years. Despite the fact that the
Government continued an intensive program to repair thousands of
damaged homes in the Danubian region, government officials, NGO's, and
international observers assessed that the reduction of population
movements into and out of the region to a trickle indicates that the
returns process is nearing its completion there. In the first 9 months
of the year, only 3,004 (mostly ethnic Croat) displaced persons
returned to their prewar homes within the region, and 2,688 (mostly
ethnic Serb) displaced persons left the region for prewar homes
elsewhere in Croatia. Of 70,000 (mostly ethnic Croats) who fled the
region during the conflict, 49,000 have returned. Overall the ethnic
Serb population in the region has fallen from a prewar number of 70,000
to an estimated 55,000 persons. While ethnic tensions continued in the
Danubian region, the overall security situation was stable. The most
salient disincentive to returns was the poor state of the regional
economy.
President Mesic and Prime Minister Racan made frequent public
statements encouraging the return and reintegration of all Croatian
citizens to their prewar homes. These commitments were supported by
several initiatives. In March the Government established a commission
to address issues in the war-affected areas. While the commission
largely had concentrated its efforts on the Danubian region, it made
little progress effecting return and reintegration throughout the other
war-effected regions of the country and lapsed into inactivity at
year's end. Also in March, the Government signed a joint declaration
with the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina to cooperate in
a number of technical areas to facilitate two-way refugee returns. Some
efforts were made to help register the return of 2,000 refugees from
Bosnia; however, the other provisions of the declaration remained
unfulfilled at year's end. In June the Government brokered the signing
of a joint statement by leaders of the Croatian Serb and Bosnian Croat
communities in Croatia that encourages returns and repossession of
private property in an atmosphere of respect for human and civil
rights; however, little progress was made during the year on property
restitution. In June and July, the Government reformed two laws that
previously discriminated against ethnic Serb returnees. The Law on
Reconstruction regulates access to reconstruction assistance and the
Law on Areas of Special State Concern provides incentives to revitalize
war-affected areas.
Notwithstanding the reform of the two laws, there has been no
significant administrative or legislative progress on restitution of
property. The greatest outstanding obstacle to the return of all
Croatian citizens is their inability to regain access to their prewar
homes and properties. Existing mechanisms for the return of private
property have worked best in the Danubian region where returnees tend
to be ethnic Croats seeking to regain their homes from ethnic Serbs who
are occupying them. Nearly every other instance of restituted property
occurred pursuant to a private agreement between the owner and
occupier.
In May the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the Law
on the Status of Displaced Persons and Refugees that prohibited
evictions unless alternative accommodation was provided for the
evictee. This provision had the effect of reinforcing the legal
precedence of temporary occupants over that of property owners, and it
provided an easy means for hard-line officials to obstruct the process
of minority returns. The law continued to contain other discriminatory
language, notably the failure of positive amendments enacted in
November 1999 to be applied retroactively, and that therefore allowed
existing discriminatory definitions of ``displaced person'' and
``refugee'' to remain in effect.
There were persistent reports that humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance was not distributed fairly by government agencies. The
Government allowed free access to all displaced persons by domestic and
international humanitarian organizations and permitted them to provide
assistance. However, the Government at times accused international
organizations of bias in providing assistance only to ethnic Serb
returnees.
The Government cooperated with UNHCR and other humanitarian and
international organizations assisting refugees. The Government began
implementation of the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Thus persons seeking
refuge (notably from Kosovo and Yugoslavia) are given ``temporary
protection.'' Separately asylum seekers are processed by the Interior
Ministry under the Law on Residence of Aliens. A working group of
Interior Ministry and UNHCR officials continued its work drafting new
legislation on asylum to meet international standards. The country
provides first asylum and there were no reports of persons claiming
asylum being returned to countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
All citizens over 18 years of age have the right to vote by secret
ballot. The President is limited by the Constitution to two 5-year
terms. President Stjepan Mesic was elected in two rounds of voting in
January and February to a 5-year term to replace President Franjo
Tudjman, who died in office in December 1999. The elections generally
were well conducted, and irregularities (particularly at out-of-country
polling stations) during the first round were addressed at the second
round. OSCE monitors characterized the elections as ``calm and
orderly,'' noting that ``voters were able to express their political
will freely;'' however, problems remained. The Citizenship Law and
electoral legislation grant citizenship, and thereby the franchise, on
purely ethnic grounds to ethnic Croats abroad with no genuine link to
the country. Meanwhile the Government failed to ensure that many
Croatian Serbs, who fled in 1995 and who wished to assume the
responsibilities of Croatian citizenship, were able to document their
Croatian citizenship in order to vote and ultimately to return.
Progress on the documentation and return of ethnic Serb refugees
continued to be slow (see Sections 1.d and 2.d.).
The Parliament comprises the (lower) House of Representatives and
the (upper) House of Counties. During the January elections, an
opposition coalition led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the
Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) won a majority of the lower house,
ending 9 years of HDZ party rule. OSCE monitors characterized the
voting as having made ``marked progress'' toward meeting OSCE
standards. The 1999 electoral law that regulated the voting allowed
independent monitoring by NGO's and the establishment of multiparty
voting commissions.
Other concerns about the electoral process remained. The electoral
law reduced the number of lower house seats reserved for ethnic
minorities from seven to five (although minorities make up about 15
percent of the population). Previous legislation more closely matched
the minority representation to the size of the minority population, and
the 1999 reduction in minority seats was especially disadvantageous to
ethnic Serbs.
Women and minorities were underrepresented in government and
politics, although there were no legal restrictions on their
participation. After the January lower house elections, 32 of 151 lower
house seats were held by women, and 11 by ethnic (non-Croat)
minorities. Of the upper house's 68 seats, 4 were held by women and 3
by ethnic minorities. On the local level, Milan Djukic, an ethnic Serb
member of Parliament, was elected mayor of the town of Donji Lapac in
September. Djukic thus became the first member of an ethnic Serb party
to win a mayoralty outside of the Danubian region.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A variety of domestic and international human rights NGO's operate
without government interference, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. The Government generally is
cooperative. The Parliamentary Ombudsman for Human Rights received over
1,500 individual complaints during the year. The Ombudsman met
periodically with human rights groups and NGO representatives who
reported that the Ombudsman is largely reactive, responding to
individual complaints rather than setting an agenda for greater respect
for human rights. Because it is a parliamentary rather than
governmental office, the Ombudsman's authority to order compliance from
government ministries is limited.
A number of NGO's, the largest being Citizens Organized to Monitor
Elections (GONG) and Voice 99 (Glas 99), were active in organizing pre-
electoral informational campaigns and in election monitoring at the
January and February elections.
NGO's have difficulty soliciting contributions or donations to
support their work, in part because there is no tax benefit for donors.
NGO's also must pay taxes on contributions classified as income. Thus
many human rights groups rely on international donations and government
funding to pursue their work. NGO representatives reported that the new
Government's attitude towards NGO's was improved significantly over
that of the previous regime. NGO's were no longer harassed for
criticizing the Government, and the Government's office for cooperation
with NGO's, while operating with limited resources, was active in
coordinating NGO and governmental efforts on human rights and civil
society. However, while cooperation with government officials in Zagreb
improved, a lack of follow-through on central government commitments by
local authorities continued to be a problem.
International organizations, including the European Community
Monitoring Mission, the OSCE, and the UNHCR among others, operated
freely. In March the Government established a commission to address
refugee returns and housing reconstruction in war-affected areas. This
commission met periodically with NGO's, representatives of ethnic
communities, and international organizations. However, after early
promise, the commission lapsed into inactivity by year's end (see
Section 2.d.). The Council of Europe (COE) in September, citing
progress on human rights, decided to end its permanent monitoring of
Croatia. Of 21 obligations which Croatia assumed when it joined the COE
in 1996, 4 remained outstanding: The abolishment of discriminatory laws
regulating refugee returns, full cooperation with ICTY, transformation
of HTV into a private television station, and amending the
constitutional law on minorities. In October the OSCE, citing a stable
security environment in the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia) and
satisfactory local police performance there, terminated its police
monitoring group in the region. The police monitoring function was
assumed by a smaller cadre of civilian observers.
Committees in the Parliament and in the Government were tasked
specifically with human and minority rights issues, and they met
periodically throughout the year to discuss topics and legislation
within their purview. The parliamentary Committee participated in
several legislative initiatives including the package of laws on
minority rights passed in May.
The Government's record of cooperation with the ICTY improved
during the year; however, problems remained and several of the ICTY's
requests remained unfulfilled at year's end. In February the Government
formalized the status of the ICTY office in Zagreb (pending since 1996)
and conceded the tribunal's jurisdiction to investigate possible war
crimes committed during the 1995 military operations ``Flash'' and
``Storm'' (disputed by the previous regime). In March indictee Mladen
Naletelic (``Tuta'') was transferred to The Hague; he was the only
publicly indicted war criminal known to be in Croatia (ICTY requested
his extradition beginning in December 1998). In April tribunal
investigators conducted a field investigation in Gospic with full
governmental support; in 1999 the previous regime refused ICTY's
request to conduct this investigation. In April the Parliament passed a
declaration of cooperation with ICTY that confirmed the tribunal's
jurisdiction and supported the punishment of all war criminals
regardless of ethnicity or level of responsibility. In May the
Government granted ICTY researchers long-sought access to archives.
However, the authorities remained reluctant and were slow to provide
timely access to witnesses and documentary evidence. Each time the
Government fulfilled a tribunal request, hard-liners both within the
Government and in society responded with harsh criticism.
In November ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte commented on the
Government's cooperation in a report to the UN Security Council,
noting, ``there has indeed been an improvement in relations when
compared with the previous policy of obstruction and delay adopted by
the former Government.'' However, she continued, ``where Croatia
perceives cooperation to be against its political or narrow security
interests, a real difficulty still exists.'' Del Ponte went on to list
a series of unfulfilled requests and disappointing developments,
including the failure to provide requested materials in the trial of
Dario Kordic, government leaks of ICTY documents, and a negative media
campaign against the Tribunal fueled by these leaks. In December the
Government passed a 13-point statement outlining its concerns and
objections to some elements of its relationship with the ICTY. At
year's end, both sides were working to resolve these difficulties.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution specifies that individuals shall enjoy all rights
and freedoms, regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth,
education, social status, or other attributes. Additionally members of
all national groups and minorities shall have equal rights. While most
of these rights were observed in practice, serious deficiencies
continued, particularly with regard to ethnic discrimination of Serbs
and Roma.
Women.--Although the Government collected only limited statistics
on the problem, credible NGO observers reported that violence against
women, including spousal abuse, remained a widespread and underreported
problem. Alcohol abuse and poor economic circumstances for veterans of
the military conflict were cited as contributing factors. Rape and
spousal rape are illegal under the Penal Code; however, NGO's report
that many women do not report rape or spousal rape.
During the autumn session of Parliament, the Government revoked
1997 Penal Code amendments that removed domestic violence from the
categories of crimes to be prosecuted automatically by the state
attorney. Thus a domestic violence case can again be initiated based
on, for example, suspicions of health care workers or police rather
than requiring the victim to press charges. Legislation passed in the
autumn created a specific Penal Code provision for family violence to
replace inadequate existing provisions, and to direct that perpetrators
of family violence, in addition to punishment, be placed under
supervision and receive psychiatric treatment. Amendments to the Law on
Misdemeanors passed in the autumn are designed to protect victims by
extending detention (for up to 30 days) of perpetrators of family
violence, even during the defendant's appeal. There is only one women's
shelter, in Zagreb.
The Government's Commission for Gender Equality participated in
U.N.-sponsored Beijing Plus Five activities in June but overall was not
very effective, according to NGO's and women's activists. Failing to
collect statistical data on violence and discrimination against women,
the Commission relied on data from 1996 and 1997 during Beijing Plus
Five activities. The Commission's already small budget was slashed to
60 percent of its 1999 level and planned initiatives to encourage
women's employment were not implemented for lack of resources.
The country is a transit point and lesser source and destination
country for trafficking in women for the purposes of sexual
exploitation (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Workplace sexual harassment is a violation of the Penal Code's
section on abuse of power but is not specifically included in the
employment law. NGO's reported that in practice, women often did not
resort to the Penal Code for relief for fear of losing their jobs.
The law does not discriminate by gender. However, in practice women
generally hold lower paying positions in the work force. Government
statistics from previous years showed that, while women constituted
roughly 50 percent of the work force, they occupied few jobs at senior
levels, even in areas such as education and administration where they
were a clear majority of the workers. Considerable anecdotal evidence
suggested that women hold by far the preponderance of low-level
clerical, labor, and shopkeeping positions. Women in these positions
often are among the first to be fired or laid off, particularly in
times of corporate restructuring. NGO's and labor organizations
reported a practice in which women received short-term work contracts
renewable every 3 to 6 months, creating a climate of job insecurity for
them. While men occasionally suffered from this practice, it was used
disproportionately against women to dissuade them from taking maternity
leave, although there were fewer reports of this practice during the
year than in the previous year. Legislation was passed in 1999 limiting
the use of short-term work contracts to a maximum of 3 years.
While there is no national organization devoted solely to the
protection of women's rights, many small, independent groups were
active in the capital and larger cities. Among the most active were
B.A.B.E. (``Be Active, Be Emancipated'') and the Center for Women
Victims of War.
Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
Education is free and mandatory through grade 8 (generally age 14).
Schools provide free meals for children, subsidized daycare facilities
are available in most communities even for infants, medical care for
children is free, and the Labor Code authorizes 1 full year of
maternity leave and 3 years' leave for women with twins or more than
two children. The majority of students continue their education to the
age of 18, with Roma being the only group reporting any notable
exception. Romani children face serious discrimination in schools, and
nearly all drop out by grade 8. While there is no societal pattern of
abuse of children, 1 NGO operating hotlines for sexual abuse victims
recorded 62 cases of abuse of children in 1 month in the city of Split.
People with Disabilities.--The 1997 Law on Social Welfare and the
Law on Construction specify access to public services and buildings for
persons with disabilities; however, the construction rules do not
mandate retro-fitting of facilities and are not always enforced, so
access to such facilities is often difficult. While people with
disabilities face no openly discriminatory measures, job opportunities
generally are limited. Special education also is limited and poorly
funded.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are closely linked in
society, and religion sometimes was used to identify and single out
non-Croats for discriminatory practices. However, most such incidents
appeared to be motivated by ethnicity and not religion or religious
doctrine. The close identification of religion with ethnicity
periodically caused religious institutions to be targets of violence
(see Section 2.c.), and there were persistent reports of vandalism to
Serb Orthodox cemeteries and structures. In January two crucifixes were
damaged on the property of the local Orthodox priest in Tenja, and
windows were broken at an Orthodox Church in Borovo. In April swastikas
were painted on the walls of the Jewish community center in Zagreb. No
arrests were made in these incidents. In August unidentified
perpetrators broke into the Orthodox Church in the Danubian town of
Branjina and wrote anti-Serb messages on the walls; no arrests were
made.
There were no further developments in the case of an August 1999
attack on the home of Mufti Sevko Omerbasic, the head of the Islamic
community in the country. No one was charged in the August 1999
desecration of a memorial plaque in Cakovec marking the site of the
synagogue destroyed during the Hungarian occupation in World War II.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Constitutionally, ethnic
minorities enjoy the same protection as other self-identified ethnic
and religious groups; however, in practice a pattern of open and
sometimes severe discrimination continued against ethnic Serbs and
other minorities in a wide number of areas, including the
administration of justice, employment, housing, and freedom of
movement. A pattern of persistent and sometimes violent harassment and
intimidation of ethnic Serbs in the war-affected regions continued to
be a serious problem. Early in the year, senior government officials
emphasized their commitment to non-discriminatory treatment of
minorities; however, in some instances, government leaders failed to
condemn highly-publicized incidents of discrimination and harassment of
ethnic Serbs.
In May the Government passed a package of laws on minority rights,
including a Constitutional law, that added nine new recognized
minorities to the existing list of seven in the Constitution, including
Muslims, Albanians, and Slovenes. Some observers, including ethnic Serb
leaders, criticized the apparent haste and secrecy with which the
constitutional law was passed. Government officials indicated that
further amendments on minorities and local self-government would
complement the Constitutional law; however, these amendments were not
passed by year's end. Two other laws passed in May guaranteed equal
status for minority languages and delineated minority educational
rights. Nevertheless ethnic minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma,
continued disproportionately to suffer discrimination. Ethnic Serb
leaders reported improved communication with government officials, in
contrast to the often tense relations under the previous Government.
There were two ethnically motivated killings, symptomatic of ethnic
tensions throughout the country and particularly in the war-affected
areas. In March on the Adriatic island of Vir, a 38-year-old ethnic
Serb, who had returned to Croatia a week earlier after spending 8 years
as a refugee in Yugoslavia, was beaten to death by three ethnic Croats
shouting anti-Serb slogans. The perpetrators were arrested quickly, and
international monitors assessed the police performance as satisfactory.
However, the Government did not issue a statement condemning the
incidents until several days had passed. At their October trial, two
suspects were convicted of murder (receiving 10 and 9-year sentences)
and the third was acquitted. During the same week, a 73-year-old ethnic
Serb woman was stabbed to death in the western Slavonian town of
Slatina by an ethnic Croat after an argument about war-related issues.
The perpetrator was arrested quickly, was convicted of aggravated
murder, and was sentenced to 9 years in prison.
Intimidation and violence against Serbs continued in war-affected
areas during the year. In May about 50 ethnic Croats disrupted a
ceremony in Veljun of mostly ethnic Serbs commemorating victims of a
World War II Fascist massacre; one woman urinated on the memorial, and
Serb leader Dr. Milorad Pupovac was escorted out of the area for his
own protection. Two weeks later, five ethnic Croats entered the area at
night and damaged the memorial; all were arrested, but in August the
charges against them were dropped for lack of evidence. In June in
nearby Slunj, a group of ethnic Croats unveiled a memorial to a
notorious World War II Fascist Colonel. President Mesic and Prime
Minister Racan condemned these incidents. During the summer, anti-Serb
posters appeared in several areas (Karlovac, Sisak, and Erdut)
containing photos and the names of local ethnic Serbs and accusing them
of war crimes. Police investigated these incidents and identified
suspects, but prosecutors did not press charges and police did not
always make arrests. The poster incidents, in particular, appeared
designed to intimidate returning Serb refugees.
In the autumn, vigilante ``wanted'' lists (similar to the anti-Serb
posters that appeared during the summer) accusing ethnic Serbs of war
crimes appeared in the Danubian region. Some lists appeared on the
Internet and others were posted in public places and delivered to
ethnic Serb homes in the area. These lists both reflected and
exacerbated ethnic tensions in the region. No senior government
official condemned them. In October 15 ethnic Serbs (the ``Baranja
group'') were arrested in Osijek on 1991 war crimes widely believed to
be based on weak evidence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). This led to
speculation that the Osijek prosecutor was responding to the vigilante
lists in pursuing the cases. Also in October, Judge Rogulja, an ethnic
Serb on the Vukovar bench, was threatened by a mob of local Croats
(that included county prefect Petar Cobankovic) shortly after he had
issued a ruling to evict a Croat police commander who was occupying a
home belonging to an ethnic Serb. The eviction never was carried out
and the case later was transferred to another judge. No public
officials, either at the municipal or national level, made any public
statement about the incident or otherwise condemned the harassment of a
judge (see Section 1.c.).
Property destruction and other forms of harassment often arose from
disputes between home occupiers of one ethnicity and returning
homeowners of another. The number of ethnic incidents reported to the
police in the Danubian region fell to less than half its 1999 level.
This development likely was due to a number of factors: A real decrease
in the number of ethnic incidents, the failure of some police officers
to regularly classify ethnic incidents as such, and a reluctance of
ethnic Serbs to report harassment because of a sense that such
incidents have become commonplace. Verbal and legal harassment,
forcible evictions, and assaults occurred regularly (see Section 2.d.).
The number of incidents in the Danubian city of Vukovar and the nearby
town of Tenja remained particularly high. An ongoing problem was the
accessibility of weapons left over from the war, including firearms and
explosives, which frequently were used in incidents of harassment
during the year. Ethnically motivated incidents of various levels of
severity occurred at a rate of over 50 per month. In about two-thirds
of these cases, the victim was an ethnic Serb. In addition to the two
murders, serious incidents included several assaults and throwing of
hand grenades onto private property. In March a group of ethnic Croats
went from house to house in the Danubian town of Erdut terrorizing
ethnic Serbs, including the local Orthodox priest and the local mayor.
The 1,270 member police force in the Danubian region comprised 42
percent ethnic Serb and 53 percent ethnic Croat officers. There were
periodic reports of tensions and incidents between ethnic Serb and
Croat officers.
The situation was similar in other war-affected regions, with high
levels of ethnic tension, particularly in areas where ethnic Serb
refugees were returning to their prewar homes in large numbers.
Observers expressed particular concern about the town of Benkovac in
the Dalmatia region, where local Serbs expressed a lack of confidence
in the performance and the impartiality of the local police force. In
response the assistant Interior Minister investigated the Benkovac
situation during the summer and replaced two senior local police
officials. In April a hand grenade exploded in the garden of an ethnic
Serb in the Dalmatian town of Imotski causing minor damages but no
injuries; no arrests were made. In May in Cista Mala in the Dalmatian
region, a 68-year-old ethnic Serb was beaten by four ethnic Croats, one
of whom cut the victim with a knife and urinated on him. Local police
apprehended the perpetrators quickly. The main perpetrator was
convicted of assault and was serving a 1-year sentence at year's end.
The ethnic Croat mayor of the neighboring town of Cista Velika
expressed his regret over the incident.
The Constitution and the package of minority laws passed in May
provide the legal basis and right for education in the languages of
recognized minorities. However, problems remained. For example, in
textbooks the history of the former Yugoslavia has been omitted in
favor of a more nationalistic Croat interpretation, and new textbooks
have used derogatory adjectives in reference to minorities. Government
pledges to provide more balanced textbooks went unfulfilled. In July
the Education Minister directed five county prefects outside the
Danubian region to survey their students to determine how many would be
interested in classes conducted in Serbian. Such classes already are
available in the Danubian region.
The Citizenship Law distinguishes between those who have a claim to
Croatian ethnicity and those who do not. Ethnic Croats are eligible to
become citizens, even if they were not citizens of the former Socialist
Republic of Croatia, as long as they submit a written statement that
they consider themselves Croatian citizens. Persons who are not ethnic
Croats must satisfy more stringent requirements through naturalization
in order to obtain citizenship. Even those who previously were lawful
residents of Croatia in the former Yugoslavia (see Section 1.d.) were
compelled to provide proof of previous residence and citizenship not
demanded of ethnic Croats. NGO's assisting ethnic Serbs with
documentation issues continued to report local officials applying this
legal double standard. These obstacles to ethnic Serbs' ability to
document their citizenship led to discrimination in other areas,
including the right to vote (see Section 3). While a citizenship
application is pending, the applicant is denied social benefits
including medical care, pensions, free education, and employment in the
civil service. Denials frequently were based on Article 26 of the
Citizenship Law (which stipulates that citizenship can be denied to
persons otherwise qualified for reasons of national interest) and
Article 8 (which requires that a person's actions demonstrate that they
are ``attached to the legal system and customs of Croatia'' and that
they have maintained a permanent residence on the territory of Croatia
for the 5 years preceding the application for citizenship). However,
the Interior Ministry began recognizing the period that (mostly ethnic
Serbs) spent outside the country as refugees as applicable to the 5-
year residency requirement.
In March the Government established a commission led by Deputy
Prime Minister Goran Granic to address issues in the war-affected
areas. It met several times in various formats, bringing together
government ministries, the international community, NGO's, and
representatives of the ethnic communities. However, the commission
lapsed into inactivity by year's end.
A serious and ongoing impediment to the return and reintegration of
ethnic Serb refugees is the failure of the Government to recognize or
``convalidate'' their legal and administrative documents from the
period of the 1991-1995 conflict. Despite the 1997 adoption of a
convalidation law to allow the recognition of documents issued by the
rebel Serb para-State, this legislation was not put into practice fully
because several ministries failed to adopt implementing instructions.
While the law itself did not include a deadline for filing
applications, a decree issued by the previous regime did fix an April
1999 filing deadline (impossible to meet for many ethnic Serbs who
still were refugees outside the country). Even persons who filed before
this deadline experienced arbitrary delays and obstructions. Without
the recognition conferred by the law, citizens (almost exclusively
ethnic Serbs) continued to be unable to resolve a wide range of
problems including pensions, disability insurance, unemployment
benefits, the recognition of births, deaths, and marriages, and even
confirmation of time served in prison. The majority of requests are
from elderly persons and relate to pension and employment histories
from occupied territories during the conflict. This made resumption of
a normal life almost impossible for this group. Also, contrary to the
law, the state pension fund unilaterally and improperly denied some
pension applications from ethnic Serbs. In 1999 one NGO providing legal
assistance had files on 9,000 unresolved convalidation cases in Osijek
alone.
Serb property owners whose homes were occupied by ethnic Croat
refugees from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, mostly from Bosnia
and Kosovo, remained unable to access their property, despite the 1998
program for returns, which mandated multiethnic ``housing commissions''
to implement property restitution. A lack of alternative housing in
many areas and the lack of political will to evict ethnic Croat
occupiers without alternative housing in favor of Serb homeowners
resulted in only a handful of restituted properties outside of the
Danubian region (see Section 1.f.).
Discrimination and violence against Roma continued. The 1991
Yugoslav census counted only 6,700 Roma in Croatia, but government
officials and NGO's agree that this was a serious undercount and that
the true number of Croatian Roma may be 30,000 to 40,000. Protective of
their culture and reluctant to assimilate, Roma faced a host of
obstacles, including language (many, especially women, have only
limited Croatian language skills), lack of education, lack of
citizenship and identity documents, high unemployment, and societal
discrimination, and lack of Government will to address such abuses.
There were no reports of police beatings of Roma during the year.
The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) reported that on April 23, a
group of 15 ethnic Croats beat a 23-year-old Romani man in Luka,
northwest of Zagreb. Human Rights Watch reported that in May, local
authorities in Varazdin County ordered 420 Roma to move from their
settlement in the village of Strmec Prodravski after refusing to allow
them to build more permanent homes and a water and electricity supply.
The ERRC also reported that on June 1, a group of youths allegedly beat
and threatened to rape a 9-year-old Romani girl in Zagreb. After her
family confronted the attackers, a larger group of youths reportedly
went to the Romani family's house, threw a brick through a window,
damaged their car, and yelled insults at the family. The police then
intervened and detained three of the attackers and four Roma.
An estimated 10 percent of Croatian Romani children begin primary
school, and of these only 10 percent go on to secondary school. There
were only an estimated 50 Romani students in secondary school
throughout the country during the year. Those individuals going beyond
secondary school tended to leave the settlements and assimilate into
mainstream society, depriving Romani communities of valuable skills. In
several instances, including in Varazdin and Zagreb, local officials
segregated Romani students into separate classes without the same level
of materials or instructors available to regular students.
The situation of other minority groups--such as Slovaks, Czechs,
Italians, and Hungarians--did not reflect discrimination to the same
extent as that of the Serb and Roma communities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers are entitled to form or join
unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. There is an
active labor movement with one major and four minor national labor
federations and independent associations of both blue-and white-collar
members. Approximately 64 percent of workers are members of unions. In
general unions are independent of the Government and political parties.
The law prohibits retaliation against strikers participating in
legal strikes. Workers only may strike at the end of a contract or in
specific circumstances mentioned in the contract. The Supreme Court has
ruled in the past that workers may not strike for nonpayment of wages.
In December facing budget cuts, the Government unilaterally
abrogated collective bargaining agreements with five public sector
unions. While this action was legal under the terms of the agreements,
it sparked protests and created concerns about the Government's respect
for employment rights.
When negotiating a new contract, workers are required to go through
mediation before they can strike. Labor and management choose the
mediator together. If they cannot agree, the Labor Law calls for a
tripartite commission of labor, business, and government
representatives to appoint one. The tripartite commission began to meet
regularly during the year and prepared its first list of mediators.
Arbitration never is mandatory but can be used if both sides agree.
Only after submitting to mediation and formally filing a statement that
negotiations are at an impasse is a strike legal. If a strike is found
to be illegal, any participant can be dismissed, and the union held
liable for damages. No strikes were found to be illegal during the
year.
The right to strike is provided for in the Constitution with these
limitations and with additional limits on members of the armed forces,
police, government administration, and public services. During the
year, authorities permitted frequent labor demonstrations both in
Zagreb's main square and in front of the Parliament. The strikes were
nearly all over nonpayment of wages. The employees of NAMA, a
department store chain, staged several demonstrations during the year
over this issue. In addition farmers in eastern Slavonia staged several
demonstrations over nonpayment for their produce. On December 8, the
public employee unions held a nonviolent nationwide strike calling for
higher wages.
Laws limiting the right to assembly were not used against labor
demonstrations during the year.
The ILO Committee of Experts in 1999 requested the Government, in
consultation with trade unions, to set criteria and a time frame for
the division of office space and property formerly owned by the unions
during the Communist era. While the five labor confederations signed
the preliminary agreement, there was no further progress on this issue
by year's end. In April the Ministry of Defense returned a Zagreb-area
facility that had been used since 1990 as an army training site to the
UATUC confederation.
Unions may affiliate freely internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is protected by law and practiced freely. The Labor Code
governs collective bargaining contracts, protection for striking
workers, and legal limitations on the ability of employers to conduct
``lockouts'' during labor disputes.
The transition to private enterprise and a free market economy kept
labor unions under pressure at the same time that they were making
progress towards establishing themselves as genuine trade unions,
representative of their members rather than the Government.
Unemployment remained high at 22.4 percent at year's end overall and
much higher in some war-affected areas. The nonpayment of wages
continued to be a serious problem; over 100,000 workers (10 percent of
the workforce) failed to receive their salaries on time. During the
summer, the Government signed an agreement with unions providing that
all state-owned companies (the assets of which were controlled by the
Croatian privatization fund) would pay salaries on time; however, some
unions complained that the Government did not abide by this commitment.
A further problem was that when salaries were not paid, associated
contributions into the social welfare system also lagged, with the
result that unpaid workers also were denied health coverage.
The Labor Code deals directly with antiunion discrimination issues.
It expressly allows unions to challenge firings in court. No reports of
systematic firings on grounds of ethnicity were reported during the
year. However, in the high-profile ``Magma'' case, violations of labor
rights were alleged. The Minister of Economy, Goranko Fizulic, his
wife, and a U.K.-based investment company were co-owners of the
``Magma'' company in Zagreb. When workers unionized early in the year,
Fizulic assured them that he would respect their wishes. Soon after,
the union's president, all eight members of the executive board, and
three union organizers were fired. The workers still were challenging
the firings in court at year's end. Generally citizens' attempts to
seek redress through the legal system were hampered seriously by the
inefficiency of the court system, where cases often languished for
months or years before reaching a final resolution (see Section 1.e.).
There were no reports of the Government employing coercion or other
illegal methods to induce striking employees to return to work. There
were no further developments in the investigation of the beating of the
vice president of the Locomotive Engineers Union by unknown assailants
during tense contract negotiations in 1999.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of
these practices; however, there were occasional instances of women
trafficked through the country for the purpose of forced prostitution
(see Section 6.f.). While legislation does not explicitly cover
children, the constitutional ban is comprehensive in this area, and the
Government enforces this prohibition effectively. The Ministry of Labor
and Social Welfare is the agency charged with enforcing the ban on
coerced or forced labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15 years
(the same as the ILO Convention standard), and it is enforced by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Children may not be employed
before reaching the legal age and are not allowed to perform work that
is harmful to their health or morality. There is no reported pattern of
abuse of child labor. Workers under the age of 18 are entitled to
special protection at work and are prohibited from heavy manual labor
and night shifts. Education is free, universal, and mandatory up to the
age of 14, generally. Children usually finish secondary school, and a
high proportion go on to university. The broad constitutional
prohibition against forced or compulsory labor encompasses children,
and there were no reported instances of such cases.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1999 the Government signed a
collective bargaining agreement establishing a minimum wage of about
$210 (1,700 kuna) per month. In July the government Bureau of
Statistics estimated that the average net monthly wage was
approximately $400 (3,275 kuna), which is not sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family.
National regulations provide for a 42-hour workweek including a 30-
minute daily break, a 24-hour rest period during the week, and a
minimum of 18 days of paid vacation leave annually. Workers receive
time-and-a-half pay for any hours worked beyond 42. However, most
unions have negotiated a 40-hour workweek.
Health and safety standards are set by the Government and are
enforced by the Ministry of Health. The 1997 Health and Safety Law
allowed unions to appoint health and safety stewards in companies, but
their activities are regulated by collective agreements. In practice
industries are not diligent in meeting standards for worker protection.
It is common, for example, to find workers without hardhats on
constructions sites and for workers to remove safety devices from
dangerous equipment. Workers can in theory remove themselves from
hazardous conditions at work and would have recourse through the courts
if they felt that they had been dismissed wrongfully for doing so;
there were no reports of wrongful dismissal complaints over workplace
safety during the year.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons. However, existing laws can be used to
prosecute traffickers. No statistical information on trafficking
exists, although U.N. officials tracking the issue regionally and local
NGO's indicate that Croatia is primarily a transit country, as well as
a lesser source and destination country for women trafficked to other
parts of Europe for forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
Women reportedly were trafficked through Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Yugoslavia to Croatia, where some remained to work as prostitutes or
are trafficked to other destinations.
Public awareness of trafficking is low. There were no government or
NGO programs to deal with the prevention of trafficking during the
year; however, government officials and NGO's are working to develop an
antitrafficking strategy.
There were few support services available for trafficking victims.
There is one women's shelter that occasionally helps trafficked women.
__________
CYPRUS
Prior to 1974, Cyprus experienced a long period of intercommunal
strife between its Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. In
response the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) began
peacekeeping operations in March 1964. The island has been divided
since the Turkish military intervention of 1974, following a coup
d'etat directed from Greece. Since 1974 the southern part of the island
has been under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
The northern part is ruled by a Turkish Cypriot administration. In 1983
that administration proclaimed itself the ``Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus'' (``TRNC''). The ``TRNC'' is not recognized by the
United States or any other country except Turkey. The two parts are
separated by a buffer zone patrolled by the UNFICYP. A substantial
number of Turkish troops remain on the island. In both the government-
controlled areas and in the Turkish Cypriot community democratic
principles generally are respected. Glafcos Clerides was reelected
President of the Republic of Cyprus in 1998; in April 2000 Rauf
Denktash was declared ``President'' after ``Prime Minister'' Dervish
Eroglu withdrew following the first round of Turkish Cypriot elections.
The judiciary is independent in both communities.
Police in the government-controlled area and in the Turkish Cypriot
community are responsible for law enforcement. Police forces operating
in the government-controlled area are under civilian control, while
military authorities direct Turkish Cypriot police forces. In general
the police forces of both sides respect the rule of law, but instances
of police abuse of power continued.
Both Cypriot economies operate on the basis of free market
principles, although in each community there are significant
administrative controls. The government-controlled part of the island
has a robust, service-oriented economy, with a declining manufacturing
base and a small agricultural sector. Tourism and trade generate 22
percent of gross domestic product and employ 29 percent of the labor
force. In 2000 per capita income was approximately $12,902, inflation
was 4.5 percent, and unemployment was 3.5 percent. Growth was 4.8
percent, compared with 4.5 percent in 1999. The Turkish Cypriot economy
is handicapped by restrictions imposed by the Government of Cyprus and
other international institutions. In addition it relies heavily on
subsidies from Turkey and is burdened by an overly large public sector.
It, too, is basically service-oriented, but has a smaller tourism and
trade base--accounting for 14 percent of gross domestic product
employing 10 percent of the workforce--and a larger agricultural
sector. During the year, per capita income in the north was
approximately $5,263, and inflation was 60 percent. Growth in the north
was 5.3 percent in 2000, compared with 4.9 percent in 1999.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus generally respected human
rights; however, instances of police brutality continued to be a
problem.
The Turkish Cypriot authorities generally respected human rights;
however, police abuse of suspects' and detainees' rights continued. The
authorities also continued to restrict freedom of movement. Since
December 1997, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have banned most
bicommunal contacts between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots,
including previously frequent meetings in Nicosia's buffer zone. They
sometimes attempted to prevent Turkish Cypriots from travelling to
bicommunal meetings off the island as well. In May Turkish Cypriot
officials lowered the ``visa'' fees for crossing the buffer zone. The
Turkish Cypriot authorities have taken some steps to improve the
conditions of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the territory
under their control, but the treatment of these groups still falls
short of Turkish Cypriot obligations under the Vienna III Agreement of
1975.
Violence against women and trafficking in women for forced
prostitution remained problems in both areas.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
Turkish Cypriot authorities still have not conducted a credible
investigation of the 1996 murder of a prominent leftist Turkish Cypriot
journalist, Kutlu Adali, who wrote articles critical of Turkey's role
in the north.
In 1996 Turkish Cypriot civilian police killed a Greek Cypriot
demonstrator who had entered the U.N. buffer zone, and the police
participated in the beating death of another. Again, there has not been
any significant investigation by Turkish Cypriot authorities of the
killings. The family of one of the deceased filed a case against Turkey
in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which declared the case
admissible in June 1999. The case was pending at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Both the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the
basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community specifically prohibit
torture, the law in both communities prohibits such practices, and the
authorities generally respect these provisions in practice; however,
instances of Cypriot police brutality against suspects in detention
continued, mostly involving non-Cypriots. One officer was tried and
acquitted in March in connection with the October 1998 beating of
illegal immigrant detainees by members of a special police unit (see
Section 2.d.).
On December 21, the ECHR found the Cypriot Government guilty of
police abuse during the 1995 arrest for drug smuggling of Turkish
Cypriot Erkan Egmez and ordered the Government to pay Egmez $16,000
(10,400 pounds sterling) in compensation.
The former European Commission on Human Rights agreed in January
1998 to investigate complaints by nine Turkish Cypriots that Greek
Cypriot police mistreated them in 1994 and expelled them to the north.
The complainants allege they were threatened with death if they
returned to the south and that Greek Cypriot police were responsible
for the death of one complainant's son, who did return to the south
later in 1994. The Cypriot Government denies all the charges; the
Commission took oral evidence in the case in Nicosia in September 1998.
The case was pending at year's end.
While there were no public allegations of police brutality in the
Turkish Cypriot community, there were credible reports of pervasive
police abuse of power and routine harsh treatment of detainees (see
Section 1.d.).
Prison conditions in general meet minimum international standards.
According to a report issued in May by the government Ombudsman,
prisoners with psychiatric problems in the south do not receive proper
medical care. Persons incarcerated in jails in the south on minor
charges are mixed with more hardened, violent criminals.
The Cypriot Government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities permit
prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Throughout Cyprus the
police respect laws providing for freedom from arbitrary arrest and
detention. Judicially issued arrest warrants are required. No one may
be detained for more than a day without referral of the case to the
courts for extension of the period of detention. Most periods of
investigative detention do not exceed 8 to 10 days before formal
charges are filed. Attorneys generally have access to detainees; bail
is permitted. The Government of Cyprus claims the right to deport
foreign nationals for reasons of public interest whether or not they
have been charged with or convicted of a crime.
Some abuses of power occur at the hands of the Turkish Cypriot
police, generally at the time of arrest. Suspects sometimes are not
permitted to have their lawyers present when testimony is being taken,
a right provided under the Turkish Cypriot basic law. Suspects who
demand the presence of a lawyer may be threatened with stiffer charges
or even physically intimidated. A high percentage of convictions in the
Turkish Cypriot community are obtained with confessions made during
initial police interrogation under these conditions. According to
credible reports, police are known to abuse their right to hold persons
up to 24 hours before having to go before a judge. Police officers use
this tactic against persons suspected of serious crimes or believed to
have behaved in a manner deemed insulting to the officer. The suspects
are then released within 24 hours without charges having been filed.
On December 1, Greek Cypriot police arrested Omer Gazi Tekogul for
possession of 2 kilograms of heroin near the village of Pyla, located
in the United Nations Buffer Zone. Shortly after Tekogul's arrest, a
Turkish Cypriot official told UNFICYP that Greek Cypriots would
``disappear'' in retaliation for Tekogul's arrest (this statement was
later repudiated by Rauf Denktash). On December 13, Turkish Cypriot
authorities arrested Greek Cypriot Panicos Tziakourmas for possession
of marijuana. An SBA police investigation points to Tziakourmas being
seized by Turkish Cypriots on SBA territory and found no evidence of
marijuana. Turkish Cypriot authorities claim that Tziakourmas was
arrested in the north. Both cases were pending at year's end.
Exile is prohibited specifically by the Constitution and by the
basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community, and is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is legally
independent of executive or military influence in both communities, and
it is independent in practice.
On both sides, most criminal and civil cases begin in district
courts, from which appeals are made to Supreme Courts. No special
courts exist for security or political offenses.
Cyprus inherited many elements of its legal system from the United
Kingdom, including the presumption of innocence, the right to due
process, and the right of appeal. Throughout Cyprus, a fair public
trial is provided for in law and accorded in practice. Defendants have
the right to be present at their trials, to be represented by counsel
(at government expense for those who cannot afford one), to confront
witnesses, and to present evidence in their own defense.
On the Turkish Cypriot side, civilians deemed to have violated
military zones or military regulations are subject to trial in a
military court. These courts consist of one military and two civilian
judges and a civilian prosecutor. Members of the Turkish Cypriot bar
have complained that civilian judges tend to defer to their military
colleagues in such hearings.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Both the Cyprus Constitution and the basic law
governing the Turkish Cypriot community include provisions to protect
the individual against arbitrary interference by the authorities, and a
judicial warrant is required for a police official to enter a private
residence. Although authorities on both sides generally respected these
provisions in practice, police on both sides have subjected members of
the other community resident in their area to surveillance (see Section
5).
The Turkish Cypriot authorities restrict the ability of Greek
Cypriots and Maronites living in the north to change their place of
residence at will (see Section 5).
In May Turkish Cypriot authorities announced that Greek Cypriots
and Maronites resident in the north may bring their spouses to reside
with them in the north. Greek Cypriot marriage certificates will be
recognized as proof of marriage. Previously this required special
permission, which was difficult to obtain. One such marriage took place
during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech and of the press
are provided for by law, and these rights are respected in practice
throughout the island. The proliferation of party and independent
newspapers and periodicals in both communities enables ideas and
arguments to circulate freely. Opposition papers frequently criticize
the authorities. Several private television and radio stations in the
Greek Cypriot community compete effectively with the government-
controlled stations. In addition to 2 smaller, university-run radio
stations, 11 private radio stations operate in the Turkish Cypriot
community along with 4 private television stations. International
broadcasts are available without interference throughout the island,
including telecasts from Turkey and Greece.
In 1998 Turkish Cypriot officials filed a number of court actions
against newspapers and journalists, alleging that certain articles
``damaged the prestige of the state.'' Five complaints against the
Turkish Cypriot daily newspaper Avrupa were consolidated into one court
action. In December 1999, a court ruled that the newspaper was liable
and fined it approximately $215,000 (120 billion Turkish lira). In May
2000 court bailiffs seized the newspaper's computers and other
equipment to satisfy partially the court judgement. The newspaper was
closed for a day until alternate production facilities were found. In
July the owner-editor of the same newspaper, two journalists and a
photographer from the newspaper, and a Turkish Cypriot ``security
forces officer'' and his wife were taken into custody on suspicion of
espionage. The journalists and photographer were released later without
being charged. The owner-editor and the ``officer'' and his wife were
released but barred from leaving the north. They were not formally
charged and faced rearrest at any time. The same newspaper was
acquitted in September of charges based on a 1998 story alleging that
Turkish Cypriot soldiers assaulted a Turkish Cypriot family after a
dispute over housing.
Restrictions sometimes were imposed on the ability of journalists
to cross the buffer zone to cover news events. The Cypriot Government
denied entry to the south for visiting Turkish journalists who arrived
in Cyprus through ports of entry in the north. In retaliation Turkish
Cypriot authorities sometimes required Greek Cypriot journalists to
purchase a ``visa'' to enter the north, which the journalists refused
to do. Current Turkish Cypriot policy, while applied inconsistently, is
to permit Greek Cypriot journalists travelling as a group to cover
events in the north without paying a ``visa'' fee, but not to allow
Greek journalists entry unless they pay the fee. Individual Greek
Cypriot journalists usually also must pay the fees.
Academic freedom generally is respected throughout the island.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The freedom to
hold meetings, associate, and organize is protected by law, and the
Government respects these rights in practice.
Although Turkish Cypriot authorities also generally respected these
rights, they imposed restrictions on bicommunal meetings (see Section
2.d.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion generally is
respected. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus recognizes five
religions that are exempt from taxes and receive government subsidies.
Other religions may register routinely as nonprofit organizations and
receive tax exemptions, but not subsidies. In the Turkish Cypriot area,
no religion is recognized in the basic law, but Islamic institutions
receive tax exemptions and subsidies through the Wakf religious trust;
no other church receives exemptions or subsidies. Although missionaries
have the legal right to proselytize in both communities, missionary
activities are monitored closely by the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church
and by both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities.
Turkish Cypriots residing in the southern part of the island and
non-Muslims in the north are allowed to practice their religions.
Restrictions on the right of Greek Cypriots resident in the north to
visit Apostolos Andreas monastery were eased in 1998; they now may
visit the monastery without restriction. Maronites may not visit
certain religious sites in the north located in military zones.
Armenians may not visit any religious sites in the north. A Greek
Cypriot application to allow a second priest to reside in the north to
assist the elderly Orthodox priest already in the north has been
pending for more than 3 years.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
enjoy freedom of movement within their respective areas. Both
authorities respect the right to travel abroad and to emigrate. Turkish
Cypriots have difficulty traveling to most countries because travel
documents issued by the ``Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'' are
recognized only by Turkey. Most Turkish Cypriots use Turkish travel
documents instead.
Republic of Cyprus authorities discourage travel to the northern
part of the island. They permit only day travel by tourists to the
north, sometimes arbitrarily refuse permission to non-Cypriots to cross
to the north, and pressure foreigners working in Cyprus not to cross to
the north. They have declared that it is illegal to enter Cyprus except
at authorized entry points in the south, effectively barring entry into
the government-controlled area by foreigners who have entered Cyprus
from the north. Turkish Cypriots traveling to the south must seek prior
permission from the Turkish Cypriot authorities and must provide the
Turkish Cypriot authorities with an itinerary and the purpose of their
travel. To pass the Greek Cypriot checkpoint, Turkish Cypriots must
provide their planned itinerary to the checkpoint police. They do not
need to notify the checkpoint police in advance but do need to prove
they are Turkish Cypriots. There is no limit on how long they may
remain in the south.
Turkish Cypriot authorities generally allow visits to the north by
persons who initially enter Cyprus in the south, but they have denied
entry to foreigners of Turkish Cypriot origin who enter Cyprus in the
south. In 1995 the Turkish Cypriot authorities instituted a policy
under which foreign nationals of Greek Cypriot origin would be
permitted to visit the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. However,
implementation of the procedures has remained inconsistent, and
visitors of Greek Cypriot or Armenian origin, or even persons having
Greek or Armenian names, may face considerable difficulties entering
the north.
In May Turkish Cypriot authorities lowered ``visa'' fees at the
main Nicosia checkpoint to 1 pound sterling. Greeks and Greek Cypriots
still must obtain a formal ``TRNC visa'' to visit the north. Maronites
are charged the same 1 pound sterling fee each time they cross.
Requests to cross into the north must be submitted 48 hours in advance.
Following an agreement in 1997 on reciprocal visits to religious
sites, a number of visits again occurred during the year. The Cypriot
Government permitted over 1,400 Turkish Cypriots to make a pilgrimage
to a Moslem shrine in the south in March and allowed another 1,300 to
travel in June. In April a group of approximately 1,950 Greek Cypriots
visited the Apostolos Andreas monastery in the north.
On July 1, Turkish forces established a new manned checkpoint in a
location adjacent to the Greek Cypriot village of Strovilia and the
British eastern SBA. Although access to Strovilia has been largely
unimpeded, the checkpoint now provides Turkish forces the ability to
control the approach to the village. Despite protests from UNFICYP and
others, Turkish forces remained at the contested checkpoint in
violation of the status quo.
On July 31, Greek Cypriot officials denied Turkish Cypriots land
passage to Kokkina. Visits to this pocket of land--surrounded by the
government-controlled area--that contains a memorial are included in
the 1997 reciprocal visit agreement. In August and November Turkish
Cypriot officials denied access to southern Greek Cypriots to visit the
Apostolos Andreas monastery.
In 1996 the ECHR ruled 11 to 6 that Turkey committed a continuing
violation of the rights of a Greek Cypriot woman by preventing her from
going to her property located in north Cyprus. The ruling reaffirmed
the validity of property deeds issued prior to 1974. The Court also
found in this case that ``it was obvious from the large number of
troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus that the Turkish
army exercised effective overall control there. In the circumstances of
the case, this entailed Turkey's responsibility for the policies and
actions of the ``TRNC.'' In July 1998 the court ordered Turkey to pay
the woman approximately $915,000 in damages and costs by October 28,
1998. The Turkish Government stated that it cannot implement the
Court's decision, which it contends is a political decision, and argued
that the land in question is not Turkish but is part of the ``Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus.'' The Council of Europe (COE) during 2000
continued to call on the Turkish Government to comply with the Court's
decision. In July the COE Committee of Ministers issued a resolution
deploring Turkey's lack of compliance and strongly urging it to comply
fully and without further delay with the ECHR judgment. About 150
similar cases filed by Greek Cypriots against Turkey have been declared
admissible by the ECHR, but no judgement was issued on any of the other
cases by year's end.
Turkish Cypriot authorities in the past had approved most
applications for Turkish Cypriots to participate in bicommunal meetings
in the U.N.-controlled buffer zone, but on December 27, 1997, they
suspended Turkish Cypriot participation in these meetings pending a
reevaluation of bicommunal activities. The ``suspension'' soon became
an effective Turkish Cypriot ban on bicommunal contacts on Cyprus.
Whereas in 1997 thousands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
participated in bicommunal events, in which mixed groups met to discuss
such topics as the environment, family violence, management techniques,
business operations, and legal questions, the Turkish Cypriot ban
halted almost all of those contacts. However, since June Turkish
Cypriot authorities have eased the ban. On a case-by-case basis, the
Turkish Cypriot authorities allowed some Turkish Cypriots to
participate in bicommunal events in and across the buffer zone. Greek
Cypriots still must obtain a Turkish Cypriot ``visa'' to visit the
north. Turkish Cypriot authorities also attempted to interfere with
some bicommunal events taking place outside Cyprus by requiring civil
servants to seek permission from their respective employer and the
Turkish Cypriot ``Ministry of Foreign Affairs'' before confirming their
participation. Enforcement of the policy has been inconsistent, with
some public officials permitted to attend off-island bicommunal events.
Private citizens have been allowed to travel to off-island bicommunal
events.
In recent years, Turkish Cypriot authorities have announced the
easing of restrictions on the approximately 580 Greek Cypriots and
Maronites living in the north. Turkish Cypriot authorities usually
grant the applications of Greek Cypriot residents in the north to visit
the government-controlled area. The limit on visits to the south was
extended in 1998 from 15 days per month to a total of 6 months per
year. The applicants must return within the designated period or risk
losing their right to return and to keep their property, although this
rule rarely is enforced in practice. In 1997 Turkish Cypriot
authorities also eliminated the previous monthly limit on visits by
close family relatives of Greek Cypriots and Maronites resident in the
north (it was once per month until 1996 and twice per month
thereafter). A limit on overnight stays also was increased from 2 days
and 3 nights, to a ``reasonable period'' (said period to be determined
by Turkish Cypriot authorities), with extensions possible. However,
there are reports that Turkish Cypriot authorities have prevented
family relatives from extending their stays in the north. There are
also reports that Turkish Cypriot authorities have prevented unlimited
travel to the north (as accorded by the 1997 elimination of a limit on
visits) by family relatives. Greek Cypriots visiting from the south
still may not travel in the north in their personal vehicles but must
use taxis or buses and pay the crossing fee. In September, after a 4-
year wait, Turkish Cypriot authorities allowed the wife of the Orthodox
priest resident in the north to rejoin her husband. The wife had left
the north to care for the couple's children.
Similar restrictions exist for visits by Maronite residents of the
north to the government-controlled areas, but they are applied much
more loosely than restrictions on Greek Cypriots, and Maronite travel
is relatively free. However, Maronite residents also must pay the
required crossing fees.
While in the past the Turkish Cypriot authorities permitted school
holiday and weekend visits to the north only by children under the ages
of 16 (male) and 18 (female), the age limits for Maronite students and
female Greek Cypriot students were lifted entirely in 1998. In May
Turkish Cypriot officials announced that male Greek Cypriot students of
military draft age who can show documentation proving they are full-
time students, and therefore not yet performing military duties, may
continue to visit the north.
According to regulations announced in October 1998, the Turkish
Cypriot authorities no longer require Greek Cypriots or Maronites
resident in the north to obtain police permits for internal travel in
the north. They may use private vehicles registered and insured in the
north. Implementation of the new policy has been inconsistent.
The Government generally cooperates with the office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With the increasing number of
illegal immigrants finding their way to Cyprus in small boats, the
Government of Cyprus is receiving a growing number of asylum
applications: 300 to 400 per year. These cases are referred to the
local UNHCR office for evaluation. If recognized as a refugee, the
applicant is granted a 3-year residence permit renewable for 3
additional years. If applicants meet the criteria for refugee status,
they are permitted to remain and are given temporary work permits.
However, applicants generally are not granted permanent resettlement
rights. Applicants are permitted to remain until resettlement in a
third country can be arranged.
In January, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention on the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Cyprus legislature passed
an asylum law designed to grant temporary residence to asylum
applicants until their applications are reviewed by the competent
government authority. The law is designed to transfer responsibility
for the asylum application process from the UNHCR to the Government.
However, there have been delays in establishing a relevant government
authority, and the UNHCR continues to review asylum applications. In
July the Government established a 130-bed detention facility for
housing arriving immigrants until their cases can be evaluated. In the
north, authorities generally cooperated with refugee authorities.
Working with the assistance of a local nongovernmental organization
(NGO), the UNHCR recognized 2 persons as refugees in 1999 and 15
persons as refugees in 2000.
In 1998-2000 groups of illegal immigrants attempting to reach
Western Europe instead landed on Cyprus after their overcrowded vessels
encountered problems at sea. A group of 34 Syrian Kurds, all of whom
applied for asylum with the UNHCR, arrived on November 15. On December
12, the UNHCR notified the Government of the 34 pending asylum
applications. The same day, under a bilateral agreement between Cyprus
and Syria for the return of all illegal immigrants departing from
Syrian ports, the Government returned the immigrants to Syria. The
Government did not consult with the UNHCR prior to the return of the
Syrian Kurds.
On September 13, 266 persons arrived on Cyprus from Lebanon after
Greek Cypriot authorities rescued them from a sinking boat. The
immigrants were held on a boat in Limassol port until Cypriot
authorities, under an agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon calling for
the return of illegal immigrants departing from any Lebanese port,
transported them to Lebanon October 3. Despite requests to the
Government, representatives of the UNHCR did not meet with the
immigrants and were unable to determine their asylum status.
According to the Government, no individuals recognized as refugees
were returned to countries where they credibly feared persecution.
A group of 100 persons, all of whom applied for political asylum,
arrived in June 1998. Only 23 were granted asylum. Most of those who
did not receive asylum were detained and then deported against their
will in late 1998 and early 1999. Prior to that, in October 1998, a
special police unit was filmed by local television cameras kicking and
beating the detainees with batons, while stopping a protest during
which the detainees burned their bedding. An examination of the
immigrants, mostly Africans, by a forensic pathologist revealed that
most were injured, some seriously. The Attorney General ordered an
investigation, and charges were brought against the officer in charge.
In July the officer was acquitted of using excessive force in quelling
the protest. Later in July, the Attorney General appealed the court's
decision; the appeal was pending at year's end.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Multiparty political systems exist throughout Cyprus. Under the
Republic's Constitution, political parties compete for popular support
actively and without restriction. Suffrage is universal, and elections
are held by secret ballot. Elections for the office of President are
held every 5 years; in February 1998 President Clerides won reelection
to a new 5-year term. Elections for members of the House of
Representatives are held every 5 years or less.
The Turkish Cypriots living in northern Cyprus elect a leader and a
representative body every 5 years or less; in December 1998 they chose
a new ``National Assembly.'' In April 2000 Rauf Denktash was named
Turkish Cypriot leader after his opponent, ``Prime Minister'' Dervish
Eroglu, withdrew between the first and second round of voting.
Under the 1960 Constitution, voting took place on a communal basis.
Therefore, since the breakdown in 1963 of bicommunal governing
arrangements, and since the 1974 de facto partition of the island,
Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area are barred
from voting there, although they may travel to the north to vote in
elections. Similarly, Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north
are barred by law from participating in Turkish Cypriot elections. They
are eligible to vote in Greek Cypriot elections but must travel to the
south to exercise that right. Officials in the north representing Greek
Cypriots and Maronites are appointed by the Government of Cyprus and
are not recognized by Turkish Cypriot authorities.
In both communities, women are underrepresented in government and
politics, although they face no legal obstacles to participating in the
political process. Women hold some cabinet-level, judicial, and other
senior positions. In the House of Representatives, women hold 4 of 56
seats; in the ``National Assembly'' in the north, women hold 4 of 50
seats.
In addition to their normal voting rights, the small Maronite,
Armenian, and Latin (Roman Catholic) communities also elect special
nonvoting representatives from their respective communities who sit in
the respective legislative bodies.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
rights
A number of organizations in both parts of the island consider
themselves human rights groups; however, they generally are concerned
with alleged violations of the rights of their community's members by
the other community. Groups with a broad human rights mission include
organizations promoting awareness of domestic violence and others
concerned with alleged police brutality.
No restrictions prevent the formation of human rights groups.
Representatives of international human rights organizations have access
throughout the island. Government officials are generally cooperative
and responsive to their views.
The United Nations, through the autonomous tripartite (United
Nations, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot) Committee on Missing Persons
in Cyprus (CMP), is attempting to resolve the problem of missing
persons who remain unaccounted for since the intercommunal violence
beginning in 1963-64 and the events of July 1974 and afterwards. The
CMP has made little progress. However, in November 1999 the CMP met
formally for the first time since early 1996 and agreed in principle to
resume investigations in 2000. However, no resumption of meetings
occurred during the year. In July 1997, the leaders of the Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities agreed to collect and share
information on missing persons by the end of September 1997, outside of
the CMP process. Information finally was exchanged in January 1998.
Further progress has been delayed due to Turkish Cypriot reluctance to
proceed without first fully accounting for those who may have been
killed in internal Greek Cypriot fighting in July 1974 prior to the
landing of Turkish forces on Cyprus.
Since June 1999 the Government of Cyprus has been conducting
exhumations of gravesites in the south that may contain the remains of
persons missing since 1974. So far 46 Greek Cypriots have been
identified through DNA testing. Of those, 17 were listed among the
missing since 1974; the remaining 29 were known to be dead, but the
locations of their graves were unknown. In July 2000 the Government of
Cyprus released a list of 1,493 Greek Cypriot missing persons whose
cases have been submitted to the CMP for investigation.
A report by the former European Commission of Human Rights,
released in September 1999, held Turkey responsible for violations of
human rights in Cyprus stemming from the 1974 Turkish military
intervention. The result of a complaint by the Government of Cyprus,
the report rejected the Turkish argument that the ``TRNC'' is an
independent state and instead ruled that it is ``a subordinate local
administration of Turkey operating in northern Cyprus.'' Turkey was
held responsible for continuing human rights violations against Greek
Cypriots missing since 1974, and their surviving relatives, and for
violations concerning the homes and properties of displaced Greek
Cypriots from 1974, as well as violations of the rights of Greek
Cypriots still living in north Cyprus. In a September 20 hearing before
the European Court of Human Rights, the Court reserved judgement on the
report until a future undetermined date.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Legislation in both communities provides for protection against
discrimination based on sex, religion, or national, racial or ethnic
origin. While each community generally respects such laws, significant
problems remain with the treatment of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites
living in the north and, to a lesser extent, with the treatment of
Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area.
Women.--Spousal abuse in the Greek Cypriot community is receiving
increasing attention, and the problem is believed to be significant. An
NGO formed to address the domestic abuse problem reported 591 cases
during 2000, compared with 747 cases in 1999, with 83.2 percent of the
reported victims women, 14.3 percent children, and 2.3 percent men. The
NGO notes that the decrease in cases in 2000 should not be interpreted
as an actual decrease in the incidence of domestic violence. A shortage
in volunteer staff during the year decreased the number of the
organization's domestic abuse hot line operating hours. A shelter for
battered women opened in 1998.
A 1994 law aimed at making spousal abuse easier to report and
prosecute initially had little effect because key provisions were
unfunded and unimplemented. However, funding increased and progress was
made in implementation during the year, with all cases reported to the
police being referred to the courts and measures taken to ensure that
such cases are treated as serious criminal charges, not simply as
family disputes. Additionally amendments to the law during the year
have facilitated the prosecution of suspected offenders. Many suspected
cases of domestic violence still do not reach the courts, largely
because of family pressure and the wife's economic dependence on her
husband. Very few cases tried in the courts result in convictions.
Little public discussion of domestic violence occurs in the Turkish
Cypriot community, although a report issued by the NGO Women's Research
Center described such violence as common. A women's shelter that opened
in 1994 closed in 2000 due to lack of use. The shelter's location was
well known in the community, and women seeking assistance feared being
discovered by their spouses. Domestic violence cases are rare in the
Turkish Cypriot legal system, since they often are considered a
``family matter.''
``Honor'' crimes, in which women are victimized and even killed by
relatives for alleged acts that dishonor the family, occur in the
government-controlled area and in the north and are prosecuted in both
areas. However, no such deaths have occurred in recent years on the
island.
There is no law against sexual harassment law in the government-
controlled area. Although prohibited by law in the north, sexual
harassment is not widely discussed, and any such incidents are largely
unreported. Republic of Cyprus law forbids forced (but not voluntary)
prostitution. However, credible reports continue that women, generally
East Asian or Eastern European night club performers, are trafficked
and forced into prostitution in both communities (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.).
The Greek Cypriot press frequently reported on the mistreatment of
some maids and other foreign workers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
Throughout Cyprus, women generally have the same legal status as
men. Greek Cypriot women married to foreign husbands were given the
right to transmit citizenship to their children automatically in 1998
legislation. A 1998 Turkish Cypriot law on marriage and divorce
provides for more equal treatment of husbands and wives. Under the law,
the man no longer is considered legally the head of the family and does
not have the exclusive right to decide the family's place of residence.
The wife may retain her surname but must add the husband's surname.
Turkish Cypriot women may now marry non-Muslim men. In cases of
divorce, the court decides on a fair distribution of the family's
assets, with each partner assured a minimum of 30 percent. In dividing
assets, the judge must take into account which partner is receiving
custody of the children and provide sufficient means to support them.
Legal provisions in both communities requiring equal pay for men
and women performing the same job are enforced effectively at the white
collar level, but Turkish Cypriot women employed in the agricultural
and textile sectors routinely are paid less than their male
counterparts.
Children.--Both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities
demonstrate a strong commitment to children's welfare. There is no
difference in the health care and educational opportunities available
to boys and girls. Free education through age 15 is compulsory in both
communities.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--In Cyprus generally, disabled persons do
not appear to be discriminated against in education or the provision of
state services. In the Greek Cypriot community, disabled persons who
apply for a public sector position are entitled to preference if they
are deemed able to perform the required duties and their qualifications
equal those of other applicants. Legislation also mandates that new
public building and tourist facilities provide access for the disabled,
although little has been done to enforce this law. In the Turkish
Cypriot community, regulations require businesses to employ 1 disabled
person for every 25 positions they fill, although enforcement is
inconsistent. While there is increasing awareness of the issue, the
Turkish Cypriot community has not yet enacted legislation to mandate
access for the disabled to public buildings and other facilities.
Religious Minorities.--Greek Cypriots living in the north report
that unused Orthodox churches continue to be vandalized. An Orthodox
Church in the north is located in the center of an as yet unopened
resort hotel constructed during the year on the grounds surrounding the
Church. Turkish Cypriots complain that unused mosques in the south have
been treated similarly. A previously unknown Greek Cypriot nationalist
organization claimed responsibility for an arson attack on a mosque in
the south in August 1999. Damage was light. The authorities repaired
and built a fence around the mosque and pledged to increase protection
of Muslim sites. No one had been arrested for the attack by year's end.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Both the Government of Cyprus
and the Turkish Cypriot administration have constitutional or legal
bars against discrimination. The basic agreement covering treatment of
Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north and Turkish Cypriots
living in the south remains the 1975 Vienna III Agreement. This
agreement provides for voluntary transfer of populations, free and
unhindered access by the UNFICYP to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living
in the north and Turkish Cypriots living in the south, and facilities
for education, medical care, and religious worship. Turkish Cypriot
noncompliance with some of the provisions of the Vienna III Agreement
made daily life difficult for Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in
the north. At year's end, there were 427 Greek Cypriots and 154
Maronites resident in the north.
Some of the approximately 300 Turkish Cypriots living in the
government-controlled area face difficulties in obtaining
identification cards and other government documents, especially if they
were born after 1974. Turkish Cypriots also appear to be subjected to
surveillance by the Greek Cypriot police. However, they make few formal
complaints to the UNFICYP.
UNFICYP access to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north
remains limited. Despite recent improvements in living conditions for
Greek Cypriots and Maronites, no Greek-language educational facilities
for Greek Cypriot or Maronite children in the north exist the beyond
elementary level. Parents thus are forced in many instances to choose
between keeping their children with them or sending them to the south
for further education (in which case Turkish Cypriot authorities no
longer allow them to return permanently to the north). Turkish Cypriot
authorities screen all textbooks sent from the south to the Greek
Cypriot schools, causing lengthy delays and shortages of up-to-date
texts. Turkish Cypriot authorities did not approve about 20 percent of
the books sent to the north in September, and the books were returned.
A request by the Government of Cyprus to send a fourth teacher to the
Greek Cypriot school in the north was rejected by Turkish Cypriot
authorities. Both Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north are
unable to change their place of residence at will. Although the Vienna
III Agreement provides for medical care by a doctor from the Greek
Cypriot community, only care by a Turkish Cypriot doctor registered
with Turkish Cypriot authorities is permitted. Additional telephones
have been installed for Greek Cypriots living in the north, although
they, like Turkish Cypriots, must pay higher, ``international'' fees to
call the south.
In May 1999 a Maronite house in the village of Asomatos was
demolished by the Turkish military. Military officials indicated that
the action was an error and promised to rebuild the house. However, it
had not yet been rebuilt by year's end. Maronites still lack some
public services available in most other Turkish Cypriot areas.
In 1998 Turkish Cypriot authorities announced they were reviewing
legislation that bans Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north from
bequeathing real property to heirs residing in the south. Such property
would no longer be seized by the Turkish Cypriot authorities but would
be taken into temporary custody pending probate of the will. However,
it is not clear whether Turkish Cypriot legal provisions exist to
facilitate the transfer of Greek Cypriot- and Maronite-owned property
in the north to heirs in the south. Therefore, the practical effect of
the 1998 announcement remains unrealized.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except for members of
the police and military forces, have the legal right to form and join
trade unions of their own choosing without prior authorization.
However, in the government-controlled area, police officers are
permitted to join associations that have the right to bargain
collectively, although not to strike. More than 70 percent of the Greek
Cypriot work force belongs to independent trade unions. Approximately
50 to 60 percent of Turkish Cypriot private sector workers, and all
public sector workers, belong to labor unions.
In the Turkish Cypriot community, union officials allege that
various firms have been successful in establishing ``company''
organizations and then applying pressure on workers to join these
unions. Officials of independent labor unions also have accused the
Turkish Cypriot authorities of creating rival public sector unions to
weaken the independent unions. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) had not yet acted on these complaints by the end of September
2000.
In both communities, trade unions freely and regularly take stands
on public policy issues affecting workers and maintain their
independence from the authorities. Two of the major trade unions, one
in each community, are affiliated closely with political parties. Both
of the other major unions are independent.
All workers have the right to strike, and several strikes occurred.
In the south, no major strikes occurred. In December in the north,
discontent with a worsening economic situation precipitated a general
strike that was supported by the major trade and teachers unions. In
the northern part of the island, a 1978 court ruling gives employers an
unrestricted right to hire replacement workers in the event of a
strike, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the right to strike.
Authorities of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities
have the power to curtail strikes in what they deem to be ``essential
services,'' although this power rarely is used.
Unions in both parts of Cyprus are able to affiliate with
international trade union organizations, although Greek Cypriot unions
sometimes object to recognition of Turkish Cypriot unions formed after
1963.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions
and confederations by law are free to organize and bargain collectively
throughout Cyprus. This right is observed in practice in the
government-controlled areas, and most wages and benefits are set by
freely negotiated collective agreements. However, Greek Cypriot
collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable. In the rare
instances when such agreements are believed to have been infringed, the
Ministry of Labor is requested to investigate the claim. If the
Ministry is unable to resolve the dispute, the union may call a strike
to support its demands.
In the Turkish Cypriot community wage levels are reviewed several
times a year for both private sector and public sector workers, and a
corresponding cost-of-living raise is established. A special commission
composed of five representatives each from organized labor, employers,
and the authorities conduct the review. Union leaders contend that
private sector employers are able to discourage union activity because
the enforcement of labor and occupational safety regulations is
sporadic, and penalties for antiunion practices are minimal. As in the
Greek Cypriot community, parties to a dispute may request mediation by
the authorities.
Small export processing zones exist in the port of Larnaca and in
Famagusta, but the laws governing working conditions and actual
practice are the same as those outside the zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and
this prohibition is generally observed. However, there were credible
reports that foreign women were forced into prostitution (see Sections
5 and 6.f.). Foreign maids and illegal foreign workers allegedly are
subject to the nonpayment of wages and the threat of deportation (see
Section 6.e.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--In both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities,
the minimum age for the employment of children in an ``industrial
undertaking'' is 16 years of age. Turkish Cypriots may be employed in
apprentice positions at the age of 15. There are labor inspectors in
both communities. However, in family-run shops it is common to see
younger children working after school, and according to press reports,
children as young as 11 or 12 years of age work in orchards during
their school holidays in the Turkish Cypriot community. Laws prohibit
forced and bonded child labor, and these laws are enforced effectively
in both communities (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legislated minimum wage in
the Greek Cypriot community, which is reviewed every year, is
approximately $426 (266 Cyprus pounds) per month for shop assistants,
practical nurses, clerks, hairdressers, and nursery assistants, rising
to $459 (287 Cyprus pounds) after 6 months' employment. This amount is
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. All other occupations are covered under collective bargaining
agreements between trade unions and employers within the same economic
sector, and the wages set in these agreements are significantly higher
than the legislated minimum wage. The legislated minimum wage in the
Turkish Cypriot area, while subject to frequent review because of high
inflation, was approximately $253 (158 Cyprus pounds) per month as of
September. This amount is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Unskilled workers typically earn about
$416 (260 Cyprus pounds) per month, which is barely adequate to support
a family.
In the Greek Cypriot community, the standard workweek in the
private sector is an average of 39 hours for white-collar workers and
38 hours for blue-collar workers. In the public sector, it is 38 hours
during the winter and 35 hours in the summer. In the Turkish Cypriot
community, the standard workweek is 38 hours in the winter and 36 hours
in the summer. Labor inspectors effectively enforce these laws.
Reports on the mistreatment of maids and other foreign workers are
frequent in the Greek Cypriot press. These reports usually involve
allegations that maids, often from East or South Asia, were mistreated
by their employers or fired without cause in violation of their
contracts. Many women do not complain to authorities, fearing
retribution from their employers. Those who do file charges run the
risk of being fired and then deported.
A significant percentage of the labor force in the north consists
of illegal workers, mostly from Turkey. According to some estimates,
illegal workers constitute as much as 25 percent of the total work
force there. There are frequent allegations that such workers are
subject to mistreatment, including nonpayment of wages and threats of
deportation.
In recent years, steps were taken to improve health and safety
standards in the workplace in the government-controlled area. A 1997
law harmonized health and safety standards with those in the European
Union (EU). The law incorporates EU principles and standards for health
and safety in the workplace and complies fully with the 1981 ILO
convention on occupational health and safety. A second 1997 law
requires employers to provide insurance liability coverage for work-
related injuries. According to labor union officials, these laws are
effectively enforced.
Occupational safety and health regulations are administered
sporadically at best in the Turkish Cypriot area. In both areas,
factory inspectors process complaints and inspect businesses in order
to ensure that occupational safety laws are observed. Workers in the
government-controlled area can remove themselves from dangerous work
conditions without risking loss of employment. Turkish Cypriot workers
who file complaints do not receive satisfactory legal protection and
may face dismissal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--In January the Cypriot legislature
passed a law making it a felony to engage in the sexual exploitation
and trafficking of adults (with or without their consent) and children.
The law obligates the State to provide protection and support for
victims and provides for punishment of up to 20 years' imprisonment. No
cases were reported by year's end. In January the Turkish Cypriot
``National Assembly'' passed a law designed to regulate the hiring of
women in nightclubs, including penalties for women and employers that
engage in prostitution. The law does not prohibit trafficking. A
holdover from British preindependence law currently makes it illegal in
both communities to procure a woman for prostitution, although the
crime is only a misdemeanor. Corruption among law enforcement and
immigration personnel is an obstacle to the effective policing of
trafficking in both communities. For example, the Chief of the
Immigration Department in the government-controlled area was arrested
in September 1999 for illegally issuing visas to female nightclub
workers and pub owners and was on trial at year's end.
During the year credible reports continued that women were
trafficked into both communities for the purpose of prostitution.
Agents in Eastern Europe recruited young women for prostitution in the
Greek Cypriot community. The women entered either illegally after
authorities were bribed or on temporary 3-month work permits. They then
sometimes were forced to surrender their passports or forced to stay
beyond the period of their work permits and in some cases were not paid
their full salaries. The authorities arrested nightclub operators for
profiting from prostitution, and the Government made some effort to
protect women who bring complaints against employers by allowing them
to remain to press charges or facilitate their return home. However,
many of the women are reluctant to press charges, fearing retaliation
by employers or deportation. A similar pattern exists of the
recruitment and hiring of Eastern European women to work in the Turkish
Cypriot community, and reports persist of restrictions on nightclub
workers, such as confiscation of their passports by employers.
__________
CZECH REPUBLIC
The Czech Republic is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with
a bicameral Parliament. Following elections in June 1998, Prime
Minister Milos Zeman formed a minority government comprised almost
exclusively of members of his left-of-center Social Democratic Party.
The Parliament elects the President for a 5-year term. President Vaclav
Havel was reelected in January 1998 by a narrow margin and remains an
internationally recognized advocate of human rights and social justice.
Although the country essentially has completed the reform of political
structures initiated after the 1989 ``Velvet Revolution,'' some
institutions are still in a state of transformation. The judiciary is
legally independent but is hampered by structural and procedural
deficiencies and a lack of resources.
The Ministry of the Interior oversees the police. The civilian
internal security service, known as the Security and Information
Service (BIS), reports to the Parliament and the Prime Minister's
office through the Foreign Minister, who is a Deputy Prime Minister.
Police and BIS authorities generally observe constitutional and legal
protection of individual rights in carrying out their responsibilities.
However, some members of the police committed human rights abuses.
The economy is market-based, with over 80 percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP) produced by the private sector. After 2 years of
contraction, the economy grew by 2.8 percent during the first three
quarters of the year. Inflation dropped to 3.9 percent, while
unemployment leveled off at 8.8 percent. The work force is employed
primarily in industry, retail trade, and construction. Leading exports
are machinery and transport equipment, and intermediate manufactured
products. The GDP per capita in 1999 stood at approximately $5,400
(186,300 Czech crowns).
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, problems remain in several areas. Occasional police violence
remains a problem. Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials
are problems, due to a lack of resources for the judicial system. There
is some violence and discrimination against women. Discrimination and
sporadic skinhead violence against the Romani community remain
problems. Trafficking in women and children is a problem. Since January
1999, the Human Rights Council, headed by the Commissioner for Human
Rights, has advised the Government on human rights issues and prepared
legislative proposals for improving human rights in the country. In
December the Parliament named former Justice Minister Otakar Motejl as
Ombudsman for Human Rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearances.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and there were no
reports of such practices; however, police occasionally used excessive
force and abused their authority.
In May police clashed with anarchists attempting to disrupt a
skinhead rally; the anarchists complained of being singled out for
arbitrary arrest and beatings. Similar allegations were made after
police prevented anarchists from disrupting neofascist rallies in
October and November.
During violent antiglobalization protests surrounding the September
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings in Prague, 123
police officers were injured, many by cobblestones thrown by rioters
(see Section 2.b.). Police arrested 900 protesters for destruction of
property, disturbing the peace, blocking roadways, and attempting to
disrupt the meetings. Most were released within 1 or 2 days. Police
brought charges against 20 persons; by December 6 all had been released
on bail. After their release, many of those detained complained of poor
treatment and abuse before and during their detention. Most complaints
were of illegal detention; overcrowded cells; lack of food and toilet
facilities; no immediate access to lawyers or telephones; and rough
treatment, strip searches, and intimidation by police and prison
officials. Some protesters stated to NGO's monitoring police behavior
that they had seen numerous people whom they believed had been beaten
by the police and prison officials. One Spanish and two Danish
protesters claimed police beat them while they were in custody. A
Polish protester, who is suing the Czech police, stated that uniformed
police had beaten him repeatedly over the course of his 24-hour
detention, during which he had been chained in his cell, denied access
to a lawyer, and not allowed to use toilet facilities. Numerous foreign
demonstrators claimed that they were arrested despite behaving
peacefully. Arrested protesters also reported that police and prison
officials were wearing masks and were not wearing or were covering
their identification numbers. A South Korean scientist and visiting
professor at Charles University not participating in the protest was
arrested and held for 24 hours. He complained of abuse while in
detention.
Government officials expressed satisfaction with overall police
conduct during the protests, although they did not reject the
possibility of misconduct by individual officers. However, local and
international human rights organizations expressed concern about police
behavior during the protests; 15 members of the European Parliament
sent an open letter to government leaders urging a thorough
investigation. In October the Ministry of the Interior initiated an
investigation into complaints of police misconduct. By year's end, the
Ministry of the Interior had received 373 complaints, 60 of which led
to investigations. Only two cases of possible police misconduct were
found (one for illegal fingerprinting and one for a covered
identification number). No misconduct was found in the case of the
Danes, the Spaniard, or the South Korean; the case of the Polish
protester was still ongoing. Several other cases were still under
investigation at year's end, including that of a police officer
photographed standing over a fallen protester wielding a club. Other
cases were suspended for lack of evidence. An NGO monitoring the police
gathered testimony of police misconduct from over 50 protesters and
filed at least 2 lawsuits against the police. That organization has
expressed dissatisfaction with the Ministry of the Interior's
investigations.
According to press reports, an American/Austrian dual citizen
detained during the riots jumped from a police station window, breaking
her leg. She stated through her attorney that she had paid a fine for
participating in the riots but had not been released at that time. In
addition she complained of ``aggressive and improper'' police behavior
toward her during detention. The Ministry of the Interior investigation
into her complaint found no police misconduct.
The police force has been restructured significantly; the majority
of officers have been recruited since the 1989 revolution. Public
approval ratings for the police reached a 10-year high after their
overall good performance during the IMF/World Bank meetings. Petty
police corruption remains a problem, although enforcement against it
has improved. During the year, 389 members of the police force were
charged with criminal offenses, a 12 percent increase over 1999, which
the authorities credit to better enforcement efforts. The most common
offenses cited were police officers fining motorists for traffic
offenses, then keeping the money, and auto accident insurance fraud.
Punishments include suspension from duty, fines, and prison sentences.
Police sometimes failed to take sufficient action in cases of threats
or attacks against Roma.
In December police officer Marian Telega was sentenced to 18 months
in prison and 2-and-a-half years' probation for his involvement in the
1998 death of Rom Milan Lacko. Telega drove the car that hit and killed
Lacko after he was beaten by skinheads and left in the road (see
Section 5). In September Rom Martin Tomko accused a Brno police officer
of stopping him in the street and, after an argument, beating him and
leaving him unconscious in a park. Three police officers have been
charged with inflicting bodily harm.
In October a Prague court rejected a complaint against a special
police unit alleged to have used excessive force to contain a group of
anarchists and radical environmentalists rioting in downtown Prague in
1998.
The case of a Brno city police officer charged with using excessive
force to break up a late night party outside a theater in 1995 still
was awaiting a formal court decision at year's end. In the meantime,
the officer continues to serve on the police force but faces suspension
or other internal disciplinary action if convicted.
The trial of one of the three Communist-era investigators charged
with torturing political prisoners in the 1950's ended in acquittal in
January. The trial of the other two was postponed for health reasons
(see Section 1.e.). The case of two former secret police officers
accused of torturing dissident Vladimir Hucin was still being
investigated at year's end. The Office for the Documentation and
Investigation of the Crimes of Communism (UDV) continued to investigate
cases of torture and misconduct from the Communist era (see Section
1.e.).
Skinhead violence against Roma and other minorities remained a
problem (see Section 5).
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There is
overcrowding in many prisons, but it declined during the course of the
year. In March the general director of the prison service announced
that the country's prisons would temporarily refuse entry to convicts
who have been sentenced to 2 years in prison or less. In February and
March, prisoners in several facilities rioted and staged hunger strikes
to protest overcrowding, deteriorating facilities, and insufficient
food and clothing. The protests ended after a week. In May the prison
system was at 120 percent of capacity, in some areas as high as 180
percent; there were approximately 23,000 prisoners in the country. By
year's end, the system was at 110 percent of capacity; some prisons
were at 135 percent. There were 21,547 prisoners and 9,890 prison
guards. Women and men are housed separately. Attorney and family visits
are permitted. The authorities follow these guidelines in practice.
The Government permits visits by human rights monitors. However,
during the IMF/World Bank protests, observers were not allowed into two
detention facilities in Branik and Ocelarska Street (see Section 4).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this
prohibition in practice. Police may hold persons without charge for up
to 48 hours, during which time they have the right to counsel. The lack
of experienced police investigators and qualified judges, combined with
a still evolving legal environment, have contributed to a backlog of
court cases. The Ministry of Justice estimates that 300 judges and 88
prosecutors are needed to fill vacant positions. Pretrial detention may
last legally as long as 4 years for cases considered ``exceptionally
grave'' under the Criminal Code. Pretrial detention for most crimes may
last as long as 2 or 3 years, with mandatory judicial review intervals
beginning at the end of the first 6 months of detention. If the court
does not approve continued detention during a judicial review, the
suspect must be released. In practice few pretrial detainees are held
for longer than 2 years. The law does not allow bail for certain
serious crimes. A suspect may petition the appropriate investigating
authorities at any time for release from detention. The average length
of pretrial detention is now 195 days. As of November, the number of
pretrial detainees was 6,353, about one third of the prison population.
The law prohibits exile, and the Government observes this
prohibition in practice.
Since 1993 local courts and foreign police have expelled to
Slovakia ``Slovaks'' without proper citizenship or residency papers.
Some of these expulsions involve ``Slovak'' Roma who have never been in
Slovakia. By the first half of 1997 (latest available statistics), a
total of 851 ``Slovaks'' had been expelled administratively or
judicially by the authorities. A February 1998 presidential amnesty
(that was expected to affect three-fourths of all expulsion sentences
issued between January 1, 1993 and February 2, 1998) granted amnesty to
those receiving expulsion sentences for crimes in which the punishment
was less than 5 years' imprisonment. However, according to one NGO that
follows this issue, some courts have not implemented this amnesty.
Courts have not imposed expulsion sentences since the implementation of
a new citizenship law in 1999, which allows ``Slovaks'' and others to
legalize their status. There have, however, been complaints from Roma
activists that local officials in some areas are refusing to process
Czech citizenship applications for ``Slovak'' or stateless Roma
families (see Section 5).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is impartial and independent in practice.
Judges are not fired or transferred for political reasons. Structural
and procedural deficiencies as well as a lack of training and resources
hamper the effectiveness of the judiciary. Ministry of Justice
proposals for judicial reform, including term limits for Constitutional
Court judges, a mandatory retirement age for judges, and measures to
streamline the legal process, failed in Parliament at several points
throughout the year. In October Justice Minister Otakar Motejl resigned
after Parliament repeatedly rejected his attempts at broad judicial
reform.
The court system consists of district, regional, and high courts.
The Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal. In addition the
separate Constitutional Court has final authority for cases concerning
the constitutionality of legislation.
The law stipulates that persons charged with criminal offenses are
entitled to fair and open public trials. They have the right to be
informed of their legal rights and of the charges against them, to
consult with counsel, and to present a defense. The State provides
lawyers for indigent defendants in criminal and some civil cases
through the bar association. All defendants enjoy a presumption of
innocence and have the right to refuse to testify against themselves.
They may appeal any judgments decided against them. The authorities
observe these rights in practice.
The 1991 lustration (vetting) law, passed to prevent Communistera
collaborators from taking up senior government responsibilities,
continues to bar many former Communist Party officials, members of the
people's militia, and suspected secret police collaborators from
holding a wide range of elective and appointive offices for 5 years,
including appointive positions in state-owned companies, academia, and
the media. In 1995 Parliament extended this legal constraint to
December 31, 2000, overriding a veto of President Havel. In February
the Chairman of the Government's privatization agency was dismissed
after presenting a falsified lustration certificate clearing him of
cooperation with Communist-era state security. In November the Chamber
of Deputies again extended the validity of the law over the veto of
President Havel until a new civil service law and security law are
passed and implemented. The extended law exempts from the lustration
process people born after December 1, 1971, an exemption not included
in the earlier version. Some private employers also have required
applicants to produce lustration certificates proving noncollaboration.
By October the special section of the Interior Ministry handling
lustration requests had processed 8,200 lustration certificates,
bringing the total since 1991 to 395,500. During the year, 3 percent of
the applications did not receive confirmation of a clear record, in
line with the average of 3.2 percent since 1991. Those who did not
receive confirmation of a clear record may file a civil suit against
the Interior Ministry for a charge similar to slander. Twenty such
suits were filed during the year; court decisions were still pending at
year's end.
Defenders of the lustration law argue that individuals who
systematically destroyed the lives of others in order to gain
advantages for themselves within the Communist system should not be
entrusted with high state responsibilities. However, the law has been
criticized for violating human rights principles prohibiting
discrimination in employment and assigning collective guilt. It also
has been criticized because the screening process is based on the
records of the Communist secret police, which many believe are
incomplete or unreliable. Citizens unjustly accused of collaboration
may suffer diminished career prospects and damaged personal
reputations. In its November assessment report on the Czech Republic
for European Union (EU) accession, the European Commission again noted
the need to eliminate the law.
Some actions taken by state authorities and the Communist Party
during the 1948 to 1989 Communist regime are being investigated as
criminal acts under a 1993 law by a government office, UDV, established
for this purpose. The UDV was established in 1995 and is an independent
part of the Czech Police Office of Investigations. The UDV is empowered
to launch and conduct prosecutions and propose filing suits to state
attorney's offices. As of October, the UDV had investigated 2,756 cases
under its jurisdiction, and recommended action against 152 individuals.
Charges have been filed in court against 44 persons. Nine of those have
been sentenced; five were placed on probation and four received
unconditional sentences, the longest of which was 5 years'
imprisonment. Nearly 2,000 cases have been dropped due to the death of
suspects or witnesses, various presidential amnesties, or statutes of
limitation. The trial in Uherske Hradiste of three Communist officials
charged with torturing political prisoners in the 1950's ended in
January. One of the three was acquitted; the case was postponed against
the other two for health reasons (see Section 1.c.). The UDV is still
working with Charles University to prepare ``moral trials'' to discuss
crimes whose offenders cannot be punished due to their death or to the
expired statue of limitations on the cases. It targets primarily cases
of: Torture (see Section 1.c.); border shootings; treason connected
with the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; state persecution
of opponents of the Communist regime; and investigation of Czech
authorities who negligently allowed exposure of citizens to hazardous
waste after the nuclear accident in Chernobyl. Although the statute of
limitations for many of the Communist-era crimes under investigation by
the UDV was set to expire this year, Parliament voted in December 1999
to suspend the statute of limitations for serious crimes committed
during the Communist regime and enabled the UDV to continue
investigating these cases. In September the Interior Ministry extended
the UDV's mandate indefinitely and broadened the period of years it
should investigate to include 1945 through 1948.
In July the case of Communist-era judge Pavel Vitek was submitted
to a regional prosecutor. A district court ruled earlier that Pavel
Vitek, who was one of the judges in a show trial against seven persons
who were accused falsely of murdering Communist officials in 1951,
could not be tried for his role in the case because the statute of
limitations had expired. However, the Supreme Court ruled in December
1999 that he could be tried for aiding and abetting murder. The
prosecutor had not yet returned the case to trial by year's end.
In February the Prosecutor General returned the case of former
Communist officials Milos Jakes and Jozek Lenart to the UDV for further
investigation. The two were to be charged with high treason for
attending a meeting at the Soviet Embassy in Prague on the day after
the Warsaw Pact invasion and for discussing the creation of a new
``workers' and farmers''' government; they were not indicted by year's
end.
The UDV also opened three new high-profile cases: The unexplained
death in August 1967 of American citizen Charles Jordan, in which
involvement of the Czech state security service is suspected; Communist
officials' responsibility for and attempts to cover up a 1981 mining
accident in which 65 miners were killed; and the alleged attempts of
two former Communist officials to conceal and protect Nazi war criminal
Werner Tutter in the 1960's. Prosecution of former Czechoslovak Premier
and Interior Minister Lubomir Strougal relating to the arming of the
People's Militia, a paramilitary force of the former Communist Party,
was halted; he still faced charges of abuse of public office at year's
end.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Electronic surveillance, the tapping of telephones,
and the interception of mail require a court order; government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions in practice, and
violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
Unlike in 1999, there were no reports of Roma filing complaints
against the police for illegal searches during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. Individuals can and do speak out on political issues and
freely criticize the Government and public figures. A wide variety of
newspapers, magazines, and journals owned by a variety of Czech and
foreign investors are published without government interference. The
press law was updated in February to conform to EU norms.
The electronic media are independent. There are 3 national
television stations--1 public (with 2 separate channels) and 2
private--and more than 61 private radio stations in addition to Czech
Public Radio. A third private television station, TV3, can be viewed
only in certain regions or through cable and satellite. The leading
television channel, Nova, is privately owned. International arbitration
continues on a dispute over its ownership and alleged fraud and
commercial misconduct by the station's license holder; several courts
found in his favor during the course of the year. Citizens also have
access to foreign broadcasts via satellite, cable, and the Internet.
On January 1, a new Freedom of Information Act took effect. The law
provides for freedom of access to information under the control of
state and local authorities as well as other institutions affecting the
rights of citizens.
In November President Havel signed an amendment to the Penal Code
that imposes prison terms of between 6 months and 3 years for denying
the Nazi Holocaust and the Communist genocide. The amendment also
outlawed the incitement of hatred based on race, religion, class,
nationality, or other group.
In February the lower house of Parliament approved a press bill,
minus its most controversial provision requiring that the press present
responses from persons or parties who believed their reputations had
been sullied by media reports, even if the information were correct.
Opponents of the measure maintained that this provision would create an
unfair burden on the press and represented an unwise regulation of free
expression.
A 13-member Television and Radio Council has limited regulatory
responsibility for policymaking and answers to the parliamentary media
committee, which exercises broad oversight of the Council and must
approve its members. The Council can issue and revoke radio and
television licenses and monitors programming. The Council continued to
be the target of criticism during the year for its lack of initiative
and ineffective action in addressing a high profile ownership dispute
at the country's largest private television channel. There is also a
nine-member Czech Television (CTV) Council charged with oversight of
the Public Czech Television. The Council became embroiled in a
controversy over political influence on CTV in mid-December when it
dismissed the CTV general manager. The council hired a new manager 8
days later who was alleged to be subject to political influence. In
protest, news staff began producing their own version of the principal
CTV and public affairs programs. The newly appointed management was
prevented from entering CTV studios and began simultaneous broadcast of
its own news and public affairs programs. By year's end, the situation
had not been resolved.
In January a Prague court dropped charges of defaming a people and
inciting racial hatred against far-right National Alliance leader
Vladimir Skoupy, who had questioned whether the Nazi Holocaust had
taken place (see Section 5).
Charges of slander, assault on a public office, and inciting racial
discord filed against prominent national Romani leader Ondrej Gina in
November 1999 were dropped in March. The mayor and city council of
Rokycany formally had pressed charges against Gina for remarks that he
had published about the mayor and the city on an Internet site about
discrimination against Roma. Local police had concluded that these
remarks constituted a criminal act and turned the case over to the
state prosecutor for action. The mayor and city council had argued that
Gina's remarks were malicious enough to constitute ``defamation of the
Czech nation'' and ``harm to the reputation of the city of Rokycany at
home and abroad (see Sections 1.f. and 5.).''
In September police brought charges of abetting in the commission
of a crime against two journalists who refused to reveal their source
of information in a case involving an alleged slander campaign against
a member of the Government. Such charges are usually brought only in
cases in which police have no other means of solving a serious crime,
such as murder. Journalists and journalists' professional organizations
criticized the charges as an attempt to stifle freedom of the press. In
October President Havel pardoned the two journalists, who then called
for the case to continue in order to establish a legal precedent on the
press' right to protect sources. A state attorney in November agreed to
proceed with the prosecution; however, no trial had begun by year's
end.
The closely watched false accusation and libel case of Zdenek Zukal
continued. Zukal faces three charges of criminal libel for reporting
that police had provided false information in their investigation of
high-level corruption in Olomouc. Originally Zukal had been charged
with slander for publishing documents he knew--or should have known--to
be forgeries. Local authorities later changed the charge to false
accusation 1 day before a planned presidential pardon. Zukal's trial
has been delayed on numerous occasions and was ongoing at year's end.
At year's end, former television reporter Tomas Smrcek was awaiting
trial on charges of deliberately endangering classified data. In a 1999
report on possible Czech intelligence service coverup of one of its
official's drunk driving offense, Smrcek allegedly showed a classified
document on the air. Smrcek faces up to 8 years in prison.
In October the far-right Republican Party (SPR-RSC) brought suit
against the Human Rights Commissioner and the Ministry of the Interior
for incitement to racial and ethnic hatred. The Ministry, at the
proposal of the Human Rights Commission, has made a public tender for
grant proposals for a study of the Republican Party (SPR-RSC) and its
racist and anti-Semitic policies.
In September a member of the far-right Republican Party (SPRRSC)
was sentenced to 10 months in prison and 2 years' probation for
spreading racial and national hatred. The man had placed photos of
current Czech leaders in a display case with anti-Semitic labels (see
Section 5).
In December publisher Michal Zitko was fined approximately $53,000
(2 million Czech crowns) and given a 3-year suspended sentence and 5
years' probation for supporting and disseminating hate speech. Zitko
had translated and published Adolf Hitler's ``Mein Kampf'' with no
editorial commentary. The police seized 300 copies of the book. Also in
December, a state attorney brought similar charges against Vit Varak
for selling ``Mein Kampf'' on the Internet.
In December 1999, President Havel pardoned a Romani woman accused
of defaming the Czech nation for comments she allegedly made about the
construction of a wall dividing Roma and Czech communities in Usti nad
Labem (see Section 5).
The law provides for academic freedom but forbids activities by
established political parties at universities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of persons to assemble peacefully, and the
Government respects these rights in practice; however, it may restrict
assemblies that promote hatred and intolerance, advocate suppression of
individual or political rights, or otherwise jeopardize the safety of
the participants. Permits are normally required for demonstrations, but
police generally do not interfere with spontaneous, peaceful
demonstrations. In October police detained around 900 antiglobalization
protesters rioting outside the IMF/World Bank meetings (see Section
1.c.) and pressed charges against 20 of them.
The law forbids political party activity at universities (see
Section 2.a.).
The Constitution provides for the right of persons to associate
freely and to form political parties, and the Government respects this
right in practice. Either the Government or the President may submit a
proposal to the Supreme Court calling for a political party to be
disbanded. Organizations, associations, foundations, and political
parties are required to register with local officials or at the
Interior Ministry, but there is no evidence that this registration is
either coercive or arbitrarily withheld. Prime Minister Zeman has
called periodically for the Interior Ministry to reexamine or cancel
the official registration of skinhead organizations and others
propagating racial hatred or fascism. In March the Ministry of the
Interior cancelled the registration of a neo-Nazi organization that had
propagated anti-Semitic sentiment (see Section 5). In October the
Ministry also refused to register the National Party, an extreme right-
wing organization, as a civic association (see Section 3). It also
started an investigation into the charter and program of the far-right
Patriotic Republican Party.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The State
subsidizes all religions that are registered officially with the
Ministry of Culture. There are 21 state-recognized religions. To
register a church must have at least 10,000 adult members permanently
residing in the country. For any churches that the World Council of
Churches already has recognized, only 500 adult members permanently
residing in the country are necessary. Churches registered prior to
1991 are not required to meet these conditions. The Jewish community,
which numbers only a few thousand, constitutes one such exception. One
group, the Unification Church (UC), was denied registration in January
1999 when the Department of Churches determined that it had obtained
the required proof of membership by fraud; the UC is contesting the
decision in court. In July the Ministry of Culture requested a
clarification from the Jehovah's Witnesses addressing their beliefs
concerning blood transfusions. The Society for the Study of Sects and
New Religious Trends, a religious observer NGO, accused the Jehovah's
Witnesses of concealing the religion's restrictions on blood
transfusions during its 1993 registration process. Unregistered
religious groups, such as the small Muslim minority, may not own
community property legally, although they are otherwise free to
assemble and worship in the manner of their choice. Their members can
and do issue publications without interference.
In March and May 1999, the Government established two commissions
to improve church-state relations. One is a ``political'' commission
with representation from the main parties currently in the lower
chamber of Parliament, and the second is a ``specialist'' commission
composed of experts including lawyers, economists, and church
representatives. The commissions advise the Government on church-state
relations, the status of churches and methods of their financing, as
well as church-related property questions. Members of the commissions
also have advised the Ministry of Culture on a proposed new Law on the
Freedom of Religious Belief and on the Status of Churches and Religious
Societies. The proposal being considered is modeled on the religious
registration law in effect in Austria. It would impose a two-tiered
registration system, lowering the membership requirement for the first
tier (non-profit religious association with limited tax benefits) to
300, but raising the membership requirement for the second tier (full
religious association with benefit of state funding and property
rights) to approximately 20,000. The new law would also impose a 10year
observation period on all first-tier organizations wishing to obtain
second-tier status. Currently registered churches would automatically
receive second-tier status. The proposed changes have been criticized
by some unregistered religious groups (including the Muslims and the
Church of Scientology) and nongovernmental observers as prejudicial
against minority religions. Some argue that government agencies for the
dissemination of information on ``harmful sects'' assume that the
groups on which they maintain such information are automatically
suspect, when in fact they are legitimate religious organizations.
Missionaries for various religious groups, including the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Jehovah's Witnesses, are present
in the country. Although they proselytize without hindrance within the
country, a more restrictive law on visas for resident foreigners has
complicated their efforts and drawn criticism. The new law went into
effect January 1. It requires that aliens apply for work visas before
entering the country and provide financial information when doing so.
The law is aimed at stopping illegal workers and does not specifically
prohibit religious workers.
In March the Government negotiated a framework agreement on the
protection and preservation of the remnants of a medieval Jewish
cemetery uncovered in 1997 at a commercial construction site in
downtown Prague. More than 100 sets of remains removed by
archaeologists in 1999 were to be reburied at the site. The remaining
graves on the site were to be encased in cement. The Government agreed
to pay $1.2 million (45 million Czech crowns) in compensation to the
Czech Insurance Company, owner of the site. Twenty-five adjacent
parcels believed to contain intact graves from the same cemetery were
designated a national cultural monument. Minister of Culture Pavel
Dostal published an editorial piece in July concerning the negotiations
over the cemetery that many observers considered anti-Semitic. Dostal
denied any anti-Semitic intent. In September the remains were buried in
the New Jewish Cemetery in Prague instead. Although the local Jewish
community considers the matter settled, some international Jewish
groups expressed dissatisfaction at the manner in which the Czech
Insurance Company implemented the March agreement.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement
to travel domestically and abroad, as well as for emigration and
repatriation, and the Government respects these rights in practice.
Czechs who emigrated during the period of Communist rule frequently
return to visit or live. A law passed in September 1999 permits such
persons to regain citizenship without having to relinquish a foreign
citizenship that they acquired during that time. Citizenship is not
revoked for political reasons.
The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A legal and institutional framework is
in place for the processing of refugees and asylees. A new law on
asylum that came into effect on January 1 improves refugee processing.
It establishes a list of ``safe countries of origin'' from which
applicants are unlikely to receive asylum, provides financial support
for towns with refugee camps, and increases access to legal advice for
asylum seekers. No independent body has been established to handle the
appeals of those denied refugee status. The Government provides first
asylum and cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The
Czech Republic is both a transit and destination country for migrants.
The Government fully funds an integration program to assist those
granted refugee status in locating housing and receiving other social
assistance. Two reception centers, six camps, and six integration
centers are provided for recognized refugees. As of the end of 1999,
the Government granted citizenship to 3,200 former citizens of Slovakia
and 564 former citizens of other countries. The new citizenship law
passed in September 1999 enabled thousands more ``Slovaks'' to become
citizens (see Section 5).
From 1993 to 1999, 20,434 asylum applications were filed, of which
838 received formal refugee status for resettlement. During the year,
8,773 applications for asylum were filed. Through August, 100
applications were approved. In 1999, 79 persons received refugee status
out of a total of 7,217 applications. Persons from Afghanistan, Russia,
Slovakia, Ukraine, Sri Lanka, and India submitted the most asylum
requests during the first half of the year. Of the 441 asylum
applicants from the Russian Federation, 212 are Chechens. In addition
migrants from economically disadvantaged countries in Central and
Eastern Europe often enter the country to take up illegal residency or
in transit to the West. In 1999 border police prevented 32,325 illegal
entry attempts, down by 25 percent from 1998. Through the end of
November, 30,651 illegal migrants were stopped at the borders. The
camps set up in 1999 for Kosovar Albanian refugees are closed and there
is not a significant number of Kosovar Albanian refugees who remain in
the country.
A growing concern is the smuggling of large groups of refugees and
economic migrants into and across the country, which lacks specific
laws criminalizing alien smuggling. Organized rings promoting illegal
employment abroad operate with impunity, freely advertising their
services in dozens of local papers and on the Internet. In spite of
existing legislative gaps, the police are taking action against large-
scale trafficking rings under organized crime statutes and a law
criminalizing the ``illegal crossing of the state border.'' The
authorities are working with neighboring countries to tighten border
controls. In December 1999, Parliament passed new legislation on
residence and visas. The new law considerably tightens previous rules
for change of status and extension of stay and requires visas in
advance for everyone but tourists. The number of illegal migrants
detained by Czech authorities declined by 25 percent from 1998 to 1999,
a result of stepped-up efforts and international cooperation. The
number of illegal migrants detained by Czech authorities through
September is roughly the same as over the same period in 1999. Illegal
migrant groups were composed primarily of persons from Romania,
Moldova, Ukraine, Afghanistan, India, Bulgaria, and Vietnam. There were
no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government by democratic means, and citizens exercise this right in
practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis
of universal suffrage. Citizens above the age of 18 are eligible to
vote by secret ballot in national, regional, and local elections.
Elections for 14 new regional governors and parliaments were held
November 12. These were the first elections for the new regional-level
administration, created to improve citizens' access to democratically
elected institutions. The elections were free and fair but turnout was
low. Opposition groups, including political parties, function openly
and participate without hindrance in the political process. Citizens
may join political organizations or vote for the political party of
their choice without government interference. Political parties must
register with the Ministry of the Interior. In October the Ministry
denied registration to the far-right National Party because its
constitution granted its leader a veto and prohibited its members from
joining other associations. In December the Ministry publicly announced
that it was conducting an investigation of the constitution of the far
right Patriotic Republican Party to determine if the party should be
deregistered. A new citizenship law passed in September 1999 remedied
the situation for some persons, predominantly Roma, who were
enfranchised under the former Czechoslovakia but who were unable to
obtain Czech citizenship at the time of the split with Slovakia,
despite birth or long residency in the Czech Republic. They lacked
voting and other rights due to restrictions under the previous
citizenship laws (see Section 5). Amendments to the election law passed
in July make it possible for nonresident Czechs to vote in national
elections for the first time.
The Government of Prime Minister Milos Zeman took office in July
1998. The Government consists almost exclusively of members of the
Prime Minister's left-of-center Social Democratic party, the first
nonrightist government since 1989. In addition to the largest
opposition party, former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' Civil Democratic
Party, which has formally agreed to support the minority Social
Democratic Government under certain conditions, the opposition consists
of the Communist Party and a coalition of four small centrist and
center-right parties. The Constitution mandates elections to Parliament
at least every 4 years, based on proportional representation. In July
the Parliament approved a new system with 35 smaller electoral
districts in place of the former 8 large electoral districts. The new
law also lowers government subsidies to political parties and raises
the percentage of votes needed for parties running in coalition to
enter Parliament. To enter Parliament, a single party must obtain 5
percent of the votes cast in the election; however, coalitions must
obtain 5 percent of the votes per party (i.e. a three-party coalition
would have to receive 15 percent of the votes cast to enter
Parliament). The President and a group of opposition senators have
challenged the law's constitutionality, complaining that the new law
discriminates against small parties and prevents free political
competition. An amendment to the party financing law enacted in
September over a presidential veto increases the government subsidy to
Members of Parliament and Senators. The President is elected by
Parliament and serves a 5-year term. The President has limited
constitutional powers but may use a suspense veto to return legislation
to Parliament, which then can override that veto by a simple majority
of all members.
There are no restrictions, in law or practice, on women's
participation in politics; however, they are underrepresented, and
relatively few women hold high public office. None of the 16 cabinet
ministers in the Government at year's end was a woman. A ``shadow''
cabinet comprised of prominent women politicians and activists was
formed in March. The 200-member Chamber of Deputies has only 30 female
deputies, including 1 deputy speaker. There are 10 female senators in
the 81-member Senate.
No seats are reserved in either house for ethnic minorities.
Slovaks, of whom there are an estimated 300,000, are almost all
``Czechoslovaks'' who elected to live in the Czech Republic after the
split. For the most part, these Slovaks define their interests in the
context of national politics, not along ethnic lines; there is no
Slovak party in Parliament.
Most of the estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Roma have not been fully
integrated into political life (see Section 5). Roma themselves have
been unable to unite behind a program or set of goals to advance their
interests within the democratic structures of the country. Few Roma
serve in local government structures, although some have been appointed
to advisory positions in government ministries. There is currently one
representative of Romani background in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction, and
government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
views. The best-known human rights groups are the Czech Helsinki
Committee and the Tolerance Foundation (an umbrella organization).
There are also many single-issue groups.
During the IMF/World Bank protests in September, members of the
nongovernmental legal observer teams (OPH) were not allowed into two
facilities where arrestees were being held. Despite agreeing before the
protests to an access procedure for OPH observers, police at stations
in Branik and Ocelarska Street refused entry to observers. During the
investigation of possible police misconduct that followed (see Section
1.c. and 2.b.), the police and Ministries of Justice and Interior were
responsive to OPH's views.
In July 1999, Parliament passed legislation needed to create a $14
million (500 million Czech crowns) endowment to be used by 39 NGO's
that work on issues of social welfare, health, culture, education,
human rights protection, and the environment. In June the Government's
Council for Nongovernmental Organizations announced it would be
dedicating an additional $37.5 million (1.5 billion Czech crowns) for
organizations focusing on human rights and the environment.
Former U.N. Human Rights Commission expert Petr Uhl has served as
the Government's Commissioner for Human Rights since 1999. The Human
Rights Commissioner serves as head of the government Committee for
Nationalities and of the Interministerial Commission for Romani
Community Affairs, established in 1997 (see Section 5). A Council for
Human Rights with 10 representatives of government ministries and 10
human rights activists was established in January 1999. The Council for
Human Rights advises the Government on human rights issues and proposes
legislation to improve the observation of human rights in the country.
On December 12, pursuant to legislation passed a year earlier, the
Chamber of Deputies elected former Justice Minister Otakar Motejl
``Public Rights Protector'' or Ombudsman. Motejl, a political
independent, resigned from the justice post in October. No Deputy
Ombudsman was selected. By year's end, Motejl was still hiring and
training staff, opening his office, and beginning public outreach. The
Ombudsman will addresses citizens' complaints of violations of civil
and human rights and freedoms by government entities. However, he will
have no legal power to sanction offending individuals or offices.
In each house of Parliament there is a petition committee for human
rights and nationalities, which includes a subcommittee for
nationalities. A government-sponsored Council for Nationalities advises
the Cabinet on minority affairs. In this body, Slovaks and Roma have
three representatives each; Poles and Germans, two each; and Hungarians
and Ukrainians, one each. In November the Government signed the
European Charter on Minority and Regional Languages; the Chamber of
Deputies continued debate on a law on ethnic minorities at year's end.
There is also a government commission staffed by members of the NGO and
journalist communities that monitors interethnic violence.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the equality of citizens and
prohibits discrimination. Health care, education, retirement, and other
social services generally are provided without regard to race, sex,
religion, disability, or social status. In practice Roma face
discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and housing, and
women face discrimination in employment.
Women.--The actual extent of violence against women is unknown;
however, some studies by experts indicate that it is more common than
publicly acknowledged. Public debate about it is rare, despite the
efforts of women's groups to focus public attention on the problem. The
Government maintains a comprehensive awareness and prevention program
designed to address issues of trafficking, abuse, and violence against
women. ROSA, an NGO that helps women in trouble, estimates that 1 in 10
women in domestic situations suffer from emotional or physical abuse,
and that 30 percent of the abusers are university educated. The press
occasionally reported on the problem of violence against women and
trafficking in prostitutes. A 1998 research study conducted by Prague's
Sexological Institute indicated that 13 percent of women are forced
into sexual intercourse under threat of violence. Spouses or partners
are responsible for 51 percent of rapes, with an additional 37 percent
of the attacks committed by men known to the victims. Only 12 percent
of rape victims are attacked by strangers. According to police
statistics, there were 500 rapes reported countrywide during the year,
although researchers at the Institute estimate that only 3.3 percent of
rape victims report the crime to the police. Approximately 80 percent
of criminal rape cases are solved. Gender studies experts reported that
women were ashamed to report rape or speak about it, and that the
police were not equipped to help, either by attitude or training.
However, to improve police responsiveness and prosecution efforts, the
Ministry of the Interior runs a training program in protocols for
investigating family violence and sexual crime cases.
According to Elektra, a help center for abused women, rape victims
can seek psychological help through any help line or crisis center.
Crisis centers that help rape victims include White Circle of Safety,
an association for crime victims that provides free psychiatric and
legal help, and Riaps, a help line that counsels persons who experience
any kind of trauma. A total of 54 state-supported shelters with 771
beds are located in most major cities and towns and accept women who
have been raped or abused; local NGO's provide medical and social
assistance to women. According to NGO's, the situation has improved in
recent years, but there are still not enough shelter spaces to meet the
demand.
Legislation does not address spousal abuse specifically; however,
the Criminal Code covers other forms of domestic violence. An attack is
considered criminal if the victim's condition warrants medical
treatment (incapacity to work) for 7 or more days. If medical treatment
lasts less than 7 days, the attack is classified as a misdemeanor and
punished by a fine not exceeding approximately $100 (3,000 Czech
crowns--approximately one fourth of the average monthly wage). Repeated
misdemeanor attacks do not result in stricter sanctions on the abuser.
The police are training specialized personnel to handle domestic
violence; however, they do not yet engage in regular contact with
welfare and medical services. However, in 1998 the Police Academy and
secondary police schools introduced, into both the introductory and
continuing education curriculums, instructional material to improve the
identification and investigation of domestic violence and sexual abuse
cases and to sensitize police to the treatment of victims.
Forced prostitution (pimping) is illegal; prostitution is not,
although local communities have the right to regulate it and enforce
restrictions. The Interior Ministry estimates that up to 25,000 persons
currently earn a living from the sex industry. Prostitution and sex
shops are particularly prevalent in the border regions with Germany and
Austria, where international vehicular traffic is heaviest. Trafficking
in prostitutes is forbidden by law, and trafficking in women is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment, long ignored by the media and by society, was
the focus of more attention during the year. A new labor law approved
in May includes a definition of and prohibition against sexual
harassment. The law defines sexual harassment as unwanted,
inappropriate or offensive sexual behavior, acceptance or rejection of
which could be interpreted by another employee as affecting her status
in the workplace. A recent study commissioned by the newspaper Lidove
Noviny noted that nearly half of the country's working women have been
subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace. A study by the Defense
Ministry in 1996 found that nearly half of female soldiers experienced
harassment on duty. The concerns of women's groups over workplace
sexual harassment have previously been ignored or dismissed. In 1999,
however, a university student became the first woman to win a civil
sexual harassment lawsuit.
Women are equal under the law and in principle receive the same pay
for the same job. Women represent roughly half of the labor force,
though they are employed disproportionately in professions where the
median salary is relatively low. Women's median wages lag behind those
of men by roughly 20 percent, although the gap is narrowing. In May
Parliament approved legislation banning discrimination in hiring and
employment based on sex. Women enjoy equal property, inheritance, and
other rights with men. The unemployment rate for women exceeds that for
men by about one-third (10 percent to 7.8 percent) and a
disproportionately small number of women hold senior positions.
A 1991 employment law bans discrimination on the basis of sex;
however, in practice employers remained free to consider sex, age, or
even attractiveness when making hiring decisions, since this did not
necessarily constitute ``discrimination'' under then current legal
interpretation. Employers often openly used such factors as age, sex,
and lifestyle in their employment solicitations. July 1999 and May 2000
amendments to the law explicitly prohibit employment discrimination
based on a variety of factors, including sex, race, skin color, sexual
orientation, language, faith, health and family status. Repeated
offenses are punishable by fines of up to one million Czech crowns. By
midyear, the employment office in Plzen had warned around three dozen
companies of discriminatory language in their classified job listings.
No fines were levied; the discriminatory passages were removed in each
case.
Children.--The Government demonstrated its commitment to children's
welfare through its programs for health care, compulsory education
through age 15 (through age 14 in special schools), and basic
nutrition. Girls and boys enjoy equal access to health care and
education at all levels. Education is free and compulsory from age 6 to
age 15.
Child abuse and trafficking in children (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.) continued to receive press attention during the year. The
conviction of a group of foreigners for pedophilia was covered widely
as were reports of pedophile activities in border areas with Germany. A
British disc jockey and three other foreigners were convicted in May on
charges of pedophilia and sentenced to 33 months in prison. Press and
government reports throughout the year indicated that Central Europe is
still a popular destination for pedophiles due to its convenient
location and low risk of sexually transmitted disease. Some experts
estimate that the number of visits to the country, primarily by West
Europeans, for the purpose of abusing children has increased 20 percent
since 1997. Dissemination of child pornography, whether by print,
video, CD-ROM, or the Internet is a criminal act. In July the
Government approved a National Plan Combating Commercial Sexual Abuse,
giving the Ministry of the Interior coordinating responsibilities. Laws
against child pornography are enforced; in January a Czech was
sentenced to 1 year in prison for offering a child pornography CD-ROM
on the Internet. Court convictions against persons guilty of child sex
abuse are reported routinely in the media.
Since 1990 the number of reported cases of child abuse roughly
doubled; this increase appears to be the result of increased awareness
of the problem and more effective police training and action. Laws
criminalize family violence, physical restraint, sexual activity, and
other abuse of a minor. A Children's Crisis Center was established in
1995 and is 70 percent state supported. The Fund for Endangered
Children estimates that the total number of children suffering from
physical, psychological, and sexual abuse is 20,000 to 40,000, but only
about one-tenth of such cases are registered by the police. Between 50
and 100 children die each year as a result of abuse and violence within
the family. According to NGO's, there are approximately 10,000 children
living in institutional settings and 4,000 foster families supported by
the Government and various NGO's.
Romani children often are relegated to ``special schools'' for the
mentally disabled and socially maladjusted. Both a government program
and various private initiatives exist to prepare Romani children for
mainstream schools. In June 1999, the European Roma Rights Center
(ERRC) filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court on behalf of 12
Romani families in Ostrava, alleging that the disproportionate number
of Romani children in special schools constitutes de facto segregation
throughout the educational system. The Ostrava Court in October 1999
dismissed the case, stating that despite evidence of a pattern of
discrimination, individual cases of discrimination had not been proved
since due process with respect to psychological evaluation and testing
with parental consent had been followed in each child's case. The Court
also ruled that it was not competent to force the Ministry of Education
to provide nondiscriminatory education. In April the ERRC took the case
to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; a decision is
pending. In February an amendment to the law governing schools
eliminated the restriction on ``special school'' graduates from
applying to regular secondary schools (see Section 5).
People with Disabilities.--The disabled suffer disproportionately
from unemployment, and the physically disabled experience difficulty in
obtaining access to buildings and public transport. Access to education
can be a problem, due to the lack of barrier-free access to public
schools, although there is at least one barrier-free school in each
district. Many buildings and means of public transportation remain
inaccessible to those in wheelchairs, although access is improving. In
Prague 22 of 48 metro stations and 4 bus lines are accessible to the
disabled. A 1994 Economic Ministry regulation and an update to the 1998
Construction Code require architects to ensure adequate access for the
disabled in all new building projects, as well as in older buildings
undergoing restoration. These regulations are applied in practice. In
July the Government passed a law requiring access for the disabled to
all museums. Also in July the Government required the State Fund for
Transportation to provide transportation subsidies for the disabled.
Businesses in which 60 percent or more of the employees are disabled
qualify for special tax breaks. Numerous NGO's support social
assistance programs to diminish the disadvantages faced by the
disabled. These NGO's report that, although problems persist, the
situation of the disabled is receiving more attention and is vastly
improved from that of only a few years ago. The integration of the
disabled into society has not been the subject of significant policy or
public debate.
Religious Minorities.--In January a court in Jesenik sentenced Jiri
Tuma to 10 months in prison for displaying racist and anti-Semitic
symbols in public and propagating a movement that suppresses citizens'
freedoms and rights. Also in January a court dropped charges of
inciting racial hatred against Vladimir Skoupy, a leader of the
National Alliance. At an October 1999 rally, Skoupy had questioned
whether the Holocaust had ever occurred. A local prosecutor stated that
because Holocaust denial was not illegal (a law passed in September
criminalizes Holocaust denial) and because Skoupy's comments were not
insulting or belittling, he could not be convicted (see Section 2.a.).
In March Minister of Interior Vaclav Grulich officially disbanded
and canceled the registration of the National Alliance, an extreme
right-wing, neo-Nazi organization whose leaders consistently have
propagated anti-Semitic sentiment and publicly questioned the
occurrence of the Holocaust (see Section 2.b.). The Patriotic Front, an
extreme right-wing association accused of denying the Holocaust, was
warned by the Interior Ministry in November 1999 that it was violating
human rights and fundamental freedoms. A month later, the Association
changed its charter to eliminate offending sections and has made no
further public anti-Semitic statements.
At an April rally, members of the National Alliance and another
extreme right-wing entity, the Patriotic Front, threatened to deface or
remove explanatory plaques installed at the urging of the North
American Boards of Rabbis in March on the historic Charles Bridge in
Prague. The plaques, in Czech, English, and Hebrew, describe the origin
of a medieval sculpture of Christ on the Cross--one of many sculptures
on the bridge--that bears an offensive Hebrew inscription.
In December 1999, as part of a display on the struggles of the
extremist right-wing Republican Party (SPR-RSC) that was hung in front
of the local party headquarters in Decin, photographs of President
Havel, Prime Minister Zeman, Civic Democratic Party Leader Klaus, and
Freedom Union chairman Jan Ruml were labeled ``Jewish Free Masons and
Murderers of the Czech Nation.'' The exhibit also included a list of
``Jews and Jewish Half-Breeds'' in politics that included the names of
Havel, Zeman, and Klaus. The list was removed a few days later. A
member of the Republican Party responsible for the display was arrested
in January and in September sentenced to 10 months in prison and with 2
years' probation for spreading hatred and racism (see Section 2.a.). In
December a publisher, Michal Zitko, was fined $53,000 (2 million Czech
crowns) and given a 3-year suspended sentence and 5 years' probation
for supporting and disseminating hate speech. He had published without
editorial comment or annotation a Czech-language version of Hitler's
``Mein Kampf.'' (See Section 2.a.) In December a state attorney brought
charges of disseminating hate speech and propagation of a movement
aimed at suppressing rights and freedoms against Vit Varak for selling
``Mein Kampf'' on the Internet.
The case of a man charged with organizing a ring in Plzen that
produced and distributed racist, fascist, and anti-Semitic materials
was ongoing at year's end. In February 1999, police arrested 12 members
of the ring and confiscated numerous racist publications, along with
membership lists, indicating that the group was part of a large, well-
organized movement with ties to groups in several other European
countries. Charges were dropped against all others involved, but the
leader still faces up to 8 years in prison for supporting and
propagating a movement aimed at suppressing rights and freedoms. In
December police in Zlin uncovered another group distributing neo-Nazi
recordings, publications, and badges. A 21-year-old woman was charged
with suppressing rights and freedoms. Police confirmed the existence of
over 20 underground magazines with small circulations propagating
fascism, racism, and anti-Semitism.
In February 1999, police in Plzen arrested 12 leaders, producers,
and distributors of racist, fascist, and anti-Semitic materials. The
raid netted large amounts of fascist and racist materials, including
membership lists, indicating that the group was part of a large, well-
organized movement with ties to groups in several other European
countries. Those arrested were charged with supporting and propagating
a movement dedicated to the suppression of the rights and liberties of
citizens, an offense punishable by up to 8 years in prison. The owners
of the firms charged with having produced the fascist and antiSemitic
materials face the loss of their operating licenses. The case against
those arrested is still pending. Police confirmed the existence of over
20 underground magazines with small circulations propagating fascism,
racism, and antiSemitism.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--After ethnic Slovaks, the
largest minority is the Romani population, officially estimated to
number between 200,000 and 250,000. Roma live throughout the country
but are concentrated in the industrial towns along the northern border,
where many eastern Slovak Roma were encouraged to settle in the homes
of Sudeten Germans transferred to the West more than 40 years ago.
Roma suffer disproportionately from poverty, unemployment,
interethnic violence, discrimination, illiteracy, and disease. They are
subject to popular prejudice, as is affirmed repeatedly by public
opinion polls. Nearly 65 percent of the respondents in a September
opinion poll admitted to an unfavorable opinion of Roma and to racial
intolerance, with more than 50 percent saying that there were too many
non-Czechs living in the country. A court case charging editors of a
Republican Party (SPR-PSC) magazine (leaders of this extreme right-wing
party espouse anti-German and anti-Romani policies) with publishing
offensive statements against Roma was filed with a Prague district
court in January 1998 and was still before the court at year's end.
The State funds television and radio programs for Roma on public
stations and also supports Romani press publications. Until July there
was one full-time Romani anchorman on television. He was placed on
administrative leave after being charged with tax and welfare fraud and
after the resolution of his case did not return to the air. There is
one full-time anchorman of Ghanaian background on TV Nova. During the
year, more and better information on Romani issues became available in
the mainstream press and other sources. A November poll showed that a
majority of Czechs (53 percent) believe that the media cover Romani
issues well. To improve media reporting on Romani issues, a Romani
journalism course was established in the College of Publicity, and the
first students graduated in February of 1999. There has been a
Department of Romani Language Studies at Charles University in Prague
since 1991, and additional university-level Romani language study
program exist in Usti nad Labem and Brno.
However, efforts by NGO's and individuals in the health and
education fields to improve living conditions for the Roma have had
only minimal impact, sometimes due to the attitudes or intransigence of
local authorities. Romani leaders themselves have had limited success
in organizing their local communities, which often are disunited and
where many are reluctant to foster contacts with the majority.
Members of skinhead organizations and their sympathizers most often
perpetrate interethnic violence. Roma are the most likely targets of
such crimes, although other ``dark-skinned'' individuals come under the
same attacks. An estimated 5,000 skinheads are active in the country.
The Documentation Center for Human Rights recorded more than 1,800
racially motivated attacks over the past 8 years, in which nearly 32
persons died. Last year police recorded 364 ``racially-motivated or
extremist crimes,'' up from 316 in 1999. However, police and courts
sometimes are reluctant to classify crimes against Roma as racially
motivated, and the actual figures likely are higher.
In November 1999, some 30 skinheads attacked between 60 and 70 Roma
in a restaurant in Ceske Budejovice; 6 persons were injured. Police
subsequently charged 23 skinheads with racially motivated violence;
they now face sentences of up to 3 years in prison. In July the trial
of the 23 skinheads began; the process is currently ongoing.
In August 1999, some 30 skinheads attacked several Romani homes in
a village near Jaromerice nad Rokytnou, which resulted in injuries to 2
Roma and damage to several cars and houses. The raid lasted
approximately 1 hour. The skinheads threw bricks and stones at the Roma
while yelling racist epithets. Police charged 12 persons with rioting,
property damage, and violence, although they were not charged with
racially motivated crimes. A decision in the case was still pending at
year's end.
In July 1999, a group of skinheads attacked a 27-year-old Rom in a
bar in Jesenik with pool cues, pool balls, and other objects, as they
shouted racial epithets at him. Police charged six persons involved in
the attack with defamation of race and disturbing the peace. In January
a court ruled that the assault was not an organized attack and
therefore the six could not be tried as a group. The court then found
four of the attackers not guilty and placed two of them on probation.
In July the Justice Ministry filed a complaint before the Supreme Court
against the court's decision to try each defendant separately. In
August the court overturned the previous verdict and criticized the
lower court for its ruling that the attack was not an organized one.
The case returned to the lower court for a new decision based on the
Supreme Court's instructions.
In a November 1998 incident in the city of Hodonin, a group of
skinheads attacked an elderly American citizen for apparently defending
a young Rom whom the skinheads were harassing while dining in the same
restaurant. After exchanging words with the man, the skinheads waited
for him outside, and after a short chase, attacked him and left him
seriously injured and unconscious on the ground. The incident was
captured by the security cameras of a nearby gasoline station. Charges
later were filed against the main attacker. During the trial, the
prosecution presented evidence that the defendant had a previous
conviction for shooting a pistol into a group of Romani youth in front
of a nightclub (he was subsequently pardoned by President Havel). On
July 19, a judge convicted him of attempted bodily harm and disturbing
the peace, rejecting the more serious charge of assault with racial
motivation. He was given a 2-year suspended sentence, the most lenient
allowable. The judge also declined to impose any monetary sanction on
the defendant. The judge ruled that as the victim had, according to
testimony by an expert medical witness, suffered no permanent physical
damage (a claim disputed by the victim), a stiffer sentence was
unwarranted. In November an appeals court again rejected the
prosecutor's contention that race had been a motive in the attack. The
court lengthened the sentence by 6 months, still suspended, and 3
years' probation. The court also imposed on the defendant a fine of
$3,000 (12,000 Czech crowns) to cover the victim's medical expenses.
The sentences of three skinheads found guilty of the 1995 murder of
Rom Tibor Danihel were confirmed. The Justice Minister had filed a
complaint in 1999 against the High Court for annulling the convictions
on technical grounds.
Rom Milan Lacko died in 1998 after being beaten by a group of
skinheads, then being hit and killed by a vehicle driven by police
officer Marian Telega (see Section 1.c.). In 1998 the skinheads charged
with beating Lacko then leaving him in the road were given suspended
sentences. The court absolved the attackers of responsibility for
Lacko's death, placing the blame on the truck that allegedly hit him.
After that acquittal, five skinheads were fined and given prison terms
of 12 to 14 months for appearing at the trial wearing swastikas and
making racial jokes and insults to the media, the victim's family, and
supporters in the courthouse. The case was re-opened in October when
experts testified that Lacko had died as a result of being hit by a car
driven by a police officer. In December the court sentenced four young
men to sentences of 3 years in prison, 1 year in prison, 2 years of
probation, and 1+ years of probation. All four were found to be
indirectly responsible for Lacko's death; the one defendant who
admitted to attacking the victim was convicted of attempting to cause
bodily harm and given the longest sentence. Police officer Marian
Telega was given an 18-month sentence and 2-and-a-half-years'
probation.
Prime Minister Zeman consistently called for the cancellation of
the official registration of groups sympathetic to the skinhead
movement. In March the Minister of Interior officially disbanded and
canceled the registration of the National Alliance, an extreme right-
wing, neo-Nazi organization whose leaders consistently have propagated
anti-Semitic and anti-Roma sentiment (see Section 2.b.). A 1999 police
raid in Plzen led to the arrest of 12 skinhead leaders, distributors,
and producers of Nazi materials. Another extreme right wing group, the
Patriotic Front, changed its charter to eliminate offending sections
after being warned in November 1999 by the Interior Ministry that it
was violating human rights and fundamental freedoms. The raid also
netted large amounts of fascist and racist materials, including
membership lists, indicating that the group was part of a large, well-
organized movement with ties to the United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary,
and Slovenia. Those arrested were charged with dissemination of fascist
propaganda, an offense with a maximum penalty of 8 years in prison. The
raid was executed prior to a planned skinhead rally in Line, near
Plzen, and forced the cancellation of the event. Charges were dropped
against all but the leader, who faces up to 8 years in prison for
supporting and propagating a movement aimed at suppressing rights and
freedoms.
In July a series of attacks against Roma and Romani homes and
facilities took place in Rokycany. On July 5, three young men attacked
a group of six Roma in Osek, near Rokycany. Two victims were slightly
injured. The attackers were charged with race defamation and organized
assault. On July 14, an unknown perpetrator broke a window at a Romani
community center run by Romani activist Ondrej Gina and threw gasoline
into the facility; no fire ignited. The same night, Gina received
anonymous racist phone calls and a bomb threat at his home. Also that
night, a group of young men on motorbikes threw Molotov cocktails at
the house of another Rom, Jiri Gina (no relation to Ondrej Gina). Three
17-year-old members of a previously unknown group, Czech Lion (Cesky
Lev), were arrested and charged with a racially motivated attack. At
year's end, investigation of the case continued; the three accused were
not in police custody.
In August a state prosecutor filed charges of tax evasion and
welfare fraud against Ondrej Gina; his son, Ondrej Gina Jr.; and Gina
Jr.''s wife. Gina Jr., the only Romani anchorman on Czech television,
took administrative leave from his job. In October a court halted
proceeding against Gina Jr. and his wife after they admitted to having
presented false information on their tax return and fraudulently
collecting social benefit payments. They agreed to pay back around $650
(25,000 Czech crowns). Gina Jr. did not return to his previous
anchorman position. In November additional charges of fraud relating to
management of Romani Community funds were filed against the elder Gina.
The investigation against him was ongoing at year's end. Several Romani
organizations have accused Rokycany authorities of racism and selective
prosecution.
In September three policemen in Brno allegedly stopped Rom Martin
Tomko arbitrarily on the street, asked for his identity documents,
then, after an argument, beat Tomko and left him unconscious in a park
(see Section 1.c.). In December two of the policemen were charged with
abuse of public office and inflicting bodily harm. The third, who was
off duty at the time of the attack, was charged with disturbing the
peace and inflicting bodily harm.
Other attacks were reported throughout the year. In January in Novy
Jicin a man attacked two Roma men at a disco while shouting racial
slurs. He was charged with defamation of a nation or race and with
rioting. The case was still pending at year's end. In February a group
of approximately 15 skinheads, cheered on by bar patrons, attacked and
beat five Roma in a bar in Nachod while shouting racial epithets. One
attacker was charged with rioting, but no racial motive was ascribed to
the attack by investigators. In July on a road near the village of
Osek, three men followed, verbally harassed, and then attacked six
Roma. Police charged the three with rioting and defamation of race.
Both cases are still pending.
In November media reported on a Romani family in Ostrozska Nova Ves
that received racist threats during the year. On one occasion an
unknown person broke a window in their home, leaving a letter with a
swastika threatening to kill them unless they moved out of town. Police
were still investigating the case at year's end.
There were reports of racially motivated Roma-instigated attacks on
others during the year. In October a Rom attacked townspeople with a
hatchet while shouting racist insults. A July Ministry of Interior
report indicated that Roma were the perpetrators in 12 percent of
racially motivated attacks in 1999.
In August the founder of an NGO dedicated to improving Czech
attitudes towards ethnic minorities received violent, racist threats
via e-mail and telephone. In September thousands of Czech mobile phone
users received electronic messages on their phones promising free phone
time for every Roma they killed.
Racial and ethnic tensions and discrimination in society continued
to be the object of much media attention during the year. Even when
federal authorities have spoken out on these issues, local attitudes
often have proven impervious to change. In October 1999, local
authorities in Usti nad Labem built a wall dividing a Romani apartment
complex from its non-Romani neighbors across the street. After a
national and international outcry against the wall, the Government
negotiated its removal in November 1999, agreeing to provide a grant of
$250,000 (10 million Czech crowns) to improve social conditions in the
area. The houses of Czechs who refused to live near the Romani
community were bought for $79,000 (three million crowns); one of the
houses was converted into a new police station; the others remain
unoccupied. A playground was opened on the street in September and
trash is now collected regularly there (neighbors' complaints of
children playing in the street and uncollected trash littering the area
had led to the proposal of the wall's construction). A portion of the
dismantled wall now stands in the municipal zoo. In a February opinion
poll, however, threefourths of those surveyed blamed the wall
controversy on the Roma's inability to adapt to rules of normal social
behavior. Several NGO-supported projects aimed at improving Czech/Roma
relations in the area were started during the year.
In October the Committee for the Compensation of Romani Holocaust
Victims unveiled commemorative plaques at the site of a Romani
concentration camp in Lety. In 1999 the Government provided $12,500
(500,000 Czech crowns) for the project when a poll showed that only 11
percent of respondents were willing to assist in financing the Lety
Project (and less than one-fourth were aware that Roma were persecuted
under the Nazi regime). The Government completed the transfer of
archives related to the site to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. In
1999 the Human Rights Commission recommended the removal of the pig
farm built on the site in 1974, yet it remains.
Roma wishing to integrate face practical difficulties in the areas
of employment and education. Estimated unemployment among Roma is 70
percent, with many unemployed Roma subsisting on government support or
earnings from illegal activities. Some employers refuse to hire Roma
and ask local labor offices not to send Romani applicants for
advertised positions. An amendment to the Labor Code prohibits hiring
and employment discrimination based on ethnic origin, but no
enforcement statistics are yet available. Under the law, individual
Roma do not have the right to file discrimination complaints; action
must come from governmental authorities. Many Roma are qualified only
for lowpaying jobs as manual laborers, since very few complete
secondary education. A higher-than-average share of the Romani
population applies for partial or full disability pensions due to the
occurrence of advanced-stage malignant diseases resulting from the
neglect of preventive health practices or the lack of available medical
care in areas with above-average Romani populations. In June the
Government approved a Plan for Roma Integration aimed at combating
discrimination against the Romani community. The plan tasked the Human
Rights Commissioner with proposing legislation in 2001 designed to give
advantage to Romani firms in placing public orders.
The integration of Romani children into mainstream schools
frequently is impeded by language and cultural barriers. Official
estimates indicate that less than 20 percent of the Romani population
completed the ninth grade, and less than 5 percent completed high
school. A significant number of Romani children are transferred at an
early age, after a psychological exam, to ``special schools'' for the
mentally disabled and socially maladjusted. According to unofficial
government estimates, Romani children make up 60 percent or more of
pupils placed in these special schools, although Roma constitute less
than 3 percent of the population. Some Romani parents do not send their
children to school regularly due to a fear of violence, the expense of
books and supplies, or the lack of a strong cultural emphasis on
education among some Roma. In 1999 12 Romani families filed suit in the
Constitutional Court to protest the ``de facto segregation'' of Romani
children into special schools. The lawsuit requested the establishment
of a compensatory educational fund, an end to racial segregation within
3 years, and the development of an educational reform plan. However,
the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint in November 1999 and
stated that it did not have the power to order the Ministry of
Education to create programs to end racial discrimination. In April the
families took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg; a decision is pending. The Ministry of Education later took
steps independently to implement some of the recommended changes. In
December 1999, the Parliament revoked the restriction on students in
special schools from applying to attend mainstream secondary or upper-
level public schools. The legislation was drafted by Parliament's sole
Romani representative and constituted a significant step in opening
access to higher education to the Romani minority. In addition the
Ministry of Education is working on changes to the psychological exam
given to Czech children that many claim is culturally biased against
Romani children. Children are assigned to ``special schools'' based on
poor results on the exam.
In 1993 the Government created the framework for a number of year-
long programs (so-called zero grades) to prepare disadvantaged youths
for their first year in school. Many districts with high concentrations
of Roma participate in the program, which is funded solely by local
authorities. More than 100 zero grades now operate throughout the
country. Some districts tracking local Romani students report that up
to 70 percent of the children who attend zero-grade training
successfully enter and remain in mainstream schools. Another
educational initiative continued placing Romani ``assistant teachers''
into the primary and special school system. Their function is to help
teachers communicate with Romani pupils and encourage cooperation
between schools and Romani parents. According to the Ministry of
Education, there are now 200 Romani assistant teachers in the school
system, which is an increase from 144 last year. In 1999 the Education
Ministry began using joint Romani-Czech language textbooks in 60
elementary schools to help overcome the barrier in the early school
years between Romani children and non-Romani speaking teachers. The
Ministry of Education ordered a textbook for use in schools on the
cultural and historical roots of the Romani minority and on successful
members of the Romani community. Local NGO's support additional studies
and private initiatives to prepare Romani children for mainstream
schools. Some Roma refuse to cooperate with compulsory vaccinations for
children or are refused treatment by general practitioners who have
full quotas of subsidized patients.
``Roma advisors'' or ``Roma assistants,'' created by the Interior
Ministry to advise local authorities on Romani issues, now serve in all
73 of the country's district offices and at the Prague, Brno, Ostrava,
and Plzen town halls. Over 60 percent of the advisors are Roma. The
positions, originally slated for elimination at the time of a scheduled
federal restructuring, will continue under the title of ``regional
advisors for ethnic minorities'' beginning in 2003. Many advisors have
made a significant contribution to their communities, but some Romani
communities have complained of advisors' ineffectiveness and called for
their removal. The advisors themselves have in some cases felt hindered
by the lack of procedural instructions for carrying out their duties
and a clear legal mandate.
Roma also face discrimination in housing and other areas of
everyday life. Despite constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, a
civil law framework to implement these provisions has not been
incorporated into specific offenses under the Criminal Code. Some
restaurants, pubs, and other venues refuse service to Roma and post
signs prohibiting their entry. The only Romani Member of Parliament
reported having been denied entry to restaurants and clubs on numerous
occasions. A civil court awarded her damages this year from a club
owner in Brno who had refused her entry. Rokycany pub owner, Ivo
Blahout, who in 1995 refused to serve Romani patrons, was fined $200
(8,000 Czech crowns) in May. He had been acquitted previously three
times; he appealed the sentence but no decision had been made by year's
end.
There were occasional reports of anti-Roma petitions, which
complained that Roma are noisy on the street, listen to loud music,
make messes, and spoil the neighborhood. In January 400 residents of
Karlovy Vary signed a petition against a plan to open a Romani cultural
center in the Doubi town district.
Beginning in 1997, when over 1,200 Roma submitted applications for
refugee status in Canada and the United Kingdom, Romani families have
continued to emigrate. The numbers applying to the United Kingdom have
decreased; most requests for asylum there are denied. Roma began
applying in greater numbers for asylum in other European countries such
as Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands, and in New Zealand. An
estimated 10,000 Czech Roma have emigrated in the last 3 years. Roma
activists state that the motive for the increased emigration is fear of
racism, violence, and discrimination. A February poll indicated that 62
percent of Czechs believe the Roma are departing for economic reasons.
In December the Government of New Zealand announced the imposition of a
visa regime with the Czech Republic effective in 2001 in response to
the growing number of Romani asylum applicants. The Honorary Czech
Consul in New Zealand reacted by declaring that the Roma were not
Czechs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned his comment.
The Government and some local municipalities reported some success
with programs designed to deal with drug addiction and crime prevention
in the Romani community during 1999. In December 1998, the
Interministerial Commission for Romani Community Affairs was expanded
to include 12 government representatives and 12 Romani representatives,
as well as the Commissioner for Human Rights and his deputy. The
revamped Commission has taken an increasingly active role in resolving
disputes between Romani communities and their non-Romani neighbors in
towns such as Usti nad Labem and Rokycany, as well as promoting
positive initiatives in housing, education, and discrimination. The
Commission was budgeted $625,000 (25 million Czech crowns) for projects
to assist in integration of Roma. There also was an active effort
underway during the year to identify, train, and recruit qualified Roma
to serve in law enforcement. The first group of police trainees
completed the national police academy's course in Romani language and
culture, designed to facilitate police officers' improved communication
and response to the Romani communities in their precincts. One
government initiative, the three ``Romani-inspector'' positions
authorized to penalize shop and restaurant owners who refuse service to
Roma, has been criticized for ineffectiveness and lack of resources.
In June the Human Rights Commission concluded its seven-month
``Project Tolerance'' campaign. The $250,000 (10 million Czech crowns)
project consisted of public opinion polls on Czech attitudes towards
ethnic minorities and foreigners; ``tolerance rides'' (information
campaigns in which Romani and non-Romani educators visited schools to
talk about racism and the history of the different ethnic groups in the
country); teacher training; funding for Romani cultural events; and a
webpage. The campaign also included a series of billboards, radio,
newspaper, and television advertisements designed to promote public
discussion of racial tolerance and to improve public opinion toward
Roma. In September the commission announced that the project would
continue for another year.
In September 1999, Parliament passed a law to allow former
Czechoslovak citizens who have lived in the country since 1993 to claim
citizenship by simple declaration. This bill was created to remedy the
de facto stateless situation of some Czech Roma, who were estimated to
number between 10,000 and 20,000 persons. The law also regularizes the
status of children in foster care who lacked citizenship or permanent
residency status. However, the law only provides for citizenship for
those who have resided continuously in the country since 1993. Certain
persons who went abroad for extended periods, including some asylum
seekers and those expelled from the country by authorities, may face
added difficulty in filing for citizenship under the new law. Roma
activists claimed that some local officials are refusing to process
Czech citizenship applications for ``Slovak'' or stateless Roma
families in violation of the law. In one case a ``Slovak'' applicant
was denied Czech citizenship illegally then required to leave the Czech
Republic, thus losing his continuous resident status and voiding his
citizenship claim. The law does not provide benefits to those who were
denied citizenship and benefits and expelled between 1993 and 1999.
Many local authorities and Roma are also apparently unaware that any
changes to the citizenship law have been made.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
right to form and join unions of their own choice without prior
authorization, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Union membership continued to decline during the year.
Most workers are members of unions affiliated with the Czech/
Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (CMKOS). The CMKOS is a democratically
oriented, republic-wide umbrella organization for branch unions. It is
not affiliated with any political party and carefully maintains its
independence.
Workers have the right to strike, except for those whose role in
public order or public safety is deemed crucial. The law requires that
labor disputes be subject first to mediation and that strikes take
place only after mediation efforts fail.
There were no major strikes during the year. The Association of
Independent Trade Unions, comprised of seven unions, staged a token
strike protesting unpaid wages, unemployment, and pension reform in
March, blocking a Prague road and halting train service in some areas.
Unions are free to form or join federations and confederations and
affiliate with and participate in international bodies. This freedom
was exercised fully.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining, which generally is carried out by
unions and employers on a company basis. The scope for collective
bargaining is more limited in the government sector, where wages are
regulated by law.
The 2000 ICFTU Annual Survey of Trade Union Rights alleges that
some employers refused to bargain or used obstructive tactics to
prevent collective agreements from being concluded.
There are 11 free trade zones. Their workers possess and practice
the same right to organize and bargain collectively as other workers in
the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
it generally is not used; however, trafficking in women and children
for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 6.d.
and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code stipulates a minimum working age of 15
years, although children who completed courses at special schools
(schools for the mentally disabled and socially maladjusted) may work
at the age of 14. These prohibitions are enforced in practice. The law
prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government
effectively enforces this prohibition (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
However, trafficking in children is a problem. Employment conditions
for children aged 15 to 18 are subject to strict safety standards.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets minimum wage
standards. In June the Government increased the minimum wage by 500
Czech crowns to 4,500 per month, about $113. Due to currency exchange
rate shifts, this represented no change in dollar terms from the
minimum wage of a year ago (approximately $115 or 3,600 Czech crowns).
The monthly average is approximately $337 (13,473 Czech crowns) per
month. Average net wages are 2.8 times as high as official sustenance
costs. The minimum wage provides a sparse standard of living for a
worker and family, although allowances are available to families with
children. Retraining efforts, carried out by district labor offices,
seek to provide labor mobility for those at the lower end of the wage
scale. The enforcement of minimum wage standards was not a problem
during the year.
In May the standard workweek was reduced to 40 hours from 42+,
effective January 1, 2001. It also requires paid rest of at least 30
minutes during the standard 8-hour workday, as well as annual leave of
4 to 8 weeks, depending on the profession. Overtime ordered by the
employer may not exceed 150 hours per year of 8 hours per week as a
standard practice, although the local employment office may permit
overtime above this limit. The Labor Ministry enforces standards for
working hours, rest periods, and annual leave.
Government, unions, and employers promote worker safety and health,
but conditions in some sectors of heavy industry are problematic,
especially those awaiting privatization. Industrial accident rates are
not unusually high. The Office of Labor Safety is responsible for
enforcement of health and safety standards. Workers have the right to
refuse work endangering their life or health without risk of loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific laws prohibit trafficking in
women and children, and trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
of forced prostitution is a problem. The Czech Republic is a source,
transit, and destination country for trafficking in persons from the
former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Czech women and
girls are trafficked to Western Europe, such as to Germany. Organizing
prostitution or pimping also is illegal and punishable by a prison term
of up to 8 years, with a term of up to 12 years if the victim is under
the age of 15. (Adults can be prosecuted for engaging in sexual
activity with a minor under the age of 15.) There have been numerous
convictions of traffickers as a result of proactive investigative
efforts on the part of law enforcement officers. The Czech Police
Organized Crime Division includes a Unit on Trafficking in Persons,
established in 1995, which cooperates with other nations to enforce
these laws. In February the Czech office of the International
Organization on Migration (IOM) completed the first stage of an
extensive information and media campaign aimed at educating women about
avoiding entrapment in trafficking for prostitution schemes and
providing information on organizations that assist victims of
trafficking.
In March, 13 people were arrested in West Bohemia for luring women
from Russia, Bulgaria, and Ukraine and forcing them into prostitution,
among other charges. Also in March, a raid in Austria broke up an
international ring that trafficked Czech and Hungarian women into
prostitution. Police maintain close contact with the IOM and other
NGO's in order to provide services to women left penniless and homeless
after trafficking arrests.
The full extent of trafficking in children is unknown; however,
convictions of child sex offenders are reported routinely in the media.
For example, the May conviction of a group of foreigners for pedophilia
was covered widely, as were the cases of several German citizens who
were detained in cities near the CzechGerman border and who reportedly
had traveled regularly to the Czech Republic for the purpose of
soliciting sexual activity from adolescents (particularly young Roma).
Following these incidents, police personnel took measures to prevent
this type of ``sex tourism'' more effectively. Police maintain patrols
in high-risk areas, enforce curfew-type policies more actively, and
work to raise public awareness of the issue through the media. In two
separate cases in February, men in the Teplice region were arrested for
providing Czech children to German pedophiles. Despite increased police
efforts, press reports still indicate that in many border regions
sexual tourism with adolescents continues. In November police conducted
raids at 7 nightclubs in 4 districts of the country, arresting 10
persons.
__________
DENMARK
Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democratic
rule. Queen Margrethe II is Head of State. The Cabinet, accountable to
the unicameral Parliament (Folketing), leads the Government. A Social
Democrat-led minority coalition remained in power following a narrow
election victory in 1998. The judiciary is independent.
The national police have sole responsibility for internal security.
The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security
forces.
Denmark has an advanced, market-based industrial economy. One-half
of the work force is employed in the public sector. The key industries
are food processing and metalworking. A broad range of industrial goods
is exported. The economy provides residents with a high standard of
living.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
instances of individual abuse. The Government is taking serious steps
to deal with violence against women. Trafficking in women is a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors. But in July the
U.N. Committee Against Torture criticized the Government for the number
of prisoners held in isolation and the length of time spent in
isolation. In response the Government revised prison rules on the
length of isolation permitted and the reasons for assigning isolation.
Previously all prisoners who refused to participate in work programs
were isolated. Under the new rules, the percentage of prisoners in
isolation dropped from 9.8 percent in 1999 to 3.7 percent in 2000.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this
prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system consists of a series of local and regional
courts, with the Supreme Court at the apex.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of
the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
A permit is required for public demonstrations, but the Government
uses objective criteria in evaluating requests and does not
discriminate in issuing permits.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. It also
provides for an official state religion, the Evangelical Lutheran
Church, which is subsidized by the Government. The Evangelical Lutheran
faith is taught in public schools, but students may withdraw from
religious classes with parental consent.
The Government does not require that religious groups be licensed,
but the State's permission is required for religious ceremonies, for
example, weddings, if they are to have civil validity. And registered
religions enjoy certain tax exemptions. In 1999 an independent,
government-appointed Council published guidelines for future approval
of religious organizations that are linked to the 1969 Marriage Act.
The guidelines established clear requirements that religious
organizations must fulfill, which include providing a written text of
the religion's central traditions; descriptions of its most important
rituals; an organizational structure accessible for public control and
approval; and constitutionally elected representatives who can be held
responsible by authorities. Additionally, the organization must ``not
teach or perform actions inconsistent with public morality or order.''
Scientologists continued to seek official approval as a religious
organization. Their first application for approval was made in the
early 1980's and rejected; the second application was made in mid-1997
and withdrawn in early 1998. The second application was resubmitted in
1999 and withdrawn again in early 2000, shortly before a decision by
the Government was expected. In withdrawing the application, the Church
of Scientology asked the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs for
additional time to respond to reports about Scientology that had
appeared in the media. By year's end the application had not been
resubmitted.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for the granting of refugee or asylum status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum and provided
it to 2,099 persons in the first 6 months of 2000 and to 4,526 persons
in 1999. A total of 9,627 aslyum applications were filed during the
year, compared with 6,950 in 1999. There were no reports of the forced
expulsion of refugees to a country where they feared persecution or of
those having a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage.
The territories of Greenland (whose population is primarily Inuit)
and the Faroe Islands (whose inhabitants have their own Norse language)
have democratically elected home rule governments whose powers
encompass all matters except foreign affairs, monetary affairs, and
national security. Greenlanders and Faroese are Danish citizens with
the same rights as those in the rest of the Kingdom. Each territory
elects two representatives to the Folketing.
Women are increasingly well represented at all levels of
government. In the current government, 9 of 20 ministers are women, as
are 67 of the parliament's 179 members. There are two parliamentarians
of mixed ancestry from Greenland and an ethnic Turkish parliamentarian.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are cooperative
and responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Government's operations and extensive public services do not
discriminate on the basis of any of these factors. The law prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex, and the Government enforces it
effectively. Discrimination on the basis of race is covered by two
laws, which prohibit racial slander and denial of access to public
places on the basis of race. The rights of indigenous people are
protected carefully.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and the Government is
taking steps to combat it. An umbrella nongovernmental organization
reports that in 1998, women's crisis shelters were contacted
approximately 9,000 times, compared with 9,961 times in 1997. A total
of 2,054 women stayed at shelters during 1999, compared with 1,934
women in 1998. There were 355 reported rapes in the first 9 months of
1999, compared with 346 in all of 1999. Rape, spousal abuse, and
spousal rape are all criminal offenses.
The law requires equal pay for equal work, but some wage inequality
still exists. The law prohibits job discrimination on the basis of sex
and provides recourse, such as access to the Equal Status Council, for
those so affected. Women hold positions of authority throughout
society, although they are underrepresented in senior business
positions. Women's rights groups effectively lobby the Government in
their areas of concern, such as wage disparities and parental leave.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution was a problem
(see Section 6.f.).
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. Education is compulsory through the age of
16 and is free through the university level. The Ministries of Social
Affairs, Justice, and Education oversee implementation of programs for
children.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. In 1997 the
Folketing passed legislation that banned the physical punishment of
children by adults, including their parents.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. Building regulations require special facilities for the
disabled in public buildings built or renovated after 1977 and in older
buildings that come into public use. The Government enforces these
provisions in practice.
Indigenous People.--The law protects the rights of the inhabitants
of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Greenland's legal system seeks to
accommodate Inuit customs. Accordingly, it provides for the use of lay
persons as judges and sentences most prisoners to holding centers
(rather than to prisons) where they are encouraged to work, hunt, or
fish during the day. Education in Greenland is provided to the native
population in both the Inuit and Danish languages.
In 1999 a court ruled that the government unjustly resettled
Greenland Inuits in 1953 in order to accommodate the expansion of a
U.S. Air Force base in northwest Greenland. The court ordered the
government to pay compensation to the displaced Greenlanders and their
descendants. The compensation is substantially less than the defendants
sued for, and the case was still under appeal in the Supreme Court at
year's end. In 1999 the office of Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen
issued a joint declaration with the home rule chairman of Greenland
apologizing for the way the decision on the resettlement was reached
and the manner in which it was carried out.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The inflow of ethnically and
racially diverse refugees and immigrants has provoked a degree of
tension between Danes and immigrants (mostly Iranians, Palestinians,
Pakistanis, and Sri Lankans until 1992; more recently refugees are
overwhelmingly from Somalia or the former Yugoslavia). In response to
publicity concerning the involvement of foreigners in street crime and
allegations of social welfare fraud committed by refugees, Parliament
passed tighter immigration laws, which took effect in 1999. Family
reunification is now more difficult, and immigrants and refugees can no
longer acquire permanent residence by living in the country for 18
months; rather they must now reside for 3 years and demonstrate that
they have integrated into society. Additionally, they receive a special
integration allowance that is 20 percent lower than the social benefits
that citizens receive. Critics claim that this provision violates the
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In response to
a perception of high criminality by asylum applicants, in September the
Interior Minister suggested that convicted offenders (who did not
receive jail time for their offenses) be isolated on one of the
country's deserted islands. The proposal provoked a mixed response from
parliamentarians but an overwhelmingly positive approval rating from
average citizens. At year's end, the subject still was being debated,
but the Government had taken no action.
Incidents of racial discrimination and racially motivated violence
occur but are rare. The Government effectively investigates and deals
with cases of racially motivated violence. On September 9, two persons
threw firebombs at an asylum center in the town of Holeby. The fire was
brought under control, and no one was injured, but the event
nonetheless upset the asylum applicant community. No one was arrested
or charged in the crime.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law states that all workers,
including military personnel and the police, may form or join unions of
their choosing. Approximately 80 percent of wage earners belong to
unions that are independent of the Government and political parties.
All unions except those representing civil servants or the military
have the right to strike.
Unions may affiliate freely with international organizations, and
they do so actively.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers and
employers acknowledge each other's right to organize. Collective
bargaining is protected by law and is widespread in practice. The law
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union members
and organizers, and there are mechanisms to resolve disputes. Employers
found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to reinstate
workers fired for union activities. In the private sector, salaries,
benefits, and working conditions are agreed upon in biennial or
triennial negotiations between the various employers' associations and
their union counterparts. If the negotiations fail, a national
conciliation board mediates, and its proposal is voted on by management
and labor. If the proposal is rejected, the Government may force a
legislated solution on the parties (usually based upon the mediators'
proposal). The agreements, in turn, are used as guidelines throughout
the public as well as the private sector. In the public sector,
collective bargaining is conducted between the employees' unions and a
government group led by the Finance Ministry.
Labor relations in Greenland are conducted in the same manner as in
Denmark. Greenland's courts are the first recourse in disputes, but
Danish mediation services or the Danish Labor Court also may be used.
There is no umbrella labor organization in the Faroes, but
individual unions engage in periodic collective bargaining with
employers. Disputes are settled by mediation.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or bonded
labor, by adults or children, is prohibited by law, and this
prohibition is enforced effectively by the Government. However, women
are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for full-time employment is 15 years. The
law sets a minimum of 13 years of age for any type of work. The law is
enforced by the Danish Working Environment Service (DWES), an
autonomous arm of the Ministry of Labor. Export industries do not use
child labor. Forced and bonded child labor is prohibited and does not
occur (see Section 6.c.). The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on
the worst forms of child labor in August.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No national minimum wage is
mandated legally, but national labor agreements effectively set a wage
floor. The lowest wage paid is currently about $10 (82 kroner) per
hour, which is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. The law provides for 5 weeks of paid vacation per
year. A 37-hour workweek is the norm, established by contract, not by
law. However, the law requires at least 11 hours between the end of one
work period and the start of the next.
The law also prescribes conditions of work, including safety and
health; the duties of employers, supervisors, and employees; work
performance; rest periods and days off; and medical examinations. The
DWES ensures compliance with labor legislation. Workers may remove
themselves from hazardous situations or weapons production without
jeopardizing their employment rights, and legal protections cover
workers who file complaints about unsafe or unhealthy conditions.
Similar conditions of work are found in Greenland and the Faroes,
except that the workweek is 40 hours. As in Denmark, the workweek is
established by contract, not by law.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, but the penalties are not severe. Trafficking in women for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem. In October the Government
rejected a proposal to harmonize trafficking penalties in the European
Union at 8 years' imprisonment because it believed Danish sentencing
rules were sufficient. The authorities cooperate with international
investigations.
Trafficking involved the importation of women mostly from Eastern
Europe and Southeast Asia, some of whom were lured by the prospect of
higher wages and a better life, but found themselves forced into
prostitution. The perpetrators usually were suspected of being part of
organized crime. No statistics were available on how many women are
involved in prostitution.
In June a regional conference on trafficking generated considerable
public debate that carried over into the Parliament. In December, the
Government set up a working group in the Ministry of Gender and
Equality to address trafficking; a report is expected in 2001. Several
Parliamentarians proposed changing the law regarding trafficking to
make the penalties much more severe. To illustrate the light sentences,
in the spring, a trafficker who received his second conviction for
trafficking several Colombian women into the country was sentenced to
only 8 months in jail.
The Government does not provide medical or legal assistance
directly to victims, and there is no governmental or nongovernmental
entity specifically concerned with victims of trafficking. Several
government-supported organizations provide these services on an ad hoc
basis. In July one nongovernmental organization assisted a Colombian
trafficking victim in a precedent-setting case in which the woman
testified against her traffickers and subsequently received asylum in
Denmark.
__________
ESTONIA
Estonia is a parliamentary democracy. The Constitution established
a 101-member unicameral legislature (State Assembly), a prime minister
as Head of Government, and a president as Head of State. The judiciary
is independent.
Efforts to develop and strengthen a Western-type police force
committed to procedures and safeguards appropriate to a democratic
society are proceeding, with police leadership actively working to
professionalize the force. The police, who are ethnically mixed, are
subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Corrections personnel
are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. The security service,
called Security Police, is subordinate to the Interior Ministry but
also reports to the Prime Minister. Police and corrections personnel
continued to commit human rights abuses.
Estonia has a market economy. Reflecting the extent of post-1992
reforms, the European Union in 1998 invited Estonia to begin accession
negotiations. Services, especially financial and tourism, are growing
in importance compared to historically more prominent light industry
and food production. The privatization of firms, including small,
medium, and large-scale enterprises, is virtually complete. The
Government is working on privatizing the remaining state-owned
infrastructure enterprises.
Economic growth increased after a slowdown due to the 1998 Russian
financial collapse, with experts predicting gross domestic product
(GDP) growth of between 3 and 5 percent in 2000. Per capita GDP is
about $3,536 per year. Some 90 percent of exports (textiles, food
products, wood, and timber products) now are directed to western
markets. Unemployment is about 14 percent but is significantly higher
in rural areas and in the northeast.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
and the large ethnic Russian noncitizen community; however, problems
remained in some areas. The major human rights abuses continued to be
mistreatment of prisoners and detainees and the use of excessive force
by the police. Prison conditions are poor; however, the Government
began a multiyear program to improve them. While some officials in the
United Nations, the Russian Government, and members of the local ethnic
Russian community continued to criticize the Citizenship Law as
discriminatory, notably for its Estonian language requirements, the
OSCE as well as other international fact-finding organizations,
including the Finnish Helsinki Committee, confirmed that the
Citizenship Law conforms to international standards.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In 1998 President Lennart Meri created an international commission
for research into crimes against humanity perpetrated in the country
from 1940-91. The Commission began work in 1999 and held three formal
meetings during the year. In November 1999 the Commission authorized
sending an investigator to study materials in the Russian and German
archives on this subject; it met again in June and November 2000.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices; however, there continued
to be credible reports that police used excessive force and verbal
abuse during the arrest and questioning of suspects. Punishment cells
(``kartsers'') continued to be used, in contravention of international
standards.
Prison conditions remained poor, although there were some
improvements. By mid-year the prison population was a record 4,800
inmates. A lack of funds and trained staff continued to be serious
problems. Overcrowding was reported in every major prison except one.
The percentage of prisoners suffering from tuberculosis was much higher
than in the general population. The Government refurbished some prison
buildings. Modest gains were made in hiring new prison staff and
retaining existing personnel. Work and study opportunities for
prisoners increased slightly since the Government implemented new
programs. As of August, 162 prisoners were released in the calendar
year under the Government's early release program for prisoners. One
prisoner was killed by another during the year.
The Government began to implement a multiyear plan to refurbish and
restructure all of the country's prisons. The State Assembly, in
addition, adopted a law authorizing the construction of a prison in
Tartu that will be largely financed by the Nordic Investment Bank.
However, a plan to close the overcrowded and antiquated Tallinn Central
Prison was scrapped.
The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and
laws forbid arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government
generally observes these prohibitions. Under the Constitution, warrants
issued by a court are required to make arrests. Detainees must be
informed promptly of the grounds for the arrest and given immediate
access to legal counsel. If a person cannot afford counsel, the State
will provide one. A person may be held for 48 hours without formally
being charged; further detention requires a court order. A person may
be held in pretrial detention for 2 months; this term may be extended
for a total of 12 months by court order. Police rarely violate these
limits. By late August, 1,382 of the 4,744 prisoners were awaiting
trial.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution establishes an
independent judicial branch, and the judiciary is independent in
practice. The judiciary operates through a three-tier court system:
Rural and city courts; district courts; and the State Court (which
functions as a supreme court). The district and State Courts are also
courts for ``constitutional supervision.'' At the rural and city
levels, court decisions are made by a majority vote with a judge and
two lay members sitting in judgment. All judges and lay judges must be
citizens. The President nominates and the State Assembly confirms the
Chief Justice of the State Court. The Chief Justice nominates State
Court judges who are subject to confirmation by the State Assembly. He
also nominates the district, city, and rural court judges who then are
appointed by the President. Judges are appointed for life.
The role of the Chancellor of Justice and the ombudsman were
combined under legislation passed by the State Assembly in 1999. The
State Assembly rejected a proposal for an independent ombudsman. The
chancellor-ombudsman is to handle complaints by private citizens
against state institutions; however, the position of chancellor was
vacant at mid-year.
The Constitution provides that court proceedings shall be public.
Closed sessions may be held only for specific reasons, such as the
protection of state or business secrets, and in cases concerning
minors. The Constitution further provides that defendants may present
witnesses and evidence as well as confront and cross-examine
prosecution witnesses. Defendants have access to prosecution evidence
and enjoy a presumption of innocence.
The Government continued to overhaul the country's criminal and
civil procedural codes. An interim Criminal Code that went into effect
in 1992 basically revised the Soviet Criminal Code by eliminating, for
example, political and economic crimes. This code has been amended
several times, most recently in June. The Code of Criminal Procedure
was adopted in 1994.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires a search warrant for the search and
seizure of property. During the investigative stage, warrants are
issued by the prosecutor upon a showing of probable cause. Once a case
has gone to court, the court issues warrants. The Constitution provides
for secrecy of the mail, telegrams, telephones, and other means of
communication. Police must obtain a court order to intercept
communications. Illegally obtained evidence is not admissible in court.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government respects
constitutional provisions providing for freedom of speech and of the
press. Four major national Estonian language and two Russian-language
dailies are published, in addition to important weeklies. Foreign
newspapers and magazines are available widely. All newsprint, printing,
and distribution facilities are private companies.
In a well-reported 1997 case, a prominent journalist was tried and
convicted for insulting the spouse of a prominent politician in a
newspaper interview and was fined. All levels of the judiciary upheld
the sentence. The European Court of Human Rights agreed in 1998 to hear
the case, but it was still pending at mid-year.
The Law on Language prohibits the use of any foreign language on
public signs, advertisements, and notices, including election posters.
The prohibition on campaign posters written in a language other than
Estonian resulted in protests by one political party.
State (public) broadcast media, including one nationwide television
channel (Estonian Television/ETV), continue to receive large government
subsidies. At the same time, ETV broadcasts commercials. Although a
basic decision has been made to combine ETV and Estonian (state/public)
Radio into one entity, no real movement toward that end has taken
place. The Estonian Broadcasting Council fired the director of ETV in
1999 for management failures, because of ETV's financial difficulties,
and for ``undisciplined behavior.'' The courts said that he could not
be fired, whereupon he returned to work but finally resigned during the
year. A new general director, with a background in banking, was
appointed in the summer.
There are several major independent television and radio stations.
Several Russian-language programs, mostly produced in Estonia, are
broadcast over state and private/commercial television channels. The
Government has played a key role in encouraging Russian-language
programs on state television. Over the past 3 budgetary years, the
ability of ETV's Russian-language department to create self-produced,
high-quality programs has been reduced greatly due to the Government's
large cuts in the department's budget. Russian state television,
Ostankino programs, and commercial channels in Russia are widely
available by cable.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble freely, but noncitizens are
prohibited from joining political parties, although they may form
social groups. Permits for all public gatherings must be obtained 3
weeks prior to the date of the gathering. The authorities have wide
discretion to prohibit such gatherings on public safety grounds but
seldom do so. There were no reports of government interference in mass
gatherings or political rallies.
The Constitution provides for the right of free association, and
the Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
The 1993 Law on Churches and Religious Organizations requires all
religious organizations to have at least 12 members and to be
registered with the Interior Ministry and the Board of Religion.
Leaders of religious organizations must be citizens with at least 5
years' residence in the country.
The majority of citizens are nominally Lutheran, but following
deep-seated tradition, there is wide tolerance of other denominations
and religions. Persons of varying ethnic backgrounds profess Orthodoxy,
including communities of the descendants of Russian Old Believers who
found refuge in Estonia in the 17th century. The Estonian Apostolic
Orthodox Church (EAOC), independent since 1919, subordinate to
Constantinople since 1923, and exiled under the Soviet occupation,
reregistered under its 1935 statute in August 1993. Since then, a group
of ethnic Estonian and Russian parishes preferring to remain under the
authority of the Russian Orthodox Church structure imposed during the
Soviet occupation has insisted that it should have claim to the EAOC
name. Representatives of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates
agreed in 1999 that the Moscow Patriarchate would register under a new
name. In July the Moscow Patriarchate submitted a new name proposal,
but the Interior Ministry rejected it on the grounds that a close
reading of the registration papers revealed variations of the name.
Throughout the dispute, worship has occurred freely in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law permits free movement within the
country, and it is honored in practice. The law also provides for the
right of foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation for citizens.
Passports serve as identification but do not have to be carried at all
times. There are no exit visas.
The Government does not restrict the right of noncitizen
residents--persons who are citizens of another country or stateless
persons--to foreign travel, emigration, or repatriation, although some
noncitizens complain of delays in obtaining travel documents. The
majority of noncitizens are ethnic Russians. In 1994 the Government
began issuing alien passports, which are issued to resident aliens not
in possession of any other valid travel document. Such aliens included:
(1) Persons who are designated as stateless; (2) foreign citizens who
lack the opportunity to obtain travel documents from their country of
origin or from another state; (3) persons who file for Estonian
citizenship and pass the language examination if required; and (4)
aliens who are permanently departing Estonia. The Government already
has approved the issuance of alien passports to noncitizens intending
to study abroad and has agreed to issue them to former military
personnel who cannot or do not want to take out Russian citizenship. By
November 30, 108,982 persons had applied for alien passports, and
122,152 alien passports were issued, including prior years.
The Government deported a relatively small number of illegal
aliens, usually those caught in criminal acts. A total of 10 illegal
aliens were held as internees by September, pending deportation or a
court order granting them residence. Internees are held in a wing of a
regular prison. In 1999 Finland and Estonia entered into a cooperation
agreement to construct a new facility for illegal aliens and asylum
seekers in East Viru County.
Domestic law is in conformity with the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1999 the
State Assembly passed amendments to domestic refugee law that delegated
authority from the Government to the Citizenship and Migration Board,
clarified the refusal of refugee status, and established a state
registry for asylum. Also, starting on October 1, 1999, temporary
residence permits may be granted to persons whose applications for a
residence permit are based on an international agreement. Asylum
applicants come under the overall annual 0.1 percent quota for
immigrants (not including Westerners, who are exempt from the quota).
The program began as scheduled, and as of December 1, 2000, 47 persons
had applied for asylum, of whom 10 were still waiting for a reply. Of
the applicants processed, 4 were granted asylum, 15 left the country,
and 1 died. The Citizenship and Migration Board turned down the
remaining 18 applications on the grounds that the applicants did not
fufill the criteria for refugee status as defined in the 1951 U.N.
Convention.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government. In March 1999,
free and fair elections to the State Assembly were held. The new
Government is a coalition of the Pro Patria, Moderate, and Reform
Parties. Four ethnic Russians are Members of the State Assembly.
Indirect presidential elections were held in 1996. When the State
Assembly failed to muster the required two-thirds majority to elect the
President, an Electoral Assembly consisting of Members of the State
Assembly and representatives of local governments convened and
reelected the incumbent, Lennart Meri.
Only citizens can vote in parliamentary elections and be members of
political parties. However, according to law, resident noncitizens and
those who have lived permanently in the area for at least 5 years
preceding the election can vote but not run for office in local
elections.
Approximately 1.1 million of the total population of 1.43 million
are citizens. Of those, approximately 113,000 received their
citizenship through the naturalization process. Holders of permanent or
temporary residence permits number approximately 300,000, 80 percent of
whom are ethnic Russians. Illegal residents number 30,000 to 50,000
persons, mostly ethnic Russians; they are not included in the census
figures.
In 1995 the State Assembly adopted a new Citizenship Law that
extended the residency requirement for naturalization from 2 to 5 years
and added a requirement for knowledge of the Constitution and the
Citizenship Law to the requirement for Estonian language capability.
Persons who were legal residents in the country prior to July 1, 1990,
are exempt from the 5-year legal residence and 1-year waiting period
requirements. The law allows the Government to waive the language
requirement but not the civic knowledge requirement for applicants who
have Estonian-language elementary or higher education, or who have
performed valuable service to Estonia. In 1998 the Citizenship Law was
amended to grant citizenship to stateless children born after February
26, 1992, to legally resident stateless parents (upon the parents' or
guardians' application). As of September 1, parents had applied for
citizenship for 539 such children: 427 of the applications were
approved.
On October 1, 1999, the Government dropped the immigration quota on
the issuance of residence permits to those noncitizens who settled in
the country prior to July 1, 1990, and who have not departed the
country subsequently. In April the State Assembly approved an amendment
to the law on aliens under which the annual immigration quota will not
be applied to non-Estonian spouses of Estonian citizens if the spouses
have a common child up to 15 years of age or if the female spouse is
more than 12 weeks pregnant. In addition the amendment also states that
the quota will not apply to children up to 15 years of age if the
parents are applying for a residence permit.
By law the following classes of persons are ineligible for
naturalization: Those filing on the basis of false data or documents;
those not abiding by the constitutional system or not fulfilling the
laws; those who have acted against the State and its security; those
convicted of felonies; those who work or have worked in the
intelligence or security services of a foreign state; or those who have
served as career soldiers in the armed forces of a foreign state,
including those discharged into the reserves or retired. (The latter
includes spouses who have come to Estonia in connection with the
service member's assignment to a posting, the reserves, or retirement.)
A provision of the law allows for the granting of citizenship to a
foreign military retiree who has been married to a native citizen for 5
years.
Between 1992 and August 1, 112,822 persons received citizenship
through naturalization. The vast majority of these persons, 87,712,
were naturalized by the end of 1996. In 1997 the Russian embassy
reported that some 120,000 persons had obtained Russian citizenship;
however, the Embassy declined to supply the Government with a list. The
number of Russian citizens may be lower since the Russian Embassy does
not appear to keep records of those who die or leave the country. As of
November 30, the Government had issued 116,289 permanent and 29,482
temporary residence permits. During the year a surge in noncitizens
filing for or renewing residency permits resulted in long lines and
delays at overtaxed registration offices. The problems precipitated the
dismissal of the director of the Citizenship and Migration Board.
While some officials in the United Nations, the Russian Government,
and members of the local ethnic Russian community continued to
criticize the Citizenship Law as discriminatory, notably for its
Estonian language requirements, the OSCE as well as other international
fact-finding organizations, including the Finnish Helsinki Committee,
confirmed that the Citizenship Law conforms to international standards.
Bureaucratic delays and the Estonian language requirement are also
cited as disincentives for securing citizenship. The Government has
established language-training centers, but there is a lack of qualified
teachers, financial resources, and training materials. Some allege that
the examination process, which 75 to 90 percent of persons pass, is
arbitrary.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
government or politics. However, women are underrepresented in
government and politics. Among the 101 Members of Parliament are 18
women. Two ministers are women. There are four ethnic Russian deputies
in the State Assembly. The law was amended in 1999 to place language
requirements on Members of Parliament; Russian speakers protested.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not restrict the formation or functioning of
human rights organizations. In response to allegations of the poor
treatment of ethnic minorities, the President established a Human
Rights Institute, which first convened in 1992. The purpose of the
Institute is to monitor human rights in the country and to provide
information to the international community. It investigates reports of
human rights violations, such as allegations of police abuse and the
inhuman treatment of detainees. In 1997 the Institute established an
information center in the heavily ethnic Russian town of Kohtla-Jarve.
In addition, because of tensions surrounding the adoption of the
Elections Law and the Aliens Law in 1993, the President established a
roundtable composed of representatives of the State Assembly, the Union
of Estonian Nationalities, and the Russianspeaking population's
Representative Assembly. An analogous but independent roundtable meets
in the county of East Virumaa. Also, with initial funding from the
Danish Government, a nongovernmental legal information center in
Tallinn provides free legal assistance to individuals--citizen and
noncitizen alike--seeking advice on human rights-related issues.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination for any reason; however,
reports continued of discrimination against ethnic Russian residents.
The Government reports that no court cases charging discrimination were
filed during the year.
Women.--Violence against women, including spousal abuse, continued
to be the subject of increasing discussion and media coverage and is
reportedly common. Rape and attempted rape occur relatively
infrequently. In the first 8 months of the year, there were reports of
29 rapes and 7 attempted rapes, compared with 50 rapes and 29 attempted
rapes for all of 1999. However, studies show that 40 percent of crime
in the country goes unreported, including domestic violence. Even when
the police are called, the abused spouse often declines to press
charges.
Both the Center of Women Citizens and a roundtable of women's
organizations were established in 1998. Although women have the same
legal rights as men and, in theory, are entitled to equal pay for equal
work, this is not true in practice. While women's average educational
level was higher than that of men, their average pay in general was
lower, and the trend did not seem to be improving. There continue to be
female- and male-dominated professions. Women constitute slightly more
than half of the work force. They also carry major household
responsibilities.
Children.--The Government's strong commitment to education is
evidenced by the high priority that it gives to building and
refurbishing schools. The Government provides free medical care for
children and subsidizes school meals.
There is no societal pattern of child abuse, but studies, including
one published by the local U.N. Development Program office during the
year, found that a significant proportion of children had experienced
at least occasional violence at home, in schools, or in youth gangs. In
the first 7 months of the year, police registered 22 cases of sexual
abuse involving 13 female victims and 9 male victims, all below age 16.
In the same period, there were 31 cases of procurement for prostitution
of victims younger than 16. Also in the first 6 months of the year,
there were 2 rape cases in which the victim was younger than 14.
People with Disabilities.--While the Constitution contains
provisions to protect disabled persons against discrimination, and both
the Government and some private organizations provide them with
financial assistance, little has been done to enable the disabled to
participate normally in public life. There is no public access law, but
some effort to accommodate the disabled is evident in the inclusion of
ramps at curbs on new urban sidewalk construction. Public
transportation firms have acquired some vehicles that are accessible to
the disabled, as have some taxi companies. In June the State Assembly
adopted amendments to the Citizenship and Aliens Law that make it
possible for persons with serious sight, hearing, or speech impediments
to become naturalized citizens without having to pass an examination on
the Estonian Constitution and language.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population is
1.43 million. Ethnic Russians total approximately 29 percent, and
nonethnic Estonians total approximately 37 percent. During the years of
the country's forced annexation by the Soviet Union, large numbers of
non-Estonians, predominantly ethnic Russians, were encouraged to
migrate to Estonia to work as laborers and administrators. These
immigrants and their descendants now compose approximately one-third of
the total population; about 40 percent of them were born in Estonia.
Approximately 8 percent of the population of the pre-1940 Republic was
ethnic Russian.
The OSCE mission in Estonia, established in 1993, continued to
promote stability, dialog, and understanding among communities. The
President's Roundtable also continued to work toward finding practical
solutions to the problems of noncitizens. The Government during the
year instituted an integration program for the years 2000-07 aimed at
fostering the integration the non-Estonian-speaking portion of the
population into Estonian society.
The Law on Cultural Autonomy for citizens belonging to minority
groups went into effect in 1993. The tradition of protection for
cultural autonomy dates from a 1925 law. Some noncitizens termed the
law discriminatory, since it restricts cultural autonomy only to
citizens. The Government replied that noncitizens can participate fully
in ethnic organizations and that the law includes subsidies for
cultural organizations.
Some noncitizens, especially Russians, continued to allege job,
salary, and housing discrimination because of Estonian language
requirements. Despite repeated Russian allegations of human rights
violations against the noncitizen population, both the OSCE mission in
Estonia and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities declared
that they could not find a pattern of human rights violations or abuses
in the country. The Government in 1998 addressed two outstanding
recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,
by simplifying the civic knowledge portion of the naturalization
process and passing legislation to grant automatic citizenship to
children born after February 26, 1992, to resident stateless persons
upon parental application. Also, at least 10 nongovernmental
organizations develop and implement local programs to assist the
integration of non-Estonians into society.
Russian government officials and parliamentarians echoed these
charges of discrimination in a variety of forums. In 1998 the
Government accepted a Russian Government proposal to establish a high-
level commission to examine all aspects of bilateral relations. One of
the subgroups of the commission would examine the humanitarian aspects
of the Russian minority in Estonia and possibly of the Estonian
minority in Russia. Although there has yet to be a formal session of
the commission, its cochairs met in St. Petersburg in July.
Other than for land ownership, the 1993 Property Ownership Law does
not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens for purposes of
business or property ownership. A 1996 law on land ownership further
liberalized land ownership by foreigners; such ownership now is
restricted only in certain strategic areas. All legal residents of
Estonia may participate equally in the privatization of state-owned
housing.
Estonian language requirements for those employed in the civil
service went into effect in 1993. As originally passed, the Law on
Public Service required state employees to be proficient in Estonian in
1995. In December 1995, the State Assembly amended the Law on Public
Service to allow noncitizen local and national government employees
without adequate Estonian to continue working until February 1, 1997.
No noncitizens were to be hired after January 1, 1996. This amendment
reflected the Government's awareness that in some sectors, the number
of employees with inadequate Estonian remained high. On February 9,
1999, the State Assembly again amended the Law on Language, requiring
that all public servants, service personnel, and sole proprietors be
able to use the Estonian language. While the Government is to establish
regulations pertaining to and describing the level of proficiency, the
actual proficiency is to be determined through examination. Non-
Estonian citizens who have obtained at least primary education
proficiency in the language are exempted from the requirement to pass a
language examination. On July 27, 1999, the Government issued the
implementation decree for the amendments to the language law regarding
public sector employees as well as those employed in the medical
profession. Some 150 ethnic Russian prison officials are expected to be
fired in January for noncompliance with the language requirement.
Following several rounds of consultations with European Commission
experts, the Government presented, and the State Assembly approved on
June 14, amendments to the Language Law that brought it into conformity
with European Union (EU) recommendations regarding language
requirements for persons working in the private sector. For employees
of private enterprises, nonprofit organizations, and foundations, as
well as sole proprietors, the amended law established a requirement of
proficiency in the Estonian language if it was in the public interest.
The OSCE Commissioner for National Minorities concluded that the
amended law was largely in conformity with Estonia's international
obligations and commitments.
The language office liberally grants extensions to persons who can
explain their failure to meet the requisite competence level in 4
years. Estonian language training is available; however, some claim
that it is too costly. Some Russian representatives have asked for free
language training. They have charged also that the language requirement
for citizenship is too difficult. There has been a proposal to make the
language requirement less rigorous. The examination fee for either
language test--for employment or citizenship--is 15 percent of the
monthly minimum wage, although it is waived for the unemployed. The
government office that conducts language examinations was forced to
close for several months because of funding shortfalls. An EU program
exists to reimburse language training costs for those who pass the
examination.
In districts where more than one-half of the population speak a
language other than Estonian, the inhabitants are entitled by law to
receive official information in that language.
All residents, whether or not they are citizens, can complain
directly to the State Court about alleged violations of human or
constitutional rights. The State Court justices review each case and
have decided in favor of complainants. All decisions are in Estonian,
but if a complaint is received in a language other than Estonian
(usually Russian), the court provides a translation.
Two court cases begun in 1998 were resolved in May, when a court
acquitted the leader of a Russian military pensioners' group in
northeast Estonia and three other activists of charges that they
fomented racial hatred by staging demonstrations. The pensioners'
leader organized an unauthorized assembly in the city of Sillamae and
claimed that the human rights of the Russian pensioners in the region
were abused by the Government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form and join a union or employee association. The Central
Organization of Estonian Trade Unions (EAKL) came into being as a
wholly voluntary and purely Estonian organization in 1990 to replace
the Estonian branch of the official Soviet labor confederation, the
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The EAKL has 58,000 members.
Another trade union, the Organization of Employee Unions, split from
the EAKL in 1993 and has 45,000 members. A central union of food
processing and rural workers was established in 1997. About one-third
of the country's labor force belongs to one of the three labor
federations.
The right to strike is legal, and unions are independent of the
Government and political parties. The Constitution and statutes
prohibit retribution against strikers. In June 5,000 energy, metal, and
mining union workers staged a protest action in Ida-Virumaa county.
Unions may join federations freely and affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While workers
have the legally acquired right to bargain collectively, collective
bargaining is still in its infancy. According to EAKL leaders, few
collective bargaining agreements have been concluded between the
management and workers of a specific enterprise. However, the EAKL has
concluded framework agreements with producer associations, which
provide the basis for specific labor agreements, including the setting
of the minimum wage. The EAKL also was involved with developing the
country's post-Soviet era Labor Code covering employment contracts,
vacation, and occupational safety. The Labor Code principles prohibit
antiunion discrimination, and employees have the right to go to court
to enforce their rights. In 1993 laws covering collective bargaining,
collective dispute resolution, and shop stewards were enacted.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor although it does not specifically
prohibit forced and bonded labor by children (see Section 6.d.). The
Labor Inspections Office effectively enforces this prohibition.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution forbids forced or bonded labor. The
statutory minimum age for employment is 16 years. Minors 13 to 15 years
of age may work provided that they have the written permission of a
parent or guardian and the local labor inspector. The work may not
endanger the minor's health or be considered immoral, cannot interfere
with studies, and must be included on a Government-prepared list.
Government authorities effectively enforce minimum age laws through
inspections. There were no reports of forced or bonded labor by
children in enterprises (see Section 6.c.); however, there were
instances of families forcing their children to engage in peddling or
begging.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government, after
consultations with the EAKL and the Central Producers Union, sets the
minimum wage. The monthly minimum wage is $82 (EEK 1,400). The minimum
wage is not sufficient to provide a worker and family with a decent
standard of living. About 5 to 6 percent of the work force receive the
minimum wage. The average monthly wage in the second quarter was about
$296.
The standard workweek is 40 hours, and there is a mandatory 24hour
rest period. According to EAKL sources, legal occupational health and
safety standards are satisfactory, but they are extremely difficult to
achieve in practice. The National Labor Inspection Board is responsible
for enforcement of these standards, but it has not been very effective
to date. The labor unions also have occupational health and safety
experts who assist workers to bring employers in compliance with legal
standards. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous
work situations without jeopardy to their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, the existing criminal codes regarding kidnaping,
extortion, and involuntary prostitution are used to address this
problem. There were no official reports during the year that persons
were trafficked in, to, or from the country. However, it is generally
understood that job advertisements placed from abroad that request
females are in some cases associated with international prostitution
rings.
The Government concluded several interstate cooperation agreements
concerning fighting crime including human trafficking. It also
concluded several bilateral agreements on the extradition of Estonian
citizens accused of trafficking in other countries.
__________
FINLAND
Finland is a constitutional republic with an elected head of state
(President), a Parliament, a head of government (Prime Minister), and
an independent judiciary.
The security apparatus is controlled effectively by elected
officials and supervised by the courts.
The economy is mixed but primarily market based. It provides
citizens with a high standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking serious
steps to address the problem of violence against women. There were
reports of trafficking in persons.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes this prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Administrative Court, and the lower courts. The President appoints
Supreme Court justices, who in turn appoint the lower court judges.
The law provides for the right to fair public trial, and the
judiciary vigorously enforces this right. Local courts may conduct a
closed trial in juvenile, matrimonial, and guardianship cases, or when
publicity would offend morality or endanger the security of the state.
In national security cases, the judge may withhold from the public any
or all information pertaining to charges, verdicts, and sentences. The
law provides for sanctions against violators of such restrictions.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Nontraditional religious groups freely profess and propagate their
beliefs. Such groups are eligible for some tax relief (e.g., they may
receive tax-free donations), provided they are registered with the
Government as religious communities. The Government's procedures for
recognizing religious communities remained under review at year's end.
About 87 percent of the population belongs to two state churches, the
Lutheran and the Orthodox. All citizens belonging to one of these state
churches pay, as part of their income tax, a church tax. These church
taxes are used to defray the costs of operating the state churches.
Those who do not want to pay the tax must notify the tax office.
Such groups as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints have been active in the country for decades. In
1998 the Ministry of Education turned down the application of the
Finnish Association of Scientologists to be registered as a religious
community. This was the first time that an applicant had been denied
church status. The Scientologists' application was pending for nearly 3
years while the Government awaited additional information that it had
requested from the association. The association acknowledged that it
had not responded to the Government's request. The Education Ministry's
decision can be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. The
Scientologists have not yet done so, but they have indicated that they
may begin the process anew and reapply for recognition as a church.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
Approved refugees and asylum seekers are processed directly for
residence. The issue of the provision of first asylum has never arisen.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid
claim to refugee status.
A total of 3,106 persons applied for asylum in 1999, up from 1,272
in 1998. As many as 1,516 of them were Slovakian Roma. By August 20,
2000, 2,472 persons had already submitted their applications for
asylum. Of these applications, 1,192 were submitted by Polish Roma. In
1999 the Directorate of Immigration processed 2,725 applications,
awarding asylum to 29 persons and residence permits to 467. Government
officials attribute the sharp increase in the number of asylum seekers
from 1998 to the first half of 2000 to two factors: the 1999 fighting
in Kosovo and the increase in 1999-2000 asylum applications from
Slovakian and Polish Roma. The Government imposed a visa regime on
Slovakian citizens in July 1999. Although the restriction was lifted in
November of that year, it was reimposed in January 2000 for 6
additional months after a large number of Slovakian Roma again entered
the country and requested asylum.
On July 10, a new asylum law took effect, under which immigration
authorities must process an application within 7 days of the initial
asylum examination. Asylum seekers who are rejected have 8 days in
which to appeal the decision, after which time they are deported. This
law is expected to decrease the number of asylum seekers substantially.
Under the previous system, the processing of applications could take
over a year. If the applicant received a negative decision, the
processing of the appeal could take several years. Some members of the
public and even politicians within the ruling coalition opposed the new
law, citing the short period during which asylum seekers can appeal the
rejection of their application. However, the Government defended the
law by stating that it only can provide public resources and services
to asylum seekers who have legitimate concerns about their safety and
welfare in their home countries. Particularly in regard to Slovakian
and Polish Roma, officials noted that the two source countries were
aspirants for European Union (EU) membership and pointed out the
contradiction of supporting Slovakia and Poland for EU membership while
also offering asylum to their citizens.
In 1999 a law went into effect to promote the integration of
immigrants into society. This law is unrelated to the new statute
governing asylum procedures; it is aimed instead at assisting those who
have been granted asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
Women are increasingly well represented at all levels of
government. There are 75 women in the 200-member Parliament, and 7 in
the 18-member Cabinet. The President, who is elected directly, and the
Speaker of Parliament are women. A 1995 law requires a minimum of 40
percent membership from each sex on all state committees, commissions,
and appointed municipal bodies.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, age,
origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, or disability, and the
Government effectively enforces these provisions.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and the Government is
taking steps to combat it. Police statistics for 1999 recorded 2,825
cases of domestic violence, 117 more than the previous year. Of the
victims, 2,290 were women, and 535 were men. A total of 514 cases of
rape were reported to the police in 1999, compared with 463 in 1998.
Government experts say that as many as half, if not more, of all rape
cases may go unreported. The law specifically criminalizes rape,
spousal rape, and domestic abuse. The law provides for stringent
penalties for violence against women; the police and the courts
vigorously enforce this provision.
The number of calls to the police concerned with domestic violence
is not compiled centrally but is estimated at 10,000 to 12,000
annually. Shelter officials state that the figure represents less than
half of the number of actual incidents. Most of the persons seeking
shelter are women between 25 and 35 years of age, either married or in
a common-law relationship. Nearly one-third are immigrants.
The Union of Shelter Homes as well as the municipalities maintain
homes all over the country for female, male, adult, and child victims
of violence. The total number of shelters is around 20. The criteria
for what counts as a shelter has changed. In the past battered persons
in need of shelter could be given keys to apartments where they could
spend the necessary length of time prior to returning home. These
apartments were included in the 1999 statistics. Now, the minimum
requirement for a shelter is 24-hour staff.
A study published in 1998 indicated that the typical victim of
family violence is a young woman between 18 and 24 years of age who is
married or is living in a common law relationship. The study concluded
that every fifth married woman or woman involved in a common law
relationship has suffered from violent behavior at the hands of her
partner. The study also concludes that as many as 40 percent of all
women over the age of 15 have experienced some form of family violence.
(The study considers psychological and verbal abuse as ``violence.//)
In 1997 the Government began a special program to promote women's
equality during the period from 1997 to 1999. This program consisted of
30 projects, 1 of which focused on violence against women and domestic
violence. The project against violence offered nationwide support for
women in need and for men to combat their own tendencies to resort to
violence. This project has been regarded as the most significant
component of the women's equality program in that it has helped to
break the taboo about the subject. The program may be renewed once the
Government evaluates the results. The Government also promised to
maintain a program against prostitution and violence until 2002.
The government-established Council for Equality coordinates and
sponsors legislation to meet the needs of women as workers, mothers,
widows, or retirees.
The Constitution calls for the promotion of equality of the sexes
in social activities and working life, the latter particularly in the
determination of remuneration. In 1985 the Parliament passed a more
detailed comprehensive equal rights law that mandates equal treatment
for women in the workplace, including equal pay for ``comparable''
jobs. In practice comparable worth has not been implemented because of
the difficulty of establishing criteria, but the Government, employers,
unions, and others continued to work on implementation plans. Women's
average earnings are 82 percent of those of men, and women still tend
to be segregated in lower paying occupations. While women individually
have attained leadership positions in the private and public sectors,
there are disproportionately fewer women in top management jobs.
Industry and finance, the labor movement, and some government
ministries remain male dominated. Some 60 percent of physicians are
women. Women serve in the armed forces. The Government's equality
ombudsman monitors compliance with regulations against sexual
discrimination. Of the 63 complaints processed by the Ombudsman between
January 1 and June 30, 10 cases were judged to be violations of the
law. In such cases, the law provides for correction of the situation as
well as compensation for the complainant.
There were reports of trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. There is no pattern of societal abuse of
children, and the national consensus supporting children's rights is
enshrined in law.
There were reports of trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--Although since the 1970's the law has
required that new public buildings be accessible to people with
physical disabilities, many older buildings remain inaccessible. No
such law applies to public transportation, but each municipality
subsidizes measures to improve accessibility to vehicles. Local
governments maintain a free transport service that provides a minimum
of 18 free trips per month for a disabled person. The deaf and the mute
are provided interpretation services ranging from 120 to 240 hours
annually. The Government provides subsidized public housing to the
severely disabled.
Indigenous People.--Sami (Lapps), who constitute less than 0.1
percent of the population, benefit from legal provisions that provide
for the protection of minority rights and customs. Sami language and
culture are supported in the Constitution and financially by the
Government. Sami receive subsidies to enable them to continue their
traditional lifestyle, which revolves around reindeer herding. Sami
have political and civil rights and are able to participate in
decisions affecting their economic and cultural interests.
In 1998 the President issued instructions on implementing an EU
directive on the use of minority and regional languages. The
directive's purpose is to ensure that the use of minority languages is
permitted in school, the media, dealings with administrative and
judicial authorities, economic and commercial life, and cultural
activities. The Sami language belongs to the category of a minority
language used regionally.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The number of immigrants rose
from 18,000 in 1987 to 90,000 in 2000. Concurrent with this increase,
concern has arisen about increasing expressions of racist and
xenophobic behavior. Antiforeigner or racist violence has been
reported. Leading government figures, including the President, have
condemned such violence. The Government is attempting to address this
problem in part through an indepth study of attitudes toward different
ethnic groups. The government study examines discrimination in working
life, looks into popular attitudes toward foreigners, and charts the
attitudes of those authorities involved in immigration affairs--police,
teachers, social workers, border guards, and employment office
personnel. The popular attitudes survey found that half of those
interviewed acknowledged some feelings of xenophobia or prejudice. The
study continued at year's end.
While the Government implemented new legislation during the year
making it somewhat more difficult to gain political asylum (see Section
2.d.), other government-sponsored initiatives were aimed at improving
the situation of noncitizens. In 1999 a law promoting the enhanced
integration of immigrants into society went into effect. In addition
the Government in 1997 issued policy guidelines for promoting tolerance
and combating racism.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
rights of trade unions to organize, to assemble peacefully, and to
strike, and the Government respects these provisions. About 87 percent
of the work force is organized. All unions are independent of the
Government and political parties. The law grants public sector
employees the right to strike, with some exceptions for the provision
of essential services. In the first half of the year, there were 72
strikes (most of them minor and brief), of which 58 were wildcat
strikes.
Trade unions freely affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective
bargaining agreements usually are based on income policy agreements
between employee and employer central organizations and the Government.
The law protects workers against antiunion discrimination. Complaint
resolution is governed by collective bargaining agreements as well as
labor law, both of which are enforced adequately.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and this prohibition generally is
observed in practice; however, there were reports of trafficking in
persons (see Section 6.f.). The law prohibits forced and bonded labor
by children and adults, and such practices do not exist. The Government
enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see
Section 6.c.). Youths under 16 years of age cannot work more than 6
hours a day or at night, and education is compulsory for children from
7 to 16 years of age. The Labor Ministry enforces child labor
regulations. There are virtually no complaints of the exploitation of
children in the work force. The Government ratified ILO Convention 182
on the worst forms of child labor in January.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated minimum
wage, but the law requires all employers--including nonunionized ones--
to meet the minimum wages agreed to in collective bargaining agreements
in the respective industrial sector. These minimum wages generally
afford a decent standard of living for workers and their families.
The legal workweek consists of 5 days not exceeding 40 hours.
Employees working shifts or during the weekend are entitled to a 24-
hour rest period during the week. The law is enforced effectively as a
minimum, and many workers enjoy even stronger benefits through
effectively enforced collective bargaining agreements.
The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, and
the Labor Ministry effectively enforces them. Workers can refuse
dangerous work situations without risk of penalty.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not explicitly prohibit
trafficking in persons, although existing statutes address a range of
trafficking-related crimes, and there were reports that trafficking
occurred. Finland is a secondary destination-transit country for such
trafficking. The Government believes that most such trafficking
involves women and girls for prostitution. The Government and
nongovernmental organizations are making a considerable effort to
counter trafficking, e.g., through the Government's leading role in the
EU's antitrafficking ``STOP'' project.
__________
FRANCE
France is a constitutional democracy with a directly elected
president and National Assembly and an independent judiciary.
The law enforcement and internal security apparatus consists of the
Gendarmerie, the national police, and municipal police forces in major
cities, all of which are under effective civilian control. Members of
those police forces committed some human rights abuses.
The highly developed, diversified, and primarily market-based
economy provides residents with a high standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide a means of dealing with
individual instances of abuse. The police committed one extrajudicial
killing. There were instances of the abuse of detainees, particularly
foreigners, by law enforcement officers. Long delays in bringing cases
to trial and lengthy pretrial detention are problems. Violence and
threats against ethnic and religious minorities continued to decline;
however, in October there were over 100 anti-Semitic incidents,
including firebombings. The Government has taken important steps to
deal with violence against women and children. The Government took
steps to combat trafficking in women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings by government officials.
Law enforcement officers have used excessive forceparticularly
directed against immigrants--resulting in deaths, although there is no
evidence of a pattern of such abuses.
In April a police officer shot and killed 25-year-old Ryad Hamlaoui
while he was attempting to steal a car in Lille-Sud. The police officer
believed that Hamlaoui was armed and that he was firing in self-
defense, but the authorities later determined that Hamlaoui was
unarmed. The officer was suspended from duty, detained, and was charged
with murder. The case was under investigation at year's end. The
incident was followed by peaceful daytime demonstrations in Lille to
protest the killing, and 3 nights of rioting.
There were no developments in the judicial investigation of a
police officer who shot and killed 17-year-old Habib Mohamed in
Toulouse in 1998. Mohamed allegedly staggered away injured after being
shot. The police officers involved reportedly failed to follow him, and
also failed to follow required procedures to report that their weapons
were fired. The investigation continued at year's end.
A judicial investigation into the 1998 death of Mohammed Ali Saoud,
who died following police intervention in a violent domestic
disturbance, continued at year's end. The police had fired rubber
bullets at Saoud and restrained him physically.
In February the public prosecutor recommended to the investigating
judge that no charges be brought against two of the police officers
involved in the 1997 fatal shooting of 16yearold Abdel-Kader Bouziane.
In March the investigating judge disagreed, and ruled that the police
officers should be tried by the Court of Assizes. In October the
chambre d'accusation (the prosecuting chamber of the criminal court) of
the Paris Court of Appeals ruled that the charges against two of the
officers should be dropped. The same court charged a third policeman in
December; he is expected to be tried by the Court of Assizes. An appeal
was pending at year's end.
In November 1997, the gendarme who shot and killed Franck Moret was
released by the correctional court in Valence, prompting the family of
the deceased to appeal the judgment. In July 1998, the appeals court
overturned the decision of the correctional court and sentenced the
officer to an 18-month suspended prison term. The officer appealed the
court's decision, and on January 5, the Court of Cassation ruled in his
favor and reversed the decision of the appeals court.
The trial of three police officers involved in the 1991 death of
18year-old Aissa Ihich, who allegedly was beaten by police officers and
subsequently died of an asthmatic attack because he allegedly was
refused medication, was scheduled to begin in January 2001. A case
against a doctor still was pending at year's end.
On April 19, a bomb exploded at a restaurant near Dinan, and killed
a female employee. The ``Breton Resistance Army'' claimed
responsibility for an earlier bomb in Pornic, which damaged buildings
but caused no injuries, but denied responsibility for the Dinan
bombing; however, the police determined that similar explosives were
used in both incidents. According to press reports, the investigation
was at a standstill by year's end.
The investigation into the 1998 killing of Corsican Prefet Claude
Erignac continued at year's end. According to press reports, a total of
nine persons have been detained in connection the killing. Yvan
Colonna, who is presumed to have fired the shots that killed Erignac,
was still at large and was believed to be hiding on the island at
year's end.
In June 1999, SOS-Attentats organization (the nongovernmental
organization (NGO) which represents the 170 persons who were killed in
the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772) brought a civil case against Libyan
leader Mu'ammar alQadhafi for ``aiding and abetting voluntary
homicide.'' In October 1999, the Paris prosecutor's office challenged
the antiterrorism magistrate's decision to investigate the civil
complaint, and the case reached the Court of Appeals on September 8.
The Court ruled that Qadhafi had no sovereign immunity for terrorist
acts. In October the Paris prosecutor's office appealed this decision
to the Court of Cassation. A final decision is expected in May or June
2001.
In September 1999, an investigating judge decided that Nazi war
criminal Alois Brunner should be tried in absentia on charges of crimes
against humanity. Brunner previously was sentenced to death in absentia
by a French military court in 1954, but vanished and was believed to
have been living in Syria. According to press reports, in 1992 the
Damascus publication Lettre d'Orient announced that Brunner had died,
but Syrian authorities and Brunner's ex-wife and daughter refused to
confirm or deny the report. The Chambre d'Accusation reviewed the
investigating judge's decision in November 1999 and agreed in December
1999 that the case should be sent to the Court of Assizes for a trial.
The deliberations of the Court of Assizes continued at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities
punish officials who employ them. There were reports that law
enforcement officers used excessive force, particularly against
immigrants; however, no complaints or criminal reports were filed.
Isolated instances of police abuse occurred, but there is no evidence
of a pattern of abuse.
In May the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT),
an organ of the Council of Europe, visited the country as part of its
regular program of periodic visits to member states. A report is
expected in 2001.
The Government is in the process of instituting certain judicial
and administrative reforms that address mistreatment of detainees by
law enforcement officials. In June Parliament passed a law that created
a national commission on security ethics to oversee the actions of law
enforcement officials and to investigate complaints of police abuse
from witnesses or victims; the commission subsequently was established.
An administrative investigation into a March 1997 incident in which
riot police beat a few dozen persons demonstrating against the National
Front (FN) in Marseille continued at year's end. According to
eyewitnesses, the police allegedly used excessive force by beating
demonstrators and using tear gas grenades to keep the anti-FN
demonstrators away from their FN counterparts.
In July 1999, the authorities arrested Mauritanian army Captain Ely
Ould Dah in Montpellier, in response to accusations by two Mauritanian
refugees living in France. The refugees alleged that Dah was
responsible for torture inflicted upon them when they were soldiers in
Mauritania in 1990 and 1991 and were suspected of taking part in an
attempted coup d'etat against Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Taya.
Dah was arrested pursuant to a complaint filed by the International
Federation of Human Rights Leagues and the French League of Human
Rights under the International Convention Against Torture. The
authorities detained him for questioning; the Montpellier Court of
Appeal released him in September 1999, but required that he remain in
the country. In April Dah violated the terms of his release and
returned to Mauritania. According to the International Federation of
Human Rights Leagues, the Court of Appeals continued to investigate the
allegations at year's end.
In December 1999 and January, the main Corsican separatist groups
agreed to a ``cease fire'' in order to allow elected Corsican officials
to engage in a dialog with the Government. In July the Government and
Corsican officials agreed to a plan that would give more legislative
authority to Corsica's elected officials. Although the cease fire is
still in effect, after the July agreement there were several bombings
in Corsica (with some minor injuries) and one shooting attack in which
Jean-Michel Rossi, a writer and former Corsica nationalist militant,
and his bodyguard, Jean-Claude Fratacci, were killed. In December a
bomb exploded at the police barracks in Corsica; a policeman was
injured.
Prison conditions generally exceed minimum international standards;
however, public debate continued on the adequacy of prison conditions.
According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 262 deaths of persons
in custody in 1999, of which 125 were suicides. In May the NGO
International Observer of Prisons (IOP) published a report that
criticized prison conditions. The report concluded that prisons are
overcrowded, have unacceptable hygienic conditions, and provide
inadequate food to inmates. The report focused on the problems that
result from overcrowded prison cells and stated that as of December 1,
1999, the average rate of occupation in prisons was 119 percent of
intended capacity. There were no reports of incidents of alleged
brutality by prison guards during the year; however, the IOP reported
in May that two such incidents occurred in 1999.
On July 5, the National Assembly and Senate each released the
conclusions of a special investigation that each body performed
concerning prison conditions. The investigations were prompted by a
book written by Veronique Vasseur, the head medical officer at La Sante
prison in Paris, which was published in January. Vasseur's book
criticized living conditions and the availability of health care in La
Sante prison, and led to public debate over general prison conditions.
After 5 months of investigations, the National Assembly and Senate each
concluded that prison reforms were necessary; however, their reform
proposals differed. The National Assembly noted a vast difference in
prison conditions across the country and concluded that a prison reform
law was needed to mandate universal standards for all prisons. The
Senate, noting more specific problems such as overcrowded cells and
inadequate numbers of guards, concluded that a universal law would not
be effective and instead recommended that the Government focus on
specific problems requiring more immediate attention.
Observers have criticized the current prison oversight mechanism as
being ineffective because there is no external administrative oversight
outside of the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for both
prison administration and the discipline of prison officials. In March
the working group known as the Canivet Commission delivered its report
on a draft code of ethics for prison guards to the Minister of Justice.
Among other things, the commission recommended creating an office of
prison inspectors, headed by a person named by the President, which
would have the power to conduct investigations and to evaluate prison
conditions and policies. The Government was considering this
recommendation and the possibility of a code of ethics for prison
guards at year's end.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes these
prohibitions.
The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its
inability to process suspects quickly. Some suspects spend many years
in prison before a trial even starts. According to the Prison
Administration, as of January 1, approximately 18,100 of the 51,411
persons held in jails and prisons were awaiting trial. A system of bail
exists.
In June Parliament passed the ``presumption of innocence'' bill,
which includes provisions that address pretrial detention and which are
designed to reduce the number of persons held in jails and prisons
awaiting trial; however, none of the bill's provisions were in effect
at year's end. The bill establishes a new system of ``detention
judges'' (to be implemented in 2001), who are to decide if a suspect is
to be kept in detention pending trial. Generally pretrial detention
only is allowed if there is a possibility that the suspect may be
sentenced (if convicted) to more than 3 years in prison for crimes
against persons and to more than 5 years in prison for crimes against
property. The bill also gives detainees the right to see their lawyer 1
hour after being detained by the police.
On October 31, the Paris correctional court released the last of
the 53 suspects who had been arrested in May 1998 in a roundup of
suspected Islamic terrorists. The court cited insufficient evidence.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The court system includes local courts, 35 regional courts of
appeal, and the highest criminal court, the Court of Cassation, which
considers appeals on procedural grounds only. In January the Court of
Cassation announced that defendants no longer would be required to
present themselves to be taken into custody in order to pursue an
appeal to the Court of Cassation. The ``presumption of innocence''
bill, passed by the Parliament in June (see Section 1.d.) contains a
provision that allows defendants to seek ``reexamination'' of a court
decision that has been found by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) to have violated the European Convention on Human Rights.
The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its
inability to process suspects quickly (see Section 1.d.).
On May 23, the ECHR ruled that the Government violated Article 6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights in the case of Leonardus Van
Pelt. Van Pelt was arrested for drug trafficking in Spain in January
1987, extradited to France in November 1987, tried, and convicted in
February 1990 by the Bobigny District Court. He challenged aspects of
subsequent appeals proceedings, including the requirement that he
present himself to be taken into custody by law enforcement officials
in order to pursue an appeal before the Court of Cassation. The ECHR
ruled that some of these proceedings violated Van Pelt's right to a
fair trial.
On July 20, the ECHR ruled that the Government violated Article 6
of the European Convention on Human Rights in the case of Adrian Caloc.
The Court rejected Caloc's argument that he had been ``treated in an
inhuman or degrading manner'' by police authorities when he was
arrested in 1998, but the Court ruled that Caloc's complaint against
the police was not heard and decided within a ``reasonable amount of
time.'' Because of lengthy police investigations and numerous appeals,
it took more than 7 years for Caloc to obtain a final decision on his
complaint.
In cases of serious crimes, investigating judges detain suspects
for questioning and direct the criminal investigation that occurs
before a case is tried. In some cases this procedure has resulted in
lengthy detentions of suspects before they are tried (see Section
1.d.). The chambre d'accusation reviews the investigating judge's
investigation to determine whether the charge established by the
investigating judge is appropriate. The Court of Assizes investigates
and decides cases involving the most serious offenses.
In March the Paris Court of Appeal reconsidered the convictions of
33 of the 138 persons tried in the October 1998 ``Chalabi network''
case. The court cleared four persons of all charges and released them;
it upheld the convictions and sentences of the other persons.
As a result of the motion for retrial submitted in January 1999,
new evidence was discovered in the case of Omar Raddad, who was
convicted of killing his employer in 1994. The resulting reports are
scheduled to be released in the spring of 2001, at which time the Court
of Cassation may decide to revise the original verdict.
Raddad's attorney had argued that a key defense witness in the
original trial was expelled on a technicality.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
The judge investigating the wiretapping cases deemed inappropriate
by the National Commission for the Regulation of Wiretapping (NCRWT)
completed his investigation at the end of 1999 and presented his
findings to the Paris public prosecutor's office in February; the
office was considering the matter at year's end. According to the
annual report of the NCRWT, the number of administrative wiretaps put
in place in 1999 remained constant. The quota on the number of
administrative wiretaps, which was set by the Prime Minister in 1997,
did not change during 1999, and the number of administrative wiretaps
put in place during 1999 was below the quota. Wiretapping is recognized
legally as a right of the Government.
Debate continues over whether Muslim girls have the right to wear
headscarves in public schools (see Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
On May 22, the Paris district court ruled that an Internet company
violated the law by permitting the public display of Nazi artifacts for
sale on the Internet (see Section 5).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There
are regular demonstrations on various issues, which occur generally
without incident. In October the Paris prefecture denied a request by
the Church of Scientology for a permit for a demonstration involving
10,000 participants. The Church alleged discrimination; however, the
prefecture justified the denial based upon the proposed size and
duration of the demonstration, which would make it difficult to
maintain public order. The group rented a private park outside Paris in
which to hold their gathering.
In December police clashed with demonstrators protesting the
European Union summit held in Nice. The protesters used Molotov
cocktail bombs, stones, and steel police barriers; police responded
with tear gas, water cannons, and clubs. More than 20 persons were
injured in clashes between police and protesters. On December 6,
approximately 12 persons were injured when police officers used tear
gas to prevent demonstrators in Ventimiglia from travelling to the
summit.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion
and the separation of church and state, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice; however, the Government took some
actions during the year that affected religious minorities that it
describes as ``sects.'' The 1905 law on separation of church and
state--the foundation of current legislation on religious freedom--
makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of faith.
Religious groups may register as ``associations cultuelles''
(associations of worship) or as ``associations culturelles'' (cultural
associations); religious groups normally register in both of these
categories. Associations in these two categories are subject to certain
management and financial disclosure requirements. An association of
worship is exempt from taxes, but can organize only religious
activities; it may not operate a school, print publications, or employ
a board president. A cultural association is a type of for-profit
association whose goal is to promote the culture of a certain group;
although not exempt from taxes, it may receive government subsidies for
its cultural and educational operations (such as schools). Religious
groups must apply with the local prefecture to be recognized as an
association of worship and therefore receive tax-exempt status under a
1905 statute. The prefecture, upon reviewing the documentation supplied
regarding the association's purpose for existence, then can grant that
status; however, the prefecture can decide to review a group's status
if the association receives a large donation or legacy that comes to
the attention of the tax authorities. If the prefecture determines that
the association is not in fact in conformity with the 1905 law, its
status can be changed, and it can be required to pay a 60 percent tax
rate on present and past donations.
For historical reasons, contrary to practice in the rest of the
country, the Jewish, Lutheran, Reformed (Protestant), and Roman
Catholic religions in three departments of Alsace and Lorraine enjoy
special legal status. Adherents of these four religions may choose to
have a portion of their income tax allocated to their church in a
system administered by the central Government.
The State subsidizes private schools, including those that are
church affiliated. Central or local governments also own and provide
upkeep for other religious buildings constructed before 1905, the date
of the law separating church and state.
Some religious minorities have experienced problems with the
wearing of special religious clothing. For example, debate continued
over whether denying some Muslim girls the right to wear headscarves in
public schools constituted a violation of the right to practice their
religion. Various courts and government bodies have considered the
question; however, there has been no definitive national decision on
the issue. In June 1999, the Government Commissioner recommended that
the administrative court repeal its October 1998 to expel a girl who
refused to remove her headscarf. The Government Commissioner stated
that no threat to public order was posed and that the school
administrator was incompetent to make the definitive decision. In
October 1999, the Conseil d'Etat reaffirmed a ban on headscarves in
public schools.
The Government's response to some minority groups that it views as
``sects'' or ``cults'' has been to continue to encourage public
caution. In 1996 the National Assembly's parliamentary commission, also
known as the Gest or the Guyard Commission, issued a report that
defined sects as groups that place inordinate importance on finances;
cause a rupture between adherents and their families; are responsible
for physical as well as psychological attacks on members; recruit
children; profess ``antisocial'' ideas; disturb public order; have
``judiciary problems;'' and/or attempt to infiltrate organs of the
State. Government officials have stated that ``sects'' are
``associations whose structure is ideological and totalitarian and
whose behavior seriously oppresses fundamental liberties as well as
social equilibrium.'' (These attributes are in addition to specific
criminal behavior prohibited by law.) The Commission's report
identified 173 groups as sects, including Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Church of Scientology. The report was prepared without the benefit of
full and complete hearings regarding the groups identified on the list.
Groups were not told why they were placed on the list, and, because the
document exists as a commission report to the National Assembly, there
is no mechanism for changing or amending the list short of a new
National Assembly commission inquiry and report.
The Government has not outlawed any of the groups on the list;
however, the ensuing publicity contributed to an atmosphere of
intolerance and bias against minority religions. Some religious groups
reported that their members suffered increased intolerance after having
been identified on the list. A number of individuals who belong to
groups on the list continued to report discrimination during the year--
for example, the loss of a job or the denial of a bank loan--which they
believe occurred because of their affiliation with a ``sect.'' In a
November 1998 report, the International Helsinki Federation criticized
the identification of the 173 groups, which it stated ``resulted in
media reports libeling minority religions, the circulation of rumors
and false information, and incitement of religious intolerance.'' The
Commission's findings also led to calls for legislative action to
restrict the activities of sects, which the Government rejected on
grounds of religious freedom. Instead, the Justice Ministry issued a
directive to all government entities to be vigilant against possible
abuses by sects, and all government offices were instructed to monitor
potentially abusive sect activities.
In 1996 the Government created an interministerial working group on
sects (known as the Observatory on Sects) to analyze the phenomenon of
sects and to develop proposals for dealing with them. The working
group's final report in 1996 made several proposals, including the
granting of legal standing to organizations that oppose sects; a
modification of the law requiring associations to divulge information
regarding the sources and management of their finances related to their
effort to obtain tax-exempt status; a limit on the allocation of public
campaign funds in order to limit public financial support for small
fringe groups; the creation of a representative in each prefecture to
provide information on sects to local officials; the creation of a
permanent commission at the European Union level to reinforce
international cooperation in controlling sect activities; and measures
to restrict group members' entry into professional training programs.
In March a Paris Correctional Court fined Jacques Guyard, the
president of the parliamentary commission and a drafter of the 1996
National Assembly report on socalled sects, approximately $2,850
(20,000 francs) in response to complaints by three groups that were
named in a parliamentary commission's June 1999 report on the financing
of religious groups named in the original report. The court also
ordered Guyard to pay approximately $12,850 (90,000 francs) in damages.
The Federation of Steiner Schools, the New Brotherly Economy, and ``le
Mercure Federale'' (an anthroposophical medical association) had filed
a complaint against Guyard for slander for calling the groups ``sects''
in a June 1999 television interview. The court found that Guyard had
made accusations against these groups when existing evidence did not
warrant even a serious inquiry into their activities. The court noted
that the parliamentary commission's report resulted from written
declarations from persons claiming to be victims of anthroposophy, but
that the parliamentary commission had not heard any of the claims in
person, and that there was no supporting documentation for accusations
that the groups had used mental manipulation, pressured persons to give
them money, or used practical medicine that endangered lives. The court
rejected Guyard's attempts to qualify his statements, and also rejected
a request from Guyard's lawyer for parliamentary immunity. The 1999
report in question focused on multinational groups, especially
Jehovah's Witnesses and Scientologists. The stated basis of concern was
that these groups may use excessive or dishonest means to obtain
donations, which then are transferred out of the country and beyond the
reach of French tax authorities.
In October 1998, the Government issued a new decree disbanding the
Observatory on Sects and creating an ``Interministerial Mission to
Battle Against Sects'' (mission interministerielle de lutte contre les
sectes). Although the decree instructs the commission to ``analyze the
phenomenon of sects,'' it does not define what is meant by the term
``sect,'' or how sects differ from religions. The Interministerial
Mission also is charged with serving as a coordinator of periodic
interministerial meetings, at which government officials are to
exchange information and coordinate their actions against sects. In
December 1998, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular urging state
prosecutors to cooperate with the Interministerial Mission in bringing
actions against sects.
On February 7, the Interministerial Mission submitted its 1999
annual report to the Prime Minister, which addressed the perceived
problem of sects or cults. The report specifically raised the
possibility of the dissolution of movements which, being ``in essence
and in action totalitarian'' are dangerous to their members and to
democracy in general. The report urges government action to deal with
sects or cults according to their degrees of dangerousness, such as
groups that limit personal freedoms of members, ``new age'' groups, and
``absolutist'' groups which are totalitarian in nature. However, the
report does not advocate new legislation to abolish groups considered
to be dangerous. The report presents two options: The use of criminal
cases against individuals for violating existing laws, which rarely is
done; and the use of existing administrative and political means--a
1936 decree against ``factious leagues"--which would require action by
the Council of Ministers and the assent of the President. The report
specifically cites concerns regarding the Church of Scientology and the
``Solar Temple'' group.
On December 21, the Interministerial Mission against Sects
submitted its 2000 annual report. The report highlighted the
globalization of sect/cult influence, specifically in underdeveloped
countries and focused on the ``infiltration'' of NGO's by sects/cults.
Within the context of developments within the country, the report
evaluated the influence of sect/cult movements in the three overseas
departments (Guyana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique). A case study examined
the anthroposophical movement, founded by Austrian Rudolf Steiner, and
recommended sustained vigilance over the Steiner schools.
On June 22, the National Assembly passed on its first reading a
private bill that would tighten restrictions on religious and other
organizations. This bill--which amended an earlier version that had
originated in and had been passed by the Senate in December 1999--
included the following clauses: (1) criteria for the dissolution of so-
called ``sects,'' (2) the prohibition of sect publicity in
``vulnerable'' areas (i.e., near schools and hospitals), (3)
prohibition of the reconstitution of dissolved ``sects'' under a
different name, and (4) establishment of the new crime of ``mental
manipulation.'' The Justice Minister at the time, who attended the
National Assembly vote, noted that certain provisions of the bill would
help ``victims'' of ``sects,'' but warned that other provisions might
threaten fundamental liberties, such as freedom of association and
belief. She questioned whether certain clauses were in conformity with
the European Convention on Human Rights and called for a ``parallel
reflection'' on these points to be organized by human rights groups
when the Senate reconsidered the bill. On November 8, the Senate held
hearings on the bill. Representatives from the Catholic, Protestant,
Jewish, and Muslim faiths, who had not been consulted previously,
expressed their concerns that the provisions of the bill could be
abused. The Senate was not expected to schedule the next reading of the
bill until April 2001.
In December 1998, the National Assembly debated and passed a
private bill that would allow two specific antisect groups, both
classified as ``public utilities,'' to become parties to court actions
involving sects. Its main provisions, with some modifications, were
integrated into a separate bill on legal reform aimed at strengthening
the presumption of innocence and victims' rights (see Section 1.d.). In
June Parliament passed that bill, which contains a provision that
allows some associations that aid individuals against groups that
``create or exploit psychological or physical dependence'' to become
civil parties to certain criminal proceedings involving such groups.
This provision is intended to allow antisect groups to become civil
parties in certain proceedings involving sects.
Some observers are concerned about the scrutiny with which tax
authorities have examined the financial records of some religious
groups. The Government currently does not recognize all branches of
Jehovah's Witnesses or the Church of Scientology as qualifying
religious associations for tax purposes, and therefore subjects them to
a 60 percent tax on all funds they receive. In June the Conseil d'Etat
decided that 2 branches of the 11 branches of Jehovah's Witnesses could
be recognized as religious associations according to the 1905 law and
thus be exonerated from certain tax obligations.
In January 1996, the tax authorities began an audit of the French
Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, and in May 1998, the tax
authorities formally assessed the 60 percent tax against donations
received by Jehovah's Witnesses from September 1992 through August
1996. In June 1998, tax authorities began proceedings to collect the
assessed tax, including steps to place a lien on the property of the
National Consistory of Jehovah's Witnesses. The tax proceedings
continued at year's end. In July a Nanterre court decided against the
French Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, ruling that the Jehovah's
Witnesses would have to pay over $42 million (300 million francs) in
back taxes to the fiscal authorities. In the same month the Jehovah's
Witnesses appealed the Nanterre court's decision to the Versailles
Court of Appeals, the appeal was pending at year's end.
The authorities previously took similar action against the Church
of Scientology. In the case of the Paris church, the Ministry of
Finance refused to grant the church authorization to import funds to
pay the claimed taxes although the church offered to pay the total
amount of all taxes assessed, a percentage of which would have come
from outside the country. Subsequently in December 1997, the Government
filed legal action for the claimed amount against the former officers
of the Paris church and against the Church of Scientology International
(a California nonprofit organization). The hearing in this legal action
was deferred pending a decision regarding a 1998 administrative claim
filed with the Conseil d'Etat by the Paris church that the Minister of
Finance acted improperly in refusing to allow the church to import
funds to pay the assessed taxes. In January 1999, the Conseil d'Etat
requested the advice of the European Court of Justice. On March 14, the
Court ruled that French law was incompatible with European Union laws
regulating the free flow of capital; however, the Court ruled that such
regulations could be allowed if required on the grounds of a threat to
public security or public policy. The Court ruled the French laws were
not sufficiently detailed and, on December 8, the Conseil d'Etat found
the State at fault and upheld the decision of the European Court of
Justice. However, the judgment's practical effect was limited because
the affected churches had dissolved themselves and been reconstituted
in the intervening period under different names.
In July 1997, a Court of Appeals in Lyon recognized Scientology as
a religion in its opinion in the conviction of Jean-Jacques Mazier, a
former leader of the Scientologists, for contributing to the 1988
suicide of a church member. In response the Minister of the Interior
stated that the court had exceeded its authority and that the
Government does not recognize Scientology as a religion. The Government
appealed the Court of Appeals decision, but in June 1999, the Court of
Cassation rejected the Government's appeal, but the Court stated that
it lacked the authority to decide if Scientology was a religion.
There have been a number of court cases against the Church of
Scientology, which generally involved former members who sue the Church
for fraud, and sometimes for the practice of medicine without a
license. In October the Paris prefecture denied a request by the Church
of Scientology for a permit for a demonstration (see Section 2.b.); the
group held their gathering in a private park.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for the grant of refugee/asylee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government provides
first asylum. In 1999 the Government received 30,907 requests for
asylum and issued 4,659 refugee certificates (a document issued to
successful asylum applicants). The Government generally cooperates with
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports of the
forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. On September 24, voters approved a referendum to
shorten the term of the President from 7 years to 5 years. Abstention
rates for the vote were almost 70 percent.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
politics or government; however, they remain significantly
underrepresented in public offices, especially at the national level.
Eleven of 32 cabinet members, 20 of 321 senators, and 57 of 577
deputies in the National Assembly are women. The European Union
Parliament includes a larger French female presence--40 percent of the
country's elected representatives are female. To increase women's
participation, some parties have established quotas for them on
electoral lists or in party management. In June 1999, a joint session
of both the Senate and the National Assembly approved a constitutional
amendment on the principle of ``equal access of men and women to
electoral mandates and elective functions.'' In May the Parliament
adopted a law that implemented the constitutional amendment. The law
provides that, starting with the municipal elections in March 2001,
political parties are to have equal numbers of women and men on their
lists of candidates. The President and the Prime Minister continued
discussions on modernizing the country's political institutions,
including measures to encourage a greater number of women in political,
social, and public positions.
The citizens of the ``collective territory'' of Mayotte and the
territories of French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia
determine their legal and political relationships to France by means of
referendums, and they elect deputies and senators to the French
Parliament, along with the overseas departments.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of local and international human rights
organizations operate freely, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
cooperative and responsive to their views. The National Consultative
Commission on Human Rights (NCCHR)--which has nongovernmental as well
as government members--also monitors complaints and advises the
Government on policies and legislation. It is an independent body in
the Office of the Prime Minister.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Statutes ban discrimination based on race, religion, sex, ethnic
background, or political opinion, and the Government effectively
enforces them.
Women.--The Penal Code prohibits rape and spousal abuse, and law
enforcement authorities vigorously enforce these laws; however,
violence against women remains a problem. The Ministry of Interior
reported that in 1999 there were 7,958 rapes and 12,732 instances of
other criminal sexual assault. The penalties for domestic violence vary
according to the type of crime and range from 3 years imprisonment and
a fine of approximately $42,450 (300,000 francs) to 20 years in prison.
The penalty for rape is 15 years in prison, which may be increased due
to other circumstances (such as the age of the victim or the nature of
the relationship of the rapist to the victim). The Government sponsors
and funds programs for women who are victims of violence, including
shelters, counseling, and hot lines. Numerous private associations also
assist abused women.
Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.). Prostitution
is legal; acting as a pimp is not. A government agency, the Central
Office on the Treatment of Human Beings (OCRTEH), addresses trafficking
in women, prostitution, and pimping.
The law prohibits sex-based job discrimination and sexual
harassment in the workplace; however, these laws have encountered
difficulties in implementation. Women's rights groups criticize the
scope of the law as narrow and the fines and compensatory damages as
often modest. For example, the law limits sexual harassment claims to
circumstances where there is a supervisorsubordinate relationship but
fails to address harassment by colleagues or a hostile work
environment.
The law requires that women receive equal pay for equal work, but
this requirement often is not implemented in practice. Reports by
various governmental organizations and NGO's indicates that men
continue to earn more than women, and unemployment rates continue to be
higher for women than for men. For example, a report released in
September 1999 by National Assembly Deputy Catherine Genisson indicated
that in the country's 5,000 largest firms, the average difference in
salary between men and women is 27 percent. A study by the National
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies indicated that in March
the unemployment rate for women was 11.9 percent, compared with 8.5
percent for men.
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The Ministry for Family Affairs oversees
implementation of the Government's programs for children.
There are strict laws against child abuse, particularly when
committed by a parent or guardian. In 1999 there were approximately
18,500 reported cases of mistreatment (physical violence, sexual abuse,
mental cruelty, or severe negligence) of children. Approximately 4,800
of these cases involved reports of sexual abuse. Special sections of
the national police and judiciary are charged with handling these
cases. The Government provides counseling, financial aid, foster homes,
and orphanages, depending on the extent of the problem. Various
associations also help minors seek justice in cases of mistreatment by
parents.
Some immigrants from countries where female genital mutilation
(FGM) is customary subject their children to this practice, which is
condemned widely by international health experts as damaging to both
physical and psychological health. Authorities prosecute FGM cases
under the provisions of the Penal Code, which states that acts of
violence towards children that result in mutilation shall be tried in
the highest criminal court. Since 1993 the Government and private
associations have undertaken a campaign to inform immigrants that FGM
is contrary to the law and would be prosecuted.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. A 1991 law requires new public buildings to be
accessible to the physically disabled, but most older buildings and
public transportation are not accessible.
Religious Minorities.--The number of anti-Semitic incidents
increased in the fall, due in part to increased unrest in the Middle
East. According to the annual NCCHR report on racism and xenophobia,
released in the spring, there were a total of 51 threats and 9 acts of
violence in 1999, compared with 73 threats and 1 act of violence in
1998.
During October more than 100 anti-Semitic incidents, ranging from
graffiti to harassment to firebombing, occurred across the country,
mainly as a result of increasing tensions in the Middle East. For
example, on October 10, a synagogue in Trappes was set on fire and
destroyed. The city government allowed the congregation to use a city
hall for the celebration of one of the Jewish high holy days. On
October 12-14, local authorities in Strasbourg recovered several
Molotov cocktails that had been planted in a synagogue. On October 14,
a synagogue in Lyon was rammed by a car and then caught fire. Three
synagogues in the Paris suburb of Bagnolet and a Jewish shop in Toulon
were firebombed. On October 17, six incendiary devices were discovered
outside a Jewish school in Paris. On October 23, a synagogue in
Marseille was firebombed. It appeared that youths were responsible for
many of these incidents, and some arrests were made. Government
leaders, members of the Jewish community, the Paris Grand Mosque, the
Protestant Federation, and the French Conference of Bishops strongly
criticized the violence. The Government increased police security for
Jewish institutions.
On May 22, the Paris district court ruled that an Internet company
violated a law prohibiting defamation and incitement to hate crimes
when it permitted the public display of Nazi artifacts for sale on the
Internet. Following a hearing on July 24, the judge postponed
implementation of the order. On November 21, a judge upheld the
verdict, and ordered the company to block access from the country to
sites offering Nazi memorabilia within 3 months.
In October 1999, the Court of Cassation upheld a Bordeaux court's
1998 conviction of Maurice Papon for his actions as secretary general
of the Prefecture of Gironde from 1942 to 1944. Papon was found guilty
of complicity in committing crimes against humanity for his role in the
deportation of hundreds of Jews to Nazi concentration camps during the
World War II German occupation. The Bordeaux court had sentenced him to
10 years' imprisonment; however, he had not been detained because he
had appealed to the Court of Cassation, and just before that court's
ruling, Papon fled from his home. His failure to appear resulted in an
automatic rejection of his appeal. On October 22, 1999, he was arrested
in Switzerland and returned to France; he remained in prison at year's
end. In April Papon filed an appeal to the European Court of Human
Rights; the appeal was pending at year's end.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Anti-immigrant sentiments led
to various incidents, including occasional attacks on members of the
large Arab/Muslim and black African communities. The annual NCCHR
report noted a continuing decrease in the number of reported incidents
of racist threats79 threats were reported in 1999, a decrease from 91
in 1998. However, the number of reported incidents of racist violence
increased to 12 in 1999 from 8 in 1998. There were no deaths due to
racist violence in 1999.
The Government strongly condemns such actions and attacks and has
strict antidefamation laws. Government programs attempt to combat
racism and anti-Semitism by promoting public awareness and bringing
together local officials, police, and citizen groups. There are also
antiracist educational programs in some public school systems. The
annual NCCHR report suggested that the Government continue to
strengthen its laws against racist acts.
According to the 1999 public opinion poll reported in the annual
NCCHR report, 12 percent of those polled admitted to being ``rather
racist,'' 27 percent admitted to being ``a little racist,'' 30 percent
said they were ``not very racist,'' 29 percent said that they were
``not at all racist,'' and 2 percent had no response.
Romani asylum seekers often remain in the country after their
claims have been denied. They do not have official papers, which limits
their access to health care and education. They often live in crowded
conditions without proper sanitary facilities.
The Administrative Court in Nantes continued to consider the June
1998 appeal of Moroccan national Khaddouj Tahir at year's end. In 1997
Tahir was refused naturalization because she wore a hejab veil during
her final interview. Naturalization officials stated that ``her
garments showed a refusal to integrate into the French community.''
According to the law, applicants for naturalization must demonstrate
their assimilation into French society as well as their loyalty to the
French nation.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
of association for all workers. Trade unions exercise significant
economic and political influence, although less than 10 percent of the
work force is unionized. Unions have legally mandated roles (as do
employers) in the administration of social institutions, including
social security (health care and most retirement systems), the
unemployment insurance system, labor courts, and the Economic and
Social Council, a constitutionally mandated consultative body.
Unions are independent of the Government, and most are not aligned
with any political party. However, many of the leaders of the General
Confederation of Labor and its unions belong to the Communist Party.
Workers, including civil servants, are free to strike except when a
strike threatens public safety. One-fourth of all salaried employees
work for the Government. The number of workdays lost to strike action
in the private sector increased during the year, and the number of
strikes increased. Most of the widely publicized national strikes or
protests occurred in the public sector or affected state-owned
companies, and were called principally over implementation of the 35-
hour workweek, salaries, privatization or reorganization plans, and
working conditions (of which hours, staffing, and personal security
were the primary issues). Teachers and health care workers mounted
several strikes and protests over pay, personnel levels, and government
efforts to reform the health and educational systems. Public
transportation workers in Paris and other cities struck repeatedly in
support of demands related to the implementation of a 35-hour workweek
or the deployment of additional security personnel to deal with
violence directed at transportation personnel. Railway workers also
mounted strikes in support of demands related to the 35-hour workweek.
Unions representing armored car workers mounted numerous strikes,
including a 2-week national strike in May, to demand increased
compensation and stricter security measures following several robberies
in which several union members were killed. Air traffic controllers
struck to protest European Union efforts to centralize air traffic
control across Europe. Workers at two airlines struck during a busy
spring travel period to protest anticipated job losses resulting from
the takeover of their company by a foreign carrier. Truck drivers
blocked border points and ports early in the year over concerns that
European regulations for work-hours in their sector would deprive them
of reductions called for under the move to a 35-hour workweek. In
September owners of taxis, trucking companies, and fishing boats
blockaded roads and ports over rising fuel prices.
The law prohibits retaliation against strikers, strike leaders, and
union members, and the Government effectively enforces this provision.
Unions freely join federations and confederations, including
international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers,
including those in the three small export processing zones, have the
right to organize and bargain collectively. The law strictly prohibits
antiunion discrimination; employers found guilty of such activity are
required to correct it, including the reinstatement of workers fired
for union activities.
A 1982 law requires at least annual bargaining in the public and
private sector on wages, hours, and working conditions at both plant
and industry levels, but does not require that negotiations result in a
signed contract. In case of an impasse, government mediators may impose
solutions that are binding unless formally rejected by either side
within a week. If no new agreement can be reached, the contract from
the previous year remains valid. Over 90 percent of the private sector
work force are covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated
at national or local levels. Trilateral consultations (unions,
management, and Government) also take place on such subjects as the
minimum wage, the duration of the legal workweek, temporary work,
social security, and unemployment benefits. Labor tribunals, composed
of worker and employer representatives, are available to resolve
complaints.
The law requires businesses with more than 50 employees to
establish a works council, through which workers are consulted on
training, working conditions, profit sharing, and similar issues. Works
councils, which are open to both union and nonunion employees, are
elected every 2 years.
The Constitution's provisions for trade union rights extend to the
country's overseas departments and territories.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and
the Government effectively enforces this provision.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--With a few exceptions for those enrolled in certain
apprenticeship programs or working in the entertainment industry,
children under the age of 16 may not be employed. Generally, work
considered arduous or work between the hours of 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. may
not be performed by minors under age 18. Laws prohibiting child
employment are enforced effectively through periodic checks by labor
inspectors, who have the authority to take employers to court for
noncompliance with the law. The law prohibits forced or bonded child
labor, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The administratively determined
minimum wage, revised whenever the cost-of-living index rises 2
percentage points, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. The hourly wage was changed to $5.60 (42.02
francs) as of July 1. Since February the legal workweek is 35 hours for
firms of 20 or more workers. Overtime, under the 35-hour workweek, is
capped at 1,600 hours per year for most workers. Firms of less than 20
workers have until January 2002 to reduce their workweek to 35 hours.
For these firms, the legal workweek is 39 hours, with a minimum break
of 24 hours per week. Overtime work is restricted to 9 hours per week.
The Ministry of Labor has overall responsibility for policing
occupational health and safety laws. Standards are high and effectively
enforced. The law requires each enterprise with 50 or more employees to
establish an occupational health and safety committee. Over 75 percent
of all enterprises, covering more than 75 percent of all employees,
have fully functioning health and safety committees. Workers have the
right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the trafficking of
persons; however, trafficking in women is a problem. In the past, the
country has been primarily a transit point for women trafficked for
sexual purposes from Africa, South America, and Eastern and Southern
Europe, despite stringent laws that prohibit such trafficking. The
country is now also a destination for trafficked women, as increasing
numbers of women from Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the
Balkans are trafficked to work as prostitutes in cities, often under
harsh conditions.
Prostitution is legal; however, the law prohibits pimping,
including aiding, assisting, maintaining, or profiting from the
prostitution of another, and the public solicitation of another person
for the purpose of inciting sexual relations also is illegal. Pimps and
traffickers usually are prosecuted under these laws. Aiding, abetting,
or protecting the prostitution of another person; obtaining a profit,
sharing proceeds or receiving subsidies from someone engaged in
prostitution; or employing, leading, corrupting, or pressuring someone
into prostitution are punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a fine
of up to approximately $140,000 (1 million francs). Penalties rise to
up to 10 years in prison and up to approximately $1,400,000 (10 million
francs) if a minor or several persons are involved, or if force is
used. Pimping by organized groups is punishable by up to 20 years in
prison and a fine of up to $2,800,000 (20 million francs). The use of
``torture'' or ``barbarous acts'' in the course of pimping is
punishable by up to life imprisonment and up to $4,200,000 (30 million
francs) in fines. These laws are enforced to various degrees--according
to one press report, the most visible pimps are arrested, while those
who work quietly go unnoticed.
Several law enforcement agencies are involved in the effort to
combat trafficking. The Central Office for the Repression of
Trafficking in Humans is under the authority of the central criminal
investigation directorate of the police judiciare, which handles
organized crime. It centralizes information and coordinates operations
to counter trafficking, and maintains contacts with the police, the
Gendarmerie, foreign and international law enforcement authorities, and
NGO's. Regional services of the police judiciare also combat
trafficking, and the police judiciare has brigades to combat pimping in
Paris and Marseille. Local police forces also address problems of
prostitution and pimping.
In the past, the country was a transit point for victims; however,
in 1997 police began to see organized rings of traffickers, primarily
from southeast Europe. The number of young women brought to the country
to work as prostitutes continues to increase, in part because
traffickers throughout Europe have benefited from the open borders
under the Schengen Accords. Some victims come as a result of fraud or
force; some are brought by a friend, or a friend of a friend; others
have worked as prostitutes in their home countries, and are willing to
continue the practice to pay for their immigration papers. In 1999
OCRTEH reported investigations into rings operating out of the Czech
Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Albania, Ecuador, Benin,
Poland, and the former Yugoslavia. Much of the flow is now from Eastern
Europe and the Balkans, but women from Africa and Latin America, who
often enter the country through Marseille or the Spanish border, also
have been trafficked into the country.
The number of women from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
and the Balkans has increased markedly, and has received increased
press attention. For example, in March French and Belgian police
dismantled an international trafficking ring organized in Paris and run
from Brussels. This network trafficked women from the former Yugoslavia
through Italy into forced prostitution in Brussels and Paris. Police
dismantled the ring after French officials noticed that a number of
prostitutes were traveling two or three times a week to Brussels on the
highspeed train, apparently to pay their ``protectors.'' French
officials arrested and extradited three Albanians. In January OCRTEH
dismantled an Albanian trafficking ring in Toulouse. After reportedly
being sequestered for several weeks and subjected to rape, torture, and
threats against their families if they tried to escape, the women
reportedly were sold for around $1,250 (9,000 francs), which included a
``guarantee'' that they would work as prostitutes for 3 months.
In May the magazine Le Nouvel Observateur quoted the Commissaire of
OCRTEH as saying that two-thirds of the foreign prostitutes in the
country were from Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union),
whereas in the previous few months, they represented only onethird. The
magazine also reported that in Nice, women have responded to
advertisements for waitresses or models that appeared in newspapers in
Kiev or Moscow; and in Strasbourg, the number of prostitutes has more
than doubled in the past 5 years--approximately two-thirds of the women
are Czechs or Bulgarians.
There are numerous NGO's that deal with trafficking in persons and
prostitution. The Scelles Foundation, which has a center for
international research and documentation of sexual exploitation,
provides information to the media on the issue, and supports other
associations in the country and around the world. The NGO L'Amicale du
Nid works directly with prostitutes.
__________
GEORGIA
The 1995 Constitution provides for an executive branch that reports
to the President and a legislature. The President appoints ministers
with the consent of the Parliament. In April Eduard Shevardnadze was
reelected to a second 5-year term as President in an election marred by
numerous serious irregularities. International observers strongly
criticized this election due to interference by state authorities in
the electoral process, deficient election legislation, an insufficient
representative election administration, and unreliable voter registers.
The country's second parliamentary elections under the 1995
Constitution were held in October 1999, which the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) characterized as a step
toward Georgia's compliance with OSCE commitments. Local elections were
held for the first time in November 1998. The country's first
multiparty parliamentary elections after independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991 followed a military coup in 1992 that ousted the elected
government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and brought Shevardnadze to power as
head of a provisional government. The civil war and separatist wars
that followed weakened greatly central government authority, not only
in separatist Abkhazia and Ossetia, but also in other areas of the
country, and the extent of central authority and control remain in
question. Central government authority is limited in the autonomous
region of Ajara. The Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary; however, it is subject to executive pressure.
Internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that erupted in
the early 1990's are unresolved. Cease-fires are in effect in both
areas, although sporadic incidents of violence occur in Abkhazia. These
unresolved conflicts, together with problems created by roughly 300,000
internally displaced persons (IDP's), pose a continuing threat to
national stability. In 1993 Abkhaz separatists won control of Abkhazia,
and most ethnic Georgians a large plurality of the population--were
expelled from or fled the region. In 1994 Russian peacekeeping forces
representing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) deployed in
Abkhazia with the agreement of the Government and the Abkhaz
separatists. Although there has been no agreement on the return of
IDP's to Abkhazia, a limited number have returned on their own to the
Gali region of southern Abkhazia. As a result of fighting in May 1998,
almost all of the 53,000 Georgian IDP's who had returned to the Gali
region of Abkhazia again fled. After May 1998, IDP's continue to travel
back and forth to the Gali region and as many as 40,000 may be living
in the Gali Region on a more or less permanent basis. A Russian
peacekeeping force also has been in South Ossetia since 1992 and is
part of a joint peacekeeping force with Ossetians and Georgians in
South Ossetia. Repatriation of Georgians to South Ossetia and of
Ossetians to the rest of Georgia has been slow. The Government has no
effective control over Abkhazia or much of South Ossetia. Almost no
IDP's have returned to other parts of Abkhazia.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) and Procuracy have primary
responsibility for law enforcement, and the Ministry of State Security
(MSS, formerly the KGB) plays a significant role in internal security.
In times of internal disorder, the Government may call on the MOI or
the army. Elected civilian authorities do not maintain adequate control
over the law enforcement and security forces. Members of the security
forces committed an increased number of serious human rights abuses.
The Government made efforts to develop a market-based economy. Key
exports are scrap metal, manganese, wine, mineral water, and
agricultural products. Agriculture represents approximately 30 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP). Per capita GDP for the first 9 months
of the year was estimated at $486. According to the Georgian Department
of Statistics, approximately 52.6 percent of the population is living
below the poverty level. The rate of economic growth continued to slow
and the eastern part of the country suffered a drought. There was a
growing fiscal deficit, as revenue collection continued to be very low.
Government salaries and pensions were still in arrears.
The Government's human rights record worsened, and was poor in
several key areas. Numerous serious irregularities in the April
presidential election limited citizens' right to change their
government. According to the Government and nongovernmental
organization (NGO) human rights monitors, security forces continued to
beat and otherwise abuse detainees, force confessions, and fabricate or
plant evidence. Reports of police brutality increased throughout the
year. Several deaths in custody were blamed on physical abuse, torture,
or inhuman or life-threatening prison conditions, and most government
promises of reforms remain unfulfilled. The Ministry of Justice gained
formal jurisdiction over the prison system from the Ministry of
Interior in 1999; however, this transfer of responsibility was
accomplished without adequate fiscal resources and consequently
exacberated the already harsh conditions. Moreover, the MOI retains a
significant role in prison staff and investigations. Minister of
Justice Mikheil Saakashvili, appointed in October, acknowledged serious
shortcomings in the prison system and initiated steps to address them.
Saakashvilli fired some corrupt administrators, released some inmates
to reduce overcrowding, and took steps toward creating a prison
inspection system that would include NGO participation. Authorities
allegedly continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Corruption
in law enforcement agencies is significant and pervasive. In addition,
despite numerous investigations, large-scale corruption on the part of
lower level and high government officials still is tolerated widely as
an inevitable consequence of economic hardship and low salaries. Local
human rights groups reported that security force brutality against
them, harassment, and arbitrary arrest and detention of their members
increased during the year, especially after April. Senior government
officials, including the President, acknowledged serious human rights
problems and sought international advice and assistance on needed
reforms; however, neither the President nor other senior officials took
concrete steps to address these problems, and Parliament failed to
budget adequately for mandated reforms. Law enforcement agencies made
little progress in adapting these practices to democratic norms, and
impunity remains a problem.
The judiciary is subject to pressure and corruption and does not
always ensure due process; judicial reform efforts to create a more
independent judiciary were undercut by failure to pay judges in a
timely manner. As a result of the Law on Common Courts, many corrupt
and incompetent judges were removed from the bench and replaced by
judges who passed a qualifying exam and vetting process. There were
lengthy delays in trials, and prolonged pretrial detention remains a
problem. The Criminal Procedures Code, which was passed in 1997, was
amended in 1999 and again in the summer in response to complaints by
security forces that legislated reforms would hamper criminal
investigations. Parliament also repealed provisions in the 1998
Criminal Code that would have allowed citizens under investigation
access to the courts prior to trial. Procuracy reform was stalled.
Human Rights Watch released a highly critical report in October that
detailed new restrictions on due process and other setbacks to judicial
reform. Law enforcement agencies and other government bodies
occasionally interfered with citizens' right to privacy. The press
generally was free; however, security forces and other authorities on
occasion intimidated and used violence against journalists. The
Government restricted freedom of assembly, and law enforcement
authorities dispersed numerous peaceful gatherings. Government
officials infringed upon freedom of religion. Discrimination against
and harassment of some religious minorities are problems. Violence and
discrimination against women are problems. Trafficking in women for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem.
Growing citizen awareness of civil rights and democratic values and
the continued evolution of civil society provided a partial check on
the excesses of law enforcement agencies. A number of independent NGO's
are active in defense of the rights of individual citizens and
religious groups. International observers noted that most NGO activity
is concentrated in Tbilisi. Criticism from the press and the NGO
community and timely intervention from government and parliamentary
human rights monitors, played an important role in halting the abuse of
citizens detained by the police in a few specific cases.
There was little information available on the human rights
situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to limited access to these
regions.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political or extrajudicial killings by government
agents. Security force abuses reportedly resulted in several deaths in
custody.
The Government stated that 61 prisoners died in prison, and it
appears that 5 prisoners died in jail or prison hospitals in pretrial
detention during the year. Human rights NGO's and the press report that
physical abuse, torture, and inhuman prison or pretrial detention
conditions contributed to a number of these deaths. The authorities
attributed the majority of these deaths to illness. On May 31, Mamuka
Rizhamadze was found hanged in a Kutaisi jail. He was arrested in
Tkibuli on May 24 but had not been charged. The official autopsy stated
that he committed suicide; however, an independent autopsy, carried out
at the request of his relatives, concluded that there were numerous
injuries to his body and that a blow to his head killed him before he
was hanged. Police claim that Rizhamadze threatened them with a grenade
and that they acted in selfdefense.
Authorities attributed nine deaths in 1999 to suicide, including
that of Ivane Kolbaya, who in February 1999, fell to his death from a
fifth floor window of the Ministry of Internal Affairs while being
questioned about his alleged involvement in a theft. An international
human rights NGO brought this case to the Government's attention, as
well as four others, including the 1998 death of Gulchora Dursunova and
the 1997 deaths of Akaki Iacobashvili and Eka Tavartkiladze. In 1999
the National Security Council requested that the Procuracy determine
the legality of the decisions made in these cases. The Procuracy upheld
decisions affirming the ruling of suicide in all cases. Two police
officers were charged in Kolbaya's case, but the court returned the
case to the Procuracy for further investigation. On December 4, 1999,
Zaza Tsitsilashvili allegedly threw himself to his death from the sixth
floor of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The investigation did not
result in any charges. However, family members say that his corpse
showed evidence of being beaten.
On October 16, Antonio Russo, a reporter for Radio Radicale was
found dead outside of Tbilisi. His colleagues feared that he may have
been murdered in reprisal for coverage of the conflict in neighboring
Chechnya, Russia. Some persons believe that Russo may have been killed
to prevent him from publishing materials on the Russian use of banned
chemical weapons in Chechnya. There have been no allegations and there
is no evidence implicating the Government in Russo's death. The
Government is conducting and ongoing investigation into the murder.
Killings were committed by elements on both sides of the separatist
conflict in Abkhazia, including by partisan groups and by Abkhaz
separatists. The partisan groups in the past have received government
support and training; however, the Government claims that it no longer
controls nor supports the partisans. The partisans are viewed by the
general public as criminal gangs engaged in smuggling, extortion, and
other illegal activities. The number of incidents of abuse decreased
from the previous year. Killings and other abuses on both sides of the
conflict have not been investigated, prosecuted, or punished.
Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces laid tens of thousands of
landmines during the 1992-1993 fighting. The 2000 Landmine Monitor
Report states that in 1999 and 2000, there continued to be numerous
reports that groups from Georgia, allegedly linked to the Georgian
Government infiltrated into Abkhazia and laid antipersonnel mines. The
Government crticized these partisan groups and arrested some of their
leaders. There has been a reduction in the number of persons killed or
injured by landmines, primarily because a large number of persons have
left the mined territories.
b. Disappearance.--Georgian partisan/criminal groups active in
Abkhazia periodically took hostages, usually in exchange for captured
compatriots. Abkhaz and Georgian officials agreed on joint efforts by
their law enforcement agencies to prosecute those responsible for this
and other criminal activity that threatened to destabilize the cease-
fire. The September 12 detention in Zugdidi of David Shengalia, the
leader of one of the partisan bands, reduced tensions to some extent
through the end of the year. During the year, there were several
instances of hostage taking by criminal groups for ransom purposes. All
of these kidnapings are believed to have been criminal or economic and
not political.
In June two U.N. officials, a foreign businessman, and their Abkhaz
interpreter were abducted in Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge. They were handed
over to Georgian authorities on June 5 without payment of the $300,000
ransom demanded by their kidnapers.
Three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff members
were abducted in the Pankisi Gorge in August. The three staff members
were released on August 13, one week later.
On November 30, two Spanish businessmen were abducted and held
captive in Pankisi Gorge. Authorities still are searching for them.
Two U.N. observers were abducted in Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge on
December 10, and released 3 days later after negotiations with
presidential representative Emzar Kvitsiani; reportedly no ransom was
paid. Svan bandits are believed to be responsible for the abduction, as
well as for a previous abductions of U.N. officials in October 1999 and
2000.
In Abkhazia, an autonomous republic in Georgia, six Georgians were
taken hostage in Abkhazia's Gali region on August 23 and were released
3 days later as a result of mediation by members of the U.N. Observer
Mission and the CIS peacekeeping forces. The Abkhaz hostage takers did
not receive the $2,050 (5,000 lari) they had demanded initially.
Georgian and Abkhaz commissions on missing persons reported that
the fates of more than over 1,000 Georgians and several hundred Abkhaz
who disappeared as a result of the war in Abkhazia still are unknown.
Abkhaz and Georgian officials agreed on joint efforts to determine the
whereabouts and repatriate the remains of missing fighters. The ICRC
cooperated in the effort through its Red Cross message system.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however,
members of the security forces continued to torture, beat, and
otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees, usually to extract money or
confessions. International and domestic observers note that incidents
of police abuse increased following the April presidential elections.
Serious abuses and police misconduct continue and corruption and
criminality, such as the fabrication or planting of evidence, remain
problems. Widespread impunity remains a problem. Many human rights
observers argue that the police increasingly believe that they will not
be held accountable for such actions.
The most serious incidents of abuse occur in the investigative
phase of pretrial detention when suspects are interrogated by police.
Human rights observers and lawyers noted that abuses occur more
frequently at the time of arrest and in police stations, rather than in
pretrial detention facilities, as was previously the case. Human rights
advocates noted a growing number of confessions made in police
stations. Some observers charge that police also also conducted
investigations in apartments outside the police stations to avoid
registering detainees. According to human rights observers, those who
suffer such abuse are held routinely for lengthy periods in pretrial
detention to give their injuries time to heal (see Section 1.e.). For
example, David Sturva claimed that in September police tortured him
with beatings and electric shocks, and attempted to suffocate him.
Medical examinations confirmed his charges. Police also abused other
detainees (see Section 1.d.).
Police agents within the prison population allegedly committed
abuses in pretrial detention facilities. For example, Paata Skhirtladze
was beaten and his ear was bitten off by another prisoner (see Section
1.d.). Another prisoner initially confessed on video camera that he was
ordered to torture another inmate and force narcotics on him. Charges
were brought against him for this incident, but he subsequently
recanted his confession (see Section 1.e.).
Police misconduct reportedly was worse outside Tbilisi, where
awareness of laws and citizens' rights is lower and human rights NGO's
are less active. However, one prominent human rights group notes that
at the village level personal relationships work to prevent the sorts
of abuse found in the larger towns and cities.
Despite an overall culture of impunity, some policemen were
arrested or administratively disciplined in high-profile cases of
physical abuse or deaths in custody. According to the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, 35 administrative inquiries were performed, 21
policemen were reprimanded administratively; and 6 policemen were
dismissed in connection with police abuses. However, recent changes to
the Criminal Procedures Code weakened a detainee's ability to
substantiate claims of such abuses (see Section 1.e.). In general,
accountability tended to occur only in extreme cases, such as those
resulting in death, and even then it is rare (see Section 1.a.). Many
observers claimed that prosecutors frequently are reluctant to open a
criminal case against the police or close a case for lack of evidence.
Observers believe that many instances of abuse go unreported by victims
due to fear of reprisals or lack of confidence in the system.
Domestic human rights advocates reported that allegations of the
use of torture, such as electric shock, to extract money or confessions
significantly increased during the year. Human Rights Watch reported in
1999 that mistreatment and physical abuse of detainees continued to be
rampant. However, some observers noted that when the Ministry of State
Security (as opposed to the Interior Ministry) managed the
investigation, allegations of physical abuses were rare.
In the past, security forces have tortured some defendants in
politically sensitive cases, such as those involving members of the
former Gamsakhurdia government and members of the paramilitary
Mkhedrioni (see Section 1.e.). Local human rights observers alleged
that abuses continued to occur in two pretrial detention facilities,
Isolator Five in Tbilisi and the pretrial facility in Kutaisi. Isolator
Five, in the basement of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs
headquarters, the facility in which is detainees suspected of a serious
crime or whose cases had political overtones incarcerated. As a
condition of membership in the Council of Europe, Isolator Five was to
be closed as of January 1, 2000; however, domestic human rights
organizations claim that the facility remains open and serves the same
function, only under a different name. According to local human rights
observers, despite calls by senior law enforcement officials for
investigators to show restraint, many persons who were detained in
Isolator Five afterwards reported that they were beaten or otherwise
abused. Often the threat of incarceration in this facility was
sufficient to induce a confession.
In contrast to those arrested in connection with the 1995
assassination attempt on President Shevardnadze, in general those
persons arrested in May 1999, for plotting against the Government and
those arrested for the 1998 assassination attempt against President
Shevardnadze reportedly were not mistreated. However, one suspect, Otar
Melikadze, reported in June that investigators had tortured him.
Although human rights observers noted that the Procuracy collected
evidence, for use in the court proceedings, the families and state-
appointed advocates of the defendants had limited access to them.
Melikadze, Soso Nadiradze, Archil Panjikidze, and David Tsotsoria, who
were arrested for plotting against the Government, initiated a hunger
strike, claiming that they and their lawyers did not have access to
their case files.
Government officials acknowledged that Ministry of Internal Affairs
personnel in the past routinely beat and abused prisoners and
detainees. Government officials continued to claim that a lack of
proper training, poor supervision of investigators and guards, and lack
of equipment often resulted in abuse. For example, investigators in the
past were trained to obtain confessions rather than use physical
evidence to assemble a case. After law enforcement agencies expressed
concern that the safeguards contained in the new Criminal Procedures
Code would make it difficult for them to combat crime, amendments to
the code in 1999 and during the year reinstated many of their powers
(see Section 1.e.).
International and local human rights observers expressed concern
that corruption is related to the number of police officers nationwide.
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are 13,881 police
officers; however, NGO's estimated that there are 35,000 police
officers. The Government was unable to pay the salaries for the police
force. Consequently, police solicited bribes from the general
population, especially motorists, and also from suspects detained on
suspicion of criminal activity. The period between an arrest and a bail
hearing was another opportunity for solicitation of bribes. According
to international and domestic observers, the police sometimes attempt
to extort money from suspects in exchange for not officially
registering an arrest. Police reportedly approached suspect's family
and offered to drop charges in exchange for a bribe.
Members of Parliament's Committee on Human Rights and Ethnic
Relations and local human rights groups independently investigated
claims of abuse. There was a significant increase in the number of
claims filed; however, fear prevented many persons from filing claims,
and not all claimants followed their claims all the way through to
trial. The Committee noted that since the presidential election, claims
shifted from requests for assistance to complaints about mistreatment
and violations by the police and Procuracy, as well about of the
Procuracy's failure to pursue criminal investigations of alleged
violators. The National Security Council's human rights advisor also
has a mandate to investigate claims of abuse. The Constitution mandates
a human rights defender or ombudsman. The role of the ombudsman's
office is to offer assistance to those who believe that abuse has
occurred or a right has been violated; however, the law does not
provide the ombudsman with the authority to forward a complaint to a
court with a recommendation that it be reviewed prior to trial.
Police officers reportedly sometimes beat and raped prostitutes.
Members of the security forces beat members of religious minorities
(see Section 2.c.).
Police reportedly harassed and at times abused street children (see
Section 5).
Prison conditions are inhuman and life threatening. Facilities lack
adequate cell space, medicine, and food. Infrastructure is crumbling
due to lack of resources and corruption in the prison administration.
The President pardoned 1,500 prisoners in April 1999, and 1,700
prisoners in October 1999 as a means of alleviating crowding; however,
observers still consider the prisons to be overcrowded. The problem was
exacerbated by the hasty transfer of responsibility for prison
administration to the Ministry of Justice, which was unprepared to take
over, according to human rights observers and government officials. The
authorities acknowledged that conditions are inhuman and life
threatening; however, they did not take effective steps during the year
to address the fundamental problems.
On January 20, a riot broke out in Kutaisi's preventive detention
Ward 2, reportedly triggered by the rape of a prisoner. As the result
of an investigation, nine officials were dismissed, including the head
of the ward. Some human rights groups claim that rape by inmates is
common in prisons. Khvicha Kvirtia claimed that, while he was in
prison, the head of the prison regularly beat him. He also claimed that
those prisoners who had no money to bribe officials were tortured.
Torture and physical abuse of prisoners led to deaths in custody.
The prison mortality rate reportedly was high; however, human rights
NGO's claim that authorities kept the official rates artificially low
by releasing prisoners who were terminally ill or by sending prisoners
to the hospital when they are on the verge of death. Additionally,
monitors state that deaths of prisoners without families usually went
unreported. The OSCE also noted an increase in the number of deaths in
prison in the first 3 months after the transfer of authority to the
Ministry of Justice. Most of the deaths during the year were attributed
officially to medical causes, usually tuberculosis. According to the
ICRC, tuberculosis is widespread in the prison system. In recognition
of this fact, the ICRC continued a joint program with authorities begun
in 1997 to reduce the incidence of the disease. In 1999 a prisoner
reportedly weighing just 66 pounds was released from a Rustavi prison;
he died within three days. Observers reported an increase in violence
among prisoners, sometimes resulting in deaths. The increase was
attributed to the insufficient and demoralized guard staff. One
observer stated that the failure to pay guard staff and the loss of
promotion possibilities due to the penitentiary reform created a
staffing problem.
Temur Papuashvili, a suspect in an alleged 1999 coup plot, died in
custody on January 3, reportedly due to illness. However, the Ministry
of State Security began an investigation into the death after
allegations that Papuashvili had been poisoned. Two days later, the
investigation was closed, apparently at the request of Pauashvili's
mother and wife.
In accordance with requirements stipulated by the Council of
Europe, the responsibility for the prisons was transferred from the
Minister of Internal Affairs (MOI) to the Ministry of Justice on
January 1, 2000. Although the Ministry of Justice is responsible for
overall administration of the prison system, the law on prisons permits
MOI personnel to continue to staff the prisons. The MOI also maintains
several of its own cells in the various prisons. Other legislation also
permits the MOI to conduct investigations among inmates to gather
evidence for trials without judicial approval. Local and international
human rights observers noted little change in prison conditions. No
significant personnel changes or restructuring occured prior to the
appointment of Minister of Justice Mikheil Saakashvili in October.
However, following a number of officials were removed. Advocates noted
an improvement in access for family members and to the telephone since
the transfer of authority.
The ICRC had full access to detention facilities, including those
in Abkhazia, in accordance with its customary procedures, which include
meetings with detainees without the presence of third-party observers
and regular repetition of visits. The OSCE mission, whose mandate
includes prison visits, reported bureaucratic delays but no serious
problems in obtaining access to prisoners and detainees. However, local
human rights groups reported that they have increasing difficulty in
visiting detainees, especially in cases with political overtones.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
includes provisions to protect citizens against arbitrary arrest and
detention; however, authorities frequently violated these provisions.
The Constitution provides for a 9 month period of maximum pretrial
detention, mandated court approval of detention after 72 hours, and
imposes restrictions on the role of the prosecutor (see Section 1.e.).
The old Soviet Criminal Code had been amended to implement these
constitutional safeguards and was superseded in 1997 by the Criminal
Procedures Code. These amendments generally, although not always, were
observed, as prosecutors continue to maintain undue influence over
criminal procedures. A new Criminal Code was enacted in June 1999.
Judges issue warrants and detention orders, and suspects must be
charged within 3 days. Pretrial investigatory detention is limited to 9
months in accordance with the Constitution, instead of 18 months as
allowed by the old Soviet code. Judges may extend pretrial detention by
3 month intervals up to 9 months. Human rights NGO's stated that the
amendments to the old Soviet Code made the pretrial detention period
less arbitrary; however, international and domestic observers also
stated that such detention usually is longer--sometimes as much as 2
years--because this protection routinely is interpreted to include only
the Procuracy's investigative period, not the defense's investigative
period as well. Reportedly, police frequently detain persons without
warrants. At year's end, there were 8,676 persons in custody, including
both prisoners serving sentences and suspects held in pretrial
detention.
A new Criminal Procedures Code, along with other legislation to
implement constitutional protections and restrict the powers of the
Procuracy and the police, was passed by Parliament in 1997; however,
implementation was delayed until May 1999 (see Section 1.e.). Following
enactment of the New Criminal Code in June 1999, the Criminal
Procedures Code was amended substantially in July of that year. A
number of amendments sought to harmonize the Criminal Procedures Code
with the new Criminal Code. However, several amendments significantly
weakened protections against arbitrary arrest and detention.
Specifically, the changes imposed severe restrictions on a detainee's
access to the courts in the pretrial period. According to Human Rights
Watch, before these amendments were enacted a defendant could complain
directly to the court prior to a trial regarding abusive actions
committed by the police or the Procuracy during a criminal
investigation and could request a forensic medical examination. Under
the ammended provisions, a defendant can file a complaint of abusive
investigation only with the Procuracy. The Procuracy's decision cannot
be appealed to the courts. Human rights NGO's state that this hinders a
detainee's ability to substantiate a claim of police misconduct,
especially in view of the close ties between the Procuracy and the
police and the delays such requests entail. Human Rights Watch and
other human rights advocates stated that permission for an independent
forensic medical examination rarely is granted. It is difficult for
those under criminal investigation to obtain objective medical
examinations in a timely manner to substantiate reports of physical
abuse. If a medical examination is not conducted within 3 to 4 days of
the incident it becomes difficult to establish the cause of a
detainee's injuries. In the courts, only a state employed forensic
medical examiner--which in the vast majority of the criminal cases is
an employee of the Ministry of Health's Judicial Medical Expert
Center--can testify about the detainee's injuries. Human rights
advocates criticize the state forensic examiners as biased in favor of
the Procuracy.
The amendments also eliminated the right of a witness to be
accompanied by a lawyer when being questioned by the police. A witness
can be held by the police for 12 hours without being charged. Human
rights monitors claimed that the police frequently charge witnesses as
suspects at the end of this period. Human Rights Watch also reported
that police often called in a detainee's lawyer as a witness, thereby
denying him access to his client. Human Rights Watch released a highly
critical report in October that detailed new restrictions on due
process and other setbacks to judicial reform.
According to observers, including the OSCE and the Association of
Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, police frequently treat
individuals in their custody with brutality; however, correct legal
procedures were observed more often once a detainee entered officially
into the system. Police often failed to inform detainees of their
rights and prevented access to family members and lawyers. While
officially suspects are charged within 3 days of registration,
observers claim that police frequently delay registering detainees for
long periods in order to seek bribes in return for dispensing with
registration altogether (see Section 1.c.). Authorities often held
prisoners who were tortured and abused in police stations and pretrial
detention for lengthy periods in order to give their injuries time to
heal (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). Police often claim that injuries
were sustained during or before arrest.
On June 18, Paata Skhirtladze was arrested for ``exhibitionism''
and later charged with two ritual murders and deaths. He allegedly was
subjected to abuse in Isolator Five. His ear was cut off, apparently by
a fellow prisoner, and he was forced to swallow it. Skhirtladze
apparently confessed to the murders, but human rights observers believe
he did so under pressure and connect the abuse of Skhirtladze to his
affiliation with the Osho community, a spiritual movement.
In September the police stopped and searched David Sturua in
Tbilisi's Saburtelo neighborhood. Upon finding keys in his bag, they
charged Sturua and his friends with involvement in multiple burglaries.
Sturua was taken to an MOI detention cell. He was not permitted to
notify family members or contact a lawyer. He claims that he was
subjected to torture, including attempted suffocation, electric shocks,
and beatings. Medical examinations confirm Sturua's charges. The
ombudsman asked the MOI to investigate (see Section 1.c.).
Lasha Kartvelishvili, arrested for allegedly killing a police
officer, claimed he was beaten severely and denied access to his lawyer
before being charged. He was charged 14 days after his arrest (the
legal limit is 72 hours) following the intervention of government human
rights advocates. An independent medical examination found numerous
injuries. Police say that he sustained his injuries falling down the
stairs. Family members argued that he was tortured. The lawyer that his
family retained to defend Kartvelishvili repeatedly was denied access
to his client. Kartvelishvili never formally filed a complaint and
assented to the official explanation of his injuries. He remained in
prison at year's end.
The Criminal Procedures Code established a system of bail; however,
observers note that it rarely is employed.
There were no cases of forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary often does
not exercise full independence. Judicial impartiality is limited. The
judicial reform process, which was completed in 1999, had some success
in leading to the appointment of a larger number of more highly
qualified judges; however, local and international observers agree that
judicial authorities continue to defer to pressures from the executive
branch and well-connected special interests. Investigators routinely
plant or fabricate evidence and extort confessions in direct violation
of the Constitution. Judges are reluctant to exclude evidence obtained
illegally over the objection of the Procuracy.
Results of the judicial reform effort were uneven. Judicial
incompetence and corruption, including the payment of bribes to judges,
is still a significant problem. Although there were reports by several
trial attorneys and local NGO's in Tbilisi that some cases were being
handled in a more and expeditious manner since the reform, progress
outside of Tbilisi was not as marked. Observers commented that although
judges were better educated, they are hindered by lack of practical
experience. Human rights organizations point to poor access to case law
as a further contributing factor. Due to the Government's fiscal
crisis, judges' salaries were not paid for a 6-month period, creating
an incentive to corruption. Pressure from extensive family and clan
networks was extensive.
The 1997 Law on the Courts, which was designed to enhance judicial
independence, established a three-tier court system. Implementation of
the law was completed in 1999. At the lowest level are district courts,
which hear routine criminal and civil cases. At the next level are
regional courts of appeal, which serve as appellate courts for district
courts; they started functioning in May 1999. The regional (``city'')
courts also try major criminal and civil cases, review cases, and
either confirm verdicts or return cases to the lower courts for
retrial. The Supreme Court acts as a higher appellate court and remains
the court of first instance for capital crimes and appeals from the
Central Election Commission.
A separate Constitutional Court was created in 1996. Its mandate
includes arbitrating constitutional disputes between branches of
government and ruling on individual claims of human rights violations.
The Court interpreted this latter function narrowly, agreeing to rule
only in cases in which the complainant alleged that the violation was
sanctioned by law. The court only considers one case at a time. Since
its inception in 1996, many of the cases filed with the court have been
heard and decided. The Court's rulings have demonstrated judicial
independence.
Administration of the court system was transferred from the
Ministry of Justice to the Council of Justice in 1997. The Council has
12 members, 4 selected from within each branch of government. The law
established a three-part testing procedure for current and prospective
judges to be administered by the council. The testing procedure was
designed to reduce judicial incompetence and corruption. The
Constitutional Court ruled in November 1998 that sitting judges could
not be removed, thereby hampering the Government's attempts at judicial
reform. The Parliament responded with a law stating that judges' terms
would not be renewed beyond 2001 if they did not take and pass the
examination, thereby observing the decision of the Constitutional
Court, yet forcing the judges to qualify themselves through
examination.
The first judges' examination was administered in February 1998. A
total of 5 examinations were administered by the end of 1999, and some
250 judges had passed. A total of 176 judges passed both the exam and a
vetting process and replaced judges who had not.
Supreme Court justices also were required to take the examination.
They resisted the requirement, arguing that the exam was an
infringement on judicial independence and that, since they were
confirmed by Parliament, they already were subject to public scrutiny
and review. The Court's Chief Justice appointed 12 new justices, 10 of
whom had passed the judicial exams. Some observers have alleged that
the Supreme Court's decisions are subject to political and other undue
influences.
Aside from the judicial system, law enforcement as a whole still
has not undergone significant reform. Payment of bribes to policemen
and Procuracy officials reportedly is common (see Section 1.c.). The
Procuracy is identified as part of the judicial system in the
Constitution, and there were calls from legislators and others to move
the Procuracy into the executive branch.
According to the Constitution, a detainee is presumed innocent and
has the right to a public trial. A detainee has the right to demand
immediate access to a lawyer and to refuse to make a statement in the
absence of counsel. The detaining officer must inform the detainee of
his rights and must notify the detainee's family of his location as
soon as possible. However, these rights are not observed fully in
practice. Authorities frequently do not permit detainees to notify
their families of their location. Defense attorneys and family members
often have difficulty obtaining permission from investigators to visit
clients. Investigators seldom inform individuals of their rights. There
were lengthy delays in trials. Human Rights Watch noted that defense
counsel is not required to be present at any pretrial hearings and that
defendants and their attorneys regularly complained that they were not
notified of scheduled hearings.
Under the Criminal Procedures Code, the police are not obliged to
allow a lawyer to enter a police station unless hired by a detainee.
Local police authorities limited lawyers' access to detainees. In 1999
the Tbilisi city council initiated a project with a local NGO to create
a system under which lawyers would be placed in Tbilisi police stations
to advise detainees of their rights without charge. The project was
implemented intermittently at the beginning of the year, but then was
halted due to lack of funding and legal difficulties. Participating
lawyers complained that there was low public awareness of the program
and that local police authorities limited their access to detainees.
For example, in 1999 one lawyer witnessed police beating a detainee;
when she began to question the police, she was pushed out of the room.
When representatives from NGO's and the Government arrived at the
station, the police chief denied that any beating had occurred. While
the district prosecutor promised to investigate the case, there had
been no investigation by year's end. The Parliamentary Committee on
Human Rights and National Minorities also created a card listing a
citizen's rights in case of arrest. By year's end, it had distributed
25,000 or 31,000 printed cards to students, NGO's, and visitors to the
Committee.
In 1999 the Tbilisi city council initiated a project with a local
NGO to create a system under which lawyers would be placed in Tbilisi
police stations to advise detainees of their rights without charge. The
project was implemented intermittently at the beginning of 2000, but
then was halted due to lack of funding and legal difficulties.
Participating lawyers complained that there was low public awareness of
the program, and that local police authorities were limiting their
access to detainees.
Parliament passed the legislation required to implement
constitutional protections in 1997. The implementing legislation
included the Criminal Procedures Code and the Law on the Procuracy.
These laws were designed to create a legal system with adversarial
trials by reducing the powers of the Procuracy, increasing the rights
of defense attorneys, and enhancing the independence and authority of
the judiciary; however, amendments to the Criminal Procedures Code
adopted in 1999 and significantly weakened many of these provisions. As
in the Soviet period, prosecutors continue to direct criminal
investigations, supervise some judicial functions, and represent the
State in trials. Most criminal trials continued to follow the Soviet
model. Prosecutors continued to wield disproportionate influence over
outcomes. The Criminal Procedures Code prohibits the same judge who
signed a warrant from hearing the case; this rule frequently was
violated outside of Tbilisi, since few regions have more than one
judge.
The Soviet system of state-employed criminal defense attorneys
began to break down in 1998. Individuals who could afford to pay were
able to obtain the attorney of their choice in both criminal and civil
cases. In instances where defendants were unable to afford legal
counsel, attorneys were assigned to a case upon the recommendation of
the Procurator's Office by the Office of Legal Assistance, a part of
the state-controlled Bar Association. In certain cases, defendants were
pressured to accept a state-appointed attorney. The Procuracy not only
had control over state-appointed lawyers; it also determined whether a
defendant's request to change lawyers was granted. However, several
NGO's provided free legal services for those whose human rights were
violated in Tbilisi and one NGO was planning to open regional offices
in 2001. Human Rights Watch noted that detainees sometimes are coerced
by procurators to accept state-appointed attorneys or other attorneys
who do not vigorously defend their interests.
The quality of attorneys is uneven. In addition, licensing of
forensic medical examiners and other experts is not an assurance of
competence.
International and local human rights groups agree that there are
some political prisoners but disagree as to the number, giving
estimates ranging from 25 to 54. A number of these individuals--
including members of the Mkhedrioni, Gamsakhurdia supporters, and state
security personnel committed criminal acts and were tried and sentenced
for them on criminal grounds, although they may have had political
motives. According to some local observers, detained political leaders
of Gamsakhurdia's supporters never took up arms and should be
considered political prisoners. Several, including Valter Shurgaia,
Zviad Dzidziguri, and Zaur Kobalia, were still in prison at year's end.
These individuals--political leaders of Gamsakhurdia's movement--were
tried and convicted on poorly substantiated charges of treason,
banditry, and illegal possession of weapons. They are serving sentences
ranging from seven to twelve years. President Shevardnadze pardoned
about ten political prisoners during the year, including former
National Guard commander Tengiz Kitovani and Nicholas Kvezereli. The
latter was convicted, along with Jaba Ioseliani, of the 1995
assassination attempt on the President. Two others who were imprisoned
for attempting to assassinate Shevardnadze also were released. The 1998
trial of Jaba Ioseliani, the head of the Mkhedrioni, and 14 other
alleged conspirators in the 1995 assassination attempt on President
Shevardnadze was characterized by the same violations found in other
recent trials with political overtones. The Government consistently
violated due process both during the investigation and the trial.
Torture, use of forced confessions, fabricated or planted evidence,
denial of legal counsel, and expulsion of defendants from the courtroom
took place. Ten of the defendants claimed to have been beaten or
tortured and coerced to confess during the investigative stage of the
case. They allegedly were tried and convicted on poorly substantiated
charges of treason, banditry, and illegal possession of weapons or have
not yet been convicted. Some procedures were violated for those
suspected of involvement in the 1998 assassination attempt on the
President. The suspects were held beyond the legal maximum period of
pretrial detention (see Section 1.d.).
On February 2, four Zviadists (followers of Gamsakhurdia) began a
hunger strike demanding amnesty for all political prisoners. They were
joined by a number of sympathizers outside the prison. A local NGO,
Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, and journalists were
denied permission to visit the hunger strikers in prison. On April 8,
the hunger strike ended after Chairman of Parliament Zurab Zhvania
promised that the Parliament would deal with the question of strikers'
amnesty, as well as the matter of amnesty for all involved in the 1992-
93 civil war.
On April 20, President Shevardnadze pardoned or reduced the term
for 279 prisoners convicted in connection with the civil war and many
participants in the 1995 assassination attempt, including Mkhedrioni
leaders Jaba Ioseliani and Dodo Gugeshashvili. On April 22, the
Parliament passed a resolution on national reconciliation. The
resolution required the Procuracy to review the cases of those
convicted in connection with the civil war and to create a list of
convicts to be released by July 30. By year's end, 85 Zviadists were
released under the program. Most of those remaining in prison had been
charged or convicted of murder.
Tengiz Asanidze, who was pardoned by President Shevardnadze in
October 1999, remained in prison in Ajara. The authorities in Ajara
refused to release him and later accused him of abduction and of
financial crimes. He was awaiting trial at year's end. Asandize ran as
a presidential candidate; as a result, the OSCE was able to visit him
in prison. The Council of Europe's High Commissioner on Human Rights,
Jose Alvaro Gil-Robles, visited Asanidze in June. Both Amnesty
International and Gil-Robles have requested Asanidze's release.
On October 1, 12 prisoners escaped from Tbilisi's prison hospital
and were subsequently recaptured. Those who escaped included former
Finance Minister (in the Gamsakhurdia administration) Guram Absanidze
and two others who had been charged with an alleged assassination plot
against the President. Observers suspected that the escape involved
collusion; it was unclear whether this involved prison staff only or
higher authorities as well. The escapees also included Vakhtang
``Loti'' Kobalia, former leader of military forces loyal to former
President Gamsakhurdia in the civil war against the paramilitary
Mkhedrioni and the national guard in 1992-93. Kobalia had been
sentenced to death for murder and treason in 1996; his sentence later
was commuted to 20 years. Their trial, together with eight other
defendants, was due to resume on October 2 but was postponed following
the escape.
The Government allows international human rights and domestic
organizations to visit political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids the wire tapping of
telephones and other forms of interference in an individual's private
life without court approval or legal necessity; however, in practice
law enforcement agencies and other government bodies occasionally
monitored private telephone conversations without obtaining court
orders. The Government stated that state security police and state tax
authorities sometimes entered homes and places of work without prior
legal sanction in emergency cases as permitted by the Criminal
Procedures Code. Police sometimes stopped and searched vehicles without
probable cause in order to extort bribes (see Section 1.c.). Police
misconduct and corruption undermined public confidence in government,
especially the law enforcement agencies.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution, the 1991 press
law, and other legislation provide for freedom of the press; however,
although the independent press was generally free, several instances of
intimidation of journalists occurred. According to journalists and
NGO's, security and other authorities on occasion attempted to
intimidate the press through public comments, private admonitions and,
in some cases, violence. During the year, journalists were able to
publish wide-ranging and extremely critical views of officials and
their conduct. However, some journalists practice self-censorship. The
Administrative Code enacted in 1999 contains a freedom of information
section that provides for public access to government meetings and
documents; however, few journalists have employed it. Libel laws
inhibit investigative journalism. The Civil Code and other legislation
make it a crime to insult the honor and dignity of an individual and
place the burden of proof on the accused. Some advocates noted that the
Government fails to register freedom of information act requests, as
the Administrative Code requires. Moreover, they claimed that since the
law contains no time limit for response, the release can be delayed
indefinitely and the requesting party has no grounds for appeal.
Some 200 independent newspapers are in circulation. The press
increasingly served as a check on government, frequently criticizing
the performance of high-level officials. Increasingly, independent
newspapers have replaced the government-controlled press as the
population's source of information. The highest-circulation independent
daily newspaper, Alia, has a national circulation nearly 20 percent
higher than the government-controlled daily. However, independent
newspapers continue to struggle in the regions, due largely to the
population's lack of purchasing power. Several newspapers are
relatively serious and reputable sources of information, although lack
of financial resources hinders overall journalistic development. The
circulation of most newspapers is limited to at most a few thousand
copies, and usually much less. Few newspapers are editorially
independent and commercial viability; they usually are subsidized by
and subject to the influence of their patrons in politics and business.
High printing costs and general poverty, especially in the countryside,
limited the circulation of most newspapers to a few hundred or a few
thousand readers. The Government finances and controls one newspaper
(which also appears in Russian-, Azeri-, and Armenian-language
versions) and a radio and television network with a national audience;
they reflect official viewpoints.
Most persons continue to get their news from television and radio.
The Government's monopoly on television news was broken when Rustavi-2,
a member of the independent television network TNG, emerged in 1998 as
an important alternative to state television, after successfully
resisting 2 years of government attempts to shut it down. It now is
considered the only station other than the state-run channel with a
national audience. In addition to Rustavi-2, there are seven
independent television stations in Tbilisi. An international NGO that
works with the press estimated that there are more than 45 regional
television stations, 17 of which offer daily news. While these stations
are ostensibly independent, a lack of advertising revenue often forces
them to depend on local government officials for support. Some regions,
such as Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kutaisi, have relatively independent
media. Rustavi-2 has a network of 15 stations, 5 of which broadcast
Rustavi-2's evening news program daily. Independent newspapers and
television stations continued to be harassed by state tax authorities.
Stations desiring benefits and better working relations with
authorities, practice self-censorship.
Journalists stated that they are vulnerable to pressure from the
authorities, as well as from business and societal elements. For
example, Clara Abramia claimed that the police harassed her after she
criticized the Internal Affairs Minister in a series of published
articles. According to press reports, the Minister had requested that
the Procuracy bring a criminal case against her, but the Procuracy
refused citing a lack of evidence. She was granted political asylum in
Sweden in February.
Gia Abdalaze, a photographer for Kviris Palitra newspaper, alleged
that four police officers beat him and broke his camera outside the
Tbilisi Sports Palace on April 8. He was attempting to photograph
police beating several youths who were attending a pre-election
concert. He filed a complaint with the Saburtelo district police and
the Procuracy. He claimed that the police threatened that they would
plant narcotics on him and beat his family. The Procuracy never filed
charges against the police. A group of NGO's protested the beating.
On May 19, Akaki Gogichaishvili, the lead reporter for ``60
Minutes,'' Rustavi-2's weekly investigative journalism series,
announced that he had received a death threat indirectly from the
Procurator's office. He was warned to stop broadcasting or face
criminal charges, and then via a relative he was told to leave the
country for his own safety. Following Gogichaishvili's May 19
announcement, NGO's and members of the public gathered to protest the
threats on his life. This threat allegedly was connected to allegations
of corruption in the Georgian writers' union broadcast on his February
26 and April 2 programs. In May the President issued a directive to the
Ministers of State Security and Internal Affairs, the Procurator, and
the Chamber of Control to investigate the allegations made by 60
minutes against the union. On May 11 the union was exonerated of
corruption charges. Prior to the incident in May, Gogichaishvilli and
others on his staff had received death threats and been harassed.
On July 27, in Tbilisi, Vasiko Silagadze, a reporter for Eco Digest
was beaten severely and his right thumb and forefinger slashed after he
wrote a series of stories about alleged corruption of senior officials
in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Silagadze claimed that he was
attacked again on September 7. The Procuracy was investigating the
first attack at year's end.
On August 16, a mob led by Orthodox extremists, attacked
journalists at a courtroom in Tbilisi (see Section 2.c.).
In October President Shevardnadze publicly criticized the daily
newspaper Rezonansi for reporting comments by an opposition politician
in Parliament who called for the overthrow of the ``Shevardnadze
regime.'' He asked the Procuracy to investigate the newspaper, which he
stated had a history of provocative, antigovernment news coverage.
On October 16, Antonio Russo, a reporter for Radio Radicale, was
found dead outside of Tbilisi (see Section 1.a.).
On October 14, 1999, George Kupuradze, a reporter for Rezonansi
newspaper, and Sergei Belousov, a photographer, alleged that they were
beaten severely by Devnoz Gabatashvili and other policemen when they
tried to intervene on behalf of another person whom they claim was
being beaten by police. Kupuradze suffered a concussion. He lodged a
formal complaint and reportedly identified all three police officers
involved at an identification procedure in the Gldani procurator's
office. Only Gabatashvili was brought to trial and was charged with
exceeding his authority and intentionally inflicting injury. Kupuradze
alleged that the police officers tried to bribe him not to pursue the
case. The Tbilisi court began hearing the case, but found the
investigation inconclusive and referred the case back to the
Procurator's office for further investigation. Kupuradze appealed, but
the decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in September.
In 1998 the trial of two journalists from the independent newspaper
Orioni who reported allegations of sexual harassment and homosexuality
in the armed forces was postponed indefinitely in April 1998. At that
time, government and military officials reportedly responded by
threatening the reporters with arrest, demanding the names of sources,
and filing a civil lawsuit that charged defamation. One of the two
journalists, Amiran Meskheli, was detained for allegedly having evaded
military service. He subsequently was conscripted and assigned to the
unit about which he had reported. Human rights monitors considered this
an attempt at intimidation and filed a lawsuit to overturn his
conscription. Meskheli remained free on bail.
The lack of an active journalists' association limited the
effectiveness of media advocacy. Media observers noted that few
journalists and government officials, especially in the regions,
understand the legal protections afforded journalists and few have the
resources to hire a lawyer to pursue court cases. Some have enlisted
the assistance of the NGO community.
The 1999 Law on Post and Communications removed the
telecommunications licensing process (including radio and television)
from the direct control of the Minister of Communications and
established an independent, self-financed, three-person regulatory
commission to create an open and transparent process. However, the
commission has not yet become active.
Channel 25 is the only independent television station broadcasting
in Ajara, and has been operating since 1998. On February 14, it
broadcast its first uncensored news coverage. On February 19, three of
the four owners of the station alleged that they were coerced by Ajaran
regional government officials and Mikhail Gagoshidze, chairman of
Ajaran Television and Radio, to cede 75 percent of the company's shares
to Gagoshidze. The owners stated that in return they were forced to
take $50,000 (100,000 laris) in cash. The same day, Batumi mayor Aslan
Smirba physically assaulted Avtandil Gvasalia, the station's commercial
director. Smirba claimed that he had a right to own the station, as he
had helped the company get permission to broadcast. The owners brought
suit against Gagoshidze, but lost their case in Ajara regional court.
The case was in the appeal process at year's end.
The Government does not limit access to the Internet.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission
from the authorities; however, both the national Government and local
governments sometimes restrict this right in practice. A 1997 law on
freedom of assembly requires political parties and other organizations
to give prior notice and obtain permission from local authorities if
they intend to assemble on a public thoroughfare. Members of the local
NGO community believe that the law violates the Constitution and have
sought to have it overturned by the Constitutional Court. However the
Court refused to hear the case, explaining that a test case must be
brought before it in order for it to consider the challenge, and that,
an individual must prove that he has been harmed by this law. Most
permits for assembly are granted without arbitrary restriction or
discrimination; however, this is not the case for Zviadists, supporters
of former President Gamsukhardia. Extreme Zviadists never have accepted
any successor to the Gamsakhurdia government as legitimate and held
demonstrations demanding that the present Government resign. The
Government viewed the public rallies of the Zviadists as a threat
because of the publicity they generated for themselves and against the
Government. The police broke up one of their rallies held in May 1999
and another in October. A hunger strike involving several hundred
persons and conducted in the shell of Gamsakhurdia's burnt-out villa in
Tbilisi since mid-June 1999 was not disturbed and continued at year's
end.
During the year, numerous rallies were held throughout Tbilisi and
in other cities to protest pension and wages arrears. Police did not
interfere. In June approximately 300 displaced persons gathered outside
the Constitutional Court to demand payment of their overdue allowances.
The police prevented the group from protesting in front of the
Parliament. During the fall, demonstrations protesting energy shortages
were common and allowed to proceed without hindrance. In February
Zviadist politician Leila Tsomaia was beaten by two unidentified men in
Tbilisi and hospitalized with a concussion. Zviadists claimed that she
was beaten in order to prevent a rally the following day. She never
filed a complaint. On April 6, Tsomaia and another opposition
politician, Luisa Shakashvili, were escorted by the police out of the
city, allegedly to prevent them from participating in a rally. In
February 1999, she and Tamila Nikoldaze, a fellow Zviadist, had been
pardoned and released from prison. They had been incarcerated on
charges of civil disorder for attempting to stage a rally in front of
Tbilisi university in 1997.
During the year, the police broke up rallies or gatherings and
meetings held by various religious groups or watched while members of
the public disrupted them (see Section 2.c.). Local authorities several
times prevented Jehovah's Witnesses from conducting open-air assemblies
on private and public property. In September police did nothing to
prevent and allegedly participated in the break-up of two such
assemblies in Zugdidi and Marneuli by followers of a radical former
Orthodox priest, Father Basil Mkalavishvili. Jehovah's Witnesses
reported ongoing threats and harassment by local police and other
authorities in the fall (see Section 2.c.). On December 15, in the
village of Uraveli, a group of 100-150 persons surrounded a house where
40 Jehovah's Witnesses had gathered and forced them to flee the area.
On December 18, Father Mkalavishili and his followers tried to disrupt
construction work on a Pentecostal meeting hall in Tbilisi. On December
19, followers of Father Mkalavishvili tried to enter Guram
Markozashvili's Tbilisi residence in order to force him to sign a
document stating that he would no longer conduct meetings of Jehovah's
Witnesses in his home.
According to press reports, police prevented a group of Chechens
from starting a public walk for peace to Azerbaijan from the Akhmeta
district on February 14. One participant allegedly was beaten. The
authorities reportedly stated that the action was not registered and
therefore was illegal.
In the Baghdati region of Imereti, police attempted to prevent a
foreign labor union official and representatives of the Free Trade
Union of Teachers of Georgia ``Solidarity'' (FTUTGS) from holding a
meeting (see Section 6.a.).
Some rallies of opposition presidential candidate Jumber
Patiashvili were disrupted, and in some areas he was denied permission
to use public buildings (see Section 3).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Authorities
granted permits for registration of associations without arbitrary
restriction or discrimination. However, on June 24, the Tbilisi
appellate court overturned the registration of two organizations
affiliated with Jehovah's Witnesses on the grounds that there was no
law regulating the registration of religious organizations (see Section
2.c.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, local police and security officials harassed several non-
Orthodox religious groups, particularly local and foreign missionaries,
including Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, and Hare Krishnas.
The Constitution recognizes the special role of the Georgian
Orthodox Church in the country's history without further defining it,
but also stipulates the independence of the Church from the State. The
tax code grants tax exemptions only for the Orthodox church and not for
any other religion. The Georgian Orthodox Church has lobbied Parliament
and the Government for laws that would grant it special status and
restrict the activities of missionaries from nontraditional religions.
Various draft laws, some modeled on the Russian law on religion, have
been rejected by Parliament.
Certain members of the Georgian Orthodox Church and the public view
non-Orthodox, so-called ``sects'' as a threat to the Church and
Georgian cultural values, a perception that some politicians exploited
during elections. Local police and security officials at times harassed
foreign missionaries and non-Georgian Orthodox congregations or did not
intervene when others harassed them. For example, on September 16, the
police and followers of the excommunicated priest Basil Mkalavishvili
prevented Jehovah's Witnesses from holding a convention in Marneuli by
stopping buses, physically attacking followers and burning and looting
the convention site (see Section 2.b.). Jehovah's Witnesses allege that
police actively participated in these activities, and at least one
eyewitness confirmed that police did not impede the so-called
Basilists. The head of the Marneuli district administration was
dismissed on September 19 for undisclosed reasons following the
incident there. An investigation was being conducted at year's end.
On September 9, police impeded buses from traveling to a Jehovah's
Witnesses convention in Zugdidi. The convention began as scheduled, but
was cut short due to pressure from local authorities, according to
Jehovah's Witnesses. As the convention was dispersing, unidentified
persons attacked some followers, looted the private property on which
the convention was held, and burned the rostrum. According to Jehovah's
Witnesses, the attackers were dressed in special forces uniforms.
On May 29, 1999, the police violently broke up a public prayer
meeting of the Assembly of God in the Gldani district of Tbilisi,
beating a number of members, pushing a 60-year-old woman to the ground,
and screaming threats of murder. Church members sued police and prior
to the subsequent civil trial, Ministry of Internal Affairs officials
repeatedly harassed the pastor and members of the congregation. At the
trial on August 16, 1999, the judge ruled that the police had not
violated the individuals' constitutional rights. The group filed an
appeal and incurred further harassment from law enforcement
authorities. On August 29, 1999, a riot allegedly instigated by the
police broke out at one of the organization's churches. Some members
were beaten, and the police confiscated some members' documents,
forcing the victims to retrieve them at the police station.
In July and August Customs officials and security officials
impounded over 40 tons of religious materials being imported by
Jehovah's Witnesses. The materials were not released, despite
intervention by the National Security Council official responsible for
human rights. The Customs Department stated that it had received
notification that the Tbilisi Appellate Court had annulled Jehovah's
Witnesses' organizational registration and therefore legally had to
hold the literature. Jehovah's Witnesses filed suit against the Customs
Department and officials in August; and their literature was released
in December.
In September the Government refused to extend the visa of the
official representative of the Watchtower Society (Jehovah's Witnesses)
to the Caucasus; however, he later was issued a visa.
In October 1999, a Jehovah's Witnesses' worship service of 120
parishioners in the Gldani section of Tbilisi was attacked violently by
renegade Georgian Orthodox group (see Section 5). (The leader of this
group was excommunicated from the Church due to its radical and
confrontational stance). The Gldani police refused to intervene.
Sixteen persons were injured in the attack. On December 25, 1999, the
case was forwarded to the Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal
charges. Despite the advocacy by the National Security Advisor for
human rights on behalf of Jehovah's Witnesses, in January the Gldani
regional prosecutor's office returned the case to the city prosecutor's
office, stating that no violation had occurred. The group continues to
press for prosecution of the police's behavior in this and similar
subsequent incidents. Instead, the official in charge of the
investigation decided in June to charge one of the plaintiffs with
hooliganism. On September 28, the two were given suspended sentences of
6 months and 3 years, respectively. The two witnesses are planning to
appeal their conviction. The judge also refered for further
investigation the case of two followers of excommunicated priest Father
Basil Mkalavishvili, who were charged with burning Jehovah's Witnesses
literature during the same incident; however, unlike those of Jehovah's
Witnesses, these cases were later dismissed.
A member of parliament brought a civil suit in April 1999 to ban
Jehovah's Witnesses, arguing that the organization is antiOrthodox,
antistate, and antinational. Appeals by Jehovah's Witnesses to an
appellate court and then to the Supreme Court contending that the suit
was groundless were refused. The Supreme Court stated that the lower
court first must hear the case. In November 1999, the lower court judge
remanded the issue to an academic study group to study the literature
of Jehovah's Witnesses. In February the Isani-Samgori district court
dismissed the lawsuit based on the opinion of an academic panel. The
case was appealed to the Tbilisi district appeals court, and on June
23, the court ruled in favor of the member of parliament. Jehovah's
Witnesses' appealed to the Supreme Court; a hearing was scheduled for
January 2001.
On January 16, two members of Jehovah's Witnesses were attacked on
the street in Gldani. On February 13, another pair of members was
attacked. They filed a complaint with both the police and the
prosecutor; both refused to pursue charges.
On August 20, the chief of the Tianeti District police and three
other policemen reportedly dispersed a service in a Baptist Church and
looted the property. The pastor allegedly was taken to the police
station and threatened with future arrests. No action had been taken
against the policemen by year's end.
On September 28, police raided a Hare Krishna meeting house in
Tbilisi and confiscated a large amount of religious literature.
The Roman Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church have
been unable to secure the return of churches closed during the Soviet
period, many of which later were given to the Georgian Orthodox church
by Soviet authorities. A prominent Armenian church in Tbilisi remained
closed. The Armenian Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church, and
Protestant denominations have had difficulty obtaining permission to
construct new churches, reportedly in part as a result of pressure from
the Georgian Orthodox Church. However, a new Catholic Church opened in
Tbilisi in 1999 and another in Batumi during the year.
Regular and reliable information about the ``Republic of
Abkhazia,'' which is not recognized by any country and over which the
government of Georgia does not exercise control, is difficult to
obtain. The Abkhaz ``President,'' Vladislav Ardzimba, issued a decree
in 1995 that banned Jehovah's Witnesses in Abkhazia. It remains in
effect. A number of members of Jehovah's Witnesses were detained
subsequently. Five persons who were detained in April 1999 for
violating the decree were released in early May after their counsel
argued that their detention violated a freedom of conscience clause in
the Abkhaz Constitution.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution, the 1993 Law on
Migration, and other legislation generally provide for these rights,
and the Government generally respected them in practice. Registration
of an individual's place of residence is not required, nor were
internal passports. Old Soviet passports bearing ``propiskas'' (proof
of legal residence in a particular locality) were accepted as proof of
identity because passports and identity cards are expensive and
difficult for many members of the electorate to obtain, especially in
poorer and more remote rural areas.
On July 21, border guards prevented Jehovah's Witnesses traveling
from Armenia from entering the country, claiming that the group no
longer was a legal organization in Georgia. Only after official
authorization by the head of the border guards were the followers
permitted to cross.
Approximately 275,000 so-called ``Meskhetian Turks,'' who were
expelled from southern Georgia to Central Asia by Stalin in the 1940's,
still face both official and public opposition to their return in the
face of threats by local ethnic-Armenian inhabitants of the Samtske-
Javakheti region and officials of the government of Armenia that their
return to the region would cause a violent reaction. Many of the
Meskhetians were expelled a second time from Central Asia when the
Soviet Union broke up and remain stateless.
In 1996 President Shevardnadze issued a decree authorizing the
return of 1,000 Meskhetians per year for 5 years. The decree has never
been implemented, and to date only a few hundred Meskhetians have
returned as illegal immigrants. The Government has provided housing for
most of them, but because they were to be the subject of a separate
law, which has not yet been passed, they were deprived early in 1998 of
their refugee status and, consequently, of their housing subsidy. Most
of the approximately 600 Meskhetians living in the country have
Georgian citizenship.
In December 1997, Parliament passed a law entitled ``Recognizing
Georgian Citizens as Political Victims and Social Protection of the
Repressed.'' This law, intended to rehabilitate victims of the Soviet
era, specifically excluded the Meskhetians, whom it identified as the
subject of a separate law. Draft legislation regarding Meskhetians has
yet to be introduced in Parliament.
In March 1999, a presidential decree was issued to address the
Meskhetian issue. It established the State Commission on the
Repatriation and Rehabilitation of the Population Deported from
Southern Georgia. In connection with its accession to the Council of
Europe in April 1999, the Government undertook to begin the process of
Meskhetian repatriation within 3 years. In July 1999, the Government
announced that it had granted citizenship to 36 Meskhetians.
The 1994 quadripartite agreement between Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia,
and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on repatriation in
Abkhazia called for the free, safe, and dignified return of internally
displaced persons (IDP's) and refugees to their homes. The Abkhaz
separatist regime prevented virtually any official repatriation and
unilaterally abrogated the agreement in late 1994. From 1994 to May
1998, an estimated 53,000 of the 283,000 IDP's and refugees from
Abkhazia returned spontaneously, most to the southern part of the Gali
district. In May 1998, the unstable security situation in Gali
deteriorated into open warfare between the Abkhaz militia and Georgian
partisans and MOI troops. The partisans were defeated and, in the
aftermath, many of the Georgian returnees fled once again as their
homes were burned and looted by Abkhaz separatist forces.
In January 1999, the Abkhaz separatists unilaterally invited IDP's
to return to Gali starting on March 1, 1999, but did so in the absence
of measures acceptable to the Georgian Government for ensuring their
safe return and security. The move did not affect significantly the
return of IDP's to Gali, who continued to travel back and forth to Gali
to tend their property. Since May 1998, IDP's continue to travel back
and forth to the Gali region and as many as 40,000 may be living in
Gali on a more or less permanent basis.
The 1992 ethnic conflict in South Ossetia also created tens of
thousands of IDP's and refugees. Ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia
fled to Georgia proper and Ossetians from South Ossetia and other
Georgian regions fled to Russia. In 1997 the UNHCR began a program to
return IDP's and refugees to their homes. Both sides created obstacles
that slowed the return. There were about 24,000 Ossetian refugees
living in North Ossetia, Russia. To date about 370 Ossetian families
from Russia have returned, the majority to South Ossetia. The South
Ossetian separatists continued to obstruct the repatriation of ethnic
Georgians to South Ossetia, although approximately 200 families
returned. For political reasons, South Ossetia continued to press for
the return of all Ossetian refugees to South Ossetia rather than to
their original homes in other Georgian regions. In 1997 the Government
publicly recognized the right of Ossetian refugees to return to their
homes in Georgia but took little action to facilitate their return.
Persistent opposition by Georgian authorities, especially at the local
level, over the return of illegally occupied homes has prevented the
organized return of Ossetian refugees to Georgia proper. During the
year, approximately 13 Ossetian refugee families returned to South
Ossetia, 11 Ossetian refugees returned to Georgia proper, and 32
Georgian IDP families returned to South Ossetia. Since the outbreak of
hostilities in the Chechnya region of Russia in September 1999, the
Government has registered approximately 7,000 refugees from that
region. Most were women and children and settled in the Pankisi Gorge.
There is no effective law concerning the settlement of refugees or
the granting of political asylum, including first asylum, in accordance
with the principles of 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Parliament passed an asylum law in
March 1998, but it is not fully consistent with international standards
as set out in the U.N. Convention.
According to the UNHCR, the Government processed no asylum cases
during year, one in 1999, and none in 1998. There were no reports of
the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution and the 1995 parliamentary and presidential
election laws provide citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully through regular elections; however, the April
presidential elections were marred by numerous serious irregularities
and limited this right in practice. An elected president and parliament
govern most of the country.
Presidential elections were held on April 9. There were seven
official candidates, although two candidates, Aslan Abashidze and
Tengiz Asanidze, withdrew less than 24 hours before the election. Only
two candidates campaigned actively: the incumbent, President Eduard
Shevardnadze, and Jumber Patiashvili, both former leaders of the
Georgian Communist Party during the Soviet period. International
observers strongly criticized the election. The CEC reported that
Shevardnadze won with over 78 percent of the vote to Patiashvili's 16
percent, in contrast to observer estimates of 50 to 70 percent of the
vote for Shevardnadze and 30 percent for Patiashvilli. The OSCE noted
serious irregularities, including instances of ballot stuffing, group
voting, groups of identical signatures on voters lists, media bias, and
lack of transparency in vote counting and tabulation. Some observers
also noted a police presence in polling places and insufficiently
representative electoral commissions at all levels. The OSCE noted that
the situation deteriorated in the counting process. In general
procedural safeguards were not implemented. The CEC annulled the
election results of six polling stations.
During the campaign period, Patiashvili protested unfair media
coverage. Eleven candidates applied for registration to the CEC. Seven
parties nominated and registered independent candidates through a
procedure that was not fully transparent. Former President
Gamsakhurdia's finance minister Guram Absanidze, who was accused of
organizing an assassination attempt against President Shevardnadze in
1998 (see Section 1.e.), applied to register as a presidential
candidate. The CEC rejected his application, since he had not been
living in the country for 2 years before the election. On August 31,
the Supreme Court overturned this decision. At year's end, Absandze was
awaiting trial after his escape from prison and subsequent recapture in
October.
The Revival Bloc, a coalition of opposition political parties also
known as the Batumi Alliance and closely linked to Ajaran leader Aslan
Abashidze, claimed that the election discredited the political process
in the country. A number of smaller political parties boycotted the
election, and another party urged the electorate to vote against all
candidates. A number of opposition rallies were disrupted by police or
bureaucratic obstacles were erected to prevent their organization (see
Section 2.b.).
Extensive amendments to the electoral laws were adopted less than
three weeks before the presidential election, causing confusion in the
administration of the election. There was inadequate time to implement
some of the amendments properly. The OSCE also raised concerns about
the transparency of the candidate registration process and ballot
distribution.
Parliamentary elections were held in October 1999. Thirteen
electoral blocs and 34 political parties fielded candidates for 150
proportional and 75 majoritarian seats. The Citizens' Union of Georgia
(CUG), chaired by President Shevardnadze, won an outright majority.
International observers judged the conduct of the elections throughout
the country to be a step towards compliance with OSCE commitments, but
noted that the election process did not meet all commitments. A number
of irregularities were noted, including restrictions on freedom of
movement, which on occasion prevented political parties and observers
from exercising their rights. A second round was held on November 14,
which OSCE observers described as well-conducted in some districts but
marred with irregularities in others. The OSCE cited in particular
intimidation of members of precinct election commissions and instances
of ballot stuffing in Tbilisi, Abasha, and Chkhorotsku. The OSCE noted
problems such as the election law's provision permitting the ruling
party to dominate all levels of the election administration, the CEC's
insufficiently transparent vote tabulation, and the CEC's poor handling
of election complaints. In the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, dominated
by Ajaran supreme chairman Aslan Abashidze, fraud was widespread. There
was no voting in these elections in the separatist regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, which remain outside government control. Ten Members
of Parliament from Abkhazia elected in 1992 had their terms extended.
The local governments elected in November 1998 were expected to
have more authority over how local government is run; however, lack of
funding from the central government (in lieu of an independent tax
base), corruption, and the absence of legislative guidelines made it
difficult for them to exercise authority. The opposition criticized the
Government for retaining the power to appoint the mayors of the largest
cities and regional chairmen, who were not always from the area they
serve.
The division of power between the central and local governments
remained a key issue in the country's transition to democracy.
The degree of actual autonomy to be exercised by the ``Autonomous
Ajaran Republic'' was at the center of this debate during the year.
Ajara's post-independence relationship to the rest of the country still
was undefined and, in matters such as elections, Ajara's authorities
claimed that regional laws took precedence over national laws. The
Revival Party, the dominant political party in Ajara led by Aslan
Abashidze, the supreme chairman of the Ajaran Autonomous Republic,
boycotted the national Parliament for much of the year in a dispute
with the CUG over the degree of autonomy in Ajara. The party took part
in the October 1999 parliamentary elections as the major opponent to
Shevardnadze's CUG. The Government was reluctant to challenge
interference in the local electoral process by the Ajaran authorities
because it sought to avoid encouraging threats of separatism in this
ethnically Georgian, but historically Muslim region.
In the November 1998 local elections, the mayor was elected by a
direct vote in Batumi, in contrast to the other major cities. In the
October 1999 parliamentary elections, international and domestic
observers reported various forms of intimidation and abuses in Ajara,
as well as outright fraud.
In April the Parliament granted the former autonomous Soviet
Republic of Ajara the constitutional status of an autonomous republic.
The division of authorities and competencies between the national and
Ajaran governments had not yet been defined.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however,
women's NGO's took an active role in the 1999 parliamentary election
season, engaging candidates in discussions about issues of concern to
their memberships. In the 235-seat Parliament, women were represented
poorly in the 1999 election with only 16 women winning seats. Only two
women held ministerial posts.
Representation of national minorities decreased in the new
Parliament from 16 members to 13 members; there were 6 ethnic Armenian
representatives and 4 ethnic Azeris in the new Parliament. Ethnic
Armenians in 1995 constituted 11 percent of the population as a whole,
while ethnic Azeris made up 3.8 percent of the population. Other
minority groups represented include Ossetians, Kurds, Jews, and Greeks.
``Presidential elections'' were held in Abkhazia in October 1999.
International organizations, including the U.N. and the OSCE declared
them illegal. Georgian authorities criticized them as having no legal
basis, as they had the Abkhaz local elections of March 1998, on the
basis that a majority of the population has been expelled from the
region.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally respected the right of local and
international organizations to monitor human rights but continued to
restrict the access of local human rights groups to some prisoners (see
Section 1.c.).
There are a number of credible local organizations that monitored
human rights, most of them in Tbilisi. Other local human rights groups
that are extensions of partisan political groups have little
credibility or influence. Local human rights NGO's reported that the
Government was slightly less responsive during the year. They continued
to view the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights as the most
objective of the Government's human rights bodies. The National
Security Council's human rights advisor was engaged on some human
rights matters, including those of Jehovah's Witnesses (see Section
2.c.).
The constitutionally mandated Office of Public Human Rights
Defender, or ombudsman, was created in 1995. The first ombudsman was
appointed to the position in November 1997 and chose to focus on social
and economic issues, rather than on defending political and civil
rights. He resigned in August 1999. On July 16, Nana Devdariani was
appointed to the position. While government representatives have been
effective in individual cases, neither they nor the NGO's have been
successful in prompting systemic reform. NGO's can and do bring suits
to courts of the first instance on behalf of persons whose rights have
been abused.
In 1997 the UNHCR and the OSCE mission established a joint human
rights office in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, to investigate security incidents
and human rights abuses. The office, which has operated sporadically
because of fluctuating security conditions, provides periodic findings,
reports, and recommendations. The human rights office in Sukhumi
registered relatively few complaints of abuse by de facto police and
judicial authorities in the region.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution recognizes the equality of all citizens without
regard to race, language, sex, religion, skin color, political views,
national, ethnic, or social affiliation, origin, social status, land
ownership, or place of residence, and the Government generally
respected these rights. The Constitution stipulates Georgian as the
state language. Ethnic Armenians, Azeris, Greeks, Abkhaz, Ossetian, and
Russian communities prefer to communicate in their native languages or
in Russian. Both Georgian and Russian are used for interethnic
communication.
Women.--The Criminal Code, in force since June 1, classifies
marital rape and sexual coercion as crimes. There are no laws that
specifically criminalize spousal abuse or violence against women.
According to a poll conducted in 1998 by the NGO Women for Democracy,
younger women reported that spousal abuse occurs with some frequency
and, since it is a social taboo to go to the police or otherwise to
raise the problem outside the family, it is reported or punished only
rarely. Spousal abuse is reportedly one of the leading causes of
divorce. Domestic violence continued to rise as economic conditions
became more difficult. Police did not always investigate reports of
rape. A local NGO, with the help of an international NGO, opened a
shelter for abused women in the spring of 1998. The Government
established a hot line for abused women, but provided no other
services. There are currently anonymous telephone services specialized
in assisting female rape victims, but there are no shelters,
specialized services, or other mechanisms to protect and assist them.
In February the President approved a national action plan on combating
violence against women, which charged the Ministries of Internal
Affairs, Labor, Health and Social Affairs with providing support to
victims; however, this plan was not implemented at year's end. Sexual
harassment, reportedly a problem in the workplace, was not
investigated.
Kidnaping of women for the purpose of marriage continues to occur,
especially in rural areas, although the practice is declining. Such
kidnapings are often arranged elopements; however, these abductions
often occur against the will of the intended bride, and sometimes
involve rape.
Prostitution is not a criminal offense. There were proposals to
create legal controls for prostitution, in part to prevent the spread
of venereal diseases. The President has indicated his opposition to the
idea.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment and violence against women in the workplace is a
problem, especially as economic conditions worsen, according to a U.N.
Development Program report.
The Civil Code gives women and men equal inheritance rights. A
number of women's NGO's, including the women's group of the Georgian
Young Lawyers' Association, the Women's Center, and Women for
Democracy, promote women's rights. NGO's supported a 1998 poll of women
conducted by Women for Democracy, which found a gap between the
perceptions of older and younger women. Older women tended to view
their place in traditional society as an honored one; younger women
reported that although there were no real barriers to a professional
life or to a good education, discrimination and harassment in the
workplace were problems. Younger women also reported that the economic
balance had shifted in their favor, as many traditionally male jobs
disappeared due to the depressed economy. Women's access to the labor
market was improving but remained primarily confined, particularly for
older women, to low-paying and low-skilled positions, often without
regard to high professional and academic qualifications. Many women,
especially of the generation under the age of 35, hold highly
professional positions. However, these are a lower percentage than men.
A study released by the Caucasus Center for Sociological Studies during
the year noted that 72 percent of working women no longer believe that
they should have a dependent role in the family. However, almost half
of these women stated that they would compromise this belief to
preserve the family unit. Many women seek employment abroad.
A study released in 1999 reported that women were paid 78 percent
of men's wages in the public sector and 67 percent of men's wages in
the private sector. The Government's data noted a wider disparity in
both categories. Reportedly, men were given preference in promotions.
Of the 105,000 unemployed persons throughout the country, 55 percent
were women. Women rarely fill leadership positions. The Government had
no active efforts focused on women's issues. According to the UNDP,
employers frequently withhold benefits connected to pregnancy and
childbirth.
Children.--Government services for children were extremely limited.
The 1995 Health Reform Act withdrew free health care for children over
the age of 3 years. While education is officially free, many parents
were unable to afford books and school supplies, and most parents have
to pay for their children's education. The Ministry of Education
announced in that it was beginning an overhaul of the educational
system; however, no action had been taken by year's end.
There was no societal pattern of abuse of children, but difficult
economic conditions broke up some families and increased the number of
street children. The private voluntary organization Child and
Environment noted a significant increase in the number of homeless
children following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It estimated that
there are currently more than 2,500 street children in Tbilisi due to
the inability of orphanages and the Government to provide support. The
organization opened a shelter in 1997. The Ministry of Education opened
a second shelter in July 1998. However, even together, the two shelters
can accommodate only a small number of the street children. Outside of
Tbilisi, even in areas of acute need such as Kutaisi, Zugdidi, and
Batumi, no such facilities or services existed. The children
increasingly survive by turning to criminal activity, narcotics, and
prostitution. Police increasingly harassed and abused street children.
Despite a cultural tradition of protecting children, the Government
took little official action to assist street children due to a lack of
resources.
The Isolator for street children in Gldani is allegedly overcrowded
and children frequently are abused. In September police beat and
detained Sasha Duchenko in the Gldani facility for 3 days before his
parents were informed. His parents had reported him missing to their
local district police station. However, the child had not been
registered and his parents at first were told that he could not be
found. The police then tried to extort money for the boy's return. The
child was released only after a public protest.
The lack of resources negatively affected orphanages as well. In
all orphanages children received inadequate food, clothing, education,
and medical care; facilities lacked heat, water, and electricity. The
adult staff was paid poorly and had many months of unpaid wages. The
staff often diverted money and supplies provided to the orphanages for
its own use.
The Criminal Code states that child prostitution and pornography
are punishable by imprisonment of 3 months to 3 years.
People with Disabilities.--There is no legislated or otherwise
mandated provision requiring access for the disabled. However, the 1995
Law on the Social Security of Disabled Persons mandates that the State
ensure appropriate conditions for the disabled to use freely the social
infrastructure and to ensure proper protections and supports. The Law
on Labor has a section that includes the provision of special discounts
and favorable social policies for those with disabilities, especially
disabled veterans.
Many of the state facilities for the disabled that operated in the
Soviet period have been closed because of lack of government funding.
Most disabled persons are supported by family members or by
international humanitarian donations.
Religious Minorities.--The Georgian Orthodox Church repeatedly has
spoken out against so-called ``sects'' and argued that foreign
Christian missionaries should confine their activities to non-Christian
areas. Foreign missionaries continued to report harassment on the part
of extremist Orthodox groups, local police, and security officials (see
Section 2.c.).
There was no pattern of anti-Semitism. The Jewish community
experienced delays in the return of property confiscated during Soviet
rule. A court ordered a former synagogue, rented from the Government by
a theater group, to be returned to the Jewish community in 1997. The
theater group refused to comply and started a publicity campaign with
anti-Semitic overtones to justify its continued occupation of the
building. In December 1997, President Shevardnadze promised Jewish
leaders that the synagogue would be returned before the celebration of
2,600 years of Jewish settlement in Georgia, on September 9, 1998.
However, the President's order was not enforced and the building
remained in the hands of the theater group. The district court ruled
again in February 1999 that the synagogue building must be returned to
the Jewish community and ordered the city to find other premises and
provide compensation for the theater company. However, the case was
appealed and on, July 3, the Tbilisi appellate court overturned the
February 1999 decision. The Jewish community plans to appeal to the
Supreme Court.
On April 19, Jehovah's Witnesses services were dispersed in four
different cities in the western part of the country. Complaints were
lodged, but no charges were filed. On May 17, the excommunicated priest
Basil Mkalavishvili and his followers held a protest demonstration
outside Parliament, demanding that the Georgian Orthodox Church be
declared the state religion and that Jehovah's Witnesses be banned. The
Basilists also tried to beat an official of Jehovah's Witness and
burned a photograph of a prominent human rights activist who has been
active on behalf of oppressed religious minorities. On May 18, the
Basilists held a rally in front of Parliament to protest the activities
of nontraditional religious groups and NGO's.
In January and February police and prosecutors refused to prosecute
persons who attacked members of Jehovah's Witnesses.
On July 28, in Gldani a large mob of Father Basil Mkalavishvili's
supporters encircled and forcibly stopped a busload of Jehovah's
Witnesses traveling to a religious gathering in Marneuli. The attackers
disabled the bus by puncturing a tire, and they shoved, pushed, and
struck the men, women, and children as they left the vehicle. Shortly
thereafter the attackers traveled to Marneuli and demanded that the
local police disperse the religious gathering. In August more then a
dozen followers of Basilia assaulted two members of Jehovah's
Witnesses. These two attacks followed a court decision on June 26 to
revoke the registration of Jehovah's Witnesses in the country.
In early August, a prayer meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was broken
up by unidentified armed men. In Kutaisi, two traffic police officers
stopped a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, tore up his religious
literature, and beat him.
On August 16, a mob of 80 Orthodox extremists, wielding metal
crosses and icons, disrupted a packed courtroom in Tbilisi after the
testimony of an Orthodox woman accused of sharing in an earlier violent
attack on Jehovah's Witnesses. The mob attacked journalists, lawyers,
and members of Jehovah's Witnesses who were in the courtroom.
In October 1999, a Jehovah's Witnesses worship service in the
Gldani section of Tbilisi with 120 parishioners was attacked violently
by members of a religious sect led by the excommunicated priest Basil
Mkalavishvili. The Gldani police refused to intervene. Sixteen persons
were injured in the attack. President Shevardnadze, in a televised
appearance, publicly criticized the attack and called for prosecution
of the attackers. On December 25, 1999, the case was forwarded to the
Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal charges. Despite appeals by the
National Security Advisor for Human Rights, the Gldani regional
prosecutor's office returned the case to the city prosecutor's office
in January, stating that no violation had occurred. The group continues
to press for prosecution of police in this and similar subsequent
incidents (see Section 2.c.). The official in charge of the
investigation decided instead in June to charge two of the plaintiffs,
as well as two Basilists, with hooliganism. On August 16 and 17, at the
first hearing of the trial in Gldani-Nadzaladevi court, Basilists
attacked journalists, human rights advocates, and members of Jehovah's
Witnesses. The police did not intervene and the Procuracy is conducting
an investigation. The trial resumed without incident on September 18
and on September 28, the two Jehovah's Witnesses were found guilty and
given suspended sentences. The two Basilists were not convicted and
their cases were returned to the Procuracy for further investigation.
On August 26, a cross-erected at the Zedazeni Monastery by the
international Georgian Youth Foundation to commemorate the war in
Abkhazia was blown up. This apparently was due to the organizer's
association with a religious group led by Boris Ivanov. On August 31
the patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church criticized the violence.
On October 1, a meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was disbanded by police
in Tsageri, according to the group's public affairs office in Tbilisi.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally
respected the rights of members of ethnic minorities in nonconflict
areas but limited selfgovernment and played a weaker role in ethnic
Armenian and Azeri areas (see Section 3). The Government reportedly
provided less funding for schools in ethnic Azeri and Armenian areas
than in other parts of the country. School instruction in non-Georgian
languages is permitted.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1997 Law on
Trade Unions provide for the right of citizens to form and join trade
unions. The Law on Collective Agreements was passed in 1997.
The principal trade union confederation is the Amalgamated Trade
Unions of Georgia (ATUG). The ATUG is the successor to the official
union that existed during the Soviet period. The union broke from the
central Soviet labor confederation in 1989. Its present structure was
established in 1992, after the union had resisted efforts first by the
Gamsakhurdia Government and later by the State Council to bring the
union under government control. The ATUG consists of 31 sectoral
unions. Representatives to the ATUG congress elected its leadership
indirectly for a period of 5 years in 1995; elections were held again
in November.
The organization officially claims 600,000 members but acknowledges
that the number of active, dues-paying members is lower. The union has
no affiliation with the Government and receives no government funding
(except for support to send 200 children each year to summer camp). The
union sees its primary role as defending the economic and social
interests of workers, a departure from its Soviet predecessor, which
was essentially an administrative body concerned with property and
finance rather than with worker rights. The ATUG supported public
sector strikes by teachers, medical service employees, and energy
sector workers. These were mostly wildcat actions. In each case, the
issue was unpaid wages. On December 23, 1999, the ATUG led a
demonstration in front of the State Chancellery to demand that back
wages and pensions be paid. The State Minister met with leaders and
promised to meet with unions in January to resolve the problem;
however, no meetings took place by year's end.
On January 31, 1999, President Shevardnadze signed a decree that
ordered all governmental agencies to consult and negotiate with unions.
During the year, the Health and Social Welfare Ministry took steps
toward negotiating agreements with unions.
In 1998 the ATUG brought suit against the Ministry of Internal
Affairs for illegally firing 220 employees in the MOI's visa office.
The suit was to be decided on a case-by-case basis. To date several
employees have been ordered reinstated, but the MOI has refused to do
so.
There are two trade unions independent of the ATUG. The Free Trade
Union of Teachers of Georgia ``Solidarity'' based in Kutaisi (FTUTGS)
successfully struck for payment of teachers' back wages in 1999. The
Independent Trade Union of Metropolitan Employees was formed in Tbilisi
during the year.
On June 22, the police initially prevented a foreign official of a
teachers' union, accompanied by representatives of the FTUTGS, from
meeting with teachers in Bagdati, a town in the Imereti region. Local
authorities allegedly told the minivan driver that his van would be
confiscated if he were to transport the group to Bagdati. When the
group entered Bagdati on foot, the local police chief and district
administrator each claimed that the FTUTGS had no right to organize the
meeting. Eventually, the foreign official was able to conduct a
meeting, although members of the local ATUG teacher's union disrupted
it.
There are no legal prohibitions against affiliation and
participation in international organizations. The ATUG worked closely
with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In
February a delegation from the ICFTU held a joint conference with
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the ATUG in Tbilisi. During
that time, the ICFTU reviewed the ATUG's application for membership in
ICFTU and recommended admittance. The AFTUG became a full member of the
ICFTU in November.
In December 1999, the ICFTU reported that the Ministry of Labor was
abolished. There has not been an assessment on the impact of this
action.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the Law on Trade Unions allow workers to organize and
bargain collectively, and this right is respected in practice. The law
prohibits discrimination by employers against union members. Employers
may be prosecuted for antiunion discrimination and forced to reinstate
employees and pay back wages. The ATUG and its national unions report
frequent cases of management warning staff not to organize trade
unions. Some workers reportedly complained of being intimidated or
threatened by employers for union organizing activity. These include
teachers in the Imereti region; employees of various mining,
winemaking, pipeline and port facilities; and the Tbilisi municipal
government. Observers also claim that employers fail to transfer
compulsory union dues, deducted from wages, to union bank accounts. The
Ministry of Labor investigated some complaints but no action has been
taken against companies that allegedly have violated workers' rights.
On August 22, the Free Trade Union of Teachers of Georgia
``Solidarity'' organized a demonstration in front of government offices
in Kutaisi to demand payment of back wages to teachers in the Imereti
region's school system. According to several school principals, the
governor of the Imereti region told them that the FTUTGS was a
``negative force'' and should be resisted. Since then, a number of
FTUTGS members allegedly were fired, regardless of seniority, when
layoffs or staff reduction took place. According to a foreign union
expert, the FTUTGS complained of increased pressure from the school
authorities in the second half of the year, including principals
instructing teachers not to join the union and actively preventing
teachers from attending meetings.
In 1999 the FTUTGS conducted a number of successful actions for the
payment of back wages in Kutaisi.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor and provides for sanctions against
violators, and in general there were no reports of its use; however,
trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a problem (see
Section 6.f.). The Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by
children and enforced this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--According to current legislation, the minimum age for
employment of children is 16 years; however, in exceptional cases, the
minimum age can be 14 years. The Ministry of Labor enforced these laws,
and generally they were respected. The Government prohibits forced and
bonded labor by children and enforced this prohibition effectively (see
Section 6.c.). The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs enforces child
labor laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The state minimum wage was
raised in 1999 to $10.80 (20 lari) a month. There is no state-mandated
minimum wage for private sector workers. The minimum wage is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. In general salaries and pensions were insufficient to meet
basic minimum needs for a worker and family. The state statistics
department of Georgia estimates that over half the population lives at
or below the poverty line. Average wages in private enterprises were
$75 to $100 (150 to 200 lari) monthly; in state enterprises, $15 to $30
(30-60 lari).
The law provides for a 41-hour work week and for a weekly 24-hour
rest period. The Government work week often was shortened during the
winter due to the continuing energy crisis. The Labor Code permits
higher wages for hazardous work and permits a worker to refuse duties
that could endanger life without risking loss of employment.
The old Soviet labor code, with some amendments, is still in
effect. A new labor code has not been adopted.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws concerning
trafficking in women, and it is a problem. Trafficking in women is not
prosecuted as a separate offense under the criminal law; however, other
offenses connected to trafficking can be found in the Constitution and
different laws such as those on slavery, forced labor, and illegal
detention.
Information on trafficking is difficult to obtain, and little, if
any research is done on the subject. Anecdotal reports indicate that
the country is both a source and transit country for trafficking;
however, due to slow economic development, poverty, and unemployment,
it is not a final destination for a significant number of trafficked
women. Women are primarily trafficked to Turkey and Greece, where many
work in the adult entertainment sector or as prostitutes, including
those who thought that they would actually be employed as waitresses in
bars and restaurants or domestic help. There is also evidence that
Russian and Ukrainian women have been trafficked through the country to
Turkey, sometimes using fraudulently obtained Georgian passports.
There is no evidence linking traffickers to government authorities.
The absence of laws aimed specifically at trafficking, together with
police indifference, make it difficult for the government to pursue
criminal cases against suspected traffickers.
There are no government policies that deal with the problem of
trafficking. There are now several NGO's in country that are involved
in dealing with trafficking and its victims. During the year, the NGO
Women Aid Georgia received international funding to launch a wide-scale
public information drive to educate women about the dangers of
trafficking.
__________
GERMANY
The Federal Republic of Germany is a constitutional parliamentary
democracy; citizens periodically choose their representatives in free
and fair multiparty elections. The head of the Federal Government, the
Chancellor, is elected by the Bundestag, the first of two chambers of
Parliament. The powers of the Chancellor and of the Parliament are set
forth in the Basic Law (Constitution). The 16 states represented in
Parliament in the Bundesrat enjoy significant autonomy, especially as
concerns law enforcement and the courts, education, the environment,
and social assistance. The judiciary is independent.
Law enforcement is primarily a responsibility of state governments,
and the police are organized at the state level. The jurisdiction of
the Federal Criminal Office is limited to counterterrorism,
international organized crime, especially narcotics trafficking,
weapons smuggling, and currency counterfeiting. Police forces in
general are well trained, disciplined, and mindful of citizens' rights,
although there have been instances in which police committed human
rights abuses.
A well-developed industrial economy provides citizens with a high
standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with cases of individual abuse. There were instances in which police
were accused of human rights abuses, mostly against foreign residents
and asylum seekers. Instances of societal violence and harassment
directed at foreign residents continued as well, some resulting in
deaths. After a 13.7 percent decline in rightwing-motivated crime in
1999, preliminary figures for the year suggest a significant increase
in the number of such crimes. Moreover, the number of proven or
suspected violent rightwing crimes (most of which resulted in bodily
harm to the victim) during the year rose by more than 12 percent, from
746 to 840, continuing a trend found in 1999. The Government is taking
serious steps to address the problem of violence against women and
children. Women continue to face some wage discrimination in the
private sector, as do members of minorities and foreigners. Trafficking
in women and girls is a serious problem, with Germany being both a
destination and a transit country. The Government has taken the lead in
coordinating federal and state efforts to combat trafficking and aid
its victims.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In December 1999, suspected Red Army Faction member Andrea Klump
was extradited from Austria to stand trial for her alleged role in
various terrorist acts, including two murders, committed in the 1980's.
Her trial began in November and continued at year's end. In 1999
Michael Steinau and Bernhard Falk, members of a leftwing terrorist
organization, the Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ), were convicted on four
charges of attempted murder and sentenced in connection with a series
of bombing attacks in 1995. Steinau was sentenced to 9 years'
imprisonment. Falk, who was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment,
appealed his sentence in May, and his case continued at year's end.
An investigation continued in the case of Aamir Ageeb, a Sudanese
asylum seeker, who died in May 1999 during a deportation flight while
in the custody of Federal Border Police. The Border Police apparently
physically subdued the man during takeoff because he was resisting
deportation violently, and they did not notice until Ageeb stopped
struggling that he was not breathing. As a result of this incident, the
Federal Interior Ministry has instituted new deportation procedures
that prohibit methods that could hinder breathing.
The trial of four individuals accused of the 1986 bombing of the
Berlin La Belle discotheque, which began in 1997, continued at year's
end. The attack killed one Turkish and two U.S. citizens and injured
230 persons.
In January Johannes Weinrich, a German terrorist, was convicted of
one count of murder and five counts of attempted murder in connection
with a 1983 bomb attack on the French cultural center in what was then
West Berlin. The trial of Hans-Joachim Klein began in October and
continued at year's end. Klein was charged with three murders during
the 1975 attack by left-wing terrorists on a convention of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna,
Austria.
Violence by rightwing extremists against marginalized social
groups, such as the homeless and foreigners, resulted in a number of
deaths during the year. In June a Mozambican immigrant was beaten and
kicked to death in Dessau by three rightwing extremists who were
caught, tried, and convicted; one was sentenced to life in prison and
the two others were sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment each (see
Section 5). Groups of rightwing extremists beat and kicked to death at
least five homeless men during the year. In each case, police arrested
the alleged perpetrators and they were charged with the crimes; several
have been convicted and sentenced to prison terms.
On January 25, two rightwing extremists were sentenced in Lower-
Saxony to 5 years' imprisonment in a youth detention center for their
attack in August 1999 on a German man, who died the following day from
his injuries. The 44-year-old victim had spoken critically about
xenophobia to one of the perpetrators. The youths, who were drunk at
the time, broke into the victim's apartment and kicked him and stabbed
him with a broken glass.
The trial of 11 rightwing defendants accused of causing the 1999
death of an Algerian asylum seeker in Brandenburg ended in November
with 8 defendants being convicted of negligent homicide and all 11
being found guilty of lesser crimes (see Section 5). Three of the
convicted youths were sentenced to 2 to 3 years' detention in a youth
facility, and the others received suspended sentences or warnings. The
family of the victim filed an appeal demanding stiffer sentences, and
10 of the 11 youths appealed their convictions. The case continued at
year's end.
As of October, seven cases remained before the courts concerning
individuals involved in the shooting deaths of East Germans who
attempted to flee to West Germany before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
In July former East German defense minister Heinz Kessler was sentenced
to 7-and-a-half years' imprisonment, while three other former Socialist
Unity Party (SED) leaders were acquitted. In January the Federal
Constitutional Court upheld the conviction of former East German
Politburo member Egon Krenz, who had been sentenced to 6-and-a-half
years' imprisonment for his role in East Germany's shoot-to-kill policy
at the East-West border. Krenz began serving his sentence on January
13. His appeal to the European Court for Human Rights was heard in
November, and a decision is expected in the spring of 2001. On
September 6, Berlin's governing mayor pardoned Krenz's two
codefendants, Guenter Schabowski and Guenther Kleiber, who each had
received 3-year sentences; the men were released on October 2 in a
gesture of reconciliation on the 10th anniversary of German
reunification the following day.
The Government continued to cooperate in bringing war criminals
from the former Yugoslavia to justice. In October, for example, the
Government signed an agreement with the International War Crimes
Tribunal for Yugoslavia to have a convicted Bosnian war criminal serve
his 20-year sentence in a German prison.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities
generally respect these prohibitions. However, Amnesty International
published a report in July 1999 that found that police treatment of
foreigners in custody showed ``a clear pattern of abuse.'' In September
an Iranian family facing deportation claimed that police held the
father's arms behind his back, pushed his head down and then held him
on the ground in a manner that hindered his breathing. Two older
children who tried to help were allegedly slapped. Border Police claim
that the father and an older child were violently resisting
deportation. Human rights and asylum-assistance organizations have
called for an investigation.
The Government investigates abuses and prosecutes police who
mistreat persons in custody. For example in July, authorities in Dessau
initiated an investigation against three officers accused of
mistreating a man from Burkina Faso who had been arrested for drug
dealing. The accusations were found to be without merit. In July the
Federal Court of Justice upheld the convictions of three police
officers from Bernau, Brandenburg, for physically mistreating
Vietnamese detainees in 11 cases in 1993 and 1994. Moreover, the Court
ordered a lower court to consider stiffer penalties for the two
officers originally sentenced to probation.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Basic Law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this
prohibition. A person can be arrested only on the basis of an arrest
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, unless the person is
caught in the act of committing a crime, or the police have strong
reason to believe that the person intends to commit a crime. Any person
detained by police must be brought before a judge and charged within 24
hours of the arrest. The court then must issue an arrest warrant
stating the grounds for detention or order the person's release.
Police often detain known or suspected rightwing and leftwing
radicals for brief periods when they believe such individuals intend to
participate in illegal or unauthorized demonstrations. For example, in
August police in Thuringia took into temporary custody 53 persons who
were suspected of heading for illegal rallies to mark the 13th
anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess (see Section 5). The rules
governing this type of detention are different in each state, with
authorized periods of detention ranging from 1 to 14 days, provided
judicial concurrence is given within 24 hours of initial apprehension.
If there is evidence that a suspect might flee the country, police
may detain that person for up to 24 hours pending a formal charge. The
right of free access to legal counsel has been restricted only in the
cases of terrorists suspected of having used contacts with lawyers to
continue terrorist activity while in prison. Only judges may decide on
the validity of any deprivation of liberty. Bail exists but seldom is
employed; the usual practice is to release detainees unless there is
clear danger of flight outside the country. In these cases, a person
may be detained for the course of the investigation and subsequent
trial. Such decisions are subject to regular judicial review, and time
spent in investigative custody applies toward the sentence. In cases of
acquittal, the Government must compensate the individual.
The Government does not use forced exile, which is prohibited by
the Basic Law.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Basic Law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The court system is highly developed and provides full legal
protection and numerous possibilities for judicial review. Ordinary
courts have jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters. There are four
levels of such courts (local courts, regional courts, higher regional
courts, and the Federal Court of Justice), with appeals possible from
lower to higher levels. In addition to the ordinary courts, there are
four types of specialized courts: administrative, labor, social, and
fiscal. These courts also have different levels, and appeals may be
made to the next higher level.
Separate from these five types of courts is the Federal
Constitutional Court, which is Germany's supreme court. Among other
things, it reviews laws to ensure their compatibility with the
Constitution and adjudicates disputes between different branches of
government on questions of competencies. It also has jurisdiction to
hear and decide claims based on the infringement of a person's basic
constitutional rights by a public authority.
The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
process, although court proceedings are sometimes delayed due to ever
creasing caseloads. For simple or less serious cases, the Government
adopted a procedure allowing for an accelerated hearing and summary
punishment at the local court level. The maximum sentence for such
cases is limited to 1 year, and if a sentence of 6 months or more is
expected, a defense counsel must be present.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, of
Correspondence.--The Basic Law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
In October a Lower Saxony court ruled that a school district could
not refuse to hire an Islamic teacher because she wished to wear a
traditional headscarf in the classroom. The school district said it
would appeal the decision. In 1998 a Muslim teacher sued the Stuttgart
school district over its decision not to hire her because she wore a
headscarf. Although a local administrative court dismissed her suit,
she appealed the ruling and the case continued at year's end (see
Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Basic Law provides for freedom
of the press, and the Government respects this right in practice. An
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech--with some
limits--and of the press, including academic freedom. Freedom of speech
does not extend to the possession or distribution of the propaganda of
proscribed organizations or to statements endorsing Nazism or denying
the Holocaust, all of which are illegal.
The authorities seek to block what they consider dangerous material
on the Internet. The 1997 Teleservices Law bans access to prohibited
material (for example, child pornography and Nazi propaganda), and the
Government has explored ways to expand cooperation in countering
Internet crime. In June the Justice Ministry cosponsored a major
symposium on combating the spread of hate materials on the Internet,
and it proposed voluntary measures for Internet service providers and
companies doing online business, as well as improved international law
enforcement cooperation. The Federal Criminal Office in February hosted
a similar event, bringing service providers and domestic law
enforcement officials together to discuss ways to enhance cooperation.
German officials estimate that there are approximately 800 Internet
sites with what they consider objectionable or dangerous rightwing
extremist content.
In December the Federal Court of Justice ruled that German laws
against Nazi incitement could apply to individuals who post Nazi
material on Internet sites available to users in Germany, even if the
site resides on a foreign server. The Court overturned a lower court
decision that such material was not subject to criminal prosecution in
the case of German-born Australian Holocaust revisionist Frederick
Toben, who had, among other things, posted material denying the
Holocaust on his Internet site. Previously in November 1999, Toben, had
been sentenced to 10 months in prison (7 months already served were
applied to that sentence) for denying the Holocaust and that Nazis
killed millions of Jews. At that time, the lower court had ruled that
Toben could not be prosecuted for Holocaust denial material he had
posted on a website in Australia. He was released from a Mannheim
prison after posting a bond. Toben is the director of the Adelaide
Institute, which questions the reality and scope of the Holocaust.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Permits must be obtained for open-air public rallies and
marches. State and local officials have the authority to deny such
permits when public safety concerns arise or when outlawed
organizations attempt to hold public assemblies. For example, rallies
and marches by neo-Nazis and rightwing radicals commemorating the death
of Nazi official Rudolf Hess are banned routinely.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
respects this right in practice. The Basic Law permits the banning of
organizations whose activities are found to be illegal or opposed to
the liberal democratic order as established by the Basic Law. The
Federal Constitutional Court is the only body that can outlaw political
parties; under this provision, the Court in the 1950's banned a neo-
Nazi and a Communist party. Federal or state governments may ban other
organizations, and legal recourse against such decisions is available.
Such banned organizations include a number of groups that authorities
generally classify as rightwing or leftwing, foreign extremist, or
criminal in nature. In addition several hundred organizations were
under observation by the Federal and state Offices for the Protection
of the Constitution (OPC). The OPC's are charged with examining
possible threats to the democratic system; they have no law enforcement
powers, and OPC monitoring by law may not interfere with the
organizations' continued activities. In observing an organization, OPC
officials seek to collect information, mostly from written materials
and first-hand accounts, to assess whether a threat exists. More
intrusive methods would be subject to legal checks and require evidence
of involvement in treason or terrorist activities.
In August the Government established a commission of experts to
examine whether evidence against the rightwing extremist National
Democratic Party (NPD) would meet the threshold to support a legal ban,
which was widely demanded after a surge of rightwing extremist activity
in the summer months. Based on the commission's recommendations, in
November the Government agreed to petition the Federal Constitutional
Court to ban the NPD. Although the Bundestag and Bundesrat formally
supported this decision, the Government had not yet submitted the
petition to the Court at year's end. On September 14, the Federal
Interior Minister banned the rightwing extremist skinhead organization
``Blood and Honor'' and its youth organization, ``White Youth,'' citing
the groups' rejection of the constitutional order as a justification.
While the ban (the first issued by the Federal Government since 1995)
allows the Government to seize the groups' assets, members are free to
reconstitute themselves under a new name.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Basic Law provides for religious
freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
Most religious organizations enjoy tax-exempt status, a designation
that requires them to operate on a nonprofit basis and contribute
socially, spiritually, or materially to society.
Church and state are separate, although historically a special
relationship exists between the State and those religious communities
that have the status of a ``corporation under public law.'' Religions
enjoying this status may request that the Government collect church
membership taxes on their behalf. However, not all religious groups
take advantage of this privilege, since the Government charges an
administrative fee for doing so. State governments subsidize various
institutions affiliated with public law corporations, such as church-
run schools and hospitals. State subsidies also are provided to some
religious organizations for historical and cultural reasons. Many
religions and denominations have been granted public law corporation
status; among them are the Lutheran and Catholic Churches, Judaism, the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Seventh-Day Adventists,
Mennonites, Baptists, Methodists, Christian Scientists, and the
Salvation Army. Applications from several Islamic groups are pending in
various states.
In December the Federal Constitutional Court overturned a lower
court's ruling that denied Jehovah's Witnesses public law corporation
status and remanded the case back to the lower court. The case stemmed
from an April 1993 decision of the Berlin state government that denied
the church public law corporation status, a decision upheld in 1997 by
the Federal Administrative Court. The Administrative Court concluded
that the group did not offer the ``indispensable loyalty'' towards the
democratic state ``essential for lasting cooperation'' because, for
example, it forbade its members from voting in public elections. In
overturning this decision, the Constitutional Court ruled that
forbidding church members to vote or to perform military service were
not sufficient justifications for withholding from the church public
law corporation status. The Court added that the judiciary should not
evaluate the compatibility of church doctrine with the democratic
order, but only judge such cases on the actual behavior of the church
and its members. Although the Court found that Jehovah's Witnesses in
Germany follow the rule of law and demonstrate no intent to overthrow
the government or political system, it did not grant them public law
corporation status. It instead returned the case to the lower court
with instructions to examine whether the Jehovah's Witnesses use
coercive methods to oppose their members leaving the congregation and
whether their child-rearing practices conform to German human rights
standards. The case continued at year's end.
With an estimated 3 million adherents, Islam is the third most
commonly practiced religion in Germany (after Catholicism and
Lutheranism). All branches of Islam are represented in the country,
with the vast majority of Muslims in Germany coming from a large number
of other countries. This has, at times, led to societal discord, such
as local resistance to the construction of mosques or disagreements
over whether Muslims can use loudspeakers in residential neighborhoods
to call the faithful to prayer. There also remain areas where German
law conflicts with Islamic practices or raises religious freedom
issues. In November the Government published a comprehensive, 93-page
report on ``Islam in Germany'' which examined these issues in response
to an inquiry from the Bundestag.
In October the Lueneburg administrative court ruled that the state
education ministry must employ a teacher who was barred in 1999 from
wearing a headscarf in the classroom. The Lower Saxony education
ministry had refused to employ the Muslim woman after she completed her
training because state officials took the position that allowing a
teacher to wear a headscarf on the job would violate the religious and
political neutrality legally required of all civil servants, including
teachers. (Members of Christian religious orders are similarly not
allowed to wear their habits while teaching at public schools, although
habits are permitted in denominational schools.) The state has vowed to
appeal the ruling and has said it will not hire the woman until it has
exhausted its legal options. In March the Stuttgart administrative
court dismissed a similar suit filed by a Muslim woman who was denied a
teaching position in Baden-Wuerttemberg. The state minister of
education supported the school district's decision not to hire the
woman because the Ministry argued the headscarf was a political symbol
of female submission rather than a religious practice prescribed by
Islam. The woman appealed the ruling, and the case was pending at
year's end. In the meantime she accepted a teaching position at a
public school for Muslims in Berlin, where she is allowed to wear a
headscarf. Muslim students generally are free to wear headscarves to
school (see Section 1.f.).
The right of Muslims to ritually slaughter animals was the subject
of two court cases during the year. In November the Federal
Administrative Court ruled that the Islamic Community of Hesse was not
a religious community as provided for in Germany's animal protection
laws and could not, therefore, receive a waiver to laws requiring an
animal to be stunned before slaughter. The Court did not rule on
whether Islam prescribes the exclusive consumption of ritually-
slaughtered meat, noting that such decisions were beyond the scope of
the courts. A similar case was heard by the Federal Constitutional
Court and a decision was pending at year's end.
Most public schools offer religious instruction in cooperation with
the Protestant and Catholic churches and will offer instruction in
Judaism if enough students express interest. A nonreligious ethics
course or study hall generally is available for students not wishing to
participate in religious instruction. The issue of Islamic education in
public schools is becoming increasingly topical in several states. In
February the Federal Administrative Court upheld previous court rulings
that the Islamic Federation qualified as a religious community and thus
must be given the opportunity to provide religious instruction in
Berlin schools. The decision drew criticism from the many Islamic
organizations not represented by the Islamic Federation. The Berlin
state government has expressed its concerns about the Islamic
Federation's alleged links to Milli Gorus, a Turkish group classified
as extremist by the Federal OPC. In November Bavaria announced that it
would offer German-language Islamic education in its public schools
starting in 2003.
Several states have published pamphlets, which are provided to the
public free of charge, detailing the beliefs and practices of non-
mainstream religions. Many of the pamphlets are factual, but the
inclusion of some religious groups in publications covering known
dangerous cults or movements may harm their reputations. For example
publications from the Hamburg state government and state-run youth
welfare offices in Lower Saxony, Thuringia, and Schleswig-Holstein,
describe theologically conservative or minority Christian groups and
imply that they can be harmful to their adherents. Scientology is the
focus of many such pamphlets, some of which warn of alleged dangers
posed by Scientology to existing political and economic structures and
to the mental and financial well-being of individuals. For example, the
Hamburg OPC publishes ``The Intelligence Service of the Scientology
Organization,'' which claims that Scientology tries to infiltrate
governments, offices, and companies, and that the church spies on its
opponents, defames them, and ``destroys'' them.
The Church of Scientology, which operates 18 churches and missions,
remained under scrutiny by both federal and state officials who contend
that its ideology is opposed to democracy and that it is not a religion
but an economic enterprise. Since 1997 Scientology has been under
observation by the Federal and state OPC's, except in Schleswig-
Holstein where the state constitution does not permit such observation
(see Section 2.b.). Observation is not an investigation into criminal
wrongdoing, and the Government has filed no criminal charges against
Scientology since observation began. However, in April the Federal OPC
concluded in its 250-page annual report for 1999 that the reasons for
initiating observation of Scientology in 1997 still were valid. The six
pages in the report covering Scientology described those aspects of the
organization's beliefs that were deemed undemocratic, quoting from the
writings of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard and Scientology-
published pamphlets and books. In 1998 the Church of Scientology filed
a suit in a Berlin state court to enjoin the Berlin interior ministry,
under whose authority the OPC falls, from further observation of the
organization and its members. The case was pending at year's end.
Scientologists continued to report discrimination because of their
beliefs. A number of state and local offices share information on
individuals known to be Scientologists. The Federal Government uses its
``Defense Clause'' (commonly referred to as a ``sect filter'') for
procurement involving some training and consulting contracts,
specifically those that may provide opportunities for mental
manipulation or behavior modification. The sect filter requires a
bidder to declare that the firm rejects and will not employ the
``technology of L. Ron Hubbard'' within the framework of the contract,
and that the firm does not require or permit employees to attend
courses and seminars conducted via this ``technology'' as part of its
business function. Some state and local agencies, businesses (including
several major international corporations), and other organizations
require job applicants and bidders on contracts to sign similar ``sect
filters.'' The Federal Property Office has in several cases barred the
sale of real estate to Scientologists, nothing that the Finance
Ministry has urged that such sales be avoided, if possible.
At the state and local level, some governments also screen
companies bidding on contracts for training and the handling and
processing of personal data, and in April the Hamburg administrative
court dismissed the suit of two Scientology members against the city-
state for its use of ``sect filters.'' In the state of Bavaria,
applicants for state civil service positions must complete
questionnaires detailing any relationship that they may have with
Scientology; the form specifically states that employment will not be
considered if the form is not completed. Moreover Bavaria has
identified some state employees as Scientologists, sometimes years
after they were first employed, and has required them to complete the
questionnaire. Some of these employees have refused and two of them
have filed suit in Bavarian courts. In October the Munich labor court
ruled that the state cannot require employees to complete the
questionnaire in the absence of evidence that the employee is involved
in anticonstitutional behavior. The court further stated that even if
the Scientology Church were to be found to be anticonstitutional, an
individual's mere membership in the organization could not justify the
Government delving into that person's private life in the absence of
illegal behavior on his or her part.
The interministerial group of mid-level federal and state officials
that exchanges information on Scientology continued its periodic
meetings. The group published no report or policy compendium during the
year and remained purely consultative in purpose.
In December the Federal Social Court in Kassel upheld a lower
court's ruling that membership in the Church of Scientology was not, in
and of itself, reason to deny a person a professional license. In 1999
the State Social Court of Appeals in Rhineland-Palatinate ruled that
the Federal Labor Office had in 1994 incorrectly refused to renew a
Scientologist's license to run her au pair agency based solely on her
Scientology membership. The case was remanded to the state court to
clarify whether the specific individual's membership in the Church of
Scientology has any bearing on her reliability as an au pair agent. The
case continued at year's end.
Some private sector entities have followed the governments' example
in using ``sect filters,'' often using them for a much broader range of
contracts. On at least one occasion a foreign firm wishing to do
business in the country was asked to declare any affiliation that it or
its employees might have with Scientology. Private firms that screen
for Scientology affiliations frequently cite OPC observation of
Scientology as a justification for discrimination and have on occasion
quoted advice they say they have received from state or local
government officials as to the legality of the ``sect filter.''
Late in 1999, allegations that Microsoft's Windows 2000 contained a
``Trojan Horse'' or ``back door'' that would permit the Church of
Scientology to obtain information from an unsuspecting user's system
surfaced in the technology trade press. These allegations arose after
Hamburg's sect commissioner expressed public concern about the software
because a firm whose chief executive officer is a Scientologist
developed a disk defragmenting component for Windows 2000. Critics
claimed--with no proof--that the defragmenter would secretly send
personal data from individual computers to Scientology offices.
Microsoft yielded to German pressure and allowed the German Federal
Office for Security in Information Technology (BSI) to investigate the
software. BSI conducted various tests but failed to find any evidence
of or anything that in any way validated the concerns regarding the
existence of a ``Trojan Horse'' or ``back door.'' Nevertheless in
December Microsoft published instructions on how to remove the disk
defragmenter from Windows 2000 as an alternative to further testing by
BSI.
In February the German branch of Amway Limited dismissed 10
distributors because of their admitted association with Scientology,
which the company claimed could damage the company's image. Parent
company representatives claimed that the distributors refused to comply
with the firm's prohibition against proselytizing in connection with
their Amway activities, a policy that applies to all religious beliefs,
and that other known Scientologists continue to work for the company.
In at least one case, a major bank unilaterally closed the accounts of
a law firm that had represented the Scientology Church.
Scientologists have taken their grievances to the courts, with
mixed results. Some individuals who had been fired because they were
Scientologists sued their employers for ``unfair dismissal.'' Several
have reached out-of-court settlements with employers. For example in
March, a woman who had been summarily dismissed from her position in
the bond department of a bank because of her association with
Scientology received $27,300 (DM 60,000) under a settlement with her
former employer.
Major political parties continued to exclude Scientologists from
membership, arguing that Scientology is not a religion but a for-profit
organization whose goals and principles are antidemocratic and thus
incompatible with those of the political parties. However, there has
been only one known enforcement of this ban. A Bonn court upheld the
practice in 1997, ruling that a political party had the right to
exclude from its organization those persons who do not identify
themselves with the party's basic goals.
Public exhibitions by Scientologists in a number of cities to
explain themselves to citizens encountered difficulties. In April the
Visitor's Bureau of the Federal Press and Information Office intervened
with a Berlin hotel, forcing the hotel to cancel Scientology's
reservations for rooms for an exhibit titled ``What is Scientology?''
The hotel claimed that the Visitors' Bureau threatened to cancel
several hundred thousand dollars worth of reservations if Scientology
were allowed to exhibit in the hotel. Scientology was able to rent
space elsewhere but incurred substantial extra expenses related to the
last minute move of the exhibit. In Frankfurt a late February
Scientology exhibit in the cafe of a well-known, city-owned museum
sparked significant criticism, with city officials speaking out openly
against Scientology and the exhibit. However, Scientology's recently
established information office in Frankfurt has generated little or no
public controversy. A Scientology exhibit at the Leipzig book fair in
March provoked complaints about what some visitors considered
aggressive marketing tactics, and fair authorities were reviewing
whether to allow the exhibitors to return next year. In April
Scientology was able to rent the public congress center in Hanover for
a 2-day exhibition, after a hotel cancelled its reservation when it
learned that Scientology had made the booking.
There were no new attempts to deregister Scientology organizations
previously registered as non-profit organizations, but the judgments in
two such earlier cases were appealed during the year. The government of
Baden-Wuerttemberg appealed a decision by the Stuttgart Administrative
Court, which ruled that a Scientology organization could not be
deregistered as a nonprofit organization because its activities were
used to accomplish its ideological purposes. The case was pending at
year's end. The Celebrity Center Munich, a Scientology-affiliated
organization that was stripped of its status as a nonprofit
organization in 1995, has appealed a 1999 upper court ruling upholding
that decision. The case was pending at year's end.
The Government continued its policy of not engaging in dialogue
with the Church of Scientology this year.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Basic Law and subsequent legislation
provide for the right of foreign victims of persecution to attain
asylum and resettlement in accordance with the standards of the 1951
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. Both the Federal Government and state governments cooperate
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees, although
immigration matters are primarily a state-level responsibility.
For ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
the Basic Law provides both for citizenship immediately upon
application and for legal residence without restrictions. On January 1,
a new law came into effect that grants citizenship to children born to
legal foreign residents. Individuals can retain both German citizenship
and that of their parents until the age of 23, when they must choose
one or the other. The law also decreased the period of residence in the
country required for legal foreign residents to earn the right to
naturalization from 15 to 8 years.
The Basic Law and subsequent legislation provide for the right of
foreign victims of persecution to attain asylum and resettlement.
Criteria for granting asylum were tightened by several provisions
enacted in 1993. Individuals attempting to enter via a ``safe third
country'' (any country in the European Union or adhering to the Geneva
Convention on Refugees) are ineligible for asylum and can be turned
back at the border or returned to that ``safe third country'' if they
manage to enter Germany. Persons coming directly from any country which
officials designate as a ``safe country of origin'' normally cannot
claim asylum in Germany, and individuals whose applications are
rejected on these grounds have up to 2 weeks to appeal the decision, a
time period critics consider too brief. Individuals who arrive at an
international airport and who are deemed to have come from a ``safe
country of origin'' can be detained at an airport holding facility. In
these cases, the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees
must make a decision on an asylum application within 48 hours or allow
the person to enter the country. The person may appeal a negative
decision to an administrative court within 3 days, and the court must
rule within 14 days or allow the individual to enter the country.
Although stays in the airport facility thus are supposed to be limited
to a maximum of 19 days, applicants whose claims were rejected, but who
could not be immediately deported have been held at the airport for
months, a practice criticized by refugee assistance groups and human
rights advocates (see Section 1.c.). However, the Constitutional Court
upheld the constitutionality of the amendments in 1996.
Applicants who enter Germany and are denied asylum at their
original administrative hearing may challenge the decision in court,
and 80 percent of applicants denied asylum do so. Approximately 3 to 4
percent of such rejections are overturned. The rejected applicant is
allowed to remain in country during the course of the appeal, which
usually takes at least a year and sometimes significantly longer. In
October the Government announced changes to the regulations governing
asylum seekers and employment. Starting January 1, 2001, applicants for
asylum and civil war refugees will be allowed to work after a 1-year
waiting period. The Government estimates that approximately 75,000
foreigners will be entitled to work under the new rules. Some
foreigners whose asylum applications were rejected, but who would be
endangered if they were sent back to their home country, such as those
fleeing civil wars, receive temporary residence permits--the so-called
small asylum. However, they are expected to leave when conditions in
their home country allow for their safe return. The vast majority of
the approximately 345,000 Bosnians and the approximately 200,000
Kosovars whom Germany admitted during the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia fall into this category. Once their residence permits
expire, these people can be deported. Individuals who fail to cooperate
during the deportation process or who are deemed liable to flee to
avoid deportation can be held in predeportation detention, with the
average detention period lasting 5 to 6 weeks.
Refugee assistance organizations have expressed concern about how
certain provisions related to the right of asylum have been interpreted
by the courts, notably the practice of excluding ``quasi-governmental''
persecution as a basis for granting asylum. In August the Federal
Constitutional Court ruled that lower courts had erred in denying
asylum to three Afghan applicants because their persecutors were not a
state government but members of a Mujahidin group (defined as a
``quasi-governmental entity''). The case was remanded back to the lower
court with instructions to reconsider the issue of quasi-governmental
persecution, and a decision was pending at year's end. In response to
the Constitutional Court ruling, the federal Office for the Recognition
of Foreign Refugees has postponed making decisions in all current
asylum cases involving quasi-governmental persecution until the lower
court reissues its ruling.
During the year, 78,564 persons applied for asylum, an almost 17.4
percent decrease over the same period in 1999 and the lowest level
since the amendment of the asylum law in 1993, when the criteria for
granting asylum were tightened. The approval rate for first-time
applicants was around 3 percent, and an additional 7.9 percent of
rejected applicants received temporary protection from deportation.
State authorities, working in close cooperation with the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR, and other
domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), continued to repatriate
Bosnian refugees, unless they qualified for an extension of stay on
certain humanitarian grounds. According to unofficial estimates,
approximately 25,000 Bosnian refugees remained in country at year's
end. Among those were up to 15,000 who were considered traumatized or
were with family members who were deemed too traumatized to return to
Bosnia. In November the Federal and state interior ministers decided at
their annual meeting to grant severely traumatized Bosnians and their
family members, including unmarried adult children, temporary residence
permits for the duration of their medical treatment. In addition some
older Bosnian refugees, as well as some categories of Kosovars (such as
orphaned children, ethnically mixed couples from areas with no minority
protection, and war crimes tribunal witnesses) will be allowed to stay
in the country.
The Government continued to support voluntary return programs for
refugees from the former Yugoslavia, providing financial incentives of
between $765 and $2,250 (DM 1,350 to DM 4,500) to help cover travel and
resettlement costs; many states provided additional resettlement funds.
The Government repatriated approximately 48,000 Kosovars under such
voluntary programs through December. However, failure to accept
voluntary repatriation subjects these refugees to the threat of
deportation, and forces them to leave their personal property behind
and excludes them from reentering the country for a 5-year period.
The right of most Kosovar refugees to stay in the country expired
in the spring, and most states began regular deportations in March. By
the end of the year, 6,800 Kosovar refugees had been deported, among
them approximately 1,300 ex-offenders. Some national officials, the
UNHCR, and domestic refugee support organizations have cautioned that
the refugees' place of origin and ethnicity should be given careful
consideration in the implementation of Kosovar returns.
An investigation is ongoing into the 1999 death of a Sudanese
asylum seeker who died during a deportation flight while in the custody
of the Federal Border Police (see Section 1.a).
In June the Federal Government appointed a commission of experts to
examine every aspect of immigration and to propose administrative or
legislative changes if deemed necessary. The commission held its first
meeting in September and is expected to present its recommendations in
mid-2001.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Basic Law provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections. Members of Parliament's
first chamber, the Bundestag, are elected from a mixture of direct-
constituency and party-list candidates on the basis of universal
suffrage and secret balloting. The second chamber, the Bundesrat, is
composed of delegations from state governments.
Women are somewhat underrepresented in government and politics,
although the law entitles them to participate fully in political life,
and a growing number are prominent in the Government and the parties.
Slightly under 31 percent of the members of the Bundestag are female.
Women occupy 6 of 15 Federal Cabinet positions. On the Federal
Constitutional Court, 5 of the 16 judges are women, including the Chief
Justice. Three of the parties represented in the Bundestag are headed
by women: the Christian Democratic Union, the Greens/Alliance 90 (co-
chaired by a woman and a man), and the Party of Democratic Socialism.
All of the parties have undertaken to enlist more women. The Greens/
Alliance 90 Party requires that women constitute half of the party's
elected officials; and 57.5 percent of the Party's federal
parliamentary caucus members are women. The Social Democrats had a 40-
percent quota for women on all party committees and governing bodies
and met that goal. The Christian Democrats required that 30 percent of
the first ballot candidates for party positions be women, a goal which
it met.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
In December the Bundestag voted to create the National Institute
for Human Rights, an autonomous foundation whose function will be to
monitor human rights both domestically and abroad and to promote
education and scientific research in the field.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits denial of access to housing, health care, or
education on the basis of race, religion, disability, sex, ethnic
background, political opinion, or citizenship. The Government enforces
the law effectively.
Women.--While violence against women is a problem and almost
certainly is underreported, it is prohibited by laws that are enforced
effectively. The Government has implemented a vast array of legal and
social structures to combat it. Societal attitudes toward such violence
are strongly negative, and legal and medical recourse is available.
Police statistics on rape, including attempted rape and spousal rape,
showed a 4.4 percent decrease from 7,914 cases in 1998 to 7,565 cases
in 1999.
The Government conducted campaigns in the schools and through
church groups to bring public attention to the existence of such
violence and proposed steps to counter it. The Federal Government has
supported numerous pilot projects throughout the country. For example
there are 435 ``women's houses'', including 115 in the eastern states
(excluding Berlin), where victims of violence and their children can
seek shelter, counseling, and legal and police protection.
Trafficking in women and forced prostitution also are illegal;
however, trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see
Section 6.f.). In recent years, the Federal Ministry for Women and
Youth has commissioned a number of studies to gain information on
violence against women, sexual harassment, and other matters.
Union contracts typically identify categories of employment in
which participants are to be paid less than 100 percent of the wage of
a skilled laborer covered by the same contract. Women are represented
disproportionately in these lower-wage scale occupations.
In January the European Court of Justice ruled that Germany's
prohibition on women in combat roles in the armed forces violated
European Union directives against discrimination based on gender. The
Government accepted the ruling and in December completed the process of
amending the Constitution to open all military jobs to women on a
voluntary basis. The first group of 244 women are scheduled to report
for duty on January 2, 2001.
The Government continued to implement its multiyear action plan,
``Women and Occupation,'' adopted in 1999. The program promotes the
equality of women and men in the workforce, including increased
vocational training for women, greater representation of women in
political advisory councils, and the promotion of female entrepreneurs
through government grants and participation in regional projects
earmarked for women. The Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly,
Women, and Youth also announced a multiyear initiative designed to
increase the number of girls who receive training in information
technology (IT) and in media careers, with the goal of raising the
number of IT-training slots to 60,000 by 2003 and the share of female
IT-trainees to 40 percent by 2005.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. Public education is provided and is
mandatory through the age of 16.
The Government recognizes that violence against children is a
problem requiring its attention. Police figures recorded 15,279 cases
of sexual abuse of children in 1999, a 7.9 percent decrease from 16,596
in 1998. Officials believe that the number of unreported cases may be
much higher. The 1990 Child and Youth Protection Law stresses the need
for preventive measures, and the Government has taken account of this
in stepping up its counseling and other assistance.
The Criminal Code was amended in 1993 and in 1997 to further
provide for the protection of children against pornography and sexual
abuse. For possession of child pornography, the maximum sentence is 1
year's imprisonment; the sentence for distribution is 5 years. The 1993
amendment makes the sexual abuse of children by German citizens abroad
punishable even if the action is not illegal in the child's own
country.
Trafficking in girls is a serious problem (See Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against the
disabled in employment, education, or in the provision of other state
services. The law mandates several special services for disabled
persons, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice. The
disabled are entitled to assistance to avert, eliminate, or alleviate
the consequences of their disabilities and to secure employment
commensurate with their abilities. The Government offers vocational
training and grants for employers who hire the disabled. The severely
disabled may be granted special benefits, such as tax relief, free
public transport, special parking facilities, and exemption from radio
and television fees.
The Federal Government set guidelines for the attainment of
``barrier-free'' public buildings and for modifications of streets and
pedestrian traffic walks to accommodate the disabled. All 16 states
have incorporated the federal guidelines into their building codes, and
98 percent of federal public buildings follow the guidelines for a
``barrier-free environment.''
Religious Minorities.--The number of crimes classified by the
authorities as anti-Semitic fell in 1999 to 871, a 17.5 percent
decrease from 991 in 1998. In the first 6 months of the year, anti-
Semitic crimes rose 3.3 percent over the same period in 1999, from 287
to 297. These incidents included 7 cases of bodily injury, one case of
arson, 14 cases of desecration of graves, and 254 ``other'' crimes that
include the distribution of anti-Semitic materials or the display of
symbols of banned organizations. For example, in March the police
arrested eight youths for allegedly painting anti-Semitic slogans,
swastikas, and other symbols on tombstones in a Jewish cemetery in
Guben, Brandenburg. The overwhelming majority of the perpetrators of
anti-Semitic acts were frustrated, largely apolitical youths and a
small core of rightwing extremists.
On April 20, a firebomb was thrown at a synagogue in Erfurt,
Thuringia. Neighbors discovered and extinguished the fire before the
building was damaged seriously. Two teenagers were arrested and
convicted. The first was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment and the
second to 2 years and 2 months. On October 2, a Dusseldorf synagogue
sustained minor damage after being firebombed. In December police
arrested two men of Arab origin in connection with the crime.
In June four rightwing youths threw a brick through the window of
an Islamic prayer house in Gera, Thuringia. No one was injured during
the attack, and the youths were arrested and charged shortly
thereafter.
In the July U.S.-German Agreement on the establishment of the
German foundation, ``Remembrance, Responsibility and Future,'' Germany
agreed to ensure that all Holocaust era insurance claims made against
German insurance companies that come within the scope of the
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC)
handling procedures are processed by the companies and the German
Insurance Association on the basis of these procedures.
Scientologists continued to report instances of societal
discrimination (see Section 2.c.). There was no progress during the
year in the investigation of the 1998 bombing of the grave of Heinz
Galinski, chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany until his
death in 1992.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Preliminary Federal Criminal
Office statistics for the year show a 39 percent increase in the
overall number of proven or suspected rightwing crimes compared with
1999, from 10,037 to approximately 14,000, reversing the past several
years' downward trend. Moreover the number of violent rightwing crimes
(including murder, attempted murder, and attacks that result in bodily
injury, arson and bombings) rose more than 12 percent, from 746 in 1999
to 840 during the year, including the beating deaths of at least five
homeless men (See Section 1.a.). In 1999 the number of violent
rightwing crimes rose 5.4 percent.
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC)
reported that 51,400 persons were active in rightwing circles in 1999,
a decrease of 4 percent from 53,600 in 1998. They included 37,000
members of rightwing political parties, 2,200 neo-Nazis, 4,200 members
of other rightwing groups, and some 9,000 violence-prone individuals
(an almost 10 percent increase from 8,200 in 1998). Perpetrators of
rightwing extremist violence were predominantly young, male, and low in
socioeconomic status; they often committed such acts spontaneously and
while inebriated. Most of the violent individuals (85 percent of whom
are ``skinheads'') could best be described as rightwing-oriented,
having loose, if any, practical or ideological ties to organized
extremist groups. As in previous years, the percentage of crimes with
proven or suspected rightwing background was disproportionately high in
the east; the Federal OPC reported that more than half of rightwing
``skinheads'' live in the east, an area with only 21 percent of the
population. In addition to these rightwing extremists, the Federal OPC
estimates that there are some 7,000 violence-prone leftwing extremists,
whose primary targets are their rightwing counterparts.
On June 11, Alberto Adriano, a Mozambican immigrant, was beaten to
death by three rightwing extremists as he walked home through a park at
night in Dessau, Saxony-Anhalt. Three perpetrators were convicted; a
24-year-old defendant was sentenced to life in prison, while two 16-
year-old accomplices were sentenced to 9 years in a youth facility. The
24-year-old and one of the juveniles have appealed their sentences, and
the case continued at year's end.
On July 16, three Kosovar Albanian children were injured when a
firebomb was thrown through the window of the shelter for asylum
seekers where they were staying in Ludwigshafen, Rhineland-Palatinate.
Police arrested four skinheads 4 days later, and they were charged with
the crime.
The Federal Government and state governments remain firmly
committed to combating and preventing rightwing violence. The
Chancellor and leaders of all political parties publicly denounced
rightwing violence after a surge of such activity in the summer months.
In August and in November, Federal and state interior ministers agreed
on a slate of measures to combat extremist violence, which includes
increased physical protection of Jewish and other potential targets,
the creation of a national register of violent rightwing extremists,
stepped up patrolling or video monitoring by the border police in
transit stations, and the prosecution of illegal rightwing content on
the Internet. The Federal Border Police established a hotline for
concerned citizens to report rightwing crimes. The Government also
announced that it would use $34 million (DM 75,000,000) from the
European Union Social Fund for antirightwing initiatives, to be
cofinanced by the states or communities wishing to apply for project
funds. In addition a number of state and local governments initiated
programs to crack down on rightwing extremist activities and to engage
young people considered most ``at risk'' for rightwing behavior.
On August 2, a bomb at a Dusseldorf train station injured 10 recent
Russian immigrants, among them 6 Jews. Because the group followed the
same route each day, police have not ruled out that they were the
specific targets of a xenophobic or anti-Semitic attack. No arrests
have been made in the case.
Isolated attacks targeting Turkish establishments and individuals
occurred. Although some attacks were linked to rightwing perpetrators,
many were attributed to intra-Turkish political or private disputes.
None was directly attributable to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a
banned organization. In August a 43-year-old Kurd was arrested and
indicted for his alleged actions as a PKK functionary, including his
order for Kurdish demonstrators to occupy foreign embassies and
consulates in Germany after the 1999 arrest and return to Turkey of PKK
leader Abdullah Ocalan.
The trial of 11 rightwing extremists charged with the February 1999
death of Algerian asylum seeker Farid Guendoul in Brandenburg ended in
November with the convictions of 8 defendants on charges of negligent
homicide and of all 11 for lesser charges. The suspects were found
guilty of having caused Guendoul's death when they failed to assist him
after he threw himself through a glass door to escape the skinheads,
who were chasing him and yelling, ``Foreigners out!'' Guendoul bled to
death. Of the 11 persons convicted, 10 have appealed their convictions,
while Guendoul's family appealed what they consider the too-lenient
sentences: 3 youths were sentenced to 2 to 3 years' term in a youth
facility while the others received suspended sentences or warnings.
Since its dedication, a memorial to Guendoul has been desecrated a
number of times by suspected rightwing extremists.
Since 1997 the Government has taken steps to protect and foster the
languages and cultures of national and ethnic minorities that
traditionally have lived in the country (e.g., Sorbs, Danes, Roma,
Sinti, and Frisians). Although the Government has recognized the Sinti
and Roma as an official ``national minority'' since 1995, the Federal
and state interior ministries have resisted including Romani among the
languages to be protected under relevant European statutes. Critics
contend that the Sinti/Romani minority is the only official national
minority that does not have unique legal protection, political
privilege, or reserved representation in certain public institutions.
There were no reports of violent anti-Roma or Sinti incidents,
similar to the 1998 desecration of a Magdeburg memorial to Roma and
Sinti murdered during the Nazi era.
Resident foreigners and minority groups continued to voice credible
concerns about societal and job-related discrimination. Unemployment
affects foreigners disproportionately, although this is sometimes due
in part to inadequate language skills or nontransferable professional
qualifications of the job seekers. The Federal Government and all
states have established permanent commissions to assist foreigners in
their dealings with government and society.
On January 1, a new citizenship law came into effect that allows
children born to legal foreign residents to become citizens (see
Section 2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The right to associate freely, choose
representatives, determine programs and policies to represent workers'
interests, and publicize views is recognized by the Basic Law and
freely exercised. About 29 percent of the total eligible labor force
belongs to unions. The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) represents
about 82 percent of organized workers.
The Basic Law provides for the right to strike, except for civil
servants (including teachers) and personnel in sensitive positions,
such as members of the armed forces. In the past, the International
Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the Government's definition of
``essential services'' as overly broad. The ILO was responding to
complaints about sanctions imposed on teachers who struck in the state
of Hesse in 1989 and, earlier, the replacement of striking postal
workers by civil servants. In neither case did permanent job loss
result. The ILO continues to seek clarifications from the Government on
policies and laws governing the labor rights of civil servants.
Compared with previous years, strike activity declined further in
1999. According to preliminary data for 1999, only 2,000 workers
participated in strikes, and only 13,000 work days were lost. There
were no notable strikes during the year.
The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) participates in various
international and European trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Basic Law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and this
right is widely exercised. Due to a well-developed system of autonomous
contract negotiations, mediation is used infrequently. Basic wages and
working conditions are negotiated at the industry level. However, some
firms in the eastern part of the country have refused to join employer
associations or have withdrawn from them and then bargained
independently with workers. Likewise, some firms in the west withdrew
at least part of their work force from the jurisdiction of employer
associations, complaining of rigidities in the industrywide,
multicompany negotiating system. However, they have not refused to
bargain as individual enterprises. The law mandates a system of ``works
councils'' and worker membership on supervisory boards, and thus
workers participate in the management of the enterprises in which they
work. The law thoroughly protects workers against antiunion
discrimination.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Basic Law
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced or bonded child
labor, and there were no reports that it occurred, apart from
trafficking in women and forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
In July agreement was reached among seven nations, German
companies, and victims' representatives on the establishment of a
German foundation which will distribute funds for payments to private
and public sector Nazi era forced/slave laborers and others who
suffered at the hands of German companies during the Nazi era. Germany
and German companies will each contribute $2.3 billion (DM 5 billion)
to the foundation, which is established under German law. The
foundation concluded agreements with partner organizations that are to
receive foundation funds in order to process and pay claims according
to agreed procedures and be subject to audit. Payments are expected to
commence in 2001.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Federal law generally prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 15, with a few exceptions: those 13 or 14 years of age
may do farm work for up to 3 hours per day or may deliver newspapers
for up to 2 hours per day; and those 3 to 14 years of age may take part
in cultural performances, albeit under stringent curbs on the kinds of
activity, number of hours, and time of day. The Federal Labor Ministry
effectively enforces the law through its Factory Inspection Bureau.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or
administratively determined minimum wage. Wages and salaries are set
either by collective bargaining agreements between unions and employer
federations or by individual contracts. Covering about 90 percent of
all wage- and salary-earners, the collective bargaining agreements set
minimum pay rates and are enforceable by law. These minimums provide an
adequate standard of living for workers and their families. The number
of hours of work per week is regulated by contracts that directly or
indirectly affect 80 percent of the working population. The average
workweek for industrial workers is 36 hours in the western part of the
country and about 39 hours in the eastern states.
In September the Federal Constitutional Court refused to review a
case filed by a civil servant in east Berlin, who had argued
unsuccessfully that the prevailing system of different rates of pay for
public service workers in the east and west were unconstitutional. The
Court ruled that lower wages in the east were justifiable due to
differences in the economic situation in both parts of the country and
that the pay gap had narrowed steadily since 1992.
Federal regulations limit the workweek to a maximum of 48 hours.
Provisions for overtime, holiday, and weekend pay vary depending upon
the applicable collective bargaining agreement.
Foreign workers are protected by law and generally receive
treatment equal to that of citizens. However, foreigners who are
employed illegally, particularly in the construction industry in
Berlin, are susceptible to substandard wages. Wage discrimination also
affects legal foreign workers to some extent. For example, foreign
teachers in some schools are paid less than their German counterparts.
In addition seasonal workers from Eastern Europe who come to Germany on
temporary work permits often receive wages below normal German
standards. Furthermore workers from other European Union countries
sometimes are employed at the same wages that they would receive in
their home country, even if the corresponding German worker would
receive a higher wage.
An extensive set of laws and regulations on occupational safety and
health incorporates a growing body of European Union standards. These
provide for the right to refuse to perform dangerous or unhealthy work
without jeopardizing employment. A comprehensive system of worker
insurance carriers enforces safety requirements in the workplace. The
Labor Ministry and its counterparts in the states effectively enforce
occupational safety and health standards through a network of
government bodies, including the Federal Institute for Work Safety. At
the local level, professional and trade associations--self-governing
public corporations with delegates both from the employers and from the
unions--oversee worker safety.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and forced
prostitution are forbidden by law; however, trafficking in women and
girls is a serious problem. The laws against trafficking in women were
modified in 1992 and 1998 to deal more effectively with problems
stemming from the opening of the country's eastern borders; trafficking
in persons is punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment.
Germany is a destination and transit country for trafficked women.
Estimates vary considerably on the number of women and girls trafficked
to and through the country, ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 per year. Most
trafficking victims are women and girls between the ages of 16 and 25
who are forced to work as prostitutes. According to police statistics,
less than + of 1 percent of trafficking victims are men or boys. Of the
women trafficked to the country through fake employment offers,
arranged marriages, fraud, and coercive measures, 80 percent come from
Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, primarily
from Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. The other 20 percent of
trafficking victims come from Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.
The Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly, Women, and Youth
heads an interagency working group to coordinate the efforts of state
and federal agencies to combat trafficking and to aid victims of
trafficking. The Ministry has lobbied states successfully to provide
victims of trafficking who have been detained by police 4 weeks to
leave the country, rather than have them face immediate deportation.
The 4-week grace period allows the victims time to decide whether to
cooperate with police on investigations of those suspected of
trafficking. Those who cooperate, although they are very few in number,
are granted a temporary stay for at least part of the proceedings and
may be eligible for witness protection at the state level. In three
cases during recent years, the children of women in such witness
protection programs were brought to the country to prevent possible
retaliation against them due to their mother's testimony. However,
protection ends once the case is concluded. Trafficking victims who
cannot afford to pay for their return tickets home may be eligible for
state and federal funds for transportation and some pocket money.
The Federal Government has embarked on a multiyear ``Action Plan to
Combat Violence Against Women,'' introduced in December 1999. This
effort includes the creation of a number of combined federal and state
working groups, with the participation of relevant NGO's, to address in
as comprehensive a manner possible legislative changes, public
educational campaigns, and opportunities for greater institutional
cooperation. Under this program, the Government plans to spend
approximately $373,000 (DM 822,000) over 3 years to establish a
``National Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Women and Violence
Against Women in the Migratory Process.'' The Federal Government
continued its funding of six counseling centers for women from Central
and Eastern Europe, and most states and many communities cofinanced
institutions that help counsel and care for victims of trafficking. The
Government publishes a brochure that provides information on residency
and work requirements, counseling centers for women, health care,
warnings about trafficking, and information for sex-industry workers
that is printed in 13 languages and distributed by NGO's and German
Consulates abroad.
__________
GREECE
Greece is a constitutional republic and multiparty parliamentary
democracy in which citizens choose their representatives in free and
fair elections. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won the
majority of parliamentary seats for a second consecutive term in
parliamentary elections held in April. Its leader, Constantine Simitis,
has been Prime Minister since 1996. The New Democracy Party is the main
opposition party. The judiciary is independent.
The national police and security services are responsible for
internal security. Civilian authorities maintain effective control of
all security forces. The police and security services are subject to a
broad variety of restraints. Some members of the police and security
forces nevertheless committed human rights abuses.
Greece has a market economy with a large public sector that
accounts for some 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Residents
enjoy a relatively advanced standard of living. Structural adjustment
funds from the European Union (EU) account for approximately 4 percent
of the country's GDP.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Security force
personnel sometimes abused persons. Overcrowding and harsh living
conditions continued in some prisons. Police sweeps resulted in the
detention of undocumented immigrants under often squalid conditions.
There are legal limits on the freedom of association of ethnic
minorities. Overall, leaders of minority religions noted a general
improvement in government tolerance, but some legal restrictions and
administrative obstacles on freedom of religion persisted. The
Government sometimes placed human rights monitors, including foreign
diplomats, non-Orthodox religious groups, and minority groups under
surveillance. Violence against women and trafficking in women for the
purpose of forced prostitution are problems. Discrimination against
ethnic minorities remained a problem, although it is decreasing.
However, Roma continued to suffer widespread discrimination. Although
it reaffirmed individuals' right of self-identification, the Government
continues formally to recognize as a minority only the Muslim minority
specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. As a result, some individuals
who define themselves as members of a minority find it difficult to
express their identity freely and to maintain their culture, although
problems in this area decreased during the year. Muslims note positive
developments in education and in the living conditions in villages.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government
officials.
In the 1998 case of a Romani man killed by police in Partheni,
Thessaloniki, the policemen were acquitted in March on all charges. The
court found that they fired in self-defense.
In the 1998 case of a foreign student killed by a policeman, the
policeman received a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment for involuntary
manslaughter in November; he has appealed the judgment.
Isolated incidents of terrorism continued during the year. A
British military attache was shot and killed in June by the terrorist
group November 17. The group has claimed responsibility for 22 killings
during the past 25 years, but no one has ever been arrested and charged
in these cases.
There was no resolution of the cases of seven doctors accused of
manslaughter in 1998 in connection with the case of an alleged hostage-
taker in an Athens hospital or of a policeman who in 1996 shot and
killed a Romani man at a roadblock in Livadia.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and a 1984
law (that has never been invoked) makes the use of torture an offense
punishable by a sentence of 3 years' to life imprisonment; however,
security force personnel occasionally abused persons, including Roma
(see Section 5).
In August two foreigners accused police in Crete of mistreatment
while under detention.
The 1998 case of three policemen who allegedly beat two Romani
teenagers was still pending in September 2000 (see Section 5). The 1996
case of five police officers accused of beating an Iraklion man also
remained pending.
In 1997 a man on Rhodes accused three policemen of beating him
while in custody. The three accused officers were charged, but the
charges were dropped later by the prosecutor in December 1999.
Immigrants--mostly Albanian citizens--accused police of physical,
verbal, and other mistreatment (including the confiscation and
destruction of their documents), particularly during police sweeps to
apprehend illegal immigrants (see Section 2.d.).
Numerous anarchist and terrorist groups attacked a wide spectrum of
targets, mostly commercial property, during the year. The firebombing
of vehicles, drive-by shootings of buildings, and bombings at
commercial establishments, mostly late at night, were widespread.
The Ministry of Public Order opened a Bureau of Internal Affairs in
October 1999 to investigate cases of police misbehavior. The Bureau
took several disciplinary measures, including dismissal and suspension,
against officers involved in corruption. The corruption mostly involved
trafficking, bribes for illegal construction, and drugs.
Conditions in some prisons remained harsh due to substantial
overcrowding and outdated facilities. As of July, the Ministry of
Justice reported that the total prison population was 8,131 (of whom
2,775 were foreigners), while the total capacity of the prison system
was 4,825.
Non-EU illegal aliens awaiting deportation at the Drapetsona police
detention center in Piraeus staged another hunger strike in April to
protest what was described by a human rights organization as a ``lack
of adequate exercise, lack of natural daylight, insufficient sanitary
facilities, restriction on visits, inadequate food, severely limited
access to medical treatment, and no access to social services.'' Poor
conditions also were reported at the Amygdaleza detention center for
illegal alien women.
The Ministry of Justice continued its program to improve prison
conditions and expand capacity. Construction is underway on four new
prisons. The Government has been inconsistent in permitting prison
visits by nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). There were no reports
of restricted prison access this year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
requires judicial warrants for all arrests, except during the actual
commission of a crime, and the law prohibits arbitrary arrest orders;
the authorities respected these provisions in practice. The police by
law must bring persons who are detained or arrested before an examining
magistrate within 24 hours. The magistrate must issue a detention
warrant or order the release of the detainee within 3 days, unless
special circumstances require a 2-day extension of this time limit.
Defendants brought to court before the end of the day following the
commission of a charged offense may be tried immediately, under an
``expedited procedure.'' Although legal safeguards, including
representation by counsel, apply in expedited procedure cases, the
short period of time may inhibit defendants' ability to present an
adequate defense. Defendants may ask for a delay to provide time to
prepare their defense, but the court is not obliged to grant it. The
expedited procedure was used in less than 10 percent of misdemeanor
cases; it does not apply in felony cases.
The effective maximum duration of pretrial detention is 18 months
for felonies and 9 months for misdemeanors. Defense lawyers assert that
pretrial detention is exceedingly long and overused by judges. A panel
of judges may grant release pending trial, with or without bail.
Pretrial detainees made up 31 percent of those incarcerated,
contributing to overcrowding, according to government sources. A person
convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment or
less may, at the court's discretion, pay a fine instead of being
imprisoned.
Throughout the year, the police conducted large-scale sweeps and
temporarily detained large numbers of foreigners under often squalid
conditions while determining their residence status (see Section 2.d.).
Some of the foreigners are detained on an indefinite basis with no
judicial review, which, according to the NGO Human Rights Watch,
constitutes arbitrary detention.
Exile is unconstitutional, and no cases have been reported since
the restoration of democracy in 1974. In a significant step, the
Government in 1998 repealed Article 19 of the Citizenship Code, which
permitted it to revoke the citizenship of Greek citizens of non-Greek
ethnic origin who traveled outside Greece. Between 1955 and 1998,
according to then-Minister of Interior Papadopoulos, some 60,000
citizens lost their citizenship under the old law. The 1998 law had no
provision for retroactive application. About 400 individuals who lost
their citizenship in the past under Article 19 continued to reside in
Greece. Following the repeal of Article 19, most of these individuals
were issued identification documents characterizing them as stateless,
but they were permitted to apply to reacquire Greek citizenship. Most
of these 400 persons had not had their applications adjudicated by
year's end (also see Section 2.d.).
Article 20 of the Citizenship Code, which permits the Government to
strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary to the
interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state,'' remained in
force. In the past, this article affected Greek citizens abroad who
asserted a ``Macedonian'' ethnicity. There have been no reports of
Article 20 being invoked by the Government since 1998 (also see Section
2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
independence of the judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
The judicial system includes three levels of civil courts, (first
instance, appeals, and supreme) and three levels of criminal courts
(first instance--divided into misdemeanor and felony divisions,
appeals, and supreme), appointed judges, and an examining magistrate
system, with trials by judicial panels.
The Constitution provides for public trials, unless the court
decides that privacy is required to protect victims and witnesses or
the cases involve national security matters. Defendants enjoy a
presumption of innocence, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the right to present evidence and call witnesses, the right of
access to the prosecution's evidence, the right to cross-examine
witnesses, and the right to counsel. Lawyers are provided to defendants
who are not able to afford legal counsel only in felony cases. Both the
prosecution and the defense may appeal.
Defendants who do not speak Greek have the right to a court-
appointed interpreter. According to several immigrant associations in
Athens, the low fees paid for such work often result in poor
interpretation. Foreign defendants who depend on these interpreters
frequently complain that they do not understand the proceedings of
their trials.
The legal system does not discriminate on the basis of sex,
religion, or nationality; however, there were some exceptions:
nonethnic Greek citizens are prohibited legally from settling in a
large ``supervised zone'' near the frontier (although this prohibition
is not enforced in practice); and a 1939 law (also not enforced in
practice) prohibits the functioning of private schools in buildings
owned by non-Orthodox religious foundations.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits the invasion of privacy and
searches without warrants, and the law permits the monitoring of
personal communications only under strict judicial controls; however,
these safeguards do not appear to be entirely effective. The security
services continued to monitor some human rights groups, such as the
Greek Helsinki Monitor (see Section 4), non-Orthodox religious groups,
minority group representatives, and foreign diplomats who met with such
individuals. Some human rights monitors reported suspicious openings
and diversions of mail. The Government apparently took no steps to stop
such practices or to prosecute those involved.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. Legal restrictions on free speech
nevertheless remain in force.
Articles of the Penal Code that can be used to restrict free speech
and the press include Article 141, which forbids exposing the friendly
relations of the Greek state with foreign states to danger of
disturbance; Article 191, which prohibits spreading false information
and rumors liable to create concern and fear among citizens and cause
disturbances in the country's international relations and inciting
citizens to rivalry and division, leading to disturbance of the peace;
and Article 192, which prohibits inciting citizens to acts of violence
or to disturbing the peace through disharmony among them. Those
convicted in the past were allowed to convert their prison sentences,
up to 3 years, into a fine of approximately $14 (5,000 drachmae) per
day.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), a renowned violinist and a
composer were given prison sentences in March for defamation based on
statements made during newspaper interviews. In such criminal
defamation cases in the past, the defendant typically has been released
on bail pending appeal, and no jail time is ever served. In November
1999, according to HRW, two journalists for Eleftherotypia were
indicted for defamation for alleging that the Lesvos police were
associated with smugglers. Also, in December 1999 an Athens court
convicted Dimitris Rizos, publisher of Adesmeftos Typos, of aggravated
defamation of the publisher of another newspaper with the same name.
In a 1997 case, two journalists were convicted of publishing
classified government documents; their convictions were still under
appeal at the Supreme Court in September 2000.
On matters other than the question of ethnic minorities, there is a
tradition of outspoken public discourse and a vigorous free press.
Satirical and opposition newspapers routinely attack the highest state
authorities. Members of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities
freely publish periodicals and other publications, often in their
native language. The Constitution allows for seizure (though not prior
restraint), by order of the public prosecutor, of publications that
insult the President, offend religious beliefs, contain obscene
articles, advocate violent overthrow of the political system, or
disclose military and defense information. However, seizures are very
rare; none have occurred since 1998.
A Thessaloniki court of first instance ruled in September in favor
of a former Member of Parliament (M.P.), Mimis Androulakis, whose novel
``M to the Power of N'' was banned from circulation in seven northern
prefectures in May as a ``blasphemous'' book because of sexual
connotations regarding the relationship between Christ and Mary
Magdalene. The court ruled that the novel was a ``work of art'' and
thus protected by the Constitution.
The Constitution provides that the state exercise ``immediate
control'' over radio and television. Once the state monopoly on radio
and television ended in 1989, numerous private stations began
operations in an essentially unregulated market while the Government
sought to draft and implement legislation on licensing and frequency
allocations. The National Radio and Television Council (NRTC) has an
advisory role in radio and television licensing, whereas the Ministry
of Press and Mass Media has final authority.
A 1995 law established ownership and technical frequency limits on
electronic media; the Government and media outlets disputed application
procedures and frequency allocations. In December 1998, the Government
passed legislation designed to legalize stations operating with pending
applications; with more applicants than available frequency spectrum,
not all stations will gain licenses. The Government occasionally closes
stations for violating intellectual property rights or interfering with
civil aviation, military, and law enforcement transmissions. In
December 1999, Channel Station 2000, an Evangelical radio station, was
closed. The station's owners stated that the closure was because of
religious content (although other non-Orthodox stations continue to
operate unhindered), whereas the Government asserted that the station's
broadcasts sporadically interfered with military channels. In January
2000, the station legally resumed operation. State-run stations tend to
emphasize the Government's views but also report objectively on other
parties' programs and positions. Private radio and television stations
operate independently of any government control over their reporting.
Turkish-language television programs are available widely via satellite
in Thrace.
The 1998 conviction of Abdulhalim Dede, the Muslim owner of Radio
Isik, for illegal construction of a new radio antenna intended to
extend the range of the station, was upheld on appeal in June. The
court reduced the sentence from 8 to 2 months in jail but suspended
enforcement pending Dede's appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court decided in May 2000 that Abdulhalim Dede did not receive a fair
trial on a fifth charge of illegal construction of a new radio antenna
intended to extend the range of the station. Dede paid a $1,368
(500,000 drachmae) fine in lieu of 2 months jail for his initial
conviction.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice. Police permits are issued routinely for public
demonstrations, and there were no reports that the permit requirement
was abused.
In the spring of 1999, a large number of demonstrations occurred in
Athens and Thessaloniki to protest NATO actions in Kosovo, and
demonstrations took place against the visit of President Clinton in
November 1999. Pro-Serb activists in Thessaloniki continued to
demonstrate against the U.S. periodically, most notably in the spring
of 2000, when U.S. troops travelling to and from the Kosovo
peacekeeping mission were transiting northern Greece. In demonstrations
organized by the Orthodox Church, over 100,000 supporters gathered in
Athens and Thessaloniki in the summer of 2000 to protest the
Government's decision to remove notation of religion on the national ID
card.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, which the
Government respected; however, the courts continue to place legal
restrictions on the names of associations involving ethnic minorities
(see Section 5).
Government authorities legally recognize the existence of the
Muslim minority but contend that other ethnic/linguistic or religious
groups have no legal basis for official recognition as ``minorities.''
The Government has affirmed an individual, but not a collective, right
of self-identification. However, in 1997 it signed (but had not yet
ratified) the European Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes the Eastern
Orthodox Church of Christ (Greek Orthodoxy) as the ``prevailing''
religion; it also provides for the right of all citizens to practice
the religion of their choice; however, while the Government respects
this right, non-Orthodox groups sometimes face administrative obstacles
or legal restrictions on religious practice. The Constitution prohibits
proselytizing and stipulates that non-Orthodox rites of worship may not
disturb public order or offend moral principles.
The Orthodox Church wields significant political and economic
influence. The Ministry of Education and Religion supervises the
Church, and the Government provides some financial support by, for
example, paying the salaries of clergy, subsidizing their religious
training, and financing the construction and maintenance of Orthodox
Church buildings.
The Orthodox Church and the Jewish and Muslim religions are
considered by law to be ``legal persons of public law.'' Other
religions are considered ``legal persons of private law.'' In practice
a primary distinction is that establishment of other religions'
``houses of prayer'' is regulated by the general provisions of the
Civil Code regarding corporations. For example other religions cannot,
as religious entities, own property; the property must belong to a
specifically created legal entity rather than to the church itself. In
practice this places an additional legal and administrative burden on
non-Orthodox religious community organizations. Parliament passed a law
in July 1999 that extended legal recognition to Catholic churches and
related entities established prior to 1946.
Two laws from the late 1930's require recognized or ``known''
religious groups to obtain house of prayer permits from the Ministry of
Education and Religion in order to open houses of worship. By law the
Ministry may base its decision to issue permits on the opinion of the
local Orthodox bishop, but Ministry officials state that they no longer
obtain the opinion of the Orthodox bishop when considering house of
prayer permit applications. According to ministry officials, once a
``known'' religion receives a house of prayer permit, applications for
additional houses of prayer are approved routinely. Minority religious
groups have requested that laws regulating house of prayer permits be
abolished. Many provisions of these laws are not applied in practice,
but local police still have the authority to bring minority churches to
court, as demonstrated in the case of the 16 churches charged but
acquitted on December 12 in Thessaloniki for operating without a house
of prayer permit.
The only recent application for recognition as a known religion at
the Ministry was submitted in February by the Scientologists of Greece.
Although the deadline mandated by law for processing the applications
is 3 months, it took the Ministry until October to decide that it would
not recognize the Scientologist community as an ``official'' religion.
A 1997 tax bill imposed three new taxes on all churches and other
nonprofit organizations. Leaders of some non-Orthodox religious groups
claimed that all taxes on religious organizations were discriminatory,
even those that the Orthodox Church has to pay, since the Government
subsidizes the Orthodox Church while other groups are self-supporting.
The Government also pays the salaries of the two official Muslim
religious leaders and provides them with official vehicles.
Approximately 94 to 97 percent of the country's 10.6 million
citizens adhere at least nominally to the Greek Orthodox faith. With
the exception of the Muslim community (some of whose rights,
privileges, and related government obligations are covered by the 1923
Treaty of Lausanne), the Government does not keep statistics on the
size of religious groups. Ethnic Greeks account for a sizeable
percentage of most non-Orthodox religions. The balance of the
population is composed of Muslims (officially estimated at 98,000
although some Muslims claim up to 110,000 countrywide); accurate
figures for other religions are not available. Protestants, including
evangelicals (approximately 30,000); Jehovah's Witnesses (50,000);
Catholics (50,000); Jews (5,000); plus small congregations of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), Scientologists,
the Baha'i Faith, and other Christian denominations are scattered
throughout the country.
Several religious denominations reported difficulties in dealing
with the authorities on a variety of administrative matters. Privileges
and legal prerogatives granted to the Greek Orthodox Church are not
extended routinely to other recognized religions. The non-Greek
Orthodox churches must make separate and lengthy applications to
government authorities on such matters as gaining permission to move
places of worship to larger facilities. In contrast Greek Orthodox
officials have an institutionalized link between the church hierarchy
and the Ministry of Education and Religion to handle administrative
matters.
The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which is still in force, gives Muslims
in Western Thrace the right to maintain social and charitable
organizations (``wakfs'') and provides for muftis (Islamic judges and
religious leaders with limited civic responsibilities) to render
religious judicial services.
The Muslim population, concentrated in Western Thrace with small
communities in Rhodes, Kos, and Athens, is composed mainly of ethnic
Turks but also includes Pomaks and Roma. The approximately 10,000
member Muslim community in Athens (composed primarily of economic
migrants from Thrace) has no mosque or state-appointed cleric to
officiate at various religious functions, including funerals. Members
of the Muslim community often transport their deceased back to Thrace
for religious burials. In June the Parliament approved a bill allowing
construction of the first Islamic cultural center and mosque in the
Athens area. According to official sources, a total of 287 mosques
operate freely in Western Thrace and others on the islands of Rhodes
and Kos. Construction of a long-delayed mosque in Kimmeria, Thrace was
completed in 1998, although its minaret remained unfinished. The issue
is one of local sensitivities rather than religious motivation, and the
religious operation of the mosque has not been affected.
Differences remain within the Muslim community and between segments
of the community and the Government over the means of selection of
muftis. Under a 1991 law, the Government appointed two muftis and one
assistant mufti, all resident in Thrace. The appointments to 10-year
terms were based on the recommendations of a committee of Muslim
notables selected by the Government. The Government argued that it must
appoint the muftis because, in addition to their religious duties, they
perform judicial functions in civil and domestic matters under Muslim
religious law, for which the State pays them.
Some Muslims accept the authority of the two officially appointed
muftis; other Muslims, with support from Turkey, have ``elected'' two
different muftis to serve their communities (although there is no
established procedure or practice for election). The courts repeatedly
have convicted (14 times in 5 years) one of the elected muftis for
usurping the authority of the official mufti. All of the respective
sentences remain suspended pending appeal. The other elected mufti, who
was convicted in 1991 of usurping the authority of the official mufti,
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. In December 1999, the
Court ruled that the conviction violated his freedom of religion and
self-expression, but it did not rule on the question of his legal
status as mufti.
Controversy between the Muslim community and the Government also
continues over the management and self-government of the wakfs,
regarding the appointment of officials as well as the degree and type
of administrative control. A 1980 law placed the administration of the
wakfs in the hands of the appointed muftis and their representatives.
In response to objections from some Muslims that this arrangement
weakened the financial autonomy of the wakfs and violated the terms of
the Treaty of Lausanne, a 1996 presidential decree put the wakfs under
the administration of a committee for 3 years as an interim measure
pending the resolution of outstanding problems. The interim period was
extended indefinitely in 1999.
Muslim activists complained that the Government regularly lodges
tax liens against the wakfs although they are in theory tax-free
religious foundations. Under a national land and property registry law
that came into full effect in January 1999, the wakfs, as with all
property holders, must register all of their property with the
Government. The law permits the Government to seize any property that
owners are not able to document; there are built-in reporting and
appeals procedures. The wakfs were established in 1560; however, due to
the destruction of files during the two world wars, the wakfs are
unable to document ownership of much of their property. They have not
registered the property, so they cannot pay assessed taxes. To date the
Government has not sought to enforce either the assessments or the
registration requirement.
Protestant groups constitute the second largest religious group
after the Greek Orthodox Church. Some groups, such as the evangelicals
and Jehovah's Witnesses, consist almost entirely of ethnic Greeks.
Other groups, such as the Latter-Day Saints and Anglicans, consist of
an approximately equal number of ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks. Non-
Greek citizen clergy reported difficulty renewing their visas during
the year because the Government does not have a distinct visa category
for religious workers. The Government, by virtue of the Orthodox
Church's status as the prevailing religion, recognizes de facto its
canon law. The Catholic Church in 1999 unsuccessfully sought government
recognition of its canon law (the official ``constitution'' of the
Church).
As part of new obligations under the Schengen Treaty and the Treaty
of Amsterdam, all non-European Union citizens face a more restrictive
visa and residence regime than they did in the past.
Although Jehovah's Witnesses are recognized as a ``known''
religion, they continued to face some harassment in the form of
arbitrary identity checks (although reduced from 1998), difficulties in
burying their dead, and local officials' resistance to their
construction of churches (which in most cases was resolved quickly and
favorably). In Thessaloniki in late 1999, the Government Tax Office
refused to recognize Jehovah's Witnesses as a nonprofit association and
imposed an inheritance tax for property willed to them. The individuals
appealed the decision in 2000, and byyear's end, the case still was
pending. In 1999 a European Court of Human Rights case was resolved
when the Government admitted surveillance of an adherent and promised
that it would never conduct surveillance of Jehovah's Witnesses again.
In previous years, the armed forces consistently refused to exempt
Jehovah's Witnesses' clergy from mandatory military service. In 1998 a
law providing an alternative form of mandatory national service for
conscientious objectors took effect. All clergy now are exempt from any
service. The law provides that conscientious objectors may work in
state hospitals or municipal services for 36 months. Conscientious
objector groups characterized the legislation as a positive first step
but criticized the 36-month alternative service term, which is double
the regular 18-month period of military service.
Evangelical parishes are located throughout the country. Members of
missionary faiths report difficulties due to constitutional and legal
prohibitions on proselytizing. Church officials express concern that
antiproselytizing laws remain on the books, although such laws no
longer hinder their ministering to the poor and to children. In
December 1999, the Government, applying legislation covering radio and
television broadcasts, shut down an evangelical radio station over a
technical issue on transmission frequency; however, the station resumed
operation legally a few months later once the case was adjudicated.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has about 80
missionaries in the country each year, for approximately 2year terms.
Church leaders report that their permanent members (nonmissionaries) do
not encounter discriminatory treatment. However, the police
occasionally detained Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses (on average every
2 weeks) after receiving complaints that individuals were engaged in
proselytizing. In most cases, these Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses
were held for several hours at a police station and then released with
no charges filed. Many reported that they were not allowed to call
their lawyers and that they were verbally abused by police officers for
their religious beliefs. In 1998 the European Court of Human Rights
found the Government in violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights for convicting Protestants of proselytizing in past cases. There
were no proselytizing-related court cases during the year.
Scientologists, most of whom are located in the Athens area,
practice their faith through a registered nonprofit philosophical
organization. According to the president of the Greek Scientologists,
the group chose to register as a philosophical organization because
legal counsel advised that the Government would not recognize
Scientology as a religion. In a step toward gaining recognition as a
religion, Scientologists reapplied for a house of prayer permit in
February. The application was rejected by the Ministry of Education and
Religious Affairs on October 17 on the grounds that Scientology ``is
not a religion.''
The Bishop of Athens heads the Roman Catholic Holy Synod. CARITAS,
a charitable organization, and the Missionaries of Charity (Mother
Teresa's order of nuns) also operate in the country. Legal recognition
of the Catholic archdiocese of Athens, earlier denied, was granted in
July 1999. The Jewish community numbers approximately 5,000 adherents;
the majority live in the Athens and Thessaloniki regions. In October
1999, a rededication of a synagogue in Hania, Crete as a house of
prayer and a cultural center was marred by public criticism of the
event by the regional governor. The Minister of National Education and
Religion, and other government and Greek Orthodox officials lent their
support to the rededication.
Religious instruction in Orthodoxy in public primary and secondary
schools is mandatory for all Greek Orthodox students. Non-Orthodox
students are exempt from this requirement. However, Jehovah's Witnesses
have reported some past instances of discrimination related to
attendance at religious education classes or other celebrations of
religious or nationalistic character. Members of the Muslim community
in Athens are lobbying for Islamic religious instruction for their
children. The neighborhood schools offer no alternative supervision for
the children during the period when religious issues are taught. The
community has complained that this forces the parents to have their
children attend Orthodox religious instruction by default.
The Government decided in the summer to remove the notation of
religious affiliation on national identity cards. This sparked a
national debate on the role of the Church in society. For example, the
issue led Archbishop Christodoulos to organize religious protest
rallies in Thessaloniki and Athens in June. Both demonstrations drew
over 100,000 supporters. Archbishop Christodoulos vociferously
criticized the Government and has started collecting signatures to
petition the Government to allow religious affiliation as an option on
national identity cards.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. Unlike
in the past, there were no reports of assertions by Muslim leaders that
the Government routinely withheld permission from Muslims seeking to
change their legal residence, which determines where they vote, from
rural to urban communities within western Thrace or from elsewhere in
Greece to Thrace.
A section of the Citizenship Code, Article 20, permits the
Government to strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary
to the interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state.'' While
the law as written applies equally to all Greeks regardless of ethnic
background, to date it has been enforced, in all but one case, only
against citizens who identified themselves as members of the
``Macedonian'' minority. The Government has not revealed the number of
Article 20 cases that it pursued. There were no reports of such cases
during the year. Dual citizens who are stripped of Greek citizenship
under Article 20 sometimes are prevented from entering the country
using the passport of their second nationality.
The Government offers asylum under the terms of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It
cooperates with the local office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). In June 1999, a presidential decree took effect that
significantly expanded the rights of asylum seekers and brought the law
into compliance with UNHCR minimum standards on asylum procedures.
UNHCR commented on its good relations with police during the year. The
Government did not forcibly deport refugees during the year to
countries where they feared persecution.
Individuals recognized as refugees under the terms of the U.N.
convention are eligible for the residence and work permits that are
necessary to settle permanently. In the first 6 months of 2000, 1,295
individuals submitted applications for refugee status; 132 individuals
were recognized as refugees. Another 43 were granted temporary
residence on humanitarian grounds until return to their countries
becomes possible. The remaining 1,120 cases were pending.
The Government usually does not recognize the concept of first
asylum rights for refugees. UNHCR has expressed its concern over the
fact that very few applicants are granted asylum on first application
to the authorities; most who are granted asylum succeed on their second
try, when UNHCR participates. Interpretation services are lacking, as
are adequate personnel who would ensure timely access to the asylum
process for all those who seek it. UNHCR also has expressed its concern
that there exists no publicly funded legal aid system for free
counseling to asylum seekers and refugees.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that thousands of individuals from
Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran enter the country illegally each
year; only a small percentage eventually apply for official refugee
status. Some of those who do not apply remain illegally, often living
in camps or in NGO shelters where conditions range from adequate to
very poor. Others proceed to Western Europe, often applying for asylum
there. In January an accident involving a truck that carried 80
smuggled persons from Turkey killed 6 of them and wounded several
dozen. Other accidental deaths occurred in similar circumstances. In
the largest immigrant smuggling operation ever reported, a Turkish ship
carrying 655 illegal migrants bound for Italy was seized off Chios on
October 20. The applications of those aboard who wanted to apply for
asylum were being processed; none were forcibly deported. The
Government usually does not seek out such individuals for deportation;
since Greece and Turkey do not have a readmission agreement, the
Government finds it practically impossible to deport formally
individuals who enter Greece from Turkey.
Deportations of both illegal and legal immigrants, abusive
treatment by police, and inconsistencies and inequities in the way
employers provide wages and benefits were common. The police conducted
many large-scale sweeps of neighborhoods populated by immigrants,
temporarily detaining large numbers of individuals while determining
their residence status. The detainees were held in squalid conditions:
A report by Human Rights Watch in December cited severe overcrowding
and a lack of sufficient exercise, sleeping accommodations, adequate
food, or medical care. The only government-funded center for asylum
seekers is old and in need of repair.
The Organization for the Employment of Human Resources (OAED), a
government agency, reported that by 2000, 386,000 illegal aliens, out
of an estimated total alien population of 700,000, had applied for
legal status or a ``white card,'' under a program designed to
regularize the residency status of illegal, (usually economic)
immigrants. A few, mostly Albanian, white card holders were able to
meet all the requirements of the law and receive a ``green card,''
which serves as a residence permit and allows the immigrants to live
and work in the country for a limited period of time. OAED issued
159,807 green cards by July. Some 80 percent of the green cards issued
so far are of 1-year duration. A new application is required to extend
the card for an additional year. Holders of a white card may reside and
work legally on a short-term basis while meeting the other requirements
necessary to obtain a green card. Press reports cite the obstacles of a
complex bureaucracy and the unwillingness of employers to pay social
security contributions as primary reasons for the limited ability of
white cardholders to advance to the green card application process. The
OAED estimated that out of a total of 386,000 white cardholders in
1998, 163,000 simply dropped out of the green card application process.
Legislation provides for the green card program to remain in effect
until the end of 2001. Atyear's end the Government proposed a bill to
establish a new legalization process. Press reports estimated that it
would take 3 years just to process the applications already submitted.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Greece is a multiparty democracy whose Constitution provides for
full political rights for all citizens and for the peaceful change of
governments and of the Constitution. The Government headed by Prime
Minister Constantine Simitis of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) won in free and fair elections in September 1996 and again in
April 2000. Parliament elects the President for a 5-year term. Voting
is mandatory for those over age 18, but there are many conditions that
allow citizens not to vote, and penalties are not applied in practice.
Members of the unicameral 300-seat Parliament are elected to maximum 4-
year terms by secret ballot. Opposition parties function freely and
have broad access to the media.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although no
legal restrictions hinder their participation, and their numbers are
slowly increasing. During the year, women held 2 of 20 ministerial
positions in the Government and 3 of 29 subministerial positions. Of
the 300 members elected to Parliament in April, 31 were women.
While the Government generally respects citizens' political rights,
there are occasionally charges that it limits the right of some
individuals to speak publicly and associate freely on the basis of
their self-proclaimed ethnic identity, thus impinging on the political
rights of such persons. However, in the 2000 parliamentary elections,
one Muslim was elected in Thrace, from PASOK. A second Muslim became a
Member of Parliament (M.P.) in September after winning a court
challenge to the eligibility of the seated M.P. for violating a
constitutional provision.
Romani representatives report that local authorities sometimes have
deprived Roma of the right to vote by refusing to register them.
However, Romani activists also report that some municipalities
encourage Roma to register. Municipalities can refuse to register Roma
who do not fulfill basic residency requirements, which many Roma have
trouble meeting.
In 1996 the Government transferred responsibility for oversight of
all rights provided to the Muslim minority under the Treaty of Lausanne
(including education, zoning, administration of the wakfs, and trade)
from elected local governors to a government-appointed regional
administrative official, the periferiarch of Eastern Macedonia and
Thrace. Some minority members charged that the transfer reduced their
ability to use the democratic process to influence decisions that
affect them. The Government stated that it made the change because the
central authorities could administer Greece's treaty obligations more
effectively. In 1994 the Government set up a system to elect nomarchs
to govern at the provincial level. These officials work in close
cooperation with both elected mayors and local leaders (Christian and
Muslim). Members of the Muslim community noted that this
decentralization has been a positive factor in local and regional
development.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government allows domestic human rights organizations to
operate, but cooperation with them varies. The security services on
occasion monitor contacts of human rights groups, including listening
in on conversations held between those groups and human rights
investigators and diplomats and questioning contacts (see Section
1.f.). Monitors view this surveillance as a form of intimidation that
deters others from meeting with investigators.
The government ombudsman's office, which opened in 1998, received
781 complaints in the first 8 months of the year directly related to
human rights issues, of which 455 were processed. Human rights cases
constituted 26 percent of all cases, an increase of 30 percent compared
with the full year in 1999. The office has proved to be an effective
means for resolving human rights and religious freedom concerns.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law irrespective
of nationality, race, language, religious or political belief; however,
government respect for these rights in practice was uneven.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The incidence of
violence against women reported to the authorities is low; however, the
General Secretariat for Equality of the Sexes (GSES), an independent
government agency that operates the only shelter for battered women in
Athens, believes that the actual incidence is ``high.'' According to
press and academic estimates, there were approximately 4,500 cases of
rape in 1999. Reportedly only 6 to 10 percent of the victims contact
the police, and only a small fraction of the cases reaches trial.
Conviction rates on rape charges are low for first time accused, but
sentences are harsh for repeat offenders. Spousal rape is a crime.
The GSES asserts that police tend to discourage women from pursuing
domestic violence charges and instead undertake reconciliation efforts.
The GSES also claims that the courts are lenient when dealing with
domestic violence cases. GSES, in cooperation with the Ministry of
Public Order, continued during the year training courses begun in 1999
for police personnel on how to treat domestic violence victims.
Facilities for battered women and their children often are staffed
inadequately to handle cases properly. Two government shelters provide
relevant services in Athens and Piraeus, including legal and
psychological advice. Battered women also can go to state hospitals and
regional health centers. In June the Secretariat started operating a
24-hour emergency telephone hot line for abused women to call for help.
An interministerial committee composed of the GSES, the Ministry of
Public Order, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Ministry of
Justice, was established in 1999 to focus on women's issues.
Prostitution is legal. Prostitutes must register at the local
police station and carry a medical card that is updated every 2 weeks.
While the number of Greek women entering the profession has declined
steadily over the years, according to the police and academic sources,
trafficking in women for prostitution, mostly from the former Soviet
republics, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, has increased sharply in
recent years (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). It is estimated that fewer
than 1,000 prostitutes are ethnic Greeks, and approximately 20,000 are
of foreign origin--most in the country illegally.
Most prostitutes who are arrested are foreigners who are
apprehended for noncompliance with legal requirements. While national
data on such arrests is not available, police reports estimate that
4,197 women were arrested for prostitution from December 1998 through
December 2000. A total of 1,693 were arrested during 2000, compared
with 2,267 in 1999. Media reports implicated several police officers as
participants in prostitution rings. The press alleged on a number of
occasions that police accepted bribes from traffickers or pimps or
forced illegal immigrants to have sex with them and then channeled them
into prostitution rings. The vice squad unit of the police was
disbanded for a couple of weeks in 1998 in part as a result of these
allegations.
Trade unions report that lawsuits for sexual harassment are very
rare: according to the unions, only four women have filed such charges
in the past 3 years. In all four cases, the courts reportedly imposed
very lenient civil sentences. The General Confederation of Greek
Workers (GSEE) women's section reports that sexual harassment is a
widespread phenomenon, but that women are discouraged from filing
charges against perpetrators by family members and coworkers since they
believe they might be socially stigmatized.
Women enjoy broad constitutional and legal protection, including
equal pay for equal work. However, the National Statistical Service's
most recent data, for the fourth quarter of 1998, show that women's
salaries in manufacturing were 71 percent of those of men in comparable
positions; in retail sales, women's salaries were 88 percent of those
of men in comparable positions.
Although relatively few women occupy senior positions, in recent
years women entered traditionally male-dominated occupations such as
the legal and medical professions in larger numbers. However, women
still face discrimination when they are considered for promotions in
both the public and private sectors. Women also are underrepresented in
labor unions' leadership. According to the women's section of the GSEE,
58.6 percent of the country's long-term unemployed are women, while
women constitute only 38 percent of the work force. To ameliorate the
situation, the GSES established two regional employment offices for
women in Thessaloniki and Patras. It also continued to provide
vocational training programs for unemployed women and programs to
reinforce entrepreneurship, subsidies to women for setting up an
enterprise, information and counseling to unemployed women, and created
childcare facilities to assist unemployed women to attend training
courses and look for a job.
Children.--The Government is committed to providing adequate basic
health and education services for children. Education is compulsory
through the ninth grade, but the legislation does not provide for
enforcement or penalties. University education is public and free.
Several government organizations have responsibility for children's
issues. The National Welfare Organization, which has a nationwide
network of offices, is active in the field of child protection. A 1998
law combined the National Welfare Organization with two similar
entities in 1999 to provide better services. The services of the new
organization were regionalized to provide greater access to child
welfare services and funding prioritized according to regional needs.
Penal law prohibits the mistreatment of children and sets penalties
for violators, while welfare legislation provides for preventive and
treatment programs for abused children and for children deprived of a
family environment; it also seeks to ensure the availability of
alternative family care or institutional placement.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. No national data
exist on the incidence of child abuse; authorities other than police
are not required to report such cases. In a 10-year clinical study of
200 cases of abused children, the Institute of Child Health (ICH)
reports that 59.5 percent involved physical abuse, 20 percent involved
neglect, and 21 percent involved children who were not abused at the
time but had a history of abuse. (The study did not cover victims of
sexual abuse.) An ICH prevalence study of child sexual abuse among 740
university students revealed an incidence rate of 7 percent among boys
and 17 percent among girls prior to age 18. Societal abuse of children
in the form of pornography and child labor is rare. Child prostitution
is a growing phenomenon, particularly in some parts of immigrant
communities of central Athens.
Children's rights advocacy groups claim that the protection of
high-risk children in state residential care centers is inadequate and
of low quality. They cite lack of coordination between welfare services
and the courts, inadequate funding of the welfare system, and poor
staffing of residential care centers as systemic weaknesses in the
treatment of child abuse. Many NGO's make honest efforts to cover the
gap, but they are not manned by professionals, lack supervision from
the State, and do not have built-in evaluation systems. Two municipal
shelters for battered children opened in Athens in 1999. Child health
specialists note that the number of children in residential care
facilities is decreasing, while the number in foster care is rising.
Child health specialists say that some social groups, such as Roma and
illegal immigrants, are underserved.
In recent years, the number of street children who panhandle or
peddle at city intersections on behalf of adult family members or for
criminal gangs increased. According to the Ministry of Public Order, 78
percent of these children are Albanian, 12 percent are from other
Balkan countries, and 10 percent are Romani. The Government implemented
measures to combat this phenomenon, which included the institutional
placement of children up to 12 years old, therapeutic consultations
with their families, and the deportation of juveniles 12 to 17 year
old. Street children are rounded up regularly by police. However, it is
believed widely that even those who were deported managed to return
eventually.
In August police detained a group of 35 Roma children from Albania,
between the ages of 3 months and 11 years old, who were begging or
being exploited by beggars in the streets. Police apprehended 20
adults, identified as parents. Police believe that this was the largest
child exploitation ring ever uncovered in the country. The group of
Roma was deported. A children's NGO, A Child's Smile, claims that many
street children are victims of abuse. Based on the findings of a study
it carried out in Thessaloniki in 1999, the majority of street children
are between the ages of 8 and 14. Some 60 percent of the children are
from Albania, and most have been separated from their parents, who
remain in their native country. They are brought to Greece by someone
posing as their guardian or parent. In most cases, their parents, faced
with extreme financial difficulties in Albania, agreed to send their
child to Greece in exchange for a small percentage of the monthly
earnings.
People with Disabilities.--Legislation mandates the hiring of
disabled persons in public and private enterprises that employ more
than 50 persons. However, the law reportedly is enforced poorly,
particularly in the private sector. The law states that disabled
persons should account for 3 percent of staff in private enterprises.
In the civil service, 5 percent of administrative staff and 80 percent
of telephone operator positions are reserved for disabled persons.
Recent legislation mandates the hiring of disabled persons in the
public sector from a priority list. The disabled are exempt from the
civil service exam. Persons with disabilities have been appointed to
important positions in the civil service.
The Construction Code mandates physical access for disabled persons
to private and public buildings, but this law, too, is enforced poorly.
A 1997 survey showed that over 60 percent of public buildings are not
accessible to persons with mobility problems. Ramps and special curbs
for the disabled have been constructed on some Athens streets and at
some public buildings, and sound signals have been installed at some
city street crossings. Since 1993 the Government has been replacing old
city buses with new ones designed to accommodate the disabled. The new
Athens subway lines provide full access for the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Greeks tend to link religious affiliation
very closely to ethnicity. In the minds of many Greeks, an ethnic Greek
is also Orthodox Christian. Non-Orthodox citizens have complained of
being treated with suspicion or told that they were not truly Greek
when they revealed their religious affiliation. Non-Orthodox citizens
also have claimed that they face career limits within the military and
the civil service due to their religions.
In the military, generally only members of the Greek Orthodox faith
become officers, leading some members of other faiths to declare
themselves Orthodox. Only two Muslim officers have advanced to the rank
of reserve officer.
Although in the past there have been numerous cases of
discriminatory denial of Muslim applications for business licenses,
tractor ownership, or property construction, both Muslim and Christian
leaders report that these discriminatory practices have ended.
Members of minority faiths have reported incidents of societal
discrimination, such as local bishops warning parishioners not to visit
clergy or members of minority faiths and neighbors requesting that the
police arrest missionaries for proselytizing. Some non-Orthodox
religious communities believe that they have been unable to communicate
with officials of the Orthodox Church and claim that the attitude of
the Orthodox Church toward their faiths has increased social
intolerance towards their religions. The Orthodox Church has issued a
list of practices and religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses,
Evangelical Protestants, Scientologists, Mormons, Baha'is, and others,
which it believes to be sacrilegious. In 1999 there was an incident in
which local Orthodox clergy and local government officials mobilized to
demolish a government-approved house of prayer in the process of
construction by Jehovah's Witnesses in Halkidiki in northern Greece.
The incident was resolved swiftly through the intervention of police
forces. Officials of the Orthodox Church have acknowledged that they
refuse to enter into dialog with religious groups considered harmful to
Greek Orthodox worshipers; church leaders instruct Orthodox Greeks to
shun members of these faiths.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--An increase in xenophobia
paralleled an increase in the number of non-Greeks living and working
in the country. Antiforeigner sentiment is directed mainly at Albanians
(who make up over three-fifths of the alien population). Landlords in
Athens and other parts of the country routinely refuse to rent to
Albanians, even to that country's diplomats.
Significant numbers of Greek citizens identify themselves as Turks,
Pomaks, Vlachs, Roma, Arvanites (Orthodox Christians who speak a
dialect of Albanian), or ``Macedonians'' or ``Slavomacedonians.'' Most
are integrated fully into society. The Government formally recognizes
only the ``Muslim minority'' specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,
although it stated publicly in August 1999 that members of that
minority could identify themselves individually as belonging to
different ethnic groups. However, the Government failed to acknowledge
formally the existence of non-Muslim ethnic groups, principally
Slavophones, under the term ``minority.'' As a result, some individuals
who define themselves as members of a minority find it difficult to
express their identity freely and to maintain their culture. Most of
the Muslim minority (officially estimated to number 98,000) are
ethnically Turkish or Turcophone and live in Western Thrace. The Muslim
minority also includes Pomaks and Roma. Many Greek Muslims, including
Pomaks, identify themselves as Turks and say that the Muslim minority
as a whole has a Turkish cultural consciousness. While use of the terms
``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos'' (``Turk'' and ``Turkish'') is prohibited
in titles of organizations, individuals legally may call themselves
``Tourkos.'' To most Greeks, the words ``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos''
connote Turkish identity or loyalties, and many object to their use by
Greek citizens of Turkish origin. The 8month prison sentence of a dozen
Muslim teachers, convicted in 1996 for using the name ``Turkish
Teachers of Western Thrace'' in a union document, remained suspended
pending appeal. In December the Supreme Court overturned an appeals
court decision that upheld a 1986 trial court's order to close the
``Turkish Union of Xanthi'' because of the use of the word ``Turkish''
in the organization's name. The Supreme Court stated that the court's
decision should be based on the organization's activities and not its
name, and it therefore ordered the appeals court to review the case.
The Treaty of Lausanne provides that the Muslim minority has the
right to Turkish-language education, with a reciprocal entitlement for
the Greek minority in Istanbul (now reduced to about 3,000 persons).
Western Thrace has both Koranic and secular Turkish-language schools.
Under a 1952 educational protocol, Greece and Turkey may exchange
annually 35 teachers on a reciprocal basis for service in Istanbul and
Western Thrace. Due to the dwindling needs of the small and aging Greek
population in Istanbul, in recent years the Greek side limited the
exchanges to 16 teachers per country. There were no complaints during
the year from Muslim leaders about bureaucratic barriers preventing
Turkish teachers from working in Thrace.
In 1999 the Government approved 19 Turkish textbooks for use in the
secular Turkish-language schools (referred to as ``minority'' schools
in Thrace). Under a 1960 bilateral protocol, Turkey provides copies of
the approved texts for use in the schools of Western Thrace. The books
arrived in May 2000.
In Western Thrace over 8,000 Muslim children attended Turkish-
language primary schools. An additional 150 attended 2 bilingual middle
schools with a religious curriculum. Approximately 700 attended
Turkish-language secondary schools, and approximately 1,300 attended
Greek-language secondary schools. In the past, many Muslims reportedly
went to high school in Turkey due to both the limited number of places
in the Turkish-language secondary schools, which are assigned by
lottery, and parent preference. However, the lottery system was not
used during the year, and all students who applied were admitted. In
1999 the Government instituted an European Union-funded program for
teaching Greek as a second language to Muslim children, primarily for
those students in the Greek-language public schools, to improve their
academic performance and chance of obtaining postsecondary education in
Greece. In addition the Government offered further opportunities for
minority students to learn Greek through preschool, kindergarden,
afterschool, and summer school courses.
Government incentives encourage Muslim and Christian educators to
reside and teach in isolated villages. However, in a 1999 law, the
Government cancelled the program of incentives for Christian educators
teaching temporarily in minority schools. Teachers Union
representatives complained that the move would discourage Christians
from seeking temporary teaching positions in minority schools. The law
permits the Minister of Education to give special consideration to
Muslims for admission to universities and technical institutes.
Universities and technical institutes are required to create a certain
number of places for Muslim students each year; 400 spaces were
available for the 2000-2001 school year. Under this law, 123 Muslim
students entered Greek universities and technical institutes during
1999. Approximately 1,700 other Muslim students entered via the
national examination process open to all Greeks and were attending
universities and technical schools.
The rate of employment of Muslims in the public sector and in
state-owned industries and corporations is much lower than the Muslim
percentage of the population. Muslims in Western Thrace claim that they
are hired only for lower level, part-time work. The Government claims
and Muslims and Christians note that a lack of fluency in written and
spoken Greek and the need for university degrees for high-level
positions limit the number of Muslims eligible for government jobs.
Public offices in Thrace do their business in Greek; the courts
provide interpreters as needed. Since 1998 there have been no claims of
discrimination against Muslims who apply for business licenses, tractor
ownership, or property construction. Muslims and Christians in Thrace
commended the Government for the basic public services (electricity,
water, and telephone) provided to Muslim villages in recent years.
Other than in one multicultural elementary education ``pilot
school,'' the Government does not provide instruction in Greek as a
second language to Turcophone children in the Athens area. Muslim
parents report that their children are unable to succeed in school as a
result of this policy. The Government maintains that Muslims outside
Thrace are not covered by the Treaty of Lausanne and therefore do not
enjoy those rights provided by the treaty.
Unlike in the past, there were no reports of assertions by Muslim
leaders that the Government routinely withheld permission from Muslims
seeking to change their legal residence, which determines where they
vote, from rural to urban communities within western Thrace or from
elsewhere in Greece to Thrace.
The Government refuses to acknowledge formally the existence and
``minority'' status of ethnic/linguistic groups, such as Vlachs and
Slavophones, other than the Muslim minority specified in the Treaty of
Lausanne. As a result some individuals who define themselves as members
of a minority find it difficult to express their identity freely and to
maintain their culture.
Northwestern Greece is home to an indeterminate number (estimates
range widely, from under 10,000 to 50,000 or more) of citizens who
still speak at home a Slavic dialect, particularly in Florina province.
A small number of them identify themselves as belonging to a distinct
ethnic group and assert their right to ``Macedonian'' minority status.
Their assertions generate strong objections among the 2.2 million non-
Slavophone Greek inhabitants of the northern Greek region of Macedonia,
who use the same term to identify themselves. The Government will not
recognize the Slavic dialect as a ``Macedonian'' language distinct from
Bulgarian. Members of the minority assert that the Government pursues a
policy designed to discourage use of their dialect. Government
sensitivity on this issue stems from concern that members of the
``Macedonian'' minority may have separatist aspirations. Greece's
dispute with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over that
country's name heightened this sensitivity. Complaints of government
harassment and intimidation directed against these persons decreased
significantly since 1998 and ceased in 2000.
In July 1999, three Muslim Members of Parliament and a number of
Greek human rights organizations issued a letter calling on the
Government to recognize legally the right of self-identification for
members of all minorities, including the Muslim and ``Macedonian''
minorities. Senior government officials in August 1999 reaffirmed an
individual, but not a collective, right of self-identification.
Roma continued to face discrimination from some local authorities
and society at large. The Prime Minister's Office for Quality of Life,
responsible for coordinating government projects for Roma, estimates
the total Romani population to be 150,000 to 200,000. Nonofficial
sources estimate the total at 250,000 to 300,000. Most of the Roma in
Western Thrace are Muslims; elsewhere the majority are Greek Orthodox.
Many Roma are settled permanently, mainly in the Athens area. Others
are either mobile, working mainly as agricultural laborers, peddlers,
and musicians throughout the country, or live in camps. The number of
Roma who move around the country is decreasing gradually as families
settle mainly into slums and camps around major cities. There are
approximately 70 Romani camps with a total camp population between
100,000 and 120,000 persons.
At a September 1999 Implementation Review Meeting in Vienna of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Greek
delegation recognized that the situation of Roma in Greece was
``unsatisfactory and unacceptable'' and committed the Government to
remedy the situation. Government representatives identified as
impediments to progress the lack of a unified voice from the Roma
community and the widespread social prejudice against them.
In 1999 the Ministry of Interior completed a survey on the housing
needs of the Roma; in March 2000 it established an interministerial
committee to coordinate government action for them. Most Romani camps
have no running water or electricity, much less garbage disposals or
sewage treatment. Local authorities harass and threaten to evict Roma
from their camps. The Roma of Tyrnavos, Thessaly, attempted to build
their own lavatories in order to improve their living conditions, but
local authorities pulled them down and imposed fines for violating
construction codes. The Ministry of Defense allocated land in 1999 and
houses in December 2000 at a former army camp (Gonou) for the Roma of
Evosmos, Thessaloniki, to occupy. (The 3,500 Roma were evicted in 1998
from their homes of some 30 years and then evicted from 4 other sites
in the following 15 days.)
The NGO Greek Helsinki Monitor reported that many communities of
Roma tent-dwellers were evicted or threatened with eviction during the
year. A number of evictions took place in Athens from the location that
will host the 2004 Olympics. In August 1999, local authorities evicted
30 Roma families from an area in Ioannina, which they had been renting
for 7 years. In June 2000, the municipal authority of Nea Kios,
Peloponnese, issued a decision to evict all 300 Roma from the region
because the municipality claimed that the Roma contributed to the high
crime rate. Police were asked to take action and implement the decision
within 48 hours. A Roma hut was set on fire by unknown perpetrators.
Human rights NGO's held the municipal authority responsible for the
arson because of its decision to declare the Roma presence
``undesirable.'' The decision of the municipal authority was repealed
following the intervention of the Ombudsman's Office. In August
municipal authorities in Crete attempted to evict over 100 Roma from
their homes of 15 years in Nea Alikarnasos; the national ombudsman
stopped the action.
Roma experience police abuse more frequently than some other
groups. In September police were accused of beating Roma during a
routine traffic stop in Nafplio. The trial of three policemen accused
of beating two Romani teenagers in Mesolonghi in May 1998 still had not
begun in September.
Roma frequently face discrimination in employment and in housing,
particularly when attempting to rent accommodations. The approximately
400 Roma families in Tyrnavos, Thessaly, live in tents because the
authorities refuse to include the area in city planning.
Romani representatives report that some local authorities have
refused to register Roma as residents in their municipalities. Until
registered with a municipality, no citizen can vote or exercise other
civic rights such as obtaining an official marriage, commercial, or
driver's license, or contributing to social security.
Government policy is to encourage the integration of Roma. The
Prime Minister has designated a member of his staff to coordinate the
efforts of all government ministries having a role in their
integration, and the Ministry of Interior established an
interministerial committee with the same aim. Poverty, illiteracy, and
social prejudice nevertheless continue to plague large parts of the
Romani population; these problems are most severe among the Roma who
are mobile or who live in slums. The illiteracy rate among Roma is
estimated at 80 percent. However, the Ministry of Education reported
that the illiteracy rate is dropping among the Roma children, because
the school enrollment rate increased by 17 percent and the dropout rate
decreased to 75 percent as a consequence of an identity card system,
set up by the Ministry, which allows students to change schools more
easily as their parents move. The idea of setting up satellite
elementary schools near Romani camps has been set aside in favor of the
policy of integration (except for preschool centers).
The integration of Roma into social security systems is quite low.
It is estimated that 90 percent of Roma are not insured by the public
social security systems, since they are unable or unwilling to make the
required contributions. Like other qualified citizens, indigent Roma
are entitled to free health care. However, their access to health care
at times is hindered by the fact that their encampments are located far
from public health facilities. The Municipality of Pyrgos, Peloponnese,
issued health cards to the Roma living permanently in the area and
established a preschool center close to the Roma camp near the Alfeios
River.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare continued work on projects to
address the chronic problems of the Roma community. The projects
included training courses for civil servants, policemen, and teachers
to ``increase sensitivity to the problems of the Roma,'' the
development of teaching materials for Roma children, and the
establishment of youth centers in areas close to Roma communities. The
Ministry established six such centers.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide
for the right of association. All workers, with the exception of the
military, have the right to form or join unions. Police have the right
to form unions but not to strike.
Approximately 26 percent of wage earners (nearly 650,000 persons)
are organized in unions. Unions receive most of their funding from a
Ministry of Labor organization, the Workers' Hearth, which distributes
mandatory contributions from employees and employers. Workers,
employers, and the state are represented in equal numbers on the board
of directors of the Workers' Hearth. Approximately 10 public sector
unions have dues-withholding provisions in their contracts, in addition
to receiving Workers' Hearth subsidies.
Over 4,000 unions are grouped into regional and sectoral
federations and 2 umbrella confederations, 1 for civil servants (ADEDY)
and 1, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), for private
sector employees. Unions are highly politicized, and there are party-
affiliated factions within the labor confederations, but day-to-day
operations are not controlled by political parties or the Government.
There are no restrictions on who may serve as a union official.
Legal restrictions on strikes include a mandatory period of notice,
which is 4 days for public utilities and 24 hours for the private
sector. Legislation mandates a skeleton staff during strikes affecting
public services, such as electricity, transportation, communications,
and banking. Public utility companies, state-owned banks, the postal
service, Olympic Airways, and the railroads also are required to
maintain a skeleton staff during strikes.
The courts have the power to declare strikes illegal, although such
decisions seldom are enforced. However, unions complain that this
judicial power serves as a deterrent to some of their members from
participating in strikes. The courts declared some strikes illegal
during the year for reasons such as failure of the union to give
adequate advance notice of the strike or the addition of demands by the
union during the course of the strike. However, no striking workers
were prosecuted.
Fewer strikes took place during the year than ever before, and
those that occurred were fairly brief and nondisruptive. Strikes by
public sector employees, including mass transport employees, lasted
between 1 and 5 days and primarily concerned securing timely pay
increases and greater job security.
Unions are free to join international associations and maintain a
variety of international affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively in the
private sector and in public corporations. These rights are respected
in practice. There are no restrictions on collective bargaining for
private sector employees.
In 1997 and 1998 civil servants were accorded the right to organize
and bargain collectively with the Ministry of Public Administration.
The civil servants confederation conducted official negotiations with
the Ministry of Interior for the first time in 1999.
In response to union complaints that most labor disputes ended in
compulsory arbitration, legislative remedies were enacted in 1989 that
provided for mediation procedures, with compulsory arbitration as a
last resort. A 1992 law established a National Mediation,
Reconciliation, and Arbitration Organization that applies to the
private sector and public corporations (the military and civil service
excluded).
Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. The Labor Inspectorate or a
court investigates complaints of discrimination against union members
or organizers. Court rulings have mandated the reinstatement of
improperly fired union members.
Three free trade zones operate according to European Union
regulations. The labor laws apply equally in these zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits all forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children, and the Ministry of Justice enforces this prohibition;
however, women and girls are trafficked into the country for the
purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The
Government may declare the ``civil mobilization'' of workers in the
event of danger to national security, life, property, or the social and
economic life of the country. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) Committee of Experts has criticized this power as violating the
standards of ILO Convention 29 on forced labor. The Government did not
resort to civil mobilization during the year.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment in the industrial sector is
15 years, with higher limits for certain activities. The minimum age is
12 years in family businesses, theaters, and the cinema. These age
limits are enforced by occasional Labor Inspectorate spot checks and
generally are observed. However, families engaged in agriculture, food
service, and merchandising often have younger family members assisting
them, at least part time. The Constitution contains a blanket
prohibition of compulsory labor. Although no specific legislation
explicitly prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, such
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.), except among some
Roma and immigrants (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Collective bargaining between
the GSEE and the Employers' Association determines a nationwide minimum
wage. The Ministry of Labor routinely ratifies this minimum wage, which
has the force of law and applies to all workers. The minimum wage of
$17.40 (6,986 drachma) daily and $389.20 (155,943 drachma) monthly,
effective July 1, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. The maximum legal workweek is 40 hours in the
private sector and 37+ hours in the public sector. The law provides for
at least one 24-hour rest period per week, mandates paid vacation of 1
month per year, and sets limits on overtime.
Legislation provides for minimum standards of occupational health
and safety. Although the GSEE characterized health and safety
legislation as satisfactory, it charged that enforcement, the
responsibility of the Labor Inspectorate, was inadequate. Legislation
passed in 1999 places the Labor Inspectorate under a central authority
in compliance with ILO Convention 81. Workers do not have the legal
right to remove themselves from situations that they believe endanger
their health. However, they do have the right to lodge a confidential
complaint with the Labor Inspectorate. Inspectors have the right to
close down machinery or a process for a period of up to 5 days if they
see safety or health hazards that they believe represent an imminent
danger to the workers.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically
criminalize trafficking in persons, but other statutes in the Penal
Code are used to prosecute such cases. Arrests and court cases for
prostitution by unlicensed foreign women, and cases against their
traffickers, have increased, but remain at a very low level. Fines and
sentences for traffickers are minimal.
Greece is both a transit and destination country for trafficked
women. Trafficking in women for prostitution in Greece has increased
sharply in recent years. At any give time, some 16,000 to 20,000
trafficked women are in the country, according to unofficial estimates.
Approximately 2,400 trafficked women were deported from Greece during
the year; many are quickly brought back into the country, according to
official sources. While the Government is stiffening its border
controls, in part because of the European Union Schengen Agreement
requirements, there are fissures through which many women are brought
into the country from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. Local
police corruption also plays a role in facilitating their entry into
the country.
According to a Panteion University professor, 75 percent of foreign
female prostitutes are not told why they are being brought to Greece.
Some women arrive as ``tourists'' or illegal immigrants who seek work
and are lured into prostitution by club owners who threaten them with
deportation. Some women are kidnaped from their homes by their fellow
countrymen and smuggled into Greece where they are ``sold'' to local
procurers. The victims of this practice are often minors. Frequently
connections exist between illegal prostitution and other criminal
activities.
__________
HUNGARY
Hungary is a parliamentary democracy with a freely elected
legislative assembly. Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the leader of the
FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party, heads a coalition Government formed after
elections in May 1998 by FIDESZ, the Independent Smallholders' Party,
and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The Government respects the
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary.
The internal and external security services report directly to a
minister without portfolio, and the police report to the Interior
Minister. Credible reports of police abuses persist, although their
frequency has declined compared with last year.
The Government demonstrated a sustained commitment to economic
reform, resulting in a successful transition to a fully functioning
market economy. The private sector accounts for 85 percent of gross
domestic product. Services, trade, and government employ about 67.4
percent of the labor force. The proportion of the labor force involved
in industry has declined to only 33 percent. Major exports include
manufactured goods (30.3 percent) and machinery and transport equipment
(58.5 percent). Unemployment has declined substantially to around 6
percent. However, an estimated 25 percent of the population live in
poverty, with elderly pensioners, dependent housewives and children,
and Roma most affected. The large Roma population is eight times more
likely to be poor than the remainder of the population.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Although the
authorities addressed problems in specific cases, police continued to
use excessive force against suspects. Police also harassed and abused
both Roma and foreign nationals. In practice the authorities do not
always ensure due process in all cases. Prosecutors and judges may
impose what amounts to unlimited pretrial detention, although the
Government expanded legal provisions for the right to fair trial.
The electronic media are a mix of state-owned and privately owned
national, local, and regional radio and television, with private
stations dominating audience share by a wide, and ever-widening,
margin. After taking office in 1998, the Government publicly declared
its intention to ``balance'' the media in order to encourage more
extensive attention to the conservative values and themes that the
Government promotes. After 2 years in office, the Government recognized
that it was only one (although an influential) player in the media
market, and decided to stop pursuing such balance. In spite of numerous
dismissals of journalists in the state-owned radio and television,
certain members of the governing coalition still publicly contend that
these outlets are overrepresented by liberal, opposition-leaning
journalists. The junior coalition partner, the Smallholders, submitted
a proposal to the Parliament to investigate the pre1990 political
activities of state-employed journalists. Although certain news
analysis programs on state media often function as platforms for right-
wing voices, the main news programs remain largely politically neutral.
Violence against women and spousal abuse of women remain serious
problems. Sexual harassment and discrimination on the job also remain
serious problems. Steps have been taken to improve the rights of women
and persons with disabilities. Anti-Semitic and racial discrimination
persisted, but no new attacks were reported this year. Societal
discrimination against Roma remains a serious problem. Trafficking in
women and children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a growing
problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In December an unsuccessful Cameroonian asylum applicant died while
being deported; his feet were cuffed after his repeated efforts to
break free (see Section 2.d.). The official report cites heart attack
as the cause of death.
Trials continued in a number of cases of men charged with crimes
against humanity for shooting into crowds of demonstrators with machine
gun fire and for throwing hand grenades, all at the time of the 1956
Revolution. The defendants were tried in 1993. At the time, they were
charged with murder, but acquitted because the 15-year statute of
limitations for such a charge had passed. The new trial became possible
after the Supreme Court overturned the previous verdicts in June 1999,
stating that these cases should be tried as war crimes, which have no
time limit. In these cases, the issue before the courts was whether
each specific individual is guilty of a war crime, an argument that can
be made because a civil war was in progress at the time, and all
defendants were members of the border guards, police, or military.
Byyear's end, 10 cases had concluded with guilty verdicts. Those
accused were sentenced to short prison terms that subsequently were
suspended, were stripped of their rank, and had their pensions reduced
accordingly.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other such practices. No
known incidents of torture occurred. An investigation into allegations
of torture made in early 1999 by a confessed mass murderer concluded
during the year without enough evidence to bring charges against any
police officers. Police abuses continued, including use of excessive
force, beatings of suspects, and harassment. Police also continued to
harass and physically abuse Roma and foreign nationals. In 1999, 2,397
reports of police abuse were filed compared with 2,296 in 1998. Of
these complaints, only 377 resulted in court cases, compared with 312
in 1998. In 845 cases, no investigation occurred. Many of the cases
that did make it into the court system were still pending atyear's end;
no accurate data on convictions were available. Historically, 10 to 15
percent of such cases result in conviction. In the first 6 months of
the year, policemen were convicted in five cases. Also in the first 6
months of the year, the National Police Headquarters reports the
following number of incidents of police abuse to be: 5 cases of forced
questioning, 8 cases of abuse against Roma, and 16 cases of abuse
against foreigners. Punishments include fines, probation, and the
imposition of suspended sentences. In 1997 the Budapest central
district court sentenced four police officers to 1 to 2 years in prison
for the exceptionally severe beating of a detainee under interrogation.
The appeals court suspended the sentences, and three out of the four
officers continue to serve as police officers. According to a report by
the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, persons detained by police complain
of abuse, but very few file official complaints because they do not
expect positive results and fear that the complaint may affect their
cases adversely. Some sources attribute the rise in numbers of reports
of police abuse to a growing willingness to seek official redress in
these instances. The Romani minority community and dark-skinned
foreigners are the most common victims of police abuse, with Roma
bearing the brunt. In June 1999, after several incidents of police
brutality against Roma in Hajduhadhaz, the Ministry of Interior
admitted that the town had the highest level of reported police
violence in the country, and that half of the town's police force was
under investigation for allegations of abuse. In May the Debrecen
County Court convicted three of five officers charged with abuse and
sentenced them each to prison terms of 2 years and 5 months. A Roma
rights organization reported that in Budapest in June 1999, three
police officers beat and kicked a Romani university student as he
walked through a park. When the man told the officers that he would
report their abuse, they beat him further. The Rom filed a lawsuit
against the officers; the case was still pending atyear's end. Despite
such occurrences, the Ombudsman for Minority Affairs believes that the
situation is, at worst, remaining constant, and possibly is marginally
better. The Ombudsman continues to promote a uniform anti-
discrimination law.
The police and Interior Ministry are working to change the police's
authoritarian image, and human rights organizations report that police
generally are more cooperative with outside monitoring of police
behavior. However, these efforts are hampered by low salaries and a
lack of physical resources. A 1997 study by the Ombudsman's office,
which investigates constitutional violations in the public sector,
denounced police corruption but noted that it was unsurprising that it
existed, given police officers' low pay and poor working conditions.
The Ombudsman found that working conditions in the vast majority of
police offices were unsuitable. In 1999 the Interior Ministry, as part
of the Government's general anticorruption plan, launched a program to
fight corruption in law enforcement. The program promotes reform of the
systems for recruitment and training at the National Police and the
Border Guards. Applicants for these organizations have to pass a
thorough psychological test; in addition their financial situation and
other risk factors are examined. The program also prepares law
enforcement officers to recognize and avoid ``corruption situations.''
As part of the program, the Interior Ministry has added 86 new officers
to the Office for Supervision and Control.
Police frequently harass foreign residents, particularly
nonEuropeans. At times, police showed indifference towards foreigners
who had been victims of street crime.
Prisons are overcrowded but meet minimum international standards.
The population of prisons and detention centers as of September was
15,769 persons (4,264 of whom were in pre-trial detention), or 160
percent of capacity, which represents an increase of over 600 prisoners
from the end of 1999. Tougher maximum sentences have contributed to the
increase of the prison population. The age of most prisoners is now
between 25- and 40-years-old. Between 65 and 70 percent of prisoners
earn wages while in prison, either from work performed in prison or
from workrelease programs. Some programs allow prisoners to spend
weekends at home. A recent change in philosophy led to more efforts to
rehabilitate criminals for their eventual return to normal life. Civil
organizations and foundations assist in the rehabilitation process.
According to officials, the general health of prisoners declined in the
last few years. The chief Ombudsman issued a report on prison
conditions and facilities in 1997. A new predetention center was opened
in the summer, and two new prisons are scheduled to open within the
next 2 years. A 1999 survey among prisoners about alleged abuse
concluded that abuse by prison personnel was not a problem.
The Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police must inform
suspects upon arrest of the charges against them but may hold them for
a maximum of 72 hours before filing charges. The law requires that all
suspects be allowed access to counsel prior to questioning and
throughout all subsequent proceedings, and that the authorities provide
counsel for juveniles, the indigent, and the mentally disabled;
however, credible reports suggest that police do not always allow
access to counsel, particularly for minor crimes. Bail has been
available to citizens since January, when a new Criminal Code entered
into force. It is also available to foreigners, but rarely is used.
The Police Act permits police to hold suspects in public security
detention (PSD) in the following cases: In which the suspect has no
identity papers; in which blood or urine tests must be performed to
determine blood alcohol content; or if the suspect continues to commit
a misdemeanor offense in spite of prior warning. Suspects may be held
in PSD for up to 24 hours. Such detainees are not always informed of
the charges against them, because such periods of ``short'' detention
are not defined as ``criminal detention'' and so are not considered to
be covered by the Criminal Code.
On December 18, a 30-year-old unsuccessful Cameroonian asylum
applicant, Ebune Christian Ecole, died while being deported by police
at Budapest Airport (see Section 1.a.). Ecole's repeated protests and
attempts to break free led the captain of the SABENA flight, which was
to transport him out of the country, to refuse to take him on board.
Police then proceeded to further restrain Ecole by shackling his feet,
at which point he reportedly fainted. Emergency Medical Technicians
were unable to revive him. The official report of his death cites heart
attack as the cause. Local NGO's have called for a thorough
investigation of the circumstances surrounding Ecole's death.
Pretrial detention, based on a warrant issued by a judge, is
initially limited to 1 year while criminal investigations are in
progress; it may be extended indefinitely on the prosecutor's motion
(provided the judge concurs). According to the new Criminal Procedure
Law, pretrial detention is to be limited to a maximum of 3 years, after
which the case expires automatically if formal charges are not brought.
The lack of a bail system gives tremendous leeway to the judge. In 1999
the average length of pretrial detention was 3.5 months, although
nearly 10 percent of detainees were held for periods ranging from 8 to
12 months. In addition foreigners usually are held until their trial
since they are considered likely to flee the country. Roma allege that
they are kept in pretrial detention longer and more frequently than
non-Roma (see Section 1.e.). The law provides for compensation when a
detainee is released for lack of evidence, but the procedure rarely is
exercised since detainees must undertake a complicated legal procedure
to pursue their claims. The Minister of Justice, on behalf of the
State, decides on compensation. The amount depends on the case and can
cover the costs of the trial, attorney's fees, lost wages, and some
other miscellaneous sums.
The law does not provide for exile, and it is not employed.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair, although
sometimes slow, process.
Under the Constitution, the courts are responsible for the
administration of justice, with the Supreme Court exercising control
over the operations and judicial procedure of all the courts. There are
three levels of courts. Original jurisdiction in most matters rests
with the local courts. Appeals of their rulings may be made to the
county courts or to the Budapest municipal court, which have original
jurisdiction in other matters. The Supreme Court is the final court of
appeal, while the Constitutional Court is the final court on
constitutional matters. In the case of military trials, appeals also
may be addressed to the Supreme Court. Under the new Criminal Procedure
Law enacted in January, an intermediate court of appeal was to be
established between the metropolitan/county courts and the Supreme
Court. These intermediate courts are designed to alleviate the current
backlog of court cases and permit lower courts to hear simple cases.
Critics of the new system charge that it would instead slow court
procedures and increase costs. Although passed and signed by
Parliament, the Government delayed indefinitely the implementation of
the new level of courts, citing budgetary constraints. A National
Judicial Council (NJC) was established in 1997 to nominate judicial
appointees and oversee the judicial budget process. The NJC will also
oversee the implementation of the fourth level of courts.
The Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing the
constitutionality of laws and statutes brought before it as well as
their compliance with international treaties that the Government has
ratified. Citizens may appeal directly to the Constitutional Court if
they believe that their constitutional rights have been violated.
Parliament elects the Court's members to 9-year terms, which may be
renewed; no renewals have been made to date. The retirement age of the
Constitutional Court judges is 70 years. No judge or member of the
Supreme or Constitutional Courts may belong to a political party or
engage in political activity.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and the authorities
respected this right in practice. Counsel is appointed for indigent
clients, but public defenders are paid poorly--less than $5 (1,000 Huf)
for the first hour of the trial and less than $2.50 (500 Huf) for each
additional hour--and do not give indigent defendants priority. Lawyers
often meet indigent clients for the first time at trial.
Defendants are entitled to counsel during all phases of criminal
proceedings and are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Judicial
proceedings are generally investigative rather than adversarial in
nature. The public defender system provides generally substandard
service. (There is no public defender's office, as such; private
attorneys may or may not choose to serve in this capacity. Since public
defenders are paid only for the hours spent in trial, little to no
preparation is done and lawyers often meet their clients for the first
time at the trial.)
In selected cases, judges may agree to a closed trial to protect
the accused or the crime victim, such as in some rape cases. In October
1998, the victim protection office was established in the Ministry of
the Interior. Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, witnesses (and in
some cases, victims, judges, and translators) are to be protected by
having their personal data kept closed, in a separate location from the
case files. For specially protected witnesses, court appearances are
unnecessary; they are to be questioned personally by the judge. In July
1999, Parliament passed a resolution calling for a new victim
protection plan, which would provide new identities and homes for
victims and their family members. A bill must be submitted by December
31, 2001. There is no jury system; hence judges are the final arbiters.
Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, prosecutors are to have greater
influence over their cases. Plea bargaining, which is known as a
``trial waiver,'' is now available to prosecutors.
Military trials follow civil law and may be closed if national
security or moral grounds so justify. In all cases, sentencing must
take place publicly.
Many human rights and Romani organizations claim that Roma receive
less than equal treatment in the judicial process. Specifically they
allege that Roma are kept in pretrial detention more often and for
longer periods of time than nonRoma. This allegation is credible in
light of general discrimination against Roma; however, there is no
statistical evidence because identifying the ethnicity of offenders is
not allowed under the data protection law. Since the majority of Roma
fall into the lowest economic strata, they also suffer from poor
counsel and unenthusiastic representation.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides that the prosecutor's office may
issue search warrants. Police must carry out house searches in the
presence of two witnesses and must prepare a written inventory of items
removed from the premises. Wiretapping, which may be done for national
security reasons and for legitimate criminal investigations, requires a
court's permission. These provisions appear to be observed in practice.
During the last 2 years, there were no publicized reports that police
entered private residences without warrants to check foreigners'
identification.
In August 1998, Prime Minister Orban stated that FIDESZ politicians
and their families were the targets of illegal secret surveillance in
1997. Orban claimed that the investigators, whose identity he did not
reveal, sought damaging information to use in the spring 1998
elections. Opposition (former government) leaders vigorously denied the
accusations. In its final report issued in the spring, the
parliamentary committee formed to investigate the matter did not find
evidence to support allegations of widespread misconduct.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects this right
in practice. However, during the year the FIDESZ-led coalition
Government actively attempted to counterbalance what it considers a
leftwing bias in news coverage through its influence on personnel
decisions within the state-owned media. Nonetheless, a wide variety of
views and opinions is available among the highly competitive print and
broadcast media.
After the transition from communism, the majority of print media
outlets were purchased by foreign publishing companies. In addition
numerous new publications made the local print market much more
competitive. Political opposition sources claim that this competition
was utilized by the coalition in its attempt to balance the print
media, some elements of which the Government views as too liberal and
anticoalition. Advertisements from state-owned companies and financial
institutions were awarded to progovernment papers, which also tend to
receive better access to government sources.
Parliament passed a media law in 1996 creating institutions
designed to foster a free and independent electronic media. The law
provided for the creation of nationwide commercial television and radio
and was intended to insulate the remaining public service media from
government control. The National Television and Radio Board (ORTT), the
regulatory agency created by the 1996 Media Law, has continued to
monitor news broadcasts for equal treatment of all political parties.
Several commercial stations were warned publicly by the ORTT during the
year for giving more time to one party over others.
The state broadcast media continue to lay off large numbers of
journalists and administrative personnel to reduce overhead. Opposition
figures have accused the Government of firing journalists based on
political bias. State-owned media (Hungarian Radio, Hungarian
Television, and Duna TV) operate with incomplete Boards of Trustees
representing only coalition nominees, an issue debated in the
constitutional court and in the Parliament.
On March 14, some 6,000 demonstrators marched across Budapest to
demand an independent supervisory board for the broadcast media. The
demonstration was organized by the Socialist Party, trade unions, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's); representatives of other
opposition parties also took part.
Academic freedom generally is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice. There are essentially no restrictions on peaceful
public gatherings. In general the Government does not require permits
for assembly, except when a public gathering is to take place near
sensitive installations, such as military facilities, embassies, or key
government buildings. Police sometimes may alter or revoke permits, but
there is no evidence that they abuse this right.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Any 10 or more persons may
form an association, provided that it does not commit criminal offenses
or disturb the rights of others. Associations with charters and elected
officers must register with the courts.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and members of all faiths are allowed to practice their
religion freely. There are 92 officially recognized religions. A group
needs 100 members (or 100 signatures) to register as a religion in any
county court. There is no preferred religion, although not all
religions receive state support. State support is in the form of funds
negotiated each year between the Ministry of Cultural Heritage and the
Finance Ministry. A 1996 law allows citizens to donate 1 percent of
their taxes to any religion, and a 1997 law extended this option by
allowing citizens to donate 1 percent to any religion and 1 percent to
a civil organization or public institution. In 1999 the Ministry of
Cultural Heritage provided $11.24 million (2.81 billion Huf) for the
reconstruction of church properties and monuments and for other
investments. In May the Government passed an amendment to existing tax
laws that confirmed sales tax exemption for country's historic
denominations and for NGO's. However, minority religions (including
Adventists, Pentecostals, Methodists, and all Eastern religions) cannot
reclaim sales tax under the amendment, which they feel threatens to
marginalize them even further. The churches took the case to the
Supreme Court, which chose not to review it. However, in December the
Government passed a new amendment to replace that which had passed in
May. The new amendment set criteria under which direct contributions to
churches are tax deductible; these criteria limit the benefit to 14 of
the some 90 registered churches in the country.
In 1997 the Government signed a treaty with the Vatican to return
church property confiscated by the Communist regime; the treaty also
provided for a minimum state payment (separate from the annual
negotiated support) of $7.8 million (1.7 billion Huf). Similar compacts
were signed with the country's three other historical religions in
1998. The Jewish community receives $2.6 million (608 million Huf), and
the Calvinist and Lutheran Churches each are entitled to $4.3 million
(1 billion Huf). Religious schools receive support per child in the
same way that state schools do. Religious orders and schools have
regained some property confiscated by the Communist regime.
Several synagogues have been built since World War II, generally
replacing older demolished synagogues. The first completely new
synagogue built since the war was constructed in 1998 at a Jewish
summer camp in Szarvas.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on the
movement of citizens within or outside the country, including on the
rights of emigration and repatriation. However, local authorities have
in some cases tried to expel Roma from towns or have taken advantage of
situations (eviction for nonpayment of bills or condemnation of Roma
homes) to relocate and concentrate Romani populations, in effect
creating ghettos. The Government may delay but not deny emigration for
those who have significant court-assessed debts or who possess state
secrets. Those with about $40,000 (over 10 million Huf) in public debt
may be denied travel documents. The Government requires that foreigners
from countries that do not have a visa waiver agreement with Hungary
obtain exit visas each time they leave the country, although blanket
permission sometimes is available.
A total of 6,247 refugees from the former Yugoslavia are registered
in the country. Most are in private housing, with only 506 housed in 3
permanent and 2 temporary refugee camps, or ``reception centers,'' run
by the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), formerly known as
the Office of Migration and Refugee Affairs (ORMA). (In January the
Government established OIN as a central authority for asylum and
immigration matters.) In addition to the three government-owned camps,
two additional temporary camps are used through contracts with the
NGO's that run them. They have been operating since 1991 and 1993,
largely as a result of the influx of refugees fleeing the various
conflicts and incidents of ethnic cleansing to the south. The
Government estimates that there are as many as 5,000 asylum seekers and
as many as 40,000 to 60,000 immigrants (the vast majority from Romania)
living in the country in unregistered status; the local office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believes that these figures
is too high. OIN began drafting amendments to the country's asylum laws
in June to comply with existing European Union (EU) regulations.
The Government provides first asylum and cooperates with the local
office of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations assisting
refugees. In 1999 the Government granted 313 out of 11,499 applicants
refugee status under the Geneva Convention; 1,776 applicants were
granted temporary protected status. During the first 9 months of this
year, 151 out of 5,720 applicants were granted refugee status and 567
were allowed to stay on temporary protected status. The number of
applicants, excluding Yugoslav citizens, increased by 8 percent. Of
11,299 applications submitted in 1999, 1,176 were Afghan, 1,176 from
Bangladesh, 506 from Iraq, 228 from Sri Lanka, and 3,306 were from the
former Yugoslavia. While the high number of Afghan refugees is not
unusual, the significant increase in Yugoslav applicants in 1999
corresponded with the onset of a series of crises in Kosovo. In the
months following the cessation of hostilities, many of these
applications were withdrawn, and OIN authorities believe that many more
refugees simply have gone home. A March 1998 law lifted Hungary's
geopolitical reservation to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government now
adheres completely to the provisions of this Convention. Under the old
law, the Government only handled claims from European asylum seekers,
and the UNHCR handled all other claims. The increase in caseload
resulting from this change and from events in Kosovo and the resulting
NATO action placed a tremendous strain on the OIN's resources, leading
to the high number of pending cases and increasing the processing time
per application. Prospective refugees who seek only to transit to
Western Europe are encouraged to return to their countries of
departure. There were approximately 1,831 asylum seekers located in 3
permanent and 2 temporary reception centers as of September 27. The
Government has been criticized by NGO's and Western countries for
inhuman conditions in detention facilities and the arbitrary
application of asylum procedures. In February 1999, the Parliament's
human rights Ombudsman criticized the conditions in border facilities
as ``uncivilized and intolerable.'' In response to this criticism, the
Government has closed down the worst buildings within the centers and
has begun the construction of others. There is an ongoing project to
refurbish the border guards' community shelters. Of the eight currently
in operation, three have been fully refurbished and reopened, and one
reopened early in the year. The conditions in the older facilities are
not good. The country, which has been dealing with refugee issues on a
large scale for only the past 10 years, has borne a great deal of the
refugee burden resulting from the Kosovo crisis, and the Government has
sought to work with NGO's to improve conditions.
Aliens caught trying to cross the border illegally may apply for
refugee status or are housed temporarily at one of eight border guard
facilities throughout the country pending deportation. During the first
6 months of the year, 910 persons occupied the facilities, while in
1999 there were between 500 to 600 occupants. During the first half of
the year, 5,798 illegal aliens were apprehended, while in 1999, 12,438
were apprehended. While police seek the timely deportation of detainees
who do not qualify for refugee status, a shortage of funds and the
detainees' lack of property or documentation, such as passports, often
result in lengthy stays. In 1999 the authorities expelled 12,000
foreigners from the country; however, there were no reports of the
forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens age 18 and over have the right to change their government
through national elections held at least every 4 years. Members of
Parliament are elected through a complex voting procedure for
individuals and party lists. The FIDESZHungarian Democratic Civic Party
heads the coalition with the Smallholders' Party and the Hungarian
Democratic Forum (the latter two parties formed the government
coalition between 1990 and 1994 with the Christian Democrats, one
segment of which later merged with FIDESZ.) The opposition includes the
extreme rightwing Hungarian Justice and Life Party and two leftwing
parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Free Democrats.
No legal impediments hinder women's participation in government or
the political process, although they are underrepresented in relation
to their percentage of the population; only 33 of 386 parliamentary
representatives are women, and 1 woman serves in the Cabinet. Few women
occupy other leadership positions in the Government or political
parties. Despite the lack of ensured minority representation, there are
several Members of Parliament, including one ethnic German and one
ethnic Slovak, who are members of ethnic minorities; however, none
specifically represents their respective minority populations. There
are no Romani Members of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Numerous human rights organizations operate without government
restriction or interference. Many NGO's report that the Government is
generally responsive to their requests for information. An increasing
number of NGO's are involved in the law-making process. However,
individual police units and prosecutors reportedly are uncooperative at
times, particularly in cases involving Roma or police abuses. There is
also a 21member parliamentary Committee for Human, Minority, and
Religious Rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and
protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination
still exists, particularly against Roma. This is due to widespread
prejudice, lack of positive reporting, and lack of opportunity for
advancement.
Women.--Spousal abuse is believed to be common, but the vast
majority of such abuse is not reported, and victims who come forward
often receive little help from authorities. While there are laws
against rape, often it is unreported for cultural reasons. Police
attitudes towards victims of sexual abuse are often reportedly
unsympathetic, particularly if the victim was acquainted with her
abuser. Laws recognize rape within marriage. Women's rights
organizations claim that 1 woman in 10 is a victim of spousal abuse and
that societal attitudes towards spousal abuse are ``archaic.'' In 1999
there were 4,668 reports of crimes against family, youth, and sexual
morality; 4,589 such crimes were reported in 1998. In 1999 women were
the victims of 103,855 crimes; they were the victims of 106,211 crimes
in 1998.
The law does not prohibit sexual harassment in the work place. A
1995 report prepared under the auspices of the U.N. to evaluate
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women termed sexual harassment in the workplace as ``virtually
epidemic.'' Women's groups report that there is little support for
efforts to criminalize sexual harassment, and that harassment is
tolerated by women who fear unemployment more than harassment. Under
present law, acts of sexual harassment may be prosecuted under the
defamation statutes (if violent, they are considered sexual
misconduct).
Legally women have the same rights as men, including identical
inheritance and property rights. In September 1999, the Office for
Women's Issues started operating an anti-discrimination hot line, which
operates 10 hours a day and offers free legal advice to women who feel
that they were discriminated against with respect to employment.
According to the head of the office, the hot line receives 20 to 30
calls per day. While there is no overt discrimination against women,
the number of women in middle or upper managerial positions in business
and government remains low, although the number of women in the police
and the military has risen significantly over the past several years,
with significant increase in 1999. Women are heavily represented in the
judiciary and in the medical and teaching professions. A Women's
Representative office was established in the Ministry of Social and
Family Affairs to address women's issues more effectively. As of August
1, the Women's Representation Secretariat became an independent
department within the Ministry.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights.
Education is mandatory through 16 years of age, and employment is
illegal below the age of 15. There is no societal pattern of child
abuse, although NGO's report that neglect and abuse are common in state
care facilities. In 1999 children were the victims in 8,977 crimes,
while in 1998 they were the victim of 8,769 crimes.
People with Disabilities.--Government sources estimate that between
600,000 and 1 million persons (6 to 10 percent of the population) are
disabled. Of these, 300,000 to 350,000 are considered seriously
disabled and receive increased government benefits. A law that was
passed in 1998 requires that all public buildings be made accessible to
the disabled within 10 years. A Council for the Disabled was
established in January 1999, under the chairmanship of the Minister of
Social and Family Affairs. The Council serves as an advisory board to
the Government. At present services for the disabled are limited, and
most buildings are not wheelchair accessible. A 1997 decree requires
all companies that employ over 20 persons to reserve 5 percent of their
jobs for the physically or mentally disabled, with fines of up to 75
percent of the average monthly salary for noncompliance. In 1999 such
fines yielded $6 million (approximately 1.77 billion Huf) for
rehabilitation funds for the disabled. While the Government appears to
be ready to consider reviews for mentally disabled patients under
limited guardianship, U.S.-based NGO Mental Disability Rights
International (MDRI) and local NGO Hungarian Mental Health Interest
Forum (PEF) note that contrary to internationally recognized norms, no
review procedures exist for patients under plenary guardianship. MDRI
and PEF also criticize the use of cages in government facilities for
the mentally disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Early in the year, the Council of Europe's
Commission Against Racism and Intolerance published a report that
criticized the ``latent anti-Semitism'' in some media, in some elements
of Parliament, and in society.
On November 2, some 30 gravestones were vandalized in Budapest. The
damage to the stones was estimated to be $16,000 (5 million Huf).
In July 1999, two skinhead members of the Arrow Cross Movement
admitted to defacing 15 graves in a Jewish cemetery in Szombathely. The
skinheads painted anti-Semitic graffiti on gravestones shortly before a
Holocaust commemoration was to take place on July 3 in the cemetery.
The desecration was criticized sharply by President Goncz. In November
1999, a municipal court found the two youths guilty and sentenced one
skinhead to 1 year in prison, which was commuted to 3 years' probation,
while the second skinhead was sentenced to 8 months in prison, which
was commuted to 2 years' probation. No new incidents of skinhead
violence were reported during this year.
In August 1999, the ``Protocols of the Elder of Zion,'' a notorious
anti-Semitic forgery, was published and available for purchase in a
Hungarian translation for the first time since World War II. The Jewish
community in Nagykoros filed a complaint against the publication with
the Prosecutor General. The publication also was criticized by the
Calvinist Church and the Catholic Church, which expressed concern over
the increasing problem of lack of ``respect and tolerance'' toward
various religious communities. Also in August 1999, the Ministry of
National Cultural Heritage criticized any defamation of religion and
announced that it supported a call by the Confederation of Hungarian
Jewish Communities (MAZSIHISZ) for the publication of a scholarly work
in the country addressing the book's false claims. The Ministry of
Culture later sponsored a lecture and reception to introduce that book.
In November 1999, MAZSIHISZ asked the Cabinet to take action
against ``Fascist, racist, and anti-Semitic'' outbreaks that were a
source of public concern. The organization objected to the planned
rehabilitation of the country's World War II Prime Minister Laszlo
Bardossy, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries, and the publication of
anti-Semitic books. MAZSIHISZ argued that the law should be changed to
prohibit the denial of the Holocaust. In response to the concerns of
the Jewish Community, Orban tasked an official in the Ministry of
Culture to oversee issues of concern to the Jewish community.
MAZSIHISZ and international Jewish organizations criticized as
unfair a 1998 decision by the Government to provide $128 (30,000 Huf)
each to the heirs of Holocaust victims. In February 1999, the president
of MAZSIHISZ said that hundreds of Holocaust survivors were returning
compensation payments to the Government, protesting that the small
amounts were an insult. Previous awards to the heirs of victims
distributed by the Communist regime were $4,255 (1 million Huf). The
Orban Government provided the 30,000 Huf figure as a line item in the
Fiscal Year 1999 budget, stating that this amount was all that could be
paid out without budget imbalances. Opposition parties were seeking to
hold a special parliamentary session on this and other issues, but the
Government was opposed to resolving the issue in this manner. Although
the figure of $128 was accepted originally by the leaders of the Jewish
Community who had negotiated with the Government, it generally is
agreed that the amount is too small, and it is a matter of ongoing
renegotiation. In December the Constitutional Court ruled that the
negotiated amount was unconstitutional. After this ruling, the Prime
Minister instructed the Ministry of Justice to investigate the matter
further and to draw up a new compensation proposal.
On March 20, the Budapest court sentenced Ehrem Kemal (Gyorgy Kemal
in Hungarian) to 2 years imprisonment for inflammatory anti-Semitic
speeches made in 1997. The sentence was suspended and replaced with 5
years probation. Kemal has appealed, and the case has been forwarded to
the Supreme Court.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The 1993 Law on National and
Ethnic Minorities' Rights recognizes individuals' minority rights, as
well as establishes the concept of collective rights of ethnic
minorities, and states that it is their inalienable collective right to
preserve their ethnic identity. The law also permits associations,
movements, and political parties of an ethnic or national character and
mandates the unrestricted use of ethnic languages. For an ethnic group
to be recognized as such it has to have at least 100 years' presence in
the country, and its members have to be citizens. On this basis,
minority status is granted specifically to 13 national or ethnic groups
(among which Roma are by far the most numerous). Other groups may
petition the Chairman of Parliament for inclusion if they believe that
they fulfill the requirements.
The law considers the establishment of local minority
selfgovernments as a precondition for the enforcement of the rights of
ethnic minorities. For this reason, local minority selfgovernment
elections, in conjunction with local government elections, have been
held since 1994. Any of the 13 minorities can set up a minority self-
government if at least 50 valid votes are cast in settlements with
fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and if at least 100 votes are cast in
larger settlements. Since ethnicity is not registered officially,
voting on minority selfgovernments is not limited to the minorities
themselves; all the voters receive a minority ballot in addition to the
local government ballot. The elected local minority self-governments
can elect their national minority self-governments; all 13 minorities
have formed national self-governments. To improve cooperation between
local and national minority self-governments, the establishment of
county level self-governments is planned for next year. This model of
minority self-government has been criticized mainly on two grounds:
first, several minority representatives have objected to the fact that
members of the majority can vote for minority candidates and thus
influence minority politics. The Government is currently collecting
proposals for an amendment to the minority law to define more precisely
both the competencies of minority self-governments and their source of
financial support. Second, critics call for an increase in the
competence of the minority self-governments and considerably more
financial resources for them. However, this would require modification
of the law, which is not expected in the near future.
There were 770 Romani minority self-governments elected in the
local elections in October 1998, a significant increase over the 477
elected self-governments in the first minority elections held in 1994.
The new self-governments began operating in January 1999. Of these, 738
continue to function; the discrepancy reflected the number that ceased
functioning between 1999 and this year due to a lack of funds. With
some funding from the central budget and some logistical support from
local governments, these bodies seek to influence and oversee matters
affecting minorities. The Romani minority poses a special challenge for
the system of national minority self-governments. In contrast to other
minorities for whom the preservation of their identity and culture is
the basic goal, the Roma also have to contend with the fact that they
generally belong to the lowest socio-economic strata of Hungarian
society. Ethnicity and poverty coincide with Roma; therefore, the
Romani selfgovernments are faced with the task of improving the lives
of their constituents with no additional resources. The concept of
minority self-governments is in itself new, and policies still are
evolving.
In 1995 Parliament appointed an Ombudsman--currently an ethnic
German--specifically charged with defending minority rights.
Roma constitute at least 5 percent of the population, with some
estimates going as high as 9 percent. In view of the higher birth rate
among Roma compared with the general decline in the Hungarian
population, this percentage is likely to remain constant or grow. This
fact causes concern among a substantial portion of the majority
population. Germans, the second largest minority group, constitute
about 2 percent of the population. Smaller communities of Slovaks,
Croats, Romanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Greeks, Serbs, Slovenes,
Armenians, Ruthenians, and Bulgarians are recognized as ethnic
minorities. Ethnicity and religion are only optional questions, so this
may or may not provide a more accurate estimate of the actual numbers
of the minority populations.
Education is available to varying degrees in almost all minority
languages. There are minority-language print media, and the state-run
radio broadcasts 2-hour daily programs in the mother tongue of major
nationalities, i.e., Romani, Slovak, Romanian, German, Croatian, and
Serbian. State-run television carries a 30-minute program for each of
the larger minority groups, complemented by 5-minute weekly news
bulletins.
Conditions of life for the Romani community are significantly worse
than among the general population. Roma suffer from discrimination and
racist attacks and are considerably less educated, with lower than
average incomes and life expectancy. The percentage of the country's
Roma graduating from high school in 1993 was 1.6 percent compared with
23.8 percent for non-Roma; only 0.24 percent of Roma graduated from
university compared with 9.45 percent for non-Roma. The unemployment
rate for Roma is estimated to be 70 percent, over ten times the
national average. With unemployment benefits exhausted and social
services stretched thin, Roma often confront desperate situations. As
of January 1, the Government has reduced the limit on unemployment
benefits from 1 year to 9 months, which affects the Romani community
disproportionately, with its high unemployment rate, and exacerbates
the poverty of this large segment of society. This may likely reinforce
negative stereotypes of Roma as poor, shiftless, and a social burden.
Roma continue to suffer widespread discrimination in education,
housing, and access to public institutions, including restaurants and
pubs. Roma and other civic organizations highlighted the practice of
placing Roma children in remedial education programs designed for
children with mental disabilities or low academic performance,
resulting in a form of de facto segregation. Although the children
could be returned to the regular school system, only a small percentage
return. In September 1999, the Minister of Education and the
parliamentary Ombudsman for Minority Rights announced at a press
conference that there is segregation in the country's educational
system. The statement followed the publication of a report by the
Ombudsman's office that found that the high proportion of Romani
children in ``special schools'' for the mentally disabled was a sign of
prejudice and a failure of the public education system. Schools for
Roma are more crowded, more poorly equipped, and in markedly poorer
condition than those attended by non-Roma. Only 1.5 percent of the
Romani community graduate from high school, while 0.001 percent
graduate from college or university. There are programs aimed at
increasing these numbers (the Romaversitas program supports Romani
students finishing degrees in institutions of higher education), and
there are Departments of Roma Studies in the Teachers' Training College
in Pecs and Zsambek. However, the impact has yet to be significant. The
Hungarian Helsinki Committee found that there are 132 segregated
schools throughout the country. The Government contests these claims of
human rights organizations and states that the Romani schools are
designed to provide intensive help for disadvantaged children. An
interministerial committee was established in the fall of 1999 and is
led by the Minister of Justice. This committee was tasked with
assigning Romani affairs desk officers in each ministry. There is
currently such a desk officer in the Ministry of Education, who is
himself a Rom. Several ministries have already accomplished this task,
including the Ministry of Education, whose desk officer is a Rom.
In what is considered a landmark case, in July 1998 a court ordered
a bar owner in the city of Pecs to pay a $750 fine and take out a
newspaper advertisement apologizing for refusing to serve a Rom.
Local officials have in some cases taken advantage of rules
prohibiting overcrowded, unsafe, or unsanitary housing, or have
punished nonpayment of utility bills by evicting Roma families, among
others, from residences without providing alternative housing as the
law requires. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) has reported cases
of forced evictions during the year. For example, in the town of Ozd,
ERRC visited apartment buildings from which Roma were forced to leave
for renovations, many without having been given alternative housing for
the duration and who may return only if they pay high fees for the
costs of renovation. In some areas, this relocation and concentration
of Roma populations has, in effect created ghettos. During the summer,
laws on the tenancy of flats were amended to ease administrative
procedures for evicting squatters. Under the new procedures, notaries
public may authorize evictions and are required to enforce the order
within 8 days, even if an appeal has been filed against the decision.
Local NGO's worry that Roma families will bear the brunt of the new
rules, saying that it expands the power of local officials to remove
Roma from their homes.
The Government sponsors programs both to preserve Romani languages
and cultural heritage and to assist social and economic assimilation.
Oversight and budgetary control of the Coordination Council for Roma
Affairs and the Office of National Ethnic Minorities were shifted from
the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Justice. In July 1999,
the Government published an action plan designed to improve living
conditions in Romani communities, with specific focus on public health,
education, and work training. However, the plan provides no additional
funds; rather, it redistributes already inadequate resources.
Early in the year, the Council of Europe's Commission Against
Racism and Intolerance published a report that criticized the living
conditions of the country's Roma population. It contends that the legal
protection of Roma is ineffective and that regulations banning
discrimination are insufficiently implemented. Government officials
stress that the situation of the country's Roma is an issue that it is
addressing.
Widespread popular prejudice against Roma continues. Police
commonly abuse them (see Section 1.c.). Foreigners of color reported
harassment by police and at border control checkpoints. The Martin
Luther King Organization (MLKO), which documents assaults on nonwhites,
reported a gradual decrease in the number of such incidents over the
past several years, with three such cases in the first 9 months of the
year. However, MLKO sources believe that many cases go unreported.
In 1997 changes to the Penal Code made it easier to enforce and
stiffen penalties for hate crimes committed on the basis of the
victim's ethnicity, race, or nationality. The law has already been
applied several times.
In March the Prime Minister's Office brought legal action against
Peter Szegvari, a high-ranking official in the office, for having
suggested that contraceptives be distributed to the Romani population
to combat ``excessive multiplication.''
In October 1999, a group of skinheads attacked two Roma at a pub in
Kakucs. One Rom suffered serious injuries as a result of the beating.
Local police began an investigation in the case, but no results were
reported by year's end.
In August 1999, a group of approximately 30 persons attacked a
Romani family in a village near Nyiregyhaza. The attackers beat male
members of the family, eight of whom were treated in the hospital for
injuries. Local police reported that they interrogated two suspects in
the case.
Discrimination, poverty, and unresolved social problems continue to
drive Roma emigration. In July, 47 members of a Roma clan from the
village of Zamoly made the news this year when they applied for refugee
status in France and indicated their intent to file suit against the
Hungarian Government at the Strasbourg International Human Rights
Court. Following 3 years of increasing tensions over adequate housing
between members of the clan and the local community, 47 members of the
family travelled to Strasbourg, where they have sought asylum. The
Strasbourg court has agreed to review that asylum case and is
temporarily housing and maintaining the 47 applicants. In 1998 an
investigation by the Ombudsman for Minority Affairs concluded that the
local mayor had indeed denied basic social services due to the Roma.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to the asylum claims by
announcing that the Roma family was free to return.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the
right of unions to organize and bargain collectively and permits trade
union pluralism. Workers have the right to associate freely, choose
representatives, publish journals, and openly promote members'
interests and views. With the exception of military personnel and
police officers, they also have the right to strike. Under a separate
1992 law, public servants may negotiate working conditions, but the
final decision on increasing salaries rests with Parliament.
The largest labor union organization is the National Confederation
of Hungarian Trade Unions, the successor to the former monolithic
Communist union, with over 735,000 members. The Democratic League of
Independent Unions and the Federation of Workers' Councils have
approximately 100,000 and 56,000 members, respectively.
There are no restrictions on trade union contacts with
international organizations, and unions have developed a wide range of
ties with European and international trade union bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
permits collective bargaining at the enterprise and industry level,
although the practice is not widespread and is discouraged actively in
the growing private sector. Labor organizations appear willing to
cooperate with one another; this is particularly evident in their
relationship in forums such as the National Labor Affairs Council
(OMT), which succeeded the Interest Reconciliation Council in April and
which provides a forum for tripartite consultation among
representatives from management, employees, and the Government. The OMT
discusses issues such as wage increases and the setting of the minimum
wage, which is negotiated centrally within the OMT in order to control
inflation. Individual trade unions and management may negotiate higher
wages at the plant level. The new Government disbanded the Ministry of
Labor and split its work between the Ministry of Economy (covering
policy issues) and the newly created Ministry of Social and Family
Affairs (covering employment issues and responsible for drafting
laborrelated legislation). In January the Government assigned all labor
responsibilities to the Ministry of Economy. Employers are prohibited
from discriminating against unions and their organizers. The Ministry
of Economy enforces this provision.
There are no export processing zones per se, but individual foreign
companies have been frequently granted duty-free zone status for their
facilities.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
the Ministry of Economy enforces this prohibition.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see
Section 6.c.). The Labor Code forbids labor by children under the age
of 15 and regulates labor conditions for minors (14 to 16 years of
age), including prohibitions on night shifts, hard physical labor, and
guaranteed overtime payments. The National Labor Center enforces these
regulations in practice, and there does not appear to be any
significant abuse of this statute. Education is compulsory through age
16. Roma are far more likely than non-Roma to stop attending school
before age 16. The Government converted the family allowance into a
school attendance allowance in September. This measure was intended to
``force'' children to go to school, but some Romani NGO's fear that
this may be another form of discrimination against Roma, many of whom
live in small villages with no high schools within manageable distance.
Furthermore, the extreme poverty of many Roma makes it difficult for
them to clothe their children appropriately for school. Taking away the
family allowance is thus seen by Roma as punishment for neglecting to
do something that they cannot afford. By the Government, however, it is
perceived as a way to provide incentives for greater commitment to
education among Roma and as an effort to end a cycle of poverty in
which impoverished Roma bring up large and illiterate families, whose
members themselves later may become public burdens.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The OMT establishes the legal
minimum wage, which is subsequently implemented by Ministry of Economy
decree. The minimum wage, $85 (25,500 Huf) per month, is insufficient
to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. This is
only 35 percent of the average wage. Many workers supplement their
primary employment with second jobs, and there are reports that many
citizens, while officially earning the minimum wage, actually make
more. Reporting the minimum wage is a way for both employer and
employee to avoid paying higher taxes.
The Labor Code specifies various conditions of employment,
including termination procedures, severance pay, maternity leave, trade
union consultation rights in some management decisions, annual and sick
leave entitlement, and labor conflict resolution procedures. Under the
Code, the official workday is set at 8 hours; however, it may vary
depending upon the nature of the industry. A 24-hour rest period is
required during any 7-day period.
Labor courts and the Ministry of Economy enforce occupational
safety standards set by the Government, but specific safety conditions
generally are not consistent with internationally accepted standards.
The enforcement of occupational safety standards is not always
effective in part due to the limited resources that the Ministry of
Economy is able to commit to enforcement. In theory workers have the
right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
jeopardy to continued employment. Foreign firms generally meet or
exceed international standards for occupational safety.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the country was once primarily
a source for women and children trafficked for the purpose of forced
prostitution, it increasingly is a transit and destination point as
well. Hungarian women are trafficked to Western Europe or other parts
of the world, primarily to Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands but also to Canada, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.
Hungary receives persons from Eastern Europe, especially from Russia,
Ukraine, and Romania, who either use the country as a point of transit,
or who remain in the country as their final destination. According to
the Office of International Migration (IOM), in 1998 3,200 persons were
trafficked in the country, which makes up one quarter of all illegal
migrants apprehended. In 1999 348 human smugglers were arrested, while
this year the number rose to 569. These figures include both those who
assist in the illegal migration of others and those trafficking in
persons. The penalty for trafficking is between 1 and 5 years in
prison; however, if an organized trafficking ring is involved, the
sentence can be doubled. A recent amendment to the alien law provides
for immediate expulsion from the country of foreign traffickers. The
Government has concluded agreements with 10 European countries to
facilitate improved police cooperation to combat organized crime and
trafficking in persons. However, prosecution of traffickers is
difficult because there is no legislation to protect victims.
Parliament passed a resolution in July 1999 that called for a victim
protection plan to be implemented no later than August 2001. Initial
steps already taken include the creation of a Victim Protection Office
in the Ministry of Interior, the establishment of a victim protection
fund, and the posting of information brochures on victim protection in
every police station. Branches of a new Victim Protection Office, which
provide psychological support services and legal advocacy for victims,
safeguard their rights, and attempt to minimize the trauma of trials,
began operating in a few towns in the fall of 1999. This office does
not deal exclusively or even primarily with victims of trafficking.
Many of the victims of trafficking are brought to the country by
organized crime syndicates, either for work in Budapest's thriving sex
industry or for transit to Western Europe or North America, to which
some Hungarian smuggling rings also provide babysitters, housekeepers,
and manual laborers. Russian-speaking organized crime syndicates are
active in trafficking women primarily from Ukraine and other countries
of the former Soviet Union to the EU via Hungary. Hungarian victims are
mainly young women, although they also include men, middle-aged women,
and children. They are recruited at discos and modeling agencies,
through word-of-mouth, or even through open advertisements in local
papers and magazines. Some know that the purpose of the trip is to
perform illegal work, while others simply think they are using a back-
door means of attaining a visa. Others plan to work but believe that
the appropriate papers and permission will be obtained by the
organizers, who turn out to be traffickers. IOM continued a program
funded by the European Union to raise awareness of the problem of
trafficking and to educate potential victims.
__________
ICELAND
Iceland is a constitutional republic and a parliamentary democracy
in which citizens periodically choose their representatives in free and
fair multiparty elections. The judiciary is independent.
Elected officials control the police force, which scrupulously
observes and enforces the laws that ensure protection of human rights.
Iceland has a mixed, open economy that provides residents with a
high standard of living. The leading exports, fish and other marine
products, account for almost 70 percent of export revenues. An
abundance of cheap hydroelectric power provides a comparative advantage
for the main manufacturing activity--aluminum smelting. Aluminum is the
second leading export. Growth was expected to approach 4 percent in
1999.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Human rights monitors expressed
concern about the Government's frequent use of solitary confinement for
remand prisoners. The Government is taking steps to deal with violence
against women. Some societal discrimination against women persists,
especially in the area of equal pay. Instances of suspected trafficking
in women were reported.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment are prohibited by law and do not occur.
Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
Most of the country's small prison population (less than 100 inmates
total) is held at Litla Hraun Prison in Reykjavik, which includes a
state-of-the-art detention facility opened in 1995. However, the prison
system still uses a substandard jail (Hegningarhusid in downtown
Reykjavik) to hold a small number of prisoners, where the individual
cells lack toilets and sinks.
Human rights monitors have expressed concern about the use of
illegal drugs by some inmates at Litla Hraun Prison and about the lack
of social services to help inmates overcome drug addiction and prepare
them for eventual release. Despite the small inmate population at Litla
Hraun, the authorities have not been able to stop narcotics from being
smuggled into the prison.
In a 1999 report, the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture (CPT) expressed concern during its visit to Litla Hraun prison
in 1998 that nearly all detainees still were placed in solitary
confinement while their cases were under investigation. While the
average duration of solitary confinement was between 2 and 3 weeks, the
CPT noted that in some cases, solitary confinement lasted up to 3
months. Under the strictest form of solitary confinement, prisoners
cannot leave their cells, except briefly to exercise alone or to use
the showers, and are not allowed to listen to the radio, watch
television, or receive visitors other than their lawyers, the prison
doctor, and a chaplain. In November 1999, the supervising doctor at
Litla Hraun wrote to prison authorities, warning that the mental health
of several prisoners awaiting trial on drug trafficking charges could
be in danger due to the extended time that they were expected to spend
in solitary confinement.
In a preliminary response to the CPT report on September 30, 1999,
the Government argued that solitary confinement was absolutely
necessary in some circumstances to keep suspects from tampering with
witnesses, destroying evidence, or hindering the investigation. On the
other hand, it conceded that ``in the vast majority of cases''
incarceration alone was sufficient to protect the integrity of
witnesses and evidence. However, the Prison and Probation
Administration's statistics show that solitary confinement has been the
rule rather than the exception, with most of those arrested being
placed into solitary confinement, at least initially.
In May the European Court of Human Rights ruled in favor of an
Icelandic woman who had been denied compensation for wrongful arrest on
the grounds that she had not cooperated with police. The woman was held
in solitary confinement for 5 weeks in 1989 in connection with a drug
case before being cleared and released. The Government since has
changed the law to make it easier for victims of wrongful arrest to
receive compensation, recognizing the principle that all detainees
should be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
With the closing of the Sudumuli remand prison in 1996, the
Government passed a law in 1998 that allows pretrial detainees to be
incarcerated with the general prison population. Some human rights
monitors claim that this law is inconsistent with the country's
obligations under the European Human Rights Convention and European
prison rules issued by the Council of Europe.
Juveniles who are 15 years of age or older can be sentenced to
prison terms, but the vast majority of juvenile offenders are given
probation or suspended sentences or agree to attend a treatment program
instead of going to jail. In the rare instances when juvenile offenders
are incarcerated, they are confined with the general adult prison
population due to the lack of a separate detention facility for
juveniles. In its 1999 report, the CPT stated that it was ``very
concerned'' about the current situation and recommended that the
Government take ``immediate steps . . . to ensure that juvenile
prisoners are held separately from adults.'' In signing the u.n.
Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, the Government entered a
reservation on the provision requiring the separation of adult and
juvenile prisoners. Government officials said that it is not practical
to establish and operate a separate facility for juvenile prisoners in
a small country like Iceland because the requirement to incarcerate a
juvenile occurs so infrequently.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide
for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this
provision in practice.
There are two levels of courts. A five-member Judicial Council
appointed by the Minister of Justice administers the district courts,
while the Supreme Court guards its independence and fairness by
administering itself. All judges, at all levels, serve for life.
The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
process. Juries are not used, but multijudge panels are common,
especially in the Supreme Court, which hears all appeals. Depending on
the seriousness of the case, a Supreme Court panel can include from
three to seven judges. Defendants are presumed innocent. They are
provided access to legal counsel of their own choosing with sufficient
time to prepare their defense. For defendants unable to pay attorneys'
fees, the state covers the cost, as set by the court, but defendants
are required to reimburse the state. Defendants have the right to be
present at their trial, to confront witnesses, and to participate
otherwise in the proceedings. No groups are barred from testifying, and
all testimony is treated alike. The courts have the discretion to allow
the introduction of evidence obtained illegally by the police. With
limited exceptions, trials are public and conducted fairly, with no
official intimidation. Defendants have the right to appeal.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Although the official state religion is
Lutheranism, the Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the
Government respects this right in practice. The salaries of Lutheran
ministers are paid by the state. Citizens 16 years of age and above are
presumed to be members of the state church and are required to support
the church by paying a tax, unless they designate another religious
denomination to receive their tax payment. The religion tax payment of
persons who choose not to belong to any specific, organized religious
group goes to the University of Iceland. Religious instruction in
Christianity is required in the public schools, although students may
be exempted.
A new law passed by Parliament in December 1999 (Law No. 108) sets
specific conditions and procedures that religious organizations must
follow in order to be recognized officially and registered by the
State. Such recognition is necessary in order for religious
organizations other than the state church to receive a per capita share
of church tax funds. The 1999 law is narrower in scope than the 1975
law it replaced and applies only to religious organizations that are
seeking to be, or are already, officially recognized and registered. No
restrictions or requirements are placed on unregistered religious
organizations, which have the same rights as other groups in society.
The law is considered necessary to deal with frequent attempts by
individuals to obtain recognition of religious organizations simply to
receive the tax income benefits.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
Although neither the Constitution nor the 1965 Law on the
Supervision of Foreigners includes provisions for granting refugee or
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, in practice the Government
adjudicates cases in accordance with their principles. The Government
cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees.
However, human rights monitors have expressed concern about the
lack of a modern and comprehensive immigration law to govern the
processing of asylum seekers and to provide a framework for the
handling of foreigners and immigrants in general. In particular there
is concern that the Supervision of Foreigners Law gives police and
custom officers at ports of entry too much discretion to deny admission
to asylum seekers whose claims they deem to be not ``credible.''
In response the Government states that official discretion is
rarely exercised and that none of the 42 individuals who were denied
entry to the country during the first 9 months of 2000 requested
asylum. Nevertheless, many government officials agree that a
comprehensive and modern immigration law is necessary.
In view of the country's geographic isolation and the lack of
direct transportation from any traditional source of refugees, the
question of first asylum rarely arises. However, the Directorate of
Immigration (which is responsible for adjudicating applications for
asylum) and the Icelandic Red Cross (which houses and assists asylum
seekers under a contact with the Government) report that 24 individuals
applied for asylum during the year, compared with 17 in 1999. None was
found to qualify for refugee status (several cases were still under
consideration or on appeal), but the 1999 application of an individual
who claimed to be 17 years old and fleeing persecution in central
Africa was approved. It was the first application for asylum status
ever approved. There were no reports of asylum seekers being detained
or forcibly expelled during the year.
The Government accepted 23 UNHCR-designated ``quota'' refugees from
the former Yugoslavia during the year, continuing a program begun in
1996 of bringing in 20 to 25 refugees from the region each year. In
1999 the Government also admitted 75 Kosovar refugees into the country,
37 of whom since returned to Kosovo with the financial support of the
Government. Local government authorities in the towns where refugees
settle take a strong interest in helping them adapt to their new
environment. The Icelandic Red Cross, in cooperation with the Refugee
Council of the Ministry of Social Affairs, developed a support family
program, whereby at least three Icelandic families are enlisted to
assist each refugee or refugee family. The refugees immediately are
granted work permits and assisted in finding jobs. For the first year,
they also are given free housing, utilities, and health care and
receive a stipend so that they can participate daily in a special half-
day language course designed specially for them. Refugees generally are
successful in assimilating into society, but their children generally
drop out of school earlier than children of citizens.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The most recent elections to the Althingi
(unicameral Parliament) were held in May 1999.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, but no legal
or practical impediments hinder their participation. Some human rights
monitors criticized the Minister of Justice (herself a woman) for
filling a vacancy on the Supreme Court during the year by choosing the
sole male candidate (who had never served on the bench) over three
experienced female district court judges. Only one of the nine Supreme
Court justices is a woman. Similarly, only 2 of 12 ministerial
permanent secretaries (civil servants who function as deputy ministers)
are women.
Women have greater representation in politics. Of the 12 government
ministers, 4 are women, and women hold 24 of the 63 seats in
Parliament. There has been a marked increase in the number of female
parliamentarians elected since the Women's List (WL), a feminist
political party, was founded in 1983. The WL forced the established
political parties to nominate more female candidates or face losing
support. The WL disappeared from the scene as the result of a political
party merger, but its legacy survives. Women's issues have moved into
the mainstream of political debate, and all of the major political
parties now have at least one woman in a prominent leadership position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The country's ethnically homogenous population is strongly
egalitarian and opposed to discrimination based on any of these
factors. The law and practice generally reflect this attitude.
Women.--Violence against women continued to be a matter of concern.
A public women's shelter offers counseling and protection to victims of
domestic violence and their children. Approximately 340 women used the
shelter during the year, 94 of whom sought temporary lodging, while the
rest asked for counseling or information. About 60 children accompanied
their mothers to the shelter during the year. At a rape trauma center,
between 300 and 400 women and children seek assistance annually. Both
facilities are financed by national and municipal governments, as well
as by private contributors. The emergency ward of the National Hospital
in Reykjavik has a special staff to care for rape victims. It reports
approximately 100 visits per year associated with incidents of sexual
abuse.
A police program to train officers in correct interrogation
procedures in rape and sexual abuse cases appears to be addressing
prior concerns that police indifference and hostility to female victims
did not assure proper attention and consideration for victims of such
abuses. Parliament passed legislation in May that gives courts the
power to issue restraining orders, an action that human rights monitors
praised as a potentially useful legal tool in keeping abusive husbands
away from their spouses.
A large majority of victims nevertheless decline to press charges,
and even more forgo trial, fearing publicity in this small, tightly
knit society. With an increasing number of interracial marriages,
mostly involving Icelandic men and Asian women, there is concern that
these new Asian immigrants are not assimilating well into local society
and could be vulnerable to mistreatment. To address this concern, the
city of Reykjavik offers these immigrant women emergency accommodation,
counseling, and information on legal rights, language training, and
Icelandic societal norms.
There were indications that some foreign women were trafficked to
work as striptease dancers or prostitutes against their will (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The sale of sex for money is not illegal per
se, but it is against the law for someone to engage in prostitution as
his or her main source of income. It is also illegal to act as an
intermediary in the sale or procurement of sex.
The rate of participation by women in the labor market is high. In
part this reflects the country's comprehensive system of subsidized day
care, which makes it affordable and convenient for women to work
outside the home. The Act on the Equal Status of Men and Women requires
that preference be given to the hiring and promotion of women in areas
where they are underrepresented, as long as they are equal in all other
respects to their male job seekers. Despite laws that require equal pay
for equal work, a sizeable pay gap continues to exist between men and
women. A survey by a union in Reykjavik showed that women, on average,
earned 30 percent less than men. A 12 percent difference in pay is
attributable to the fact that men work 4.2 more hours per week than
women, but the rest of the gap is unexplained.
Parliament passed legislation during the year that gives fathers
the same right as mothers to paid leave upon the birth of a child. When
the law is fully implemented in 2003, both mother and father will be
allowed to take 3 months of paid leave, with an additional 3 months
that can be taken by either parent or shared between them. Previously,
a mother was given 6 months of paid maternity leave and the father just
2 weeks. The new leave requirements apply equally to the public and
private sectors.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights through its well-funded systems of public education
and medical care. School attendance is compulsory through the age of
15. About 85 percent of students continue to upper secondary education,
which is financed completely by the State. The Government provides free
prenatal and infant medical care, as well as heavily subsidized
childcare. The Office of the Children's Ombudsman in the Prime
Minister's Office has a mandate to protect children's rights,
interests, and welfare by, among other things, exerting influence on
legislation, government decisions, and public attitudes.
There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
In an effort to improve the rate of prosecution of child sexual
abuse and lessen the trauma to the child, the Government in 1998
established the Children's Assessment Center. The objective of the
center is to create a safe and secure environment where child victims
feel more comfortable talking about what happened to them and are not
subjected to multiple interviews. The center brings together police,
prosecutors, judges, doctors, and officials from child protection
services. However, a 1999 change in the Code of Criminal Procedure
inadvertently undermined the center by making judges (instead of the
police) responsible for the investigatory interview of abused children
and by allowing these interviews to be conducted in specially designed
rooms at district courthouses. In September the Supreme Court upheld
the right of a Reykjavik district court judge to hold an investigatory
interview in the courthouse rather than at the assessment center. As of
September, only about 20 percent of child sexual abuse cases were being
handled through the center, a development that human rights monitors
claim is a step backwards in the protection of children's rights.
People with Disabilities.--Disabled individuals are not subject to
discrimination in employment, education, or the provision of other
state services. A 1992 law calls for the disabled to have the right to
``all common national and municipal services'' and provides that they
be given assistance to ``make it possible for them to live and work in
normal society with others.'' The law also provides that the disabled
should receive preference for a government job when they are qualified
equally, or more qualified, than regular applicants.
Building regulations updated in 1998 call for public
accommodations--such as hotels, restaurants, banks, and stores--as well
as government buildings to be accessible so that persons in wheelchairs
have access without assistance. Building regulations also specify that
elevators in such buildings should be large enough to accommodate
wheelchairs and that 1 percent of parking spaces (a minimum of one
space) should be reserved for disabled use only. Moreover, the
regulations specify that, to the extent possible, the sidewalk outside
the main entrance of a public accommodation or government building
should be heated so that it remains clear of ice and snow throughout
the winter.
The 1997 Planning and Building Act provides that violations of
these regulations are punishable by a fine or a jail sentence of up to
2 years. However, the country's main association for the disabled
complains that enforcement is lax and that penalties are rarely
assessed for noncompliance. Access to new buildings tends to be good,
while efforts to make old buildings more accessible have lagged. A
government committee is currently doing a systematic survey of all
state-owned buildings in the country to evaluate their accessibility.
Since 1995 the Reykjavik city government, in cooperation with local
associations representing bicycle riders and the blind, has been
systematically beveling sidewalks at intersections throughout the city
to facilitate the movement of pedestrians, bicyclists, and disabled
persons in wheelchairs. The city is spending about $175,000 a year on
this project, which it aims to have completed by 2006.
In what was heralded as a major human rights victory for the
disabled, the Supreme Court ruled in December that the Government's
practice of basing a disabled person's social security payment on the
income of his or her able-bodied spouse or partner was
unconstitutional. The Court said that such means testing violated
constitutional protections regarding equality and support for the
disabled and that it was contrary to the country's obligations under
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. At
year's end, the Government appointed a committee to study the court
ruling, a move that the Association of Disabled Persons criticized as a
delaying tactic. It called on the Government to take immediate action
to end the means testing and reimburse disabled persons for past
reductions in their social security payments.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Concern was voiced during the
year that the rapidly increasing number of foreigners being brought
into the country to meet the labor shortage in fish processing and
other less desirable occupations could lead to future problems,
especially in the event of an economic downturn. At the end of 1999,
7,271 foreigners were living in Iceland, or about 3 percent of the
population, according to the statistics office. However, persons of
foreign origin actually constituted 4 or 5 percent of the population
when account is taken of individuals who were born in foreign countries
but have since become citizens. New work and residence permits were
issued at a rate of about 150 per month during the year. Many of these
``temporary'' workers come from Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, and the Directorate of Immigration expected most
of them to seek to remain permanently rather than return to their
countries of origin.
Human rights monitors expressed concern about the establishment in
1997 of an ultra-nationalist organization called the Association of
Icelandic Nationalists, whose motto is ``Iceland for Icelanders.'' The
avowed aim of the association is to prevent further settlement of
foreigners of other than European origin in the country. Some human
rights monitors claim that the Government is not living up its
obligations under Article 4 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination because there is no
law that prohibits organizations that promote and incite racial
discrimination.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers make extensive use of the
right provided by the Constitution to establish organizations, draw up
their own constitutions and rules, choose their own leaders and
policies, and publicize their views. The resulting organizations are
controlled neither by the Government nor by any single political party.
Unions take active part in Nordic, European, and other international
trade union bodies. With the exception of limited categories of workers
in the public sector whose services are essential to public health or
safety, unions have had and used the right to strike for many years.
Approximately 80 percent of all eligible workers belong to unions.
During the year, 3 major strikes took place: A 2-week strike in the
spring by most of the unskilled and semiskilled labor unions outside of
Reykjavik, a 2-month strike during the summer by the main bus drivers'
union, and a 2-month strike at the end of the year by secondary school
teachers. The teachers' strike, which was the longest such strike in
the country's history, led some students to leave school and take up
full-time jobs.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Union
membership is not impeded in law or practice. Employers are required to
withhold union dues (1 percent of gross pay) from the pay of all
employees, whether or not they are union members. This is because union
dues help support, among other things, disability, strike, and pension
funds to which all workers are entitled.
The various trade unions and management organizations periodically
negotiate collective bargaining agreements that set specific terms for
workers' pay, hours, and other conditions. New collective bargaining
agreements were negotiated in the spring of 2000, and most will expire
in either 2003 or 2004. The Government played only a minor role in the
bargaining process, providing mediation assistance in a few cases
(through the State Mediator's Office) while generally encouraging wage
restraint to limit inflation. The new contacts provide that if
inflation exceeds expectations during the first year, the unions have
the right to seek renegotiation of the wage terms. In recent years, the
Government has played almost no role in the private sector collective
bargaining process, other than generally to encourage wage restraint
that would help to limit inflation.
Labor courts effectively adjudicate disputes over contracts and
over the rights provided for in the 1938 Act on Trade Unions and
Industrial Disputes, which prohibits antiunion discrimination. By law
employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to
reinstate workers fired for union activities. In practice the charges
are difficult to prove.
In 1996 Parliament passed legislation updating the labor laws and
bringing them into compliance with the European Convention on Human
Rights.
There are no export processing or other special economic zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by law and does not occur; however, some women
reportedly were coerced to work as striptease dancers or prostitutes
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.), and work permit practices could leave
workers vulnerable to abuse by employers (see Section 6.e.). The law
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section
6.c.). The law requires children to attend school until the age of 16
and prohibits the employment of younger children in factories, on
ships, or in other places that are hazardous or require hard labor.
This prohibition is observed in practice. Children 14 or 15 years old
may be employed part time or during school vacations in light,
nonhazardous work. Their work-hours must not exceed the ordinary work
hours of adults in the same occupation. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration enforces child labor regulations.
The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of
child labor in May.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No minimum wage is mandated
legislatively, but the minimum wages negotiated in the various
collective bargaining agreements apply automatically to all employees
in those occupations, whether they are union members or not. Union
membership is so extensive and effective that labor contracts afford
even the lowest paid workers a sufficient income for a decent standard
of living for themselves and their families.
Workers are protected by laws that effectively provide for their
health and safety as well as for unemployment insurance, paid
vacations, pensions, and reasonable working conditions and hours. The
standard legal workweek is 40 hours, which includes nearly 3 hours of
paid breaks. Work exceeding 8 hours in a workday must be compensated as
overtime. Under changes that took effect during the year, workers are
entitled to 11 hours of rest (up from 10 hours previously) within each
24-hour period and to a day off every week. Under defined special
circumstances, the 11-hour rest period can be reduced to 8 hours, but
the worker must then be compensated with 1.5 hours of rest for every
hour he received less than 11 hours. The day off can be postponed by a
week, in which case the worker has a right to 2 additional hours off in
the following week. Health and safety standards are set by Parliament
and administered and enforced by the Ministry of Social Affairs through
its Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which can close down
workplaces until safety and health standards are met. Workers have a
collective, not an individual, right to refuse to work in a place that
does not meet the criteria of occupational safety and health. Firing
workers who report unsafe or unhealthy conditions is illegal.
However, in the case of newly arrived foreign workers or refugees
(i.e., those who have been in the country for less than 3 years), human
rights monitors expressed concern that the Government's practice of
issuing the applicable work permit to the employer rather than to the
individual concerned could leave the worker vulnerable to abuse by the
employer.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically
criminalize trafficking in persons; however, a number of provisions in
the Penal Code can be used to prosecute such cases.
Although no charges have ever been filed, trafficking in women is
suspected in connection with the hundreds of foreign women who enter
the country to work in striptease clubs. The main concern is that some
of the women, especially those from Eastern and Central Europe, are
being brought to Iceland under false pretenses and then coerced to work
as striptease dancers or prostitutes. The police believe that the
foreign women also may be used to bring illegal drugs into the country.
Parliament passed legislation in May that closed a loophole that
allowed striptease dancers to enter the country and perform without a
work permit for up to 4 weeks under an exemption given for ``artists.''
Now any foreign woman (except those from the Nordic area and countries
of the European Economic Area) seeking to come to the country to work
as a striptease dancer must first obtain work and residence permits,
which are typically valid for 3 months. However, the Government has not
yet put any numerical limits or other controls on the issuance of work
permits for foreign striptease dancers. The clubs are allowed to bring
in as many as they want. One check is provided by the Icelandic
Federation of Labor. The Federation reviews the work permit
applications and labor contacts for striptease dancers (under the law,
all work permit applications must be reviewed and approved by the
``relevant'' labor union) and ensures that the dancers are afforded the
minimal labor protections and benefits.
The number of women entering the country for such work, while still
based on anecdotal evidence, has fallen to a few hundred since they can
now stay longer legally. Byyear's end, there had been no arrests in
connection with these activities.
__________
IRELAND
Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a long tradition of
orderly transfer of power. The Government consists of an executive
branch headed by a prime minister, a legislative branch with a
bicameral parliament, a directly elected president, and an independent
judiciary.
The national police (Garda Siochana) are under effective civilian
control and have primary responsibility for internal security. Since
the police are an unarmed force, the army acts in their support when
necessary--the latter under the effective civilian control of the
Minster for Defense. Ireland's principal internal security concern has
been to prevent the spillover of terrorist violence from Northern
Ireland. With the signing of the Good Friday Peace Agreement on April
10, 1998, virtually all parties in Northern Ireland acknowledged the
goals of democracy, peace, and reconciliation. All major paramilitary
groups, on both sides of the border, have declared permanent cease-
fires. Members of the police have committed some human rights abuses.
Ireland has an open, market-based economy that is highly dependent
on international trade. Over the last 2 decades it has been a large net
recipient of funds from the European Union (EU), and this assistance
has helped to address imbalances in the socioeconomic environment.
Strong economic growth over the past few years lowered unemployment to
4.4 percent, the lowest in 30 years.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens. Human rights problems arise primarily from: Instances of
abuse by the police; prison overcrowding and substandard facilities;
the continuation of special arrest and detention authority and the
nonjury court; the occasional censorship of films, books, and
periodicals; violence and discrimination against women; the abuse of
children; and discrimination against asylum seekers and Travellers (an
itinerant ethnic community).
As stipulated in the Good Friday Agreement, the Government
established a human rights commission in July, which is to cooperate
with a parallel commission in Northern Ireland. The human rights
commissions are to provide information and promote awareness of human
rights, comment on human rights draft legislation referred to them by
the legislatures, make recommendations to the governments on the
adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, and initiate court
proceedings or provide assistance to individuals doing so. The Good
Friday Agreement also mandates equivalency with regard to protection of
human rights in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. To this
end, the Government atyear's end was preparing legislation which would
allow for an 'interpretive incorporation' of the European Convention on
Human Rights into Irish law.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
During the year, the Garda in the Republic of Ireland and the Royal
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland cooperated in questioning
87 persons in connection with the August 1998 Omagh bombing that killed
29 people and injured hundreds. To date only one person, Colm Murphy,
has been charged in connection with the bombing. Murphy, an Irish
citizen charged with conspiracy to cause an explosion, is expected to
stand trial in Dublin in 2001. In October 2000, at the conclusion of
the inquests of 28 of the 29 victims, the RUC announced that it knew of
15 suspects responsible for the bombing but lacked evidence sufficient
to charge and prosecute them.
In May 1999, the Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains, a
joint body made up of representatives from the Republic and Northern
Ireland, began efforts to locate the remains of nine persons, termed
the ``disappeared,'' abducted and killed by the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) in the 1970's.
Pursuant to joint Irish and British legislation granting limited
immunity to IRA members involved in these acts, information was given
to the Commission by the IRA on the location of the nine bodies. In
1999 the remains of three of the nine victims were recovered and
returned to their families. In January 2000 the Commission halted
excavations until May, when digging resumed for another 3 weeks
following receipt of new information from the IRA. At the end of May,
the Commission again suspended the search pending new information from
the IRA. Work had not resumed byyear's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and officials generally
did not employ them. However, there were instances of abuse of
detainees and prisoners. While the mistreatment of persons in police
custody is not widespread, detainees filed a number of cases claiming
damages for injuries sustained while in police custody.
Human rights organizations have called for the establishment of an
independent ombudsman or authority to investigate complaints against
the police. It would replace the current statutory board, the Garda
Siochana (Police) Complaints Board, through which the Garda authorities
investigate alleged misconduct by their peers. In 1999 the Board
received 1,264 complaints, a decrease from 1,400 complaints in 1998.
The complaints included charges of criminal behavior (mistreatment or
abuse). After a review process conducted in accordance with the 1986
Garda Siochana (Complaints) Act, 192 cases were referred to the
Director of Public Prosecutions, who directed that members of the Garda
Siochana be prosecuted in 9 of those cases. None of the 9 cases
reportedly resulted in convictions.
The Board also referred 20 of the complaints to an internal
disciplinary body in 1999. Of the nine cases dealt with byyear's end,
five were found to involve wrongdoing. The Board in addition sent 28
complaints directly to the Garda Commissioner for disciplinary action.
In response to a pan-European program, ``Police and Human Rights
1997-2000,'' the Garda Commissioner in late 1999 launched the Garda
Siochana Human Rights Initiative for 1999-2000 in order to further
develop policing practices that uphold human rights. This initiative
focused on the training of officers (from the senior level to incoming
students), a review of practices and procedures, and increased
coordination and cooperation with NGO's. In addition to this
initiative, the Government introduced the recording of questioning of
suspects in Garda stations, a practice designed to deter further abuse
or mistreatment.
Ireland has a low incarceration rate (80 inmates per 100,000
population), and the prison regime is generally liberal. However, the
physical infrastructure of many prisons is inadequate. Following
charges that prisons are overcrowded and lack in-cell sanitation
facilities such as toilets and running water, many are undergoing
renovation. In addition prisons lack sufficient health care facilities
and services. Cloverhill remand prison and Mountjoy women's prison (the
Dochas Center), both unable to accept inmates at their initial openings
in 1999, are now fully operational. These new facilities are designed
to accommodate a further 1,200 prisoners and thereby help reduce
overcrowding.
Prisoners with complaints of mistreatment by prison officials or
negligence of health and safety due to prison conditions have ready
access to mechanisms for redress. However, according to the Justice
Department, no allegations of mistreatment of prisoners were leveled
against the Prison Service during the year, and no similar claims were
left outstanding from previous years. However, 44 complaints were made
in 1998, the last year for which statistics are available. The
authorities continued to arrest and incarcerate at Portlaoise prison
persons involved in paramilitary activity. Conditions for these inmates
are the same, if not better, than those for the general prison
population.
Domestic and international human rights monitors are permitted to
visit prisons without reservation. The Council of Europe's Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT) visited prisons in 1998. In December 1999, the
Government responded to the CPT's report with plans for improving
conditions. In May 2000 the Government published a followup report as
requested by the CPT.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
stipulates that no person shall be deprived of personal liberty without
due process under the law; however, special arrest and detention
authority continued. A detainee has the right to petition the High
Court, which is required to order release unless it can be shown that
the person is being detained in accordance with the law. The 1984
Criminal Justice Act provides for an initial period of detention of 6
hours, with an extension of another 6 hours when a police officer of
the rank of superintendent or above so directs, in cases in which there
are grounds for believing that such detention is necessary for the
proper investigation of an offense. A continuation of detention of 8
hours overnight is possible, to allow a detainee to sleep.
In cases covered by the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, the
initial period of detention without charge is 24 hours on the direction
of a police superintendent; detention can be extended another 24 hours
by a judge. This act allows police to arrest and detain for questioning
anyone suspected of committing a ``scheduled offense,'' i.e., one
involving firearms, explosives, or membership in an unlawful
organization. Although the stated purpose of the act is to ``prevent
actions and conduct calculated to undermine public order and the
authority of the state,'' it is not restricted to subversive offenses.
Therefore, the police have broad arrest and detention powers in any
case involving firearms. However, under the terms of the
Decommissioning Law enacted in 1997 in support of the Northern Ireland
peace process, proceedings may not be instituted against persons in
relation to any offense that may be committed in the course of
decommissioning illegally held arms in accordance with an approved arms
decommissioning scheme.
The 1939 act also provides for the indefinite detention, or
internment, without trial of any person who is engaged in activities
that are ``prejudicial to the preservation of public peace and order or
to the security of the State.'' While this power has not been invoked
since the late 1950's, the Government could do so by simply issuing a
proclamation.
An amendment to the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act was enacted
in the wake of the Omagh bombing in 1998. The amendment allows police
to detain suspects in certain crimes, usually involving serious
offenses with firearms or explosives, for 48 hours, with a possible 24-
hour extension if approved by a judge.
The legislation also curtails the right of silence. Under the
amendment, if the accused was informed of the consequences of remaining
silent to questions regarding his whereabouts, associations, or
actions, then the accused's silence may be used as corroborative
evidence of guilt. The accused person's failure to respond to
accusations of membership in an illegal organization also may be used
as corroborative evidence of guilt. However, the accused cannot be
convicted based solely on his refusal to speak.
Membership in or leadership of an illegal organization carries a
possible life sentence under the new amendment (illegal organizations
are defined by the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act). The word of a
police superintendent can be used as corroborative evidence of
membership. Collecting information to aid in a serious offense carries
a penalty of up to 10years' imprisonment, a fine, or both. Withholding
information that could prevent a ``serious'' offense or that could aid
in the apprehension or conviction of a perpetrator also is illegal,
with a penalty of up to 5years' imprisonment, a fine, or both.
The Government established a committee, chaired by a justice of the
district court, to investigate allegations that the legislation
violates international human right conventions. The legislation, which
was set to expire in June, was extended in July for an additional 12
months. The committee was expected to report its findings by the end of
the year.
The 1996 Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act permits detention
without charge for up to 7 days in cases involving drug trafficking.
However, to hold a suspected drug trafficker for more than 48 hours the
police must seek a judge's approval.
Following approval in 1996 of a referendum calling for stricter
bail laws, legislation was enacted in 1997 that allows a court to
refuse bail to a person charged with a serious offense where it is
considered reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of another
serious offense. A schedule of serious offenses is contained in the
bill; the offense must be one that carries a penalty of 5years'
imprisonment or more. In May the courts implemented the entire bail act
following a delay due to a lack of prison accommodations.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system includes a district court with 23 districts, a
circuit court with 8 circuits, the High Court, the Court of Criminal
Appeal, and the Supreme Court. The President appoints judges
recommended by the Judicial Appointment Board, who choose from a list
presented by the Government.
The Director of Public Prosecutions, a state official with
independent status, prosecutes criminal cases. Jury trial is the norm.
The accused generally may choose an attorney. For indigent defendants,
the State assumes the cost of counsel under the criminal legal aid
scheme.
However, the Constitution explicitly allows ``special courts'' to
be created when ``ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the
effective administration of justice and the preservation of public
peace and order.'' In 1972, under the 1939 Offenses Against the State
Act, the government created a nonjury ``Special Criminal Court'' (SCC)
to try ``scheduled offenses'' (see Section 1.d.). Largely a reaction to
the spillover of paramilitary violence from Northern Ireland, the use
of the SCC was justified over the years to address the problem of jury
intimidation in cases involving defendants with suspected paramilitary
links. The continued need for the SCC is being kept under review by the
Government.
During the first 6 months of the year, the SCC indicted 25 persons
and held 14 trials, compared with 25 indictments and 18 trials in all
of 1999. In addition to ``scheduled offenses,'' the Director of Public
Prosecutions can have any nonscheduled offense tried by the SCC if he
certifies that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the
effective administration of justice and the preservation of public
peace.
In lieu of a jury, the SCC always sits as a three-judge panel. Its
verdicts are by majority vote. Rules of evidence are essentially the
same as in regular courts, except that the sworn statement of a police
chief superintendent identifying the accused as a member of an illegal
organization is accepted as prima facie evidence. Sessions of the SCC
are usually public, but judges may exclude certain persons other than
journalists. Appeals of SCC decisions are allowed in certain
circumstances.
Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, releases continued of
those imprisoned for crimes related to the terrorist campaign in
Northern Ireland. Prisoners belonging to organizations that have
declared permanent cease-fires and who have committed themselves to
work through peaceful, democratic means are the only persons qualified
for this program. All releases were completed by July.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution and the law prohibit such practices,
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and
violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides
individuals with the right to ``express freely their convictions and
opinions.'' However, freedom of the press is subject to the
constitutional qualification that it not ``undermine public order or
morality or the authority of the state.'' The publication or utterance
of ``blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter'' is prohibited by the
Constitution. While the press in practice operates freely, the 1961
Defamation Act (which puts the onus on newspapers and periodicals
accused of libel to prove that defamatory words are true) and the 1963
Official Secrets Act (which gives the State wide scope to prosecute
unauthorized disclosures of sensitive government information) are
believed to result in some self-censorship.
Broadcasting remains mostly state controlled, but private sector
broadcasting continues to grow. There are 43 independent radio stations
and an independent television station. Expanded access to cable and
satellite television is lessening considerably the relative influence
of state-controlled broadcasting. The Broadcasting Complaints
Commission oversees standards and investigates complaints about
programming. The 1960 Broadcasting Act empowers the Government to
prohibit the state-owned radio and television network from broadcasting
any matter that is ``likely to promote or incite to crime or which
would tend to undermine the authority of the state.'' It was on this
basis that the government banned Sinn Fein (the legal political front
of the Irish Republican Army) from the airwaves from 1971 to 1994.
Following Sinn Fein's agreement to participate in the Northern Ireland
peace process and the declaration of the IRA cease-fire, the Government
restored Sinn Fein's access.
The Office of the Film Censor must classify films and videos before
they can be shown or sold. Distributors pay fees to finance the
censor's office. Under the 1923 Censorship of Films Act, the censor has
the authority to cut or ban any film that is ``indecent, obscene, or
blasphemous'' or which tends to ``inculcate principles contrary to
public morality or subversive of public morality.'' As of October, no
theatrical films were banned during the year, but 125 videos were
banned, mainly because of their pornographic or violent content.
Decisions of the censor can be appealed to a nine-member appeal board
within 3 months, but neither the censor nor the appeal board is
required to hear arguments or evidence in public or to state the
reasons for its decisions.
Books and periodicals are also subject to censorship. The 1946
Censorship of Publications Act calls for a five-member board to examine
publications referred to it by the customs service or the general
public. It also can examine books (but not periodicals) on its own
initiative. The board can prohibit the sale of any publication that it
judges to be indecent or obscene. As of October, the board had not
banned any books or periodicals. In 1999 the board banned the
mainstream In Dublin magazine for carrying advertisements for ``massage
parlors,'' which were regarded by the board as solicitations for
prostitution. The publishers challenged the ban in court, and the
board's ruling was overturned on the condition that the magazine take
out the advertisements. In 1999 the board did not ban any books, but it
banned 8 periodicals, compared with 15 books and 10 periodicals in
1998.
In 1996 Veronica Guerin, a journalist and crime reporter with the
Sunday Independent newspaper, was murdered. The murder was seen as an
attempt by criminal elements to silence press coverage of their
activities. The incident shocked public opinion and led to the adoption
of new legislation to combat narcotics-related crime. The courts
convicted two men, Paul Ward (November 1998) and Brian Meehan (July
1999), in connection with the murder and sentenced them to life
imprisonment. As of October, a third, John Gilligan, extradited from
the United Kingdom, was awaiting trial; three other men have been
sentenced on lesser charges related to the Guerin case. No incidents of
violence against journalists have been reported since Guerin's murder
in 1996.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides citizens with the right to ``assemble peaceably and without
arms'' and to form associations and unions; however, it also allows the
State to ``prevent or control meetings'' that are calculated to cause a
breach of the peace or to be a danger or nuisance to the general
public. Under the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, it is unlawful
to hold any public meeting on behalf of, or in support of, an illegal
organization. Although the law mandates the prosecution and
incarceration of persons for mere membership in a terrorist
organization, the Government allows meetings and assemblies by some
groups that are associated with illegal terrorist organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government does not hamper the teaching or practice
of any faith. Even though overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, Ireland has no
state religion. However, most primary and secondary schools are
denominational, and the Catholic Church partially controls their boards
of management. The Government provides equal funding to the schools of
different religious denominations. Although religious instruction is an
integral part of the curriculum, parents may exempt their children from
such instruction. There is no discrimination against nontraditional
religious groups.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There is complete freedom of movement
within the country, as well as freedom to engage in foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation.
The existing refugee law, enacted in 1996, has been implemented
only partially and was under review. The law gives effect to the 1990
Dublin Convention, harmonizing European Union asylum procedures, and it
also makes provision for program refugees (those invited by the state
to apply for asylum; in 1999 mostly Kosovars). The law also expressly
forbids the forced return of persons to a country where they fear
persecution.
The Government grants refugee or asylee status in accordance with
the provision of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and it cooperates with the office of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Government drew up
specific administrative procedures for implementation of the convention
in consultation with the UNHCR. In 1992 the Supreme Court ruled that
these procedures were binding on the Department of Justice, Equality,
and Law Reform.
The large increase in the number of asylum seekers continued to
cause problems, severely straining the Government's processing system
and societal acceptance (see Section 5). A total of 10,938 asylum
seekers entered the country during the year. As of July, over 5,000 new
applications were filed. The total number of applications awaiting
processing as of December was 6,972; most applicants were from Romania
and Nigeria. The Government provided first asylum in 211 cases during
the year. An equal or larger number of asylum applications are expected
in 2001.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution. Measures taken to speed the lengthy
processing time of applications (currently about 18 months), including
recruitment of additional staff, have had little impact because of the
increasing number of refugee applications. The Government improved the
situation of asylum seekers awaiting review of their applications by
allowing those who filed before July 26, 1999, and have been waiting
over 12 months, to work in Ireland. The Government established a new
Garda (police) National Immigration Bureau to monitor and track
nonnationals who are the subject of deportation orders. The new Bureau
also plans to: Coordinate activities leading to deportation,
operational strategies and resources at ports of entry, and strategies
to combat trafficking in illegal immigrants; strengthen international
liaison on immigration issues; administer the nonnational registration
service; and enforce immigration law generally.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage for citizens over the age of 18. Several political
parties have seats in the bicameral Parliament. Members of the Dail
(House of Representatives)--the chamber that carries out the main
legislative functions--are popularly elected; in the Seanad (Senate),
most members are elected by vocational and university groups, and the
others are appointed by the Prime Minister. The President is popularly
elected for a 7-year term and is limited to 2 terms. An appointed
Council of State serves as an advisory body to the President.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Although the
President is a woman, only 22 of the 166 deputies in the Dail and 11 of
the 60 senators are women. Of the 15 government ministers, 3 are women,
as are 3 of the 17 junior ministers. Two women sit on the 26-member
High Court; 2 of the 8 Supreme Court judges are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
cooperative and responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution forbids state promotion of one religion over
another and discrimination on the grounds of religion, profession,
belief, or status. However, until recently few laws implemented these
provisions of the Constitution. The 1998 amended Employment Equality
Act went into effect in October 1999. It outlaws discrimination in
relation to employment on the basis of nine distinct discriminatory
grounds: Gender, marital status, family status, sexual orientation,
religious belief, age, disability, race, and membership in the
Traveller community. The 2000 Equal Status Act outlaws discrimination
in the provision of goods, facilities, and services on the basis of the
nine grounds listed above.
Women.--Domestic violence and emotional abuse are common. In
response to what it sees as a ``hidden'' and ``severely under
reported'' issue, the National Steering Committee on Violence Against
Women (a multiagency government body) began a public outreach campaign
in December 1999. The campaign aims to facilitate victims' reporting of
domestic and other types of violence by informing women of the
resources available and rallying public support for victims. There are
24 women's shelters, funded in part by the Government. According to the
Dublin Rape Crisis Center, the overall number of reported rapes
continued to rise. However, calls to the center registered a slight
decrease: 7,243 calls were received between July 1999 and June 2000,
compared with 7,500 calls received over the same period in the previous
year, probably due to changes in the call system. For the 1999-2000
period, the center estimated that 28 percent of rape and child sexual
abuse victims reported the crime to police and that 10 percent of these
cases resulted in convictions, with 39 percent of cases still pending.
Recent rape victims and victims raped by a stranger were more likely to
have reported the rape to police.
A 1990 law criminalizes rape within marriage, and the 1995 Civil
Legal Aid Act provides for free legal advice to victims in cases of
serious sexual assault. In rape cases, the State brings the case
against the accused, with the complainant (victim) acting as a witness.
Until 2000, as a witness, the victim was afforded no legal
representation. The 2000 Sex Offenders Bill provides that ``separate
legal representation will be provided to complainants in rape and other
serious sexual assault cases where application is made to adduce
evidence or to cross-examine the complainant about his or her past
sexual experience.''
Discrimination against women in the workplace is unlawful, but
inequalities persist regarding pay and promotions in both the public
and the private sectors. Women hold about 43 percent of public sector
jobs but are underrepresented in senior management positions. A 1999
government report found that at least 50 percent of state-sponsored
bodies have no guidelines for dealing with sexual harassment and no
policy on equal opportunity. The 1974 Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act,
the 1977 Employment Equality Act, and the amended 1998 Employment
Equality Act provide for protection and redress against discrimination
based on gender and marital status. The Equality Authority monitors the
implementation of these acts. According to 1998 statistics, women's
earnings have increased more rapidly than men's since 1985, albeit from
a lower starting point. The weekly earnings of women in industry still
averaged only 65 percent of those of men in 1998.
Women's participation in the work force still is hampered by the
lack of adequate childcare facilities. To encourage the participation
of parents, both men and women, in the work force, the Government
included in its 2000-2006 national development plan in March an equal
opportunities childcare program, under which approximately $275 million
(250 million Irish pounds) was allocated to fund measures to improve
childcare availability and quality.
The 1994 Maternity Protection Act provides a woman with 14 weeks of
paid maternity leave and the right to return to her job. A 1998
Parental Leave Act allows a child's mother and father each to take 14
weeks of unpaid leave to care for a child under the age of 5. Although
each parent has a separate entitlement to parental leave, the leave is
not transferable, i.e., the mother cannot take the father's leave or
vice versa. Parental leave does not affect a mother's right to
maternity leave.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and health care. Under the 1991 Child Care Act, education is
free and compulsory for children from 6 to 15 years of age. The act
places a statutory duty on government health boards to identify and
help children who are not receiving adequate care, and it gives the
police increased powers to remove children from the family when there
is an immediate and serious risk to their health or welfare. The
Minister of State (junior minister) for Health has special
responsibility for children's policy, including monitoring the
implementation of the Child Care Act by the eight regional health
boards. The 1987 Status of Children Act provided for equal rights for
children in all legal proceedings.
The sexual abuse of children continued to receive significant media
attention. The Dublin Rape Crisis Center reported that 58 percent of
calls to its crisis line involved child sexual abuse, and only 13
percent of the incidents had occurred within 1 year preceding the call.
The 1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act strengthens and updates
measures to protect children from sexual exploitation, including any
exchange of information on the Internet that implies a child is
available for sex.
People with Disabilities.--The government Commission on the Status
of People with Disabilities estimated in 1996 that 10 percent of the
population have a disability. Under the 1998 Employment Equality Act,
it is unlawful to discriminate against anyone on the basis of
disability in relation to employment. The 1991 Building Regulations Act
established minimum criteria to ensure access for people with
disabilities to all public and private buildings constructed or
significantly altered after 1992, but enforcement is uneven. A National
Disability Authority (NDA) began operations in 1999 with a budget of
$2.7 million (2 million Irish pounds). The NDA is to set disability
standards, monitor the implementation of these standards, and engage in
research and the formulation of disability policy. The Authority's new
strategic plan was awaiting approval by the Government atyear's end.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 25,000 nomadic
persons regard themselves as a distinct ethnic group called
``Travellers,'' roughly analogous to the Roma of continental Europe.
The ``travelling'' community has its own history, culture, and
language. The Travellers' emphasis on self-employment and the extended
family distinguishes them from the rest of society.
Travellers regularly are denied access to premises, goods,
facilities, and services; many restaurants and pubs, for example, will
not serve them. Despite national school rules that provide that no
child may be refused admission on account of social position,
Travellers frequently experience difficulties in enrolling their
children in school. Sometimes they are segregated into all-Traveller
classes. According to 1998 government statistics, of 4,978 Traveller
families, approximately 1,191 live on roadsides or on temporary sites
without toilets, electricity, or washing facilities. Many Travellers
are dependent on social welfare for survival and are unable to
participate in the mainstream economy because of discrimination and a
lack of education.
The 1998 Employment Equality Act outlaws job discrimination against
Travellers. A 1993 task force on the travelling community produced a
comprehensive report in 1995 on various aspects of Travellers' lives,
including education, work, accommodation, health, and discrimination. A
monitoring committee is overseeing implementation of the
recommendations of the report, some of which have resulted in the
formation of special committees in the Departments of Education,
Environment, and Health to examine Traveller difficulties in these
areas.
A 1998 law, entitled the Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act--
recommended by the 1995 task force--obliges local elected officials to
draw up and implement Traveller accommodation plans on a 5-year basis
and requires Traveller input in the process. In the event of a failure
to agree on a draft plan, county and city managers are responsible for
their adoption and implementation. According to traveller groups, the
act was implemented with mixed results during its first 2 years.
The growing immigration of foreign workers has been accompanied by
societal discrimination and racial violence against the newcomers.
These developments have sparked public debate over the openness of
society to immigrants and how to address outbreaks of xenophobic
incidents of violence. Although asylum seekers have the right to work
if their cases remain pending for over a year, 4 in 10 claimed to have
experienced racism and discrimination from recruiters and employers
while looking for work, according to a study commissioned by the Irish
Refugee Council. Racially motivated incidents occurred frequently,
involving physical violence, intimidation, and verbal slurs. A British
citizen visiting Dublin was stabbed and seriously wounded in June while
defending his black wife and son from attack. A Dublin bus driver was
convicted and fined under the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act
in September as a result of a verbal exchange, which included racist
slurs, with a black passenger. Groups of young people reportedly
targeted white foreigners as well for verbal harassment and violent
attacks. Government officials spoke out against racism and xenophobia,
and in July racism was one of two major topics addressed at a
government-sponsored NGO forum on human rights. In addition the
Government initiated a public outreach campaign welcoming immigrants.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The right to join a union is provided
for by law, as is the right to refrain from joining. About 48 percent
of workers in the private and public sectors are members of unions.
Police and military personnel are prohibited from striking, but they
may form associations to represent themselves in matters of pay,
working conditions, and general welfare. The right to strike is freely
exercised in both the public and private sectors. The 1990 Industrial
Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and union leaders;
the Government effectively enforces this provision through the
Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment. A number of strikes
occurred during the year, including a nurses' strike, a bus drivers'
strike, a train engineers' strike over wages, and a hauliers' (truck
drivers) ``go-slow'' over fuel prices. All concluded peacefully, with
the unions involved achieving some, if not all, of their goals.
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) represents 64 unions in
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The ICTU is independent
of the Government and political parties.
Unions may freely form or join federations or confederations and
affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
have full freedom to organize and to engage in collective bargaining.
The 1974 Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act and the 1977 Employment Equality
Act make the Equality Authority responsible for the investigation of
allegations of antiunion discrimination. If the Authority is unable to
effect resolution, the dispute goes before the Labor Court, which
consists of one representative each for the employer and the union,
plus an independent chairperson. The 1977 Unfair Dismissals Act
provides for various forms of relief in cases where employers are found
guilty of antiunion discrimination, including the reinstatement of
workers fired for union activities.
Most terms and conditions of employment are determined through
collective bargaining, in the context of a national economic pact
negotiated every 3 years by the ``social partners,'' i.e., unions,
employers, farmers, and the Government. The latest version of these
agreements, the Partnership for Prosperity and Fairness, was signed in
April.
The 1990 Industrial Relations Act established the Labor Relations
Commission, which provides advice and conciliation services in
industrial disputes. The Commission may refer unresolved disputes to
the Labor Court, which may recommend terms of settlement and may set up
joint employer-union committees to regulate conditions of employment
and minimum wages in a specific trade or industry.
The export processing zone at Shannon Airport has the same labor
laws as the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced and bonded
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
does not occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--By law children are required to attend school through the
age of 15. Under the terms of the 1997 Protection of Young Persons Act,
employers may not employ those under the age of 16 in a regular full-
time job. Employers may hire 14- or 15-year-olds for light work on
school holidays, as part of an approved work experience or educational
program, or on a part-time basis during the school year (for children
over the age of 15 only). The act incorporates international rules on
the protection of young workers drawn up by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the European Union; it sets rest intervals and
maximum working hours, prohibits the employment of 18-year-olds for
late night work, and requires employers to keep specified records for
workers who are under 18 years of age. Enforcement is reportedly lax,
but violations appear to be rare. The law prohibits forced and bonded
child labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively
(see Section 6.c.). The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the
worst forms of child labor in December.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A new national minimum wage,
$4.84 (4.40 Irish pounds) per hour, went into effect on April 1. This
wage alone would not provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. Low-income families continue to be entitled to benefits
such as subsidized housing and children's allowances.
The standard workweek is 39 hours. Working hours in the industrial
sector are limited to 9 hours per day and 48 hours per week. Overtime
work is limited to 2 hours per day, 12 hours per week, and 240 hours in
a year. The Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment is
responsible for enforcing four basic laws dealing with occupational
safety that provide adequate and comprehensive coverage. No significant
complaints arose from either labor or management regarding enforcement
of these laws. Regulations provide that employees who find themselves
in situations that present a ``serious, imminent and unavoidable risk''
may leave without the employer being able to take disciplinary action.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Recent legislation criminalizes
trafficking in persons, which so far is limited and infrequent. The
1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act, criminalized trafficking in
children for the purpose of sexual exploitation, with penalties of up
to life imprisonment. The Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill passed
in October was upheld as constitutional but has not yet been
implemented. It will criminalize the activities of persons trafficking
in illegal immigrants and asylum seekers. There is no specific
legislation addressing the trafficking in women for sexual criminal
activities. According to an NGO, trafficking in women does not receive
much attention from organizations or the Government.
__________
ITALY
Italy is a longstanding, multiparty parliamentary democracy.
Executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by
the president of the Council (the Prime Minister). The Head of State
(President of the Republic) nominates the Prime Minister after
consulting with leaders of all political forces in Parliament. The
current Parliament was elected in free and democratic elections in
April 1996. The judiciary is independent, but critics complain that
some judges are politicized.
The armed forces are under the control of the Ministry of Defense.
Control over the Carabinieri, a military security force, was
transferred in March from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of
Defense; however, the Ministry of Interior retains authority over this
force in matters of internal security. Four separate police forces
report to different ministerial or local authorities. Under exceptional
circumstances, the Government may call on the army to provide security
in the form of police duty in certain local areas, thereby freeing the
Carabinieri and local police to focus on other duties. For several
years, the army supported the police in Sicily and in the province of
Naples, areas with high levels of organized crime. The army left Naples
at the end of 1997 and Sicily in 1998 but was redeployed back to both
locations for a short period in 1999, during which time special actions
were in progress against organized crime. In September the Government
sent an augmented force to Naples of 500 police and Carabinieri, some
of whom wore military-style camouflage battle dress uniforms, to combat
criminal violence in the city. Amnesty International (AI) reported
numerous allegations that the police used excessive force against
individuals, often Roma, refugees, and, increasingly, women, at the
time of arrest and initial detention.
Italy has an advanced, industrialized market economy, and the
standard of living is high. Small and midsized companies employ from 70
to 80 percent of the work force. Major products include machinery,
textiles, apparel, transportation equipment, and food and agricultural
products. The Government owns a substantial number of enterprises in
finance, communications, industry, transportation, and services, but
privatization is moving forward at a measured pace.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and the judiciary generally provide effective means of
dealing with instances of individual abuse; however, there were
problems in some areas. There were isolated reports of police abuse of
detainees; such accusations are investigated by the judiciary. Prisons
are overcrowded. The pace of justice is slow, and perpetrators of some
serious crimes avoid punishment due to trials that exceed the statute
of limitations. Lengthy pretrial detention is a serious problem. The
Government has taken steps to combat violence against women and child
abuse; however, they remain problems. Societal discrimination against
women and discrimination and sporadic violence against immigrants and
other foreigners continue to be problems. Child labor, mainly involving
immigrant children, persists in the underground economy but is
investigated actively. Exploitation of clandestine immigrants is
widespread. Trafficking in women and girls to the country for
prostitution and forced labor is a growing problem, as is trafficking
in children.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government
officials.
On May 20, 1999, Massimo D'Antona, a senior adviser to the Minister
of Labor, was shot and killed outside his home in Rome. The Red
Brigades, a terrorist movement, claimed responsibility for the killing.
A suspect detained by police in Rome in May subsequently was released,
and the investigation continued atyear's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and cruel or degrading
punishment; however, there were reports of isolated incidents in which
police abused detainees. Amnesty International, the U.N. Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC), the U.N. Committee Against Torture, and the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Torture regularly assess the country's judicial
and prison system. The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Antigone,
which is composed mainly of lawyers, magistrates, and academics,
promotes the rights of detainees, works closely with the European
Commission for Prevention of Torture, and monitors the prison system.
According to a report issued by AI in June, there are numerous
allegations of the deliberate use of excessive force against
individuals detained in connection with common criminal offenses or in
the course of identity checks. Allegations of mistreatment relate to
the time of arrest and first 24 hours in custody and concern both
citizens and foreigners, with an increasing number of women appearing
as alleged victims. A high proportion of the allegations received by AI
concern foreign nationals (many of them from Africa), as well as Roma.
In a May letter to penal authorities, AI expressed concern over suits
filed the previous month by inmates of the Sassari District Prison, who
had been subjected to cruel and degrading punishment. In a separate
communication, AI referred to allegations of mistreatment at newly
established temporary detention centers for aliens (see Section 2.d.).
Overcrowded and antiquated prisons continue to be a problem. The
prison system has a capacity of 35,000 but holds over 53,000 detainees,
of whom 3,500 were added in 1999 alone. Older facilities tend to lack
outdoor or exercise space, compounding the difficulties of close
quarters. Approximately 54 percent of detainees are serving sentences;
the other 46 percent consist mainly of persons awaiting trial or the
outcome of an appeal. Nearly one in three pensioners has been jailed
for a drug violation. One in four is an alien. Of drug users, almost 10
percent are HIV positive. Over 80 prisoners died while in jail in 1999;
53 committed suicide, with a reported 920 unsuccessful suicide attempts
and some 6,500 acts of self-mutilation.
In the spring these conditions led to protests both by prisoners
and guards. A 2-day guard strike in Sassari that left inmates without
food or water led to a prisoner riot in March, which was followed by
retaliation by prison guards in April. In early May, 82 Sassari guards
and wardens were arrested in connection with the April abuses. These
arrests provoked sympathy strikes and demonstrations by prison guards
across the country, who protested their low pay, long hours, and the
conditions of tension and risk under which they work. During the same
period, prisoner protests broke out at several jails and the Parliament
debated proposals for decriminalizing certain crimes, the shortening of
sentences, alternative punishments to imprisonment, and the expulsion
of non-EU nationals who are sentenced to prison terms. The Pope's call
in June for a Jubilee-Year clemency increased the pressure on
parliamentarians and raised prisoner expectations; however, proponents
of such measures could not obtain the necessary twothirds support in
each chamber. The Government and opposition forces were unable to
agree, and no action was taken byyear's end.
The Government permits the independent monitoring of prison
conditions by parliamentarians, local human rights groups, the media,
and other organizations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Detainees are allowed
prompt and regular access to lawyers of their choosing (although
occasional lapses in this general rule have been alleged) and to family
members. If detainees are indigent, the State provides a lawyer. Within
24 hours of being detained, the examining magistrate must decide
whether there is enough evidence to proceed to an arrest. The
investigating judge then has 48 hours in which to confirm the arrest
and recommend whether the case goes to trial. In exceptional
circumstances, usually in cases of organized crime figures, where there
is danger that attorneys may attempt to tamper with evidence, the
investigating judge may take up to 5 days to interrogate the accused
before the accused is allowed to contact an attorney. The U.N. Human
Rights Committee, the treaty monitoring body for the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recommended that this 5-day
period be reduced and that all detainees have access to legal advice
immediately upon arrest.
Preventive detention can be imposed only as a last resort, or if
there is clear and convincing evidence of a serious offense, such as
crimes involving the Mafia, or those related to drugs, arms, or
subversion. In these cases, a maximum of 2 years of preliminary
investigation is permitted. Except in extraordinary situations,
preventive custody is not permitted for pregnant women, single parents
of children under 3 years of age, persons over 70 years of age, or
those who are seriously ill. Preventive custody can be imposed only for
crimes punishable by a maximum sentence of not less than 4 years.
Magistrates' interrogations of persons in custody must be recorded
on audio tape or videotape to be admissible in judicial proceedings.
Prosecutors are required to include all evidence favorable to the
accused in requests for preventive detention. The defense may present
any favorable evidence directly to the court.
There is no provision for bail, but judges may grant provisional
liberty to suspects awaiting trial. As a safeguard against unjustified
detention, panels of judges (liberty tribunals) review cases of persons
awaiting trial and rule whether continued detention is warranted.
Persons in detention include not only those awaiting trial, but also
individuals awaiting the outcome of a first or second appeal (see
Section 1.e.). The Constitution and the law provide for restitution in
cases of unjust detention.
The law prohibits punishment by internal exile or exile abroad.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process.
There are three levels of courts. A 1998 law that aimed to
restructure and expedite the judicial process established that a single
judge would hear cases at the level of courts of first instance.
Implementation of the measure's civil provisions began in June 1999,
while changes in criminal proceedings took force in January. At the
second level, separate courts hear appeals for civil and penal cases.
Decisions of the Court of Appeals can be appealed to the highest court,
the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court) in Rome, but only for reasons
related to correct application of the law, not a case's merit.
The law provides for trials to be fair and public, and the
authorities observe these provisions. The law grants defendants the
presumption of innocence. Defendants have access to an attorney
sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense and can confront
witnesses. All evidence held by prosecutors normally is made available
to defendants and their attorneys. Defendants can appeal verdicts to
the highest appellate court.
Both domestic and European institutions criticize the slow pace of
justice in the country, which is due in part to cumbersome and
frequently changing procedures, unclear or contradictory legal
provisions, and an inadequate number of judges. In April the National
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) reported that the average trial lasts 35
months; appeal procedures can add another 59 months. The length of
trials varies by region; those in the north tend to be shorter than
those in the south. The European Court of Human Rights noted the high
number of complaints filed against the country in 1999 and the number
of adverse decisions (44 of 120) that the court rendered. These
decisions almost always centered on excessive trial delays. In June the
Council of Europe's (COE) Committee of Ministers reiterated to the COE
parliamentary assembly that excessive delays in the administration of
justice constituted ``an important danger, in particular for the
respect of the rule of law.'' While noting that Italian authorities
shared these concerns, the ministers observed that the trend in the
number of new cases referred to the Court had not changed.
Excessive trial delay has also complicated the outcome of judicial
processes involving ``clean hands'' investigations of corruption
launched in 1991. Public prosecutors uncovered numerous instances of
illegal arrangements between businessmen and political figures,
including illicit financing of political parties, as well as ties
between elected officials and organized crime. Over 1,300 persons were
either convicted and sentenced or accepted plea bargains. Those
sentenced to prison terms, generally for periods of 3 years, were able
to benefit from a legal system that allows alternative punishment for
persons whose sentences do not exceed 4 years. Thus few individuals
served jail sentences as a result of the trials. The most sensational
cases involved multiple accusations against two former prime ministers,
Giulio Andreotti and Silvio Berlusconi. With regard to the latter, two
cases ended at the appeals level (following lower court convictions)
when judicial delays and maneuvers caused the trials to exceed the
statute of limitations. Berlusconi won acquittals in two other appeals
cases, however, as well as one at a lower court level, and cited these
outcomes as vindication, signifying that the original charges had been
an effort by elements in the judiciary to achieve political objectives
through prosecutorial means. Milan's chief public prosecutor retorted
that Berlusconi's criticisms were aimed at undermining the legitimacy
of investigating magistrates. In the case of (now) senatorforlife
Andreotti, prosecutors relied heavily in two separate trials on
testimony by turncoat Mafia witnesses (``pentiti''). These trials ended
with court criticisms of both the prosecution and defendant. The court
stated that prosecutors failed to produce concrete evidence backing up
vague and contradictory testimony by the pentiti. Other court
observations, which asserted that Andreotti had lied at the trial, fell
short of resolving doubts about his conduct.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law safeguards the privacy of the home, and the
authorities respect this provision. Searches and electronic monitoring
may be carried out only under judicial warrant and in carefully defined
circumstances. Violations are subject to legal sanctions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press.
However, courts are sensitive to criticism and impose fines for
``defamation.'' In May Member of Parliament Alessandra Mussolini was
sued for $600,000 (1.2 billion lire) by two judges on the highest
appeals court. Mussolini had criticized as a ``killer sentence,'' a
court ruling that failed to consider the pregnancy of a rape victim as
an aggravating factor, warranting a heavier penalty. In July a court
levied a $27,000 (55 million lire) fine against weekly magazine
Panorama for a 1997 article that defamed anti-Mafia prosecutors in
Palermo.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
does not restrict the right of peaceful assembly, including protests
against government policies, except in cases where national security or
public safety is at risk. Permits are not required for meetings, but
organizers of public demonstrations must notify the police in advance.
Catholic Church authorities strongly opposed gay community plans to
hold a world pride week in Rome during the first week in July, calling
it a provocation and an affront to the Church's Jubilee Year. However,
the event was held, with the cooperation of national and municipal
authorities.
While allowing general freedom of association, the Constitution and
law prohibit clandestine associations, those that pursue political aims
through force, that incite racial, ethnic or religious discrimination,
or that advocate fascism. Professional associations organize and
operate freely.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Roman Catholicism is not the state religion but it is the dominant
one, in the sense that most citizens were born and raised under
Catholic principles, which form part of their culture. Roman Catholic
religious instruction is offered in public schools as an optional
subject. Students who do not opt to attend can elect to take an
alternative course or, in some schools, have a free class period. A
1929 agreement between the Catholic Church and the Government, which
was revised in 1984, accords the Church certain privileges. For
example, the Church can select Catholic religion teachers, whose
earnings are paid by the State. This privilege has led to charges of
unconstitutional discrimination.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and the Law provide for
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. Citizens
who leave are ensured the right to return. The Constitution forbids
deprivation of citizenship for political reasons. Parliament has not
yet repealed the XIII transitory provision of the 1947 Constitution,
which forbids male heirs of the former king, Umberto I of Savoy, from
entering the country. For this reason, in December 1999, royal
descendant Vittorio Emanuele IV filed a suit in the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg challenging the validity of this
constitutional bar. In March the European Parliament voted against
including a reference to the Savoy case in its human rights report.
Political asylum is obtained according to the provisions of the
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. However, the country still lacks a specific law on political
asylum; such a law has been pending before Parliament since 1997. The
Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It provides
first asylum to refugees fleeing hostilities or natural disasters. Such
refugees are granted temporary residence permits, which must be renewed
periodically and do not ensure future permanent residence.
In 1999 the Ministry of Interior approved 912 asylum requests and
disapproved some 12,000 others. (In 1998, 7,674 persons applied for
asylum, of whom 1,045 were found eligible.) Nationals of Yugoslavia,
Iraq, Turkey, and Iran accounted for over half of the approvals. An
immigration law passed in February 1998 levies high fines and penalties
for land, air, and sea carriers that board passengers without
documentation. There is a huge influx, mainly by sea, of Albanians,
Serbs, Kurds, North Africans, Chinese, Nigerians, and other West
Africans, many of whom enter the country intending to transit to other
member states of the European Union. In April the Government approved a
migration accord with Albania (similar to previous such accords with
Tunisia and Morocco) aimed at promoting regular annual emigration of
5,000 Albanians. More aggressive coastal patrolling helped reduce
illegal immigrant landings in the south. A total of 16,100 illegal
immigrants landed in the first 7 months of the year, compared with
35,200 in the same period in 1999 (due largely to the conflict in
Kosovo). Some 37,200 such entrants were repatriated over the first 7
months of the year, compared with 34,800 in 1999.
Most illegal migrants paid fees to smugglers; some risked death, as
smugglers unloaded their human cargo at sea to avoid capture by patrol
boats. Others were forced to engage in illegal activities, were paid
substandard wages, or forced to work as prostitutes to pay off debts
incurred for their passage (see section 6.f.).
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons having a
valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. There are no restrictions on women's participation
in government and politics; however, few women hold elected office:
women hold 4 of 24 cabinet positions, 24 of 325 Senate seats, and 69 of
630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
In October the Senate gave final approval to a constitutional
change allowing an estimated 3.9 million Italians abroad to vote, and
seting aside 12 seats in the 630-seat Chamber of Deputies and 6 in the
315-seat Senate to represent them. However, the law's implementation
required administrative action that did not take place byyear's end.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex (except
with regard to hazardous work), religion, ethnic background, or
political opinion, and provides some protection against discrimination
based on disability, language, or social status. However, societal
discrimination persists to some degree.
Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. A 1998 ISTAT
survey (the first one nationwide) reported that at least 9.4 million
women between the ages of 14 and 59 had experienced some form of sexual
violence during their lives. The NGO Telefono Rosa which provides a hot
line through which abused women can obtain legal, medical, and other
assistance, reports that nearly half of all complaints it receives
nationally involve physical violence, much of it at home.
Legislation to protect women from physical abuse, including by
family members, was updated and strengthened in 1996. The revised law
makes the prosecution of perpetrators of violence against women easier
and shields women who have been objects of attack from publicity. The
law treats spousal rape in the same manner as any other rape. Law
enforcement and judicial authorities are not reluctant to bring
perpetrators of violence against women to justice, but victims
sometimes do not press charges due to fear, shame, or ignorance of the
law. Telefono Rosa notes that the entry of more women into the police
force has contributed greatly to an increased willingness of female
victims of violence to cooperate with police. Acting on behalf of local
government administrations, some 60 local women's associations maintain
and run shelters for battered women.
In December 1999, the Labor Ministry and major trade union
confederations agreed on a code of conduct regarding sexual harassment
in the workplace. The code, which follows a 1991 EU recommendation, is
to be attached to national sectoral labor contracts as they are
negotiated. Telefono Rosa reports that previous ad hoc labor contract
sexual harassment provisions have worked as a deterrent to workplace
harassment both in the public and private sectors.
Trafficking in illegal immigrant women and girls for prostitution
and forced labor is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
Women enjoy legal equality with men in marriage, property, and
inheritance rights. Males and females enjoy equal access and treatment
with regard to education, health, and other government services. Many
NGO's actively and effectively promote women's rights. Most are
affiliated with labor unions or political parties.
A number of government offices work to ensure women's rights. The
Ministry for Equal Opportunity is headed by a woman. In addition, there
is an equal opportunity commission in the office of the Prime Minister.
The Labor Ministry has a similar commission that focuses on women's
rights and discrimination in the workplace, as well as equal
opportunity counselors who deal with this problem at the national,
regional, and provincial government levels. However, many counselors
have limited resources with which to work. A decree approved in May
requires civil service recruiters to explain in writing their motives
for hiring or promoting a man rather than a woman as a manager. The
rule was designed to promote women's access to the higher echelons of
public administration and is to apply in offices where women managers
number less than a third of the total.
In February 1999, the European Union directive regulating night
work for women was incorporated into the law, thus amending the 1977
law that had prohibited night shifts for women. With some exceptions
(if pregnant, the mother of a child below 3 years of age, or the mother
of a disabled person), women now are allowed to work at night. Liberal
maternity leave, introduced to benefit women, adds to the cost of
employing them, with the result that employers sometimes find it
advantageous to hire men instead. A March law on parental leave, which
grants mothers and fathers an equal right to take leave when a child is
sick, is aimed at offering equal opportunity without penalizing women
at work.
According to research conducted by Eurostat, the statistical office
of the European Commission, women's salaries are 23.5 percent lower
than men's for comparable work. They are underrepresented in many
fields, such as management and the professions. According to a recent
report based on ISTAT data, women account for 36 percent of the labor
force, with yearly growth in female employment of 2 percent (compared
with 0.2 percent for men). The National Council for Economy and Labor
(CNEL) reported that in 1998, 3 percent of executives in large firms
were women, a figure that rose to 5 percent in mid-size firms and 8
percent in small firms. In 1999 women occupied 19.1 percent of public
offices, 11.3 percent of teaching positions, and 3.8 percent of media
executive positions. Employed women are more likely to have a high
school diploma (34.7 percent) than employed men (28.5 percent). The
comparable figures for a university degree are 13.8 percent for women
and 9.4 percent for men. Unemployment figures show that women still are
lagging. In 1999 male unemployment was 9.6 percent, while female
unemployment was 16.8 percent. Youth unemployment (ages 15 to 24) was
30.2 percent for men (53.5 in the south) and 39.0 percent for women
(66.9 in the south).
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare. As of academic year 1999-2000, schooling
became compulsory for children from age 7 to age 18; those unable (or
unwilling) to follow the academic curriculum are allowed to shift to
vocational training at age 15. This reform was intended to reverse the
middle and secondary school dropout rate, which had been high.
Abuse of children is recognized as a societal problem; an estimated
90 percent of violence against minors is committed within their own
families. Social workers counsel abused children and are authorized to
take action to protect them. The NGO Telefono Azzurro maintains two
toll-free hot lines for reporting incidents of child abuse. Research
conducted on behalf of the Government by a private institute estimates
the number of minors involved in cases of violence (including
prostitution) to be 10,000 to 12,000. There are 1,880 to 2,500 minors
who work as street prostitutes, of whom 1,500 to 2,300 were trafficked
illegal immigrants (predominantly Albanians, other eastern Europeans,
and some Nigerians), many of whom were forced into prostitution (see
Section 6.f.). Social Service International (a domestic NGO) assists in
repatriating unaccompanied immigrant minors.
Several laws and government programs enhance the protection
available for minors. In 1996 minors offices staffed by trained police
(often women) were established in police stations around the country to
offer emergency help for minors and families in distress, as well as
counsel in dealing with other government social and judicial entities.
A 1997 law established an information gathering network to collect data
on the condition of minors. A 1998 immigration law formalized an office
in the Ministry of Social Affairs that protects the rights of
unaccompanied immigrant minors. (In 1997 this office screened and
authorized entry permits for nearly 48,000 minors and 3,000
accompanying adults.) In 1998 the Parliament enacted a law to combat
pedophilia, child pornography, the possession of pornographic material
involving children, sex tourism involving minors, and trafficking in
children (also see Section 6.f.). The law established a special police
unit to monitor and prosecute Internet sites devoted to promoting
pedophilia.
People with Disabilities.--In January a new law replaced previous
legislation that forbade discrimination against disabled persons in
employment, education, or the provision of state services. The new law
requires companies having 15 or more employees to hire one or more
disabled workers: those with 15 to 35 employees must hire 1 disabled
worker, those with 35 to 50 must hire 2 , and, for larger companies 7
percent of the work force must consist of the disabled. Companies
hiring the disabled are granted certain benefits, including lower
social security contributions, while the cost of worker training is
borne by the Government. The new law also provides for more severe
sanctions against violators.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some traditional minorities,
including French and German speaking Alpine communities in the north
and a mixture of German and Slovene speakers in the northeast, enjoy
special autonomous status. The special rights of these areas
(respectively the Valle d'Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, and Friuli
Venezia Giulia) include use of non-Italian languages in government
offices and public schools in the former two.
Roma are another traditional minority, but without a specific
geographic base. Of a national total of 115,000, some 70,000 are
citizens--most of whom can trace ancestry in the country to the late
fourteenth century. Most of these Roma live in the center and south, in
conditions indistinguishable from those of other Italians. Roma in the
north, whose numbers have swelled with the arrival of 40,000 immigrants
from the former Yugoslavia, live in more precarious conditions.
Although many municipalities are building permanent settlements, poor
housing, limited employment prospects, and inadequate educational
facilities remain problems. With limited income and job opportunities
available, some turn to begging or petty crime, generating in turn
repressive measures by police authorities. Roma communities complain
that their language does not enjoy the same privileged status as that
granted to minority languages in the autonomous regions.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to
establish trade unions, join unions, and carry out union activities in
the workplace. The unions state that they represent between 35 and 40
percent of the work force. Trade unions are free of government controls
and have no formal ties with political parties. The right to strike is
embodied in the Constitution and is exercised frequently. In April
following a period of multiple land, sea, and air transport sector
strikes, a new law changed provisions of a 1990 measure that restricted
strikes affecting essential public services (e.g., transport,
sanitation, and health). The new law defined minimum service to be
maintained during a strike as 50 percent of normal, with staffing by at
least one-third the normal work force. The law established compulsory
cooling off periods and more severe sanctions for violations. Besides
transport worker unions, the law also covers lawyers and selfemployed
taxi drivers. In May a Transport Ministry regulation required all
national labor contracts involving employment sectors covered by the
law to adjust contract provisions to the new rules. These changes were
backed by the three major national trade union confederations, which
sought to avoid inconvenience to tourists and the traveling public
alike during the Catholic Church's Jubilee Year.
Unions associate freely with international trade union
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively, and these rights are respected in practice. By custom,
although not by law, national collective bargaining agreements apply to
all workers, regardless of union affiliation. The law prohibits
discrimination by employers against union members and organizers. It
requires employers that have more than 15 employees and who are found
guilty of antiunion discrimination to reinstate any workers affected.
In firms with less than 15 workers, an employer must provide the
grounds for firing a union employee in writing. If a judge deems the
grounds spurious, he can order the employer to reinstate or compensate
the worker.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
generally it does not occur; however, some illegal immigrants and
children were forced into prostitution (see Section 5), and trafficking
in illegal immigrant women for prostitution and forced labor, as well
as trafficking in illegal immigrant children, are problems (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law forbids the employment of children under age 15
(with some limited exceptions). There also are specific restrictions on
employment in hazardous or unhealthful occupations for men under age
18, and women under age 21. The enforcement of minimum age laws is
difficult in the extensive underground economy. Estimates of the number
of child laborers differ, ranging from 30,000 to 300,000 children (the
most probable figure may be in the area of 50,000). Most of these cases
involve immigrants, but instances involving Italian children also have
been reported. Illegal immigrant child laborers from Northern Africa,
the Philippines, Albania, and especially China have entered in record
numbers every year since 1989, and the influx from China is rising.
According to the Carabinieri, an estimated 30,000 illegal Chinese work
in sweatshop conditions near Florence, with many minor children working
alongside the rest of their families to produce scarves, purses, and
imitations of various brand name products. Many of these factories,
which face threats of infiltration or coercion by Chinese organized
crime, are equipped with escape tunnels to thwart labor inspections.
Carabinieri officers who work on child labor developed a videocassette
program to educate schoolchildren on child labor laws, their rights as
specially protected workers, and workplace hazards.
The Government, employers associations, and unions continue their
tripartite cooperation on child labor. Their periodic consultations,
begun in 1997, cover such matters as better enforcement of school
attendance regulations; programs to reduce the number of school
dropouts; faster assistance for families in financial difficulty;
further restrictions on exceptions to the minimum wage law; and
canceling economic or administrative incentives for companies found to
make use of child labor, whether domestically or abroad. The Prime
Minister's office provided a toll-free telephone number to report
incidents of child labor. The footwear and textile industries have
established a code of conduct that prohibits the use of child labor in
their international as well as national activities; the code is
applicable to subcontractors as well. In 1999 a child labor clause was
attached to the national labor contract in the health sector, whereby
the parties committed themselves not to use surgical tools produced by
child labor. The law forbids forced or bonded labor involving children,
and the Government generally enforces this prohibition effectively;
however, some illegal immigrant children were forced into prostitution
(see Sections 5 and 6.c.), and some of them were trafficked (see
Section 6.f.).
The Government ratified International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 182 prohibiting the worst forms of child labor following
completion of parliamentary action in May.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages are not set by
law, but by collective bargaining agreements on a sector by sector
basis. These specify minimum standards to which individual employment
contracts must conform. When an employer and a union fail to reach an
agreement, courts may step in to determine fair wages on the basis of
practice in comparable activities or engagements, although this rarely
happens in practice.
A 1997 law reduced the legal workweek from 48 hours to 40. Most
collective agreements provide for a 36- to 38-hour workweek. The
average contractual workweek is 39 hours but is actually less in many
industries. Overtime work may not exceed 2 hours per day or an average
of 12 hours per week.
The law sets basic health and safety standards and guidelines for
compensation for on-the-job injuries. For most practical purposes,
European Union directives on health and safety also have been
incorporated into the law. Labor inspectors are from the public health
service or from the Ministry of Labor. They are few in number, given
the scope of their responsibilities. Courts impose fines and sometimes
prison terms for violation of health and safety laws. The Workmen's
Compensation Institute reports that there were a million accidents in
1999, involving 1,309 deaths. Accidents occur with the greatest
frequency in the underground economy, which employs between 3.5 and 5
million workers. Workers have the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not address
specifically trafficking in persons, it can be prosecuted through
application of provisions of a 1958 law on prostitution and other
articles of the Penal Code. Trafficking in women and girls for
prostitution and forced labor is a growing problem.
Trafficking in women and girls for purposes of sexual exploitation
involves vulnerable, illegal immigrants, most of whom come from Nigeria
and Eastern Europe. The country is also a destination for trafficked
women and girls. Varying estimates suggest that nearly 20,000 foreign
women--from Albania, Nigeria, Romania, Moldavia, Ukraine, and other
countries of Eastern Europe--are involved in prostitution, of whom some
1,500 (according to the social research institute Parsec) may be
trafficked forcibly. For some, Italy is only a point of entry, and
their ultimate destinations are elsewhere in Western or Northern
Europe. Trafficking in children for sweatshop labor is a particular
problem in Tuscany's expanding Chinese immigrant community, where
children are considered to be part of the family ``production unit''
(see Section 6.d). The Chinese consulate in Florence cooperates with
Carabinieri in persuading families to enroll their children in school.
The Ministry of Equal Opportunity leads an intergovernmental
committee charged with monitoring trafficking and coordinating
government activity to combat it. Other members include the Ministries
of Social Affairs, Justice, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, as well as a
special anti-Mafia prosecutorial unit. Major lay and Catholic NGO's
concerned with trafficking, among which Parsec and Caritas are the most
active, cooperate with this body.
While most prostitution involves women fleeing economic destitution
in their home countries, those who are trafficked forcibly are often
unable or reluctant to contact the police for help. A 1998 immigration
law, for which implementing regulations were completed in November 1999
and assistance programs established in February, provided temporary
residence/work permits to such women who seek to escape their
exploiters. The legislation permits a temporary stay for victimized
women. During this time, victims are provided with shelter, benefits,
and services such as counseling and medical assistance, in cooperation
with NGO's. They also may be permitted to work or study. If the victim
agrees to cooperate with law enforcement and judicial authorities, the
residence permit and services are extended for the length of the
criminal proceedings. In July the Government set up a toll-free
telephone number to help victims take advantage of this program and in
its first month of operation received 7,000 calls for help. As a result
of these and related policies, almost 750 women were able to benefit
from these programs in their first weeks of operation, and significant
increases in witness testimony and successful prosecution of
traffickers were reported. In October the Ministry of the Interior
hosted an international conference on trafficking in persons to focus
attention on the issue.
In August 1998, a law was passed to combat abuses against children,
including trafficking in children. The NGO, End Child Prostitution,
Pornography and Trafficking (ECPAT), was a main advocate for this law,
which criminalizes prostitution or pornography involving minors, even
if committed abroad. In conjunction with other concerned NGO's, ECPAT
has worked to ensure that police treat juvenile prostitutes as victims
of trafficking, not criminals. In May ECPAT and components of the
tourism industry (tour companies, travel agents, computer reservation
system personnel, airline companies, airport authorities, and trade
unions) initiated a voluntary code of conduct designed to impede sex
tourism.
__________
KAZAKHSTAN
The Constitution of Kazakhstan concentrates power in the
presidency. President Nursultan Nazarbayev is the dominant political
figure. The Constitution, adopted in 1995 in a referendum marred by
irregularities, permits the President to dominate the legislature and
judiciary, as well as regional and local governments; changes or
amendments to the Constitution are nearly impossible without the
President's consent. President Nazarbayev was elected to a new 7-year
term in a 1999 election that fell far short of international standards.
Previous presidential elections originally scheduled for 1996 did not
take place, as President Nazarbayev's term in office was extended in a
separate 1995 referendum, also marred by irregularities. Parliamentary
elections held in October 1999 were an improvement on the presidential
election but still fell short of the country's commitments as a member
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
A law passed in June would allow the President to maintain certain
policy prerogatives and a seat on the National Security Council after
he leaves office. The 1995 Constitution limited Parliament's powers
more than previously, notably by precluding it from appropriating state
money or lowering taxes without executive branch approval. However,
Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) have the right to introduce legislation,
and some bills introduced by M.P.'s have become laws. The judiciary
remained under the control of the President and the executive branch.
The lack of an independent judiciary made it difficult to root out
governmental corruption, which was pervasive, although some corrupt
officials were removed from office.
The Committee for National Security (the KNB, successor to the
Soviet-era Committee on State Security (KGB)) is responsible for
national security, intelligence, and counterintelligence. In practice
it also plays a role in law enforcement. It also oversees the external
intelligence service, Barlau. The chairman of the KNB reports directly
to the Prime Minister and President. The Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD) supervises the criminal police, who are poorly paid and widely
believed to be corrupt. Both the KNB and the MVD police monitored
government opponents, the opposition press, human rights monitors, and
some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), who claimed that KNB and
MVD officials pressured them to limit activities objectionable to the
Government. The KNB continued efforts to improve its public image by
focusing on fighting government corruption, religious extremism,
terrorism, illegal arms exports, and organized crime. Members of the
security forces committed human rights abuses.
The country is rich in natural resources, particularly petroleum
and minerals. The Government has made significant progress toward a
market-based economy since independence. It has successfully privatized
small- and medium-sized firms and many large-scale industrial complexes
and has attracted significant foreign investment, primarily to the
energy and minerals sectors. The agricultural sector, which represents
about 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), has been slower to
reform since the Government has not established a legal basis for
private land ownership. Official statistics indicate that the long fall
in real wages after independence stopped in 1997. The average annual
wage in 1999 was approximately $1,180 (167,560 tenge). The average
monthly nominal wage in 2000 was $95.14 (13,521 tenge). Real wages grew
5.3 percent in 2000 over 1999 figures. According to government data, in
the first 3 quarters of the year approximately 25.5 percent of the
population had incomes below the ``minimum subsistence level'' of $27
(3,969 tenge) per month, compared with 34.5 percent whose incomes were
below the 1999 minimum subsistence level of $24 (3,394 tenge) per
month.
Rising oil prices in the second half of 1999 combined with the
positive effects of an April 1999 decision to allow the currency to
float helped the country to post GDP growth of 1.7 percent in 1999,
after a 2.5 percent fall in GDP the previous year. GDP per capita also
increased slightly to $1066 (127,000 tenge). Inflation, which initially
spiked after the currency fell following the April 1999 decision to
float the currency, has been under control and was 9.8 percent in 2000.
Real GDP grew by 9.5 percent.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. The
Government severely limits citizens' right to change their government,
and democratic institutions remain weak. The OSCE concluded that
presidential elections in January 1999 fell far short of international
standards, although it saw some improvement in the Parliamentary
elections held later in the year. The Government barred two opposition
politicians from competing in the presidential elections on
administrative grounds and authorities harassed opposition candidates
during both election campaigns. During the year, government officials
began a series of conferences on electoral reform with opposition
leaders and others under the auspices of the OSCE, although the Central
Elections Commission moved to effect electoral commission changes
before waiting for the conclusion of the conferences. The legal
structure, including the Constitution adopted in 1995, does not fully
safeguard human rights. Members of the security forces committed
extrajudicial killings as a result of abuse of military conscripts and,
reportedly, through mistreatment of individuals in custody. President
Nazarbayev spoke out against police use of torture, and there were a
number of cases in which the Government pressed criminal charges
against police accused of mistreating individuals in their custody.
However, human rights monitors criticized the efforts as inadequate.
Prison conditions remained harsh. The Government began a process of
transferring authority over prisons from the MVD to the Justice
Ministry, a step that human rights monitors had long sought, but the
effect of this change could not be determined as of year's end. The
Government on some occasions used arbitrary arrest and detention, and
prolonged detention is a problem. The judiciary remains under the
control of the President and the executive branch, and corruption is
deeply rooted. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press. The
Government harassed much of the opposition media, and government
efforts to restrain the independent media continued. Vague laws
concerning the media, state secrets, libel, and national security
increased pressure on the media to practice self-censorship. The
Government introduced draft amendments to the Law on Media in October
that, if enacted, would constitute a step backward for the independent
media. However, the Government continued to issue new licenses for
various types of media and, according to the Government, the number of
media outlets increased. The Government continued to own some major
printing and distribution facilities and to enjoy influence over those
owned privately. Academic freedom is not respected. The Government
imposes significant restrictions on freedom of assembly. At least two
organizers of unsanctioned demonstrations were arrested and fined or
imprisoned. The Government imposes significant restrictions on freedom
of association, and complicated and cumbersome registration
requirements hinder organizations and political parties. Some political
parties increased their organizational activities successfully. The
Government sometimes harasses those whom it regards as religious
extremists. Domestic violence against women remained a serious problem.
There was discrimination against women, the disabled, and ethnic
minorities. The Government discriminated in favor of ethnic Kazakhs.
The Government limited worker rights; it tried to limit the influence
of independent trade unions, both directly and through its support for
state-sponsored unions, and members of independent trade unions were
harassed. Workers continued to protest chronic nonpayment of wages.
Child labor persists in agricultural areas. There was evidence of
trafficking in women and in at least one case customs and border
officials were under investigation for complicity in trafficking.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated extrajudicial killings.
Members of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings as
a result of abuse of military conscripts and, reportedly, through
mistreatment of individuals in custody.
In July 28-year-old Kairat Sabdenov, the son of an M.P., died from
internal injuries that he sustained from a police beating in Kokshetau
after he had been detained following a car accident. In December police
charged the policeman who allegedly beat Sabdenov with murder. Five
policemen were charged with improper performance of their duties and
one from the Akmola Oblast MVD was relieved of his post for
investigating the accident scene improperly.
Ivan Prokopenko died in a detention center in Aktobe on March 1. He
had been arrested 2 months earlier on suspicion of having stolen $250
(36,750 tenge) worth of wooden poles. Human rights monitors reported
that a doctor who examined the body and the boy's parents saw evidence
of brain trauma, burns, and cuts. The Aktobe city prosecutor found in
October that Prokopenko had died from head injuries suffered when he
slipped and fell, hitting his head on the concrete floor. The
authorities indicated that their investigation had found no other
injuries and they closed the case.
In April a man named Bekov died in a hospital from injuries he had
said he sustained when police in Almaty detained and beat him. An
official investigation was launched, but no further information was
available at year's end.
According to press reports, a criminal case was brought against a
police sergeant in Makhtaaralsk (Shymkent Oblast) for the 1999 beating
death of a 24-year-old man, Nurzhan Saparov, who was in custody
following his arrest for disturbing the peace. At year's end,
reportedly four police officers were awaiting trial charged with
responsibility for his death.
On December 1, a District court fined Lieutenant Colonel
Zhanteleyev 2 month's wages in the 1998 death of Yalkynzhan Yakupov,
whose body was found hanging in the Chunjua District police station.
However, the court dismissed the charges of abuse of power and illegal
detention against the Colonel. Zhanteleyev was amnestied under the
December 2000 general amnesty.
Reports indicate that deaths caused by military hazing persist. The
Deputy Chief of the General Staff reported 17 cases of death due to
mistreatment in the first 6 months of 1998. No statistics on the
incidence of this form of mistreatment have been available since that
time. However, there are some reports that military personnel engaging
in hazing have been prosecuted, and the Government has begun a program
to improve training of military forces on social and legal issues. (See
Section 1.c.)
Harsh prison conditions led to the deaths of some persons in
custody, many from disease (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution states that ``no one must be subject to
torture, violence or other treatment and punishment that is cruel or
humiliating to human dignity;'' however, police tortured, beat, and
otherwise abused detainees, often in order to obtain confessions.
Government officials acknowledged the seriousness of the problem and
undertook some efforts to combat it. There were no reports of police
beating protestors as they have done in earlier years. In a speech to
law enforcement officials on April 19, President Nazarbayev criticized
police use of an ``arsenal of torture (that) can surprise the most
extreme sadists.'' President Nazarbayev referred in his speech to cases
where law enforcement officials seared one detainee with a hot iron and
poured cold water over another as he stood naked outside in cold
weather. He said that the use of such tactics was ``widespread.''
Prosecutors brought criminal charges against 70 police officers for the
unlawful use of violence against citizens during the year and
disciplinary actions were taken against hundreds more. More than 20
Interior Ministry (MVD) employees reportedly were convicted on such
charges. Human rights observers believe that these cases cover only a
small fraction of the incidents of police abuse of detainees, which
they characterized as routine. Training standards and pay for police
are very low, and individual law enforcement officials often are
supervised poorly.
Some of the instances of mistreatment occur in prisons, and the
Government formally transferred authority over prisons from the
Interior Ministry to the Justice Ministry in a move intended to reduce
such abuses. The actual transfer of authority will be implemented over
a period of 2 years. In March 2000, the MVD opened a training center
for penitentiary system employees in Pavlodar. Together with the OSCE
and Prison Reform International (PRI) the Government has undertaken
training abroad for 15 instructors from this new institute to review
penal policies, including human rights of prisoners.
On April 26, three teenagers widely believed to have been tortured
in detention slit their throats in a Zhanatas courtroom after being
sentenced to prison terms for fighting with police. One of the 3, 17-
year-old Kairat Seidakhmetov, died from the self-inflicted injury. The
Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights (KIBHR) and
independent television stations charged that police repeatedly tortured
these 3 boys and the 17 other individuals charged in the same case. One
reportedly suffered a concussion and two broken arms. Police reportedly
cut the feet of another and stuck needles under the fingertips of
detainees under interrogation. One female detainee charged that police
repeatedly raped her. The detainees, some of whom confessed, reportedly
had no access to lawyers. Reports of the mistreatment led to
demonstrations in Zhanatas in February and again in April following
Seidakhmetov's suicide. The July 4 edition of the official
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda newspaper reported that the Chief of the Legal
Bureau of the Presidential Administration visited Zhanatas to
investigate the allegations of police torture. The head of the city
police force was fired and other MVD employees reprimanded, but
criminal charges brought against the policemen involved in the case
were later dropped.
Almaty authorities brought criminal charges against two policemen
for beating opposition activist Aleksei Martynov in custody in December
1999. A trial began in August but had not been concluded at year's end.
No arrests were made in connection with the assault against opposition
activist Andrei Grishin in November 1999, shortly after he published a
newspaper article critical of a new museum dedicated to President
Nazarbayev. Law enforcement authorities claimed that Grishin never
filed a complaint. Grishin said he filed a complaint with the Almaty
city prosecutor's office in December 1999 and was subsequently
interviewed by an Interior Ministry official in January. The
authorities took no actions against police who allegedly beat 70
members of an Islamic group from Taraz whom they detained in July 1999.
The authorities took no actions against police accused of beating a
group of female hunger strikers in Aralsk in April 1999. Police closed
investigations, without making arrests, into 1998 assaults against
opposition activist Amirzhan Kosanov and a Kazakhstani employee of a
foreign embassy. The latter assisted diplomats in making contacts with
opposition and human rights figures. Police detained a suspect in
connection with the 1998 assault against opposition activist Yelena
Nikitenko but did not bring charges, according to official sources,
because Nikitenko, who moved away from Kazakhstan, was unavailable to
testify.
Six unidentified men assaulted Sergey Bondartsev, a youth organizer
for the opposition Republican National People's Party (RNPK), in Almaty
on April 9. Bondartsev suffered serious internal injuries that required
two operations. At the time of the assault, Bondartsev was organizing a
demonstration in support of opposition figure Madel Ismailov, who had
earlier in the week been sentenced to a jail term (see Section l.d.).
The demonstration did not take place. Law enforcement authorities made
no arrests in the case, claiming that Bondartsev had never filed a
complaint. Bondartsev asserted that he filed a complaint and that
police from the Medeu district of Almaty interviewed him about the
assault while he was in the hospital. The attack clearly appeared to
have been premeditated.
MVD and other government officials participated in a September
conference in Almaty on combating police use of torture that was
organized by the OSCE, the KIBHR and the Government of Germany. They
acknowledged that police use of torture and other abuses were
widespread.
Army personnel continued to subject conscripts to brutal hazing,
including beatings and verbal abuse. No statistics were available on
the extent of the problem. The Army launched a campaign to punish
violators of a new antihazing policy in 1998, and the Government has
taken action occasionally against officials charged with abuses, often
levying administrative sanctions such as fines for those found guilty.
A military court in Zhambul region sentenced a sergeant to death by
firing squad in December. The court ruled the man was guilty of killing
two persons and of desertion to avoid responsibility for beating up a
soldier under him.
Prison conditions remained harsh and sometimes life-threatening due
to inadequate resources. In 1998, 1,290 inmates, more than 1 percent of
all prisoners, died from disease, mostly tuberculosis, aggravated by
harsh and at times life-threatening prison conditions and inadequate
medical treatment (see Section 1.c.). In 2000, 498 prisoners died in
custody. More than 200 of these deaths were due to illness, mostly
tuberculosis. Another 170 gravely ill prisoners died shortly after
release from prison. Government officials indicate that improved
treatment undertaken in cooperation with the World Health Organization
(WHO) has reduced the deaths from tuberculosis. In 1999, 384 prisoners
died of the disease in custody and 409 were released on humanitarian
grounds due to illness and died at home (see Section 1.c.).
Overcrowding, inadequate prison diet, and a lack of medical
supplies and personnel contributed to the spread of tuberculosis and
other major diseases. Government officials reported that l0,000, or 12
percent of all, prisoners suffered from tuberculosis. Government
representatives assert that the incidence of tuberculosis is declining,
in part as a result of cooperation with WHO to improve conditions for
both prisoners and the civilian population. These figures do not differ
significantly from figures provided by human rights observers. The
Government's senior prisons official acknowledged that the number of
prisoners with AIDS is growing. The number infected reportedly grew
from 256 in 1999 to 263 in 2000, although the authorities maintain that
the prisoners were infected before being incarcerated. Experts believe,
however, that many cases go unreported. Prison guards, who are poorly
paid, steal food and medicines intended for prisoners. Violent crime
among prisoners is common. Prisoners protested poor living conditions
in prison through mass self-mutilation. According to the official
press, 44 prisoners in Arkalyk reportedly cut open their abdomens on
July 13. Some 57 prisoners in an Almaty Juvenile Detention Center cut
open their abdomens and wrists on August 11. None of the prisoners
died. The deputy head of the Arkalyk prison and the head and deputy
head of the Almaty juvenile facility were fired as a result of these
incidents.
According to the Interior Ministry, during the year there were
approximately 80,000 prisoners in facilities designed to hold 60,000. A
1999 amnesty reduced the total prison population by about 15,000, but
the population nearly returned to pre-amnesty levels within a year. The
chief national prosecutor deplored overcrowded conditions in an Astana
detention center he visited in March, noting that cells of 200 square
feet contained 20 detainees each. He reportedly ordered the release of
several of the detainees.
The Government followed up its 1999 general prison amnesty in
December with a law to provide amnesty in the first 6 months of 2001
for 18,200 inmates, shorten the terms of an additional 2,500, and
terminate approximately 3,000 pending criminal cases. The 1999 amnesty
resulted in the release of over 15,000 prisoners. Prisoners are allowed
one 4-hour visit every 3 months, but additional visits may be granted
in emergency situations. Some prisoners are eligible for 3-day visits
with close relatives once every 6 months. Juveniles are kept in
separate facilities.
Although there is no known statutory requirement, human rights
monitors and journalists wishing to visit prisons must receive
authorization from the MVD. Although the Government sometimes created
obstacles for those who requested access to prisons, the KIBHR reported
that its representatives sometimes, but not always, received
authorization. The KIBHR visited men's, women's, and juveniles' prisons
during the year. Prison experts from the OSCE visited prisons in Akmola
and East Kazakhstan oblasts. Two international NGO's, the Dutch
Interchurch Aid and Penal Reform International (PRI), accompanied KIBHR
on prison visits in Pavlodar during the year. PRI also visited prisons
for juveniles and women in Almaty. On September 6, the Minister of
Justice announced that the Government had decided to transfer
responsibility for prisons from the Ministry of the Interior to the
Ministry of Justice. Human rights monitors had called for the change,
which President Nazarbayev endorsed in a September 1 address to
Parliament.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government used
minor infractions of the law frequently related to unsanctioned
assembly to arrest and detain government opponents (see also Section
2.b.). On April 6, authorities in Almaty arrested, tried, and convicted
labor movement leader Madel Ismailov for organizing an unsanctioned
demonstration and for contempt of court. The Court sentenced Ismailov
to 15 days in jail. Ismailov served a 1-year prison sentence in 1998-99
for publicly calling the President a ``scoundrel.'' The demonstration
in question, a regular monthly pensioners' protest over living
conditions, took place on January 30. The contempt of court charge
stemmed from Ismailov's refusal to answer a summons to appear in court
on April 5. Ismailov went to the courthouse on April 5 but refused to
enter when, he and press reports alleged, the authorities refused to
allow his lawyer or supporters to enter with him.
A court in Almaty on April 24 sentenced two members of the
opposition Republican National People's Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK),
Pyotr Afanasenko and Satzhan Ibrayev, to 3+ years in prison for a
weapons offense. An appeals court upheld the convictions. Afanasenko
and Ibrayev, former KNB officers, served as bodyguards to RNPK leader
Akezhan Kazhegeldin. Although it appeared there could be a factual
basis for the charges against Afanasenko and Ibrayev, the OSCE and
international and domestic human rights observers charged that
government prosecution and sentencing of them was politically
motivated. Some human rights observers also criticized the authorities
for incarcerating Afanasenko and Ibrayev in ordinary prisons rather
than in special institutions created to protect former members of the
security forces from possible retribution by other prisoners.
A member of the RNPK, film director Rashid Nugmanov, a long-time
resident of France, was detained by customs and tax officials upon
arriving on an international flight to Almaty on May 24 and summoned to
appear before the tax police on May 25. His brother, Murat, an Almaty
businessman, was also summoned by tax authorities on May 24. Details of
the investigation were unclear. RNPK and human rights observers alleged
that the investigation of Rashid Nugmanov was motivated politically.
The chief of the Almaty branch of the RNPK, Alikhan Ramazanov, and
an activist of the party, Nurlan Bakirkhanov, were brought to trial in
Medeu District Court on June 7 for organizing an unsanctioned mass
gathering on May 31. Both were fined $205 (29,000 tenge).
The law sanctions pretrial detention. According to the
Constitution, police may hold a detainee for 72 hours before bringing
charges. The Criminal Code allows continued detention for much longer
periods with the approval of the General Prosecutor of the Republic.
Lower-ranking prosecutors may approve interim extensions of detention.
In practice police routinely hold detainees, with the sanction of a
prosecutor, for weeks or even months without bringing charges, and
prolonged detention is a serious problem. The General Prosecutor's
office was reported in the official Russian-language newspaper
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda as stating that law enforcement authorities held
more than 7,000 persons in custody longer than legally allowed in 1998.
Government officials have subsequently denied this, but no other
statistics concerning the scale of this practice have been made
available. Additionally, short (3hour) and long (72-hour) detentions
for ``suspicion'' are used widely.
A bail system exists, but government officials indicate that only
47 persons were released on bail in the first 8 months of the year (no
figure for total detainees was available, but 28 persons were released
on bail out of the 26,598 persons detained in the first 8 months of
1999).
According to the Constitution, every person detained, arrested, or
accused of committing a crime has the right to the assistance of a
defense lawyer from the moment of detention, arrest, or accusation.
This right generally is respected in practice. Human rights monitors
allege that law enforcement officials have pressured prisoners to use
certain attorneys or to refuse the assistance of an attorney, sometimes
resulting in a delay before the accused sees a lawyer. Detainees also
may appeal the legality of detention or arrest to the prosecutor before
trial, but in practice most persons refrain from making an appeal due
to fear of reprisal for doing so. If the defendant cannot afford an
attorney, the Constitution provides that the State must provide one
free of charge. Human rights organizations allege that many prisoners
are unaware of this provision of the law. The Government's reluctance
to provide a lawyer is partly attributed to a shortage of funds to pay
court-appointed lawyers to which defendants are entitled. Some lawyers
are reluctant to defend clients unpopular with the Government.
Almaty authorities detained well-known criminal defense lawyer
Anatoly Ginzburg for 3 days in July after Ginzburg agreed to defend a
man charged in a high-profile murder case. Ginzburg remained under
investigation for allegedly stealing documents from the MVD in 1994,
although no charges were filed. According to one press report, Ginzburg
had been warned by ``the authorities'' not to defend Anatoly Adamov,
the former deputy director of the national arms export agency,
Kazspetsexport, in connection with the April 15 murder of
Kazspetsexport director Talgat Ibrayev. Ginzburg and human rights
monitors alleged that the authorities detained Ginzburg in order to
dissuade him from defending Adamov. In July the Union of Lawyers of
Kazakhstan sent an open letter to the heads of the national law
enforcement agencies to protest the Ginzburg case and a ``universal''
pattern of abuse of the rights of criminal defense lawyers. The letter
charged that law enforcement authorities infringe on the rights of
lawyers to meet confidentially, and as often as necessary, with
defendants; deny lawyers access to government buildings, including the
courts; search the lawyers' belongings when allowing them to enter; and
surreptitiously record lawyers' conversations with clients. In response
to the letter, the Coordinating Council of the National Law Enforcement
Agencies, under the chairmanship of the Prosecutor General, passed a
resolution in August calling on the agencies to abide by the law and,
where necessary, to draft new statutes guaranteeing that lawyers can
effectively do their work. However, a representative of the local
lawyer's association maintained that the Government had not passed any
statutes facilitating lawyers' work by year's end.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does
not use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Government interference and
pressure compromised the court system's independence throughout the
year--a situation based largely on legislative, administrative and
Constitutional arrangements that in practice subjugate the judiciary to
the executive branch of government. A presidential decree signed in
September sought to lessen executive branch control of the judiciary by
moving responsibility for the courts' administrative support from the
justice ministry to the Supreme Court, though its ultimate impact
remained uncertain.
There are three levels in the court system: Local; oblast
(provincial); and the Supreme Court. According to the Constitution, the
President proposes to the upper house of Parliament (the Senate)
nominees for the Supreme Court. (Nominees are recommended by the
Supreme Judicial Council, members of which include the chairperson of
the Constitutional Council, the chairperson of the Supreme Court, the
Prosecutor General, the Minister of Justice, Senators, judges, and
other persons appointed by the President.) The President appoints
oblast judges (nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council) and local
level judges from a list presented by the Ministry of Justice. The list
is based on recommendations from the Qualification Collegium of
Justice, an institution made up of deputies from the lower house of
Parliament (the Majilis), judges, public prosecutors, legal experts,
and Ministry of Justice officials. Under a change introduced in
December, the President appoints the collegium chairman.
According to legislation passed in December 1996, judges are
appointed for life, although in practice this means until mandatory
retirement at age 65. Under a 1995 presidential decree on the courts
and the status of judges, the President can remove judges, except
members of the Supreme Court or chairmen of judicial collegia, upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice. (The Minister's
recommendations must in turn be based on findings by either the Supreme
Judicial Council or Qualification Collegium of Justice that the judge
failed to, or was no longer capable of, performing his duties.) The
President can request, based on recommendations from the Supreme
Judicial Council, that the Senate remove members of the Supreme Court
or chairmen of judicial collegia.
The 1995 Constitution abolished the Constitutional Court and
established a Constitutional Council. The Council rules on election and
referendum challenges, interprets the Constitution, and determines the
constitutionality of laws adopted by Parliament. The President directly
appoints three of its seven members, including the chairman, and has
the right of veto over Council decisions. The Council can overturn a
presidential veto if at least two-thirds, or five, of its members vote
to do so. At least one presidential appointee must therefore vote to
overturn the President's veto in order for the Council to overrule the
President. Citizens do not have the right to appeal to the Council
about the constitutionality of government actions, although they were
allowed to make such appeals to the former Constitutional Court. Under
the Constitution, only the President, chairperson of the Senate,
chairperson of the Majilis, Prime Minister, one-fifth of the members of
Parliament or a court of law may appeal to the Constitutional Council.
The Constitution states that a court shall appeal to the Council if it
``finds that a law or other regulatory legal act subject to application
undermined the rights and liberties of an individual and a citizen.''
Local courts try less serious crimes, such as petty theft and
vandalism. Oblast courts handle more serious crimes, such as murder,
grand theft, and organized criminal activities. The oblast courts also
may handle cases in rural areas where no local courts are organized.
Judgments of the local courts may be appealed to the oblast-level
courts, while those of the oblast courts may be appealed to the Supreme
Court. There is also a military court.
The Constitution and the law establish the necessary procedures for
a fair trial. Trials are public, with the exception of instances in
which an open hearing could result in state secrets being divulged, or
when the private life or personal family concerns of a citizen must be
protected.
According to the Constitution, defendants have the right to be
present, the right to counsel (at public expense if needed), and the
right to be heard in court and call witnesses for the defense.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, are protected from self-
incrimination, and have the right to appeal a decision to a higher
court. Legal proceedings are to be conducted in the state language,
Kazakh, although Russian also may be used officially in the courts.
Proceedings also may be held in the language of the majority of the
population in a particular area. In most cases, these rights are
respected. However, cases involving government opponents frequently are
closed. Labor movement leader Madel Ismailov alleged that the Medeu
district court in Almaty refused to allow the public to observe an
administrative trial against him in April (see Section 1.d.).
The problem of corruption is evident at every stage and level of
the judicial process. Lawyers and human rights monitors alleged that
judges, prosecutors or other officials solicit bribes in exchange for
favorable rulings in nearly all criminal cases. Judges are poorly paid.
According to the Minister of Interior, in 2000 the Government dismissed
613 MVD officers and initiated criminal proceedings against 105 for
corruption related crimes. The Prosecutor General stated that 9 senior
prosecutors, 8 district prosecutors and 3 department heads had been
fired for similar offenses. The Ministries of Justice and Internal
Affairs have received additional funding to increase salaries for law
enforcement agents and judges. Human rights monitors allege that these
government actions only scratch the surface of the problem. According
to press and other accounts, judicial positions can be purchased.
There were no political prisoners. However, opposition and human
rights activists charged that the prosecution and imprisonment of Pyotr
Afanasenko and Satzhan Ibrayev was politically motivated (see Section
1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Despite Constitutional protections, the Government
infringed on these rights. The Constitution provides that citizens have
the right to ``confidentiality of personal deposits and savings,
correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other
messages.'' However, limitation of this right is allowed ``in cases and
according to procedures directly established by law.'' The KNB and
Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the concurrence of the general
prosecutor's office, can and do interfere with citizens' privacy and
correspondence. The Criminal Procedure Code allows the police and KNB
to conduct searches or monitor telephone calls and mail without a
warrant if they inform the General Prosecutor's office within 24 hours
of such activity. Some government opponents complained that the
Government monitored their movements and telephone calls.
A central, state-run billing center for telecommunications services
opened during the year. Few companies complied with government
requirements to route their services through the center; those that did
comply routed service only for the city of Almaty through the center.
The Government presented the creation of the center as an attempt to
ensure that all telecommunications traffic was being taxed properly.
NGO's, opposition figures, and human rights monitors expressed concern
that the Government would use the center to enhance its ability to
monitor telecommunications and control the availability of information
on the Internet. Government officials denied that this was their
intent. As of year's end there was no effort to systematically block
access to web sites. However, clients of the two largest Internet
providers, Kazakhtelecom and Nursat, were blocked from direct access to
the opposition Evrasia website from September 15 to October 15. They
still could access the site through proxy servers. Users of other
Internet services could access the site without difficulty.
A 1999 decree that would have required telecommunications companies
to conform their equipment to KNB standards was repealed on May 22.
Human rights monitors and many potentially affected companies had
sharply criticized the decree.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and a 1999 press
and media law provide for freedom of speech and of the press; however,
the Government restricted these freedoms in practice. The Government
harassed independent and opposition media, and as a consequence many
journalists practiced self-censorship.
The media law reaffirms the Constitutional provision for free
speech and prohibits censorship; however, the Government takes
advantage of the law's vague language effectively to restrict media
freedom. For example the law prohibits the mass media from
``undermining state security'' or advocating ``class, social, race,
national, or religious superiority'' or ``a cult of cruelty and
violence.'' Under the law, owners, editors, distributors, and
journalists can be held responsible for violations. The law also
requires all media to register with the Government, but it does not set
forth an appeals process, other than through the courts, if
registration is denied. A vaguely written 1998 law on national security
similarly restrains media freedom. It gives the Prosecutor General the
authority to suspend the activity of news media that undermine national
security. A 1999 state secrets law established a list of government
secrets the release of which is proscribed in the Criminal Code. Much
of the information on the expansive list was vaguely defined and
thereby likely to inspire media self-censorship. The law defines, for
example, certain foreign policy information as secret if ``disclosure
of this information might lead to diplomatic complications for one of
the parties.'' The list of state secrets enumerated in the law also
included all information about the health and private life of the
President and his family. Also defined as state secrets was basic
economic information such as the volumes and scientific characteristics
of national mineral reserves and the amount of government debt owed to
foreign creditors.
In an April 19 speech to law enforcement officials, the President
called for the verification of mass media compliance with the media and
national security laws and how the media are financed. The President
sharply criticized much of the national mass media, including the
Khabar state television channel, which is operated by his eldest
daughter. He accused Khabar of tendentious reporting; he accused other
unnamed media outlets of ``inciting national strife, insulting the
dignity of the people, coming out against the Constitutional system
(and) disparaging their country.'' Consistent with public assurances on
April 24 by the Minister of Culture, Information, and Social Accord
that the President's speech did not presage a crackdown on the media,
government policy toward the media did not appear to change after the
President's speech. However, human rights monitors charged that the
tone of the President's speech reinforced a climate of media self-
censorship and law enforcement harassment of the media. Nonetheless,
new licenses for media of various forms continued to be issued and,
according to the Government, the number of media outlets in the country
increased.
In October the Government introduced draft amendments to the media
law that would limit foreign media rebroadcasters to per cent of a
station's total air time, hold media outlets responsible for the
accuracy of foreign media they rebroadcast, and force websites to
register as media outlets. Journalists and NGO's charged that the draft
law would infringe freedom of speech.
The Government continued to be in a strong position to influence
most printing and distribution facilities and to subsidize periodicals,
including many that supposedly were independent. Although publications
expressing views independent of the Government continued to publish,
the Government took measures to punish publications that reported
certain undesirable stories and harassed two publications that were
affiliated with one of the opposition parties, measures taken with the
evident intention of intimidating certain media critics. These actions
and the resulting widespread belief that the Government was cracking
down on independent media effectively resulted in widespread media
self-censorship. In January a court in Ust-Kamenogorsk ordered the
local HBC-Press newspaper to suspend publication for 3 months. The
court found, and an appeals court subsequently upheld, that the
newspaper had violated the media law by publishing an article calling
for the overthrow of the country's constitutional system. The article
in question contained a public appeal from the leader of a Russian
nationalist group arrested in November 1999 for plotting to overthrow
the local government in Ust-Kamenogorsk. The newspaper had received a
copy of the appeal at a news conference attended by other local media.
The editor of HBC-Press asserted that representatives of the KNB at the
press conference did not warn journalists not to publish the press
release. HBC-Press went out of business without resuming publication
after the court-ordered suspension.
The key subject considered ``off limits'' by journalists was
personal criticism of the President and his family. Most newspapers did
not present the story, widely reported in the western press, about
alleged American and Swiss investigations into possible illicit
payments by a foreign businessman to President Nazarbayev and two
former Prime Ministers. However, The Globe, a small-circulation
Russian-English bilingual newspaper based in Almaty, dedicated most of
one edition to the subject. Law enforcement authorities visited the
newspaper's office on the day the issue appeared, July 6, to summon its
publisher for questioning. The visit appeared to be in response to the
content of the July 6 edition, although government officials
characterized the visit as a routine tax inspection. The Globe stopped
printing for a month after refusing, its management claimed, to agree
to a request from its government-owned publishing house to refrain from
including such controversial material. About 1 month after resuming
publication, the newspaper announced that the publishing house would no
longer print the newspaper following inclusion of an article critical
of the Prime Minster. However, the newspaper continued to publish, and
no charges were brought against the publisher, who remained abroad.
The Government took steps that inhibited the publication and
distribution of newspapers affiliated with the opposition. The tax
police temporarily seized newspapers during investigations of various
printing houses; they were later returned. Government actions appeared
to focus in particular on two newspapers associated with RNPK, the
party of former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Twenty-First
Century (XXI VEK) and SolDat. Both newspapers had difficulty finding
printing houses willing to publish them, resulting in several missed
editions. Twenty-First Century finally purchased its own small printing
machine but on December 27 unknown individuals allegedly broke into
their offices and short-circuited the machine. Customs officials seized
a run of Soldat newspaper when the editors tried to bring it across the
border from Russia. These papers were also later returned. SolDat also
attempted to print in the Kyrgiz Republic twice during the year, but
both runs were confiscated by customs at the border. However, both
newspapers continued to appear during the year.
The KNB reportedly was investigating SolDat and its editor in
chief, Yermurat Bapi, in connection with a complaint that the newspaper
insulted the honor and dignity of the President, an offense proscribed
in the Criminal Code. The complaint arose from two articles in the
newspaper's June 22 edition that reported corruption allegations
against the President. The articles were purportedly reprints from
Western publications.
In June a government-run publishing house refused to continue
printing SolDat. The Ministry of Agriculture publishing house had been
printing the newspaper for 8 months. The chief of the publishing house
told journalists that he acted because the newspaper's editors failed
to meet unspecified contractual obligations. The management of SolDat
denied the charge. After SolDat subsequently began publishing in
Russia, its management claimed that customs officials at a border
crossing point near Semipalatinsk seized an entire print run of the
newspaper on July 5. Editor in chief Bapi, who was transporting the
newspapers, said that customs officials justified the action because
Bapi misstated the number of newspaper bundles he was transporting.
SolDat management publicly charged that officials seized the newspaper
because it contained articles critical of President Nazarbayev on the
occasion of his 60th birthday. Twenty-First Century continued to have
difficulty finding printing houses willing to publish it, though it
managed to circulate with inferior print quality. On April 27, the tax
police in Almaty seized an entire print run of the newspaper at a
publishing house because of alleged tax violations by the printer.
Government authorities said that the seizure was directed at the
printer, not the newspaper.
The independent newspaper Nachnyem's Ponedelnika, which specializes
in investigative articles about government corruption, continued to
face a number of defamation lawsuits, many from government officials.
After finding in favor of a defamation suit brought by the association
of judges, a court in Almaty ordered the seizure of the newspaper's
assets, along with the personal assets of its founder and executive
director, on May 24. Police confiscated the newspaper's print run,
financial records, office equipment, and furniture, on the next day. In
June a judge in Almaty fined Nachnyem's Ponedelnika $350,000 (50
million tenge) for infringing on the name of another newspaper. The
fine was reduced to $2,000 (290,000 tenge) by an appeals court in July.
Management of Nachnyem's Ponedelnika alleged that these and other
lawsuits against it were politically motivated and that prosecutors,
the tax police, and the mayor of Almaty were harassing the newspaper.
Government officials denied they were conducting a campaign against the
newspaper, and maintained that reckless allegations in the newspaper
were responsible for the spate of civil law suits against it.
Government's influence over media outlets is extensive. According
to government statistics, there were 1,258 mass media and information
agencies in the country as of September 1, 76 percent of them privately
owned. However the Government runs the newspapers that appear most
frequently, five times a week, a number of privately owned media are
believed to be controlled by members of the President's family, and
many of those which are nominally independent, particularly Kazakh-
language print media, receive government subsidies. There are a number
of newspapers that are produced by government ministries, for example,
Kazakhstan Science, which is published by the Ministry of Science. Each
major population center has at least one independent weekly newspaper.
There are 11 major independent newspapers in Almaty.
The Government controls nearly all broadcast transmission
facilities. There are 45 independent television and radio stations (17
television stations, 15 radio stations, and 13 combined television and
radio stations). Of these, 11 are in Almaty. There are only two
government-owned, combined radio and television companies; however,
they represent five channels and are the only stations that can
broadcast nationwide. Regional governments own several frequencies;
however, independent broadcasters have arranged with local
administrations to use the majority of these. An organization of
electronic media, the Association of Independent Electronic Media of
Central Asia (ANESMI), exists, but it is divided and weak.
On March 31, the independent Almaty television channel 31 fired
Tatiana Deltsova, the chief editor of its nightly news program, under
what the station president publicly alleged was a government threat to
close the station. The reported cause of Deltsova's dismissal was an
article that she presented March 30 about vandals' attacks earlier that
day on the homes of three leading Government opponents (see Section
2.b.). Government officials reportedly had expressed their
dissatisfaction previously with Deltsova's coverage of the opposition.
At year's end, Deltsova was hosting a new news program on the
television company TAN, an independent television station.
There were no reports, as there were in 1998, that the Government
threatened not to renew broadcast licenses of outoffavor independent
stations. There were also no frequency auctions; many members of the
independent media and human rights monitors believed that the
Government used the auctions in the past to harass and even eliminate
independent media.
During the campaign for the January 1999 presidential election,
many members of the independent media reported Government pressure not
to cover opposition candidates. Media coverage of the campaign for the
October 1999 parliamentary elections was extensive and featured all
candidates. A nationally televised 2 + hour live debate on Khabar state
television featured representatives of the nine registered parties that
were participating in the party-list section of the vote. Despite these
improvements over the presidential election, independent media around
the country reported official pressure to give the majority of their
parliamentary election coverage to the propresidential Otan party. They
also reported that government authorities told them to limit coverage
of, and to focus on negative news about, the RNPK and Azamat opposition
parties, as well as the Orleu (``Progress'') opposition movement. Some
television editors claimed that they were told categorically not to
cover certain opposition candidates. An RNPK candidate, Twenty-First
Century newspaper editor Bigeldy Gabdullin, charged, correctly, that
his free broadcast was not shown in his home constituency of Talgar.
The Constitution provides for the protection of the dignity of the
President, and the law against insulting the President and other
officials remained on the books. The 1999 media law did not control, as
did the earlier media law, advertising in the mass media. One law
restricts alcohol and tobacco advertising on television. The 1999 media
law prohibited violence and all ``pornography'' from television
broadcasts.
Academic freedom is circumscribed. As is the case for journalists,
academics cannot violate certain taboos, such as criticizing the
President and his family. During the presidential election campaign of
1999, there were widespread credible reports that university and school
administrators coerced faculty, students, and the parents of
schoolchildren to sign nominating petitions for the reelection campaign
of President Nazarbayev. Administrators reportedly pressured faculty to
join the propresidential Otan party formed later in 1999. According to
credible reports, authorities in Karaganda pressured the administration
of the private Bolashak University to cancel a scheduled April 11
lecture by a leading critic of the Government, political scientist
Nurbulat Masanov. An MVD officer was reportedly fired in April for
allowing Masanov to deliver a lecture at the MVD senior officers
school. Masanov was unemployed since faculty at the state Al-Farabi
University in Almaty voted in 1998 not to renew his contract, allegedly
over his political views. Unknown vandals attacked Masanov's apartment,
as well as those of two other opposition activists, in March (see
Section 2.b.). Course topics and content generally are subject to
approval by university administrations. There were reports that
university students in private as well as state universities sometimes
had to pay bribes for admission and good grades.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for peaceful assembly; however, the Government and the law
impose significant restrictions. The 1998 law on national security
defined as a threat to national security ``unsanctioned gatherings,
public meetings, marches, demonstrations, illegal picketing, and
strikes'' that upset social and political stability.
Under the law, organizations must apply to the local authorities
for a permit to hold a demonstration or public meeting at least 10 days
in advance, or the activity is considered illegal. In some cases, local
officials routinely issued necessary permits. However, opposition and
human rights monitors complained that complicated procedures and the
10-day notification period made it difficult for all groups to organize
public meetings and demonstrations. They reported that local
authorities, especially those outside the largest city, Almaty, turned
down most applications for demonstrations in central locations.
Officials in Almaty authorized a March 31 demonstration in the center
of the city by members of the opposition RNPK, although party members
alleged that the authorities were complicit in allowing students from
Interior Ministry and olympic-games training schools to disrupt the
event.
In the early morning hours of the day preceding the demonstration,
unknown persons vandalized the Almaty apartments of RNPK activists
Nurbulat Masanov and Amirzhan Kosanov as well as of another well-known
opposition figure, Seidakhmet Kuttykadam of the Orleu movement. The
vandals cemented or jammed shut the apartment doors, cut electrical and
telephone lines, painted threatening graffiti, and hurled a rock
through a window into a bedroom where Kosanov's infant daughter was
asleep. The three activists publicly charged that government agents
working through the KNB were responsible for the crimes. Government
officials denied the charge and suggested that the victims might have
orchestrated the incidents to attract sympathy, a charge the activists
denied. During the week following the incident, Kosanov received a
series of messages threatening him and his family. Law enforcement
investigations into the incidents were closed without arrests. On March
31, the President of Almaty's independent Television-Radio Channel 31
acting under what he said was government pressure, fired the station's
news editor for including a report about the vandalism incidents on the
nightly news (see Section 2.a.).
There were numerous peaceful, unsanctioned demonstrations by
workers and pensioners protesting difficult economic conditions and the
nonpayment of wages. For the most part, law enforcement authorities did
not interfere in the demonstrations or take action against the
individuals who participated; however, there were some exceptions. In
March a court in Astana sentenced a labor union leader to 24 hours in
jail for organizing an unsanctioned demonstration by striking
construction workers (see Section 6.a.). The authorities arrested well-
known government opponent Madel Ismailov (see Section 1.d.), who took
part in the longstanding monthly pensioners' demonstrations in Almaty;
other participants were not arrested. On April 20, the city court of
Ust-Kamenogorsk suspended the activities of the local chapter of the
Pokoleniye pensioners' movement for 3 months, charging that the group
systematically carried out unsanctioned demonstrations. On December 13,
the Bostandyk district court of Almaty found Sakhib Zhanabayeva guilty
of organizing an unsanctioned mass gathering and sentenced her to 5
days in jail. Zhanabayeva, an activist of the Kazakhstan Workers
Movement, had taken part in a protest by pensioners on November 30.
The chief of the Almaty branch of the RNPK, Alikhan Ramazanov, and
an activist of the party, Nurlan Bakirkhanov, were brought to trial in
Medeu District Court on June 7 for organizing an unsanctioned mass
gathering on May 31. Both were fined $205 (29,000 tenge).
The RNPK claimed that it was denied access to hotels and other
venues in Almaty in May and June. Allegedly the Government had told
hotels and other venues in Almaty not to provide their premises for
meetings of political parties or movements.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government and the law impose significant restrictions on this right.
Organizations that conduct public activities, hold public meetings,
participate in conferences, or have bank accounts must be registered
with the Government. ``Membership organizations,'' such as churches or
political parties, must register in each of the 14 provinces where they
have active members, whereas ``nonmembership organizations,'' such as
NGOs, only register at the national level. Registration on the local
level requires a minimum of 10 members and on the national level, a
minimum of 10 members in at least 7 of the 14 oblasts. In addition a
registration fee of $135 (19,845 tenge) is required, and most
organizations must hire lawyers or other consultants to expidite their
registrations through the bureaucracy. This increases the registration
cost by approximately $200 (29,400 tenge). Some groups consider these
costs to be a deterrent to registration.
The Constitution prohibits political parties established on a
religious basis. The Government has refused to register ethnically
based political parties on the grounds that their activities could
spark ethnic violence; however, the small Kazakh ethnic nationalist
``Alash'' Party was registered for the 1999 parliamentary elections.
The Constitution bans ``public associations"--including political
parties--whose ``goals or actions are directed at a violent change of
the Constitutional system, violation of the integrity of the republic,
undermining of the security of the state (and), fanning of social,
racial, national, religious, class, and tribal enmity.'' All of the
major religious and ethnic groups have independently functioning
cultural centers.
To participate in elections, a political party must register with
the Government. The Government registered 3 new parties in addition to
the 10 registered to participate in the 1999 parliamentary elections.
At least three parties registered in 1999 were widely viewed as
opponents of President Nazarbayev. Under current law, a party must
submit a list of at least 3,000 members from a minimum of 9 oblasts.
(The cities of Almaty and Astana count as oblast-equivalents in
addition to the 14 oblasts for this purpose.) The list must provide
personal information about members, including date and place of birth,
address, and place of employment. For many citizens, the submission of
such personal data to the Government is reminiscent of the tactics of
the former Soviet KGB and inhibits them from joining parties. Under the
law, members of unregistered parties may run for elected office as
individuals but not as party members. The party affiliation of
candidates does not appear on ballots for candidates in single-mandate
parliamentary constituencies. Since the 1999 elections, 10 members of
the lower house of Parliament (Majilis) are elected on the basis of
proportional, party-list voting. Two registered opposition parties,
Azamat and the RNPK, increased their organizational activities. They
participated in training seminars, were active in public political
debates, and held press conferences.
The Minister of Internal Affairs rescinded in October a directive
that MVD claimed gave law enforcement officers the right to attend any
meetings of political parties and NGO's. This claim, to which human
rights monitors and opposition party leaders had strongly objected, had
been upheld by the Supreme Court in July. Authorities had first
asserted this claim when they brought charges against Bigeldy
Gabdullin, a leading figure in the opposition RNPK, for obstructing the
work of a state organ. The charges arose from a December 1999 incident
in which Gabdullin insisted that a senior MVD officer leave a meeting
of RNPK officials at the RNPK office in Almaty. An Almaty court
convicted Gabdullin on January 25 and fined him $35 (5,000 tenge). The
conviction was upheld on appeal. The judge in the case said she based
her decision on the presidential decree on the organization and conduct
of peaceful meetings, rallies, pickets, and demonstrations, which
authorizes law enforcement agents to attend certain public gatherings.
However, Gabdullin's lawyer stressed that article 11 of the decree
explicitly exempts indoor meetings of public associations, such as
political parties, that are held in accordance with law and the group's
charter.
The Constitution prohibits foreign political parties and foreign
trade unions from operating. In addition the Constitution prohibits the
financing of political parties and trade unions by foreign legal
entities and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the various denominations worship largely without
government interference; however, the Government sometimes harasses
Islamic and Christian groups whose members it regards as religious
extremists. The Constitution defines the country as a ``secular''
state. The constitution also requires foreign religious associations to
carry out their activities, including the appointment of the heads of
religious associations, ``in coordination with appropriate state
institutions.'' In general the Government does not interfere with the
appointment of religious leaders or other activities of foreign
religious associations, although foreign missionaries have encountered
some visa problems.
Religious organizations, including churches, must register with the
Ministry of Justice in order to receive legal status. Without
registration, religious organizations cannot buy or rent real property,
hire employees, obtain visas for foreign missionaries, or engage in any
other legal transactions. Although religious organizations, unlike
other nongovernmental organizations, are entitled by law to carry out
their activities without government registration, in practice many
local officials insisted that they register and in a few instances,
disrupted services by unregistered groups. Registration requires an
application submitted by at least 10 persons and is usually a quick and
simple process. Some religious groups out of favor with the Government
have encountered difficulties registering in certain jurisdictions.
These groups include Jehovah's Witnesses and some Korean Protestant
groups, as well as Muslim groups independent of the Mufti (the national
leader of Islam). Foreign missionaries require state accreditation.
Witnesses reported continued difficulties with registration in
Pavlodar, Osakarovka and Kzyl-Orda in 2000. One group of Jehovah's
Witnesses in Petropavlovsk has attempted to register five times. They
received four rejections and still have no answer to their latest,
September 9, application. One human rights monitor asserted that the
Government typically claims that religious groups' charters do not meet
the requirements of the law. For example, Kazakhstani law does not
allow religious groups to engage in educating children without
education ministry approval, and many religions include education in
their charters.
A 1999 law on education forbids the activities of educational
institutions, including religious schools, that have not been
registered by the Ministry of Education. Although no religious schools
are known to be registered, the Government apparently took no action
against religious schools over registration pending full implementation
of the law. On December 19, First Deputy Minister of Education Erlan
Aryn sent a letter to all regional education departments rescinding an
earlier ban on visits to schools by religious figures, humanitarian and
other aid from religious organizations, and the rental of facilities to
religious groups.
Government officials frequently expressed concerns about the
potential spread of religious extremism from Afghanistan and other
states. Despite concerns about regional security threats from groups
claiming a religious basis, the Government did not impose new legal
restrictions on religious freedom. Draft restrictive amendments to the
law on religion, withdrawn by the government in March 1999, were not
reintroduced. However, the country's highest law enforcement officials
called for toughening the religion law. The Procurator General of the
Republic and the Interior Minister both called for prohibiting the
activities of unregistered religious organizations. In February the
Interior Minister publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with the
presence of conservative Muslims in the country and criticized a local
official for attending a stadium meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses. The
KNB has characterized the fight against ``religious extremism'' as a
top priority of the internal intelligence service. The official
Russian-language newspaper, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, and the official
television station, Khabar, present as objective news allegations that
unregistered religious groups present a threat to national security and
social cohesion.
The Ministry of Justice has requested that Jehovah's Witnesses
amend their charter to eliminate education as a religious activity.
However there were no reports that the Government shut down religious
schools. Information on the number of such schools, if any, operating
in Kazakhstan, was not available.
In September an education ministry official announced that the
Foreign Ministry would ``recall'' all Kazakhstani students studying in
religious institutions outside Kazakhstan, a step considered by some
observers to be aimed primarily at preventing young Muslims from being
radicalized by militant Islamic education abroad. The official said
that the measure was intended to protect the country against religious
extremism. It was unclear how the Government would implement the
policy. The Government announced that several students studying in
Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey would return voluntarily by year's end.
On June 26, the Third Congress of Muslims in Kazakhstan voted to
appoint Absattar Derbisaliyev as the new mufti (spiritual chief) of the
national Muslim organization. Senior government officials, including
reportedly the Chief of the Presidential Administration and the
Minister of Culture, Information, and Public Accord, took part in the
Congress. Some Muslims alleged that the government officials engineered
Derbisaliyev's appointment and the resignation of his predecessor.
Derbisaliyev publicly denied that government officials present at the
Congress influenced the votes of congress participants, arguing that
they were not there when the voting was conducted.
Some local officials continued to maintain, contrary to law, that
unregistered religious organizations could not conduct religious
activities. Local KNB officials disrupted meetings in private homes of
unregistered groups of Jehovah's Witnesses in Pavlodar, Osakarovka and
Kyzl-Orda. In March the city prosecutor's office in Astana, the
national capital, issued a written warning to a group of schismatic
Baptists for not being registered. Earlier in the month, the head of
the local Astana office of the Ministry of Culture, Information, and
Social Accord visited the leader of the schismatic Baptists to
recommend that the church alter its charter prohibition against seeking
government registration and apply for registration. In September a
Baptist congregation in Astrakhanka was ordered to close by the
district court until it complied with registration requirements.
Earlier, the pastor had been fined $10 (1,500 tenge) for failing to
register the church. In September KNB official confiscated Bibles and
other literature from a prayer group in Kyzl-Orda and had not by year's
end returned the documents despite the Prosecutor's order to do so. Law
enforcement authorities in Akmola Oblast, the province that includes
Astana, conducted regular inspections of religious organizations in
order, they asserted, to prevent the development of religious extremism
and to ensure that religious groups pay taxes.
Representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses alleged incidents of
harassment by a number of local governments. They claimed that city
officials in Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent sometimes blocked the group
from renting stadiums or other large public or private sites for
religious meetings. In other cities, officials allowed the church to
rent facilities for such gatherings. Church representatives alleged in
March that the director of one facility in Almaty told them that city
officials had given instructions not to rent space to Jehovah's
Witnesses. A city official denied the allegation. Church
representatives also alleged that the Prosecutor's Office in Kostenai
requested information from the church about its clergymen,
organizational structure, and schools, and that in April documents of
Jehovah's Witnesses congregations in Taraz and Abay were inspected. The
church faced difficulties registering communities of church members in
Petropavlovsk, where registration has been denied several times, and
Aktau, although it ultimately was registered in Aktau. On June 7, local
KNB and Interior Ministry officers, accompanied by local government
officials, raided a prayer house belonging to a registered community of
Jehovah's Witnesses in the village of Derbesek (South Kazakhstan
Oblast). The officers confiscated religious literature and church
correspondence. Church representatives complained to district and
oblast KNB officials that the raid was illegal because the officers did
not have a prosecutor's warrant. In response the director of the KNB
department for South Kazakhstan Oblast wrote a letter confirming that
no evidence of ``illegal missionary activity'' was discovered and that
the local KNB officers who participated in the raid had been ordered to
return the seized literature and correspondence, which they did at the
end of June.
On occasion the authorities took action against groups engaged in
proselytizing. In December, two female Jehovah's Witnesses were
arrested and detained for one day for proselytizing in Talgar. The
police confiscated their documents but returned them after three days.
No charges were filed. On December 15, two Krishna Consciousness
devotees were detained in Aktobe for selling Krishna books on the
street. Police confiscated 20 books, but later released the women
without charges. However, one Krishna leader reported that in most
oblasts officials leave their followers alone. In July in Akshoki, near
the Chinese border, members of a Baptist church reported that local KNB
officials, police and clergy incited a crowd to threaten a group
preaching Christianity and burn Christian literature. One member was
severely beaten by a group of eight men who demanded he convert to
Islam. Government officials declined to comment on this incident.
Foreign missionary activity is authorized under law, but only when
missionaries are accredited by the State. In practice many missionaries
operate without accreditation. Although legally entitled to register
religious organizations, foreign missionaries generally find that to be
registered they had to list a majority of local citizens among the 10
founders of the religious organization. Some foreign missionaries,
whose presence is unwelcome to some Muslim and Orthodox citizens, have
complained of occasional harassment by junior government officials. In
particular evangelical Protestants working in schools, hospitals, and
other social service institutions have alleged government hostility
toward their efforts to proselytize. Jehovah's Witnesses reported
difficulties obtaining visas for foreign missionaries to visit
Kazakhstan. Other missionaries are harassed by local officials
regularly. On June 7, immigration officials at Almaty airport refused
to admit an American missionary. The missionary, who held a valid visa,
alleged that airport authorities did not give an explanation for his
exclusion, saying only that the reasons were secret. The missionary
suggested that his exclusion might have been related to problems that
he had experienced 6 months earlier with customs officials in Russia,
where he had performed religious work. He subsequently was denied a
visa to return to Russia. Government officials subsequently confirmed
the refusal to grant entry to the missionary and indicated that his
name matched one on an immigration lookout list that had been
circulated to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Other foreign missionaries, unwelcome to some Muslim and Orthodox
citizens, have complained of occasional harassment by low-level
government officials. In particular evangelical Protestants working in
schools, hospitals, and other social service institutions have alleged
government hostility toward their efforts to proselytize. Kazakhstan's
small Jewish population continued to revive. Following the foundation
of the Jewish Congress of Kazakhstan in December 1999, seven new
synagogues opened during the year.
The authorities took no actions against police who allegedly beat
70 members of an Islamic group from Taraz who were detained and
ultimately released in 1999. The Government invited the national
leaders of the two largest religions, Islam and Russian Orthodoxy, to
participate jointly in state events. Leaders of other faiths
participated in some events, especially in Almaty. In December 1999,
during a visit to the United States, the President presented to the
Lubavitcher community documents relating to the father of the late
Lubavitcher rabbi, Menachem Schneerson. Joint appearances by the
Islamic mufti and the Orthodox archbishop, often in the presence of the
President, were intended to promote religious and ethnic harmony. Some
members of other faiths, including Muslims not affiliated with the
national Muslim organization headed by the mufti, criticized the
Government's inclusion of the mufti and archbishop in state events as
official favoritism and a violation of the Constitutional separation of
church and state. Many also believe that the distinction government
officials sometimes make between ``traditional'' and ``nontraditional''
religions violated the fundamental standard of equality among
religions.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
to emigrate and the right of repatriation; both are respected in
practice. The Law on National Security prohibits persons who had access
to state secrets through their work from taking up permanent residence
abroad for 5 years after leaving government service. Citizens have the
right to change their citizenship, but are not permitted to hold dual
citizenship.
According to the Constitution, everyone who is legally present in
the country has the right to move freely on its territory and freely
choose a place of residence except in cases stipulated by law. This
provision formally abolished the ``propiska'' system of residence
permits, a holdover from the Soviet era, which ended in 1991, and
replaced it with a system of registration. However, in practice
citizens still are required to register in order to prove legal
residence and obtain city services. Registration in most of the country
generally was routine, but it was difficult to register in Almaty due
to its relative affluence and local officials' fears of overcrowding.
The Government can refuse to register a citizen, just as it did under
the propiska system, in order to limit the number of persons who can
move to a certain city or area.
There were no further reports of government efforts to restrict the
movement of foreigners around the country. There were no further
reports of foreigners being detained for entering restricted areas that
were not clearly marked. Likewise, there were no further reports by
foreigners that they were denied access or required to pay exorbitant
entry fees to ostensibly free national parks. There were no reports
that the authorities refused to approve the assignment of foreign aid
workers to towns considered ``sensitive,'' as had been the case in
earlier years. Internal visas are no longer required for foreigners
traveling outside Almaty.
An exit visa is required for citizens who wish to travel abroad.
Although refusals are rare in general, some opposition political
figures encountered difficulties obtaining exit visas. The deputy
chairman of the RNPK, Gaziz Aldamzharov, did not receive an exit visa
for a trip he planned in February. He reported that immigration
authorities told him that the visa could not be issued because of an
unspecified criminal investigation against him. He ultimately received
a visa after the dates of his intended travel. There have been reports
of some officials demanding bribes for exit visas. It is usually
necessary to meet a number of bureaucratic requirements before the exit
visa is issued. A permanent exit visa is much more difficult to obtain.
It requires criminal checks, documents from every creditor stating that
the applicant has no outstanding debts and letters from any close
relatives with a claim to support from intending emigrants giving their
concurrence to the exit visa. In October the President and then-
Minister of Internal Affairs announced their intention to eliminate the
exit visa requirement for temporary visits or permanent residence
abroad, but no action had been taken by year's end.
Foreigners must have exit visas, although they receive them
routinely as part of their entry visa. Foreigners who overstay their
original visas, or who did not receive exit visas as part of their
original visas, must get exit visas from the immigration authorities
before leaving. Foreign visitors are required to register, depending on
their circumstances, either with the immigration officials who admit
them at the airport or with the local office of visas and registration
(OVIR). Many foreigners complained that the process was
bureaucratically cumbersome. Foreigners are no longer required to
register in every city they visit. One registration with OVIR is
sufficient for travel throughout the country. Immigration authorities
occasionally refused to allow foreigners without proof of registration
to leave the country.
Authorities used the 1999 Law on State Secrets to justify
confiscating the passport of Amirzhan Kosanov, an official of the
opposition RNPK, as he tried to fly to the United Kingdom on November
25 (see Section 3). Kosanov, who had traveled abroad during the 3 years
between his departure from government service and full implementation
of the state secrets law, said that he had a valid exit visa and U.K.
entry visa for the November trip. Almaty migration police in October
had tried to seize Kosanov's passport. The Government alleged that
Kosanov had access to state secrets when he served as press secretary
to former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, the leader of the RNPK;
that Kosanov had refused to sign a standard non-disclosure agreement
and follow other simple procedures prescribed by the law; and that
other former officials with knowledge of sensitive information had been
allowed to travel after complying with the procedures. The Government
is not known to have used the Law on State Secrets to block the foreign
travel of any other former officials since the law's passage in 1999.
The Government accords special treatment to ethnic Kazakhs and
their families who fled during Stalin's era and wish to return. Kazakhs
in this category are entitled, in principle, to citizenship and many
other privileges. Anyone else, including ethnic Kazakhs who are not
considered refugees from the Stalin era, such as the descendants of
Kazakhs who moved to Mongolia during the previous century, must apply
for permission to return. However, it is the stated policy of the
Government to encourage and assist all ethnic Kazakhs living outside
the country to return, if they wish.
The Government usually cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. In 1999 the Government ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the
Government did not pass implementing legislation for the Refugee
Convention by year's end. The absence of implementing legislation left
unclear many aspects of the status of refugees, such as whether they
have a right to work.
Following the passage of a 1997 migration law and the creation of
the Agency for Migration and Demography, the Government began in 1998
to register asylum seekers and to determine their status in
consultation with the UNHCR. The Government in most cases allowed UNHCR
access to detained foreigners. Ethnic Kazakh migrants are automatically
eligible for citizenship, although the Government has granted
citizenship to only about 10 percent of the 191,000 Kazakh migrants.
Migrants from other CIS countries are not considered to be refugees as
they may travel and settle freely in any CIS country. The Government
has not allowed refugees without passports to register and has
restricted registration largely to refugees from Afghanistan. All non-
CIS citizens are considered to be intending immigrants. However, in
practice the Government is tolerant in its treatment of local refugee
populations. Only the President can grant political asylum; he is known
to have done so only once since independence in 1991.
The Agency for Migration integrates the UNHCR and a local NGO,
Kazakhstan Refugee Legal Support, into the process of reviewing refugee
claims. However, the limited resources of the agency impeded the
processing of many cases. Asylum claims were processed only in Almaty,
which is as far as 2,000 miles from other major Kazakhstani cities. The
Agency for Migration and the courts took a restrictive approach to many
asylum claims, apparently out of a desire to limit the number of
refugees. The Government's desire to control the size of the refugee
population appeared to be motivated by the country's difficult economic
situation and national security concerns stemming from the national
origins of many asylum seekers. The UNHCR estimated that there were
approximately 18,000 refugees in the country (at least 10,000 Chechens
from Russia and about 5,000 persons from Tajikistan, 2,500 from
Afghanistan, and 500 from other countries). There was a large influx of
Chechens fleeing the conflict with the central authorities in Russia.
Consistent with the Minsk Convention on Migration within the CIS, the
Government did not formally recognize the Chechens as refugees.
However, the Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR and Chechen
organizations, did grant indefinite legal resident status to Chechens
until they could return home to safe conditions. By September the
Government registered 1,211 asylum seekers and accorded refugee status
to about two-thirds of them. The Government continues to give priority
to the return of ethnic Kazakhs in order to increase the percentage of
Kazakhs in the overall population and to offset the large-scale
emigration of ethnic Russians and Germans. Since independence
approximately 190,000 ethnic Kazakhs, mostly from other CIS countries,
Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Turkey, China, and Saudi Arabia have
immigrated. The Government struggled to find resources for integration
programs for these immigrants, some of whom lived in squalid settings.
The problem of integrating the Kazakh migrants was compounded by the
inability of about 90 percent of them to obtain Kazakhstani
citizenship, to which theoretically they are entitled by law. Without
citizenship, the migrants do not have clear rights to own property,
open businesses, or conduct other legal transactions.
Agreements between Kazakhstan and Russia that established broad
legal rights for the citizens of one country living on the territory of
the other and provided for expeditious naturalization for citizens of
one country who moved to the other entered into force in 1999.
Kazakhstan and China agreed in December 1999 not to tolerate the
presence of ethnic separatists from one country on the territory of the
other. Human rights monitors were concerned about the impact of this
agreement on Uyghurs from China present in Kazakhstan. The Government
did not consider any asylum claims from Uyghurs; it was unclear whether
any Uyghurs applied. In general the Government was tolerant toward the
Chinese Uyghur population. There were no known cases of the Government
returning Uyghurs to China since February 1999, when the Government
returned three Uyghurs. The Chinese authorities had accused the three
of murdering a policeman; Amnesty International reported evidence that
at least one was wanted for ``separatist'' activities. Some reports
indicate that the three men were subsequently executed upon return to
China, but this information has not been confirmed.
There were no reports that the Government forcibly repatriated
refugees in the period covered by this report to any country where they
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for a democratic government; however, in
practice the Government severely limited the right of citizens to
change their government. The Constitution concentrates power in the
presidency, granting the President considerable control over the
legislature, judiciary, and local government. Modifying or amending the
Constitution is nearly impossible without the consent of the president.
President Nazarbayev was elected to a 7-year term in a 1999 election
that fell far short of international standards. He extended his
previous term of office via a deeply flawed 1995 referendum without a
contested presidential election (which, according to the Constitution
then in force, should have been held in 1996).
The President appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet. His appointment of the Prime Minister, but not of cabinet
members, is subject to parliamentary consent. He has the power to
dismiss Parliament. If Parliament does not act within 30 days on bills
the President designates as urgent, the President can issue the bills
as decrees with the force of law. He appoints judges, senior court
officials, and all regional governors. He directly appointed the
chairman and members of the Central Elections Commission (CEC) who
oversaw the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections in
1999. In accordance with the Constitution, the lower house of
Parliament (Majilis) confirmed the CEC chairman and members nominated
by the President in May.
President Nazarbayev won his current term in office in a 1999
election held nearly 2 years earlier than previously scheduled. The
previous October, the President and the Parliament passed in 1 day,
without any prior public notice, a series of 19 constitutional
amendments that enabled them 1 day later to call the early presidential
election. Among other changes, the constitutional amendments extended
the presidential term of office from 5 to 7 years and removed the 65-
year age limit on government service. (President Nazarbayev would be 65
year of age before the end of his current 7-year presidential term.)
The Constitutional amendments also extended the terms of members of
Parliament from 4 to 5 years for the lower house (Majilis) and from 4
to 6 years for the Senate. Government opponents and international
observers criticized the short-notice call of early elections because
it did not leave enough time for the government to implement promised
electoral reforms and for intending candidates to organize effective
campaigns.
The Government imposed onerous requirements on candidates seeking
to qualify for the presidential ballot. Candidates were required to
submit petitions with approximately 170,000 signatures collected in
equal proportions from at least 11 of the country's 16 regions (the 14
oblasts plus the cities of Almaty and Astana). They also were required
to pass a Kazakh-language test and to make a nonrefundable payment of
1,000 times the minimum monthly wage (approximately $30,000), although
an equal sum was then provided to each registered candidate for
campaign expenses. Although three candidates, in addition to President
Nazarbayev, qualified for the ballot, two of them, then-Senator Engels
Gabassov and then-Customs Committee chairman Gani Kasymov, were known
as supporters of the President and widely believed to be running at
government behest.
In October 1998, less than 1 week after the early presidential
election was called, the Government resorted to a provision of the
presidential decree on elections, passed in May 1998, that prohibited
persons convicted of administrative offenses from running for public
office within a year of their conviction. A district court in Almaty
summoned on less than 24 hours' notice 5 leading government opponents--
former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, former Social Democratic
party leader Dos Kushim, Pokoleniye Pensioners Movement leader Irina
Savostina, Azamat movement co-chairman Petr Svoik, and Tabigat
ecological movement leader Mels Yeleusizov--to face charges of
participating in the October 1998 meeting of an unregistered
organization called For Fair Elections. The court convicted all five.
Despite the judgment against him, Kazhegeldin, the most widely known
opposition figure, applied for registration as a candidate in the
presidential election. The presidentially appointed CEC disqualified
his candidacy under the provision of the presidential decree on
elections that then served as the election law. The Supreme Court
upheld the disqualification. The CEC also used the election law
provision to disqualify the presidential candidacy of Amantai Asylbek,
leader of the Attan antinuclear testing movement, because of a 3-day
jail sentence that he received in February 1998 for participating in an
unsanctioned demonstration.
The Government harassed President Nazarbayev's opponents throughout
the presidential election campaign. According to credible reports,
government agents repeatedly pressured managers of conference
facilities to deny access at the last moment to government opponents
who had arranged to use the facilities for meetings and press
conferences. When opposition meetings and press conferences did take
place, electricity at the facilities often was interrupted. Government
attempts to disrupt opposition meetings appeared to have extended
beyond national borders when the management of a Moscow hotel withdrew
permission at the last moment for a December 1998 opposition congress.
Communist Party leader Serykbolsyn Abdildin, the only candidate from
the ranks of the preelection opposition who qualified for the
presidential ballot, publicly complained that local officials loyal to
the President impeded his attempts to hold campaign rallies and
meetings. As recently as November, authorities used the State Secrets
Law to confiscate the passport of RPNK official Amirzhan Kosanov as he
tried to travel to the United Kingdom (see Section 2.d.).
Assaults on two of Kazhegeldin's advisers appeared to have been
politically motivated and, government critics charged, sanctioned by
the Government. In addition, Kazhegeldin claimed that two gunshots were
fired at him on the eve of the press conference at which he announced
his presidential candidacy. Unknown assailants beat one of his public
relations advisers, Yelena Nikitenko (see Section 1.c.) and beat his
press spokesman, Amirzhan Kosanov. Several days before the attack,
officials of the al-Farabi National University in Almaty forced
Nikitenko to resign from the faculty because of her political
activities. Government officials alleged that the Kazhegeldin campaign
staged or invented all three attacks. Following the announcement of
Kazhegeldin's candidacy, the then first deputy chairman of the KNB held
an unprecedented press conference at which he made admittedly
unsubstantiated allegations of financial malfeasance against
Kazhegeldin. The tax authorities brought an action against Kazhegeldin
during the campaign and, according to credible reports, threatened
actions against other government opponents. At a news conference,
Kazhegeldin supporters showed videotape of police repeatedly pulling
over Kazhegeldin's car for unspecified ``inspections.'' Kazhegeldin
also claimed that border control officials at the Almaty airport tried
to prevent him and his family from taking a flight out of the country.
An attack on a Kazakhstani employee of a foreign embassy also appeared
to be motivated politically and, human rights observers believe,
sanctioned by the Government. In December 1998, three men beat the
employee outside his apartment as the employee returned home. The
employee suffered a cracked rib, some internal injuries, and required
stitches to close wounds near both eyes. The attackers stole the
employee's briefcase but did not try to steal his wallet and other
valuables. The absence of robbery as a motive and the fact that the
employee's responsibilities included assisting diplomats in making
contacts with political opposition and human rights figures suggested
that the attack was motivated politically. Law enforcement authorities
closed the investigations into all of these cases without arrests. A
suspect was identified in the Nikitenko case but no charges were
brought, allegedly because Nikitenko had left the country and was
unavailable to identify her assailant.
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of
the OSCE announced in December 1998 that it would not meet the
Government's request to send a presidential election observation
mission. In its public explanation, the ODIHR cited concerns about the
exclusion of two opposition candidates, unequal access to the media,
and coerced support for President Nazarbayev. The ODIHR sent a small
election assessment team to report to the OSCE on the full election
process. The assessment team concluded that the presidential election
fell ``far short'' of Kazakhstan's commitments as an OSCE participating
state. It cited in particular the exclusion of candidates, the short
duration of the election campaign, obstacles to free assembly and
association, the use of government resources to support President
Nazarbayev' s campaign, unequal access to the media, and the flawed
presidential decree that served as the election law.
A newly elected bicameral legislature took office in December 1999.
The lower house (Majilis), consisting of 77 members, was elected
directly in October 1999. Under amendments to the Constitution passed
in 1998, membership in the Majilis elected in 1999 included 10 new
seats assigned proportionally to political parties based on the
percentage of votes they received nationally (with a minimum vote
threshold of 7 percent). As before the other 67 seats were attributed
by single mandate districts. The upper house (the Senate) consists of
39 members 32 of whom are elected directly by members of oblast and
city parliaments; the President appoints the remaining 7 senators. (The
number of senate seats was reduced from 42 in accordance with the
Government's 1997 decision to reduce the number of oblasts from 19 to
14. Each oblast elects two senators, as do the cities of Almaty and
Astana.) Elections were held in September 1999 for 16 Senate seats. The
May 1999 election law requires candidates for both houses to meet
minimum age and education requirements and to pay a nonrefundable
registration fee of 25 times the minimum monthly wage (approximately
$50070,000 tenge). This fee represented a 75 percent decrease over
previous registration fees, which opposition figures, human rights
monitors, and the OSCE/ODIHR had considered a barrier to participation.
The election law does not require Majilis candidates to collect a
certain number of signatures in order to be placed on the ballot;
however, Senate candidates must obtain signatures from 10 percent of
the members of the local assemblies in their oblasts in order to be
placed on the ballot. Political parties wishing to compete for the 10
proportionally allocated seats in the Majilis must be registered by the
CEC and regional electoral commissions in two-thirds of the principal
administrative jurisdictions (the 14 oblasts, plus the former and new
capital cities, Almaty and Astana). The Constitution states that
participation in elections is voluntary. One of the Constitutional
amendments passed in October 1998 rescinded the requirement that at
least 50 percent of eligible voters participate in order to make an
election valid. Experts had cited the old requirement as one of the
causes of fraud and vote inflation in past elections.
The legislature exercises little oversight over the executive
branch, although it has the Constitutional authority to remove
government ministers and vote no-confidence in the Government. The
Constitution and other arrangements allow the executive branch to
dominate the legislature. Although Parliament must approve the overall
state budget, the Constitution precludes Parliament from increasing
state spending or decreasing state revenues without executive branch
approval. The executive branch used this authority to block legislation
drafted by Members of Parliament. Nearly all laws passed by Parliament
originate in the executive branch. The executive branch controls the
budget for Parliament's operations; it has not provided funds for
Members of Parliament to hire staff, a situation generally viewed as
decreasing Parliament's effectiveness. Should Parliament fail to
consider within 30 days a bill designated as ``urgent'' by the
President, the President may issue the bill by decree. Although the
President has never resorted to this authority, it gives him additional
leverage with Parliament. While the President has broad powers to
dissolve Parliament, Parliament can remove the President only for
disability or high treason, and only with the consent of the
Constitutional Council, which largely is controlled by the President
(see Section 1.e.).
The introduction, for the 1999 parliamentary elections, of 10 new
seats in the Majilis distributed by party-list vote enhanced the role
of political parties, which, with the exception of the Communists, were
previously very weak. The Communist Party and three propresidential
parties--Otan (Fatherland), the Civic Party, and the Agrarian Party--
divided the 10 new party-list seats in the 1999 parliamentary election.
No candidate nominated by a non-Communist opposition party won a seat
in the Parliament. One member of the opposition RNPK won a seat after
running as an independent candidate. The RNPK withdrew its party-list
slate after two of its candidates, Akezhan Kazhegeldin and Madel
Ismailov, were declared ineligible. (They were the only two candidates
rejected of more than 600 applicants for Majilis contests.) Of the more
than 600 other candidates, about half who won ran as independents. Many
of them were former government officials with strong presumed sympathy
for the progovernment parties.
Many activities of Parliament remained outside public view. In June
1999, Parliament banned the press and other outsiders from observing
the vote of confidence in the Government. Final totals in the
parliamentary vote of confidence were made public, but not the votes of
individual members. The Parliament invited nongovernmental
representatives to observe at least four meetings. Many draft bills
were held closely and published in the press only after passage and
signature by the President. In 2000 the Parliament became more open by
publishing important draft laws (for example, the tax code) and by
meeting with NGO's on others (for example, the local self-government
law).
Although an improvement in many ways over the most recent
presidential election, parliamentary elections held in 1999 were marred
by election law deficiencies, executive branch interference in the
electoral process, and a lack of government openness about vote
tabulations. There was convincing evidence of government manipulation
of results in some cases. The OSCE mission sent to observe the
elections concluded that the elections were ``a tentative step'' toward
democracy but ``fell short of (Kazakhstan's) OSCE commitments.'' The
OSCE also expressed concern that parliamentary runoff races were
conducted just 2 weeks after first-round voting, which left no time for
the CEC and the courts to act on hundreds of complaints filed about the
conduct of first-round voting and the campaign.
The May 1999 election law replaced a presidential decree that had
served as the election law. It lowered candidate registration fees by
75 percent but failed to correct other deficiencies of the decree it
replaced. The law maintained a system of territorial, district, and
precinct electoral commissions subject to regional and local government
authorities, who recommend commission members. It failed to incorporate
suggestions for creating a more open vote tabulation process. It also
maintained more than 40 administrative provisions that bar candidates
convicted of administrative offenses from running for office for a
year, although one offense was eliminated from the list of
disqualifying offenses.
The CEC issued regulations to ameliorate some of these deficiencies
in time for the parliamentary elections, but the effects were limited.
For example the CEC filled vacant seats on electoral commissions by
lottery among all registered political parties. However, the initiative
affected only 25 percent of commissions and was limited to 1 seat per
commission, each of which usually consists of 7 members. Regulations
that clarified the rights of election observers significantly improved
the ability of observers to monitor vote counts at the precinct level.
However, observers could not, in the end, use the information they
obtained to corroborate or challenge official results. The CEC
ultimately released comprehensive precinct- and district-level vote
tallies for only 1 of 67 single-mandate districts, despite repeated
requests from the OSCE and other observers. With the exception of the
one district for which comprehensive results were released, the CEC
never issued the order of finish or final totals for Majilis candidates
who neither won nor qualified for a run-off.
The Government, prior to the 1999 parliamentary elections, removed
participation in the activities of an unregistered organization from
the list of administrative offenses that potentially could disqualify
candidates for public office. However, more than 40 other
administrative offenses remained on the list. Among these offenses were
participation in unsanctioned demonstrations or rallies, an offense
that the Government has used to charge its opponents (see Section
2.b.). The Government presented rescission of the administrative
offense as a measure to enable the five opposition leaders convicted of
participating in the For Fair Elections meeting to run for Parliament.
Two of the five successfully registered as candidates. However, the CEC
declined to register Akezhan Kazhegeldin due to a December 1998
administrative conviction for contempt of court. The conviction arose
from Kazhegeldin's failure to respond in person to the For Fair
Elections charge. (Kazhegeldin argued at the time that he met the law's
requirements by sending his attorney.) The chairperson of the CEC
publicly encouraged Kazhegeldin to seek the overturn of his contempt of
court conviction 1 week before the registration deadline for the
parliamentary elections. A successful appeal by Kazhegeldin would have
made him eligible, according to the CEC, to run in the parliamentary
election. Kazhegeldin subsequently wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting that it overturn his contempt conviction, but the court
ruled that his letter did not constitute a proper legal appeal.
Within a day of the CEC exclusion of Kazhegeldin's candidacy,
Russian authorities detained Kazhegeldin on a pre-existing warrant
issued 2 months earlier by the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan. The
Government requested the extradition of Kazhegeldin, who was living in
exile, in connection with allegations that he had laundered illicit
funds received while serving as Prime Minister from 1994 to 1997.
Following protests from international human rights groups, the
Prosecutor General dropped his extradition request, and the Russian
authorities released Kazhegeldin. In July Kazhegeldin was detained
again in Italy on charges of corruption, pursuant to an Interpol
warrant posted by Kazakhstan. Italian authorities released him shortly
thereafter. The investigation of Kazhegeldin, while possibly grounded
in facts, appeared motivated politically.
The CEC barred the 1999 parliamentary candidacy of Madel Ismailov
because of his February 1998 criminal conviction for insulting the
President (see Section 1.d.). Ismailov had sought to register as a
candidate on the RNPK party list. The election law precludes candidates
convicted of criminal offenses from running for office for 3 years
following their convictions.
A flawed provision in the electoral law was used to disqualify from
the 1999 parliamentary election another RNPK candidate, deputy party
chairman Gaziz Aldamzharov, after he apparently received a majority of
votes in an election in Atyrau. The CEC annulled the second round of
the Atyrau election, as well as two other second-round elections, but
gave no specific reason in its official decree. The electoral law
precludes all candidates who participated in an invalidated election
from running in a make- up election, regardless of who was responsible
for the violations that led to invalidating the election. The CEC
interpreted this provision to exclude from the 3 rerun elections all of
the approximately 500 candidates who ran unsuccessfully for any Majilis
seat in 1999. Although the CEC did not formally specify the reason for
invalidating the Atyrau election, the CEC chairperson said in a
television interview that district and precinct electoral officials in
Atyrau refused to certify protocols after a series of disturbances that
the chairperson attributed to the ``opposition.'' These disturbances
included alleged bomb threats, alleged falsification of ballots, and
the incursion into one polling station of four masked men who opened
and overturned ballot boxes. Given widespread expectations that
Aldamzharov would receive a majority of votes in Atyray,
unsubstantiated CEC allegations that the ``opposition'' disrupted
voting in Atyrau appeared contrived.
There were widespread, documented allegations that regional and
local executive authorities (akims) interfered with the parliamentary
elections during the campaign and in the voting process. In one case,
the chief election commissioner for the Ili district (Almaty Oblast)
resigned because, he alleged, the district akim ordered him to deliver
a victory for the akim's favored candidate. The commissioner, like most
election officials a government employee, offered to resign from his
full-time government job in addition to his electoral responsibilities.
A significant number of complaints filed in several regions indicated
that akimats and, through them, other employers threatened supporters
of opposition candidates with job loss. In one such case, the akimat of
the capital city, Astana, allegedly threatened to fire more than 20
government employees for their support of a nonfavored candidate. There
were also reports that tax inspectors and some KNB officials
intimidated opposition candidates, their supporters, and the
independent media. Akimats used government personnel and other
resources, including office space, to support ``favored'' candidates
and to distribute campaign literature for the propresidential Otan
party. On first- and second-round voting days, international and
domestic observers found akimat representatives ``supervising'' the
work of putatively independent precinct electoral commissions in
numerous locations throughout the country.
The failure of the CEC to release most precinct- and district-
level vote tallies undermined the credibility of election results.
Evidence of official vote tampering in many districts exacerbated this
problem. The OSCE observation mission obtained copies of flagrantly
falsified protocols (reports of official results). During the first
round of voting OSCE observers found multiple vote protocols prepared
in one Almaty polling station. OSCE and domestic observers reported
that precinct officials frequently did not use official protocol forms
to record results in the presence of observers or filled out the
official forms in pencil. District election officials, especially in
first-round elections, generally refused to allow observers to witness
the tabulation of results from various polling stations. Observers'
access to district vote tabulations improved in the second round of
voting after the CEC issued new instructions for preparing protocols
and instructed district officials to cooperate with observers.
Nevertheless, the district election commission in Atyrau refused
initially to allow OSCE observers into the district commission office.
District officials ultimately allowed the observers into their office
but subsequently recommended that they leave because the commission
``could not assure the (observers') safety.''
Government officials said that President Nazarbayev took
disciplinary actions against some local officials for interfering with
the parliamentary elections but this could not be confirmed; the
Government did not release any details such as the names of the
officials, their offenses, or punishment.
In February a team of OSCE representatives visited Astana to
discuss the final OSCE report on the parliamentary elections.
Government officials agreed during the visit to an OSCE proposal for a
series of roundtable discussions of the electoral reforms recommended
in the report. The agreement called for broad participation in the
discussions, including by representatives of the Government, all
registered political parties, other political movements, and NGO's.
After some delays, the first of four planned sessions took place on
September 2 in Astana. Participants agreed to a future work plan with
the inclusion of the OSCE and all political parties registered in 1999
in a parallel government working group on electoral reform. The
remaining sessions were scheduled for 2001; the leading opposition
parties and movements took part, as did approximately 15 Members of
Parliament from across the political spectrum. The CEC and
representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and
Culture, Information, and Public Access also took part. Shortly after
the September session, and with only a few days' notice, the CEC
announced that it would organize new regional and local electoral
commissions without waiting for the issue to be discussed in subsequent
sessions. The CEC said it had to act because the terms of the previous
commissions were expiring. Other roundtable participants criticized the
CEC for failing to discuss its plans to reconstitute the commissions or
to give political parties more notice that they would be invited to
nominate candidates.
The Constitution and laws significantly constrain the independence
of the judiciary (see Section 1.e.). A Constitutional Council replaced
the Constitutional Court in August 1995 when the new Constitution was
adopted. The President appoints three of its seven members, including
the chairman. A two-thirds majority of the Council is required to
overrule a presidential veto. All judges below the level of the Supreme
Court are appointed directly by the President. The President's nominees
for the Supreme Court are subject to Senate confirmation.
According to the Constitution, the President selects Governors of
oblasts (the ``akims''), based on the recommendation of the Prime
Minister; they serve at the discretion of the President, who may annul
their decisions. All adult citizens (at least 18 years of age) have the
right to vote. Membership in political parties or trade unions is
forbidden to members of the armed forces, employees of national
security and law enforcement organizations, and judges.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no
legal restrictions on the participation of women and minorities in
politics, but the persistence of traditional attitudes means that few
women hold high office or play active parts in political life. At the
end of the year, no women held ministerial portfolios, although one had
ministerial rank and several deputy ministers were women. There were no
female provincial governors (akims). Of 39 Senate members, 5 are women;
of 77 Majilis members, 8 are women.
Although minority ethnic groups are represented in the Government,
ethnic Kazakhs hold the majority of leadership positions. Nearly half
the population are non-Kazakhs according to the national census
completed in 1999. Non-Kazakhs hold 1 of 3 positions as vice premier
and head 2 of 14 government ministries and the national bank. Non-
Kazakhs also are underrepresented in the Majilis and the Senate. In
Parliament 8 of 39 senators are non-Kazakhs, and 19 of 77 members of
the Majilis are non-Kazakhs.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of
Law (formerly the Kazakhstan-American Bureau on Human Rights) and the
Almaty Helsinki Commission are the most active of a small number of
local human rights organizations. They cooperate on human rights and
legal reform issues. Although these groups operated largely without
government interference, limited financial means hampered their ability
to monitor and report human rights violations. Law enforcement
investigators closed an investigation into a November 1999 fire that
destroyed the main office and archives of the Bureau for Human Rights
in Almaty. The Almaty fire department concluded that arson was the
probable cause of the fire. It absolved the organization from potential
civil liability for the fire. However, investigators identified no
suspects and made no arrests. Some human rights observers complained
that the Government monitored their movements and telephone calls.
The Civil Code requires NGO's to register with the Government, and
most NGO's are registered; however, some continue to operate without
legal standing. An increasing number of government officials made an
effort to work with domestic and foreign NGO's, although others
persisted in asserting that NGO's should stay out of sectors of
government interest. A coalition of NGO's played an apparently
unprecedented role in government consideration of draft local
government laws. After successfully delaying passage of what was widely
viewed as flawed legislation on this subject early in the year, the
coalition successfully lobbied Parliament to publish the draft. That
draft was withdrawn in December for revision. Some NGO's chose not to
register because they objected to the requirement of registration in
principle or because they did not have the money to pay the
registration fee. Others believe that they were not eligible to
register because they promoted the interests of one ethnic group or
religion and are considered by some to violate the constitutional ban
on inciting social, racial, national, religious, class, and tribal
enmity. The new Criminal Code that took effect in 1998 criminalized the
activity of NGO's that are not registered. In 1998 five leading
opposition figures were convicted for participating in a meeting of an
unregistered NGO, the For Fair Elections group (see Section 3).
The Government permitted international and foreign NGO's and
multilateral institutions dealing with human rights to visit the
country and meet with local human rights groups as well as government
officials. The International Labor Organization, the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the UNHCR, the
International Organization on Migration, and the OSCE have permanent
offices in the country. The Constitution forbids ``the financing of
political parties and trade unions by foreign legal entities and
citizens, foreign states and international organizations.''
The Presidential Commission on Human Rights is a consultative body.
It prepares annual reports to the President that can be released to the
public only with the President's consent. At the end of 1998, the
Commission made public its annual report to the President for the first
and only time by publishing an expurgated version of its report for
1997. The report focused almost exclusively on ``economic and social
rights,'' for example, the right to a decent standard of living. It
concluded that the country consistently abides by human rights
principles and suggested that those who blame the Government for social
problems should realize that individual well-being ultimately is the
responsibility of the individual. The Commission reached out to
independent human rights organizations but made little progress in
establishing itself as an Ombudsman. In general the Government showed
greater willingness to focus on abuses highlighted by human rights
monitors and individual citizens in the criminal justice system and to
investigate allegations of corruption but tended to deny or downplay
charges of abuses of civil liberties and political rights. In general
the Government tended to deny or ignore charges of specific human
rights abuses that were levied by human rights monitors and individual
citizens. In its report to the President for 1997, the Commission
charged that many domestic NGO's are oriented towards developed
countries' standards and do not realize that progress towards a market
economy and civil society is a slow, gradual process. It said that
NGO's sympathetic to ``left-wing radicals'' have nothing constructive
to offer.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``everyone is equal before law and
court. No one may be subjected to any discrimination for reasons of
origin, social position, occupation, property status, sex, race,
nationality, language, attitude to religion, convictions, place of
residence, or any other circumstances.'' However, the Government does
not enforce this provision effectively on a consistent basis. The
Government has favored ethnic Kazakhs in government employment and,
according to many citizens, in the process of privatizing state
enterprises.
Women.--According to human rights groups, there is considerable
domestic violence against women. A local NGO, the Feminist League,
estimates that hundreds of thousands of women are the victims of
spousal abuse. The Interior Ministry reported that family members or
domestic partners were responsible for about onethird of the nearly
8,500 crimes against women registered in the first half of 1999. During
the same period, 81 women were killed by family members. The Feminist
League reported that the levels of domestic violence remained
approximately the same in 2000. Karaganda oblast reported 3,060 crimes
against women in the first 6 months of 2000, including 33 murders and
53 rapes. Almaty police reported 49 murders, 134, rapes and 936
assaults against women during the first nine months of the year. There
was no information on the percentage of these crimes successfully
prosecuted, but police often are reluctant to intervene in domestic
disputes, considering them to be the family's business, unless they
believe that the abuse is life threatening. However, new domestic
violence units opened during the year within the Almaty and Astana
police departments. A women's crisis center in Almaty maintains that
the Almaty police are very effective when there is a complaint.
However, the police cannot detain a person legally for more than 72
hours if the victim refuses to provide a written complaint. In most
cases, women refuse to follow through with charges. The maximum
sentence for wife beating is 3 years, but few such cases are
prosecuted. A government commission on women and family continued to
draw attention to the issue of domestic violence. Law enforcement
authorities reported that 288 persons were convicted of rape in the
first 8 months of 1999, although the total number of reported rapes was
unavailable. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, prosecutors can
initiate a rape case, absent aggravating circumstances such as gang
rape, only upon the application of the victim. There were unconfirmed
reports that prosecutors sometimes interpreted this provision to
require rape victims to pay for forensic testing, pay the expenses of
prosecution, and personally prosecute rape cases themselves. The
punishment for rape can range from 3 to 15 years' imprisonment. There
is very little reporting on rape in the press. There is no law
specifically against spousal rape, which is proscribed under general
rape laws.
Trafficking in women is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
There is no legal discrimination against women, but traditional
cultural practices limit their role in everyday society and in owning
and managing businesses or real property. The President and other
members of the Government speak in favor of women's rights, and
official state policy (adopted in 1997) states that constitutional
prohibitions on sex discrimination must be supported by effective
government measures. Women are underrepresented severely in higher
positions in state enterprises and overrepresented in low-paying and
some menial jobs. Women have unrestricted access to higher education.
Approximately 30 women's rights organizations are registered, including
the Feminist League, Women of the East, the Almaty Women's Information
Center, and the Businesswomen's Association. In September the
Government announced the creation of a $4.5 million (661 million tenge)
fund to provide loans to female entrepreneurs. However, as of year's
end, the fund had not distributed any loans.
Children.--The Government is committed in principle to children's
rights, but as in many other areas, budget stringencies and other
priorities severely limit its effectiveness in dealing with children's
issues. Education is mandatory through the llth grade, although
students may begin technical training after the 9th grade. Secondary
education is both free and universal. Kazakhstani law provides for
equal access to education by both boys and girls. There is no societal
pattern of abuse against children. Rural children normally work during
harvests (see Section 6.d.).
People with Disabilities.--Citizens with disabilities are entitled
by law to assistance from the State. There is no legal discrimination
against the disabled, but in practice, employers do not give them equal
consideration. There are laws mandating the provision of accessibility
to public buildings and commercial establishments for the disabled, but
the Government does not enforce these laws. However, improvements to
facilitate access are not uncommon in Almaty and Astana. Assisting
disabled persons is a low priority for the Government. Mentally ill and
mentally retarded citizens can be committed to institutions run by the
State. These institutions are poorly run and inadequately funded. The
NGO, Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights, observed that
the Government provides almost no care for the mentally ill and
mentally retarded due to a lack of funds.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to results of the
1999 census, the population of about 15 million consists of
approximately 50 percent Kazakhs and 33 percent ethnic Slavs (Russians,
Ukrainians, Belarusians, and others) with many other ethnic groups
represented, including Uzbeks (2.5 percent), and Germans (2.4 percent).
The Government continued to discriminate in favor of ethnic Kazakhs
in government employment, where ethnic Kazakhs predominate, as well as
in education, housing, and other areas. However, the Government has
largely abandoned the explicit ``Kazakhification'' campaign of the 1st
year of independence (1991- 1992). President Nazarbayev has emphasized
publicly that all nationalities are welcome. Nonetheless, many non-
Kazakhs are anxious about what they perceive as expanding preferences
for ethnic Kazakhs. Many ethnic Kazakhs believe that such preferences
are needed to reverse 200 years of discrimination against their
community.
Most of the population speaks Russian; only about one-half of
ethnic Kazakhs speak Kazakh fluently. According to the Constitution,
the Kazakh language is the state language. The Constitution states that
the Russian language is used officially on a basis equal with that of
the Kazakh language in organizations and bodies of local self-
administration. Some ethnic Russians believe that Russian should be
designated as a second state language. The Government is encouraging
more education of children in the Kazakh language, but it has done
little to provide Kazakh-language education for adults. A 1997 language
law intended to strengthen the use of Kazakh without infringing on the
rights of citizens to use other languages has not been funded
sufficiently to make Kazakh-language education universal.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide for basic worker rights, including the right to organize and
the right to strike; however, the Government at times infringed on
worker rights. Activist unions came under government pressure for
holding unsanctioned demonstrations and marches.
A new Labor Code took effect on January 1. Among many other
revisions, the new law provides for individual contracts between an
employer and each employee, but allows ``optional'' collective labor
contracts. It also allows unions to represent an employee in labor
disputes, but an employee may choose other representation.
Most workers remained members of state-sponsored trade unions
established during the Soviet period, when membership was obligatory.
At most enterprises, the state-sponsored unions continued to deduct 1
percent of each worker's wage as dues. The state unions under the
Communist system were, and for the most part still are, organs of the
Government and work with management to enforce labor discipline and to
discourage workers from forming or joining independent unions.
A collective bargaining law gives workers the right to join or form
unions of their choosing and to stop the automatic dues deductions for
the state unions. The Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTUK,
formerly the Independent Trade Union center of Kazakhstan) claims
membership of about 250,000 persons; however, the actual number of
independent trade union members is estimated to be much lower. The pro-
Government Federation of Trade Unions claims 4 million members;
however, that figure is regarded as too high. To obtain legal status,
an independent union must apply for registration with the local
judicial authority at the oblast level and with the Ministry of
Justice. Registration is generally lengthy, difficult, and expensive.
The process of registering a union appears to be completely subjective,
with no published criteria. No unions were registered or denied
registration during the year. The two major independent trade union
confederations are registered. Courts may cancel a union's
registration, as a provincial court did in Kentau in 1998.
The law does not provide mechanisms to protect workers who join
independent unions from threats or harassment by enterprise management
or state-run unions. Members of independent unions have been dismissed,
transferred to lower paying or lower status jobs, threatened, and
intimidated. According to independent union leaders, state unions work
closely with management to ensure that independent trade union members
are the first fired in times of economic downturn.
Unions and individual workers exercised their right to strike
during the year, primarily to protest the nonpayment of wages and in an
attempt to recover back wages owed to workers. The nonpayment of wages
continued to be the priority issue for workers. Early in the year,
workers of the Uralsk ``Mettalist'' factory, led by the independent
trade union of the factory, conducted mass meetings demanding the full
payment of salaries. The company subsequently prohibited one of the
union's leaders, Vlaoimir Podzhidaev, a member of the local city
council, from entering the factory's territory. In addition police
detained the union's chairman, Ainur Kurmanov, on March 31. Kurmanov
alleged that police drugged and beat him, and detained him without
charges for 7 days. He claimed that a local television station
subsequently slandered him by showing footage of his ``drunk'' behavior
in police custody.
According to the law, workers may exercise the right to strike only
if a labor dispute has not been resolved by means of existing
conciliation procedures. In addition the law requires that employers be
notified that a strike is to occur no less than 15 days before its
commencement. There were numerous strikes throughout the country to
protest the nonpayment of wages and unsafe working conditions.
Construction workers in Astana held a series of strikes complaining of
the degradation of their working conditions under foreign contractors.
According to the CFTUK, the Turkish construction company ``Okan Holding
Isot,'' under various pretexts, fired 125 of its employees in Astana
shortly after the employees formed an independent labor union in
November 1999. Workers at the company began a strike on March 29 to
demand recognition of the union, collective bargaining, and the timely
payment of wages. Police detained 8 out of 19 participants for 5 hours
the same day. The workers were tried the following day and the leader,
J. T. Sharipov, was sentenced to one day in jail for organizing an
unsanctioned demonstration. The other seven were warned and then
released.
Independent unions complain about a provision in the Constitution
that forbids the financing of trade unions by foreign legal entities
and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations. After
independence in 1991, independent trade unions received financial
assistance from the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI). Most
of this assistance ended in 1996 when funding was reduced, and FTUI
currently provides no funding. Independent trade unions have sought new
means of support; some associations of trade unions were able to
receive financing from foreign sources by registering as ``public
organizations'' rather than labor unions. The law does not forbid other
nonmonetary types of assistance such as training, participation in
which appeared to increase.
By law unions freely may join federations or confederations and
affiliate with international bodies. Most independent trade unions
belong to the CFTUK, headquartered in Astana. The Independent Miners
Federation of Kazakhstan and the State Miners' Union of Karaganda are
members of the Miners' International Federation. Unions belonging to
the CFTUK are not members of international federations but are able to
maintain contacts with foreign trade union federations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law permits
collective bargaining and collective agreements. If a union's demands
are not acceptable to management, it may present those demands to an
arbitration commission composed of management, union officials, and
independent technical experts. Unions routinely appealed to arbitration
commissions.
The new Labor Law that took effect January 1 reduced the role of
unions by requiring employers and employees to negotiate individual
labor contracts. Collective bargaining agreements are allowed as long
as they do not reduce protections afforded to the workers in their
individual contracts or under law. Previously the terms of contracts
were set only by law and collective bargaining agreements. The new law
also gave employers the right to fire an employee without the consent
of the employee's union.
There is no legal protection against antiunion discrimination.
There are no export processing zones. Free economic zones enjoy all
the privileges of export processing zones as well as other tax
privileges and abatements, but labor conditions there appear to be no
different from elsewhere in the country. On August 1, the President
signed a decree abolishing the last free economic zone to become
effective on January 1, 2001.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor except ``at the sentence of the court or in the
conditions of a state of emergency or martial law,'' and it is
generally not known to occur; however, in 1999 there were reports that
some persons were required to provide labor or the use of privately
owned equipment with no, or very low, compensation to help gather the
annual grain harvest.
The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years, but only for
parttime work (5 hours a day) that is not physically onerous. A child
between the ages of 14 and 16 may work only with the permission of his
or her parents. Education is compulsory to age 16, and the law
stipulates harsh punishment for employers who exploit children under
this age. Responsibility for enforcement rests with the Ministry of
Labor, for administrative offenses punishable by fines, and the MVD for
criminal offenses. The Criminal Code allows for fines up to $25,000
(3,675,000 tenge) and 2 years in prison in cases where a minor is
injured or placed in unhealthy conditions. Children from the ages of 16
to 18 can work full time provided that they are not required to do any
heavy work. The Government has acknowledged that children in this age
group work in construction and other heavy industries but report that
duties for children are limited to washing windows, general cleaning,
laying tile, and similar nonstrenuous activities. Although the
Constitution does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children, the sale, trafficking, and abduction of children or hiring
minors for exploitation are punishable with up to 12 years in prison.
There were no reports of forced or bonded child labor (see Section
6.c.), and abuse of child labor is generally not a problem; however,
child labor is used routinely in agricultural areas, especially during
harvest season.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1997 the Government resumed
setting a minimum wage. The minimum monthly wage remained at its 1999
level of approximately $20 (2,680 tenge). The Government raised the
minimum monthly pension to approximately $25 per month (3,500 tenge)
and cleared pension arrears. These amounts do not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family and fell far short of the
minimum subsistence amount for one person as calculated in 1998 by the
Kazakhstan Institute of Nutrition.
The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although most enterprises
maintained a 40-hour workweek, with at least a 24hour rest period. The
Constitution provides that labor agreements stipulate the length of
working time, vacation days, holidays, and paid annual leave for each
worker.
Although the Constitution provides for the right to ``safe and
hygienic working conditions,'' working and safety conditions in the
industrial sector are substandard. Safety consciousness is low. Workers
in factories usually do not wear protective clothing, such as goggles
and hard hats, and work in conditions of poor visibility and
ventilation. Management largely ignores regulations concerning
occupational health and safety, which are not enforced by the Ministry
of Labor and the state-sponsored unions. Workers, including miners,
have no legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons, although government officials generally
maintained that prosecutors could effectively charge traffickers under
the existing Criminal Code. Article 270, Illegal Involvement in
Prostitution, provides punishment of up to 3 years in jail.
Prostitution connected with organized crime is punishable by up to 5
years in jail. According to Article 135, kidnaping of persons is
punishable by a term of up to 7 years. An organized group working for
sexual or other exploitation can be punished with up to 15 years in
jail and confiscation of property.
There are no official statistics on trafficking, but women's rights
groups and the IOM report additional indications that the problem is
serious and growing. However, experts estimate that from 5,000 to
70,000 women have been victimized in the past 10 years. The higher
figure was the result of a survey of Almaty women completed in April,
the Crisis Center for Women and Children. In 1999, 25 women were
repatriated from greece, 21 from the United Arab Emirates, 16 from
Turkey and 3 from Israel, according to the MVD. In December the press
reported that 2,000 women were sent to South Korea for prostitution; 2
had been repatriated. All of the trafficking cases known to the IOM
involve women between the ages of 18 and 25 who had been trafficked for
purposes of sexual exploitation. According to the Kazakhstan Crisis
Center for Women and Children, most women are recruited with promises
of good jobs or marriage abroad. The organization blames the rising
number of women being trafficked from the country on the lack of
employment opportunities and lack of information about trafficking. The
KNB reported in June that it broke up a trafficking ring that
specialized in sending women to the United Arab Emirates for
prostitution. Criminal charges were brought against five alleged
members of the ring. The five were arrested while trying to board a
woman and a 15-year-old girl on a flight to Dubai. The official press
reported that customs officers and border officials were under
investigation for complicity with the ring.
The Government has no programs to target trafficking in women.
However senior government officials presented reports on the problem,
including the lack of appropriate legislation, during a November
conference on trafficking in persons. The participants adopted a
resolution which called for revision of legislation to make trafficking
illegal; a distinction between victims of trafficking and illegal
migrants, and a joint governmental, NGO and international organization
approach to the problem.
Nongovernmental efforts to combat trafficking in persons increased.
The Kazakhstan Crisis Center for Women and Children published a
brochure warning of the danger of trafficking in women and conducted a
survey to measure the level of awareness of the trafficking problem. In
response to international organizations' efforts to raise awareness of
the problem, local feminist leagues have also begun to get involved.
The Feminist League of Kokshetau discovered that 50 local women had
been sent to Greece for prostitution. Four regional workshops on
trafficking in Aktau, Petropavlosk, Kokshetau, and Shmkent were held
during the year.
__________
KYRGYZSTAN
Although the 1993 Constitution defines the form of government as a
democratic republic, President Askar Akayev dominates the Government.
Both presidential and parliamentary elections were held during the
year, and both were marred by serious irregularities. In October
President Akayev was elected to his third term. Although the
Constitution only allows an individual to serve two presidential terms,
the Constitutional Court ruled that Akayev could serve a third term
because he had been elected to his first term under the old Soviet-era
Constitution. The Government disqualified otherwise qualified
candidates through conviction on questionable criminal charges.
Observers reported instances of ballot box stuffing, voter
intimidation, discrepancies in vote counts, and the presence of a large
number of local and regional administration officials in and around the
polling stations. Parliamentary elections were held in February and
March, the second such elections since independence in 1991. For the
first time, 15 of the Legislative Assembly's 60 seats were distributed
proportionally based on party lists; however, political parties remain
weak, and the Government took numerous actions that disadvantaged
opposition political parties. The Government used judicial proceedings
in numerous instances to prevent prominent political opposition
candidates from participating in or winning office in the parliamentary
and presidential elections. The Parliament has become increasingly
active and on occasion has blocked presidential initiatives; however,
in many areas it still does not check the power of the President
effectively. The judiciary also is dominated by the executive branch.
Beginning in August, there were continuous military engagements in the
southwest of the country, near the border with Tajikistan, between
government forces and armed insurgents.
Law enforcement responsibilities are divided among the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD) for general crime, the Ministry of National
Security (MNB) for state-level crime, and the procurator's office for
both types of crime. Both the MVD and the MNB deal with corruption and
organized crime. These ministries inherited their infrastructure from
their Soviet predecessors. Both appear to be under the general control
of the Government and generally conform their actions to the law.
Border guards are under the full control of the Government. Some
members of the police committed human rights abuses.
The country is poor and mountainous, with a rough balance between
agricultural and industrial production. Cotton, tobacco, vegetables,
and sugar are the primary agricultural exports. The country also
exports hydroelectric power, gold, antimony, and mercury. The
Government has carried out progressive market reforms, although some
reforms have not been implemented fully. The economy was stable during
the year. According to government figures, gross domestic product
growth (GDP) growth was 5 percent. Inflation was estimated at 9.6
percent. The country faces an external debt of roughly $1.69 billion.
Industrial production remains significantly below preindependence
levels. The level of hardship for pensioners, unemployed workers, and
government workers with low salaries or unpaid benefits continues to be
high. Government figures indicate the average annual salary is $165
(8,072 soms), while the subsistence level is estimated at $295 (14,463
soms). Foreign assistance plays a significant role in the country's
budget.
The Government's human rights record worsened and was poor in
several key areas. The Government limits citizens' ability to change
their Government. Prison conditions are very poor, and there were many
cases of arbitrary arrest and detention. Executive domination of the
judiciary limited citizens' rights to due process. Executive branch
interference affected verdicts involving prominent opposition figures.
The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press.
Authorities pressured journalists who criticized individual members of
the Government. The Government used bureaucratic means to harass and
pressure the independent media, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
and the opposition. The Government at times restricted freedom of
assembly; in particular, there were serious problems with political
parties' rights to free assembly. The Government at times inhibited
freedom of association. The Government generally respected freedom of
religion; however at times it infringed on this right. The Government
harassed and pressured human rights groups. Violence against women is a
problem that authorities often ignore, and societal discrimination
against women persists. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
of forced prostitution also is a persistent problem. Child abuse is a
problem, and there is a growing number of street children.
Discrimination against ethnic minorities and child labor are problems.
Armed insurgents in the country's southwest areas along the Tajik-
Kyrgyz/Kyrgyz-Uzbek border took citizens and foreign nationals hostage
in August.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
There were no further developments in the January 1998 beating
death by police of Muratbek Sulaimanov.
The criminal investigation of the 1998 police beating and killing
by burial alive of Sergei Skromnov continues. Two police officers
suspected of the killing are in detention. A third police officer was
released on bail.
Nigmat Bazakov, a leading representative of the ethnic minority
Uighur community was murdered on March 28. The identity of the
perpetrator is unknown. Figures in the Uighur community indicated that
the killing likely was a criminal, business-related act, and not linked
to government discrimination against Uighurs. Bazakov had run for a
seat in the legislative assembly in the second parliamentary election
but lost in Bishkek's eighth district.
In early August, fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), an organization opposed to the present Uzbek Government, crossed
the Tajik-Kyrgyz border and engaged Kyrgyz security forces. As of
October 9 when fighting ended, a total of 30 government troops were
killed. It was estimated that 120 IMU partisans died and 200 were
injured. No new attacks had occurred by year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances due to action by the Government or domestic groups.
In August armed insurgents entered the Southern Batken Oblast from
Tajikistan and took a number of citizens and foreign nationals hostage.
There were military engagements between the Government and the
insurgents, who identified themselves as members of the IMU. Some of
the hostages escaped uninjured after 6 days of captivity. The other
hostages were released unharmed several days later.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, the
supervision of conditions for pretrial detainees is poor, and abuses,
such as beatings to extract confessions, sometimes occur. Police
patrols are supervised poorly, are not always paid promptly, and
sometimes commit crimes. Police sometimes used ill-defined charges to
arrest persons (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
On March 22, police in Kara Bura, Talas Oblast, reportedly used
excessive force to break up a peaceful demonstration. Between 70 and
120 demonstrators were arrested. Approximately half were released the
following day, and the remainder were eventually released. The
participants were protesting irregularities in the February 20 and
March 12 rounds of parliamentary elections (see Section 2.b.).
Several police officials were charged with issuing passports
specifically for use in the trafficking of persons (see Section 6.f.).
In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded their authority by
trying major crimes, using torture to extract confessions, or even
levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as stoning and death
sentences have abated, and there were no reports of such action during
the year (see Section 1.e.).
Prison conditions (including overcrowding, food shortages, and lack
of heat and other necessities) are very poor. Those detained by the MNB
rather than the MVD are kept in MNB facilities; after conviction, they
go to a regular prison. In June 1999 a new Criminal Procedure Code went
into effect, replacing the previous 1994 Soviet-era Criminal Code. The
new code contains the right for attorney-client visits of unlimited
number and duration; however official permission still is required. The
code also greatly expands the rights of defense lawyers to obtain all
evidence gathered during the course of the investigation. Prison visits
by family members are at the discretion of the investigator during the
investigation phase. After conviction, family members may visit
regularly.
In principle nonfamily visitors seldom are permitted. However, some
citizens, including local human rights monitors, usually can obtain
official permission for a visit through personal connections. The
International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited Feliks Kulov,
an opposition political leader, in March when he was in jail; however,
it does not have full access to prisons (see Section 1.d.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The judicial system
continues to operate, in many cases, under Soviet laws and procedures,
and authorities generally respect these provisions in practice;
however, there were many cases of arbitrary arrest and detention
related to the Parliamentary and presidential elections. The
Procurator's Office determines who may be detained, arrested, and
prosecuted. The MNB, the MVD, and the General Procurator carry out
investigations. Since 1990 persons arrested or charged with crimes have
had the right to a defense counsel, who is required to visit the
accused within the first 3 days of incarceration. However, sometimes
the accused first sees the defense counsel only at the trial.
The Criminal Code permits the Procurator to detain suspects for 72
hours before releasing them or charging them with a crime. The
Procurator must issue an arrest warrant before a person can be
detained. If a suspect is charged, the Procurator must advise defense
counsel immediately. The accused usually remains in detention while the
Procurator investigates and prepares the case for trial. The Procurator
has discretion to keep the accused in pretrial detention for up to 1
year, but there are conditions for provisional release before trial.
After 1 year, the Procurator must release the accused or ask Parliament
to extend the period of detention. Since independence there have been
no known instances in which Parliament has been asked to extend a
detention. The Criminal Procedure Code requires notification of a
detainee's family by the investigator within 12 hours of detention.
This requirement often is not observed in practice.
The Government used judicial proceedings in numerous instances to
prevent prominent political opposition candidates from participating in
or winning office in the parliamentary and presidential elections. For
example, on January 25, the Government began criminal proceedings
against People's Party opposition leader and registered parliamentary
candidate Daniyar Usenov based on 4-year-old assault charges that had
been withdrawn long before by the person allegedly assaulted (see
Sections 1.e. and 3).
The Government arrested opposition party Ar-Namys activist Emil
Aliyev on March 9, 3 days before the second round of the parliamentary
elections. The charges related to alleged fraud in a 1994 loan
transaction. Aliyev was released from custody on August 14 for reasons
of poor health. Also on March 9, the Government declared the Issyk-Kul
election invalid. The Government subsequently charged Omurbek
Suvanaliyev, a leader of the Ar-Namys party and candidate in that
election, with fraud, which made him ineligible to run in the repeat
election.
On March 22, the Government arrested opposition political leader
Feliks Kulov at a hospital where he was receiving treatment for cardiac
problems. The arrest followed his defeat in a parliamentary election
and the announcement of his intention to run in the presidential
election. He was arrested on suspicion of participating in illegal
activities by members of the Kalkhan antiterrorist squad, while he
headed the Security Ministry in 1997-1998. Kulov also was suspected of
misappropriating some $22,000 that the Security Ministry received from
commercial firms. After his arrest, demonstrations were held demanding
his release. On April 5, the Government terminated People's Party
leader Daniyar Usenov's conditional release and took him into custody,
despite no violation of the terms of his conditional release. He was
released later that same day by intervention of President Akayev.
The MNB continues to monitor the Uighur community (a Turkic people
native to western China) closely. In the past, it arrested Uighurs on
ill-defined charges. In March the MNB arrested a resident ethnic Uighur
from China for lacking a residence permit and for possession of Islamic
literature that was deemed fundamentalist by the authorities. He
reportedly was deported forcibly to China (see Section 2.c.).
In Jalalabad Oblast, throughout the year, the MNB detained more
than 20 persons for membership in the Khieb-Ut-Takhrir Islamic
organization and distribution of its literature. The Government has
prosecuted criminally 11 of those detained for alleged possession of
material containing appeals of an extreme character.
The Government does not employ forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, despite extensive reforms in the court
system and a large body of new law, the executive branch continues to
dominate the judiciary.
Cases originate in local courts; they may move to appeals courts at
the district or regional level and finally to the Supreme Court.
Separate courts of arbitration handle civil disputes, and traditional
elders' courts handle low-level crime in rural areas.
Defendants are afforded the same constitutional protections in both
military and civilian courts, although military court proceedings can
be closed to the public. A civilian can be tried in a military court if
one of the codefendants is a member of the military.
Local elders' courts are found in almost every oblast and region.
They exercise their authority by trying petty crimes, such as robbery,
hooliganism, or theft. In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded
their authority by trying major crimes, using torture to extract
confessions or even levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as
stoning and death sentences have abated, and there were no reports of
such action during the year. Local elders' courts are under the
supervision of the Procurator's Office, but they may not receive close
oversight due to the fact that many such courts are located in remote
regions, which makes monitoring difficult.
The Procurator brings cases to court and tries them before a judge
and two ``people's assessors'' (pensioners or citizens chosen from
labor collectives). The accused and the defense counsel have access to
all evidence gathered by the Procurator. They attend all proceedings,
which are generally public, and are allowed to question witnesses and
present evidence. In practice, all members of the court have equal
rights. Anyone in the courtroom may question witnesses. Witnesses do
not always recapitulate their evidence in court; instead they affirm or
deny their statements in the Procurator's files.
The court compares the facts as presented by the Procurator and the
defense, and in most cases makes its decision after receiving all
available information in each case. The court may render one of three
decisions: innocent; guilty; or indeterminate, that is, the case is
returned to the Procurator for further investigation. The decision of a
court to return a case to the Procurator for further investigation may
not be appealed, and accused persons are returned to the Procurator's
custody, where they may remain under detention. In practice there was
considerable evidence of executive branch interference in verdicts
involving prominent political opposition figures.
The Procurator, not the judge, is in charge of criminal
proceedings. Thus the courts are widely perceived as a rubber stamp for
the Procurator and for high-ranking Government officials and not as the
protectors of citizens' rights. In addition very low judges' salaries
have led to a well-grounded view among lawyers and citizens that all
but a very few scrupulously honest judges are open to bribes or
pressure.
The Government introduced in 1999 several judicial reform measures,
including a proposal to establish an independent judicial budget,
creation of judicial judgment enforcement procedures, and independent
judicial training; however, but no progress was made during the year in
implementing these measures. Generally accepted international
practices, including the presumption of the innocence of the accused,
exist in law but are not always respected.
Judges do not hold positions for life. As provided in the
Constitution, terms for judges range from 15 years for Constitutional
Court judges to 3 years for first-term local judges. In 1993 a new
system of court administration was introduced; judges are tested on
their knowledge of the law and new civil codes. If judges fail these
tests, they may be disqualified from holding office. The process
appears to have increased judicial professionalism, and a number of
judges have been removed due to poor performance on the exams. Some
removals appear to have been subjective, but most lawyers and judges
consider the system to be a fair measure of competence.
The appointment of ethnic Kyrgyz to key positions in the judicial
system has led to charges by non-Kyrgyz that the system is arbitrary
and unfair and that the courts treat Kyrgyz more leniently than members
of other groups; however in December an ethnic Korean was appointed
head of the Supreme Court. Although systematic discrimination is not
clearly evident, allegations that it exists are credible in some cases.
There are also complaints by Uzbeks, and even by ethnic Kyrgyz, that
the southern portion of the country is underrepresented in the
judiciary.
Economic crimes such as tax evasion, embezzlement, and theft of
government property, including electric power, are common. Prosecution
for these crimes is relatively rare and sometimes appears to be
directed at opponents of the Government. Legislators in the past have
used their parliamentary immunity to avoid being brought to court.
However, an October 1998 referendum included an amendment that limited
immunity to official acts only.
Trials took place in March and September for two of the three
Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) who were arrested in 1999 for
misappropriation of state property, abuse of power, and tax evasion.
One M.P. was found guilty and sentenced to time served during the
course of the investigation. The other was sentenced to 14 years'
imprisonment and confiscation of his property. The case of the third MP
remains under investigation.
The Government frequently used the judicial process to eliminate
key political opposition leaders from participation in elections and
narrow the range of choice for voters. A number of judicial actions
against individuals apparently were motivated politically.
On June 27, the Government began the trial of opposition Ar-Namys
Party leader Feliks Kulov in a closed military court on charges of
instigation of and accessory to fraud and abuse of power for personal
interests. He was held in custody from March 22 through August 7. Legal
provisions allow the judge discretion to release Kulov pending trial;
however, he was not released. The military court acquitted Kulov of all
charges on August 7, but the military Procurator appealed the
acquittal. On September 11, the Appeals Court ruled in the Procurator's
favor and returned the case to the lower court for possible retrial.
The Supreme Court denied Kulov's appeal of the Appellate Court's
decision. The Government began a new trial on the same charges on
October 3. The Government denied Kulov the right to representation by
two Russian lawyers on the grounds that his case involved sensitive
information and therefore foreign attorneys could not participate.
There were no reports of political prisoners; however, the
Government detained Feliks Kulov, Emil Aliyev, and Daniyar Usenov on
grounds that appeared to be politically motivated (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unlawful entry into a home
against the wishes of the occupant and states that a person's private
life, privacy of correspondence, and telephonic and telegraphic
communications are protected. The law and procedures require the
General Procurator's approval for wiretaps, searches of homes,
interception of mail, and similar acts. A change in the law in 1995
weakened these protections by allowing the Procurator to give approval
for searches over the telephone; thus no written proof exists to verify
that the search was approved. Furthermore, in certain cases, law
enforcement officers first may carry out a search and then get approval
ex post facto within 24 hours. If approval is not given, any evidence
seized is inadmissible in court.
Organizational structures responsible for violations during the
Soviet era have remained largely in place; however, there were no
reports of violations of citizens' privacy. There were concerns by
citizens active in politics or human rights problems that the privacy
of their communications was violated, but evidence to that effect is
not available.
The MNB continues to monitor the Uighur community (see Section
1.d.)
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted these
rights.
The 1992 law on the mass media provides for freedom of speech and
of the mass media and outlines registration procedures. It identifies
prohibited material: Government and commercial secrets; material
advocating war, violence, or intolerance toward ethnic or religious
groups; desecration of national norms, ethics and symbols such as the
national seal, flag, or anthem; pornography; and encroachment on the
honor and dignity of a person. Two laws related to the media, On
Guarantees and Free Access to Information and On The Protection of the
Professional Activities of Journalists, were adopted in December 1997.
The Government closed three newspapers during the year by refusing
to publish them. Kapitalism and Litsa stopped publishing in October,
and Res Publica was closed for 4 months. One journalist was arrested as
a direct result of journalistic activities.
All media must register with the Ministry of Justice and wait for
ministry approval before beginning to operate. The media law states
that the registration process requires 1 month. During the year, there
were no reports of media organizations that could not register in a
timely manner.
Libel is a criminal, not a civil, action. The Government attempted
at the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 to amend the Criminal Code
to remove libel; however, its efforts were defeated in Parliament by an
overwhelming majority. As a result of the October 1998 referendum, the
Constitution now includes language that precludes Parliament from
passing laws that infringe on free speech. However, to date there has
been no implementing legislation for this amendment.
There are approximately 40 to 50 independent newspapers and
magazines, including some with local, not national, standing. There are
also several hours daily of independent television and radio
broadcasting. However, state television, radio, and government
newspapers receive government subsidies, which permit the Government to
influence media coverage. Additionally, the State's printing house,
Uchkun, is the only newspaper publisher in the country.
Uchkun refused to print the independent newspaper Res Publica for 4
months during the year. This action was taken pending Res Publica's
full payment of a fine awarded to the president of the state television
and radio corporation in an earlier honor and dignity suit. Uchkun also
refused to deliver Res Publica to the regions via its distribution
system after it resumed publishing the newspaper. Res Publica also
experienced distribution problems with the state postal system prior to
the presidential elections, and the newspapers were confiscated from
kiosks by authorities in Osh and Jalalabad.
The opposition Kyrgyz-language newspaper Asaba again was subjected
to pressure and intimidation shortly after the newspaper's owner
declared his candidacy to run in the Presidential election. Two honor
and dignity suits were lodged against the newspaper, a longstanding tax
dispute continued, and a long-dormant debt case was reactivated against
the newspaper. A Bishkek district court ruled on October 20 that Asaba
must pay $105,000 (5 million soms) in compensation to parliamentary
deputy Turdakun Usubaliev for having insulted him repeatedly over a
period of 8 years Seven Asaba journalists also were ordered to pay $20
to 30 (1,500 soms) each for articles critical of Usubaliyev. The
newspaper had lodged a counter suit against Usubaliyev accusing him of
insulting the newspaper and its journalists. The judge ruled in favor
of the counter suit, Usubaliyev must pay the newspaper $1,000 (50,000
soms).
After a year of government harassment, tax investigations, and
change of its editorial leadership and direction, the independent daily
newspaper Vecherny Bishkek muted its criticism of the Government.
In June an independent journalist from Jalalabad was sentenced to 2
years' imprisonment and fined $2,250 (108,000 soms) for libeling a
judge. After spending 5 weeks in jail, the journalist upon appeal was
released and his fine was reduced to $210 (10,080 soms). Three NGO's,
Internews, the Association of Journalists, and the Osh Media Resource
Center provided legal representation for the journalist. On October 27
the independent newspaper Res Publica was fined $5,000 (25,000 soms)
for an article it published 2 years earlier that criticized the
Ministry of Justice's decisions to revoke the registration of the
Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights in September 1997 and to register in
1998 an alternative body with the same name that was loyal to the
Government.
The Government harassed the owner, the editor, and a journalist of
the independent newspaper Delo No. These journalists underwent lengthy
interrogations by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and their offices
and homes were raided and searched. A case is pending against the
newspaper, alleging that it published state secrets during its coverage
of the closed trial of Feliks Kulov. The Government also pressured
independent television stations. The Government interfered with the
stations' programming, particularly their coverage of politics,
elections, and candidates. During Feliks Kulov's pretrial
incarceration, the Government directed stations to air a documentary
program that was highly critical of Kulov. Government interference with
independent television and radio stations continues.
There are two television stations in Osh that broadcast in Uzbek:
Osh Television broadcasts in Uzbek part of the time--although the
station has been criticized by the Government for airing too much Uzbek
language programming--and Mezon Television, all of whose programs are
in Uzbek. The latter was founded by the Mezon Uzbek Ethnic Center to
serve the needs of the large Uzbek population in Osh. A case was
pending against Mezon Television for broadcasting a candidate's
political advertisement, which allegedly had the potential to inspire
interethnic hatred during the parliamentary elections.
Although Osh Television has a license to broadcast, its dispute
with the National Agency for Communications (NAC) continues. The NAC
required Osh Television to change its broadcast frequency. The station
and the association of journalists continue to protest the change as
unfair and not justified technically. It also would impose a financial
hardship on the station. The NAC's directive that Osh Television switch
channels was postponed until the end of the year. In addition Osh
television is engaged in an ongoing dispute with the tax authorities
for what it considers unfair tax assessments.
Some independent media continue to operate despite these pressures.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides citizens with the right to assemble freely; however, at times
the Government restricted this right in practice. The Government on
occasion used force to disrupt peaceful demonstrations and officials,
including those at local levels, sometimes use regulations that require
registration of rallies and demonstrations to restrict this right. The
law requires official written permission for holding assemblies,
rallies, and demonstrations.
Permits are required for public marches and gatherings but are
routinely available. Rallies and demonstrations are held regularly in
front of the Government Building and in other places. Throughout the
year, several peaceful protests were held outside the President's
office. Those demonstrating included pensioners, political and human
rights monitors, and ethnic groups living in the country, such as
Uighurs and Kurds. During the year, there were many demonstrations
protesting the results of the parliamentary elections and the arrests
of opposition figures. On March 25, approximately 500 demonstrators
gathered in front of the Constitutional Court in Bishkek to demonstrate
against the results of the second round of parliamentary elections.
This demonstration was held without incident. Throughout the spring,
demonstrations were held by supporters, particularly in the Talas
Oblast in support of Feliks Kulov (see Section 3). While the police and
local authorities did not disrupt the majority of demonstrations, there
were instances when the Government either broke up peaceful
demonstrations, or harassed those protesting. There are credible
reports that police used excessive force to break up a peaceful
demonstration in Kara Bura (Talas Oblast) on March 20. Over 100
demonstrators were arrested. In April demonstrators who were protesting
Kulov's arrest throughout downtown Bishkek were required to move from
the steps of a government building to a park. Local authorities stated
that the demonstrators did not obtain the required permit and that the
demonstrations were impeding traffic and creating disturbances. The
demonstrators subsequently were moved to another, less public, area of
Bishkek. Pro-Kulov demonstrators also gathered in front of various
government offices and the White House. They also demonstrated in front
of the U.S. Embassy and the office of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These demonstrations were peaceful and
were not broken up by police.
The opposition Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (``DDK'') was
denied a permit to organize a demonstration in front of the White
House.
Demonstrations also were held in support of opposition People's
Party Leader Daniyar Usenov, who was arrested and briefly detained
after the second round of the parliamentary elections.
The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
while the Government generally respects this right, at times local
authorities inhibited it in practice.
The 1991 Law on Public Organizations, which includes labor unions,
political parties, and cultural associations, requires registration of
these organizations with the Ministry of Justice. Excessive caution by
some officials is a contributing element for the delay some
organizations experience in registering. Ultimately all organizations
that sought registration during the year were registered. The Kyrgyz
Committee for Human Rights (KHCR) was reregistered in 1999; however,
due to government pressure its president, Ramazan Dyryldaev, fled the
country (see Section 4).
In June 1999 Parliament passed a new law on NGO's. This law
distinguishes NGO's from political parties, labor unions, and religious
organizations and lowers the required number of members for
registration. The President signed this law into effect at the end of
1999.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the law provide for
freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right
in practice; however, the Government occasionally infringes on this
right. The Constitution provides for a secular state and the separation
of church and state, and the Government does not support any one
religion. The Government expressly forbids the teaching of both
religion and atheism in public schools.
In 1996 the Government created a State Commission on Religious
Affairs (SCRA), officially in order to promote religious tolerance,
protect freedom of conscience, and oversee laws on religion. The
Commission quickly became active and has overseen the registration of
over 300 religious institutions, of which 210 are Christian
denominations. According to a 1997 presidential decree, all religious
organizations must register with the SCRA, which must recognize the
registrant as a religious organization; each congregation must register
separately. Subsequently a religious organization must register with
the Ministry of Justice to obtain status as a legal entity, which is
necessary to own property, open bank accounts, and otherwise engage in
contractual activities. However, if a religious organization engages in
commercial activity, it is required to pay taxes in accordance with the
tax code. In practice the Ministry has never registered a religious
organization without prior registration by the SCRA. There were no
known instances during the year of the Commission refusing attempts by
religious groups to register, although the process sometimes is
cumbersome, taking a month on average. The Unification Church, which is
registered as a social, rather than a religious organization, has
``semiofficial status''.
Islam is the single most widely practiced faith. Official sources
estimate that up to 80 percent of the populace Muslim. There are
approximately 1,225 mosques in the country, of which 700 are
registered. Approximately 17 percent of the population is Russian
Orthodox. There are 40 houses of prayer for other Christian
denominations. There were no reports of interference by authorities
with worship services.
A number of missionary groups operate in the country. They operate
freely, although they are required to register with the Government.
There is anecdotal evidence of periodic tension between followers of
conservative Islam and foreign missionaries in rural areas. Government
authorities indicated that they would monitor the activities of the
Unification Church, which is led by Reverend Moon. The Unification
Church currently is not active in the country, but it has a presence
through the charity organization of Reverend Moon's wife. There were no
reports of interference with its activities during the period covered
by this report.
The Government is concerned about the threat of political extremism
in the guise of conservative Islam, whose followers it labels
``Wahabbis''. The sentencing in May of three Uighur Islamic militants
who were charged with the 1998 bombings in Osh added to the
Government's concern about ``Wahhabist'' elements operating in the
country. Armed incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
in August, as well as between August and October 1999, also increased
the Government's apprehension about radical Islam and the actions of
its followers.
According to a March 21 Amnesty International report, Jelil Turadi,
an ethnic Uighur Chinese national was arrested in Bishkek for not
having a necessary residency permit. Unofficial sources stated that
after a police search of his apartment turned up religious material
that was deemed fundamentalist, Turadi was taken into custody for
possessing ``Wahabbist'' material, and after being interrogated by
Chinese and Kyrgyz security agents, was deported back to China.
On September 6, security forces arrested a 23-year-old man in Kara
Suu and charged him with instigating ``national, racial and religious
enmity.'' He admitted to security forces that he belonged to the banned
fundamentalist organization Hezeb-E-Tahrir. According to press
accounts, eight persons were arrested in August for distributing
literature produced by the IMU.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--In general government policy allows free
travel within and outside the country; however, certain Soviet-era
policies continue to complicate internal migration, resettlement, and
travel abroad. Under the Soviet-era law still in force, citizens need
official government permission (a propiska) to work and settle in a
particular area of the country. Strictly speaking the propiska affords
the right to reside in a given city or region. In addition home and
apartment owners legally can sell their property only to buyers with
such permission. In practice many employers traditionally have refused
to provide employment to any applicant residing illegally. However,
this law has not been enforced recently. Persons now move within the
country, purchase homes, and sell businesses without hindrance.
There is no law on emigration. In August 1999, a presidential
decree stated that exit visa requirements would be abolished by October
1999, and the law was fully implemented by the end of the year.
Citizens now can travel abroad without an exit visa; however, some
travelers still may be required to present letters of invitation to
validate their passports for international travel for their first trips
abroad, or for the purpose of emigration. After validation of the
passport, travel is unrestricted. A Soviet-era law prohibits emigration
within 5 years of working with state secrets. No one is believed to
have been barred from emigration under this statute during the year.
After validation of the passport, travel is unrestricted. All passport
applications are reviewed by the Ministry of National Security.
Emigration of both ethnic Russian and Russian-speakers has risen
significantly since independence due to fears of discrimination, the
threat of continued fighting in the south, and the issue of dual
citizenship (an agreement recognizing dual citizenship has not been
signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan). Since independence over 300,000
ethnic Russians and 200,000 Russian-language speakers have emigrated
from the country (see Section 5).
Emigrants are not prevented from returning to the country, and
there is reportedly a small but steady flow of returnees.
The armed militants who crossed the border into southern portions
of the country from Tajikistan caused an estimated 1,139 citizens to
flee their homes and left them internally displaced. Most of those
displaced have returned to their homes. The Government, assisted by
NGO's and international organizations, rendered assistance to the
displaced.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees.
According to the UNHCR, there were approximately 140 refugees from
Chechnya in the country who were granted first asylum. An additional
11,671 were granted refugee status. Of this number, 1,000 were from
Afghanistan, and the remainder from Tajikistan. Twenty-two asylum
requests from Tajikistan were denied. Since 1993 the country has
offered ``first asylum'' to those who have qualified for first asylum
status.
There were no reports of expulsion of those having a valid claim to
refugee status. However, there were reports of Uighurs opposed to
Chinese policies being repatriated forcibly to China where they feared
persecution. The UNHCR assisted approximately 669 Tajik refugees to
return to Tajikistan during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully; however, in practice citizens' ability to do so
is limited. During the year both presidential and parliamentary
elections were held and both were marred by serious irregularities.
The Constitution mandates presidential elections every 5 years.
There is a two-term limit. Although the Constitution only allows an
individual to serve two presidential terms, the Constitutional Court
ruled that Akayev could serve a third term because he had been elected
to his first term under the old Soviet-era Constitution. However the
Government took steps to disqualify otherwise qualified candidates
through conviction on questionable criminal charges.
Akayev was elected to a third term as President on October 29 in an
election that did not follow international standards for equal, free,
fair, and accountable elections. Restrictions on the registration of
candidates limited the field to six candidates, and there was
intervention by local officials in the electoral process. The OSCE/
ODIHR stated that ``international standards for equal, free, fair, and
accountable elections were not met.'' Although six competing candidates
offered the electorate some political choice, the restrictive process
of candidate registration excluded a number of prominent opposition
leaders from the election. Harassment of opposition candidates'
activities negatively influenced the fairness of the campaign. Pressure
against a major domestic election-monitoring NGO violated fundamental
freedoms, a setback from the parliamentary elections. Executive
authorities, mostly at local and regional levels, interfered in the
functioning of election commissions and the electoral process in
general. Campaign restrictions and biased media failed to ensure free
and fair conditions for candidates. Central Election Commission
chairman Sulaiman Imanbaev conceded that violations occurred but
accused the OSCE of bowing to pressure from unnamed political forces to
give an overly negative evaluation of the election.
The law requires a demonstration of Kyrgyz language competency
before final registration as a presidential candidate. According to the
Election Code Article 61, command of the language is the ability to
read, write, express one's thoughts and speak publicly. The examination
is given by a linguistic commission. The procedure for evaluating the
examination is not transparent, and the OSCE noted that the difficulty
of the exam was not uniform for all candidates. Examination results
eliminated seven candidates from the race, including several native
Kyrgyz speakers. In September the Constitutional Court heard and
rejected a challenge of the requirement brought by two candidates.
According to the OSCE, the language test was used to limit the
possibilities of participation by opposition candidates.
The administration of voting procedure technically was correct. All
six candidates remained on the ballot through election day. The
independent media continued to appear until election day, although the
Government interfered with the distribution of opposition newspapers.
There were candidate observers in most, if not all precincts, although
they tended to be poorly trained and unwilling to challenge precinct
commissions when their rights as observers were violated. The
Government excluded independent observers representing the constituent
organizations of the ``Coalition of NGO's for Democracy and Civil
Society'' from polling places. A pattern emerged whereby local
Coalition representatives were denied admittance to polling places when
the polls opened, then allowed to enter later in the day after they
sought relief through the courts, then again denied access on technical
grounds at the end of the voting day. As a result, Coalition
representatives were not present in many polling places for the vote
count.
According to information released by the Central Election
Commission, Akayev received 74.4 percent of the vote; his closest
opponent Omurbek Tekebayev received 13.6 percent. The election was
flawed in numerous ways including ballot box stuffing, voter
intimidation, discrepancies in vote counts, a large presence of local
and regional administration officials in and around the polling
stations, and the discovery during opening procedures in a precinct in
Bishkek of 700 ballots marked for Akayev in a ballot box that was
supposed to be empty. In some instances, election observers were unable
to witness the counting procedure to verify that votes were tallied for
the candidate indicated on the ballot.
In February and March, the first and second rounds of parliamentary
elections were held. The Constitution provides for parliamentary
elections every 5 years. For the first time, 15 of the Legislative
Assembly's 60 seats were distributed proportionally based on party
lists. The OSCE noted that executive and judicial branch interference
in the electoral process continued through the runoffs, despite
international criticism of these practices following the first round.
In decisions that appear politically motivated, a number of prominent
opposition candidates were disqualified or deregistered before the
runoffs, despite having led the voting after the first round. Although
there were improvements in overall election administration on the day
of the vote, the process was marred by serious irregularities in a
number of key electoral districts. There were allegations of ballot
tampering, government intimidation of voters, and harassment of
campaign officials in the elections of a number of opposition leaders.
Prior to the parliamentary elections, the Government took numerous
actions which disadvantaged opposition political parties. Four
political parties, including one of the most popular opposition
parties, the People's Party, were blocked from competing because their
charters did not state specifically they could compete in elections for
state bodies. In a legal challenge, the courts upheld this restriction
in the election law. Eight parties were barred from competing because
they were registered less than 1 year prior to the announcement of
elections. This included a second major opposition party, the Ar-Namys
Party, and the progovernment party Adilet. The participation of three
registered parties, including the opposition Democratic Movement of
Kyrgyzstan, subsequently was challenged on the grounds that their
nominating conventions were conducted improperly.
In March a district election commission deregistered opposition
candidate Daniyar Usenov from the second round elections on technical
grounds related to his alleged failure to include ownership of an
apartment in his financial disclosure statement. On March 11, after the
parliamentary elections, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
decision, but neither the Supreme Court nor the Central Election
Commission (CEC) would permit a repeat of the election so that Usenov
could run in his district. In another instance, on March 9 the
Government declared the Issyk-Kul election invalid. The Government
subsequently charged Omurbek Suvanaliyev, a leader of the Ar-Namys
Party and candidate in that election, with fraud, making him ineligible
to run in the second election.
On March 10, the Government attempted to deregister Parliamentarian
and candidate Omurbek Tekebayev in Bazar-Korgon for filing an allegedly
false financial disclosure form. However, the court did not rule in the
Government's favor. Before the court decision was rendered, hundreds of
Tekebayev's supporters demonstrated and blocked streets in his
district.
Opposition candidate Feliks Kulov competed in both rounds of the
elections but lost badly in the second round amid credible allegations
of ballot tampering. His supporters demonstrated against the election
in his district and in Bishkek for several months. The OSCE determined
that in the second round of election, in district 44 (in which Kulov
ran) there was clear evidence of systematic fraud committed by both
state and election authorities. In the second round, more than 10
candidates were automatically declared winners as a result of their
opponents' refusal to run or, in 9 cases, the Government's cancellation
of the opponents' registration.
The conduct of elections in many places, especially in Talas and
Jalalabad, was seriously flawed. Problems included credible reports of
a massive increase in advance voting, vote buying, premarked ballots,
ballots shown to officials before being deposited in the ballot box,
and an atmosphere of intimidation in the election district, including
threats to students of arrest and eviction from dormitories and
confiscation of driver's licenses from truck drivers.
Amendments approved in a 1996 constitutional referendum, which was
marred by serious flaws, strengthened the formal power of the President
and his advisers, who dominate the Government. The Parliament tends to
be subordinate to the executive branch but shows increasing signs of
independence, such as the overriding of presidential vetoes. During the
year, Parliament adopted 33 laws, of which the President signed 11. The
overwhelming majority of local government officials, including mayors
and governors, continue to be appointed by the President, but the first
elections for local legislative bodies were held in October 1999. The
elections were flawed but were an improvement over the l996 referendum.
Political parties remain weak. There are 27 registered political
parties, 15 of which qualified for the proportional representation
component of the parliamentary elections. To receive any of the 15
seats available under proportional representation, parties must receive
5 percent of the overall vote. The remaining seats are held by single-
mandate candidates. In the lower chamber, 29 of 60 members elected in
2000, including those elected to party seats, claimed party
affiliation. In addition there is a parallel structure involving 3
factions with a total of 23 members. In the upper chamber, the People's
Representatives Assembly, 7 of 45 members claim party affiliation.
Women and most ethnic minorities are underrepresented in government
and politics. Women hold only 7 of 105 seats in the legislature. The
Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court
are women. The Democratic Party of Women participated in the
parliamentary elections and won two party seats, earning 13 percent of
the party-list votes. Russians and Uzbeks are underrepresented in
government positions, although the newly named First Deputy Prime
Minister, is an ethnic Russian, as was his predecessor. In December an
ethnic Korean was appointed head of the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operated in an increasingly hostile environment
and were faced with continuous government pressure to curtail their
activities, especially activities related to the parliamentary and
presidential elections. Despite this pressure, most groups were able to
continue investigating and publishing their findings on government
interference with elections, as well as on human rights cases.
The Government repeatedly threatened leaders of the Kyrgyz
Committee for Human Rights (KCHR), the NGO Coalition for Democracy and
Civil Society (Coalition), and the Republican party with criminal
action for their activity on behalf of opposition political leaders and
their supporters. On March 29, the Bishkek city prosecutor sent the
Coalition a warning that the Coalition, together with the KCHR, the
Public Union for Social Defense of the Population, Union of Kyrgyz
Children and Women, and several political parties violated a law that
prohibits the destabilization of society by preparing and distributing
flyers that appealed for public support of Ar-Namys candidate Feliks
Kulov (see Sections 1.d, 1.e, and 3). On March 30, the Bishkek city
prosecutor summoned KCHR chairman Ramazan Dyryldayev and Republican
Party chairman Giyaz Tokombayev and delivered the same warning.
In June the Minister of Justice stated that since the Coalition was
not registered as a public association with the Ministry, it did not
have the right to receive funds from abroad to support its activities,
nor could it assess internal political developments. Although no formal
action was taken against the Coalition, threats against and
intimidation of the coalition continued throughout the year.
On May 31, the Government opened a criminal case against KCHR
chairman Ramazan Dyryldayev for failure to comply with provisions of
the Labor Code related to the firing of an employee. The fired employee
in question was terminated during the period when the Government
deregistered the KCHR and registered a different organization under
different leadership under the KCHR's name. Also in May, the Government
charged former KCHR deputy chairman Eleman Mambetaipov with
misappropriation of furniture located in a room rented by the KCHR from
the Ministry of Agriculture. At the trial, the judge would not accept
evidence that the property in question was in its proper place. On July
14, Mambetaipov was given a year prison sentence. Dyryldayev has
remained abroad since July. In July police attempted to force their way
into the office of the KCHR in an effort to locate him.
In June the Government held a political roundtable including some
political parties, NGO's, and social movements. The OSCE initially
planned to hold such an event under its auspices. A preparatory
committee consisting of nine representatives from the Government, nine
representatives from NGO's, and nine representatives from political
parties was established for the event. During the preparatory stage,
two political parties, Ar-Namys, whose leader was in jail, and Kairan
El, withdrew from the process because their conditions for
participation were not met. On June 3, the Government withdrew from the
preparations in favor of holding its own event. The majority of NGO's
on the preparatory committee and five political parties refused to
participate in the Government's roundtable due to unilateral changes of
the agenda and the format of the discussion introduced by the
Government. The OSCE withdrew its support for the event after the
Government's refusal to abide by the formulation worked out by the
preparatory committee but attended the event as an observer. OSCE
observers stated that the meeting had flaws, including the absence of
significant opposition elements and a failure to alleviate tensions
that arose after the parliamentary election.
The Government formed a progovernment NGO called the Association of
NGO's (the Association). There are reports that local authorities apply
pressure on independent NGO's to become affiliated with the government-
organized Association. Only those NGO's with independent sources of
funding are able to resist this pressure.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the rights and freedom of individuals
and prohibits discrimination, including that based on language, and the
Government expresses a strong commitment to protecting the rights of
members of all ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, as well as
those of women; however, in practice it does not always ensure these
rights effectively.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Research conducted in
1996 on violence against women showed a noticeable increase in such
incidents since independence in 1991. Activists note that rape is
becoming more common. It is not clear whether the incidence of rape or
only the reporting of such attacks is becoming more common, but
authorities often ignore such attacks. Government statistics indicate
that in 1999, there were 400 to 450 crimes against women, but many
crimes never are reported due to psychological pressures, cultural
traditions, and apathy by law enforcement officials. The Government has
not devised a program to deal with this problem, and the number of
shelters for battered women is not increasing to meet the need. The
Umut (Hope) Center opened in 1997 to provide basic protection as well
as psychological, legal, and medical counseling for battered women and
girls. The Umut Center has organized biweekly discussions and training
for women to advise and counsel them about their rights. It provides 10
days of emergency shelter, clothing, and meals for battered women as
well as employment counseling and legal services. In 1998 the director
attributed the rise in the number of women visiting the shelter to the
country's severe economic crisis, which had led to increased violence
against women. Umut received grants from a variety of foreign sources
during the year, and provided shelter for 165 persons and provided
advice to 1,524 others through its hot line. Umut also offers
psychiatric counseling to victims. There were internationally funded
crisis centers for women in need of such assistance in both Talas and
Jalalabad.
In 1997 the NGO Tendesh opened a crisis center in Naryn with a hot
line to support women affected by violence. It provides psychological,
legal, and medical assistance. Another center, Sezim, opened in April
1998 in Bishkek with a staff of lawyers, psychologists, and doctors,
and operates a crisis hot line for the public. Staff members conduct
training, debates, and seminars on women's rights and family planning.
During the year, at least three new programs were introduced to address
the needs of women by NGO's. The Congress of Women has set up legal
clinics for women throughout the country to help counsel women on legal
issues and women's' issues. Center Mercy embarked on a program to find
employment in handicraft production for mothers of large families. The
Center for Women's Initiative Aigerim introduced programs to assist
with needy families.
Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a growing problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Discrimination against women persists. The law gives equal status
to women, and they are well represented in the work force, in
professions, and in institutions of higher learning. Women are
prominent in law, medicine, accounting, and banking. They also play an
active role in the rapidly growing nongovernmental sector.
During the parliamentary elections, NGO's embarked on programs to
help educate women in the electoral process and on their voters'
rights. The Center of Women's Initiative Aigerim helped train women to
monitor during the parliamentary elections. According to Counterpart
Consortium, 293 NGO's dealing with women's issues operated in the
country during the year, of which 25 deal with women's advocacy. In
1999 women's advocacy NGO's sent an appeal to the Government,
Parliament, journalists, international organizations, as well as other
NGO's in support of women's rights. Nonetheless deteriorating economic
conditions have had a severe effect on women, who are more likely than
men to lose their jobs. According to a U.N. Development Program report,
as of January, the unemployment figures for women were considerably
larger (58,300) than those for men (48,100). For women the average
wages were lower than $13 per month (637 soms), and for men $18 per
month (881 soms). Women with children under the age of 16 account for
67 percent of unemployed women. Women make up the majority of
pensioners who have felt the negative effects of the country's economic
downturn as inflation has eroded pensions that often are paid late.
Women's groups express general concern about the situation of rural
women. With the end of communism, traditional attitudes toward women
are reasserting themselves strongly in the countryside, where women are
relegated to the role of wife and mother, and educational opportunities
are curtailed. Data indicate that women are becoming less healthy, more
abused, less able to work outside the home, and less able to dispose of
their earnings independently.
Family law prohibits divorce during pregnancy and while a child is
younger than 1 year of age. A special expert counsel under the State
Commission on Family, Women, and Youth Issues reviewed all legislation
for a gender perspective and submitted its recommendations to
Parliament. The findings demonstrate that while women's rights are
supported by legislation, the principle of women's equality is not
always observed.
The women's advocacy NGO community is becoming increasingly
organized. As a result of conferences held in 1999 an appeal was sent
to the Government, Parliament, journalists, NGO's, and international
organizations in support of women's rights.
Children.--The socioeconomic situation does not effectively provide
decent living conditions for all children. Basic needs for shelter,
food, and clothing seldom are met, and the Government does not take
effective measures to address these needs. After independence, vaccine-
preventable diseases such as diphtheria, polio, and measles reemerged.
A range of serious nutrition-related problems affects a large number of
children, especially in rural areas. Traditional social safety measures
are now inadequate to cope with the social pressures that affect
families, and in major cities children regularly are observed begging
or selling cigarettes. There are increasing reports of abandonment due
to parents' lack of resources to care for children.
Education is compulsory for the first 9 years, and the country has
a 97 percent literacy rate. However, the educational system has
suffered material and financial hardships, and conditions continue to
deteriorate due to an acute shortage of budgetary and material
resources. The Government established two funds, Jetkinchek and Kadry
XXI Veka (Cadres the 21st Century), to provide educational benefits for
low-income and disabled children. Jetkinchek, a Presidential
Educational Program, created in 1999, provides assistance such as pens,
books, clothes to low-income children. The program is funded primarily
by the Government but has received assistance from international
organizations. Kadry XXI Veka is another government program financed by
international organizations that helps talented youth continue their
education abroad.
The Law on Education requires that secondary education be free and
universal. However, financial constraints prevent the Government from
implementing this for all students. According to the Criminal Code, the
penalty for infringing on a student's right to obtain free secondary
education ranges from receiving a public reprimand to 1 year of forced
labor. The law penalizes parents who do not send their children to
school or obstruct their attendance. Many of those families who can
afford it choose to send their children to more expensive private
schools. Moreover those families that keep their children in public
schools must pay administrative fees. These costs add up and are
difficult for families, particularly large ones, to bear.
The Government and its Commission on the Affairs of Under-age
Children disseminate information regarding children's rights among both
children and adults. The Ministries of Justice, Education, Science and
Culture, and Health as well as the state television and radio company
and various NGO's also help disseminate information including by
translations into Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek in order to reach those
segments of the population that speak different languages. There are
also plans to publish textbooks on human rights problems for high
school students, with information on children's rights. The Talent
Support Fund, an NGO funded by Save the Children and UNICEF, produced a
series of educational television programs titled ``The Rights of
Children in Kyrgyzstan'' to help educate the population.
Human rights groups and the Kyrgyz Children's Fund (KCF) monitor
the condition of children. Human rights groups note that children who
are arrested usually are denied lawyers. Police often do not notify
parents of children who are arrested, and neither parents nor lawyers
generally are present during questioning, despite laws to the contrary.
Children often are intimidated into signing confessions.
The KCF is concerned about the growing number of street children,
many of whom have left home because of abusive or alcoholic parents.
Social workers and police regularly conduct street sweeps to locate
abandoned children. Children who are found are sent to orphanages and
police holding centers depending on the amount of space available. The
KCF has one shelter in Bishkek to provide food, clothing, and schooling
to approximately 30 children In 1999, the Svetlii Put shelter (formerly
known as the Ak Zhol shelter), was reestablished with assistance from
UNICEF. During the year, the shelter received training assistance from
UNICEF and cared for approximately 32 children. The SOS Children's
Village, funded by the Austrian organization Kinder Dorf International
and other foreign and domestic organizations, opened in 1998 to care
for orphans. Approximately 110 children and 14 mothers live in this
village, which offers housing and a kindergarten.
Girls are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
Section 6.f.).
The forced marriage of underage girls has become more common, and
the authorities often tacitly approve this practice. Cultural
traditions and social structures discourage victims from going to the
authorities.
People with Disabilities.--The Government passed the Law on Social
Protection of Invalids in 1991 and adopted amendments in October 1998.
The amendments provide for convenient access to public transportation
and parking for the disabled; subsidies for mass media sources that
make their services available to the hearing or visually impaired; and
free plots of land to construct a home. Social facilities for the
mentally disabled are strained severely, as budgets have fallen and
workloads remain heavy. In one program facilitated by foreign
volunteers, local high school students have begun to visit special
institutions such as those for the mentally disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are reports of
discrimination in the treatment of citizens who are not ethnic Kyrgyz.
The most recent statistical data reflect the following ethnic breakdown
of the population: 61.2 percent are Kyrgyz; 14.9 percent are Russians;
14.4 percent are Uzbeks; 1.1 percent are Tatars; 0.3 percent are
Germans; and others constitute 8.1 percent. Members of the minorities
allege discrimination in hiring, promotion, and housing. They complain
that government officials at all levels favor ethnic Kyrgyz.
Russian-speaking citizens (those who do not speak Kyrgyz) also
allege that a ceiling exists in government employment that precludes
their promotion beyond a certain level. The representation of ethnic
Kyrgyz at senior and intermediate levels of government is
disproportionately high, giving credence to perceptions that career
opportunities in government are limited for those who are not ethnic
Kyrgyz. There also were complaints about discrimination against non-
Kyrgyz in the judicial system (see Section 1.e.).
Since independence, over 300,000 ethnic Russians and 200,000
Russian-language speakers have emigrated. In order to help stem the
tide of migration, the Government passed legislation elevating Russian
to the status of an ``official language.'' On May 20, President Akayev
issued a decree to moderate emigration by improving the situation of
ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. During the year, a bilateral
agreement was signed with Russia on the legal status of Russian
citizens living in Russia and Kyrgyz citizens living in Russia. This
agreement is to provide maximum social benefits possible under Kyrgyz
law for those Russian citizens living in the country.
The Constitution designates Kyrgyz as the state language, but it
provides for preservation and equal and free development of Russian and
other languages spoken in the country. Kyrgyz increasingly is replacing
Russian, and the Government has announced that by 2010 all government
documents are to be in Kyrgyz. A new draft law that was introduced in
November allows for Russian to be used in the workplace until measures
can be established to change to Kyrgyz. On March 20, President Akayev
issued a draft decree calling for all high and middle-level government
officials to have sufficient proficiency in Kyrgyz, with the aim to
have all official business conducted in Kyrgyz by 2005. This draft
decree was not enacted into law as a result of widespread criticism.
Candidates in the 2000 presidential elections were required to
demonstrate ability in Kyrgyz. Some otherwise qualified candidates were
disqualified on the basis of exams, the fairness of which was
questioned (see Section 3).
University education is carried out largely in Russian (although
Kyrgyz instruction is available in some departments in some
universities, where textbooks are available), so that Russian-language
capability remains an important skill for those who wish to pursue
higher learning.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor law provides for the
right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions, and there is
no evidence that the Government has tried to obstruct the formation of
independent unions. The Federation of Trade Unions of Kyrgyzstan, the
successor to the former official union, remains the only trade union
umbrella organization in the country, although unions are not required
to belong to it. The Federation forms one part of a bilateral
commission, along with the Cabinet. Each year the two parties sign an
agreement on ``cooperation.'' There is one small independent union, the
Union of Entrepreneurs and Small Business Workers, whose membership
reached approximately 80,000. Precise numbers for the Federation's
membership are not available, but it is significantly larger than other
unions.
The Federation has been critical of government policies, especially
privatization, and their effect on working class living standards. The
Federation still regards itself as being in a process of transition,
during which it is adjusting its relations with the Government, with
other unions in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and with
other foreign unions. Growing numbers of smaller unions are not
affiliated with the umbrella organization.
The law calls for practices consistent with international
standards.
While the right to strike is not codified, strikes are not
prohibited. There were no retaliatory actions against strikers, nor
were there instances of abuse generally directed at unions or
individual workers. During the year, there were several instances when
workers repairing the Bishkek-Osh Highway went on strike against
foreign companies that employed them since they did not receive payment
for their work. In November vendors at the Dorodoi Market in Bishkek
went on strike to protest against the decision of the Dorodoi Market's
administration to allocate preferred selling areas to Chinese merchants
over local merchants.
The law permits unions to form and join federations and to
affiliate with international trade union bodies. Since independent
unions are still in their infancy, no meaningful affiliation with
international trade union bodies has taken place.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
recognizes the right of unions to negotiate for better wages and
conditions. Although overall union structure and practice are changing
only slowly from those of the Soviet era, there is growing evidence of
active union participation in state-owned and privatized enterprises.
The Government sets the minimum wage, and then each employer sets its
own wage level.
The law protects union members from antiunion discrimination, and
there were no recorded instances of discrimination against anyone
because of union activities.
There are Free Economic Zones (FEZ's) that can be used as export
processing zones. The minimum wage law does not apply to the
approximately 3,000 workers in ordinary FEZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids
forced or compulsory labor, as well as forced or bonded labor by
children; however, women and girls are trafficked for the purpose of
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Although the majority of children are enrolled in school,
child labor is a problem.
Provisions of the Labor Code, the Law on Public Safety, and the Law
on the Protection of Rights of Underage Children address child labor.
The Labor Code provides for the protection of children from economic
exploitation and from work that poses a danger to their health, or
spiritual, physical, mental, or academic development. The Labor Code is
contradictory in the requirements it sets for the minimum age of
employment in work that can harm their physical and moral well being
(i.e. employment in casinos, bars, night clubs, etc.). Article 285
states that such work is prohibited for those under age 21; however,
Article 319 prohibits such employment for those under age 18. According
to Article 317 of the Labor Code, those between 14 and 16 years of age
are permitted to perform strenuous work with parental consent. However,
minors less than 18 years of age cannot work in underground conditions.
Minors between 18 and 21 years of age may not perform hazardous or
manual work. Article 319 sets the maximum daily hours of work for those
between 14 and 16 years of age at 5 to 7 hours respectively. Underage
children cannot work beyond this limit or during night shifts. These
laws also apply to disabled children who work.
Given its budget constraints and lack of resources, the Government
is unable to enforce adequately these laws. Although those employers
who are caught violating the Labor Code can be charged with
disciplinary, financial, administrative, or criminal penalties, the
punishment is usually minimal.
Child labor is becoming more widespread both in towns and rural
areas. Since many children are ``self-employed'' (selling newspapers,
carrying handcarts at markets, selling cigarettes and candy on the
streets, etc.) or work for their families, it is very difficult for the
Government to determine if their work schedule and environment conform
to government regulations. Families are traditionally large, and it is
sometimes necessary for children to work at an early age to help
support the family on the family farm or in the family business.
According to reports from various NGO's, child labor is
particularly evident in the south. During the fall, classes are
cancelled, and children are sent to fields to pick cotton. During the
summer, children are used to harvest tobacco and are involved in all
steps of production from the actual picking of the leaves to the
preparation for shipping. Some fields are located on school grounds,
and the income earned goes directly to the schools, not to the
children. Children also are involved in family enterprises such as
shepherding, bread baking, selling products at roadside kiosks, and
growing fruits and vegetables.
The Prosecutor's Office and the State Labor Inspectorate are
responsible for enforcing employers' compliance with Labor Code laws.
The legislative assembly has established a special commission on
education, women's affairs, the family, and minors, which oversees the
legal protection of the interests of minors whenever new laws are
discussed in Parliament. Public control of compliance with the labor
code is enforced by trade unions, a function holdover from the Soviet
period.
The Government has undertaken additional initiatives to help
protect minors from forced labor. Since the budget is facing severe
funding constraints, many children who are entitled to receive help do
not.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but
does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government mandates a
national minimum wage at a level theoretically sufficient to assure a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The legal minimum
wage is about $2.50 (100 soms) per month. In practice this wage is
insufficient to ensure a decent standard of living for a worker and
family, and therefore industries and employers set the minimum level
wages that actually are paid. The Federation is responsible for
enforcing all labor laws, including the law on minimum wages. Minimum
wage regulations largely are observed. However, the enforcement of
labor laws is nonexistent in the growing underground economy. Market
forces help wages in the unofficial sector keep pace with official wage
scales.
The standard workweek is 41 hours, usually within a 5-day week. For
state-owned industries, there is a mandated 24-hour rest period in the
workweek.
Safety and health conditions in factories are poor. Despite the
recent improvement in economic growth, the previous deterioration in
enforcement of existing regulations continued to hamper investment to
improve health and safety standards. In March 1999, the State
Inspectorate of Labor was established to protect and educate workers as
well as also inform business owners on their respective rights and
responsibilities. A 1992 law established occupational health and safety
standards, as well as enforcement procedures. Besides government
inspection teams, trade unions are assigned active roles in assuring
compliance with these measures, but the deterioration of the economy
has led to an uneven compliance record among businesses. Workers have
the legal right to remove themselves from unsafe working conditions,
and workers who choose not to work in an unsafe environment may find
employment elsewhere. However, in practice refusal to work in
situations with relatively high accident rates or associated chronic
health problems could result in loss of employment, although only if
informal methods of resolution failed.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law provides that those involved in
trafficking can be sentenced up to 15 years' imprisonment; however,
very few traffickers are caught, and those that are receive lenient
sentences or fines. A lack of coordination between government agencies
involved in migration issues, the obscure wording of laws regarding
trafficking issues, and corruption contribute to the problem. The
trafficking of Kyrgyz women and girls,largely to Turkey, Germany, and
the United Arab Emirates for the purpose of forced prostitution, is a
growing problem. According to the International Office of Migration
(IOM), approximately 4,000 women and 7 boys were trafficked abroad in
1999. Often women are trafficked through deception. They are lured
abroad under the pretext of legitimate employment (i.e. waitresses, au
pairs, dancers, etc.), and by the time they discover the true intent of
the traffickers, they find themselves without the money for return
tickets, without documents, and are forced to agree to the conditions
and terms of the employers. A flourishing sex trade draws girls, as
young as age 10, from destitute mountain villages. Several media
articles have raised public awareness of the problem. The Ministry of
Interior had planned to establish a special police unit to combat
trafficking but was unable to do so due to lack of funding.
According to IOM, fraudulent passports are issued to those being
trafficked. Eleven law enforcement officers have been accused of
preparing fraudulent documentation for trafficked women, and criminal
proceedings have begun against three of the accused officers. During
the year, 4 persons were tried and sentenced to prison terms for
trafficking; 18 persons were tried and sentenced in 1999.
Trafficked women do not normally receive assistance due to lack of
understanding of the problem. Many have reported being victimized by
law enforcement officials upon their return.
__________
LATVIA
Latvia is a parliamentary democracy. The Prime Minister, as chief
executive, and the Cabinet are responsible for government operations.
The President, as Head of State, is elected by the Parliament (Saeima).
The Saeima elected Vaira Vike-Freiberga to a 4-year term in June 1999.
The October 1998 elections for the 100-seat Parliament and the national
referendum to amend the Citizenship Law to meet European standards were
free and fair. The judiciary is independent but not well-trained,
efficient, or free from corruption.
The security apparatus consists of: The national police and other
services, such as the Special Immigration Police and the Border Guards,
who are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior; municipal police under
local government control; the military Counterintelligence Service and
a protective service under the Ministry of Defense; and the National
Guard, an element of the national armed forces, which also assists in
police activities. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective
control of the security forces. The Constitution Protection Bureau
(SAB) is responsible for coordinating intelligence activities. Some
members of the security forces, including police and other Interior
Ministry personnel, committed human rights abuses.
Privatization essentially is complete, although some large utility
companies remain in state hands including the national electric
company, railroads, and shipping. The currency remained stable and
traded freely; unemployment was 7.8 percent, and annual inflation was
1.8 percent. Per capita gross domestic product was approximately
$2,950.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
and the large resident noncitizen community; however, problems remained
in certain areas. Members of the security forces, including the police
and other Interior Ministry personnel, sometimes used excessive force.
In most instances, the Government took disciplinary measures against
those responsible. Prison conditions remained poor. Lengthy pretrial
detention was a problem. The inefficient judiciary did not always
ensure the fair administration of justice. Women are discriminated
against in the workplace. Domestic violence, trafficking in women
(including minors), and child prostitution and abuse are significant
problems.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In March 1999, a member of the security police shot and killed two
persons and injured three others during a bar fight in Jelgava. In
October he was sentenced to 20 years in prison; he appealed to the
Supreme Court, which affirmed the verdict of the lower court.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, but there were
credible reports that police and prison guards mistreated persons. In
September 1999, four prison guards at Riga Central Prison were
dismissed for excessive use of force against prisoners.
In conjunction with the Soros Foundation and the National Human
Rights Office (NHRO), the Ministry of Interior continued its programs
for educating police officers about human rights concerns. In 1999 a
local nongovernmental organization (NGO) established a free legal
advisory service for prisoners and others who believe that they were
victims of police abuse (see Section 4).
Prison conditions remained poor, although human rights groups noted
some improvements during the year. Prison cells often are overcrowded
severely. Inadequate sanitation facilities, persistent shortages of
blankets and medical care, and insufficient lighting and ventilation
are common problems, as is the shortage of resources in general. Most
jails badly need renovation. The Government has taken additional steps
to upgrade certain facilities. The NHRO records complaints of
violations of the right to humane treatment and respect of dignity.
During the year, 47 prisoners filed complaints concerning their
treatment, and 19 persons filed such complaints relating to the police.
The NHRO investigates each complaint. Human rights groups are alarmed
by the number of drug-resistant tuberculosis cases in the prisons, and
the Government has received assistance from several foreign
organizations to address this problem. Although the number of
tuberculosis cases has decreased, the Riga central prison hospital
remains overcrowded at close to 200 percent capacity.
At a prominent conference attended by human rights groups and
government officials in November, the deputy director of the prison
administration and the Prosecutor General criticized the the Government
for its failure to improve the Criminal Code and provide resources to
the judicial system. Two youths committed suicide in July while in
pretrial detention awaiting trial for murder. They were held in the
same cell, one for 17 months, the other for 5 months. The archaic
provisions of the Criminal Code make it difficult to investigate and
move a case forward in the court system. Press reports estimate that 70
percent of all juveniles in prisons are awaiting trial. While most have
been waiting for about 2 years, some have been waiting 4 years or more.
Unlike convicts, those in pretrial detention are not allowed to work or
go to school, have limited contact with outside NGO's or family, and
suffer considerably worse living conditions than prisoners in general.
The deputy director of the prison system also noted the lack of work
and job training for inmates and the need to provide social support to
inmates after release.
The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law requires the
Prosecutor's Office to make a formal decision whether to charge or
release a detainee within 72 hours after arrest. Charges must be filed
within 10 days of arrest. There were no known instances of arbitrary
arrest. The responsibility for issuing arrest warrants was transferred
from prosecutors to the courts in 1994. Detainees have the right to
have an attorney present at any time. These rights are subject to
judicial review but only at the time of trial. According to credible
reports, these rights are not always respected in practice, especially
outside of Riga.
According to Ministry of Interior personnel, detainees awaiting
trial spend an average of 2 years in prison, but many have been there
much longer. More than 40 percent of all inmates are in pretrial
detention. Complaints were filed by 94 prisoners during the year
concerning their right to a just and timely trial.
The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its
use.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
provision in practice. However, the courts must rely on the Ministry of
Justice for administrative support, and the judiciary is not well
trained, efficient, or free from corruption.
The judicial structure is composed of district (city) courts,
regional courts, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court. The
Constitutional Court is a seven-judge panel that is authorized to hear
cases regarding constitutional issues at the request of state
institutions or individuals who believe that their constitutional
rights were violated.
The Government continued to reform the judicial system. In 1995 it
completed the establishment of regional courts to hear appeals of lower
court decisions. For more serious criminal cases, two lay assessors
join the professional judge on the bench. Corruption in the judicial
system reportedly is widespread. In 1997 the judges appointed to
preside over the trial of the president of the collapsed Bank Baltija,
Aleksander Lavent, resigned from the case, citing alleged political
pressure from the Government. The accusation came after the judges
released Lavent to house arrest following a heart attack that he
suffered in the courtroom on the first day of the trial. In December
1998, the courts determined that Lavent had recovered his health, and
he was returned from house arrest to prison. The trial of Lavent and
his alleged accomplices resumed briefly in the fall, but it was
suspended again at year's end 1999. The trial resumed in 2000 but was
suspended again due to the defendant's illness. On July 27, Lavent
filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights accusing the
Latvian courts of violating his right to a fair and speedy trial. In
October Lavents led a hunger strike with several other prisoners to
protest lengthy pretrial detention.
Most judges have inadequate judicial training, and the court system
is too weak to enforce many of its decisions. A major difficulty in
enforcing court decisions is the continuing lack of an effective
bailiff or sheriff system. In 1999 a new criminal law went into force,
which allows for more alternative punishments, including community
service. Despite the new law, alternative punishments are utilized
rarely by the courts.
Court decisions are not published systematically, nor is there a
centralized index for those that are published. Trials may be closed if
state secrets might be revealed or to protect the interests of minors.
All defendants have the right to hire an attorney, and the State will
lend funds to destitute defendants for this purpose. Defendants have
the right to read all charges, confront all witnesses, and may call
witnesses and offer evidence to support their case. They also may make
multiple appeals.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires that law enforcement authorities have
a judicial warrant in order to intercept citizens' mail, telephone
calls, or other forms of communication. The laws protecting privacy
apply to citizens and noncitizens equally. There were no credible
reports of the unsanctioned wiretapping of the telephone conversations.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. The 1991 Press Law prohibits
censorship of the press or other mass media. Most newspapers and
magazines are privately owned. Newspapers in both Latvian and Russian
publish a wide range of political criticism and viewpoints.
A large number of independent television and radio outlets
broadcast in both Russian and Latvian, and the number of persons
receiving satellite television broadcasts continued to increase.
The Law on the Media, revised in October 1998, contains a number of
restrictive provisions regulating the content and language of
broadcasts. No less than 51 percent of television broadcasts must be of
European origin, of which 40 percent should be in the Latvian language.
However, these provisions are not always implemented. In addition
foreign investment may not exceed 20 percent of the capital in
electronic media organizations.
There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for peaceful assembly, and the authorities may not prohibit
public gatherings; however, organizers of demonstrations must provide
advance notice to local authorities, who may change the time and place
of public gatherings for such reasons as fear of public disorder. In
1997 the Saeima passed legislation on public demonstrations that
requires protesters to remain specified distances from foreign
missions, the Saeima, the Prosecutor's Office, and certain other public
institutions. While the law purports to imitate Western European
statutes, independent human rights organizations find its provisions
contradictory and confusing. Numerous demonstrations nevertheless took
place peacefully and without government interference during the year.
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to associate in
public organizations; however, the Law on Registering Public
Organizations bars the registration of Communist, Nazi, or other
organizations whose activities would contravene the Constitution.
Noncitizens can join and form political parties, but there must be at
least 200 citizens in the party and at least half of the total
membership must be citizens. More than 40 political parties are
registered officially.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, bureaucratic problems for minority religions persist. There is
no state religion, but the Government distinguishes between
``traditional'' (Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believers,
Baptists, and Jewish) and ``new'' religions.
Although the Government does not require the registration of
religious groups, the 1995 Law on Religious Organizations accords
religious organizations certain rights and privileges when they
register, such as status as a separate legal entity for owning property
or other financial transactions, as well as tax benefits for donors.
By law any 10 citizens or permanent residents over the age of 18
may apply to register a church. Congregations functioning in the
country for the first time that do not belong to a church association
already registered must reregister each year for 10 years.
Congregations numbering 10 or more of the same denomination having
permanent registration status may form a religious association. Only
churches with religious association status may establish theological
schools or monasteries. A decision to register a church is made by the
Minister of Justice.
According to Ministry of Justice officials, most registration
applications are approved eventually once proper documents are
submitted. The Ministry has registered over 1,000 congregations.
Problems arise and registration is denied because the Law on Religious
Organizations does not permit simultaneous registration of more than
one religious union (church) in a single confession. Because of this
provision, the Government can not register any splinter groups,
including an independent Jewish congregation, the Latvian Free Orthodox
Church, and a separate Old Believers group. The Christian Scientists
have been refused registration due to opposition from the Doctors
Association.
Shortly after the renewal of independence in 1991, the Vatican,
with the support of the Latvian Catholic community, requested
negotiations for a reestablishment of the 1922 Concordat, which existed
between Latvia and the Vatican during Latvia's period of independence
between World War I and World War II. In 1996 the Prime Minister
established a working group to negotiate a new agreement. This
agreement reportedly would grant the Roman Catholic Church privileged
status. The negotiations have led to some concern among members of
other religions. If approved it is expected that adherents of other
faiths would seek similar recognition and benefits for their own
religious community. In November the draft agreement was submitted to
the Saima for review.
Visa regulations require that religious workers present either an
ordination certificate or evidence of religious education that
corresponds to a Latvian bachelor's degree in theology. The visa
application process still is cumbersome. However, difficulties in this
area diminished, and Citizenship and Migration Department officials
have worked to ease the situation. The Government cooperated to resolve
several difficult visa cases in favor of missionary workers.
Foreign evangelists and missionaries are permitted to hold meetings
and to proselytize, but the law stipulates that only domestic religious
organizations may invite them to conduct such activities. Foreign
religious denominations have criticized this provision.
The law provides that religion may be taught to students in public
schools on a voluntary basis only by representatives of Evangelical
Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believer, Baptist, and Jewish
religions. The State provides funds for this education. Students at
state-supported national minority schools also may receive education on
the religion ``characteristic of the national minority'' on a voluntary
basis. Other denominations may provide religious education in private
schools only.
The Latvian Lutheran Church established its own clergy education
center, the Luther Academy in Riga, in 1998. The Roman Catholic Church
also has its own seminary but wants to establish its own separate
faculty of theology at the University of Latvia or, alternatively, join
forces with a Catholic university elsewhere in Europe that would issue
degrees. The University of Latvia's theological faculty is now
nondenominational.
Citizen's passports currently indicate the ethnicity of the bearer.
Jews are considered an ethnic group and are listed as such rather than
Latvian, Russian, etc.
Jewish community leaders have regained a number of major properties
around the country, and they report that the legal framework for
restitution of religious property is adequate. While restitution of a
few Jewish properties proceeds, the process is slow, complex, and often
delayed by legal wrangling and bureaucratic obstacles.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The Government
has readmitted noncitizens who claimed refugee status in a foreign
country, or who voluntarily abandoned their permanent residence and
then decided to return to the country to live and work. Noncitizens who
left the country as refugees based on Soviet-era persecution have no
difficulty returning on foreign refugee travel documents for business
reasons or for family visits. The Government also extends protections
to noncitizen residents who travel abroad.
The 1995 Law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens stipulates
that registered permanent resident noncitizens enjoy the right to
establish and change residences, travel abroad, and return to the
country. Noncitizens, as well as citizens, may be granted amnesty.
However, certain rights are denied to noncitizens. They are prohibited
from working as armed guards or criminal trial attorneys. Noncitizens
may own land only under complex procedures but may not purchase land in
the border zones. The law also provides for the issuance of a
noncitizen travel document that certifies these rights.
The Government works closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, and the Law on Asylum Seekers and Refugees complies with all
provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Special immigration police and border
guards units help prescreen asylum requests. Decisions of the Citizens
and Migration Affairs Office can be appealed to the Asylum Appeals
Board in the Ministry of Justice.
The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during the
year and never has arisen. According to statistics provided by the
immigration police, during the year 1,126 aliens were detained for
questioning. Of those, 218 were deported, and 79 departed voluntarily.
The Government has approached Russia and Belarus about concluding
refugee readmission agreements, the lack of which poses a major barrier
to effective control of the eastern border. However, by year's end
agreements had not been concluded.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Free and fair elections for Parliament were held in
1998, and in June 1999 the Parliament elected the President. In the
1998 election, candidates from 6 of the 21 participating parties,
representing a broad political spectrum, won Saeima seats, and 72
percent of eligible voters participated.
The election law prohibits persons who remained active in the
Communist Party or various other pro-Soviet organizations after January
13, 1991, or who worked for such institutions as the former Soviet
Committee for State Security, from seeking elected office. Noncitizens,
most of whom are ethnic Russians, are not allowed to vote; however,
many ethnic Russians are Latvian citizens and can vote.
On December 15, 1999, the Supreme Court upheld a regional court
decision that the extreme Russian nationalist of the Equal Rights
Movement and Riga city council deputy Tatyana Zhdanok was not eligible
to run for public office due to her pro-Soviet activites after Janury
13, 1991. After the Riga City Council annulled her election, Zhdanok
filed suit against the Latvian Government in the European Court of
Human Rights.
Following the restoration of independence in 1991, citizenship was
accorded immediately only to those persons who were citizens of the
independent Latvian Republic in 1940 and their direct descendants.
After independence the status of approximately 670,000 persons, mostly
ethnic Russians, changed from citizens of the Soviet Union to
noncitizen residents in Latvia. Since 1995 about 39,000 persons have
become citizens. Approximately 35 percent or 14,00 of these persons
were naturalized in 2000 alone. Owing to the Russification policy
pursued during the Soviet era, ethnic Latvians constitute only 56
percent of a total population of 2.5 million, and 78 percent of
citizens. Ethnic Latvians do not constitute a majority in three of
Latvia's seven cities.
The 1998 Citizenship Law includes a Latvian language and residence
requirement for those seeking to naturalize, as well as restrictions on
former Soviet intelligence and military personnel. The law also
requires applicants for citizenship to renounce previous non-Latvian
citizenship, to have knowledge of the Constitution and Latvian history,
and to pledge allegiance to Latvia. At present, according to
Naturalization Board figures, nearly 95 percent of applicants pass the
citizenship tests on the first attempt.
In addition a 1998 referendum brought the citizenship law into
compliance with Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) standards. Children of noncitizens born after August 1992 are
entitled to citizenship upon application.
International observers, including the resident OSCE mission,
credit the Government with establishing a competent and professional
Naturalization Board with offices throughout the country to implement
the law. In the estimation of the NHRO, the OSCE, and various NGO's,
the Board has sought to apply the law fairly.
International experts, government officials, and domestic human
rights monitors agreed that Latvia must continue to place high priority
on and devote sufficient resources to implementing the citizenship law
in a fair and impartial manner, as well as seek ways to expedite
naturalization and promote social integration. Working with the
European Union and the U.N. Development Program, the Government also
has implemented a long-term nationwide Latvian language teaching
program for adults and children in non-Latvian schools.
There are no ethnic restrictions on eligibility to hold political
office. Nonethnic Latvians, including ethnic Russians and the first
Roma deputy in the Saeima, serve in various elected bodies. Women are
underrepresented in government and politics. There are 20 women in the
100-member Saeima. Two women are in the 15-member Cabinet of Ministers.
For the first time, the President of the country is female.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A growing number of NGO's devoted to research and advocacy on human
rights issues, including prison conditions and women's and children's
rights, operate without government restriction. Several organizations
deal with issues of concern to local noncitizens and other nonethnic
Latvians, presenting them to the courts and the press.
The Government engages in dialog with NGO's working on human rights
issues. The NHRO is an independent governmental institution with a
mandate to promote human rights, provide information on human rights,
investigate individual complaints, and initiate its own investigation
into alleged violations. The office acts as a general ombudsman on
social issues and handles a variety of individual complaints, primarily
concerning problems receiving social benefits.
A number of NGO's provide assistance to those who wish to complain
of police abuse or abuse in prisons.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
According to the 1922 Constitution, all citizens are equal under
the law. In 1998 the Saeima passed amendments to the Constitution that
granted constitutional protection to fundamental human rights. The
amendments supersede provisions of the 1991 Constitutional Law, which
had served in the interim, and contain constitutional provisions for
the exercise of the freedoms of speech, religion, association, the
press, and other basic liberties. The amendments also provide for
protection from discrimination due to race, sex, religion, language, or
disability. Only citizens can vote or hold government office. There are
some restrictions on land purchases by noncitizens.
Women.--Despite legal protections, international observers and
human rights groups increasingly are concerned about problems facing
women. Although no overall statistics are available, sources indicate
that domestic violence against women, often connected with alcohol
abuse, is significant and underreported. Women who are victims of abuse
often seem to be uninformed about their rights and reluctant to seek
redress through the justice system. Human rights groups assert that the
legal system, including the courts, tends to downplay the seriousness
of domestic violence and that the police are sometimes reluctant to
make arrests in such cases.
There are no shelters designed specifically for battered or abused
women. There is one shelter in Riga where homeless women with children
may reside for up to 2 months. Likewise, there are no specific rape or
assault hot lines; however, two crisis hot lines are managed by NGO's.
Police do not compile figures for domestic violence as a distinct
category. Instead, episodes are placed under more general categories
such as assault or battery. During the year, 107 rape cases were
reported.
Both adult and child prostitution are widespread, often linked to
organized crime, and abetted by economic problems (see Section 6.f.).
The Government estimates that 3,000 persons work as prostitutes. The
NHRO reports that adult prostitutes have no legal protections.
Prostitution is legal; procuring is not. There are no state
institutions to assist prostitutes. However, the private Latvian Center
for Gender Problems provides medical help and social support for
prostitutes.
Sexual harassment of women in the workplace, although illegal, is
reportedly common. Cultural factors tend to discourage women from
coming forth publicly with complaints of abuse.
Women possess the same legal rights as men. The Labor Code
prohibits women from performing ``hard jobs or jobs having unhealthy
conditions,'' which are specified in a list agreed upon by the Cabinet
and labor unions. The code also bans employment discrimination. In
reality women frequently face hiring and pay discrimination, especially
in the emerging private sector. According to the Central Statistics
Bureau, the number of women in the lower income brackets exceeds that
of men by 75 percent, while men outnumber women two to one in upper
income levels. The Ministry of Welfare has designated a one-person
office with responsibility for gender issues.
Women's advocacy groups are growing in size and number. They are
involved in finding employment for women, lobbying for increased social
benefits, and assisting victims of domestic abuse.
Children.--The law on the rights of the child and the
constitutional provisions on children are based on Western European
models and provide for various protections, including health care and
legal protections against physical abuse. However, resources are not
adequate to ensure observance of these provisions. There is a national
center for the protection of the rights of the child.
Evidence suggests that abandonment and child abuse, including
sexual abuse, are relatively widespread, as is child prostitution. An
estimated 12 to 15 percent of prostitutes are considered juveniles,
that is, between the ages of 8 and 18. Although in theory the
Constitution and the Law on the Rights of the Child protect children,
these rights only are enforced sporadically in the case of child
prostitutes. Schooling is mandatory through the ninth grade, between
the ages of 7 and 16, and free through the 12th grade, or age 18.
Despite the existence of laws on mandatory education, truancy is
widespread and growing. A few children's advocacy groups are active,
particularly in lobbying for legislation to protect children's rights
and for increased welfare payments for children.
Law enforcement authorities have won court suits to remove children
from abusive parents and secured convictions in child molestation
cases.
Trafficking in young girls for forced prostitution abroad is
increasing (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution calls for protection of
the disabled against discrimination; the 1992 Law on the Medical and
Social Protection of Disabled provides for their right of access to
public facilities. Provisions in the Labor Law and other laws aim to
protect the disabled from bias in the workplace and from job
discrimination. In 1998 the Cabinet adopted a framework document
entitled ``Equal Opportunity for Everyone.'' The document is designed
to coordinate the efforts of all branches of Government in assisting
the disabled. The Government supports special schools for disabled
persons. It does not enforce uniformly a 1993 law requiring buildings
to be accessible to wheelchairs, and most buildings are not. However,
some larger cities, including Riga and Ventspils, have undertaken an
extensive wheelchair ramp building program at intersections.
Religious Minorities.--In August the magazine Kapitals published a
derogatory article about Jews and business. The public and senior
government officials immediately condemned the article. The editor of
the magazine resigned, and senior officials of the company apologized.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Of the country's more than 2.4
million inhabitants, approximately 1 million persons are of non-Latvian
ethnicity, including more than 700,000 ethnic Russians, 100,000 ethnic
Belarusians, almost 64,000 ethnic Ukrainians, and more than 60,000
ethnic Poles. More than 74 percent of the country's inhabitants are
citizens, including nearly 400,000 persons who belong to national or
ethnic minorities. There are approximately 583,000 resident
noncitizens, of whom an estimated 68 percent are Russian; 12 percent,
Belarusian; 9 percent, Ukrainian; and smaller percentages of Poles,
Lithuanians, Jews, Roma, Germans, Tatars, Estonians, and Armenians.
Ethnicity is identified in the passport of Latvian citizens but not
in the passports of Latvia's noncitizen residents. Groups such as Roma
and Belarusians have complained that, because the passport is a basic
form of identification, this requirement has opened them to various
forms of discrimination based on ethnicity.
On December 9, 1999, the Saeima passed a revised version of the
language law, which went into effect on September 1, 2000. The language
law regulates the uses of language that affect public safety, health
care, protection of the consumer, and labor rights. The law requires
that documents submitted to the Government be translated into Latvian,
including company reports and records, except in cases of emergency. If
a public event is coorganized by the State, one of the working
languages must be Latvian. Labels and user instructions for goods sold
must be in Latvian, although other languages can be present as well.
The law and its implementing regulations meet international standards.
However, the implementation of this law remains a matter of public
debate and continued international attention.
In July 1998, the police arrested Vilis Linins, the chief ideologue
of the ultranationalist Thundercross organization, which was suspected
of terrorist attacks against Soviet memorials and other targets. On May
29, 2000, Linins was found guilty of several acts of vandalism and
sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment and fined $35,000 (21,000 lats).
This was the first case where a political group was convicted of
violent acts carried out to promote its political goals.
The Government financially supports education in both Latvian and
Russian, as well as in eight other minority languages. However, under
the revised Education Law, the Government is implementing a bilingual
education program at the elementary school level. The goal of this
program is to facilitate the eventual transition to Latvian-language
secondary schools by 2004. Although all non-Latvian-speaking students
in public schools are supposed to learn Latvian and to study a minimum
number of subjects in Latvian, there is a shortage of qualified
teachers.
State-funded university education is in Latvian, and incoming
students whose native language is not Latvian must pass a language
entrance examination. However, several private institutions offer
higher education in Russian.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Law on Trade Unions stipulates
that workers, except for the uniformed military, have the right to form
and join labor unions of their own choosing. Union membership is about
30 percent of the work force. Free elections for union leadership are
held every 4 years.
The law does not limit the right to strike, but there were no major
strikes during the year. The law bans the dismissal of employees who
have invoked the right to strike. No cases of such dismissals have been
reported.
Unions are free to affiliate internationally and have established
contacts with European labor unions and international labor union
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
have the right to bargain collectively and are largely free of
government interference in their negotiations with employers. The law
prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers. The
Government's ability to protect the right to organize in the private
sector is weak.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and it generally is
not practiced. Inspectors from the Ministry of Welfare's State Labor
Inspection Board or Inspectorate enforce this ban. However, trafficking
in women (including minors) for prostitution abroad is a significant
problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The statutory minimum age for employment of children is 15
years, although children between the ages of 13 and 15 years may work
in certain jobs outside of school hours. The law restricts employment
of those under the age of 18; for example, by banning night shift or
overtime work. Schooling is compulsory until age 16 and free until age
18. State authorities are lax in their enforcement of child labor and
school attendance laws. There generally is no evidence of forced or
bonded labor involving children, which is prohibited by law (see
Section 6.c.); however, trafficking in young girls for prostitution is
a problem (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly minimum wage is
about $82 (50 lats), far below the amount that trade union officials
describe as the bare minimum for survival.
The Labor Code provides for a mandatory 40-hour maximum workweek
with at least one 42-hour rest period weekly, 4 weeks of annual
vacation, and a program of assistance to working mothers with small
children. The laws establish minimum occupational health and safety
standards for the workplace, but these standards frequently are
ignored. Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from
hazardous work situations without endangering their continued
employment, but these standards also frequently are ignored in
practice.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--In May the Criminal Code was revised to
make it illegal to forcibly send a person to a foreign country for the
purpose of sexual exploitation. There were no prosecutions by year's
end.
There were instances of trafficking in women for purposes of forced
prostitution. Prostitution is a significant problem in Riga, and there
is evidence that trafficking in women (including minors) for
prostitution abroad also is increasing. The country is primarily a
source or transit country rather than a destination.
__________
LIECHTENSTEIN
The Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy and
a parliamentary democracy. The reigning Prince is the head of state;
all legislation enacted by the popularly elected Parliament (Landtag)
must have his concurrence. The Parliament elects and the Prince
appoints the members of the Government and of the independent
judiciary. In July the Prince decided to postpone the ongoing debate on
a new Constitution until after parliamentary elections in 2001.
Consultations between the Prince and Parliament's constitutional
commission collapsed in April over diverging views on the executive
powers of the monarch.
The Interior Ministry effectively oversees the regular and
auxiliary police forces. There is no standing military force.
Liechtenstein has a prosperous, highly industrialized, free
enterprise economy with a vital service sector. It participates in a
customs union with Switzerland and uses the Swiss franc as its national
currency. As a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), its 32,000
citizens enjoy a very high standard of living. Unemployment fell to 1.1
percent during the year.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Violence against women is a
problem. The Government is working to eliminate societal discrimination
against women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government
observes these provisions. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must
bring suspects before an examining magistrate, who must either file
formal charges or order release. The law grants suspects the right to
legal counsel of their own choosing; counsel is provided to indigents.
Release on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the
examining magistrate has reason to believe the suspects are a danger to
society or will not appear for trial.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judicial system has three tiers: Lower court; high court;
and Supreme Court. In addition an Administrative Court hears appeals
against government decisions. The State Court protects the rights
accorded by the Constitution, decides conflicts of jurisdiction between
the law courts and the administrative authorities, and acts as a
disciplinary court for members of the Government.
The Constitution provides for fair public trials and judicial
appeal, and an independent judiciary respects these provisions.
The Constitution authorizes the Prince to alter criminal sentences
or pardon offenders. However, if the offender is a member of the
Government and is sentenced for a crime in connection with official
duties, the Prince can take such action only if the Parliament requests
it.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for personal liberty and for
the inviolability of the home, postal correspondence, and telephone
conversations. No violations were reported. Police need a judicial
warrant to search private property.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--An independent press, an effective
judiciary, and a democratic political system combine to ensure freedom
of speech and of the press. Two daily newspapers are published, each
representing the interests of one of the two major political parties,
as is one weekly newsmagazine. One state and one private television
station broadcast, along with a private radio station, and residents
freely receive radio and television broadcasts from neighboring
countries. An information bulletin is also issued by the third party
(Freie Liste) represented in Parliament. There are no limits on access
to the Internet.
In October 1999, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) fined
Prince Hans-Adam II for abusing one of his subject's freedom of speech.
The ECHR reprimanded the monarch for refusing to reappoint a judge,
Herbert Wille, who disagreed with him in an ongoing constitutional
debate. In a public lecture held in 1995, Wille said that the State
Court should decide on cases of disagreement between citizens
(represented in parliament) and the Prince. The Prince wrote Wille
shortly afterwards that the opinions that he expressed disqualified him
from office, and in 1997 he refused to endorse Parliament's support for
Wille's reappointment as head of the administrative court. The ECHR
found that Hans-Adam II had curbed Wille's right to free speech and
ordered him to pay $59,000 (100,000 Swiss francs) in costs and damages.
In his response on the following day, Prince Hans-Adam II stated that
he took note of the judgement of the ECHR; however, the Prince had not
reappointed Wille to the court by year's end. The Prince further stated
that he and his successors will no longer publish the reasons for such
appointment decisions. The 100,000 Swiss francs in costs and damages
were paid out to Willie and his two legal counsels in February.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government does not hamper the teaching or practice
of any faith. The relationship between the Government and the Catholic
Church currently is being redefined, and a new agreement is scheduled
for 2002. The Government contributes to the Catholic Church, as well as
to other denominations. The finances of the Catholic Church are
integrated directly into the budgets of the national and local
governments. Catholic or Protestant religious education is compulsory
in all schools, but the authorities routinely grant exemptions for
children whose parents request them.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have unrestricted freedom to
travel in the country, to emigrate, and to return.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. On
July 3, the Government signed a trilateral agreement with Switzerland
and Austria regarding the return of persons entering the country
without permission. The treaty was ratified on October 25.
The Government provides first asylum; however, the country's lack
of an airport or international train station means that it receives few
requests. The 1998 asylum law is in accord with the U.N. 1951
Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Since its passage, the
number of asylum requests has increased. Those persons who enter from
Austria without permission still are returned to Austrian authorities
in accordance with a 1955 bilateral agreement.
The Government granted collective protective status to Kosovar
immigrants in the fall of 1998, following rising numbers of asylum
applications. In April 1999, the Government decided that children under
age 20 and spouses of guest workers from Kosovo could enter the country
on request. In total the Government granted temporary protective status
to 748 immigrants from Kosovo. In September 1999, the Government
stopped granting collective asylum and set a deadline 8 months later
(May 31) for repatriations.
By October 1999, 505 Kosovars left the country voluntarily, 481 of
whom agreed to their repatriation before the May 31 deadline and thus
benefited from government financial and material assistance in
coordination with Switzerland's refugee repatriation program. Beginning
in June, 19 Kosovars were ``forcibly'' repatriated, but only 1 was
repatriated under police escort. To avoid repatriation, 92 Kosovars
disappeared. An additional 115 Kosovars, whose asylum applications are
pending, remained in the country awaiting a decision on their
applications.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
The country is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary
democracy. The monarchy is hereditary in the male line. The 25member
unicameral legislature is elected every 4 years. Suffrage is universal
for adults over age 18, and balloting is secret. Political parties
operate freely. Citizens regularly vote on initiatives and referendums.
Women are underrepresented in politics and government, although
since gaining the right to vote in 1984, a growing number have been
active in politics. A woman, the Foreign Minister, is one of the five
members of the Cabinet, and another is a Member of Parliament. Women
serve on the executive committees of the major parties. In June 1999,
women's organizations, political parties, and the Government's Bureau
for the Promotion of Equal Rights for Women and Men held a convention
to promote greater participation by women in politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
International and domestic human rights groups operate without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive
to their views.
The sole local human rights organization, Justitia et Pax, is an
informal group of about 10 members who monitor prison conditions and
assist foreign workers with immigration matters.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
language, or social status, and the authorities respect these
provisions. The law also prohibits public incitement to violence or
public agitation or insult directed against a race, people, ethnic
group, or state.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) estimate that one in five women is a victim of
physical or psychological violence. There is 1 women's shelter, which
provided refuge for 33 women, only 12 of whom were citizens, and 30
children during the year. Annual government financing for the shelter
is approximately $140,000 (240,000 Swiss francs). The law prohibits all
forms of domestic violence, and the Government vigorously enforces the
law.
NGO's assume that, as in neighboring countries, trafficking in
women occurs, but no specific cases have been documented (see Sections
6.c. and 6.f.).
Societal discrimination still limits opportunities for women in
fields traditionally dominated by men. Men earn more than women. In
accordance with a 1992 constitutional amendment mandating equality for
women, Parliament amended a significant number of laws to provide for
equality of treatment. For example, Parliament revised the citizenship
law, the employment law, the law on labor conditions, the tax law, and
the divorce law. The process of amending laws is almost complete. In
March 1999, Parliament passed legislation on equal opportunity for
women and men. The law is designed to eliminate discrimination and
sexual harassment in the workplace and to create conditions that allow
both women and men to combine work and family. It entered into force in
May 1999. In April 1999, the Government approved a plan to promote
equal opportunity and to create conditions that allow both men and
women to combine work and family. Measures include: Raising public
awareness about the new law; improving programs and infrastructure for
traditional and single-parent families, such as affordable housing and
childcare; promoting educational and career opportunities for women;
and raising recognition for work in the home to the same level as for
work outside the home. The Government took steps to end all forms of
discrimination against women. In December 1999, the Government signed
the optional protocol to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All
Discrimination Against Women.
Three women's rights groups were active. Their chief concerns were
public affairs, information, legal counseling, lobbying, and other
political activities.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The Government provided compulsory, free,
and universal primary school education for children of both sexes for 9
years, normally until the age of 16.
The Government supported programs to protect the rights of children
and matches contributions made to the four NGO's that monitor
children's rights. A children and youth service belonging to the Office
for Social Services oversaw the implementation of government-supported
programs for children.
In September the Government signed two optional protocols to the
1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. One protocol strictly
regulates the drafting of minors into the armed services, and the other
forbids child prostitution and child pornography as well as trafficking
in children.
In November the Government established a Commission for the
Coordination of Professionals in Cases of Sexual Offences against
Children. The group consisted of experts from different backgrounds and
focused on assisting professionals (counselors, therapists, and
physicians) who deal with sexual offences against children. The
Commission takes a comprehensive approach to sexual offences against
children.
During the year, two children allegedly were abused sexually by
acquaintances, but the prosecutor's office dropped the case after
further inquiries undermined the validity of the allegations. The
suspect, a Brazilian national, no longer resides in the country.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
People with Disabilities.--Although the law expressly does not
prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities, complaints of
such discrimination may be pursued in the courts. Amendments to the law
on insurance for the disabled, which were intended to improve the
economic situation of disabled persons, came into force in 1997.
The Government requires that buildings and government services be
made accessible for people with disabilities, but in general they are
not, particularly old buildings.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In its 1998 security report,
the Government confirmed the existence of a small number of rightwing
extremists, consisting of about 20 skinheads between the ages of 20 and
30, and about as many followers of a slightly younger age. A 1999
government survey of 700 young persons indicated that approximately 20
percent of youths expressed ambivalence toward or sympathy for
extremist views, while 4 percent supported extremist views. Incidents
of violence increased in 1999, according to the survey. On August 19,
an adolescent from former Yugoslavia was injured in a fight with a
local youth. The attack appeared to have been motivated racially. The
rightwing extremists have not been publicly active. One case of
repeated verbal attacks against Kosovar refugees was reported to a
local NGO. In November 1999, a local youth was fined $375 (600 Swiss
francs) and sentenced to 2 weeks of social work for putting a racist
web site on the Internet. There were no reports of rightwing propaganda
on the Internet during the year.
Parliament adopted national antiracism legislation in December
1999. The law entered into force on February 11 and makes it a crime to
produce or distribute racist propaganda, deny or trivialize genocide
and crimes against humanity, engage in racist or religious
discrimination, deny services to a particular group, or support racist
organizations. Violations are punishable with a maximum 2-year prison
sentence. On March 1, the country acceded to the U.N. Convention
against Racial Discrimination. On June 18, voters approved a referendum
that changed naturalization requirements to facilitate the
naturalization of long-term residents, but it required that applicants
relinquish their citizenship in other countries.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners,
are free to associate, join unions of their choice, and select their
own union representatives. Due to the country's small size and
population, only one trade union operates, representing about 13
percent of the work force. However, the sole trade union looks after
the interests of nonmembers as well. It is a member of the World
Confederation of Labor but is represented on an ad hoc basis by a Swiss
union.
Workers have the right to strike except in certain essential
services. No strikes were reported during the year. The law does not
provide specific protections for strikers. Employers may dismiss
employees for refusing to work; such dismissals may be contested. In
1997 the Government incorporated EEA guidelines into its domestic labor
law. These guidelines require that, among other things, employers
consult in cases of projected mass dismissals and submit employment
contracts in written form.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively.
However, collective bargaining agreements generally are adapted from
ones negotiated by Swiss employers and unions.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. Except by
implication, the law does not forbid forced and bonded labor by
children specifically, but such practices are not known to occur. NGO's
assume that trafficking in women occurs, but there were no reports of
specific cases (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Government does not prohibit forced and bonded labor
by children specifically, but such practices are not known to occur
(see Section 6.c.). The law generally prohibits the employment of
children under 16 years of age. However, exceptions may be made for the
limited employment of youths at least age 14 and for those who leave
school after completing their 9 years of compulsory education. Children
ages 14 and older may be employed in light duties for not more than 9
hours a week during the school year and 15 hours a week at other times.
Inspections are adequate. No employers have been fined or
imprisoned for violations of the law. The Government devoted adequate
resources and oversight to child labor policies. The Department for
Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy effectively
supervised compliance with the law.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage. The number of working poor households has not increased in recent
years. In 1999 36 households (0.3 percent) depended on public welfare
to obtain a yearly minimal income, set at $10,700 (17,720 Swiss francs)
for a one-person household, and were considered working poor. A total
of 458 households (2.7 percent) received public assistance. The law
sets the maximum workweek at 45 hours for white-collar workers and
employees of industrial firms and sales personnel, and 48 hours for all
other workers. With few exceptions, Sunday work is not allowed. Workers
over age 20 receive at least 4 weeks of vacation; younger workers
receive at least 5 weeks.
The law sets occupational health and safety standards, and the
Department for Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy
effectively enforces these provisions. The law provides for a hearing
in cases in which workers remove themselves from dangerous situations.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons.
NGO's assume that, as in neighboring countries, trafficking in
women occurs, but no specific cases have been documented. Although
there were no reports of trafficking during the year, six cases of
trafficking in persons (assistance with illegal immigration) were
reported in 1999. In most cases, the traffickers concerned were
relatives of illegal immigrants.
__________
LITHUANIA
Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy with a Constitution adopted
by referendum in 1992. The Constitution established a 141-member
unicameral legislature, the Seimas; a directly elected president; and a
government whose ministers are nominated by the Prime Minister,
appointed by the President, and approved by the Seimas. The Government
exercises authority with the approval of the Seimas and the President.
The judiciary is independent.
A unified national police force under the jurisdiction of the
Interior Ministry is responsible for law enforcement. The State
Security Department is responsible for internal security and reports to
Parliament and the President. The police committed a number of human
rights abuses.
Since its independence in 1990, Lithuania has made steady progress
in developing a market economy. Most housing and small businesses are
privatized, and the contribution of the private sector to gross
domestic product amounts to more than 70 percent. Trade is diversifying
and expanding both to the West and the East. Agriculture employs the
largest number of workers (20 percent). Major exports include textiles,
mineral products, machinery, and electronic appliances. Inflation from
January to August remained low at 0.3 percent. Per capita GDP in 1999
was $2,878. During the first half of the year, real GDP reportedly
increased by 2 percent. However, unemployment continued to remain high
at over 11 percent. (It was above 15 percent according to a labor
market survey.)
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remained in some areas. Police on occasion
beat detainees and misused detention laws. The Government has made some
progress in bringing police corruption under control. Prison conditions
remained poor, and prolonged detention in a small number of cases
remained a problem. State media continued to be subject to political
interests. Violence and discrimination against women and child abuse
were serious problems. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
of forced prostitution was a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In 1998 the President formed the International Commission to
Investigate the Crimes of Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in
Lithuania. The Commission includes historians, human rights
representatives, representatives of international Jewish organizations,
and lawyers from Lithuania and a number of foreign countries. The
Government allotted $37,500 (150,000 litas) to establish a full-time
working secretariat for the Commission. The secretariat was in
operation by October 1999, and the first research group of the
Commission began work in December 1999.
In August 1999 a court found six persons guilty of complicity in
the January 1991 coup attempt. The defendants were former leaders and
officials of the Lithuanian Communist Party who were sentenced to
prison terms of from 3 to 12 years for crimes that included
premeditated acts of murder and inflicting serious bodily harm. Defense
lawyers appealed the verdict, but their appeal was still under
consideration at year's end.
Formal charges were filed against alleged war criminals Aleksandras
Lileikis and Kazys Gimzauskas. After being stripped of his U.S.
citizenship in 1996 for concealing his World War II activities,
Lileikis returned to Lithuania. He was accused of acts of genocide
committed when he headed the security police of the Vilnius district
under Nazi control. Lileikis's trial was postponed several times due to
his poor health; he died at age 93 without trial on September 27.
Gimzauskas, who served as Lileikis's deputy during the war,
returned to Lithuania in 1993. On October 13, 2000, the Vilnius
regional court decided to try the case of Gimzauskas in absentia due to
his poor health. The court hearing started in November. It is expected
that the court will hear the case and make a decision regarding guilt,
but that there would be no sentence imposed. After considering the
case, the court also can adopt a resolution on whether Gimzauskas'
actions in this particular case constituted a crime or not, thus
formally closing the case.
In June 1999, the Prosecutor General's Office of Special
Investigations filed genocide charges against Vincas Valkavickas, who
returned to Lithuania in June 1999. In July 1999, a case was initiated
against Petras Bernotavicius, a resident of the United States, and
Antanas Gudelis, an Australian citizen. In July 1999, the prosecutor
launched an investigation into the role of Kazys Ciurinskas in a
separate war-related criminal case. No substantial progress was
reported in the latter four cases by the end of the year.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
There is a growing problem of women being forced or sold into
prostitution by organized crime figures. Their families often believe
that they disappeared or were kidnaped (see Sections 5, 6.c., and
6.f.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and there
were no reports of its use; however, police sometimes beat or otherwise
physically mistreat detainees. The press reported that incidents of
police brutality are becoming more common. In many instances, the
victims reportedly are reluctant to bring charges against police
officers due to fear of reprisals. According to the Ministry of
Interior, during the first 6 months of the year no police officers were
charged with abuse of power or sentenced. In 1999 four officers were
charged and one was sentenced for this crime.
The Interior Ministry states that district police inspectors are
the most negligent in the force. To strengthen the integrity of the
police, the Inspectorate General of the Interior Ministry was given
administrative autonomy in 1997. In 1999 the Inspectorate General was
reorganized into an office of the Inspector General, and some functions
of the Inspectorate were delegated to the internal investigations
division at the police department. The Inspector General cannot
investigate abuses on his own authority but can act only on the order
of the Minister.
In the past, noncommissioned military personnel committed human
rights abuses by hazing recruits, despite efforts to quash the
practice, which was inherited from the former Soviet armed forces. As
living conditions improve for military personnel, human rights
violations committed by noncommissioned officers have declined
significantly. During the year, seven criminal cases were filed for
``systemic degrading treatment'' or breach of discipline involving
violence (the relevant legal codes). According to the Ministry of
National Defense, most trauma inflicted on conscripts is psychological
rather than physical. The Ministry believes that a lack of
professionalism among noncommissioned officers--rather than ethnic,
regional, or social factors--is a primary factor in cases of hazing,
and it is working actively to improve their skills and judgment. In
1999 the Seimas approved a new disciplinary statute for the armed
forces, and the military police formed by a 1998 law are charged with
maintaining discipline. The disciplinary statute sets procedures for
the investigation of disciplinary offences, provides for the right to
appeal, and lists the types of punishments.
Prison conditions are poor. Due to limited resources, most prisons
are overcrowded and poorly maintained. One local human rights group
claims that the administration of penal institutions does not do enough
to prevent violence among prisoners. During the first 9 months of the
year, 35 deaths were recorded among prisoners (16 of them killings) as
well as 524 injuries, mostly self-inflicted (in order to escape abuse
from fellow inmates or guards).
The Government is attempting to reform the prison system with
international assistance; however, progress has been very slow. In
September the Seimas adopted a new Criminal Code. The prison department
was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Justice Ministry,
heralding the beginning of practical reforms in the correctional
system. New hygiene norms came into effect in 1999 that require a
certain amount of space for each convict to assure healthy and safe
conditions. However, in 2000 the budget allotted $5 million (20 million
litas) less for running 14 correctional institutions than in 1999.
Funding only covers minimal needs and on average amounts to 75 cents
for three meals per prisoner per day. Thus prison overcrowding
persists, particularly in pretrial detention.
As a result of the funding shortfall and overcrowding, a Law on
Amnesty was passed in April that reduced the number of prisoners and
detainees from 15,000 (as of January 1, 2000) to 9,000 (as of July 1,
2000). As of August 30, there were 7,045 prisoners, including 251 women
and 125 juveniles (2 women). There were 1,612 detainees, including 68
women and 99 juveniles (2 women). The latter are held separately from
adults.
Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that no person may be arbitrarily arrested or detained;
however, there were instances of prolonged detention. Under the law,
police temporarily may detain suspects for up to 48 hours, based upon
reliable evidence of criminal activity and approval by an investigator
or prosecutor. Pretrial detention applies only in the case of felonies
and when it is impossible to prevent flight by other means or to allow
unhindered investigation. A district judge, acting on a prosecutor's
application, may order longer pretrial detention, which can last up to
6 months and may be extended using the same procedure for periods not
to exceed 18 months in total. However, in practice the prison
department admits that pretrial detention has in some instances
exceeded 18 months. The prison department faults a slow justice system
that cannot bring cases to trial expeditiously. Bail in theory is
available, but it is not used widely. The Constitution provides for the
right to an attorney from the moment of detention (see Section 1.e.).
In an effort to cope with the rise in violent organized crime, the
1997 Law on the Prevention of Organized Crime allows for the imposition
of restrictions on the freedom of a person who by his actions might
``restrict the rights and freedoms of other persons, create conditions
for the emergence and development of social and economic preconditions
of organized crime, or pose a threat to public security.''
The Government is addressing concerns that periods of detention
were excessive. The Prosecutor General is stepping up his monitoring of
the investigation of cases, and additional and better qualified judges
are being added.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the judiciary is independent in practice.
The Constitution and the 1994 Law on Courts established a four-tier
court system: The Supreme Court; the Court of Appeals; district courts;
and local courts. The local courts are tribunals of first instance for
all cases that are not assigned to some other court by law. The Supreme
Court's Senate of Judges, consisting of the Supreme Court chairman, the
division chairmen, and other members of the Supreme Court, rules on the
decisions by lower domestic courts that may violate the European
Convention on Human Rights. The Constitution also established a
Constitutional Court and allowed for specialized courts for
administrative, labor, family, and other purposes.
The administrative courts began functioning on May 1, 1999. The
main function of administrative courts is to investigate the legality
and validity of administrative acts and conflicts in the sphere of
public administration and taxation. The creation of administrative
courts completed national court reform, a process that started in 1995.
The Ministry of Justice is moving towards a system of specialization of
judges in district and local courts according to the types of cases.
A new Civil Code was adopted in July. It will enter into force in
July 2001. The Civil Code complies with the requirements of the
European Convention on Human Rights and takes into account the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The Seimas adopted
a Criminal Code in September 2000. It will enter into force
simultaneously with the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was still
under preparation at year's end.
The Constitutional Court, at the request of the President, members
of the Seimas, the Government, or the judiciary, reviews the
constitutionality of laws and other legal acts, as well as that of
actions by the President and the Cabinet. The Constitutional Court's
authority to issue the final word on subjects within its jurisdiction
is unquestioned; it is the country's ultimate legal authority with no
further appeal of its rulings.
The 1996 Law on Commercial Arbitration provides for the
establishment of arbitration institutions and the abolition of the
economic court (abolished in 1998). The law provides for private
dispute resolution by an arbitration tribunal, either organized by a
permanent arbitration institution or by the parties themselves.
The Prosecutor General exercises oversight responsibility through a
network of district and local prosecutors who work with police
investigators--employed by the Ministry of the Interior--in preparing
the prosecution's evidence for the courts.
The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel for
defendants. In practice the right to counsel is abridged by the
shortage of trained advocates, who find it difficult to cope with the
burgeoning numbers of criminal cases brought before the courts. Outside
observers have recommended the establishment of a public defender
system to regularize procedures for the provision of legal assistance
to indigent persons charged in criminal cases. By law defense advocates
have access to government evidence and may present evidence and
witnesses. The courts and law enforcement agencies generally honor
routine, written requests for evidence. By law a judge may decide to
hold a closed trial in a limited number of circumstances.
Government rehabilitation of over 50,000 persons charged with anti-
Soviet crimes during the Stalin era led to reports in 1991 that some
persons who allegedly were involved with crimes against humanity during
the Nazi occupation had benefited from this rehabilitation. A special
judicial procedure was established in 1997 to examine each case in
which an individual or organization raised an objection that a
rehabilitated person may have committed a crime against humanity.
During the first 8 months of 2000, the Supreme Court overturned the
rehabilitation of 15 persons.
Parliamentarian Audrius Butkevicius, a former Minister of National
Defense, was charged in 1997 with several counts of corruption.
According to the Lithuanian Human Rights Association, the case was
based on false information from the State Security Department.
Butkevicius's pretrial detention was prolonged without the decision of
a judge. The parliamentary ombudsman said that there were many similar
cases and confirmed that the authorities had violated the law.
Typically, he wrote, judges and prosecutors wrongly interpret the law
to mean that pretrial detention can be extended automatically when a
case is submitted to a court of law. In 1998 Butkevicius was sentenced
to 5+ years in prison, fined $12,500 (50,000 litas), and half of his
property was confiscated. On May 12, 1999, the Supreme Court rejected
Butkevicius's appeal. Butkevicius's lawyers appealed to the European
Court of Human Rights, and in September the Court agreed to review the
case; but it had not been resolved by year's end 2000. Butkevicius was
released on March 20 after serving two-thirds of his 5+-year jail term.
He resumed his seat in the Parliament. However, the court decided that
he had not completed the sentence at least 65 days before election day,
and thus he was not allowed to be a candidate for the parliamentary
elections in October.
In November the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) announced
that it would try three new cases against Lithuania. The cases were
brought by former Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius, former Kaunas
Police Commissioner Stasys Sipavicius, and businessman Arvydas
Stasaitis. The ECHR found that Stasaitis' entire period of detention
(1996-2000) may have been unjustified. He was charged with large-scale
financial crime. Slezevicius was accused of abusing his position as
Prime Minister when he withdrew his personal funds from a Lithuanian
bank just days before it failed. The case was accepted because charges
against him were investigated for too long (4 years) and never came
under scrutiny in a court of law. Sipavicius spent 10 months in custody
before his trial on charges of abusing his powers in a major smuggling
case. He was sentenced to the 10 months served for neglecting his
duties and released in court. Sipavicius complained that the charges
against him suddenly were changed and that he had not had time to
prepare to defend himself against the new charges.
Through December 2000, the ECHR ruled against the Government in 5
cases involving various breaches of conventions, laws, and regulations
concerning arbitrary detention and the right to a fair trial.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy,
and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The
authorities do not engage in indiscriminate or widespread monitoring of
the correspondence or communications of citizens. However, with the
written authorization of a prosecutor or judge, police and security
service personnel may engage in surveillance and monitoring activities
on the grounds of national security. Except in cases of hot pursuit or
the danger of disappearance of evidence, police must obtain a search
warrant signed by a prosecutor before they may enter private premises.
However, it is assumed widely that law enforcement agencies have
increased the use of a range of surveillance methods to cope with the
expansion of organized crime. There is some question as to the legal
basis for this police surveillance, but there are no known legal
challenges to such surveillance.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice.
Prior restraint over either print or broadcast media and
restrictions on disclosure are prohibited, unless the Government
determines that national security is involved. Under a 1996 media law,
the media created a special ethics commission and an ombudsman to
address complaints and seek conciliation in potential libel cases. This
ombudsman position later was established and funded by the Seimas.
The independent print media are flourishing and comprise a wide
range of newspapers and magazines. Radio and television include a mix
of state and private stations. National television and radio are in the
process of being transformed into an entirely public entity; however,
attempts to make it independent financially from the Government have
lagged.
There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the rights of peaceful assembly and association, and the
Government respects them in practice.
The Communist Party of Lithuania and other organizations associated
with the former Soviet regime continued to be banned.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government generally respects this provision in
practice. A 1995 law grants religious communities, associations, and
centers property rights to prayer houses, homes, and other buildings.
Article 5 of this law mentions nine religious communities that have
been declared ``traditional'' by the law and therefore are eligible for
governmental assistance: Latin Rite Catholics; Greek Rite Catholics;
Evangelical Lutherans; Evangelical Reformers; Orthodox; Old Believers;
Jews; Sunni Muslims; and Karaites. In 1999 the Hasidic Chabad Lubavich
community was recognized by the Ministry of Justice as a part of the
Jewish religious community, thereby gaining the status of an official
religious community that the rest of the Jewish community had enjoyed
since 1995. Other religious communities are not eligible for financial
assistance from the Government, but there are no restrictions on their
activities or property rights. Nontraditional foreign religious workers
must obtain work permits, and they face difficult bureaucratic
requirements in obtaining residence permits from officials who regard
them as representatives of cults and sects. These religious workers
complain of unofficial harassment. There are no restrictions on the
activities of other religious communities. In 1999 the Seimas amended
the Law on Religious Communities and Associations. The amendment
provides funding from the national budget for educational institutions
of traditional religious organizations. The Government Department of
European Law has warned publicly that this amendment discriminates in
favor of traditional religious communities versus nontraditional; the
law is expected to come into effect in 2001.
Under 1995 legislation, the Catholic community has been more
successful in having its property returned than the Jewish community;
an agreement between Jewish community leaders and the World Jewish
Restitution Organization signed in 1995 never has been implemented.
However, some religious property, including 26 synagogues, was returned
to the Jewish community, mostly from 1993 to 1996.
The law provides for the restitution of private property to
citizens, but the deadline for filing claims has passed. A number of
successful claims were made, and others still are pending. A lack of
funds for compensation and protracted bureaucratic obstacles are the
primary problems preventing the return of private property. The
Government has taken no action on the problem of heirless (community)
property and has no plans to do so.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the law, citizens and permanent
residents are permitted free movement within the country and the right
to return to the country, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. There are no restrictions on foreign travel.
Under 1997 and 1998 legislation, the Government grants refugee
status to qualified applicants in accordance with the provisions of the
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol.
There is a registration center for migrants and asylum seekers in
the town of Pabrade, where 30 illegal immigrants were registered in
August, and a refugee reception center for asylum seekers in the town
of Rukla, where 56 persons were registered. Living conditions at the
center for refugees in Rukla are modern, safe, and healthy. The center
has benefited from financing from other European countries. The center
in Pabrade is overcrowded and rundown, but construction was underway on
a new complex there. As of September, of a total of 2,765 foreigners
initially settled at the Pabrade center (since 1997), 1,884 eventually
were deported. Irregular migration reached its peak in 1997. By mid-
2000 it had decreased by more than 400 percent due to improved border
control, the adoption of new and strict laws against human smuggling,
and the more effective detention and return of migrants to their
countries of origin. However, counter to this trend, illegal
immigration from CIS countries and Afghanistan was on the rise. The
Government continued its efforts to stop illegal migrants by
negotiating readmission agreements with Russia and Belarus, the two
countries used by most migrants to reach Lithuania, but no progress had
been made by year's end. A border demarcation agreement with Belarus
was ratified. The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Of 141 seats in the Seimas, 71 are elected
directly, and 70 are elected through proportional representation. Only
those parties that receive more than 5 percent of the total ballots (or
7 percent for coalitions) are allowed representation in the Parliament.
In 1998 independent candidate Valdas Adamkus was elected President
by a narrow margin. Following the resignation of Prime Minister
Gediminas Vagnorius, the Seimas endorsed the 14member Cabinet of Prime
Minister Rolandas Paksas, a member of the ruling Conservative Party, to
carry out the amended program of the Government. Paksas resigned in
October 1998 in opposition to a government oil privatization contract.
The next Prime Minister, Andrius Kubilius, stepped down after the
October 2000 general elections, and Rolandas Paksas, who switched
parties and became leader of the Liberal Union, was sworn in as Prime
Minister.
Women are underrepresented in politics and government, although
there are no legal restrictions on their participation. The number of
female parliamentarians in the new 141-seat Seimas, elected in October,
is 14 compared with 24 in the previous Seimas; as in the previous
government, there is 1 female minister in the new 14-member Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Most government authorities cooperate with local nongovernmental
organizations and actively encourage visits by international and
nongovernmental human rights groups. A key exception in the past was
the Ministry of Interior, which continually refused to release
information on police brutality and statistics on corruption-related
incidents. The Ministry is more willing to share such information;
however, it has released few statistics or reports. The Association for
the Defense of Human Rights in Lithuania is an umbrella organization
for several small human rights groups, all of which operate without
government restriction.
The division of human rights of the department of international law
and European integration in the Ministry of Justice monitors law and
legal practice to determine whether they are in accord with the
country's international obligations.
Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, or ethnic background; however, discrimination
against women in employment and other areas persists.
Women.--The abuse of women at home is reportedly common, especially
in connection with alcohol abuse by husbands, but institutional
mechanisms for coping with this problem are developing slowly. A
women's shelter funded in part with Norwegian assistance is now in
operation. According to one sociological survey published in 1997, 20
percent of women reported experiencing an attempted rape, while another
33 percent reported having been beaten at least once in their lives.
During the first 6 months of the year, 154 rapes were reported, but
only 78 were registered and prosecuted. Official statistics on the
incidence of abuse of women in the home are not reported separately
from other categories of assault. Persons convicted of rape generally
receive sentences of from 3 to 5 years in prison.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Sections 1.b., 6.c., and 6.f.).
The Constitution provides for equal rights for men and women;
however, women continue to face discrimination. Official policy
specifies equal pay for equal work. The Law of Realization on Equal
Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men came into effect on March 1,
1999. The Office of the Ombudsman for Equal Opportunities of Women and
Men was established in May, and the Seimas appointed lawyer Ausra
Burneikiene as ombudsman. The Ombudsman's Office is an independent
public organization, accountable to the Seimas, which oversees the
implementation of the law and investigates complaints concerning
violations of gender discrimination and sexual harassment. The
ombudsman also has some enforcement powers in this regard, and the new
Criminal Code envisions criminal sanctions for discrimination or
harassment. Generally, men and women receive the same pay for
comparable work, but women are underrepresented significantly in some
professions and in the managerial sector as a whole. Women are
underrepresented in businesses. Significant inequalities in society
based on gender continue, and conservative views about the role of
women persist. In 1999 the Ministry of Education and Science abolished
preferential university entrance criteria. Since then the equal
opportunities ombudsman also closely followed admission examinations to
high schools. During the period from March to August, the ombudsman
received 20 complaints based on gender discrimination. During the
period from July 1999, when the ombudsman's office began operating, to
March 2000, 35 complaints were registered.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
rights and welfare through a system of public education and medical
care. The Government provides compulsory, free, and universal primary
school education for children through the age of 15 or 9th grade. The
Government provides low-cost health care for all children. A special
office in the Ministry of Social Security and Labor oversees
implementation of the Government's program for children, and an
ombudsperson for children was established during the year.
The Ministries of Social Security and Labor and of the Interior
share official responsibility for the protection of children's rights
and welfare. By the end of April 1999, the Minister of Justice had
appointed 85 judges in the district courts for hearings in juvenile
criminal cases and cases related to children's rights (adoption and
paternity matters). Starting in 1994, the Children's Rights Office of
the Ministry of Social Security and Labor (also known as the Children's
Rights Protection Council) began to take on many of the functions
formerly handled by the Interior Ministry and its police officers
throughout the country, thereby focusing more attention on the social
welfare needs of children. As of January 2000, the service identified
36,856 children in abusive and dysfunctional families, a 44 percent
increase compared with 1995. The number of such families grew by 65
percent over the same period.
The ombudsperson's office for children, established in November, is
taking over most of the functions of the Children's Rights Protection
Council. In August an adoption service at the Ministry of Social
Security and Labor was established to oversee implementation of the
1993 Hague Adoption Convention. The Office of Family and Children at
the Ministry of Social Security and Labor formulates and implements the
Government's program for family and children.
Child abuse is a problem. Child abuse in connection with alcohol
abuse by parents is a serious problem. The prevalence of authoritarian
values in family upbringing has discouraged more active measures
against child abuse; however, the press has reported increases in
cruelty to children, including sexual abuse, intentional starvation,
beatings, and murder. Authorities reported that two children were
killed by their parents in 1998; however, the media widely reported on
five cases during the year. The penalties for violence and cruel
behavior against underage persons were made stricter in 1999, providing
for imprisonment terms of from 1 to 2 years. No department or
organization collects information on child abuse.
There is one rehabilitation center in the country for children who
have been abused sexually. The Penal Code provides for terms of up to 3
year's imprisonment for sexual abuse and from 1 to 4 years'
imprisonment for exploiting children in the production of pornography.
There is no official data on the exploitation of children in
pornography cases.
Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The 1991 Law on Integrating Disabled
People provides for a broad category of rights and public benefits to
which disabled people are entitled legally. Legal provisions for access
to buildings for the disabled are in place but are not enforced widely;
the vast majority of public buildings remain inaccessible to the
disabled.
In 1999 there were 544,674 adults and 13,276 children with
disabilities. The latest data available shows that in 1998 spending for
disabled persons was $166 million (666.58 million litas) or 1.55
percent of GDP, with various assistance programs being implemented. A
project in Kaunas to build an apartment building for persons with
disabilities has not been finished due to a lack of funds and the
pending privatization of the state institution that was to have
supervised the project. A center for deaf children and a program for
children with special orthopedic problems have been in effect since
1997.
Religious Minorities.--A certain level of anti-Semitic sentiment
persists in the country, reflected in sporadic public incidents of
anti-Semitism and sensationalist exploitation of anti-Semitism for
commercial gain. In November the Prosecutor General launched an
official criminal investigation into anti-Semitic articles published on
October 18 in the national daily newspaper Lietuvos Aidas (circulation
10,000). The President, Prime Minister, and the journalists' union
publicly condemned the articles. The Penal Code provides for a sentence
of from 2 to 10 years' imprisonment for incitement of racial or
national hatred or incitement of violence against foreigners. The
investigation continued at year's end.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minority ethnic groups--
including Russians, Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and
Karaites--make up roughly 20 percent of the population. Members of the
Polish Parliament criticized the Government in February over alleged
discrimination against the Polish minority.
Many nonethnic Lithuanian public sector employees by law were
required to attain a functional knowledge of the Lithuanian language
within several years, although the authorities have been granting
liberal extensions of the time frame in which this competence is to be
achieved. In the first half of the year, 223 persons took the language
portion of the citizenship test, and 209 persons passed. From January
to August, 352 persons were naturalized (compared with 567 in 1999 and
550 in 1998). There is no documented evidence of job dismissals based
on the language law. The authorities have indicated that the intent of
the law is to apply moral incentives to learn Lithuanian as the
official language of the State; they have asserted that no one would be
dismissed solely because of an inability to meet the language
requirements.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on
Trade Unions recognize the right of workers and employees to form and
join trade unions. The Law on Trade Unions formally extends this right
to employees of the police and the armed forces, although the
Collective Agreements Law of 1991 does not allow collective bargaining
by government employees involved in law enforcement and securityrelated
work.
In 1990 the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Union's
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, which includes 23 of 25
trade unions, renamed itself the Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(CFTU) and began asserting increased independence from its Soviet
parent organization. In 1993 the CFTU joined eight other unions that
also had been part of the All-Union Central Council to form the
Lithuanian Trade Union Center (LTUC).
Four major trade union associations work within the trilateral
commission, which is composed of representatives of the Government,
trade unions, and employers' organizations: The LTUC (110,000 members
as of June 2000), the Lithuanian Workers' Union or LWU (52,000
members), the Association of Lithuanian Trade Unions (41,650 members),
and the Lithuanian Work Federation (over 15,000 members).
The Constitution and the Law on Trade Unions provide for the right
to strike, although public workers in essential services may not do so.
No major strikes took place during the year; 56 other labor actions
occurred during the first 8 months of the year.
There are no restrictions on unions affiliating with international
trade unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Collective
Agreements Law provides for collective bargaining and the right of
unions to organize employees, although several provisions reportedly
hinder the establishment of new unions. Probably as a result of the
discrediting of labor unions during the Soviet period, only 10 percent
of enterprises have trade unions. Some 10 to 15 percent of the
workforce is unionized. Collective negotiations regarding labor
relations, including wages, are not very widespread. Workers often
present their own case against their employer. Negotiations are more
common in enterprises that have trade unions.
According to the law, unions, in order to be registered, must have
at least 30 founding members in large enterprises or have a membership
of one-fifth of all employees in small enterprises. Difficulties
commonly arise in state enterprises in which employees are represented
by more than one union. LWU officials charge that managers in some
state enterprises discriminated against LWU organizers and have on
occasion dismissed employees in retribution for their trade union
activities. The LWU also charged that the judicial system was slow to
respond to LWU grievances regarding dismissals from work. LWU
representatives claimed that state managers sometimes preferred the
CFTU/LTUC over LWU unions as collective bargaining partners.
In general trade union spokesmen said that managers often determine
wages without regard to trade union preferences, except in larger
factories with well-organized trade unions. The Government issues
periodic decrees that serve as guidelines for state enterprise
management in setting wage scales. The LWU and the LTUC engage in
direct collective bargaining over wages at the workplace level. Wage
decisions increasingly are being made at the enterprise level, although
government ministries still retain some control over this sphere in
state-owned enterprises. The LWU reports that it supplements its
bargaining efforts with active lobbying in government ministries that
own enterprises.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
specifically prohibits forced labor by all, including children, and
this prohibition generally is observed in practice; however,
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution
is a problem (see Sections 1.b., 5, and 6.f.). Families of women who
are trafficked often believe they have disappeared or been kidnaped.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment of children without
parental consent is 16 years; with the written consent of parents, it
is 14 years. Complaints about the infringement of child labor
regulations generally are referred to local prosecutors who investigate
the charges and take legal action to stop violations. Child labor
problems appear to be rare.
The Constitution specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children, and this prohibition generally is observed in practice;
however, girls are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution
(see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for
every person's right to receive just payment for work.
The legal minimum wage has been stable at $107.50 (430 litas) per
month since December 1999. The minimum wage does not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. The average wage in July
2000 was $275 (1,100 litas) per month, which is a 0.5 percent increase
since July 1999. The Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Social
Security and Labor periodically adjust the minimum wage. Every 3 months
these government bodies must submit their minimum wage proposals to the
Seimas, which has the right to approve or revise the minimum wage
level. Enforcement of the minimum wage is almost nonexistent, in part
because the Government does not want to increase unemployment.
The 40-hour workweek is standard, with a provision for at least one
24-hour rest period. For a majority of the population, living standards
remain low. Some 65 percent of the expenditures of the poorest 16
percent of households goes for food, compared with 30 percent for food
in the top 10 percent.
The Constitution provides that workers have the right to safe and
healthy working conditions. The State Labor Inspection Service
implements the Labor Safety Law. From January to July, the Labor
Inspection Service received 2,169 complaints and declarations, of which
more than 1,458 were found to have merit. Of the complaints, 90.5
percent involved abuses of labor laws while only 9.5 percent dealt with
working conditions. The most numerous abuses include illegal employment
(working without a written contract), wage arrears, and time off.
In October the Seimas passed amendments to the Law on Safety at
Work. The law now complies with European Union directives and outlines
clear responsibility of the employer for the safety and health of
employees at work. The 1993 Labor Safety Law sets out the rights of
workers facing hazardous conditions and provides legal protection for
workers who file complaints about such conditions. Workers may remove
themselves from hazardous job conditions without losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution was a problem. A 1998 law criminalizes trafficking
in persons for purposes of sexual abuse: the penalty is 4 to 8 years'
imprisonment. There were no prosecutions under this statute during the
year.
The country is a source, transit point, and destination for
trafficking in women. Women from Belarus, Russia (Kalingrad District),
Latvia, and the Lithuanian countryside are trafficked to major cities.
Some are trafficked further to Western Europe and elsewhere. Germany,
Israel, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria are major destinations,
based on the figures of women subsequently deported from these
countries to Lithuania.
A number of women, some underage, have been enticed or forced into
prostitution and sold abroad by organized crime figures. Many are lured
by deceptive offers of seemingly innocent jobs such as household
helpers, bar dancers, or waitresses. Women also are tricked into
prostitution through false marriage advertisements. Their families
often are unaware of their predicament and believe that they have
disappeared or been kidnaped. However, it is difficult to determine
what percentage were enticed or coerced and how many departed
voluntarily. Of those returned to Lithuania as deportees, 70 percent
reportedly said that they knew what type of work they were going to
undertake.
Experts from nongovernmental organizations consider government
efforts to prevent trafficking in persons and search for missing
persons unsatisfactory. In July the border police were instructed to
pay more attention to young persons, particularly females, traveling
abroad. Since January statistics on deported persons are being
collected. During the first half of the year, 1,618 persons were
deported back to Lithuania. Most of them worked or attempted to work
illegally, stayed illegally in other countries, or were turned back at
the border. The absolute majority of them are citizens of Lithuania.
There are no specific government assistance programs for victims of
trafficking; however, the police offer protection for witnesses.
The media report extensively on trafficking in persons. A local
nongovernmental organization, the Missing Persons' Families Support
Center, received a foreign grant during the year to conduct an
awareness campaign on trafficking in persons.
__________
LUXEMBOURG
Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic,
parliamentary form of government. The role of the Grand Duke is mainly
ceremonial and administrative. The Prime Minister is the leader of the
dominant party in the popularly elected Parliament. The Council of
State, whose members are appointed by the Grand Duke, serves as an
advisory body to the Parliament. The judiciary is independent.
The Government effectively controls the security apparatus, which
consists of the police and gendarmerie.
Luxembourg has a prosperous market economy with active industrial
and service sectors. The standard of living and the level of social
benefits are high.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
individual instances of abuse.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. The
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
From December 1999 to May 2000, 6 inmates committed suicide at the
penitentiary in Schrassig, which houses 330 inmates. A report
commissioned by the Government cited poor management, rampant drug use,
and an insufficient number of trained personnel at the prison to cope
with the inmates' medical and psychological problems. In October the
Minister of Justice appointed a new prison director and allocated $1.3
million (LUF 60 million) to fund antidrug programs at the penitentiary.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions.
Judicial warrants are required by law for arrests except in cases
of hot pursuit. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must lodge
charges and bring suspects before a judge. Suspects are given immediate
access to an attorney, at government expense for indigents. The
presiding judge may order release on bail.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The independent judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court, whose
members are appointed by the Grand Duke. One of the country's three
Justices of the Peace has jurisdiction over minor criminal, civil, and
commercial cases, and one of two District Courts hears more serious
cases. The Youth and Guardianship Court rules on matters concerning the
protection of young people.
Defendants are presumed innocent. They have the right to public
trials and are free to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence.
Either the defendant or the prosecutor can appeal a ruling; an appeal
results in a completely new judicial procedure, with the possibility
that a sentence may be increased or decreased. In response to a 1995
decision by the European Court of Human Rights, the government
established an administrative court system to review citizen challenges
to legislation.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
The Government failed to act on its 1999 pledge to introduce
legislation to reform an 1869 press law that requires journalists to
reveal confidential sources, following the 1998 police search of a
journalist's office who had alleged corruption on the part of the
Interior Minister.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The
Government requires and routinely issues permits for public meetings
and demonstrations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
no state religion, but the State pays the salaries of Roman Catholic,
some Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish clergy, and several local
governments maintain sectarian religious facilities. The Anglican and
Islamic congregations continued to wait for a decision by the
Department of Religion regarding requests for government funding made
several years ago.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and
provides first asylum. The law provides for the granting of refugee or
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not
expel those having a valid claim to refugee status, and there were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
The country has a refugee population of 4,681, some 4,400 of whom
come from Montenegro, according to government reports. This number
represents more than 1 percent of the total population. In March the
Government passed legislation to create a status of temporary
protection for refugees and to modify procedures to adjudicate requests
for asylum. The Government received some 600 new requests for asylum
during the year. Of the 1,800 total asylum requests examined, 100 were
approved.
In March the Government enacted a financial assistance program to
encourage the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their countries of
origin. In April the Government created a service council to assist
those refugees wanting to utilize the financial aid program. By August
some 280 refugees returned voluntarily to their countries of origin, 5
were forcibly returned to Albania, and 29 were transferred to other
European Union member states under the 1993 Dublin Convention.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Luxembourg is a multiparty democracy. Suffrage is universal and
compulsory for citizens 18 years of age and above, and balloting is
secret. National parliamentary elections are held every 5 years.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
they are active in political life. Of 60 members of Parliament, 10 are
women, as are 4 members of the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction.
Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views.
In June the Government established the Consultative Commission on
Human Rights. This 22-member independent body acts as a consultant to
the Government on human rights issues. The commission can propose
measures to the Government to increase the protection and promotion of
human rights and also serves as the national correspondent for the
Vienna-based European Observatory of Racial and Xenophobic Phenomena.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits racial, sexual, or social discrimination, and the
Government enforces these provisions. Blatant societal discrimination
occurs only rarely.
Women.--In 1999 shelters provided refuge to 368 women and 413
children, a slight decrease from 1998 levels. Information offices set
up to respond to women in distress reported that they received 4,364
telephone calls in 1999. The Government funds organizations that
provide shelter, counseling, and hot lines. Women enjoy the same
property rights as men. In the absence of a prenuptial agreement,
property is divided equally upon the dissolution of a marriage.
The law mandates equal pay for equal work, and the Ministry for the
Promotion of Women has a mandate to encourage a climate of equal
treatment and opportunity. However, according to government reports,
women are paid 20 to 30 percent less than men for comparable work. The
Government cites the interruption in the careers of women caused by
childbirth and their maternal roles as one reason for the disparity. To
date there have been no work-related discrimination lawsuits. Women
constitute 38 percent of the work force.
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The law mandates school attendance from the
ages of 4 to 16. Schooling is free through the secondary level, and the
Government provides some financial assistance for postsecondary
education.
In September at the millennium summit of the United Nations, the
Government signed two children's rights protocols: The Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution, and Child Pornography, and the Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child Concerning the Implications of Armed
Conflict.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. A physicians'
organization estimates that approximately 200 cases of child abuse are
treated in hospitals each year that result in legal proceedings. This
group is working to reform judicial procedures to permit videotaped
testimony in court proceedings and the testimony of child
psychiatrists, as well as the coordination of hospital records in child
abuse cases. In May the Government set up a hot line for young persons
in distress; by the end of the year it had received 183 calls.
In 1999 the Government passed a comprehensive new law dealing with
the sexual exploitation of children. The law increased penalties for
adults who traffic in children, facilitate child prostitution, or
exploit children through pornography. The law also extended the
country's criminal jurisdiction over citizens and residents who engage
in such activities abroad. No such trafficking was reported during the
year.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
people with disabilities in employment, education, and the provision of
other state services. The law does not directly mandate accessibility
for the disabled, but the Government pays subsidies to builders to
construct ``disabled-friendly'' structures. Despite government
incentives, only a modest proportion of buildings and public
transportation are modified to accommodate people with disabilities.
The Government helps disabled persons obtain employment and
professional education. Businesses and enterprises with at least 25
employees by law must fill a quota for hiring disabled workers and must
pay them prevailing wages. The quotas are fixed according to the total
number of employees; employers who do not fulfill them are subject to
sizable monthly fines. The Government provides subsidies and tax breaks
for employers who hire the disabled. There have been no known
complaints of noncompliance with the disability laws.
Despite strong legal protections, the Government acknowledged that
laws establishing quotas for businesses that employ over 25 persons are
not applied or enforced consistently, and there is a particular problem
in the case of persons with mental disabilities. The Government was
reviewing the effectiveness of the disability legislation, particularly
the provisions that establish quotas, at year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers have the right to
associate freely and choose their representatives. About 57 percent of
the working population belongs to a trade union. Membership is not
mandatory. Unions operate free of governmental interference. The two
largest labor federations are linked to, but organized independently
of, major political parties. The law prohibits discrimination against
strike leaders, and a labor tribunal deals with complaints.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for
government workers who provide essential services. Legal strikes may
occur only after a lengthy conciliation procedure between the parties.
The Government's National Conciliation Office must certify that
conciliation efforts have ended for a strike to be legal. No strikes,
legal or illegal, occurred during the year.
Unions maintain unrestricted contact with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for and protects collective bargaining, which is conducted in
periodic negotiations between centralized organizations of unions and
employers. Enterprises having 15 or more employees must have worker
representatives to conduct collective bargaining. Enterprises with over
150 employees must form joint works councils composed of equal numbers
of management and employee representatives. In enterprises with more
than 1,000 employees, one-third of the membership of the supervisory
boards of directors must be employee representatives.
The law provides for the adjudication of employment-related
complaints and authorizes labor tribunals to deal with them. A tribunal
can fine an employer found guilty of antiunion discrimination, but it
cannot require the employer to reinstate a worker fired for union
activities.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor by children and adults, and it is not known
to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
of 16 and requires all children to remain in school until the age of
16. Apprentices who are 16 years old must attend school in addition to
their job training. The Government prohibits forced and bonded child
labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
Workers under the age of 18 have additional legal protection,
including limits on overtime and the number of hours that can be worked
continuously. The Ministries of Labor and Education effectively monitor
the enforcement of child labor and education laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law provides for minimum
wage rates that vary according to the worker's age and number of
dependents. The minimum wage for a single worker over the age of 18 is
$6.34 (LUF 285) per hour. Supporting a family is difficult on the
minimum wage, but most employees earn more than the minimum.
The law mandates a maximum workweek of 40 hours. Premium pay is
required for overtime or unusual hours. Employment on Sunday is
permitted in continuous-process industries (steel, glass, and
chemicals) and for certain maintenance and security personnel; other
industries have requested permission for Sunday work, which the
government grants on a case-by-case basis. Work on Sunday, allowed for
some retail employees, must be entirely voluntary and compensated at
double the normal wage; employees must be given compensatory time off
on another day, equal to the number of hours worked on Sunday. The law
requires rest breaks for shift workers and limits all workers to a
maximum of 10 hours per day including overtime. All workers receive at
least 5 weeks of paid vacation yearly, in addition to paid holidays.
The law mandates a safe working environment. An inspection system
provides severe penalties for infractions. The Labor Inspectorate of
the Ministry of Labor and the Accident Insurance Agency of the Social
Security Ministry carry out their inspections effectively.
No laws or regulations specifically provide workers the right to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to
continued employment, but every worker has the right to ask the Labor
Inspectorate to make a determination, and the inspectorate usually does
so expeditiously.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
from, within, or through the country. In August the Ministry of Labor
denied allegations made by a European Parliament Deputy that Luxembourg
is a ``turntable'' for trafficking in women. The Deputy's report stated
that the Government grants limited entry visas to Eastern and Central
European women to work as performers in cabarets. The Ministry said
that it issued 146 limited visas during the year to women who had
received job offers as janitors, hairdressers, and other similar
positions.
__________
MACEDONIA, FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF
Macedonia, which became independent in 1991 following the breakup
of Yugoslavia, is a parliamentary democracy led by a coalition
government. It has a popularly elected president. In multiparty
parliamentary elections held in October and November 1998, opposition
parties defeated parties of the governing coalition in voting that
international observers concluded was conducted fairly and reflected
the will of the electorate. International observers considered the
conduct of the first round of voting for president on October 31, 1999,
to be satisfactory; however, there were allegations of fraud and ballot
stuffing in the second round on November 14, and the Supreme Court
ordered another vote in most of the country's ethnic Albanian polling
stations, which was conducted on December 5. That final round also was
marred by irregularities; however, international observers concluded
that these likely did not affect the final outcome and resulted in the
election of President Boris Trajkovski. The judiciary is generally
independent, although at times inefficient.
The Ministry of Interior oversees the uniformed police, criminal
police, border police, and the state intelligence service. Municipal
police chiefs are responsible to the Ministry of Interior, not to
municipal leaders. The Ministry is under the control of a civilian
minister; a parliamentary commission oversees operations. The Ministry
of Defense shares with the border police responsibility for border
security. Some members of the police occasionally committed human
rights abuses.
The economy is in transition from Yugoslav-style communism to a
market-based system. Most firms are privatized, large money-losing
state enterprises are being restructured, and inflation has remained
below 4 percent in recent years. However, during the year, the
transitive effects of introducing a new Value Added Tax system, coupled
with a year-end surge in fuel prices, caused inflation to reach about
10 percent. The economy improved substantially after the lifting of the
Greek embargo and the suspension of international sanctions against
Serbia, both in 1995, before which the gross domestic product (GDP) had
fallen an estimated 50 percent. Growth resumed slowly in 1996 and
continued at about a 5 percent rate until the outbreak of the Kosovo
crisis in the spring of 1999. The crisis cut many firms off from
customers in Serbia and made the transportation of goods to and from
other parts of Europe more difficult and expensive. The overall
economic effects of the Kosovo crisis were quite negative, but the
local and regional influx of international funds related to
humanitarian efforts and the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission has
helped stem the economic decline and generated positive growth. The
economy made broad-based gains during the year, and GDP grew about 6
percent. Unemployment was high; the gray economy was large. Some
workers received their pay weeks or months late.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems remained in several areas. Police
were accused of extrajudicial killings involving at least two deaths of
detainees in custody, and the Government took inadequate steps to
clarify the circumstances or discipline responsible officers. Police on
occasion abused suspects and prisoners, in particular Roma and ethnic
Albanians. Arbitrary arrest and detention were problems. The Government
was working to end the practice of police compelling citizens to appear
for questioning, pursuant to a 1997 law; however, incidents involving
the use of such practices still occurred. Another 1997 law imposes some
limitations on religious practices. The Government took inadequate
measures to ensure the security of the electoral process during
nationwide local elections, resulting in incidents of violence and
procedural problems that were strongly criticized by the OSCE. Societal
discrimination against minorities, including Roma, ethnic Albanians,
ethnic Turks, and ethnic Serbs, was a problem. Ethnic minorities
continued to make progress in securing more representation in
Government and politics, although ethnic Macedonians still hold a
disproportionately high number of positions. Violence and
discrimination against women remained problems; trafficking in women
and girls for prostitution was also a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, there were credible reports of
at least two deaths in police custody. An ethnic Albanian suspected of
involvement in the January 11 murder of three police officers died
under suspicious circumstances while in police custody in January. The
official report stated that the suspect died of a drug overdose, but
friends and family members who saw the body before the burial charged
that he was shot. No autopsy report has been made public. A second
ethnic Albanian suspect died in police custody in February after his
arrest for theft. Authorities reported his death to be a suicide, but
his family claimed that he died due to injuries received while being
questioned. On May 14, an ethnic Albanian man died in a Skopje prison.
The Government did not take adequate steps to investigate, to inform
the public, or to discipline the responsible officers in any of these
cases. During a December 1998 police raid on the home of an ethnic
Albanian suspect believed to have stockpiled illegal arms, the
suspect's father was killed by police gunfire. A government inquiry
cleared the police of any wrongdoing, but the incident remained
controversial.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances attributed to government agents.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such treatment and punishment;
however, police occasionally used excessive force during the
apprehension of criminal suspects, and they occasionally abused
prisoners, especially members of ethnic minorities.
Following the killing of three police officers outside Aracinovo on
January 11, police beat numerous ethnic Albanian residents, destroyed
property, and used tear gas in raids. One of the three suspects
arrested in connection with the killings died in police custody (see
Section 1.a.). Human Rights Watch reported that nine other suspects
were arrested and beaten in custody and that some were forced to sign
confessions. An investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman found that
the police had used excessive force in Aracinovo and recommended an
internal investigation. Although some families were compensated for
damage to their property, the Government did little to address police
abuse in the wake of the incident.
There are credible reports of occasional police violence against
Roma, including beatings during arrest and while in detention. Roma
rights organizations also complained of police harassment of Roma and
accused the police of reinforcing patterns of societal discrimination
by consistently siding with ethnic Macedonian citizens in any disputes
involving Roma.
On April 21, police reportedly beat an ``Egyptian'' couple (the
country's Egyptians consider themselves distinct from Roma) near Ohrid
at a traffic stop. The husband, a taxi driver, was arrested for not
presenting the necessary permits, although he later claimed that he had
presented them. Police allegedly beat the man in custody and kept him
in jail for 8 days. According to the European Roma Rights Center
(ERRC), a police officer reportedly beat a 20-year-old Romani man with
a truncheon at the police station in Stip on January 9. Police
reportedly beat a 16-year-old Romani boy in the village of Krivolak on
May 14. Police officers and non-Romani civilians reportedly attacked
and severely beat six Romani men in Stip on May 26.
The vast majority of Kosovar refugees returned to Kosovo during the
second half of 1999; most of those who remain are Roma. Several
thousand Roma refugees are housed in collective centers or in private
accommodations. According to the ERRC, the police allegedly beat and
detained a Romani refugee from Kosovo on September 10. In October the
Roma residents of the Suto Orizari collective center began a series of
protests over the food served to them. The World Food Program (WFP)
inspected the facility and reviewed the food situation; WFP concluded
that the water system at the center was barely adequate and needed
improvements, but that the food rations given to refugees were up to
international standards.
There were three attacks on police stations during the year. On
February 2, a bomb exploded in front of the Directorate of Interior in
Kumanovo. No one was reported injured in the explosion.
There were some incidents of violence during the September
elections. Police beat an opposition supporter; several police officers
were suspended pending an investigation. There were a few shootings by
members of political parties. In another incident, a Member of
Parliament fired into a crowd of demonstrators (see Section 3).
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards; however,
there were two deaths in custody. Prisons meet basic needs of food,
hygiene, and access to medical care. Men and women are held separately.
While juveniles are also supposed to be held separately, limited
facilities sometimes result in older juveniles being confined with
adults.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and
the Human Rights Ombudsman. The Government agreed to allow the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons under
procedures which the ICRC finds acceptable, but has not yet agreed to
commit to those procedures in a binding, written agreement with the
ICRC.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution states
that a person must be arraigned in court within 24 hours of arrest. The
maximum length of pretrial detention was increased in 1998 from 90 to
180 days by constitutional amendment. The accused is entitled to
contact a lawyer at the time of arrest and to have a lawyer present
during police and court proceedings. Arbitrary arrest and detention are
problems. Although the law requires warrants for arrests, this
provision frequently is ignored, and it is not uncommon for a warrant
to be issued some time after an arrest. According to human rights
observers and criminal defense attorneys, police sometimes violate the
24-hour time period within which a suspect must be arraigned and deny
immediate access to an attorney.
The Government has not yet ended completely the practice of police
compelling citizens to appear at police stations through an
``invitation'' for ``informative talks.'' Although a law on criminal
procedures was passed in 1997 that states that police cannot force
citizens to appear for these sessions without presentation of a court
order, the practice continued to be applied on occasion. Roma rights
organizations accuse the police of arbitrarily arresting and detaining
Roma, and there are credible reports of such police actions.
The police continued a pattern of selective enforcement of various
laws and regulations against individuals and businesses linked with the
political opposition. The police initiated a series of raids on
businesses in 1999, seized records, and briefly detained some 20
enterprise directors and officers to question them on charges of
corruption and failure to pay taxes. Almost all of the individuals who
were questioned or whose offices were raided were connected to
opposition political parties, and the raids were widely viewed as
having been politically motivated. The Government publicly defended
itself against media criticism of its actions by releasing information
on the alleged crimes under investigation, but no charges were ever
brought against the subjects of the raids. During the year several
opposition-oriented media outlets and other firms were the subject of
tax inquiries; in one case official action was initiated to tear down
an illegally constructed building erected by an opposition-oriented
media owner (see Section 2.a.). The authorities defended their actions
as being based upon law, but the individuals and firms involved noted
that while tax and construction offenses are very common, the
Government appeared to take enforcement actions mostly against entities
linked to the opposition. A similar police raid in December 1999
against the director of a company involved in a dispute with the
Government resulted in a media outcry and the suspension by the
Ministry of Interior of the local chief of police who conducted the
operation.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice, although the court system is still developing and is
sometimes inefficient and slow.
The court system is three tiered and comprises municipal courts,
district courts, and a Supreme Court. A Constitutional Court deals with
matters of constitutional interpretation.
The Constitutional Court has a mandate to protect the human rights
of citizens but has not taken action in any case in this area. In
addition the Constitution provides for a public attorney to protect the
constitutional and legal rights of citizens when violated by bodies of
state administration and other agencies with public mandates. The
Office of the People's Ombudsman was created and became functional in
1997 (see Section 4).
Trials are presided over by judges appointed by the Republican
Judicial Council (an independent agency) and confirmed by Parliament.
The judges are assisted by two members of the community who serve
essentially as consulting jurors, although the judge makes the final
decision. Court hearings and the rendering of verdicts are open to the
public except in some cases, such as those involving minors and those
in which the personal safety of the defendant is of concern. Trials
cannot be televised, pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code, although
the court in certain cases can authorize the presence of television and
film cameras.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions. Opposition
political leaders accused the Government of wiretapping their
telephones and released some transcripts of telephone conversations
from late in the year that they claimed proved the truth of their
charges. An investigation into the charges is underway.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice.
Several daily newspapers are published in Skopje, as well as
numerous weekly or periodical political and other publications. Most
towns and municipalities have local newspapers. Government-subsidized
newspapers in the Albanian and Turkish languages are published and
distributed nationally by the leading news publishing house. The
Government subsidizes some other newspapers and magazines. The process
of granting media subsidies is not transparent, leading to charges of
political bias in government support for the independent media. Several
privately owned publications have a wide distribution throughout the
country, and some are considered to be oriented toward opposition
political parties. The media that remain partially state owned are
government oriented but report on opposition press conferences and
statements and in general provide coverage of the major opposition
parties. The leading newspaper publisher is still partially government
owned and controls one of only two modern, high-speed printing
facilities in the country, as well as many newspaper kiosks. Following
the parliamentary elections in late 1998, influence over this publisher
passed to the new Government. International monitors noted that the
media provided generally unbiased coverage of the full spectrum of
political debate. However, media outlets often reflected the views of
one or another political party.
Distributors of foreign newspapers and magazines must obtain the
permission of the Ministry of Interior. All such requests during the
year were approved. Media reports indicated that one edition of the
Albanian newspaper Bota Sot was confiscated in Gostivar and Tetovo
because it contained articles critical of the leadership of the
Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). The party denied any involvement
and quickly arranged for the articles in question to be reprinted and
run in the local Albanian language newspapers. Foreign newspapers,
including those from neighboring countries, are available throughout
the country.
State-run radio and television is in countrywide competition with
two private television stations and one private radio station that are
licensed to broadcast nationally. The state broadcast media also face
the competition of dozens of small independent local radio and
television stations throughout the country. The Broadcast Council
issues licenses to broadcasters, in a process that international
observers consider generally meets international norms. License fees
collected from private broadcasters are supposed to help subsidize the
state-run system, but collections are inconsistent. Dozens of illegal,
``pirate'' radio and television stations operate without licenses and
pay no fees.
Individuals and opposition political groups criticize the
Government, but during the year media complaints arose over alleged
intimidation of newspapers and television companies critical of the
Government. The intimidation took the form of law enforcement action
against the media companies and their financial backers in areas such
as tax collection and checks of building permits, areas in which there
is widespread noncompliance among private companies. One notable case
involved the Government's order to tear down a building belonging to
the owner of an opposition-oriented media company because of a supposed
failure to obtain the proper building permit. The Government eventually
reversed its order, but the incident left the impression that officials
were selectively enforcing laws in an effort to control the behavior of
the media (see Section 1.d.).
On May 12, the Government introduced a draft law on information to
replace existing regulations from the Communist era. Local journalists
and international press groups criticized the draft law and provisions
that would require local journalists to obtain government-issued press
accreditation. The law remained pending at year's end.
The Government respects academic freedom. Because government-
recognized higher education is not yet available in the Albanian
language (except for teacher training), some ethnic Albanians claim
that they do not have complete academic freedom. They want to see the
currently unauthorized Albanian-language Tetovo University gain legal
status, or a new accredited private institution to be established, so
that they can study in their native language at the university level
(see Section 5).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. Advance notification of large
meetings is optional; political and protest rallies occur regularly
without major incident. Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of
specific religious facilities, must be approved in advance by the
Ministry of Interior and can only be convened by registered religious
groups (see Section 2.c.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Political
parties and organizations are required to register with a court. More
than 40 political parties are registered, including ethnically based
parties of Albanians, Turks, Serbs, and Roma.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
However, the 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups limits some
aspects of religious practice, although the law does not appear to be
enforced consistently. While the Macedonian Orthodox Church is
mentioned by name in the Constitution, it does not enjoy official
status.
The 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups designates the
Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic community, and the Roman
Catholic Church as ``religious communities,'' while all other religions
are designated ``religious groups.'' However, despite the difference in
designation, there is no legal difference between the two categories.
The law places some limitations on religious practices. For
example, only a citizen may found a religious group. The law also
stipulates that anyone carrying out religious work be registered with
the Government's Commission on Religious Communities and Groups.
The Government requires that religious groups be registered. The
1997 Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups contained a
number of specific requirements for the registration of religious
groups that were struck down by the Constitutional Court in 1999.
Subsequently there was considerable confusion over which procedures
still applied, and several foreign religious groups experienced delays
in their efforts to register. During the year, the Government acted to
make the remaining requirements more transparent, but the process
remained slow and cumbersome. At least one international Protestant
church was granted legal registration, and several others are at some
stage of the process. One Islamic group withdrew its 1998 application
for registration but continues to operate openly without taking further
steps toward legal registration, and the Government has not taken any
enforcement actions against the group. The Government no longer keeps a
count of registered religious groups and communities.
Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of specific religious
facilities, must be approved in advance by the Ministry of Interior and
can only be convened by registered religious groups.
The refusal of the Serbian Orthodox Church to recognize the self-
proclaimed Macedonian Orthodox Church has led to difficulties for
ethnic Serbs who wish to worship in their own church. On several
occasions in 1998 the Government refused Serbian Orthodox priests
permission to enter the country because of the recognition issue. No
Serbian Orthodox priests attempted to enter the country for religious
purposes during the year. In December 1999 a delegation from the
Macedonian Orthodox Church traveled to Istanbul to consult with
Orthodox leaders on ways to end the impasse with the Serbian Orthodox
Church.
On March 10, the Jewish community of Skopje inaugurated a new
synagogue. The Government supported the opening of the synagogue; the
mayor of Skopje and former President Gligorov attended the events.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government generally respects them in practice.
Citizenship in the old Yugoslav system was national, but all
records and processing were at the level of the individual republics,
so some residents at the time of independence had Yugoslav citizenship
that became citizenship in other newly independent former republics.
During the first year of independence, beginning with the adoption of
the Constitution in November 1991, any Yugoslav citizen who had legal
residence (of any duration) in the republic could acquire citizenship
by simple application. The Law on Citizenship adopted in November 1992
established new procedures for conferring citizenship, and under its
transitional provisions citizenship was granted essentially
automatically to any legal resident who applied before November 1993.
Despite this 2-year window of opportunity for residents to become
citizens by simple application, several thousand residents did not
regularize their status before November 1993. Some of these persons,
and others who arrived in the country later, have complained that the
provisions of the Law on Citizenship that followed the transition
period are too restrictive and have prevented them from obtaining
citizenship. For example, after the transition period the law required
applicants for naturalization to have 15 years of residency. The law
also affects many Roma who wish to become citizens, particularly with
regard to difficulties they encountered in establishing residence and
meeting requirements of a regular income. During 1999 the 15-year
residence requirement was lowered to 10 years, in conformity with the
Council of Europe Convention on Citizenship, but the enabling
legislation needed to fully implement the change still was not
completed. New procedures instituted in 1998 have made the citizenship
application process considerably more transparent; the Macedonian
Helsinki Committee has full access to all files, and the office within
the Ministry of Interior that processes the cases works closely with
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in
Skopje. A total of 2,124,599 citizens have established their status
since independence; since the end of the early procedures for gaining
citizenship, 140,495 individuals have applied through the Ministry of
Interior, and about 96 percent of those applications have been
approved. About 2,000 new applications for citizenship are received
annually by the Ministry of Interior.
During the 1999 crisis, over 360,000 Kosovars found refuge in
Macedonia. Following the conclusion of the crisis, the great majority
of those refugees still in the country returned to Kosovo; the
exception were the Roma, who feared returning because of dramatically
deteriorated relations with the ethnic Albanian Kosovars. During the
year, the overall number of refugees continued to decrease, and at
year's end only 7,600 registered refugees remained. In addition
officials estimate that about another 2,000 unregistered individuals
remain. Of the registered refugees, approximately 60 percent are Roma.
The largest number of registered Roma refugees (about 1,200) reside in
the Suto Orizani collective center. Roma also reside in collective
centers at Dare Bombol, Llubanci, Saraj, and Struga. Ethnic Albanian
refugees all reside at the Radusa collective center. In all only about
2,100 of the total registered refugee population reside in centers;
however, the remaining 5,500 live with host families or in rental
accommodations. During the year there were several Roma protests about
living conditions and food at the collective centers, although
international donors and administrators judge conditions to meet
generally accepted standards.
Continued tensions in the Presevo region of southern Serbia also
generated potential for refugee flows during the year, but by year's
end only a small number of Presevo residents had chosen to come to
Macedonia; they did not enter as refugees, but rather as temporary
visitors.
Macedonia provides first asylum, and there were no reports of
persons being returned to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The country's third parliamentary elections were
held in October and November 1998 and resulted in an opposition victory
and a peaceful change of government. The unicameral Parliament governs
the country. The Prime Minister, as head of government, is selected by
the party or coalition that produces a majority in the Parliament. The
Prime Minister and the other Ministers may not be Members of
Parliament. The Prime Minister is formally appointed by the President,
who is head of state, Chairman of the Security Council, and commander
in chief of the armed forces.
The Government was accused by opposition leaders and the media of
harassing members of the opposition prior to the presidential elections
held in October 1999. In the summer of 1999, police conducted a number
of raids on businesses and charged some 20 enterprise directors with
corruption and failure to pay taxes. Almost all of the enterprise
directors singled out for this treatment belonged to an opposition
party (see Section 1.d.).
On October 31, 1999, the first round of balloting in the
presidential election was held. There were six candidates on the
ballot, representing every major political party, including both ethnic
Albanian parties. International observers reported that the conduct of
the first round was satisfactory, and the candidates who received the
most votes advanced to the second round. The ruling VMRO (Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) candidate Trajkovski gained the
majority of the votes cast in round two on November 14, but the
opposition SDSM (Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia) candidate
claimed fraud and appealed the results. International observers agreed
that irregularities occurred in some areas of the country in the second
round, and the Supreme Court ruled that round two should be rerun in
230 polling precincts, all of which were predominantly ethnic Albanian.
The voting held on December 5, 1999, was as flawed as the previous
round, according to international monitors, who reported numerous
incidents of ballot stuffing and other problems in some polling
stations. Trajkovski again gained the majority of votes cast, and the
SDSM filed a list of complaints of irregularities. Claiming that the
Government was incapable of conducting a fair vote in the contested
precincts, the SDSM later withdrew those complaints and did not press
for another repeat of the voting. President Trajkovski was sworn into
office on December 15, 1999.
Nationwide local elections held in September drew OSCE and other
international criticism due to poor organization, sporadic violence,
and voting irregularities. While the voting was calm and orderly in
most of the country, serious incidents of violence caused the polls to
be closed in several municipalities. Irregularities and intimidation in
other areas further marred the process. The worst election day problems
included some blatant cases of ballot stuffing, some smashing of ballot
boxes, incidents of unauthorized persons being present at polling
stations in an intimidating manner, and shooting incidents in Debar and
Ohrid that left four persons wounded. In Debar a Democratic Party of
Albania (DPA) activist shot a Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP)
activist on September 10, although investigators concluded that the
incident was personally ``- rather than politically--motivated. In
Ohrid two opposition members belonging to the SDSM were shot, one in
the head, causing serious injury. Several arrests were made in these
cases, and charges were brought against individuals who had been
identified as participants in violent acts; however, in several cases
the perpetrators remained unknown at year's end. These problems caused
the elections to be rerun in several areas, and the Government did not
act decisively to prevent some repetition of the same difficulties
during the reruns. During the campaign period, six Members of
Parliament (M.P.'s) from the ruling party defected to an opposition
party, and their homes were surrounded briefly by crowds of angry party
loyalists; some property damage occurred before police moved to protect
the homes. Following an incident in which an opposition supporter was
beaten by police during the campaign, several police officers were
suspended pending an investigation. In Skopje approximately 200
demonstrators threatened a Member of Parliament at his home; in
response he fired several pistol shots into the crowd, lightly injuring
two persons. The police, slow to respond to the initial disturbance,
later charged the M.P. with illegal use of a firearm. A local NGO
reported the alleged beating of a group of Roma in the town of Strumica
on September 24, the day of the second round of the local elections.
Non-Romani men allegedly beat Roma in the street with their fists and
rubber truncheons. Many electoral difficulties were judged by
international observers to have resulted from a weak and ambiguous Law
on Local Elections, and they criticized the State Electoral Committee
for not acting to anticipate or overcome those weaknesses.
Although no formal restrictions exist on the participation of women
in politics and government, they are severely underrepresented in these
areas. The Government has two female ministers. In the Parliament, 9 of
120 members are women, an increase from 4 women in the previous
Parliament. In Muslim communities, especially among more traditional
ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect disenfranchised due to the
practice of family/proxy voting through which men vote on behalf of the
women in their families (see Section 5).
A number of political parties represent the interests of
minorities, including ethnic Albanians, ethnic Turks, ethnic Serbs, and
Roma. Two ethnic Albanian parties and the Roma party have members in
the Parliament; the ruling government coalition includes one of the two
major ethnic Albanian parties, as well as the Romani party. The
Parliament includes 25 ethnic Albanian members, 1 Macedonian Muslim, 1
Rom, and a small number of Vlachs. Minorities nonetheless maintain that
political structures continue to be biased against them. Partly to
address these concerns, the electoral law includes elements of
proportional representation. A total of 35 of the 120 parliamentary
members are chosen on the basis of proportionality, while the other 85
members are elected in single-member districts. Some ethnic Albanians
and Roma complain that discrimination against them in citizenship
decisions effectively disenfranchises them (see Section 2.d.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally is responsive to the concerns of human
rights groups. Human rights groups and ethnic community representatives
meet freely with foreign representatives without government
interference. Several independent forums for human rights exist and
operate freely, but their activities have not been prominent.
The Office of the Ombudsman, established in 1997, is active;
however, most complaints filed with the office do not relate to human
rights issues.
The Government allows independent missions by foreign observers.
The Kosovo crisis led many international NGO's to establish new offices
in the country, staffed by scores of international workers; many of
these organizations have a strong interest in human rights issues. The
Government generally has been cooperative in its dealings with these
and other international organizations concerning such issues.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens
regardless of their sex, race, color of skin, national or social
origin, political or religious beliefs, property, or social status.
However, societal discrimination against ethnic minorities and the
protection of women's rights remain problems.
Women.--Violence against women, especially in the family setting,
is a persistent and common problem. Criminal procedures are available
to victims of rape, including limited legal recourse in the case of
marital rape. Cultural norms discourage the reporting of such violence,
and criminal charges on grounds of domestic violence are very rare.
Public concern about violence against women is not evident in the
media, although some women's groups are working to raise awareness of
the issue. Shelters for victims of spousal abuse are operated by NGO's.
A hot line remains open but has limited hours. The Government offers
some limited support for victims of domestic violence, but relies
heavily on international donor support to maintain a hot line and
shelter.
Trafficking in women and girls for prostitution and pornography is
a growing problem (see Section 6.f.). Traffickers have recruited women
and girls from other countries, especially Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania,
and Ukraine, to work as prostitutes in several towns (see Section 6.c.
and 6.f.).
Sexual harassment of women in the workplace is a problem, but no
statistics are available to indicate its scope. Maternity benefits
include 9-months' paid leave, and benefits are received in practice.
Women also retain the right to return to their jobs for 2 years after
giving birth.
The Constitution provides that women possess the same legal rights
as men. Macedonian society, in both the Muslim and Christian
communities, is strongly patriarchal, and the advancement of women into
nontraditional roles is limited. Women are underrepresented severely in
the higher levels of the private sector, although some professional
women are prominent. Women from some parts of the ethnic Albanian
community do not have equal opportunities for employment and education,
primarily due to traditional and religious constraints on their full
participation in society. In Muslim communities, especially among more
traditional ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect disenfranchised
due to the practice of family/proxy voting through which men vote on
behalf of the women in their families (see Section 3).
Women's advocacy groups include the Humanitarian Association for
the Emancipation, Solidarity, and Equality of Women; the Union of
Associations of Macedonian Women; and the League of Albanian Women.
Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of
children; however, in some areas it is limited by resource constraints.
Education is compulsory through the eighth grade, or to the age of 15
or 16. At both the primary and secondary levels, girls in some ethnic
Albanian communities are underrepresented in schools. The Ministry of
Education encourages ethnic minority students, especially girls, to
enroll in secondary schools. Secondary education is free to all.
Medical care for children is adequate but is hampered by the generally
difficult economic circumstances of the country and by the weak
national medical system.
Trafficking in girls for prostitution and pornography is a growing
problem (see Section 6.f.).
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
People with Disabilities.--Social programs to meet the needs of the
disabled exist to the extent that government resources allow.
Discrimination on the basis of disability is forbidden by law; however,
in practice this mandate is not enforced. No laws or regulations
mandate accessibility to buildings for disabled persons.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of 2.2 million
is composed of a variety of national and ethnic groups, mainly
Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs, and Vlachs. All citizens
are equal under the law. The Constitution provides for the protection
of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of
minorities, including state support for education in minority languages
through secondary school and the official use of ethnic minority
languages in areas where ethnic minorities make up a majority of the
population.
Ethnic tensions and prejudices are present in society. The
Government is committed to a policy of peaceful integration of all
ethnic groups into society but faces political resistance and continued
popular prejudices regarding the means to achieve this goal (hiring
quotas, affirmative action in school admissions, education in minority
languages, etc.).
Representatives of the ethnic Albanian community, by far the
largest minority group with 23 percent of the population according to
government statistics, are the most vocal in charging discrimination.
The underrepresentation of ethnic Albanians in the military and police
is a major grievance in the community. Despite government efforts to
recruit more ethnic Albanians, the police force remains overwhelmingly
Slavic Macedonian, even in areas where the ethnic Albanian population
is large. Members of ethnic minorities constitute 8.7 percent of the
law enforcement officers of the Ministry of the Interior; in the
primarily ethnic Albanian cities of Tetovo and Gostivar the respective
figures are 17 percent and 12 percent. To raise the percentage of
ethnic minority police officers, the Government for several years has
set a recruiting quota of 22 percent for enrolling minority students at
the police secondary school. Attrition has kept the graduating classes
from retaining that percentage of ethnic minorities.
The military continues efforts to recruit and retain minority
officers and cadets. The military is composed mostly of short-service
conscripts, drawn from all ethnic groups. The proportion of ethnic
Albanians in the ranks is estimated to be about 25 percent, but the
proportion is significantly lower in the officer corps. Minorities
constitute about 12 percent of the total of officers, noncommissioned
officers, and professional soldiers; about 15 percent of the cadets at
the military academy are from ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities
constitute about 11 percent of Ministry of Defense civilian employees.
The Deputy Minister of Defense and 2 of a total of 10 general officers
are ethnic Albanians.
The Constitution provides for primary and secondary education in
the languages of the ethnic minorities. Primary education is available
in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, and Serbian. Albanian-language
education is a crucial issue for the ethnic Albanian community; it is
seen as vital for preserving Albanian heritage and culture. Almost all
ethnic Albanian children receive 8 years of education in Albanian-
language schools. The number of ethnic minority students who receive
secondary education in their native languages is increasing and was
about 15 percent in 1999, up from 14 percent in 1998. However, only
about half of ethnic minority students go on to high school, partly
because of the lack of available classes in minority languages at the
secondary level and partly because the traditional nature of parts of
Albanian society leads many families in rural areas to see no need to
educate their children, particularly girls, beyond the eighth grade.
At the university level, ethnic minorities are underrepresented,
but there has been much progress in increasing the number of ethnic
minority applicants and students since independence in 1991. There are
eased admission requirements for minorities at the universities in
Skopje and Bitola for up to 23 percent of entering places, although the
quota has not always been filled. In 1991 302 ethnic minority students
attended university; in 1998 1,073 attended, representing about 16
percent of all university students; no updated figures were available
for the year. Most university education is conducted in the Macedonian
language; there is Albanian-language university education only for
students at Skopje University's teacher training faculty, for students
studying to be teachers at Albanian-language primary and secondary
schools. An obstacle to increasing university attendance of ethnic
Albanians and Roma, especially for girls, is their low but slowly
increasing enrollment in secondary education.
In July the Government adopted legislation to address longstanding
demands by ethnic Albanians for university-level courses taught in the
Albanian language with the passage of a new Law on Higher Education.
The new law authorizes private institutions of higher learning and,
under an OSCE sponsored plan, a new internationally funded institution
is being created which would be designed to conduct classes in
Albanian, English, and Macedonian, with initial funding coming from
foreign donors. Plans have been made for construction to begin early in
2001. This legislation was designed to resolve the question of Tetovo
University, a private Albanian-language institution that the
authorities declined to accredit but tacitly allowed to function. The
new, internationally funded institution would allow ethnic Albanians to
study in their own language; however, courses in Macedonian must also
be provided in at least two subjects. The law received the support of
the Albanian party in the ruling government coalition; however, many
ethnic Albanians, who favor recognition and funding of Tetovo
University, did not support the new institution.
The new Government met one major demand of the ethnic Albanian
community in 1999 by agreeing to change the 15-year residence
requirement for naturalization to 10 years (see Section 2.d.); however,
enabling legislation still is pending to complete that change. The new
Government has continued previous governments' rejection of demands for
legalizing use of the Albanian language in dealings with the central
Government and in the Parliament and for allowing official use of the
Albanian flag.
Ethnic Turks, who make up about 4 percent of the population, also
complain of governmental, societal, and cultural discrimination. Their
main complaints center on Turkish-language education and media. One
continuing dispute has been over the desire of parents who consider
themselves Turkish to educate their children in Turkish despite the
fact that they do not speak Turkish at home. The Education Ministry
refuses to provide Turkish-language education for them, noting that the
Constitution provides for education in the native languages of
minorities, not in foreign languages. Some parents have hired teachers
of their own, although this kind of private education is not authorized
legally.
Ethnic Serbs, who constitute about 2 percent of the population,
also complain about discrimination and their inability to worship
freely in the Serbian Orthodox Church (see Section 2.c.).
There were credible reports of occasional police violence and
harassment against Roma during the year. Roma rights organizations also
complain of police harassment of Roma and accuse the police of
reinforcing patterns of societal discrimination by consistently siding
with ethnic Macedonian citizens in any disputes involving Roma (see
Section 1.c.).
In June five Romani houses in Stip burned under suspicious
circumstances; police suspected arson.
Relations between Roma and other citizens were strained during 1999
as a result of dislocations of Roma caused by the Kosovo crisis.
According to the 1994 census, there were 43,700 Roma in the country
(2.0 percent of the population). Romani leaders claim that the 1994
census seriously undercounted the actual number of Roma. There were
incidents of societal violence against Roma (see Section 1.c.). In 1999
approximately 6,000 Roma fled Kosovo and took up residence in the
country. They left not only because of the direct dangers of the
conflict, but also because of the hostility of ethnic Albanian
Kosovars, who widely consider the Roma to have supported the Serbs and
to have committed theft and other crimes against ethnic Albanians
during the crisis. The new Roma arrivals initially were sheltered in a
refugee camp (about 2,000 persons) and under host family arrangements
(about 4,000 persons) that were underwritten by the international
relief community. During the year, all of the registered Romani
refugees were staying with host families or in collective centers. The
presence of these Romani refugees is not popular among ethnic
Albanians, who largely share the view of the ethnic Albanian Kosovars
concerning both Roma and Serbs. Ethnic Macedonians also express
irritation at the new arrivals, many of whom settled in Skopje, and
some of whom frequent busy traffic intersections to beg, wash car
windows, or sell small items. The Macedonian Roma already tended to
occupy the lowest economic position of society, and the new arrivals
added to the ranks of the very poor. Optional Romani-language education
has been offered at several primary schools since 1996, but there has
been limited demand and no pressure for a more extensive curriculum.
According to Romani community leaders, up to 10 percent of Romani
children never enroll in school, and of those who do, 50 percent drop
out by the fifth grade, and only 35 to 40 percent finish the eighth
grade. There is some Romani-language broadcasting.
There are also a number of ethnic Macedonian Muslims and Bosnian
Muslims in the country. Some ethnic Macedonian Muslims contend that
they are identified too closely with ethnic Albanians, most of whom are
also Muslim, and with whose policies the ethnic Macedonian Muslims
often disagree.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form trade unions, but this right is restricted for members of
the military, police, and civil service. Independent trade unions have
been allowed to organize since 1992, when an Association of Independent
and Autonomous Unions was formed. However, there is still a national
trade union. The Confederation of Trade Unions of Macedonia is the
successor organization to the old Communist labor confederation. It
maintains the assets of the old unions and is the Government's main
negotiating partner on labor issues, along with the Chamber of the
Economy. While its officers may tend to oppose strikes because of the
legacy of the past, they appear to be genuinely independent of the
Government and committed to the interests of the workers they
represent.
The total number of strikes during the year was 100 to 150, which
included many protest work stoppages of a few hours or less. The
reasons for the strikes included demands for overdue pay, workers'
objections to government changes in management personnel at some state-
owned entities, and objection to various decisions related to
privatization. Strikes were generally small and confined to company
grounds, although in September 1999 striking workers at a government-
owned smelting plant blocked a major highway for several hours,
protesting government plans to close the plant if a private purchaser
or partner could not be found. Most strikes were calm and well
organized and took place without serious incident.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution implicitly recognizes employees' right to bargain
collectively, a concept that nonetheless is still in its infancy.
Collective bargaining takes place, but in the country's weak economic
environment employees have very little practical leverage. Legislation
in this area has yet to be passed by Parliament.
An export processing zone is being developed with the advice and
financial support of the Taiwanese Government and various Taiwanese
businesses. No date has been set for the beginning of operations.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children; however,
trafficking of women and girls for prostitution and pornography is a
growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The constitutional minimum age for employment is 15 years.
Children legally may not work nights or more than 40 hours per week.
Education is compulsory through grade eight, or to the ages of 14 or
15. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for
enforcing laws regulating the employment of children. These laws are
generally enforced; however, the authorities are reluctant to attempt
to enforce these laws on Roma. The law prohibits forced or bonded labor
by children; however, trafficking in girls for prostitution and
pornography is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The average monthly wage was
about $158. The minimum wage is by law two-thirds of the average wage;
however, it was not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. The average month's worth of food for a family
of four exceeded average incomes by about 20 percent. This economic
situation meant that few workers could support a family on their wages
alone. Many households are dual-income, and many persons take on
additional work, often in the gray market.
Yugoslavia had extensive laws concerning acceptable conditions of
work, including an official 42-hour workweek with a minimum 24-hour
rest period and generous vacation and sick leave benefits. The
Government adopted many of these provisions, including the workweek and
rest period. However, high unemployment and the fragile condition of
the economy led many employees to accept work conditions that do not
comply with the law. Small retail businesses in particular often
require employees to work far beyond the legal limits.
The Constitution provides for safe working conditions, temporary
disability compensation, and leave benefits. Although laws and
regulations on worker safety remain from the Yugoslav era, they are not
enforced strictly. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is
responsible for enforcing regulations pertaining to working conditions.
Under the law, if workers have safety concerns, employers are
obliged to address dangerous situations. Should an employer fail to do
so, employees are entitled legally to leave the dangerous situation
without losing their jobs; however, this does not happen often, if
ever, in practice.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically prohibits
trafficking for the purpose of prostitution; however, trafficking in
women and girls for prostitution and pornography is a growing problem.
Trafficking in persons for the purpose of illegal immigration is not
prohibited specifically by law but is covered by immigration
regulations. The country is a source, transit, and destination point
for trafficking in persons. Traffickers have recruited women from other
countries, especially Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine,
to work as prostitutes in several towns. Women are trafficked through
the country on their way to West European countries, especially Italy.
There are no reliable estimates of the number of victims of trafficking
in the country.
Trafficking in women is not treated as a priority on either the
governmental or nongovernmental level. Trafficking is handled by the
Interior Ministry Department on Organized Crime. The Government
cooperated with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to
provide shelter and assistance to trafficked women on an ad hoc basis
in several cases, and late in the year a small center was opened to
establish such services on a more regular basis.
Police expelled 108 prostitutes from Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Russia in December. Deputy Interior Minister Rifat Elmazi said the
police intend ``to deport all prostitutes from other countries.'' The
Government cooperated with the IOM to arrange passage of these and
other trafficking victims to their home countries. Very few traffickers
have been caught, and the owners of the establishments where the women
worked have either fled or managed otherwise to avoid prosecution.
__________
MALTA
Malta is a constitutional republic and parliamentary democracy. The
chief of state (President) appoints as the head of government (Prime
Minister) the leader of the party that gains a plurality of seats in
the quinquennial elections for the unicameral legislature. The
judiciary is independent.
The appointed commissioner who commands the police is under the
effective supervision of the Government and may be either a civilian or
career member of the force.
The economy is a mixture of state-owned and private industry, with
tourism and light manufacturing as the largest sectors, and it provides
residents with a moderate to high standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with instances of individual abuse. An independent judiciary upholds
the Constitution's protections for individual rights and freedoms.
Violence against women is a problem, and societal discrimination
against women persists, but the Government has taken steps to address
both issues.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them. Prison conditions meet minimal
international standards, and the Government permits visits by human
rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
law prohibit arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions. The police may arrest a person for
questioning on the basis of reasonable suspicion but within 48 hours
must either release the suspect or lodge charges. Arrested persons have
no right to legal counsel during this 48-hour period. Persons
incarcerated pending trial are granted access to counsel. Bail normally
is granted. In June the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the
Government had violated articles 5/3 and 5/4 of the European Convention
on Human Rights by holding a Tunisian citizen in custody for 2 years
prior to trial, thereby denying the accused prompt due process.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The Chief Justice and 16 judges are appointed by the President on
the advice of the Prime Minister; judges serve until the age of 65, and
magistrates serve until the age of 60. The highest court, the
Constitutional Court, interprets the Constitution and has original
jurisdiction in cases involving human rights violations and allegations
relating to electoral corruption charges. The two courts of appeal hear
appeals from the civil court, court of magistrates, special tribunals,
and from the criminal court, respectively. The criminal court, composed
of a judge and nine jurors, hears criminal cases. The civil court first
hall hears civil and commercial cases that exceed the magistrates'
jurisdiction; the civil court's second hall offers voluntary
jurisdiction in civil matters. The court of magistrates has
jurisdiction for civil claims of less than $2,207 (1,000 Maltese liri)
and for lesser criminal offenses. The juvenile court hears cases
involving persons under 16 years of age.
The Constitution requires a fair public trial before an impartial
court. Defendants have the right to counsel of their choice or, if they
cannot pay the cost, to court-appointed counsel at public expense.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. They may confront
witnesses, present evidence, and have the right of appeal.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanctions. Police officers with the rank of
inspector and above may issue search warrants based on perceived
reasonable grounds for suspicion of wrongdoing. Reportedly only the
Home Affairs Minister and the Prime Minister may issue warrants for
telephone tapping, and then only in drug-related cases and matters
relating to national security.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. However, the 1987 Foreign Interference Act bans
foreign participation in local politics during the period leading up to
elections. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
Diverse views are expressed in four daily newspapers, seven
weeklies, and five Sunday editions. A total of 6 television stations, a
commercial cable network, and 19 radio stations function freely.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
state-supported religion is Roman Catholicism. The Government and the
Catholic Church participate in a foundation that finances Catholic
schools. The church transferred nonpastoral land to this foundation as
part of the 1991 Ecclesiastical Entities Act. Parts of the proceeds
accruing from the dispersal of the land are transferred to the
foundation to support free education of church school students.
Students in government schools may decline instruction in Catholicism.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not arbitrarily
restrict movement within the country, foreign travel, or emigration. A
court order may prohibit the departure from the country of anyone who
is the subject of a formal complaint alleging nonfulfillment of a legal
obligation, such as the nonpayment of a debt or nonsupport of an
estranged spouse.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The passage of a new refugee law in
February expanded due process and the protection available to refugee
applicants and formalizes what had been a system of de facto refugee
status. However, enabling legislation and regulations had not been
implemented by year's end. Under the law, the position of commissioner
for refugees, as well as an appeals board will be established. In
addition to the current humanitarian temporary protected status, the
law provides for refugee status, access to free social services and
education, residence permits, and travel documents. Work permits for
refugees are issued on a case-by-case basis.
The UNHCR considers approximately 165 immigrants to be refugees and
another 215 to be applicants. The authorities expel or repatriate those
determined to be ineligible for refugee status. However, the Government
did not force the return of any persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the
September 1998 elections, six women were elected to Parliament, three
in each party, and one received a ministerial post. The Government has
taken steps to include more women in civil service and other government
positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
views
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and law prohibit discrimination based on race,
place of origin, political opinion, color, creed, or sex. The
Government respects this prohibition. Alleged victims of job
discrimination may apply directly for relief to the Employment
Commission of the first hall of the Civil Court in the appropriate
jurisdiction.
Women.--Domestic violence against women is a problem. During the
first 6 months of the year, 235 cases of domestic violence were
reported to the Police Domestic Violence Unit. A special police unit
and several voluntary organizations provide support to victims of
domestic violence. For women who are threatened or physically abused,
the Government also maintains an emergency fund and subsidizes
shelters. During the year, 53 women used the shelters.
The Government set up a hot line in 1996 to assist victims of abuse
through counseling and through referrals to legal assistance and
shelters.
A committee was set up during 1998 to review existing family
legislation and propose amendments dealing with domestic violence. Its
findings were under consideration by the Government.
Prostitution is a serious offense under the law, and stiff
penalties are reserved for organizers. Rape and violent indecent
assault carry sentences of up to 10 years imprisonment. The law treats
spousal rape the same as other rape. Divorce and abortion are not
legal.
The Constitution provides that all citizens have access, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, to housing, employment, and education. While
women constitute a growing portion of the work force, they are
underrepresented in management. Cultural and traditional employment
patterns often direct them either into traditional ``women's jobs''
(such as sales clerk, secretary, bank teller, teacher, or nurse) or
into better paying jobs in family-owned businesses or select
professions (e.g., academia or medicine). Therefore women generally
earn less than their male counterparts.
Women's issues are handled by the Department of Women's Rights
under the Minister of Social Policy. The Minister is a prominent member
of the Government who is also Deputy Prime Minister and the Nationalist
Party's deputy leader. Legislation enacted in 1993 granted women
equality in matters of family law, and a 1991 constitutional amendment
committed the Government to promote equal rights for all persons
regardless of sex. The Government has taken steps to ensure that
legislation is gender neutral to the degree possible. Redress in the
courts for sexual discrimination is available. The Government's policy
on gender abandoned the concept of introducing gender-based quotas in
the civil service. The Government is sponsoring a report to study the
prevalence of sexual harassment.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and health care. It provides compulsory, free, and universal
education and free health care for children through age 16. The
Government voices concern for children's rights and welfare but
addresses those concerns within family law. In September the Government
signed the Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and
the Nairobi Protocol.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. The number of
reported cases of child abuse has grown as public awareness has
increased. For the first 6 months of the year, 434 cases of child abuse
were reported. The introduction of a ``helpline'' telephone number to
report suspected cases of child abuse has been effective.
People with Disabilities.--The law provides for rights for the
disabled. The Persons with Disabilities Act built on provisions in the
1969 (public employment) and 1992 (accessibility) laws. The new law
requires the private sector to apply equal employment guarantees
already in place in the public sector. During the year for the first
time, private development project plans must include access for the
disabled. Government and private sector efforts to advance the status
of the disabled are improving.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 2,000 men of
North African origin are married to Maltese women. This community has a
mosque and a separate school.
Owners of some bars and discos reportedly discourage or prohibit
darker-skinned persons from entering. In a February report, the leisure
industry acknowledged that such incidents do occur and recommended
corrective steps to both the Government and industry. In September the
Government announced that it plans include criminalization of ``racial
hatred'' in proposed amendments to the Criminal Code.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to associate
freely and to strike, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. Only noncivilian personnel of the armed forces and police are
prohibited from striking. There are 36 registered trade unions,
representing about 50 percent of the work force. Although all unions
are independent of political parties, the largest, the General Workers'
Union, generally is regarded as having close informal ties with the
Labor Party.
Under the Industrial Relations Act of 1976, the responsible
minister may refer labor disputes either to the Industrial Tribunal (a
government-appointed body consisting of representatives of government,
employers, and employee groups) or to binding arbitration. The
International Labor Organization Committee of Experts objects to a
provision of the act that permits compulsory arbitration to be held at
the request of only one of the parties, but neither unions nor
employers appear to object to this provision. In practice a striking
union can ignore an unfavorable decision of the Tribunal by continuing
the strike on other grounds. During the first 6 months of the year, one
strike was referred to the Industrial Tribunal.
There is no prohibition on unions affiliating internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are
free, in law and practice, to organize and bargain collectively. Unions
and employers meet annually with government representatives to work out
a comprehensive agreement regulating industrial relations and income
policy.
Under the Industrial Relations Act, an employer may not take action
against any employee for participation or membership in a trade union.
Complaints may be pursued through a court of law, through the
Industrial Tribunal, or through the Tribunal for the Investigation of
Injustices (presided over by a judge of the Superior Court); however,
most disputes are resolved directly between the parties. Workers fired
solely for union activities must be reinstated.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children younger than
age 16. This injunction generally is respected, but some underage
children were employed during summer months, especially as domestics,
restaurant kitchen help, or vendors. The Department of Labor enforces
the law effectively, but it is lenient in cases of summer employment of
underage youths in businesses run by their families. The Government
prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces this prohibition
effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The weekly legal minimum wage is
$96 (44 Maltese liri) for persons under age 17; $99 (45 Maltese liri)
for 17-year-olds; and $105 (48 Maltese liri) for persons age 18 and
over. Additionally a mandatory bonus of $10 (4 Maltese liri) per week
is paid. This minimum wage structure provides a decent standard of
living for a worker and family with the addition of government
subsidies for housing, health care, and free education. Wage Councils,
composed of representatives of government, business, and unions,
regulate work hours; for most sectors the standard is 40 hours per
week, but in some trades it is 43 or 45 hours per week.
Government regulations prescribe a daily rest period, which is
normally 1 hour. The law mandates an annual paid vacation of 4
workweeks plus 4 workdays. The Department of Labor effectively enforces
these requirements.
Enforcement of the 1994 Occupational Health and Safety (Promotion)
Act is uneven, and industrial accidents remain frequent. Workers may
remove themselves from unsafe working conditions without jeopardy to
their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically prohibits
trafficking in persons, although traffickers may be prosecuted under
the Immigration Act for unlawful entry or unregulated status.
There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from,
through, or within the country.
__________
MOLDOVA
Moldova gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and
in 1994 adopted a constitution that provides for a multiparty
representative government with power divided among a president,
cabinet, parliament, and judiciary. International observers considered
the 1996 presidential and 1998 parliamentary elections to be free and
fair, but authorities in the separatist Transnistrian region interfered
with citizens' ability to vote. President Petru Lucinschi's 4-year term
ends in January 2001. The Parliament, which was dismissed at the end of
the year, was composed of: The Communist Party with 40 seats, centrist
parties with 39 seats, a rightwing party with 9 seats, and 13
independents. The Parliament amended the 1994 Constitution on July 21
by voting to transform the country into a parliamentary republic,
significantly reducing the President's powers and changing the
presidential election from a popular to a parliamentary vote. The
amendment also eliminated the President's ability to introduce
legislation for Parliament's consideration. The Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary; while the executive branch has exerted
undue influence on the judiciary, there were indications during the
year that judicial independence continued to increase.
The country remains divided, with mostly Slavic separatists
controlling the Transnistrian region along the Ukrainian border. This
separatist regime has entered into negotiations with the national
Government on the possibility of a special status for the region.
Progress in resolving the ongoing conflict has been blocked by the
separatists' continuing demands for statehood and recognition of the
country as a confederation of two equal states. The Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Russian Federation, and
Ukraine act as mediators. The two sides generally have observed the
cease-fire of 1992, which ended armed conflict between them, but other
agreements to normalize relations often have not been honored. In the
second half of the year, Russian State Commission chairman Yevgeniy
Primakov launched a new initiative for a resolution of the
Transnistrian issue. A Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, enjoys
local autonomy in the southern part of the country. The Gagauz elected
a new governor (Bashkan) and 35 deputies to their Popular Assembly in
free and fair elections in September 1999. The stability of the
agreement on autonomy was put in doubt as differences developed between
the Gagauz and central authorities over the distribution of tax
revenues, budget allocations, and property ownership.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs has responsibility for the police.
The Ministry of National Security renamed by Parliament the Information
and Security Service (ISS) was placed under Parliament's control. The
Border Guards are no longer under ISS control, but are a separate
agency. The ISS has the right to investigate, but not to arrest. The
Constitution assigns to Parliament the authority to investigate the
activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ISS, and ensures
that they comply with existing legislation. Some members of the
security forces committed a number of human rights abuses. General
Aleksei, the head of the Anti-Organized Crime and Corruption Department
under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was suspended from his position
and is under investigation for misuse of funds. The General
Prosecutor's office is conducting the investigation, which was still
ongoing at year's end.
The country continued to make progress in economic reform.
International observers viewed the Government of Prime Minister Braghis
as strongly proreform. The economy is largely based on agriculture.
Citizens and foreigners can buy and sell land at market prices.
However, foreigners cannot buy agricultural land, nor can agricultural
land be resold for a period of 5 years. Over 900 of approximately 1,000
large collective farms have applied for the Government's land
privatization program. By year's end, approximately 634,000 landowners
have received title to almost 1.7 million plots of land. The leading
exports are foodstuffs, wine, tobacco, clothing, and footwear. The
gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated officially at about $312
(3900 lei) per capita but may be considerably underestimated because of
activity in the large shadow economy and underreporting for tax
purposes. According to some estimates, the shadow economy accounts for
about two-thirds of the national economy. The officially reported
median salary is $33 per month (410 Moldovan lei). According to
government statistics about 80 percent of the population lives below
the poverty level and 20 percent of the population is classified as
extremely poor. Some 65.4 percent of the poorest people live in rural
areas. According to the results of the Government's household budget
survey for the first quarter of the year, the monthly disposable income
per person was about $15.50 (193 Moldovan lei) and 92 percent of the
population lives on less than $1 per day. A majority of citizens cannot
afford to buy fish, meat, milk and other dairy products on a regular
basis. Malnutrition is recongnizable in the rates of anemia for
children, and the percentage of young men not physically fit for
military,service. The infant mortality rate is increasing, life
expectancy is decreasing, and deaths in childbirth are increasing. The
GDP increased by 1.9 percent during the year. GDP per capita was $353
(439 Moldovan lei). A program privatizing state-owned enterprises and
real estate based on vouchers issued to all citizens is complete. The
exchange rate remained stable for most of the year, with local currency
depreciation in the beginning of the year and its slow appreciation in
mid-year. Inflation for the year was 18.4 percent. The country has
considerable foreign debt. The economic situation is worse in
Transnistria.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, there were problems in some areas. The police occasionally
beat and otherwise abused detainees and prisoners. Prison conditions
remained harsh, with attempts to improve them are hampered by lack of
funding. While the executive branch has exerted undue influence on the
judiciary, there were indications during the year that judicial
independence continued to increase. It is widely believed that security
forces monitor political figures, use unauthorized wiretaps, and at
times conduct illegal searches. The Constitution potentially limits the
activities of the press, political parties, and religious groups. In
the past, journalists have practiced self-censorship, due to fear of
protracted legal battles. A recent Supreme Court decision tightened the
requirements for bringing such suits. The law also imposes restrictions
on some religious groups. Societal discrimination and violence against
women persisted. The Constitution allows parents the right to choose
the language of education for their children. Trafficking in women and
girls was a very serious problem.
The Transnistrian authorities continued to be responsible for
abuses, including questionable detentions, harassment of independent
media, restrictions on freedom of religion, and discrimination against
Moldovan/Romanian speakers.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings in the country or
its separatist region.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were credible
reports that police sometimes beat and abused prisoners or suspects.
From April 17 to 19, violent clashes took place in Chisinau between
police and students protesting the municipal decision to cancel their
free public transport privileges (see Section 2.b.). Press reports
alleged that Ministry of Interior police used excessive force against
the students. An unspecified number of students suffered injuries and
approximately 400 were detained; however, no official charges were
filed and the students were subsequently released. The Chisinau
municipal Prosecutor's Office was investigating the incident at year's
end. Subsequent protests over wage arrears were peaceful (see Section
1.d.).
A businessman alleged that the police kidnaped his brother for 3
days in July 1999. The police reportedly tortured him, then released
him after charging him with drunkenness and resisting arrest. The
businessman also charged that this was a case of racketeering and
involved persons from the prosecutor's office as well as the police.
The Prosecutor's Office announced in December 1999 that physical
assault charges were pending against three police officers, but the
case was dismissed on April 17 for lack of evidence. There was no
investigation into the racketeering charges.
Conditions in most prisons remain harsh, with serious overcrowding.
Cell sizes do not meet local legal requirements or minimum
international standards. Conditions are especially harsh in prisons
used to hold persons awaiting trial or sentencing. These prisons suffer
from overcrowding, bad ventilation, and a lack of recreational and
rehabilitation facilities. Conditions for those serving sentences are
better only marginally. According to the 1999 Human Development Report
of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2.3 percent of the
total number of inmates are children. There are separate facilities for
children and teenaged prisioners; most are in detention camps. The
incidence of malnutrition and disease, especially tuberculosis, is high
in all facilities. The medical section of the Department of
Penitentiaries released figures of 1,871 inmates with tuberculosis and
124 with HIV/AIDS. Abuse of prisoners by other prisoners or by jailers
themselves, ostensibly for disciplinary reasons, has been reduced by
the dismissal or retirement of some of the worst offending guards;
however, the practice likely continued at diminished levels. The
Ministry of Justice administers the prison system. Attempts to improve
prison conditions are frustrated by a lack of financing.
Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons. Local and
international human rights monitors were allowed to visit prisons in
Moldovia, and Council of Europe (COE) monitors were allowed to visit
some prisoners in Transnistria; however, COE monitors were not allowed
to inspect prisons in Transnistria.
After questionable trials in 1993, four ethnic Moldovans continued
to serve sentences in Transnistria for alleged terrorism-related crimes
(see Section 1.e.). At the end of July 1999, one of the four, Ilie
Ilascu, wrote a letter to the press claiming to be on his 77th day of a
hunger strike and alleging a number of abuses by the Transnistrian
authorities. A member of the OSCE mission visited him in July 1999 and
observed that he did not appear to be in imminent danger. At the end of
1999, he still was claiming to be on a hunger strike. In December 1999,
the wives of all four complained that they were not able to visit,
although they were allowed to send food. In March a Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) official visited Ilascu, but OSCE members were
not allowed to accompany him. None of the visitors made any observation
of imminent danger to the state of health of the prisoner. In May
Moldovan Parliamentary President Diacov visited Ilascu. This was the
first time a senior government official met with him. The visit was
filmed and televised by local television stations (see Section 1.e.).
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited these
prisoners in 1992 and again in 1993 in Tiraspol, but later were denied
visitation. The ICRC continued negotiating with Transnistrian officials
at year's end to visit the prisoners with an international medical
team. In June the Government of Moldova officially requested a retrial
of the Ilascu group in a third country OSCE member state. In August
Ilascu himself conveyed to a visiting Council of Europe official that
he wanted a retrial. Some OSCE member states are considering the
Government's request; however, at year's end, no state had yet
confirmed its willingness to do so.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The former Soviet Code
on Penal Procedure remains in force with some amendments, and
authorities respect its provisions. New penal and civil codes and the
Code on Punishment for Minor Offenses were undergoing hearings in
Parliament. The July session of Parliament decided that the Prosecutor
General's office would no longer supervise the implementation of laws.
Its function was restricted to criminal prosecution, presentation of
formal charges before a court, and overall protection of the rule of
law and civil freedoms. The Prosecutor General's office is under the
judiciary branch. A law was passed during the year to make the
Prosecutor General's office an independent body within the Supreme
Council of Magistrates. Judges issue arrest warrants based on cases
being presented by prosecutors. Under the Constitution, a suspect may
be detained without charge for 24 hours. The suspect normally is
allowed family visits during this period. The 24-hour time limit is not
always respected, especially if a person is arrested late on a Friday
or on a weekend. If charged a suspect may be released on personal
recognizance or pending trial. There is no system of bail, but in some
cases, in order to arrange release, a friend or relative may give a
written pledge that the accused will appear for trial. Suspects accused
of violent or serious crimes generally are not released before trial.
The Constitution permits pretrial arrest for an initial period of
30 days, which may be extended up to 6 months. Detentions of several
months are fairly frequent. In exceptional cases, Parliament may
approve extension of pretrial detention on an individual basis of up to
12 months. The accused has the right, under the Constitution, to a
hearing before a court regarding the legality of his arrest. According
to figures provided by the Ministry of Justice, 3,477 persons of a
total prison population of 9,449, were held in confinement awaiting
trial at year's end (these statistics do not include persons held in
Transnistria).
According to the Constitution, a detained person must be informed
immediately of the reason for his arrest and must be made aware of the
charges as quickly as possible. The accused has the right to a defense
attorney throughout the entire process, and the attorney must be
present when the charges are brought. Many lawyers point out that
access to a lawyer generally is granted only after a person has been
detained for 24 hours. If the defendant cannot afford an attorney, the
State requires the local bar association to provide one. Because the
State is unable to pay ongoing legal fees, defendants often do not have
adequate legal representation.
From April 17 to 19, violent clashes took place in Chisinau between
police and students protesting the municipal decision to cancel their
free public transport privileges (see Section 2.b.). Press reports
alleged that Ministry of Interior police used excessive force against
the students. An unspecified number of students suffered injuries and
approximately 400 were detained; however, no official charges were
filed and the students were subsequently released. The Chisinau
municipal Prosecutor's Office was investigating the incident at year's
end (see Section 1.c.).
The Transnistrian authorities have imposed a state of emergency
that allows law enforcement officials to detain suspects for up to 30
days, reportedly without access to an attorney. Such arbitrary
detention procedures usually have been applied to persons suspected of
being critical of the regime and sometimes last up to several months.
According to a credible report by Amnesty International (AI), many
pretrial detentions in Transnistria fit this description; however,
there were no reports that Transnistrian authorities used this
provision during the year.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the executive branch has exerted undue
influence on the judiciary. Many observers believe that arrears in
salary payments also make it difficult for judges to remain independent
from outside influences and free from corruption. There were continuing
indications during the year that judicial independence was increasing.
Since 1997 prosecutors have the right to open and close
investigations without bringing the matter before a court, which gives
them considerable influence over the judicial process. The Constitution
provides that the President, acting on the nomination of the Superior
Court of Magistrates, appoints judges for an initial period of 5 years.
This provision for judicial tenure is designed to increase judicial
independence. Beginning during the year, judges being considered for
reappointment were required to take a specialized training course at
the Judicial Training Center. At the end of this training, they are
tested. The test is evaluated by the Superior Council of Judges and the
results are considered when making reappointment decisions. This
process was designed to increase the professionalism of the judges.
The judiciary consists of lower courts of the first instance, five
appellate courts (tribunals), a Higher Court of Appeals, a Supreme
Court, and a Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court supervises and
reviews the activities of the lower courts and serves as a final court
of appeal.
By law defendants in criminal cases are presumed innocent. In
practice prosecutors' recommendations still carry considerable weight
and limit the defendant's actual presumption of innocence. Trials
generally are open to the public. Defendants have the right to attend
proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence. Defense
attorneys are able to review the evidence against their clients when
preparing cases. The accused enjoys a right to appeal to a higher
court. Because of a lack of funding for adequate facilities and
personnel, there is a large backlog of cases at the tribunal and Higher
Appeals Court levels. Court decisions involving the restitution of
salary or a position are not always implemented.
To date no pattern of discrimination has emerged in the judicial
system. The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to have
an interpreter both at the trial and in reviewing the documents of the
case. If the majority of the participants agree, trials may take place
in Russian or another acceptable language instead of Moldovan/Romanian.
There continued to be credible reports that local prosecutors and
judges extort bribes for reducing charges or sentences. In January
1999, a judge in the Chisinau economic court was arrested for allegedly
accepting a bribe to reduce a fine against a firm. He was convicted and
sentenced to 10 years in prison.
Prosecutors occasionally use bureaucratic maneuvers to restrict
lawyers' access to clients.
The Constitutional Court showed signs of increasing independence
during the year. The Court reviewed 90 cases during the year, a 40
percent decrease from 1999. The Court declared unconstitutional 16
laws, 1 parliamentary decision, and 4 government acts. In the period
since Parliament passed the July 5 amendment to the constitution, the
court has been called upon to issue a number of rulings on the
interpretation of the amendment and subsequent implementing
legislation. Despite the political rivalry between the President and
the Parliament, the court's decisions have generally been regarded as
fair and objective. On October 10, the Court ruled recent legislation
requiring political parties be registered for 2 years before
participating in elections to be unconstitutional.
There were no reports of political prisoners outside Transnistria.
In Transnistria four ethnic Moldovans, members of the ``Ilascu
Group,'' (one of whom, Ilie Ilascu, is an elected member of the
Romanian Parliament but has never been able to take his seat) remained
in prison following their conviction in 1993 for allegedly killing two
separatist officials (see Section 1.c.). International human rights
groups raised serious questions about the fairness of the trial; local
organizations alleged that the Moldovans were prosecuted solely because
of their membership in the Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD), a
Moldovan political party that favors unification with Romania. Family
members have been allowed access. In April 1999, the Ilascu Group filed
a case with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) against the
Government of Moldova and the Russian Federation. In June 1999, the
ECHR registered the case and began examining it. The ECHR notified both
Governments during the year that it would hear the case and ordered
them to file their responses by September 25. Both governments
submitted their documents on October 25, which were sent by the ECHR to
the Ilascu Group's lawyers. Lawyers for the Ilascu Group are scheduled
to present their case before the ECHR in January 2001. The President of
the Parliament of Moldova, Dumitru Diacov, visited Ilascu on May 16.
This was the first time a senior government official met with Ilascu.
The visit was filmed and then broadcast by local television stations.
International organizations continued to pressure the Transnistrian
authorities to retry the Ilascu Group in another OSCE-member state;
however, by year's end no country had expressed willingness to retry
them. In July 1999, the Transnistrians issued a moratorium on capital
punishment, which in effect suspended implementation of Ilascu's death
sentence.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Prosecutors issue search warrants; however, in some
instances searches are conducted without warrants. Courts do not
exclude evidence that was obtained illegally. There is no judicial
review of search warrants. The Constitution specifies that searches
must be carried out ``in accordance with the law'' but does not specify
the consequences if the law is not respected. It also forbids searches
at night, except in the case of flagrant crime.
It is widely believed that security agencies continue to use
electronic monitoring of residences and telephones without proper
authorization. By law the prosecutor's office must authorize wiretaps
and may do so only if a criminal investigation is under way. In
practice the prosecutor's office lacks the ability to control the
security organizations and police and prevent them from using wiretaps
illegally.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the law
provide for freedom of speech and of the press, although with some
restrictions. The Government does not limit freedom of speech, and the
print media express a wide variety of political views and commentary.
National and city governments subsidize a number of newspapers, but
political parties and professional organizations, including trade
unions, also publish newspapers. Most newspapers have a circulation of
less than 5,000.
Although the number of media outlets that are not owned and
operated publicly by the State or a political party is growing, most of
these independent media still are in the service of a political
movement, commercial interest, or foreign country, and secure large
subsidies from these sources. There are several independent radio
stations, including one religious station, with some stations
rebroadcasting programs from Romania and Russia. There are three
independent television stations in the Chisinau area and one in the
city of Balti. The Government owns and operates several radio stations
and a television station that covers most of the country. A number of
local governments, including Gagauzia, operate television and radio
stations. The Association of Electronic Press was founded in September
1999. The Association of Independent Press was founded in July 1997.
The 1995 Moldovan Audiovisual (AV) law requires a minimum of 65
percent of broadcasting be in the state (Moldovan/Romanian) language.
The law did not specify if the 65 percent rule applied to all broadcast
content or only that locally produced. In August the Audio-Visual
Council (AVC) suspended the licenses of two radio stations and two
television channels for their failure to respect the 65 percent
requirement. On September 20, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
revocation of the licenses and ordered the AVC to enforce the
revocation. A court case brought by the Club of Romanian and Western
University Graduates, against a number of other stations for failure to
respect the 65 percent rule, was decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
This decision forced the AVC to suspend the licenses of several other
radio and television stations. This decision caused much controversy
within the country and abroad. The Transnistrian authorities
immediately proclaimed it further proof of their need to be independent
of Chisinau. The Communist faction in Parliament demanded that the
court decisions be annulled and the audiovisual legislation be
modified. Several groups, among them the Student Association at the
Academy of Economic Studies and a group of performing artists and
composers, spoke out against the closure of television and radio
stations under this law, as did the OSCE High Commissioner for National
Minorities and the Head of the OSCE mission in Moldova. The law also
elicited strong criticism from Russia. The television and radio
stations continued broadcasting despite suspension of their licenses,
because the AVC had no real means to enforce the suspension. In October
Parliament passed an amendment to the AV law, specifying that the 65
percent rule applied only to locally produced broadcast content. This
allowed the AVC to reinstate the suspended licenses, because the
affected stations were primarily repeater stations for foreign produced
material.
The Constitution restricts press freedoms, forbidding ``disputing
or defaming the State and the people'' and political parties that
``militate'' against the country's sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity. These restrictions lack implementing legislation
and are not invoked. In the past, criticism of public figures had
resulted in a number of lawsuits. Consequently to avoid lengthy
lawsuits, journalists practiced self-censorship. The Supreme Court in
1999 overturned an article in the Civil Code that allowed public
figures to sue for defamation without distinguishing between their
public and private persons. Under the Court's 1999 ruling, parties
filing lawsuits must prove that the information was false and
defamatory and published recklessly or with intentional malice. Since
the 1999 decision, the plaintiffs generally have lost in cases where
suits have been filed against journalists and media organs.
Legislation was passed in May giving access to public information.
Journalists and ordinary citizens now have the right to obtain
information from government organizations, which must also provide a
timetable of when they will supply the information; however, at year's
end the Government had not yet put into place the necessary mechanisms
to respond to public inquiries.
The Government does not restrict foreign publications. However,
Western publications do not circulate widely since they are very
expensive by local standards. Russian newspapers are available, and
some publish a special Moldovan weekly supplement. The country receives
television and radio broadcasts from Romania, France, and Russia. A
small number of cable subscribers receive a variety of foreign cable
television programs. Parliament prohibited the use of locally based
foreign media outlets from accepting political ads and publishing
editorials in favor of a particular candidate. Of the two major
newspapers in Transnistria, one is controlled by the regional
authorities and the other by the Tiraspol city government. There is one
independent newspaper in Tiraspol and one in the northern Transnistrian
city of Ribnitsa. At times the independent newspapers criticize the
Transnistrian regime and have been harassed by separatist authorities.
Other print media in Transnistria do not have a large circulation and
appear only on a weekly or monthly basis. Nonetheless some of them also
criticize local authorities. The one independent television station is
trying to enlarge its broadcast radius, but produced less than 10 hours
of programming per week. The official Transnistrian television station,
which previously had enjoyed a virtual monopoly of advertising
revenues, continued to resist the independent station's expansion. Most
Moldovan newspapers do not circulate in Transnistria although they are
available in Tiraspol. Circulation of all print media in Transnistria
is hampered by the closed nature of the society. The independent
newspaper in Tiraspol, the Novaya Gazeta, was effectively shut down
from January to August 1999 through the repeated confiscation of its
press run by the Transnistrian authorities. Authorities did not present
search warrants or court orders authorizing these confiscations. After
a number of legal proceedings in which Transnistrian courts ruled the
interventions illegal, and an intervention by the OSCE, the newspaper
began to publish again in August 1999, although with a sharply limited
circulation and under a modified name (Samya Novaya Gazeta). An
independent newspaper in Ribnitsa was almost put out of business by two
costly libel suits by local officials during the year.
Article 34.5 of the Constitution prohibits censorship and the
Government does not officially censor books, films, or any other media;
however, members of Parliament and other government officials often
contact a media outlet with complaints about their reporting, which
usually results in the criticism being toned down. Internet access is
not limited by the government, but is prohibitively expensive; however,
Internet cafes are plentiful in major cities.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and authorities respected
this right in practice. Mayors' offices issue permits for
demonstrations; they may consult the national government if a
demonstration is likely to be extremely large. On March 20,
approximately 5,000 teachers and other protesters went on strike in
front of the government building, protesting the nonpayment and low
level of teachers' salaries. Although over 500 police officers and
cadets were present with riot gear and gas masks, the protest remained
peaceful.
From April 17 to 19, violent clashes took place between police and
as many as 20,000 students, reportedly from every higher education
institution in Chisinau, protesting the municipal decision to cancel
the students' free public transportation privileges. Both police and
students sustained serious injuries, including broken arms and legs
(see Section 1.c.). It is estimated that some 400 students were
detained over the 3 days. The incident was currently under
investigation by the Chisinau municipal prosecutor's office at year's
end.
On September 7, about 180 pensioners and others demonstrated
peacefully in downtown Chisinau against the municipal withdrawal of
free transportation on trolleys and buses for pensioners. The
pensioners later enlarged their grievances to include a call for a
larger increase in the size of pension deemed necessary to maintain a
decent standard of living. Approximately 2,500 pensioners returned to
protest on November 1, demanding an increase in their monthly payments
and the provision of free public transportation. In December pensioners
staged a small, peaceful demonstration protesting pension arrears;
there was a similar demonstration in support of veterans who had
illegally occupied a building earmarked for parliamentary delegates.
Police did not use force at any of the demonstrations.
The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and
other social and political organizations, and authorities respected
this right in practice. Private organizations, including political
parties, are required to register, but applications are approved
routinely. The Constitution forbids parties that ``militate against the
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Moldova.'' A
total of 30 parties met the requirement of the October 1998 law
requiring 5,000 members and are registered officially. An amendment to
this law, which required that parties must have been registered for at
least 2 years before taking part in elections, was ruled
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in October. Parties
registered for less than 2 years will therefore be allowed to
participate in February 2001 elections.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government generally permits the free
practice of religion; however, a 1992 law on religion that codifies
religious freedoms contains restrictions that couldand in some
instances did--inhibit the activities of some religious groups. The law
provides for freedom of religious practice, including each person's
right to profess his religion in any form. It also protects the
confidentiality of the confessional, allows denominations to establish
associations and foundations, and states that the Government may not
interfere in the religious activities of denominations. The procedures
for registering a religious organization are the same for all groups.
In the territory under effective control of the Moldovan authorities
the Bessarabian Orthodox Church is the only religious group presently
denied registration.
Several religious organizations face difficulties registering or
conducting religious activities in the area under control of the
Transnistrian authorities.
The law on religion as amended to legalize proselytizing--in
principle bringing the legislation in line with the ECHR--went into
effect in June 1999. However, the law on religion explicitly forbids
``abusive proselytizing.'' Abusive is defined as ``an attempt to
influence someone's religious faith through violence or abuse of
authority.'' Although some Protestant groups were concerned that the
previous prohibition on proselytizing could inhibit their activities,
the Government has not taken legal action against individuals for
proselytizing.
Although Eastern Orthodoxy is not designated in the law on religion
as the official religion, it continued to be a strong religious force
and exerted significant influence. A notable example has been that of
the Bessarabian Orthodox Church. The Government denied recognition to
the Bessarabian Orthodox Church in October 1992, March 1996, August
1996, and March 1997. The Bessarabian Orthodox Church was formed in
1992 when a number of priests broke away from the Moldovan Orthodox
Church, which is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. The
Bessarabian Orthodox Church, which sees itself as the legal and
canonical successor to the pre-World War II Romanian Orthodox Church in
Bessarabia (the part of Moldova between the Nistru and Prut Rivers),
subordinated itself to the Bucharest Patriarchate of the Romanian
Orthodox Church. The Government consistently has refused to register
the Bessarabian Church, citing unresolved property claims and stating
that the Bessarabian Church is a ``schismatic movement.'' The issue has
political as well as religious overtones, because it raises the
question whether the Orthodox Church should be united and oriented
toward Moscow, or divided with a branch oriented toward Bucharest.
(Leaders of the Moldovan Orthodox Church appear more interested in
independence than in links to Moscow.) In 1997 the Supreme Court
overturned an appellate court decision affirming the right of the
Bessarabian Church to register with the Government. However, the
Supreme Court's decision was based on a procedural issue rather than on
the merits of the case. The Bessarabian Church appealed the case to the
European Court of Human Rights in June 1998. The Government submitted
its response in February, arguing that registering the Bessarabian
Church would interfere with an internal matter of the Moldovan Orthodox
Church. There was no decision by year's end.
In January 1998, authorities in Transnistria canceled the
registration of Jehovah's Witnesses. Repeated attempts by Jehovah's
Witnesses to reregister have been denied or delayed. Transnistrian
officials regularly confiscate religious tracts from members of
Jehovah's Witnesses, most recently in January, because the group is not
registered properly. According to local leaders of Jehovah's Witnesses,
two preachers were arrested and detained for several days in April
1999. The Church of the Living God has been denied registration in five
towns in Transnistria. Baptist leaders have complained that they are
not allowed to distribute religious literature or organize public
meetings in Transnistria. Non-Orthodox groups complain that they
generally are not allowed to rent property and often are harassed
during religious services.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel
within the country, and there are no closed areas. Citizens generally
are able to travel freely; however, there are some restrictions on
emigration. Close relatives with a claim to support from the applicant
must give their concurrence. The Government also may deny permission to
emigrate if the applicant had access to state secrets. However, such
cases are very rare, and none were reported during the year. It is
generally accepted that a large number of Moldovan citizens are working
in foreign countries without having legal status in those countries.
Figures on emigration from a variety of official Moldovan sources are
statistically inaccurate; however, current government estimates claim
that between 600,000 and 800,000 Moldovans are illegally working
outside the country due to economic depravation. Estimates indicate
that the majority of them are working in Russia, Romania, Ukraine and
Bulgaria. There also are occasional news stories of arrests of illegal
Moldovans in South Africa and South Korea. The Interior Ministry
reported in October that 2,240 Moldovan citizens working illegally
abroad had been extradited back to the country.
Travel between Transnistria and the rest of the country is not
prevented. There are regularly scheduled buses and trains. However, the
separatist authorities often stop and search incoming and outgoing
vehicles. In May 1999, the Moldovan Government established fixed and
mobile ``fiscal posts'' to control smuggling of untaxed goods from
Transnistria.
Moldova is not a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government has no
processing procedures for potential refugees resident in the country.
According to a representative of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) about 10 to 15 people per month arrive in Moldova seeking
refuge. Many originate in Chechnya, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan and
Nigeria. Most are detained at the airport until they can be deported.
The Chechens, Russian speakers who physically resemble resident
Moldovans, are more successful in gaining admission. The Government
formally started cooperating with the UNHCR in late 1997.
The approximately 60 to 100 Chechen refugees who arrived in Moldova
during the year led to controversy between the Government and the UNHCR
over the extent of legal protection refugees should receive. According
to a UNHCR representative, the authorities frequently fail to inform
the UNHCR of the arrival of refugees or disregard UNHCR guidance and
advice. At the urging of the UNHCR, the Government accelerated the
submission of a law on refugees to the Parliament, but it had not been
passed by year's end.
The issue of providing first asylum has never arisen formally.
There were no official reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared prosecution; however AI reported a case in
which such a forced return took place. According to AI, a Kurdish Turk,
allegedly a leader in the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), was seized on
July 13 by unidentified men in Chisinau and flown to Turkey where he
faces charges that could carry a death sentence. Local human rights
organizations charge that the Government failed to follow correct
procedures in the case. There are allegations that national security
officers were involved; however, the authorities deny them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have voted in multiparty presidential and parliamentary
elections in 1996 and 1998 respectively. International observers
considered the elections to be free and fair, but Transnistrian
authorities have interfered with citizens' ability to vote in these
elections.
The Constitution adopted in 1994 provided for the division of power
among the popularly elected President, the Cabinet, the Parliament, and
the judiciary. The President as Head of State, in consultation with the
Parliament, appoints the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, who functions
as the head of government. A minister can be dismissed only with the
assent of the Prime Minister. Some observers believe that the
Constitution does not define adequately how executive powers are to be
shared between the President and the Prime Minister. The President held
a nonbinding referendum in May 1999, asking if citizens wanted a
stronger presidency. Based on a 65 percent positive response, the
President proposed an initiative to revise portions of the Constitution
in August 1999. The proposal sought to create a ``presidential
republic'' with more power in the hands of the chief executive. Two
groups of parliamentarians presented alternative constitutional
amendments to create a ``parliamentary republic.'' On July 5,
Parliament acted on the proposals and voted to amend the 1994
Constitution to transform the country into a parliamentary republic,
significantly reducing the president's powers and changing the
presidential election from a popular to a parliamentary vote. The bill
was sent to the President who vetoed it and sent it back to parliament.
The Parliament overrode the veto on July 21 and the bill became law.
In September Parliament passed implementing legislation. According
to this legislation, three-fifths of the vote in Parliament are
required to elect a candidate, and the vote must be held by secret
ballot. If Parliament fails to elect a candidate in the first round of
voting, a runoff can be held between the two leading candidates. If the
runoff fails to produce a winner, another vote can be held within 15
days. If Parliament fails to elect a president after the second round
of voting, the sitting President can dissolve Parliament.
On December 1, Parliament held the first round of the presidential
election. Two candidates competed for the position of President:
Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin and Constitutional Court
President Pavel Barbalat. Several Parliamentarians did not respect the
secret ballot and the results of the first round of voting were
declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. A repeat of the first
vote was held on December 4. Neither candidate secured the necessary
three-fifths majority of the vote, therefore a runoff was held on
December 6; however, both candidates were again unsuccessful in
securing a three-fifths majority. A second round of voting on December
21 ended in disarray when several parties boycotted the vote,
preventing Parliament from achieving the required quorum to hold the
vote. The Constitutional Court however ruled that the December 21
Parliamentary session, although unsuccessful, constituted the legal
second round of elections. Thus on December 31, Moldovan President
Petru Lucinschi dissolved the Parliament and scheduled new
parliamentary elections for February 25, 2001. His decision to dissolve
Parliament was made on the grounds that Parliament had failed to elect
a new president according to the constitutional procedure and
timeframe, a position supported by the Constitutional Court.
The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and
other socio-political organizations. However, the controversial Article
41 of the Constitution states that organizations that are ``engaged in
fighting against political pluralism,'' the ``principles of the rule of
law,'' or ``the sovereignty and independence or territorial integrity''
of the country are unconstitutional. Small parties that favor
unification with neighboring Romania have charged that this provision
is intended to impede their political activities. The Association of
Victims succeeded in registering as a political party, but a request to
change its name to the National Romanian Party, was refused. Following
an appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the organization could
change its name. The Ministry of Justice followed the decision of the
Court of Appeals and registered the party under its new name in
December.
A law on administrative and territorial reform went into effect in
January 1999 and reduced the number of administrative districts from 42
to 12. New districts included the municipality of Chisinau, the Gagauz
autonomous region, and the Transnistrian region. Citizens voted for
mayors and newly created district and municipal councils in May 1999
elections. Twenty-three parties and a number of independent candidates
participated in the campaign. Although the parties in Parliament won
most of the posts, a leftist party, not in Parliament, gained several
positions in the north, and independents were elected throughout the
country. Transnistrian authorities did not allow citizens to vote in
their region. The Gagauz did not participate in the May 1999 elections
but held separate elections in September 1999 for governor (Bashkan)
and 35 deputies to its Popular Assembly.
In 1991 separatist elements, assisted by uniformed Russian military
forces in the area and led by supporters of the 1991 coup attempt in
Moscow, declared a ``Dniester Republic'' in the area of the country
that is located between the Dniester River and Ukraine. Fighting flared
briefly in 1992 but ended after Russian forces intervened, and a truce
has held since. Russian, Ukrainian, and OSCE mediators have attempted
to encourage the two sides to reach a settlement that preserves
Moldovan sovereignty and independence while granting a measure of
autonomy to Transnistria. In 1997 the Transnistrian authorities signed
a memorandum of understanding with the Government. Since then further
negotiations have been inconclusive, and there was no significant
progress towards a settlement by year's end. In August Russian State
Commission chairman Yevgeniy Primakov launched a new initiative for a
resolution of the Transnistrian issue. The initiative recommended the
federalization of Moldova and the creation of a Russian-led OSCE
peacekeeping force.
Women are underrepresented in leading positions both in government
and political parties, although there are no restrictions in law or
practice on the participation of women or minorities in political life.
Women hold 8 of 101 parliamentary seats. All female parliamentarians
formed a club in September 1999 to unite efforts to improve the social
condition of women and children. The Association of Moldovan Women, a
sociopolitical organization, competed in the 1998 parliamentary
elections but was unable to gain parliamentary representation. Russian,
Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Gagauz minorities are represented in
Parliament, with deputies elected from nationwide party lists rather
than local districts. Debate takes place in either the Moldovan/
Romanian or Russian language, with translation provided.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several local human rights groups exist. They operate without
interference except in the Transnistrian region. The local Helsinki
Watch Organization maintains contacts with international human rights
organizations, as does the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. AI established a
satellite office in Chisinau in 1997 and has become active in the
country, although the authorities in Tiraspol impede its activities in
the Transnistrian region. Amnesty, a local human rights nongovernmental
organization (NGO) unaffiliated with Amnesty International, applied for
registration in Transnistria, as required by the Transnistrian
``Constitution.'' Their petition took 8 months to be approved (as
opposed to the usual 2 months) and their members were called in
separately by the police for questioning. Two members reported they had
received veiled death threats.
Citizens may appeal to the EHCR in Strasbourg if they believe their
rights have been violated or Moldovan laws are not in accordance with
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). In the first half of the year, citizens
filed 50 cases with the ECHR. The majority of the cases dealt with lack
of social protection and salary and pension arrears accumulated by the
Government. At year's end, none of the cases had been resolved. Most
citizens are unaware of the convention and their rights to legal
remedies in general.
Parliament passed the Law on Parliamentary Advocates in October
1997, which created three positions of parliamentary advocates
(ombudsmen) and established an independent center for human rights.
Parliament appointed the three advocates, with equal rights and
responsibilities, in February 1998 for 5-year terms. A parliamentary
advocate may only be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of
Parliament, which gives them substantial independence. Parliamentary
advocates are empowered to examine claims of human rights violations
and advise Parliament on human rights issues. Advocates also have the
right to submit any legislation to the Constitutional Court for a
review of constitutionality, even if no specific case has been brought
before them. The advocates oversee the operation of a human rights
center, which opened in April 1998 with the support of the U.N.
Development Program. The center provides training for lawyers and
journalists, visits jails, tries to influence legislation, and conducts
seminars and training programs. In 1999 with financial aid from the
Government of the Netherlands, it organized eight seminars and 17
training sessions on human rights issues. Of the approximately 7,300
complaints handled by the center this year, the majority involved
private property violations, labor rights, access to justice, personal
security, right to life and personal dignity issues. The center also
held approximately 80 specialized seminars and educational training
programs for police, penitentiary personnel, judges, prosecutors,
public administration officials, and law students.
The Government has supported the work of the OSCE, which has had a
mission in the country since 1993 to assist in efforts to resolve the
separatist conflict. The OSCE participates in the Joint Control
Commission-composed of Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, and Transnistrian
members-which reviews violations of the cease-fire agreement. The
mission generally enjoys access to the security zone along the river
dividing the separatist-controlled territory from the rest of the
country.
The Government has cooperated with the ICRC in the past, permitting
visits to prisoners from the 1992 conflict. In August Transnistrian
separatist authorities agreed in principle to allow the ICRC access to
the four members of the original Ilascu Group, who have remained in
prison since 1993 (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.); however, the visit had
not taken place by year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that persons are equal before the law
regardless of race, sex, disability, religion, or social origin. There
are remedies for violations, such as orders for redress of grievances,
but these are not always enforced.
Women.--Spousal violence is known to occur, although the Government
does not keep official data on incidences of domestic violence. A
prominent women's rights advocate asserts that one-half of women are
victims of domestic violence. The Government supports educational
efforts, usually undertaken with foreign assistance, to increase public
awareness of this problem and to train public officials and law
enforcement officials in how to address domestic violence. The Criminal
Code does not specifically address crimes of domestic assault, and the
Government rarely prosecutes domestic assault crimes under its general
assault laws; however, women abused by their husbands have the right to
press charges. Husbands convicted of such abuse may receive prison
sentences (typically up to 6 months). There is no law on spousal rape.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported 382 cases of spousal abuse
cases during the year, including 95 resulting in serious bodily injury,
10 murder attempts, and 72 murders.
The First Lady and the mayor of Chisinau initiated a project in
October 1999 to open a women's shelter in Chisinau. The city donated a
former kindergarten to a private organization to operate the shelter,
and a member of Parliament was named as executive director of the
organization. By year's end, the shelter had not yet opened due to lack
of funds. A private organization operates a confidential service to
provide support to abused spouses, including a hot line for battered
women. According to knowledgeable sources, women generally do not
appeal to police or the courts for protection against abusive spouses
because they are embarrassed to do so and are not convinced that the
authorities would react positively, as the police generally do not
consider spousal abuse a serious crime. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs recorded 193 cases of rape and 22 cases of attempted rape, an
11 percent decrease from the same period in 1999. Women's groups
believe that the numbers of rapes and incidents of spousal abuse are
underreported.
Trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see Sections 6.e.
and 6.f.).
The law provides that women shall be equal to men; however,
according to statistics, women have been affected disproportionately by
growing unemployment. By law women are paid the same as men for the
same work, although they still are victimized by societal
discrimination. There are a significant number of female managers in
the public sector and in banking. The president of the country's
largest bank is a woman.
Children.--There is extensive legislation designed to protect
children, including extended paid maternity leave and government
supplementary payments for families with many children. Free, basic
education is compulsory for 9 years, and may be followed by either
technical school or further study leading to higher education. The
requirement can change at the discretion of the Minister of Education
or budgetary constraints. During the year, many inadequately funded
schools in the countryside started charging parents for their
children's education. While not technically illegal, it runs counter to
the educational guarantees of the government. This resulted in many
children being kept at home by their parents. Children are sent to work
in the fields or to find other work in violation of the child labor
laws. Some credible estimates state that as many as 25 percent of the
students in the countryside are no longer in school. The health system
devotes extensive resources to childcare.
There are no statistics on child abuse, but it is believed to be
widespread. Observers allege that women begging on the streets of
Chisinau often sedate their babies in order to spend long hours begging
without having to take time out to attend to their babies' needs. Child
support programs suffer from inadequate funding.
The situation of children in the country's orphanages is generally
very bad. Official estimates put the number of orphans at about 10,000,
although NGO's estimate up to 30,000 children. Among the major problems
are insufficient food, warehousing of children, lack of heat in the
winter, and disease. Most of these problems are caused by lack of
funding. One orphanage director lost his job for selling the food
earmarked for the children on the black market. He also was rumored to
have sterilized forcibly a teenage girl in his care.
Homeless children live on the streets of Chisinau and other large
urban areas. Reliable statistical information is not available,
although estimates were as high as 1,000 in 1998.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs announced in December 1999 that it
had uncovered a network trafficking children for purposes of adoption
between Moldova and Uzbekistan. According to the Ministry, 18 children,
most of them under one year of age, were sold in Tashkent during 1998
and 1999 for an average price of between approximately $2,000 and
$3,000 (approximately 25,000 `` 37,000 Moldovan lei). The Ministry of
National Security stopped a similar ring that trafficked children
between Moldova and Israel in 1995.
Trafficking in girls for forced prostitution between the ages of 15
to 18 years is a very serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination against
persons with disabilities; however, there are no laws providing for
access to buildings, and there are few government resources devoted to
training persons with disabilities. The Government does provide tax
advantages to charitable groups that assist the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--There were no reports during the year of
incidents such as that in May 1999 when a group of about 500 Orthodox
Christians led by 4 to 6 priests attacked a small group of Baptists in
the village of Mingir, injuring 3 persons, and partially destroying a
Baptist church.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the 1989 census,
the population is about 4.3 million, of which 65 percent are ethnic
Moldovans. Ukrainians (14 percent) and Russians (13 percent) are the
two largest minorities. A Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, lives
primarily in the southern regions of the country. The Gagauz are
largely Russian-speaking and represent about 3.5 percent of the
population. Official statistics put the Roma population at 11,600,
although estimates from the OSCE and Roma NGO's range from 50,000 to
200,000. The Government announced in September that it would allocate
money from the budget to conduct a national census in 2001; however, no
action had been taken by year's end.
The issue of minority rights and the language issue are closely
related, particularly in the perceptions of the Russian speaking
minority and the Moldovan/Romanian speaking majority. Moldovan/Romanian
was declared at independence to be the state language; however, in 1989
Russian was designated a language for interethnic communication. The
1990 citizenship law offered an equal opportunity to all persons
residing in the country at the time of independence to adopt Moldovan
citizenship. The OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights described the law as very liberal. A new law permitting dual
citizenship went into effect in August. According to this law, dual
citizenship can be obtained through birth, marriage, on the basis of a
bilateral agreement (although no such agreements are in effect), or if
it is provided by an international accord to which the country is a
party. Naturalization requirements of the new law include a
``sufficient knowledge'' of the state language and constitution.
Parliament has postponed indefinitely the implementation of
language testing, which was called for in the 1989 language law and was
to have begun by 1994. According to the law, a citizen should be able
to choose which language to use in dealing with government officials or
commercial entities. Officials are required to know Russian and
Moldovan/Romanian ``to the degree necessary to fulfill their
professional obligations.'' Since many Russian speakers do not speak
Moldovan/Romanian (while most educated Moldovans speak both languages),
they argued for a delay in the implementation of the law in order to
permit more time to learn the language. The Constitution provides
parents with the right to choose the language of instruction for their
children.
In October 1999, the Parliament approved the Government's decision
to grant district status to Taraclia, a region in the south with a 64
percent ethnic Bulgarian majority. The vote reversed the results of the
territorial-administrative reform begun in January 1999, which had
eliminated Taraclia's district status and subsumed it under a region
where Bulgarians would no longer constitute a majority. Voters in the
Taraclia district approved a referendum in January 1999 specifying they
not be included in the larger district, with 88 percent of eligible
voters participating and 92 percent voting in favor of the referendum.
In the separatist Transnistrian region discrimination against
Moldovan/Romanian speakers continued. State schools are required to use
the Cyrillic alphabet when teaching Romanian. Many teachers, parents,
and students objected to the use of the Cyrillic script to teach
Romanian. They believe that it disadvantages pupils who wish to pursue
higher education opportunities in the rest of the country or in
Romania. (Cyrillic script was used to write the Romanian language in
Moldova until 1989, since ``Moldovan,'' as it was then called, was
decreed officially during the Soviet era to be a different language
from Romanian, which is written in the Latin alphabet. The 1989
language law reinstituted obligatory use of the Latin script. As a
result of an agreement between the Government and the separatist
authorities, eight schools in the separatist region obtained permission
in 1996 to use the Latin alphabet, with salaries and textbooks to be
supplied by the Moldovan Ministry of Education. These schools are
considered private schools by the local authorities. They must pay rent
for their facilities and meet local curriculum requirements, building
codes, and safety standards. The Government still has no budgetary
provisions to pay the high rents of such facilities. As a result,
classes were held in local homes or run in shifts in the few available
buildings.
After delaying its opening and threatening to keep it closed,
separatist authorities allowed the Romanian Language School (Latin
alphabet) in Tiraspol to open in September 1999 without restriction
from the authorities. The Ministry of Education and the Romanian
government supplied books to the school and the UNHCR provided
furniture and vehicles. The school is running three to four shifts per
day to accommodate the number of students.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions
enacted by Moldova's thenSupreme Soviet remains in effect and provides
for independent trade unions. Laws passed in 1989 and 1991, which give
citizens the right to form all kinds of social organizations, also
provide a legal basis for the formation of independent unions. The 1994
Constitution states that any employee may found a union or join a union
that defends workers' interests. However, there have been no known
successful attempts to establish alternate trade union structures
independent of the successor to the Soviet trade union system.
The successor organization is the General Federation of Trade
Unions (GFTU). The GFTU's continuing role in managing the state
insurance system and its retention of former official union
headquarters and vacation facilities provide an inherent advantage over
other groups who might wish to form a union. The growing
dissatisfaction with the GFTU's policies resulted in several splits
within the organization; however, these informal splinter groups have
been unsuccessful in forming a new independent union. Virtually all
employed adults are members of a union.
Government workers do not have the right to strike, nor do those in
essential services such as health care and energy. Other unions may
strike if two-thirds of the members vote for a strike in a secret
ballot. There were several labor actions for payment of wage arrears,
including a number of strikes by teachers, health care workers, and
spouses of police officers in various parts of the country.
Unions may affiliate and maintain contacts with international
organizations. The GFTU became a member of the International
Confederation of Trade Unions in 1999.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law, which
is based on former Soviet legislation, provides for collective
bargaining rights; however, wages are set through a tripartite
negotiation process involving government, management, and unions. The
three parties meet and negotiate national minimum wages for all
categories of workers. Then each branch union representing a particular
industry negotiates with management and the government ministries
responsible for that industry. They may set wages higher than the
minimum set on the national level and often do, especially if the
industry in question is more profitable than average. Finally on the
enterprise level, union and management representatives negotiate
directly on wages. Again they may set wages higher than negotiators on
the industry level.
There were no reports of actions taken against union members for
union activities. The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions provides that
union leaders may not be fired from their jobs while in leadership
positions or for a period after they leave those positions. There were
no reports of such firings this year.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced and compulsory labor, and it generally is not known to
occur; however, trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see
Section 6.f.). The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children; however, trafficking in girls for purposes of forced
prostitution is a very serious problem (see Section 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for unrestricted employment is 18 years.
Employment of those between the ages of 16 and 18 is permitted under
special conditions, including shorter workdays, no night shifts, and
longer vacations. The Ministry of Labor, Social Protection, and the
Family is primarily responsible for enforcing these restrictions, and
the Ministry of Health also has a role. Child labor is not used in
industry, although children living in rural areas often assist in the
agricultural sector. Education is compulsory for 9 years (see Section
5). The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children; however there were reports of trafficking in girls (see
Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legal minimum monthly
wage of $9 (100 Moldovan lei), for those employed by the state and
$12.75 (150 Moldovan lei) for those employed by private firms, but this
is used primarily as a basis for calculating pensions, scholarships,
and fines. The average monthly wage of approximately $33 (410 Moldovan
lei) does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. The lowest wages are in the agricultural sector, where the
monthly average is approximately $17 (216 Moldovan lei). Due to severe
budgetary constraints, the Government and private sector often do not
meet payrolls for employees, and workers conducted labor actions to
protest wage arrears several times during the year (see Section 2.b.).
The Constitution sets the maximum workweek at 40 hours, and the Labor
Code provides for at least 1 day off per week.
The State is required to set and check safety standards in the
workplace. The unions within the GFTU also have inspection personnel
who have a right to stop work in the factory or fine the enterprise if
safety standards are not met; however, this right is rarely exercised.
Further, workers have the right to refuse to work, but they may
continue to draw their salaries if working conditions represent a
serious threat to their health. However, in practice the depressed
economic situation has led enterprises to economize on safety equipment
and generally to show little concern for worker safety issues. Workers
often do not know their rights in this area. The Ministry of Labor
reported 83 serious industrial injuries, 38 of which resulted in death
during the year. The Ministry of Labor has announced it will publish a
new statistical report on labor standards in April 2001.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
and it cannot be prosecuted under other statutes, and trafficking in
women and girls is a very serious problem (see sections 5 and 6.c.).
The new criminal code under consideration in Parliament does contain a
prohibition on trafficking in persons. Although no statistics are
available, Moldova is a source country for women and girls, who are
trafficked to various locations, including Turkey, Greece, Italy,
Kosovo, and Israel for forced prostitution. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that more than 50 percent of
the women working in forced prostitution in Kosovo are from Moldova.
Turkey deports approximately 2,500 Moldovan women for prostitution
yearly. Women and girls reportedly are trafficked to Italy and Greece
through Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, and Albania. There are also reports
that women are trafficked to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, France,
Spain, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. A prominent women's
rights activist and member of Parliament states that more than 10,000
Moldovan women are working as prostitutes in other countries. The large
profits of the trafficking industry allow traffickers to exploit
opportunities for the corruption of officials. There have been
unsubstantiated reports by local NGO's of involvement by government
officials; however, no official charges have been made. Women and girls
accept job offers in other countries, ostensibly as dancers, models,
nannies, or housekeepers. Then traffickers take their passports,
require them to ``repay'' a sizeable sum, and force them into sexual
bondage. It is common for traffickers to recruit women from rural
villages; the women are brought to larger cities and then trafficked
abroad.
Apart from a 1999 documentary shown on state television the
problem, the Government has taken few steps to prevent the trafficking
of women or to assist victims; however, it slowly is beginning to
address the problem. In addition to participating in a Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Human Trafficking Task Force,
the Government started a working group in May to implement a project of
the IOM on trafficking in women and girls. The group consists of the
Vice-Prime Minister, the Ministers of Labor, Justice, and External
Affairs, and three Parliamentarians involved in women's issues. The
group created a special law enforcement unit within the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, during the year. The Ministry of Internal Affairs
proposed strengthening laws against trafficking in women in the new
criminal code; however, the amendment had not yet been sent to
Parliament by year's end. There are no government-operated assistance
programs for victims.
Several NGO's made efforts, with foreign assistance, to combat the
problem through information campaigns and job training for women. Save
the Children works with victims, especially repatriated girls. There
are also local NGO's involved in public school programs to educate
young women about the dangers of prostitution and to establish a hot
line for those in need of advice. The IOM established an office in
Chisinau in January.
__________
MONACO
Monaco is a constitutional monarchy in which the sovereign Prince
plays a leading role in governing the country. The Prince appoints the
four-member Government, headed by a Minister of State chosen by the
Prince from a list of candidates proposed by France. The other three
members are the Counselor for the Interior (who is usually French), the
Counselor for Public Works and Social Affairs, and the Counselor for
Finance and the Economy. Each is responsible to the Prince. Legislative
power is shared between the Prince and the popularly elected 18-member
National Council. In addition, there are three consultative bodies
whose members are appointed by the Prince: The 7-member Crown Council;
the 12-member Council of State; and the 30-member Economic Council,
which includes representatives of employers and trade unions.
In addition to the national police force, the ``Carabiniers du
Prince'' carry out security functions. Government officials control
both forces.
The principal economic activities are services and banking, light
manufacturing, and tourism.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. The Constitution distinguishes
between those rights that are provided for all residents and those that
apply only to the approximately 5,000 residents who hold Monegasque
nationality. The latter enjoy free education, financial assistance in
case of unemployment or illness, and the right to vote and hold
elective office. Women traditionally have played a less active role
than men in public life, but this is changing; women currently hold
both elective and appointive offices.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them. Prison conditions meet or
exceed minimum international standards, and the Government permits
visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
observes these prohibitions. Arrest warrants are required, except when
a suspect is arrested while committing an offense. The police must
bring detainees before a judge within 24 hours to be informed of the
charges against them and of their rights under the law. Most detainees
are released without bail, but the investigating magistrate may order
detention on grounds that the suspect either might flee or interfere
with the investigation of the case. The magistrate may extend the
initial 2-month detention for additional 2-month periods indefinitely.
The magistrate may permit family members to see detainees.
The Government does not use forced exile on its own nationals .
However, sometimes it expels non-Monegasque nationals who violate of
residency laws or who have committed minor offenses, such as disorderly
conduct.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the 1962 Constitution, the
Prince delegated his judicial powers to an independent judiciary. The
law provides for a fair, public trial, and an independent judiciary
respects these provisions. The defendant has the right to be present
and the right to counsel, at public expense if necessary. As under
French law, a three-judge tribunal considers the evidence collected by
the investigating magistrate and hears the arguments made by the
prosecuting and defense attorneys. The defendant enjoys a presumption
of innocence and the right of appeal.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices and
Government authorities generally respect these rights in practice.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. However, the Monegasque Penal Code prohibits public
denunciations of the ruling family, a provision that the media respect
in practice. Several periodicals are published. Foreign newspapers and
magazines circulate freely, including French journals that specifically
cover news in the Principality. Foreign radio and television are
received without restriction. There are no restrictions in the access
to the Internet. Stations that broadcast from the Principality operate
in accordance with French and Italian regulations.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides citizens with the rights of peaceful assembly and association.
Outdoor meetings require police authorization, which is not withheld
for political or arbitrary reasons. Formal associations must be
registered and authorized by the Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government respects this right in practice. Roman Catholicism
is the state religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Residents move freely within the country
and across its open borders with France. Monegasque nationals enjoy the
rights of emigration and repatriation. They can be deprived of their
nationality only for specified acts, including naturalization in a
foreign state. Only the Prince can grant or restore Monegasque
nationality, but he is obliged by the Constitution to consult the Crown
Council on each case before deciding.
In light of its bilateral arrangements with France, the Government
does not grant political asylum or refugee status unless the request
also meets French criteria for such cases. The number of cases is very
small. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Authority to change the government and to initiate laws rests with
the Prince. The 1962 Constitution cannot be suspended, but it can be
revised by common agreement between the Prince and the elected National
Council. The Prince plays an active role in Government. He names the
Minister of State (in effect, the Prime Minister) from a list of names
proposed by the French Government. He names as well the three
Counselors of Government (of whom the one responsible for the interior
is usually a French national). Together the four constitute the
Government. Each is responsible to the Prince.
Only the Prince may initiate legislation, but the 18-member
National Council may propose legislation to the Government. All
legislation and the adoption of the budget require the Council's
assent. Elections for National Council members, which are held every 5
years, are based on universal adult suffrage and secret balloting. Both
political parties currently are represented on the Council. There is
one independent member.
The Constitution provides for three consultative bodies. The seven-
member Crown Council (composed exclusively of Monegasque nationals)
must be consulted by the Prince on certain questions of national
importance. He may choose to consult it on other matters as well. The
12-member Council of State advises the Prince on proposed legislation
and regulations. The 30-member Economic Council advises the government
on social, financial, and economic questions. One-third of its members
come from the trade union movement, and one-third from the employers'
federation.
Women are active in public service. The Mayor of Monaco, one member
of the Crown Council, four members of the National Council, and four
members of the Economic Council are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
While the Government imposes no impediments to the establishment or
operation of local groups devoted to monitoring human rights, no such
groups have been formed. Outside groups have not sought to investigate
human rights conditions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that all Monegasque nationals are equal
before the law. It differentiates between rights that are accorded to
nationals (including preference in employment, free education, and
assistance to the ill or unemployed) and those accorded all residents
for example, freedom of religion and inviolability of the home.
Women.--Reported instances of violence against women are rare.
Marital violence is prohibited strictly and any wife who is a victim
may bring criminal charges against her husband. Women are represented
fairly well in the professions; they are represented less well in
business. The law governing transmission of citizenship provides for
equality of treatment between men and women who are Monegasque by
birth. However, women who acquire Monegasque citizenship by
naturalization cannot transmit it to their children, whereas
naturalized male citizens can.
Children.--The Government is committed fully to the protection of
children's rights and welfare and has well-funded public education and
health care programs. The Government provides compulsory free and
universal education for children. There is no societal pattern of abuse
of children.
People with Disabilities.--The Government mandated that public
buildings provide access for the disabled, and this objective has been
largely accomplished.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers are free to form unions, but
fewer than 10 percent of workers are unionized, and relatively few of
these reside in the Principality. Unions are independent of both the
Government and the Monegasque political parties. The Monegasque
Confederation of Unions is not affiliated with any larger labor
organization but is free to join international bodies.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike in conformity
with relevant legislation. However, government workers may not strike.
Strikes are rare. The last strike occurred in 1996, when the Monegasque
Confederation of Unions organized a 1-day work stoppage by bank,
transportation, and factory employees.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the free exercise of union activity. Agreements on working
conditions are negotiated between organizations representing employers
in a given sector of the economy and the respective union. Antiunion
discrimination is prohibited. Union representatives can be fired only
with the agreement of a commission that includes two members from the
employers' association and two from the labor movement. Allegations
that an employee was fired for union activity may be brought before the
Labor Court, which can order redress, such as the payment of damages
with interest.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and enforces
this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years; those
employing children under that age can be punished under criminal law.
Special restrictions apply to the hiring, work times, and other
conditions of workers 16 to 18 years old. The Constitution prohibits
forced and bonded child labor, and the government enforces this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for full-
time work is the French minimum wage plus 5 percent, that is
approximately $6.90 (42.76 French francs) per hour. The 5 percent
adjustment is intended to compensate for the travel costs of the three-
quarters of the workforce who commute daily from France. The minimum
wage is adequate to provide a decent living for a worker and family.
Most workers receive more than the minimum. The legal workweek is 39
hours. Health and safety standards are fixed by law and government
decree. These standards are enforced by health and safety committees in
the workplace and by the government Labor Inspector.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
to, from, within or through the country.
__________
THE NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary
legislative system. Executive authority is exercised by the Prime
Minister and Cabinet representing the governing political parties
(traditionally a coalition of at least two major parties). The
bicameral Parliament is elected through free and fair elections. The
judiciary is independent.
Regional police forces are primarily responsible for maintaining
internal security. The police, the royal constabulary, and
investigative organizations concerned with internal and external
security are under effective civilian authority.
The market-based economy is export oriented and features a mixture
of industry, services, and agriculture. Key industries include
chemicals, oil refining, natural gas, machinery, and electronics. The
agricultural sector produces fruit, vegetables, flowers, meat, and
dairy products. Living standards and the level of social benefits are
high. Unemployment is 2.7 percent; however, long-term unemployment,
particularly among ethnic minorities, remains a problem.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Problems include violence and
discrimination against women, child abuse, trafficking in women and
children, and discrimination against minorities. The Government is
taking steps to deal with all of these problems.
Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, which are two autonomous
regions of the kingdom, also feature parliamentary systems and full
constitutional protection of human rights. In practice respect for
human rights in these islands generally is little different from that
in the European Netherlands. The islands' prison conditions remain
substandard.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
The Government took steps in 1999 to facilitate the filing of
complaints about police behavior, to create uniform complaint
procedures, and to ensure that complaints are assessed by an
independent committee.
Prison conditions in the Netherlands meet minimum international
standards, and the Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
The Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has urged the
Governments of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba to
improve the ``inhuman'' conditions in Curacao's Koraal Specht prison
and in cell blocks at the police stations on the islands of St.
Maarten, Bonaire, and Aruba. The CPT's criticism focused on
overcrowding, extremely poor sanitary conditions, poor food, and
insufficient ventilation. The Committee also criticized widespread
corruption and the mistreatment of prisoners by guards at Koraal
Specht. In May the CPT specifically criticized the Government for not
doing enough to prevent outbursts of violence among prisoners--
including sexual assaults--and the use of riot police to guard
prisoners at the Koraal Specht prison.
The Dutch Government repeatedly offered financial assistance to the
Government of the Netherlands Antilles for the construction of a new
juvenile wing, a maximum security facility, and other improvements at
Koraal Specht. The Government also sent experts on prison organization
and the training of guards. Steady progress has been made in improving
conditions (prisoners now have mattresses, hygiene and food have
improved, and construction began on a new wing to relieve
overcrowding). The entire prison complex is being renovated, and a new
facility is being built. The Antillean Government reached agreement
with a private company to supply expert personnel who are to reorganize
prison management and train mid-level staff during a period of 1 year.
The management team began work on September 1 and is being paid by the
Dutch Government. New wardens and security guards also were hired.
The Governments of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba allow access
by nongovernmental organizations to prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this
prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code. A pyramidal
system of cantonal, district, and appellate courts handles both
criminal and civil cases. The Supreme Court acts as the highest
appellate court and ensures the uniform interpretation of the law. In
criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of innocence and
the right to public trial, to counsel (virtually free for low income
persons), and to appeal. The law provides for the right to a fair
trial, and the independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. State
subsidies are provided to religious organizations that maintain
educational facilities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports
of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to refugee
status. The Government does not provide first asylum as such, but most
asylum seekers (86 percent in 1999), except those who obviously came
from a ``safe country of origin'' or stayed for some time in a ``safe
third country,'' are permitted to apply for resident status. In 1999
the Government turned down 75 percent of the asylum requests that were
processed. However, up to 30 percent of those whose applications were
denied nonetheless were permitted to stay temporarily on humanitarian
grounds or as long as their country of origin was considered unsafe.
The Government's asylum policy is designed to protect genuine
refugees while excluding economic migrants and illegal immigrants. In
the early 1990's, the Government adopted several measures to curb the
relatively high influx of asylum seekers. This policy initially
resulted in the desired decrease, but as other countries adopted even
stricter laws, the influx rose again to 45,217 in 1998, a 31 percent
increase over 1997. In 1999 the number of asylum seekers fell to
41,306. A new series of harsher rules aims to discourage economic
migrants at all stages of the asylum process, by means of a stricter
intake, the accelerated processing of asylum requests, limited appeal
procedures, and a denial of social assistance to asylum seekers who are
screened out. Several of the measures are scheduled to come into effect
in 2001.
The Justice Ministry estimates on the basis of interviews with
applicants that two-thirds of asylum seekers came to the country via
alien smuggling organizations.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
No restrictions in law or in practice hinder the participation of
women and minorities in government and politics; women are nevertheless
underrepresented. A total of 52 of the 150 members of the second
chamber of Parliament are women, as are 4 of the 15 cabinet ministers.
However, the two Deputy Prime Ministers are women. The Government
pursues an active policy to promote the participation of women in
politics and public administration.
Although a minority, women also hold positions in the Parliaments
and Cabinets of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials are very cooperative and responsive to their
views.
In view of its longstanding tradition of hosting international
legal tribunals, the Government facilitated the trial of two Libyans
accused of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which
killed 270 persons. By agreement among the parties, the Government
provided Camp Zeist to the United Kingdom as an extraterritorial venue
for the trial, which began in 1999 and is being conducted under
Scottish law. The trial continued at year's end.
The Government also hosts the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and the headquarters of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution bans discrimination on the basis of any of these
factors or political preference. The Government generally is effective
in enforcing these provisions. Under the Equal Treatment Act,
complainants may take offenders to court under civil law.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. A recent report by the
Utrecht University's human rights department showed that about 1 out of
25 women, particularly of ethnic minority groups, are victims of
violence by their former and present partners. Each year 60 to 80 women
and 40 children die of domestic violence.
The Government supports programs to reduce and prevent violence
against women. Battered women find refuge in a network of 48
government-subsidized shelters offering the services of social workers
and psychologists. In addition battered women who leave their domestic
partners become eligible for social benefits, which include an adequate
basic subsidy as well as an allowance for dependent children.
Nongovernmental organizations also advise and assist women who are
victims of sexual assault. Marital rape is a crime and carries the same
penalty as nonmarital rape, a maximum of 8 years' imprisonment. Spousal
abuse carries a one-third higher penalty than ordinary battery.
In addition to helping victims of sexual abuse, the Government has
pursued an active prevention campaign through commercials and awareness
training of educators. A recent evaluation showed that, on average, the
campaign positively influenced two-thirds of the population.
Prostitution is legal, and since 1999 the law no longer treats
``organizing the prostitution of somebody else'' as a crime when done
with the consent of the prostitute. However, any form of forced
prostitution remains punishable. All brothels now require licenses
issued by local governments with strict conditions to be observed by
brothel owners. The Government's assumption is that by decriminalizing
prostitution, licensing brothel operators, and improving working
conditions and health care for prostitutes, while at the same time
prohibiting the employment of minors and illegal immigrants,
prostitution would be less susceptible to criminal organizations
trafficking in women and children. An additional advantage is that the
licensing system would make prostitution more transparent and easier
for the police to monitor. Between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals are
employed in prostitution. It is estimated that half of all prostitutes
originate in non-European Union countries and are residing illegally in
the country. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
prostitution remains a problem, which the Government is giving priority
to fighting (see Section 6.f.).
The law requires employers to take measures to protect workers from
sexual harassment; research shows that about 245,000 women, or 6.6
percent of the female working population, are confronted with sexual
intimidation in the work place each year. The Government funds an
ongoing publicity campaign to increase awareness of the problem. As the
largest employer, it has taken measures to counter harassment among
civil servants, for example, in the police force.
Women increasingly are entering the job market, but traditional
cultural factors and an inadequate number of day care facilities tend
to discourage them--especially women with young children--from working.
One-third of women stop working after the birth of their first child.
The participation of women in the labor market increased significantly
in the last 25 years, from 29 percent of the working-age female
population in 1975 to 58 percent in 2000. The Government wants to raise
this figure to at least 65 percent in 2010 through various measures,
including an expansion of child care facilities and special leave
programs. About 42 percent of women hold part-time jobs. In 1998 the
Government established favorable conditions for part-time employment by
adopting a law that prohibits employers from treating part-time workers
differently from those in full-time jobs.
Women often are underemployed and have less chance of promotion
than their male colleagues. They often hold lower level positions than
men, mostly because of their part-time status. According to the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the difference in earnings
between men and women is 23 percent. Some women nevertheless are making
steady progress by moving into professional and high-visibility jobs.
In 1988 the Government started affirmative action programs for
women. Collective labor agreements usually include one or more
provisions to strengthen the position of women. Legislation mandates
equal pay for equal work, prohibits dismissal because of marriage,
pregnancy, or motherhood, and provides the basis for equality in other
employment-related areas. A legislatively mandated Equal Treatment
Commission actively pursues complaints of discrimination in these areas
as well as allegations of pay discrimination.
The social welfare and national health systems provide considerable
assistance to working women with families. Women are eligible for 16
weeks of maternity leave with full pay. The Parental Leave Law allows
parents to take (unpaid) full-time leave during 3 months and to extend
the leave over a period longer than 6 months to care for children up to
8 years old. Persons working fewer than 20 hours per week also are
entitled to parental leave.
Children.--The Government works to ensure the well-being of
children through numerous well-funded health, education, and public
information programs. The Council for the Protection of Children,
operated through the Ministry of Justice, enforces child support
orders, investigates cases of child abuse, and recommends remedies
ranging from counseling to withdrawal of parental rights. The
Government also maintains a popular hot line for children and a network
of pediatricians who track suspected cases of child abuse on a
confidential basis.
An estimated 50,000 children are victims of child abuse each year,
although only approximately 15,000 formal reports of child abuse are
registered. As a result of abuse, 40 children died in 1998. The U.N.
Commission on Childrens' Rights in 1999 questioned the Government about
its performance in this area. In particular the United Nations
questioned the long waiting list for assistance to abused children.
Approximately 7,000 abused children are on the waiting list.
The age of consent is 16. Sexual intercourse with minors under age
12 always constitutes a criminal offense; in cases involving minors
between the ages of 12 and 16, an interested party must file a
complaint. The new prostitution law imposes heavier penalties on
prostitution activities involving minors. Maximum penalties vary
between 6 years' imprisonment for sex with minors (in the context of
prostitution) under age 18, 8 years for sex with minors under 16 years
of age, and 10 for sex with minors under 12 years. International sex
tourism involving the abuse of minor children is prosecutable. Since
1996 several Dutch citizens have been tried and convicted for the abuse
of minors in other countries.
Trafficking in female African youths for the purpose of
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
The maximum penalty for child pornography is 4 years' imprisonment
and 6 years in the event of financial gain. The law allows for
provisional arrest, house searches, and criminal financial
investigations. The mere possession of child pornography is punishable,
but exemptions are made for scientific or educational use. However,
these exemptions caused some problems with two child pornographic
collections claimed to be of historic value. The age at which minors
are allowed to act in pornographic movies was expected to be raised
shortly from 16 to 18 years.
The Government has begun a national offensive against child
pornography on the Internet. The police monitored the Internet in a
year-long pilot project that ended in August. Another police
investigation showed that child pornography on the Internet has
increased. The police discovered that a large portion of new
photographs are processed digitally into pornographic material. The law
does not yet include a provision to fight this new form of child
pornography. The current law is aimed at the abuse of children, but the
children shown on the manipulated pictures in fact have not been
abused.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. Local governments increasingly mandate access to public
buildings for the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--There were a number of complaints about
anti-Semitism on Internet sites set up by Dutch citizens.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The traditionally homogeneous
nature of society has changed in recent decades due to the influx of
immigrants and asylum seekers who make up about 9 percent of the
population. Despite comprehensive policies to promote the integration
of racial and ethnic minorities, integration remains a problem. In
general citizens are averse to discrimination and unequal treatment and
support integration. Society has become increasingly alert to racial
discrimination, and various organizations monitor violations.
The Government pursues an active campaign aimed at increasing
public awareness of racism and discrimination. According to the latest
statistics, 112 persons or organizations were tried on discrimination
charges in 1997 (latest statistics available). The chief public
prosecutor set up the National Expertise Center on Discrimination in
2000 to improve the prosecution's handling of discrimination cases.
A central government organization was set up in 1999 to fight
racial discrimination and to collect nationwide statistics on incidents
of discrimination, but it has yet to work out a uniform system. The 29
local antidiscrimination bureaus together registered about 3,000
complaints per year in recent years. Many complaints concern
discrimination in the workplace.
In 1998 the Equal Opportunities Committee received 104 complaints
relating to race or nationality and ruled in 53 cases of
discrimination. Its rulings on such issues as headscarves, dismissal,
accent, and language requirements are of major importance because they
are applied widely. Most complaints concerned the labor market,
including denial of promotion, discrimination in the work place,
unequal pay, and dismissal.
At the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the University
of Leiden each year investigates the extent of rightwing and racist
violence. It reported an increase from 201 registered incidents in 1996
to 313 in 1998, but it assumed that the problem is more widespread
because many cases remain unregistered. The 313 cases in 1998 were
subdivided as follows: Threats 157; abuse 41; painting slogans 41;
vandalism 27; bomb threat 23; other 24. Only a limited number of
incidents can be attributed to rightwing extremism: about 19 percent of
the 313 cases in 1998. However, that percentage was much higher in the
past, which may be connected with the steady decline in membership of
rightwing groups from about 1,400 in 1997 to some 600 in 1999. Most of
the racist violence is committed at random and arbitrarily by youths
often under the influence of alcohol. The culprits rarely are tracked
down. In 1998 the culprits were identified in only 22 of the 313 cases.
Only half of all discrimination cases are prosecuted.
Immigrant groups also face some discrimination in housing and
employment. These groups, concentrated in the larger cities, suffer
from a high rate of unemployment. The Government has worked for several
years with employers' groups and unions to reduce minority unemployment
levels to the national average.
The 1998 Act on the Stimulation of Labor Participation by Ethnic
Minorities is intended to increase job opportunities for ethnic
minorities. It requires employers with a work force of over 35 persons
to register their non-Dutch employees. Employers are to strive for a
composition of their work force that reflects the regional working
population. They must submit their annual social action plans,
including recruitment targets, to the regional labor bureaus. The Labor
Inspectorate oversees implementation of the law. Despite these efforts,
unemployment among ethnic minorities is still about four times higher
than within the ethnically Dutch workforce. In May the U.N. Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination criticized the Government
for not doing enough to prevent discrimination in hiring. It
recommended that the Government take steps to reduce segregation in
schools and create a police force whose composition reflects the entire
population.
A campaign beginning in April, in which several ministries,
government job centers, and the Dutch small business association
pledged to find jobs for some 20,000 persons from ethnic minorities
before May 2001, had succeeded in recruiting just 240 persons by the
end of August.
With the proliferation of Internet web sites, the dissemination of
racial and discriminatory material on Internet has also increased. The
privately run Discrimination on the Internet Registration Center
received 181 complaints in 1999 about 360 controversial statements,
subdivided by category as follows: Racism 147, anti-Semitism 91, denial
of the Holocaust 21, sexual preference 46, religion 15, discrimination
against asylum seekers 12, incitement to violence 6, and ``other'' 19.
It also investigates web sites and home pages on its own. Over 70
percent of the statements are removed voluntarily at the Center's
request. In 2 cases in 1999, the Center requested that criminal
proceedings be initiated; such a request was still under review in 18
other cases; and another 25 cases were being prepared. Four cases were
passed on to the Government's antidiscrimination office for action.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Membership in labor unions is open to
all workers including armed forces personnel, the police, and civil
service employees. Workers are entitled to form or join unions of their
own choosing without prior government authorization, and unions are
free to affiliate with national trade union federations. This right is
exercised freely.
Unions are free of control by the Government and political parties.
Union members may and do participate in political activities.
All workers have the right to strike, except for most civil
servants who have other institutionalized means of protection and
redress. Industrial relations are very harmonious, and strikes are
infrequent. In 1999 some 75 labor days per 1,000 workers were lost,
mostly over union demands for higher pay and a 36-hour workweek. By law
retribution against striking workers is prohibited.
About 28 percent of the work force is unionized, but union-
negotiated collective bargaining agreements usually are extended to
cover about three-quarters of the work force. The white-collar unions'
membership is the fastest growing.
The three union federations are active internationally, without
restriction.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is recognized and well established.
Discrimination against workers because of union membership is illegal
and does not occur.
Collective bargaining agreements are negotiated in the framework of
the ``Social Partnership'' developed between trade unions and private
employers. Representatives of the main union federations, employers'
organizations, and the Government meet each autumn to discuss labor
issues, including wage levels and their relation to the state of the
economy and to international competition. The discussions lead to a
central accord with social as well as economic goals for the coming
year. Under this umbrella agreement, unions and employers in various
sectors negotiate sectoral agreements, which the Government usually
extends to all companies in the sector.
Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. Union federations and
employers' organizations are represented, along with independent
experts, on the Social and Economic Council. The Council is the major
advisory board for the Government on policies and legislation regarding
national and international social and economic matters.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by the
Constitution and generally does not occur; however, trafficking in
women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Mandatory
attendance at school ends at age 16, or after at least 12 years of
education. Those still in school at the age of 16 may not work more
than 8 hours per week. The law prohibits persons under the age of 18
from working at night, overtime, or in areas dangerous to their
physical or mental well-being. Anyone working more than 4.5 hours per
day is entitled to a 30-minute break. The laws are enforced effectively
by the tripartite Labor Commission, which monitors hiring practices and
conducts inspections.
Holiday work and after school jobs are subject to very strict
rules, which are set in the Work Time Act, the Child Labor Regulation
(for children under age 16), and the Working Conditions Decree.
Observance of the rules is overseen by the Social Ministry's Labor
Inspection Office. Although child labor is banned, an increasing number
of children work for pay during holidays. The parents of such children
are to be reported officially by labor inspectors, and the Public
Prosecutor may decide to prosecute the parents for violating the ban on
child labor. In 1999 the labor inspections showed that one out of four
companies violated the regulations applying to holiday work, including
by employing children under age 13.
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and this
prohibition is enforced effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage for adults is
established by law and can be adjusted every 6 months to changes in the
cost-of-living index. Over the last few years, the statutory minimum
wage has been pegged to the average wage in collective labor contracts.
The gross minimum wage is about $1,000 (2,448 guilders) per month. For
workers earning the minimum wage, employers currently pay $3,750 a year
(6,000 guilders) in premiums for social security benefits, which
includes medical insurance. Only 3 percent of workers earn the minimum
wage because collective bargaining agreements, which normally are
extended across a sector, usually set a minimum wage well above the
legislated minimum. The Government, unions, and employers have taken
measures to increase the number of minimum wage jobs and to decrease
employers' social payments in order to lower the cost of hiring new
workers and to create more jobs, especially for the long-term
unemployed.
A reduced minimum wage applies to young persons under the age of
23--one of the groups with the highest rate of unemployment--and is
intended to provide incentives for their employment. This wage ranges
from 34.5 percent of the adult minimum wage for workers 16 years of age
to 85 percent for those 22 years of age. The legislated minimum wage
and social benefits available to all minimum wage earners provide an
adequate standard of living for workers and their families.
Although the law sets a 40-hour workweek, the average workweek for
those with full-time jobs is 37+ hours. This workweek is the result of
agreements reached in collective bargaining on shorter workweeks, often
in conjunction with more flexible working hours. This combination makes
it possible to adapt shorter working hours to the specific situation in
a particular business or branch of industry.
Working conditions, including comprehensive occupational safety and
health standards set by law and regulations, are monitored actively by
the tripartite Labor Commission. Enforcement is effective. Workers may
refuse to continue working at a hazardous work site. The Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs also monitors standards through its Labor
Inspectorate.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically criminalizes alien
smuggling and trafficking in persons, both of which are problems. The
maximum sentence for trafficking in persons is 6 years. In cases
involving minors, severe physical violence, or organized trafficking,
the maximum sentence is 10 years. The maximum sentence for alien
smuggling is 8 years.
The Government has an active policy to combat trafficking in
persons, including a more aggressive prosecution policy as well as
closer international cooperation. A number of police forces have
established special units to deal with the problem. The Justice
Minister appointed a national rapporteur on trafficking in persons in
April. The rapporteur is to study the extent of the problem and report
annually to the Government.
The country is a major destination for trafficked women. According
to the Justice Ministry, 20,000 to 30,000 persons work in prostitution,
about half of them illegal residents from non-EU countries. Many come
from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Eastern Europe, and Nigeria. The
Foundation Against Trafficking in Women estimates that each year some
3,000 women and girls are brought into the country for the purpose of
prostitution. With the introduction of the new prostitution law, which
prohibits the employment of prostitutes in the country illegally, the
Government seeks to intensify the fight against criminal organizations
trafficking in women and children (see Section 5).
In 1998 a ruling was obtained under the Aliens Law to prevent
illegal residents, who may have become victims of trafficking, from
being expelled before investigations are completed. Victims are allowed
3 months to consider pressing charges. Victims who do so are allowed to
stay in the country until the judicial process is completed. During
this period, victims receive legal, financial, and psychological
assistance. In special circumstances, residence permits are granted on
humanitarian grounds. After completion of the judicial process, illegal
prostitutes returning to their native countries are eligible for
temporary financial assistance.
African women, in particular those from Nigeria, make up a sizeable
portion of foreign women illegally working as prostitutes. According to
the authorities, the most widely used ploy for trafficking African
women is the fraudulent use of special asylum procedures for minors,
who are virtually ensured entry. Although most such women are not
actually under age 18, all claim to be. Once at the open-door asylum
center, they remain for a few days and then disappear, only to turn up
later as prostitutes in the country or elsewhere in Europe. Most such
young African women are under extreme pressure to work as prostitutes.
According to the Terre des Hommes organization, their families have
signed contracts with trafficking organizations, often sanctioned by
``voodoo'' priests. The girls strongly believe in the magical power of
voodoo.
A Dutch study of prostitutes from Central and Eastern Europe shows
that five out of six, ``liberated'' from trafficking organizations in
the Netherlands, knew exactly that they were to be employed in the sex
industry when they accepted the offer of their recruiters. Some 40
percent already had worked as prostitutes in their native country. The
study concluded that most such women came to the Netherlands
voluntarily, and only after their arrival, did they become victims of
their traffickers. They are often treated as slaves: intimidated,
threatened, and locked up.
__________
NORWAY
Norway is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy
with King Harald V as the Head of State. It is governed by a prime
minister, cabinet, and a 165-seat Storting (Parliament) that is elected
every 4 years and cannot be dissolved. The judiciary is independent.
The national police have primary responsibility for internal
security, but in times of crisis, such as internal disorder or natural
catastrophe, the police may call on the armed forces for assistance. In
such circumstances, the armed forces are always under police authority.
The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security
forces.
Norway is an advanced industrial state with a mixed economy
combining private and public ownership that provides a high standard of
living for residents. The key industries are oil and gas, metals,
engineering, shipbuilding, fishing, and manufacturing (including fish
processing equipment). The leading exports are oil and gas,
manufactured goods, fish, and metals. During the year, 80.6 percent of
workers were in the service sector (including public service), and 13.3
percent were in the manufacturing sector.
The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens, and
the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
individual instances of abuse. Violence against women and abuse of
children are problems.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
The Government in the past has been criticized for its practice of
indefinite detention, often in solitary confinement with restricted
communications, for suspects during the investigation of criminal cases
(most recently in September 1999 by the Council of Europe's Committee
for the Prevention of Torture). Restrictions were used sometimes to
pressure prisoners to be more cooperative during investigations. In
response to international criticism, the Government was reevaluating
its practices and by year's end had made some changes. In September the
Government tightened the requirements for restricting prisoners'
communications and visitation rights. In June two working groups
commissioned by the Ministry of Justice presented their recommendations
for a more comprehensive reform of the practice. The reports will form
the basis for a white paper, which is expected to be presented to the
Parliament in 2001. Prison conditions meet minimum international
standards, and the Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The court system consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
Appellate Court (committee), superior courts, county courts for
criminal cases, magistrate courts for civil cases, and claims courts.
Special courts include the Impeachment Court (composed of
parliamentarians), the labor court, trusteeship courts, fishery courts,
and land ownership severance courts.
All courts, some of which date to laws passed in the 11th century,
meet internationally accepted standards for fair trials, including
providing counsel to the indigent. The law provides for the right to a
fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces this
right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Both the Constitution and the law prohibit such
practices, government authorities generally respect these prohibitions,
and violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, and the Government respects this right in
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government generally respects them in
practice.
In August a small, previously unknown neo-Nazi group was denied
permission to stage a Rudolf Hess commemorative march in downtown Oslo;
the group then staged an illegal march in the nearby town of Askim; a
counter demonstration by 15,000 persons took place in Oslo on August
19.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
The state church is the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway,
which is supported financially by the State, and to which 93 percent of
the population nominally belong. The Constitution requires that the
King and one-half of the Cabinet belong to this church. The
relationship between church and State is increasingly debated by the
public. The Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act permits
prospective employers to ask applicants for employment in private or
religious schools, or in day care centers, whether they respect
Christian beliefs and principles.
In July 1998, the Government suspended two priests in the Church of
Norway and asked the courts for approval legally to terminate their
priesthood due to insubordination and disloyalty. The priests openly
refused to accept religious and spiritual guidance from their bishop,
with whom they were in disagreement on a number of social issues (such
as gay rights). In January 2000, the Alta district court ruled that the
priests' employment could not be terminated legally. Upon taking office
in March, the new Labor Party Government appealed the ruling to a
higher regional court, which had not ruled by year's end.
Other denominations operate freely. A religious community is
required to register with the Government only if it desires state
support, which is provided to all registered denominations on a
proportional basis in accordance with membership. In 1995 the
Parliament introduced the subject ``religious knowledge and education
in ethics'' into the national school system. The class teaches the
ethical values of Christianity, as well as Christian beliefs and the
main features of Christianity. All children must attend this mandatory
class; there are no exceptions for children of other faiths.
Organizations for atheists as well as Muslim communities have contested
the legality of forced religious teaching, but the Oslo city court
twice has ruled against their arguments. The case was being tried in a
regional appellate court. Because of its potential for setting a
precedent, the case is expected to go ultimately to the Supreme Court.
Workers belonging to minority denominations are allowed leave for their
religious holidays.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government grants refugee or asylee status in
accordance with the the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
During the year, the Government granted protective residency to
8,231 persons. The total included: Political asylum for 97 persons;
temporary collective residency permits for 2,019 Iraqi Kurds;
individual residency permits for 2,856 persons; and asylum as U.N.
quota refugees for 1,485 persons. Immigration authorities rejected
4,899 applications for protective residency. In addition 1,778 persons
received residency status through a family reunification program.
The collective 1-year residency permits that were granted to
Kosovar Albanians in 1999 expired in August 2000, and all members of
this group were encouraged to return to Kosovo voluntarily. The
Government gives financial aid for repatriation to all Kosovar
Albanians who do so. Of almost 8,000 Kosovar Albanians who sought
refuge in Norway during and after NATO's campaign in Kosovo, 1,500
returned voluntarily in 2000 (3,600 returned voluntarily in 1999). Of
those who had previously gone back to Kosovo, 1,063 came back to Norway
once again in 2000. When the collective residency permits expired, the
Kosovar Albanians could apply for individual permits--and most did. By
year's end, most had been rejected. However, in October all Kosovar
Albanian families with small children were granted so-called postponed
implementation of deportation until after March 1, 2001. The decision
was based on complaints made by the UNHCR and other onsite U.N.
agencies in October 2000 that Kosovo could not handle a major influx of
returning refugees before the winter. However, as the March 1 extension
deadline passes, a mass repatriation of Kosovar Albanians is expected
in the spring and summer of 2001.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a
valid claim to refugee status or of persons being forcibly returned to
countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their Government
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage.
Women are increasingly well represented at all levels of
government. However, no restrictions in law or practice hinder their
participation. Women lead 8 of the 18 government ministries. They hold
60 of the 165 seats in Parliament (36.4 percent), chair 5 of 12
standing committees in Parliament, and lead 2 of the 6 main political
parties. A woman heads the Parliament.
In addition to participating freely in the national political
process, in 1997 Norwegian Sami (formerly known as Lapps) elected their
own constituent assembly, the Sameting, for the third time. Under the
law establishing the 39-seat body, the Sameting is a consultative group
which meets regularly to deal with ``all matters which in [its] opinion
are of special importance to the Sami people.'' In practice the
Sameting has been most interested in protecting the group's language
and cultural rights and in influencing decisions on resources and lands
where Sami are a majority.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
When the new Labor Government took office in March, the Prime
Minister transferred the human rights portfolio from the Ministry of
Development, Cooperation, and Human Rights to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The new Government reversed the previous government's decision
to appoint a minister for human rights issues. In 1999 the previous
government presented a white paper to the Parliament on human rights,
which addresses how the country can improve the state of human rights
both domestically and internationally. On November 2, 2000, the
Parliament's committee on foreign affairs supported the previous
government's proposal and stressed the importance of incorporating
human rights into law and society in general. The white paper was
debated and passed in Parliament on November 14. It then was sent back
to the respective ministries for implementation.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, language, or social status, and the Government
enforces this prohibition in practice.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Public and private
organizations run several shelters that give battered women an
alternative to returning to a violent domestic situation. In 1999 the
country's 14 shelters registered 9,183 overnight stays. In addition 967
other women contacted the shelters for advice or counseling. During the
year, 555 rapes were reported, along with 126 attempted rapes. The
police believe that increases in reported rapes and domestic abuse in
recent years have been largely due to greater willingness among women
to report these crimes. The police vigorously investigate and prosecute
such crimes. They also instituted special programs to prevent rape and
domestic violence and to counsel victims.
The rights of women are protected under the 1978 Equal Rights Law
and other regulations. According to that law, ``women and men engaged
in the same activity shall have equal wages for work of equal value.''
However, the equal rights ombudsman's office, which monitors
enforcement of the law, confirms that women generally receive 10 to 15
percent less pay and benefits than men for work of ``equal value.''
The equal rights ombudsman processes complaints of sexual
discrimination. In 1999 there were 254 written complaints and 393
telephone inquiries to the ombudsman. Women filed 40 percent of the
complaints, men 28 percent, organizations 23 percent, and the remainder
were filed by the ombudsman's office. The increase in men filing
complaints is related to an increase in postdivorce child custody
cases.
In 1995 the Parliament adopted a harassment amendment to the
Working Environment Act, which states that ``employees shall not be
subjected to harassment or other unseemly behavior.'' Employers who
violate these provisions, including the harassment clause, are subject
to fines or prison sentences of up to 2 years, depending on the
seriousness of the offense.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of
education and medical care. The Government provides education for
children through the postsecondary level. There is no difference in the
treatment of girls and boys in education or health care services. An
independent Children's Ombudsman Office, within the Ministry of
Children and Families, assures the protection of children in law and in
practice.
Abuse of children is a problem. A total of 191 sexual assaults on
children by nonfamily members were reported, along with 96 such
assaults by family members. The latter is a substantial decrease from
the 153 cases reported in 1999. Children's rights advocates have
expressed concern that authorities may have found investigation of
these crimes so difficult that they have not pursued investigations in
some legitimate cases. The Government is examining this problem. In
1999 welfare services assisted 23,800 abused or neglected children (2.1
percent of children under 18). Of these, 4,950 received assistance in
the home (such as financial assistance, guidance and support for
parents, or temporary stays at respite homes).
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. The law mandates access to public buildings for people
with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in
practice.
Indigenous People.--Apart from a tiny Finnish population in the
northeast, the indigenous Sami constituted the only significant
minority group until the influx of immigrants during the 1970's. In
recent years, the Government has taken steps to protect Sami cultural
rights by providing Sami language instruction at schools in their
areas, radio and television programs broadcast or subtitled in Sami,
and subsidies for newspapers and books oriented toward the Sami. In a
rare political statement in October 1999 at the opening of the third
Sami Parliament, King Harald V publicly apologized to the Sami people
for repression under Norwegian rule. In 1997 the Government created the
position of Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Local Government and
Regional Affairs to deal specifically with Sami issues. When the Labor
Party Government took office in March, new State Secretary Steinar
Pedersen--of Sami origin like his predecessor--took over responsibility
for coordinating government policies for the Sami minority.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
right to associate freely and to strike. The Government changed the
wage negotiating process in 1996, shifting negotiations from the
national to the local and company level. During the year, almost
100,000 workers in the private and public sectors went on strike, an
80-year high. The strikes were settled mainly through negotiations,
although compulsory arbitration was used to settle a 2-week oil
workers' strike. The strikers achieved the largest wage settlement in
many years and also obtained a fifth week of annual leave.
The Government has the right, with the approval of the Parliament,
to invoke compulsory arbitration under certain circumstances. The
Government came under increasing criticism in 1995 for resorting to
compulsory arbitration too quickly during strikes. In addition this
procedure, which was also invoked several times in the 1980's,
particularly in the oil industry, was criticized repeatedly by the
Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization, which
argued that the situations were not a sufficient threat to public
health and safety to justify invoking compulsory arbitration. The
Supreme Court is reviewing a case that will allow it to rule on whether
the national process in this regard violates the country's
international commitments.
After the 1998 wage negotiations, the Government appointed a
committee with representatives from all employer organizations and
employee unions to look at the present practice of using compulsory
arbitration in especially difficult labor conflicts. Its mandate is to
provide a new system for handling labor conflicts and wage
negotiations, and avoid situations in future labor conflicts that could
lead to the use of compulsory arbitration. The committee is expected to
present its proposal by April 1, 2001. The Ministry of Regional Affairs
takes the position that it is not the legislation itself that needs to
be amended, but the way in which this legislation is interpreted by the
parties in labor conflicts and implemented by the Government.
With membership totaling about 60 percent of the work force, unions
play an important role in political and economic life, and the
Government consults them on important economic and social problems.
Although the largest trade union federation is associated with the
Labor Party, all unions and labor federations are free of party and
government control.
Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate
internationally. They maintain strong ties with such international
bodies as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All workers,
including government employees and military personnel, exercise the
right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining is
widespread, with most wage earners covered by negotiated settlements,
either directly or through understandings that extend the contract
terms to workers outside the main labor federation and the employers'
bargaining group. Any complaint of antiunion discrimination would be
dealt with by the Labor Court, but there have been no complaints in
recent years.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor is
prohibited by law and does not exist. The Government prohibits forced
and bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it
occurred. The Directorate of Labor Inspections (DLI) ensures compliance
and is effective. Domestics, children, or foreign workers are not
required to remain in situations amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Children 13 to 18 years of age may be employed part time
in light work that will not affect adversely their health, development,
or schooling. Minimum age rules are observed in practice and enforced
by the DLI. Education is compulsory for 9 years. School is mandatory
through the ninth grade; most children stay in school at least until
the age of 18. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see Section
6.c.). The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of
child labor in December.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Normal working hours are
mandated by law and limited to 37.5 hours per week. The law also
provides for 25 working days of paid leave per year (31 days for those
over age 60). A 28-hour rest period is mandated legally on weekends and
holidays. There is no specified minimum wage, but wages normally fall
within a national scale negotiated by labor, employers, and the
Government. Average income, not including extensive social benefits, is
adequate to provide a worker and family with a decent living.
The 1977 Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act provides
for safe and physically acceptable working conditions for all employed
persons. Specific standards are set by the DLI in consultation with
nongovernmental experts. According to the act, environment committees
composed of management, workers, and health personnel must be
established in all enterprises with 50 or more workers, and safety
delegates must be elected in all organizations. Workers have the right
to remove themselves from situations that endanger their health. The
DLI ensures effective compliance with labor legislation and standards.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically criminalizes
trafficking in persons, but existing labor and immigration statutes may
be used in such cases.
Norway is becoming a destination country for trafficked women,
according to an OSCE report.
__________
POLAND
Poland is a parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty political
system. Free and fair presidential elections were held in October,
resulting in the re-election of President Aleksander Kwasniewski.
Executive power is shared by the Prime Minister, the Council of
Ministers, and to a lesser extent, the President. The Parliament is
bicameral (Senate and Sejm). The Government formed after free and fair
elections in 1997 was a two-party coalition composed of the center-
right Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) party anchored by the
Solidarity Labor Union and the Centrist Freedom Union (UW), also with
origins in Solidarity. The majority government dissolved in June when
UW withdrew and five of its ministers resigned; AWS is now a minority
government. Parliamentary elections are next scheduled for fall 2001.
The judiciary is independent but inefficient.
Internal security forces and the armed forces are subject to
effective civilian control by the Government. Since 1996 the civilian
Minister of Defense has had clear command and control authority over
the military chief of the general staff as well as oversight of
military intelligence. Civilian control was reinforced further by a
restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and general staff undertaken
as part of the country's entry into NATO in April.
After several years of strong growth in the mid-1990's, the economy
slowed starting in 1998 as a result of the Russian financial crisis and
economic slowdown in the country's largest export markets in Europe.
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth dropped to 4.1 percent in 1999 and
stayed at this level in 2000. After dropping steadily through the last
decade, inflation began increasing again in 1999, climbing as high as
11.7 percent in the summer but dropping to 8.5 percent in December
2000. The ongoing process of restructuring, and increasing numbers of
youths entering the labor force, have increased unemployment in recent
years. The official unemployment rate was 15 percent at year's end.
Since 1989 most small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises have
been privatized, and the Government has launched privatizations of
major state-owned enterprises such as insurance, telephone, airline,
power generation, petroleum refining, steel, coal, and banks.
Significant reforms are underway in other areas as well, including
pensions, health, decentralization of government, and education. Still
to be addressed are the agriculture sector, a major part of the economy
(employing more than 25 percent of the labor force), and lagging
development in rural areas.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, problems remain in some areas. Prison conditions are generally
poor. A cumbersome legal process, poor administration, and an
inadequate budget hamper the court system. Lengthy pretrial detention
occurs occasionally. Court decisions frequently are not implemented,
particularly those of the administrative courts, and simple civil cases
can take as long as 2 or 3 years. As a result, public confidence in the
judicial system is low. Many poorly paid prosecutors and judges have
left public service for more lucrative employment. The threat of
organized crime has provoked legislative responses that raise questions
regarding the right to privacy. The Government maintains a large number
of wiretaps without judicial review.
There are some marginal restrictions in law and in practice on
freedom of speech and of the press. With few exceptions, the Criminal
Code provides protection for journalists' sources. Spousal abuse
continues to affect many women. Women continue to experience serious
discrimination in the labor market and are subject to various legal
inequities as a consequence of paternalistic laws. Child prostitution
is a problem. There were incidents of desecration of graves in both
Jewish and Catholic cemeteries and anti-Semitic graffiti on Jewish
buildings. The Government has worked constructively toward resolving
issues of concern to the Jewish community. There is some societal
discrimination and violence against ethnic minorities. Although the
right to organize unions and bargain collectively largely was observed,
some employers violated worker rights provided for by law, particularly
in the growing private sector. Trafficking in women and children in,
to, and from the country is a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In January 1998, a police officer was charged with the beating
death of 13-year-old Przemek Czaja following a basketball game in the
Baltic coast city of Slupsk. The officer was sentenced in May 1999 to 6
years in prison. In December 1999, the appeals court increased the
sentence to 8 years. The defendant has lodged an appeal to the Supreme
Court. At year's end, the defendant was still free on appeal. On March
7, the District Court in Koszalin decided that the defendant should be
examined by psychiatrists from the Szczecin Medical Academy.
A police officer indicted in connection with the shooting deaths of
two unarmed civilians and the wounding of another in Brodno, a suburb
of Warsaw, was sentenced in December 1999 to 7 years in prison. His
appeal was pending at year's end.
On October 30, the Lublin Appeals Court sentenced the former Lomaz
police chief to 4.5 years in prison (originally he was sentenced to 15
years in 1998, but he appealed the decision). The October verdict is
final.
Trials related to extrajudicial killings during the Communist
period continued in 1999. A new trial began in a Katowice appeals court
in October 1999 in the case of 22 riot policemen accused of killing
miners during the Communist martial law era after a 1998 appeals court
decision annulled their acquittals. In September 1999, the decision of
a district court was upheld in the case of the appeal of two officers
convicted in 1997 of the 1983 Communist era beating death of Grzegorz
Przemyk.
One officer was sentenced to 2 years in prison for participating in
the beating, and the other officer was found not guilty of attempting
to destroy the file in the case. In November 1999, the Supreme Court
ordered a new trial for former Communist leader Wojciech Jaruzelski and
nine other officials who allegedly ordered police to shoot workers
during the 1970 riots in Gdansk. The Court ruled that the trial that
began in the Gdansk provincial court should be started over in the
Warsaw district court. No new trial date was set. In December 1999,
lawyers representing miners submitted a motion requesting the retrial
of former Communist Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak for his role in
the pacification of the Wujek mine, but a Katowice district court did
not rule on the motion by year's end. In December 1999, the Warsaw
regional court ruled that Kiszczak's health made it possible for him
(although to a limited degree) to face the court and thus rejected a
defense motion to suspend his trial because of poor health. Kiszczak
appealed; the trial was still pending at year's end.
On October 30, the retrial began in Warsaw of General Wladyslaw
Ciaston, one of the two former Communist Security Services (SB)
generals accused (and acquitted in 1994) of having directed the 1984
murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko. Popieluszko upset the Communist
regime during martial law for openly supporting the cause of the then-
outlawed Solidarity trade unions in his sermons. He was tortured to
death in October 1984 by the secret police at the time and became a
martyr and the ``patron saint'' of Solidarity. In March 1996, the
appeal court ordered a retrial. The other accused general was excused
from the trial in January of this year for health reasons.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Criminal Code prohibits torture, and there were no
reported incidents of it. Unlike in the previous year, there were no
reports of police using force to disperse violent protestors or to
break up illegal roadblocks.
In June 1998, a Gdansk court indicted 11 riot policemen for their
participation in the October 1997 beating of soccer fans attending a
match in the town of Gdynia. The officers' activities, which took place
before, during, and after the match, both at the stadium and at a
nearby bar, were captured on videotape. A civil case against the
officers, launched by the father of one of the teenage victims, also
was pending. Both civil and criminal cases stemming from the incident
were pending at year's end. The civil case against the officers ended
during the year; it was suspended pending resolution of the criminal
case. Public television was fined $2,400 (10,000 PLN) and the private
television station TVN $1,200 (5,000 PLN) for airing tapes of the
incident. Both stations also must apologize to the victim on their main
news programs. Initially the court acquitted the police officers but
the prosecutor appealed; the criminal case was still pending at year's
end.
Prison conditions are still generally poor, according to reports by
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's); overcrowding, damp cells, and a
lack of medical treatment are the chief problems. According to a July
1998 report by the National Penitentiary Authority, the prison system
is in urgent need of additional funding. Of 156 detention facilities,
100 require considerable renovation. At the same time, the National
Penitentiary Authority's annual budget continued to fall; it has
declined by approximately 34 percent since 1991. The Ombudsman for
Human Rights complained about the safety of prisoners, noting that
inmates are often the victims of violent attacks by other prisoners.
Civil litigation against the prison administration in the 1996 case of
an 18-year-old mentally retarded boy who was beaten and sodomized by
fellow inmates was considered by the Bydgoszcz district court in
February; the case was still pending at year's end. The Ombudsman also
suggested in 1999 that the prison population be reduced, including by
decriminalizing certain offenses, pointing out that the ratio of
prisoners to rehabilitation officers is very poor.
The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes
this prohibition. Courts rather than prosecutors issue arrest warrants.
The law allows a 48-hour detention period before authorities are
required to bring a defendant before a court and an additional 24 hours
for the court to decide whether to issue a pretrial detention order.
During this period, access to a lawyer normally is limited. Once a
prosecutor presents the legal basis for a formal investigation, the law
provides for access to counsel. Detainees may be held in pretrial
detention for up to 3 months and may challenge the legality of an
arrest through appeal to the district court. A court may extend this
pretrial confinement period every 3 months for up to 18 months until
the trial date. Total time of temporary arrest until the first sentence
rendered by the court of lower instance cannot be more than 2 years.
However, under certain circumstances, the 2-year period may be extended
further by the Supreme Court. Bail is available, and most detainees are
released on bail pending trial.
The Government does not employ forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. However, the judiciary remains inefficient and lacks
resources and public confidence.
The Government continues to restructure the court system in order
to streamline and accelerate the legal process. At present there is a
four-tiered court and prosecutorial structure. The courts consist of
regional, provincial, and appellate divisions, as well as a Supreme
Court. These tiers are subdivided further into five parts: Military,
civil, criminal, labor, and family. Regional courts are courts of first
instance, while appellate courts are charged solely with appeals.
Provincial courts have a dual responsibility, handling appeals from
regional courts while enjoying original jurisdiction for the most
serious types of offenses. Appellate courts handle appeals tried at the
provincial level, and the Supreme Court only handles appeals about
questions of law. The prosecutorial system mirrors the court structure
with national, provincial, appellate, and regional offices.
Judges are nominated by the national judicial council and appointed
by the President. They are appointed for life and can be reassigned but
not dismissed, except by a court decision. The Constitutional Tribunal
rules on the constitutionality of legislation. In October 1999,
Constitutional Tribunal decisions became final and binding, after a 2-
year interim period following the entry into force of the new
Constitution during which a two-thirds majority in the Sejm could
overrule its decisions.
The court system is cumbersome, poorly administered, overstaffed,
and underfunded. There are numerous inefficiencies, most notably the
fact that many districts have more criminal judges than prosecutors.
These factors contribute to a lack of public confidence. Many effective
judges and prosecutors have left public service for the more lucrative
private sector. Court decisions frequently are not implemented.
Bailiffs normally ensure the execution of civil verdicts such as damage
payments and evictions. However, according to some observers, they are
underpaid, subject to intimidation and bribery, and have a mixed record
of implementing court decisions. Civil and administrative rulings
against public institutions such as hospitals often cannot be enforced
due to a lack of funds. Simple civil cases can take as long as 2 to 3
years before resolution, and the pretrial waiting time in criminal
cases can be several months. The backlog and the costs of legal action
appear to deter many citizens from using the justice system at all,
particularly in civil matters such as divorce. The long wait for
routine court decisions in commercial matters is an incentive for
bribery and corruption.
All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. At the
end of a trial, the court renders its decision orally and then has 7
days to prepare a written decision. A defendant has the right to appeal
within 14 days of the written decision. Appeals may be made on the
basis of new evidence or procedural irregularities.
Criminal cases are tried in regional and provincial courts by a
panel consisting of a professional judge and two lay assessors. The
seriousness of the offense determines which is the court of first
instance. Once formal charges are filed, the defendant is allowed to
study the charges and consult with an attorney, who is provided at
public expense if necessary. Once the defendant is prepared, a trial
date is set. Defendants are required to be present during trial and may
present evidence and confront witnesses in their own defense. Since
1995 prosecutors have had the authority to grant witnesses anonymity at
trial if they express fear of retribution from the defendant. This law,
designed to help combat organized crime, impairs defendants' right to
confront their accusers. In 1996 reforms were made that provide for a
two-level appeal process in most civil and criminal matters;
previously, citizens enjoyed access only to a one-step appeal process.
Trials are normally public. However, the courts reserve the right
to close a trial to the public in some circumstances, such as divorce
cases, trials in which state secrets may be disclosed, or cases whose
content might offend ``public morality.'' (See Section 1.f.) The courts
rarely invoke this prerogative.
The current Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure went into
effect in September 1998. However, in March 1998 the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) unanimously ruled that a provincial appellate
court's examination of the verdict in the presence of the prosecutor,
but not the defendant or his representative, infringed on the European
Convention on Human Rights provisions concerning fair trial. Article
451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to take account of
all implications of the March 1998 ruling of the ECHR. This amendment
came into force on September 1.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of
correspondence; however, the Government maintains, without judicial
review or oversight, a large number of wiretaps. There is no
legislation that provides for the general right to privacy. However, a
1998 law prohibits the collection of information about a person's
ethnic origin, religious convictions, health condition, political
views, or membership in religious, political, or trade union
organizations. The law allows for certain exceptions, specifically, the
gathering of information without a person's permission by courts,
hospitals, or organizations if the information pertains to their
members. All exceptions are subject to some restrictions. A few
continuing practices (such as a requirement to fill out ``creed'' or
``nationality'' items in some questionnaires) became illegal, effective
April 1999. Violators of these provisions are subject to imprisonment
for up to 3 years. The Ministry of Justice reports that from March 1998
to September of this year, the office of the prosecutor received 324
notifications of crimes pursuant to Articles 49 to 54 of the 1998 Law
on Personal Data Protection. Of those, 304 have been closed; the office
declined to prosecute 90 cases; 39 cases were referred to the court;
and 170 cases were discontinued by the court. In nine cases, the
prosecutor recommended conditional discontinuance. There is no record
of a conviction obtained in any case.
In response to the growing threat of organized crime and money
laundering, Parliament permitted the police and intelligence services
to monitor private correspondence and to use wiretaps and electronic
monitoring devices in cases involving serious crimes, narcotics, money
laundering, or illegal firearms sales. Under the Criminal Code, the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior, both political
appointees, must authorize these investigative methods. In emergency
cases, the police may initiate an investigation that utilizes wiretaps
or the opening of private correspondence at the same time that they
seek permission from the ministers. Estimates on the number of
wiretapping devices installed annually at the request of the police
vary widely; however, a high-ranking public prosecutor in 1998 put the
number at 4,000. After interventions by the Human Rights Ombudsman, the
Prosecutor General curtailed the number of warrants for wiretapping.
Levels are reportedly back at pre-1998 levels, over 4,000.
Parliamentarians and human rights groups expressed concern about
the lack of control over this type of surveillance. There is no
independent judicial review of surveillance activities, nor is there
any control over how the information derived from investigations is
used. A growing number of agencies have access to wiretap information,
and the Police Code allows electronic surveillance to be used for the
prevention of crime as well as for investigative purposes. As is the
case under the Criminal Code, police must obtain permission from the
Ministers of Justice and Interior before initiating wiretap procedures.
The law forbids arbitrary forced entry into homes. Search warrants
issued by a prosecutor are required in order to enter private
residences. In emergency cases, when a prosecutor is not immediately
available, police may enter a residence with the approval of the local
police commander. In the most urgent cases, in which there is no time
to consult with the police commander, police may enter a private
residence after showing their official identification. There were no
reports that police abused search warrant procedures.
A law on ``lustration'' or vetting went into effect in November
1998. The law, designed to expose government officials who collaborated
with the Communist-era secret police, bans from office for 10 years
those caught lying about their past. The law requires officials to
provide sworn affidavits concerning their possible cooperation with the
secret police; the public interest spokesman (lustration prosecutor)
then verifies the affidavits and brings suspected cases of
misrepresentation before the lustration court, a special three-judge
panel whose decisions may be appealed. Several high-profile cases came
before the court during the year, including that of a Deputy Defense
Minister who was judged to have lied in his affidavit; the case is
currently on appeal. Many of these cases are closed to the public
because they involve classified documents. In accordance with the
presidential election law, all candidates for the October presidential
elections were vetted in August; after some controversy surrounding the
lustration of President Kwasniewski and former president Walesa, all
passed muster. Critics continue to voice concern that the procedures
may be unfair, in view of the likelihood that secret police records
were subject to loss or tampering. In June Parliament agreed on a
chairman for the Institute of National Remembrance, creation of which
the lustration law mandated in order to organize all communist-era
secret police files and eventually give citizens access to information
in files compiled on them.
In June 1998, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled unconstitutional a
1997 draft law envisioning the possible removal from service of judges
proven to have violated judicial independence by issuing unjust
verdicts between 1944 and 1989 at the request of the Communist
authorities. Disciplinary proceedings against the judges in question
were to be initiated by the Minister of Justice, the presidents of the
appellate or regional courts, the National Judiciary Council, or
individuals who felt wronged by court verdicts. In December 1998, the
Sejm addressed the issue and adopted amendments to the law requiring
that procedures against accused judges be initiated before December 31,
2002. The law went into effect in January 1999. According to the
National Judiciary Council, at the end of the year, 10 cases had been
filed against 13 judges.
Men are not permitted to marry without parental permission until
the age of 21, whereas women may marry at the age of 18 (see Section
5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects these
rights; however, there are some marginal restrictions in law and
practice. Nonetheless, the press is vigorous and independent.
The Criminal Code states that an individual who ``publicly insults
or humiliates a constitutional institution of the Republic of Poland''
is subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to 2 years, while an
individual who insults a public functionary is subject to a fine or
imprisonment of up to 1 year. In December 1999, the trial began in
Elblag in the case of Andrzej Lepper, who was accused of insulting
Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek and state officials in January 1999; the
case was still pending at year's end. Prosecutors charge that during a
road blockade in Nowy Dwor Gdanski, Lepper called Buzek's cabinet a
``government of national betrayal, a government of dilettantes,
traitors to Poland.'' He is said to have called the Prime Minister and
another political leader ``bandits and criminals.'' In May the Warsaw
district court ruled that the daily newspaper ``Zycie'' must apologize
to President Aleksander Kwasniewski for publishing untrue information
suggesting that the President had contacts with Russian spies. However,
the court rejected the President's demand that Zycie pay $0.6 million
(2.5 million PLN) in damages in favor of flood victims. The President
said he would not appeal the verdict, while Zycie said that it would.
This provision of the Criminal Code also can be used by individual
citizens and businesses ``to protect their good name.'' In March 1998,
Network Twenty One, which sells Amway products, and seven of its
employees used the provision to prevent the broadcast, showing, or
copying of a 1-hour documentary critical of the company and its
practices. The documentary had not been shown by year's end.
The case against talk show host Wojciech Cejrowski, charged with
publicly insulting President Kwasniewski, was decided against the
defendant in April 1998; it since has been appealed and still was
pending decision at year's end. Also pending was a 1995 case against
presidential candidate Leszek Bubel for violating a section of the
Penal Code that prohibits acts that ``publicly insult, ridicule, and
deride the Polish nation, the Polish Republic, its political system, or
its principal organs.'' Bubel had claimed publicly that a former head
of the Presidential Chancellery protected a group of criminals.
There was no progress during the year in the ongoing investigation
into the case of Mikolaj Siwicki for publishing an allegedly hate-
mongering book that could damage the nation's interests.
The Criminal Code also stipulates that offending religious
sentiment through public speech is punishable by a fine or a 3-year
prison term. In 1995 a provincial court charged presidential candidate
Leszek Bubel with violating this article by publishing a pamphlet
containing anti-Semitic ``humor.'' A verdict on the case was still
pending at year's end.
In July 1999, the Warsaw district court revoked the 1998 decision
of prosecutors not to start proceedings against the leftist newspaper
Trybuna for insulting Pope John Paul II in one of its articles. In 1997
Tadeusz Rydzyk and AllPolish Youth director Roman Giertych, both acting
on behalf of the Council for the Coordination of the Defense of the
Dignity of Poland and Poles, originally filed charges against Trybuna
for its alleged insults of the Pope. In April 1998, the Warsaw
prosecutor's office decided to drop the case; subsequently, some 1,500
persons appealed to the Warsaw district court to reopened. In the wake
of the lost lawsuit, Trybuna had to apologize twice for publishing the
article. A separate suit against the author was ended when he died, but
it appears that the Prosecutor's Office may charge the then editor-in-
chief of the paper for having allowed the article to go to press. At
least one civil suit related to the Trybuna case was still pending at
year's end.
The State Secrets Act allows for the prosecution of citizens who
publish or otherwise betray state secrets. Human rights groups
criticize this law, since it restricts the right of free speech of
private citizens.
The Criminal Code regulates the protection of journalistic sources.
The code grants news sources absolute protection, except in cases
involving national security, murder, and terrorist acts. Pursuant to
the law, statutory provisions are applied retroactively if their terms
are beneficial to the accused. Journalists who refused to divulge
sources prior to the new code's enactment also can avoid sanctions by
invoking ``journalistic privilege.''
There is no restriction on the establishment of private newspapers
or distribution of journals; private newspapers and magazines flourish.
There was no progress in the ongoing privatization of RUCH, a national
network of newspaper kiosks.
The national radio and television broadcasting council (KRRiTV) has
broad powers in monitoring and regulating programming on radio and
television, allocating broadcasting frequencies and licenses, and
apportioning subscription revenues to public media.
In order to encourage the KRRiTV's apolitical character, the nine
KRRiTV members are obliged legally to suspend any membership in
political parties or public associations. However, they are chosen for
their political allegiances and nominated by the Sejm, the Senate, and
the President following political bargaining, thus raising potentially
serious questions about the independence of broadcasting oversight from
political influence.
The broadcasting law stipulates that programs should not promote
activities that are illegal or against state policy, morality, or the
common good. The law, whose constitutionality has been confirmed by the
Constitutional Tribunal, requires that all broadcasts ``respect the
religious feelings of the audiences and in particular respect the
Christian system of values.'' This provision has never been used as a
means of censorship, although the restrictions theoretically could be
used as such.
Private television broadcasters operate on frequencies selected by
the Ministry of Communications and auctioned by the KRRiTV. Private
radio flourishes on the local, regional, and national levels alongside
public radio.
The Government owns 2 of the 3 most widely-viewed television
channels and 17 regional stations, as well as 5 national radio
networks. PAP, the national wire service, was privatized partially in
1997, and a five-member supervisory board is preparing the service for
full privatization. However, there was no progress at year's end.
Although public television remains a major source of news and
information, private broadcast television, satellite, and private cable
services (domestic and foreign) are available across most of the
country. Cable services, available in all major cities, carry the main
public channels, two nationwide private networks (Polsat and TVN), as
well as local and regional stations and a variety of foreign offerings.
The law on radio and television requires public television to
provide direct media access to the main state institutions, including
the presidency, ``to make presentations or explanations of public
policy.'' The President and the Prime Minister have complained
occasionally of the other's abuse of the access privilege. Both public
and private radio and television provide coverage of all ranges of
political opinion.
Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints
are widely available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications
from abroad.
The Internet is widely available and is not regulated.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Permits are not necessary for public meetings but are
required for public demonstrations; demonstration organizers must
obtain these permits from local authorities if the demonstration might
block a public road. For large demonstrations, organizers also are
required to inform the local police of the time and place of their
activities and their planned route. Every gathering must have a
chairperson who is required to open the demonstration, preside over it,
and close it.
Unlike in 1999, there were no violent clashes between police and
demonstrators during the year.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice. Private associations need
government approval to organize and must register with their district
court. The procedure essentially requires the organization to sign a
declaration that commits it to abide by the law. However, in practice
the procedure is complicated and may be subject to the discretion of
the judge in charge.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Citizens
enjoy the freedom to practice any faith they choose. Religious groups
may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive
contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without government
interference. There are 15 religious groups in the country whose
relationship with the State is governed by specific legislation and 140
other religious communities. The legislation outlines the internal
structure of the religious groups, their activities, and procedures for
property restitution. There are no government restrictions on
establishing and maintaining places of worship. More than 95 percent of
Poles are Roman Catholic, but Eastern Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and
much smaller Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim congregations meet freely.
Although the Constitution provides for the separation of church and
state, a crucifix hangs in both the upper and lower houses of
Parliament. State-run radio broadcasts Catholic mass on Sundays, and
the Catholic Church is authorized to relicense radio and television
stations to operate on frequencies assigned to the Church, the only
body outside the KRRiTV allowed to do so.
Religious communities may register with the Government, but they
are not required to do so and may function freely without registration.
Registration requires that the group have submitted the names of 100
members as well as information regarding the group itself. This
information on membership must be confirmed by a notary public,
although the registration itself often appears to be a formality. Four
new religious communities were registered during the year. All churches
and recognized religious groups share the same privileges, such as
duty-free importation of office equipment and reduced taxes.
Although the Constitution gives parents the right to bring up their
children in compliance with their own religious and philosophical
beliefs, religious education classes continue to be taught in the
public schools at public expense. While children are supposed to have
the choice between religious instruction and ethics, the Ombudsman's
office states that in most schools, ethics courses are not offered due
to financial constraints. Catholic Church representatives are employed
to teach religious classes in the schools. Such classes constitute the
vast majority of all religious education classes offered, since the
population of the country is approximately 95 percent Catholic.
However, parents can request religious classes in any of the religions
legally registered, including Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish. Such
non-Catholic religious instruction exists in practice, although it is
not common; the Ministry of Education pays the instructors. Priests
receive salaries from the state budget for teaching religion in public
schools.
In mid-year the Government announced plans to establish by
September, a department within the Ministry of Interior to monitor the
activities of ``new religious groups'' and cults; by year's end, the
new department had not yet been formed.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although the Constitution does not
address freedom of movement, the Government does not restrict internal
or foreign travel. Citizens who leave the country have no trouble
returning. There are no restrictions on emigration.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. There were no reports of the forced repatriation of persons
with a valid claim to refugee status. Foreigners recognized as refugees
under the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol are granted full refugee status and permission to
remain permanently. The Government received 4,519 petitions for refugee
status during the year, compared with 2,864 for all of 1999. Including
petitions carried over from 1999, 76 have been approved, 2,626 were
denied, and 1,206 discontinued or abandoned. The increase from 1999 can
be attributed to the marked increase in Chechen refugees. The
Government approved 22 Chechens for refugee status prior to August,
when they ceased granting approvals for political reasons.
The 1997 Aliens Act addresses immigration issues. Human rights
organizations generally view the Aliens Act as positive. The law gives
all prospective refugees access to a procedure for adjudicating refugee
status and established an independent board to which prospective
refugees can appeal negative status decisions by the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. Refugee advocates note that the board serves as an
impartial and independent adjudicator of appeals. The law does not
recognize the concept of first asylum or any other form of temporary
protection.
The new Aliens Act would, for the first time, include the category
of humanitarian assistance as a reason for re-settling aliens. The
Government currently only has categories for asylum seekers and for
refugees (for example, those who qualify under the Geneva Convention
standards). A new category would be created for those who do not
qualify as refugees but who cannot be returned to their countries of
origin. Previously the Government had to find creative means of
allowing refugees to stay in the country, as the Government did during
the Kosovo conflict when they issued 1-year residency permits.
The new Aliens Act would create the Office of Repatriation and
Aliens. This office would control the various refugee boards and
agencies as well as have some political control over the border guards.
The law would also create an expedited system of refugee processing.
Aliens would receive an answer to their petition within 2 days. If they
were denied, they would be able to appeal to the refugee board, from
whom they would receive an answer within 5 days. If their claims were
found to be ``manifestly unfounded,'' they would be denied and no
further appeal would be available to them. This would represent a
significant change from the current system, in which refugees could
wait up to 3 months for the first answer and could then appeal all the
way to the Supreme Court.
During the year, the Government cooperated with the UNHCR and the
Polish NGO Caritas in a program monitoring portions of the country's
eastern and western borders from offices in Bialystok and Zgorzelec.
The UNHCR reports that the Government has been cooperative as the
offices monitor relevant issues such as tracking asylum cases.
The UNHCR reports isolated incidents of the border guards turning
away potential refugees, in particular Chechen refugees. In addition
UNHCR expressed concern during the year over the fate of unaccompanied
children seeking asylum in the country. It urged that procedures and
practices concerning the appointment and maintenance of supervisors and
guardians for minors be improved.
Many of the problems that the Government faces in dealing with
aliens present in the country center around funding. The Government
receives significant EU funds for upgrading its refugee processing
system, which includes money for such things as fingerprinting
equipment and running the refugee centers. However, the Government has
very little money available to send aliens who have been denied
petitions back to their country of origin (only 20 were returned by air
in 1999). Most denied applicants simply receive a letter informing them
that their petition has been denied and that they should leave the
country. The Government does not have funding to help assimilate those
persons who receive permission to permanently reside in the country.
The approved petitioners receive funds from various NGO's, but this
money covers only basic living needs, and not services such as language
training, medical care, or other social benefits.
The country is becoming a destination point for refugees, rather
than simply a transit point. The UNHCR reports that significantly fewer
persons are abandoning their refugee applications and that fewer
persons are leaving the country after receiving status. The National
Labor Office also estimates that as many as 200,000 foreigners are
working illegally in the country, while the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) estimates that some 300,000 irregular migrants are
present at any given moment in the country. The IOM also reports that
in recent years, 10,000 to 15,000 foreigners annually have been
apprehended crossing the border into the country. Most of the illegal
residents come from the countries of the former Soviet Union, although
an increasingly larger number are coming from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
Sri Lanka. Poland's relatively strong economic growth and its status as
an EU candidate country are mainly responsible for this phenomenon, and
illegal and legal immigrants alike can find employment in the country.
The UNHCR has been working with government officials, police, and
hospital personnel to sensitize them to the plight of refugees and
train them in better ways of handling refugees. As part of this
campaign, in September the UNHCR, in conjunction with the domestic NGO
Polska Akcja Humanitarska and the entertainment agency 'Alter Art,'
hosted a ``Refugee Day'' in Warsaw that featured bands, food, and
entertainment appealing to younger persons.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully. This
right is provided for in the Constitution and exists in practice. All
citizens 18 years of age and older have the right to vote and to cast
secret ballots, and voting is voluntary. The country is a multiparty
democracy. A permanent, democratic Constitution entered into force in
1997. Free and fair presidential elections were held in October.
Multiple candidates ran and had access to the media. President
Kwasniewski was re-elected to a second (and final) 5-year term in the
first round with 53 percent of the vote.
Executive power is divided between the President and a government
chosen by the Sejm, or lower house of Parliament. There is also an
upper house (the Senate). The Constitution provides for parliamentary
elections at least once every 4 years. The President, elected for 5
years, has the right, in certain very limited cases and after seeking
the opinion of the Speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, to shorten the
Sejm's term of office. Whenever the Sejm's term of office is shortened,
the Senate's term automatically is shortened as well. Parliament may
impeach the President.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Only 13.7
percent of parliamentarians (63 of 460) are women, and presently none
of the 19 cabinet ministers is a woman. The Speaker of the Senate is
the only female parliamentary leader, and none of the leaders of the
nation's largest political parties are women.
Two members of the German minority party are Members of Parliament
(M.P.s) (see Section 5). The electoral law exempts ethnic minority
parties from the requirement to win 5 percent of the vote nationwide in
order to qualify for seats in individual districts.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and
responsive to their views.
The Helsinki Foundation, a major NGO, conducts human rights
investigations without government interference. Members of the
foundation report that the Government displays a generally positive and
helpful attitude towards human rights investigations. However, some
domestic NGO's believe that a hostile regulatory climate is developing
in parts of the government bureaucracy.
The Office of the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection (the
Ombudsman), established in 1987, is the Government's watchdog for human
rights. The Ombudsman's office is an effective, independent body with
broad authority to investigate alleged violations of civil rights and
liberties. The Ombudsman registers each reported case and files
grievances, where appropriate, with the relevant government office. He
has no legislative authority and is sworn to act apolitically. The
Government cooperates with his office.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``no one shall be discriminated
against in political, social, or economic life for any reason
whatsoever.'' The Government attempts to ensure that these provisions
are observed; however, violence and societal discrimination against
women and ethnic minorities persist.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. Women's
rights advocates report that unofficial statistics are similar to those
of previous years, although there are no recent comprehensive surveys.
Physical abuse is illegal and spousal rape is treated the same as other
types of rape. In 1996 some 9 percent of women polled by the Public
Opinion Research Center admitted to being beaten repeatedly by their
husbands. Women's organizations assert that the number of women
suffering from domestic abuse is probably much higher. They explain
that battered women usually refuse to admit abuse even to themselves.
Violence against women remains hidden, particularly in small towns and
villages. Government and police statistics do not differentiate between
male and female victims of violence. Police intervene in cases of
domestic violence, and husbands can be convicted for beating their
wives. In 1998 the police, in cooperation with the State Agency for
Solving Alcoholic Problems, introduced the so-called ``blue card,'' a
record-keeping system designed to better document incidents of spousal
abuse. Sentences for abuse of family members range from 3 months to 5
years, or from 2 to 10 years if the victim attempts suicide as a result
of the abuse. However, statistics suggest that a large majority of
convictions result in suspended sentences. According to a spokesman for
the police, there were 23,147 cases of family abuse reported during the
year, with 161 of those being of particularly severe abuse. According
to NGO's, the courts often treat domestic violence as a minor crime,
pronounce lenient verdicts, or dismiss cases.
According to the Women's Rights Center Report published during the
year, there has been significant progress in raising public awareness
of the problem of violence against women. The topic received increasing
coverage in the media during the year, most notably through a highly
visible media campaign. In addition an increasing number of NGO's are
addressing the problem. Fifteen centers have been established to assist
victims, to provide preventive treatment as well as resocialization
counseling to perpetrators, and to train personnel working with victims
of domestic violence. As of July 6, an Office of Victims' Rights
Spokesman at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration has
been established. The main task of the office is to ensure that victims
of violence are treated with respect by law enforcement and the
judicial system. The office provides legal and psychological assistance
for victims and their families.
The law has no provision for restraining orders to protect battered
women against further abuse. For example, in divorce cases, courts
frequently grant a divorce but do not issue a property settlement,
sending the woman back to live with the abusive husband. This problem
is exacerbated by a lack of alternative housing in the country. Women's
advocacy groups also have complained about the small number of state-
supported shelters for battered women.
According to police statistics, the frequency of rape is
increasing. During the year, there were 2,399 cases reported, compared
with 2,029 in 1999. NGO's report that women often are unwilling to
report the crime and estimate that the actual number of rapes is 10
times higher than reported statistics suggest.
Trafficking in women is a serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.).
While laws specifically addressing sexual harassment do not exist,
social awareness is increasing, as are mechanisms with the potential to
deal with the problem. For example, the Criminal Code states that
whoever takes advantage of a position of power in a relationship to
gain sexual gratification may be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison.
According to a Supreme Court advisory opinion, such a relationship can
occur between employers and employees, between supervisors and
subordinates, or between teachers and students. However, this provision
can be invoked only when alleged sexual harassment occurs between a
supervisor and an individual in a subordinate position. Abuse of power
cannot be claimed when harassment occurs between persons of equal rank.
In August a prosecutor charged a former director of a hospital
emergency ward of sexually harassing six nurses; the case was still
pending at year's end. Public discussion of the problem of sexual
harassment is relatively new, but women increasingly are talking about
the problem and speaking out against it.
The Constitution provides for equal rights regardless of gender and
grants women equal rights with men in all areas of family, political,
social, and economic life, including equal compensation for work of
similar value. However, in practice women frequently are paid less for
equivalent work, mainly hold lower level positions, are discharged more
quickly, and are less likely to be promoted than men. According to the
1999 government statistical bulletin, men have a higher employment rate
(54 percent) than women (45.9 percent), and women have a higher
unemployment rate (13.5 percent) than men (11.7 percent). Despite a
generally higher level of education, women earn on average 30 percent
less than men. In August 1999, the U.N. Human Rights Commission
expressed its concern about the situation and agreed that women are
discriminated against in the labor market.
Women are employed in a wide variety of professions and
occupations, and a number of women occupy high positions in government
and in the private sector. Although clauses in social insurance law
limit child sick care benefits to women, since June 1999, both men and
women have the right to claim child sick care. The pension law passed
in late 1998 did not change the mandatory earlier retirement for women
at age 60 (65 for men). As a result women get about 60 percent of the
average pension that men receive. In December the Constitutional
Tribunal ruled that the law setting retirement age at 60 for women and
65 for men is discriminatory, as it reduces women's chances of
promotion and better pensions. Based on this verdict women can appeal
to the labor court if employers insist that they retire at 60. The law
does not address equality in hiring practices (there are no legal
penalties for discriminatory behavior in this area), and advertisements
for jobs frequently indicate a gender preference. Although women have
access to a number of previously forbidden careers since the Labor Code
was modified in 1996, they still are prevented from working underground
or in jobs that require heavy lifting. In March 1999, the Parliament
failed to approve the proposed law on equal status that would have
remedied some of these inequalities. Apart from the Constitution, there
is no other legal provision for equal rights for women.
The Ombudsman for Human Rights monitors the rights of women within
the broader context of human rights. Observers note that the broad
scope of the office's mandate dilutes its ability to function as an
effective advocate of women's issues. In 1997 the government
Plenipotentiary for Family Affairs within the Cabinet replaced the
government Plenipotentiary for Women and the Family, a change that many
women's rights groups perceived as an example of discrimination. There
are several women's rights NGO's. Among the most notable are the Polish
Foundation for Women and Family Planning and the Women's Rights Center.
These groups are active advocates of gender equality and advance their
goals through research, monitoring, and publishing. There are several
church-sponsored women's advocacy organizations, but their cooperation
with other women's NGO's is limited.
Women have the same right as men to transmit citizenship to their
foreign-born spouses.
Children.--The Constitution extends some state protection to the
family and children and the Sejm appointed an ombudsman for children's
rights in June, although he resigned in August. A replacement was being
sought at year's end. The Government sponsors some health programs
targeted specifically at children, including a vaccination program and
periodic checkups conducted in the schools. In reality, budget
shortfalls prevent complete implementation of these programs. There are
no procedures in schools to protect children from abuse by teachers; in
fact, the teachers' work code provides legal immunity from prosecution
for the use of corporal punishment in classrooms.
Violence against children is illegal. A provision of the Criminal
Code threatens those who physically or psychologically abuse a juvenile
with a prison sentence of 3 months to 5 years. If the victim attempts
suicide the sentence is increased, as it is if the perpetrator is found
to have acted with extreme cruelty. Abuse rarely is reported, and
convictions for child abuse are even more rare. There is no societal
pattern of abuse of children; however, trafficking in children is a
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Young men and women are treated unequally in terms of the age of
majority. Men and women reach majority at the age of 18 under the Civil
Code. However, a young woman can reach majority at the age of 16 if she
has entered into marriage with the consent of her parents and the
guardianship court. In addition men are not permitted to marry without
parental consent until the age of 21, whereas women may do so at the
age of 18 (see Section 1.f.). Lawmakers' rationale for this difference
in treatment is the assumption that it is better that men entering
compulsory military service not be encumbered with families.
People with Disabilities.--There were approximately 5.5 million
disabled persons in the country by year's end, and the number is
expected to reach 6 million by the year 2010. During the year, the
Central Bureau of Statistics (GUS) reported that 17 percent of disabled
persons able to work are unemployed. Advocacy groups claim that the
percentage is much higher. GUS data from 1999 indicate that 48.7
percent of the disabled have no more than an elementary school
education, compared with 33.7 percent of those without disabilities,
and that only 4.2 percent have a university education, compared with
8.2 percent of the nondisabled.
The Constitution provides for aid to disabled persons ``to ensure
their subsistence, professional training, and social communication,''
and a number of laws protect the rights of the disabled. However,
implementation falls short of rights set forth in the legislation.
Public buildings and transportation generally are not accessible to the
disabled. Current law provides only that buildings ``should be
accessible.''
The law creates a state fund for the rehabilitation of the disabled
that derives its assets from a tax on employers of over 50 persons,
unless 6 percent of the employer's work force are disabled persons.
While the fund has adequate resources, its management has encountered
difficulties, including frequent changes in leadership. According to
press reports, the fund has 4,000 grant applications pending. During
the year, the fund had $0.4 billion (1.8 billion PLN) at its disposal.
Thirty percent of this sum was spent for social rehabilitation and the
rest for professional rehabilitation. The fund has branches in all 16
provinces. According to the August 1997 revision of the law on
professional and social rehabilitation, 5 to 10 percent of the fund can
be used to assist disabled children.
A 1996 law allows individuals from certain disability groups to
take up gainful employment without the risk of losing their disability
benefits. Previously, disabled individuals from those groups lost their
benefits once they began to work.
Religious Minorities.--Current law places Protestant, Catholic,
Orthodox, and Jewish communities on the same legal footing, and the
Government attempts to address problems that minority religious groups
face. Among the most important of these problems is that of property
restitution. The laws governing restitution of communal property allow
for the return of churches and synagogues, cemeteries, and community
headquarters, as well as buildings that were used for other religious,
educational, or charitable activities. The laws included time limits
for filing claims; in several cases the deadlines have expired, and no
additional claims may be filed. Restitution commissions (composed of
representatives of the Government and of the affected religious
community) are continuing to adjudicate previously filed claims. The
Government established four separate commissions to process the claims
of the Catholic, Lutheran, and Orthodox Churches, and the Jewish
community. A fifth commission to handle the claims of other religious
groups became active on September 1.
The Concordat, a treaty regulating relations between the Government
and the Vatican, took effect in April 1998.
The time limit for applications by the Catholic Church expired in
December 1991. At the end of December, 2,512 of 3,045 claims filed by
the Catholic church had been concluded, with 1,184 claims settled by
agreement between the church and the party in possession of the
property (usually the national or a local government); 859 properties
were returned through decisions of the commission on property
restitution, which rules on disputed claims; 456 claims were rejected;
and 13 cases were expected to go to court. The local Jewish community's
deadline for filing claims under the 1997 law expires in 2002. By
year's end, 532 had been filed. Of those 532 claims, by year's end the
commission on property restitution considered and closed 145 cases; 78
of the 145 cases were closed by an agreement between the parties. As of
early in the year, Lutheran claims for 1,200 properties had resulted in
392 cases being closed with the return of the properties in question
(the deadline for filing such claims was August 1993). Seventy-four
claims were filed by the Orthodox Church, one property has been
transferred, and the commission is considering another 20 claims.
Laws on religious communal property do not address the private
property of any group, and laws on communal property restitution do not
address the issue of communal properties to which third parties now
have title, leaving several controversial and complicated cases
unresolved. In a number of cases over the years, buildings and
residences were built on land that included Jewish cemeteries that were
destroyed during or after World War II. For example, a school for
disabled children now stands on the site of a completely destroyed
Jewish cemetery in Kalisz. The existence of the school complicated the
issue of returning the cemetery to the Jewish community. Efforts
continued during the year to reach a resolution acceptable to all
concerned.
Units set up to monitor new religious movements that are being
trained to deal with criminal activities by sects have been criticized
by Adventist church leaders, who allege that the ``anti-sect'' training
material gives a distorted picture of minority religions that could
lead to discrimination against them.
Relations between the various religious communities are generally
amicable, although anti-Semitic feelings persist among certain sectors
of the population, occasionally manifesting themselves in acts of
vandalism and physical or verbal abuse. It is not always clear that
vandalism of graves is anti-Semitic in nature. Surveys in recent years
show a continuing decline in anti-Semitic sentiment and avowedly anti-
Semitic candidates fare very poorly in elections.
Sporadic and isolated incidents of harassment and violence against
Jews continue to occur in the country, often generated by skinheads and
other marginal societal groups. Occasional cases of cemetery
desecration, including both Jewish and Catholic shrines, also occurred
during the year. Government authorities consistently criticized such
actions and made efforts to prevent similar acts from occurring in the
future, for example, by increasing police patrols around Jewish sites.
No arrests or prosecutions took place after any of these events.
In February near Katowice, some 60 graves were desecrated in what
apparently was an attempt to steal and sell the stones from the local
Catholic cemetery; no one was charged in the case. Later in the month,
two other Catholic cemeteries were desecrated with Satanist graffiti,
one near Zamosc and one near Wroclaw. Perpetrators in the case were not
found and the investigation was discontinued.
In March hooligans vandalized a monument to martyred priest Jerzy
Popielusko; no one was arrested in the case. Also in March, the
citizens of Lodz took action of their own accord to clean up anti-
Semitic (and other) graffiti in the town. The same evening as the
clean-up, vandals spray-painted anti-Semitic and anti-Roma graffiti on
the home of Marek Edelman, the last surviving commander of the 1943
Warsaw ghetto uprising. The attack was criticized strongly by both the
President and the Prime Minister. The case was investigated, but no
perpetrators were identified and the investigation was discontinued.
In April anti-Semitic and anti-Roma graffiti were painted on the
Wall of the Jewish cemetery at Oswiecim (Auschwitz). The perpetrators
were not caught. The town paid to have the graffiti removed. Also in
April, on 2 successive nights, vandals in Krakow painted swastikas and
anti-Semitic graffiti on the walls of a local museum, whose site once
had housed a pharmacy operated by the only non-Jewish Pole to live in
the Krakow ghetto. The pharmacy's owner had received the Israeli
``righteous among nations'' award for the help he rendered to many Jews
during the war. Although the local public housing authorities
responsible for maintenance of the property painted over the graffiti
the following afternoon, the next evening the vandals wrote anti-
Semitic slogans over the fresh paint. The second set of graffiti was
painted over the next morning. Local police vowed to step up patrols in
the area but no arrests were made by year's end.
Also in April, Satanist graffiti defaced some 20 gravestones in a
Catholic cemetery in a village near Poznan. The vandals were never
identified. In August a group of eight to nine teenagers armed with
clubs attacked a Buddhist center in Krakow. The teenagers assaulted
three persons inside the center, one of whom required hospitalization,
and broke windows and smashed furniture. Center representatives said
the attack was the most serious in a series of incidents--including
assaults on Buddhists visiting the center, breaking windows, and
threatening graffiti--that began earlier in the year. Although the
center has been open since 1991, this is the first year that it became
the target of such attacks. The Krakow prosecutor initiated an
investigation into the case and two persons have been arrested in
relation to the case. The investigation is ongoing and legal
proceedings against the arrestees continued at year's end.
The ``Pope's Cross,'' located on the grounds of a former Carmelite
convent in Oswiecim adjacent to the Auschwitz concentration camp
museum, remained in place at year's end.
In April Opole University fired professor Dariusz Ratajczak for
publishing a book denying the Holocaust. The firing followed the
unsuccessful prosecution of Ratajczak in December 1999 for violating
the law on the preservation of national remembrance, a provision of
which criminalizes public denials of Nazi and communist-era crimes. The
University announced that Ratajczak had violated ethical standards and
would be barred from teaching at other universities for 3 years.
In January 1999, vandals damaged or destroyed 57 gravestones in the
Jewish cemetery in Krakow. In May 1999, the cemetery was vandalized
again when unidentified perpetrators overturned 30 gravestones and set
fire to the main door of the pre-burial house. Perpetrators in these
events were not found and the investigation into the cases was
discontinued. The local Jewish community now pays for two guards and
two guard dogs at the cemetery, where such incidents have ceased.
In July 1999, unknown vandals sprayed swastikas and anti-Semitic
graffiti on the Jewish community headquarters in Bielsko-Biala.
According to the mayor of Bielsko-Biala, city police officers were
ordered to guard the building after the attack and an investigation
opened in 1999 into the case was discontinued in 2000. There were no
further incidents reported during the year.
In May during the 12th March of the Living from Auschwitz to
Birkenau to honor victims of the Holocaust, several hundred Poles
joined the Presidents of Israel and Poland as well as some 6,000
marchers from Israel and other countries. This was the largest
participation of Polish citizens in the event to date. Government
officials participating in the march included M.P.s, the province's
governor, and Oswiecim's mayor and city council chairman.
Schoolchildren, Boy Scouts, the Polish-Israeli Friendship Society, and
the Jewish Students Association of Poland also participated in the
march.
Investigations continued into the May 1998 desecration of graves in
the Warsaw Jewish cemetery and the July 1998 vandalism of a plaque
commemorating Jewish Holocaust victims in Rzeszow. No charges have been
filed to date, and the Rzeszow case was still under investigation at
year's end.
In September dignitaries from Poland, Israel, the United States,
and other countries (including Prince Hassan of Jordan) gathered in
Oswiecim (Auschwitz) to commemorate the opening of the refurbished
Chevra Lomdei Mishnayot synagogue and the Auschwitz Jewish Center. The
synagogue, the sole synagogue in Oswiecim to survive World War II, and
an adjacent Jewish cultural and educational center, provide visitors a
place to pray and to learn about the active pre-war Jewish community
that once existed in Oswiecim. The synagogue was the first communal
property in the country to be returned to the Jewish community after
the fall of communism under a 1997 law allowing restitution of Jewish
communal property.
On November 11, some 400 persons participated in a demonstration in
Katowice officially organized by the No To Europe Association; some of
the participants chanted anti-Semitic slogans and burned the EU and
Israeli flags. The association's head told prosecutors investigating
the case that only some 30 percent of the rally's participants were
actual members of his organization.
There is some public concern about the growth of groups perceived
to be ``sects'' and the influence of non-mainstream religious groups,
especially in the wake of press reports of the deaths of a few young
persons in circumstances suggesting cult activity.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The law provides for the
educational rights of ethnic minorities, including the right to be
taught in their own language. There were 5 Lithuanian-language
textbooks in use during the year and the number will probably increase
to 8 or 9 in 2001. The Ministry of Education fully finances their
publication and uses Lithuanian minority representation on development
of the texts. The issue of Lithuanian minority rights, including
language instruction, is routinely addressed during governmental talks
at the highest levels.
The Romani community, numbering around 30,000, faces
disproportionately high unemployment and was hit harder by economic
changes and restructuring than were ethnic Poles, according to its
leaders. The national Government does not discriminate overtly against
Roma, though discrimination against Roma is commonplace in society at
large and some local officials have been known to discriminate by not
providing services in a timely manner or at all. Romani leaders
complain of widespread discrimination in employment, housing, banking,
the justice system, the media, and education. There have been
occasional incidents of skinheads clashing with Roma and racially
motivated violence directed at Roma. The central Government is
cooperating with local governments to develop and finance programs to
assist the poorest Roma. Some local governments are becoming more
active in dealing with the problems of local Romani communities. In the
southern town of Nowy Sacz, where some of the country's poorest Roma
reside, the local government launched a new initiative to improve the
lives of the city's Roma. The initiative calls for hiring a special
liaison to the Romani community, improving housing and access to
utilities (sewers and running water), and expanding educational
opportunities for Roma. The Government has also mounted an advertising
campaign featuring a famous Polish actor that emphasizes tolerance and
friendly attitudes towards foreigners and refugees resident in the
country. A November poll showed no significant change in Polish
attitudes toward other nationalities. The highest negative attitude is
towards Roma and Romanians (64 percent and 63 percent); Russians,
Ukrainians and Belarussians (57 percent, 58 percent, 50 percent); and
Jews (49 percent).
The small Ukrainian and Belarussian minorities occasionally
experience petty harassment and discrimination. Individuals of African,
Asian, or Arab descent have experienced verbal or other types of abuse,
including physical abuse. In February an African-American woman was
kicked at the Czestochowa train station, in what she felt was a
racially-motivated attack. In April a group of African-American
military personnel visiting Wroclaw in connection with a NATO exercise
were singled out for harassment by a group of skinheads. Part of the
group was involved in a shoving match outside of a local restaurant,
which ended when a larger group of military personnel arrived and the
skinheads dispersed. In a second related incident, three of the
servicemen were cornered by a group of skinheads carrying bottles who
identified themselves as ``white racists.'' In June two African-
Americans were verbally harassed by a group of skinheads in Gdansk.
They did not respond to the taunts and there was no further incident.
The German minority in Opole province makes up one-third of the 1
million inhabitants of this area of Poland that was part of Germany
prior to World War II. Some members of the community complain that not
enough German is used in the province's schools and that the minority
rights bill will not successfully pass Parliament. However, two members
of the German minority party are able to voice such concerns as Members
of Parliament (see Section 3).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides that all workers,
including civilian employees of the Armed Forces, police, and frontier
guards have the right to establish and join trade unions of their own
choosing. The law sets minimum size requirements for establishing a
trade union: 10 persons may form a local union, and 30 may establish a
national union. Unions, including interbranch national unions and
national interbranch federations, must be registered with the courts. A
court decision refusing registration may be appealed to an appeals
court. During the year, the number of officially registered national-
level unions remained at about 360, about the same as in 1999. No
precise data exist on work force unionization, although the trend
continues to be downward. Recent studies suggest that only 9 to 10
percent of workers belong to a union. As a rule, newly established
small- and medium-sized firms were nonunion, while union activity in
most cases carried over into privatized (former state-owned)
enterprises. The Independent Selfgoverning Trade Union (NSZZ)
Solidarity has a verified regular dues-paying membership of about 1
million. Small spin-offs from mainstream Solidarity include the rival
factions Solidarity '80, August '80, and the Christian Trade Union
Solidarity (Popieluszko). There are no reliable estimates of their
membership.
The other principal national unions are those affiliated with the
All-Poland Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ), the formerly Communist-aligned
confederation established in 1984 as the sole legal alternative to
then-outlawed NSZZ Solidarity, and its teachers' affiliate, the Polish
Union of Teachers (ZNP). The OPZZ reports that its membership has
dropped by more than 50 percent in recent years to about 1.7 million,
but this figure is unverified, and independent sociological surveys
suggest that its regular dues-paying membership is considerably less
than Solidarity's. A recent survey found that Solidarity represents
some 7.6 percent of all Polish workers, while the OPZZ represents only
3.6 percent (one estimate put OPZZ membership at roughly 700,000 to
800,000 workers). According to a 1999 study by the State Labor
Inspectorate, out of some 27,000 local union organizations, Solidarity
had 13,500 organizations, the OPZZ had 11,000 organizations, and
Solidarity '80 had 770 organizations.
The law on collective bargaining, in force since 1994, does not
require union membership figures to be verified or based on dues-paying
members in order for unions to be considered ``representative''
negotiating partners for management and government. Solidarity
protested some unions' (largely OPZZ affiliates) participation in
negotiations with the Government on the grounds that their membership
figures remain unproved.
Most trade unions were active in politics at all levels. Trade
unions are affiliated with political parties and scores of union
activists were parliamentarians, and several became senior government
officials. Solidarity plays a key role in political life. With 62
deputies, 27 senators, dozens of ministers, governors, and other senior
national and local officials, the union serves as the backbone of the
ruling AWS coalition. The OPZZ has 42 deputies, about one-quarter of
the opposition Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) caucus.
Unions have the right to strike except in ``essential services.''
However, labor leaders complain that the 1991 Act on Collective Dispute
Resolution prescribes an overly lengthy process before a strike may be
called. Employers consider the law too lenient, since it allows only
one-quarter of the work force to vote to call a strike. As a result, as
many as 60 to 90 percent of strikes called in recent years have been
technically ``illegal'' because one or both of the sides did not follow
each step exactly as required by law. Labor courts act slowly on
deciding the legality of strikes, while sanctions against unions for
calling illegal strikes, or against employers for provoking them, are
minimal. Arbitration is not obligatory and depends on the agreement of
disputing parties. Unions allege that laws prohibiting retribution
against strikers are not enforced consistently and that fines imposed
as punishment are so minimal that they are ineffective sanctions to
illegal activity. Workers who strike in accordance with the law retain
their right to social insurance but not to pay. However, if a court
rules a strike ``illegal,'' workers may lose social benefits, and
organizers are liable for damages and may face civil charges and fines.
The social partners (unions, employers, and the Government) continued
to work out ambiguities in dispute resolution mechanisms in the new
Labor Code, which went into effect in 1996, and which represented a
major overhaul of communist-era labor regulations.
The number of strikes in the first 6 months of the year remained
relatively low and dropped to 6 from 25, compared with the same time
period in 1999. There were strikes lasting for a few days in public
transportation, health, armaments, and metallurgy sectors. Railroad
(PKP) workers struck for a few hours during the year, demanding overdue
payments, changes in the privatization process, and protesting layoffs.
In November hundreds of nurses began hunger strikes and protests
throughout the country to protest the Government's failure to pay wage
increases. In December the Sejm passed a bill giving the nurses a
raise. The nurses found the offer unsatisfactory, and the matter was
still pending conclusion at year's end.
Unions have the right to join labor federations and confederations
and to affiliate with international labor organizations. Independent
labor leaders reported that these rights were observed in practice.
Solidarity is a full member of the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions, the World Confederation of Labor, and the European Trade
Union Confederation.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1991 Law on
Trade Unions created a favorable environment for trade union activity.
However, labor leaders report that the 1991 law has not prevented
employers from discriminating against workers who attempt to organize
or join unions, particularly in the growing private sector. The law
also has not prevented employer harassment of union members for labor
activity. The ICFTU alleges that the sanctions provided in the law
against acts of antiunion discrimination are not sufficiently
dissuasive.
The 1991 law provides for parties to take disputes first to labor
courts, then to the prosecutor general, and, in the last resort, to the
Supreme Court. In a typical year, Solidarity takes several thousand
cases to labor courts, several hundred to the Prosecutor General, and
dozens to the Supreme Court for resolution. In an overwhelming majority
of these cases, the courts ordered employers to correct practices or
reinstate dismissed workers or unions to reimburse employers for
activity found to be illegal. However, penalties are minimal and are
not an effective deterrent.
Enterprise-level collective bargaining over wages and working
conditions increasingly characterized the labor relations system. Labor
and management are adapting their relationship to the demands of a
market economy, but experience in modern labor relations is still in
its early stages. Many enterprises rolled over agreements concluded in
earlier years.
Since its formation in early 1994, the Tripartite Commission
(unions, employers, and the Government), currently chaired by Labor
Minister Longin Komolowski, has become the main forum that determines
national-level wage and benefit increases in such politically sensitive
areas as the so-called budget sector (health, education, and public
employees), while rendering opinions on pension indexation, energy
pricing, and other important aspects of social policy. The Commission
serves as an important forum in which the social partners air
differences, discuss grievances, and often negotiate agreements before
problems erupt into social conflict.
Many disputes arose because of the weakness of the employer side of
the union/employer/Government triangle. Key state sector employers
(largely in heavy industry and the budget sector) still were unable to
negotiate independently with organized labor without the extensive
involvement of central government ministries to which they are
subordinate, although the Government repeatedly stated that its
intention was not to be drawn into labor disputes. This weakness
complicated and politicized the Government's labor relations system.
Claiming that the Government was refusing seriously to discuss labor
issues with it, the OPZZ suspended participation in the commission in
April 1999 and stayed away all throughout this year.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor
does not exist, except for prisoners convicted of criminal offenses,
and otherwise is prohibited by law, including that performed by
children. There were no reports of forced or compulsory labor by
children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law contains strict legal prescriptions about the
conditions in which children may work. Education is universal and
mandatory until age 18, and public schools are free of charge. The
Labor Code forbids the employment of persons under the age of 15. Those
between the ages of 15 and 18 may be employed only if they have
completed primary school and if the proposed employment constitutes
vocational training and is not harmful to their health. The age
requirement rises to 18 years if a particular job might pose a health
danger.
Child labor is not a problem, although the State Labor Inspectorate
reported that increasing numbers of minors now work, and that many
employers violate labor rules in employing them (by underpaying
workers, paying them late, etc.). Inspectors found violations on stud
farms, in restaurants, and, in some instances, in small private sector
businesses and factories. Sanctions for illegal employment of children
range from warning letters through orders to cease the work of under-
age employees. These orders can be enforced through the police to
demand the transfer of under-age employees or shut down all or part of
the offending workplace, or, working through the Ministry of Labor, to
impose fines ranging from $5 to $125 (20 to 500 PLN) per offense. Cases
may also be referred to an administrative tribunal, which can levy
fines of up to $1,250 (5,000 PLN). Jail sentence may be imposed if the
infractions are serious enough; such cases generally involve serious
injury or death. In 1999, the last year for which figures are
available, the State Labor Inspectorate (PIP) conducted 1,494
investigations involving some 12,000 possible underage employees. Fines
were levied in 417 of these cases, amounting to some $35,000 (140,000
PLN). The number of cases sent to the administrative tribunal were 358.
The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, the
unions, and employers' organizations negotiate a revised national
minimum wage every 3 months. The minimum monthly wage in state-owned
enterprises is approximately $162.50 (700 PLN), which constitutes no
real increase over 1999 figures. This amount was insufficient to
provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living in view of
rising prices. A large percentage of construction workers and seasonal
agricultural laborers from the former Soviet Union earn less than the
minimum wage. The large size of the informal economy and the small
number of state labor inspectors make enforcement of the minimum wage
very difficult. As long as unemployment remains high, workers often
agree to inferior working conditions and lower pay in order to find or
keep their jobs.
The standard legal workweek is 42 hours, which allows 6- or 7-hour
days, including at least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires
overtime payment for hours in excess of the standard workweek.
The Labor Code defines minimum conditions for the protection of
workers' health and safety. Provisions are strict and extensive, and
trade unions have the right to stop production or extract a worker from
dangerous working conditions without jeopardizing the worker's
continued employment. However, enforcement is a major problem because
the Labor Inspectorate is unable to monitor the state sector
sufficiently, much less the private sector, where a growing percentage
of accidents take place. In addition there is a lack of clarity
concerning which government or legislative body has responsibility for
enforcing the law. The Labor Inspectorate can shut down workplaces in
which it finds unsafe conditions. In 1999, the last year for which
figures are available, there were 16 shutdowns of either a part or of a
whole workplace.
In the 41,011 work-related accidents reported during the first 6
months of the year, 277 individuals were killed and 602 seriously
injured. The Government's Central Statistical Office reported that most
accidents were in the public sector, while most serious accidents were
in the private sector, where proportionally more deaths also occurred.
Solidarity contends that the problem lies not in the law, which
establishes safe standards, but in enforcement, because employer
sanctions for illegal behavior are minimal. Standards for exposure to
chemicals, dust, and noise are exceeded routinely. Workers may remove
themselves from dangerous working conditions without losing their jobs,
but there were reports that fears of such loss prompted some to stay on
the job.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and children is
illegal and several specific provisions in the Criminal Code address
this issue; however, it remains a problem. The Criminal Code prohibits
trafficking in human beings, and pimping, and imposes sentences of up
to 10 years on those convicted. It also bans recruiting or luring
persons into prostitution; penalties for this offense are also up to 10
years. The most severe sentences are reserved for individuals
trafficking in children and those luring women into prostitution
abroad. Statutes on trafficking were most recently revised in 1998.
Due to the illicit nature of the activity, it is difficult to
estimate the numbers of women who are trafficked. There was an increase
in numbers of prosecutions from 1998 to 1999. In 1998 the police
reported 70 cases (18 cases of trafficking and 52 of luring women and
children into prostitution); in 1999 they reported 184 (8 cases of
trafficking and 176 cases of luring women and children into
prostitution). It is not clear whether this increase is due to a growth
in the number of women trafficked or to greater activity by the Polish
authorities. According to a recent press report, road prostitution has
doubled since 1998. However, in 1999 there was a police crackdown on
highway trafficking and prostitution in response to a letter from the
Polish Episcopate to the Prime Minister, and the Polish police report
that the crackdown resulted in an estimated 20 percent decrease in such
activity. Nonetheless, the international NGO La Strada, which focuses
on trafficking in women and girls worldwide, and other sources report
that this did not represent an overall decrease in the problem. Rather
the activities were moved to secondary roads and agencies. La Strada
also estimates that 90 percent of cases handled by Polish prosecutors
are the results of deportations from Germany to Poland that are
initiated and investigated in Germany. According to La Strada, Polish
authorities lack the resources to initiate and investigate cases
originating within Poland.
It is particularly difficult to estimate the extent to which
children are victims of trafficking. Trafficking in children is
reported to be marginal; that which exists appears to be in connection
with illegal adoption. Police authorities deal with child traffickers
more severely, in part because laws on statutory rape are easier to
prosecute. As a result the activity has been driven completely
underground. Child prostitution is a crime, while prostitution of
adults is neither banned nor regulated by law, making it more difficult
for the police to pursue. The authorities do not always recognize
trafficking in children since minors can be trafficked on false
documents identifying them as adults. Twenty of the 184 cases initiated
by prosecutors in 1999 involved victims who were minors.
Poland is a source, transit, and destination country for trafficked
women and girls. Polish women are trafficked into the sex trade to
Germany and other Western European countries through such means as fake
employment offers, arranged marriages, fraud, and coercive measures.
Women and girls are trafficked into Poland primarily from east and
south central Europe, where they are recruited from areas with low
socioeconomic conditions, sometimes quite openly. Many believe that
they are accepting employment as waitresses or maids in the west. While
they are en route to what they believe to be their destinations, their
passports and identity papers are taken away from them. Stripped of
their personal identity, the women and girls are kept under the control
of the traffickers through fear and intimidation. They are required to
serve a minimum number of clients each day in order to earn their keep.
They are threatened with violence, and those who resist are raped or
beaten. If they try to flee, their legs may be broken. There are also
reports of victims being killed by their traffickers. Since the border
guards and police may regard them as criminals who have violated
passport laws, the women and girls are afraid to turn to officials for
help. They have no legal status and there are no public resources
available to assist them. When detained by the police, they may be
deported to the border, where they are met by traffickers who quickly
provide them with new travel documents and return them to Poland. One
official mentioned the case of a Bulgarian woman who had been arrested
in Poland four times, each time under a different name. Bulgaria is the
largest single source of foreign women trafficked in Poland. Women from
Bulgaria tend to be from the Turkish and Roma minorities. There are
also significant numbers of women from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and
Latvia. Recently there also have been reports of Roma women from
Romania who are trafficked on Bulgarian documents. Those women and
girls with the lowest socioeconomic status are most vulnerable, and
subjected to the worst conditions. For example, Roma and ethnically
Turkish Bulgarians tend to be employed on highways. They may spend a
few months in Poland before they are trafficked further west. In
contrast, women from other countries of Eastern Europe are also
trafficked in agencies run as brothels. Educated Polish and Russian
women are more likely than others to be employed voluntarily by escort
services.
In the last few years, trafficking has become increasingly
organized and has been associated with a rampant growth in document
fraud. As many as 90 percent of the women and girls trafficked in the
country have false travel documents, and the trafficking of a single
woman will involve a whole network of criminals. One criminal will
recruit the woman; the second will provide false travel documents and
traffic her across the border. A third criminal will supervise her work
with clients, functioning as a pimp. La Strada reports that last year a
large scale ``auction'' of women was held at a convention of
traffickers meeting at a major hotel outside Warsaw. Polish authorities
are investigating reports that such auctions occur regularly; one news
source indicates that such auctions take place regularly. Prices paid
for women and girls who are trafficked reportedly range from $2,000 to
$4000 (4,000 to 8,000 DM). They are usually trafficked by nationals
from the same source country. For example, Bulgarian women are
trafficked by Bulgarians and Ukrainians by Ukrainians. Foreign
traffickers systematically pay a percentage of their receipts to Polish
traffickers operating out of the same region.
__________
PORTUGAL
The Portuguese Republic is a constitutional democracy with a
President, a Prime Minister, a Parliament freely elected by secret
ballot in multiparty elections, and an independent judiciary.
Internal security is primarily the responsibility of the Ministries
of Justice and Internal Administration. Security forces are controlled
by, and responsive to, the Government. They occasionally committed
human rights abuses.
Portugal has a market-based economy. The service sector (with
tourism playing a prominent role) is the leading source of employment,
while employment in agriculture and industry continues to be static or
decline. Manufacturing provides about 35 percent of total economic
output. The principal exports are textiles, machinery, and vehicles.
The standard of living has increased: per capita gross domestic product
is approximately $10,000 (2.15 million escudos).
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Credible reports
continued that security personnel occasionally beat detainees. Prison
conditions remained poor but improved somewhat. There were lengthy
delays in holding trials. Violence against women and trafficking in
women are problems, as are discrimination and violence against Roma,
minorities, and immigrants. The Government is taking active steps to
deal with the problem of child labor.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In a widely reported January incident in Porto, Alvaro Rosa
Cardoso, a member of the Roma community, died from internal abdominal
bleeding after a violent encounter with police. The officers had been
called to the scene of a local disturbance. The two officers alleged to
be responsible were charged, but in August a court found the officers
not guilty since it could not be determined whether the internal
bleeding was due to the fight before the arrest or the alleged police
mistreatment afterwards. Cardosa's family continued to blame the death
on police mistreatment.
A similar event happened on the same day in another part of the
city in which Paulo Silva died of internal bleeding which may have come
about during an arrest for drug use. This case was reopened in October
and was pending at year's end.
An inmate was reported to have died as a result of beatings by
prison guards in Vale de Judeus in 1997; however, the Ministry of
Justice later determined that the inmate committed suicide.
No one was ever charged or disciplined in the case of the death of
Olivio Almada, whose body was found in 1996. He was last seen in the
company of three police officers.
Three PSP officers were convicted on criminal charges related to
the death in custody in 1996 of Carlos Areujo. The officers appealed
the verdict, and their case remained in the appeals process at year's
end. Disciplinary proceedings against the officers were deferred until
after the criminal case is resolved.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, and the use of evidence obtained under torture
in criminal proceedings; however, credible but infrequent reports
continued that police and prison guards beat and otherwise abused
detainees, particularly non-Europeans.
In an attempt to respond to past negative reports on the treatment
of detainees and to consolidate alleged improvements in the system, new
legislation entitled ``Regulations on the Material Conditions of
Detention in Police Establishments'' was adopted in May 1999. The law
provides detailed guidelines covering all aspects of arrest and
custody.
According to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Amnesty
International (AI), a National Republican Guard (GNR) infantry sergeant
reported in August 1999 that in spite of the new regulations, the
mistreatment of detainees was ``virtually systematic.'' In November
1999, the General Inspectorate of Internal Administration (IGAI) opened
an inquiry into the sergeant's allegations and began disciplinary
proceedings against him personally, on unrelated charges. However, the
IGAI stated that these proceedings were not in response to the
allegations he made.
AI also brought to light the alleged mistreatment of Jorge Manuel
da Conceicao Simoes. He was arrested in May 1999 on suspicion of
possessing drugs and allegedly was beaten when he refused to sign a
confession. In a September 1999 Madeira incident, also reported by AI,
Marco Fernandes claimed to have been beaten by police with a pipe and a
police radio. Judicial and disciplinary proceedings were opened and
remained pending at year's end.
A police officer who used electroshock torture in Sintra in 1999
was fired from the force. A civil case against him was ongoing at
year's end. Police were disciplined for misconduct during a January
1999 street festival in Lisbon.
In late 1997, two police officers were accused of having violated
sexually a female drug addict in 1994. The supervisors of the officers
initially delayed the opening of an investigation, but in December 1997
the divisional commander in Lisbon suspended the officers and ordered
an investigation. The officers subsequently were fired and jailed,
according to the Inspector General's office.
In April AI released a report covering the last 6 months of 1998,
which noted the mistreatment of prisoners and excessive use of force by
the police. In September 1997, Marcelino Soares, a 17-year-old inmate
at the Caxias prison, reportedly was beaten and confined to an
isolation cell for 3 days by guards for complaining that prison
authorities had blocked visits by his brother. The guards involved in
this case were fired, according to the Ministry of Justice.
Prison conditions remained poor; however, the Directorate General
of Prison Services (DGSP) has taken steps to improve them. Prison
crowding remains a major problem, but due to higher levels of funding
and DGSP-led improvements, the rate of overcrowding went from a 1996
high of 57.5 percent (14,177 prisoners and 8,999 places) to a low of
13.4 percent (12,728 prisoners and 11,221 places) as of September 1.
By year's end, every cell was equipped with proper hygiene
facilities. Health problems such as hepatitis and drug dependency
nevertheless continued, and prisoners suffer from a high AIDS infection
rate. In 1999 the health services director of the Bureau of Prisons
reported that 7 out of every 10 convicts entering the prison system
were infected with AIDS, Hepatitis B, or Hepatitis C. An estimated 20
percent of the total prison population is infected with AIDS.
Tuberculosis was also on the rise. Prison health services, although
still not adequately staffed, have benefited from increased spending on
health services, the use of local health care providers to help prison
inmates, and the construction of new health care facilities in many
prisons.
Reports persisted about the mistreatment of prisoners by prison
guards, severe overcrowding, poor medical treatment and the spread of
contagious diseases, drug addiction, and cold temperatures in winter.
Prisoners alleged that at Linho the warden and other supervisory staff
seemed powerless to stop daily beatings of inmates by guards. Prison
authorities deny these reports and point to the existence of organized
violence among inmates. According to AI, other prisons where brutality
by guards was alleged were Pinheiro da Cruz and Angra Heroismo. To help
combat brutality by guards, the General Directorate of Prison Services
began using resources from AI; all guards participate in mandatory
training conducted by AI on such topics as nonviolent control of
prisoners and conflict resolution.
An independent ombudsman, chosen by the Parliament, investigates
complaints of mistreatment by the police and prison authorities. IGAI
also conducts internal investigations in cases of alleged mistreatment.
Police officers receive training in human rights and proper
investigative procedure. However, NGO's have been critical of the slow
pace of police investigations in general and internal investigations by
the police in particular.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
Human rights organizations reported no difficulties in gaining access
to inmates at detention facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides for protection against arbitrary arrest and detention, and the
Government respects its provisions in practice.
Under the law, an investigating judge determines whether an
arrested person should be detained, released on bail, or released
outright. A person may not be held more than 48 hours without appearing
before an investigating judge. Investigative detention is limited to a
maximum of 6 months for each suspected crime. If a formal charge is not
filed within that period, the detainee must be released. In cases of
serious crimes, for example, murder or armed robbery, or of more than
one suspect, investigative detention may last for up to 2 years and may
be extended by a judge to 3 years in extraordinary circumstances. A
suspect in investigative detention must be brought to trial within 18
months of being charged formally. If a suspect is not in detention,
there is no specified period for going to trial. A detainee has access
to lawyers; the state assumes the cost if necessary.
Exile is illegal and is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
impartial.
The court system, laid out in the Constitution, consists of a
Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court of Justice, and judicial courts
of first and second instance. There is also a Supreme Court of
Administration, which deals with administrative and tax disputes, and
which is supported by lower administrative courts. An audit court is in
the Ministry of Finance.
All trials are public except those that may offend the dignity of
the victim, such as in cases of sexual abuse of children. The accused
is presumed innocent. In trials for serious crimes, a panel of three
judges presides. For lesser crimes, a single judge presides. At the
request of the accused, a jury may be used in trials for major crimes;
in practice, requests for jury trials are extremely rare.
The judicial system provides citizens with a fair legal process.
However, frequent critics point to a large backlog of pending trials
resulting from inefficient functioning of the courts. A new law passed
during the year aims to reduce the case backlog by increasing the
number of judges. The bill also has provisions to reduce the time it
takes a lawyer to become a judge. Another new law provides for
witnesses to testify in cases heard in distant jurisdictions via
teleconference. Also the Ministry of Justice announced in November a
plan to speed the service of subpoenas. Many factors, from the
underutilization of technology (case folders are still sewn closed by a
large number of ``needlemen/women''), to the heretofore confusing and
drawn out method of serving subpoenas, to the reluctance of the justice
system to change old ways of doing things all contribute to the backlog
problem. The extremely slow pace of the judicial process was cited as
contributing to a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights in a 1999 report from the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR).
In March the ECHR ordered the Ministry of Justice to pay a fine to
three plaintiffs in three separate civil cases. The first case involved
two sets of proceedings that lasted nearly 11 years. The second case
was not resolved after 7 years, and the third case had continued for
4.5 years. In April the ECHR ordered the Ministry of Justice to pay a
fine to a corporate plaintiff in a case that had lasted over 17 years
without a final resolution. Many similar examples of judicial delay and
backlog are reported in the press.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids such practices, and the
Government respects these provisions in practice. Violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution (law) provides
for freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects
these rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary,
and a functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom
of speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
In a September freedom of the press case, the ECHR found in favor
of Vicente Jorge Silva, a former editor of the center-left daily,
Publico, in his appeal of a decision of the Constitutional Court. In
1993 he published a scathing editorial highly critical of the policies
of a local politician running for public office. The politician sued
for ``abuse of freedom of the press,'' but Silva won the case in
criminal court. Upon appeal two higher courts found in favor of the
politician. The ECHR determined that the Constitutional Court had
failed to support the freedom of the press in Silva's case.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The Roman
Catholic Church is the dominant religion; it receives tax exemptions
and other privileges unavailable to other denominations. Although the
overwhelming majority of citizens are Roman Catholic, other religions
practice freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for granting refugee or asylee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. Persons who qualify as refugees
are entitled to residence permits. There were no reports of the forced
expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee status. However, the
Government almost never rules that an asylum seeker has a ``valid''
claim. Immigration authorities attempt to distinguish among political,
humanitarian, and temporary refugees, but the Government continues to
maintain that the majority are economic refugees using Portugal as a
gateway to the other European Union ``Schengen'' countries.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections on the basis of universal
suffrage. Portugal is a multiparty parliamentary democracy.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. However,
they and minorities have full political rights and participate actively
in political life. Women head the Ministries of Health and of
Environment. There are 49 female members of the 230-member Parliament.
Race is rarely an issue in politics; persons of minority origin have
achieved political prominence. Some persons advocate laws mandating
female quotas on political party lists, but such legislation has not
been passed. Some political parties nevertheless adopted their own
internal quotas.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic (and international) human rights groups
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are
generally cooperative, although most groups complain of slow
investigations or remedial actions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution forbids discrimination based on ancestry, sex,
language, origin, religion, political or ideological convictions,
education, economic situation, or social condition, and the Government
enforces these prohibitions.
Women.--Domestic and other violence against women is reportedly a
common but hidden problem for which few seek legal recourse. According
to the first national report on family violence, presented in March
1999, police agencies recorded 2,889 cases of family violence during
the period October 1998 through January 1999. Of the 633 family
violence crimes reported in January, more than two-thirds involved acts
of physical violence and occurred between spouses or partners. Of the
victims, 81 percent were women, and 87 percent of the suspects were
men.
According to the 1999 statistics of a major NGO providing services
to victims of crime, 46 percent of the 4,653 cases it handled involved
domestic violence, and in the vast majority of those cases the target
of the violence was women. The same NGO agreed with the Governmental
Commission for Equality and Women's Rights that the frequency of
violent incidents is probably the same, but increased publicity and
resources have increased the number of victims who seek help. The law
provides for criminal penalties in cases of violence by a spouse, and
the judicial system shows no apparent reluctance to prosecute suspects
accused of abusing women. Changes to the Penal Code in May granted any
interested party the ability to file charges in domestic violence
cases. However, traditional societal attitudes still discourage many
battered women from recourse to the judicial system.
The toll-free hot line for victims of domestic violence, in service
since November 1998, now operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In its
first 6 months of operation, approximately 64 percent of the calls
related to acts of physical violence, while 30 percent related to
psychological concerns. The majority of callers (66 percent) were
themselves victims. Women between the ages of 25 and 35 accounted for
about 29 percent of the calls, while about 31 percent were women
between the ages of 35 and 45. Although calls came from all over the
country, the vast majority came from the large urban centers of Lisbon
and Porto. These percentages have remained essentially unchanged.
Parliament has continued to address the problem of domestic
violence with the passage of several laws in recent years. One provided
for the expansion of the system of shelters for victims. Educational
campaigns for the public and specialized training for the police also
were strengthened. The creation of domestic violence units in the
police, and of a new domestic violence category in the Attorney
General's report on crime, were mandated by one of the new laws in May.
Perpetrators of domestic violence now can be barred from contact with
their victims, and in extreme cases, the police can order the immediate
expulsion of a perpetrator from the victim's dwelling. The law also
calls for the development of new programs to teach anger management to
the perpetrators of domestic violence and to assist victims with the
professional development necessary to live independent lives.
In August 1999, Parliament passed legislation to establish a
national support network and a system of compensation for victims of
domestic violence. In May 2000 Parliament changed the legal definition
of domestic violence, the net result of which was expected to give
police and the courts more leverage to prosecute such cases and remove
some of the burden of bringing charges from the victim.
Prostitution is legal, but procurement is not. Trafficking in women
for the purposes of forced prostitution continues to be problem (see
Section 5 and 6.f.). Prostitution is linked closely to other types of
organized crime, especially international narcotics trafficking.
Specific legislation prohibits forced prostitution and trafficking in
human beings. The Nest, an NGO, operates economic and social recovery
programs for prostitutes.
The Civil Code provides for full legal equality for women. Sexual
harassment, a problem that continues to gain public attention, is
covered in the Penal Code as a sex crime, but only if perpetrated by a
superior and in the workplace. The penalties are 2 to 3 years'
imprisonment. As in the case of domestic violence, socially ingrained
attitudes discourage many women from taking advantage of the legal
protection available.
The Commission on Equality in the Workplace and in Employment, made
up of representatives of the Government, employers' organizations, and
labor unions, is empowered to examine, but not adjudicate, complaints
of sexual harassment, but it receives few. It does review numerous
complaints of discrimination by employers against pregnant workers and
new mothers, who are protected by law. Maternity leave was increased in
2000 from 90 days to 120 days with full pay and benefits. Also after
return to work a new mother (or father) may take time off every day to
nurse or feed an infant. If pregnant or nursing women or new fathers
are fired, they may take their complaint to the government Equality
Commission (CITE), which was established to deal with equal opportunity
complaints. If CITE finds that the employee's legal rights were
violated, the employer must reinstate the worker and pay double back
pay and benefits for the time at work missed due to the wrongful
firing.
Women increasingly are represented in university student bodies,
business, science, and the professions. However, a gap remains between
male and female salaries: according to the most recent figures
available (1997), women earned an average of 77 percent of men's
earnings. Women make up the majority of university graduates.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The Government provides 9 years of
compulsory, free, and universal education for children through the age
of 15. The Government provides free or low cost health care for all
children up to the age of 15. A special office in the Directorate
General of Health oversees implementation of the Government's programs
for children. A 9-year period of education is compulsory. A 1996 study
by the European Commission indicated that only 50 percent of children
receive preschool education. To counter this problem, the Ministry of
Education instituted a pilot project on early childhood education in
the Algarve region in 1997. This program proved successful. More
teachers were hired, and more new schools were constructed in remote
places. Preschool education became free for 5 year olds in 1998 and was
scheduled to become free for 3 and 4 year olds by 2001. Each year the
number of students enrolled in preschool has increased. In the 1998-99
school year, 207,109 attended; in 1999-2000, the number increased to
218,225; and in the 2000-2001 school year, 230,000 students attended
preschool.
The National Children's Rights Commission is charged with
implementing the principles of the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. The Commission operates under the aegis of the
High Commissioner for the Promotion of Equality and of the Family and
includes representatives from the Ministries of Justice, Health,
Education, and Solidarity, as well as from leading NGO's. The quasi-
independent Institute for the Support of Children organized a network
of 48 NGO's dedicated to helping at-risk youth. The University of
Minho's Institute for the Study of Children is a research center
dedicated solely to the study of children's issues. The Institute for
the Support of Children organizes public awareness programs, serves as
an information clearinghouse for NGO's working on childrens' issues and
promotes legislation protecting children's rights. It provides
telephone and in-person counseling, intervention, and prevention
services in cases of child abuse and neglect. It also operates services
assisting the at-risk youth known as ``criancas da rua''--``street
kids.''
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children, although child
labor remains a problem (see Section 6.d.).
Following the uncovering of a pedophile ring in Madeira in 1997,
the Parliament passed a law in 1998 that enlarged the definition of
pedophilia to include the consumers of child pornography as well as the
producers.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or the provision of other
state services. The law mandates access to public buildings for persons
with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in
practice. However, no such legislation covers private businesses or
other facilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The principal minority groups
are immigrants, legal and illegal, from Portugal's former African
colonies. There is also a resident Romani population of approximately
40,000 persons, who are the subject of some discrimination and
violence.
In 1999 the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination conducted a periodic review of the Government's
obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In its report, the Committee
expressed concern about racial discrimination and xenophobia in the
country, including violence against blacks, Roma, immigrants, and
foreigners--frequently perpetrated by skinheads. While acknowledging
efforts by the Government to combat such acts, the Committee urged that
the law be extended to prohibit all racist groups. According to an NGO
that tracks racist and xenophobic issues, activities by racist groups
are increasing, and the police response to such actions tends to be
inconsistent.
The law permits victims and antiracism associations to participate
in race-related criminal trials by lodging criminal complaints,
retaining their own lawyers, and calling witnesses. In 1999 the
Parliament approved a new set of antiracism laws, reiterating
antidiscrimination sections of the Constitution and the Penal Code. The
new laws prohibit and penalize racial discrimination in housing,
business, and health services. They also provided for the creation of a
new Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination to work
alongside the High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities.
However, by year's end the new commission had yet to be established.
The growing number undocumented persons who enter the country
illegally in order to work is a problem. Recent economic growth has
created a need for many workers, especially in the construction and
service sectors. These undocumented workers, usually ethnic minorities,
are allowed to remain and work but have no access to health care,
education, or other social services. Parliament rejected legislation
during the year that was intended to bring them into the social
services system.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers in both the private and
public sectors have the right to associate freely and to establish
committees in the workplace to defend their interests. The Constitution
provides for the right to establish unions by profession or industry.
Trade union associations have the right to participate in the
preparation of labor legislation. Strikes are permitted by the
Constitution for any reason, including political causes; they are
common and generally are resolved through direct negotiations.
Policemen and members of the armed forces may not strike. The
authorities respect all provisions of the law on labor's rights.
Two principal labor federations exist, the Workers' General Union
(UGT) and the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP). No
restrictions limit the formation of additional labor federations.
Unions function without hindrance by the Government and are associated
closely with political parties.
There are no restrictions on the ability of unions to join
federations or of federations to affiliate with international labor
bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions are free
to organize without interference by the Government or by employers.
Collective bargaining is provided for in the Constitution and is
practiced extensively in the public and private sectors.
Collective bargaining disputes usually are resolved through
negotiation. However, should a long strike occur in an essential sector
such as health, energy, or transportation, the Government may order the
strikers back to work for a specific period. The Government rarely has
invoked this power, in part because most strikes last only 1 to 3 days.
The law requires a ``minimum level of service'' to be provided during
strikes in essential sectors, but this requirement is applied
infrequently. When it is applied, minimum levels of service are
established by agreement between the Government and the striking
unions, although unions have complained, including to the International
Labor Organization (ILO), that the minimum levels were set too high.
When collective bargaining fails, the Government may appoint a mediator
at the request of either management or labor.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and the authorities
enforce this prohibition in practice. The General Directorate of Labor
promptly examines complaints.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including by children, is prohibited and generally does not occur.
Specific legislation prohibits trafficking in persons; however,
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum working age is 16 years. There are instances
of child labor, but the overall incidence is small and is concentrated
geographically and sectorally. The greatest problems are reported in
Braga, Porto, and Aveiro and tend to occur in the clothing, footwear,
construction, and hotel industries. Government agencies have noted a
recent gradual shift from child labor in industries to the home, where
children work in family businesses. The extensive national network
designed to combat child labor is beginning to shift some of its
resources in this direction. The Government prohibits forced and bonded
child labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section
6.c.).
In 1998 the Government created a commission called Plan for the
Elimination of Exploitation of Child Labor (PEETI). Working with
several NGO's, PEETI has developed an integrated program of education
and training in which local teams of social workers and educators
intervene in situations involving dropouts and working children. These
teams develop programs of scholastic and vocational study tailored to
the individual child and his community. PEETI gives ``scholarships'' to
help offset the loss of income to the family. In the first year of
PEETI'S existence, 600 teenagers were involved. The Government also
created in 1996 the National Council Against the Exploitation of Child
Labor (CNETI), a multiagency body that coordinates government efforts
to eliminate child labor. CNETI is the successor to the National
Children's Rights Commission CCNCTI.
In a first-of-its-kind study, conducted in conjunction with the ILO
in 1998, the Government polled 26,500 families, with separate
questionnaires for parents and children, to try to measure the
incidence of child labor. According to this survey, as many as 20,000
to 40,000 children under the age of 16 may be engaged in some form of
labor. The majority of these cases consist of daily chores on family
farms, which do not prevent school attendance. However, the study
estimates that as many as 11,000 children may be working for nonfamily
employers, a figure that represents 0.2 percent of the labor force. The
next comprehensive study of the problem is scheduled for April 2001.
The key enforcement mechanisms of labor laws falls to labor
inspectors. Because of an increase in the minimum working age from 15
to 16 in 1997, the total number of child labor cases has increased in
the last few years. However, according to the Ministry of Labor and
Equality, the incidence of child labor is decreasing as a result of
government efforts to combat child labor and a move towards a higher
technology industrial base (with a corresponding need for better
educated and skilled labor). The Ministry reported a 74 percent
decrease in child labor cases from 1997 to 2000. The Minister of Labor
attributed this decrease to the extensive reorganization of groups
fighting this problem and the effectiveness of new programs being
carried out. Portugal's fight against exploitative child labor is no
longer limited to inspectors' visits to factories and farms, but
includes policies designed to address some of the root causes of this
problem.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage legislation covers
full-time workers as well as rural workers and domestic employees ages
18 years and over. For 2000 the monthly minimum wage was approximately
$284 (63,800 escudos). Along with widespread rent controls, basic food
and utility subsidies, and phased implementation of an assured minimum
income, the minimum wage affords a basic standard of living for a
worker and family. Only 9.2 percent of the work force received the
minimum wage.
Employees generally receive 14 months' pay for 11 months' work: the
extra 3 months' pay are for a Christmas bonus, a vacation subsidy, and
22 days of annual leave. The maximum legal workday is 8 hours, and the
maximum workweek is 40 hours. There is a maximum of 2 hours of paid
overtime per day and 200 hours of overtime per year, with a minimum of
12 hours between workdays. The Ministry of Employment and Social
Security monitors compliance through its regional inspectors.
Employers legally are responsible for accidents at work and are
required by law to carry accident insurance. An existing body of
legislation regulates safety and health, but labor unions continue to
argue for stiffer laws. The General Directorate of Hygiene and Labor
Security develops safety standards in harmony with European Union
standards, and the General Labor Inspectorate is responsible for their
enforcement. However, the Inspectorate lacks sufficient funds and
inspectors to combat the problem of work accidents effectively. Workers
injured on the job rarely initiate lawsuits. A relatively large
proportion of accidents occurs in the construction industry. Poor
environmental controls in textile production also cause considerable
concern.
While the ability of workers to remove themselves from situations
where these hazards exist is limited, it is difficult to fire workers
for any reason.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific legislation prohibits
trafficking in persons, which nevertheless is a problem. Under the
Penal Code, trafficking in persons is punishable by 2 to 8 years'
imprisonment. Parliament passed legislation during the year that
established training programs for those who provide services for
victims of trafficking. The Commission for Equality and Women's Rights
has two working groups, one to oversee the training of social service
workers and the other to inform victims of their legal rights; both are
providing services.
However, trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
prostitution continues to be a problem. International trafficking rings
take Portuguese women abroad, often to Spain, and bring foreign women
to Portugal. The Portuguese women involved tend to be from poorer areas
and are often, but not always, drug users. Women from Brazil and from
Lusophone Africa also are involved, as are women from non-Lusophone
countries such as Senegal.
Russian mafia organizations are present in the country in
increasing numbers, largely as the networks behind the trafficking in
Eastern European women. One such network reportedly sells Moldovan and
Ukrainian women for the equivalent of around $4,000 each. The
authorities broke up one such ring in 1999 that was headed by a nuclear
scientist from the former Soviet Union.
__________
ROMANIA
Romania is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty, bicameral
parliamentary system. Prior to the end-of-year elections, Prime
Minister Mugur Isarescu was the Head of Government, and President Emil
Constantinescu, who was elected directly, was the Head of State. On
December 29, Adrian Nastase was sworn into office as the new Prime
Minister, and Ion Iliescu was elected President on December 10. The
judiciary is a separate branch of the Government; however, in practice
the executive branch exercises influence over the judiciary.
Several different security forces are responsible for preserving
law and order and protecting against external threats. The laws that
established these organizations are somewhat vague, and their security
responsibilities overlap. All security and intelligence organizations
operate under the authority of civilian leadership. The Ministry of the
Interior supervises the national police, which have primary
responsibility for security, and the border police. Some police
officers committed serious human rights abuses.
Romania is a middle-income, developing country in transition from a
centrally planned economy to a market economy. The private sector
accounted for 61.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and employed
61.9 percent of the work force, primarily in agriculture, commerce, and
services. Although privatization is under way, government ownership
remains dominant in the industrial sector. From 1993 through October
2000, 7,108 firms were privatized; 1,162 during the year. Approximately
1,200 firms are left in the State Privatization Fund's portfolio,
including several of the country's largest firms. The economy
contracted 6.6 percent in 1997, 5.4 percent in 1998, and 3.2 percent in
1999. However, GDP grew 2 percent during the year. GDP per capita in
1999 was about $1,512. Exports decreased 1.5 percent in 1998 and rose
2.4 percent in 1999. Inflation increased from 40.6 percent in 1998 to
54.8 percent in 1999. Official statistics significantly understated
economic activity because of the size of the informal economy.
The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens;
however, several serious problems remained. Police use of excessive
force resulted in one death. Some police officers continued to beat
detainees. The Government investigated police officers suspected of
abuse and in some cases indicted those accused of criminal activities
in military courts. However, investigations of police abuses generally
are lengthy and inconclusive and rarely result in prosecution or
punishment. While some progress was made in reforming the police, cases
of inhuman and degrading treatment continue to be reported. The
Government promised important modifications to the criminal code in
1998, but no such changes were made. Prison conditions did not meet
minimum international standards, and overcrowding remained a serious
problem, despite improvements made in 1999. The judiciary remained
subject to executive branch influence. Violence and discrimination
against women remained serious problems. There was a large number of
impoverished homeless children in large cities. Societal harassment of
religious minorities still remained a problem, and religious groups not
officially recognized by the Government sometimes complain that they
receive discriminatory treatment from the authorities. Discrimination
and instances of societal violence against Roma continued. Child labor
was a problem. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution was a problem.
The Ombudsman's Office, which was established in 1997, registered
3,326 complaints as of early September 2000, 4,372 complaints in 1999,
2,985 in 1998, and 1,168 in 1997. The Ombudsman's role still is not
fully clear to the public. Many complaints were rejected because they
related to problems with the judiciary and not the administration.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, Amnesty International and
APADOR-CH, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the
International Helsinki Federation, reported one case in which police
used excessive lethal force against a member of the Romani minority.
On May 21, a police officer shot and killed Petre Letea, a Romani
man, and wounded Marian Pilos in Bucharest as they were attempting to
escape in a car. Police had stopped to ask Letea what he was doing in a
parked car by an apartment block. When told that he was waiting for two
friends, police entered the apartment block and found two men
attempting to burglarize an apartment. The men fled. One disappeared,
while the other, Pilos, got into Letea's car, and Letea drove away. The
police officer who had remained on the street opened fire on the car,
shooting Letea in the head and killing him and wounding Pilos with a
shot in the back. A 1994 law on the organization of the police force
allows police to shoot in order to stop persons who are fleeing from
attempts to take them into custody. The law also allows the use of
firearms against persons who have escaped detention or run away from an
escort.
On November 30, Sorin Moldovan, deputy chairman of the Hunedoara
County branch of the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) was
killed by an unknown assailant. It was unclear whether the murder was
politically motivated. Moldovan was the head of the Hunedoara customs
office and had been sentenced for taking bribes in 1997; the Supreme
Court later lifted his sentence.
In several cases of deaths in custody or deaths reportedly due to
police brutality during 1999, investigations and trials still are
dragging on. There was no progress in the investigation of the death of
Aurel Uluiteanu in police custody in September 1999 in Barcanesti.
There were no further developments in the case of Cristian-Venus
Dumitrescu, who allegedly was beaten by police in September 1999 and
died after he ``threw'' himself out of a third floor window en route to
a police station. There was no progress in the investigation of the
death of Sevastian Apostol, a Rom killed by police while trying to flee
a bar where he had a serious conflict with the owner and other clients.
There was no further investigation into the August 1999 case of Elinoiu
Toader, who died after being beaten by police. There was no further
investigation into the killing of Radu Marian, an unarmed Rom who was
killed in October 1999 during a police raid on a group of cigarette
smugglers.
According to the Government, the chief of police in Valcele was
indicted in June 1999 for the illegal use of his weapon in the 1996
killing of Mircea-Muresul Mosor, a Rom from Comani who was shot in the
back and killed while in police custody. A lower court found the police
officer not guilty, but the prosecutor's office appealed the verdict in
May 1999; the superior court's decision still was pending at year's
end.
In several earlier cases of deaths in custody or deaths reportedly
due to police brutality, investigations and trials still are dragging
on, years later.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading.--Treatment or
Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading
punishment or treatment, and these prohibitions generally were
respected in practice; however, there were credible reports that police
beat detainees and used excessive force.
Amnesty International cited numerous reports of torture and
mistreatment. In 1999 in seeking to cover up the death of Elinoiu
Toader, a witness allegedly was beaten to induce him to sign a
statement that Toader had died as a result of alcohol abuse. At least
two other witnesses were threatened similarly (see Section 1.a.).
Romani NGO's claimed that police used excessive force against Roma
and also subjected them to brutal treatment and harassment (see Section
5). In one case excessive force reportedly resulted in death (see
Section 1.a.).
On January 8, Constantin Vrabie, of Candesti, was beaten severely
by police officers in Buzau County. In December 1999, Vrabie had been
fined approximately $30 (600,000 lei) for failure to produce
identification and insulting the police. On the evening of January 8
Vrabie, a friend named Valentin Barbu, and two more friends were
stopped by three plainclothes policemen who took Vrabie and Barbu to a
van and allegedly beat them. The two men were then taken to the Buzau
police station. Vrabie was reportedly fined $10 (200,000 lei) for
insulting the police and Barbu was admonished. Medical examination of
Vrabie by the Buzau county hospital after he was released noted that he
had massive bruises on his eye, lip, and forehead. Marks on Vrabie's
lips and eye were still obvious on February 4 when he was interviewed
by APADOR-CH representatives. Vrabie reportedly filed a complaint with
the military prosecutor's office and challenged his fine. Barbu also
reportedly filed a complaint.
On January 25, Silviu Rosioru from Buzau County became involved in
an altercation with several police officers from the Buzau intervention
unit in a bar. The police threw Rosioru to the floor, handcuffed him,
kicked him, and beat him with their batons. Rosioru was placed into a
police van and then beaten on the way to Buzau police station. Rosioru
was fined $10 (200,000 lei) for insulting the bar owner and refusing a
reasonable request to provide personal identification. Rosioru claims
that his signature was falsified on his police report, which claimed
that he confessed to these crimes. Police officers allegedly subjected
a witness to the incident to pressure and intimidation to ensure that
her statement was consistent with police reports. The chief of the
Bazau intervention unit was reported by local press reports to have a
record of violence. As a result of this case and the Vrabie case, both
involving the Bazau County intervention unit, several police officers
in the unit, including the commander, were administratively sanctioned,
and several were removed from the unit.
On February 14, Alexandru Botu, of Prunaru village in the county of
Teleorman, was reportedly beaten seriously by police. Botu had stopped
in front of the shop S.C. Dina to talk to some acquaintances. The shop
owner, the brother of Prunaru's mayor, had had an altercation with
Botu's brother, beating him, in January. Botu finished his conversation
and began to cross the street when he was stopped by the police chief
and his deputy and led back to the shop. The shop owner closed the shop
and its blinds and left. The policemen proceeded to beat Botu for about
half an hour. A villager who heard Botu scream alerted Botu's wife, who
rushed to the shop and took Botu home. The next day he was taken to
Alexandria hospital where he was diagnosed with a series of deep
bruises and two broken ribs. When interviewed by APADOR-CH
representatives a month later he was still in poor physical condition.
On May 18, in Bucharest a police officer shot Mugurel Soare, a
Romani man, in the head and severely injured him. Police reports
claimed that Soare and his brother, Vipan Soare, were chasing their
former brother-in-law, Sorin Cutea, in order to kill him. When detained
by three plainclothes policeman sitting nearby in an unmarked car, who
been informed of the chase by Sorin Cutea, Soare attacked one officer,
allegedly injuring him with a knife, and was shot in the scuffle that
followed. However, local newspapers later reported that witnesses to
the incident claimed that Soare was unarmed. Soare's right side remains
paralyzed, and he is unable to speak. He is reportedly unlikely to make
a full recovery. The case remained under investigation.
Police reportedly abused journalists (see Section 2.a.).
In April 1998, a policeman with whom he had refused to share a pool
game beat Nicolae Iloaie of Tandareni. Iloaiei was hospitalized for 90
days. When he asked for a certified medical report for the forensic
laboratory, the physician in charge refused to issue it. The case
remained under investigation. In May 1998, a policeman shot Marian
Ciulei from Brasov in the leg while he was running from a confrontation
in a discotheque. The case remained under investigation.
In April 1998, the Government responded to the 1997 report of the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Special Rapporteur received
allegations of torture and mistreatment of detainees by the police. The
Government in its response promised in 1998 to make modifications to
the criminal code and to detention regulations, but no such
modifications have been made.
Judicial cases involving military personnel and the police are
tried in military courts. Local and international human rights groups
criticize this system, claiming that the military prosecutor's
investigations are unnecessarily lengthy and often purposefully
inconclusive, and that some military prosecutors sometimes block proper
investigation of alleged police abuses. The Government declined to
provide updated information on cases of alleged police abuse from 1998
and 1997.
Prison conditions do not meet minimum international standards;
however, the prison system is improving slowly as efforts increase to
bring prisons in line with these requirements. The year's prison budget
increased 74 percent over the 1999 budget. There are now a total of 41
penal units, 34 prisons, (an increase from 33 prisons in 1999), 5
prison hospitals, and 2 juvenile detention facilities. Nevertheless,
overcrowding remains a serious problem, although it has improved
slightly from 1999. On September 22, 49,540 people, including 1,571
minors, were under detention. The legal capacity of the system was
33,464.
In May 1999 a law providing for alternative sentences for minor
offenses went into effect. The law provides for community service
instead of a prison sentence and is aimed at reducing the prison
population.
Human rights organizations continued to report the abuse of
prisoners by other prisoners and prison authorities. Prisons continued
to use the ``cell boss'' system, in which some prisoners are designated
to be in semiofficial charge of other prisoners. There were attempts to
ameliorate this system in some prisons by giving the inmates some input
in the selection of these ``cell bosses.'' Prison guards wore firearms
only when guarding prisoners working outside the prison, correspondence
was no longer opened routinely, and inmates had the right to telephone
calls. Prison authorities introduced some vocational training programs
to assist inmates' future integration into society.
The Government permitted prison visits by human rights monitors,
and several NGO's made such visits.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids the
detention of anyone for more than 24 hours without an arrest warrant
from a prosecutor, who may order detention for up to 30 days, and
authorities generally respected this provision in practice. Detention
can be extended past the 30-day limit only by a court ruling. Detainees
have the right to apply for bail and may ask for a hearing before a
judge. Such a request must be granted within 24 hours.
However, police often appear to take advantage of Article 16,
Section b in the Police Organization Law 26 of 1994, which states that
persons endangering the public, other people, or social order and whose
identity cannot be established, can be taken to a police station.
Police often use this provision of the law to detain people for up to
24 hours at a police station.
Police often do not inform citizens of their rights. The law
requires the authorities to inform arrestees of the charges against
them and of their right to an attorney at all stages of the legal
process. Police must notify defendants of this right in a language they
understand before obtaining a statement. However, the prosecutor's
office may delay action on a request for a lawyer for up to 5 days from
the date of arrest.
Under the law, minors detained by police and placed under guard in
a center for the protection of minors are considered by judicial
authorities to be in detention or under arrest if their age is more
than 16, or, if aged between 14 and 16, they have consciously committed
a crime. However, since the Penal Code does not apply to minors in
these centers until their cases are referred to a prosecutor, police
are permitted to question them without restriction and may hold those
suspected of criminal offenses for up to 30 days in such centers. This
law appears to be in conflict with the Constitution, and both Amnesty
International and local human rights groups have called on the
Government to change it.
According to APADOR-CH, the Interior Ministry issued new
instructions on detention in 1999 that provide for the confidentiality
of discussions between detainees and their lawyers.
Exile was not used as a means of punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the terms of a 1992 law, the
judicial branch is independent of other government branches; however,
it remains subject to influence by the executive branch. Although
members of the Senior Council of Magistrates, which controls the
selection, promotion, transfer and sanctioning of judges, are appointed
by Parliament from a list provided by the courts and prosecutorial
offices represented on the council, the Justice Minister may avoid the
appointment of members he does not want by simply keeping them off the
agenda.
The 1992 law reestablished a four-tier legal system, including
appellate courts, which had ceased to exist under Communist rule.
Defendants have final recourse to the Supreme Court or, for
constitutional matters, to the Constitutional Court. The 1992 law that
reorganized the judicial system divided the Prosecutor General's Office
into 16 local offices (paralleling the appeals court structure) and
established an office at the Supreme Court; the law also curtailed
certain powers of the Prosecutor General, including the right to
overturn court decisions and bypass appeals courts by going directly to
the Supreme Court.
The law provides for fair public trial and the presumption of
innocence. The Penal Code requires that an attorney be appointed for a
defendant who cannot afford legal representation or is otherwise unable
to select counsel. In practice the local bar association provides
attorneys to the indigent and is compensated by the Ministry of
Justice. Either a plaintiff or a defendant may appeal. These provisions
of the law are respected in practice. The law provides that confessions
extracted as a result of police brutality may be withdrawn by the
accused when brought before the court.
In a notable case in January 1999, a criminal appeals court ruled
against miners' union leader Miron Cozma and overturned the
Government's implicit deal to protect Cozma from prosecution for his
role in a miner's strike.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--During the year there were no reported instances of
interference with individual citizens' right to privacy.
The Constitution provides for protection against the search of a
residence without a warrant, but this protection is subordinate to
``national security or public order.'' The 1992 National Security Law
defines national security very broadly and lists as threats not only
crimes such as terrorism, treason, espionage, assassination, and armed
insurrection but also totalitarian, racist, and anti-Semitic actions or
attempts to change the existing national borders. Security officials
may enter residences without proper authorization from a prosecutor if
they deem a threat to national security ``imminent.''
The Constitution states that the privacy of legal means of
communication is inviolable; thus, the Romanian Internal Intelligence
Service (SRI) is prohibited legally from engaging in political acts
(for example, wiretapping on behalf of the Government for political
reasons). However, the law allows the security services to monitor
communications on national security grounds after obtaining
authorization. The law requires the SRI to obtain a warrant from the
``public prosecutor specially appointed by the General Public
Prosecutor'' in order to carry out intelligence activities involving
``threats to national security.'' It may engage legally in a wide
variety of operations to determine if a situation meets the legal
definition of a threat to national security, or to prevent a crime.
Legislation that permits citizens access to secret police files
kept by the Communist government was passed in 1999. Under the law, any
Romanian or foreign citizen who had Romanian citizenship after 1945 is
entitled to have access to his file; a council approved by Parliament
reviews the files and release the information unless it was a state
secret or could threaten national security. The files remain in the
custody of Romania's intelligence services. This law has been
criticized on the grounds that it exempts files of current employees of
the intelligence services for review, and changes the definition of
informer to require actual payment. Many informers were unpaid
volunteers.
The NGO Romani CRISS reported that on September 26, police evicted
12 Romani families from an apartment building in Bucharest. According
to the testimony of the evicted Roma, they did not receive prior notice
of the evictions, nor did the police present them with warrants for
eviction. During the eviction police reportedly intimidated and
harassed the families. The police station chief stated that the
eviction was conducted pursuant to the permission of the prosecutor's
office of the Sector Three Court of Bucharest. A spokesperson for the
Bucharest city government stated that the Roma were illegally occupying
the building and that they were housed in a hostel after their
eviction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides
for freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, it limits the
bounds of free expression by prohibiting ``defamation of the country''
and ``offense to authority;'' the Government respected the
constitutional provisions in practice.
An amended Penal Code passed by Parliament in 1996 rectified many
of the shortcomings of the former, Communist-era code. However, the new
version is criticized by human rights organizations and professional
journalists for retaining jail terms for those convicted of libel or
slander, including journalists. Despite official promises that jail
terms would be removed from penalties for libel and calumny, Parliament
has yet to amend the relevant sections of the Penal Code. Consequently,
Articles 205 and 206 concerning libel and calumny and articles 238 and
239 concerning offense to authority and defamation of character are
still in force.
On the recommendation of the Council of Europe, legislation that
would reduce the sentence for violating Article 205 to a fine instead
of a prison term, and that would decrease a violation of Article 206 to
3 to 12 months instead of the previous 2 to 6 years passed the Chamber
of Deputies in June. This legislative package would have abolished
Article 238, which criminalizes an offense against authority, along
with Article 239, paragraph 1, which establishes a crime of verbal
outrage against the authorities. However, the legislation failed to
pass in the Senate during the year.
The Government failed to rescind the prohibitions on ``defamation
of the nation'' and ``defamation of public officials'' used to harass
and punish journalists who report governmental or bureaucratic
corruption. In 1999 several journalists were arrested and tried during
the year for reporting on corruption by local government officials;
journalists who were investigating corruption cases were also targets
of violence.
There were reports of police abuse of journalists. In May police
severely beat Valentin Dragin, a Constanta-based journalist, while he
was trying to photograph a party hosted by Constanta County's police
chief. Dragan suffered several injuries, including a broken leg. He
received most of his injuries from press officer Major Marian Saragea.
The Interior Ministry still was investigating the matter.
Independent media continued to grow in an increasingly competitive
market. Several hundred daily and weekly newspapers are published.
Several private television stations broadcast nationwide, with the
largest reaching approximately 20 percent of the rural and 80 percent
of the urban market. There are 72 private television stations and 162
private radio stations. Approximately 2.8 million households were wired
for cable, giving significant portions of the population access to both
private and foreign broadcasts. Romanian State Television (RTV) and
Radio Romania remained at year's end the only national broadcasters
capable of reaching the bulk of the rural population. Independent
stations continued to enlarge their coverage throughout the country by
over-the-air, cable, and satellite transmissions. A French media group
received a license for a private radio nationwide broadcasting
operation in 1999 and is operating. Romania plans to bid licenses for
another nationwide radio license in the future.
Foreign news publications may be imported and distributed freely,
but high costs, relative to domestic publications, limit their
circulation.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected that
right in practice. The law on public assembly provides for the right of
citizens to assemble peacefully while unarmed but states that meetings
must not interfere with other economic or social activities and may not
be held near locations such as hospitals, airports, or military
installations. Organizers of demonstrations must inform local
authorities and police before the event. Authorities may forbid a
public gathering by notifying the organizers in writing within 48 hours
of receipt of the request. The law prohibits the organization of, or
participation in, a counterdemonstration held at the same time as a
scheduled public gathering.
The law forbids public gatherings to espouse Communist, racist, or
Fascist ideologies or to commit actions contrary to public order or
national security. Unauthorized demonstrations or other violations are
punished by imprisonment and fines.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Political parties gain
legal status if they have at least 10,000 members. (The minimum
membership required was increased in 1996 in order to reduce the number
of small parties.) Associations may be granted legal status with proof
of only 20 founding members and over 200 supporting members.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government generally does not impede the observance of
religious belief. However, several denominations continued to make
credible allegations that low-level government officials and Romanian
Orthodox clergy impeded their efforts at proselytizing. The press
reported several instances when adherents of minority religions were
prevented by others from practicing their faith, and local law
enforcement authorities did not protect them. Members of religious
communities not officially recognized by the Government during the year
again accused government officials of harassment--allegations denied by
the Government. Proselytizing that involves denigrating recognized
churches is perceived as provocative.
Under the provisions of a 1948 decree, the Government recognizes 14
religions. A December 1989 decree reestablished the Catholic Church of
the Byzantine rite, or Greek Catholic Church, which had been merged
forcibly with the Romanian Orthodox Church by the communists in 1948.
Only the clergy of these 15 recognized religions are eligible to
receive state financial support. The number of adherents each religion
had in the last census determines the proportion of the budget each
recognized religion receives. Representatives of minority religious
groups dispute the 1992 census results, claiming that census takers in
some cases argued with citizens over their religious affiliation or
simply assigned an affiliation in some cases even without inquiring
about religious affiliation.
The Government requires religious groups to register. To be
recognized as a religion, religious groups must register with the State
Secretariat for Religious Denominations and present their statutes,
organizational, leadership, and management diagrams, and the body of
dogma and doctrines formally stated by a religion. Representatives of
religious groups that sought recognition after 1990 allege that the
registration process was arbitrary and unduly influenced by the
Romanian Orthodox Church. They also allege that they did not receive
clear instructions concerning the requirements and that often the time
frame in which a decision on their application has to be made is not
respected by the State Secretary of Religions. Not one religious group
has succeeded in receiving religion status since 1990. For example,
although the Romanian Supreme Court has recognized that Jehovah's
Witnesses are a religion, the State Secretariat for Cults and the
Military Court of Appeals refuse to do so.
The Government registers religious groups that it does not
recognize as ``independent religions'' either as religious and
charitable foundations or as cultural associations. This registration
process was simplified, in theory, by a new law enacted on May 1. The
Government currently interprets this law as forbidding religious groups
registered as associations or foundations from building churches or
other buildings designated as houses of worship.
The Romanian Orthodox Church, to which approximately 86 percent of
the population nominally adheres, predominates. The official
registration of religious associations is extremely slow because of
bureaucratic delays; in this regard, smaller religious groups have
criticized the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs for its
obstructionist tactics in favor of the Romanian Orthodox Church. A
draft bill on religious denominations proposed in September 1999, which
most religious groups objected to on the grounds it would have
increased state control over religious activity and made the Romanian
Orthodox Church the national church, was withdrawn in February.
The Greek Catholic Church has made only limited progress in
recovering its properties taken by the Romanian Orthodox Church after
its forced merger in 1948. Of approximately 2,600 properties to which
it has claim, only a handful have been returned. The Greek Catholics
say they have received 136 churches, while the Government claims 142
churches have been returned as of this year. The Greek Catholic Church
has very few places of worship. Many followers still are compelled to
hold services in public places or parks (260 such cases, according to
Greek Catholic reports) because most of the former Greek Catholic
churches have not been returned. A joint Orthodox and Greek Catholic
committee formed by government decree in 1990 has failed to resolve the
issue due to Orthodox resistance, despite the scaling back of the Greek
Catholic requests from 2,600 properties to 300 churches. Restitution of
the existing churches is important to both sides because local
residents, who prize tradition, are likely to attend their local church
whether it is Greek Catholic or Orthodox. Thus the number of believers
and share of the state budget allocation for religions is at stake. The
historical Hungarian churches, including the Hungarian Roman Catholic
and the Hungarian Protestant Reformed, Evangelical, and Unitarian
churches, largely have not received their property back from the
Government. Out of 1,400 to 1,450 buildings claimed by the Hungarian
churches, they have received about 10. The Jewish community reported in
May that out of 21 properties nominally returned by the Government, it
only has obtained actual possession of 5.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places no restrictions on
travel within the country, except for certain small areas reserved for
military purposes. Citizens who wish to change their place of work or
residence do not face any official barriers. The law stipulates that
citizens have the right to travel abroad freely, to emigrate, and to
return. In practice citizens freely exercise these rights.
The 1996 refugee law implemented the provisions of the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. This legislation established a refugee office in the Interior
Ministry to receive, process, and house asylum seekers. The Ministry
received 807 applications for asylum in the first 6 months of 1999;
more recent figures were unavailable.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations. In mid-1998 the
Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry began funding programs to
assist asylum seekers and refugees. Financial support provided by the
Government (reimbursable loans for a period of 6 to 9 months) is
minimal, usually not enough to cover basic needs. The Government
provides temporary accommodation in only a few locations; more
facilities are to open as funds are made available. Programs for
integrating refugees into society are developing slowly. An increasing
number of transiting illegal migrants regards the country as a
springboard to the West.
There were no reports during the year of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government through periodic and free elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
In November and December the left-center Democratic Socialist Party
of Romania (PDSR) won a near majority in the legislature and the PDSR
candidate, Ion Iliescu, won the Romanian presidency. The PDSR planned
to govern as a minority government. The extremist, xenophobic Greater
Romania Party (PRM) won the next largest share of parliamentary and
presidential votes. Allegations of widespread voting fraud by the
losing PRM candidate, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, were not judged credible.
No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in
government or politics; however, societal attitudes are a significant
impediment, and women are underrepresented significantly in government
and politics. Before the November 26 elections, there were 2 women out
of 143 senators, and 25 women out of the 343 deputies in the lower
house of Parliament, or 5.6 percent of total seats in Parliament.
However, after the November elections, the percent of women in
Parliament increased to 9.8 percent. Prior to the November elections,
there was one female cabinet member; the current cabinet has five
female members.
The Constitution and electoral legislation grant each recognized
ethnic minority one representative in the Chamber of Deputies, provided
that the minority's political organization obtains at least 5 percent
of the average number of valid votes needed to elect a deputy outright
(1,784 votes in the 1996 elections). Organizations representing 15
minority groups elected deputies under this provision in 1996. Ethnic
Hungarians, represented by the UDMR, obtained parliamentary
representation through the normal electoral process. Roma are
underrepresented in Parliament because of low Roma voter turnout and
internal divisions that worked against the consolidation of votes for
one candidate, organization, or party. One Romani parliamentarian, the
former Romani minority representative, joined the PDSR and sits in the
legislature in addition to the one seat provided for Roma by the
Constitution and electoral legislation.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic human rights monitoring groups include the Romanian
Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH), the independent Romanian Society for
Human Rights (SIRDO), the League for the Defense of Human Rights
(LADO), the Romanian Institute for Human Rights, and several issue-
specific groups such as the Young Generation of Roma and the Center for
Crisis Intervention and Study, also a Romani NGO. Other groups, such as
political parties and trade unions, continued to maintain sections
monitoring the observance of human rights. These groups, as well as
international human rights organizations, functioned freely without
government interference.
The Government cooperates with local and international monitoring
groups, although some offices are slow to respond to inquiries. Local
human rights monitoring agencies have found it difficult to obtain
statistics concerning police abuses. The General Inspectorate of
Police, which is responsible for investigating such abuses, responds
unevenly to inquiries from monitors. Often victims are reluctant to
come forward, and the Government does not promote transparency in this
regard.
The Ministry of the Interior stiffened conditions for prison visits
by human rights organizations in February. The new regulations, which
are authorized by internal regulations the Ministry does not release to
the public, require the visit be requested by a prisoner, and be
announced 3 to 4 days in advance.
With the aim of protecting citizens against abuses or capricious
acts of public officers, the Ombudsman's Office envisioned under the
1991 Constitution was instituted by law in March 1997, and its first
appointee, Paul Mitroi, took office in June 1997. However, due to a
lack of office space, the office began working at normal capacity only
at the beginning of 1998; by November it had received 4,255 cases. The
office is registering these complaints and is obliged by law to provide
an initial response within a year of the date they were recorded. It
deals not just with human rights but with all facets of citizens'
interaction with the Government.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, nationality,
ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion and political
allegiance, wealth, or social background. However, in practice the
Government does not enforce these provisions effectively, and women,
Roma, and other minorities are subject to various forms of extralegal
discrimination. Homosexuals reportedly have been the victims of police
brutality in the past.
In September the Government issued emergency ordinance number 137
which outlaws discrimination based on a number of factors and
introduces the ability to sue on the grounds of discrimination. An
emergency ordinance has the effect of law unless it is nullified by the
Parliament.
Women.--Violence against women, including rape, continued to be a
serious problem. Both human and women's rights groups credibly reported
that domestic violence is common, and a 1999 report by the U.N.
Children's Fund (UNICEF) emphasized that violence against women in the
workplace is not uncommon since their subordinate position exposes them
to greater risk. According to UNICEF, the country has an average of 108
sexual incidents per 1,000 women and 41 assaults per 1,000 women. Under
a government pilot project begun in 1997, a shelter for victims of
domestic violence opened in Bucharest in 1997. The shelter can
accommodate only four persons. It received 490 calls for help during
1998 on a hot line, and registered 230 walk-in victims. The prosecution
of rape is difficult because it requires both a medical certificate and
a witness, and a rapist can avoid punishment if he marries the victim.
There is no specific legislation dealing with spousal abuse or rape,
and successful prosecution of spousal rape is almost impossible. Police
are often reluctant to intervene in instances of domestic violence.
In April the Romanian edition of Playboy published a satirical
article that explained in graphic detail how to beat one's wife without
leaving marks. International and domestic protests led to apologies by
Playboy's foreign editors and local publisher, and in July the Romanian
edition of Playboy published an article on the costs of domestic
violence.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution
continues to be a growing problem. Several domestic prostitution rings
are active (see Section 6.f.).
The Constitution grants women and men equal rights. However, in
practice the Government does not enforce these provisions, nor do the
authorities focus attention or resources on women's issues.
Few resources are available for women who experience economic
discrimination. Despite existing laws and educational equality, women
have a higher rate of unemployment than men, occupy few influential
positions in the private sector, and earn lower than average wages. In
1996 the Government created a department in the Ministry of Labor and
Social Protection to advance women's concerns and family policies. This
department organizes programs for women, proposes new laws, monitors
legislation for sexual bias, targets resources to train women for
skilled professions, and addresses the problems of single mothers,
especially in rural areas. In 1998 this department organized with the
U.N. Development Program a series of conferences on ``promoting gender
politics.'' An Ombudsman was created within the department for child,
woman, and family protection in 1998, but the total budget for women's
programs for 1999 was less than $75,000.
Children.--The Government administers health care and public
education programs for children, despite scarce domestic resources.
International agencies and NGO's supplement government programs in
these areas. However, living conditions in all child care institutions
very seriously deteriorated in 1999 for financial and administrative
reasons and did not improve during the year. Inspectors who visited
institutions and identified humanitarian needs at the request of the
European Union Commission reported that while conditions were not
equally bad in all institutions, the general situation in the summer
could only be described as unacceptable in terms of basic
infrastructure as well as hygiene, medical care, nutrition, and general
assistance. According to official statistics, there were approximately
60,000 orphans in state institutions.
There was no perceptible societal pattern of abuse against
children. Nevertheless large numbers of impoverished and apparently
homeless, but not necessarily orphaned, children were seen on the
streets of the larger cities. The Government does not have statistics
defining the scope of the problem. NGO's working with children remained
particularly concerned about the number of minors detained in jail and
prison. These NGO's continued to seek alternative solutions, such as
parole for juveniles. Because time served while awaiting trial counts
as part of the prison sentence but does not count towards time to be
served in a juvenile detention center, some minors actually requested
prison sentences.
The prevalence of child labor in the Roma community is widespread
(see Section 6.d.).
The sexual exploitation of children continued to attract press
attention, and the police staged a few high-publicity arrests of
foreign pedophiles. Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). Other issues, such as
adequate legislation to protect children, received less attention. The
law does not outlaw pedophilia expressly. Instead, pedophiles are
charged with rape, corporal harm, and sexual corruption.
People with Disabilities.--Difficult economic conditions and
serious budgetary constraints contributed to very difficult living
conditions for those with physical or mental disabilities. Many
disabled persons cannot make use of government-provided transportation
discounts because public transport does not have facilitated access.
The law does not mandate accessibility for the disabled to buildings
and public transportation. According to official statistics, there were
3,500 disabled children living in state institutions.
Religious Minorities.--Most mainstream politicians publicly have
criticized anti- Semitism, racism, and xenophobia. However, the fringe
press continued to publish anti-Semitic harangues. The Romanian
Orthodox Church has attacked the ``aggressive proselytism'' of
Protestant and neo-Protestant groups.
In October a 19th century synagogue in Timisoara was vandalized and
several religious items were stolen. A Jewish cemetery was desecrated
in Turnu-Severin. There was no progress in the investigations of the
desecrations of Jewish cemeteries in Galati and Transylvania in 1999.
On December 28, two men attacked a guard at the Jewish History Museum
in Bucharest and vandalized the exhibit. No arrests had been made at
year's end.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Department for the
Protection of National Minorities has the responsibility to monitor the
specific problems of persons belonging to ethnic minorities, to
maintain contacts with minority groups, to submit proposals for draft
legislation and administrative measures, to maintain permanent links
with local authorities, and to investigate complaints.
Ethnic Hungarians, numbering more than 1.6 million, constitute the
largest and most vocal minority, and their UDMR party was a coalition
member in the ruling Government for most of the year. Many of the
issues addressed in the Romanian-Hungarian treaty of 1996 were
implemented. Progress was made on economic issues, high-level visits,
and infrastructure improvements such as border crossings. A government
decree on Hungarian-language minority education was enacted and went
into force in 1999. The decree permits students in state-funded primary
and secondary schools to be taught in their own language, with the
exception of secondary school courses on the history and geography of
Romania.
The Romani population, officially estimated by the Government at
400,000, is estimated by the European Commission to number between 1.1
and 1.5 million. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) reported a case
of ethnically motivated violence against Vasile Florica, a Rom, and his
family in April. Non-Romani villagers in Palos repeatedly beat Florica
and attacked his wife and children. Florica filed a complaint with the
Military Prosecutor's Office against a police officer and four civilian
perpetrators; the case remained under investigation. Romani groups
complain of routine police brutality, prejudice, and racial harassment
at the local level. Four people arrested, tried, and convicted in a
1993 incident in Hadareni, in which three Roma died in a house burning,
were released in 2000 after serving their sentences. The victims are
considering appealing to the European Court of Justice, arguing that
the sentences given to the perpetrators were too light at 2 to 6 years.
In February Bucharest-based Roma organizations filed charges
against Marcel Flueraru, a journalist for the National, for using
racist language in an article. On March 21, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty reported that Minister of Foreign Affairs Petre Roman stated
that the Government had an obligation to ``protect 23 million Romanians
against the few thousand Gypsies'' who were damaging the country's
image abroad. The NGO Romani CRISS reported a job announcement, posted
in Bucharest's Third Sector Labor Force Office by a private firm called
S.C. Guard, which stated, ``no Roma accepted.'' Romani CRISS filed a
complaint with the Ombudsman's Office but had not received a response
as of October 10. There was no further progress on the ban on Roma in
the Iasi County hospital, where Roma who cannot afford to pay for
medical treatment and cannot prove that they have medical insurance
provided by the State are banned from the hospital. Some steps have
been taken toward establishing an institutional framework to improve
the conditions of the Roma, but in practice little progress has been
made. The Department for the Protection of National Minorities and a
working group of Roma associations set up by the Roma community signed
an agreement for drafting a strategy for the protection of the Roma
minority. However, the Roma office within the GOR is still understaffed
with two civil servants. Meanwhile, the Roma population continues to be
subject to societal discrimination.
According to Human Rights Watch, the ERRC lodged applications
against Romania with the European Court of Human Rights regarding cases
of violence and destruction of property in Casinul Nou (1990) and
Plaiesii de Sus (1991). These cases had been denied in Romanian courts
in part because the statute of limitations had expired before they
could initiate final appeals, due to the slowness of the court system.
Police in both cases failed to conduct on-site investigations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers except certain public
employees have the right to associate freely, engage in collective
bargaining, and form and join labor unions without previous
authorization. Intelligence, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of
Interior personnel are not allowed to unionize. Trade unions may
acquire property, support their member's exercise of their profession,
establish mutual insurance funds, print publications, set up cultural,
teaching and research bodies, establish commercial enterprises and
banks, and borrow money. Limitations on the right to strike apply only
to industries that the Government considers critical to the public
interest and to other public employees. No workers may be forced to
join or withdraw from a union, and union officials who resign from
elected positions and return to the regular work force are protected
against employer retaliation. The majority of workers are members of
about 18 nationwide trade union confederations and smaller independent
trade unions.
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 2000
``Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights'' reported that
violations of trade union rights continued in practice. The unions
reported that the Government interfered in trade union activities,
collective bargaining, and strikes. The requirements to register a
union were excessive.
Amendments to Romania's 1991 law on labor disputes in November 1999
brought some improvements and eliminated many restrictions. It widened
the scope of the right to strike, although it continues to be difficult
to hold a legal strike because of lengthy and cumbersome procedures.
Union members complained that unions must submit their grievances to
government-sponsored conciliation before initiating a strike, and they
were frustrated with the courts' propensity to declare illegal the
majority of strikes on which they have been asked to rule. Past studies
indicated that the labor legislation adopted in 1991 falls short of
International Labor Organization (ILO) standards in several areas,
including the free election of union representatives, binding
arbitration, the financial liability of strike organizers, the
restriction of eligibility for trade unions, and the restriction of
eligibility for trade union membership and offices to ``employees.''
Although the 1991 legislation supports collective bargaining as an
institution, the contracts that result are not always enforceable in a
consistent manner. Unions representing a wide range of economic sectors
carried out strikes during the year, often protesting wage levels that
did not keep pace with the rate of inflation. Early in the year,
railway workers went on strike and only returned after a court
determination that their strike was illegal. Additionally public
education was suspended for several weeks until the Government awarded
back wages and a pay increase to teachers. Utility company employees,
lawyers, defense industry workers, textile workers, and public finance
workers also carried out strikes, pressing for higher wages during the
year. While most of these strikes ended with government promises to
improve wages and working conditions, union leaders complain that these
agreements frequently are not implemented.
The November 1991 collective labor dispute law defined the
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration procedures under which strikes
can be conducted. An important provision from both the labor and
management perspective was the establishment of tripartite arbitration
panels. The list of arbitrators must be approved by the economic and
social council where trade unions and employers associations each have
one-third of the membership.
In January 1999 striking coal miners from the Jiu valley launched a
march on Bucharest to protest mine closures. Due to previous violent
miners' demonstrations the government denied them permission to march
to Bucharest. Defying the Government decision, the miners continued on
and attacked law enforcement officials. However, the Government
succeeded in restoring order, and the perpetrators of the violence were
arrested and tried.
The law stipulates that labor unions should be free from government
or political party control, a provision that the Government has honored
in practice. Unions are free to engage in political activity and have
done so.
Labor unions may form or join federations and affiliate with
international bodies. The National Confederation of Trade Unions-Fratia
and the National Union Bloc are affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union
Confederation. The Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions of Romania
is affiliated with the World Labor Confederation. Representatives of
foreign and international organizations freely visit and advise
domestic trade unionists.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
the legal right to bargain collectively, but collective bargaining
efforts are complicated by continued state control of most industrial
enterprises and the absence of independent management representatives.
Basic wage scales for employees of state-owned enterprises are
established through collective bargaining with the Government. Public
employees may bargain for everything except salaries, which are set by
the Government.
Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law.
Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country,
including in the four free trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection generally
enforces this prohibition; however, trafficking in women and girls for
the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.-- The minimum age for employment is 16 years, but children
as young as the age of 15 may work with the consent of their parents or
guardians, although only ``according to their physical development,
aptitude, and knowledge.'' Minors are prohibited from working under
dangerous or hazardous conditions. Violations of the child labor laws
are punishable by imprisonment for periods of from 2 months to 3 years,
although there is no recent evidence of anyone being charged or
convicted under this law. Working children under the age of 16 have the
right to continue their education, and the law obliges employers to
assist in this regard. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has
the authority to impose fines and close sections of factories to ensure
compliance with the law. There is no recent evidence of anyone being
charged or convicted under this law. The Constitution prohibits forced
and bonded child labor, and the Government generally enforces this
provision; however, trafficking in girls is a problem (see Sections 5,
6.c., and 6.f.).
A department in the Office of the Prime Minister was established in
1997 responsible for child protection. Local organizations were
established in the counties and city of Bucharest to enforce child
labor laws. As of September, the Ministry of Labor and Social
Protection confirmed that violations of the child labor laws have not
been controlled.
There are no accurate statistics of the number of illegally
employed children. However, there is growing recognition of the
problem. The Ministry of Education reported that 500,000 children under
the age of 15 left school in 1997-98, which is approximately 20 percent
of the school-age population. The prevalence of child labor in the Roma
community is widespread (see Section 5). As the economy continues to
restructure and as the gray market grows, the incidence of child labor
is expected to increase. In March the ILO and the Ministry of Labor and
Social Protection agreed to form a task force to collect data and
assist in organizing a national steering committee to combat child
labor. The first meeting of the committee was held on July 4. The ILO
is to provide $600,000 to assist 1,500 children to return to school.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Most wage rates are established
through collective bargaining at the enterprise level. However, they
are based on minimum wages for specific economic sectors and categories
of workers that the government sets after negotiations with industry
representatives and the labor confederations. Minimum wage rates
generally are observed and enforced. During the year, the minimum
monthly wage, an equivalent of about $30 (700,000 lei), did not keep
pace with inflation and did not provide a decent standard of living for
a worker and family. Prices for utility services such as water and
heating have risen dramatically. However, basic foodstuffs and
pharmaceutical products still are subject to price ceilings. Housing is
no longer subsidized. A proposal to raise the minimum wage to 1 million
lei was approved in November.
The Labor Code of 1991 provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours
or 5 days, with overtime to be paid for weekend or holiday work or work
in excess of 40 hours. It also includes a requirement for a 24-hour
rest period in the workweek, although most workers receive 2 days off.
Paid holidays range from 18 to 24 days annually, depending on the
employee's length of service. The law requires employers to pay
additional benefits and allowances to workers engaged in particularly
dangerous or difficult occupations. The Labor Code was to be revised
during the year. However, trade unions and business associations were
not included in the drafting discussion. No agreement could be reached
on changes and no new legislation was presented to Parliament by year's
end.
Some labor organizations lobby for healthier, safer working
conditions on behalf of their members. However, neither the government
nor industry, which is still mostly state owned, has the resources
necessary to improve significantly health and safety conditions in the
workplace. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has established
safety standards for most industries and is responsible for enforcing
them. However, it lacks sufficient trained personnel for inspection and
enforcement, and employers often ignore its recommendations. In 1999 a
department was established within the Ministry to conduct comprehensive
safety inspections. European Union PHARE funds have assisted in
building capacity within the new department. Although they have the
right to refuse dangerous work assignments, workers seldom invoke it in
practice, appearing to value increased pay over a safe work
environment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women is an
underreported but serious problem. The law is vague and outdated and
does not address trafficking directly. Those involved in trafficking
may be prosecuted for such offenses as prostitution and procurement,
falsifying documents, assisting individuals to cross borders illegally,
blackmail, forced labor, or illegal deprivation of freedom.
Romania is both a source and a transit country for trafficked women
and girls. The full extent of the problem is not known, since neither
the Government nor NGO's maintain statistics on this issue; however,
there is evidence that the problem is growing. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) office in the country reported that
during the year about 141 women and girls were repatriated from sexual
slavery by December, including 7 from Cambodia and 5 from Moldova.
Figures for 1999 were less than 10. The number of individuals
prosecuted for prostitution and procurement has been increasing since
1997, but this phenomenon appears to be partially due to an increased
awareness of the problem among law enforcement officials as well as to
an increase in the activities themselves. The IOM Romania estimates
that as many as 20,000 women are trafficked from Romania each year.
It is estimated that there are between 20,000 to 22,000 illegal
immigrants, and that part of this total is a result of illegal
trafficking. According to official statistics, 28 groups that tried to
transit the country illegally were discovered in 1998. Women reportedly
were trafficked to Serbia, Macedonia, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Greece, Italy, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands,
Poland, the United Arab Emirates, Japan and Cambodia. Romania remains a
popular transit country for persons, especially women, being trafficked
from the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, and other parts of the former
Soviet Union. Iasi and Timisoara are major centers. Romania is also a
source country; in 1997 the Government of Turkey deported some 7,000
Romanian women. Authorities in the Netherlands broke up a trafficking
ring late in 1999 that victimized some women from Romania. In May of
this year, the Romanian embassy in Abu Dhabi had under its protection 3
Romanian women who alleged that they were brought to the United Arab
Emirates under false pretenses and were forced to engage in
prostitution. Their passports were allegedly confiscated by their
traffickers. In August Cambodian police and U.N. human rights officers
rescued seven women from Romania and Moldova who had been trafficked
and forced into prostitution there.
Women often are recruited to work abroad by friends, relatives, or
newspaper advertisements. According to the IOM, most women were unaware
that they would be forced into prostitution. A minority of trafficked
women are sold into prostitution by their parents or husbands or are
kidnaped by trafficking rings. Ministry of Interior officials reported
that trafficking rings appear to be operated primarily by Romanians.
Several domestic prostitution rings are active.
No separate IOM statistics exist for children trafficked to other
countries. The Romanian NGO Sanse Egale Pentru Femei (Equal
Opportunities for Women) reports that cases of trafficking in children
rose from 8 in 1997 to 43 in 1999. In 1998, the NGO Save the Children
dealt with 101 cases of children, mostly Roma, being taken to Germany
and Italy and being forced to work as beggars or petty thieves.
Trafficking of girls for prostitution is also a problem. The country
has an extensive system of orphanages with approximately 60,000
dependents, and many are complicit in letting girls escape into
prostitution. Children forced out of orphanages between the ages of 16
and 18 often have no identity documents, very little education, and
few, if any job skills. NGO's estimate that many girls from these
orphanages fall victim to trafficking networks.
Legislation is generally inadequate to deal with this issue, and
while the Government is beginning to recognize trafficking as a
problem, it has not yet been able to mount any effective efforts to
combat it. Corruption in the police force, particularly in local
forces, also may contribute to the problem. Police officials often deny
that Romania is a source country for trafficking; however, acceptance
of the problem is slowly growing.
One problem raised by law enforcement officers is that victims
transiting or leaving the country may be doing so voluntarily, under
the false belief they are accepting legitimate jobs or are unaware of
the exploitation they will face if they are aware that they are to be
prostitutes. Victims returned to Romania in the past have been
prosecuted for the crime of leaving the country illegally, reducing
their willingness to return or to cooperate with law enforcement
authorities. Because there is no legislation that directly addresses
trafficking, victims have no way to press charges against traffickers.
The law also does not ensure a woman's safety if she decides to speak
out against a trafficker. Legislation for the protection of minors is
similarly inadequate.
A very small number of local NGO's deal with trafficking issues.
There are two shelters for victims of sexual abuse. Some NGO's
expressed fear of reprisal from organized crime groups as a deterrent
that prevents them from taking aggressive action against traffickers.
NGO's are having some success in providing training for and working
with local police forces on trafficking.
Awareness of human trafficking is low. No large-scale awareness
campaigns have been launched to publicize the issue and the dangers of
accepting employment abroad. The IOM, working with local NGO's, plans
to start a campaign in 2001.
The Southeastern Europe Cooperation Initiative's task force on
trafficking in human beings met twice during the year. As part of this
initiative a seven man police unit of officers fully dedicated to
combating human trafficking was established in November and December.
__________
RUSSIA
The 1993 Constitution established a governmental structure with a
strong head of state (a president), a government headed by a prime
minister, and a bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly) consisting of
the State Duma (lower house) and the Federation Council (upper house).
Unlike its predecessor, this Duma is characterized by a strong pro-
presidential center that puts a majority within reach of almost all
presidential priorities. Both the President and the Duma were selected
in competitive elections, with a broad range of political parties and
movements contesting offices. President Vladimir Putin was elected in
March, and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov took office in May. Both the
presidential elections and the December 1999 Duma Elections were judged
by international observers to be largely free and fair, although in
both cases preelection manipulation of the media was a problem. There
were credible reports in March of election fraud in some locations;
however, there was no evidence that such abuses affected the outcome of
the presidential election. There were some modifications to the
legislature and administrative structures; however, democratic
institution building continues to face serious challenges, in part due
to significant limitations on the state's financial resources. The
judiciary, although still seriously impaired by a lack of resources and
by high levels of corruption, has shown signs of limited independence.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security
Service (FSB), the Procuracy, and the Federal Tax Police are
responsible for law enforcement at all levels of government. The FSB
has broad law enforcement functions, including fighting crime and
corruption, in addition to its core responsibilities of security,
counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. The FSB operates with only
limited oversight by the Procuracy and the courts. The primary mission
of the armed forces is national defense, although they have been
employed in local internal conflicts for which they are prepared
inadequately, and they are available to control civil disturbances.
Internal security threats in parts of the Russian Federation in some
recent cases have been dealt with by militarized elements of the
security services. These same organizations are tasked with domestic
law enforcement. Members of the security forces, particularly within
the internal affairs apparatus, continued to commit numerous, serious
human rights abuses.
Economic recovery following the August 1998 financial crisis and
the steep ruble devaluation continued to exceed expectations. Gross
domestic product (GDP) grew 3.5 percent in 1999, and according to
preliminary estimates was 7.6 percent in 2000. Industrial production
increased by 9 percent in 2000. GDP was estimated at $197.1 billion for
the year. In 1999 inflation was 36.5 percent; by year's end it was 20.2
percent. The ruble's devaluation continued to give domestic producers a
significant cost advantage over imported goods, although the ruble has
appreciated approximately 10 percent since the 1998 crisis. Economic
growth during the year was led by a recovery in domestic demand, with
net exports contributing less than in previous years. Real income grew
in the first half of the year by 8.7 percent, compared with the same
period in 1999 but remained 10 percent lower than in 1998 and 25
percent lower than in 1997. Average wages increased to $89 per month by
year's end, compared with $66 per month in the fall of 1999. However,
approximately 36 percent of citizens continue to live below the
official monthly subsistence level of $35. Official unemployment was
10.2 percent, down from 12 percent at the beginning of the year.
Reported levels of barter transactions--which make up a significant
element in the economy--declined steadily in 1999, stabilizing during
the last quarter of 1999 and the first quarter of the year. Corruption
continued to be a negative factor in the development of the economy and
commercial relations.
Although the Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens in many areas, serious problems remain, including the
independence and freedom of the media and the conditions of pre-trial
detention and torture of prisoners. Its record was poor in Chechnya,
where the Russian security forces demonstrated little respect for basic
human rights and there were credible reports of serious violations.
There were numerous reports of extrajudicial killings by both the
Government and Chechen separatists. Beatings by security officials
throughout the country resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. Law
enforcement and correctional officials tortured and severely beat
detainees and inmates. Police also beat, harassed, and extorted money
from persons. Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh and
frequently life-threatening. According to human rights groups,
approximately 11,000 detainees and prison inmates die in penitentiary
facilities annually, some from beatings, but most as a result of
overcrowding, inferior sanitary conditions, disease, and lack of
medical care. The Government made little progress in combating abuses
committed by soldiers, including ``dedovshchina'' (violent hazing of
new recruits). Military justice systems consistent with democratic
practices remained largely underdeveloped. While the military Procuracy
reported decreases in the number of reported crimes and hazing
incidents in 1999, human rights groups continued to receive the same
number of complaints of such abuses and claimed that only about 10 to
12 percent of serious cases are reported. Existing laws on military
courts, military service, and the rights of service members often
contradict the Constitution, federal laws, and presidential decrees,
elevating arbitrary judgments of unit commanders over the rule of law.
Arbitrary arrest and detention and police corruption remain
problems. Police and other security forces in various parts of the
country continued their practice of harassing citizens from the
Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa, and darker-skinned persons in general
through arbitrary searches, detention, beatings, and extortions on the
pretext of fighting crime and enforcing residential registration
requirements. In August human rights groups in Moscow complained of
increased detentions of persons from the Caucasus. Lengthy pretrial
detention remained a serious problem. Institutions such as the Ministry
of Internal Affairs have attempted to educate officers about
safeguarding human rights during law enforcement activities through
training provided by other countries; however, such institutions remain
largely unreformed and have not yet adopted practices fully consistent
with standards of law enforcement in a democratic society. The
President and the Government were mostly silent about violations of
human rights and democratic practice. While the President made
statements about the need for a ``dictatorship of law,'' the Government
has not institutionalized the rule of law required to protect human
rights. Most abuses occur at lower levels, but government officials do
not investigate the majority of cases of abuse and rarely dismiss or
discipline the perpetrators.
The Government made no progress during the year in the
implementation of constitutional provisions for due process, fair and
timely trial, and humane punishment. In addition the judiciary often
was subject to manipulation by central and local political authorities
and was plagued by large case backlogs and trial delays. There were
some indications that the law was becoming an increasingly important
tool for those seeking to protect human rights; however, serious
problems remain. For example, in August the Procurator appealed the
December 1999 ruling by a St. Petersburg judge that found Aleksandr
Nikitin, a retired Soviet Navy captain and environmental reporter, not
guilty on charges of treason and espionage. The Presidium of the
Supreme Court rejected this appeal on September 13, ending Nikitin's
four year legal battle with the FSB and the Procurator.
Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights.
Government technical regulations that require Internet service
providers and telecommunications companies to invest in equipment that
enables the FSB to monitor Internet traffic, telephone calls, and
pagers without judicial approval caused serious concern. However, in
response to a challenge by a St. Petersburg journalist, the Supreme
Court ruled in September that the FSB is required to obtain and show
court approval to telecommunications companies before it can proceed to
initiate surveillance. Past practices raised questions among many
observers about whether the FSB would abide by this ruling.
The Government's record on media freedom worsened and significant
problems persist. There was persistent evidence of government pressure
on the media. Federal, regional, and local governments continued to
exert pressure on journalists by: initiating investigations by the
federal tax police, FSB, and MVD of media companies such as independent
Media-Most; selectively denying access to information (including, for
example, statistics theoretically available to the public) and filming
opportunities; demanding the right to approve certain stories prior to
publication; prohibiting the tape recording of public trials and
hearings; withholding financial support from government media
operations that exercised independent editorial judgment; attempting to
influence unduly the appointment of senior editors at regional and
local newspapers and broadcast media organizations; and removing
reporters from their jobs and bringing libel suits against them. The
disappearance and subsequent arrest and prosecution of Radio Liberty
reporter Andrey Babitskiy caused great concern, since there was
credible evidence that the Babitsky case was politically motivated and
that units of the Federal Government were involved in trying to silence
critical reporting about the Chechen conflict.
The Federal Government took few steps to mitigate the potentially
discriminatory effects of a 1997 religion law that required national
and local religious organizations to register or reregister with the
Government. By year's end approximately 70 percent of religious
organizations had managed to register or reregister their local
organizations successfully. There were numerous reports that religious
organizations from certain minority or ``nontraditional'' denominations
either were denied registration or experienced long delays in
reregistration. The delays in reregistration are in part due to the
slow pace at which the federal Ministry of Justice at first
disseminated the regulations and guidelines to local authorities and to
understaffing both at the Ministry of Justice and at local levels.
However, delays and rejections also are due in part to discrimination
by some local officials. Religious organizations and human rights
experts have suggested repeatedly that the law be amended to extend the
period for reregistration to prevent a situation in which a large
number of religious organizations are left unregistered and therefore
vulnerable to legal liquidation by court order after year's end. No
extension was implemented by year's end. While the previous
presidential administration promised to implement measures to
discourage local authorities from attempting to liquidate (i.e.,
eliminate the organization's status as a juridical person) unregistered
religious organizations, President Putin and the Government did not to
comment on the law by year's end. Critics of the Religion Law fear
that, while the law does not require the closure of unregistered
religious organizations, that may be the practical effect of losing
legal status. Discriminatory practices at the local level were
attributable in part to the decentralization of power that took place
during the Yeltsin administration, as well as to government inaction
and widely held discriminatory attitudes; it remains unclear whether
President Putin's efforts to strengthen central authority throughout
the country might in some cases affect the situation for religious
minorities.
Despite constitutional protections for citizens' freedom of
movement, the Government places some limits on this right, and some
regional and local authorities (most notably the city of Moscow)
restrict movement through residence registration mechanisms. These
restrictions, although repeatedly challenged in city court (most
recently in September with success by a human rights organization),
remain largely in force and are tolerated by the Federal Government.
The presence of these restrictions, which increased following terrorist
bombings in September 1999 and were reinvigorated following an
explosion in Moscow in August, demonstrated the continued obstacles to
the enforcement of judicial rulings.
Government institutions intended to protect human rights are still
weak and lack independence but are becoming more active. Human Rights
Ombudsman Oleg Mironov has played an increasingly public role in
promoting human rights, speaking out on human rights abuses in pretrial
detention, Chechnya, psychiatry, and on religious freedom. Mironov has
an office with 150 staff members who investigate human rights
complaints and promote human rights education. The Presidential Human
Rights Commission, chaired by Vladimir Kartashkin, also investigates
human rights complaints and promotes human rights education. Kartashkin
currently is working with the armed forces to introduce human rights
training manuals for soldiers. Nonetheless, the Presidential Commission
has not played a vital role and receives limited financial support from
the Government. The Office of Vladimir Kalamanov, the Presidential
Representative for Securing and Defending Human Rights and Freedoms in
Chechnya, is understaffed, underfunded, and has as limited mandate.
While Kalamanov worked with the Council of Europe and the
nongovernmental organization Memorial, he lacked a prosecutorial
mandate and even the independence and resources to monitor human rights
abuses adequately. Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) in the human
rights field documented and reported on human rights violations;
however, they also reported some limited governmental interference.
Some environmental and human rights groups complained of harassment
from the Procuracy, tax police, and the FSB. In August armed masked men
accompanied by a local police official in uniform raided the office in
Moscow of the Glasnost Public Foundation, a human rights organization,
holding personnel at gunpoint for nearly 40 minutes.
Violence against women, and the abuse of children remain problems,
as does discrimination against women and religious and ethnic
minorities. People with disabilities continue to face immense problems
from both societal attitudes and lack of governmental support. Societal
discrimination, harassment, and violence against members of some
religious minorities remained a problem. Although there were
improvements in some areas, there were continued reports of religious
violence in the North Caucasus and several serious anti-Semitic
incidents to which the government did not adequately respond. There
were credible allegations of politically motivated government
interference in the internal affairs of the Jewish community. There are
some limits on worker rights, and there were reports of instances of
forced labor. Trafficking in women and young girls is a serious
problem.
Chechen separatists reportedly committed abuses, including the
killing of civilians and Russian security forces they captured.
Government officials accused separatists of organizing and carrying out
a series of bomb attacks throughout the country beginning in September
1999 and continuing into the year; hundreds of civilians were killed or
injured.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed political killings by agents of the Government.
During the conflict in Chechnya in February, there were credible
reports that the military used indiscriminate force in areas of
significant civilian populations, resulting in numerous deaths (see
Section 1.g.). There also were credible reports that military forces
engaged in extrajudicial killings in Chechnya. For example, on February
5 Russian riot police and contract soldiers (men hired by the military
for short-term service contracts) executed at least 60 civilians in
Aldi and Chernorechiye, suburbs of Grozny. The perpetrators raped some
of the victims and extorted money, later setting many houses on fire to
destroy evidence. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), authorities
suspended their investigation of the incident, and there were no
indications that those responsible for similar incidents in late 1999
were apprehended or punished (see Section 1.g.). According to the
Presidential press service, since the start of the second war in
Chechnya, 35 cases relating to crimes committed by servicemen against
the local population were initiated; seven have been found guilty.
NGO's argue that this is only a fraction of the true number of cases
and there is little or no progress in accountability. According to HRW,
no one has been held accountable for the extrajudicial killings of 130
civilians in Alkjan-Yurt, Staropromyslovski, and Novye Aldi in late
1999 and 2000.
A number of government officials were murdered throughout the
country. Some of these killings appear to have been politically
motivated, connected with the ongoing strife in Chechnya, and others
may be connected to local politics. For example, on December 5 Svetlana
Semenova, SPS regional coordinator for the Leningrad Oblast was
murdered; that same day the Mayor of Murom, Petr Kaurov was also
murdered. It is not clear whether these incidents were politically
motivated.
An estimated 11,000 detainees and prisoners died during the year
(see Section 1.e.). Hazing in the armed forces resulted in the deaths
of servicemen (see Section 1.c.).
On August 11, a bomb exploded in a crowded Moscow pedestrian way at
the Pushkinskaya metro station, killing 12 people and injuring nearly
90. Government officials implied at first that Chechnya-based Islamic
extremist groups were responsible for the bombing and arrested four
Muslim suspects from the Northern Caucasus. However, investigators have
not ruled out the possibility that the incident was a result of feuding
between rival criminal gangs.
According to media reports in February, a woman was being held in
connection with the murder of a prominent member of Parliament, Galina
Starovoitova. Starovoitova was shot outside of her apartment in 1998 in
what appeared to be a political killing. In 1999 a former police
officer became a suspect in the assassination, but charges were dropped
due to lack of evidence.
There were no developments in the 1999 killings of the St.
Petersburg Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) leader Gennadiy Tuganov and
Deputy Mayor Mikhail Menevich. In the case of St. Petersburg
legislative assembly Deputy Viktor Novoselov, police arrested the
killers but had no information on who hired them.
On November 9, a military court began hearings against five former
military intelligence officers accused of organizing the murder of
``Moskovskii Kosomolets'' journalist Dmitri Kholodov. A sixth
defendant, the head of a bodyguard agency, is charged with complicity.
Kholodov was killed by a suitcase bomb in 1994; at the time of his
murder, he was investigating widespread corruption among the military
leadership.
There were no developments in the 1998 murder of St. Petersburg
city official Yevgeniy Agarev, although the investigation into the case
reportedly continues. There were no developments in the 1998 murders of
Deputy Representative of the Russian Federation to the Chechen Republic
Akmal Saidov, Dagestani mufti Said-Mukhamed Abubakarov, or Chechen
official Shadid Bargishev.
Religious figures also were kidnaped and killed in Chechnya during
the year (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., and 5).
There were credible press reports that Chechen separatists tortured
and killed a number of civilians and Russian captives. For example, on
September 10, separatists shot and killed Mayor of Oktyabrskoye village
Bukara Akhmatov. Government officials accuse separatists of organizing
and carrying out a series of bomb attacks throughout the country
beginning in September 1999. Since then, authorities have tied
incidents in Dagestan and several cities in Southern Russia to
separatists. Authorities have produced evidence and tried and convicted
at least six persons for bombings around Russia. In addition
separatists have executed summarily Russian soldiers whom they have
taken prisoner (see Section 1.g.).
There has been no resolution to the December 1998 beheading of four
foreign telecommunications workers, whom kidnapers had been holding
hostage in Chechnya for 2 months.
Government forces and Chechen Separatists have used landmines
extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan since August 1999 (see Section
1.g.).
b. Disappearance.--There were reports of Government involvement in
politically motivated disappearances in Chechnya. According to credible
reports, units of the Government were involved in the detention and the
temporary disappearance of journalist Andrey Babitskiy in January. The
Government at first denied any knowledge of Babitskiy's whereabouts,
but after considerable international pressure officials asserted that
the journalist was in the custody of ``local Chechens.'' Despite
assurances that Babitskiy would be released on February 2, Russian
officials declared the following day that he had been delivered to
Chechen separatists in exchange for three Russian prisoners of war.
However, separatists denied they had participated in such an exchange
or that they held Babitskiy. Almost 2 months after his initial
disappearance, Babitskiy was released but then was held by Russian
authorities at a detention center in Makhachkala, Dagestan. Authorities
stated that he had been charged with carrying a falsified passport.
Babitskiy subsequently claimed that the passport was thrust upon him,
essentially to set him up to be arrested. Journalists and human rights
activists believe Babitskiy was targeted by the Government for his
critical reports on the conflict in Chechnya. Babitskiy was tried in
Makhachkala in September and convicted of possession and use of a false
passport. However, he was covered under the amnesty granted for the
anniversary of World War II and was released (see Sections 1.g. and
2.a.).
The NGO Memorial claimed in October that the total number of
detainees had exceeded 15,000 persons. Many of these persons
disappeared, but the majority were bought back by relatives. Memorial
estimated that the number of individuals unaccounted for was somewhere
between several hundred to one thousand.
In a December report, Vladimir Kalamanov, the President's Special
Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya, stated that his office had
received complaints of 853 disappearances by year's end. His office
forwarded a list of 462 missing residents of Chechnya to the Ministry
of Interior. Forty-eight of the 462 were found to have been convicted
and incarcerated into corrective labor institutions. According to this
report, the Government began 34 criminal cases in connection with the
disappearances of persons after their detention, including the Chairman
of the Chechen Parliament, R.A. Alikhagiyev. Several media reports in
October claimed that Alikhagiyev was being held in Lefortovo prison by
the FSB; however, to at year's end there is no word on his whereabouts.
In 1999 Chechen president Maskhadov's adviser on relations with
ethnic Russians, himself a Russian, was kidnaped in Grozny.
On March 5, 1999, unknown assailants abducted Major General
Gennadiy Shipgun--the Interior Ministry's special envoy to Chechnya--
from his airplane at Grozny airport. Although the motives behind
Shipgun's kidnaping are unclear, Russian press reports indicate that
his role in the 1994-96 Chechen war earned him much local animosity.
Chechen law enforcement officials later claimed to have issued arrest
warrants for six unnamed assailants. Russian authorities reported that
what most likely were Shipgun's remains were found in May; forensics
tests were being conducted in a laboratory in Rostov at year's end.
There has been no progress in the case against the alleged
kidnapers of a foreign missionary and university instructor, who was
kidnaped in the Dagestan capital of Makhachkala in November 1998. In
1999 Dagestani law enforcement officials told the Russian press that
they had arrested four unnamed suspects in connection with the case.
Russian and Ingush interior ministry troops later freed the victim on
June 29, 1999. Other religious figures also were kidnaped (see Sections
1.a. and 5).
Kidnaping frequently is used by criminal groups in the Northern
Caucasus, some of which may have links to elements of the separatist
forces. The main motivation behind such cases apparently is ransom,
although some cases have political or religious overtones. Many of the
hostages are being held in Chechnya or Dagestan. For example, Alla
Geyfman, the daughter of a Jewish businessman, was held for nearly 7
months by a Chechen gang demanding ransom. She was freed in February by
security forces.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Article 21 of the Constitution prohibits torture,
violence, and other brutal or humiliating treatment or punishment;
however, there are credible reports that law enforcement personnel
regularly use torture to coerce confessions from suspects and that the
Government does not hold most of the torturers accountable for their
actions. There were credible reports that Government and separatist
forces in Chechnya tortured detainees. There are also claims of abuse
of psychiatry by authorities. Institutions such as the Ministry of
Internal Affairs have begun to educate officers about safeguarding
human rights during law enforcement activities through training
provided by other countries but remain largely unreformed and have not
yet adopted practices fully consistent with law enforcement in a
democratic society. Since torture has never been defined in a
subsequent law or the Criminal Code and is only mentioned in the
Constitution, it is difficult to charge perpetrators. Police only can
be accused of exceeding granted authority, a far milder violation of
the Criminal Code.
Prisoners' rights groups, as well as other human rights groups,
documented numerous cases in which law enforcement and correctional
officials tortured and beat detainees and suspects. Human rights groups
describe the practice of torture as ``widespread.'' Numerous press
reports indicate that the police frequently strike persons based on
little or no provocation or use excessive force to subdue those whom
they arrest. Reports by refugees, NGO's, and the press suggest a
pattern of beatings, arrests, and extortion by police against persons
with dark skin, or who appeared to be from the Caucasus, Central Asia,
or Africa. However, press reports and human rights groups indicate that
police in some republics engage in beatings and torture as part of
investigative procedures as well. Police also increasingly harassed
defense lawyers, including beatings and arrests, and intimidated
witnesses (see Section 1.e.). Police are reported to plant drugs and
other false evidence as pretexts for arrests, arrest and detain persons
based on their political views and religious beliefs, and conduct
illegal searches of homes. Police also are reported often to extort
money from suspects, their friends, and their relatives.
According to Human Rights Watch's (HRW) report on torture in Russia
released in November 1999, torture by police officers usually occurs
within the first few hours or days of arrest and usually takes one of
four forms: beatings with fists, batons, or other objects; asphyxiation
using gas masks or bags (sometimes filled with mace); electric shocks;
or suspension of body parts (e.g. suspending a victim from the wrists,
which are tied together behind the back). Allegations of torture are
difficult to substantiate because of lack of access by medical
professionals and because the techniques used often leave few or no
permanent physical traces.
Research conducted by HRW indicates that the country's justice
system encourages police to resort to torture and hampers an adequate
defense of the accused. Law enforcement entities are expected to meet
an unreasonably high 80 percent target rate for solving crimes, despite
the loss of experienced officers and underfunding since the breakup of
the Soviet Union. The official rate for crimes solved in 1998 was 74.4
percent; experts consider a 30 to 40 percent rate to be consistent with
democratic practices and international standards for due process.
In 1999 Sergey Pashin, a Moscow judge and rule of law activist,
stated repeatedly that, in the cases that come before him, confessions
often have been coerced from suspects through beatings. He also charged
that ``witnesses'' often have been beaten to force them into
testifying, when in fact they may have no knowledge of the case. As
Pashin has told the press, he estimates that out of 1,200 official
torture complaints received in the country annually, only 20 criminal
investigations are opened, and only 3 or 4 go to trial. Human Rights
Ombudsman Oleg Mironov estimated in October that 50 percent of
prisoners with whom he spoke claimed to have been tortured. In April
1998, the Permanent Human Rights Chamber, an advisory presidential
committee, concluded that torture was ``common'' among representatives
of the Ministry of Interior, and that it was ``widespread and
systematic,'' especially in the pretrial stages of law enforcement.
Yakov Pister, head of the administration of the Procurator General's
office, testified to the Chamber that the Criminal Code has no
definition of torture, and that no statistics were gathered on the use
of torture. He blamed police reliance on torture as a means of
gathering evidence on a lack of professional training.
HRW noted that, assuming that they are aware of their rights under
the law, defendants often are not granted access to defense attorneys
or to medical treatment. Pretrial detention conditions are so miserable
that defendants sometimes confess simply to be moved to relatively
easier prison conditions. Retractions of forced confessions usually are
ignored. The accused can spend many months or even years in pretrial
detention because the current criminal procedure code allows judges to
send cases back for investigation an unlimited number of times (see
Section 1.e.).
Under the ``Operation Clean Hands'' program, created in 1995, MVD
officials continued to combat police crime. By the end of 1998, more
than 34,000 citizen complaints were lodged against police officers.
Over 2,100 cases were initiated against police personnel. Of that
number, 922 were group crimes, and 127 included civilian perpetrators.
For example, in Ulyanovsk court, proceedings were initiated against
five militiamen on charges of ``exceeding their authority,'' for
regularly subjecting young male suspects to torture. A Ministry of
Justice (MOJ) official estimated that during the first nine months of
the year, the number of cases initiated against police personnel was
similar to the number registered during the same period in 1999, with
108 convictions in the first six months of the year.
Various abuses against military servicemen, including but not
limited to the practice of ``dedovshchina'' (the violent, sometimes
fatal, hazing of new junior recruits for the armed services, MVD, and
border guards), continued during the year. Press reports citing serving
and former armed forces personnel, the Military Procurator's Office,
and NGO's monitoring conditions in the armed forces indicate that this
mistreatment often includes extortion of money or material goods in the
face of the threat of increased hazing or actual beatings. Press
reports also indicate that this type of mistreatment resulted in
permanent injuries and deaths among servicemen. Soldiers often do not
report hazing to either unit officers or military procurators due to
fear of reprisals, since officers in some cases reportedly tolerate or
even encourage such hazing as a means of controlling their units. There
are also reports that officers in some cases use beatings to discipline
soldiers whom they find to be ``inattentive to their duties.''
In July 1999, the Main Military Procurator's Office (MMPO) reported
that cases involving the abuse of military position or authority
increased by 23 percent. Half of such cases involved physical violence.
However, the MMPO also recorded a 14 percent drop in reported crimes
during 1999 and a 10 percent decrease in reports of hazing. Statistics
for the year were unavailable, although MMPO officials estimated that
from January to June, over 4,800 investigations into allegations of
human rights abuses were initiated.
Both the Union of Soldiers' Mothers Committee (USMC) and the MPPO
also noted an increase in the number of reports about ``nonstatutory
relations'' in which officers or sergeants physically assault or demean
their subordinates. This tendency commonly is attributed to stressful
conditions throughout the armed forces and to the widespread placement
of inexperienced reserve officers, on active duty for 2 years, in
primary troop leadership positions. In 1998 every second draftee
expressed concern that his life, health, or sanity would be threatened
during the period of military service by such incidents.
In the navy, investigations reportedly uncovered about 20 incidents
of nonstatutory treatment of sailors since the beginning of 1999 just
on the aircraft carrier cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov. Similar activity,
including the theft of hardware and weapons by sailors seeking to
escape hazing, reportedly was uncovered on the heavy nuclear cruiser
(and flagship) Petr Velikiy in 1999. According to press reports, in
September, a warrant officer on a Pacific Fleet ship became drunk and
began to beat enlisted men on board. As a result, 41 sailors, over half
the ship's company, left the ship and went to the Pacific Fleet
Headquarters to complain about repeated, savage beatings by drunken
noncommissioned officers. Admiral Rasskazov told the press that sailors
complain to him or to prosecutors every day. In the same article, a
prosecutor revealed that, as of July 10, criminal cases had been filed
in Vladivostok against naval officers and sailors who ``tortured''
their subordinates and shipmates.
Other reported abuses of armed forces personnel included the
practice by officers and sergeants of ``selling'' soldiers to others as
slave labor (to build dachas, etc.) or to other officers who have a
military need for personnel but are not able to work through the
system, most often linked to units in the Northern Caucasus military
district. The USMC reported that such practices continue. In one recent
complaint received in the USMC's Moscow office, a soldier was allegedly
sold for approximately $2 (50 rubles) to another unit. In another case,
an officer bought a soldier for 10 bottles of vodka. The USMC continues
to receive complaints about the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
accused it of being among the worst of the branches in its human rights
record.
The MMPO continues to cooperate with the USMC to investigate
allegations of abuse and established telephone and postal ``hot lines''
to receive reports directly from soldiers. Nonetheless, the USMC
believes that the majority of hazing incidents and assaults are not
reported, due to fear of reprisals, indifference of commanders, and
deliberate efforts to cover up such activity. The USMC estimates that
only 10 to 12 percent of serious incidents are reported; it received
nearly 4,000 complaints in its Moscow office alone during the year.
According to the armed forces' Medical Service, approximately 45
percent of military personnel committing or attempting suicide were
driven to it by either physical abuse or the often inhuman conditions
of military service. Nonpayment of wages could also be a factor,
although nonpayment decreased significantly during the year. (However,
contract soldiers serving in Chechnya complained of chronic nonpayment,
and in some cases, such as in Rostov on the Don in September, they
engaged in protests). The USMC reported in 1997 that in 60 percent of
the cases brought to the authorities attention, there was an official
finding that abuse had taken place, and that some disciplinary action
was taken as a result. These figures remained unchanged by year's end.
The deteriorating quality of the armed forces, cited as the main reason
for the breakdown in discipline, is aggravated by negligence during the
conscription process. A rise in the acceptance of draftees who are
unfit for military service allegedly also is contributing to crime
within the armed forces. Draft evasion is common, including the
reported ``purchase'' of unwarranted medical deferments by potential
conscripts otherwise ineligible for one of the many categories of legal
deferment. The Military Procuracy continued its campaign against draft
evasion and cracked down on conscription abuses. The USMC reported that
after the spring draft, police often dragged unsuspecting recruits
without documents, regardless of their mental or physical health, into
draft board offices.
Degrading and substandard living conditions persist throughout the
armed forces, principally due to insufficient funding. August
television reports of naval housing in the Murmansk region showed
decrepit, crowded apartments even for officers.
Despite the acknowledged seriousness of the problem, the leadership
of the armed forces has made only superficial efforts to implement
substantive reforms in training, education, and administration programs
within units to combat abuse. Their limited efforts were due at least
in part to lack of funding and the leadership's preoccupation with
urgent reorganization problems and the fighting in Chechnya.
There was still no law providing for the constitutional right to
alternative civilian service, and the proposal for an all-volunteer
armed forces has been put off indefinitely by the Government's
inability to raise military pay sufficiently. Although some regional
authorities have attempted to introduce alternative service programs,
national legislation necessary to implement the constitutional right to
alternative service has not been passed by the Duma. Without such
legislation there is no legal basis beyond the constitutional language
itself for any alternative service program. As a result, the courts
often rule against the individual based upon the legal requirements
relating to military service.
The systematic abuse of psychiatry as a form of punishment
prevalent during the Soviet era has ended. However, human rights groups
charge that psychiatric hospitals continue to conceal their archives
and their practices. Further, authorities reportedly still sometimes
abuse the practice of psychiatry for other purposes. The Independent
Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with several human rights
organizations, has criticized the use of psychiatry in
``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects'' and in testifying
against ``nontraditional'' religions in court cases. In deprogramming
cases, authorities allegedly use pseudo-psychological and spiritual
techniques to ``treat'' persons who had been members of new religious
groups (see Section 2.c.). Human rights groups are concerned about
court-appointed ``expert commissions'' charged with evaluating rituals,
beliefs, and the mental health of believers. Groups assert that the
commissions lack objectivity and often act under pressure from regional
authorities negatively disposed toward the religious denominations.
Yuriy Savenko, Head of the Independent Psychiatric Association of
Russia (originally formed during the Soviet era when psychiatric
hospitals were used to punish dissidents), and other human rights
activists such as the Moscow Helsinki Group head Lyudmila Aleksyeva,
criticized the trial of Platon Obukhov, a Russian diplomat charged with
espionage. Although independent psychiatrists deemed Obukhov mentally
unfit to stand trial, a court-appointed commission found him competent.
Human rights activists charge that the evaluation was based on
political considerations and pressure from the FSB. Obukhov's case is
currently under appeal.
Prison conditions are extremely harsh and frequently life
threatening. Since 1998 the penitentiary system has been administered
centrally from Moscow by the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of
Justice, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the
Ministry of Education all maintain penal facilities. There are five
basic forms of custody in the criminal justice system: Police detention
centers, pretrial detention (SIZO's), correctional labor colonies
(ITK's), prisons designated for those who violate ITK rules, and
educational labor colonies (VTK's) for juveniles. Responsibility for
operating the country's penal facilities falls under the Ministry of
Justice's Main Directorate for Execution of Sentences (GUIN). The
country's penal institutions remain extremely overcrowded. According to
January statistics of the Public Center for Penitentiary Reform (PCPR),
1,060,000 persons were incarcerated in the prison system run by GUIN.
By year's end, PCPR estimated there had been a decrease of prisoners
that brought the total to 912,100, approximately 655 per 100,000
persons of the population at large. While this number only includes
prisoners in the GUIN system, PCPR estimates that approximately 90
percent of all prisoners fall into this system. Conditions for
detainees and prisoners in most government facilities remain extremely
harsh. According to the 1995 Law On the Detention of Those Suspected or
Accused of Committing Crimes, inmates must be provided with adequate
space, food, and medical attention. Although most of the law's
provisions went into effect at the end of 1996, the authorities were
not able to ensure compliance, due in part to lack of funds, most
judges' failure to use the option of bail, and a very large prison
population.
Conditions in police station detention centers vary considerably,
but as a rule are harsh. In most cases, detainees are not fed and have
no bedding, places to sleep, running water, or toilets.
Suspects awaiting completion of criminal investigation, trial,
sentencing, or appeal, are confined in a Special Isolation Facility
(SIZO), which is a pretrial detention facility, mainly for a person who
is awaiting trial. Persons can spend up to three years awaiting trial
in a SIZO. Around 280,000 persons are held in the 195 SIZO's. Around
65,000 are held in police detention centers with another 5,000 to 6,000
in special facilities for the homeless. Convicts on occasion are
imprisoned in SIZO's because there is no transport to take them
elsewhere. Conditions in SIZO's remain extremely harsh and pose a
serious threat to life and health. Health, nutrition, and sanitation
standards in penal facilities remain low due to a lack of funding. Head
lice, scabies, and various skin diseases are prevalent. Prisoners and
detainees typically rely on families to provide them with extra food.
The PCPR estimates that SIZO's are filled to 230 percent of capacity.
In larger cities such as Moscow, the average space per prisoner amounts
to 0.5 cubic meters. In the majority of police detention centers there
is no shower and no outdoor exercise, and inmates are fed only twice a
day. To alleviate overcrowding, the Government announced an amnesty (to
reach 120,000). According to PCPR, on September 1 more than 99,000
inmates were released in an amnesty (358 of them were juveniles). The
total number amnestied was expected to reach 120,000 by November. While
the amnesty has affected the overall number of prisoners, by most
accounts the greatest decrease is due to the increased use of
alternative punishments such as selective parole for certain offences.
In some regions such as Murmansk, more than 70 percent of all convicted
offenders are given sentences not involving incarceration. In 1998 the
occupancy rate for the overall penitentiary system was 112 percent.
Special facilities exclusively for women are filled to 1.5 times of
capacity, according to a study financed by Penal Reform International.
As of September, there were 40,800 women held in correctional labor
colonies, according to the MCPCJR. Under such conditions, prisoners
sleep in shifts, and there is little, if any, room to move within the
cell. In most pretrial detention centers and prisons, there is no
ventilation system. Poor ventilation is thought to contribute to
cardiac problems and lowered resistance to disease. Cells are
overcrowded and stiflingly hot in the summer.
Correctional labor colonies (ITK's) hold the bulk of the nation's
convicts. Of the 742 ITK's, 644 are designated for men (122 of these
are ``timber'' correctional colonies). Although they are not as crowded
as SIZO's, guards reportedly severely discipline prisoners to break
down resistance. Prisoners sometimes are humiliated, beaten, and
starved. According to the PCPR, conditions in the ITK's are better than
in SIZO's prisons only to the extent that there is fresh air. In the
timber correctional colonies, where hardened criminals serve their
time, beatings, torture, and rape by guards reportedly are common. A
total 678,500 male prisoners and 40,800 female prisoners are held in
the ITK's. Of the 34 colonies for women, there are a few special
facilities for children to be held with their mothers (465 children up
to 4 years old). In the educational labor facilities, there are 19,000
males and 1,100 females. The country's ``prisons''--distinct from the
labor colonies or ITK's--are penitentiary institutions for those who
repeatedly violate the rules in effect in ITK's.
Educational labor colonies for juveniles (VTK's) are facilities for
from 14 to 20 years of age. The PCPR's September statistics indicate
that there were approximately 20,000 persons in the 64 educational
colonies, some 19,000 males and 1,000 females. Conditions in VTK's are
significantly better than in ITK's, but juveniles in VTK's and juvenile
SIZO cells reportedly also suffer from beatings, torture, and rape. The
PCPR reports that such facilities have a poor psychological atmosphere
and lack educational and vocational training opportunities. Many of the
juveniles are from orphanages, have no outside support, and are unaware
of their rights. There currently are two prisons for children in
Moscow. Boys are held in small crowded, smoky cells with adults.
Schooling in the prisons for children is sporadic at best, with
students of different ages studying together when a teacher can be
found.
According to statistics provided by the PCPR, the proposed federal
budget as of the end of September allocated $778 million (14 billion
rubles) for the upkeep of the GUIN system. According to GUIN, $1.3
billion (23 billion rubles) are needed to maintain the system
adequately. However, the full allotment is not always spent. For
example, in a Ryazan educational colony for females, less then $1 (18
rubles) per day for each inmate is considered necessary. In the budget,
the institution is allotted only 10 rubles per inmate, while in
actuality, less than four rubles actually make it to the institution.
There are no steps underway at present to increase the portion of the
budget allotted to GUIN.
According to the PCPR, conditions in penal facilities vary among
the regions. Some regions offer assistance in the form of food,
clothing, and medicine. NGO's and religious groups offer other support.
Inmates in the prison system often suffer from inadequate medical
care. Detention facilities have infection rates of tuberculosis far
higher than in the population at large. Tuberculosis in the general
population and especially in prisons is considered by health and human
rights experts to be not only a national, but an international health
threat. PCPR estimates that 96,000 prisoners suffer from infectious
tuberculosis--approximately 42 to 43 percent of all tuberculosis
patients in Russia. A total of 25,000 of these prisoners are infected
with a drug-resistant form of the disease. Some 90,000 of the overall
patients, mostly under 30 years of age, are incarcerated in SIZO's. Of
these, 26,000 are in special prison hospital wards for tuberculosis,
42,000 in medical facilities, and 17,000 in isolation in prison
facilities, with the rest being held among the healthy prison
population. The Saratov oblast administration, concerned with the
tuberculosis crisis in facilities located there, fully funded the
tuberculosis-related medicinal needs of prisoners, according to the
PCPR. GUIN is working the with Soros Foundation to develop programs in
some regions to combat tuberculosis.
HIV/AIDS infection rates are also a source of concern. The PCPR
estimated that there were 8,000 prisoners infected either with HIV or
who had developed AIDS, but the lack of adequate health care precludes
estimating the true number of such prisoners and suggests that this is
an underestimate. Space shortages do not allow for separate facilities
for prisoners with AIDS.
Statistics on the number of detainees and prisoners who were killed
or died and on the number of law enforcement and prison personnel
disciplined for the use of excessive force are not released publicly.
PCPR estimates that around 11,000 prisoners died in penitentiary
facilities during the year (2,500 of whom died in SIZO's). Most died as
a result of overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, or lack of medical
care (the leading cause of death was heart disease), but some died due
to beatings. The Procuracy General claimed that it receives
approximately 1,000 complaints of torture per year, but no reliable
figures are available. The press often reports on innocent individuals
mistreated, injured, or killed in various SIZO's; some of the reported
cases include habitual abuse by the same officers.
Violence among inmates, including beatings and rape, is common.
There are elaborate inmate-enforced caste systems in which informers,
homosexuals, rapists, prison rape victims, child molesters, and others
are considered to be ``untouchable'' and treated very harshly, with
little or no protection provided by the prison authorities.
At a March 1999 joint hearing at the Human Rights Chamber of the
President's Political Consultative Council, the Ministry of Justice,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Court, and the Procuracy
General developed a plan to address the ``critical'' state of the
national penal system. The proposals forwarded to the Government and
the State Duma included provisions such as another amnesty and changes
in the Criminal Code that could yield a prison population decrease of
400,000 over 1 year.
According to the PCPR, Aleksandr Zubkov, Deputy Director of GUIN in
the Ministry of Justice, stated that the only way to reduce the prison
population is to change the Criminal Code provisions regarding
pretrial, parole and probation, and postconviction release measures.
Zubkov stated that the Criminal Code is too severe and allows
unjustifiably wide use of custody as a measure of restraint (as opposed
to bail or release on the prisoner's own recognizance, for example).
The PCPR called for greater use of alternatives to custody, such as
bail and house arrest. Moreover, the PCPR reported that detainees spend
too long in pretrial detention, in many cases as long as 3 years or
more. The Ministry of Justice concurs with the PCPR that limits must be
placed on time in detention awaiting trial.
Moscow-based human rights groups make infrequent visits to prisons
in the Moscow area, and they have neither the resources nor a national
network to investigate conditions in all 89 regions. The pretrial
detention centers and filtration camps for suspected Chechen fighters,
are not usually accessible to human rights monitors (see Section 1.g.).
In May, the ICRC began to visit persons detained by Russian
authorities. The ICRC works throughout Russia and is especially active
in the North Caucasus. They are currently carrying out regular prison
visits, but by agreement with the Government, their findings are kept
confidential. The ICRC provides advice to authorities on how to improve
conditions.
In January and February the remand prison at Chernokozovo was the
principal detention center for those detained in Chechnya. Prolonged
beatings to the genitals and to the soles of the feet, rape, electric
shocks, tear gas and other methods of torture were used at the center.
Guards subjected detainees to humiliation and degrading treatment. At
least one person was beaten to death. Often prison guards and other law
enforcement officers use torture to coerce confessions or testimony.
Conditions improved at Chernokozovo in mid-February; however, an
increasing number of detainees subsequently were held elsewhere and
continued to suffer abuses, including torture, according to Human
Rights Watch. The Government has allowed ICRC access to some facilities
in the North Caucasus where Chechen detainees are held.
In one of many reported incidents, a Chechen man described how he
saw federal guards puncture detainees' eardrums and file their teeth
and damage their lips with a file forced into their mouths--an
apparently new form of torture. In another reported incident, a Chechen
man was pulled from his cell, homosexually raped, and taunted with
anti-Chechen epithets. In the case of the Chernokozovo prison, the
torture of prisoners by federal guards came to light in part through
reports of Andrey Babistkiy, a reporter for Radio Liberty who was
himself detained and beaten there. According to credible reports, units
of the Government were involved in the detention and disappearance of
Babitskiy in January for his reporting in Chechnya (see Section 1.b.
and 2.a.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain serious problems. The Constitution provides that the
arrest, taking into custody, and detention of persons suspected of
crimes are permitted only by judicial decision. Under the 1997 code the
maximum sentence for all offenses increased from 15 years to 30 years.
Criminal proceedings continue to be governed both by the 1997 Criminal
Code and the Soviet Criminal Procedure Code, adopted in 1960.
Efforts to achieve Duma approval of a new Criminal Procedure Code
have been unsuccessful.
There are credible reports from throughout the country that police
detain persons without observing mandated procedures and fail to issue
proper arrest warrants or receipts for confiscated property. This is
especially true for persons from the Caucasus. There are credible
reports that security forces continue regularly to single out persons
from the Caucasus for document checks, detention, and extortion of
bribes. In 1999 Moscow city law enforcement authorities frequently
detained persons unlawfully for alleged violations of registration
requirements, especially in response to the terrorist bombings in
September 1999, when authorities detained some 2,000 persons and
deported more than 500, according to NGO's. Russian forces commonly
rounded up and detained groups of Chechen men at checkpoints along the
borders and during ``mop-up'' operations following military
hostilities, and engaged in severe beating and torture.
In the absence of measures to implement the procedural safeguards
contained in the Constitution, suspects often were subjected to uneven
and arbitrary treatment by officials acting under the current Criminal
Procedure Code and presidential decrees. The code gives procurators
authority to issue an order of detention without a judge's
authorization and, if police believe that the suspect has committed a
crime or is a danger to others, to detain him for up to 48 hours
without a warrant.
The Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code provide that
detainees are entitled to have a lawyer present from the time of
detention, during questioning following detention, and throughout
investigation up to and including the formal filing of charges. This
procedure generally is followed in practice. The PCPR reports that
detainees are given the opportunity to have access to a lawyer in
accordance with their rights. However, the Center notes that the high
cost of legal fees and the poor quality of court-appointed public
defenders for those lacking the funds to engage counsel effectively
deny the majority of suspects competent legal representation. As a
result, many prisoners do not exercise this right because they believe
it useless. Families have access to individuals in pre-trial detention;
however, in initial detention by the police in precincts, they may at
times not be granted access.
Articles 47 to 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide that in
certain cases the court, an investigator, or a procurator is to provide
the suspect with an advocate free of charge if the suspect cannot
afford one. A president of a collegium of advocates must appoint a
lawyer within 24 hours after receiving such a request. However, lawyers
(advocates) try to avoid these cases since the Government does not in
fact reimburse them for this work as it is supposed to do. As a result,
in many cases indigent defendants receive little or no assistance
during the investigation stage of the case, and such in-court
assistance as they do receive may be rendered by poorly trained
lawyers. At times the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning
cannot be exercised even when the suspect can afford to pay for a
lawyer. Human rights NGO's report that in many cases investigators deny
access to a lawyer by various means, including restrictions on the time
when the suspect can see his lawyer (which may mean that the lawyer has
to wait for days to get a meeting with the client).
A 1997 presidential decree allows police to detain persons
suspected of ties to organized crime for up to 10 days without bringing
charges. The law overturned two previous presidential decrees (of 1994
and 1996) that allowed detention for up to 30 days. The 1997 decree
also instructed the Government to submit to the Duma a draft federal
law on preventing vagrancy and providing social rehabilitation of the
homeless. However, according to Duma and NGO sources there is not yet
any such draft law under consideration.
The Criminal Procedure Code specifies that only 2 months should
elapse between the date an investigation is initiated and the date the
file is transferred to the procurator so that the procurator can file
formal charges against the suspect in court. However, investigations
seldom are completed that quickly. Some suspects spend 18 months or
longer in detention under harsh conditions in a SIZO while the criminal
investigation is conducted. The PCPR reports terms of pretrial
detention extending up to 3 years, with the average ranging from 7 to
10 months. However, in some extreme cases the PCPR reports detention
periods of up to 5 years due to financial constraints and poor
investigative and court work.
The Code provides that a prosecutor may extend the period of
criminal investigation to 6 months in ``complex'' cases. If more time
is required in ``exceptional'' cases, the Procurator General personally
can extend the period up to 18 months. Extensions of the investigation
period often are issued without explanation to the detainee. Until the
investigation is completed, the suspect is under the jurisdiction of
the Procurator's office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. There is no procedure for a suspect to plead guilty
during the investigative period, although if a suspect informs the
investigator that he is guilty, the period of the investigation usually
is shorter than if he maintains his innocence. Suspects frequently fear
exercising their right to request judicial review of their detention
due to fear of angering the investigating officer.
There also were credible reports that persons were detained far in
excess of the permissible periods for administrative offenses, in some
cases so that police officials could extort money from friends or
relatives of detainees. The situation has improved somewhat since the
issuance of the 1997 presidential decree that annulled a previous
decree that had allowed for 30-day detentions. However, the practice of
detaining individuals in excess of permissible periods is common, and
this often is done for the purpose of extorting money.
The use of bail is rare, even if suspects are not flight risks or
have not been charged with violent crimes. This aggravates overcrowding
in pretrial detention and, due to delays in bringing cases to trial,
results in many suspects remaining in pretrial detention for longer
than the maximum penalty they might face if convicted. In the
juveniles' prisons, boys and girls (in separate facilities) are
incarcerated in the facility for up to several years while they await
trial and sentencing.
Delays also plague the trial stage. Although the Criminal Procedure
Code requires court proceedings to begin no more than 14 days after the
judge issues an order designating the location of the trial, congestion
in the court system frequently leads to long postponements. Judges
often do not dismiss cases involving improper investigations or
indictments, particularly if the procurator's case has political
support or if the case is controversial. Such cases often are returned
to the procurator for further investigation.
Some regional and local authorities have taken advantage of the
system's procedural weaknesses to arrest persons on false pretexts for
expressing views critical of the Government. Human rights advocates in
the regions have been charged with libel, contempt of court, or
interference in judicial procedures in cases with distinct political
overtones. Others have been charged with other offenses and held either
in excess of normal periods of detention or for offenses that do not
require detention at all (see Section 4).
On June 2, Taisa Isayeva, a Chechen journalist, was arrested at the
border checkpoint ``Nizhny Zaramag'', between North Ossetia and
Georgian controlled Ossetia. Isayeva, who works for the Chechen Press
agency based in Georgia, was detained at the border because she was
carrying a video camera and a portable computer.
On October 3, Primorye Regional FSB authorities opened a criminal
case against Vladimir Schurov, Director of the Sonar Laboratory of the
Pacific Oceanographic Institute (POI). He was charged with divulging
state secrets, unlawful transfer of dual use technologies, and also for
organizing a criminal group. Schurov has denied all charges.
Russian authorities took measures in two ``espionage'' cases
involving foreigners who worked with Russians and obtained information
the authorities considered sensitive. In both cases, proceedings took
place behind closed doors and the defendants and their attorneys
encountered difficulties in learning the details of the charges. In
both cases, the circumstances suggested that the security services were
seeking to discourage foreigners on issues they considered to be
sensitive.
In November 1999 disarmament researcher Igor Sutyagin of the USA
Canada Institute was detained on suspicion of espionage. No information
about the specific charges was made public. At first the case appeared
to focus on his work on a study of civil-military relations funded by
the Canadian Defense Ministry. Sutyagin's family stated that the study
did not deal in secret matters and was partially funded by the Russian
Defense and Foreign ministries. Evidence in the case is secret and
lawyers stated that Sutyagin received copies of the details on December
15. The trial was recessed until January 9, 2001.
Throughout the year there have also been numerous other cases of
individuals charged with treason and detained. In August 1999
Vladivostok environmental scientist Vladimir Soyfer filed a complaint
in Vladivostok municipal court alleging that in early July 1999 the FSB
confiscated a large number of documents from his apartment, the removal
of which was not covered by its warrant and not documented in the FSB's
official record of the search. While under investigation the FSB
dropped the case stating that Soyfer fell under the November amnesty.
Soyfer appealed this decision to clear his name, arguing that he was
innocent, and that there was no basis or need to amnesty him. The court
agreed, passing the case back to the FSB for either investigation and
prosecution, or dropping charges.
In October 1999 Vladimir Slivyak, director of the antinuclear
organization Eco-Defense, announced at a press conference that Moscow
police detained and questioned him for a few hours in September about
his possible involvement in the August bombing of the Manezh shopping
center in Moscow. One of Slivyak's coworkers reportedly had been framed
on charges of drug possession. Natalya Minonova of Chelyabinsk also was
detained and questioned by police officers in September as she and four
other activists were on their way to city hall to deliver a letter
protesting the potential import of spent nuclear fuel into the country.
Authorities charged all five with hooliganism. Reportedly authorities
told another activist in Voronezh to report to the police station for
an ``informal conversation'' on the topic of an antinuclear camp near
the NovoVoronezh nuclear power plant and threatened him with drug
possession charges if he failed to appear.
St. Petersburg judge Sergey Golets ruled at the end of 1999 that
Aleksandr Nikitin, an environmentalist and retired Soviet Navy captain,
was not guilty on charges of espionage and treason. Although
prosecutors later appealed the decision, the Presidium of the Supreme
Court on September 13 upheld the acquittal. Legal observers believe
that the legal foundations of the Golets ruling were sound and that it,
along with the Supreme Court decision, may provide an important
precedent in combating abuses by the FSB.
Nikitin's case was characterized by serious violations of due
process. There were credible charges that his detention was politically
motivated. The FSB detained Nikitin in St. Petersburg in February 1996
on suspicion of espionage and revealing state secrets, crimes
punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Nikitin had been working with
the Bellona foundation, a Norwegian environmental NGO, on the
publication of a report detailing the hazards posed by nuclear waste
generated by the Northern Fleet, in which Nikitin served. Indictments
cited classified decrees that were made available to Nikitin's defense
team only at the beginning of the trial, which finally commenced in
October 1998, nearly 3 years after Nikitin's detention. In his December
1999 ruling, Judge Golets argued that the secret decrees used to charge
Nikitin violated every citizen's right to access to the law and
therefore were not binding under the Constitution. Moreover, according
to the ruling, investigators failed to adhere to the Criminal Code
during the investigation and violated Nikitin's constitutional rights.
The case against Nikitin was finally closed by the September ruling of
the Supreme Court presidium that the prosecutor's appeal of Nikitin's
acquittal was without merit. However, the Federal Tax Police continued
to harass him, claiming that the money provided by Bellona for his
legal defense was taxable income.
Media-Most chairman Vladimir Gusinskiy was detained in Moscow's
Butyrka Prison for three days in June, in connection with the General
Procuracy's criminal fraud case against him. Gusinkiy left Russia in
July, shortly after the Procuracy dropped its criminal case against
him. Later it became known that Gusinskiy signed an agreement with
Gazprom-Media chief Alfred Kokh just before leaving the country in
which he pledged to sell a controlling share of his media enterprises
to Gazprom. Gusinskiy insisted publicly that he had signed under
duress, citing a protocol to the agreement that was co-signed by Press
Minister Mikhail Lesin. Many observers interpreted the protocol as a
quid pro quo in which the Government agreed to drop its criminal
investigations of Gusinskiy and Media-Most in exchange for receipt by
Gazprom of a controlling share in NTV and
Media-Most. Later in the year, the General Procuracy cited
Gusinskiy's refusal to appear for further questioning on a broader
criminal fraud case against Media-Most as grounds for seeking his
extradition. At year's end, Gusinskiy remained in Spain under house
arrest as Spanish officials considered the Government's extradition
request.
No new arrests of human rights monitors were documented during the
year.
In July 1999 after 20 months in pretrial detention, military
journalist and active-duty officer in the Pacific Fleet Grigoriy Pasko
was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for dereliction of duty but
immediately was released under the prisoner amnesty. However,
prosecutors subsequently appealed the sentence and the military
collegium of the Supreme Court dismissed the earlier conviction and
sent the case back to Vladivostok to be retried for the more serious
charges of espionage and treason. The trial is expected to begin in
March 2001. Pasko originally was charged with treason and espionage
after reporting on radioactive contamination by Russian Pacific Fleet
sailors dumping radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan. The trial was
marked by a number of irregularities, including the judge's decision to
remove one of Pasko's defense attorneys for contempt of court and also
a key witness recanting earlier testimony claiming it had been made
under duress from investigators. The Committee to Protect Journalists
and the Glasnost Defense Fund observed that the case is still a
powerful disincentive to investigative reporting (see Section 2.a.).
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and there are signs of limited judicial
independence; however, the judiciary does not yet act as an effective
counterweight to other branches of government. Efforts to develop an
independent judiciary continue. Judges remain subject to some influence
from the executive, military, and security forces, especially in high
profile or political cases. The judiciary still lacks sufficient
resources and is subject to corruption.
The judiciary is divided into three branches: The courts of general
jurisdiction, subordinated to the Supreme Court; the arbitration court
system under the High Court of Arbitration; and the Constitutional
Court. Civil and criminal cases are tried in courts of primary
jurisdiction, courts of appeals, and higher courts. The general court
system's lowest level is the municipal court, which serves each city or
rural district and hears over 90 percent of all civil and criminal
cases. The next level of courts of general jurisdiction are the
regional courts. At the highest level is the Supreme Court. Decisions
of the lower trial courts can be appealed only to the immediately
superior court unless a constitutional issue is involved. The
arbitration court system consists of city or regional courts as well as
appellate circuit courts subordinated to the High Court of Arbitration.
Arbitration courts hear cases involving business disputes between legal
entities and between legal entities and the state. Qualifying Collegium
nominate judges for approval (by the President), remove them, and
approve requests by prosecutors to investigate judges. Approximately
1,000 justices of the peace were appointed in 33 regions throughout the
country during the year. These judges handle family law and criminal
cases where the maximum sentence is 2 years.
Low salaries and lack of prestige make it difficult to attract
talented new judges and contribute to the vulnerability of existing
judges to bribery and corruption. Judges have received some incremental
salary increases aimed at improving the quality of judges recruited and
raising the retention rate. Although judges' pay has improved, working
conditions remain poor, and support personnel continue to be underpaid.
The 2000 government budget increased funding for the judicial
system; however, it is not enough to cover all of the system's needs.
Not all of the money allocated was dispersed and regional
administration support is still needed.
Judges are subject to intimidation and bribery from officials and
others. As judges generally bear responsibility both for reaching a
verdict and handing down a sentence, they are logical targets for
intimidation. In July 1999, the chair of the Primorskiy Kray
arbitration court, Tatyana Loktionova, announced that Primorskiy Kray
Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko had been interfering in the court's
activities and that she and her colleagues feared for their personal
safety. The governor blamed the court for bankrupting the region's
enterprises and destroying its economy and persuaded then-Prime
Minister Putin to authorize an internal investigation of the
arbitration court for possible illegal conduct. Loktionova was removed
from the court but appealed to the Supreme Court for reinstatement. On
August 23, the Supreme Court's Board of Appeal upheld the lower court's
ruling removing Loktionova from the bench. Loktionova appealed to the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. In October the Moscow
City Collegium of Judges removed Moscow City Judge Sergey Pashin from
the bench for ostensible infractions of professional etiquette.
However, most observers believe that Pashin was removed for political
purposes, as punishment for his outspoken views criticizing judicial
colleagues on cases ranging from the conscientious objector Neverovskiy
in Kaluga to the legal procedures surrounding Media-Most. Pashin
appealed the Collegium's decision to a higher body and he was later
reinstated.
The Criminal Code provides for the court to appoint a lawyer if the
suspect cannot afford one. The Society for the Guardianship of
Penitentiary Institutions often is called upon by judges to provide
legal assistance for suspects facing charges and trial without any
representation. This society operates primarily in Moscow, although it
uses its connections throughout the country to appeal to legal
professionals to represent the indigent. However, in many cases the
indigent receive little legal assistance, because funds are lacking to
pay for trial attorneys for them and public defenders are poorly
trained.
Because the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning often is
not exercised (see Section 1.d.), many defendants recant testimony
given in pretrial questioning, stating that they were denied access to
a lawyer or that they were coerced into making false confessions or
statements. Nevertheless, human rights monitors have documented cases
in which convictions were obtained on the basis of testimony that the
defendant recanted in court, even in the absence of other proof of
guilt.
In the 80 regions where adversarial jury trials have not yet been
introduced, criminal procedures are weighted heavily in favor of the
prosecutor. The judge or panel of judges conducts the trial by asking
questions based on a prior review of the evidence. Reports indicate
that in practice the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence
often is disregarded. Judges are known to return poorly developed cases
to the prosecution for additional investigation rather than risk
confrontation with powerful prosecutors. Moreover in certain cases the
Criminal Procedure Code allows them to do so with no limitation on the
number of times the case can be investigated. The Constitutional Court
partly addressed this issue in an April 20, 1999, decision that held
that part of the article of the Code providing for this practice was
unconstitutional. The practice of repeatedly returning cases for
further investigation greatly increases the time that defendants spend
in SIZO's (see Section 1.c.).
Defense attorneys, defendants, and the general public reportedly
favor jury trials and the more adversarial approach to criminal
justice. Prosecutors and law enforcement officials continue to prefer
trial by judges and the inquisitorial system.
The Independent Council of Legal Expertise reported that defense
lawyers increasingly were the target of police harassment, including
beatings and arrests. Professional associations at both the local and
federal levels reported abuses throughout the country. They charge that
police are trying both to intimidate defense attorneys and to cover up
their own criminal activities. For example, on March 28 Moscow defense
lawyer K. Moskalenko was assaulted by members of Moscow's Organized
Crime Unit of the MVD while attempting to assist a client illegally
detained by the Unit at a residence. Moskalenko complained to the
Procurator, but her complaint was rejected at the end of April. The
Glasnost Public Foundation criticized the September 30 arrest of public
defender Mikhail Konstantinidiy in Novorossiysk. Konstantinidiy was
arrested for purported ``illegal entrepreneurial activity,'' which
human rights activists believe was concocted in retaliation for the
lawyer's successes against an oil company and a local politician.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy
rights. The Constitution states that officials can enter a private
residence only in cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of a
judicial decision. It permits the government to monitor correspondence,
telephone conversations, and other means of communication only with
judicial permission. It prohibits the collection, storage, utilization,
and dissemination of information about a person's private life without
his consent. Legislation to implement these provisions was passed as
part of the country's new criminal code, which provides for criminal
penalties. However, problems remain, and no one has ever been convicted
of violating those safeguards. There were reports of electronic
surveillance by government officials and others. Moscow law enforcement
officials reportedly entered residences and other premises without
warrants. For example, on October 19, three investigators from the
Organized Crime Unit and Economic Crime Unit of the MVD entered the
premises of the Moscow Choral Synagogue without a warrant and searched
the offices of Moscow Chief Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt (see Section
2.b.).
Internet experts and right-to-privacy advocates say that
interagency technical regulations called SORM-2 (SORM is the Russian
acronym for System for Operational Investigative Measures), which were
issued by the Ministry of Communications, the FSB, the Federal Agency
of Government Communications and Information, and other agencies
present a serious threat to privacy rights, and violate the Civil Code,
the Constitution, and international norms. SORM-2 is an amendment to
SORM telecommunications regulations. The original SORM, issued in 1995,
granted security services the power to monitor all telecommunications
transmissions for investigative purposes. It required a warrant to
carry out such monitoring, in accordance with the Constitution and
other provisions of the law. SORM-2 extends to the FSB the same kind of
monitoring power over Internet communication that it had for
telecommunication, but without ensuring judicial oversight.
Internet service providers were required to install, at their own
expense, a device that routes all Internet traffic to an FSB terminal.
Those providers that did not comply with the requirements faced either
loss of their licenses or denial of their license renewal. While SORM-2
framers claim that the regulation does not violate the Constitution or
the Civil Code because it still requires a court order, right to
privacy advocates say that there is no mechanism to ensure that a
warrant is obtained before the FSB accesses private information. There
appears to be no mechanism to prevent unauthorized FSB access to
Internet traffic without a warrant.
On July 25 Minister of Communications Leonid Reyman issued an order
implementing the last stage of SORM. According to the order, registered
by the Ministry of Justice on August 9, the FSB is no longer required
to provide to the telecommunications and Internet companies any court
documentation or any information about targets of interest. Human
rights activists suggest that this order only formalizes the practices
established since SORM was introduced. However, Pavel Netupskiy, a St.
Petersburg journalist, challenged Reyman's order in court, claiming
that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court examined the case and
ruled September 25 partially in Netupskiy's favor, leaving the
requirement that the FSB conduct monitoring only by court order and
that it provide information to the company about the target of
surveillance. However, despite the court ruling, adequate oversight and
enforcement of this constitutional provision and the court order are
lacking. On September 12 Putin signed the ``Doctrine of Information
Security of the Russian Federation'' which offers general language on
protecting citizens' constitutional rights and civil liberties but also
includes specific provisions that would justify greater state
intervention. The Doctrine gives much leeway to law enforcement
authorities in carrying out SORM surveillance of telephone, cellular,
and wireless communications.
Allegations continue to circulate that officers in the special
services, including authorities at the highest levels of the MVD and
the FSB, have used their services' power to gather compromising
materials on political and public figures as political insurance and to
remove rivals. Similarly, persons in these agencies, both active and
retired, were accused of working with commercial or criminal
organizations for the same purpose.
There are credible reports that regional branches of the FSB
continue to exert pressure on Russian citizens employed by Western
firms and organizations, often with the goal of coercing them into
becoming informants.
Government forces in Chechnya looted valuables and foodstuffs from
houses in regions that they controlled (see Section 1.g.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The indiscriminate use of force by government
troops in the Chechen conflict resulted in widespread civilian
casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons,
the majority of whom sought refuge in the neighboring republic of
Ingushetiya. The Federal Government has been fighting a war against
separatists in Chechnya since August 1999 following attacks by Chechen
separatists in neighboring Dagestan. In the fall of 1999, government
forces launched air and artillery attacks against numerous Chechen
villages along the republic's eastern border with Dagestan in the
territory controlled by Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev.
Attempts by government forces to regain control over Chechnya were
accompanied by indiscriminate use of air power and artillery,
particularly in the fall 1999 campaign to retake the capital, Grozny.
There were numerous reports of attacks on civilian targets, including
the bombing of schools and residential areas. In early 2000 a large-
scale offensive military campaign by government forces continued
against the separatists. That offensive campaign largely ended
following federal occupation of most of Chechnya by late spring,
although federal forces remained engaged in an intensive anti-
insurgency campaign against separatist guerillas. The security
situation prevented most foreign observers from travelling to the
region, and the Federal Government enforced strict controls on press
access. NGO's reported that federal authorities in some cases
confiscated recording devices and communications equipment at the
border. These restrictions made independent observation of conditions
and verification of reports very difficult. Nevertheless, there were
numerous credible reports of human rights abuses and atrocities
committed by federal forces.
Federal authorities continued to claim that government forces
utilized ``high precision'' weapons and tactics against the rebels;
however, a wide range of reports indicated that government military
operations resulted in many civilian casualties and the massive
destruction of property and infrastructure. The number of civilian
fatalities caused by federal military operations cannot be verified,
and estimates of the total number of civilian dead vary from the
hundreds to the thousands. For example, on December 20, seven students
were killed when Russian forces fired mortar rounds on Grozny State
Pedagogical Institute. The procurator was investigating the incident at
year's end. The number of civilians wounded by federal forces also
could not be verified, although reports from hospitals that still were
operating in the region indicated that the majority of patients were
mine or ordnance victims, and that such weaponry was the primary cause
of death. Throughout the conflict, accusations were made by both sides
about the use of chemical weapons. However, no credible evidence has
been offered to support these claims.
In addition to casualties attributable to indiscriminate use of
force by the federal armed forces, many atrocities reportedly were
committed by individual federal servicemen or units. Command and
control among military and special police units often appeared to be
weak, and a culture of lawlessness, corruption and impunity flourished.
This culture fostered individual acts (by government forces) of
violence and looting against civilians. For example, according to HRW
and press reports, on February 5, Russian riot police and contract
soldiers (men hired by the military for short-term service contracts)
executed at least 60 civilians in Aldi and Chernorechiye, suburbs of
Grozny. The perpetrators reportedly raped some of the victims and
extorted money, later setting many of the houses on fire to destroy
evidence.
According to HRW and other NGO reports, Russian soldiers executed
at least 38 civilians in the Staropromyslovski district between
December 1999-January 2000. Most of the victims were women and elderly
men, and all apparently were shot deliberately by Russian soldiers at
close range. Similar events also occurred in Katr Yurt, were hundreds
of already displaced persons were forced to flee, persons were killed,
and houses were burned. Russian forces allegedly did this because
Chechen fighters had passed through the village after the retreat from
Grozny on February 5. In November 1999, government troops opened fire
on doctors and other medical staff at a psychiatric hospital, injuring
three persons. According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped
civilian women in Chechnya in December 1999 in the village of Alkhan-
Yurt and in other villages.
According to human rights NGO's, federal troops on numerous
occasions looted valuables and foodstuffs in regions they controlled.
Many internally displaced persons (IDP's) reported that they were
forced to provide payments to, or were otherwise subjected to
harassment and pressure by, guards at checkpoints. There were also
widespread reports of the killing or abuse of captured fighters by
federal troops, as well as by the separatists, and a policy of ``no
quarter given'' appeared to prevail in many units. A private wounded in
the conflict told representatives of the Union of Soldiers Mother's
Committee (USMC) organization that the commander of his unit gave the
order that no prisoners should be taken and no one should be left alive
in Grozny. Federal forces reportedly beat, raped, tortured, and killed
numerous detainees. The human rights NGO Memorial compiled a list of
300 missing captured rebels, some of whom had not been seen in 6
months. Federal forces reportedly ransomed Chechen detainees to their
families. Prices were said to range from several hundred to thousands
of dollars.
Armed forces and police units reportedly routinely abused and
tortured persons held at so-called filtration camps, where federal
authorities claimed that fighters or those suspected of aiding the
rebels were sorted out from civilians.
There were some reports that federal troops purposefully targeted
some infrastructure essential to the survival of the civilian
population, such as water facilities or hospitals. The NGO Physicians
for Human Rights reported that that physicians in Grozny Ambulatory
Clinic #5 and Grozny City Hospital #4 stated that their hospitals were
destroyed. The indiscriminate use of force by federal troops resulted
in massive destruction of housing and commercial and administrative
buildings, as well as the breakdown of gas- and water-supply facilities
and other types of infrastructure. Representatives of international
organizations and NGO's who visited Chechnya also reported little
evidence of federal assistance for rebuilding war-torn areas.
International organizations estimate that the number of IDP's and
refugees who left Chechnya as a result of the conflict reached a total
of about 280,000 at its peak in late spring. Of this total, most went
to Ingushetiya (245,000). Some 6,000 Chechen IDP's were reported in
Dagestan, 3,000 in North Ossetia, and 6,000 in Georgia. About 20,000
Chechen IDP's reportedly went to other regions of the Russian
Federation. Federal refugee policy aimed at repatriating IDP's as soon
as possible back to Chechnya. However, as of early fall, federal
authorities promised that no one would be repatriated forcibly.
Reliable information on the number and status of displaced persons
within Chechnya was especially difficult to obtain, due to heavy
fighting and limited outside access to the region. The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that at times as many
as 150,000 persons were displaced within Chechnya and lacked access to
humanitarian assistance. There were approximately 6,000 Dagestani IDP's
in Dagestan. NGO's also estimated that at least a quarter of a million
residents, including almost the entire Russian, Armenian, and Jewish
populations, migrated from Chechnya as a result of the current conflict
and the first war of 1994-96.
At various points during the conflict, authorities restricted the
movement of IDP's fleeing Chechnya. According to some reports by NGO's,
early in the conflict border guards at times permitted only ethnic
Russians to cross into Ingushetiya. According to the Russian press,
some displaced persons were transported by bus back to parts of
Chechnya that were under government control. In 1999 refugees at the
border sometimes had to live in the open, without access to food or
water. Russian border guards and police officers on the border between
Chechnya and neighboring regions reportedly required Chechen refugees
to pay money to pass. According to UNHCR, the authorities early in the
year prevented medical supplies destined for hospitals from entering
Chechnya. There also were many credible reports that Russian guards at
checkpoints within Chechnya demanding money to allow persons to pass.
Some refugees also had trouble moving about because their documents had
been lost, stolen, or confiscated by Russian authorities. Currently
8,000 persons live in railway carriages in the region. During the year,
4,000 others who had been living in railway cars were transferred to a
winterized tent camp. According to the Council of Europe (COE), about
2,000 persons live in harsh conditions in rail wagons in Sernovodsk
without sufficient heating and appropriate sanitation facilities, which
puts them at risk of contagious diseases.
While Russian media coverage of events in Chechnya was extensive,
most journalists and editors appeared to be exercising self-censorship
and avoiding subjects embarrassing to the Government (see Section
2.a.). Since the resumption of the war in October 1999, federal
authorities--both military and civilian--limited journalists' access to
war zones and confiscated reports and equipment, citing threats to the
safety of reporters. After November 1999, additional accreditation--
besides the usual Foreign Ministry accreditation--was required for
entry to the region. In some cases, foreign journalists publicly
complained that military officials in the northern Caucasus region made
it excessively difficult for them to receive local press accreditation.
In one instance in September, Associated Press reporter Ruslan Musayev
was detained, beaten, and held in a covered pit for 24 hours until he
paid Russian soldiers to release him.
In April U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR) Mary Robinson
visited Chechnya to investigate allegations of human rights abuses.
However on the visit, according to Robinson's report to the UNCHR,
Russian authorities denied her access to a number of locations,
including five detention centers where Amnesty International alleged
that Russian guards committed abuses against Chechen detainees. She
also was denied access to villages near Grozny where Russian troops
were accused of killing and raping civilians. Robinson did meet with
IDP's in Ingushetiya, who provided firsthand testimony of alleged
violations of human rights by Russian military, militia, and Ministry
of Interior forces in Chechnya. Authorities asserted that Robinson
distorted the true nature of the state of affairs and that Russia never
hid the truth about the situation in Chechnya.
In response to international criticism of the human rights
situation in Chechnya, several official Russian organizations were
established to examine alleged human rights violations in the republic.
In February President Putin appointed Vladimir Kalamanov as special
Presidential Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya. Kalamanov's
office, with a staff of 25 persons, including 3 experts on loan from
the COE, opened branches in Moscow and a number of locations in the
North Caucasus to take complaints about alleged human rights
violations. In April Pavel Krasheninnikov, Chairman of the State Duma
Committee on Legislation, was elected head of a newly created
Independent Commission on Human Rights in the North Caucasus. In
September the Commission opened nine offices in Chechnya and three in
Ingushetiya. Together Kalamanov's office and Krasheninnikov's
Commission heard thousands of complaints from citizens, ranging from
destruction or theft of property to rape and murder. However, neither
organization was empowered to investigate or prosecute alleged offenses
and had to refer complaints to the military or civil prosecutors. By
the end of the year, the prosecutors had opened more than 100 cases of
alleged crimes. Almost all of these concerned alleged violations of
military discipline and other common crimes. The Presidential
Administration press service reported that 38 cases relating to crimes
committed by servicemen against the local population were opened, and
that seven servicemen were convicted by year's end. The charges against
the seven service men were not known. The Federal Government did not
comply with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution's calling
for a broad-based, independent commission of inquiry to investigate
alleged human rights violations and breaches of international
humanitarian law.
Chechen separatists also committed abuses, but--as with the many
reported Russian violations--there were difficulties in verifying or
investigating them. According to unconfirmed reports, separatists
killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human
shields, forced civilians to build fortifications, and prevented
refugees from fleeing Chechnya. For example, the rebel fighter Akhmed
Ibragimov reportedly murdered 34 fellow villagers, including 3
children, after 1 of the villagers refused to dig trenches. One witness
described seeing four bodies of persons who were crucified on spikes by
separatists for cooperating with federal authorities in Grozny.
Separatists allegedly killed and attempted to kill numerous Chechen
officials loyal to the Federal Government. For example, on May 31,
Grozny Mayor Supyan Makhchayev was wounded and his aide and a Russian
official were killed by a car bomb. According to press reports, Chechen
rebels opened fire on an EMERCOM (Ministry of Civil Defense,
Emergencies, and the Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters)
Car on June 9 in Grozny, killing three Russian epidemiologists and
wounding three others. In July Ruslan Khamidov, head of the
administration of the settlement of Alkhan-Yurt, was killed in his
home. On August 4, head of the Nozhay-Yurtovskiy Rayon Administration
Isita Gayribekova was wounded and her brother and sister killed in a
bomb explosion at the home of their mother. Chechen separatists started
a series of suicide attacks in June. Two Chechen women detonated a
truck packed with explosives at a Russian army base west of Grozny.
Human rights NGO's reported that Chechen separatist units abused
civilians and endangered their lives by provoking Russian
counterattacks on civilian areas. The rebels took up positions in
populated areas and fired on Russian forces, thereby exposing the
civilians to Russian counterattacks. When villagers protested, they
sometimes were beaten or fired upon by the rebels.
Separatist military units also reportedly abused, tortured, and
killed captured Russian soldiers. In one incident, rebel sources
reported that they executed nine Russian prisoners after Moscow refused
to exchange them for a Russian officer accused of raping and killing a
Chechen woman. In another incident reported by an NGO, a Chechen
witness described seeing the body of a Russian soldier with his throat
cut. When asked by the witness why the soldier was killed, the rebel
fighters purportedly replied that it was their standard practice to
slit the throats of Russian captives.
Individual rebel field commanders were reportedly responsible for
funding their own units, and some allegedly resorted to drug smuggling
and kidnaping and ransom to raise funds. As a result, it often was
difficult, if not impossible, to make a distinction between rebel units
and simple criminal gangs. Some rebels received financial and other
forms of assistance from foreign supporters of international terrorism.
The international terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden reportedly sent
funds, personnel, and material to elements in the rebel camp. According
to press reports, as many as 400 of Bin Laden's followers may have
joined the rebels from his base in Afghanistan (see Section 1.a.).
Government forces and Chechen separatists have used landmines
extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan since August 1999. In April, the
country announced plans to mine its border with Georgia. There is not
accurate information on the number of those killed by landmines
throughout Russia.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and numerous national and regional
media reflect a multitude of opinions; however, government pressure on
the media persisted and in some respects increased significantly,
resulting in numerous infringements of these rights. The Government
exerted pressure on journalists, particularly those who reported on
corruption or criticized officials, by: selectively denying them access
to information (including, for example, statistics theoretically
available to the public) and filming opportunities; demanding the right
to approve certain stories prior to publication; prohibiting the tape
recording of public trials and hearings; withholding financial support
from government media operations that exercised independent editorial
judgment; attempting to influence the appointment of senior editors at
regional and local newspapers and broadcast media organizations;
removing reporters from their jobs; and bringing libel suits against
journalists. Faced with continuing financial difficulties and increased
pressure from the Government, many media organizations saw their
autonomy erode during the year. The Glasnost Defense Foundation (GDF),
an NGO that tracks violations of the rights of journalists in the
countries of the former Soviet Union, estimates that several hundred
lawsuits and other legal actions were brought by government agencies
against journalists and journalistic organizations during 1999, the
majority of them in response to unfavorable coverage of government
policy or operations. During the year, judges rarely found for the
journalists; in the majority of cases, the Government succeeded in
either intimidating or punishing the journalist. On October 4 the
Kirovskiy district court of Kazan ordered the local television company
``Efir'' to compensate Anatoliy Vasilyev, a former candidate to the
State Council of Tatarstan, for airing a program which, according to
the court, falsely accused Vasilyev of deceiving his business partners.
On November 1, Kirovskiy district court in Yekaterinburg ruled that an
article in the local newspaper ``Vecherniye Vedomosti Yekaterinburga''
accusing Arkadiy Chernetskiy, the mayor of Yekaterinburg, of applying
illegal methods in his election campaign, was false. The court ordered
the newspaper to print a disclaimer, and to pay damages to Chernetskiy.
On November 9, the Sovietskiy district court in the city of Bryansk
required the local newspaper ``Bryanskoye Vremya'' to print an apology
and to compensate Bryansk governor Yuriy Lodkin, who sued the paper for
criticizing him in a way that he considered insulting.
With some exceptions, judges appeared unwilling to challenge
powerful federal and local officials. Stiff fines for journalists were
a common result of these proceedings; jail terms occasionally were
handed down as well. Such rulings served to reinforce the already
significant tendency toward self-censorship. Not infrequently
journalists were attacked physically, although in the majority of these
cases, no direct link was ever established between the assault and the
authorities who reportedly took offense at the reporting in question.
The financial dependence of most major media organizations on the
Government or on one or more of several major financial-industrial
groups continued to undermine editorial independence and journalistic
integrity in both the print and broadcast media.
The concentration of ownership of major media organizations--
already a serious threat to editorial independence in 1999--increased
during the year. The largest media empires (including media outlets
owned by the federal, regional, and local governments) remained intact.
However, Media-Most, the country's largest independent company was
under pressure by the Government and the Government resumed operational
control of ORT. In particular, government structures, banking
interests, and the state-controlled energy giants UES and Gazprom
continued to dominate the Moscow media market even as they extended
their influence into the regions. Continuing financial difficulties
exacerbated this problem during the year, weakening the fiscal
positions of most news organizations and thereby increasing their
dependence on financial sponsors and, in some cases, the federal and
regional governments. Although advertising revenues began to return to
1998 levels, they did not do so completely. As a result, the media's
autonomy and concomitant ability to act as a watchdog remained weak. In
key respects, private media organizations across the country remained
dependent on the Government during the year. According to the GDF, some
90 percent of print media organizations continued to rely on state-
controlled concerns for paper, printing, or distribution, while many
television stations were forced to rely on the state (in particular,
regional committees for the management of state property) for access to
the airwaves and office space.
Moreover, journalists continued to depend on local authorities for
accreditation to major news events. Reports of both favoritism toward
reporters associated (or aligned) with the federal or local
administration and denial of access to journalists representing
independent media organizations were widespread. The Presidential
Administration, for example, refused to accredit a reporter from the
Moscow-based newspaper Novyye Izvestiya for President Putin's summer
visit to China and Japan. Novyye Izvestiya has frequently criticized
the President since his election in March. Kommersant Daily has also
reportedly been denied access to some official sources. Moreover, in
the immediate aftermath of the Kursk submarine sinking, the Government
denied site access to all media except the official network, Russian
Television and Radio (RTR), a decision that gave rise to heavy
criticism from the majority of media outlets.
The GDF also reported that officials continued to manipulate a
variety of other ``instruments of leverage'' (including the price of
printing at state-controlled publishing houses) in an effort to apply
pressure on private media rivals. The Foundation noted that, as in
1999, this practice was more common outside the Moscow area than in the
capital itself. Private print and broadcast media, like other
enterprises, were vulnerable to arbitrary changes in the policy and
practice of tax collection. Although media still routinely receive tax
breaks on high-cost items such as paper, the GDF and other media NGO's
documented numerous instances of use by the Government of tax levers to
pressure media across the country. Further, the Government occasionally
sought to limit reporting on tax matters. In Volgograd oblast, for
instance, local tax police in November declared the entry into force of
an ``Agreement on Cooperation'' which stipulated that all information
related to the activities of the tax police should be ``cleared'' with
the relevant authorities prior to publication. In certain cases,
journalists were even forbidden to cite sources from the local tax
service. A number of local newspapers, including Volgogradskaya Pravda,
Inter, Gorodskiye Vesti, and Delovoye Povolzhye were reportedly
pressured into signing the agreement. This agreement came on the heels
of a similar agreement with the FSB in Volgograd, binding the same
publications to inform the FSB before they publish any materials
related to the security service. National independent media, such as
NTV, expressed concern that such contracts would serve as examples for
other regions around the country.
The private media continue to face more direct challenges from the
Government as well. The Government owns about 150 of the 550 television
stations in the country and nearly one-fifth of the 12,000 registered
newspapers and periodicals. Of the three national television stations,
the State owns Russian Television and Radio (RTR) and a majority of
Russian Public Television (ORT); it also maintains ownership or control
of major radio stations (Mayak and Radio Rossii) and news agencies
(ITAR-TASS and RIA-Novosti). At the regional and local levels,
governments operated or controlled a much higher percentage of the
media than in Moscow; in many cities and towns across the country,
government-run media organizations were the only major source of news
and information, according to the GDF. Thus, in many media markets,
citizens received information mainly from unchallenged government
sources. In efforts to control the media, federal authorities issued
orders and formulated doctrines designed to limit free expression and
electronic privacy. On June 22 President Putin signed an amendment to
the law on mass media that places restrictions on media coverage of
narcotics issues, banning reporting on: ``The location of illegal trade
in drugs;'' ``methods of narcotics consumption''; and ``the composition
of drugs.'' Media outlets which violate these bans could be closed
after two warnings. Newspapers did not successfully challenge the
legality of the amendment during the year. On September 12 President
Putin approved an Information Security Doctrine which had been adopted
by the Security Council on June 23. The 40-page document outlined
``threats to Russian national security'' in the fields of ``mass media,
means of mass communication, and information technology.'' Sergey
Ivanov, Secretary of the Security Council, claimed that the goals of
the document are ``the protection of the rights of the individual,
freedom of speech, and the prohibition of censorship.'' However, the
doctrine immediately raised concerns among journalists that its real
purpose may be to consolidate government control over the mass media.
Many observers viewed it as an indication that the Kremlin considers
the media as ``yet another sphere subject to the administration and
control of the government.'' Although the document reaffirms the
state's commitment to preserve the freedoms of expression and of access
to information, it contains numerous clauses that are extremely vague,
and which according to critics, can be interpreted very broadly by
lawmakers and bureaucrats. Of particular concern, for example, were the
clauses calling for an ``increase in propaganda activity to counter the
negative effects of the dissemination of misinformation about the
internal policies of the Russian state''; and ``clarification of the
status of foreign journalists and media outlets'' working in the
country, in order to ``place them on an equal footing with the domestic
media.''
The system of operative and investigate procedures (SORM) continued
during the year to limit the electronic privacy of both citizens and
foreigners (see section 1.f.).
Government intimidation and censorship, both direct and indirect,
remained a significant problem during the year. On January 17
Aleksander Khinshtein, a journalist with Moskovskiy Komsomolets and TV-
Center known for his frequent vitriolic attacks on senior Government
officials, was visited at his home by armed FSB agents who demanded
that the journalist accompany them to the city of Vladimir for
``psychiatric testing.'' (Khinshtein produced documentation to the
effect that he was ill and, in the end, was not forced to leave his
home.) Police also charged the journalist with falsification of his
Moscow driver's license; Khinshtein denies any wrongdoing. Khinshtein
and many other independent observers characterized the arrest as ``an
act of intimidation designed to send a message.'' The case was closed
on February 16. On March 15 the Moscow daily Novaya Gazeta reported
that its computer network was hacked, preventing the publication of
that day's edition. Dmitriy Muratov, the newspaper's editor in chief,
told the GDF that the hacking occurred on the very day that the
newspaper was to publish a number of articles exploring irregularities
in the financing of Vladimir Putin's election campaign. Muratov
categorically ruled out any possibility of an ``accidental'' or
``technical'' failure. Muratov also stated that his newspaper had come
under ``increased pressure from the authorities'' in connection with
its reporting on corruption in the Government and the war in Chechnya.
Moreover, Muratov stated that the newspaper was offered financial
``favors'' on a number of occasions in exchange for ``reconsidering its
political stance.'' The perpetrators of the computer attack were never
identified.
The Government has also brought considerable pressure to bear on
the largest media conglomerates. The most notable example of this
phenomenon was the high-profile conflict between the Kremlin and Media-
Most (owned by Vladimir Gusinskiy). The conflict, which became public
in the summer of 1999, intensified significantly in 2000. Government-
controlled media, including the RTR and the government-aligned ORT,
continued to ``expose'' Media-Most's debts to state structures,
including the energy giant Gazprom. The state filed a lawsuit against
Media-Most and demanded repayment to the state-controlled
Vneshekonombank of a $42.2 million credit. In March the state-backed
Gazprom repaid Credit Suisse-First Boston a $211 million Media-Most
loan that the firm had guaranteed in 1998. Immediately following the
repayment, Gazprom demanded that Media-Most repay this debt, refusing
to accept shares in the holding's outlets as a form of repayment.
Media-Most executives and most media experts maintain that Gazprom
acted at the behest of the Putin administration. On October 18 a
district court in Moscow found for Media-Most in its suit against the
FSB for ``slandering its business reputation'' as a result of
information the FSB made public earlier in the year. The court held
that the FSB must apologize for this on ORT during prime time; the FSB
has appealed this decision.
Notwithstanding this pressure, the Media-Most media companies
(including the NTV, the radio station Ekho Moskvy, the news daily
Segodnya, and the weekly Itogi) which are generally well regarded for
their relative professionalism and independence, did not cede editorial
ground. These media outlets continued to criticize President Putin and
his administration on a wide range of problems, including the Kremlin's
media policy. On May 11 masked law enforcement officers raided the
offices of Media-Most in central Moscow and confiscated documents and
technical equipment. The authorities charged that the holding's
security service illegally recorded telephone conversations. Media-Most
called the raid ``a politically motivated attack on freedom of the
press.'' In a statement, the Russian Union of Journalists termed it
``an unconstitutional act aimed at intimidating the independent
media.'' On June 11 Media-Most chief Vladimir Gusinskiy was arrested on
charges of embezzlement of state property in the course of the 1995
privatization of Russkoye Video, a television production company in St.
Petersburg. (The head of Russkoye Video remained in jail, although no
formal charges have yet been brought against him.) While observers
expressed differing opinions on the legitimacy of the charge, most
disinterested analysts considered the arrest to be an ``excessive''
measure. Gusinskiy was released 3 days after his arrest following
widespread domestic and international criticism. Although the
progovernment media defended the arrest, arguing that ``everyone is
equal before the law,'' politicians, journalists, and observers in
opposition to the Kremlin agreed that the case was politically
motivated and that it augured poorly for the future of freedom of
expression. After Gusinskiy's release, law enforcement officers once
again raided the Media-Most headquarters and Gusinskiy's private
residence, where they inventoried his property, reportedly in
connection with the ``Russkoye Video'' case. On July 27 Gusinskiy left
the country to join his family in Spain. On September 19 both Media-
Most and Gazprom Media acknowledged that Gusinskiy, Media Minister
Mikhail Lesin, and Gazprom Media head Alfred Kokh signed an agreement
in July to sell Media-Most for $300 million in cash and $473 million in
debt to Gazprom Media. The agreement, published in the media in
September, contained a paragraph on the dropping of criminal charges
against Gusinskiy, who later declared the agreement ``null and void''
for having been signed under duress--in his own words, ``at
gunpoint''--and indeed under the direct threat of imprisonment. Gazprom
alleged that Media-Most hid assets in offshore companies. Deputy
Procurator General Vasiliy Kolmogorov said on September 19 that if
these allegations were substantiated, he would launch a criminal case
against the holding (see Section 1.d.).
On December 8 the Media Ministry ordered independent privately-
owned MAKS-TV in Sochi closed. According to the Ministry, the Station
had violated both the law on advertising, by running a commercial for
Ararat cognac in September, and the law on elections in early December.
MAKS-TV went back on the air in late December.
The Kremlin has also reportedly sought to strengthen its control
over the country's most widely watched television network, ORT. In
September the weekly ``Sergey Dorenko Show,'' a widely watched news
analysis program, was taken off the air abruptly after Dorenko aired a
program on September 2 highly critical of President Putin's handling of
the Kursk submarine disaster. ORT General Director Konstantin Ernst, a
Putin appointee, reportedly instructed Dorenko to produce ``a program
the Kremlin could be happy with.'' When Dorenko refused, the program
was terminated on September 9. Other senior journalists at ORT, such as
Tatyana Koshkaryeva and Rustam Narsikulov, were also dismissed. On
December 5 a group of law enforcement agents wearing masks and
bulletproof vests searched the offices of ORT, confiscating boxes of
financial documents. ORT had allegedly failed to pay customs duties on
imported films that it broadcast between 1996 and 1998. The Prosecutor
General stated that ``there was no need to apply force'' during the
search and demanded the resignation of the investigator who led the
raid.
Freedom of the press came under the greatest challenge in the
country's farthest regions. On April 14 local authorities in the city
of Saratov made changes to a front-page article in the local issue of
the Moscow-based daily, Izvestiya, which leveled criticism against
Saratov Governor Dmitriy Ayatskov. Phrases containing ``unfriendly''
content were edited out prior to the publication. Mikhail Kozhokin,
Izvestiya's editor in chief, described this censoring action as an
example of ``the new phenomenon of oblast-level censorship.'' On April
19 St. Petersburg police confiscated the entire issue of the local
newspaper, Moya Stolitsa, saying that the newspaper ``lacked proper
registration documentation.'' However, according to editor in chief
Aleksey Razoryonov, the real issue was the newspaper's political
leanings, not the registration documentation. The newspaper frequently
carried articles critical of St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev.
According to the GDP, on April 26 police once again confiscated issues
of Moya Stolitsa from street vendors. However, the newspaper continued
to publish. On May 1, police in Kamensk-Uralskiy, Sverdlovskiy Region,
ordered Artyem Schadrin, a cameraman of the local television company
Gong-TV, to erase a videotape showing participants at a May Day rally
beating up his colleague, Gong-TV correspondent Konstantin Litvinenko.
The police also warned Denis Poteryayev, a photographer of the local
newspaper Novyy Kompas, not to publish the pictures he took during the
rally. Later that day, several police officers visited the newspaper
and ordered Poteryayev to expose the film containing the photographs in
their presence. The journalist complied. On May 5, local authorities in
Rostov-on-Don ordered the destruction of an entire issue of the local
newspaper Perekrestok Kentavra. The newspaper contained an editorial
about the upcoming inauguration of President Putin and a collage
depicting Putin as a Nazi officer. The publication of ``fascist
symbolism,'' including Nazi imagery, is prohibited by law.
On July 26, local authorities arrested Irina Grebneva, the editor
of Vladivostok newspaper Arsenyevskiye Vesti, on charges of ``petty
hooliganism.'' Grebneva published uncensored, profanity-ridden
transcripts of phone conversations of top regional officials, including
Primorye Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. Grebneva was convicted of the
charges on which she was arrested and sentenced to 5 days in jail. When
she was denied the right to appeal the decision, she launched a hunger
strike to protest the sentence. Arsenyevskiye Vesti is one of the few
local newspapers which regularly criticized Governor Nazdratenko and
his allies. The governor and local authorities have sued the paper for
libel 22 times since Nazdratenko was elected in 1995. All of the cases
are pending.
Journalists who publish critical information about local
governments and influential businesses, as well as investigative
journalists writing about crime and other sensitive issues, continued
to be subjected to threats of physical violence, beatings, and murder.
A number of independent media NGO's have characterized beatings of
journalists as ``routine,'' noting that those who pursued investigative
stories on corruption and organized crime found themselves at greatest
risk.
The press and media NGO's reported a number of killings of
journalists, presumed to be related to the journalistic work of the
victims, and dozens of other bodily assaults on journalists. As in
1999, police seldom identified the perpetrators of crimes against
journalists. On July 16, Igor Domnikov, a Moscow journalist from Novaya
Gazeta died in the hospital after a brutal beating in April. According
to Dmitriy Muratov, editor in chief of Novaya Gazeta, the killing was
directly linked to his professional activities. Press reports after the
incident speculated that Domnikov was mistaken for his colleague Oleg
Sultanov, an investigative reporter who has written extensively on
alleged corruption in LUKOIL and the FSB. On July 18, Andrey Barys, a
reporter from Uralskiy Rabochiy, was attacked by three unidentified
assailants in the city of Kachkanar (Sverdlovsk oblast), where he had
traveled to do a story on a criminal group headed by Valeriy Volkov.
Shortly after his arrival in Kachkanar, Barys discovered that he was
being followed by a group of men. Later, the men attacked Barys,
telling him, ``Don't poke your nose into Volkov's affairs!'' After the
beating, the men advised Barys to leave the city. The next day, Barys
attempted to contact the local police, but the police chief refused to
hear his complaint. On July 21, a correspondent of the local
Yekaterinburg TV company ASV Prestige, Sergey Melnikov, was badly
beaten; Melnikov and his colleagues contend that the attack was the
result of his reporting on the city's illegal drug trade. The
journalist had to be hospitalized with serious head injuries. No
arrests were made.
On July 26 Sergey Novikov, president of Smolensk's only independent
radio station, Vesna, was killed in his apartment building. Since 1999
the radio station had repeatedly denounced corruption within the ranks
of the regional administration, the courts, and the police. A month
before his death, Novikov wrote an open letter to Smolensk governor
Aleksandr Prokhorov that included the names of officials suspected of
corruption. The Ministry of the Interior classified the murder as a
contract killing and has not ruled out a link to Novikov's work as a
journalist. On August 23 journalists from local Pskov newspapers were
denied access to a meeting of Governor Mikhaylov with the employees of
the farm Krasnyy Luch. When a journalist from Pskov Lenta Novostey,
Tatyana Mustaykina, tried to convince the guards to let her in, Yuriy
Kusov, an officer of local administration, arrived, grabbed Mustaykina
by the hair, and attempted to force her to the ground. When Kusov
realized that the episode was being filmed by a cameraman, he tried
unsuccessfully to confiscate the camera. In October, the Pskov
Procuracy decided that Kusov could be charged on administrative
charges. Kusov was summoned to but replied he was sick. On November 9,
the GUVD Chief received Kusov's request to close the case due to
expiration of statute of limitations and the case was closed.
On September 22, Iskander Khatloni, a Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty journalist was murdered in Moscow. The police have opened an
investigation but have not so far released any information.
On December 17, Oleg Lure, an investigative journalist for Novaya
Gazeta was severely beaten by five assailants. The assailants did not
take either his money or valuables. Lure believes the attack was
related to his articles touching on the interests of such individuals
as the presidential chief of staff, the State Duma deputy, and his most
recent article on alleged kickbacks to Kremlin officials. Police are
investigating the incident.
No progress was made in the investigation of the August 1998
beating death of Anatoliy Levin-Utkin, deputy editor of Yuridichesky
Petersburg Segodnya.
The country's Northern Caucasus continued to be a dangerous region
for Russian journalists. Kidnapings and assaults remained serious
threats. In addition, federal authorities--both military and civilian--
limited journalists' access to war zones and confiscated reports and
equipment. Special accreditation besides the usual Foreign Ministry
accreditation was required for entry to the region. In some cases,
foreign journalists publicly complained that military officials in the
northern Caucasus region made it excessively difficult for them to
obtain local press accreditation.
The best-known example of the violation of the rights of a
journalist operating in this region is that of Radio Liberty's Andrey
Babitskiy. Babitskiy's coverage of the conflict in Chechnya prompted an
angry reaction from the Government and the armed forces; the latter
frequently accused the correspondent of ``conspiring with Chechen
rebels.'' On January 8 security agents raided Babitskiy's Moscow
apartment and confiscated several items. On January 15, Babitskiy was
reported ``missing'' in Chechnya. Although the Government denied at
first any involvement in the case, Interior Ministry spokesman Oleg
Aksenov acknowledged on January 28 that law enforcement authorities had
arrested Babitskiy in Chechnya on the grounds that he ``lacked the
proper accreditation.'' On February 3, Acting Procurator General
Vladimir Ustinov stated that Babitskiy had been ``exchanged'' for three
Russian prisoners of war. Ustinov later revised his statement,
explaining that Babitskiy had been released and that the journalist had
``gone over to the Chechen rebels'' of his own volition. However, later
on, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, a senior Presidential aide for public
information on Chechnya, confirmed that Babitskiy had indeed been
exchanged, and Interior Minister Vladimir Rushaylo defended the
exchange as ``correct and justified.'' On February 8, a group of
prominent Russian journalists issued a statement saying, ``Until we
learn the truth about this story, we have every reason to think that
the Russian government suspended not only freedom of speech, but also
the rule of law itself, and is moving toward totalitarianism.''
Babitskiy subsequently was released but was later taken into custody in
Makhachkala, Dagestan, by Government forces on charges of ``carrying a
falsified passport. On February 28, Acting President Putin announced
publicly that there was no need to detain Babitskiy further, and the
RFE/RL correspondent was released that day and sent back to Moscow. In
October Babitskiy was tried and convicted in a court in Makhachkala of
this offense but was immediately amnestied under an amnesty granted in
honor of World War II. Babitskiy had trouble obtaining a passport;
however, he did receive one and is now working abroad.
On February 2, Russian troops in Chechnya detained Giles Whittell,
Moscow Bureau Chief of the Times of London. Presidential aide Sergey
Yastrzhembskiy said at a press conference that the journalist was
detained and returned to Moscow because he ``lacked accreditation
allowing him to work in Chechnya.'' The GDF issued a statement
characterizing the Chechnya accreditation requirements of the Russian
authorities as ``illegal.''
On February 15, the state-owned news agency RIA Novosti reported
that Yastrzhembskiy announced an official order denying journalists
access to the Chechen capital of Grozny ``for 2 to 3 weeks.'' The order
additionally limited journalist access to military hospitals by
requiring that interviews take place only ``under the supervision of
representatives of federal troops.'' On March 3, federal troops in the
Chechen city of Mozdok confiscated and destroyed an ORT videotape
containing interviews with Russian soldiers. According to ORT
correspondent Roman Perevezentsev, the crew had traveled into Mozdok to
report on casualties among Russian troops in a recent combat operation
in the Chechen village of Pervomayskoye. On March 15 the Russian
Ministry of Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting, and Mass
Communications issued a statement that warned the Russian mass media
that providing air time or news-space to Chechen rebel leaders would be
considered a violation of the counterterrorism laws. In April the
Ministry issued specific warnings to the newspapers Kommersant and
Novaya Gazeta for publishing interviews with Chechen president Aslan
Maskhadov. No further action was taken. The new Information Security
Doctrine approved by the Security Council in August implies that
foreign media outlets, such as Radio Free Europe Liberty, represent a
danger to the state. Human rights activists and journalists fear that
media freedom could be even more severely restricted.
The Government generally respects academic freedom; however, human
rights activists question whether recent cases such as Sutyagin and
others discourage academic freedom and contact with foreigners on
issues that might be deemed sensitive.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides citizens with the right to assemble freely, and the Government
respects this right in practice. Organizations must obtain permits in
order to hold public meetings. The application process must begin
between 5 and 10 days before the scheduled event. Citizens freely and
actively protested government decisions and actions. Permits to
demonstrate were granted readily to both opponents and supporters of
the Government. However, certain religious denominations such as
Jehovah's Witnesses have been either denied permission to assemble, or
once Ministry of Justice officials issued permission, local officials
have withdrawn it.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. Public
organizations must register their bylaws and the names of their leaders
with the Ministry of Justice. A 1995 registration law specified that
organizations had until July 1999 to reregister. When the deadline
expired, some human rights monitors expressed concern that an estimated
10,000 NGO's would be vulnerable to possible ``liquidation''
(elimination of juridical status by court order) by local authorities
who were hostile to human rights or opposition political activity. In
November 1999, the Federation Council rejected a bill passed by the
Duma to extend the reregistration deadline by a year, a move which
human rights activists marked as a potentially serious blow to freedom
of association. The Ministry of Justice maintained that there were not
a large number of liquidations as a result of the passing deadline.
Most of the organizations that wanted to register were able to do so
with the notable few whose names or charters were unacceptable to the
authorities (e.g., Yablokov's Ecology and Human Rights).
However, a February report, prepared by the NGO Human Rights
Information Center and the Center for Development of Democracy and
Human Rights, cited Ministry of Justice statistics indicating that only
57.8 percent of the total number of organizations managed to reregister
by the July 1999 deadline. According to the report, 42.2 percent of
organizations became liable to liquidation of their juridical status.
The report further claimed that only 12 percent of Moscow organizations
succeeded in registering or reregistering. The report claimed that the
net result was to reduce the overall number of organizations and to
eliminate ``politically undesirable'' organizations from certain
regions. While the numbers are high, many organizations continued to
work without registration, while others reregistered under a new name.
Reasons for failure to register varied, but a common thread was the
request by the Ministry of Justice for many organizations to refrain
from citing ``defense of human rights'' as one of their goals. The
Ministry demanded that organizations such as Ecology and Human Rights,
Glasnost Public Foundation, and Memorial remove such references since,
according to the Constitution, NGO's are not among the institutions
authorized to ``defend'' human rights. According to the reasoning used
by the MOJ, such organizations can only aid the government and lawyers
in the defense of such rights. Ecology and Human Rights managed to
register in August, but only as a branch of an organization registered
in St. Petersburg by prominent activists Aleksandr Nikitin and Grigoriy
Pasko. Despite the apparent high number of unregistered groups, many
organizations are defunct or changed names. Lyudmila Alekseyvena, Chair
of the Moscow Helsinki Group, reported that the majority of groups that
desired to register were able to do so, although sometimes this came
after repeated attempts.
In addition to submitting their bylaws and the names of their
leaders, political parties must present 5,000 signatures and pay a fee
to register. The Constitution and the Law on Elections ban the
participation in elections of organizations that profess
anticonstitutional themes or activities.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, although the Constitution also provides for the equality of
all religions before the law and the separation of church and state, in
practice the Government does not always respect the provision for
equality of religions, and in some cases local authorities imposed
restrictions on some groups.
In 1997 the Duma enacted a new, restrictive, and potentially
discriminatory law on religion. This law replaced the progressive 1990
religion law that had helped facilitate a revival of religious
activity. The new law ostensibly targeted so-called totalitarian sects
or dangerous religious cults. However, the intent of some of the law's
sponsors appears to have been to discriminate against members of
foreign and less well-established religions by making it difficult for
them to manifest their beliefs through organized religious
institutions. The Presidential Administration has been mostly silent on
implementation of the law. Implementation of the 1997 law on religion
has varied in the regions. To a great extent, implementation depends on
the territorial bodies of the Ministry of Justice in each area which
are responsible for registering new organizations, reregistering
existing organizations, and liquidating those that do not manage to
reregister. In some areas such as Moscow, minority religious
denominations like the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Salvation Army have
not been able to reregister local religious organizations.
The 1997 law on religion has many ambiguous and contradictory
provisions. The law creates various categories of religious communities
with differing levels of legal status and privileges, distinguishes
between religious ``groups'' and ``organizations,'' two mutually
exclusive registration categories, and creates two categories of
organizations: ``regional'' and ``centralized.'' A religious ``group''
is a congregation of worshipers that does not have the legal status of
a juridical person. However, groups are permitted to rent public spaces
and hold services. Moreover, the law does not purport to abridge the
rights of individual members of ``groups.''
Organizations, both local and centralized, are considered juridical
persons, enjoy tax exemptions, and are permitted to proselytize,
conduct liturgical services and other religious activities, establish
religious schools, host foreign religious workers, and publish
literature.
Under the 1997 religion law, representative offices of foreign
religious organizations are required to register with state
authorities. In practice foreign religious representatives' offices
(those not registered under the law) have opened without registering or
have been accredited to a registered Russian religious organization.
However, these representative offices cannot carry out religious
activities and do not have the status of a religious organization.
Critics of the law have claimed that it violates the Constitution's
provision of equality before the law of all confessions. In particular,
many religious groups criticized the law's 15 year requirement and
feared the consequences of the law's provisions limiting the actions of
foreign religious missionaries. Officials at the local level have used
the law to restrict the activities of religious minorities.
Human rights activists welcomed a March 1999 and December 2000 open
letter to the President and Duma by Human Rights Plenipotentiary Oleg
Mironov, in which he criticized the 1997 religion law and recommended
changes to bring it into accordance with the Constitution and
international norms for religious freedom. In practice the registration
process--which involves simultaneous registration at both the federal
and local levels--requires considerable time, effort, and legal expense
and has proven onerous for a number of groups. International and well-
funded Russian religious organizations, in particular, began the
reregistration process soon after publication of the regulations.
Russian Pentecostal groups, which have a solid and growing network of
churches throughout the country, sought guidance from the Ministry of
Justice on reregistration as early as November 1997. One of the larger
organizations, the Russian Unified Fellowship of Christians of the
Evangelical Faith (which traces its origins back to the early 1900's),
reregistered as a centralized religious organization by late March
1998. It has since incorporated many smaller, newer Pentecostal groups
within its structure. However, nearly 500 Pentecostal local religious
organizations did not succeed in reregistering and are now subject to
liquidation of their status as juridical persons.
The vast majority of organizations attempting to reregister as
central organizations succeeded, although there were a few notable
exceptions: Salvation Army, Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and a faction of
the Muslim communities under the Mufti Tayzhuddin. By year's end, the
Ministry of Justice estimated that 70-75 percent of local religious
organizations needing to reregister had done so. However, these figures
are misleading, since in some cases the organizations no longer exist.
The Russian Orthodox Church reregistered between 65-75 percent of its
organizations, Protestant communities 78 percent, Muslim 60 percent,
Jewish 80 percent, Buddhists 65 percent, and Catholic 70-80 percent.
All organizations, according to the Congress of Religious Jewish
Communities of Russia (KEROOR) and the Federation of Jewish Communities
of Russia (FEOR) have reregistered at year's end. However, one of
KEROOR's local Moscow organizations has not been able to register as a
new organization, applying already three times unsuccessfully.
By year's end no religious organization had ceased operations as a
result of the law; however the Salvation Army has had problems in
Moscow trying to extend office leases and operate its food distribution
program because landlords and social services personnel have assumed it
has been liquidated.
Jehovah's Witnesses reported that since the 1997 law went into
effect they managed to register or reregister 97 percent of their
organizations. A total of 190 of those were organizations already
extant which had to reregister. Some 156 were new organizations
registering for the first time. There were several regions such as
Tartarstan, Moscow, Chelyabinsk, and Kalbadrino-Balkaria where
organizations experienced problems.
Hare Krishnas have experienced no problems at the federal level;
however, they have encountered significant opposition from the Russian
Orthodox Church. For many years the group operated underground, and in
1999 it successfully registered as a religious organization and
received permission to lease a building in Moscow to use as a temple.
The city has slated the area in which the current central temple is
located as part of a new ring road, however, and Hare Krishnas have
experienced problems in trying to obtain permission to build a new
complex. The Krishna Movement has grown to more than 130 centers across
the country and nearly 100,000 believers. They have experienced
problems in the Krasnador Oblast, particularly. The Procurator General
of Moscow has opened an investigation into the group's liturgy as of
October. Investigators claim they are examining whether the literature
``incites criminal acts''.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints registered or
reregistered all of its organizations requiring registration by year's
end but continued to encounter problems in registering four of its new
organizations in Chelyabinsk, Tver, and Tatarstan. In September the
directorate of justice in Chelyabinsk rejected the local registration
application of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints for a
seventh time. Even without registration, the church continued to hold
regular services without incident, although its missionaries
experienced problems in registering with the local visa office; this
required them to stay in a hotel in a different city and then travel to
the area for brief periods.
The Society of Jesus (Jesuits) was denied federal registration
because the order's status, which is independent of a local bishop,
does not meet requirements contained in the 1997 law's provisions.
However, an April 13 the Constitutional Court ruling authorized the
Jesuits to be registered. This ruling in Rossisskaya Gazeta referred
extensively to passages in the November 1999 Constitutional Court
ruling (which effectively legalized registered organizations existing
at the time of the passage of the 1997 law). The April ruling also
specifically refuted points cited by the Ministry of Justice as reasons
for initial refusal. By year's end they were registered.
Around sixty percent of Muslim organizations managed to reregister.
The large percentage that did not is due partly to an internal struggle
between the Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in European Russia
and Siberia, based in Ufa and led by Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin, and the
Moscow-based Russian Council of Muftis, led by Chief Mufti Ravil
Gainutdin. Due to the refusal to register Mufti Tayzhuddin's group as a
central organization, many local organizations did not manage to
reregister in time. Additionally, many rural parishes either did not
know they needed to reregister or did not know how to go about
reregistering.
The delays in reregistration are in part due to the slow pace at
which the federal Ministry of Justice at first disseminated the
regulations and guidelines to local authorities and to understaffing
both at the Ministry of Justice and at local levels. Although the
Ministry of Justice claims that internal organizational disputes, which
lead to the failure of many religious leaders to prepare documentation
properly, is to blame for the slow pace of registration. However,
delays and rejections also are due in part to discrimination by some
local officials against what they believe are ``sects,'' such as
Scientologists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and others. In many
instances, the Ministry of Justice asks for additional information and
demands changes in the organizational structure and by-laws of some
groups to ensure that they are in conformance with the law. In other
instances, groups are rejected with no explanation. Another problem is
the lack of congruence between regional and federal laws. As of 1999,
of 89 regions, 30 had laws and decrees on religion that violated the
Constitution by restricting the activities of religious groups.
Government authorities have attempted to deal with this by introducing
a federal register of laws to ensure that laws conformed to the
constitution.
The Moscow city authorities continued to create difficulties for
some religious denominations. The Moscow Directorate of Justice
continues to refuse registration to Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow,
despite the precedent set by the federal Ministry of Justice's April
30, 1999, decision to reregister Jehovah's Witnesses at the federal
level. The Directorate has refused four applications for local
registration by Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses for unclear reasons. In this
case, the Judge has appointed an ``expert panel'' to assess the merits
of the organization as a religion. In some cases, human rights groups
have accused such panels of lacking objectivity and ruling according to
political allegiance rather than legal criteria. In November the
Salvation Army was denied registration by the Moscow City Appeals
Court, which refused to register their Moscow branch as a Local
Religious Organization (LRO). The Appeals Court upheld a lower court
ruling that the organization could only be accorded the status of
``representative of a foreign religious organization'' since its
headquarters is abroad. This denial has implications for other
religious groups since it may affect the registration of Roman
Catholics, Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses.
Although it can be a slow and costly process, the judicial system
has provided an appeal process for religious organizations threatened
with loss of registered status or ``liquidation'' as a religious
organization under Article 14 of the 1997 religion law. Some local
churches initially denied local registration have been registered
following successful lawsuits, as in the case of the Evangelical
Lutheran Mission in Khakasiya in November 1998, when the federal
Supreme Court overturned the verdict of the Khakasiya Supreme Court. In
February 1999 the Supreme Court of Khakasiya rejected the regional
procurator's request to nullify the registration of the Evangelical
Lutheran Mission; the procurator plans to appeal the case. In 1998 a
local Procuracy opened a civil case against the Word of Life
Pentecostal Church in the Far Eastern city of Magadan under Article 14
of the 1997 religion law, accusing the Church of using cult practices
to manipulate its members. After a lengthy delay, a Magadan municipal
court finally dismissed the case in May due to insufficient evidence, a
decision that was upheld in June by the Magadan oblast court. However,
the Church fears that the same Procuracy soon may try to open a
criminal case. The Word of Life Church also won a court battle for
reregistration in March. A church member employed by the Government who
was threatened with the loss of her job late in 1998 was still at her
post as of June. Church officials report that two other church members
were fired because of their religion, but such allegations are
difficult to prove. Also, tax investigations on two separate charges
continue. Church members reported that negative stories about them
repeatedly appeared in the local state-controlled press, with no
mention of their court victories. Despite the court case and other
difficulties, the Word of Life Pentecostal Church continues its normal
activities.
The Government has restricted the activities of a number of foreign
missionaries and of congregations associated with them. There were
reports that four foreign missionaries were being refused visas to
return to the country. The former pastor of the Vanino Baptist Church
in the Khabarovsk region was banned from receiving a visa based on
allegations that he violated customs regulations and evaded property
taxes; however, it appears that local authorities violated their own
regulations and refused to take necessary actions (such as providing a
timely tax assessment), which would have enabled the pastor to comply
with the law. An official of the Church of Christ in Magadan also faced
a criminal charge for failing to report $8,000 to customs officials,
reportedly because he feared that the money would be stolen. He was
acquitted in December 1999, primarily because the investigation and
prosecution were marred by serious violations of due process by local
authorities. Local authorities then defied a court ruling to return the
money, returning it briefly only to confiscate it a few minutes later,
citing administrative customs regulations not applicable to the case.
The third case, regarding the Church of Christ in Volgograd, appears to
have been a response to articles in the local press accusing a church
official of being a spy. Those allegations may have led local
authorities to recommend to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a visa
be refused. A member of the local congregation, reported in May that
since local authorities no longer object to the missionary's return, it
appears to be federal authorities who still are refusing to authorize
issuance of a visa. A fourth missionary, of the Evangelical Free Church
of America, who entered the country legally with a visa sponsored by a
Moscow congregation, has been refused registration to reside in
Naberezhniy Chelniy, Tartarstan. The missionary, who is married to a
Russian citizen, also has been refused permission to register as a
resident foreign spouse of a Russian citizen. The letter of refusal he
received from the Ministry of Internal Affairs' local passport control
office cited ``national security'' concerns.
Critics contend that the Federal Government should be more active
in reversing discriminatory actions taken at the local level and, when
necessary, reprimanding the officials at fault. Also according to
critics, the federal authorities need to take action to ensure that
regional and local legislation or other actions do not contradict
constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom. Government
officials have established consultative mechanisms to facilitate
government interaction with religious communities and to monitor
application of the law on religion. Federal authorities and Moscow
human rights monitors often have limited information about what is
happening in the regions, however. According to various sources, most
citizens, especially those living in the regions, still are skeptical
about the protection of religious freedom and are reluctant to assert
their rights due to fear of retaliation. Some local and municipal
governments reportedly prevented religious groups from using venues,
such as cinemas, suitable for large gatherings. In many areas of the
country, government-owned facilities are the only available venues. As
a result, in some instances denominations that do not have their own
property effectively are denied the opportunity to practice their faith
in large groups. Jehovah's Witnesses organized a convention to take
place in Ivanovo on July 7-9. On July 4, the deputy head of the city
administration issued an injunction prohibiting the convention. The
Jehovah's Witnesses local leader, Yevgeniy Borisov, ignored the
injunction and went ahead with the convention. However, on July 31, the
Ivanovo Oktyabrskiy district court ruled that Borisov had violated the
administrative order and sentenced him to 2 months of ``correctional
activities'' (not incarceration) and forfeiture of 20 percent of his
salary during this period. The Jehovah's Witnesses appealed this
ruling, and the Regional Court of the Federal Judiciary System
overturned the lower court ruling on the basis that the city
administration's injunction violated federal law. On October 10, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sergeir Airiyev, one of the Jehovah's
Witnesses who had been accused by local officials of breaking the law
by organizing a religious convention in Kislovodsk.
Reports of official harassment and punishment for religious belief
or activity continued. Despite legal registration, members of some
religions--including Protestant groups, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints--continue to face
discrimination in their ability to rent premises and conduct group
activities. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses report that in Volgograd,
on August 20, national and religious extremists broke up their
religious meetings and whipped some of their members. Criminal charges
have been brought, but no prosecution or conviction has occurred to
date. In six cases in St. Petersburg and Moscow, police arrested and
harshly treated Jehovah's Witnesses while they were engaged in publicly
discussing their religious views with neighbors. Two of these cases
occurred in the Northern Administrative county in Moscow (where the
trial to ban Jehovah's Witnesses will be heard). In four other cases,
two men and two women were beaten by hooligans while engaged in public
evangelizing work. Charges have been filed with the police. Jehovah's
Witnesses report that there are currently about 20 cases across Russia
where local authorities have arbitrarily refused to issue permits for
construction, renovation, or occupancy of buildings to be used as
houses of worship for Jehovah's Witnesses. In regard to a proposed
house of worship in St. Petersburg, the Governor's Office is said to
have stated that Jehovah's Witnesses had enough places of worship and
any permit was subject to the feelings of local residents. Jehovah's
Witnesses also report that in Alagir, Northern Ossetia, local
authorities sealed the door of a newly built house of worship on July 5
and prohibited its use despite the fact that all permits had been
obtained.
The Church of Scientology has been in conflict with authorities
since a February 1999 raid on its Hubbard Center in Moscow by the tax
police, FSB, and procurator. Since then the organization has faced
charges that it engaged in a commercial enterprise without a license.
The case is still pending. The Church has been repeatedly refused in
its efforts to reregister its national center and register local
religious organizations. While the Church has succeeded in registering
50 ``Dianetics Centers'' as social organizations, it has only managed
to register 1 Church of Scientology in Moscow as of October. The Church
reports that authorities have impeded the operation of its centers in
Dmitrograd, Khabarovsk, and Izhevsk.
Groups such as the Catholic Church have complained about undue
attention from the authorities in Moscow, being forced to submit to
unwarranted fire inspections, document verifications by the Ministry of
Interior, and harassment of believers at a Sunday Mass.
Property disputes are among the most frequent complaints cited by
religious groups. Many synagogues, churches, and mosques were returned
to communities to be used for religious services. The Federal
Government met the requirements of the 1993 presidential decree on
communal property restitution, and the decree continues to guide the
ongoing process. According to statistics from the Ministry of State
Property, as of 1999 over 2,000 federally owned properties had been
returned to religious communities since 1989. However, jurisdiction in
most cases is at the regional level, and there is no centralized source
of information on these cases. One Ministry of Culture official
responsible for restitution of religious historical monuments estimated
early in 1999 that over 3,600 transfers of religious buildings had
occurred at the regional level and that approximately 30 percent of
property designated for return had been transferred back to its
original owners at both the federal and regional levels. Nonetheless,
there continue to be reports of religious property that has not been
returned. For example, the Roman Catholic Church of Saints Peter and
Paul in Moscow has not been returned to the Catholic Church despite
numerous appeals to the authorities and court. Twice in 1997 the
Arbitration Court ruled against the Church. However, the Catholic
Church continues to press for the return of this property despite the
rulings.
Some Protestant faiths have suggested that the Russian Orthodox
Church influences the Government regarding land allocated for churches
of other religious groups. The Russian Orthodox Church denies such
influence. The Jewish community, which had some success on communal
property restitution, faces the same obstacles as other religious
communities on the issue of the return of Torah scrolls, many of which
are in state museum collections. In May the Ministry of Culture turned
over 60 Torah scrolls to the Congress of Religious Jewish Communities,
welcomed by the Jewish community.
In its preamble (which government officials insist has no legal
force), the 1997 religion law recognizes the ``special contribution of
Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and
development of Russia's spirituality and culture.'' It accords
``respect'' to Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and certain
other religions as an inseparable part of the country's historical
heritage. Russian Orthodoxy is considered in conservative nationalist
circles as the de facto official religion of the country. Many Russians
firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the Russian Orthodox
Church is at the heart of what it means to be Russian.
The Russian Orthodox Church was involved actively in drafting the
1997 law on religion. It has special arrangements with government
agencies to conduct religious education and to provide spiritual
counseling to members of the armed forces. These arrangements do not
appear to be available to other religions. In particular, Muslim
religious leaders have complained that they are not permitted to
minister to Muslim members of the armed forces. The head of the Moscow
Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of Moscow
and all Russia, participates in most high-level official events and
appears to have direct access to and influence with officials of the
executive branch. Even well-established foreign religious organizations
have been characterized by the Orthodox leadership as ``dangerous and
destructive sects.'' In addition, during the year the Russian Orthodox
Church entered into formal agreements with the Ministries of Education,
Interior, and Tax. In the latter case, October press reports indicated
that the Church has agreed to cooperate with the tax authorities in
investigating tax infractions by religious organizations. However, the
nature of such cooperation remains vague. The Ministry of Education
sent a letter in September to the rectors of higher education
establishments throughout the country alleging that 700 ``foreign''
religious groups--including the True Orthodox Church, Jehovah's
Witnesses, and the Salvation Army--are involved in military espionage
and the encouragement of separatist activity, and blames foreigners for
allegedly encouraging splits within the ``traditional'' Russian faiths,
the Orthodox, Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists.
The Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with
several human rights organizations, criticized the use of psychiatry in
``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects'' (see Section 1.c.).
In such cases, authorities use pseudo-psychological and spiritual
techniques to ``treat'' persons who were members of new religious
groups. Human rights monitors condemned the secret video taping of a
Pentecostal Church's service in Kostroma, which was introduced as
evidence of hypnosis in a court case against the church in October. The
Association of Independent Psychiatrists claimed that not only was the
video taping illegal, but that the quality was so poor that any sort of
conclusion drawn from it would be questionable. In addition, both human
rights activists and independent psychiatrists believe that the
``expert commission'' appointed to review the tape was biased.
Although Jews and Muslims continue to encounter prejudice and
societal discrimination, authorities have generally not inhibited the
free practice of their religion. Other religions, including Buddhism
and Shamanism, are practiced in specific localities where they are
rooted in local traditions.
President Putin issued public expressions of sympathy for Jews and
made a public appearance at the opening and on the first night of
Hanukkah at a Jewish Cultural Center in Moscow. Nevertheless, he and
his administration were accused by some members of the Jewish community
and some in the press of fomenting division within the community by
supporting as head Rabbi of Russia the FEOR head Rabbi, Berel Lazar
over the long-time Chief Rabbi of Russia, Adolf Shayevich. Shayevitch,
is associated with a Jewish community organization headed by Vladimir
Gusinskiy, owner of Russia's sole independent television network, which
has been critical of President Putin and his support for Government
forces in Chechnya. Fears of Kremlin interference in the Internal
Affairs of the Jewish Community were reignited when, on October 19 law
enforcement authorities conducted an illegal search of the Choral
Synagogue's offices of Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, who is aligned with
Rabbi Shayevich. While officials claimed that the search was not
directed against the synagogue or Jewish community, but rather against
the Media-Most Security Service then owned by Gusinskiy that was
guarding the premises, investigators nevertheless focused on the Moscow
Jewish Community's charter, membership lists, and the synagogue's
financial documents. Moreover, during the search, investigators told a
synagogue employee present that they were looking for evidence of money
laundering. Organizations such as the Union Councils of Soviet Jews
have accused the administration of harboring anti-Semitic figures. On
September 7, Aleksandr Ignatov, identified as head of an office in the
Presidential Administration, published an essay in the Nezavisimaya
Gazeta claiming that a ``Chasidic para-Masonic group'' stood behind a
supposed ``world government'' that was leading the drive for
globalization. Subsequent to the publication of this anti-Semitic
piece, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the Kremlin had
established that as of October there was no Ignatov in the rolls of the
Presidential Administration, and that it was conducting an internal
investigation of the events surrounding the article's publication. It
is unclear whether Ignatov indeed had been an official in the
Presidential Administration.
Newly elected Kursk Governor Aleksandr Mikhaylov made anti-Semitic
statements that were published in newspapers and aired on a television
network. The Jewish community urged Putin to separate himself from the
Governor. The Presidential District Representative Poltavchenko
reprimanded Governor Mikhaylov in public and Mikhaylov apologized for
his comments to the press.
The Federal Government states that it has moved forward on its
promised initiatives against extremism and anti-Semitism, but only
limited steps have been taken. In November 1998, the Duma adopted a
resolution against public statements damaging to interethnic relations
in the country. In March 1999, the Government presented to the Duma a
draft law on combating political extremism. The Duma is still
considering a draft law forbidding ``Nazi symbols and literature.''
Separately the Procurator General sent to regional procurators in
January 1999 a letter describing the Moscow city procurator's
experience in combating political extremism with instructions to cut
off distribution of any literature or printed material depicting Nazi
symbols. The Government also states that in implementing the
presidential decree on extremism, it conducted interagency
consultations, beginning in June 1999 and continuing on a quarterly
basis, which involve the Presidential Administration, the judiciary,
law enforcement bodies, and experts from outside the Government. A
government review of the implementation of existing laws against acts
of national, racial, and religious hatred revealed that 25 criminal
investigations were conducted in 1998, and 10 were opened by June 1999.
A prominent public figure who has regularly engaged in anti-Semitic
remarks is Krasnodar region's former Governor Nikolay Kondratenko.
During his tenure, the governor's speeches often contained anti-Semitic
remarks and stereotypes and blamed Jews and alleged Jewish conspiracies
for the country's problems. For example, Kondratenko had said that the
essence of Russian history is the Russian battle against Jewish
domination. He blamed ``Zionists'' for the war in Chechnya, for the
destruction of the Communist Party, for attacks on the Russian Orthodox
Church, and for introducing homosexuality into the country. According
to credible reports, Kondratenko urged the firing of Jewish public
employees in the region.
Particularly troubling to human rights groups and some of the
Russian media has been the very public support of Kondratenko by the
Kremlin-backed party Yedinstvo. Minister of Emergency Situations Sergey
Shoygu, who heads Yedinstvo, openly encouraged Kondratenko to run again
in the December elections. According to NTV reports, the Kremlin sent
public relations specialists to the region in early September to
organize a ``grass roots'' campaign of support for Kondratenko's
candidacy, although Kondratenko decided against running for another
term.
Several religious groups encountered extremist violence this year,
with little or belated response from the local authorities (see Section
5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
the right to choose their place of residence freely; however, some
regional governments continue to restrict this right through
residential registration rules that closely resemble the Soviet-era
``propiska'' (pass) regulations. Although the rules, which came into
effect at the beginning of 1996, were touted as a notification device
rather than a control system, their application has produced many of
the same results as the propiska system. Corruption in the registration
process in local police precincts is a problem. Police demand bribes in
processing registration applications and during spot checks for
registration documentation.
While citizens are free to travel within the country, the
Government also imposes registration requirements on domestic travel.
All adults are issued internal passports, which they must carry while
traveling and use to register with local authorities for visits of more
than 3 days (in Moscow, 24 hours). However, travelers not staying in
hotels usually ignore this requirement. Citizens must register to live
and work in a specific area within 7 days of moving there. Russian
citizens changing residence within the country, as well as persons with
a legal claim to citizenship who decide to move to Russia from other
former Soviet republics, often face enormous difficulties or simply are
not permitted to register in some cities. In 1999 UNHCR and refugee
rights NGO's cited Stavropol, Krasnodar, Moscow, and St. Petersburg as
being the cities least open to migrants (although some NGO's dispute
including St. Petersburg on this list). This continued to hold true
this year. The cost of permanent registration is only $0.30 (8 rubles).
Temporary registration is available for periods ranging from 45 days to
6 months and costs $0.16 (4 rubles and 18 kopeks) regardless of the
length of stay. The Government and many residents of Moscow and other
large cities defend registration as necessary in order to control
crime, keep crowded urban areas from attracting even more inhabitants,
and gain revenue.
There have been several disputes between the central authorities
and regional governments regarding internal ``passports,'' identity
documents required for obtaining many governmental services. On
December 15, the Presidents of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and a
presidential representative of the Volga federal district reached an
agreement on resuming the issuance of passports to residents of the two
republics. Both leaderships suspended issuing passports three years ago
to protest the failure of new Russian passports to indicate the
bearer's ethnicity. Under the agreement, a special page will be
inserted in passports issued in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan giving the
bearer's data in the national language.
While federal law provides for education for all children in the
country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to the
children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants because
they lack residential registration. Similarly, while the Moscow
procurator's office has upheld the right of migrants to receive
publicly available medical care, those services are frequently denied
to unregistered persons, migrants, and asylum seekers.
The city of Moscow frequently is cited by NGO's for violating the
rights of nonresidents and ethnic minorities, as well as the rights of
those legitimately seeking asylum. Mayor Luzhkov has in the past called
for the expulsion from Moscow of Chechens and other persons from the
Caucasus. Moscow police, particularly special duty OMON (special forces
unit of the Ministry of Interior) units, conduct frequent document
checks, particularly of persons who are dark-skinned or appear to be
from the Caucasus or elsewhere. Such checks on many occasions have
involved police entering residences without warrants. There are many
credible reports that police fined unregistered persons in excess of
legal requirements and did provide proper documentation of the fine.
According to HRW, it is not unusual for darker-skinned persons to be
stopped at random and for officers to solicit bribes from those without
residence permits.
In connection with bomb explosions in August and September 1999
which Moscow officials attributed to terrorists from the Northern
Caucasus, Mayor Luzhkov issued an ordinance on September 13, 1999,
requiring all temporary residents in Moscow since January 1, 1999 to
reregister within 3 days with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Reportedly 74,000 temporary residents sought reregistration, and
approximately 15,500 were refused. In order to reregister, residents
had to demonstrate a legal place of work, payment of city taxes, and a
legal place of residence. Moscow authorities also restricted the
arrival of new residents to the city and increased road checks and
checks in train stations and marketplaces for these new arrivals. Law
enforcement officials conducted searches of 26,500 apartments, 180
hotels, 415 guest houses, and 548 nightclubs and cafes. Police
continued to conduct road checks at train stations, but the number of
people detained was reportedly much less then last year. Human rights
NGO's claim that authorities detained some 2,000 persons and expelled
500 from Moscow (see Section 1.d).
In April, the Movement for Human Rights in Moscow joined forces
with the procurator general to challenge Moscow's registration
requirements in Moscow City Court. In September the procurator's
office, in what many believe was a political concession, withdrew its
support for the lawsuit. Nevertheless, on September 25 the Moscow City
Court ruled that the city's rules on registration were
unconstitutional, violating the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of
movement. The Supreme Court overturned an earlier similar decision by
the Moscow City Court and forced the court to hear the case again. In
October the requirement was still in effect, and the practice--which
police reportedly use mainly as a threat to extort money--continues.
The 1999 Moscow Helsinki Group's (MHG) human rights report
highlighted restrictions placed by the authorities on Meskhetian Turks.
During 1989-90 some 90,000 Meskhetians were forced by ethnic conflicts
to leave the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan. An estimated 60,000
Meskhetians remain in the Russian Federation. More than 13,000 of them
settled in Krasnodar Kray, and approximately 700 settled in the
Kabardino-Balkaria Republic. Authorities in Krasnodar Kray and the
Karbardino-Balkaria Republic deny the Meskhetians the right to
register, which deprives them of all rights of citizenship, despite the
provisions of the Constitution that all Meskhetians who were residing
in the Soviet Union at the time of its collapse are entitled to
citizenship. Meskhetian Turks living in Krasnodar, like other ethnic
minorities, are subject to special registration restrictions, for
example, having to register as a ``guest'' every 45 days. According to
the MHG, in May 1998 Krasnodar Kray authorities initiated an attempt to
compel Meskhetians to emigrate to Turkey. By September 1998 it was
believed that almost 90 families had left the region for Turkey.
Krasnodar human rights groups continue to state that the situation in
Krasnodar has not improved. In December, the speaker of the Krasnodar
Duma stated in a interview that approximately 30 families had left the
region but later returned.
The Constitution provides all citizens with the right to emigrate.
The Government imposes nominal emigration taxes, fees, and duties. On
average it takes three months to process a passport application,
although it can take much longer if documentation is needed from
elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.
Some liberal principles regarding emigration procedures were
codified formally in a 1996 law on exit from and entry into the
country. This law abolished the old Soviet requirement that, in order
to emigrate, citizens must receive a stamp permitting ``permanent
residence abroad'' (PMZh)--essentially a propiska for those living
outside the country. The law required the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
through its Office of Visas and Registration (OVIR), to establish
regulations for eliminating this practice within six months of the
passage of the law. However, implementation of the law (which was to go
into effect early in 1997) is still incomplete. According to the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), border guards continue
to require a PMZh-like stamp of all emigrants, and the passport control
agency OVIR continues to issue it.
Another feature of the 1996 law is the codification of the legal
grounds for denying foreign travel documents to citizens who had access
to state secrets. Under the new law, access to such classified material
can occur only with the consent of the citizen, established in the form
of a written contract that states that the signatory understands that
he has been given access to state secrets and that his ability to
travel abroad may be restricted. The law envisions a maximum period of
delay under normal circumstances of five years, and it grants the
interagency Commission on Secrecy the right to add an additional 5-year
term to the period of delay if the Commission finds that a person had
access to particularly sensitive materials. This latter provision has
raised serious concerns among human rights advocates who monitor
arbitrary and excessive powers on the part of the Government to
restrict foreign travel. There was one report that the provision was
applied in a restrictive manner. According to human rights monitors, in
1999 the FSB told Raisa Isakova, a former researcher at a secret
institute in Omsk, that if she did not sign compromising testimony
against the Jewish Agency (an NGO that promotes emigration to Israel),
her application for an exit visa to Israel would be denied. When she
refused to sign, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed her that she
was ineligible for a visa until 2003.
If a citizen had access to classified material, police and FSB
clearances are necessary to receive an external passport. Persons
denied travel documents on secrecy grounds can appeal the decision to
an interagency commission (called the Ivanov Commission) chaired by the
First Deputy Foreign Minister. The Ivanov Commission cannot rule on
whether the material should or should not be classified, but it can
rule on the legality of travel restrictions imposed and on whether or
not the traveler actually had access to materials requiring a travel
restriction. Since it was established in 1994, the Ivanov Commission
has granted travel permission to approximately 90 percent of
appellants.
Other grounds for denial of the right to travel abroad are military
conscription or assignment to civilian alternative service (although in
fact the Duma has failed to pass legislation implementing the
constitutionally provided right to civilian alternative service), being
under investigation for or serving a sentence for a crime, evasion of a
court-ordered obligation, or providing false information on a passport
application. The requirement that citizens satisfy obligations to
immediate relatives, such as material support for parents, was
eliminated except for court-ordered obligations such as alimony
payments.
Emigrants who resettled permanently abroad have been able to visit
or repatriate without hindrance. However, visiting emigrants who
departed without first obtaining a PMZh stamp have been stopped at the
border and prevented from departing the country (although they may
enter without difficulty), since they could present neither a
nonimmigrant visa to another country nor evidence of permission to
reside legally abroad.
The current conflict in Chechnya resulted in a large number of
internally displaced persons (see Section 1.g.). International
organizations estimate that the number of IDP's who left Chechnya as a
result of the conflict reached a total of about 280,000 at peak. Of
this total, most of the IDP's went to Ingushetiya (245,000), 6,000 were
reported in Dagestan, 3,000 in North Ossetia, and 6,000 in the Republic
of Georgia. A total of 20,000 Chechen IDP's were reported to have gone
to other regions of the Russian Federation. Reliable information on the
number and status of displaced persons within Chechnya itself was
especially difficult to obtain due to heavy fighting and limited
outside access to the region. At times as many as 200,000 persons were
estimated by the UNHCR to be displaced within Chechnya and without
access to humanitarian assistance. In addition, 6,000 Dagestani IDP's
were reported displaced within Dagestan. At various points during the
conflict, authorities restricted the movement of the IDP's fleeing
Chechnya. According to some reports by NGO's, border guards at times
permitted only ethnic Russians to cross into Ingushetiya. According to
the press, some displaced persons were transported by bus back to parts
of Chechnya that were under Russian Government control. Refugees at the
border sometimes had to live in the open, often without access to food
or water. Russian border guards and police officers on the border
between Chechnya and neighboring regions--and at checkpoints within
Chechnya--reportedly required Chechen refugees to pay money to pass.
According to UNHCR, authorities early in the year prevented medical
supplies for Chechen hospitals from entering Chechnya; however since
spring they have been able to do so. Some refugees also had trouble
moving about because their documents were lost, stolen, or confiscated
by Russian authorities. The NGO Civic Assistance estimated in October
that only 141,870 of 171,000 IDP's were able to register and thereby
receive aid (see Section 1.g.). In April North Ossetia's Deputy Prime
Minister stated that an estimated 15,000 South Ossetian refugees, who
fled to North Ossetia from Georgia in the early 1990's to escape ethnic
violence, should be sent back to the country. North Ossetian officials
claim that refugees occupying sanatoria and tourist facilities have
deprived the republic of millions of rubles in income.
Human rights NGO's and press organizations reported that federal
and republic authorities at times pressured the IDP's to return from
Ingushetiya to Chechnya. According to these reports, government
officials singled out persons from Chechen towns and districts that
were designated as ``safe'' by the Government. According to some
accounts, refugee camp administrators announced that persons from these
areas would no longer receive food rations. After international
criticism of these actions, government officials publicly said that
they would not pressure or compel refugees to return to Chechnya. At
the same time, authorities consistently announced their determination
to repatriate all refugees back to Chechnya as soon as possible.
The Government rarely provides first asylum. It cooperates to a
limited extent with the UNHCR and the IOM. Both organizations assist
the Government in developing a humane migration management system; this
includes effective and fair refugee status determination procedures. As
of July 31, the UNHCR had registered 40,000 asylum seekers who
originated from outside the territories of the former Soviet Union
since 1992. The UNHCR estimates that only 11,000 of these are active
cases, i.e., persons still seeking asylum or receiving UNHCR
assistance. The remainder either integrated into Russian society, left
the country, or have been resettled or repatriated. According to the
NGO Civic Assistance, as of October, the Government had granted refugee
status to only 39 petitioners.
According to UNHCR, as of October, the Government had granted
refugee status to 238 petitioners this year. Of the 238, 141 were from
outside the CIS countries and 97 were from the ``near abroad'' or other
CIS countries.
According to the UNHCR, between 1993 and November 1999, the
Government granted refugee status to only 491 persons from outside the
former Soviet Union, including the Baltic states; all but 17 of those
individuals were from Afghanistan. By contrast, the comparable figure
for former citizens of the Soviet Union apart from the Baltic states
(mainly ethnic Russians) who were granted refugee status by the former
Federal Migration Service (FMS) is 98,188. The Government acted more
expeditiously for the latter group and applied a more lenient standard.
The UNHCR and Amnesty International were working with the FMS and
border officials to ensure that interviews of potential refugees are
conducted in a timely fashion, that the UNHCR is allowed access to
potential refugees in airport transit lounges, and that deportations of
potential refugees are delayed until cases are adjudicated. However,
under government reorganization, the FMS was disbanded with its
functions and responsibilities transferred to other ministries. There
continues to be widespread ignorance of refugee law both on the part of
officials (MVD, EMERCOM, Border guards) and would be petitioners.
According to Civic Assistance, involuntarily displaced persons and
asylum seekers suffer the greatest difficulties in cities with
restrictive registration regulations. Their migrant registration
documents generally are not recognized by the MVD officials who control
registration. They often are subject to harassment, unauthorized
detention, and extortion of bribes.
A large number of workers and students from Africa and Asia who
came to work or study in accordance with treaties between their
countries and the former Soviet Union remain in the country. The
Government has not deported them but encourages their return home. The
number of persons in Russia from these countries has increased in
recent years due to the recent arrival of persons seeking refugee
status.
The situation of asylum seekers and refugees at Moscow's
Sheremetyevo-2 Airport continues to be of major concern to the UNHCR.
Improperly documented passengers are deported systematically, including
persons who demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution in their
countries of origin. If a passenger wants asylum, Aeroflot gives out
telephone numbers for FMS and UNHCR, but these numbers are not posted
publicly anywhere in the transit zone. Despite repeated UNHCR
recommendations, there are also no signs in the transit area to advise
asylum seekers about the refugee status determination process at the
airport. Undocumented travelers are not allowed to leave the transit
zone and often are returned to the carrier on which they entered the
country. Legally bound to provide food and emergency medical care for
undocumented travelers, the airline returns them to their point of
departure as quickly as possible. (Airlines are fined if an
undocumented passenger is admitted to Russia but not if the passenger
is returned to the country of origin.) Human rights organizations
allege that Aeroflot improperly deports hundreds of asylum seekers.
Until 1998 the FMS Point of Immigration Control (PIC), whose officials
are responsible for processing requests for refugee status, was located
outside of the transit zone, where asylum seekers were unable to reach
it. The PIC now has a fully equipped office inside the transit zone,
which UNHCR staff are also permitted to use.
The PIC interviews almost exclusively persons referred to it by the
UNHCR. According to the UNHCR, the process is neither fair or
effective; as of the end of 1998, the PIC had not yet rendered any
decisions in favor of asylum seekers. As of late 1998, 82 percent of
asylum seekers who managed to contact the UNHCR were deported before
the former FMS made a determination of refugee status. The actual
number of deportees is presumed to be higher, as many asylum seekers
did not have an opportunity to contact the UNHCR.
The treatment of asylum seekers in the transit zone can be harsh.
The UNHCR has received reports of physical and verbal abuse of transit
passengers by police officers and Aeroflot employees. Authorities
rarely release passengers from the transit zone, unless there is a
medical emergency.
A group of about 1,400 to 2,000 Armenian refugees evacuated from
Baku in the wake of late 1980's ethnic violence still are housed in
``temporary quarters'', usually in Moscow hotels or workers'
dormitories. They are unable to return to Azerbaijan and are not
accepted by Armenia; they also lack residency permits for Moscow. They
have been invited to apply for Russian citizenship, which would entitle
them to the benefits accorded to Russian forced migrants, but
representatives of the community have stated that they do not believe
such a step would improve their situation materially. They also have
rejected offers of relocation to other regions, because they allege
that the alternative housing that they are offered frequently is not
suitable or available. Their situation remains precarious as the
formerly state-owned hotels in which many reside are privatized. A
number of eviction orders already were served in such cases. Despite
official promises, their status and permanent housing had yet to be
resolved by year's end.
The Constitution does not permit the extradition to other states of
persons who would be persecuted there for their political beliefs or
for actions (or inaction) that are not considered a crime in the
Russian Federation. However, according to press reports and the UNHCR,
in December 1999 the Government deported seven North Korean refugees to
China in an apparent violation of the Refugee Convention, despite
promises to allow them to travel to South Korea for third country
resettlement. The exact reason for the return of these refugees is
unclear. The Government of China reportedly returned the seven to North
Korea. Moreover, in the past there were instances in which opposition
figures were deported to countries of the former Soviet Union to face
charges that were political in nature. Under the 1993 Commonwealth of
Independent States Convention on Legal Assistance in Civil, Family, and
Criminal Affairs, persons with outstanding warrants can be detained for
periods of up to 1 month while the Procurator General investigates the
nature of outstanding charges against the detainee. This system is
reinforced informally but effectively by collegial links among senior
law enforcement and security officials in the various republics of the
former Soviet Union. Human rights groups allege that this network is
employed to detain opposition figures from the other former Soviet
republics without actual legal grounds.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
The Constitution also provides the President and the Prime Minister
with substantial powers, which they used to dominate most areas of
administration and daytoday policy making and to limit the independence
of the judicial branch. The judiciary is showing signs of limited
independence in cases such as the Supreme Court acquittal of Nikitin,
religious freedom cases in a number of reforms dealing with
registration, and in the SORM case. Unlike its predecessor, this Duma
is characterized by a strong pro-presidential center that puts a
majority within reach for almost all presidential priorities.
Competitive elections for various regional and local offices were held
during the year, including elections for the chief executives in 44 of
the country's 89 regions. Observers generally viewed the elections as
free and fair. Challengers were able to defeat incumbents in almost
one-third of the races for regional executive positions and losing
candidates generally accepted the legitimacy of the voting results.
There were problems in a number of regions relating to unequal access
to the media, non-compliance with financial disclosure requirements,
and use of ``administrative resources'' (such as government staff and
official media) by incumbents to support their candidacies. Voters
generally had the opportunity to choose among all serious candidates,
but a regional court in the Kursk region struck the name of incumbent
Governor Aleksandr Rutskoy from the ballot for alleged campaign law
violations on the eve of the October 22 election. Many observers
considered this court action to be politically motivated and arbitrary,
particularly in light of similar campaign law violations allegedly
committed by other incumbents, but the Supreme Court sustained the
lower court decision on appeal.
A democratic election for the President took place in 1996 for the
first time in the history of Russia as an independent state. Former
President Yeltsin was reelected in a generally free and fair election.
After President Yeltsin's December 31, 1999, resignation, Vladimir
Putin assumed the post of acting President. In March, in an election
that was generally considered to be free and fair, Putin was elected
President. While the opposition and the media leveled accusations of
widespread election fraud, most international observers concluded that
the results of the election were valid. There were credible reports of
election fraud in some locations, particularly in the Republic of
Dagestan and a few other regions with a long history of falsifying
votes, but there was no evidence that such abuses were systematic or
that they affected the choice of the new President. Problems with
voting that did occur were due to a lack of attention to proper
procedure or carelessness rather than to premeditation. Vote counting
was generally transparent and absent of fraudulent intent.
In elections that were judged by international observers largely to
be free and fair, a more centrist-leaning Duma was elected on December
19, 1999. Elections were conducted in all 89 of the country's regions,
including 12 of the 15 districts of the Chechen Republic, where polling
was suspended for the Duma elections. This election had a 69 percent
voter turnout, and was the first democratic transfer of power in the
country. In spite of efforts made by authorities to prepare for safe
and orderly elections in the Chechen Republic, observers stated that
many of the conditions associated with democratic elections could not
be met.
Many observers pointed to problems with biased media coverage of
the presidential election campaign. Paid political advertisements in
newspapers often are disguised as legitimate news stories. Campaigns
pay ``under the table'' for stories favorable to their candidate, which
allows them to bypass limits on campaign spending. In the final days of
the presidential campaign, ORT (at that time aligned with the
Presidential Administration) aired a false story reporting on a
``grass-roots'' initiative by a supposed group of homosexuals to
support the Yabloko candidate Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. During the same
period ORT aired several investigative reports about Yavlinskiy's
supposed financial links to the head of Media-Most, Vladimir Gusinskiy.
During these reports, footage of Gusinskiy, who is also the president
of the Russian Jewish Congress, showed the Media-Most head in Jewish
settings. Critics accuse ORT of playing on anti-Semitic sentiments
within Russian society to discredit Yavlinskiy.
In July the Federal Assembly passed legislation according to which
regional executive and legislative leaders will appoint members of the
Federation Council instead of serving in that body themselves. Also
during the year the President appointed high-level presidential
representatives to exercise a range of oversight and coordination
responsibilities in seven newly established federal districts. He
established an advisory State Council consisting of leaders of all 89
regions. The net effect of these modifications to Russia's legislative
and administrative structures for democratic development was not
entirely clear at year's end.
In March 1999, President Yeltsin signed the Law On the Basic
Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens to Participate
in a Referendum (Voting Rights Act) and the federal Law on Public
Associations. These laws clarify which political public associations
may participate in elections; add restrictions on preferential media
coverage, donations, and financial or material support from foreign
entities for campaign-related activities; introduce measures to reduce
the number of noncompetitive political parties and candidates on the
ballot; increase the level of information available to voters about
candidates' financial and criminal history; and introduce provisions
allowing multi-candidate constituencies. Changes to the Voting Rights
Act affect legislation on both the federal and regional levels of the
Russian Federation. The Constitutional Court was expected to rule on
Voting Rights Act provisions that pertain to holding referendums, which
may compel lawmakers to reconsider the law.
There were reports of politically motivated violence and
intimidation during the gubernatorial campaign in St. Petersburg.
Yabloko activists reported that police and others harassed them during
the campaign and prevented them from distributing campaign literature.
Not long after the presidential elections in March, two Yabloko student
activists, Dmitriy Barkovskiy and Konstantin Suzdal, reported an
attempt by the FSB to recruit them to spy on the political party.
According to press reports, the students were threatened with dismissal
from Baltic State Technical University, where they studied, and with
conscription to fight in Chechnya if they refused. When they refused,
they were expelled from the university. Barkovskiy is currently in
hiding.
Human Rights Ombudsman Mironov's office set up a working group to
monitor electoral rights violations in both the 1999 Duma elections and
2000 Presidential elections. In August 1999, Mironov called for
legislation to increase the transparency of elections funding. To date
no legislation has been passed.
Political parties generally are organizationally weak and rise and
fall quickly. There are two exceptions `` the Communist Party and the
pro-Putin ``Unity'' Party. In December, Putin submitted draft
legislation that would require parties to have 10,000 members in order
to be registered, with no less than 100 members in each region. The
draft law would grant political parties a partial monopoly on running
candidates for legislative office, erect serious hurdles for the
registration of new political parties and give the executive branch and
procuracy broad powers to regulate, investigate, and even close down
parties. The law is scheduled for its first review in February 2001.
On November 29, State Duma deputies approved the first reading of a
bill that would allow some regional leaders to seek a third and fourth
term in office. The bill would amend an existing law, passed in October
1999, that forbids heads of regions to serve more then two terms in
office. The law was passed on January 31, 2001.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the
December 1999 elections, 32 female deputies were elected to the 450-
member Duma, a decrease from the 46 female deputies in the Duma elected
in 1995. Only one woman, Valentina Matviyenko, serves as a Cabinet
Minister.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Many domestic and international human rights groups operate freely.
Most investigated and publicly commented on human rights problems,
generally doing so without government interference or restrictions.
Human rights monitors have worked mostly unhindered by authorities in
recent years; however, some local officials harassed human rights
monitors (see Section 1.d.). The Government's attitude towards human
rights NGO's varied. Officials such as Vladimir Kalamanov and Oleg
Mironov regularly interact and cooperate with NGO's. The level of
cooperation tends to depend on the perceived threat to national
security or level of opposition that an NGO might pose. For example,
NGO's monitoring prison conditions enjoy an excellent relationship with
Government authorities, while those monitoring Chechnya enjoy a more
tense relationship. On August 30, a uniformed militia officer and
several armed masked men entered the offices of Glasnost Public
Foundation, a human rights group that has been critical of official
actions in Chechnya and abuses by the security services in general.
Activists were planning a conference about the security services at the
time of the raid. The authorities held participants on the floor at
gunpoint for nearly 40 minutes while they checked documents of
individuals and of the foundation. After the press learned of the
incident and began to call the Glasnost offices, the security officials
left without arresting anyone. Human rights activists viewed this raid
as an act of intimidation on the part of authorities.
Several NGO's are headquartered in Moscow and have branches
throughout the country. Some of the more prominent human rights
organizations are the Public Center for Prison Reform, the Society for
the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions, the Glasnost Public and
Defense Funds, Memorial, the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights,
the Union of Soldiers' Mothers' Committees, the Mothers' Rights
Foundation, and the Moscow Helsinki Group. Several of these groups are
recognized by government and legislative officials for their expertise
in certain fields, and such groups participate (with varying degrees of
success) in the process of drafting legislation and decrees. Also, the
prominent human rights organization Memorial worked with the offices of
Vladimir Kalamanov, Special Presidential Representative for human
rights in Chechnya, turning to Kalamanov to provide security for trips
to the regions.
Various types of regionally based human rights groups are being
established. Socioeconomic rights groups are the most numerous and
monitor issues such as unpaid wages and benefits. There are fewer
civil-political rights groups, but according to Memorial these are
growing in number. These groups include ``generalist'' organizations
that cover the range of human rights issues and ``specialist''
organizations that cover only one issue. Public legal centers have been
formed, due to the critical lack of legal advice that is available to
the general public. These centers usually are run on a part-time basis
by lawyers who, while they cannot afford to offer trial counsel or
actual legal work, offer advice at no cost on legal rights and recourse
under the law. Resources for human rights work became even scarcer
after the 1998 financial crisis, threatening the work of NGO's. Most
groups rely on foreign support in the form of grants to maintain
operations.
Regional groups generally receive little, if any, international
support or attention. Although at times they reported that local
authorities obstructed their work, criticism of the Federal Government
and regional authorities usually is permitted without hindrance. The
threshold appears to be criticism of a specific political leader in the
region (usually the governor or a senior law enforcement official).
Local human rights groups have far fewer opportunities to interact with
legislators in developing legislation than their Moscow counterparts;
some are excluded from the process entirely by local authorities.
Because of the risk of kidnaping and ongoing military conflict (see
Sections 1.b. and 1.g.), NGO's largely withdrew from Chechnya; some
still operate but on a limited basis working from Ingushetia.
The Government's human rights institutions lack independence but
some of them appear to be making efforts to promote human rights. The
Office of the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman appears to be
working actively to develop its authority and public profile. Since
taking office, Ombudsman Oleg Mironov has worked on becoming an
increasingly high-profile government spokesman on human rights issues,
despite earlier criticism by human rights organizations due to his lack
of human rights expertise. Mironov's office has grown to over 150
employees and has several specialized sections responsible for
investigating complaints of human rights abuses. The effectiveness of
Mironov's office in assisting individual victims cannot yet be assessed
accurately. However, Mironov continues to expand the scope of his
activities, attempting to promote broader compliance with international
human rights standards. During the summer of 1999, Mironov established
a department of human rights education within his office. The staff of
six, headed by Anatoliy Azarov (a former director of the Moscow School
of Human Rights), developed guidelines and materials for teaching human
rights to the public. The office also established a section on
religious freedom. Perhaps most importantly, Mironov's office has
issued four reports detailing human rights abuses in areas ranging from
psychiatry to pretrial detention. In eight of the regions, regional
human rights ombudsmen established operations in a similar manner as
Mironov. In many other regions, human rights commissions were set up.
However, the effectiveness of the regional ombudsmen and committees
differs significantly from region to region.
The President's Human Rights Commission, now composed primarily of
government officials (unlike the 1993-96 commission under Sergey
Kovalev, which included a large number of human rights monitors),
appeared largely inactive during the year. Some human rights groups
continued to complain that the Commission's focus has changed from
advocacy of human rights to defending the Government's policy and that
the Commission has failed to engage well-established human rights
NGO's. According to Commission chair Vladimir Kartashkin, his role is
mainly consultative and investigatory, without powers of enforcement.
Kartashkin receives little financial support from the Government and
has a very small staff that spends most of its time responding to
letters from the regions.
The country has yet to comply with the UN Commission on Human
Rights (UNCHR) resolution on Chechnya provisions to facilitate visits
to the region by UN special rapporteurs and special representatives of
the Secretary General. The country reportedly invited only the Special
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, and Special Rapporteur
for Violence against Women, but explicitly de-linked these invitations
to the resolution. The country did not invite the Special Rapporteur on
Torture, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
Internally Displaced Persons.
Citizens can file appeals to the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations that
occurred after Russia's May 5, 1998, accession to the Council of
Europe. Complainants need no longer exhaust all appeals in Russian
courts before they can turn to the European Court. According to the
press, the ECHR received 914 complaints from Russia, 60 of which are
based on human rights violations in Chechnya. However, because the
Government refused so far to respond to the initial complaints accepted
by the ECHR (a procedural requirement), no cases have yet been heard.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, language, social status, or other circumstances. However,
both official and societal discrimination still exist.
Women.--Domestic violence remains a major problem, since victims
rarely have recourse to protection from the authorities. Police
frequently are reluctant or unwilling to involve themselves in what
they see as purely domestic disputes. Many women are deterred from
reporting such crimes because of this and because the housing system
makes it difficult either to find housing outside the family dwelling
or to expel an abusive spouse, even after a final divorce action. The
underlying problem is that much of society, including some leaders in
the human rights community, do not acknowledge domestic violence as a
problem or do not believe it to be an area for concern outside the
family. No reliable statistics exist to evaluate the true extent of the
problem. There is a general lack of understanding of these problems in
the legal community, and there is no legal definition of domestic
violence. Some forms of battering are addressed in the new Criminal
Code but are defined too narrowly to apply to most cases. There is also
no national political will to consider these problems seriously. More
than four dozen versions of a national civil law to address domestic
violence have failed to make any progress in the Duma. Women's NGO
monitor Yelena Yershova has pointed out that law enforcement
authorities distinguish between crimes committed outside the home and
``acts of violence'' committed at home. In the latter case, such acts
often are not treated as crimes, but rather as a domestic affair. In
the first six months of the year, 4,787 persons were convicted of rape.
There are no current statistics on the reported rape or attempted
rape of women. The Ministry of Interior states that in 1998 there were
9,014 cases of rape and attempted rape reported. In 1998 a HRW Europe
researcher estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of rapes are reported to
police. HRW further reported that Yekaterina Lakhova, former President
Yeltsin's then-adviser on women's issues, estimated in 1997 that 14,000
women are killed by husbands or family members each year. However, HRW
notes that these statistics underestimate the extent of the problem,
due to underreporting of these crimes by victims. In 1996 the MVD
estimated that 80 percent of violent crimes occurred in the home.
Hospitals and members of the medical profession provide assistance
to women who have been assaulted. However, some doctors are reluctant
to ascertain the details of a sexual assault, fearing that they may be
required to spend long periods in court.
Trafficking of women for sexual exploitation is a very serious
problem, particularly because of lack of adequate employment
opportunities. Reliable statistics on the number of women involved are
difficult to obtain (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Despite serious problems and difficulties in addressing these
problems, many effective projects are underway. Approximately 40 crisis
centers for women are in operation throughout the country, and their
number continues to grow. The crisis centers formed an association in
order to coordinate their efforts better, and they chose Marina
Pisklakova, the Director of the crisis center ANNA, as President. The
association held its first national conference September 1999, in
Moscow. Since the conference, ANNA has been working with the Ministry
of Interior to organize a class to educate police on domestic violence.
Nongovernmental work in this area is recognized and supported by
several government entities.
Women report sexual harassment in the workplace, and anecdotal
information suggests that many potential employers seek female
employees who are receptive to sexual relations. The phrase, ``without
complexes,'' is used occasionally in job advertisements. Some firms ask
applicants for employment to complete a form including the abbreviation
``VBO,'' a Russian abbreviation for ``possibility of close relations,''
to which the applicant is expected to reply ``yes'' or ``no.'' There is
no law in the legal code that prosecutes sexual harassment.
Credible evidence suggests that women encounter considerable
discrimination in employment. NGO's continue to accuse the Government
of participating in discriminatory actions against women, contending
that the Government seldom enforces employment laws concerning women.
Article 19 of the Constitution states that men and women have equal
rights and opportunities to pursue those rights. In addition Article 2
of the labor code prohibits discrimination, further stating that every
person has the right for equal pay for equal work. Employers prefer to
hire men, thereby saving on maternity and child-care costs and avoiding
the perceived unreliability that accompanies the hiring of women with
small children. The problem of age-based discrimination is very
relevant to women. Employers try to avoid the requirement of a three
year paid maternity leave for childcare. Women continue to report cases
in which they are paid less for the same work that male colleagues
perform. There has been no recent substantial research in this area, so
exact figures are difficult to ascertain.
Job advertisements often specify sex and age groups, and sometimes
physical appearance as well. Women's average incomes generally are
estimated to be significantly below average male incomes. Professions
dominated by women are much lower paid than those dominated by men.
Moscow human resources managers privately admit that discrimination
against women in hiring is common. Unemployment, at 10.2 percent of the
workforce, also disproportionately affects women.
In July 1999, Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued a decree
permitting men in the republic to have up to four wives. According to
Aushev, the decision came in response to the republic's demographic
situation, and he appealed to the Duma to make the necessary changes in
the family code; the law was ruled unconstitutional.
Children.--The Constitution assigns the Government some
responsibility for safeguarding the rights of children. The State
endeavors to provide, within its limited means, for the welfare of
children. While federal law provides for education for all children in
the country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to
the children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants
because they lack residential registration (see Section 2.d.).
The educational system includes both private and public
institutions. Children have the right to free education until the 11th
grade (approximately 17 years old). Students are obligated to stay in
school until the 9th grade. Boys and girls are treated equally in the
school system. Health care for children is legally free, although the
quality varies and individuals incur significant out of pocket
expenses.
A Family Code regulating children's rights and marriage and divorce
issues came into effect in 1996; however, implementation of the code
has been slow. Many Moscow charitable organizations established
productive relations with the city government to address the needs of
disabled children, as well as other vulnerable groups.
The position of many children deteriorated since the collapse of
communism because of falling living standards, an increase in the
number of broken homes, and domestic violence. According to press
reports, 40 percent of all children live below the poverty line.
Children on the street often become dependent on illegal narcotics. To
combat the growing number of children being abducted, police
organizations are establishing programs to protect children.
Figures for homeless children are unreliable at best. Nationwide
they range from 1 to 4 million. Oleg Zykov, head of the No to
Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Foundation, estimates that there are about
15,000 street children in Moscow alone. The St. Petersburg NGO
Perspektiva estimate that about 3,000 children are actively involved in
street life there and that 500 to 600 of these actually live on the
streets. Many of these children have come from the regions, only to be
sent back to where they came from by city police. One shelter director
complained that young girls from Chechnya also were returned there,
despite the danger to them. Homeless children often engage in criminal
activities, receive no education, and are vulnerable to drug and
alcohol abuse. Some young girls who find themselves on the street turn
to prostitution in order to survive (see Section 6.f.).
An estimated 50,000 children run away from their homes each year.
The main reasons children run away appear to be family violence,
financial problems, or social problems such as drug or alcohol abuse by
one or both of the parents. In Moscow approximately 6,000 children per
year are brought to the Center of Temporary Isolation of Minor
Delinquents (COVINA). These children stay in COVINA for no more than 30
days. During this period, the child's guardian is located and his or
her case is investigated. However, in 90 to 95 percent of these cases,
the police simply return the child to the family or to the institution
from which the child ran away. Many officials consider domestic
problems as private and prefer not to interfere.
In St. Petersburg local and international NGO's provide a variety
of services for the homeless. In particular Perspektiva: Medecins du
Monde (MDM) supports homeless children with a ``social hotel'' and a
medical/social consultation center that provides medical help,
vaccines, and referrals to hospitals and orphanages. Perspektiva also
organizes specialized training seminars for medical and social
professionals and city officials engaged in work with homeless youth.
As the former Soviet Union opened to the international community,
attention focused on the status of orphans and the disabled, who were
removed from mainstream society and isolated in state institutions. A
complex and cumbersome system was developed to manage their life-long
institutionalization. Three different ministries (Education, Health,
and Labor and Social Development) assumed responsibility for different
age groups and categories of orphans. Rather than focus on the needs of
the child, the system revolves around the institution itself. Child
welfare is easily lost within the bureaucracy; little clear recourse
exists in instances of abuse by the system. Human rights groups allege
that children in state institutions are provided for poorly (often
because funds are lacking) and in some cases are abused physically by
staff.
While there are no comprehensive studies of the effects of the
orphanage system, its costs, and the extent of its problems, several
groups have compiled important information. Many NGO's including Human
Rights Watch and Mental Disability Rights International, have called
for reform to the child protection system. Several approaches have been
proposed to reform the orphanage and have been implemented by regional
governments with the help of international donors.
A 1997 report by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development,
which is cited often, indicate that there are approximately 600,000
children registered as orphans. Of these children, 10 percent are
orphans with no parents and 90 percent are ``social orphans,'' who have
at least one living parent who has given up the child to the State for
a variety of reasons. Between 1993 and 1997, the number of registered
orphans increased by 30 percent and the number residing in institutions
by 35 percent. Concurrently, the number of children in foster families
increased by 46 percent (most children are related to the members of
their foster families). However, the number adopted has remained fairly
consistent, with an overall increase of only 2 percent.
Although comprehensive statistics are not available, the prospects
of children/orphans who are disabled physically or mentally are
extremely bleak. The label of ``imbecile'' or idiot, which signifies
``uneducable,'' is almost always irrevocable. The most likely future is
a lifetime in state institutions. Even the label of ``debil,'' or
lightly retarded, follows a person throughout his or her life on
official documents, creating barriers to employment and housing after
graduation from state institutions. One study conducted by the Rights
of the Child program of the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights
found that on graduation from a state institution for the lightly
retarded at age 18, 30 percent of orphans became vagrants, 10 percent
became involved in crime, and 10 percent committed suicide. Even for
those orphans classified as ``normal,'' life after institutionalization
poses serious problems, as they may lack the necessary social,
educational, and vocational skills to function in society.
The existing system provides little oversight and no formal
recourse for orphans who have been misdiagnosed as mentally ill or
retarded, abused, or neglected. Facilities to which such children are
remanded frequently use unprescribed narcotics to keep children under
control. Boris Altshuler of the Rights of the Child Program has called
for the establishment of an ombudsman for the rights of children with
the power to enter and inspect children's facilities at any time of day
or night without advance notification. Since 1998 the Ministry of Labor
and Social Development has been working with the U.N. Children's Fund
on a pilot program to establish regional children's rights ombudsmen.
According to the Ministry and the Rights of the Child NGO, there are
now ombudsmen in the cities of Yekaterinburg and St. Petersburg and in
the regions of Novgorod, Kaluga, and Volgograd, and there are plans to
establish new ombudsmen in two other regions. Ombudsmen can only write
a letter requesting an inquiry by law enforcement authorities, assist
those whose rights have been violated to understand their legal rights,
and make suggestions to legislators (local, regional, and federal) on
ways to improve legislation.
Trafficking in children and young girls is a problem (see Sections
6.c. and 6.f.).
Conditions for children in prisons and pretrial detention are a
problem (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.)
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution does not address
directly the issue of discrimination against disabled persons. Although
laws exist that prohibit discrimination, the Government has not
enforced them. The meager resources that the Government can devote to
assisting disabled persons are provided to veterans of World War II and
other conflicts. Special institutions exist for children with various
disabilities, but do not serve their needs adequately. The Government
does not mandate special access to buildings for the disabled. The NGO,
Society for the Defense of Invalids, is working to broaden public
awareness and understanding of problems concerning the disabled.
A 1995 law requires that firms with over 30 employees to either
reserve 3 percent of their positions for persons with disabilities or
contribute to a government fund to create job opportunities for the
disabled. The law also removed language defining an ``invalid'' as a
person unable to work. However, the Government has not implemented this
law. Some persons with disabilities find work within factories run by
the All-Russian Society for the Disabled, but the majority are unable
to find work and frequently are discouraged from working, forced to
subsist on social benefits.
The December 1998 Human Rights Watch report ``Abandoned to the
State,'' documented the conditions which persist in many orphanages,
including in special state orphanages for the disabled. Being disabled
is still a serious social stigma in the country, an attitude that
profoundly influences how institutionalized children are treated. Many
physically or mentally disabled children are considered ineducable,
even those with only minor birth defects. According to the report, many
disabled children are confined to beds around the clock or to rooms
that are lit, heated, and furnished inadequately. The children are
given only minimal care by low-paid unskilled workers with no training
in the care of the disabled.
Indigenous People.--Until its abolition by presidential decree on
September 22, 1998, the Moscow-based State Committee for the
Development of the North was charged with representing and advocating
the interests of indigenous people. With only a small staff, its
influence was limited. The Committee's functions were transferred to
the new Ministry for Regional Affairs and Nationalities, which is
directed by presidential decree to take ``into account the need for
singling out the most important issues of northern territories'' as one
of its priorities. A 1999 bill, signed into law by President Yeltsin,
on indigenous ethnic communities, provides them with support,
permitting the creation of self-government bodies, and permitting them
to seek compensation if economic development threatens their lands. In
some areas local communities have organized to study and make
recommendations regarding the preservation of the culture of indigenous
people. People such as the Buryats in Siberia; the Tatar and Bashkiri
in the Urals; the people of the North, including the Enver, Tafarli,
and Chukchi; and others work actively to preserve and defend their
cultures, as well as the economic resources of their regions. In this
context, some groups in the far eastern part of the country criticized
the Government for not developing an overall concept for the
development of indigenous people. Most believe that they are treated
equally with ethnic Russians, although some groups believe that they
are not represented or are underrepresented in regional governments.
The principal problems for indigenous people center on distribution of
necessary supplies and services, particularly in the winter months for
those who live in the far north.
Religious Minorities.--Incidents of societal violence apparently
based on religious belief decreased this year. Nevertheless, some
serious incidents were recorded. On August 20, a group of extremists in
Volgograd accosted a group of Mormons, beat four Russian members and
threatened foreign missionaries. The same day, the same group similarly
attacked Jehovah's Witnesses in Volgograd, beating a minister with a
``Cossack'' whip. Members of the victimized groups have accused the
authorities of being slow to investigate these incidents and make
arrests. To date there has been no prosecution in the Volgograd
incidents despite the fact that the identity of at least one of the
accused perpetrators is known to authorities. On September 17, a group
of extremists burst into a school in Ryazan where Jewish classes were
being held and smashed windows, furniture, and an art exhibit made by
the children, shouting death threats at the teachers present.
Subsequent to the attack, the extremists left slogans on the school
threatening to return and kill all the Jews. Police and local
administration officials initially appeared to dismiss the case. Only
after international and Moscow media began to probe the case did the
authorities announce that four suspects were identified and would be
charged with ``hooliganism.'' As of October, local officials reported
that they had identified and detained one suspect, but that he had
inexplicably disappeared. An editor of the local newspaper Vechermi-
Ryazan was threatened with dismissal for publishing an article related
to the incident. There have been no developments in solving the
bombings of two Moscow synagogues in May 1999 and in July 1999.
As foreign or so-called nontraditional religions in the country
continue to grow, many Russians continue to feel hostility toward these
``foreign sects,'' perhaps influenced by negative reports in the mass
media and public criticism by Russian Orthodox Church officials and
other influential figures. These sentiments appear to have sparked
occasional harassment and even physical attacks.
During the Jubilee Bishops' Conference of the Russian Orthodox
Church, August 13-16, the Church issued a document entitled
``Fundamental Principles of the Russian Orthodox Church's Relations
with Other Faiths.'' In the document the Church identifies
denominations such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons as
proselytizing ``cults'' whose operations on the ``canonical'' territory
of Russia must be stopped. According to the document, the mission of
other ``traditional'' confessions is possible only under the condition
that they refrain from proselytizing or tempt the faithful away from
the Church with material goods. Occasionally opposition to the
dissemination of information came from religious groups. From time to
time the Russian Orthodox Church has criticized the press for what it
called ``anti-church publications,'' but stopped short of imposing any
church sanctions against particular authors or editors. However, the
Church appealed to authors of what it considered inaccurate accounts of
church history to ``realize the sinfulness of their evil deeds.''
Minority religious groups frequently complain of discriminatory
stories in the media. Newspapers have published sensational or biased
articles criticizing both traditional and nontraditional religious
minorities. In October Russian Muslim groups complained of biased
portrayal of Russian Muslims in a Russian State Television documentary
entitled ``Half Moon in the Caucasus.'' The documentary, Muslims claim,
exaggerated the influence of radicals and implied that all Muslims were
working to support the Chechen separatists.
Following large-scale emigration over the last two decades, between
600,000 and 700,000 Jews remain in the country (0.5 percent of the
total population). While Jewish emigration rates are significantly
lower than during the Soviet period, the number of Jews emigrating to
Israel for economic and other reasons increased approximately 70
percent from January 1998 to January 1999. The vast majority of Jews--
80 percent--live in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Jews continue to
encounter societal discrimination, and government authorities were
criticized for insufficient action to counter it.
Several reports of acts of intimidation were linked to anti-Semitic
groups or motives during the year. Anti-Semitic leaflets, graffiti, and
articles continued to appear in some regions, such as St. Petersburg,
Ryazan, and Krasnodar. On September 7, an anti-Semitic article appeared
on the pages of the prominent daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, reportedly
authored by Kremlin official Aleksandr Ignatov. In the article, Ignatov
refers to a ``Chasidic para-Masonic'' group standing behind ``world
government'' and globalization. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials
reported in October that no one by that name was employed in the
Presidential administration and that an internal investigation was
under way (see Section 2.c.). The attack in Ryazan on a Jewish School
was one of the first incidents of its kind during the year. The attack
was followed by the publication of an extremely anti-Semitic article in
the Vechernyaya Ryazan, a local newspaper, accusing the local Jewish
organization of orchestrating the attack to gain publicity and foreign
financial support. A Jewish cemetery in Nizhniy Novgorod was vandalized
in July. Police apprehended the juvenile offenders within 2 weeks,
earning support from the local Jewish community, and received a reward
from FEOR. On September 29, an orthodox Jew associated with the Moscow
Choral Synagogue was attacked by a group of ``skin heads''. Similar
attacks have occurred on Africans and African-Americans in Moscow and
other cities.
The ultranationalist and anti-Semitic Russian National Unity (RNE)
paramilitary organization, formerly led by Aleksandr Barkashov,
appeared to have splintered and lost some of its support in the
regions. The group ousted Barkashov in September, and several of its
affiliates split off from the organization, unhappy with the current
leadership. The RNE claims a membership of 100,000 in 64 federation
chapters, but press reports estimate its membership at 12,000, and it
is registered officially in 22 regions. According to various pollsters,
the radical movement appears to have won some degree of national name
recognition and may enjoy the support of up to 3 percent of the
population. According to press accounts, the RNE managed to get a
representative elected to the local administration in Saratov. In
Borovichiy the RNE and another local Fascist group, Mertvaya Voda, were
active, according to local Jewish leaders, and desecrated Jewish
graves, mailed death threats to Jews, and displayed anti-Semitic
posters. The local Borovichiy Duma passed a decree in December 1998
prohibiting RNE activities and the distribution of its propaganda, and
in March 1999 city and law enforcement officials formed a commission to
counteract the RNE's activities and propaganda. In April 1999,
officials from the Borovichiy city administration invited the Harold
Light Center, a Jewish NGO, to present a 2-day seminar on combating
anti-Semitism and extremism. In August, a group of city and regional
officials traveled to San Francisco to meet with law enforcement
officials dealing with hate crimes, and in October the San Francisco
officials traveled to Russia and participated in a hate-crimes seminar
with their Russian colleagues.
Jewish NGO's claimed that anti-Semitic themes figured on the eve of
the presidential elections, citing ORT's airing of a report showing
opposition figure Grigoriy Yavlinskiy supported by Jewish leader
Vladimir Gusinskiy, wearing a yarmulke and participating in a meeting
with Jewish leaders (Rabbis included) in a cynical attempt to discredit
Yavlinskiy among those who would find the association troublesome.
A prominent public figure who regularly used anti-Semitic remarks
was former Krasnodar region governor Nikolay Kondratenko (see Section
2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In July 1998, the presidential
Human Rights Commission issued an official statement noting that ``the
increase in the threat of fascism'' was ``taking on visible and ominous
features,'' and that incitement of national, racial, and religious
enmity was ``taking on an increasingly organized nature.'' It noted the
increasing number of extremist groups that advocated racial supremacy
and ``national xenophobia'' and commented that such groups were moving
with increasing frequency from combat training (under the guise of
sports training) to ``acts of direct terror, hoodlum attacks on persons
of 'unwelcome' nationality, the desecration of cemeteries, and
explosions of monuments.'' The statement followed a number of
wellpublicized incidents that spring, including several racially
motivated attacks on members of minorities, particularly Asians and
Africans. Attacks generally appeared to be random, inspired by racial
hatred, and carried out by private individuals or small groups, some of
whom were known to local law enforcement authorities for their racial
intolerance or criminal records. In December, an African-American
student was beaten on a tram in Moscow.
Roma and persons from the Caucasus and Central Asia face widespread
societal discrimination, which often is reflected in official attitudes
and actions. Police reportedly beat, harassed, and solicited bribes
from persons with dark skin, or who appeared to be from the Caucasus,
Central Asia, or Africa. Discrimination against persons from the
Caucasus and Central Asia also increased concurrently with new measures
at both the federal and local levels to combat crime. Law enforcement
authorities targeted persons with dark complexions for harassment,
arrest, and deportation from urban centers, particularly after the
August 1999 bombing in Moscow. In Moscow such persons are subjected to
far more frequent document checks than others and frequently are
detained or fined in excess of permissible penalties, often without
formal documents recording the infraction being drawn up and presented
by police.
During the year, members of ethnic or racial minorities were the
victims of beatings, extortion, and harassment by ``skinheads'' and
members of other racist and extremist groups. Arrests seldom are made
in most such attacks, many of which have been reported by human rights
organizations. Many victims, particularly refugees who lack residence
documents recognized by the police, choose not to report such attacks
or report indifference on the part of police. On October 21, a group of
``skinheads'' in Moscow attacked Vietnamese residents in front of their
dormitory. When Vietnamese residents poured out of the dormitory to
assist in fending off the attackers, police intervened to protect the
``skinheads.'' No arrests were made.
The Government reported that in 1998 authorities investigated 25
criminal cases on charges of incitement to national, racial or
religious hatred. In July 1999, 10 cases were opened, and courts have
ruled on 9 of them. Chechen IDP's and the Civic Assistance Committee
for migrants reported that Chechens face great difficulty in finding
lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to pay at least twice the
usual rent for an apartment.
In February 1999, the republican legislature in Bashkortostan
passed a law naming Bashkiri and Russian as its two official languages,
but excluded Tatar. There are more Tatars than Bashkir in the republic,
and Tatars constitute 30 percent of the republic's population. The
legislature of the republic of Tatarstan appealed to the Bashkortostan
legislature to include the language, but the appeal was rejected. On
January 21, some 20 Tatars protested a draft version of the language
law outside the republican legislature, and authorities arrested 7 of
the protesters. The law still remains in effect.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
right to form and join trade unions, but practical limitations on the
exercise of this right continue to arise from governmental policy and
the dominant position of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of
Russia (FNPR), the successor organization to the Communist trade
unions. Approximately 55 percent of the work force is unionized (of an
estimated 72.4 million workers), and approximately 4 percent of union
members belong to independent unions. However, there is no
authoritative data on union membership, because there was no mandatory
reregistration of union members following the Soviet era, during which
all workers were registered as trade union members. Union membership
overall has fallen as a result of economic restructuring, including the
closing of some enterprises and a resistance by some foreign companies
to trade union activities.
The FNPR claims that some 80 percent of all workers belong to the
FNPR, although International Labor Organization (ILO) representatives
state that 60 percent is a more accurate estimate. The FNPR thus
largely dominates the union movement and provides a practical
constraint on the right to freedom of association. The FNPR inherited
the bulk of the property of its predecessors, including office and
recreational property. The majority of its income comes from sources
other than dues, such as rental income, sale of real estate, and fees
for member services. Its unions frequently include management as part
of the bargaining unit or elect management as delegates to its
congresses. The FNPR and other trade union federations act
independently on the national political level, but FNPR unions
sometimes are affiliated closely with local political structures.
Political parties often act in parallel with unions, for example, in
calling for a national day of protest.
Benefits of membership presently vary depending on union
affiliation and generally discourage the formation of new unions. These
benefits are largely financed by the Social Insurance Fund. As the
largest group of trade unions, FNPR enjoys a privileged position with
regard to the distribution of state funds at the municipal, oblast, and
federal levels. It routinely decides who receives benefits, such as
child subsidies and vacations, based on the politics or affiliation of
union members. However, the new tax code, effective January 1, 2001,
will include a single social tax and essentially end trade union
control over the distribution of social benefits at the federal level.
FNPR sees this as a threat to its dominant role. Other trade unions
worry that a consolidation of social security assets in the federal
budget and an additional layer of bureaucracy in the distribution of
benefits will lead to reduced benefits for workers and the public in
general.
The number of court decisions supporting the right of association
and ruling in favor of employees increased during the year. However,
the enforcement of these court decisions remains a problem. Moreover,
most workers do not understand or have faith in the legal structure,
fear possible retaliation, and thus are reluctant to bring cases to
court. For example, the Association of Flight Personnel at Vnukovo
Airport (an independent union) won an out-of-court dispute over unpaid
monthly bonuses in December 1998. Members of the union, who numbered
100 at the time, subsequently found themselves excluded from the list
of payees. The only reason appeared to be their union membership, as
those who quit the union immediately received bonuses. In January 1999,
the union filed a lawsuit. After several postponements, management
agreed in March to pay the remaining 10 members bonuses owed since
December 1998.
Management and FNPR local unions often work together to discourage
the establishment of new unions. In August 1999, management at the Alit
Factory and the Sverdlovsk Oblast FNPR leadership convened a ``trade
union conference'' where a newly elected chairman of a local
construction workers' union was dismissed from her position. The
chairman filed a case in the municipal court, claiming that management
and the oblast committee of FNPR were not authorized to convene a local
union's conference and that conference participants were not even
members of the local union. The municipal court refused to hear the
case. The chairman appealed the decision to the Oblast Court, which
ruled in her favor. The case has been sent back to the lower court for
review.
In accordance with the federal Law on Public Organizations, all
civic organizations founded before 1994 were required to reregister
with the Ministry of Justice by July. The registration procedure for
NGO's requires that the local departments of justice check all articles
of charter documents for compliance with existing laws. However, the
registration procedures for unions are governed by the Law on Trade
Unions, which specifies that registration requires a simple
``notification'' and submission of documents. Departments of Justice
throughout Russia have ignored the procedures set out by this law and
continually refused to register new unions by requiring changes in
charter documents or confirmation of attendance at founding
conferences. In one case in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the local Department of
Justice demanded that founders of a trade union sign again the founding
documents in the presence of a Justice Department official, a procedure
not required in any law. Such practices have prevented the registration
of new unions or the reregistration of existing ones.
Department of Justice officials extended their authority far beyond
the letter of the law and in some cases canceled the registration of
unions. In 1997 the Sverdlovsk Court of Arbitration canceled the
registration of a local union of utility workers at management's
request. The Supreme Arbitration Court in June cancelled the initial
ruling and sent the case back to the lower court for review. Recovery
of registration will allow the union to again become a legal entity and
reinstate its chairman, who had been illegally fired. In March the
leader of a union of ambulance drivers in Nizhniy Tagil received a
warning from the local procurator's office, demanding that she stop
interfering with the work of her ambulance depot. The municipal court
ruled that the leader be fined. The leader appealed the case, and the
Sverdlovsk Oblast Court ruled in her favor in May. In the opinion of
independent lawyers, these actions contradict the laws governing union
registration and are a direct and illegal attempt to discourage labor
activism.
Court rulings have established the principle that nonpayment of
wages--still by far the predominant grievance--is an individual dispute
and cannot be addressed collectively by unions. As a result, a
collective action based on the nonpayment of wages is not recognized as
a strike, and individuals are not protected by the labor law's
protection against being fired while on strike. Prior to 1999,
collective actions on this issue were considered strikes if they
concerned violations of a collective bargaining agreement that
specified the time frame for wage payments.
The right to strike is difficult to exercise. Most strikes are
considered technically illegal, because the procedures for disputes are
exceedingly complex and require coordination of information from both
sides, even before courts are involved. Strikes may be reviewed by a
civil court to establish their legality. The Russian Law on Resolution
of Collective Labor Disputes specifies that if a strike could affect
the safety or health of citizens, then a minimum level of essential
services must be provided. Under such a definition, it is difficult to
exclude any public sector employees. After a trade union declares a
strike, the trade union, management, and local executive authority have
5 days to agree on the required level of essential services. If no
agreement is reached--which is often the case, the local executive
authority simply decrees the minimal services. The local executive
authority also often sets the minimal level of essential services at
roughly the same level as the average work load. Moreover, the civil
court has the right to order the confiscation of union property to
settle damages and losses to an employer if a strike is found to be
illegal and not discontinued before the decision goes into effect. As a
result, an increasing number of strikes are organized by strike
committees, rather than unions. Reprisals for strikes are also common,
although strictly prohibited by law. In August 1998, workers at St.
Petersburg's Oktyabrskaya Railroad declared a strike over nonpayment of
wages, management's refusal to conduct collective bargaining with the
local union, and noncompliance with health and safety standards. Strike
participants were sent on forced leave with reduced pay. Management
claimed there was no work for them at the depot. The workers filed
cases against management, but the local court ruled against them in
April. All participants in the strike have been subject to transfer to
``idle time'' due to low ticket sales.
In 1995 transportation unions complained that because
transportation can be considered an essential service that must be
provided under law, their right to strike is denied. The Constitutional
Court agreed and found that banning industry-wide strikes was
unconstitutional and that each needs to be considered on a case-by-case
basis. However, a subsequent 1995 federal Law on Railways banned
railway strikes in contradiction to the Constitution. After successful
negotiations with the air traffic controllers' union to avoid a strike,
the Government drafted a regulation that became law in 1999 to ban all
strikes in the air traffic sector. In addition to the railway and air
traffic sector, strikes are banned by workers at nuclear power stations
and by members of the military, militia, government agencies, and
disaster assistance organizations.
Union leaders have been followed by the security services, detained
for questioning by police, and subjected to heavy fines, losses of
bonuses, and demotions. In January the death of a youth in Polevskoy
allegedly was due to the trade union activism of his parent who was a
leader of the regional trade union center. The leader had received
threats to her job and family after filing cases against the local
prosecutor's office, municipal court, and police concerning misuse of
funds. The leader subsequently left her position. There were no further
developments in the investigation of the son's death by year's end.
According to an International Labor Organization report, on January
27, 1999, unknown assailants murdered Gennadiy Borisov, a leader of the
Vnukovo Airlines Technical and Ground Personnel Union at the entrance
to his apartment. Earlier that month, Borisov and other labor activists
began picketing the airline headquarters to protest their not being
paid for 4 months. Borisov also reportedly was monitoring alleged
illegal practices involving the company's shares. To date, there have
been no significant developments in this case, and it reportedly is
still open.
There were no prolonged strikes during the year. According to
official statistics, wage arrears in the first half of the year fell by
over 80 percent in real terms when compared with the same period in
1998. Nonpayment of wages, which had motivated strikes in previous
years, grew less prevalent. The number of strikes fell by 25 percent in
1999 and continued to fall this year. Unions may freely form
federations and affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Bargain Collectively.--The law provides for the
right of collective bargaining, but this right is not always protected.
The law requires employers to respond to a trade union's initiative and
negotiate with the union, but no time limit is specified. Moreover, the
law does not require management to sign the agreement, even after both
sides have signed protocols approving a draft text. As a result, the
right to conclude a collective agreement is often not protected.
Employers often ignore the requirement to negotiate and refuse to come
to the bargaining table or refuse to provide financial information
demanded by trade unions. In the past, employers have successfully
refused to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, particularly for
unions not affiliated with the FNPR. However, some progress has been
made in this area. In December 1999, the trade union of employees of
the State TV and Radio Company filed suit against management because of
the latter's refusal to enter into collective bargaining negotiations.
Management demanded that the union prove it was authorized to
participate in collective bargaining, which it did twice. The court
ruled that management should start negotiating a collective bargaining
agreement. Management appealed the ruling, but the higher court left
the decision unchanged--a significant victory for the trade union.
An estimated 14 percent of enterprises have officially registered
collective bargaining agreements. (FNPR claims that approximately 80
percent of its enterprises have such agreements.) It is not obligatory
to register collective agreements, and it is very likely that there are
far more collective agreements than those actually registered. However,
a gap in the law, which fails to establish the employer's legal
identity, often makes collective agreements ineffective. A lack of
clear identification under the Law of the Employer has made nonbinding
tripartite tariff agreements (with labor, management, and government
participation) nonbinding at the municipal, regional, national, and
industrial levels and has brought their legal validity into question.
Even after an agreement is signed, employers often claim that the
``employer representative'' was not authorized to represent the factory
involved.
In December the Duma was scheduled to consider two draft versions
of a new Labor Code. The Government proposed the first in 1999, while
prounion deputies in the Duma support the second. The government draft
seeks to increase labor mobility and reduce the so-called gray economy.
However, trade unionists view the government draft as antiunion and
fear that it will undercut collective bargaining because of its
emphasis on individual labor agreements, provision for entities other
than unions to represent workers, and restrictions of collective
bargaining to legal entities that essentially eliminate local trade
union representation. The prounion draft strengthens trade union rights
and guarantees for workers, including repayment of delayed wages with
interest and employees' right to stop working if payment is delayed
more than 10 days.
There are no export processing zones. Worker rights in the special
economic zones and free trade zones are covered fully by the existing
Labor Code and are the same as in other parts of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by adults and children; however,
there were some reports of its use relative to adults. Officers have
reportedly sent soldiers under their charge to work on farms to gather
food for their units or perform work for private citizens or
organizations. Women are trafficked from the country for the purpose of
forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). There were no reports of
forced or bonded labor by children.
According to credible media reports, significant numbers of foreign
workers from countries of the former Soviet Union are forced to work
without pay because their passports are held by firms that brought them
into the country. Similar reports describe North Koreans brought in to
work in the construction and timber industries in the Russian Far East,
with salaries remitted to their Government.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits regular employment for children
under the age of 16 and also regulates the working conditions of
children under the age of 18, including banning dangerous, nighttime,
and overtime work. Children may, under certain specific conditions and
with parental approval, work in apprenticeship or internship programs
at the ages of 14 and 15. Such programs may not pose any threat to the
health or welfare of children. The Ministries of Labor and the Interior
are responsible for child labor issues. Local police authorities are
responsible for conducting inspections of entities suspected of
violating child labor laws; however, investigations are entirely
complaint-driven.
Accepted social prohibitions against the employment of children and
the availability of adult workers at low wages generally prevent
widespread abuse of child labor legislation. However, the transition
from a planned to a market economy has brought with it drastic
economic, political, and social changes. An increase in the number of
children working and living on the streets is largely the result of
deterioration in the social service infrastructure, including access to
education and health care. In some cases, economic hardship has
undermined traditions and social customs, and eroded the protection
families traditionally provided to children. Homeless children are
especially at risk for exploitation in prostitution or criminal
activities. Children often are used by their parents to lend credence
to their poverty when begging.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
however, some girls were trafficked abroad for the purpose of forced
prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly minimum wage of
$4.70 (132 rubles) remains well below the official subsistence level of
$35 (1,234 rubles) per month and is insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. Approximately 37 percent of
the population have incomes below this survival minimum, compared with
38 percent in 1999. Most workers receive several times the monthly
minimum, and the minimum wage is essentially an accounting reference
for calculating university stipends, pensions, civil service wages, and
social benefits. It is not a number used for real salaries. Enterprises
often use this number to avoid taxation by reporting the number of
employees paid at the minimum wage instead of reporting actual
salaries. According to Ministry of Labor statistics, unreported wages
currently account for about 12 percent of the gross domestic product.
Legally paid wages account only about 36 percent of the total income of
citizens. In addition, much of the population continues to reside in
low-rent or subsidized housing and receives various social services
from enterprises or municipalities. Dependence on such subsidies, in
conjunction with the residency registration system--illegal but widely
practiced--generally prevents relocation to find work.
The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours with at
least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires premium pay for
overtime work or work on holidays. Workers have complained of being
required to work well beyond the normal week, that is 10- to 12-hour
days, of abrogations of negotiated labor agreements, and of forced
transfers.
Despite a steady decline since the 1998 crisis, the nonpayment of
wages continues to be the most widespread abuse of the Labor Code,
especially for workers in the education, medicine, and coal sectors.
While the overall problem of nonpayment of wages appeared to diminish
greatly, total wage arrears at the end of November remained high and
equaled over $1 billion (36.8 billion rubles). While some enterprises
still force their employees to take wages in barter, the practice is
much less prevalent than in the period before or immediately after the
1998 financial crisis. The International Confederation of Trade Unions
(ICFTU) contends that the total bill of wage arrears is now more than
$15 billion.
An increasing number of workers owed back wages seek relief through
the court system, but the process is lengthy. Courts often are willing
to rule in favor of employees, but the collection of back wages remains
difficult. Courts often insist that cases be filed individually, in
contradiction to the Law on Trade Unions, thereby undercutting union
attempts to include the entire membership in one case. This insistence
also makes the process lengthier and more difficult for the affected
workers and exposes them to possible retaliation. It is widespread
practice to remove the names of workers who win judgments for back
wages, but have not yet received the wages, from the list of those who
can buy food on credit from the company store.
Labor mobility continues to be a problem. For various reasons, many
workers are not able to move to other areas of the country in search of
work. Many are constrained economically because their savings were
destroyed by the rampant inflation of the early 1990's and the
nonpayment of wages. Their freedom to move in search of new employment
is limited further by the system of residency permits. Other workers
effectively are tied to enterprises that can give them only credits at
the company cafeteria and grocery and the hope of future salary
payments. The knowledge that workers cannot easily move across regions
and find employment has made managers in some one-factory towns
reluctant to lay off workers. Because of the inability of local
employment agencies to provide benefits or to absorb laid-off employees
from some factory towns, local governors and mayors often overturn the
enterprises' decisions to lay off workers who are not really working.
Other factors, such as the availability of subsidized housing and
cultural ties to locations, also inhibit the movement of workers. By
decriminalizing the nonpayment of wages and by maintaining the system
of residency permits, the Government has restricted even further the
mobility of labor.
The law establishes minimal conditions for workplace safety and
worker health, but these standards often are not enforced. Workers wear
little protective equipment in factories, enterprises store hazardous
materials in open areas, and smoking is permitted near containers of
flammable substances. Funds remain limited for safety and health in the
workplace.
The Labor Code guarantees workers the right to remove themselves
from hazardous or life-threatening work situations without endangering
their continued employment and entitlements to such compensations as
shorter hours, increased vacations, extra pay, and pension benefits for
working under such conditions. However, the pressure for survival often
displaces concern for safety. There continue to be reported cases of
miners removing the supports from mineshafts and selling them for scrap
metal. Doctors and nurses have been known to sell health and safety
equipment at hospitals to patients' families in order to supplement
salaries that often remain below the minimum subsistence level.
The risk of industrial accidents or death for workers remains high,
although reliable recent statistics on accident and death rates at the
workplace are not available. After repeated requests went unanswered,
members of a St. Petersburg local locomotive engineers' union this year
sued management to obtain information on health and safety risks
associated with their work and measures taken to address these
problems. The workers based their case on a federal law that grants
employees the right to obtain information on their working conditions
and occupational hazards. Hearing of the case has been postponed.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and young girls is
a problem, but there are no reliable estimates of its scope. There is
no special legislation nor has the Government established special task
forces on the issue. However, there are several articles of the
Criminal Code that relate to trafficking of persons. For example,
Article 322, the principal legal statute against trafficking in
persons, provides for punishment of up to 5 years' imprisonment for
unlawful violation of Russian borders by a ``group of persons in prior
arrangement or by an organized group either using violence or the
threat of violence.'' Crossing the country's borders without required
documentation is punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to 2 years.
Regarding trafficking of women, Article 133 prohibits forcing a person
into sexual activity; Article 240 prohibits drawing a person into
prostitution by force or threat of force, and Article 241 prohibits the
organization and maintenance of a house of prostitution. Prostitution
itself is not illegal in the country.
Russia is a country of origin for trafficking in persons,
especially in the trafficking of women. However, the authorities often
dispute the extent to which trafficking occurs, and who believe that
estimates are based on too little information. The difficulty is that
law enforcement bodies consider that most of the illegal activity takes
place outside its borders and therefore is not within their
jurisdiction. The country also serves as a transit and destination
country for a large portion of women trafficked from the New
Independent States to Western Europe. There are reports that women from
Tajikistan are trafficked to Russia. Women reportedly are trafficked to
European Union countries, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States.
Reportedly women also are trafficked within the country. Women (most
often young girls) usually are transferred from provincial areas to
Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Due to a continuing lack of adequate employment opportunities, a
significant number of women are victims of international trafficking
for sexual exploitation. Reliable statistics on the number of women
involved are difficult to obtain. NGO's allege that Russian organized
crime increasingly is involved in trafficking in women and children,
but reliable data are not available. Women often respond to
advertisements promising well-paying jobs abroad, where they are forced
into prostitution. A comprehensive 2-year study of trafficking in the
former Soviet Union, completed in 1997 by the Global Survival Network,
an international NGO, remains one of the few sources of information on
the scope of this problem. The study concluded that most women who are
trafficked are unwitting participants who respond to advertisements
while searching for legitimate work. Some government officials and law
enforcement agencies acknowledge that a trafficking problem exists.
However, the belief that women are aware of the risks involved is still
pervasive. According to data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
more then half of the women engaged in prostitution abroad learned
about the nature of their future occupation before leaving the country.
NGO's contend that women are more often told they are would be
hostesses, exotic dancers, hotel workers, models, etc. They further
claim that even those who agreed to be sex workers did not agree to the
kinds of working and living conditions to which they were subjected, or
to the loss of their documentation and the lack of pay. According to
credible reports in the national media, there are significant numbers
of foreign workers from countries of the former Soviet Union who are
forced to work without pay because their passports are held by firms
which brought them into the country.
There are no known specific measures undertaken by law enforcement
bodies in order to prevent the export of women for the purpose of
sexual exploitation. The criminal persecution of representatives of the
``business'' usually takes place in connection with cases whose
investigation is performed within the framework of cooperation with
international law enforcement structures. The Ministry of the Interior
believes that the ``trafficking in women'' problem is the
responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Consular Services
abroad. However, NGO's charge that exploited women commonly are refused
help by Russian consular officials abroad. Women rarely seek the
assistance of local authorities nor do they file complaints against the
agencies that recruited them once they are back in the country because
they often do not trust the law enforcement authorities.
The Government does not provide assistance to trafficking victims.
Victims of trafficking can turn to a crisis center or other NGO's that
render assistance to women victims of sexual and other kinds of abuse.
There are 40 crisis centers and NGO's that render assistance to female
victims of sexual and other kinds of abuse.
There are no Government initiatives to return trafficked women.
Unless deported by the host country, women must pay their own way home.
Some women who return have reportedly told NGO's that they were unable
to communicate with local law enforcement in their destination country.
Women reported that their documentation was withheld and that without
it they were not able to gain assistance from the Russian consulates.
There are also reports of officers ``selling'' soldiers. The Union
of Soldiers' Mothers Committee reported in October that this practice
remains widespread, especially in Chechnya. According to the Committee,
they received reports that the going rate for a soldier was $2 (50
rubles). In one egregious case in September, a soldier in Chechnya
reportedly was purchased for 10 bottles of vodka (see Section 1.c.).
Law enforcement bodies take the trafficking of children more
seriously. There are reports of children being kidnaped or purchased
from orphanages for sexual abuse, child pornography, and body parts.
There are no statistics available, but law enforcement acknowledge that
Internet child pornography is an increasing business. There is also
some evidence of trafficking for organs and body parts. In a much
publicized case near Moscow, police set up an undercover operation
which resulted in the arrest of a grandmother and uncle of an 8 year
old boy, who had sold the child for $90,000 to persons who admitted
they wanted the boy for sale of his body parts.
__________
SAN MARINO
San Marino is a democratic, multiparty republic. The popularly
elected Parliament (the Great and General Council (GGC)) selects two of
its members to serve as the Captains Regent (co-Heads of State). They
preside over meetings of the GGC and of the Cabinet (Congress of
State), which has 10 other members (Secretaries of State), also
selected by the GGC. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has
some of the prerogatives of a prime minister. The Government respects
the law's provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
Elected officials effectively control the centralized police
organization (the Civil Police) and the two military organizations (the
Gendarmerie and the Guardie di Rocca).
The principal economic activities are tourism, farming, light
manufacturing, and banking. In addition to revenue from taxes and
customs, the Government also derives revenue from the sale of coins and
postage stamps to collectors throughout the world and from an annual
budget subsidy provided by the Italian Government under the terms of
the Basic Treaty with Italy.
The authorities generally respect citizen's rights in practice;
however, although the Parliament and the Government have demonstrated
strong commitment to the protection of human rights, some laws
discriminate against women, particularly with regard to the
transmission of citizenship.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process. The judicial system requires that the country's lower
court judges be non-Sammarinese citizens, with the aim of assuring
impartiality.
A local conciliation judge handles cases of minor importance. Other
cases are handled by the non-Sammarinese judges who serve under
contract to the Government. The final court of review is the Council of
Twelve, a group of judges chosen for 6-year terms (4 replaced every 2
years) from among the members of the GGC.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices. Government
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations.
Although it does not formally offer asylum to refugees, the Government
has permitted a few individuals to reside and work in the country. The
issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the year;
nor were there any reports of the forced repatriation of refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
they face no legal impediments. In 1974 the first female member was
elected to the GGC. Since then, women have served on the Council as
Secretary of State for Internal Affairs and as Captain Regent. All
women's branches of the political parties have been integrated into the
mainstream party organizations, where women hold important positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no domestic human rights organizations, although the
Government does not impede their formation. The Government has declared
itself open to outsiders' investigations of alleged abuses, but there
have been no known requests.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on race, religion,
disability, language, or social status, and the authorities respect
these provisions. The law also prohibits some forms of discrimination
based on sex, but vestiges of legal as well as societal discrimination
against women remain.
Women.--The law provides for the protection of women from violence,
and occurrences of such violence, including spousal abuse, are rare.
Several laws provide specifically for the equality of women in the
workplace and elsewhere. In practice there is no discrimination in pay
or working conditions. All careers are open to women, including careers
in the military and police as well as the highest public offices.
However, one law discriminates against women by stipulating that a
woman who marries a foreigner cannot transmit citizenship to her
husband or children, but that a man who marries a foreigner can do so
to both his wife and their children. In a September 1999 referendum,
the electorate by a very narrow margin failed to confirm a change to
the law that was approved by Parliament in June 1999. The proposed law
would have provided for the transmission of Sammarinese citizenship by
women, but it was narrowly defeated despite support by all political
parties.
The September 1999 referendum also failed to confirm a provision
that would have revoked the citizenship of women who acquired
citizenship through marriage 5 years after a divorce, if they no longer
resided in the country. This provision was included in the proposed law
after the Government had noted that several Eastern European women
recently had married significantly older citizens, presumably with the
aim of acquiring citizenship.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public education
and medical care. No differences are apparent in the treatment of girls
and boys in education or health care, nor is there any societal pattern
of abuse directed against children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. A 1992 law established guidelines for easier access to
public buildings, but its implementation remained incomplete.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--By law all workers (except the armed
forces but including the police) are free to form and join unions. A
1961 law sets the conditions for the establishment of a union. Unions
may form domestic federations or join international labor federations.
Union members constitute about half of the country's work force
(which numbers about 10,300 Sammarinese citizens plus 4,000 Italians
from the country's total population of about 25,000 persons).
Trade unions are independent of the Government and the political
parties, but they have close informal ties with the parties, which
exercise strong influence on them.
Workers in all nonmilitary occupations have the right to strike. No
general strikes occurred in at least the last 10 years. However, during
this period some brief sector-wide and company strikes took place.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.
The law gives collective bargaining agreements the force of law and
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Effective mechanisms
exist to resolve complaints. Negotiations are conducted freely, often
in the presence of government officials (usually from the Labor and
Industry Departments) by invitation from both the unions and the
employers' association. For the last several years, all complaints have
been resolved amicably by a ``conciliatory committee'' composed of
labor union and business association representatives and government
officials.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor, including by children, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
the Government enforces this prohibition (see Section 6.c.). The
minimum working age and compulsory education age ceiling is 16 years.
The Ministry of Labor and Cooperation permits no exceptions. Most
students continue in school until age 18.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Since January 1, the legal
minimum wage has been approximately $1,100 (2.29 million lira) per
month, which affords a decent living for a worker and family. Wages
generally were higher than the minimum.
The law sets the workweek at 36 hours in public administration and
37+ hours in industry and private business, with 24
consecutive hours of rest per week for workers in either category.
The law stipulates safety and health standards, and the judicial
system monitors them. Most workplaces implement the standards
effectively, but there are some exceptions, notably in the construction
industry.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
The Slovak Republic became an independent state in 1993, following
the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Its
Constitution provides for a multiparty, multiethnic parliamentary
democracy, including separation of powers. Prime Minister Mikulas
Dzurinda took office after parliamentary elections in the fall of 1998.
The first direct presidential elections were held in May 1999. Both
elections were declared free and fair by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR). The Slovak Republic chose to carry over the
entire body of CSFR domestic legislation and international treaty
obligations, which still are being renewed or updated. The Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary; however, some experts allege
that the Ministry of Justice's logistical and personnel authority
allows it to exert some influence on the judicial system.
The national police, which fall under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Interior, are the primary law enforcement agency. In
addition to domestic law enforcement, they also have responsibility for
border security. The Slovak Information Service (SIS), an independent
organization reporting directly to the Prime Minister, is responsible
for all civilian security and intelligence activities. A parliamentary
commission composed of legislators from ruling and opposition parties
oversees the SIS. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective
control of the security forces. Police committed some human rights
abuses.
The Slovak Republic continued to make progress in the transition to
a market-based economy, with more than 83 percent of the gross domestic
product (GDP) now generated by the private sector. The economy is
largely industrial, with only 5 percent of the GDP generated by
agricultural production. Major exports are iron and steel products,
vehicles and automobile parts, audio and video equipment, machinery and
transport equipment, petroleum products, and organic chemicals. GDP
growth reached 2 percent during the year. The economy's growth is
fueled by foreign demand as exports increased by 30 percent in the
third quarter of the year. Inflation grew by 12 percent, lower than
expected, due to a combination of increases in regulated prices,
growing competition on the retail market, and lower than expected
domestic demand. Slow growth is largely the result of the failure of
the previous government to implement structural reforms, such as
financial sector privatization and industrial restructuring. The GDP
per capita was $3,569 during the year. This provided most of the
population with an adequate standard of living. The unemployment rate
was 18.8 percent at year's end, reaching almost 30 percent in some
areas. A disproportionate number of unemployed are Roma, who face
exceptional difficulties in finding and holding jobs, partly as a
result of discrimination. According to the law, social benefits of
those unemployed over 2 years were cut in half. Savings have been
transferred to municipalities to pay for community service jobs. More
than 64,000 jobs have been created to date, of which over half have
gone to the Roma minority.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the human rights situation improved during the year;
however, problems remained in some areas. Police on occasion allegedly
beat and abused Roma. Although the practice under the former government
of using the SIS to conduct surveillance of many political figures,
journalists, and their spouses nearly has been eliminated, there were
allegations in October that this surveillance continues on both
opposition and government politicians. The absence of government
intimidation removed the pressure on journalists to practice self-
censorship. Media monitors report that government politicization of the
state-owned electronic media nearly has been eliminated; and although
the potential for political interference with Slovak Television (STV)
and Slovak Radio (SRO) exists because they are reliant on government
funds, no threats of retaliation for negative reporting of government
actions were reported. On May 17, the Parliament approved a Freedom of
Information Act, which grants citizens access to virtually all
unclassified information from national and local government offices.
Discrimination and violence against women remain problems. Cases of
abuse of children and discrimination against the disabled were
reported. Ethnic minorities, in particular Roma, faced societal
discrimination. The frequency of skinhead attacks on Roma appeared to
remain the same during the year. Police sometimes failed to provide
adequate protection against these attacks or to investigate such cases
vigorously. Some anti-Semitic incidents occurred, and limited societal
discrimination against the Hungarian minority persists, mainly in
regions where only small numbers of the ethnic Hungarian minority
reside. There were instances of trafficking in women and girls.
During the year, the Government initiated investigations into some
serious crimes. In 1999 the Government created the position of special
government commissioner for Roma issues in the Office of Deputy Prime
Minister for Human Rights and Minorities. However, the Government still
has not fulfilled the United Nations (UN) recommendation to create a
national committee for human rights and a human rights ombudsman. The
government Office for Human Rights and National Minorities established
an ad hoc working group in June to examine existing anti-discrimination
legislation. The group completed an in-depth analysis of the
legislation in December and found that although anti-discrimination
provisions in the Penal Code are sufficient, improvements in the Civil
Code and more effective implementation of all legislation are needed.
The cabinet approved an action plan to prevent all forms of
discrimination and intolerance.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political killings by government officials.
However, former Prime Minister Meciar's party, the Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), alleges that the January 1999 killing of
Jan Ducky, the former Economy Minister under the Meciar Government and
head of the national gas distribution monopoly, was the result of a
political vendetta. Ducky was killed in the lobby of his apartment
building a week after the authorities filed charges against him for
financial mismanagement and illegal property transfers while at the gas
monopoly. Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner publicly speculated that
Ducky might have been killed to prevent his testimony. In November the
Bratislava district court ruled to halt the criminal prosecution of
Ukrainian citizen Oleg T. due to lack of incriminating evidence,
although the appeals court has not yet confirmed this decision. The
investigation into the murder of Ducky continued at year's end.
The August 1999 case of a police officer allegedly shooting a 21-
year-old Rom during interrogation is still under investigation, and the
police officer involved was dismissed this year for violating the law
by interrogating the Rom alone when he had access to a gun. The
Government has appointed independent investigators to examine the case
further; the investigation continued at year's end.
There was no progress during the year in the on-going investigation
of the 1996 death of Robert Remias. There has been widespread press
speculation that elements of the security services under the Meciar
administration were involved in his death.
In November 1999, Minister of Justice Jan Carnogursky established a
department for the documentation of crimes committed by the communist
regime. The commission provides legal advice regarding restitution and
rehabilitation after imprisonment or persecution during the communist
regime. The commission responded to approximately 250 requests during
the year. The commission also prepared draft legislation to assist
victims of the communist regime.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, both
national and city police on occasion allegedly beat suspects in
custody. Police reportedly use pressure and threats to discourage Roma
from pressing charges of police brutality (see Section 1.e.). Credible
sources say that the police sometimes tolerate violence against Roma by
not thoroughly investigating attacks against them in a timely and
thorough manner or by coercing Roma to refrain from submitting
incriminating evidence (see Sections 1.e. and 5.). Some police also
infringe on the rights of Roma to social benefits and housing (see
Section 2.d.). In 1998 and 1999, Roma in the town of Vrable lodged
complaints against local law enforcement officer Roman Frajka for
allegedly attacking teenage Romani boys. The Ministry of Interior
investigated the case and found Frajka not guilty. The case was closed
and no official charges or further complaints were registered against
him this year.
Residents of African and Asian origin continued to complain that
police fail to investigate skinhead attacks against them.
The 1995 case of the violent abduction of the former president's
son, Michal Kovac, Jr. to Austria, during which he was tortured,
remains unsolved. The Government actively reinvestigated the case in
which former SIS personnel are alleged to be implicated. Interior
Minister Pittner released a report in January 1999 attesting to the
SIS's influence over the Ministry of Interior under Meciar, especially
over the investigative and criminal police sections. In February 1999,
the police arrested two former high-ranking officers of the SIS. The
Constitutional Court concluded that amnesties granted to Gustav Krajci
and a second official involved in the case, Jaroslav Svechota, by
former Prime Minister Meciar shielded them from prosecution. Police
closed their investigation in April. Twelve persons, most of whom were
formerly members of the SIS, were charged. Former SIS head Ivan Lexa
was the primary person accused.
In April 1999, the Parliament lifted the immunity of former SIS
head Ivan Lexa in five of the seven criminal cases in which he
allegedly was implicated. Subsequently he was placed in preliminary
detention; however, he was released later on the decision of a regional
court due to insufficient evidence. On September 4, the Bratislava
district court issued an international warrant for the arrest of Lexa,
who allegedly had fled the country. Lexa faces several charges,
including abuse of power, fraud, and money laundering. Following the
issuance of the international arrest warrant, Slovak police applied for
Interpol's help in finding and detaining him. Lexa's attorneys have
charged that the Government's continued pursuit of their client is
unfair persecution since they argue that he cannot be prosecuted
because of Meciar's amnesties. However, the Government's investigation
into Lexa's involvement in crimes for which he had not received amnesty
continues.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes
these prohibitions.
A person accused or suspected of a crime must be given a hearing
within 24 hours and be either set free or remanded by the court. During
this time, the detainee has the right to an attorney. If remanded by a
court, the accused is entitled to an additional hearing within 24
hours, at which time the judge either sets the accused free or issues a
substantive written order placing the accused in custody. Some critics
argue that the initial 24-hour detainment period, during which time
investigators must gather all evidence, which can be submitted, to the
prosecutor, is not sufficient and occasionally results in the release
of guilty suspects. A Ministry of Justice judicial reform committee
recommended lengthening the initial detainment period to 72 hours.
In April Special Forces broke into the residence of former Prime
Minister Vladimir Meciar, and detained and transported him to
Bratislava to question him concerning his alleged misuse of authority
as a public official. His supporters called the action an excessive use
of force and an illegal and politically motivated indictment. Police
defended the action and stated that it was in accordance with the law.
Investigative detention may last 18 to 40 days, with further
pretrial detention permitted. The total length of pretrial detention
may not exceed 1 year, unless the Supreme Court extends it, after
determining that the person constitutes a serious danger to society.
Pretrial detainees constituted roughly 26.7 percent of the total
prison population, and the average pretrial detention period was 7.2
months. The law allows family visits and provides for a court-paid
attorney if needed. A system of bail exists. Noncitizens may be held
for up to 30 days for identification purposes or for 18 to 40 days in
investigative detention. Detainees have the right to see an attorney
immediately and should be notified of this right; however, one
nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports that not all detainees are
notified of their rights.
The law allows monthly family visits upon request and receipt by
detainees of a package of up to 10 pounds every 2 weeks. Attorney
visits are allowed as frequently as necessary, and consular visits are
allowed upon request by the judge.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government observes this
prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
courts that are independent, impartial, and separate from the other
branches of government; however, some critics allege that the
dependence of judges upon the Ministry of Justice for logistical
support, the granting of leave requests, and other services undermines
their independent status. Also, the Ministry of Justice can demote
presidents and vice presidents of the courts for any reason, although
they remain judges, and it has done so. Although not specified in
legislation, in practice the Judicial Council, an independent
organization of lawyers and judges, recommends nominations for
presidents of courts, and the Minister of Justice then officially
nominates the recommended judge. The Ministry has denied nomination of
only one of the council's recommendations. This practice increases the
independence of the judicial branch.
The court system consists of local and regional courts, with the
Supreme Court as the highest court of appeal except for on
constitutional questions. There is a separate Constitutional Court--
with no ties to the Ministry of Justice--that considers constitutional
issues. In addition there is a separate military court system, the
decisions of which may be appealed to the Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Court. Under the Constitution, the President appoints
Constitutional Court judges to 7-year terms based upon parliamentary
nominations. Parliament elects other judges, based on recommendations
from the Ministry of Justice, and can remove them for misconduct.
Many activists make credible allegations that some judges are
corrupt and that adequate safeguards against corruption do not exist.
Persons charged with criminal offenses are entitled to fair and
open public trials. They have the right to be informed of the charges
against them and of their legal rights, to retain and consult with
counsel sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense, and to confront
witnesses. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. Defendants also
have the right to refuse to make self-incriminating statements, and
they may appeal any judgment against them.
According to existing legislation, suspects are presumed innocent
during the appeal process, and if that process lasts more than 3 years,
the suspect will be released. Critics say that this rule occasionally
results in the release of dangerous criminals.
Human rights monitors continued to charge that police and
investigators are reluctant to take the testimony of witnesses,
particularly Roma, to skinhead attacks on Roma, and police on occasion
have failed to investigate cases of skinhead violence when the skinhead
did not admit the crime (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Some NGO's have
defended the police, contending that the real fault lies in the
legislation, which states that only evidence that is collected by the
investigator in the 24-hour detention period can be considered in the
decision on whether to hold the suspect. Furthermore human rights
monitors reported that police used the device of countercharges or
threats of countercharges to pressure Roma victims of police brutality
to drop their complaints. They also reported that medical doctors and
investigators cooperated with police by refusing to describe accurately
the injuries involved, and that lawyers often were reluctant to
represent Roma in such situations, for fear that this would have a
negative effect on their law practice.
Credible sources say that it is increasingly difficult for citizens
who are disadvantaged economically to obtain noncriminal legal
representation, and therefore it is becoming more difficult for some
who may have had their rights infringed upon to take further legal
action. The Ministry of Justice has initiated a program in which free
legal advice is offered in seven cities every Wednesday for 5 hours.
However, a legal NGO claimed that a more systematic approach is
necessary. The practice of Chamber of Advocates leadership encouraging
their membership to avoid indigent cases has been eliminated. The
Slovak bar association currently is preparing a program to encourage
lawyers to accept pro-bono cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides for these rights, but the authorities
sometimes infringed upon them. The Criminal Code requires police to
obtain a judicial search warrant in order to enter a home. The court
may issue such a warrant only if there is a well-founded suspicion that
important evidence or persons accused of criminal activity are present
inside, or if there is some other important reason. Police must present
the warrant before conducting the house search or within 24 hours after
the search.
Some Roma activists have alleged that local police detachments on
occasion have entered Roma premises without a search warrant.
The 1993 police law regulates wiretapping and mail surveillance for
the purposes of criminal investigation, which may be conducted on the
order of a judge or prosecutor only in cases of extraordinarily serious
premeditated crimes or crimes involving international treaty
obligations. There were allegations in October that SIS surveillance
continued on both opposition and government politicians (see Section
2.a). Unlike during the previous year, there were no known reports of
alleged government surveillance of Roma.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. The print media are free and
uncensored. Individuals report that they feel able to criticize the
Government without fear of reprisal. However, there were many
allegations in October that this surveillance continues on both
opposition and government politicians (see Section 1.f.).
Newspapers and magazines regularly publish a wide range of opinions
and news articles. The politicization of state-owned broadcast media,
which was a significant problem under the previous Government, no
longer is evident. There were no reported cases of journalists being
intimidated or threatened in attempts to influence their reporting
during the year.
The potential for political interference exists because STV and SRO
are reliant on government funds; there have been no reports of such
interference this year. However, STV and SRO officials assert that
government officials do not threaten retaliation if they do not report
the news to the Government's liking.
In one case the Government used libel laws to suppress criticism of
political or other leaders, and some human rights activists have
criticized the section of the Penal Code that prohibits the defamation
of the republic. The Government does not use tax laws or allocations of
newsprint or advertising revenue to suppress criticism of political and
other leaders or the expression of viewpoints not favored by the
Government.
On February 16, former HZDS Member of Parliament (M.P.) Frantisek
Gauleider rescinded his complaint to the European Court for Human
Rights in Strasbourg against the Slovak Republic for his 1996 expulsion
from Parliament, after the Government agreed to a conciliation
agreement and financial compensation.
On March 23, the editor-in-chief of the extreme nationalist weekly
Zmena, Vladimir Mohorita, was found guilty of defaming the Government
in an article in which he used inflammatory rhetoric to criticize the
Government for its decision to open its airspace to NATO flights during
the Kosovo crisis. Mohorita called the decision a ``shameful and
fratricidal act,'' denounced the Cabinet as a ``government of mass
murderers,'' and attacked the ``crazy Satanists from the United
States.'' He received a 4-month suspended sentence with 2 years
probation. The law under which he was charged, Article 102 of the Penal
Code, had been passed under the Government of former Prime Minister
Vladimir Meciar.
On May 17, the Parliament approved a Freedom of Information Act,
effective January 1, 2001, which grants citizens access to virtually
all unclassified information from national and local government
offices.
None of the 26 journalists fired from the STV in 1999 have pursued
legal action or received legal relief.
Three boards appointed by a majority vote of Parliament supervise
radio and television broadcasting. The Slovak Television Council and
the Slovak Radio Council establish broadcasting policy for state-owned
television and radio. The Slovak Council for Radio and Television
Broadcasting issues broadcast licenses and administers advertising laws
and some other regulations. The Radio and Television Council has made
significant progress in fostering the spread of private broadcasting,
for which it has issued 27 radio and 78 television and cable television
licenses. TV Markiza, a private company with a signal covering two-
thirds of the country, is the most watched station.
The Government does not censor books, films, or plays; it also does
not limit access to the Internet.
Money has been reallocated to minority groups for the publication
of minority language newspapers. However, the media monitoring
organization Memo said that from April until June, Slovak media devoted
only one percent of their combined airtime to minority issues. In
addition Roma received no positive coverage, and the Czech, Ukrainian,
and Ruthenian minorities received no coverage.
The law provides for academic freedom. Unlike the previous
government, the current Government neither intervenes in the
administration and funding of institutions of higher education, nor
approves all professors' appointments. Many of the school
administrators who were appointed based solely upon political
favoritism during the previous regime have been replaced. The practice
of diverting money from the older, then pro-opposition, universities
largely has been reversed. In April the Parliament passed legislation
establishing a private Catholic university in the town of Ruzomberok,
which officially opened in September. It received a state subsidy of
$200,000, which constitutes 70 percent of the school's budget. The use
of bribery by some students to increase their chances for acceptance
into some more prestigious faculties is believed widely to result in
unequal access for economically disadvantaged students.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Registration is not required, but under existing law, only registered
churches and religious organizations have the explicit right to conduct
public worship services and other activities. However, in practice no
specific religions are banned or discouraged by the authorities. In
order to register as a church, a religious organization must collect
the signatures of 20,000 persons with long-term residency in the
country. Some experts argue that the requirement to collect 20,000
signatures is too stringent and unfairly limits the registration of
smaller churches. The State provides financial benefits, including
subsidies for clergy and office expenses, only to the 15 registered
churches and religious organizations.
In February 1999, police arrested two former high officials in the
SIS for involvement in the 1995 effort to discredit the chairman of the
Slovak Bishops Conference. Allegedly the SIS framed the Bishop for
selling religious art for personal gain. If convicted, former Chief of
the SIS Counterintelligence Unit Jaroslav Svechota and Deputy Director
of the Surveillance Unit Robert Beno would face sentences of between 5
and 12 years in jail. SIS involvement in the case was proven, and
property was returned; however, the court had not made any rulings
regarding Svechota or Beno by year's end.
By law churches and religious organizations could apply for the
return of their property that had been confiscated by the communist
government; the deadline for these claims was December 31, 1994. The
property was returned by the State, by municipalities, by state legal
entities, and under certain conditions by private persons. The main
obstacles to the resolution of outstanding restitution claims are the
Government's lack of financial resources, and bureaucratic resistance
on the part of those entities required to vacate restitutable
properties. While the Orthodox Church reported that six of the seven
properties on which it had filed claims already had been returned, the
Catholic Church and the Federation of Jewish Communities (FJC) reported
lower rates of success. The FJC is dissatisfied with the Government's
failure to discuss compensation for property that belonged to Jewish
families who no longer have living heirs.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
According to a legal rights NGO, although the law requires state
administrators to register all citizens, some local police officers
refused to give a registration stamp to Romani citizens, which prevents
them from receiving social benefits and housing.
The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. During the year,
1,556 persons applied for asylum. Of these cases and cases held over
from previous years, none were granted citizenship, 10 were accepted as
refugees, 123 claims were rejected, 1,366 persons terminated their
cases, and 400 cases were pending at year's end.
On April 19, Parliament amended the law on refugees to no longer
require asylum seekers to register at the migration office within 24
hours of entering the country.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a
valid claim to refugee status; however, some refugee claimants had
difficulty in gaining access to initial processing.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government
through the periodic free election of their national representatives.
All citizens over the age of 18 are eligible to vote, and voting is by
secret ballot. The Constitution reserves certain powers to the
President as Chief of State (directly elected by the citizens), but
executive power rests with the Prime Minister. Legislative power is
vested in the National Council of the Slovak Republic (Parliament).
On August 31, charges against former Minister of Interior, Gustav
Krajci, for abuse of power and forgery of ballots in the 1997
referendum on direct presidential elections were dropped. As deputy
chairman of the central election commission, Krajci allegedly deleted
from the referendum ballot the question on holding direct elections for
president and marked the new ballot with the commission's official
stamp, without notifying the commission of the change. Legal
proceedings were halted because of a Constitutional Court ruling that
Krajci was covered by an amnesty issued by former Prime Minister Meciar
while the latter was temporarily exercising presidential authority.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 2
female ministers, 1 of the 9 Constitutional Court judges appointed in
November 1999 is a woman, and women hold 21 seats in the 150-member
Parliament. In the last parliamentary elections, only 273 of the 1,618
candidates (17 percent) were women.
The large ethnic Hungarian minority, whose coalition gained 15
seats in Parliament in the September 1998 elections, is well
represented in Parliament and the Government. One ethnic Hungarian sits
on the Constitutional Court. Roma are not represented in Parliament,
but a Rom holds the position of Government Commissioner for Roma
Issues.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally are
cooperative and responsive to their views. A 1996 law requiring NGO's
and foundations to reregister and have substantial financial resources
in order to operate, eliminated some foundations, primarily dormant
groups. However, no organization was denied registration or faced any
other major problem in continuing to operate. Some NGO leaders
continued to allege that the current Government at times is
unresponsive to their requests.
Roma calls for Deputy Prime Minister Csaky's resignation had little
effect. The Roma community appeared more satisfied with the performance
of his office during the year; however, there has been an increase in
dissatisfaction among Roma with the performance of the Government's
commissioner for Roma Issues, Vincent Danihel. The Roma community has
called for Danihel's resignation to little effect.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination and provides for the equality of
all citizens. However, enforcement is uneven, with different minority
groups reporting that their members often receive no government
assistance with complaints about discrimination. Health care,
education, retirement benefits, and other social services are provided
regardless of race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social
status; however, there were credible reports by human rights monitors
that indicate that Roma continued to suffer from discrimination in
employment, housing, schooling, health care, and the administration of
state services. Deputy Prime Minister Csaky's office appointed a
commission in May to examine existing anti-discrimination legislation
and determine whether additional legislation is necessary. The
committee completed its assignment in December. The result of the
committee's findings indicate that the Penal Code sufficiently
addresses anti-discrimination concerns, but both improved legislation
protecting civil rights and better implementation of the legislation is
needed.
Women.--Violence, particularly sexual violence against women,
remains a serious and underreported problem. According to Ministry of
Interior statistics, both domestic and public violence against women
has been increasing: 1,000 cases of public violence were registered in
1997, compared with 276 in 1985. Domestic violence in 1997 included
2,656 cases, compared with 1,874 in 1995 when statistics first were
kept. Further police statistics indicate that from 1995 to 1997, 69.8
percent of all violent crimes occurred at home, with 90 percent of the
victims being women or children. One NGO's regional research showed
that 38 to 40 percent of women were victims of domestic violence. A
national poll from this year indicated that as many as one in five
women are subjected to some form of physical violence in the home, and
that 70 percent of all violence against women occurs in the home.
Police estimate that two-thirds of female rape victims fail to report
their cases. Police treat spousal abuse, other violence against women,
and child abuse in the same way as other criminal offenses; sections in
the criminal code specifically address rape, sexual abuse, and
trafficking in women.
Legislation has not yet recognized and defined the term domestic
violence. There is one consulting center for abused women in the
country. There is no shelter for battered women without children, but
there are three family shelters for victims of child and spousal abuse.
In the view of some NGO's, the lack of relevant data on domestic
violence is used by police authorities to downplay the extent of
domestic violence.
Many activists argue that existing legislation does not
specifically address domestic violence and fails to protect victims
sufficiently, but noted that the Government adopted a law that
addresses specifically abuse of family members. As a result of
amendments to the criminal code that took effect in 1994, prostitution
is not illegal. However, the code prohibits activities related to
prostitution, such as renting apartments for conducting prostitution,
spreading sexually transmitted diseases, or trafficking in women for
the purpose of prostitution. Trafficking in women is a problem, and the
Government views it with concern (see Section 6.f.).
Women are equal under the law. They have the same property,
inheritance, and other legal rights as men. However, discrimination
against women remained a problem. According to sociological studies,
women receive approximately 85 percent of men's wages for similar work.
However, the definition of similar work is not defined precisely. For
example, women may have fewer years' experience on the job due to time
spent out of the work force raising a family. Women earn, on average,
22 percent less than men.
In December 1997, the Gender Center for Equal Treatment of Men and
Women was founded. The Center is an independent NGO that cooperates
with the U.N. Development Program and the Government. The Government's
Coordinating Committee for Women's Affairs (including NGO's) has done
little to implement the 1997 national action plan meant to reduce
violence against women, protect women's health, and reduce women's
economic disadvantages.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
rights and welfare through its system of public education and medical
care. The Ministry of Labor oversees implementation of the Government's
programs for children. The Constitution, the law on education, the
Labor Code, and the system of assistance payments to families with
children each address in part the issue of children's rights. Education
is universal, free, and compulsory for 9 years, or until the age of 15.
Abuse of children remains a problem and is underreported. Experts
from various state institutions dealing with child abuse claim that
there are significant discrepancies between official figures on child
violence and the actual situation. A 1999 survey of over 7,000 children
conducted by an NGO offering resources to abused children indicated
that 12 percent of children are victims of sexual abuse, while 20
percent are victims of physical abuse. According to available police
statistics, child beating and sexual abuse are on the rise. In 1997
there were 1,083 reported cases of crimes against children. Among the
most frequent crimes committed against children were: Nonpayment of
child support, sexual violence, and beatings. In the past 10 years,
only 127 cases of abused children were reported officially, while the
actual number is likely 20 to 30 times greater. According to
independent research, 25 percent of all children are punished
physically on a regular basis. The lack of legislation protecting
children in state institutions presents a problem.
Youth criminality has increased as well. In 1990 children under the
age of 15 reportedly committed 226 crimes; in 2000 this number rose to
4,159. Juveniles (15 to 18 years of age) committed 5,565 crimes during
the year. Child prostitution is not addressed specifically in the
Criminal Code, but is covered by more general provisions in the law.
The Penal Code was amended in September 1999 to include a provision
outlawing child pornography.
The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), several NGO's, and other
institutions dealing with children's issues have called for amendments
to the law on families, particularly the part on relations between
parents and children. Although new departments dealing specifically
with children's issues have been established in the Ministries of
Education and Social affairs, the Government has not yet created an
ombudsman's office to defend children's rights, as UNICEF recommended
in 1999. In June the Ministry of Social Affairs established a
Commission on the Rights of the Child. The Commission provides
information to children regarding their rights and performs the duties
traditionally fulfilled by an ombudsman. There are two regional
emergency hot line numbers for abused children and one counseling help
line.
Existing legislation appears to place emphasis on parents' rights
over children's rights. Current legislation allows parents to place
their child in a state-run institution for abandoned children, and as
long as contact is maintained once every 6 months, the child remains in
the custody of the parents and cannot be adopted. NGO leaders claim
that existing legislation protects aggressors before victims. If a
husband or wife is guilty of child and/or spousal abuse, it is often
the victim who is forced to leave the family home. However, legislation
was amended in 1999 to allow children who are victims of physical or
sexual abuse to seek assistance and treatment, without parental
consent.
Trafficking of girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution and implementing
legislation provide for health protection and special working
conditions for mentally and physically disabled persons, including
special protection in employment relations and special assistance in
training. A 1994 decree provides incentives to employers who create a
``sheltered'' workplace (i.e., a certain percentage of jobs set aside
for the disabled). The law also prohibits discrimination against
physically disabled individuals in employment, education, and the
provision of other state services. Nevertheless, experts report
discrimination in the accessibility of premises and access to education
(especially higher education), and in 1998 the quotas for mandatory
hiring of disabled citizens were lowered in accordance with employers'
wishes. Although not required specifically by law, another 1994
Government decree mandates accessibility for new public building
construction. The decree provides for sanctions but lacks a mechanism
to enforce them. A spokeswoman for an NGO dealing with the disabled
said that due to pressure from a number of NGO's and the willingness of
the Dzurinda Government, accessibility has been improving, particularly
regarding new construction; however, many barriers remain. NGO's
complained that other legislation, including the provision of jobs for
the disabled, while on the books, often is ignored.
Religious Minorities.--Despite an order by former Prime Minister
Meciar to withdraw a controversial history book entitled the ``History
of the Slovak Republic and the Slovaks'' by Milan Durica, it remains
available in schools. The book has been criticized widely by religious
groups and the Slovak Academy of Sciences for gross inaccuracies and
distortions, particularly in its portrayal of wartime Slovakia and the
deportation of Jews and Roma.
In March the city council of the town of Zilina announced its
decision to install a plaque honoring the Nazi-collaborationist and
wartime Slovak President, Jozef Tiso, on the city's Catholic community
center. High-level politicians including President Rudolf Schuster and
Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda publicly condemned the proposal. The
council eventually reversed its decision.
On May 18, the Government sponsored a national conference on
racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and intolerance. At the conference
the President announced that he would dedicate September 10 as a
memorial day to victims of the Holocaust; the event took place as
announced.
In September the Government approved an agreement between the
Vatican and the Republic. In February the Ministry of Education and the
Institute of Judaism undertook a joint educational project on Jewish
history and culture that is targeted to elementary and high school
teachers of history, civic education, and ethics. This project is
intended to assist in educating the public about Jewish themes and
increase tolerance toward minorities. The Government currently is
seeking to obtain membership in the task force for international
cooperation on Holocaust education, remembrance, and research.
In July 1999, the FJC in the Slovak Republic expressed its concern
over the desecration of the monument to Holocaust victims located in
the old city in Bratislava. Investigation into the case revealed that
it was one of pure vandalism; no connection to racism was found.
In November 1999, Parliament passed legislation compensating Slovak
citizens who were deported to German-controlled concentration camps
during World War II on the basis of their nationality, race, or
religion. For each month of deportation, those eligible are to receive
a cash sum of $75 (SK 3,000), plus a $.75 (SK 30) addition to their
monthly pension. Direct heirs of deceased victims, who at the time of
deportation were minors, are entitled to a lump sum of up to
approximately $2,500 (SK 100,000). The legislation disqualifies the
nearly 700 Slovak Jewish survivors from southern Slovakia, which was
under Hungarian control during World War II, because they received
compensation from the Hungarian Government.
In May 1998, the Supreme Court upheld a prior verdict that the
publisher of Zmena weekly had to publish an apology to the honorary
chairman of the FJC for abusing his person and offending his religious
feelings. The apology still was not published by year's end.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides
minorities with the right to develop their own culture, receive
information and education in their mother tongue, and participate in
decisionmaking in matters affecting them. The Government continued to
provide funding for cultural, educational, broadcasting, and publishing
activities for the major ethnic minorities, but at greatly reduced
levels. However, there is no comprehensive law against discrimination.
The largest minority is the ethnic Hungarian minority. It is
concentrated primarily in the southern part of the country, with a
population registered at 568,714 at the end of 1999 (150,000 of whom
are thought to be Roma who speak Hungarian and choose to declare
themselves as ethnic Hungarian). Most ethnic Hungarians and ethnic
Slovaks living in mixed areas continued to coexist peacefully, but in
recent years there have been occasional expressions of anti-Hungarian
sentiments by Slovak nationalists. In 1998 the Slovak Government and
the Government of Hungary signed an implementation agreement for their
1996 bilateral treaty, which called for the establishment of
commissions to deal with the treatment of ethnic minorities. The
commissions were established in February 1999.
A 1999 minority language law provides for the use of minority
languages in official activities. According to the law, in places where
a minority group constitutes at least 20 percent of the population, the
minority language can be used in contacts with government officials.
The law was deemed acceptable by the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities and the European Union. However, all members of the
Hungarian coalition voted against the law because they felt that it did
not ensure that the provisions in the new law would take precedence
over the existing state language law. The Hungarian minority felt that
a more comprehensive law was necessary, and that this law did not
protect the use of Hungarian in cultural and educational activities.
The Cabinet held numerous negotiations regarding the European Charter
on Minority Languages, in an attempt to reach a solution acceptable to
all government parties.
The special parliamentary advisory committee for Roma issues that
was created in February 1999 met only twice this year.
In January 1999, Parliament amended three laws to permit bilingual
recordkeeping at schools with Hungarian or other minority language
instruction. As a result of these changes, the Ministry of Education
ordered report cards in both Hungarian/Slovak and Ukrainian/Slovak
versions.
Roma constitute the second largest ethnic minority, estimated by
experts to number up to 500,000 citizens, although the Government
officially reported 83,988 Roma in the country. Police on occasion beat
Roma, and in a 1999 case allegedly shot a Rom during questioning at the
police station (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). They suffer
disproportionately from high levels of poverty and unemployment.
Credible reports by human rights monitors indicated that Roma continued
to suffer from discrimination in employment, housing, schooling, health
care, and the administration of state services. Discrimination is most
severe in the eastern part of the country, where unemployment is higher
and the Romani population is larger. Among Roma living in settlements
in the east, the unemployment rate is nearly 100 percent. In urban
areas in the east, incidents of Roma being denied admission to certain
hotels, restaurants, and swimming facilities are widely reported.
According to the Office for Protection of Legal Rights (KPO), Roma are
often segregated in hospitals, particularly in maternity wards, and
some say Roma receive inferior care. The Ministry of Health promised in
July to investigate the claim and to ensure that all citizens receive
equal care and that wards are not segregated; the Ministry was
continuing its investigation at year's end. The practice of
unemployment offices identifying Roma in their records by placing an
``R'' next to their name in the register was eliminated by order from
the National Labor Bureau. Romani children disproportionately are
placed in special schools for the mentally retarded in many cases due
to their insufficient knowledge of the Slovak language.
In August 1999, the Government increased the budget for the office
of Special Government Commissioner for Roma Issues Vincent Danihel. The
office's budget totaled $667,000 (SK 30 million) in 2000; it funded 102
Roma projects. It also allocated about $375,000 (SK approximately 15
million) for special projects aimed at improving the situation of Roma,
including ``Headstart'' programs for Roma in 10 schools; training for
Roma and non-Roma mayors, local government officials, and police
officers; publication of two Romani textbooks in Slovak, Hungarian, and
the Romani language; public television programs to educate the public
about the Romani minority; support for the Kosice Roma secondary art
school; and support for regional Roma cultural centers, social advisory
bodies, and health care programs.
In September 1999, the Cabinet approved a new program, ``the
Strategy of the Slovak Republic for the Solution of the Problems of the
Roma Minority,'' for addressing issues of the Romani minority. While
many Romani leaders and experts on Roma issues believe that the
strategy is a positive step, they also criticized it for lacking
specific proposals, being formulated with limited input from Roma, and
not allocating sufficient resources. On April 7, the Cabinet approved
an additional $241,000 (approximately SK 10.5 million) for 56
assistance projects aimed at improving infrastructure and housing in
Roma settlements.
During the year, approximately 3,387 Slovak citizens applied for
asylum in Western European countries, mainly Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Finland, Netherlands, and Norway, of which only 9 cases have
been adjudicated successfully. Many human rights organizations claim
that these asylum seekers migrate in order to receive the generous
benefits to pay back incurred debt from high interest loans they have
received from moneylenders. Allegedly the moneylenders organize these
trips for the Romani families.
Illegal high interest moneylending to economically disadvantaged
Roma occurs frequently and occasionally results in Roma losing all
possessions including housing. The Government has not developed a
concrete strategy to deal with this problem.
On August 4, SNS M.P. Vitazolslv Moric proposed setting up
reservations for Slovak Roma who refuse to assimilate into society. He
further said, ``It is clear that many mentally retarded people are born
into Romani communities, why should the State allow a moron to create
another moron and thus raise the percentage of morons in our nation?''
In response to his statements, the Slovak Romani initiative (RIS) filed
a suit with the general prosecutor against Moric. On September 22,
Parliament voted to lift his parliamentary immunity, thus allowing
criminal prosecution on the grounds of instigating racial hatred.
Skinhead violence against Roma was a serious problem, and human
rights monitors reported that police remain reluctant to take action.
Occasionally police also infringed on Roma rights to social benefits
and housing (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). Attacks against Roma
continued at 1999 levels, however; these cases received increased media
attention. The authorities sometimes tolerate such attacks. In May
1999, a Banska Bystrica court ruled that a crime that was committed by
a skinhead against a Rom could not be racially motivated since they are
of the same race.
On April 28, the Banska Bystrica district court issued a guilty
verdict for the crime of bodily harm with a racial motive. The court
found a skinhead guilty of racially motivated damage to health and
sentenced him to 2 years in prison plus 3 years' probation for his 1996
verbal and physical abuse against a Rom. Lawyer Jan Hrubala claimed
that this was the first time authorities had applied ``racially
motivated crimes'' provisions of the Penal Code to an assault case.
Roma citizens have established their own police patrols in the
largely Roma-populated Kosice suburb, Lunik Ix, because of the alleged
inability of local police to protect effectively the area. The unit was
established and funded by the local self-government with assistance
from the Society for Personal Safety of the Slovak Republic and has
been successful in patrolling the area.
Members of Zebra, an organization representing interracial
marriages, said that citizens of racially mixed background are denied
equal access to opportunity. Further, they claim that skinhead violence
has increased, and that police fail to protect adequately citizens from
this violence.
Skinheads reportedly continued distributing racist materials to the
mailboxes of Romani families in Kosice, Trebisov, and Plavecky Strvtok.
An international poll released in September indicated that 79
percent of Slovaks have a negative view of Roma, 46 percent believe
that too many non-Slovaks reside in the Slovak Republic, and only 54
percent believe that Roma should have the same rights as Slovaks.
On January 7, skinheads beat an African American citizen. The
victim sought medical treatment for a contusion in his head. The case
was still pending at year's end.
On January 29, five skinheads attacked a black man in Bratislava
and called him a black pig. The suspects were arrested but a racially-
motivated verdict was not applied.
On February 17, eight male teenagers attacked two Japanese tourists
in Bratislava. According to a police spokesperson, they were not
seriously injured. The tourists apparently left the country after
lodging a complaint with the police.
In March two Roma from the eastern town of Michalovce voluntarily
came to the police station for questioning. They were allegedly beaten
by some police officers. The victims suffered several injuries
including broken legs, hands, and ribs. When questioned about the
incident, the police first claimed the action was justified but later
admitted that it was unwarranted. Both policemen involved in the case
were subsequently dismissed from active duty.
On March 11, approximately 20 supporters of the skinhead movement
attacked 2 Brazilians and 2 Angolans in Bratislava. One of the victims
escaped, but the skinheads beat the remaining three with baseball bats
while shouting racist slogans. The case was still pending at year's
end.
On March 27, 10 skinheads verbally abused an Afro-Slovak family
with 3 small children, one of whom was disabled. When the family got
into their car, the skinheads started to hit it with baseball bats. The
family went to the police, who informed them that charges could not be
filed because no one was injured.
On June 18, three Afghan men were attacked during a benefit concert
for refugees organized by the UNHCR. All three victims were treated for
injuries while one was hospitalized suffering from a concussion. The
UNHCR spokesperson expressed disappointment over police reaction to the
attack, claiming that ``the officers just stood by for 2 or 3 minutes
while the beatings took place.''
On July 21, a group of 50 Roma armed with machetes, knives, axes,
and iron rods allegedly forced a moving car to stop and attacked one of
its occupants. The 21-year-old non-Roma victim is expected to spend up
to 6 months in the hospital to recover. Police are investigating the
motive for the attack.
Anastazia Balazova, Roma mother of eight, died of injuries from a
beating by unknown assailants in her Zilina home on August 20. On
September 23, Zilina regional police placed two suspects in custody and
confirmed that the attack was racially motivated. Three suspects are
currently imprisoned, one of whom is a Rom. The investigation continued
at year's end; no conclusion had been made regarding whether or not the
crime was racially motivated.
On August 30, Rom Jan Sudman was shot and injured in his hand by a
pellet gun while doing clean-up work in the public works program. The
case is currently under investigation. Allegedly other Roma
participating in the public works program have also been attacked by
skinheads, and citizens are deliberately throwing litter out their
windows in response to their participation.
There was no progress during the year in a number of 1999 cases of
violence against Roma. Many cases of skinhead violence that occurred in
1999 were dropped due to lack of witnesses.
During the most recent census (1991), 14,000 citizens registered
themselves as Ukrainians, and 17,000 registered themselves as
Ruthenians. However, the statistical office does not differentiate
between Ruthenian and Ukrainian; it records 32,747 persons in the
Ruthenian/Ukrainian ethnic group. The current Government also considers
the Ruthenian and Ukrainian minorities as a single group. However,
about 50,000 persons listed Ruthenian as their native language in the
1991 census. Ruthenians disagree that they are Ukrainians, and that
their language is only a Ukrainian dialect. In September 1998, Slovak
State Radio started broadcasting a long-promised daily regional program
for the Ruthenian minority in Presov. However, after the 1998
parliamentary elections, this broadcasting was discontinued, and the
broadcast is now in Ukrainian. There is a television broadcast in
Ruthenian on STV, which is aired once every 2 months. In addition the
Ruthenian minority receives state funding to publish a biweekly
newspaper in Ukrainian. A representative of the Ruthenian Revival
Organization stated that Ruthenian language instruction is provided in
two schools in the northeast. There is an institute for minority
languages at Presov University in the northeast. Two instructors at the
Institute teach Ruthenian culture and language.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form and join unions, except in the armed forces.
Approximately 45 percent of the work force is unionized. Most unions
are independent of the Government and political parties but lobby those
entities in order to gain support for union positions on key labor
issues.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no
restrictions on this right. The national statistical office reported no
official strikes during the year.
However, an increasing number of strike alerts and unofficial
strikes were reported during the year. Many of these actions
anticipated layoffs or protested the nonpayment or partial payment of
salaries due to restructuring of the company or insolvency. Local
unions also held strike alerts.
There were no instances of retribution against strikers or labor
leaders. Relevant legislation on collective bargaining prohibits the
dismissal of workers legally participating in strikes. However,
according to this law, a strike is legal and official only if it is for
the purpose of collective bargaining; if it is announced in advance;
and if a list of strike participants is provided. If the strike is not
considered to be official, strikers are not ensured protection.
Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and
to affiliate with and participate in international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining. Following the September 1998
parliamentary election the KOZ decided to reenter tripartite
negotiations with employers and the Government. However, unions have
expressed dissatisfaction with the Government, claiming that it has not
included them in important decisionmaking and does not give adequate
attention to their demands.
The law on citizens' associations prohibits discrimination by
employers against union members and organizers. Complaints may be
resolved either in collective negotiations or in court. If a court
rules that an employer dismissed a worker for union activities or for
any reason other than certain grounds for dismissal listed in the Labor
Code, the employer must reinstate the worker. There were no reports of
abuses targeted against unions or workers.
In July the Railway Workers, with the support of the ILO, appealed
to the Government to amend the Act on Collective Bargaining to lower
the quorum of employees necessary for the declaration of a strike and
to eliminate the requirement that a list of employees participating in
a strike be provided to the employer. Although the Government has
developed draft amendments to this legislation, no agreement has been
reached to date.
The 1996 Customs Act regulates free customs zones and customs
warehouses. Firms operating in such zones must comply with the labor
code; there have been no reports of special involvement by the trade
unions to date. No special legislation governs labor relations in free
trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the
Constitution and the employment act prohibit forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively; however, trafficking in women
and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see
Sections 5 and 6.f.). The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and
Family, as well as district and local labor offices, have
responsibility for enforcement.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Government ratified ILO convention 182 in 1999; it
came into force in December, and the Government adheres to its
standards. The law sets the minimum employment age at 15 years.
Children must remain in school for 9 years, or until the age of 15,
although this requirement is not enforced strictly, particularly for
the Romani minority. Workers under the age of 16 may not work more than
33 hours per week; may not be compensated on a piecework basis; may not
work overtime or night shifts; and may not work underground or in
specified conditions deemed dangerous to their health or safety.
Special conditions and protections, though somewhat less stringent,
apply to young workers up to the age of 18. The Ministry of Labor
enforces this legislation. There were no reports of violations. The law
and the Constitution prohibit forced and bonded child labor, and the
Government enforces these prohibitions effectively; however, instances
of trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage was $93 (SK
4,000) per month during the year. Even when combined with special
allowances paid to families with children it did not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. The Ministry of Labor is
responsible for enforcing the minimum wage. No violations were
reported. The standard workweek mandated by the Labor Code is 42.5
hours, although collective bargaining agreements have achieved
reductions in some cases (most often to 40 hours). For state
enterprises, the law requires overtime pay up to a maximum of 8 hours
per week, and 150 hours per year, and provides 5 weeks of annual leave.
Private enterprises can compensate their employees for more hours of
overtime than stipulated by the law. There is no specifically mandated
24-hour rest period during the workweek. The trade unions, the Ministry
of Labor, and local employment offices monitor observance of these
laws, and the authorities effectively enforce them.
The Labor Code establishes health and safety standards that the
Office of Labor Safety effectively enforces. For hazardous employment,
workers undergo medical screening under the supervision of a physician.
They have the right to refuse to work in situations that endanger their
health and safety and may file complaints against employers in such
situations. Employees working under conditions endangering their health
and safety for a certain period of time are entitled to paid
``relaxation'' leave in addition to their standard leave.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically prohibits
trafficking in persons in all forms; however, there were instances of
trafficking in women and girls. The country is a source country, a
transit country, and a destination country for such victims of
trafficking. There is no evidence of government involvement in or
tolerance of trafficking, and the Ministry of Interior is involved in
activities to combat trafficking. According to the Ministry of
Interior, there were 13 documented cases of Slovak women being forced
into prostitution in other countries or foreign women being forced into
prostitution in the Slovak Republic during the year, of which 11 were
resolved. A case can be documented either when a trafficked person
files a complaint with the police or when the police initiate a
criminal investigation against a suspected trafficker. During the year,
there were 11 investigations opened against pimps, of which 7 were
resolved. The problem received more public attention this year, but it
is still likely that there are more cases than those that are
documented. There are no NGO's or organizations that have as their main
purpose to specifically provide support to victims of trafficking;
however, women's NGO Fenestra provides support for these victims. In
April a women's NGO, the Alliance for Women, sponsored a conference on
trafficking.
In July an 18-year-old Roma girl from Hencovce was allegedly
kidnaped, taken to the Czech Republic where she was sold for $93, and
forced into prostitution. This case is pending. Other Roma women have
reported similar stories. Some NGO's argue that the women voluntarily
chose the profession and then claim they were forced in order to avoid
contempt from their community when they return, while others contend
they were true victims of trafficking.
A report issued by the Ministry of Interior states that the Slovak
Republic is a transit country for persons being trafficked mainly to
Austria, the Czech Republic, and Germany for the purpose of forced
prostitution. There were also reports of Slovak women being trafficked
to Western Europe with promises of work as models, waitresses, and au
pairs. Their passports were allegedly confiscated, and they were
allegedly forced to work in adult entertainment clubs or as
prostitutes. According to the report, 3 cases of trafficking were
prosecuted in 1998 and 11 in 1999. There were four prosecuted cases of
forced prostitution in 1998 and nine cases in 1999.
Some women from Russia and Ukraine reportedly are trafficked
through the Slovak Republic on their way to countries such as Turkey,
Greece, Italy, Germany, and Serbia, where they are forced to work as
prostitutes. According to a report on trafficking in women issued by
the Swedish National Criminal Investigation Department in March 1999,
women from the Slovak Republic work in Sweden as prostitutes. In four
1998 court cases involving women trafficked to Sweden, some women came
from the Slovak Republic, among other countries. Although previously it
was primarily a source country, increasingly women from less prosperous
eastern countries (including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, and
Bulgaria) find themselves trafficked through and to the Slovak
Republic.
__________
SLOVENIA
Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional republic.
Power is shared between a directly elected president, a prime minister,
and a bicameral legislature. Since the country's independence with the
breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, free, fair, and open elections have
characterized the political system. In October elections were held to
elect representatives to the Parliament's lower house. The Government
respects constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary in
practice.
The police are under the effective civilian control of the Ministry
of the Interior. By law the armed forces do not exercise civil police
functions.
The country has made steady progress toward developing a market
economy. Although ``social property'' was abolished in 1998, the
Government continues to own 50 percent of the economy, particularly in
the financial sector, utilities, and the port of Koper. Trade has been
diversified toward the West and the growing markets of Central and
Eastern Europe. Manufacturing accounts for most employment, with
machinery and other manufactured products constituting the major
exports. Labor force surveys put unemployment at 7.6 percent, but
registration for unemployment assistance was 13.6 percent. Inflation
was 6.1 percent in 1999, while real gross national product grew 4.9
percent. The currency is stable, fully convertible, and backed by
substantial reserves. The economy provides citizens with a good
standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of
dealing with individual instances of abuse. An ombudsman deals with
human rights problems, including citizenship cases. Police on occasion
beat and abused Roma. Violence against women is a problem.
Approximately 13,000 non-Slovene (former Yugoslav) residents who had
been without legal status since independence in 1991, some due to the
Government's slow processing of their original applications, and others
because they had never applied, were offered legal residence in late
1999. A total of 12,862 persons applied for legal residence: 7,861 were
accepted; 264 were refused; and 4,737 were still being processed at
year's end. These minorities reported some discrimination. There were
instances of trafficking in women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman treatment
as well as ``humiliating punishment or treatment;'' however, police on
occasion beat Roma, allegedly resulting in severe injuries in some
cases. Danko Brajdic, a Rom, was beaten by the police and admitted to a
hospital with severe injuries. Sadik Kemalj, a Rom and former citizen
of Slovenia, allegedly left the country without a passport and was
beaten by police at the border when he attempted to return with a
Macedonian passport. The authorities have not announced the filing of
charges or the imposition of disciplinary measures in any of these
cases.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards and were not
the subject of complaint by any human rights organization.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and
the media.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest or deprivation of liberty, and the
Government respects these provisions in practice.
The authorities must advise detainees in writing within 24 hours,
in their own language, of the reasons for the arrest. Until charges are
brought, detention may last up to 6 months; once charges are brought,
detention may be prolonged for a maximum of 2 years. Some 26 percent of
the average prison population of 1,100 inmates are in pretrial
detention at any given time. The law also provides safeguards against
self-incrimination. These rights and limitations are respected in
practice.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The judicial system consists of district courts, regional courts, a
court of appeals, an administrative court, and the Supreme Court. A
nine-member Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of
legislation. Judges, elected by the State Assembly (Parliament) upon
the nomination of the Judicial Council, are constitutionally
independent and serve indefinitely, subject to an age limit. The
Judicial Council is composed of six sitting judges elected by their
peers and five presidential nominees elected by the Parliament.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, including
provisions for: Equality before the law, presumption of innocence, due
process, open court proceedings, the right of appeal, and a prohibition
against double jeopardy. Defendants by law have the right to counsel,
without cost if need be. These rights are respected in practice,
although the judicial system is so burdened that justice frequently is
protracted. In some instances, criminal cases reportedly have taken 2
to 5 years to come to trial. The problem is not widespread, and
defendants are released on bail except in the most serious criminal
cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of
privacy, ``personal data rights,'' and the inviolability of the home,
mail, and other means of communication. These rights and protections
are respected in practice, and violations are subject to effective
legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of thought, speech, public association, the press, and other
forms of public communication and expression. Lingering self-censorship
and some indirect political pressures continued to influence the media.
The press is now a vigorous institution emerging from its more
restricted past. The major media do not represent a broad range of
political or ethnic interests, although there is an Italian-language
television channel as well as a newspaper available to the ethnic
Italian minority who live on the Adriatic Coast. Hungarian radio
programming is common in the northeast where there are approximately
8,500 ethnic Hungarians. Bosnian refugees and the Albanian community
have newsletters in their own languages.
Four major daily and several weekly newspapers are published. The
major print media are supported through private investment and
advertising, although the national broadcaster, RTV Slovenia, enjoys
government subsidies, as do cultural publications and book publishing.
Seven local television channels are available and four of them are
independent private stations. Numerous foreign broadcasts are available
via satellite and cable. All major towns have radio stations and cable
television. Numerous business and academic publications are available.
Foreign newspapers, magazines, and journals are widely available.
In theory and practice, the media enjoyed full journalistic
freedom. However, for over 40 years the country was ruled by an
authoritarian Communist political system, and reporting about domestic
politics may be influenced to some degree by self-censorship and
indirect political pressures.
The election law requires the media to offer free space and
broadcasting time to political parties at election time. Television
networks routinely give public figures and opinion makers from across
the political spectrum access via a broad range of public service
programming.
The Constitution provides for autonomy and freedom for universities
and other institutions of higher education. There are two universities;
each has numerous affiliated research and study institutions. Academic
freedom is respected, and centers of higher education are lively and
intellectually stimulating.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the rights of peaceful assembly, association, and
participation in public meetings, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. These rights can be restricted only by an act of
Parliament in circumstances involving national security, public safety,
or protection against infectious diseases.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. No person
can be compelled to admit his religious or other beliefs. There are few
formal requirements for recognition as a religion by the Government.
Religious groups, including foreign missionaries, must register with
the Ministry of the Interior. Registration entitles such groups to
value added tax rebates on a quarterly basis. All groups in the country
report equal access to registration and tax rebate status. Foreign
missionaries (including a Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(Mormon) mission) and religious groups (including Hare Krishna,
Scientology, and Unification organizations) operate without hindrance.
The appropriate role for religious instruction in the schools
continues to be an issue of debate. The Constitution states that
parents are entitled ``to give their children a moral and religious
upbringing. . . .'' Before 1945 religion was much more prominent in the
schools, but now only those schools supported by religious bodies teach
religion.
The Roman Catholic Church was a major property holder in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia before World War II. After the war, much church
property--church buildings and support buildings, residences,
businesses, and forests--was confiscated and nationalized by the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After Slovenian independence
in 1991, Parliament passed legislation calling for denationalization
(restitution or compensation) within a fixed period. However, a
subsequent change of government in 1992 led to a virtual standstill in
denationalization proceedings for several years. At year's end, over
one-half of all cases had been adjudicated at the initial
administrative level, representing over two-thirds of the total value
of all cases. However, an increase in administrative processing in turn
has led to a judicial backlog.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides that each
person has the right to freedom of movement, to choice of place of
residence, to leave the country freely, and to return. Limitations on
these rights may be made only by statute and only where necessary in
criminal cases, to control infectious disease, or in wartime. In
practice citizens travel widely and often.
The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum in accordance
with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government has provided asylum
(or ``temporary protection'') to refugees but on a very limited basis
in recent years. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared prosecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides that elections should be held at least
every 4 years. Citizens have the right to change their government,
voting by secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage. The country
has a mixed parliamentary and presidential system. The President
proposes a candidate to the legislature for confirmation as Prime
Minister, after consultations with the leaders of the political parties
in the Parliament.
No restrictions hinder the participation of women or minorities in
politics; however, women are underrepresented in government and
politics. Of the 90 Members of Parliament, 13 are women, while 3 of 18
cabinet ministers are women. During the October 15 Parliamentary
elections, an increased number of women were nominated to run by
political parties; however, the majority of these female candidates
were assigned to run in districts in which their parties had little
chance of winning (based on 1996 election results). The Prime
Minister's Office has an active agency for monitoring and promoting the
participation by women in public life.
The Constitution stipulates that the Italian and Hungarian ethnic
communities each are entitled to at least one representative in the
Parliament, regardless of their population.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Independent human rights monitoring groups promote respect for
human rights and freedoms and freely investigate complaints about
violations. The Government generally does not place obstacles in the
way of investigations by international or local human rights groups.
An independent ombudsman appointed by Parliament deals with human
rights problems, including so-called ``economic rights.'' The incumbent
is regarded as fair, but he lacks the power to enforce his opinions. In
addition Parliament has been criticized as a major factor in the slow
progress of property restitution (``denationalization''), casting doubt
on the ombudsman's ability to alter the pace of the process. The
ombudsman criticized the Government for the slow pace of legal and
administrative proceedings, in criminal and civil cases, as well as in
denationalization proceedings.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law, and the
Government observed this provision in practice. According to the 1991
census, the population is approximately 2 million, of whom 1.7 million
are ethnic Slovenes and the remainder are persons of 23 other
nationalities. There were some 50,000 Croats, 48,000 Serbs, 27,000
Muslims, 8,500 Hungarians, and 3,000 Italians.
The Constitution provides special rights for the ``autochthonous
Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities,'' including the right to use
their own national symbols, enjoy bilingual education, and benefit from
other privileges. It also provides for special status and rights for
the small Romani community, which are observed in practice.
Women.--While violence against women occurs and almost certainly is
underreported, the awareness of spousal abuse and violence against
women is on the rise. During 1999 and 2000, 224 persons were charged
with offenses including domestic violence (82), ``brutality'' (25),
``threat to safety'' (27), and other unspecified offenses that resulted
in injuries (51). In 1998 83 men were charged with rape. In 1998 10,021
misdemeanor charges of ``endangering safety in a private place'' were
filed. Although no breakdown of victims is available by sex for 1998,
records from previous years indicate that at least 40 percent, or
approximately 4,000 cases, involved domestic disputes where women were
threatened. Three shelters are available for battered women, which are
partially funded by the State. The shelters operate at capacity (about
40 beds combined) and turn away numerous women every year. In cases of
reported spousal abuse or violence, the police actively intervene, and
criminal charges are filed. Although the law allows police to fine both
parties in cases of domestic violence, in practice fines and arrests
are reportedly confined to men only.
Slovenia is primarily a transit country for trafficking in women
for prostitution, although it is also a destination country (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Equal rights for women are a matter of state policy. There is no
official discrimination against women or minorities in housing, jobs,
or education. Under the Constitution, marriage is based on the equality
of both spouses. The Constitution stipulates that the State shall
protect the family, motherhood, and fatherhood.
In rural areas, women, even those employed outside the home, bear a
disproportionate share of household work and family care, because of a
generally conservative social tradition. However, women frequently are
encountered in business and in government executive departments.
Equal pay for equal work for men and women is the norm. Although
both sexes have the same average period of unemployment, women still
are found more often in lower paying jobs. On average women's earnings
are 85 percent of those of men.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The Government provided compulsory, free,
and universal primary school education for children through grade 9
(ages 14 and 15). The Government provided universal health care for all
citizens, including children.
The Constitution stipulates that children ``enjoy human rights and
fundamental freedoms consistent with their age and level of maturity.''
Moreover, special protection from exploitation and maltreatment is
provided by statute. Social workers visited schools regularly to
monitor for any incidents of mistreatment or abuse of children.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. The law mandates access to buildings for the disabled,
and the Government enforces these provisions in practice. Modifications
of public and private structures to ease access by the disabled
continued slowly but steadily.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minorities make up about 12
percent of the population; most are nationals of the former Yugoslavia.
Ethnic minorities face a complex reality. ``Autochthonous'' groups in
general are provided special rights and protection by the Constitution.
Three of these groups--Italians, Hungarians, and Roma--are identified
in the Constitution for special treatment, and the first two are
assigned representation in Parliament. Other ``autochthonous'' groups
include some 500 ethnic Germans and fewer than 100 Jews.
However, ``new minorities"--ethnic Serbs, Croats, Kosovar
Albanians, and nonautochthonous Roma from Kosovo and Albania--are
unprotected by special provisions of the Constitution and face some
societal and governmental discrimination. Many of these 5,000 to 10,000
non-Slovene citizens of the former Yugoslavia migrated internally to
Slovenia during the decades leading to independence because of the
economic opportunities. Most opted not to take Slovene citizenship
during a 6-month window in 1991-92 and have been living in the country
as essentially stateless persons since then, while others were without
residence status because of slow processing of their applications by
the Government. In 1999 Parliament offered these persons permanent
resident status; a 3-month window for applications closed at the end of
1999. A total of 12,862 persons applied for legal residence: 7,861 were
accepted; 264 were refused; and 4,737 still were being processed at
year's end.
The Roma are best characterized as a set of groups rather than as
one community. Some have lived in the country for hundreds of years,
while others are very recent migrants. Police on occasion beat Roma
(see Section 1.a.). A lack of cohesion prevented the Romani communities
from taking advantage of their special constitutional status, although
the Government also failed to implement fully the special legislation
on Romani status called for in Article 65 of the Constitution. Roma
report discrimination in employment, which in turn complicates their
housing situation. In education the Government has attempted to involve
more Romani children in formal education at the earliest stages, both
through enrichment programs and through inclusion in public
kindergartens. However, despite a renewed emphasis on assistance
programs in the 1990's, Roma suffer disproportionately from poverty and
unemployment.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution stipulates that
trade unions, their operation, and their membership shall be free and
provides for the right to strike. Virtually all workers, except police
and military personnel, are eligible to form and join labor
organizations. In 1993 the Parliament for the first time passed
legislation restricting strikes by some public sector employees.
However, after government budget-cutting, some public sector
professionals (judges, doctors, and educators) became increasingly
active on the labor front.
Labor has two main groupings, the Association of Free Slovene Trade
Unions, and the Union of Slovene Rail Workers, with constituent
branches throughout the country. A third, much smaller, regional labor
union operates on the Adriatic coast. Unions are formally and actually
independent of the Government and political parties, but individual
union members hold positions in the legislature. The Constitution
provides that the State shall be responsible for ``the creation of
opportunities for employment and for work.''
There are no restrictions on unions joining or forming federations
and affiliating with like-minded international union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The economy is
in transition from the former Communist system, which included some
private ownership of enterprises along with state-controlled and
``socially owned'' enterprises. In the transition to a fully market-
based economy, the collective bargaining process is undergoing change.
Formerly, the old Yugoslav Government had a dominant role in setting
the minimum wage and conditions of work. The Government still exercises
this role to an extent, although in the private sector, wages and
working conditions are agreed annually in a general collective
agreement between the ``social partners:'' The labor unions and the
Chamber of Economy. There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
Export processing zones exist in Koper, Maribor, and Nova Gorica.
Worker rights in these zones are the same as in the rest of the
country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children, and
there were no reports of forced labor by adults or children; however,
police reported 20 cases of trafficking in women for prostitution in
1999 (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16. Children must remain
in school through grade 9 (ages 14 and 15). During the harvest or for
other farm chores, younger children do work. In general urban employers
respect the age limits. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children, and there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is $252 (59,150
tolars) per month, which provides a decent standard of living for the
average worker and family. The workweek is 40 hours. In general
businesses provide acceptable conditions of work for their employees.
Occupational health and safety standards are set and enforced by
special commissions controlled by the Ministries of Health and Labor.
Workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe conditions
without jeopardizing their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law on ``enslavement'' prescribes
criminal prosecution for a person who ``brings another person into
slavery or a similar condition, or keeps another person in such a
condition, or buys, sells or delivers another person to a third party''
or brokers such a deal. Sentences for enslavement convictions range
from 1 to 10 years' imprisonment. Persons also can be prosecuted for
pimping or pandering ``by force, threat or deception.'' The penalty
ranges from 3 months' to 5 years' imprisonment or, in cases involving
minors or forced prostitution, 1 to 10 years' imprisonment.
The country was primarily a transit point for trafficking in
persons, although it was also a destination country. Police interest in
the issue was limited; victims were not encouraged to file complaints
and very few cases were reported to the police. Police reported 20
cases in 1999 in which the country was a destination for prostitutes
from Ukraine. Statistics on prosecutions were not available. The
Government had no programs in place to prevent trafficking or to assist
victims. There were no NGO's that dealt specifically with trafficking.
__________
SPAIN
Spain is a democracy with a constitutional monarch. The Parliament
consists of two chambers, the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. In
March Jose Maria Aznar of the Popular Party (PP) was reelected Prime
Minister, with the title President of the Government. The next national
elections are scheduled for March 2004. The Government respects the
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
There are three levels of security forces. The National Police are
responsible for nationwide investigations, security in urban areas,
traffic control, and hostage rescue. The Civil Guard polices rural
areas and controls borders and highways. Autonomous police forces have
taken over many of the duties of the Civil Guard in Galicia, parts of
Catalunya, and the Basque country. The security forces are under the
effective control of the Government. The security forces also maintain
anticorruption units. Some members of the security forces committed
human rights abuses.
The economy is market based, with primary reliance on private
enterprise. Although a number of public sector enterprises remain in
key areas, the Government's policy has been to privatize as many of
them as possible. The economy grew during the second quarter at a 4.2
percent annual rate. The annual inflation rate at the close of 1999 was
2.9 percent; in the third quarter of 2000 it was 3.6 percent.
Unemployment in the third quarter dropped to 14.2 percent, continuing
its downward trend.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas, including cases
of police brutality, lengthy pretrial detention, and delays in trials.
Government investigations of alleged human rights abuses by the
security forces are often lengthy, and punishments light. The
Government is taking steps to deal with the problem of violence against
women. Incidents of racism and rightwing violence against minorities
and discrimination against Roma continued to be problems. There were
instances of forced labor and child labor. Trafficking in women for the
purpose of forced prostitution was a problem.
Throughout the year there were ongoing judicial proceedings related
to the involvement of former government officials in the Antiterrorist
Liberation Groups (government-sponsored death squads known by their
acronym, GAL), which killed 27 persons between 1983 and 1987, including
10 persons with no connection to the terrorist group Basque Fatherland
and Liberty (ETA), the ostensible target of the GAL.
In December 1999, ETA ended its 14-month unilateral cease-fire and
launched a new campaign of terrorism. ETA attacks claimed 23 lives
during the year. ETA sympathizers also conducted a campaign of street
violence and vandalism in the Basque region. Judicial proceedings
against members of ETA continued. Spanish and French police arrested
dozens of suspected ETA members and collaborators.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudical killings by government
agents.
No developments were reported in the following ongoing cases: The
March 1997 case of a Civil guard officer who allegedly shot a Moroccan
boy in the back and killed him; the appeal of police officer Antonio
Barrionuevo's conviction in the 1996 killing of Portuguese citizen
Manual Abreu Silva; and the deaths of eight prison inmates under
suspicious circumstances in 1996-97.
Five individuals were convicted during the year in the GAL case of
Jose Ignacio Zabala and Jose Antonio Lasa, who were kidnaped, tortured,
and killed in 1983. Enrique Rodriguez Galindo, a Civil Guard general,
and Julen Elgorriaga, the then civil governor of Guipuzcoa, each
received sentences of 71 years' imprisonment. An additional three Civil
Guard officers were sentenced to 69 and 67 years' imprisonment. Miguel
Brecia Guillen was sentenced in 1999 to 68 years in jail for the 1986
murder of two French citizens. The state prosecutor recommended closure
of the 1984 Monbar case for lack of evidence. Other cases in which
security forces are alleged to have committed murder in the mid-1980's,
such as those of Ramon Onaederra, Mikel Zabaltza, and Robert Caplanne,
remain open but are unlikely to be prosecuted, also due to lack of
evidence.
ETA declared an end to its 14-month ``cease-fire'' in December 1999
and resumed its terrorist activities. ETA's declared aim is to
establish an independent Basque state in the Basque region of northern
Spain and southern France. By year's end, ETA car bombings and
shootings resulted in the deaths of 23 victims.
The ETA attacks began on January 21 when an ETA car bomb killed Lt.
Col. Pedro Blanco in Madrid. On February 22, an ETA car bomb in Vitoria
killed Basque Socialist Party Spokesman Fernando Buesa and his
bodyguard. On March 6, an ETA car bomb exploded in San Sebastian,
injuring eight persons. ETA assailants shot and killed newspaper
columnist Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle on May 7 in Navarra. On June 4,
ETA shot and killed Popular Party councilman Jesus Maria Pedrosa in
Durango. On June 25, an ETA car bomb injured seven in Getxo.
An ETA car bomb detonated in the central shopping district of
Madrid on July 12, injuring eight people. City councilman Jose Maria
Martin Carpena was shot and killed in front of his family on July 15 in
Malaga. On July 16, an ETA car bomb injured the wife of a civil guard
in Agreda. On July 29, Juan Maria Jauregui, former Socialist Party
delegate to Guipuzcoa, was shot and killed. On August 8, an ETA car
bomb killed Basque businessman Jose Maria Korta. In Madrid 6 hours
later, another ETA car bomb injured 11 persons. On August 9, an ETA
assailant shot and killed army Lt. Francisco Casanova in Navarra.
On August 20, ETA killed two civil guards in the northern region of
Huesca by planting a bomb under their patrol car. On August 30, an ETA
assailant shot and killed Popular Party town councilman Manuel Indiano
Azaustre in his Guipuzcoa candy shop. On September 13, an ETA assailant
shot and severely wounded Jose Ramon Recalde, a former Socialist Party
Counselor, at his home in San Sebastian. On September 20, ETA
assailants shot and killed Popular Party town counselor Jose Luis Ruiz
Casado near Barcelona. ETA killed a military doctor in Andalucia on
October 16 and a prison official in Victoria on October 22. An ETA car
bomb took the life of a Supreme Court judge and three persons in Madrid
on October 30. An ETA assailant shot and killed former Health Minister
Ernest Lluch in Barcelona on November 11. ETA ended the year with the
killing of its fifth Popular Party town counselor and a policeman, both
near Barcelona. It was the bloodiest year of ETA violence since 1994.
ETA publicly claimed responsibility for these attacks.
Legal actions against ETA members continued. Spain obtained the
extradition of the former leader of ETA, Francisco Mugica Garmendia,
from France in February. He faces charges that include involvement in
23 killings, illicit possession of explosives, and falsification of
documents. In February a court sentenced ETA member Mikel Azurmendi
Penagaricano to 36 years in prison for the killing of Army Lt. Miguel
Peralta in 1994. On July 6, a court sentenced members of the Andalucian
command of ETA to a total of 108 years in prison for crimes committed
in 1997 and 1998, when the group tried to murder the then mayors of
Granada and Seville. On July 25, a court convicted ETA member Ramon
Aldasoro for his participation in the March 1988 bombing of a police
barracks and sentenced him to 67 years' imprisonment.
In March Amnesty International (AI) appeared before the Basque
Parliament and made a strong appeal for ETA to stop violating human
rights through murder, kidnaping, and intimidation. AI expressed its
support for the Government's 1999 compensation law for victims of ETA
terror but called on the Government to compensate victims of government
torture as well. AI also criticized the Government for permitting
suspected terrorists to be held incommunicado for up to 5 days after
arrest.
Several organizations are dedicated to the concerns of victims of
terrorism, among them the Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT).
AVT was founded in 1981 and serves 1,300 families, providing legal and
psychological counseling. The Government supports its work.
A Spanish extradition request for former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet was denied after a lengthy judicial review in the United
Kingdom. Spanish courts sought to try Pinochet for his involvement in
the disappearance of 600 Spaniards under Chilean and Argentine
governments in the 1970's and 1980's. On March 2, the United Kingdom
Minister of Home Affairs allowed Pinochet to return to Chile without
trial on grounds of ill health.
No developments occurred in case of the 1999 international arrest
warrants for former Argentine junta Generals Galtieri and Videla,
Admiral Massera, and 95 lower ranking military officers. The High Court
refused jurisdiction in December in the the criminal suit filed by
indigenous Guatemalan leader Rigoberta Menchu against eight former
Guatemalan military and civilian leaders for human rights abuses.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such acts; however, suspects charged
with terrorism routinely assert that they have been abused during
detention, and other detainees sometimes make similar charges. The
Government investigates allegations of torture and also permits outside
parties to investigate them.
On May 20, Antonio Fonseca, an illegal African immigrant, died
after his arrest in Arrecife. Witnesses contend that police
aggressively detained Fonseca. One claimed that four officers beat
Fonseca before he reached his holding cell. The police chief of
Arrecife denied the accusations, claiming that Fonseca's contusions
resulted from his struggle to escape. In September Interior Minister
Mayor Oreja announced that two investigations and autopsies indicated
that Fonseca died of natural causes and that there was no basis for
prosecution of the arresting officers.
No developments were reported in the following cases from previous
years: The November 1998 case of two policemen in Melilla who were
charged with raping a Moroccan girl; the trial that began in November
1998 of six members of the Civil Guard who were accused of torturing
three suspected ETA members in 1992; the complaint filed against the
police in the beating of Ivan Gonzalez in September 1997.
In April a Madrid court sentenced a policeman to 5 years'
imprisonment for the July 1994 illegal detention and beating of a man
from the Madrid suburb of Majadahonda.
ETA sympathizers engaged in extensive street violence in the Basque
region throughout the year. On February 25, 8 families were evacuated
from their homes in Vizcaya after 30 hooded individuals threw Molotov
cocktails at a bank in the central square. Molotov cocktails also were
thrown into the home of Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle, member of the
anti-ETA Ermua forum and columnist, on February 28. (ETA subsequently
killed Lopez de la Calle in May.) Incidents of street violence in
support of ETA, called the ``kale barroka'' in the Basque language,
increased during the year: 681 acts of street violence were reported in
the Basque region and neighboring Navarra during the year. The Basque
police and the Spanish National Police arrested over 160 persons in
connection with the street violence.
Prison conditions generally meet or exceed minimum international
standards.
In Madrid prisons there were 21 reports of abuse during 1999. In
the first 3 months of 2000, eight cases were reported. On February 24,
17 prisoners in San Sebastian's Martutene Prison began a sit-in and
hunger strike in solidarity with ETA prisoner Daniel Derguy, who had
been fasting for 60 days in a French prison.
No developments were reported in the March 1998 investigation into
31 cases of alleged abuse and negligence by prison officials in 1996
and 1997 that led to 8 inmate deaths. The Supreme Court awarded
$115,000 (20 million pesetas) to the family of Juan Antonio Fernandez,
a prisoner who was killed by a fellow inmate in the Madrid prison of
Carabanchel in March 1997.
Basque activists continued to demand that all imprisoned ETA
terrorists be moved to prisons in the Basque region or the adjacent
region, Navarra. As of March, 378 ETA terrorists were in jail.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors,
including the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of
Torture.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions in practice.
A suspect may not be held for more than 72 hours without a hearing
except in cases involving terrorism, in which case the Penal Code
permits holding a suspect an additional 2 days without a hearing and
the possibility of incommunicado detention, provided that a judge
authorizes such action.
At times pretrial detention can be lengthy. By law suspects may not
be confined for more than 2 years before being brought to trial, unless
a further delay is authorized by a judge, who may extend pretrial
custody to 4 years. In practice pretrial custody is usually less than a
year. However, criticism is heard in legal circles that some judges use
``preventive custody'' as a form of anticipatory sentencing. In late
2000, approximately 20 percent of the prison population was in pretrial
detention (9,446 inmates out of 44,866 total), although that number
included convicted prisoners whose cases were on appeal.
The law on aliens permits detention of a person for up to 40 days
prior to deportation but specifies that it must not take place in a
prison-like setting.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision.
The judicial structure consists of local, provincial, regional, and
national courts with the Supreme Court at its apex. The Constitutional
Court has the authority to return a case to the court in which it was
adjudicated if it can be determined that constitutional rights were
violated during the course of the proceedings. The National High Court
handles crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking. The European
Court of Human Rights is the final arbiter in cases concerning human
rights.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, and
the authorities respect this right in practice. There is a nine-person
jury system.
Defendants have the right to be represented by an attorney (at
state expense for the indigent). They are released on bail unless the
court believes that they may flee or be a threat to public safety.
Following conviction, defendants may appeal to the next highest court.
The law calls for an expeditious judicial hearing following arrest.
However, the AVT and others have criticized delays in the judicial
process, which can result at times in lengthy pretrial detention (see
Section 1.d.) and delays in trials. In cases of petty crime, suspects
released on bail sometimes wait up to 5 years for trial.
Human rights groups such as the Association Against Torture and
members of the press complain that many persons convicted of offenses
constituting violations of human rights avoided sentencing by
prolonging the appeals process and that sentences for persons convicted
of such offenses are unduly light. According to AI, custodial sentences
of less than 1 year and a day customarily are not served in such cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the privacy of the home
and correspondence. Under the Criminal Code, government authorities
must obtain court approval before searching private property,
wiretapping, or interfering with private correspondence. The
antiterrorist law gives discretionary authority to the Minister of the
Interior to act prior to obtaining court approval in ``cases of
emergency.''
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects this
right in practice. Opposition viewpoints, both from political parties
and nonpartisan organizations, are reflected freely and widely in the
media.
The Catalunya regional government's failure in 1999 to renew
broadcast licenses for three Catholic Church radio stations was
challenged successfully in the Catalunya Supreme Court in March. The
court ruled that the criteria used by the regional government to award
licenses placed disproportionate emphasis on the use of Catalan
language in the programming. The government of Catalunya elected not to
appeal the decision.
On March 2, the Supreme Court prohibited the radical Basque party
Euskal Herritarrok (EH) from using free broadcast time in the public
media. The pro-ETA newspaper Egin and its affiliated radio station
(Egin Irratia) were closed in 1998. Gara--another pro-ETA newspaper--
has since emerged. An investigation into the alleged subordination of
Egin's editorial line and hiring practices to ETA's command and the use
of coded classified ads to coordinate ETA strategy still was underway.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
no state religion, although Catholicism is the predominant religion and
receives some government funding. Jews, Muslims, and Protestants have
official status and also receive some support from the Government.
Other recognized religions, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons,
are covered by constitutional protections but receive no assistance.
Religions not recognized officially are treated as cultural
associations. Religious courses are offered in public schools but are
not mandatory.
There are some allegations that the Government discriminates
against non-Catholic religions, principally by not providing to other
churches all of the privileges accorded to the Catholic Church.
In 1999 Parliament approved a nonbinding resolution calling on the
Government to reinforce measures against the activity of destructive
``sects.'' A 1989 law on sects already had authorized the police to
investigate their activities, and a special unit was created for that
purpose. The resolution was preceded by press accounts of a death under
unusual circumstances of a member of Jehovah's Witnesses and the arrest
of the leader of a group called The Orientation in April 1999.
Also in April 1999, a Helsinki Human Rights Federation report
criticized the Government for discrimination against ``new religions.''
The decision of the regional government of Cataluyna not to renew
three local radio broadcasting licenses of the Catholic Church was
overturned in court in March (see Section 2.a.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel within and
outside the country, to emigrate, and to repatriate, and the Government
respects these rights in practice.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, including the
Spanish Committee for Assistance to Refugees (CEAR), in assisting
refugees and asylum seekers. Under a 1994 law, asylum requests are
adjudicated in a two-stage process with the Office of Asylum and
Refugees (OAR) making an initial decision on the admissibility of the
application for processing. The Interministerial Committee for Asylum
and Refuge (CIAR) examines the applications accepted for processing.
The CIAR includes representatives from the Ministries of Interior,
Justice, Labor, Foreign Affairs, and a nonvoting member of the UNHCR.
The decision of the CIAR in each case must be approved by the Minister
of the Interior.
The 1994 law eliminated the distinction between asylum status and
refugee status. This distinction was eliminated to prevent applicants
from drawing out judicial proceedings by applying first for refugee
status and then for asylum, if the former was denied.
The UNHCR advises the authorities throughout the process.
Applicants for asylum have the right to have their applications sent
immediately to the local office of the UNHCR. The authorities are not
bound by the judgment of the UNHCR in individual cases, but they often
reevaluate decisions with which the UNHCR does not agree. Appeals of
rejection at either stage may be made to the National High Court, and
appeals of the National High Court's decisions may be made to the
Supreme Court.
Asylum requests may be made from outside as well as within the
country. From outside anyone can request asylum from a Spanish
diplomatic or consular representative. Illegal immigrants are permitted
to apply for asylum. Those who lack visas or permission to enter may
apply at the border or port of entry. The applicant in such cases may
be detained until a decision is made regarding the admissibility for
processing of the application. In cases of persons who apply inside the
country, a decision must be reached within 2 months, but in cases of
persons who apply at a port of entry this period is reduced to 72
hours. The period for filing an appeal in such cases is 24 hours. The
Ombudsman (see Section 4) challenged the legality of this form of
detention before the Constitutional Court. The Court issued a
preliminary decision in which it ruled that this form of detention does
not deprive the detainee of his liberty. This provisional decision
allowed the Government to continue to detain applicants without
modifications to its detention procedures.
Applicants have the right by law to free legal assistance,
regardless of where they are when they apply for asylum. This
assistance is available from the first step in the process through any
appeals of unfavorable decisions. The applicant also has the right to
the assistance of translators and interpreters, and the OAR admits
documents in any language without requiring an official translation.
In 1999 the Government received 8,405 requests for political
asylum. Only 294 of the applicants were granted refugee status. An
additional 679 were permitted entrance on humanitarian grounds. In the
first 5 months of 2000 the Government received 3,010 requests for
political asylum. The majority of applicants came from Algeria,
Romania, Sierra Leone, and Armenia. The number of persons granted
asylum has dropped steadily during the past 5 years.
The ombudsman expressed his concern over the high percentage of
applications not admitted for processing (68.5 percent in 1997 and 56.6
percent in 1998). However, many persons with falsified documents are
rejected early in the process. Many such applicants come from
politically stable but economically impoverished countries.
The Government's practice of substituting temporary admittance on
humanitarian grounds for granting asylum also has been criticized. The
former status includes some restrictions on access to the labor market
and welfare payments, although it does grant the applicant residency
and work permits. Another concern is that in some cases individuals
whose asylum requests were turned down may have been expelled while
their appeals were still in progress, although no statistics are
available. The law allows the applicant a 15 day grace period in which
to leave the country if refugee status is denied. Within that time
frame, the applicant may appeal the decision, and the court of appeal
has the authority to prevent the initiation of expulsion procedures,
which normally begin after the 15th day.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
A new law on immigration was passed in January and took effect in
April. Although the new law does not include any specific mandates
regarding work permits, it does recognize the rights of immigrants to
peaceful assembly and association. The law grants eligibility for
emergency health care to all immigrants and for all forms of health
care to minors and pregnant women.
The new law prompted thousands of illegal aliens to seek to
regularize their status. Between March and July, immigrants submitted
about a quarter of a million applications. Of the 131,700 applications
reviewed, 85,526 received legal status. The Government later concluded
that the law, by granting illegal and legal immigrants many of the same
rights, promoted increased illegal immigration. The authorities
intercepted 3,569 aliens entering illegally via the Straits of
Gibraltar in all of 1999. By August 2000, the authorities had already
intercepted 7,833. The Government amended the immigration law in
December to increase sanctions on employers who hire illegal aliens and
to draw a sharper distinction between the rights afforded to legal
versus illegal immigrants. Under the amended law, illegal aliens do not
have the right to join unions or strike.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Spain is a multiparty democracy with open elections in which all
citizens 18 years of age and over have the right to vote by secret
ballot. At all levels of government, elections are held at least every
4 years. In the 1996 national elections, the Popular Party ended 13
years of Socialist (PSOE) rule, and Jose Maria Aznar became President
of the Government. The Popular Party received an absolute majority in
the 2000 parliamentary elections. The next national elections are
scheduled for March 2004.
Governmental power is shared between the central government and 17
regional ``autonomous communities.'' Local nationalist parties give
political expression to regional linguistic and cultural identities.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
they are increasing their participation in the political process. Of 19
Cabinet Ministers, 3 are women. The President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies are women. The number of female
Members of Parliament increased after the 2000 elections: of the 350
members of the lower house, 99 are women. Of 259 Senators, 63 are
women. In the 1999 European Parliament elections, both the PP and PSOE
placed women at the top of their lists. On the PSOE list, 50 percent of
the candidates were women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of nongovernmental human rights groups, including the
Human Rights Association of Spain in Madrid and the Human Rights
Institute of Cataluyna in Barcelona, operate freely without government
interference. The Government cooperates readily with international
organizations, international nongovernmental human rights groups, and
independent national groups investigating allegations of human rights
abuses.
The Constitution provides for an ombudsman, called the ``People's
Defender,'' who as part of his duties actively investigates complaints
of human rights abuses by the authorities. The ombudsman operates
independently from any party or government ministry, must be elected
every 5 years by a three-fifths majority of the Congress of Deputies,
and is immune from prosecution. He has complete access to government
institutions and to all documents other than those classified for
national security reasons and may refer cases to the courts on his own
authority. The ombudsman has a staff of approximately 150 persons and
received some 25,000 complaints during the year. The majority of the
complaints pertained to education and social services, although some
dealt with discrimination, domestic violence, and mistreatment by law
enforcement agencies.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens. In
1995 the Parliament modified the Penal Code to make it a crime to
``incite, publicize, or otherwise promote abuse or discrimination of
people or groups'' because of race, ethnicity, nationality, ideology,
or religious beliefs. However, incidents of racism and rightwing
violence against minorities and discrimination against Roma continued
to be problems.
Women.--Sexual abuse, violence, and harassment of women in the home
continued to be problems. According to the Government, at least 40
women and 6 men died as a result of domestic violence during the year.
During 1999 over 25,000 women filed complaints of abuse against their
husbands or partners, compared with 19,621 complaints in 1998. In 2000
5,722 criminal complaints were filed against husbands for abuse of
their wives, as well as 14,846 misdemeanor complaints. However, experts
believe that only 10 percent of violent acts against women are reported
to the authorities. The Women's Institute, which is part of the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, counseled 104,856 women
concerning domestic violence and legal aid in 1998 compared with 86,893
in 1997. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) estimate that from
600,000 to 800,000 cases of domestic abuse occur each year.
In 1998 the Government unveiled a 3-year, $60 million (9 billion
pesetas) ``Plan Against Domestic Violence.'' The plan criminalizes the
violation of restraining orders and the infliction of psychological
violence and calls for a quadrupling of the number of offices that
assist victims and an expansion of medical and legal services. (Rape,
spousal rape, and spousal abuse were already crimes.) Other provisions
of the plan include: Public awareness campaigns in the media and in the
schools; the establishment of a domestic abuse database to streamline
judicial investigations; increased access of victims to public housing;
and greater linkage between medical, police, legal, and counseling
services in order to promote an integrated approach to treating
victims. Public service announcements and press articles drawing
attention to the problem of domestic violence were ubiquitous
throughout the year.
Women's rights' advocates, while acknowledging that the plan
incorporated many of their demands, expressed disappointment with
several of its omissions. The Federation of Separated and Divorced
Women criticized the plan as lacking in specifics, particularly its
public sensitization campaigns. According to the Federation, the plan's
key shortcoming is that it fails to make the issuance of a restraining
order automatic upon filing a complaint. Currently, a restraining order
is issued only after a guilty verdict.
The Government has invested over $15.2 million (2.288 billion
pesetas) in the plan. Since the plan was approved, 9 special services
units and 54 Civil Guard units staffed by 110 women have been created
to assist battered women. There are special sections in the police
department to deal with violence against women, which are staffed by
trained female officers, and there are approximately 25 shelters for
battered women. There are 54 official centers in all for mistreated
women. A toll-free hot line advises women where to go for government
shelter or other aid if mistreated.
On April 9, the Government announced an initiative that would
complete the 1998 ``Plan Against Domestic Violence.'' The initiative
calls for 5,000 lawyers specializing in domestic violence to be
assigned throughout the country. The Government hopes that the presence
of these lawyers will encourage women to come forward with complaints
of violence or domestic abuse.
A 1999 law allows for an ``immediate'' divorce upon conviction of a
husband for domestic violence. The socially conservative political
parties (PP and nationalist parties) tended to favor this bill. Womens'
groups and the more left-of-center political parties (PSOE and NI)
opposed the bill, due to concern that a woman's right to divorce her
abusive husband would be dependent on an inefficient legal system that
often takes years to complete a single criminal proceeding.
A 1989 law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, but very
few cases have been brought to trial under this law. Police received
319 sexual harassment complaints during the year. Meanwhile the number
of women in the labor market is increasing steadily. The Government
recognizes the difficulties faced by women in the workplace. According
to a 1998 decree, employers no longer have to pay social security
benefits to someone filling in for a worker on leave either for
maternity, adopting children, or in other similar circumstances.
Previously, companies hired substitutes for only 10 percent of workers
on maternity leave. The Government hopes to raise this figure to 25
percent. A ministerial order to increase women's presence in sectors in
which they currently are underrepresented provides a 2-year reprieve
from paying social security taxes to employers who hire women in these
sectors. The 1999 National Employment Action Plan gives priority to
battered women who search for employment.
The Minister of Social Affairs reports that women constitute 43
percent of the work force. However, according to the Taxation Agency
(Agencia Tributaria) and its 1997 report ``Employment, Salaries and
Pensions'' completed by the Institution of Fiscal Studies, women hold
only 18 percent of better paying positions. The female unemployment
rate was 23 percent in 1999, down from 26.6 percent in 1998. It was
still more than double the 11.1 percent unemployment rate for 1999 for
men. Women outnumber men in the legal, journalistic, and health care
professions but still play minor roles in many other fields.
Discrimination in the workplace and in hiring practices persists. A
1998 study of 100 labor union contracts revealed that 38 contracts
failed to use gender-neutral language, 22 employed gender-specific job
titles resulting in the imposition of discriminatory wage differentials
(i.e., the salary of a male secretary, ``secretario,'' was 13 percent
higher than that of a ``secretaria'' in one food processing industry
contract), and only 17 addressed the problem of sexual harassment.
Discriminatory wage differentials continue to exist. A 1999 report by
the General Workers' Union shows that women's salaries are 30 percent
less than those of their male counterparts.
Women are equal under the law for divorce, inheritance, and
business purposes.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution, primarily
from Latin America and Eastern Europe, appears to be growing (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
welfare through well-funded and easily accessed programs of education
and health care. Education is compulsory until age 16 and free until
age 18. The Constitution obligates both the State and parents to
protect children, whether or not born in wedlock. The Ministries of
Health and Social Affairs are responsible for the welfare of children
and have created numerous programs to aid needy children. Numerous
NGO's further children's rights. For example a school help program for
the protection of children has a team of experts who work with
educators to help identify abused or abandoned children in the
classroom.
The 1995 Law of the Child gives legal rights of testimony to minors
in child abuse cases; it also obliges all citizens to act on cases of
suspected child abuse and, for the first time, sets out rules regarding
foreign adoptions. Under the Penal Code, children under the age of 18
are not considered responsible for their actions and cannot be sent to
prison.
A 1996 penitentiary law lowered the maximum age that a child can
remain with an incarcerated mother from 6 to 3 years. When the children
reach their third birthday, they are sent to live with relatives or are
placed in an institution. Some prisons have special units for mothers
with children under age 3. The units usually include a kindergarten,
psychological support, and programs for children to get out of prison
regularly. Family groups with children under the age of 3 can now stay
together in cases where both parents are convicts.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution calls for the State to
provide for the adequate treatment and care of the disabled, ensuring
that they are not deprived of the basic rights that apply to all
citizens. The law aims to ensure fair access to public employment,
prevent discrimination, and facilitate access to public facilities and
transportation. The national law serves as a guide for regional laws;
however, levels of assistance and accessibility differ from region to
region and have not improved in many areas.
The Penal Code continues to allow parents or legal representatives
of a mentally disabled person to petition a judge to obtain permission
for the erilization of that person. In 1994 the Constitutional Court
held that sterilization of the mentally infirm does not constitute a
violation of the Constitution. In practice many courts have authorized
such surgery. Religious groups continue to protest this ruling.
The labor market reform laws of 1997 and 1998 worked out between
the Government, labor, and management provided for incentives to hire
individuals from groups underrepresented in the work force, such as the
disabled. In the 1998 agreement, the Government agreed to subsidize
partially the costs of hiring the disabled for part-time work.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Public opinion surveys indicate
the continued presence of racism and xenophobia, which result in
discrimination against minorities. A February poll conducted by the
Government's polling organization regarding attitudes towards
foreigners found that Spaniards feel most identification with other
Western Europeans and Latin Americans. There is less acceptance of
immigrants from Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa. In February hundreds of
Spanish villagers attacked the Moroccan immigrant population of El
Ejido (Almeria) with baseball bats and iron rods. The riot was sparked
by the murder of a Spanish woman by a Moroccan immigrant. The
disturbance lasted 4 days and was followed over the course of several
weeks by smaller outbreaks of anti-Moroccan immigrant violence.
On January 25, the Council of Europe cited a resurgence in
nationalism, sometimes violent, which manifested itself in intolerance
towards Roma, Africans, and Arabs. The Council recommended that the
Government implement the antiracist provisions of the Penal Code;
provide better statistics on racist attacks and vulnerable groups; deal
with the marginalization of Roma and immigrants; and combat the
activities of rightwing networks.
Roma continue to suffer discrimination in jobs, schools, and
housing. According to a report issued by Gypsy Presence, the largest
Roma-rights NGO, as many as 1 million Roma may live in the country. The
organization estimates that half of this population is under 16 years
of age and two-thirds are under the age of 25. The report states that
one-third of Roma families are not economically self-sufficient. Romani
activists attribute the high incidence of Romani informal sector
employment in agriculture and peddling (an estimated 75 to 80 percent)
to discrimination and historical marginalization. Although the Madrid
High Court of Justice struck down in 1999 a city ordinance prohibiting
peddling, Gypsy Presence reports that local authorities continue to
find ways to enforce the ban. According to the organization, several
other municipalities have enacted similar statutes, and this has been
detrimental to the economic welfare of many Roma. Romani women suffer
even more acute difficulties when seeking employment, since employers
are reluctant to hire women from ethnic groups with high birth rates.
A 1998 study found that only 35 percent of Romani children are
integrated fully into the educational system. About 60 percent of
Romani children do not complete primary school, and only very few
progress to middle school and beyond. According to a Gypsy Presence
report, one-fifth of teachers describe themselves as anti-Roma, and
one-fourth of students say that they would like to see Roma expelled
from school. Truancy and dropout rates among Roma are very high, and
Romani parents, over 80 percent of whom are functionally illiterate,
often do not see the value of an education or are unaware of the
educational opportunities for their children.
A shooting incident in the village of Albaladejo in 1999
illustrated the problems that even economically successful Roma can
face. According to an NGO, the victim in the case was Juan Jose Garcia
Garcia, who at one time was accused of drug dealing and assaulting
Civil Guards but was acquitted of both charges. However, Civil Guards
continued to harass him, often stopping him for identity checks or not
wearing a seatbelt. According to Gypsy Presence, after being refused
service at a bar, Garcia arranged to meet an employee of the bar, who
later appeared at the appointed place with a another man, shot Garcia,
and left him for dead. Garcia was able to contact his wife by cellular
phone, and help arrived in time to save him. After the two assailants
were apprehended, the residents of Albaladejo turned out in force to
protest their incarceration and petition for their release. The mayor
often led the demonstrations. In June a court freed the two accused
after they posted bond in the amount of $3,333 and $2,666 (500,000 and
400,000 pesetas respectively). Garcia and his family left Albaladejo.
In April 2000 the Department of Social Services announced a plan to
relocate 300 Roma immigrants from a rural area to Madrid to improve
their living conditions. The Roma were provided amenities such as
running water, electricity, toilets, trash services, showers, and a
community area in return for attending employment training. The project
cost $2 million (350 million pesetas). As of July 25, 17 of the Roma
participants had secured outside employment.
Quasi-organized rightwing youth groups (called ``skinheads'' by the
press) continued to commit violent acts throughout the year,
terrorizing minorities. According to a 1999 report by the NGO Movement
Against Intolerance, which the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
helped prepare, the number of persons involved in ultrarightist groups
more than quintupled since 1995: at least 10,400 citizens are known to
be involved in such groups, and the actual number could be as high as
20,800. Movement Against Intolerance reported in March the presence of
Spanish neo-Nazi groups on the Internet, aiming their attacks at
Maghrebi immigrants. Through their web pages, these groups urged others
to take violent action against all immigrants of North African descent.
In 1999 an NGO urged the Government to halt neo-Nazi activites in
the formerly deserted village of Los Pedriches in the southeast.
Foreign neo-Nazis were said to be organizing camps in the village. The
authorities were monitoring the situation closely. After press
attention, the groups reportedly left the village.
No arrests were made in July 1999 incidents in which a mosque in
Gerona and a building in Banyoles that housed immigrants from Senegal
and the Gambia were burned.
A language or dialect other than Castilian Spanish is used in 6 of
the 17 autonomous communities. The Constitution stipulates that
citizens have ``the duty to know'' Castilian, which is the ``official
language of the state,'' but it adds that other languages also can be
official under regional statutes and that the ``different language
variations of Spain are a cultural heritage which shall . . . be
protected.''
The Law of the Catalan Language, approved by the Catalan regional
legislature (Generalitat) in 1998, stipulates the use of Catalan as the
official language in local government and administrative offices,
regional courts, publicly owned corporations, and private companies
subsidized by the Catalan regional Government. Spanish-speaking
citizens have the right to be addressed in Spanish by public officials.
The legislation also establishes minimum quotas for Catalan-language
radio and television programming. Controversy continued over the
language law implementing legislation and related regulatory measures.
Facing strong resistance from film distributors, the regional
government in March annulled legislation that required foreign films
distributed in sufficient quantities also to be dubbed and distributed
in Catalan.
In June an administrative court in Tarragona considered a challenge
to a local university regulation that imposed extensive use of Catalan
in university affairs. The court, although leaving some of the
regulation intact and declaring itself not competent to rule on the
constitutionality of the linguistic law, struck down several sections
of the regulation. For example, the court found that the regulation's
treatment of certain administrative issues and a requirement that staff
use Catalan at all public university functions exceeded university
authority and autonomy and were not in conformance with other laws.
Another court challenge involved the propriety of the same university's
discipline of a professor for supplying copies of the university
entrance examination in Spanish, rather than Catalan, to two students
requesting Spanish versions. The court ruled in December that the
professor was excluded wrongly from the administration of the
examinations and praised her for defending the students' rights. The
court clearly implied that the university's regulation limiting access
to the exmination in Spanish was discriminatory and said that it was
permissible to foster the use of Catalan but not to do so in a manner
that excludes or limits the use of Spanish. The university
administration responded that it had no intention of modifying its
regulation and intended to appeal the continued suspension of certain
aspects of the regulation. Notwithstanding its response, in May it
began supplying the entrance examination in Spanish to those who
requested it.
The European Parliament in September declined to investigate
allegations brought by Spanish-speaking activists that the linguistic
law discriminated against Spanish-speakers. Both Galicia and Valencia
have laws stating that it is the duty of the Government to ``promote''
their regional languages in schools and at official functions.
The debate continued over the extent to which the Basque language
(Euskera) should be promoted. The Union of Basque-Speaking Lawyers,
affiliated with the pro-ETA HB political party, intensified its
campaign against the use of translation services in trials of Basque-
speaking citizens.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except those in the
military services, judges, magistrates, and prosecutors, are entitled
to form or join unions of their own choosing. About 15 percent of the
workforce is unionized.
Under the Constitution, trade unions are free to choose their
representatives, determine their policies, represent their members'
interests, and strike. They are not restricted or harassed by the
Government and are independent of political parties. A strike in
nonessential services is legal if its sponsors give 5 days' notice. Any
striking union must respect minimum service requirements negotiated
with the respective employer. The right to strike was interpreted by
the Constitutional Court to include general strikes called to protest
government policy. There were 632 strikes in 1998, a decrease of 53
from 1997. The number of striking workers in 1998 was 680,500, an
increase of 29,900 on the previous year. The number of workdays lost to
strikes in 1998 was 1,280,900, a decrease of 555,900 on the previous
year. The number of workdays lost to strikes continued to decrease in
1999 and 2000. In December government workers held a protest march and
general strike over their demands for salary increases that kept pace
with inflation.
Unions are free to form or join federations and affiliate with
international bodies and do so without hindrance.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1980 statute
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Trade
union and collective bargaining rights were extended in 1986 to all
workers in the public sector except military personnel. Public sector
collective bargaining in 1990 was broadened to include salaries and
employment levels, but the Government retained the right to set these
if negotiations failed. Collective bargaining agreements are widespread
in both the public and private sectors; in the latter they cover 60
percent of workers, notwithstanding that only about 15 percent of
workers are actually union members.
The law prohibits discrimination by employers against trade union
members and organizers. Discrimination cases have priority in the labor
courts. The law gives unions a role in controlling temporary work
contracts to prevent the abuse of such contracts and of termination
actions. Unions nonetheless contend that employers discriminate in many
cases by refusing to renew the temporary contracts of workers engaging
in union organizing. More than one-third of all employees are under
temporary contracts.
Labor regulations and practices in free trade zones and export
processing zones are the same as in the rest of the country. Union
membership in these zones is reportedly higher than the average
throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited, and the law
is enforced effectively; however, there were instances of trafficking
in women who were forced into prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
of Children.--The statutory minimum age for the employment of children
is 16 years. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is primarily
responsible for enforcement. The minimum age is enforced effectively in
major industries and in the service sector. It is more difficult to
enforce on small farms and in family-owned businesses, where some child
labor persists. Legislation prohibiting child labor is enforced
effectively in the special economic zones. The law also prohibits the
employment of persons under the age of 18 at night, for overtime work,
or in sectors considered hazardous. The law prohibits forced or
compulsory labor by children, and it is enforced effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
In 1998 UNICEF called for an investigation into child labor on
tomato farms in Badajoz. According to Red Cross personnel providing
assistance to migrant farm workers there, over 200 children under the
age of 16, the majority Portuguese citizens, worked 10-hour days and
earned less than $14 (2,000 pesetas) per day. Many of the children were
less than 10 years old.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage was set in
December 1999 for 2000 and is $14.16 (2,356 pesetas) per day or $424.80
(70,680 pesetas) per month, a 2 percent increase compared with 1999.
The legal minimum wage for workers over 18 years of age is considered
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. The rate is revised every year in line with the consumer price
index and is enforced effectively by the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs.
The law sets a 40-hour workweek with an unbroken rest period of 36
hours after each 40 hours worked. Workers enjoy 12 paid holidays a year
and a month's paid vacation.
Several press stories reported that illegal immigrants worked for
substandard pay and in substandard working conditions. The Inspectorate
of Labor reported 2,724 cases of labor rights violations related to
immigrants during the first 8 months of the year.
Government mechanisms exist for enforcing working conditions and
occupational health and safety rules, but bureaucratic procedures are
cumbersome and inefficient. Safety and health legislation is being
revised to conform to European Union (EU) directives. The 1995 Law to
Prevent Labor Risks is the basis for the completion of the rest of the
EU directives. The National Institute of Safety and Health in the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security has technical responsibility for
developing labor standards, but the Inspectorate of Labor has
responsibility for enforcing the legislation through judicial action
when infractions are found. Workers have firm legal protection for
filing complaints about hazardous conditions, but easily replaced
temporary workers may be reluctant to use this protection due to fear
of losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law provides for sentences of up to
3 years' imprisonment and a fine for trafficking in persons.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution, primarily
from Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, appears to be growing.
The Guardia Civil announced a plan in May to focus on trafficking
in women for prostitution and made 162 arrests from May to the end of
the year. In February police arrested 19 persons for trafficking in
women for prostitution in Andalucia. The network controlled 235 women,
most were from Eastern Europe. In March police in Taragona and
Castellon arrested 7 Moldovan nationals for operating a trafficking
network which brought 520 women from Eastern Europe into Spain for
purposes of prostitution. In late December, the Guardia Civil arrested
a network of 30 traffickers. The coordinated arrests occurred in
Madrid, the Basque region, and several other cities. The women were
from Latin America.
At least three such rings were broken up in 1999. One ring was run
by Russians and Azerbaijanis and involved the trafficking women from
Eastern Europe. Another, which police in Castilla-La Mancha broke up in
mid-July, brought women to the country from Africa, Europe, and South
America. In August police in Andalucia detained 51 persons and broke up
a ring that trafficked women from Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. In all
these cases, women were promised jobs and given the necessary documents
to enter the country. Upon arrival their documents were seized, and
they were taken to alternative clubs and forced to have up to 10 sexual
encounters per day.
Most women apprehended in raids are Latin Americans who entered the
country legally as tourists (most from countries whose citizens do not
require visas), but who began working as prostitutes instead. Profits
in the sex industry are 10 times higher than those in other occupations
commonly filled by migrants (waitresses, maids, etc.). Nonetheless,
officials concede that significant numbers of women are trafficked to
Spain by eastern European Mafia groups that ruthlessly exploit their
victims. A Chinese gang, which forced migrants to submit to abortions,
was apprehended. Media attention to the issue of international
trafficking in women has encouraged NGO's and others to demand
protection for victims. The April immigration law provides protections
for trafficking victims who cooperate with police against traffickers.
Press accounts state that authorities detained 163 pimps and freed 865
foreigners from abusive situations in the first half of the year. The
half-year figures surpass the totals for all of 1998. A 1999 Civil
Guard study estimated that 10,000 women were working in sex clubs, of
whom 90 percent were immigrants.
The NGO Doctors of the World, which works with prostitutes,
estimated during the year that 60 percent of the 45,000 female
prostitutes were immigrants. Doctors of the World reported that 69
percent of these immigrant prostitutes were from Sub-Saharan Africa, 21
percent were from Latin America, and 8 percent were from Eastern
Europe.
__________
SWEDEN
Sweden is a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty parliamentary
democracy. The King is Chief of State. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime
Minister, exercises executive authority. The judiciary is independent.
The Government effectively controls the police, all security
organizations, and the armed forces.
Sweden has an advanced industrial economy, mainly market based, and
a high standard of living, with extensive social welfare services.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. The Government has longstanding
programs to deal with violence against women and abuse of children and
took steps against trafficking in women. Neo-Nazi violence remained a
problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In June a police officer was charged with breach of duty, serious
ill treatment, and causing the death of another, in a March incident in
which he shot a fleeing suspect. The police officer reportedly fired a
warning shot, then shot the man from behind because he was convinced
that the suspect was armed.
In June a prison escapee died after being caught and restrained by
four prison guards. Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are concerned
that the man may have died as a result of excessive use of force by the
guards. The guards were suspended pending the results of a police
investigation into the death.
The Prosecutor General closed his review of the initial
investigation of a 1995 case in which a man died in police custody,
acknowledging that there had been flaws in the investigation. He urged
that a further, independent investigation be carried out into how the
authorities had handled the different aspects of the case. No one was
ever prosecuted for the death, although the two policemen involved were
convicted of a minor offense in 1996. A report by the parliamentary
Ombudsman concluded that the current procedure for dealing with
complaints against the police was inadequate and proposed that an
independent system be established. In June the Minister of Justice
decided to appoint a commission of inquiry to look into past deaths in
custody in order to propose safeguards. NGO's remain very interested in
such cases.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities
generally respect such prohibitions. Complaints of the excessive use of
force by the police are infrequent. Thorough investigations have
produced no evidence of a systemic problem. Typically, police officers
found guilty of abuse are suspended or otherwise disciplined.
Five cases of excessive use of force by policemen during the year
were under investigation. Three officers were fined for excessive use
of force in October 1999, but there were no reported cases of policemen
being fired for committing crimes in the course of their duties--
including the use of excessive force.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions. Arrests are by warrant. The police must
file charges within 6 hours against persons detained for disturbing the
public order or considered dangerous, and within 12 hours against those
detained on other grounds. The law requires arraignment within 48
hours. The time between arrest and the first court hearing may be
extended to 96 hours for detainees considered dangerous, likely to
destroy evidence, or likely to flee. In cases involving more than one
individual and in the case of foreigners, courts can and do order
continued detention for 2 weeks at a time while police are
investigating. Such detentions can be protracted, particularly in drug
cases. Other than such dangerous suspects, detainees routinely are
released pending trial. Bail as such does not exist. If a person files
for bankruptcy and refuses to cooperate with an official investigation,
a court may order detention for up to 3 months, with judicial review
every 2 weeks.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system is composed of three levels of courts: District
courts, a court of appeals, and a Supreme Court. All criminal and civil
cases are heard first in district court regardless of the severity of
the alleged crime.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law limits home searches to investigations of
major crimes punishable by at least 2 years' imprisonment. The
authorities respect this provision. Normally the police must obtain
court approval for a search or a wiretap. However, a senior police
official may approve a search if time is a critical factor or the case
involves a threat to life. The national police and the Prosecutor
General's Office submit a report to Parliament every year detailing all
of the electronic monitoring done during the previous year. In April
the Minister of Justice presented a proposal to expand the use of
police wiretapping. According to the proposal, wiretapping would be
allowed only if serious drug crimes or serious crimes that would result
in at least 4 years' imprisonment were suspected. A parliamentary
decision is likely in 2001. A court must grant permission for wiretaps
on a case-by-case basis. NGO's were critical of the Ministry's
proposal.
In 1997 journalistic investigations focused attention on the
country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization. The majority of
persons sterilized were disabled either mentally or physically. Such
operations were known for years to have taken place under pre-World War
II legislation, most of them without force. It initially was reported
that between 1934 and 1976, 62,888 forced sterilizations were carried
out, 95 percent of them on women. In 1999 a government-appointed
commission concluded that approximately 10,000 to 15,000 of these
sterilizations were forced. The commission gave priority to the
question of damages to victims and also looked into the possible
existence of other categories of victims. The commission concluded its
inquiry in 1999, and Parliament decided to pay damages of approximately
$21,000 (175,000 krona) to each victim. By October 1,925 persons had
applied for compensation. By year's end, some 1,300 had received
payment. The Government allocated additional resources to pay
compensation since the number of applicants far exceeded expectations.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
provisions in practice. Most newspapers and periodicals are privately
owned. The Government subsidizes daily newspapers, regardless of
political affiliation. Broadcasters operate under a state concession.
Until a few years ago, the State had a monopoly over ground-based
broadcasting, but a variety of commercial television channels (one
ground-based and several via satellite or cable), and several
commercial radio stations now exist.
The Government may censor publications containing national security
information. A quasi-governmental body excises extremely graphic
violence from films, television programs, and videos.
Criticism of child pornography is widespread, and the debate on the
legality of ownership of pornographic material continued. A 1999 law
criminalizes the possession and handling of child pornography. It also
is illegal to publish or distribute such material. The Queen remains a
strong and popular advocate of children's rights and an active opponent
of child pornography.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respects
this right in practice. Police require a permit for public
demonstrations. The authorities routinely grant such permits, with rare
exceptions to prevent clashes between antagonistic groups or due to
insufficient police resources to patrol an event adequately.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. The debate that began in
1999 over the possible criminalization of neo-Nazi organizations
continued.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects that right in practice. The
Government does not hamper the practice or teaching of any faith.
The country maintained a state (Lutheran) church for several
hundred years, supported by a general ``church tax'' (although the
Government routinely grants exemptions). However, in 1995 the Church of
Sweden and the Government agreed to a formal separation, which became
effective during the year, but the Church still is to receive some
state support. The reform also made it possible for all religious
communities to register by fulfilling certainmainly organizational--
requirements. The principles governing state support to all religious
communities have been laid down in a new special act of law.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The law and regulations incorporate the precepts of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
They are also consistent with the European Union's (EU) Dublin
Convention. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees; it also provides first asylum. In keeping with international
agreements, the Government reviewed applications for asylum more
thoroughly than before. The number of applications for asylum decreased
in 1999 to 11,231 (from 12,844 in 1998). Applicants included 3,576
Iraqi citizens, 1,812 from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 854
Iranians. The Government approved 5,597 applications in 1999. A total
of 6,835 persons sought asylum through July 2000. Nearly 11 percent of
the country's population is foreign born.
The Government carries out expeditious returns of asylum seekers
from EU countries or from countries with which there are reciprocal
return agreements. In many cases, asylum seekers were deported within
72 hours of arrival, and NGO's were critical of their lack of access to
legal counsel. To remedy this situation, the Government is
experimenting with pilot programs at selected border crossings to
provide expeditious legal assistance. Most of these are cases of
persons who passed through or have asylum determinations pending in
other EU countries. Applications can remain under consideration for
long periods of time with applicants in uncertain status. Because of
the appeals process in the courts, cases can extend for several years.
These cases are few in number.
The principal complaint of NGO's is that the country lacks a
transparent process for making decisions in asylum cases. They maintain
that the asylum procedures lack rules to guide the conduct of
authorities to ensure legal protection for asylum seekers. The
procedures accord great discretion to individuals in decisionmaking
positions. According to the NGO's, the decisionmakers use arbitrary,
unspecified, and inconsistent criteria. NGO's are particularly critical
of the unclear burden of proof and the lack of an appeals process to an
independent court. Four cases, in which the Government sought to return
asylum seekers to countries where they feared persecution, were pending
at the U.N. Committee Against Torture; the Committee was expected to
review the cases in the fall of 2000.
The Government conducted a review of the safety of countries that
are considered safe third countries. NGO's raised the issue of
insufficient protection for returnees to countries without a reciprocal
return agreement. While these countries provide safe asylum, they are
often reluctant to accept asylum seekers deported from European
countries. Despite the Government's review, late in the year the
authorities ordered the deportation of two Iranian asylum seekers to
Tehran. The deportation was halted after the U.N. Committee Against
Torture decided to review both cases to determine if the individuals
would face torture if returned to Tehran.
A total of 3,752 Kosovar Albanian refugees were granted temporary
residence permits in 1999, initially valid for 11 months. By July more
than 2,500 of the refugees had returned to Kosovo. The Government has
accepted over 100,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia. The
Government provides grants to Bosnians to travel to their homeland in
order to determine if they wish to be repatriated. It also provides
financial incentives for returnees, but there is no forced
repatriation. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution.
In March the Government withdrew a proposal envisaging changes to
its temporary protection regulations in a situation of mass
immigration. The proposal was withdrawn following massive criticism by
the political opposition, the UNHCR, NGO's, and the parliamentary
Committee on Social Insurance.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Citizens exercised this right most recently in
1998. Elections to the 349-member unicameral Parliament are held every
4 years.
Women participate actively in the political process and Government.
They constitute 43.6 percent of the Parliament and 55 percent of the
Cabinet. The governing Social Democratic Party largely kept its pledge
to place women in half of all political appointments at all levels.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several private organizations actively monitor issues such as the
impact of social legislation, anti-immigrant or racist activities, and
the condition of the indigenous Sami population. The official ombudsmen
publicize abuses of state authority and may initiate actions to rectify
such abuses. Government agencies are in close contact with a variety of
local and international groups working in the country and abroad to
improve human rights observance, and they are very open to dialog and
input from these groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and
the Government respects this provision.
Women.--A total of 19,982 reported cases of assault against women
(excluding rape) were reported in 1999, compared with 20,516 in 1998.
Most involved spousal abuse. In three-quarters of the assaults, the
perpetrator was an acquaintance of the victim. Reported abuse against
women occurs disproportionately in immigrant communities. On average 33
murders of women and girls are reported each year, half of them by men
closely related to the victim. The number of reported rapes of persons
over age 15 was 1,747 in 1999, compared with 1,386 in 1998. The law
does not differentiate between spousal and nonspousal rape. In 1998
(latest statistics available) 4,928 cases of violence against women
were prosecuted, as were 243 rape cases, 208 of which were sexual
assaults on persons over age 15.
Trafficking in women from Russia and the Baltics for purposes of
forced prostitution continues to be a small but serious problem (see
Section 6.f.). The purchase or attempted purchase of sexual services
became illegal in 1999.
The Government has longstanding programs to deal with violence
against women. The law provides complainants with protection from
contact with their abusers, if so desired. In some cases, the
authorities help women obtain new identities and homes. The Government
provides electronic alarms or bodyguards for women in extreme danger of
assault. Both national and local governments help fund volunteer groups
that provide shelter and other assistance to abused women. The
authorities strive to apprehend and prosecute abusers. Typically, the
sentence for abuse is a prison term--14 months on average--or
psychiatric treatment. However, women complain about short sentences
and the early release of offenders.
The law prohibits sexual harassment and specifies clearly
employers' responsibilities to prevent and--if applicable--to
investigate sexual harassment in the workplace and to formulate and
post a specific policy and guidelines for the workplace. Employers who
do not investigate and intervene against harassment at work can be
obliged to pay damages to the victim. As with other forms of
discrimination, women and men may take complaints to the courts or to
their unions. To combat gender discrimination in the longer term, the
Equal Opportunities Act requires all employers, both in the public and
private sector, actively to promote equal opportunities for women and
men in the workplace.
The law requires employers to treat men and women alike in hiring,
promotion, and pay, including equal pay for comparable work. According
to 1998 statistics, women's salaries were 82 percent of men's salaries.
Adjusting for age, education, and occupational differences between men
and women, women average 91 percent of men's salaries. The equal
opportunity Ombudsman, a public official, investigates complaints of
gender discrimination in the labor market. Women and men also may
pursue complaints through the courts. A third option, and by far the
most common, involves settling allegations with the employee's labor
union as mediator. In 1999 gender discrimination cases by 94 women and
16 men were registered with the equal opportunity Ombudsman. The courts
did not rule on any of the cases in 1999 (pending the resolution of 1
of the cases in the European Court of Justice), 11 were settled through
mediation, 22 were withdrawn, and 72 were dropped. The remainder were
pending. In the past, many of these cases involved salary
discrimination.
All employers with more than 10 employees must prepare an annual
equality plan, including a survey of pay differences between male and
female employees. The equal opportunity Ombudsman reviews these plans.
Women were trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
Section 6.f.).
Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization,
thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976.
The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or
physically, and 95 percent were women. In May 1999, Parliament decided
to pay damages in such cases (see Section 1.f.).
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The Government provides compulsory, free,
and universal primary school education for children for 9 years. It
also provides free medical and dental care for all children up to the
age of 16 (19 for dental care). Parents receive some $1,000 per year
for each child under 16 years of age. An official children's Ombudsman
monitors the Government's programs.
The Government allocates funds to private organizations concerned
with children's rights. An NGO, Children's Rights in Society, offers
counseling to troubled youngsters. The Government remains active
internationally in efforts to prevent child abuse.
Although the physical abuse of children appears relatively
uncommon, the public and authorities remain concerned by consistent
data indicating an increase in cases over the past several years. The
number of reported cases for children under the age of 15 rose to 5,919
in 1999, up from 5,642 in 1998. The number of reported cases of sexual
abuse of children under the age of 15 was 2,969 in 1999 and 2,756 in
1998. The U.N. Children's Committee criticized the Government, stating
that it provides less protection for the children of immigrant and
disadvantaged groups.
The law prohibits parents or other caretakers from abusing children
mentally or physically in any way. Parents, teachers, and other adults
are subject to prosecution if they physically punish a child, including
slapping or spanking. Children have the right to report such abuses to
the police. The authorities respect these laws, and the usual sentence
is a fine combined with counseling and monitoring by social workers.
However, if the situation warrants, authorities may remove children
from their homes and place them in foster care. Foster parents
virtually never receive permission to adopt long-term foster children,
even in cases where the parents are seen as unfit or seek no contact
with the child. Critics charge that this policy places the rights of
biological parents over the needs of children for security in permanent
family situations.
People with Disabilities.--With one exception, there are no
specific laws that prohibit discrimination against persons with
disabilities, but considerable efforts are made to ensure that the
disabled enjoy equal opportunities. A 1999 act prohibits discrimination
against disabled persons in the workplace. In May the Parliament
adopted a national plan on disability policy that provides for freedom
of access and social support as basic rights for disabled citizens.
Since 1994 the country has had an Ombudsman for disability issues. The
Government provides disabled persons with assistance aimed at allowing
them to live as normal a life as possible, preferably outside an
institutional setting. This support may include a personal assistant
for the severely disabled, plus improvements in the workplace's
accessibility to wheelchairs. Government assistance also encompasses
services such as home care or group living. Regulations for new
buildings require full accessibility, but the Government has no such
requirement for existing public buildings. Many buildings and some
public transportation remain inaccessible. Deaf children have the right
to education in sign language. The parents of disabled children and
disabled workers under the age of 65 receive financial assistance every
7 years to buy a car adapted to the person's disability.
Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization,
thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976.
The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or
physically (see Section 1.f.). In 1999 Parliament decided to pay
damages in such cases.
Indigenous People.--The country counts at least 17,000 Sami
(formerly known as Lapps) among its 8.87 million inhabitants (Sami
organizations place that number somewhat higher, 25,000 to 30,000). In
1993 the Government allowed the formation of a Sametinget, or Sami
Parliament, as an advisory body to the Government. Under the current
Government, Sami issues fall under the Ministry of Agriculture.
The Sami continue a protracted struggle for recognition as an
indigenous people under a variety of international agreements, such as
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169. Historically,
the Government resisted granting the Sami such rights. For example,
Sami children had no right to education in their native language until
the provision of such education to immigrant group children under a
1977 law forced the Government to grant Sami at least equal treatment.
As a result of such education, northern Sami dialects have enjoyed a
recent renaissance. However, Sami dialects in the southern portions of
traditional Sami lands now may have too few native speakers to survive
as living languages. In 1997 the Government initiated an inquiry into
whether the country could ratify ILO Convention 169. The inquiry was
published in 1999 and concluded that the country could ratify the
convention, but that it should not be ratified until a number of steps
relating to Sami land rights are taken. No further steps were taken
during the year.
In 1994 the Government removed from the Sami the right to control
hunting and fishing activities on Sami village lands, permitting
instead totally unlimited hunting and fishing activity on all
government property. Sami leaders continued to protest this change
during the year.
Some Sami state that they face discrimination in housing and
employment on an individual basis, particularly in the southern
mountain regions. In January the Government officially recognized the
Sami people as a national minority in the context of its ratification
of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities.
Religious Minorities.--The Government continued to take proactive
steps to combat anti-Semitism by increasing awareness of Nazi crimes
and the Holocaust. Under its living history project, the Government
provides educational material on the Holocaust to schoolchildren and
families throughout the country. The media are also active in
publicizing and condemning neo-Nazi activity.
The Government declared January 27, the anniversary of Auschwitz's
liberation, as a national day of remembrance. In January Sweden hosted
a large, high-level international conference on Holocaust education.
The Stockholm international forum on the Holocaust was attended by over
40 countries and over 20 heads of state and government.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 11 percent of
Sweden's population is foreign born, with the largest groups being from
Finland, Iran, and the former Yugoslavia. ``Skinhead'' and neoNazi
related violence increased during the year. Neo-Nazi activity in the
past was rarely lethal or well organized and was directed mostly at
immigrants. However, cases over the last couple of years are notable
for the fact that they mainly targeted white, native, non-Jewish
citizens. Crimes with racial overtones increased, but only 13 per cent
of the racist crimes reported could be linked directly to neo-Nazis.
Violent incidents with racial overtones have averaged about 100 per
year in recent years, although no official statistics are kept.
Three neo-Nazis were sentenced in January to life imprisonment for
killing two police officers during the course of a May 1999 bank
robbery. Two young neo-Nazis were sentenced to 11 years in prison in
April for the murder of a trade union official in October 1999. A third
defendant was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment for being an
accessory.
The public continued to urge a tougher stance against neo-Nazi
groups. Several demonstrations against violence and racism were
organized all over the country. The Government supports volunteer
groups that oppose racism and xenophobia. As a result of the 1999 press
campaign against 62 of the country's leading neo-Nazis, 5 were expelled
from their unions, and 1 was fired from his job.
Most estimates place the number of active neo-Nazis at fewer than
2,000, and there appears to be little popular support for their
activities or sentiments. Many citizens doubt whether such youth
actually embrace neo-Nazi ideology, and the Government supports
activities by volunteer groups working against racism. The Government
investigates and prosecutes race-related crimes, although in many
clashes between Swedish and immigrant youth gangs, authorities judge
both sides to be at fault. Neo-Nazi groups operate legally, but serious
discussion has been taking place about outlawing such groups. The
Supreme Court ruled that it can be illegal to wear xenophobic symbols
or racist paraphernalia. Rightwing groups, which have and exercise the
right to demonstrate, are not permitted to display signs and banners
with provocative symbols at their rallies.
The Ombudsman for racial discrimination reported in January that
complaints of ethnic discrimination in the labor market increased by 50
percent in 1999 to 184 cases, compared with 122 cases in 1998. The
increase could be linked to a new law, introduced in May 1999, which
provides easier redress.
A government committee presented a report that proposed a
tightening of the laws against Nazi and racist crimes. The committee
proposed that a new charge be introduced, ``seriously disorderly
conduct,'' in order to be able to prosecute people for crimes that do
not fall under ``agitation against ethnic groups.''
In January the Government decided to ratify the Council of Europe's
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The decision
implies that the Sami people, Swedish Finns, Tornedal-Finns, Roma, and
Jews are recognized as national minorities. It means that the
Government should support and protect minority languages such as Sami,
Finnish, and Yiddish. A new law that gave effect to the conventions
entered into force on April 1.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The work force is approximately 80
percent unionized. Career military personnel, police officers, and
civilian government officials, as well as private sector workers in
both manufacturing and service industries, are organized. Most business
owners belong to counterpart employer organizations.
Unions and employer organizations operate independently of the
Government and political parties (although the largest federation of
unions has always been linked with the largest political party, the
Social Democrats). The law protects the freedom of workers to associate
and to strike, as well as for employers to organize and to conduct
lockouts. Within limits protecting the public's immediate health and
security, public employees also enjoy the right to strike. These laws
are respected fully and are not challenged.
Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies. They
are affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation among others.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Management-
labor cooperation tends to be excellent and nonconfrontational. Labor
and management, each represented by a national organization by sector
(for example retailers and engineering industries), negotiate framework
agreements every 2 to 3 years. More detailed company-level agreements
put such framework agreements into effect at the local level. New
framework agreements were signed during 1998, with most valid until
2001. In contrast with the recent past, most agreements with labor
unions now provide for a degree of individualized pay, including merit
bonuses.
The law provides both workers and employers with effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints. The vast majority of complaints
are resolved informally. The law protects union officials and members
from dismissal or reprisals for official union activities. In some
instances, unions even demand collective agreements regardless of the
views and union status of employees. The Government is studying ways to
strengthen the system of public mediation. During the year, a new
government office, the Mediation Institute, began functioning. During
1999 there were seven legal and two illegal strikes. No strikes or
lockouts were reported during the year, apart from two small wildcat
actions in October.
Agreement was reached in 1997 between 12 employer associations and
8 unions representing 800,000 manufacturing employees on steps to
prevent strikes and lockouts, such as requiring serious wage
negotiations to start 3 months before a collective agreement expires
and appointing a mediator if an agreement has not been reached after 2
months. As a result of this agreement, wages increased by approximately
3 percent in 1998 and a further 3 to 3.5 percent in 1999. Similar
agreements were signed in the municipal sector and in the retail-
commercial and service sectors.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and the authorities effectively enforce
this ban. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively. However, women
are trafficked to the country for the purposes of forced prostitution
(see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Compulsory 9-year education ends at age 16, and the law
permits full-time employment at that age under the supervision of local
authorities. Employees under age 18 may work only during the daytime
and under supervision. During summer and other vacation periods,
children as young as 13 years may work part time or in ``light'' work
with parental permission. Union representatives, police, and public
prosecutors effectively enforce this restriction. The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage law. Wages are set by collective bargaining contracts, which
nonunion establishments usually observe as well. Even the lowest paid
workers can maintain a decent standard of living for themselves and
their families through substantial benefits (such as housing or day
care support) provided by social welfare entitlement programs. However,
cutbacks in these programs have made it harder for some workers to make
ends meet, particularly low-paid single women with children.
The standard workweek is 40 hours or less. Both the law and
collective bargaining agreements regulate overtime and rest periods.
For workers not covered by a labor agreement, the law stipulates a
limit for overtime at 200 hours a year, although exceptions may be
granted for key employees with union approval; some collective
bargaining agreements put the limit at 150 hours. The law requires a
rest period after 5 hours of work but does not stipulate a minimum
duration; in practice it is usually 30 minutes. The law also provides
all employees with a minimum of 5 weeks of paid annual leave; labor
contracts often provide more, particularly for higher ranking private
sector employees and older public service workers. Amendments to the
labor law in 1997 made it easier for employers to hire workers for
limited periods, as well as empowering local unions to agree to
exceptions to last-in, first-out laws.
Currently the focus of concern is on the psychosocial aspect of
health and safety. Occupational health and safety rules are set by a
government-appointed board and monitored by trained union stewards,
safety ombudsmen, and, occasionally, government inspectors. These
standards are very high, making workplaces both safe and healthy.
Safety ombudsmen have the authority to stop unsafe activity immediately
and to call in an inspector. An individual also has the right to halt
work in dangerous situations in order to consult a supervisor or safety
representative.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit such
trafficking, although traffickers are prosecuted under other statutes.
Women are trafficked to the country for forced prostitution. In 1999
the Government initiated six court cases against individuals involved
in trafficking. The 11 cases prosecuted in 1998-99 resulted in 6
convictions. All of the accused traffickers are Swedish residents with
family and personal ties to Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle
East. The affected women in these cases, numbering 200 to 500 per year,
came principally from Central Europe, the Baltic states, and Russia.
The women typically are recruited in their own countries to come and
work as cleaners, babysitters, or similar employment. Some reportedly
were ``purchased'' from other traffickers and brought into Sweden. A
1998 baseline report stated that considerable additional information
available to the police suggests that the problem of trafficking is
more widespread than the few prosecutions indicate.
The Government and the EU provided funds to the Foundation of
Women's Forums to combat trafficking in women in the Nordic and Baltic
nations by creating interactive networks that link NGO's and research
institutions that deal with prevention and the rehabilitation of
trafficked women.
__________
SWITZERLAND
Switzerland is a constitutional democracy with a federal structure.
The bicameral Parliament elects the seven members of the Federal
Council, the highest executive body, whose presidency rotates annually.
Because of the nation's linguistic and religious diversity, the Swiss
political system emphasizes local and national political consensus and
grants considerable autonomy to individual cantons. Voters approved a
new Constitution in April 1999 that came into force on January 1, 2000.
The judiciary is independent.
The armed forces are a civilian-controlled militia based on
universal military service for able-bodied males. There is virtually no
standing army apart from training cadres and a few essential
headquarters staff. Police duties are primarily a responsibility of the
individual cantons, which have their own police forces that are kept
under effective control. The National Police Authority has a
coordinating role and relies on the cantons for actual law enforcement.
There were allegations of occasional abuses by police.
Switzerland has a highly developed free enterprise, industrial, and
service economy strongly dependent on international trade. The standard
of living is very high.
The Government generally respects human rights, and the law and
judiciary provide effective means of dealing with individual instances
of abuse. There continue to be allegations by nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) of occasional police harassment directed against
foreigners, particularly asylum seekers, including arbitrary detention.
Violence against women is a problem, and the Government is continuing
to take serious steps to address it. Trafficking in women for forced
prostitution increased. Some laws still tend to discriminate against
women. There continue to be reports of verbal abuse against foreigners
by private citizens.
The new Constitution approved by voters in 1999 provides for new
protection for citizens' rights, including the principle of equal
opportunity for the disabled and the right to strike.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
Human rights groups strongly criticized police for the death of 27-
year-old Palestinian Khaled Abuzarifeh, who died at Zurich-Kloten
airport while being forcibly deported in March 1999. In January Zurich
cantonal authorities announced that forensic tests showed that
Abuzarifeh died of suffocation. For deportation he was strapped into a
wheelchair and adhesive tape was placed over his mouth to prevent him
from shouting. According to airport police, such restraints were
permitted because Abuzarifeh's physical resistance thwarted a first
deportation attempt. Cantonal authorities claim no longer to be using
adhesive tape to cover the mouth during deportations. In connection
with Abuzarifeh's death, three police officers and a doctor were placed
under formal investigation of charges of manslaughter by culpable
negligence.
Fulgence Niyonteze, the former mayor of the Rwandan town of
Mushubati, sought asylum in Switzerland in 1994 and was arrested in
1996. In May 1999, a military court convicted him of crimes committed
during the 1994 genocide, including murder (taking part in the massacre
of Tutsis), attempted murder, incitement to murder, and war crimes. He
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Niyonteze was tried by a military
tribunal because Swiss law stipulates that alleged war crimes and
violations of the Geneva Conventions be tried by a military tribunal.
On May 26, 2000, a military appeal court heard Niyonteze's appeal
of his sentence of life imprisonment. The court found Niyonteze guilty
of war crimes and violations of the Geneva Conventions but dropped the
first charges of murder and incitement to murder and declared that a
military tribunal had no authority to try such offenses when committed
abroad by a civilian. The military appeal court sentenced Niyonteze to
14 years in prison. Both the public prosecutor and Niyonteze filed
appeals of the sentence.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution proscribes such practices, and there were
no reports of violations. There were allegations by NGO's and some
individuals of occasional police harassment of foreigners, particularly
asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.).
Brazilian national Luis Felipe Lourenco was arrested in 1998 in
Geneva on charges of theft of a credit card. A prison guard allegedly
beat him while he was in custody. Prison authorities reportedly waited
2 hours before transporting Lourenco to the hospital, where he was
diagnosed with a perforated lung and damage to his spinal cord.
Lourenco is paralyzed in all his limbs as result of the injuries that
he claims to have suffered while detained. The prison administration
maintained that Lourenco's injuries were incurred when he threw himself
against a door.
On August 28, a Geneva magistrate decided not to indict the guard
for negligence causing bodily harm, as Lourenco had demanded, on the
grounds that there was insufficient evidence for criminal charges. The
magistrate based the decision primarily on the results of a medical
study of Lourenco's injuries but also took into consideration the
guard's previously unblemished record. In their report, the three
medical experts consulted by the magistrate stated that they failed to
establish the truth with certainty, but that they deemed the guard's
version of events, that Lourenco's injuries were self-inflicted, more
plausible. In October Lourenco's lawyers filed an appeal of the
magistrate's decision with the Genenva Criminal Court.
No new developments occurred in the case of Clement Nwankwo, a
Nigerian human rights monitor who accused the Geneva police of
mistreatment during his arrest in 1997. Having exhausted domestic
remedies unsuccessfully, Nwankwo is appealing his case to the European
Court of Human Rights. NGO's believe that the Nwankwo case underscores
overall problems with police treatment of foreigners, especially asylum
seekers in Geneva and perhaps elsewhere. Their concern was echoed in a
1997 report by the U.N. Committee Against Torture, which expressed
concern about ``frequent allegations of ill-treatment'' inflicted in
the course of arrests and police custody. The report also noted a lack
of independent mechanisms in the cantons to provide certain legal
protections such as the possibility, ``especially for foreigners,'' to
contact their family or a lawyer in case of arrest and to be examined
by an independent doctor on entering police custody, after each
interrogation, and before being brought before an investigating
magistrate or being released. Responding to these concerns, in 1998 a
team of experts appointed by the Federal Office of Justice presented a
preliminary study identifying possible characteristics of a future
federal-level code of penal procedures that would replace the cantonal
codes. The study recommends granting fundamental protections to
detainees in police custody, including the introduction of a legal
right to inform relatives or third parties of their arrest. However,
the committee did not recommend a provision for access to a lawyer from
the time of arrest.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, although
some NGO's complain of prison overcrowding. The Government has taken
measures to improve prison conditions and address overcrowding. The
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The legal prohibitions
on arbitrary arrest and detention generally are respected at all levels
of government. The cantons are responsible for handling most criminal
matters, and procedures vary somewhat from canton to canton. In general
a suspect may not be held longer than 48 hours without a warrant of
arrest issued by an investigative magistrate. However, asylum seekers
and foreigners without valid documents may be held for up to 96 hours
without an arrest warrant. Some NGO's alleged that the authorities
arbitrarily detained asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.). A suspect may
be denied legal counsel at the time of detention but has the right to
choose and contact an attorney by the time an arrest warrant is issued.
The State provides free legal assistance for indigents who may be
jailed pending trial. Investigations are generally prompt, even if in
some cases investigative detention may exceed the length of sentence.
Release on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the
magistrate believes the person is dangerous or will not appear for
trial. Any lengthy detention is subject to review by higher judicial
authorities. During the year, about onethird of all prisoners were in
pretrial detention, and the average length of such detention was 52
days.
The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government does not use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
All courts of first instance are local or cantonal courts. Citizens
have the right to appeal, ultimately to the Federal Court.
Minor cases are tried by a single judge, difficult cases by a panel
of judges, and murder (or other serious cases) by a public jury. Trials
usually are held expeditiously. The Constitution provides for public
trials in which the defendant's rights are fully respected, including
the right to challenge and to present witnesses or evidence.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Cantonal laws regulate police entry into private
premises. These regulations differ widely from canton to canton, but
all prohibit such practices without a warrant. All government
authorities respect these provisions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanction.
Instances of forced sterilization of women resurfaced in public
debate during the year. In 1981 the Swiss Academy for Medical Science
decided that forced sterilization is not permissible if a person is
incapable of understanding the consequences. This guideline is
undergoing revision because of what the Academy calls a changed social
understanding of the sexuality of the mentally disabled. Although no
data indicates that more pregnancies occur when disabled women and men
live together in homes, the Academy considers its guideline outdated.
Draft legislation to revise the Academy's position is in parliamentary
consultation. The draft would permit forced sterilization in cases when
no other form of contraception is usable.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom. The authorities
legally may restrict these freedoms for groups deemed to be a threat to
the State, but no groups were restricted during the year. In addition
an article of the Penal Code criminalizes racist or anti-Semitic
expression, whether in public speech or in printed material.
Parliamentary immunity protects parliamentarians from prosecution
for acts that relate to their government position. However, following a
1998 incident in which a national councilor, Rudolf Keller, made anti-
Semitic remarks and could not be prosecuted because Parliament refused
to lift his immunity, the upper house of Parliament voted in 1999 for
its partial abolishment. However, the National Council, the lower house
of Parliament, rejected the legislative proposal twice, the second time
in October, thus preserving the existing rules.
The nationwide broadcast media are government funded but possess
editorial autonomy. Private and foreign broadcast media operate freely.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for complete
freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right
in practice. There is no single state church, but all cantons support
at least one of the three traditional denominations--Roman Catholic,
Old Catholic, or Protestant--with public funds. In all cantons, an
individual may choose not to contribute to church funding. However, in
some cantons, private companies are unable to avoid payment of the
church tax. A religious organization must register with the Government
in order to receive tax-exempt status. There have been no reports of a
religious group applying for the ``church taxation'' status that the
traditional three denominations enjoy.
Foreign missionaries must obtain a ``religious worker'' visa to
work in the country. Requirements include proof that the foreigner
would not displace a citizen from doing the job, that the foreigner
would be financially supported by the host organization, and that the
country of origin of religious workers also grants visas to Swiss
religious workers.
Religion is taught in public schools. The doctrine presented
depends on which religion predominates in the particular canton.
However, those of different faiths are free to attend classes for their
own creeds during the designated class period. Atheists also may be
excused from the classes. Parents also may send their children to
private (parochial) schools or teach their children at home.
In July 1999, the Business Review Commission of the National
Assembly issued a report entitled ``Sects or Assimilative Movements in
Switzerland,'' containing recommendations to the Government on the need
for state involvement and the creation of national policy. The
Commission recommended that the Government formulate a ``sect'' policy
and coordinate the cooperation of researchers and informational and
counseling committees. In June 2000, the Government rejected the
Business Review Commission's recommendation to formulate a national
sect policy. The Government stated that such a policy would conflict
with the constitutional right to freedom of religious beliefs. The
Government also opposed the creation of a National Information and
Counseling Center pointing out that religious matters fall under the
jurisdiction of the cantons.
In 1998 the city of Basel passed a law banning aggressive tactics
for handing out flyers. This action was prompted by complaints about
Scientologists' methods. In June 1999, Scientology lost a bid in the
country's highest court to overturn a municipal law that barred persons
from being approached on the street by those using ``deceptive or
dishonest methods.'' The Court ruled that a 1998 Basel law, prompted by
efforts to curb Scientology, involved an intervention in religious
freedom but did not infringe on it.
The city of Buchs, St. Gallen, also passed a law modeled on the
Basel law. However, it is still legal to proselytize in nonintrusive
ways, such as public speaking on the street or by going door-to-door in
neighborhoods.
In Zurich in June 1995 Scientologists appealed a city decision that
prohibited them from distributing flyers on public property. In
September 1999, a higher court decided that the Scientologists'
activities were commercial and not religious, and that the city should
grant them and other commercial enterprises such as fast food
restaurants more freedom to distribute flyers on a permit basis.
Fearing a heavy administrative and enforcement workload, the city
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision rejected the
appeal in June 2000, reinforcing the decision by the previous court
that the Scientologists' activities were commercial in nature. The
Supreme Court decision is expected to establish a nationwide legal
guideline on the issue.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the Constitution and the law,
citizens are free to travel in or outside the country, to emigrate, and
to repatriate. Non-Swiss convicted of crimes may receive sentences that
include denial of reentry for a specific period following the
completion of a prison sentence.
Switzerland traditionally has been a haven for refugees, but public
concern over the high number of asylum seekers entering the country in
the wake of the Kosovo conflict generated domestic political pressure
on the Government in 1999 to tighten its policy regarding their
acceptance. The Government granted temporary asylum to approximately
63,000 Kosovars seeking refuge from the armed conflict. Following the
end of hostilities and the deployment of the international protection
force, the Federal Council in August 1999 deemed a return of refugees
to Kosovo justifiable and ended its policy of granting temporary asylum
collectively.
The Government initially offered material and financial aid to
refugees leaving the country voluntarily. Some 32,000 Kosovars accepted
this offer, which ended in May. Since June the Government proceeded
with forced repatriations, expelling by the end of August some 4,300
Kosovars--178 of them on special flights in police custody. In May the
Federal Government granted a delay in departure dates in some 4,000
cases that involved individual hardship (families with children in
school, members of ethnic minorities, the elderly, the sick, single
mothers, and pregnant women). In December approximately 1,500 Kosovars
with expired temporary residence permits remained in the country. In
coordination with the U.N. Mission in Kosovo, the Government agreed to
slow the flow of repatriations in December and in January 2001.
In August the umbrella organization of refugee aid NGO's criticized
the Federal Government for some forced repatriations of Kosovo refugees
that they termed excessively harsh and inhumane. Another human rights
group, Eyes Open, criticized Zurich cantonal police practices in the
compulsory repatriations of failed asylum seekers (see Section 1.c.).
The group noted that the excessive use of hand and leg restraints in
the return of Conglolese asylum seekers in August gave the impression
that they were criminals.
The 1999 asylum law provides for the collective admission of
victims of violence and authorizes the Federal Council to grant them
temporary protective status. It also simplifies and accelerates the
process of applying for asylum. At the same time, the law is designed
to curtail the misuse of asylum regulations and to enable the more
rapid repatriation of uncooperative refugees or those who enter the
country without identity papers. The Government may refuse to process
the application of an asylum seeker who cannot credibly justify not
having identity papers. In such a case the applicant must submit an
appeal to reactivate consideration of the application within 24 hours.
NGO's contend that such a short time span does not constitute an
effective remedy and therefore violates the European Convention on
Human Rights.
Some human rights NGO's have charged the authorities with abuses in
connection with the implementation of a 1995 amendment to the Law on
Foreigners. The amendment is aimed at asylum seekers or foreigners who
live illegally in the country and who are suspected of disturbing the
public order or avoiding repatriation. In particular these groups have
alleged instances of abuse by police, including arbitrary detention as
well as denial of access to established asylum procedures at the
country's two main airports. They also charge that police officers use
the law to detain or harass asylum seekers who were not suspected of
having disturbed public order. Under the law, police actions are
subject to judicial oversight, and the Federal Court overturned many
cases in which it believed that there was insufficient regard for the
rights of asylum seekers and foreigners. While NGO's claim that the
situation with regard to arbitrary detention has improved, they contend
that the denial of access to asylum procedures at the two airports is
increasing.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum. The Federal
Office for Refugees estimated that in August the total number of asylum
applicants and temporary residents living in the country was 143,000.
(This included recognized refugees, persons granted temporary asylum,
as well as those who either have a first asylum application pending,
appealed against a rejection, or were currently awaiting repatriation.)
A year earlier, in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the figure stood at
182,000. Some 11,000 new applications for asylum were submitted by the
end of August, 72 percent less than during the same period last year.
Refugees whose applications are rejected are allowed to stay
temporarily, if their home country is experiencing war or insurrection.
The Government denies having forced persons to return to countries
where they have a well-founded fear of persecution and insists that
each case is examined carefully. However, NGO's including the well-
known Eyes Open organization have accused the Government of sometimes
expelling rejected asylum seekers even though conditions in their
native country remain unfavorable.
In December the independent commission of experts under Professor
Bergier published a supplement to its 1999 report. The commission found
that the Government systematically expelled Roma (Gypsies) or turned
them away at the border during much of the 20th century, including
during World War II. Thus Switzerland refused asylum to Roma who faced
persecution in Nazi-occupied territory. The commission report does not
indicate the number of rejected applicants. In response to the Bergier
report, the Government expressed to the Roma communities its deep
regret over its policy prior to, during, and after World War II. In its
statement the Government mentioned the foundation of ``A Future for
Swiss Itinerants,'' a fund that it established in 1997 and endowed with
$600,000 (1 million Swiss francs) to improve living conditions for
Roma.
In the same statement, the Government referred to its earlier
statement following issuance of the Bergier commission report in
December 1999, in which the Government apologized for its asylum policy
during World War II, when thousands of Jewish refugees were refused
entry to the country (see Section 5).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully (at local, cantonal, and federal levels), and
citizens exercise this right in practice through periodic, free, and
fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. In addition
initiative and referendum procedures provide unusually intense popular
involvement in the legislative process. In April 1999 voters approved a
new Constitution.
Women remain underrepresented in government and politics. They were
disenfranchised until 1971 at the federal level, but since then their
participation in politics has continued to expand. In 1999 Ruth
Dreifuss served as the first female President. Women occupy 55 of the
246 seats in the Parliament, 2 of 7 seats in the Federal Council
(Cabinet), roughly one-fourth of the seats in the cantonal government
executive bodies, and one-fifth of the seats in the communal
executives. In 1999 the electorate overwhelmingly rejected a popular
initiative to mandate equal gender representation in all federal
institutions by a ratio of four to one.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A large number of international and domestic human rights groups
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are
cooperative and generally responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, language, or social status. The Government
generally enforces these prohibitions effectively, although some laws
tend to discriminate against women. The new Constitution includes
provisions for equal rights for the disabled and for minorities.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to a 1997
government-funded study on domestic violence, one-fifth of all women
suffer at least once in their lifetimes from physical or sexual
violence, and about 40 percent suffer from psychological or verbal
abuse. Another 1998 study estimates that over 100,000 cases of domestic
violence occur each year.
The law prohibits wife beating and similar offenses. Spousal rape
is a crime in the Penal Code. Victims of domestic violence can obtain
help, counseling, and legal assistance from specialized agencies or
from nearly a dozen hot lines sponsored privately or by local,
cantonal, and national authorities. Police have specially trained units
to deal with violence against women, and victims legally are entitled
to be heard exclusively by female police officers and judges. A total
of 732 women and 722 children took refuge in 14 women's shelters across
the country during 1999. Those in charge of the shelters estimate that
nearly as many were denied access due to a lack of space and limited
funding.
The difficulty in gathering information about the number of
prosecuted, convicted, or punished spouse abusers stems in part from
the fact that legal cases are handled by each canton and data are often
not up-to-date. According to 1998 police criminal statistics, 314 men
were investigated for rape offenses, and 84 were sentenced.
The Federation of Women's Organizations and numerous other women's
NGO's have heightened public awareness of the problem of violence
against women. In 1998 two government-supported women's organizations
that fight for equal gender rights jointly conducted the first national
campaign against violence in relationships. This campaign received
extensive media coverage.
Prostitution is legal; however, working by foreigners without a
valid permit is illegal. The Penal Code criminalizes sexual
exploitation and trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women is
a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Although the new Constitution prohibits all types of
discrimination, and a 1981 amendment provides for equal rights, equal
treatment, and equivalent wages for men and women, some laws still tend
to discriminate against women. A 1988 federal marriage law provides
that in the event of a divorce, assets accumulated during the marriage
will be divided equally. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the
primary wage earner must be left with sufficient income to remain above
the poverty level. Since the man is the primary wage earner in most
marriages, when the income is too low to support both parties, it is
usually the wife (and children) who are forced to survive on public
assistance. Statistics from 1999 show that nearly 70 percent of women
who did not work outside the home while married fell below the poverty
line immediately after a divorce. Although mandated by a constitutional
amendment in 1945, no federal law on maternity insurance exists.
Immigrant women married to a Swiss husband (or immigrants with
long-term residence permits), who have lived in Switzerland for less
than 3 to 5 years from date of marriage (length depends on country of
origin, education, and income level), cannot divorce their husbands
without the risk of having to leave the country. Their purpose for
being in Switzerland officially is registered as ``stay with spouse''
until they receive their own long-term residency permits, and they are
in danger of losing permission to remain if they divorce. NGO's argue
that this prevents women with problems from being able to seek help--or
leave their husbands--without serious consequences.
A 1996 law includes a general prohibition on gender-based
discrimination and incorporates the principle of ``equal wages for
equal work.'' The law also includes provisions aimed at eliminating
sexual harassment and facilitating access to legal remedies for those
who claim discrimination or harassment.
The Federal Office for Equal Opportunities for Men and Women and
the Federal Commission on Women work to eliminate all forms of direct
and indirect discrimination. In 1999 a federal level interdepartmental
working group issued an action plan that outlined strategic goals and
measures to improve the situation of women. These include measures in
the areas of education, health, violence against women, the workplace,
human rights, the media, and the environment. For example, the plan
calls for financial support for child care facilities at colleges and
universities to enable a larger number of women to obtain a higher
education; continued education and support for specialists in the area
of addiction prevention for women; and ongoing analysis and data
collection on the issue of wage differences between men and women. The
working group that issued the plan in 1999 is scheduled to reconvene in
January 2001 to draft a report to Parliament due in 2002 on federal
implementation of the action plan.
On average women earn 20 to 30 percent less than men. A June study
found that discriminatory behavior by employers accounts for 60 percent
of the overall wage gap between men and women. Women also are promoted
less often than men. Individual cases of denial of equal pay for equal
work are subject to the 1996 law. In 1998, the most recent year for
which data are available, 26.3 percent of women between the ages of 15
and 61 were not in the work force; of those in the work force 50.5
percent worked full time. Women hold 83 percent of all part-time jobs.
The issue of pre-1970's forced sterilization of some women
resurfaced in the media this year, when the Swiss Academy for Medical
Science decided to review its guidelines for the practice (see Section
1.f.).
The law prohibits women from working during the 8 weeks after the
birth of a child. Further measures also protect pregnant and breast-
feeding women. For example, pregnant women are not allowed to work
night shifts during the 8 weeks prior to giving birth. The law does not
provide for compensation; however, 72 percent of working women have
negotiated maternity benefits with their employers. In June 1999 voters
rejected a government proposal in a referendum for 14 weeks of paid
maternity leave at 80 percent pay for working women. The plan would
also have given low-income new mothers a one time premium. (The
Parliament had passed draft legislation in December 1998 that provided
for the maternity benefits mandated by the Constitution in 1945.) It
was the third time that a maternity benefits scheme had been rejected
in a popular referendum in 15 years. Hundreds demonstrated to protest
the vote, and a new proposal appeared in the National Council in July
2000. In alignment with the European Union, it again called for 14
weeks of paid maternity leave and asked employers for full pay during
the first 8 weeks as is consistent with the law prohibiting women from
working in the first 8 weeks after birth. The new proposal leaves out
the subsidy for nonworking mothers. The Council of States, the upper
house of Parliament, followed the lead of the National Council in
December, and obliged the Federal Government to work out a new
maternity benefits scheme along the lines of the July 2000 proposal.
Meantime, women in Geneva Canton will have paid maternity leave
beginning in July 2001; on December 14 the cantonal parliament passed
legislation providing for a 16-week leave following delivery at 80
percent of salary for all women who previously worked in the canton for
a minimum of 3 months. However, the law is still subject to federal
approval.
Children.--Despite the fact that the Government has no special
program for children and that there is no special governmental office
for children's matters, the Government demonstrates its strong
commitment to children's rights and welfare through a well-funded
public education system and need-based subsidies of health insurance.
Schooling is free and compulsory for 9 years, from age 6 or 7 through
age 16 or 17, depending on the canton. Some cantons offer a 10th school
year. The Government subsidizes the health insurance premiums of low-
income families.
The federal and cantonal governments, as well as about 80 NGO's
that defend children's rights, have devoted considerable attention in
recent years to child abuse, especially sexual abuse. For convicted
perpetrators of the latter, the law provides for imprisonment of up to
15 years. In 1997 amendments to the Federal Penal Code came into effect
that provide for an increase in the statute of limitations in cases of
child abuse from 5 to 10 years. In severe cases of sexual abuse, the
statute is to begin to take effect only when the victim turns 18. There
is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
To combat child pornography on the Internet, the Federal Office for
Police provides an Internet monitoring service on its World Wide Web
page. Individuals who find pornographic material involving children are
asked to contact the Federal Office via e-mail. According to the Penal
Code, the production, possession, distribution, or showing of hard
pornography are punishable with fines or prison sentences. Any
pornography involving children falls into this category. In March 1999
an NGO published the first compilation of cases of child pornography
and prostitution in the country. The study cited 60 cases. Most of the
victims were girls between 13 and 17 years of age.
With respect to child abuse abroad, the law provides for
prosecution only if the act is considered a crime in the country in
which it took place. Experts have proposed making such acts punishable
in Switzerland regardless of where the crime took place, but there was
no legislative action on the problem during the year.
Parliament's 1997 ratification of the U.N. Convention on Children's
Rights included five reservations, the most important of which
concerned children of migrant seasonal workers who are not permitted
automatically to join their parents. Children of foreigners working as
migrant laborers are only permitted to visit on tourist visas for a
period of 3 months at a time. After 3 months, they must return to their
homeland for 1 month. The Government reexamined the necessity for these
reservations and included its conclusions in its first report to the
Committee on Children's Rights in November. All five reservations still
apply.
In June the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 forbidding the
worst forms of child labor (including child prostitution, forced labor,
and using children for illegal activities such as drug dealing).
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination
directed at disabled persons in employment, education, and the
provision of other state services. Advocates for the disabled have
called for new measures to ensure greater protection for their rights,
including easier access to buildings and public transportation.
However, the Government has not mandated that buildings or
transportation facilities be made accessible. Article 8 of the new
Constitution (in effect as of January 1) provides for equal
opportunities for the disabled. However, it does not include provision
for making public buildings and facilities accessible. The upper house
of Parliament discussed this addition in June and decided that the
requirements for equal treatment as contained in the Constitution were
sufficient to meet the demands of the disabled.
A 1995 law exempts disabled men from the tax imposed on those who
have not fulfilled their military duty.
Religious Minorities.--In response to the issue of Holocaust era
assets, the Government and private sector initiated a series of
measures designed to shed light on the past, provide assistance to
Holocaust victims, and address claims to dormant accounts in Swiss
banks. The independent commission of experts under Professor Jean-
Francois Bergier, charged with examining the country's wartime history
and role as a financial center, issued its report in December 1999 and
found that there were more than 24,000 documented rejections of asylum
seekers during the World War II period, including a large number of
Jewish refugees who were refused asylum even after authorities were
aware of the dangers that they faced from the Nazis.
The Federal Council issued a statement that repeated its previous
apology for policy errors made during World War II and stated that its
asylum policy ``was marred by errors, omissions, and compromises.''
Also in December 1999, the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons
under Paul Volcker released its report on ``dormant accounts of victims
of Nazi persecution in Swiss banks.'' The report represents the
culmination of a 3-year investigation into the fate of victims'
accounts. The Volcker report recommended that the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission publish about 26,000 account holders' names, based on their
probable or possible identity as Holocaust victims. The report also
made recommendations on the means of resolving claims by victims of
Nazi persecution or their heirs and the appropriate treatment of
dormant accounts in the future.
The Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims received
approximately $190 million (323 million Swiss francs) in contributions
from the private sector and the Swiss National Bank. By September the
fund had allocated but not yet fully paid out an initial contribution
to holocaust survivors in Israel, Australia, Germany, Latin America,
and Eastern Europe. In total some 310,000 persons, 88 percent of them
Jewish, are expected to benefit from the fund. On March 31, 1999, the
Government's World War II task force became the Switzerland-World War
II Office, which remains engaged in supporting progress on resolving
Holocaust assets issues. A $1.25 billion (2.12 billion Swiss francs)
settlement of the class action lawsuit filed in the United States
district court in Brooklyn, New York, against Swiss banks was announced
in August 1998, completed in January 1999, and formally approved by the
New York judge on July 26, 2000.
A provisional plan of allocation and distribution was announced on
September 11. The plan earmarks up to $800 million (1.36 billion Swiss
francs) to cover outstanding claims against Swiss banks; the remaining
sum is to be paid out to World War II forced laborers as well as
refugees who were denied entry to or were harmed while detained in
Switzerland. To be included in the settlement and thus avoid further
class action suits, 37 Swiss industrial firms notified the New York
court that their subsidiaries employed forced labor during World War
II.
The Swiss National Bank released a report in 1999 that stated that
its officials ignored warnings that they were buying looted Nazi gold.
The bank has contributed approximately $70 million (110 million Swiss
francs) to the Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims.
Two Swiss life insurers, both explicitly excluded from the $1.25
billion settlement, participate in the ongoing efforts by the
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims to establish
a formula and just sum for compensating Holocaust victims or their
families for policies they held. Both companies agreed to resolve
outstanding claims of unpaid insurance policies submitted within a
period of 2 years, starting in February and ending in 2002. The Federal
Council is seeking legislation to establish a solidarity fund, which
would assist victims of human rights violations, including those who
suffered in the Holocaust. In May the Federal Council endorsed and
returned to Parliament revised legislation concerning a Swiss
Solidarity Foundation. Under the modified act, the foundation would
dispose of the proceeds from the management of 500 tons of central bank
gold reserves recently declared ``excess.'' The Solidarity Foundation
act has yet to be approved by Parliament. The alternative use of the
extra gold reserves will be subject to a mandatory referendum.
In the context of the discussions over Nazi gold and Holocaust era
assets, anti-Semitic slurs reportedly still remain a problem.
Government officials, including the President, have spoken frequently
and publicly against anti-Semitism. From 1995 when an antiracism law
was enacted until the end of 1998, some 300 court cases were brought
for violations of the law. Roughly half of them resulted in convictions
by a court of first instance, but in many cases appeals are pending.
According to the Government, 104 cases of violation of the Anti-
Racism Act were brought before the courts between 1995 (when the law
was enacted) and the end of 1999. A total of 45 resulted in convictions
(for anti-Semitism, revisionism, and racist oral or written slurs).
Sentences for convictions included a 15-month prison sentence and a
fine of $12,000 (20,000 Swiss francs) for the Holocaust denier Jurgen
Graf. The human rights group Eyes Open was among the NGO's that
expressed concern over the continued existence of anti-Semitic
sentiment.
In November 1998, the Federal Commission against Racism released a
report on anti-Semitism in the country, which expressed concern that
the recent controversy over the country's role during World War II had
to some extent opened the door to expressions of latent anti-Semitism.
At the same time, the Commission described the emergence of strong
public opposition to anti-Semitism and credited the Federal Council
with taking a ``decisive stand'' against anti-Semitism. The Commission
also proposed various public and private measures to combat anti-
Semitism and encourage greater tolerance and understanding. In its
initial response to the report, the Federal Council pledged to
facilitate implementation of the Commission's recommendations.
In December 1999, the Federal Council announced the creation of a
Center for Tolerance in Bern. Planning under the chairmanship of a
former parliamentarian is continuing, and financing will come from the
public and private sectors. The center plans to produce exhibits
designed to teach historical lessons, offer academic research
opportunities, and host international symposia. A survey published in
March showed that 16 percent of Swiss hold anti-Semitic notions. Among
supporters of the rightwing Swiss People's Party the figure was 33
percent. The study also found that the recent controversy over Swiss
World War II behavior affected survey results, particularly among the
older generation. Conversely, 92 percent of young persons polled
harbored no anti-Semitic sentiments. The survey reflected
inconsistencies. During the recent period of controversy over the Swiss
World War II record, public opinion actually strengthened in support of
antiracism laws. The case of a national councilor who made anti-Semitic
remarks, but could not be prosecuted because Parliament refused to lift
his immunity, led to an abortive attempt to restrict parliamentary
immunity (see Section 2.a.).
The Federal Court decided on June 7 to uphold a cantonal decision
granting Scientologists the right to distribute leaflets in public
areas. However, the court also affirmed that Scientology leaflets serve
a ``commercial enterprise'' and that distributors must obtain a permit
to use public areas for their dissemination. The court ruled that
Scientology does not act as a religious organization in such cases.
Scientologists previously distributed flyers without the necessary
permits, protected by the Religious Freedom Act. Several cantons are
likely to use the precedence of the Federal Court's decision to
regulate the distribution of leaflets (see Section 2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to NGO statistics,
there were 56 reported incidents directed against foreigners or
minorities in the first 6 months of the year, compared with 62 for the
first half of 1999. These figures include instances of verbal and
written ``attacks,'' which are much more common than physical assaults.
Investigations of these attacks are conducted effectively and lead, in
most cases, to the arrest of the persons responsible. Persons convicted
of racist crimes commonly are sentenced to from 3 days' to 3 years'
imprisonment with a fine of up to approximately $27,000 (40,000 Swiss
francs).
On March 12 the voters of Emmen, a small township in Canton Lucern,
voted on local foreign residents' applications for citizenship. The
voters rejected 48 applicants, almost all exclusively from southeast
Europe, while approving 8 Italians' citizenship bids. Fearing the vote
was a violation of the European Human Rights Convention, the Swiss
Federal Council determined to look into the practice. The Emmen vote
caused a national uproar and prompted several motions in Parliament. In
response the Federal Council referred the issue to a working group set
up in 1999, which examines the Government's naturalization practice.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners,
have the freedom to associate freely, to join unions of their choice,
and to select their own representatives. The Government does not hamper
the exercise of these rights. About one-quarter of the work force is
unionized.
The right to strike is recognized legally and exercised freely, but
a unique labor peace under an informal agreement between unions and
employers--in existence since the 1930's--has meant fewer than 10
strikes per year since 1975. The new Constitution provides specific
protection for the right to strike. In a Basel laundry workers went on
an almost unprecedented 5-day strike after management of the former
state enterprise asked some workers to accept a ``industry standard''
wage of about $1,700 monthly (3,000 Swiss francs). The strike ended on
December 4 after a tense scuffle between police and pickets and
protracted negotiations between the two sides and Basel city officials.
Management agreed to small wage gains and a cost-of-living adjustment
mechanism that will increase wages gradually to about $2,000 (3,500
Swiss francs). In the absence of a minimum wage law, labor leaders see
the worker gains in this first major strike in a decade as a signal for
revived recruiting and broader public opinion support for the labor
movement's minimum wage campaign.
A 1927 law bans public servants, as well as workers in state-owned
bodies such as the postal service, from striking. However, in November
voters approved a referendum on a new law concerning employees of the
Federal Government that generally recognizes the right to strike. Only
for reasons of national security, safeguarding national foreign policy
interests, or providing the population with essential goods and
services may the Government curtail or suspend the right to strike for
certain categories of government employees. The new law will enter into
force in steps for different categories of employees between January
2001 and 2002.
Unions are independent of the Government and political parties, and
laws prohibit retribution against strikers or their leaders.
Unions can associate freely with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--By law workers
have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the law
protects them from acts of antiunion discrimination. The Government
fully respects these provisions. Periodic negotiations between employer
and worker organizations determine wages and settle other labor issues
at the local, or infrequently, at the industry sector level. Nonunion
firms generally adopt the terms and conditions fixed in the unions'
collective bargaining.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although there is no
specific constitutional or statutory ban on forced or compulsory labor
in general, and on child labor in particular, such practices generally
are not known to occur; however, trafficking in women for forced
prostitution increased (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for full-time employment of children is 15
years, and children are in school until this age. Children over 13
years of age may be employed in light duties for not more than 9 hours
per week during the school year and 15 hours otherwise. The employment
of youths between the ages of 15 and 20 is regulated strictly; they
cannot work at night, on Sundays, or in hazardous or dangerous
conditions. The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs effectively
enforces the law on working conditions.
The Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
labor by children, although such prohibitions are included implicitly
in the Labor Act. Such forms of labor are not believed to occur (see
Section 6.c.). In June the Government ratified ILO Convention 182
forbidding the worst forms of child labor (including child
prostitution, forced labor, and using children for illegal activities
such as drug dealing).
Government officials inspect companies that employ children after
having received complaints. Every year a few employers are fined or
receive conditional imprisonment for violations of the law.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage. The lowest wages fixed in collective bargaining are generally
adequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. However, the Swiss Association of Trade Unions in a 1999 study
found that 60,000 full-time workers (or 3.4 percent) fall below the
poverty line, defined as earning less than approximately $15,500
(22,900 Swiss francs), which is half of the median wage.
The 1964 Labor Act established a maximum 45-hour workweek for blue-
and white-collar workers in industry, services, and retail trades, and
a 50-hour workweek for all other workers. The law prescribes a rest
period of 35 consecutive hours plus an additional half day per week.
New labor legislation, which came into force on August 1, limits annual
overtime to 170 hours for those working 45 hours per week and to 140
hours for those working 50 hours per week.
The law protects legal and illegal foreign workers. However,
illegal foreign workers are not covered by mandatory health insurance
in case of illness or accident. Wage discrimination against foreign
workers is not permitted.
The Labor Act and the Federal Code of Obligations contain extensive
regulations to protect worker health and safety. There have been no
reports of lapses in the enforcement of these regulations, but the
degree to which enforcement is effective is unclear. A 1998 law is
designed to increase flexibility in the workplace and remove
restrictions on women working at night. A worker may leave a dangerous
assignment without penalty.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code criminalizes sexual
exploitation and trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons can
result in prison sentence of up to 5 years; coercing someone into
prostitution or restricting a prostitute's personal freedom can carry a
sentence of up to 10 years in prison. According to a 1999 official
report, the police are concerned about the growing number of foreign
women subject to abuse in sex trafficking rings. In the past, victims
came from Thailand, parts of Africa, or South America; recently an
increasing number of women come from Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, and
other states of the former Soviet Union. Many victims are forced to
work in salons or clubs to pay for the cost of their travel and forged
documents and find themselves in a state of dependency. Traffickers
sometimes seize victims' passports. Generally the victims do not read,
write, or speak the country's languages, and are afraid to seek help
from the authorities.
Since 1905 the Government has had an office to combat the
trafficking of girls for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation.
Over the years this office has evolved to include all forms of
trafficking in persons. The office has existed in its present form
since 1998 as part of the criminal intelligence unit of the Federal
Department of Police. In 1998 the Government institutionalized an
exchange of information on trafficking in persons with NGO's. The
Department of Foreign Affairs helps fund programs intended to combat
trafficking from Eastern Europe.
Because the investigation, enforcement, and prosecution of
individual trafficking and related cases is the responsibility of the
cantonal police authorities, the federal human trafficking office also
supports the cantonal prosecution authorities with information
concerning trafficking abroad. In major cases the federal government
establishes contacts with foreign government authorities.
In March Neuchatel cantonal police announced the arrests of four
persons, including two African women married to Swiss nationals, on
trafficking-related charges. The arrests followed an investigation
initiated when the Swiss consulate in Yaounde became suspicious about
unusually large numbers of Cameroonian women travelling to Switzerland.
The consulate informed the federal Department of Foreign Affairs, which
alerted cantonal police authorities. After an investigation spanning
several months, the police were able to uncover the organization and
obtain valuable information on how the ring operated.
Shortly after the arrests, a Zurich-based NGO submitted a petition
to the Cabinet and both houses of Parliament that called urgently for
the establishment of a protection program for trafficking victims. The
petition was signed by 7,500 individuals, organizations, and
parliamentarians. Their program would end the automatic expulsion of
women arrested for illegal prostitution and legalize their stay for the
duration of investigations and trials. Currently, most women are
expelled within 96 hours. It would also provide shelter, protection
from intimidation, counseling centers, and sensitivity training for
police. The petition also calls for a change in the legal definition of
trafficking to include not only women forced into prostitution but also
women whose migration to Switzerland for marriage or domestic work puts
them in a state of dependency. Parallel to the submission of the
petition, a parliamentary initiative was launched calling for similar
measures. The Federal Council (Cabinet) instructed an interdepartmental
working group to assess the situation and to determine whether a
revision of the relevant legal articles would be a useful step.
In order to confront modern forms of trafficking in women,
especially via the Internet, the federal police have increased the
number of their agents. In 1997 4 persons were convicted of trafficking
in women and 13 were convicted of sexual exploitation; and in 1997-98
police uncovered a large Thai trafficking organization. Its leader was
arrested, tried, and convicted. He later committed suicide in prison.
Prostitution is legal; however, it is illegal for foreigners to
work without a valid work permit. Official police figures estimate that
approximately 7,050 women work as prostitutes, both legally and
illegally, mostly in the major Swiss cantons. In March 1999 the
Government introduced new visa requirements for applicants from four
South American countries--Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The
Office for Equality between Men and Women has a program to educate visa
applicants in their native countries about the methods used by
traffickers and the dangers of falling victim to them.
__________
TAJIKISTAN
Tajikistan is ruled by an authoritarian regime that has established
some nominally democratic institutions. President Emomali Rahmonov and
an inner circle of fellow natives of the Kulyab region continued to
dominate the Government; however, Rahmonov's narrow base of support
limited his control of the entire territory of the country. Rahmonov
won reelection in a November 1999 election that was flawed seriously
and was neither free nor fair. As a result of 1997 peace accords that
ended the civil war, some former opposition figures continue to hold
seats in the Government. Rahmonov's supporters overwhelmingly won
February parliamentary elections that were neither free nor fair, but
were notable for the fact that several opposition parties were allowed
to participate, and that one opposition party won two seats in
Parliament. Although the Constitution was adopted in 1994 and amended
in September 1999, political decisionmaking normally takes the form of
power plays among the various factions, formerly aligned with the other
side during the civil war, that now make up the Government. The legacy
of civil war continued to affect the Government, which still faced the
problems of demobilizing and reintegrating former opposition troops and
maintaining law and order while rival armed factions competed for
power. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however,
it is not independent in practice.
The Ministries of Interior, Security, and Defense share
responsibility for internal security, although the Government actually
relies on a handful of commanders who use their forces almost as
private armies. Some regions of the country remained effectively
outside the Government's control, and government control in other areas
existed only by day, or at the sufferance of local former opposition
commanders. The soldiers of some of these commanders are involved in
crime and corruption. The Russian Army's 201st Motorized Rifle
Division, part of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
peacekeeping force established in 1993, remained in the country and
continued to have a major influence on political developments; however,
the division began to transition into a new status on a permanent
military base after the peacekeeping mandate ended in September. Some
members of the government security forces and government-aligned
militias committed serious human rights abuses.
The economy is a state-controlled system making a difficult
transition to a market-based one. Most of the work force is engaged in
agriculture, part of which remains collectivized. Government revenue
depends highly on state-controlled cotton production. The small
industrial sector is dominated by aluminum production (another critical
source of government revenue), although most Soviet-era factories
operate at a minimal level, if at all. Small-scale privatization is
over 80 percent complete, but the level of medium to large scale
privatization is much lower (approximately 16 percent) with the heavy
industry, wholesale trade, and transport sectors remaining largely
under state control. Many, but not all, wages and pensions are paid.
The country is poor, with a per capita gross national product of
approximately $290, according to World Bank data. The failure of the
Soviet economic system has been accompanied by a rise in narcotics
trafficking and other forms of corruption. This development has led to
clear disparities of income between the vast majority of the population
and a small number of former progovernment and opposition warlords, who
control many of the legal and most of the criminal sectors of the
economy.
The Government's human rights record remained poor and the
Government continued to commit serious abuses. The February
parliamentary elections represented an improvement in the citizens'
right to change their Government; however, this right remains
restricted. Some members of the security forces committed extrajudicial
killings. There were a number of disappearances. Security forces
frequently tortured, beat, and abused detainees. These forces also were
responsible for threats, extortion, looting, and abuse of civilians.
Certain battalions of nominally government forces operated quasi-
independently under their leaders. Impunity remains a problem, and the
Government prosecuted few of the persons who committed these abuses.
Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. The Government
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention and also arrested
persons for political reasons. Lengthy pretrial detention remained a
problem. Basic problems of rule of law persist. There are often long
delays before trials, and the judiciary is subject to political and
paramilitary pressure. The authorities infringed on citizens' right to
privacy.
The Government continued to restrict severely freedom of speech and
the press and essentially controls the electronic media. The Government
severely restricted opposition access to state-run radio and
television; however, an opposition newspaper begun in 1998 continued to
publish, and a number of small television stations were operated by
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Journalists practice self-
censorship. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and
association by exercising strict control over political organizations;
it banned three opposition parties and prevented another from being
registered. A number of parliamentary candidates were prevented from
registering for the elections. There are some restrictions on freedom
of religion and on freedom of movement. The Government still has not
established a human rights ombudsman position, despite a 1996 pledge to
do so. Violence and against women is a problem, as is discrimination of
the disabled and religious and ethnic minorities. Child labor is a
problem. There were some instances of forced labor, including children.
Trafficking in women is a problem.
Some former opposition troops committed serious abuses, including
killings and abductions. There were credible reports that paramilitary
units threatened, extorted, and abused the civilian population.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Some members of the
security forces committed extrajudicial killings; however, it was
difficult to estimate the total number of such killings or to attribute
responsibility in many cases. Some killings were committed by competing
government factions for both political and economic motives.
Harsh prison conditions and lack of food and adequate medical
treatment resulted in a significant number of deaths of prisoners while
in custody (see Section 1.c.). There were reports that a member of the
banned Hizb ut-Tahrir movement died in police custody after being
arrested (see section 2.c.).
A number of local officials, businessmen, and professional figures
were killed during the year, for a variety of political, economic, and
ethnic reasons. A former Deputy Minister of Security and parliamentary
candidate, Shamsullo Tobirov, was killed in an attack apparently aimed
at the mayor of Dushanbe in February. Sirojiddin ``Sergei'' Davlatov,
chairman of the Gharm district and a former deputy opposition field
commander, was killed in May. The chairman of the State Radio and
Television Committee, Saif Rahimov (Rahimzoda) also was killed in May.
A correspondent for the Khovar state information agency, Aleksandr
Olpatov, was killed in September. In addition, a number of high-ranking
figures associated with various competing paramilitary factions were
killed. For example, the brother of Mullo Abdullo, a former opposition
field commander in the Karategin Valley, reportedly was killed in
retaliation for the killing of Davlatov. In most cases, suspects were
not identified. The competence of the investigators and their
independence from official interference was questioned. A number of
apparent murders essentially were concealed, with official news noting
only that the individual died.
Both the Government and the opposition used landmines during the
civil war. Some unmarked mine fields in the Karetegin Valley probably
killed innocent civilians. According to press reports, a total of 21
persons were killed during the year by landmines laid along the
northern segment of the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan border, which winds
throughout populated areas and is not demarcated clearly in most
places. The Government of Uzbekistan apparently laid the mines as part
of a counterinsurgency campaign. Some killings were committed by former
opposition forces and others by independent warlords answering to
neither the Government nor the former opposition forces. The Government
also has laid numerous minefields along the border with Afghanistan.
A landmine brought on board a public bus on the outskirts of
Dushanbe killed at least five passengers in February; the person who
carried the mine aboard the bus was among those killed. It was not
clear whether the mine detonated inside the bus by plan or by accident,
and there were no developments in identifying the individual or group
responsible for the incident.
Terrorists bombed a Protestant church in Dushanbe in October,
killing seven persons and injuring many more (see Section 1.c. and 5).
There were reports of instances where Tajik border guards were
killed on the Afghanistan border. It is unclear whether these cases
were politically motivated or the result of narcotics trafficking.
There were no developments in the 1999 murder case of British
national Abdullah Mugharebi, a resident of Dushanbe and leader of
Tajikistan's Baha'i community, who was widely believed to have been
killed by Iranian-sponsored Islamic fundamentalists. There were no
developments in the 1997 killings of several Russian servicemen, or in
the 1996 murder of the mufti of Tajikistan.
There were no developments in the 1999 killings of Tolib Bobev, an
official of the Popular Unity Party, or Jumakhona Khotami, Ministry of
Interior press center chief.
b. Disappearance.--There were a number of disappearances during the
year; in at least one case security forces apparently were responsible.
The driver and bodyguard of First Deputy Prime Minster Akbar
Turajonzoda disappeared briefly in October and appeared in police
custody. The taking of hostages for revenge or for bargaining purposes
remained a common occurrence.
Political pressures, the central Government's lack of control over
violently competitive factions within and outside the Government, and a
lack of professional resources hamper police efforts to investigate
disappearances.
The sister of Deputy Prime Minister Nigina Sharapovna disappeared
in February; she later reappeared after ransom apparently was paid. The
ethnic Uzbek mayor of a town in Khatlon District disappeared in
September under mysterious circumstances.
There were no developments in the 1996 disappearance of Zafar
Rahmonov, the opposition cochairman of the Joint Commission on Cease-
fire Observation.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, the Government uses it
in practice. Security officials, particularly those in the Ministry of
Interior, regularly beat detainees in custody and use systematic
beatings to extort confessions. In contrast to the previous year,
however, there were no public allegations that security forces
mistreated or beat members of opposition parties or their relatives.
Impunity remains a serious problem, and the Government has prosecuted
few of the persons who committed these abuses.
The Government has acknowledged that the security forces were
corrupted by criminal elements, and that most citizens chose to keep
silent in the face of official mistreatment rather than risk
retaliation by the police. In the southern regions of the country, many
border guards are involved in the drug trade, and the local population
has made numerous complaints of harassment and human rights abuses
committed by them.
Members of Tajikistan's Afghan refugee population, sometimes
regardless of social status or official connections, are singled out
for mistreatment by law enforcement authorities. For example, a
prominent Afghan refugee (a former official of the overthrown Communist
regime in Afghanistan) credibly claimed that Ministry of Interior
officers apprehended and beat him, apparently in retaliation for
previous claims of abuse that were reported publicly abroad (see
Section 2.d.).
Journalists regularly risked beatings at the hand of law
enforcement authorities (or at least armed individuals dressed as and
claiming to be law enforcement authorities) (see Section 2.a.). For
example, the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations reported that
militiamen seized a reporter for the state-owned newspaper Jumhuriyat
in Dushanbe in August, forced him into a car, beat him en route to a
militia station, where they beat him so badly that he suffered a
concussion and hearing loss in one ear.
There were a number of shootings, bombings, and terrorist attacks
that resulted in nonlethal injuries and serious property damage. The
February bombing of a Dushanbe city bus left scores of passengers
injured (see Section 1.a.). Also in February, the mayor of Dushanbe,
Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloyev, along with his driver and bodyguard, was
injured seriously in a failed attempt on his life by terrorists;
another passenger in the mayor's official vehicle was killed (see
Section 1.a.). On February 25, 2 days before parliamentary elections, a
bomb explosion in a parliamentary candidate's office in the town of
Hissar caused three injuries. Following these events, the central
Government cracked down on rogue paramilitary groups. This brought a
greater sense of security to the capital city of Dushanbe. However,
despite this effort, a Protestant church in Dushanbe was bombed in
October, leaving approximately 70 persons injured, almost half of them
seriously (see Section 1.a and 2.c.). The official vehicle of
Democratic Party leader and presidential cabinet member Mahmadruzi
Iskandarov was destroyed by a bomb in October; there were no injuries.
An official vehicle of the European Commission Humanitarian Office was
destroyed by a bomb in July; there were no injuries.
According to credible counternarcotics law enforcement authorities
in the central Government, Tajik and Afghan criminal groups engaged in
narcotics smuggling across the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border
threatened, harassed, and committed abuses against the border area
populations.
Prison conditions remain harsh and lifethreatening. They fail to
meet minimum international standards. Prisons generally are
overcrowded, unsanitary, and disease-ridden, producing a serious health
threat. This problem reflects in part the self-funded status of most
prisons, under which before 1992 prisoners grew much of their own food
or made goods for sale. The general collapse of governmental programs
and of the economy also meant the virtual disappearance of these
programs. Some food production has resumed, but is still inadequate.
Some prisoners die of hunger. Family members are allowed access to
prisoners only after a guilty verdict, in accordance with the law.
There was no official action against government forces responsible
for the deaths of 26 prisoners when they retook Khojand prison in 1997
after a prison revolt. Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, the brother of a
political opponent of the President, was arrested in May 1997 on
narcotics charges that appear fabricated and was sentenced to death in
1998. Despite appeals for clemency based on a diagnosis of terminal
cancer, Abdullojonov remained in prison and claimed to have been denied
proper medical treatment. Government sources say that he was executed
early in 1999, although other sources maintain that he simply died of
cancer in prison.
The Government does permit some prison visits by international
human rights monitors, including an OSCE visit during the year, in
which the OSCE found the conditions to be very poor. The Government
invariably has denied requests by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) to make prison visits in a manner consistent with the
ICRC's standard modalities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. The Criminal Code has not
been amended significantly since independence, and it therefore retains
many of the defects inherited from Soviet times. The Government claims
that revision of the Criminal Code is a high priority, but due to the
size and complexity of the code, the small parliamentary staff, and
limited time in session for the Oli Majilis (Parliament) progress has
been slow. There is no projected completion date, and there has been no
indication of progress toward a comprehensive revision of the Criminal
Code. Minor modifications to the code in 1999 increased punishment for
crimes such as rape, theft, and illegal drug use. The system allows for
lengthy pretrial detention and provides few checks on the power of
procurators and police to arrest persons. Public order, which broke
down during the civil war, has yet to be restored fully, and the
virtual immunity from prosecution of armed militia groups has eroded
further the integrity of the legal system.
Police legally may detain persons without a warrant for a period of
72 hours, and the procurator's office may do so for a period of 10 days
after which the accused must be officially charged. At that point, the
Criminal Code permits pretrial detention for up to 15 months. The first
3 months of detention are at the discretion of the local procurator,
the second 3 months must be approved at the regional level, and the
Procurator General must sanction the remaining time in detention. The
Criminal Code specifies that all investigations must be completed 1
month before the 15-month maximum in order to allow time for the
defense to examine government evidence. There is no requirement for
judicial approval or for a preliminary judicial hearing on the charge
or detention. In criminal cases, detainees may be released and
restricted to their place of residence pending trial. Once a case is
entered for trial, the law states that it must be brought before a
judge within 28 days. However, it is common for cases to be delayed for
many months before trial begins. There is no provision for bail, and
lengthy pretrial detention is a problem.
The Government made politically motivated arrests, and there are
credible allegations of cases of illegal government detention of
members of rival political factions. For example, the bodyguard and the
former driver of First Deputy Prime Minister Akbar Turajonzoda were
detained in October, apparently as part of a campaign of intimidation
by other elements of the Government against Turajonzoda. In most cases,
the security officers, principally personnel from the Ministry of
Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Security, do not obtain arrest
warrants and do not bring charges. Those released sometimes claimed
that they were mistreated and beaten during detention (also see Section
1.c.).
The number of political detainees was not clear. Since the law
precludes visits to persons in pretrial detention, and the Government
denies the ICRC or other observers access to these persons, any
estimate is uncertain.
Human Rights Watch reported that by December 1999, the Government
had granted amnesty to approximately 5,000 United Tajik Opposition
(UTO) fighters. There were reports of several UTO fighters in the
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast being arrested by local authorities
despite this amnesty. The families of these fighters have appealed, and
the leader of the Lal-I Badakhshan movement is pursuing their case.
Border Force units routinely take family members of deserters
hostage and hold them until the deserters return to duty (see Section
1.e.).
The Constitution states that no one can be exiled without a legal
basis; no laws have been passed so far setting out any legal basis for
exile. There were no reports of forced exile, although, some opponents
of the Government are in self-imposed exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1994 Constitution states that
judges are independent and subordinate only to the Constitution and the
law and prohibits interference in their activities; however, in
practice the political leadership and, in many instances, armed
paramilitary groups directly influence judicial officials at all
levels. Under the Constitution, the President has the right, with
confirmation by the Parliament, both to appoint and to dismiss judges
and prosecutors. Judges at the local, regional, and national level are
for the most part poorly trained and lack understanding of the concept
of an independent judiciary. The Government made some progress in this
respect by instituting regular examinations to screen unqualified
candidates for judgeships. Bribery of prosecutors and judges appears to
be a common practice.
The court system, largely unmodified from the Soviet period,
includes city, district, regional, and national levels, with a parallel
military court system. Higher courts serve as appellate courts for the
lower ones. The Constitution establishes additional courts, including
the Constitutional Court, which began to function in 1997.
According to the law, trials are public, except in cases involving
national security or the protection of minors. The court appoints an
attorney for those who do not have one. Defendants may choose their own
attorney but may not necessarily choose among court-appointed
defenders. In practice arrested persons often are denied prompt, and in
some cases any, access to an attorney.
The procurator's office is responsible for conducting all
investigations of alleged criminal conduct. According to the law, both
defendant and counsel have the right to review all government evidence,
to confront witnesses, and to present evidence and testimony. No groups
are barred from testifying, and all testimony theoretically is given
equal consideration, regardless of the ethnicity or gender of the
witness. Ministry of Justice officials maintain that defendants benefit
from the presumption of innocence, despite the unmodified Soviet legal
statute that presumes the guilt of all persons brought to trial. In
practice, bringing charges tends to suggest guilt.
The obstacles to ensuring fair public trials were evident in the
murder trial of Dilfuza Nimonova, a 21-year-old woman accused of
murdering the man who raped her. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Tajikistan, which observed the
trial, reported that the evidence presented by prosecutors against the
defendant was poor, that the defendant's lawyer was denied access to
his client, and that the politically well-connected family of the
victim pressured the judges hearing the case. Members of the security
forces tortured and beat Nimonova while she was in prison. Authorities
also forced her to undergo an abortion while in prison. Nimonova was
sentenced to death, although the Government later commuted her sentence
to 16 years in prison after President Rahmonov received international
appeals to intervene in the matter.
There was no information during the year concerning Bahrom Sodirov,
who was charged in the February 1997 kidnaping of the Minister of
Security, 5 United Nations personnel, and 11 others. Sodirov was
arrested soon after the hostages were released. His trial, from which
observers were barred, was suspended in late 1997 and has not resumed.
In contrast with the previous year, there were no new public
allegations that the Government holds political prisoners. The
Government and the UTO exchanged multiple lists of prisoners of war and
political prisoners for exchange as a result of the 1997 inter-Tajik
talks in Moscow. By November 1999, the Government had released all UTO
prisoners named on lists submitted by the UTO, with the exception of
six individuals, of whom the Government claimed no knowledge. The
families of the six individuals continued to seek their whereabouts
without success. The Government accepted the UTO's 1998 claim that it
released all prisoners of war that it held.
Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, whose arrest and unfair trial in 1997 were
politically motivated, remained a political prisoner until his
mysterious death early in 1999 (see Section 1.c.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home and prohibits interference with correspondence, telephone
conversations, and postal and communication rights, except ``in cases
prescribed by law''; however, authorities continued to infringe on
citizens' right to privacy. Except for in some special circumstances,
by law police may not enter and search a private home without the
approval of the procurator. When they do enter and search without prior
approval, they then must inform the procurator within 24 hours.
However, police frequently ignored these requirements. There is no
independent judicial review of police searches conducted without a
warrant. Police also are permitted to enter and search homes without
permission if they have compelling reason to believe that a delay in
obtaining a warrant would impair national security.
Security forces detained relatives of deserters in order to compel
deserters to return to duty (see Section 1.d.). According to the OSCE
mission in Tajikistan, the family of Dilfuza Nimonova (see Section
1.e.) was harassed at the behest of her alleged murder victim's
politically well-connected family after Nimonova's family sought
international intervention in her case. There is also strong evidence
that Nimonova, a rape victim, was forced to undergo an abortion while
in prison ( see Section 1.e.).
Some political parties remain banned. In some cases, the security
services apparently created difficulties for persons associated with
opposition parties who sought employment. Other persons were pressured
to join the ruling party (see Section 2.b.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely
restricts this right in practice. Journalists, broadcasters, and
individual citizens who disagree with government policies are
discouraged from speaking freely or critically. The Government
exercises control over the media both overtly through legislation and
indirectly through such mechanisms as ``friendly advice'' to reporters
on what news should not be covered. The Government also controls the
printing presses and the supply of newsprint and broadcasting
facilities and subsidizes virtually all publications and productions.
Editors and journalists fearful of reprisals carefully exercise self-
censorship.
The number of independent and local newspapers is increasing, but
only a handful of them attempt to cover serious news. Several are
organs of political parties or blocs. The Government exerted pressure
on newspapers critical of it. Najot, the new official paper of the
Islamic Renaissance Party, which began weekly publication in October
1999, continued to publish during the year. It experienced indirect
government censorship in the early summer, apparently in retaliation
for publishing a serialized translation of a foreign human rights
report crtitical of the Government. It temporarily lost its access to
state-run printing presses and has been forced to rely on a small,
privately owned printing press to publish its editions.
Journalists frequently are subject to harassment, intimidation, and
violence. Sometimes the perpetrators are government authorities, as in
the case of a reporter for the state-owned newspaper Jumhuriyat, who
was beaten severely by militiamen in August (see Section 1.b.),
according to the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations. In other
cases, the perpetrators are criminal or terrorist elements who are
believed to have narcotics trafficking connections, as in the cases of
Ministry of Interior press center chief Jumankhon Hotami, who was shot
and killed near Dushanbe in 1999, and Sergei Sitkovskii, a Russian
national working for the newspaper Tojikiston, who was killed in a hit-
and-run car accident in 1999. Both were investigating narcotics
trafficking at the time of their deaths. There were no developments in
their cases by year's end.
There is one Government-run television network; its several local
stations cover regional and local issues from an official point of
view. Opposition politicians have had little access to it, although in
January and June it broadcast two political party debates organized by
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. There are 36
nongovernmental television stations, not all of which are operating at
any one time and only a handful of which can be considered genuinely
independent. The Islamic Renaissance Party was able to begin
broadcasting a weekly television program on one such station. Some have
independent studio facilities. These stations continued to experience
administrative and legal harassment. To obtain licenses, independent
television stations must work through two government agencies, the
Ministry of Communications, and the State Committee on Radio and
Television. At every stage of the bureaucratic process, there are high
official and unofficial fees.
The Government continued to prevent independent radio stations from
operating by interminably delaying applications for broadcasting
licenses. At least two independent radio stations in Dushanbe have had
their license applications pending without explanation since the summer
of 1998.
Access to the Internet is limited partly by state control. The
Government allowed a handful of Internet provider companies to begin
operating during the year, but high fees and limited capacity put
access to information over the Internet out of reach for most citizens.
Academic expression is limited principally by the complete reliance
of scientific institutes upon government funding, and in practical
terms by the need to find alternate employment to generate sufficient
income, leaving little time for academic writing.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
restricts this right in practice and exercises strict control over
organizations and activities of a political nature. Nonpolitical
associations, such as trade unions, are allowed to meet. Registered
organizations must apply for a permit from the local executive
committee in order to organize legally any public assembly or
demonstration. Sometimes permits are granted, but the Government
subsequently has been known to take reprisals against organizers.
Because fear of reprisal is so widespread, public assemblies or
demonstrations of a political nature were rare during the year.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice by exercising strict
control over organizations and activities of a political nature.
Although freedom of association is permitted for nonpolitical
associations (including trade unions), this right is circumscribed
further by the requirement in the Law on Nongovernmental Associations
that all organizations first must register with the Ministry of
Justice. This process often is slowed by the requirement to submit
documents in both Russian and Tajik. The Ministry of Justice's
verification of the text inevitably delays the granting of
registration. The Minister of Justice made public statements in support
of nongovernmental organizations (most of which are involved in social
work, rather than political activity), and attempted to address
problems that existing NGO's have experienced with registration and
taxation. Once registered, an organization may apply for a permit to
hold a public assembly or demonstration.
There are five political parties and five ``movements'' registered
with the Government. Three parties are banned officially: The Party of
Popular Unity (banned in December 1998), the Agrarian Party (banned in
April 1999); and the ``Tehran platform'' faction of the Democratic
Party (banned in December 1999). The Party of Economic and Political
Revival of Tajikistan was not allowed to register in March 1999 because
of insufficient membership. The Party of Justice and Progress has not
been allowed to register since the end of 1999 for unexplained reasons.
In May 1998, the Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation
of political parties with a religious orientation. The opposition UTO,
international organizations, and foreign governments strongly
criticized the law for violating the spirit and the letter of the 1997
peace agreement. In June 1998, President Rahmonov established a Special
Conciliation Commission to resolve the dispute, which proposed
compromise language for the law, banning political parties from
receiving support from religious institutions. A new version of the law
including the compromise language was passed in November 1998.
Subsequently, parties of religious character were permitted to
register; one such party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, has done so.
The leadership of certain opposition parties reported threats and
harassment by the authorities in their workplaces. Many others often
were pressured to join the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the
ruling party (see Section 1.f.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, there are some restrictions, and the Government monitors the
activities of religious institutions to keep them from becoming overly
political. The vast majority of the population is Sunni Islam, although
only a small portion is observant: this does not appear to affect the
religious freedom of the non-Sunni Muslim minority. President Rahmonov
defends secularism aggressively and describes Islamists as a threat to
national security. Government policies reflect a pervasive fear of
Islamic fundamentalism, a fear shared by much of the general
population.
According to the Law on Freedom of Faith, the Committee on
Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers registers religious
communities and monitors the activities of the various religious
establishments. While the official reason given to justify registration
is to ensure that religious groups act in accordance with the law, the
practical purpose is to ensure that they do not become overly
political. In 1997 the Government subordinated the Council of the
Islamic Center (the former Muftiyat) to the Committee on Religious
Affairs; however, the observant Muslim community apparently did not
object to this step.
Although unregistered, recently organized religious communities,
such as Baha'i and Hare Krishna groups, function with no apparent
formal restriction. There were no developments in the murder case of a
prominent member of the Baha'i community, who was widely believed to
have been killed by Iranian-supported Islamic extremists (see Section
1.a.). Members of the Baha'i community were occasionally confronted by
the police guard outside Dushanbe's Baha'i Center and asked why they
had forsaken Islam. Others were called in by the Ministry of Security
and also asked why they had changed religious affiliation.
In May 1998, Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation of
political parties with a religious orientation (see Section 2.b.). The
UTO, the largest component of which is the Islamic Renaissance Party
(IRP, along with international organizations and foreign governments,
strongly criticized the law for violating the June 1997 peace
agreement, which included a government commitment to lift the ban on
member parties of the UTO. The post-independence 1992-7 civil war was
fought in part over differing views of the role of religion in the
country. In early June 1998, President Rahmonov established a Special
Conciliation Commission to resolve the dispute. Later that month, the
Commission reported that it had devised compromise language for the
law, banning parties from receiving support from religious
institutions. A new version of the law including the compromise
language was passed in the November 1998 parliamentary session. A
constitutional amendment passed in a September 1999 referendum states
that the State is secular and that citizens can be members of parties
formed on a religious basis. Two representatives from the IRP now sit
in the lower house of the national Parliament.
Aside from the registration requirement, there are few official
constraints on religious practice, but government officials sometimes
issue extrajudicial restrictions. For example, the mayor of Dushanbe
has prohibited mosques from using microphones for the five daily calls
to prayer. There are also reports that some local officials have
forbidden members of the IRP from speaking in mosques in their region.
However, this restriction is more a reflection of political than
religious differences. Government printing houses reportedly are
forbidden to publish texts in Arabic and as a rule do not publish
religious literature. There are no longer restrictions on private
Arabic language schools; however, restrictions on home-based Islamic
instruction remain. These restrictions appear to be based on political
concerns, but the effect on private religious instruction is also
clear.
The Government has banned specifically the activity of one
religious faction, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist movement with
origins in the Middle East, which has developed a significant following
among the ethnic Uzbek population of northern Tajikistan. This movement
operates underground and apparently calls for a nonviolent overthrow of
established authority and the reestablishment of government along the
lines of the six ``rightly-guided Caliphs'' of early Islamic history.
According to the Ministry of Security, over 105 members of Hizb ut-
Tahrir were arrested during the year, and one reportedly died in police
custody (see Section 1.a.). Fifty-seven of these persons were sentenced
to between one and two years imprisonment.
During the year there were three church bombings that occurred
throughout Dushanbe (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
The Government continued to impose restrictions on the number of
pilgrims allowed to go on the Hajj. Individuals were not permitted to
travel in a personal vehicle; persons were required to travel by
government-owned transportation, primarily buses. There were regional
quotas on the number of pilgrims, which led to corruption as places
were sold. Missionaries are not restricted legally and proselytize
openly; however, the Government's fear of Islamic terrorists prompts it
to restrict visas for Muslim missionaries.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights; however, the Government imposes some restrictions on them.
The Government has stipulated that both citizens and foreigners are
prohibited from traveling within a 15-mile zone along the country's
borders with China and Afghanistan without permission from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. This restriction is not always enforced along the
western part of the border with Afghanistan, but a special visa
generally is required for travelers, including international workers
and diplomats, to Gorno-Badakhshan. Travel to border areas near
Uzbekistan in the southwest is not restricted significantly, except
occasionally at the border, which was closed intermittently by
Uzbekistan.
The Ministry of Security inhibits freedom of travel by requiring
citizens who wish to travel abroad to obtain an exit visa. This process
sometimes includes lengthy interviews. The Ministry of Security
sometimes withholds or delays exit visas when it believes that other
ministries or NGO's are infringing upon its jurisdiction and have not
adhered to its formalities for foreign travel.
Residents of Dushanbe and those travelers who wish to remain in the
city longer than 3 days are supposed to register with central
authorities, and regulations require registration at the local Ministry
of Interior office upon arrival and departure from a city. However,
these regulations largely are ignored in practice. There are no legal
restrictions on changing residence or workplace.
There is no law on emigration. Persons who wish to migrate within
the former Soviet Union notify the Ministry of Interior of their
departure. Persons who wish to emigrate beyond the borders of the
former Soviet Union must receive the approval of the relevant country's
embassy in order to obtain their passport. Persons who settle abroad
are required to inform the Tajikistan embassy or Tajikistan interests
section of the nearest Russian embassy or consulate.
Persons who wish to return to Tajikistan after having emigrated may
do so freely by submitting their applications to the embassy of
Tajikistan or Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian
embassy or consulate. The Government adjudicates requests on a case-by-
case basis. There is no indication that persons other than those who
fled the country for political reasons after the civil war, are not
permitted to return freely. Some persons currently active with the
Tajik opposition, whose travel documents expired, at times have had
difficulty obtaining new documents permitting them to return.
A number of persons remained internally displaced as a result of
the civil war, but their total number was difficult to estimate. The
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) no longer has estimates on
the number of internally displaced persons (IDP's). These persons live
throughout the country and are not concentrated in a single geographic
area. The Government provides protection and modest assistance, and it
actively cooperates with international organizations to resettle them.
Resettlement is voluntary; IDP's are not returned forcibly to dangerous
conditions.
The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum to persons who
have entered the country seeking protection, in accordance with U.N.
refugee criteria. Under the 1994 refugee law, a person granted refugee
status is provided with the right to work and to move freely throughout
the country. The State Migration Service (formerly the Department of
Refugee Affairs) under the Ministry of Labor has responsibility for the
registration of refugees.
The State Migration Service handles the registration of Afghan
refugees in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and Tajikistan's 1994 Law on Refugees. An unresolved
problem stems from the unofficial government policy of denying official
status to Afghan spouses of returning Tajik refugees. The UNHCR has
aided their admission to the country (avoiding their being jailed as
illegal immigrants); however, their legal status remains uncertain.
There were no cases during the year. However, members of Tajikistan's
Afghan refugee population, sometimes regardless of social status or
official connections, are singled out for mistreatment by law
enforcement authorities (see Section 1.c.).
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. According to the UNHCR, 176 asylum
seekers submitted requests for refugee status to the State Migration
Service during the first half of the year, of which 28 were granted by
mid-year. However, the UNHCR does not have statistics on the number of
refugees remaining in the country after receiving asylum because the
majority of such persons use the country as a transit point en route to
Western Europe. As in 1999, the Government faced the problematic issue
of several hundred dependent family members and camp followers of
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militants. As in a similar incident in
1999, several hundred of these persons were sent in buses to
Afghanistan. The Government did not consider them for refugee status
and officially refused to acknowledge even the presence of these
persons.
After protests from the UNHCR, the Government cancelled its short-
lived ``Operation Foreigner,'' in which numerous Afghan refugees in
Dushanbe were detained by security forces and reportedly slated for
relocation to refugee camps elsewhere. However, government officials
continued to maintain that Dushanbe was still ``off limits'' for Afghan
refugees.
It remained an question whether the Government would provide first
asylum to a potential mass influx of refugees fleeing Taliban advances
in northern Afghanistan; Government and Russian border officials made
contradictory statements on this issue.
Following the signing of the 1997 peace accords, all Tajik refugees
from northern Afghanistan who wished to return, as well as thousands
from the CIS, returned to the country. There was continued incremental
progress during the year in returning occupied houses to their original
UTO fighter owners. Problems remain, although they are almost entirely
in the Khatlon region.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
Government peacefully and freely through elections of the President and
members of Parliament; however, the Government restricted this right in
practice. There was some improvement in the February parliamentary
elections; however, the 1999 presidential election was seriously
flawed. While the country made progress in its transition from a
Soviet-model system to a more open and competitive one, the Government
remained dominated by President Rahmonov and his inner circle from the
Kulyab region.
The 1999 Presidential election was flawed seriously. The
Government's handling of preparations for the November presidential
election cast doubt on the possibility that there could be a peaceful
transfer of power through genuinely free and fair elections. Candidates
had to contend with a cumbersome registration process requiring them to
obtain large numbers of signatures during a short period of time. Only
President Rahmonov, who used his political apparatus throughout the
country for this purpose, probably ahead of time, was able to do so by
the deadline. Prospective opposition candidates complained that local,
progovernment administrators prevented them from gathering signatures.
Days before the election, an apparently arbitrary Supreme Court
decision allowed one of the three aspiring opposition candidates,
Economics and Foreign Economic Relations Minister Davlat Usmon of the
Islamic Renaissance Party, to register. Although Davlat announced that
he would boycott the election unless the other two opposition figures
also were allowed to run, the Central Election Commission included his
name on the ballot. Davlat told journalists in Dushanbe on November 7
that he believed that the outcome of the election was rigged and that
only 20 to 30 percent of voters had participated. President Rahmonov
enjoyed a virtual monopoly over mass media access, and there were
obvious irregularities in the operation of polling places, such as
multiple voting by pro-Rahmonov supporters. The Government claimed that
98 percent of the electorate voted and that 96 percent of those voting
supported Rahmonov; the claim lacked credibility.
A joint mission of the U.N. and the OSCE observed February 27
elections to the lower house of the new bicameral national Parliament.
This joint observation mission noted that there were improvements in
the process compared to previous elections. Six parties, including two
former segments of the disbanded UTO, were allowed to participate in
the electoral process. Two seats in the new Parliament are now held by
members of an openly Islamic political party. However, the joint
observation mission concluded that the elections failed to meet the
minimum standards for equal, fair, free, secret, transparent, and
accountable elections. There were particular problems with the
independence of election commissions and the conduct of the vote count
and tabulation of results. State organs, particularly regional and
local administration officials, interfered in the preparations for and
conduct of the elections in a manner not foreseen by law and in a way
that contradicted international standards for democratic elections.
During the course of the February 27 elections, joint U.N.-OSCE
observers noted a variety of irregularities in a number of
constituencies including proxy voting, unsealed ballot boxes, stuffed
ballot boxes, votes added in favor of a particular party, lack of
consistency between the sum of votes counted and the number of ballots
issued, discrepancies between votes considered invalid during the count
and the final result sheet, and blank copies of protocols signed before
the counting of ballots and filled in with pencil during the count. The
observers judged the conduct of the vote to have been ``very good''
(i.e., no irregularities) in only 13 percent of the 294 polling
stations observed, while finding it ``good'' (i.e., hardly any minor
irregularities) in 32 percent, ``acceptable, but not good'' (i.e.,
several minor irregularities) in another 32 percent, and
``unacceptable'' (i.e. major irregularities) in 23 percent of the
polling stations.
While state television provided free broadcast time to parties
competing in the election, it failed to provide balanced news and
editorial coverage of the campaign. In general, both publicly and
privately funded broadcasts as well as print media failed to provide
voters with unbiased information.
At least one prospective independent candidate for the lower house
of Parliament was prevented from registering as a candidate in what
Human Rights Watch called ``a wholly arbitrary candidate registration
process.'' The decision to prevent this individual from registering
appeared to have been politically motivated; he earlier had served as
chairman of an opposition party that had been deregistered prior to the
November 1999 presidential election.
Local district assemblies elected the members of the upper house of
the national Parliament in March, in elections that were not held under
international observation.
President Rahmonov's highly centralized People's Democratic Party
of Tajikistan controls an overwhelming majority of seats in both houses
of Parliament. This fact, combined with a lack of democratic culture,
results in a legislative branch that is not genuinely independent of
the executive branch.
There are no formal barriers to women's participation in the
electoral process; however, they are underrepresented in government and
politics. Since the removal of Soviet-era quotas, the number of female
deputies has declined. In the parliamentary election campaign, only 17
out of the 365 registered candidates were women, and only 5 of the 17
were elected. There are two female ministers in the Government.
While ethnic Uzbeks make up some 25 percent of the total
population, they are underrepresented in the political system.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government's record on dealing with international and
nongovernmental investigation of alleged human rights abuses was mixed.
Fear of harrasment and abuse by government or paramilitary elements
tended to discourage citizens from forming their own human rights
organizations, although the Government did not block the registration
of local NGO's dealing with human rights; several such organizations
exist. The Government did prevent some citizens, especially government
officials, from participating in international and local seminars
sponsored by the OSCE, the ICRC, United Nations agencies, NGO's, and
foreign governments on such topics as the rule of law, an independent
judiciary, and international humanitarian law. Discussion at such
seminars, including those held in Tajikistan, was frequently critical
of the Government.
The Government first stated the intention of forming a national
human rights ombudsman position in 1996, and in 1998 agreed to
establish a national human rights institution and ombudsman position
with OSCE financial support; however, no institution or ombudsman
position had been established by year's end.
Within the Parliament, the Committee on Legislation and Human
Rights is charged with monitoring human rights violations; however,
like the rest of the Parliament, it is not independent in practice.
The OSCE mission in Dushanbe continues to monitor human rights
issues with the help of its five field offices. However, these field
offices experienced varying levels of cooperation with local
authorities. The Government allowed a joint U.N.-OSCE observation
mission to monitor parliamentary elections in February (see Section 3).
The mission reported that its team of experts was given every
assistance and freedom of access that it requested. The joint mission
issued a series of reports that severely criticized the conduct of the
elections. The Government's reaction to the reports was mild,
minimizing the critical aspects of joint mission statements and
presenting the participation of international observers as evidence of
a successful democratic exercise.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintains a
delegation in Tajikistan. The Government continued to refuse the ICRC
unconditional access to prisons in accordance with standard ICRC
modalities, despite letters received in the past from senior government
officials that assured that such access would be forthcoming.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the rights and freedoms of every
person regardless of nationality, race, sex, language, religious
beliefs, political persuasion, or social status and also explicitly
states that men and women have the same rights; however, in practice
there is some discrimination as a result of cultural traditions and the
lingering hostilities from the 1992-97 civil war.
Women.--Violence against women is widespread. Wife beating is a
common problem. In both urban and rural areas, many cases of wife
beating go unreported and many of those cases reported are not
investigated. There is a widespread reluctance to discuss the issue or
provide assistance to women in abusive situations, and the Government
did not propose legislation on the issue. In addition, abduction of
young women, who are raped or forced to marry their abductors, is
widely reported.
The Criminal Code prohibits rape; however, it is widely believed
that most cases are unreported, and the problem is believed to be
growing, particularly in urban areas. The threat of rape often is used
to coerce women. There are no special police units for handling these
cases. One rape crisis center was established by a local NGO in
Dushanbe in 1993; there are now 10 such centers in the country. The
situation is exacerbated by a continued lack of public order, so that
in many cities, including Dushanbe, women exercise particular care in
their movement, especially at night. There are no statistics on the
number of rapists prosecuted, convicted, or punished each year. In one
widely publicized case, Dilfuza Nimonova, an alleged victim of rape was
convicted, in a trial of questionable fairness, of having killed the
man who raped her. She was forced to undergo an abortion (see Section
1.e. and 1.f.).
The law prohibits keeping brothels, procuring, making, or selling
pornography, infecting another person with a venereal disease, and
sexual exploitation of women; however, prostitutes operate openly at
night in certain urban areas.
There are credible reports of trafficking in women (see Section
6.f.).
There have been reports of physical harassment of women by
conservative Muslims in rural areas for not wearing traditional attire.
According to the law, women have equal rights with men; however
discrimination against women remains a problem. Articles in the
Criminal Code protect women's rights in marriage and family matters.
Girls often are pressured to marry men that they do not choose
themselves, and polygyny is increasingly common, although it is
illegal.
Traditionally there has been a high level of female participation
in the work force and in institutes of higher learning. There is no
formal discrimination against women in employment, education, or
housing; and in urban areas women can be found employed throughout
government, academic institutes, and enterprises. However, women face
diminishing opportunities for education and rising poverty. Some women
hold the same jobs as men, although not in equal numbers. Women
officially receive equal pay for equal work; however this regulation is
not always enforced in practice. Divorce rates in urban areas are
comparatively high, and women tend to carry the burden of child-rearing
and household management, whether married or divorced. In rural areas,
women tend to marry younger, have larger families, and receive less
university education than women in cities. In rural and traditional
areas, women receive less education in general, often leaving school
after the eighth year. Due to the prevalence of large families, women
in rural areas are also much less likely to work outside the home.
Inheritance laws do not discriminate against women; however, in
practice, inheritances may pass disproportionately to sons.
Children.--The Government's lack of financial resources left it
unable to fulfill its extensive commitments to children's rights and
welfare, and the government social security network for child welfare
appeared to have deteriorated. Women are provided 3 years of maternity
leave and monthly subsidies for each child; health care is free (but
the quality and quantity of medical services available has declined
significantly since the Soviet era). Education is compulsory until age
16; however, the law is not enforced. Public education is intended to
be free; however, a lack of resources has caused the public school
system to deteriorate to the point at which it barely functions.
Parents who can afford to do so send their children to private schools
(a number of which have been founded since the end of the Soviet
period), or join together in groups that hire teachers to give their
children lessons for a fee. Public education is intended to be
universal; however, a significant number of school-age children--as
many as one in eight, according to World Bank data--work instead of
attending school. While most children are enrolled in school up to the
completion of the secondary level, actual attendance may be lower
because of the need to supplement family income by working in the home
or in informal activities. The old Soviet practice, now illegal, of
closing high schools at cotton harvest time and putting the students to
work in the field continues in some areas.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--The 1992 Law on Social Protection of
Invalids stipulates the right of the disabled to employment and
adequate medical care.
However, in practice the Government does not require employers to
provide physical access for the disabled. Financial constraints and the
absence of basic technology to assist the disabled result, in practice,
in high unemployment and widespread discrimination. There is no law
mandating accessibility for the disabled. There are facilities for the
mentally disabled; however, funding is limited and the facilities are
in poor condition. Several international NGO's provide limited
assistance to persons with disabilities.
Religious Minorities.--Baha'i and Hare Krishna groups experience
limited prejudice. There were no developments in the 1999 murder of a
prominent member of Baha'i community (see Section 1.a.). Police made no
arrests, although militant Islamists aligned with Iran are considered
the likely perpetrators.
The authorities continued to investigate the October bombing of a
Protestant church in Dushanbe (see Section 1.a.). It is believed that
the attack was meant to destabilize the political situation in the
country. Prosecutors have charged three students from the Dushanbe
Islamic Institute with terrorism in connection with the bombing. The
students confessed to the bombing and stated their motive was
religious. Investigators already have identified the remaining
conspirators, and said that the three suspects claimed to be operating
on their own and not on the orders of someone else. The Government
believes that the act was independent and not associated with the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or Hiz ut-Tahir.
On December 31, two churches in Dushanbe were bombed, the Svyato-
Nikolskii Russian Orthodox Church and a Seventh Day Adventist Church.
There were no injuries at either church, both of which were closed at
the time. Government law enforcement and security agencies are
investigating the bombings. It is believed that these events were
carried out by religious extremists opposed to foreign missionaries in
the country.
Some Muslim leaders occasionally have expressed concern that
minority religious groups undermine national unity.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Uzbeks make up
approximately a quarter of the population but are substantially
underrepresented in government service. The number of Uzbek language
newspapers, television broadcasts, and schools has declined
significantly since 1992. With the exception of the trilingual (Tajik/
Uzbek/Russian) school structure, the Uzbek language has no official
status. Although the Government permits a daily Uzbek radio broadcast,
broadcast time is dominated by Tajik and Russian language programs. A
weekly television broadcast in Uzbek, which ceased in 1999, resumed in
2000.
In practice Russian is the language of interethnic communication
and widely used in government. Ethnic Russians and other Russian
speakers, for example, Ukrainians, make up less than 2 percent of the
population. While the Government repeatedly has expressed its desire
for the ethnic Russian and Slavic populations to remain, economic
conditions provide little incentive for them to do so, and some local
Russians and other Slavs perceive an increase in negative social
attitudes toward them. A Slavic university and a Russian high school
operate in Dushanbe with Russian as the language of instruction, but
also include ethnic Tajik and Uzbek students. An agreement ratified by
the Russian Duma in December 1996 allows for dual Russian and Tajik
citizenship.
Tensions persist between ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks in some areas.
Government officials have organized meetings at the local level to
resolve conflicts; however, the authorities apparently have not
arrested or prosecuted suspects in murders of ethnic Uzbeks in July
1998. Since the signing of the peace treaty in 1997, there have been
multiple murders of ethnic Uzbeks in the Panj district. Some of these
cases appear to be a matter of retaliation by returned ethnic Tajik
refugees for injuries done to them by ethnic Uzbeks during the civil
war. As a result of these attacks, some ethnic Uzbek families have
moved to other locations in the district where Uzbeks predominate or to
neighboring countries formerly part of the Soviet Union.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Both the Law on Social Organization
and the Law on Trade Union Rights and Guarantees provide all citizens
with the right of association, including the right to form and join
associations without prior authorization, to organize territorially,
and to form and join federations. According to official figures,
approximately 90 percent of the labor force is organized.
The Federation of Trade Unions, a docile holdover from the Soviet
era, remains the dominant labor organization, although it since has
shed its subordination to the Communist Party. The Federation consists
of 19 professional trade unions and claims 1.5 million members,
virtually all nonagricultural workers. The separate, independent Trade
Union of Non-State Enterprises has registered unions in over 3,000
small and medium-sized enterprises, totaling about 30,000 employees
(according to 1998 figures). Many of the enterprises in which these two
organizations nominally are present are not functioning because of the
general economic crisis, and the membership of both has declined as a
result. The Council of Ministers formally consults both organizations
during the drafting of social welfare and worker rights legislation.
The Law on Tariff Agreements and Social Partnerships mandates
arbitration before a union legally may call a strike. Depending on the
scale of the labor disagreement, arbitration can take place at the
company, sector, or governmental level. In the event that arbitration
fails, unions have the right to strike, but both labor unions have
disavowed publicly the utility of strikes in a period of deepening
economic crisis and high unemployment and have espoused compromise
between management and workers.
There were no official, union-sanctioned strikes, nor were there
any wildcat strikes, the last which occurred in 1996).
The law provides citizens but not unions with the right to
affiliate freely with international organizations, including
international labor organizations. It does not prohibit unions from
affiliating with international organizations; however, there are no
unions with international affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is codified in the Law on Trade Union
Rights and Guarantees, the Law on Social Partnerships and Collective
Contracts, and the Law on Labor Protection. Employees, members of the
trade union, and management participate in collective bargaining at the
company level. Negotiations involving an industrial sector include
officials from the relevant ministry and members of the union's
steering committee for that particular sector. As the economic
situation worsens, it is increasingly difficult for enterprises to
engage in effective collective bargaining.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, the use of sanctions to
dissuade union membership, and the firing of a worker solely for union
activity. Any complaints of discrimination against a labor union or
labor union activist are considered first by a local labor union
committee and, if necessary, raised to the level of the Supreme Court
and investigated by the Ministry of Justice. The law compels an
employer found guilty of firing an employee based on union activity to
reinstate the employee.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, except in cases defined in the law; however, it
persists in some cases. No labor laws have been passed since the
adoption of the Constitution in 1994. Neither the Law on Labor
Protection nor the Law on Employment, both predating the present
Constitution, specifically prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The
Soviet practice of compelling students to pick cotton was banned
officially in 1989; however, high school students in some regions still
are sent to the fields to pick cotton, particularly in the Soghd
(formerly Leninabad) area, sometimes with compensation. Residents of
state or collective farms still may be required to pick cotton,
although wages usually are not paid and these institutions no longer
provide the services they once did.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children; however, apart from traditional participation by children in
family agricultural or home craftsman work, such practices are not
known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--According to labor laws, the minimum age for the
employment of children is 16, the age at which children also may leave
school legally. With the concurrence of the local trade union,
employment may begin at the age of 15. By law workers under the age of
18 may work no more than 6 hours a day and 36 hours per week. However,
children as young as 7 years of age can perform household-based labor
and participate in agricultural work, which is classified as family
assistance. Many children under 10 years of age work in the bazaars or
sell newspapers or consumables on the street. Trade unions are
responsible for reporting any violations in the employment of minors.
Cases not resolved between the union and the employer may be brought
before the Procurator General, who may investigate and charge the
manager of the enterprise with violations of the Labor Code.
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and such
practices generally do not occur, apart from family-based work (see
Section 6.c.).
The Government lacks the resources and ability to regulate
effectively acceptable working conditions for youths, and there were no
governmental or judicial initiatives to strengthen or enforce child
labor legislation or regulations during the year. The Government does
not have a comprehensive policy for the elimination of the worst forms
of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The President, on the advice of
the Ministry of Labor and in consultation with trade unions, sets the
minimum monthly wage. The nominal minimum daily rate was approximately
$0.03 (100 Tajik rubles). This rate fell far short of providing a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The Government
recognizes this problem and has retained certain subsidies for workers
and their families at the minimum wage. Although the Government adopted
a wage indexation law in 1993 and inflation has been high, the law has
not been implemented.
Although slightly improved, the economy remained extremely weak
during the year, with a majority of industrial operations standing
idle. As factories and enterprises either remained closed or were shut
down, workers were laid off or furloughed for extended periods.
Some establishments, both governmental and private, compensated
their employees in kind with food commodities or with the products
produced by the enterprise. The employee could then sell or barter
those products in local private markets.
The legal workweek for adults (over age 18) is 40 hours. Overtime
payment is mandated by law, with the first 2 hours of overtime to be
paid at 1 1/2 times the normal rate and the rest of the overtime hours
at double time.
The Government has established occupational health and safety
standards, but these fall far below accepted international norms, and
the Government does not enforce them in practice. The enforcement of
work standards is the responsibility of the State Technical Supervision
Committee under the Council of Ministers. While new statistics were not
available, it is virtually certain, given the continuing economic
decline, that 1993 statistics, which reported that over one-fifth of
the population worked under substandard conditions, greatly
underreported the number working under those conditions. Workers can
leave their jobs with 2 months' notice, but, given the bleak employment
situation, few choose to do so. The Law on Labor Protection provides
that workers can remove themselves from hazardous conditions without
risking loss of employment; however, in view of the poor prospects for
finding another job, few do so.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons, and it is a problem. The criminal code prohibits the
recruitment of minors for sexual exploitation. There are credible
reports that trafficking is a growing problem with wide ramifications.
The most common form of trafficking is in women, for ``export'' to the
Gulf states, Turkey, and Russia. The OSCE has identified several rings
of traffickers that recruit young women for prostitution abroad. The
International Organization for Migration is leading an initiative to
fully research the problem. The Government has taken no significant
action against trafficking. There is no evidence of official,
institutional government involvement in the trafficking of persons, but
it is believed that some individual authorities are involved. It is
believed that, due to the large number of female Afghan refugees,
Afghan women may be the subjects of trafficking abroad using Tajikistan
as the transit country.
__________
TURKEY
Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty Parliament,
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which elects the President. In May
it elected Ahmet Necdet Sezer President for a 7year term. After 1999
parliamentary elections, Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP),
the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) led by Devlet Bahceli, and former
Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz's Motherland Party (ANAP) formed a
Government with Ecevit as Prime Minister. The military exercises
substantial, but indirect, influence over government policy and
actions--and politics--in the belief, shared by much of the population
according to opinion polls, that it is the constitutional protector of
the State. The Government generally respects the Constitution's
provisions for an independent judiciary; however, various officials
acknowledge the need for legislative changes to strengthen its
independence.
For over 15 years, the Government has engaged in armed conflict
with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal until
recently was the formation of a separate state of Kurdistan in
southeastern Turkey. A state of emergency, declared in 1987, continues
in four southeastern provinces that faced substantial PKK terrorist
violence. Parliament in July lifted the state of emergency in Van
province. The level of violence has been low since the second half of
1999; according to the Government, the number of PKK-related terrorist
incidents declined almost 90 percent from 1999. The state of emergency
region's governor has authority over the provincial governors in the
four provinces, and seven adjacent ones including Van, for security
matters. Under the state of emergency, this regional governor may
exercise certain quasi-martial law powers, including imposing
restrictions on the press, removing from the area persons whose
activities are deemed detrimental to public order, and ordering village
evacuations. The state of emergency decree was renewed in Diyarbakir,
Hakkari, Sirnak, and Tunceli provinces for 4 months in November.
The Turkish National Police (TNP) have primary responsibility for
security in urban areas, while the Jandarma (Gendarmerie) carry out
this function in the countryside. The armed forces, in support of the
police and particularly the Jandarma, carry out operations against the
PKK in the state of emergency region, thereby serving an internal
security function. These operations have declined in number as the
terrorist threat ebbed. Although civilian and military authorities
remain publicly committed to the rule of law and respect for human
rights, members of the security forces, including police ``special
teams'' and anti-terror squads, other TNP personnel, village guards,
and Jandarma committed serious human rights abuses such as torture.
In December 1999, the Government adopted a 3-year disinflation and
fiscal adjustment program. During the first year of this program the
Government registered some significant improvements in the
macroeconomic situation. Inflation was cut nearly in half, to 39
percent. Economic growth increased significantly, after a recession in
1999, to about 6 percent of gross national product. This growth
included a strong increase in imports, fueled partly by an increase in
world oil prices and the Turkish lira's appreciation against the euro,
which led to a wider than expected current account deficit. This
deficit, together with delays in the structural aspects of the reform
program and other factors, resulted in a large loss of investor
confidence and capital outflows in November and early December.
Intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) helped to
stabilize the situation in December, but the financial situation
remained fragile at year's end. Another continuing problem is the
projected deficit in energy sources, as energy demand grows at 9
percent per year. To find new sources of imported oil and gas, the
Government is negotiating supply and pipeline agreements with countries
in the Caspian basin.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in a
number of areas; however, its record was poor in several other areas,
and serious problems remain. Extrajudicial killings continued,
including deaths due to excessive use of force. Unlike the previous
year, there were no deaths in detention due to torture and no reports
of mystery killings and disappearances of political activists. Although
the authorities failed to investigate adequately many past
disappearances, ongoing investigation of the Turkish Hizbullah
terrorist organization may lead to resolution of some cases. Torture,
beatings, and other abuses by security forces remained widespread.
Police and Jandarma often employed torture and abused detainees during
incommunicado detention and interrogation. The lack of universal and
immediate access to an attorney, long detention periods for those held
for political crimes (especially in the state of emergency region), and
a culture of impunity are major factors in the commission of torture by
police and other security forces. In addition the general climate of
violence engendered by the PKK insurgency and urban leftist and Islamic
fundamentalist terrorism, combined with a confession-oriented trial
system, have hampered past efforts to carry out legal prohibitions
against torture. With the decrease in counterterror operations and
overall detentions in the southeast, fewer cases of abuse of detainees
were reported; however, the proportion of cases of abuse remained at
high levels, and many cases go unreported.
The rarity of convictions and the light sentences imposed on police
and other security officials for killings and torture continued to
foster a climate of impunity that remained the single largest obstacle
to reducing torture and prisoner abuse. Investigations and trials of
officials suspected of abuses continued to be protracted and often
inconclusive. Some important cases dating back several years continued
without resolution, including the case against police and security
personnel charged with beating to death 10 prisoners during a prison
disturbance in Diyarbakir in 1996. However, the case against 10 police
accused of torturing 15 teenagers in Manisa in 1995 concluded in
November with the conviction of all of the accused police.
Prison conditions remained poor. Clashes between prisoners and
prison officials, especially over the issue of newly constructed small-
cell prisons, which would break up the current ward system, resulted in
deaths and injuries. In December during government actions to break up
prisoner hunger strikes and violent protests against small-cell
prisons, 31 prisoners and 2 security officials perished. Police and
Jandarma continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, although the
number of such incidents declined. Prolonged pretrial detention and
lengthy trials continued to be problems. Prosecutions brought by the
Government in State Security Courts (SSC's) reflect a legal structure
that protects state interests over individual rights. The Government
infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
Limits on freedom of speech and of the press remained a serious
problem. Some members of the country's political elite, bureaucracy,
military, and judiciary argue that the State is threatened by both
``reactionaries'' (Islamists) and ``separatists'' (Kurdish
nationalists) and continued to call for parliamentary and judicial
steps--many involving potential curbs on freedom of expression--to meet
these threats. Consequently, authorities banned or confiscated numerous
publications and raided newspaper offices, which encouraged continued
self-censorship by some journalists.
Police and the courts continued to limit freedom of expression by
using restrictions in the 1982 Constitution and several laws, including
the 1991 Anti-Terror Law (disseminating separatist propaganda), Article
312 of the Penal Code (incitement to racial, ethnic, or religious
enmity), Article 159 (concerning insults to Parliament, the army,
republic, or judiciary), Article 160 (insulting the Turkish Republic),
Article 169 (aiding an illegal organization), the Law to Protect
Ataturk, and Article 16 of the Press Law. During the year there were no
reports of journalists being returned to jail or trial for violating
the 3-year ``parole'' following their release under the August 1999
``suspension of sentences for journalists'' law. The Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that 14 journalists were imprisoned
at year's end, compared with 18 in 1999, but some local journalists'
groups dispute whether all of them are legitimate journalists.
In September documents became public that allegedly demonstrated
that senior military figures had debated a plan of action in 1998 to
discredit Fazilet and HADEP parties, Human Rights Association (HRA)
Chairman Akin Birdal, and several journalists. Many of the proposed
actions described in the document did, in fact, occur.
Prosecutors, courts, and the police continued to take actions
against those accused of challenging the secular nature or unity of the
State, generally on the basis of the constitutional restrictions on
freedom of expression. In August the Government announced a decree that
would have streamlined procedures for firing civil servants suspected
of Islamist or separatist tendencies. President Sezer, in a popular
decision widely viewed as upholding the rule of law, returned the
decree and argued that Parliament must consider an issue of this
weight. Turkish General Staff (TGS) Chief Huseyin Kivrikoglu issued a
statement in August reiterating the necessity of such measures and
urging Parliament to pass appropriate legislation to dismiss civil
servants who secretly support antistate, Islamist activities, but
Parliament had not done so by year's end. Government pressure continued
on the People's Democracy Party (HADEP), widely seen as supporting
Kurdish cultural and political positions. This included a number of
police raids and detentions. In June and November, HADEP Secretary
General Ahmet Turan Demir was convicted of ``disseminating separatist
propaganda'' and ``supporting an illegal organization;'' his cases are
on appeal.
The National Security Council (NSC), a powerful, constitutionally
mandated advisory body to the Government composed of equal numbers of
senior military officers and civilian ministers, which is chaired by
the President, continued to urge the Government to fight against the
perceived threat of radical Islam and accused Islamist media of
extremism and undermining the State. In March Islamist former Prime
Minister Necmettin Erbakan was convicted under Article 312 of the Penal
Code for ``promoting enmity'' along religious lines, for a speech he
made in 1994 in which he referred to parliamentarians as ``infidels.''
His appeal was turned down in July, and he was sentenced to 1 year's
imprisonment. However, his prison sentence was suspended by the ``Law
on Probation of Sentences and Deferment of Judgements.'' In August the
Ankara SSC prosecutor filed an indictment against Fetullah Gulen, the
leader of a moderate Islamic ``Tarikat,'' a Sufi religious order, on
charges of plotting to overthrow the State by force. That investigation
continued at year's end.
Both HADEP and the Islamist Fazilet Party, whose predecessor
parties the Government previously had closed, continued to be the
subjects of closure cases during the year for alleged
anticonstitutional activities. The cases were pending at year's end,
and elected officials of both parties remained in office and were able
to perform their duties.
The state of emergency governor, courts, police, and the state
broadcasting oversight body denied the Kurdish population, the largest
single ethnic group in the southeast, the use of its language in
election campaigning, education, broadcasting, and in some cultural
activities. Kurdish language broadcasting remains illegal, although
some senior government officials, including the Prime Minister, Foreign
Minister Ismail Cem, Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz, and the head of
Turkey's intelligence service, have supported publicly the idea of
legalizing such broadcasts, thereby opening public debate on the issue.
The military has spoken out against this step. Although printed
material in Kurdish is legal, the police continue to interfere with the
distribution of some newspapers, and the governor of the emergency
region banned some Kurdish-language publications in that predominantly
Kurdish area. Kurdish music recordings are widely available, but bans
on numerous songs and singers persist. Few radio stations play Kurdish
music. The Government's broadcast monitoring agency closed some
stations for playing banned Kurdish music. In all these cases, the
Government's argument for doing so was the allegedly objectionable
political content.
The police and Jandarma continued to restrict freedom of assembly
and association by strictly enforcing existing laws against unlawful
meetings and demonstrations. The police beat, abused, detained, and
harassed some demonstrators but showed restraint in other instances.
For example, during the Kurdish holiday of Nevruz, authorities for the
first time granted permission for a major celebration just outside of
Diyarbakir. The gathering of more than 80,000 persons was peaceful,
with no detentions, and the police interacted positively with the
crowd.
The Government continued to impose some restrictions on religious
minorities and on some forms of religious expression, and, at times,
imposed some limits on freedom of movement. The Government, which
argues that some human rights groups pursue extremist political
agendas, continued to harass, indict, and imprison human rights
monitors, journalists, and lawyers for ideas that they expressed in
public forums. The Diyarbakir branch of the leading human rights
nongovernmental organization (NGO), the HRA was able to reopen in April
but the Government ordered it closed again within 3 weeks. It reopened
in October. Other NGO branches have been closed, temporarily or
indefinitely, especially in the southeast. The HRA office in Van was
closed from May to August but has since reopened; however, four HRA
offices were closed at year's end for activities related to prison
protests. Former HRA President Akin Birdal returned to prison in March
to serve out his 9-month sentence for ``inciting hatred and enmity'' in
nonviolent statements he made about the Kurdish problem and torture. He
was released in September.
Violence against women, particularly spousal abuse, remained a
serious problem, and discrimination against women persisted. Abuse of
children and restrictions on ethnic minorities remained serious
problems. Child labor remained a serious problem, although to a
diminishing degree.
There are some restrictions on worker rights. Trafficking in women
and girls to Turkey for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem.
The situation in the southeast remained a serious concern. The
Government has long denied the Kurdish population, who are a majority
in the southeast, basic cultural and linguistic rights. The conflict
between government security forces and separatist PKK terrorists slowed
considerably, with only about 45 armed clashes during the year,
according to the military. Past cases of extrajudicial killings went
unsolved, and the police and Jandarma tortured civilians. The state of
emergency authority abridged freedom of expression and association and
put disproportionate pressure on Kurdish NGO's and HADEP. The number of
villagers forcibly evacuated from their homes since the conflict began
is estimated credibly to be between 380,000 and 1 million. There was
one report of a village burning in October (see Section 1.e and 1.g).
The Government gave permission for thousands of returns and initiated
resettlement efforts; some villagers return by themselves. More than
10,000 persons have returned to their villages or moved to
``consolidated villages'' near their original homes.
In January the Government suspended the sentence of execution for
convicted PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, pending the results of his appeal
to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In December the ECHR
accepted Ocalan's petition and will inquire into allegations regarding
irregularities of his capture and trial in Turkey. Human rights
observers, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNHCHR), had raised several due process concerns in the Ocalan case.
The Government of Prime Minister Ecevit continued to place a strong
emphasis on human rights issues; however, Parliament did not pass any
human rights legislation in the first half of the year. In September
the Cabinet debated and adopted, as a working and reference document,
the ``Copenhagen Criteria'' report on steps Turkey must take to be in
compliance with the European Union (EU)'s political criteria. The
report, also known as the ``Demirok Report,'' is an ambitious and
comprehensive work plan of constitutional, legislative, and
administrative reforms that addresses questions of free speech and
assembly, the composition and powers of the NSC, and the role of the
judiciary. In December Parliament passed the ``Law on Probation of
Sentences and Deferment of Judgements'' granting conditional release to
thousands of prison inmates and suspending the trials of hundreds of
others. Some persons jailed on charges related to free expression, or
to non-violent ``support'' for outlawed organizations, will benefit
from this measure. Those convicted of torture will not be released, but
those convicted of mistreatment or murder of detainees may benefit from
the law. Partly in the context of EU accession requirements, officials
continued to participate in a wide-ranging public debate on democracy
and human rights. Senior jurists, the President, politicians, and
public figures discussed amending the 1982 postmilitary coup era
Constitution in order to allow greater individual liberties. Public
discussion of options for dealing with the southeast, particularly
Kurdish cultural and linguistic issues, was vigorous. In addition the
parliamentary Human Rights Committee issued a series of reports mid-
year that detail the existence of torture in prisons and places of
detention.
The armed forces emphasize human rights in training for officers
and noncommissioned officers. Human rights groups attribute the limited
number of human rights violations by military personnel to this effort.
Human rights education in primary schools is mandatory, and it is an
elective in high schools. Police and Jandarma also receive human rights
training.
PKK abuses, which were common during its violent 16-year campaign
against the Government and civilians, slowed considerably and were no
longer an important factor of daily life in the southeast. In recent
years, military pressure significantly reduced the PKK's effectiveness,
and some PKK members--although not all--are heeding Ocalan's call for
an end to the armed struggle and PKK withdrawal from Turkey. Violence
declined to the point where the public's freedom to travel at night no
longer is restricted in parts of the southeast. Thousands of heavily
armed, militarily organized PKK members remain encamped in neighboring
countries close to Turkey's borders.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Credible reports of
extrajudicial killings by government authorities continued. Although
accurate figures were unavailable, figures were down from last year.
For the first time in many years, the Human Rights Foundation (HRF)
documentation center reported no deaths of detainees under torture.
However, in December, 31 prison inmates and 2 security officials died
following police intervention into widespread hunger strikes and other
violent protests over F-type prisons (see Section 1.c.). Over the year,
another five detainees died under suspicious circumstances such as
alleged suicide. Investigations in these cases were rare, and in some
cases the prisoners' associates confirmed the case as a suicide. More
than 20 persons were shot to death by police, Jandarma, and the
military allegedly for not heeding a ``stop warning'' during arrest or
commission of a crime, illegal entry into the country, or in accidental
shootings. In September Jandarma shot and killed Yilmaz Ozcan,
allegedly while trying to capture him. Ozcan had cut down a tree
without permission and was supposed to turn himself in for a jail
sentence. According to the HRF, in October three villagers allegedly
were killed by soldiers in Hakkari province when they returned to their
home village to collect walnuts. Relatives who retrieved the bodies
alleged that the victims' hands were tied behind their backs.
Some raids on criminals or alleged terrorist and militant safe
houses by security forces resulted in deaths, sometimes due to
excessive force. More than 20 persons died during such raids; most were
allegedly members of the Hizbullah extremist group. Several police also
died during the raids. More than 25 persons--mainly children or
military personnel--were killed by mines in the southeast; many more
were maimed.
The courts undertook investigations of most alleged extrajudicial
killings; however, only a few yielded concrete results. The number of
arrests and prosecutions in such cases remained low compared with the
number of incidents, and convictions remained rare. In November a
police officer was arrested in Istanbul after fatally shooting a 14-
year-old bystander during the apprehension of an unarmed robbery
suspect. Punishments, when handed down, were generally minimal.
Jurisdictional questions, efforts by the police leadership to protect
officers, prosecutors' failure to investigate and bring charges, and
the failure of courts to hand down appropriate sentences were all
obstacles to resolving the problem of apparent security force impunity
for such deaths. In some cases, monetary fines have not kept pace with
the high rate of inflation.
After the Constitutional Court in January 1999 annulled part of the
1996 Provincial Authority Law allowing security officers to ``fire
directly and without hesitation'' at persons who ignored a warning to
stop, the Government did not issue a new regulation. Therefore, the old
law on police duties and authorities remains in force, stipulating that
police must apply certain procedures before firing.
In cases of past extrajudicial killings by police, Jandarma, or
prison guards, 24 trials were begun during the year or continued from
previous years. Another eight trials ended this year. Out of the 67
police or Jandarma on trial in these 8 cases, 2 were convicted and 65
were acquitted. In January the Court of Cassation reversed the
Diyarbakir SSC's verdict that convicted six members of a Jandarma
antinarcotics squad accused of killing a businessman in 1991. A new
trial for the six officers began in May.
The trial continued of six police officers who shot and killed two
suspects in Adana in October 1999. Four of the officers face sentences
of between 24 and 30 years, and the chief superintendent and another
officer face 6 to 15 years in jail on charges of deliberate homicide.
The officers remain on duty. Two of these officers also had been on
trial for the January 1998 shooting deaths of three persons in Adana,
along with another officer. The three were acquitted in April on the
grounds of self-defense.
Following an investigation of the September 1999 incident at
Ulucanlar prison, where Jandarma killed 10 prisoners and seriously
injured others during a disturbance, a prosecutor ruled that no
criminal prosecution of the security officials was necessary. A court
upheld this decision in May. A trial also began in October in the case
of 85 prisoners for the deaths of 5 other prisoners during the
incident. In June the Ankara regional administrative court reversed the
earlier ``nonprosecution'' decision, allowing a case to be opened
against 150 Jandarma and soldiers. A report by the parliamentary Human
Rights Committee into the Ulucanlar incident states that security
forces ``fired with an intent to kill'' and inflicted torture.
According to the report, medical treatment of prisoners involved in the
incident was delayed or denied. Furthermore, autopsies of the prisoners
who died indicated that some may have been shot at close range or
tortured before being shot, contradicting the authorities' version of
events. Then-committee chair Sema Piskinsut added publicly that since
the autopsy findings did not meet international standards and some
evidence such as prisoners' clothing was removed, the results were
inconclusive.
In September the Izmir security directorate police investigation
board recommended that the policemen accused of killing Alpaslan Yelden
in custody in July 1999, in an attempt to get his confession, should be
expelled from the force. A complaint was filed against the policemen at
the Izmir public prosecutor's office. A court case continues against
three police officers accused of murdering trade unionist Suleyman
Yeter in March 1999 while he was in custody at the Istanbul security
directorate political police center. Yeter had been a plaintiff in an
ongoing trial of eight police officers who allegedly had tortured and
raped detainees in 1997.
On January 20, a final Appeals Court upheld the sentences of 7 or
more years' imprisonment for five police officers convicted of beating
journalist Metin Goktepe to death in 1996. The court also ruled that
the police superintendent on duty, Seydi Kose, should be tried for
misuse of power rather than murder. In April, Kose was sentenced to 1
year's imprisonment (8 months' imprisonment on this charge), relieved
from public service for 5 months, and fined the equivalent of 1 dollar.
He was released for time served during the trial. Goktepe, a
correspondent for the left-wing newspaper, Evrensel, died from wounds
inflicted while in detention in Istanbul in 1996. Police initially
denied that he was detained, then later said that he died from a fall.
The trial of 29 Jandarma soldiers and 36 anti-terror police
officers charged with manslaughter in the 1996 beating deaths of 10
prisoners while quelling a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir, continued
into its fifth year.
In March a Trabzon criminal court convicted two policemen for their
role in causing the deaths of nine persons during riots in Gazi,
Istanbul in March 1995. The trial, which began in November 1996, was
moved from Istanbul for security reasons. The court sentenced one
policeman to a total of 96 years' imprisonment (24 each for four
victims) but reduced the sentence to 6 years and 8 months, in part
because the victims had been acting illegally and because the defendant
surrendered voluntarily. He was released for time served and suspended
from public service for 4.5 months. Another policeman was given two 24-
year sentences, but these were reduced, for the same reasons, to 3
years and 4 months (with a suspension from public service for 2.5
months). He also was released for time served. The other 18 policemen
were acquitted because the court ruled that there was no definitive or
convincing evidence against them.
The trial continued in Istanbul of policeman Abdullah Bozkurt for
the 1994 shooting and killing of Vedat Han Gulsenoglu. Bozkurt has not
appeared for trial sessions for a year, leading to continued
postponements. According to the victim's lawyer, Bozkurt currently
works as a policeman in Isparta. He is under a ruling of imprisonment
in absentia for the duration of the trial. In July the court board
decided to send a letter to the police station to locate the gun used
in the incident, to initiate an investigation of why Bozkurt cannot be
found, and to make a complaint against officials who did not carry out
Bozkurt's arrest. There were no results of these actions at year's end.
In November the Diyarbakir Provincial Administrative Board decided
to refuse a request for prosecution of police officers who allegedly
killed 18-year-old detainee Hamit Cakar in 1998. Cakar, detained
following a hunger strike at Diyarbakir's HADEP provincial organization
building, died in custody allegedly due to ``cardiac problems.''
Lawyers for Cakar's family have appealed to the Supreme Administrative
Court (Danistay.)
The ECHR ruled against Turkey on nine cases during the year in
which persons had been killed in detention or taken into custody and
then disappeared. In all of these cases, the court noted that domestic
legal remedies were insufficient. However, in one case the court ruled
that security forces were not responsible for the death of a Kurdish
activist, and that the State had taken reasonable measures to find the
real killers.
According to human rights monitors, there were no killings of high-
profile, pro-Kurdish figures in the southeast or of proKurdish
politicians, journalists, or lawyers. The HRF reported a nationwide
total of 10 unsolved killings, some of which may have had a political
component. In May the Diyarbakir Provincial Chairman for the right-wing
National Action Party (MHP) was killed while walking near his home. In
December a human rights activist in Eskisehir was allegedly abducted by
persons claiming to be police officers, forced to drink pesticide, and
left for dead (although he was found and taken to a hospital, where he
recovered). According to information provided by the Governor of
Eskisehir, the assailants were criminals posing as police officers.
The PKK discontinued its practice of targeted political murders,
but it remains armed and in some cases clashed with soldiers, Jandarma,
and state-paid paramilitary village guards. According to the Turkish
National Police, during the year, 35 security officials and 24
civilians died in terrorist incidents, and 270 PKK members were killed
by security forces (see Section 1.g.).
In January police discovered evidence of the Turkish Hizbullah
terrorist group's kidnaping and killing of moderate Islamic business
figures, religious leaders, and intellectuals, including prominent
Islamist feminist Konca Kuris. The Government captured dozens of
alleged Hizbullah militants and in July indicted 21 for a number of
murders, including those of Ahmet Taner Kislali and Ugur Mumcu. An
unrelated suspect in Mumcu's killing had been held in custody since the
previous year; he was released from custody but remains on trial.
According to the office of the emergency region governor, over
2,600 persons in that region alone were detained this year on suspicion
of links to Hizbullah (see Section 1.g.). Some of these were teachers
and imams. Many alleged Hizbullah members claim that they were tortured
in custody, a claim that has been supported in some cases by medical
evidence. Some murders from previous years, especially of moderate
Kurdish leaders, may have been committed by Hizbullah. A Hizbullah
suspect reportedly confessed in police custody that he murdered Ramazan
Sat in 1992 for ``being a PKK member.''
Far-left armed groups, such as Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol/DHKP-C),
the Islamic Eastern Raider's Front (IBDA-C), and the Turkish Workers
and Peasants' Liberation Army (TIKKO), continued to commit acts of
terrorism, in some cases leading to deaths.
b. Disappearance.--Unlike the previous year, there were no reports
of disappearances of political activists. Accurate statistics on the
disappearance of those previously under detention, or seen being taken
into custody by security forces or law enforcement officials, are hard
to confirm. However, the HRF claims that there were no such
disappearances in 2000, compared with 36 of this type in 1999.
In March a trial ended for two police officers in connection with
the disappearance of suspect Mural Yildiz in 1995. The two were
convicted of ``negligence of duty;'' a 3-month prison term was
converted to a fine of about $2 (1.2 million TL). The judge apologized
to Yildiz's mother for the fact that inflation had rendered the
monetary fine meaningless.
There was no new information available on the case of Aydin Esmer,
who disappeared according to Amnesty International (AI) in September
1999 while returning to his home in Diyarbakir province from Mus
province.
The body of Omer Cinar, who disappeared in Istanbul in November
1999, was discovered in one of the ``grave houses'' where Hizbullah
operatives killed and buried their victims. His body was found in the
Beykoz district of Istanbul in January, along with nine other bodies,
and police confirmed his identity.
No charges have been filed in the 1998 disappearances from Izmir of
editors Neslihan Uslu, Hasan Aydogan, Metin Andac, and Mehmet Mandal.
The 1997 disappearances of Ilyas Eren and 73-year-old Fikri Ozgen, who
allegedly were taken into custody by plainclothes police, were not
resolved.
The Government made efforts to investigate and explain some
reported cases of disappearance. The Ministry of Interior operates the
Bureau for the Investigation of Missing Persons, which is open 24 hours
a day. Since 1996, according to the Ministry of Interior, 425
applications of a political nature for missing persons were made. Of
these, 88 were found alive, 18 were in prison, 46 died, and 273 were
still missing at year's end. Most families of persons who disappeared
hold the Government and security forces responsible and consequently
avoid contact with the government office. AI criticizes the bureau's
findings for falling short of the thorough and impartial investigations
required in accordance with international standards. The Ankara police
operate a telephone number through which the public can obtain
information about detainees.
The PKK's practice of kidnaping young men or threatening their
families as part of its recruiting effort and abductions by PKK
terrorists of local villagers and state officials has virtually ended,
due to reduced PKK capabilities in the southeast and calls by its
captured leader Ocalan for the PKK to withdraw from its former
operating areas in the country.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, members of
the security forces continue to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse
persons regularly. Despite the Government's cooperation with
unscheduled foreign inspection teams, public pledges by successive
governments to end the practice, and government initiatives designed to
address the problem, torture continues to be widespread. However, based
on reports from a number of sources, the incidence of torture appears
to have declined somewhat, especially in the southeast, where there
have been fewer political detentions.
Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims of torture
say that most persons detained for or suspected of political crimes
usually suffer some torture at the hands of police and Jandarma during
periods of incommunicado detention before they are brought before a
court; ordinary criminal suspects also report frequent torture and
mistreatment by police. The HRF estimates the number of credible
applications by torture victims at its 5 national treatment centers to
be approximately 1,030 in 2000, compared with some 700 in 1999. These
figures include complaints stemming from previous years' incidents. The
HRF believes that these numbers seriously underrepresent the actual
number of persons tortured while in detention or prison. Human rights
advocates believe that thousands of detainees were tortured during the
year in the southeast, where the problem is particularly serious, but
that only 5 to 20 percent report torture because they fear retaliation
or believe that complaints are futile.
Some of the factors affecting the rate of torture are the use of
incommunicado detention and the number of detentions in general;
reduced PKK violence, which has eased treatment by security officials;
and increased concern about the problem from many sources. Human rights
monitors report improvement in some areas of the country, especially in
the first 6 months of the year, but problems continued, especially in
more rural areas. All report that torture remains widespread in the
southeast and in large cities.
Because the arresting officer is responsible for interrogating the
suspect, officers frequently resort to torture to obtain a confession
that would justify the arrest. There is allegedly a difference in
police practice for those arrested for ordinary crimes (who are beaten
until they give a confession) and those arrested for ``political''
crimes. If suspects detained under the Anti-Terror Law do not produce
information and confessions, interrogators often allegedly shift from
beatings to electric shock, cold water from high-pressure hoses, and
other methods. Observers say that security officials often torture
political detainees simply to express anger and to intimidate the
detainees.
Human rights monitors and medical experts say that security
officials often use methods that do not leave physical traces, such as
beating with weighted bags instead of clubs or fists. A new method that
was reported is the application of electric shocks to a metal chair
where the detainee sits, rather than directly to the body. Commonly
employed methods of torture reported by the HRF's treatment centers
include: Systematic beatings; stripping and blindfolding; exposure to
extreme cold or high-pressure cold water hoses; electric shocks;
beatings on the soles of the feet (falaka) and genitalia; hanging by
the arms; food and sleep deprivation; heavy weights hung on the body;
water dripped onto the head; burns; hanging sandbags on the neck; near-
suffocation by placing bags over the head; vaginal and anal rape with
truncheons and, in some instances, gun barrels; squeezing and twisting
of testicles; and other forms of sexual abuse. In some cases, multiple
torture methods (e.g., hanging and electric shocks) are employed at the
same time. Other methods used are forced prolonged standing, isolation,
loud music, witnessing or hearing torture, being driven to the
countryside for a mock execution, and threats to detainees or their
family members.
Female detainees often face sexual humiliation and, less
frequently, more severe forms of sexual torture. After being forced to
strip in front of male security officers, female detainees often are
touched, insulted, and threatened with rape. A poll conducted by an NGO
called the Legal Counsel Project Against Sexual Harassment and Rape
(affiliated with the HRA) indicated that three-quarters of female
detainees had experienced sexual violence, but only one-sixth of those
who had undergone such violence reported it to the authorities.
The deputy mayor of Diyarbakir, Ramazan Tekin, was detained in
January and claimed that he was subjected to severe torture. As a
result of testimony given during this detention, three HADEP mayors
were arrested the following month for ``assisting the PKK'' (see
Sections 2.b. and 4). According to news reports, in March the president
of HADEP's women's commission in Mardin, Gulistan Durc, alleged that
she was tortured while in detention. Durc, who was detained under
suspicion of supporting the PKK, was sent to a Diyarbakir hospital for
treatment following a medical exam. The governor refused permission to
put the police officers involved on trial. The prosecutor opposed this
decision and appealed it to the regional administrative court, which
upheld the governor's ruling. The prosecutor then agreed to drop the
case; Durc's lawyer has appealed to the Mardin penal court.
In May the Izmir SSC acquitted Dr. Zeki Uzun of charges that he
supported the PKK by providing medical treatment to two female
terrorists. Uzun, a gynecologist who volunteers at the HRF Izmir
treatment and rehabilitation center, was taken into custody in October
1999 during a raid on his private clinic by anti-terror police. He
credibly reported being tortured in detention. Uzun filed a formal
complaint against the Izmir anti-terror department, but a prosecutor
concluded that there were insufficient grounds to pursue a case. In
August Dr. Uzun opened a compensation case against the Interior
Ministry for his torture and against some newspapers for slander. His
attorney applied to the ECHR with a complaint of prolonged detention,
torture, and violation of Dr. Uzun's individual rights.
In May the Public Prosecutor's Office in Mardin indicted seven
police officers for allegedly raping and torturing a female suspect in
1992. When preparing the indictment the prosecutor accepted an
alternative medical report by the HRF's Istanbul torture treatment
center. Prosecutors and courts have used such reports only a few times,
since normally all medical reports come from state-employed doctors.
The alleged victim was hospitalized several times during the period of
her detention. The police officers remain on duty.
Government officials admit that torture occurs but deny that it is
systematic. In September State Minister for Human Rights Rustu Yucelen
said publicly, after visiting a detention center in Icel, that the
State was opposed to torture and that ``speculation'' that the police
were using torture was initiated by powers acting against Turkey. In
response to criticism from the HRA, he said that his remarks had been
misunderstood and that torture was against state policy. The Ecevit
Government was in regular dialog with the Council of Europe's Committee
for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The Government accepted an
unannounced visit by the CPT in July and invited members of the
committee to help in the prison crisis in December, and allowed the
publication of 1999 and 2000 CPT visit reports.
Regulations on detention were supplemented in 1999 by a directive
against torture from the Prime Minister, which called for public
prosecutors to make unscheduled inspections of places of detention. The
Parliamentary Human Rights Committee also has publicly called on
prosecutors to carry out this aspect of their job more effectively. The
Prime Minister asked for reports from prosecutors every 3 months on
this process. According to officials at the Ministry of Interior, over
a thousand inspections have been made and these reports are on file
with the High Council for Human Rights Coordination. According to
Minister for Human Rights Yucelen, from July to September, a total of
2,309 inspections (at both police and Jandarma stations) were carried
out. The reports were not made public. Although some provincial
authorities said that the inspections uncovered no deficiencies, others
claimed that they led to some improvements in practices. Human rights
observers say that the inspections and reports are cursory at best, do
not include any detainee interviews, and give a false impression of
government attention to the problem. They also question prosecutors'
ability to influence police practices. There is little public awareness
of these visits.
Private attorneys and human rights monitors continue to report
uneven implementation of the right to immediate access to an attorney
by those arrested for common crimes and access after 14 days of
detention for those detained under the Anti-Terror Law. No immediate
access to an attorney is provided for under the law for persons whose
cases fall under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. This
includes individuals suspected of drug trafficking, smuggling, and
crimes under the Anti-Terror Law. The lack of early access to an
attorney is a major factor in the occurrence of torture by police and
security forces.
State-employed doctors give all medical exams for detainees. The
Government maintains that medical examinations occur once during
detention and a second time before either arraignment or release;
however, the examinations generally are exceedingly brief and informal,
often lasting less than a minute. In some cases doctors were brought
reports to sign, but no examinees. Former detainees assert that some
medical examinations occur too long after the event to reveal any
definitive evidence of torture. Lawyers contend that medical reports--
their only basis for filing a claim of torture--are not placed
regularly in prisoners' files.
Pressures against doctors continue. In 1999 the governor of
Istanbul tried to get a doctor fired from her job at Istanbul
University. The doctor, Sebnem Korur Fincanci, had certified that trade
unionist Suleyman Yeter had been killed under torture while in
detention (see Section 1.a.). Fincanci filed suit and a compensation
trial against the governor opened in May at the Istanbul Penal Court.
She claimed that he had accused her, in a letter to the university
president, of ``having sympathy for illegal left-wing views'' and going
to ``extreme'' lengths to prove that the police officers were guilty of
Yeter's death. The court ruled that the trial could take place since
writing the letter was outside the governor's official duties. However,
in November the Penal Court decided not to pursue the case and
forwarded the file to the Administrative Court for its consideration.
Fincanci has appealed.
Citing security reasons, members of security and police forces
often stay in the examination room when physicians are examining
detainees, resulting in the intimidation of both the detainee and the
physician. Since September, however, Health Ministry regulations have
allowed doctors to ask security force members to leave during
examinations. However, some doctors claim that in practice they cannot
do so because they could face disciplinary procedures or court cases.
According to the Medical Association and other human rights observers,
the presence of a security officer--at times the one allegedly
responsible for torture--can lead physicians to refrain from examining
detainees, perform cursory examinations and not report findings, or
report physical findings but not draw reasonable medical inferences
that torture occurred.
The law mandates heavy jail sentences and fines for medical
personnel who falsify reports to hide torture, those who knowingly use
such reports, and those who coerce doctors into making them. The
highest penalties are for doctors who supply false reports for money.
In practice there are few such prosecutions. Dr. Nur Birgen,
chairperson of a state forensic medical facility in Istanbul, was
convicted in December of giving false medical reports and concealing
evidence of torture. The court sentenced her to 3 months' imprisonment,
less than the normal 6-month minimum sentence, and then commuted the
sentence to a suspended $1.50 (1 million TL) fine. Birgen had been
sanctioned in 1998 by the Turkish Medical Doctor's Association, and her
medical license was ordered suspended for 6 months. However, the
Justice Ministry concluded that since Dr. Birgen is a state employee,
the suspension fell under a September 1999 law that offered amnesty for
administrative punishments for civil servants. The Medical Association
filed suit objecting to this decision and the Ankara Administrative
Court ruled that the Justice Ministry's action was illegal. Meanwhile,
a trial continues against a lawyer who pressed for Birgen's suspension
for insulting her by comparing her to the Nazi doctor Josef Mengele.
The investigation, prosecution, and punishment of members of the
security forces for torture or other mistreatment is rare, and accused
officers usually remain on duty pending a decision, which can take
years. According to the TNP, judicial action taken during the year
against police charged with torture or mistreatment resulted in 72
convictions, 273 acquittals, and 19 ongoing prosecutions.
Administrative decisions determined that no trial was needed in 252
other cases, and that no charges needed to be brought against 140 other
officers accused of abuse. During the year, 63 police officers also
were given administrative punishments, such as suspensions, for torture
or mistreatment, while a decision not to investigate was given in 890
cases. According to the Jandarma, 253 Jandarma were prosecuted during
the year, resulting in 52 convictions, 53 acquittals, and 149 ongoing
trials. No military personnel were prosecuted for torture; there is no
new information on previous years' trials.
According to the Justice Ministry, during the year 1,258 cases were
brought to prosecutors against police and Jandarma, and of these, 664
investigations are ongoing; 422 indictments were forwarded to the
courts, and 172 cases did not go forward. The courts concluded 165 of
the 422 cases they received, resulting in 71 convictions, 79
acquittals, and 15 not authorized or improper jurisdiction decisions;
another 257 cases were ongoing.
Legal, administrative, and bureaucratic barriers impede
prosecutions and contribute to the low number of convictions for
torture. The December 1999 Civil Servant Prosecution Law has not
resulted in an immediate change in approach by the State to allowing
prosecutions, since civil servants are generally immune from direct
prosecution unless their superiors grant permission to investigate
them. The law authorizes prosecutors to begin collecting evidence
immediately to substantiate claims of torture by security officials,
but in practice this rarely occurs. Within a 30-day deadline, with a
possible 15-day extension, a civil servant's supervisor supposedly must
decide whether that employee can be prosecuted (or whether the employee
is to be disciplined otherwise). In at least one high-profile case--
that of Ramazan Tekin, the deputy mayor of Diyarbakir--this deadline
was not observed. This provision has been widely criticized. Many
jurists as well as human rights observers have said that the new law
still falls short of the needed reform. The law allows prosecutors to
open investigations against persons suspected of falsely accusing a
civil servant based on ``enmity, hatred or slandering.''
The failure to enforce domestic and international bans on torture
fosters a climate of official impunity that encourages the systematic
abuse of detainees. Detainees state that prosecutors ignore their
claims of abuse during interrogation. Some prosecutors believe that all
allegations of torture are manipulated by political organizations such
as the PKK and claim that detainees fabricate torture claims and injure
themselves to accuse and defame the security forces.
Under the criminal procedures law, prosecutors may initiate
investigations of police or Jandarma officers suspected of torturing or
mistreating suspects. In cases where township security directors or
Jandarma commanders are accused of torture, the prosecutor must obtain
permission to initiate an investigation from the Ministry of Justice,
because these officials are deemed to have a status equal to that of
judges. Finally, in the state of emergency regions, any prosecution or
legal action directed at government authorities must be approved by the
state of emergency Governor. Approval is rare.
In February the then-chair of Parliament's Human Rights Committee,
Sema Piskinsut, and two other Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) led an
unannounced early morning raid on an Istanbul police station. This
unprecedented raid was based on tips that this particular police
station was notorious for torture, gathered during a prison research
trip from women and children who were prisoners. The M.P.'s seized
several instruments of torture, including a so-called ``Palestinian
hanger,'' and required the police chief to sign a statement affirming
that these were found in his station. She showed the torture implements
to the press and publicly called for an investigation. When the
investigation appeared to be stalled, another M.P. on her committee
pressed the Interior Ministry for action. According to the Turkish
National Police, the many administrative processes necessary to
investigate the subprovincial security director and the chief of the
police station, were nearly complete at year's end. However, the public
prosecutor decided not to pursue a judicial case against the two
officials. The police station has been pulled down and a new station is
being constructed, according to an Istanbul M.P. Soon after the raid,
Interior Minister Tantan met with Parliament's Human Rights Committee
and said publicly that ``it is a mistake to define human rights only as
violations by security forces.''
A higher court reversed a January decision by the Iskendurun chief
public prosecutor not to prosecute anti-terror police accused of
sexually harassing, raping with a truncheon, and torturing two female
high school students arrested in March 1999. The trial of the four
police officers began in March. However, at the same time, the
conviction of the two girls on grounds of belonging to a terrorist
organization and firebombing a bus--a conviction based solely on the
confessions allegedly obtained under torture--was upheld by the Court
of Cassation in June. The girls are serving 12-year and 18-year
sentences.
Five defendants in Istanbul have been jailed since 1995 without
having been convicted (they are accused of being members of TIKKO).
Their trial is pending the outcome of a case against five police
officers accused of torturing them. At a September hearing in the case,
none of the accused police officers appeared in court, the case was
postponed again, and the detainees were sent back to jail.
Songul Yildiz was acquitted in 1997 on charges of being a PKK
member. In 1997 two policemen received 10-month suspended sentences for
mistreatment and were suspended from the police force for 2.5 months;
both were still on duty by year's end.
A case against 12 policemen accused of torturing the September 1997
``Musa Anter Peace Train'' detainees continues, but charges may be
suspended under a new law (see Section 4).
On November 15, the Manisa court sentenced 10 policemen to between
5 and 10 years in jail for torturing 15 teenagers in Manisa in 1995.
The court found that the students exhibited evidence of physical and
psychological torture while under detention; lawyers for the teenagers
said that their clients were tortured by means of beating, electric
shocks, hosing with cold pressurized water after having been stripped,
and sexual abuse. The policemen previously had been acquitted twice due
to lack of evidence, but each time the appeals court overruled the
acquittal and ordered a retrial. The policemen cannot appeal the
November decision again, but have applied to the Court of Cassation to
reduce their sentences. The case against the students at the State
Security Court in Izmir ended with their acquittal in late November.
The Court of Cassation had overturned the January 1997 convictions of
10 of the students on charges of belonging to an illegal leftist
organization; 4 other students originally were acquitted.
Police harass, beat, and abuse demonstrators (see Section 2.b.).
Police also harass and abuse journalists (see Section 2.a.).
The ECHR ruled against Turkey in several cases of torture from
previous years. In one case the victim had suffered brain damage. The
ECHR noted that domestic legal remedies were insufficient because
prosecutors had not taken adequate steps to investigate the torture
claims.
Prison conditions remain poor. With some exceptions (i.e., for
high-profile political prisoners or for those with gang connections),
prisons remain plagued by overcrowding, underfunding, and very poor
administration. Despite the existence of separate juvenile facilities,
juveniles and adults sometimes are incarcerated together, and most
prisons lack adequate medical care for routine treatment or even
medical emergencies. Families often must supplement the poor quality
food. Human rights observers estimate that at any given time, at least
one-quarter of those in prison are awaiting trial or the outcome of
their trial.
In most cases, prisons are run on the ward system. Prisoners with
similar ideological views are incarcerated together and, in some cases
indoctrinate and punish their own, resulting in gang and terrorist
group domination of entire wards. The Ministry of Justice said publicly
in December that it has not fully controlled the prisons since 1991.
Efforts by the Ministry of Justice over the past year to construct and
transfer inmates to a small-group ``F-type'' cell system were
criticized strongly by human rights groups and prisoners' groups.
Groups linked to terrorist organizations claimed that the ward system
was a more humane form of incarceration. Critics of the F-type cells
claim that these cells allow authorities to isolate single inmates or
small groups of prisoners from other inmates, and to control prisoners'
access to water, food, electricity, and toilets.
In November and December, hundreds of prisoners, mostly affiliated
with far-left terrorist groups, went on hunger strikes to protest F-
type prisons, claiming that they intended to starve themselves to
death. The Government entered the prisons in December, after the fast
had reached its sixtieth day and negotiations to end it had not been
successful. During and after the government intervention, at least 31
inmates and 2 Jandarma were killed. Weapons and other illegal materials
were found in the cells during the operation. The cause of many of the
deaths--including those who allegedly set themselves on fire on the
order of their organization--is unclear. The Government, not following
normal practice, refused to allow prisoner families or lawyers to see
autopsy results. No open investigation has been planned, although there
may be internal disciplinary proceedings for some prison officials.
Some prisoners were transferred to newly-opened cell-system prisons.
Two members of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee visited one of
the new prisons at the end of the year. According to their report, 341
prisoners from 5 other jails had been transferred to the new cell-
system prison. Some of them, as well as prisoners in other jails,
continued their hunger strikes while many others complained of brutal
handling by the authorities or inadequate medical treatment. Prisoners'
strikes and demonstrations by supporters' groups and human rights
organizations, particularly the HRA, continued and in many cases led to
detentions. Four offices of the HRA were closed in November and
December for activities relating to the prison protests (see Section
4.)
During an attempt to bring prisoners to their court appearances in
July, prison authorities injured 61 inmates at Burdur Prison. One
prisoner's arm was torn off by machinery used to break down a wall.
Inmates alleged that they were tortured following the incident.
In May and June, the Parliament's Human Rights Committee, under
then-chairman Sema Piskinsut, released a series of comprehensive and
highly critical reports on prison conditions throughout the country. In
October Piskinsut was not re-appointed to chair the committee. Some
critics of the Government claim that this was in response to her
activism. She was replaced by Huseyin Akgul of the MHP. The reports
were based on 2 years of visits by the committee (which includes
members from all 5 political parties represented in Parliament) and
interviews with over 8,500 inmates. The reports, which also included
evaluations of some detention sites such as police cells, alleged that
torture remains widespread in the prison system and that those in
positions of authority, including prosecutors and provincial governors,
were not doing enough to ensure adequate living conditions for inmates.
AI noted that these reports represented a significant step forward by
officials in documenting torture as well as prison conditions.
The Government permits prison visits by representatives of some
international organizations, such as the European Committee to Prevent
Torture and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture. The CPT visited in
July, and again in December. However, the Government does not allow
NGO's to visit prisons except for individuals acting in their capacity
as lawyers. A delegation from AI visited in April and Human Rights
Watch (HRW) conducted research into prisons over the course of the
year. Delegations from AI and HRW met with Turkish officials as part of
their research into prison issues; however, AI and HRW assert that
during their return visits in December, following the prison crisis,
government officials declined to meet with them.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention continued to be problems. To take a person into custody, a
prosecutor must issue a detention order, except when suspects are
caught committing a crime. The maximum detention period for those
charged with individual common crimes is 24 hours, which may be
extended by a judge to a maximum of 7 days; this period is longer for
groups. In the state of emergency area, the use of a prosecutor's
detention order is in practice extremely rare. According to the HRA,
there was significant improvement in the first 8 months of the year in
numbers of detentions (21,866) compared with the same period in 1999
(40,380). However, the HRF claims that in the final 2 months of the
year there was an upsurge in unregistered detentions in connection with
prison protests.
Under the Criminal Code, those detained for individual common
crimes are entitled to immediate access to an attorney and may meet and
confer with an attorney at any time. In practice, legal experts assert
that the authorities do not always respect these provisions and that
most citizens do not exercise this right, either because they are
unaware of it, or because they fear possibly antagonizing the
authorities. The court consistently provides attorneys only to minors
or deaf-mutes who cannot represent themselves. By law a detainee's next
of kin must be notified as soon as possible after arrest. In criminal
and civil cases this requirement is observed.
In state security cases, the pretrial detention period without
charge is longer, and the law provides for no immediate access to an
attorney. The lack of early access to an attorney is a major factor in
the continued use of torture by security forces. Persons detained for
individual crimes under the Anti-Terror Law must be brought before a
judge within 48 hours. Those charged with crimes of a collective,
political, or conspiratorial nature may be detained for an initial
period of 48 hours, extended for up to 4 days at a prosecutor's
discretion and, with a judge's permission, which is almost always
granted, for up to 7 days in most of the country and up to 10 days in
the southeastern provinces under the state of emergency. Attorneys are
allowed access only after the first 4 days.
Private attorneys and human rights monitors reported uneven
implementation of these regulations, especially attorney access. AI
asserts that lawyers rarely are permitted adequate access to their
clients, even after the fourth day, although they may be allowed to
exchange a few words during a brief interview in the presence of
security officers. According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
the secretive nature of arrests and detentions often leaves the
detainee's lawyer and family members with no information about the
detention, and police often refuse to disclose the place of detention
or even the fact that the detainee is being held. Current regulations
on detention and arrest procedures exempt the authorities from the
obligation to inform relatives in the case of state security
detentions. In addition legal limits on detention periods at times are
circumvented by subjecting a detainee to successive charges or
falsifying detention records. The police maintain 24-hour monitoring
bureaus that are required to record detentions on computers. According
to the HRA, in the state of emergency region the police detain, beat,
and then release groups after the maximum period of detention in order
to intimidate them.
Once formally charged by the prosecutor, a detainee is arraigned by
a judge and allowed to retain a lawyer. After arraignment the judge may
release the accused upon receipt of an appropriate assurance, such as
bail, or order him detained if the court determines that he is likely
to flee the jurisdiction or destroy evidence.
The decision concerning early access to counsel in such cases is
left to the public prosecutor, who often denies access on the grounds
that it would prejudice an ongoing investigation. Although the
Constitution specifies the right of detainees to request speedy
arraignment and trial, judges have ordered that some suspects be
detained indefinitely, sometimes for years. Many such cases involve
persons accused of violent crimes, but there are cases of those accused
of nonviolent political crimes being kept in custody until the
conclusion of their trials.
On several occasions, the police beat and detained peaceful
demonstrators (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). During a September protest
over prison conditions officers beat the relatives of prisoners. The
police also beat and detained members of political parties (see Section
3). Students detained while making a press statement in Istanbul in
June claimed that they were tortured, and one alleged that the police
broke her arm.
The Government does not use forced external exile. It retains the
authority to authorize internal exile (see Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and in practice the general law courts generally
act independently of the executive and legislative branches; however,
various officials acknowledge the need for legislative changes to
strengthen the judiciary's independence. The Constitution prohibits
state authorities from issuing orders or recommendations concerning the
exercise of judicial power; however, in practice the Government and the
NSC periodically issue announcements or directives about threats to the
State, which could be interpreted as instructions to the judiciary. The
High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which is appointed by the
President and includes the Minister of Justice, selects judges and
prosecutors for the higher courts and is responsible for oversight of
those in the lower courts. The composition of the High Council could
impact the independence of the judiciary; although the Constitution
provides for security of tenure, the High Council controls the career
paths of judges through appointments, transfers, promotions, and other
matters, and its decisions are not subject to review. Various
government and judicial officials during the year discussed the need to
adopt legislative changes to strengthen the independence of the
judiciary.
The judicial system is composed of general law courts, military
courts, the SSC's, and the Constitutional Court, the nation's highest
court. The Court of Cassation hears appeals for criminal cases,
including from the SSC's. The Council of State hears appeals of
administrative cases or those between government entities. Most cases
are prosecuted in the general law courts, which include civil,
administrative, and criminal courts. Public servants, including police,
can be tried only after administrative approval from the governor or
subgovernor, which are centrally appointed positions.
The Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of laws,
decrees, and parliamentary procedural rules and hears cases involving
the banning of political parties. If impeached, ministers and prime
ministers can be tried in the Constitutional Court as well. However,
the Court may not consider ``decrees with the force of law'' issued
under a state of emergency, martial law, or in time of war.
Military courts, with their own appeals system, hear cases
involving military law, members of the armed forces, and may try
civilians who are accused of impugning the honor of the armed forces or
undermining compliance with the draft.
SSC's are composed of panels of five members: Three civilian judges
and two prosecutors. SSC's sit in eight cities and try defendants
accused of crimes such as terrorism, gang-related crimes, drug
smuggling, membership in illegal organizations, and espousing or
disseminating ideas prohibited by law, such as those ``damaging the
indivisible unity of the State.'' These courts may hold closed hearings
and may admit testimony obtained during police interrogation in the
absence of counsel. SSC verdicts may be appealed only to a specialized
department of the Court of Cassation (Appeals Court) dealing with
crimes against state security. During the year, the SSC's dealt mainly
with cases under the Anti-Terror Law and Section 312 of the Criminal
Code. Human rights observers cite prosecutions of leaders of the
political Islamic movement, nonviolent political leaders associated
with the Kurdish issue, and persons who criticize the military or the
Government's practices as evidence that the SSC's often serve a
primarily political purpose.
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, sentenced to death in 1999, remained in
prison at year's end. Carrying out the death sentence still requires
action and approval by the Justice Ministry, the Council of Ministers,
Parliament, and the President. The Government in January decided to
agree to the request of the ECHR to suspend the death sentence process
until the court completes its judicial processes. In December the ECHR
accepted Ocalan's petition and will inquire into allegations regarding
irregularities of his capture and trial in the country.
The law gives prosecutors far-reaching authority to supervise the
police during an investigation. Prosecutors complain that they have few
resources to do so, and many have begun to call for ``judicial police''
who could help investigate and gather evidence. Human rights observers
and Ministry of Justice officials note that problems can arise from the
fact that the police report to the Interior Ministry, not to the
courts.
Prosecutors are charged with determining which law has been broken
and objectively presenting the facts to the court. Defense lawyers do
not have equal status with prosecutors. There is no jury system; a
judge or a panel of judges decides all cases. Trials for political
crimes or torture frequently last for months or years, with one or two
hearings scheduled each month. Proceedings against security officials
often are delayed because officers do not submit statements promptly or
attend trials. Illegally gathered evidence may be excluded by law.
However, this rarely occurs and then only after a separate case
determining the legality of the evidence is resolved. In practice a
trial based on a confession allegedly coerced under torture may proceed
and even conclude, before the court has established the merits of the
torture allegations.
In January a ``prisons protocol'' signed by the Ministries of
Justice, Interior, and Health called for intensified searches of those
entering prisons, including lawyers and prosecutors. The Bar
Association claims that defense lawyers are searched intensively, in
contrast to other personnel, and that the new rule permits prison
officials to confiscate documents from prisoners that may relate to
their defense. The State is required to return the documents if they
are defense-related. The Government issued a second circular, in March,
requesting that those who conduct the searches do so in a respectful
manner and bear in mind the right of access and of private
correspondence between a client and his attorney.
Defense attorneys routinely are denied access to files that the
State asserts deal with national intelligence or security matters,
especially in cases heard by SSC's. Furthermore, attorneys defending
controversial cases have been subject to legal charges, including
spurious accusations that they are couriers for clients who are alleged
terrorists. Hasan Dogan, a Malatya attorney who frequently defends
suspects in SSC cases, was acquitted in 1999 of charges by an informer
that he was a member of the PKK or assisted the organization. An
appeals court reversed his acquittal and he was sentenced to 3 years
and 9 months. He has appealed this verdict and the case was still
pending. He also faces the same charge in another case, and was
sentenced in December to 3 years, 9 months. He has applied for a
suspension of this punishment. Another case was opened against him for
insulting the military; results were still pending at year's end. The
trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers charged in 1993 and 1994 for aiding and
abetting the PKK, and in a few cases with membership in a terrorist
organization, continued at the Diyarbakir SSC (see Section 4).
By law the Bar Association must provide free counsel to indigents
who make a request to the court, except for crimes falling under the
scope of the SSC's. In practice only a tiny percentage of defendants
have lawyers. Bar Associations in large cities, such as Istanbul, have
attorneys on call 24 hours a day. Costs are borne by the Association.
Defense lawyers generally have access to the public prosecutor's files
only after arraignment.
In law and in practice, the legal system does not discriminate
against minorities. Legal proceedings are conducted solely in Turkish
with some interpreting available; however, some defendants whose native
language is not Turkish may be disadvantaged seriously. Turkey
recognizes the jurisdiction of the ECHR. During the year, Turkey lost
23 cases to which it was a party, most of which pertained to free
expression, deaths, past disappearances, and torture and was fined $1.2
million (812 billion TL). In 11 additional cases, mostly relating to
failure to ensure due process of law, Turkey accepted a friendly
settlement and paid $150,000 (about 1 billion TL); and the court
dismissed a further five cases.
There is no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners
in the country. The Government claims that alleged political prisoners
are in fact security detainees convicted of being members of, or
assisting, terrorist organizations.
International humanitarian organizations are allowed access to
political prisoners, provided the organization can obtain permission
from the Ministry of Justice. With the exception of the Committee to
Prevent Torture of the Council of Europe, which has good access, in
practice few such permissions are granted.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a
person's domicile and the privacy of correspondence and communication;
however, at times the Government infringed on these rights. With some
exceptions, government officials may enter a private residence or
intercept or monitor private correspondence only after the issuance of
a judicial warrant. These provisions generally are respected outside
the state of emergency region. If delay may cause harm to the case,
prosecutors may authorize a search. Searches of private premises may
not be carried out at night, unless the delay would be damaging to the
case or the search is expected to result in the capture of a prisoner
at large. Other exceptions include persons under special observation by
the security directorate general, places anyone can enter at night,
places where criminals gather, places where materials obtained through
the commission of crimes are kept, gambling establishments, and
brothels. According to a 1999 law that permits wider wiretapping, a
court order is needed to carry out a wiretap. However, in an emergency
situation, a prosecutor can grant permission. The wiretap can last only
3 months, with two possible extensions of 3 months each.
In the provinces under emergency rule, the regional state of
emergency governor empowers security authorities to search without a
warrant residences or the premises of political parties, businesses,
associations, or other organizations. The Bar Association maintains
that it is not constitutional for security authorities in these
provinces to search, hold, or seize without warrant persons or
documents. Seven provinces remain under ``adjacent province'' status,
which authorizes the Jandarma to retain security responsibility for
municipalities as well as rural areas, and grants the provincial
governor several extraordinary powers. Due to the improved security
situation, the use of roadblocks in the southeast decreased.
With the diminution of PKK terrorism, the formerly widespread
practice of evacuating villages to prevent their giving aid to the PKK
has lessened; however, there was a report of one village re-evacuation
occurring in October (see Section 1.g.).
Some elements of society complain that a ban on the wearing of
religious head coverings in government offices, other state-run
facilities, and universities interfered with citizens' religious
observance (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Since 1984 the PKK has waged a violent terrorist
insurgency in southeast Turkey, directed against both security forces
and civilians. In response, police, Jandarma, village guards, and the
armed forces conducted an intense campaign to suppress PKK terrorism.
However, since 1999 almost all such violent activity by the PKK has
ceased, although some armed clashes between the two sides continued to
occur. Security forces continued to target active PKK units as well as
those persons they believed supported or sympathized with the PKK.
There continued to be few reports of government and PKK human rights
abuses committed against noncombatants. According to statistics from
the governor of the state of emergency region, 23,415 PKK members,
5,029 security force members, and 4,460 civilians have lost their lives
in the fighting since 1987. During the year, 29 members of the security
forces and 15 civilians died, according to the military.
The Government's state of emergency, renewed in Diyarbakir,
Hakkari, Sirnak, and Tunceli provinces for 4 months in November,
imposes stringent security measures in those four southeastern
provinces. The regional governor for the state of emergency may censor
news, ban strikes or lockouts, and impose internal exile. The decree
provides for doubling the sentences of those convicted of ``cooperating
with separatists.'' Informants and convicted persons who cooperate with
the State may receive rewards and reduced sentences. Only limited
judicial review of the state of emergency governor's administrative
decisions is permitted.
In October the governor of Tunceli formally abolished the food
embargo in that region, the last large-scale rationing in the region.
Food rationing also had been justified as a means of denying logistical
support to the PKK. Provincial authorities deny villagers access to
some high pastures for grazing, citing security concerns, but have
allowed other villages access to their high pastures.
Unlike in the previous year, there were no credible allegations of
serious abuses by security forces during the course of operations
against the PKK.
The Government organizes, arms, and pays a civil defense force in
the region of more than 65,000 persons, which is known as the village
guards. Participation in this paramilitary militia is mainly voluntary,
but villagers faced danger from both the PKK and the Government when
choosing whether or not to join the guard force. Village guards have a
reputation for being the least disciplined of the Government's security
forces and have been accused repeatedly of drug trafficking, rape,
corruption, theft, and human rights abuses. Inadequate oversight and
compensation contribute to this problem, and in some cases Jandarma
allegedly have protected village guards from prosecution. In addition
to the village guards, Jandarma and police ``special teams'' are viewed
as those most responsible for abuses. However, the incidence of
credible allegations of serious abuses by security forces, in the
course of operations against the PKK, is significantly lower than in
the past.
There was a report of one village re-evacuation during the year
(see Section 1.e). Five residents of Akcapinar hamlet said Jandarma
burned 16 tents, one home, and crops there in early October. Residents
had apparently returned to the hamlet in May after having received
permission from local officials but without the requisite permission
from higher levels within the Government. Between 1984 and 1999, and
particularly in the early 1990's, a large number of persons were
displaced forcibly from villages. The practice was justified by the
Government as a means of protecting civilians or preventing PKK
guerrillas from obtaining logistical support from the inhabitants.
Provincial authorities deny villagers access to some high pastures for
grazing, citing security concerns, but have allowed other villages
access to their high pastures. The Government reported that 378,000
persons had ``migrated'' (it disputes the term ``evacuation'') from
3,165 state of emergency region villages between 1994 and 1999; many
left before that due to the fighting. The highest credible estimate of
displaced persons is as high as 1 million. Voluntary and assisted
resettlements have begun in the region. In some cases, persons may
return to their old homes; in other cases, centralized villages have
been constructed. Only a fraction of the total number of evacuees has
returned, but there is a noticeable increase in the pace of returns.
After the middle of the year, there appeared to be an upsurge in
the rate of returns and return requests. About 10,000 persons returned
to their villages between June and August, according to the state of
emergency governor. In July he declared that 65,000 of the 131,000
return requests filed with his office were ``appropriate.'' According
to the Jandarma, over 28,000 persons returned to the OHAL region and
adjacent provinces during the year. They state that there are an
additional 238,900 applications for returns to 621 villages and 461
smaller hamlets, but only about a third of these claims are appropriate
(mainly for security reasons) at this time. A July HADEP ``migrant
commission'' report claimed HADEP had over 23,000 additional requests
for returns, each petition representing a family. However, some persons
included on return petitions may not have been aware that a request had
been made for them. Furthermore, many evacuees have neither the will
nor the economic means to return.
Despite the increased pace, returns to date represent a fraction of
the number of persons who may wish to return. Governors continued to
provide building materials to some returnees. Activists remain critical
of government efforts to resettle villagers in government-constructed
``central villages'' instead of original village sites. Local Jandarma
impose limitations on some resettlement efforts. According to news
reports, in January Jandarma prevented the return of 15 families to a
village in Sirnak province. The families claimed that the village
guards who currently occupy their village had burned their homes and
cut down their orchards.
The Government continues to deal with the problem of the hundreds
of thousands of persons displaced from their villages and hamlets.
According to the Government, its ``East and Southeast Anatolia Action
Plan'' began in May. The Plan, as well as other government programs,
has focused on providing assistance to displaced persons and support
for return to villages or relocation to new, centralized villages. Over
4,000 persons now live in centralized villages. From June to October,
financial and other assistance (including young trees, animals,
beehives, and looms) was provided to over 14,000 persons in 96 villages
and 87 hamlets.
Regional cities in the southeast have doubled and tripled in size
in the past decade, without a commensurate increase in services such as
schools. Many persons from the area went to major cities in the West of
the country. A 1998 parliamentary committee investigation concluded
that the State was partly responsible for the displacements and had
failed to compensate adequately villagers who had lost their homes and
lands in the region. However, regional officials report that flows of
migrants nearly stopped during the year due to waning PKK activity in
the countryside.
In contrast to the national average of 45 children per classroom,
there are typically 60 to 90 children per classroom in eastern and
southeastern provinces and as many as 80 to 100 in Diyarbakir (most
schools in the southeast employ a shift schedule for classes to
accommodate the large numbers). According to the Government, in the
southeast there was a noticeable improvement in the number of students
able to attend classes, partly due to improved availability of teachers
and schools, and partly due to the requirement for an 8-year education.
During the 1999 to 2000 school year, there were 270,000 students in
secondary education in the southeast, compared to 240,000 the year
before. In the state of emergency region, 450 schools are closed,
although none were closed during the year. Although the Government has
built boarding schools in the region's larger towns, these new schools
have not met the demand. Although schools remained open in most urban
centers in the southeast, rapid migration led to severe overcrowding of
city schools and chronic teacher shortages. Despite a longstanding
tradition of boarding schools in the rural areas of the country, some
ethnic Kurdish leaders have expressed concern that the Government
constructed boarding schools, rather than rebuild local schools, in
order to accelerate the process of Kurdish assimilation. According to
press reports, soldiers in one command of the state of emergency region
repaired 167 village schools in preparation for the 2000 to 2001
academic year and during the past year spent about $700,000 (300
million TL) on health, education, and infrastructure projects in the
region.
During the year, Turkish ground forces with air support conducted
several operations in northern Iraq against the PKK. The Kurdistan
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan cooperated with
the Turkish Government in shutting down certain PKK facilities in
northern Iraq. Turkish government policy is to target only PKK fighters
in northern Iraq; however, Turkish planes accidentally killed 38
civilians in Sedakan, northern Iraq, during an operation in August
against the PKK. The Government is taking steps to compensate the
victims' families. At the end of the year, an operation against the PKK
involving hundreds of Turkish soldiers continued in northern Iraq,
according to press reports.
In February Parliament renewed legislation allowing members of
terrorist organizations (and criminal gangs) to apply for amnesty or
reductions in sentences, if they provide useful information that helps
lead to the dissolution of the organization. Government figures are not
available for the number of persons who applied for the amnesty, but
human rights attorneys speculate that the number is above 2,500.
According to press reports, many applicants, including some who were
members of Turkish Hizbullah, have obtained sentence reductions or
release.
The PKK remained almost completely inactive during the year. There
were reports of internal divisions over jailed PKK leader Ocalan's call
for ending the armed struggle, but by year's end no rival faction
appeared to have gained control of the group. Apparently on orders from
the PKK leadership, several groups of 8 to 10 former militants turned
themselves in to the authorities, asking for amnesty. They are all
currently standing trial for charges relating to membership in the PKK.
Although PKK attacks against civilians and law enforcement personnel in
the southeast have virtually ended, the military did engage the PKK,
killing several alleged terrorists. Government authorities acknowledge
that the level of violent conflict is considerably lower than in the
past and that the main reason is an absence of PKK activity and the
fact that the security forces were able to effectively end Hizbullah
operations.
Other terrorist organizations, most notably DHKP-C, conducted
attacks mainly against police targets.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government continued
to limit these freedoms. The Constitution leaves open the possibility
of restrictions to these freedoms on the basis of defense of the
secular, unitary, state and protection of public order. The Government,
particularly the judiciary, limits freedom of expression through the
use of restrictions in the 1982 Constitution and numerous laws such as
the following: Article 8 of the 1991 Anti-Terror Law (disseminating
separatist propaganda); Penal Code Articles 312 (incitement to racial,
ethnic, or religious enmity); 159 (insulting Parliament, the army,
republic, or judiciary); 160 (insulting the Turkish Republic); 169
(aiding an illegal organization); the Law to Protect Ataturk; and over
150 articles of the Press Law (including a provision against commenting
on ongoing trials). While prosecutors bring dozens of such cases to
court each year, judges dismiss many charges brought under these laws.
These cases constitute a form of harassment against writers,
journalists, and political figures.
Domestic and foreign periodicals that provide a broad spectrum of
views and opinions, including intense criticism of the Government, are
widely available. The newspaper business is extremely competitive.
Government censorship of foreign periodicals is very rare.
Electronic media reach nearly every adult, and their influence,
particularly that of television, is correspondingly great. According to
the High Board of Radio and Television, there are 229 local, 15
regional, and 16 national officially registered television stations,
and 1,036 local, 108 regional and 36 national radio stations. Other
television and radio stations broadcast without an official license.
The increasing availability of satellite dishes and cable television
allows access to foreign broadcasts, including several Turkish-language
private channels. The State owns and operates the Turkish Radio and
Television Corporation.
Internet use is growing and faces no government restrictions; in
fact, some banned newspapers can be accessed freely on the Internet.
Parliament passed legislation in September 1999 suspending for 3 years
the sentences of those convicted of crimes in the media, such as
journalists, writers, and party officials who published articles. The
Islamist opposition party Fazilet challenged the constitutionality of
the law because it did not apply to those who committed similar crimes
through speech. In September the Constitutional Court ruled that this
complaint had merit and ordered the Government to correct the problem.
In mid-December, the Government passed the ``Provisional Suspension of
Sentence Law,'' which in addition to leading to the eventual release of
thousands of ordinary criminals, may effect the release, and suspension
of trials, of many persons prosecuted on charges related to free
expression. The suspension only applies to those whose ``criminal act''
took place before April 23, 1999.
Although hundreds of those prosecuted or convicted for free
expression crimes had their sentences or trials suspended, some writers
remain in jail. Esber Yagmurdereli, for example, remains imprisoned
because his conviction in 1998 was for a speech, although his case may
fall under the ``Provisional Suspension of Sentence Law.'' The CPJ
reported that 14 journalists were imprisoned at year's end, compared
with 18 in 1999. According to the Ministry of Interior, 43 journalists
were in jail in July, of whom 26 had been convicted and the rest were
still standing trial. The Chairman of the Press Council said, after
studying the list, that his organization considered only four of these
to be ``imprisoned for their journalistic practices.'' Other journalist
associations note that some who are imprisoned for crimes in the media
are political activists with only tenuous journalistic credentials.
Under the suspension law, charges are dropped if the journalist or
writer does not commit the same crime again during the 3-year period;
if a second offense is committed during this time, the suspension is
revoked. Human rights advocates, journalists, and other writers
consider that the conditions for the suspension amount to censorship.
The law makes it illegal for broadcasters to threaten the country's
unity or national security and limits the private broadcast of
television programs in languages other than Turkish. The High Board of
Radio and Television (RTUK), created in 1994 to regulate private
television and radio frequencies, monitors broadcasters and sanctions
them if they are not in compliance with relevant laws. Parliament
elects the RTUK members (divided between ruling and opposition parties)
and provides its budget. Although nominally independent, the RTUK is
subject to some political pressures. In December RTUK banned broadcasts
of Ozgur Radio for 180 days, claiming that the station had slandered
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash in a July broadcast.
The RTUK penalizes private radio and television stations for the
use of offensive language, libel, obscenity, instigating separatist
propaganda, or broadcasting programs in Kurdish. Throughout the year,
the RTUK penalized radio and television stations over 210 times for
noncompliance with broadcast regulations, according to testimony given
by the RTUK chairman to a Parliamentary committee in November. In
general RTUK suspended television broadcasts for a day, and radio
broadcasts for longer terms such as 3 to 6 months, usually for
violating laws prohibiting the broadcast of ``terrorist organization
declarations.'' The human rights monitoring group Mazlum-DER recorded
closures of 26 television stations for a total of 208 closure days, and
closures of 24 radio stations for a total of 3,725 days, while the
Government provided RTUK closure figures of 62 television stations
closed for 704 days, and 67 radio stations closed for 3,889 days.
RTUK decisions may be appealed to the provincial administrative
court and then to the Council of State (Danistay). In some cases, this
is successful. In February the RTUK gave a 1-day closure punishment to
CNN TURK, in response to a January broadcast in which a commentator
asked a program guest if PKK leader Ocalan could be compared with
former South African President Mandela. According to the RTUK, the
broadcast ``threatened the existence and unity of the Turkish state''
and ``encouraged separatism.'' CNN TURK appealed the decision and won.
Another RTUK closure order, against Channel 6 for its criticism of the
Government's response to the August 1999 earthquake, was also
overturned by the Danistay.
Despite the Government's restrictions, the media criticize
government leaders and policies daily and have developed a more
adversarial role vis-a-vis the Government. Lively debates on human
rights and government policies continued, especially on issues relating
to Turkey's EU membership process; the role of the military; political
Islam; and the question of ethnic Kurds as ``minorities.''
Nevertheless, persons who write or speak out on such highly sensitive
topics risk prosecution.
Government decree 430 gives the Interior Ministry, upon the request
of the state of emergency regional governor, the authority to ban
distribution of any news viewed as misrepresenting events in the
region. In the event that a government warning is not obeyed, the
decree provides for a 10day suspension of operations for a first
offense and 30 days for subsequent offenses. This and other pressures,
such as RTUK suspensions, lead to self-censorship on some issues.
SSC prosecutors ordered the confiscation of numerous issues of
leftist, Kurdish nationalist, and pro-PKK periodicals and banned
several books on a range of topics. Prosecutors closed numerous
journals or suspended their operations during the year. The police
frequently raid offices of small leftist publications, while
distributors of the pro-Kurdish journals Evrensel and Yeni Gundem
outside the state of emergency region claim regular harassment and the
confiscation of their newspapers by the police.
Journalists, including those from mainstream and western media,
were harassed periodically and subjected to police abuse while covering
stories. Two Swedish journalists were arrested, and their film
confiscated, while visiting a small town near Diyarbakir in April.
Their film was returned and they were released after the Swedish
Government protested.
The Government continued to restrict the free expression of ideas
by individuals sympathetic to some Islamist, leftist, and Kurdish
nationalist or cultural viewpoints.
In April a group of 24 intellectuals sought to challenge legal
restrictions on expression by republishing the formally banned book
``Freedom of Thought'' under the new title ``Freedom of Thought--
2000.'' The group, which consists of well-known human rights activists,
actors, journalists, and academicians, notified officials at the
Istanbul SSC of their actions. The court indicted the group in May,
demanding sentences ranging from 7 to 15 years' imprisonment for 16
persons on various charges, including supporting a terrorist
organization and inciting hatred and enmity. The case was ongoing at
year's end. In December musician and human rights activist Sanar
Yurdatapan and Nevzat Onaran, Chairman of the Contemporary Lawyer's
Association's Istanbul branch, each served 24-day sentences given by a
military court in connection with the publication of a previous
``Freedom of Thought'' pamphlet.
Nadire Mater was acquitted in September of charges that she
``insulted the military'' with her publication, ``Mehmet's Book.''
Copies of the book were seized in 1999 on order of the Istanbul SSC,
and Mater and her publisher were charged under Article 159 of the Penal
Code, with a possible prison sentence of 2 to 12 years. Since part of
the acquittal was based on the Suspension of Sentences Law for the
book's early editions, she faces a 3-year ``probation'' period, and if
she commits the same crime she theoretically would face a resumption of
her trial. The prosecutor appealed the acquittal, and the ban on the
book continues. ``Mehmet's Book'' is a compilation of interviews with
retired conscripts who had served in the southeast. The book records
without commentary the soldiers' experiences in the field. These rank-
and-file stories allege corruption, drug abuse, and dishonest handling
of the press. As many as 40,000 to 50,000 copies have been sold, and
although the book remains banned it is available in some bookstores.
The Istanbul SSC brought charges of ``supporting separatist and
terrorist propaganda'' against the distributors of the CD-Rom version
of National Geographic magazine's full collection in late 1999. The
collection included a 1992 article on Kurds that showed a map of the
region most populated most heavily by Kurds; the article was published
and circulated in Turkey. In February the court suspended the case in
line with the ``suspension of sentences'' law, because the publication
date was before April 1999.
In March Islamist former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was
convicted under the Penal Code (Article 312) of ``promoting enmity''
along religious lines, for a speech he had made in 1994 in which he
referred to parliamentarians as ``infidels.'' He was sentenced to 1
year's imprisonment, but his punishment was suspended under the
``probational suspension of sentences law'' passed in December. Human
rights groups and some politicians criticized the verdict as
undemocratic, but the judiciary and many mainstream politicians
defended it. Also in March, the chairman of the Islamic business-
oriented association Musiad was sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment
under the same law, for a 1999 statement in which he referred to
``believers and nonbelievers.'' His sentence was suspended.
Abdurrahman Dilipak, a veteran columnist with the Islamist daily
Akit, faced multiple charges during the year for articles criticizing
the Government's policy, especially on religious head coverings and the
alleged activities of a military group that reportedly monitors
political Islam. He was convicted in January by the Malatya SSC and
sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment related to a 1998 conference in
Malatya. Appeals continued at year's end.
Former chairman of the HRA Akin Birdal reentered prison in March
after a 6-month release on medical grounds. He was released on
September 23 after serving a total of over 9 months' imprisonment on
charges related to free speech (see Section 4).
Hasan Guzel, head of the small Rebirth Party and an outspoken
former Education Minister under the pro-Islamist Refah Party
government, was released from jail in May after serving 5 months of a
1-year sentence for ``inciting religious and ethnic enmity,'' based on
a controversial 1997 speech. In January he was convicted on the same
charge in a different case relating to a 1998 speech.
Poet Yilmaz Odabasi entered prison in March to serve a 7-month
sentence for contempt of court, for having said that he was ``ashamed
to live in the same age and country'' as the court that convicted him
in 1997 for ``disseminating separatist propaganda'' with his book
``Dream and Life.'' He was released in June.
Cases may be continuing against Dogu Perincek, chairman of the
Workers' Party, for convictions concerning a 1994 speech delivered at
the HRA general convention and slandering former Prime Minister Tansu
Ciller. In September Perincek was acquitted on charges of assisting the
PKK and possessing secret state documents.
The trial of Dr. Veli Lok, president of the HRF's Izmir branch, for
violation of the press law, ended in June. Dr. Lok, Bahri Akkan
(spokesman for the Izmir Democracy Platform), and Fikret Ilkiz (an
editor at Cumhuriyet newspaper) were convicted on the basis of an
article published in October 1999 in Cumhuriyet, in which Lok and Akkan
were quoted regarding a trial involving other HRF members. Publicly
commenting on an ongoing court case is forbidden under the Press Law.
The Ministry of Justice sent a letter to the Izmir prosecutor in
November 1999, asking him to review the Cumhuriyet article and
determine if a crime had been committed. The indictment followed
shortly. Lok and Akkan were sentenced to pay a fine of about $200 (120
million TL); Ilkiz is to pay about $210 (124 million TL). Lok's
sentence was suspended for 5 years, and he has appealed.
In October a Syriac priest was charged under Article 312 for
``inciting religious, racial and sectarian hatred'' for comments he
made to the media about legislation under consideration at that time by
the U.S. Congress that referred to Armenian genocide. The trial of the
priest, who spoke in favor of the legislation, began in December. He
spent one night under arrest but otherwise has been free to continue
his pastoral duties.
In April the pro-Kurdish daily Ozgur Bakis ceased publication,
blaming government pressure (including closure orders, fines,
investigations of 124 out of 370 editions, and court cases against
editors). In its place Yeni Gundem newspaper began publication in May
and was banned in the emergency region a week later. Also in April, the
state of emergency governor banned four magazines (Ozgur Halk, Yasamda
Genclik, Ozgur Kadinin Sesi, and Rewsen) from the emergency region. In
May the governor banned distribution of four newspapers and eight
journals, including Evrensel Kurdish-language weekly Azadiya Welate
(which had been banned previously). However, these publications can be
accessed in the emergency region on the Internet. Throughout the
country some potential customers are afraid to purchase Kurdish-
language materials because the possession of such items may be
interpreted as evidence of PKK sympathies.
Kurdish-language cassettes and publications are available
commercially, although the periodic banning of particular cassettes or
singers continued, especially in the state of emergency region.
Kurdish-language broadcasts of news, commentary, or discussion are
illegal throughout the country. One radio station broadcasts in Kurdish
but is widely believed to be government-sponsored. Kurdish music is
played on radio and television programs with certain restrictions,
especially in the emergency zone and adjacent provinces. The state of
emergency regional governor frequently bans from the region Kurdish
recordings that may be played legally elsewhere in the country. In
August he issued an order banning the sale of 242 music recordings,
most in Kurdish. Stations that play Kurdish songs not on the limited
play list risk temporary bans or closure. Radio stations that mix small
amounts of Kurdish songs into their predominantly Turkish broadcasting
appear to face fewer problems.
Pro-PKK Medya-TV, which is banned, broadcasts in Kurdish from
Europe and nevertheless can be received via satellite dish. Another
station, Kurdistan-TV, based in northern Iraq, can be received via
satellite, and is not banned. The ECHR ruled against Turkey on some
cases of free expression, such as the conviction of a newspaper editor
for ``disseminating separatist propaganda'' in 1993.
The Mesopotamian Cultural Center (MKM), an NGO that seeks to
promote Kurdish language and culture, continues to operate. Some
officials alleged that the organization is linked to the PKK. The
group's centers in the southeast remain closed. Police exert pressure
against the groups and hinder their activities, and local officials
monitor and often interrupt their cultural events. Some MKM branches
report that they were prevented from selling Kurdish-language music
cassettes and were warned against organizing cultural events. On
December 30, however, for the first time the Governor of Hakkari
province in the southeast allowed a Kurdish-language music concert,
organized by an MKM-sponsored band. Five thousand persons attended the
concert.
The Kurdish culture and research foundation (Kurt-Kav) remained
open and continued some activities, including Kurdish language training
and a study of Kurdish oral tradition. In February Kurt-Kav was
acquitted of charges alleging promotion of separatism for its
sponsorship of scholarships for 30 Kurdishspeaking students. A second
case on the same charges, based on cooperation with a Swedish
university to promote study of the Kurdish language, still was pending
in the courts at year's end.
Academic freedom generally is respected; however, there is believed
to be some self-censorship on sensitive topics.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government often
restricted this right in practice. The authorities may deny permission
if they believe that a gathering is likely to disrupt public order.
Significant prior notification of gatherings is required, and the
authorities may restrict meetings to designated sites.
The police beat, abused, detained and harassed some demonstrators,
but showed restraint in other instances. The police appeared to be
acceding to a November 1999 Security Administration directive that
called for the use of minimum force in dispersing demonstrations. In
February, following the arrests of three HADEP mayors in the southeast
(see Section 3), supporters of the mayors held large, peaceful protests
in Diyarbakir's center. Police allowed the demonstrations to continue
even though they were not approved, and there was no violence. Police
detained several dozen demonstrators during the 3-day protest period.
In contrast to the previous year, the March 21 Kurdish Nevruz
(``New Year'') celebrations were marked by calm and respectful behavior
among participants and security forces. According to press reports and
initial contacts with activists in the southeast, the police detained
several hundred unauthorized demonstrators in Mersin, Sanliurfa, Siirt,
and Adana, but there were reportedly no arrests nor excessive use of
force (as there had been in the previous year). The authorities for the
first time granted permission for a major celebration a few miles
outside of Diyarbakir. The gathering of more than 80,000 persons was
peaceful, with no detentions, and police treated the crowd well,
according to a Kurdish activist. Istanbul municipal authorities denied
permission for a celebration there because the organizers referred to
``Newroz,'' on the grounds that since there is no letter ``w'' in
Turkish, this was a Kurdish spelling.
On World Peace Day, September 1, the authorities denied permission
for peace demonstrations in Diyarbakir, Izmir, Ankara, Mersin, and
Antalya. In Diyarbakir the police reportedly broke up a gathering,
detaining 30 participants and injuring 10. In Van the police detained
27 persons, including the HADEP provincial chairman. In Mus the police
reportedly detained, beat, and tortured the former district president
of HADEP. In Tunceli a group of 200 persons was allowed to demonstrate,
and in other cities events took place peacefully.
In October police disrupted a professional conference in Izmir of
the Turkish Medical Association (TMA) on the grounds that the meeting,
which was to have discussed the issue of prison health, was illegal.
International observers present for the conference noted that police
officers demanded to videotape all of the proceedings. The TMA
cancelled the conference.
Police have detained and, on occasion, mistreated members of groups
that protested prison conditions, the Ulucanlar prison incident in
September 1999 (see Section 1.c.), and the installation of ``F-type''
small cells to replace the current ward system. In June the police
broke up an anti-prison rally and detained 20 participants, including
the chair of the Istanbul branch of the HRA, Erin Keskin; when critics
started to protest those detentions, the police broke up that second
rally and detained another 30 persons. However, in early August the
Minister of Justice spoke to demonstrators in front of his Ministry and
invited some of them to visit a new F-type prison, which they did the
following day. In August an association of families of political
prisoners left Istanbul for Ankara by bus to protest F-type prisons and
warn against the potential of hunger strikes and violence in jails (see
Section 1.c.). The group alleges that it was stopped while en route
several times by police and Jandarma, and that some parents were beaten
with clubs and had to be hospitalized. Hundreds of protesters were
temporarily detained during the period of hunger strikes in the prisons
in November and police intervention in December.
In December, following a terrorist attack on a police bus that
killed two anti-riot police, thousands of fellow officers staged
protest marches in all of the country's major cities. The marches
occurred over several days, despite efforts by senior police officials
to bring them under control. Several hundred police officers have been
charged with disobeying orders and marching without a permit; they
faced disciplinary and judicial proceedings at year's end.
Dr. Alp Ayan, a psychiatrist with the HRF Izmir Treatment and
Rehabilitation Center; Gunseli Kaya, who also works at the Center; and
66 others face charges of ``holding an unauthorized demonstration'' for
participating in the funeral procession in October 1999 of one of the
prisoners killed in the September 1999 Ulucanlar incident. Ayan, Kaya,
and 12 others were held in detention for 3 months before being released
at the start of their trial in January. The trial continued at year's
end.
Six school children, between the ages of 12 and 14 years, were
acquitted in March of charges of holding an ``unauthorized
demonstration'' in 1998. The children had held a sign that said ``We
Want Teachers'' during a rally after no teachers came to school that
day and previous days.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however,
associations and foundations must submit their charters for government
approval, which is a lengthy and cumbersome process.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Turkey as a
secular state and provides for freedom of belief, freedom of worship,
and the private dissemination of religious ideas, and the Government
generally observed these provisions in practice; however, it imposed
some restrictions on religious minorities and on religious expression
in government offices and state-run institutions, including
universities.
The Government oversees Muslim religious facilities and education
through its Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The Diyanet,
which some groups claim reflects the beliefs of the Sunni Islamist
mainstream to the exclusion of Alevi adherents, regulates the operation
of the country's more than 70,000 mosques. Local and provincial imams,
who are civil servants, are employed by the Diyanet. The Government
states that the Diyanet treats equally all that request services.
During the year, partly in commemoration of the Christian jubilee, the
Diyanet sponsored several ecumenical events among major religious
groups, including a meeting in Tarsus in May, which produced a document
that called for intercommunal understanding.
A separate government agency, the Office of Foundations (Vakiflar
Genel Mudurlugu), regulates some activities of religious minorities,
including those established under the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 (Greek
Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish), and their affiliated
churches, monasteries, and religious schools. The Vakiflar, which dates
back to the Ottoman Empire, must approve the operation of churches,
monasteries, synagogues, schools, and charitable religious foundations,
such as hospitals and orphanages. The Vakiflar oversees 160 minority
religious foundations, including Greek Orthodox (about 70 sites);
Armenian Orthodox (about 50); and Jewish (20); as well as Syrian
Christians, Chaldoneans, Bulgarian Orthodox, Georgians, and Maronis.
In May a court allowed a Protestant church in Istanbul to establish
itself as a ``foundation.'' Normally all ``religious'' foundations need
to have been in existence since the early days of the republic in order
to be deemed as such.
The population is about 99 percent Muslim, primarily Sunni. In
addition to the country's Sunni majority, an estimated 12 million
Alawis (an offshoot of Shi'a Islam) freely practice their faith and
build ``Cem houses'' (Alawi places of worship). Some Alawis allege
discrimination in the form of failure to include any Alawi doctrines or
beliefs in religious instruction classes. Alawis also charge that there
is a Sunni bias in the Religious Affairs Directorate and claim that the
Directorate tends to view the Alawis as a cultural rather than a
religious group. However, some Sunni Islamic political activists charge
that the secular State favors and is under the influence of the Alawis.
The Government periodically allocates funds to the Alawi community and
funds Sunni activities.
There are several non-Muslim religious minority groups; most are
concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. These include an
estimated 50,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians, 25,000 Jews, and roughly
3,000 Greek Orthodox adherents. There are approximately 3,000
Protestants; 10,000 Baha'is; an estimated 15,000 Syrian Orthodox
(Syriac) Christians; and a small, undetermined number of Bulgarian,
Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian, and Maronite Christians. The number of
Christians in the southeast has declined as the younger generation,
especially among Syriacs, leaves the area to live in Istanbul, Europe,
or North America. In December President Sezer issued a message to
Turkey's minority religious groups on the occasion of Christmas and
Hanukah.
The military and judiciary, with support from other members of the
country's secular elite, continued to wage a private and public
campaign against Islamic fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to
the secular republic (see Section 3). The National Security Council
(NSC)--a powerful military/civilian body established by the
Constitution to advise senior leadership on national security matters--
categorizes fundamentalism as a primary threat to public safety and
order. The armed forces regularly dismiss individuals whose official
files reflect participation in Islamist fundamentalist activities. In
October the military dismissed 44 officers suspected of sympathizing
with Islamic groups or Kurdish rebels. At a meeting in March, the NSC
discussed a report that claimed that fundamentalist Islamic elements
had increased their activities in a number of areas, including
infiltrating government ministries. However, the same NSC report noted
that legislative measures have been taken on only 5 points of the
February 1997 18-point program against fundamentalism. In August
President Sezer twice refused to sign a ``decree with force of law''
that would have streamlined the procedures for firing civil servants
suspected of fundamentalist or separatist tendencies, explaining that
such a measure should be reviewed by Parliament.
In a widely publicized August 30 ``victory day'' statement, armed
forces Chief of Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu issued a strong
message to the Government to take action against Islamic
fundamentalism. In a reference to the civil servants decree turned back
twice by President Sezer, Kivrikoglu said that the Government and the
Parliament should take immediate action to address the problem of
``thousands'' of civil servants whose fundamentalist views were
threatening the secular state. He noted that the military had an
effective means of getting rid of suspected fundamentalists or
separatists from its ranks and that the civil service should adopt
similar measures. Kivrikoglu alleged that the leader of a moderate
Islamic Tarikat, Fetullah Gulen, plans to undermine the state and said
that 11 of the 44 officers recently dismissed by the military for
fundamentalist proclivities were Gulen supporters. Kivrikoglu claimed
that Gulen supporters had infiltrated the judiciary as well, a charge
denied by the Minister of Justice.
Tarikats and other mystical Sunni Islamic, quasi-religious, and
social orders were banned in the 1920's but largely were tolerated
until the 1997 call by the National Security Council for strict
enforcement of the ban against Tarikats as part of its campaign against
Islamic fundamentalism. However, prominent political and social leaders
remain associated with Tarikats.
In March Islamist former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was
convicted under the Penal Code (Article 312) of ``promoting enmity''
along religious lines, for a 1994 speech in which he referred to
Parliamentarians as ``infidels.'' He was sentenced in March to 1 year's
imprisonment (see Section 2.a). Also in March, the chairman of the
Islamic business-oriented association Musiad was sentenced to 1 year's
imprisonment under the same law, for a 1999 statement in which he
referred to ``believers and nonbelievers.'' His sentence was suspended.
The Istanbul SSC ordered the confiscation of the June 28 issue of the
reportedly anti-Semitic newspaper Akit and the June 23-29 edition of
its related weekly publication Cuma for ``inciting religious hatred,''
for its treatment of the death of a prominent military official known
for his secular views. Akit had reported in its coverage that it ``did
not forgive'' the official for his actions against imam-Hatip schools,
Koran courses, and students who wear headscarves.
Religious and moral instruction in state primary and secondary
schools is compulsory for Muslims. Students who complete primary school
may study the Koran in government-sponsored schools. The Government
does not permit private Koran courses.
Upon written verification of their non-Muslim background,
minorities considered by the Government to be covered by the 1923
Lausanne Treaty (Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish) are
exempted by law from Muslim religious instruction. They may hold their
own classes or if they want to attend Muslim courses, may do so with
parental consent. Syriac and other Christians whom the Government does
not consider to be an official Lausanne Treaty minority are not
exempted. In August the Syriac community reiterated a 1995 appeal to
the Government to be considered a Lausanne Treaty minority.
Government authorities do not interfere in matters of doctrine
pertaining to minority religions, nor do they restrict the publication
or use of religious literature. While the Government does not recognize
the ecumenical nature of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, it acknowledges
him as head of the Turkish Greek Orthodox community and does not
interfere with his travels or other ecumenical activities.
The authorities monitor the activities of eastern Orthodox churches
and their affiliated operations. The Ecumenical Patriarchate in
Istanbul consistently has expressed interest in reopening the seminary
on the Island on Halki in the Sea of Marmara. The seminary has been
closed since 1971 when the State nationalized most private institutions
of higher learning. Under current restrictions, including a citizenship
requirement, religious communities remain unable to train new clergy.
However, coreligionists from outside the country have been permitted to
assume leadership positions.
By law religious services may take place only in designated places
of worship, although non-Muslim religious services often take place in
nondesignated places of worship. However, police disrupted several
Christian religious gatherings on the grounds that they were being held
in unauthorized locations. On May 24 in Istanbul, several persons
(including non-Turks) were detained overnight following a police raid
on a private apartment where a group was holding Protestant services.
Most of the participants were released the next day and charges were
dropped; two Turks were held for several days before being released.
Currently the attendees face charges for unauthorized meetings and
unauthorized establishment of an education center.
Minority foundations, including those of religions recognized under
the Lausanne Treaty, may not acquire property for any purpose, although
they can lose it. If a community does not use its property because of a
decline in the size of its congregation over 10 years, the Vakiflar
takes over direct administration and ownership. There have been no
reports of minority religions losing their houses of worship or other
facilities during the year. If such minorities can demonstrate a
renewed community need, they may apply legally to recover their
properties. Bureaucratic procedures and considerations relating to
historic preservation at times have impeded repairs to existing
religious facilities. Restoration or construction may be carried out in
buildings and monuments considered ``ancient'' only with authorization
of the regional board on the protection of cultural and national
wealth. Syriac Christians have been allowed to renovate their historic
buildings in Mardin, although their efforts remain closely monitored by
the authorities. In May Syriac Christians gathered in Elazig to
celebrate the completed restoration of a 1,800-year-old church.
The Baha'i community currently is fighting a legal battle against
government expropriation of a sacred Baha'i site near Edirne. The site
was granted cultural heritage status in 1993 by Edirne's board of
natural and cultural riches, a branch of the Ministry of Culture.
However, in January the Ministry of Education notified the Baha'i
community that the property had been expropriated for future use by the
adjacent primary school. The Ministry has deposited funds in the Baha'i
community's bank account for the expropriated property. In April the
local administration court in Edirne rescinded its temporary stay of
execution and allowed the Ministry of Education to implement
expropriation, although it has not done so. The Baha'i appeal of the
expropriation continued at year's end.
There are legal restrictions against insulting any religion
recognized by the State, interfering with that religion's services, or
debasing its property.
No law explicitly prohibits proselytizing or religious conversions;
however, religious groups that proselytize occasionally are subject to
government restrictions or harassment. There are no known estimates of
the number and religious affiliation of foreign missionaries in the
country. Many prosecutors regard proselytizing and religious activism
on the part of evangelical Christians, and particularly Islamists, with
suspicion, especially when such activities are deemed to have political
overtones. The police sometimes arrest proselytizers for disturbing the
peace; courts usually dismiss such charges. If the proselytizers are
foreigners, they may be deported, but generally they are able to
reenter the country easily. In a case in March, two Turkish Christians
were detained for a month on the charge of ``insulting Islam'' by
distributing Bibles; they were released in May at their first hearing
when witnesses refused to stand by their signed statements. Their trial
continued in one of four jurisdictions where cases were opened.
The Government continued to enforce a more than 50-year-old ban on
the wearing of religious head coverings at universities or by civil
servants in public buildings. Some women who wear head coverings, and
both men and women who actively have shown support for those who defy
the ban, have lost their jobs in the public sector as nurses and
teachers; some others were not allowed to register as university
students. The Council of State (Danistay) ruled in a 1999 case that
universities are public institutions and, as such, have an obligation
to protect the country's basic principles, including secularism. In
making its ruling, the Danistay referred to its understanding of a
ruling by the ECHR in favor of Turkey, which noted that students had to
abide by university dress codes, and that the wearing of a headscarf
could be construed as pressure on other students. According to Mazlum-
DER, during the year 127 teachers lost their jobs for wearing head
coverings and there were dozens of smallscale protests this school year
against the headscarf ban.
Merve Kavakci, elected an M.P. in April 1999 from the Islamist
Fazilet (Virtue) Party, unsuccessfully sought in May 1999 to be sworn
in to Parliament wearing an Islamist-style head covering. Kavakci's
case highlighted the ongoing dispute over the ban on wearing religious-
style clothing in official settings. She later was stripped of Turkish
citizenship on the grounds that she had assumed another country's
citizenship without notifying proper authorities and lost her
parliamentary privileges. She appealed the verdict on her citizenship,
and in February the highest administrative court upheld the lower
court's ruling. The issue of headscarves in Parliament, in terms of
legislation that would give a final definition to the parliamentary
dress code, remained unresolved.
The case to close the Islamist Fazilet Party, which was filed in
May 1999, was still pending at the Constitutional Court at year's end
(see Section 3). Although religious affiliation is listed on national
identity cards, there is no official discrimination.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally enjoy freedom of
movement domestically and the freedom to travel abroad; however, at
times the Government limited some of these rights. The Constitution
provides that a citizen's freedom to leave may be restricted only in
the case of a national emergency, civic obligations (military service,
for example), or criminal investigation or prosecution. As the security
situation continued to improve in the southeast, security officials
decreased use of roadblocks and vehicle and passenger searches.
Although there is no legal internal exile, since 1990 the state of
emergency region's governor in the southeast has had the authority to
``remove from the region,'' for a period not to exceed the duration of
the state of emergency (in place for 15 years), citizens under his
administration whose activities ``give an impression that they are
prone to disturb general security and public order.'' Teachers, party
officials, and trade unionists have been affected by this provision in
the past, and dozens of unionists were kept out of the southeast this
year, according to press reports. In July security officials in Batman
took the passports of two visiting British parliamentarians who were
looking into the issue of the Ilisu dam, and also took documents of a
Republican People's Party (CHP) official and some accompanying
journalists.
When Turkey ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which have the force of
domestic law, it exercised the option of accepting the Convention's
obligations only with respect to refugees from Europe. Although it has
not lifted subsequently the geographic limit of its treaty obligation,
since 1994 the Government has granted temporary asylum to all those
recognized as refugees. Asylum-seekers apply to the Government for
temporary protection and to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) for resettlement. If both procedures recognize the asylum-
seeker as a refugee, UNHCR proceeds with resettlement and submits the
case to other countries. European refugees are given temporary
residence permits by the Government, renewable until they achieve
resettlement or a durable solution.
Furthermore, the UNHCR intervenes with government officials if it
disagrees with their negative decisions about individual asylum claims.
An appeal may be lodged within 15 days of a negative decision by the
authorities. After the appeal procedure, rejected applicants are issued
a deportation order that may be implemented after 15 days. According to
the UNHCR, there were 5,681 asylum seekers during the year; out of
these cases and some from previous years, UNHCR rejected the asylum
applications of 4,471 and accepted 2,709.
A regulation obliges asylum seekers to apply within 10 days of
their arrival and submit proof of identity in order to register as an
asylum-seeker. The time limit for registration in the Government's
asylum program is implemented strictly and remains an obstacle to the
full access of asylum seekers to refugee status determination
procedures. During the year, 25 refugees and asylum-seekers were
returned to a country where they feared persecution, compared with 46
in 1999 and continuing a steady decline since 1995, according to the
UNHCR. The obstacles inherent in the Government's asylum procedures
lead to many refugees being considered as ``illegals.'' This year the
UNHCR considered that there were approximately 100 refugees not
registered with the Government. The UNHCR and government authorities
continue to work to resolve this problem and to find ways to allow
greater access of all asylum seekers to this procedure.
If they comply with the asylum regulation's requirements, asylum
seekers are registered by the Government and processed for eligibility
determination. Late in the year, the Council of State confirmed
administrative court rulings since 1997 that concluded that failure to
submit an asylum claim within a fixed time limit could not be a reason
not to address the application or grant asylum. The UNHCR has no
information on discrimination by the Government on the basis of
nationality. The UNHCR maintains a branch office in Ankara and field
presences in Istanbul, Silopi, Van, and Agri.
The mass influx in 1999 of 18,000 Kosovars fell under the 1994
asylum regulation. The Government allowed Kosovars to enter the country
freely and de facto allowed them ``first asylum''--to stay until they
repatriate or resettle voluntarily. An estimated 2,000 persons from
Bosnia-Herzegovina and several hundred from Kosovo were granted a
special temporary ``guest'' status; 42 Kosovars and 74 Bosnians still
reside in former refugee camps. Because there are no visa requirements,
thousands of Iranians remain in the country for extended periods. The
Government generally does not allow similar mass influxes from Iraq but
allows some individuals and families to settle in or transit the
country en route to permanent resettlement.
Cooperation between the UNHCR and the Government has continued
since 1998 in the field of training border guards and other government
officials responsible for asylum-seekers and refugees. During the year,
approximately 150 officials received UNHCR-sponsored training in Bursa,
Izmir, Antalya, Ankara, and Van. The training is very successful and
has led to increased contact between UNHCR and local, military, and
judicial authorities. The UNHCR works with local partners including the
Turkish Red Crescent Society, the Association for Solidarity with
Asylum Seekers and Migrants, and the Anatolian Development Foundation
to integrate refugees into society.
The country continues to be a transit and departure point for
illegal migrants and asylum seekers of various nationalities en route
to Europe, who travel in small groups utilizing land routes, boats, and
ships.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
Turkey has a multiparty parliamentary system, in which national
elections are held at least every 5 years, with mandatory universal
suffrage for all citizens 18 years of age and over. More than 30
political parties are active (most of them minuscule), 5 of which are
represented in Parliament. Parliament elects the President as Head of
State every 7 years or when the incumbent becomes incapacitated or
dies.
In addition to these bodies, in accordance with the Constitution,
the NSC, which includes both military and civilian government leaders
and is chaired by the President, plays a significant role in shaping
government policy.
The Government neither coerces nor forbids membership in any
political organization; however, the chief public prosecutor may bring
cases seeking the closure of political parties before the
Constitutional Court, which may close them down for unconstitutional
activities. The chief public prosecutor opened cases in 1999 to close
two significant parties, Fazilet and HADEP, alleging that they were
centers of illegal activities. These cases were unresolved at year's
end.
Government pressure against HADEP continued, based on the
Government's belief that many HADEP supporters had ties to the PKK or
supported their agenda. Throughout the year, the police raided dozens
of HADEP offices, especially in the state of emergency region, and
detained provincial officials and elected HADEP mayors. For example, in
September the chair of HADEP'S Sirnak branch and a dozen other
executives were arrested, and police raided HADEP offices in Istanbul,
Diyarbakir, Adana, Mersin, and Van. In June HADEP secretary general
Ahmet Turan Demir was convicted under Article Eight of the Anti-Terror
Law for ``separatism,'' for a speech he gave in October 1999; in
November Demir was sentenced to 1-year's imprisonment and a fine of
$1,168 (800 million TL), and in November he was convicted of ``making
separatist propaganda'' in a 1998 speech and given another 1-year
sentence, reduced to 10 months. He has not yet gone to jail for either
conviction. During the year, the Government brought 10 cases against
HADEP mayors, most for charges of ``separatist propaganda.'' A case
against Cihan Sincar, Mayor of Kiziltepe, on the grounds that she had
referred to ``Kurdistan'' in an interview with a Swedish newspaper,
ended with her acquittal in November. In December the Ankara SSC opened
an investigation against HADEP on the grounds that its November party
congress had extended support for the PKK.
In February Jandarma arrested the HADEP mayors of Diyarbakir,
Siirt, and Bingol, mostly based on testimony by the deputy mayor of
Diyarbakir who allegedly was tortured while in police custody (see
Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 4). The mayors were charged under Article 169
of the Penal Code with supporting an illegal organization (the PKK)
through fundraising activities in Europe and Turkey. The mayors were
held for 3 days, and the Interior Ministry removed them from office but
reinstated them after peaceful public protests began. The mayors
remained free and in office at year's end, pending the outcome of their
trial, which began in April. They were allowed to travel outside the
country, although some HADEP officials have been barred for years from
international travel. In September another aide to the Diyarbakir mayor
was arrested by the anti-terror police on charges of links to the PKK.
The military and judiciary, with support from some other members of
the country's secular elite, continued to wage a private and public
campaign against Islamic fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to
the secular republic (see Section 2.c.).
In August Islamist leader Fetullah Gulen was indicted for
``separatism'' and ``forming a criminal gang;'' however, an Istanbul
court annulled this indictment on appeal. Two weeks later Ankara SSC
Prosecutor Nuh Mete Yuksel brought another indictment of trying to
``change the characteristics of the republic as specified in the
Constitution.'' Yuksel is seeking the maximum 10-year sentence against
Gulen under the Anti-Terrorism Law and alleges that Gulen was trying to
``infiltrate'' the military.
The trial continued in Ankara of a group of 33 Islamist politicians
and business figures who had formed a group called the National View
Organization. The group, many of whom were members of the banned Refah
Party, were charged in 1999 with attempting to impose a ``religious
order'' in contravention of Article 146.1 of the Penal Code (forcibly
trying to change the constitutional order); some of the defendants face
the death penalty. The case continued at year's end.
The Democratic Mass Party (DKP), which the Government closed in
February 1999, had not yet had its closure decision published. Party
members cannot legally form or join another party until the closure
decision is officially published.
Reports continued of corruption and the abuse of power in the
security forces, including ties with illegal organizations. The
Government mounted 21 operations in the final 3 months of the year into
corruption in banking, exports/imports, rural affairs, drugs, and other
areas, leading to hundreds of detentions and over 100 arrests. In June
parliamentary committees cleared former Prime Ministers Yilmaz and
Ciller of a range of corruption charges relating to their activities
while in office. Some trials linked to corruption charges, involving
former Interior Minister Mehmet Agar and M.P. Sedat Bucak, began in
1998 but were halted in April 1999 when both were elected to the new
Parliament and gained automatic legal immunity (which had been lifted
by the previous Parliament). During the year some M.P.''s proposed in
Parliament that their immunity be lifted. In June Parliament also voted
to clear Agar of charges of ``establishing a criminal gang'' relating
to the 1996 Susurluk scandal. In September an alleged 1998 memorandum
from senior military sources was made public by the media and human
rights groups. The memo details a plan of discrediting government
critics, including HADEP and Fazilet parties, the HRA, and specific
politicians and journalists. In some cases, actions occurred that were
similar to the memo's recommendations.
In February a former Batman provincial governor admitted that
during his 1993 to 1997 term, his office acquired weapons worth $2.6
million (1.5 trillion TL) to equip extraordinary units fighting the
PKK. He said that most were given to the Jandarma and some to the
police; some allegedly were given to village guards as well. The then-
Prime Minister agreed to fund the purchase in order to ``protect the
State,'' she explained, although the Ministry of Interior had not
agreed. The foreignmade weapons entered the country without clearing
customs. The extralegal aspects of the transaction fueled speculation
that some weapons may have disappeared. There was no parliamentary
investigation following the revelations. In December, however, a case
was opened against four officials from the Foreign Trade
Undersecretariat's General Directorate of Imports for ``allowing
illegal importation of weapons by the Batman governate.'' The
defendants face sentences of between 1 and 4 years.
There are no legal restrictions on political activity by women, the
Constitution calls for equal political rights for men and women, and
many women are active politically; however, women are underrepresented
seriously in government and politics. There are only 22 women in the
550-seat Parliament, there are no female ministers in Prime Minister
Ecevit's 35-member Cabinet, and there are no female governors. However,
one of the five major political parties is headed by a woman.
There are no legal restrictions on political activity by
minorities; however, some minorities are underrepresented in government
and politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Nongovernmental organizations operate in many regions but face
government obstruction and restrictive laws regarding their operations,
especially in the four provinces that comprise the state of emergency
region. The Associations Law governing the activities of most NGO's
(some fall under the Law of Foundations, and others incorporate
themselves as businesses) has restrictive provisions regarding
membership, fundraising, and scope of activities.
The nongovernmental HRA has branches nationwide and claims a
membership of about 20,000 persons. In 1990 the HRA established the
HRF, which operates torture rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir,
Istanbul, Diyarbakir, and Adana and serves as a clearinghouse for human
rights information. Other domestic NGO's include the Istanbul-based
Helsinki Citizens Assembly, the Ankara-based Turkish Democracy
Foundation, the Turkish Medical Doctor's Association, human rights
centers at a number of universities, and Mazlum-DER, which is the
Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples.
Human rights organizations are represented on the Provincial Human
Rights Councils currently being formed.
Human rights monitors, as well as lawyers and doctors involved in
documenting human rights violations, continued to face detention,
prosecution, intimidation, harassment, and formal closure orders for
their legitimate activities. The HRA's Diyarbakir branch was reopened
in April after having been closed for 3 years. However, several weeks
later the state of emergency region governor's office ordered the
branch closed for 3 months. Police allowed the reopening in August but
within minutes revealed orders to close it for 3 months. The Diyarbakir
governor allowed it to reopen 2 months later in October. The HRA branch
in Van was also closed for 3 months in May but reopened in August
without incident. In February the authorities closed the Malatya HRA
branch indefinitely for possessing illegal publications (such as banned
issues of otherwise legal newspapers). However, in April a court ruled
that there were no criminal grounds for closure, and it reopened in
June. At the end of the year, mostly for reasons linked to ongoing
protests over F-type prisons (see Section 1.c.), authorities closed HRA
branches in Malatya, Gaziantep, Van, and Konya.
Mazlum-DER's Sanliurfa branch reopened in April. The office had
been closed since December 1998 after members had made allegedly
``separatist'' statements in the press regarding the ban on headscarves
in public buildings. The Malatya branch remained closed.
In September an international summer program held by the Helsinki
Citizen's Assembly (HCA) in Canakkale was closed by Turkish authorities
two days after opening. Although no official reason was given for
closure, it is possible that the participation of Armenian students may
have played a role. The HCA generally has not experienced this kind of
closure problem.
The Mersin Migrants' Association (Goc-Der), which was shut down in
1998, in February was given written permission by the Mersin governor
to reopen. The Kurdish-led organization assists migrants from the
southeast. Goc-Der had been closed pending a verdict in a case accusing
its founders of several technical violations of Turkey's Associations
Law and of possession of illegal publications. In December 1999, a
court acquitted the defendants of all but one minor charge and fined
them $2 (1.5 million TL).
In May student associations at Diyarbakir's Dicle University and
Van's Centennial University were closed for 3 months, along with two
Diyarbakir ``cultural centers.'' In September the leaders of an Islamic
youth organization (National Youth Foundation) said that the police
ordered the closure of 28 regional offices of their organization. The
National Youth Foundation is affiliated with the Islamist Fazilet
party.
The harassment of lawyers involved in political cases in the
southeast continued. An increased number of attorneys are willing to
defend politically sensitive cases and provide greater mutual support
within the profession. However, attorneys still face criminal charges
and other harassment, particularly if they defend clients accused of
terrorism or illegal political activity, pursue torture cases, or seek
prompt access to their clients (which police often view as
interference).
During the year, attorneys in several cases were charged with
various offenses (such as acting on behalf of illegal organizations),
and were detained, searched, or threatened. The lawyer for the
teenagers tortured in Manisa (see Section 1.c.) was put on trial for
allegedly showing pictures of the accused policemen to the media,
although her lawyer claimed that the television cameras had viewed an
open case file. In November attorney Zeki Ruzgar, who was convicted in
December 1999 of ``membership in an illegal organization'' and
sentenced to 15 years in jail, was acquitted of all charges by the
Court of Cassation.
The trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers entered its sixth year at the
Diyarbakir SSC, with prosecutors in October calling for significant
sentences against some of the defendants, who were charged in 1993 to
1994 with ``aiding and abetting the PKK'' and ``membership in an
illegal terror organization.'' Allegations in the indictment include
legal behavior such as filing a petition with the ECHR. Some 16 of the
lawyers alleged that they were tortured while in incommunicado
detention after their arrests. The lawyers were free pending trial at
year's end. Human rights monitors believe that their prosecution is
intended to punish them for representing clients unpopular with the
Government and publicizing human rights violations in the southeast
(see Section 1.e.).
In Elazig two lawyers had not yet stood trial based on their 1999
indictment for ``slandering government officials.'' The new Prosecution
of Civil Servants law prohibits making false accusations against public
employees based on ``enmity, hatred, or slandering;'' the lawyers are
charged with having stated publicly that an alternative medical report
showed that their client had been tortured by security officials. No
new cases are believed to have been opened under this provision during
the year.
Dr. Seyfettin Kizilkan filed his second appeal to the Court of
Cassation for a reversal of the Diyarbakir SSC's reconfirmed decision
to sentence him to more than 20 years' imprisonment for ``assisting and
sheltering an illegal organization.'' Dr. Kizilkan was the director of
Diyarbakir's largest hospital and was arrested after police allegedly
found bomb materials and PKK documents in his home. Dr. Kizilkan and
his associates maintain that the police planted the evidence. He has
been transferred out of the state of emergency region to a government
hospital in the Black Sea region and was free pending the outcome of
his appeal at year's end. The case against Dr. Zeki Uzun, who was
accused of aiding illegal organizations by providing medical reports
and treatment, ended with his acquittal in March (see Section 1.c.).
Some observers claim that Uzun, and others associated with the Izmir
HRF Torture Treatment Center, have been harassed for their work with
torture victims.
Former HRA Chairman Akin Birdal, who was released from jail in
September (see Section 2.a.), faces additional charges in two cases. He
is accused of ``insulting the moral being of the State'' based on a
1998 speech in Urfa to the HRA, while the other trial is based on a
1995 speech in Tarsus for ``inciting racial or religious enmity.''
A court case was opened in 1998 against 12 policemen accused of
torturing the September 1997 ``Musa Anter Peace Train'' detainees. The
case was due to continue with the next trial session in March 2001, but
may be suspended under the newly-passed law for probational release of
prisoners since the charge was mistreatment (Penal Code Article 245)
rather than torture (Article 243). Legal proceedings against some of
the organizers ended in 1998 with an acquittal.
Representatives of diplomatic missions who wish to monitor human
rights are free to speak with private citizens, groups, and government
officials. Security police routinely place such official visitors in
the southeast under visible surveillance for reasons that may include
an effort to intimidate those they meet, as well as legitimate
protection concerns. Visiting foreign government officials and
legislators were able to meet with human rights monitors.
Representatives of international governmental organizations were able
to visit Leyla Zana and Akin Birdal in prison, in accordance with
Turkey's international obligations. There were no public reports of
officials representing foreign governments being denied permission for
such visits.
In May State Minister for Human Rights Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik
resigned. He was replaced by Rustu Kazim Yucelen. In September Minister
Yucelen began a series of meetings with governmental and civil society
leaders. Ten meetings were held in provinces throughout the country and
were designed to allow all provinces an opportunity to send
representatives. The first meeting, in Tunceli, was attended by more
than 200 government and NGO representatives who discussed human rights
problems. Participants in other meetings noted the importance of
establishing such a dialog, and a range of human rights groups took
part. In late November, the Government passed regulations establishing
permanent Provincial and Sub-Provincial Human Rights Councils, which
will institutionalize consultations among NGO's, professional
organizations, and the Government. These councils are being formed and
some have held introductory meetings.
In February the High Council for Human Rights Coordination (HCHRC)
drafted a report on the reforms needed in order for Turkey to comply
with the EU'S ``Copenhagen Criteria'' of democratization and human
rights. The report, also known as the ``Demirok Report,'' was adopted
by the High Council (composed of representatives from the Justice,
Interior, Education, Health, and Foreign Affairs Ministries, along with
representatives of the security forces). The Cabinet adopted the report
in September as a working and reference document. The report details
dozens of constitutional, legislative, and administrative reforms
necessary for compliance with EU political standards and underlines the
immediate importance of reforms in the area of free expression.
The mandate of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee is to
oversee compliance with the human rights provisions of domestic law and
international agreements, investigate alleged abuses, and prepare
reports. The Committee undertook a review of systemic human rights
problems, including but not limited to problems in prisons and other
places of detention such as police stations (see Section 1.c.). In
December the Committee formed permanent sub-committees on prisons and
the Provincial/Sub-Provincial Human Rights Councils.
In August the Government signed two U.N. covenants, on Civil and
Political Rights and on Economic and Social Rights. They had not yet
been ratified by year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution proclaims Turkey to be a secular state, regards
all citizens as equal, and prohibits discrimination on ethnic,
religious, or racial grounds; however, discrimination remains a problem
in several areas. The Government officially recognizes only Eastern
Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, and Jewish adherents as minorities
covered under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Spousal abuse is
serious and widespread. According to the Family Research Institute in
the Prime Minister's office, beating in the home is one of the most
frequent forms of violence against women. Despite 1998 legislation that
made spousal abuse illegal, complaints of beatings, threats, economic
pressure, and sexual violence continue. According to a survey done in
April by Istanbul University, at least 10 percent of women experience
violence on a daily or weekly basis.
Spousal abuse is considered an extremely private matter, involving
societal notions of family honor. Few women go to the police, who in
any case are reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes and frequently
advise women to return to their husbands. The 1998 law allows women to
apply for restraining orders against their husbands and therefore to
stay in their own homes. Observers and government officials note that
this program has been very successful in some of the cities and rural
areas of the country but less so in the more traditional southeast. The
law is also limited to spouses, and therefore does not address some
other sources of violence such as in-laws. Citizens of either sex may
file civil or criminal charges for abuse but rarely do so.
There are 9 shelters and 6 consultation centers for battered women;
in addition the child protection and social services agency provides
services to victims of domestic violence through its 19 social centers.
Several private shelters that had previously been in operation closed
due to lack of funds.
Laws and ingrained societal notions make it difficult to prosecute
sexual assault or rape cases. Although national police statistics show
about 1,200 complaints of rape through November, there is no
information on what percentage of rape incidents are reported. ``Honor
murders''--the killing by immediate family members of women who are
suspected of being unchaste--continue in rural areas and among recent
immigrants to cities; according to media reports, there may be dozens
of such murders every year. Under the law, killings that were
``provoked'' (such as honor killings) can receive a lighter sentence
than other types of murders. Because of further sentence reductions for
juvenile offenders, observers note that young male relatives often are
designated to perform the killing. Government authorities have tried to
send a clear message of intolerance for this practice through the
prosecution of those responsible for the murders, but it continues.
Another dimension of this problem is suicides among young girls forced
into marriage. Such suicides are most common in the southeast, where
suicides have risen more than 50 percent since 1993 and where 80
percent of suicides are by women. The traditional practice of
``virginity testing'' continues, despite governmental regulations
prohibiting it unless requested by the woman.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
Some laws still discriminate against women. The Civil Code
prohibits granting gender-based privileges or rights but retains some
discriminatory provisions concerning marital rights and obligations.
Because the husband is the legal head of household, he is authorized to
choose the domicile and represents the conjugal unit. As parents,
husband and wife exercise joint child rearing rights, but when they
disagree, the husband's view often prevails. A single woman who gives
birth to a child out of wedlock is not considered automatically to be
the legal guardian of her child; a court decision may be required.
Divorce law requires that the divorcing spouses divide their property
according to property registered in each spouse's name. Because in most
cases property is registered in the husband's name, this provision can
create difficulties for women who wish to divorce. Under inheritance
laws, a widow generally receives one-fourth of the estate, and her
children receive the rest. According to a 1994 government survey,
households headed by women have 50 percent less income than those
headed by men.
The literacy rate for women is 78 percent, compared with 94 percent
for men, but in rural areas the rate can be as low as 50 percent for
women, according to 1999 statistics. One reason for this is that men
must serve in the army, and if they do not know how to read they are
taught upon entry.
Particularly in urban areas, women continue to improve their
position, including in the professions, business, and the civil
service. They constitute 35 percent of the students in universities.
However, they continue to face discrimination to varying degrees. Women
are generally underrepresented in managerial-level positions. Women
generally receive equal pay for equal work in the professions,
business, and civil service jobs, although a large percentage of women
employed in agriculture and in the trade, restaurant, and hotel sectors
work as unpaid family help. Women may take the examination to become
governors or subgovernors; several are subgovernors.
Independent women's groups and women's rights associations continue
to increase in number. There are many women's committees affiliated
with local bar associations. Other organizations include the
Association to Support Women Candidates (Ka-Der), ``The Flying Broom''
women's advocacy group, the Turkish Women's Union, and the Foundation
for the Evaluation of Women's Labor. The concept of lobbying for
women's rights, including greater elected representation, is gaining
momentum. Women continue to be very active in ongoing debates between
secularists and Islamists, especially with respect to the right to
choose whether to wear religious head coverings in public places, such
as government offices and universities.
Children.--The Government is committed to furthering children's
welfare and works to expand opportunities in education and health,
including a further reduction in the infant mortality rate. The State
Minister for Women's and Family issues oversees implementation of the
Government's programs for children. During the year, the Government
established a Children's Rights Monitoring and Assessment High Council
to focus on children's rights issues.
Government-provided education through the age of 14 or the eighth
grade is compulsory. Traditional family values in rural areas place a
greater emphasis on advanced education for sons than for daughters; the
relatively new 8-year compulsory education requirement (implemented in
1998) was expected to allow more girls to continue their education. In
practice in rural Anatolia, the literacy rate for girls is very low,
and many do not complete primary school. The literacy rate for boys,
most of whom complete primary school, is higher. Some continue on to
high school, for which they generally must travel or live away from
home (see Section 1.g.).
The social security system aims to provide social security and
health insurance for all its citizens, but there are still gaps in this
coverage, leaving about 20 percent of families and their children
without coverage, according to the June UNICEF report on ``The State of
Women and Children in Turkey.'' Persons not covered by insurance may
use a special program to access public health care. In terms of
immunization, infant mortality, and malnutrition, Turkey's standards
remain at levels that are not compatible with the level of development
and resources in the country, according to the UNICEF report.
Currently, only about 40 percent of children aged 12 to 23 months are
fully immunized. Infant mortality has rapidly declined over the past
decade, and as of 1998 stood at 43 per 1,000.
Although the law provides special safeguards for children in police
custody, police officers and prosecutors frequently circumvent or
ignore these provisions. The law stipulates that the state prosecutor
or a designated assistant should carry out interrogations of minors and
that minors must be provided with lawyers; however, in practice police
and prosecutors often deny minors access to lawyers and fail to inform
parents. Children and juveniles detained under the Anti-Terror Law also
often are held for up to 4 days in incommunicado detention. In
September the Minister of Justice and the head of Ankara's Bar
Association signed an agreement allowing the Bar Association to inspect
two children's prison facilities in Ankara, the first such arrangement.
Children have suffered greatly from the cycle of violence in the
southeast. The migration--forced or voluntary--of many families, past
terrorism against teachers, and school closings in the southeast have
uprooted children and moved them to cities that are hard pressed to
find the resources to provide basic, mandatory services such as
schooling. Many cities in the southeast are operating schools on double
shifts, with as many as 100 students per classroom (see Section 1.g.).
The Government has built regional boarding schools to help deal with
this problem, but they are insufficient in number.
Instances of child beating and abuse are reported more frequently
than in previous years, according to women's groups. The increase
likely is attributable to greater public awareness of the problem.
Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility
to buildings and public transportation for the disabled. According to
the June UNICEF report on women and children in Turkey, welfare
institutions ``provide limited financial, employment and educational
support to the handicapped.'' According to the report, the number of
disabled persons is unknown. The Ministry of Education reports that
there are 1.1 million disabled children in the country. Although there
are many institutions for the disabled, most attention to disabled
persons remains at the individual and family level. The Government
established an ``Administration of Disabilities'' office under the
Prime Ministry in 1997, with the mandate of developing cooperation and
coordination among national and international institutions, and to
conduct research into issues such as delivery of services. Certain
categories of employers are required to hire disabled persons as 2
percent of their employee pool, although there is no penalty for
failure to comply.
Religious Minorities.--Jews and numerous Christian denominations
are generally free to practice their religions and report little
discrimination in daily life. However, there are restrictions on
clerical training and on the Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul, and police
disrupted several Christian religious gatherings on the grounds that
they were being held in unauthorized locations.
The Government restricts the Orthodox Patriarch by requiring that
he be a Turkish citizen and that his selection be approved by the
Government. In addition in 1971 the Government closed the only
remaining Orthodox theological seminary in the country. As a result,
Orthodox citizens have no access to theological training--requisite to
become an Orthodox Priest--in Turkey.
In May police raided a small Christian congregation in the Avcilar
district of Istanbul and arrested six Turkish citizens, an American,
and an Australian. They were charged with opening a Christian training
institute without legal permission. The defendants were charged with
violating Law 2911, which ``prohibits unauthorized meetings and
demonstrations.'' The defendants maintained that they completed the
required applications to hold meetings with the assistance of local
police officials. The case is currently pending.
Jews and numerous Christian denominations freely practice their
religions and report little discrimination in daily life. Some
incidents still occur, and extremist groups or individuals target
minority communities from time to time. However, during the year no
attacks were reported on minority community properties. No perpetrators
have been arrested or charged in a 1998 arson attack on the Orthodox
shrine, now a museum, at Saint Therapon where the custodian was killed;
nor in the December 1997 bombing at the Orthodox Patriarchate. Police
protection increased after the 1998 attack, and investigations
continue. In June, 33 persons were convicted and given the death
penalty for ``trying to change the constitutional regime,'' for their
role in setting a July 1993 fire in which 37 secularist intellectuals
(mainly Alawi Muslims) died.
No laws prohibit religious conversion. Nonetheless individuals
contemplating conversion, especially to Christianity, often face family
and community pressures, and proselytizing remains socially
unacceptable. Some members of religious minorities claim that they have
limited career prospects in government or military service as a result
of their religious affiliation. There are no non-Muslim senior officers
in the military, according to a senior military official, because non-
Muslims do not apply to attend the military academy, and officers must
be graduates.
Many religious minority members, along with many in the secular
political majority of Muslims, fear the possibility of Islamic
extremism and the involvement of even moderate Islam in politics.
Islamist journals frequently publish anti-Semitic material.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution does not
recognize the Kurds as a national, racial, or ethnic minority, although
they are in fact the country's largest ethnic and linguistic minority.
There are no legal barriers to ethnic Kurds' participation in political
and economic affairs, and many M.P.''s, senior officials, and
professionals are Kurds; however, Kurds who publicly or politically
assert their Kurdish identity or publicly espouse using Kurdish in the
public domain risk public censure, harassment, or prosecution. In March
the Court of Cassation for the first time affirmed a lower court
decision to allow a Turkish citizen to change registry records and give
his daughter a Kurdish-language, rather than Turkish, first name. Kurds
who are long-term residents in industrialized cities in the West are in
many cases assimilated into the political, economic, and social life of
the nation, and much intermarriage has occurred over many generations.
Kurds currently migrating westward (including those displaced by the
conflict in the southeast) bring with them their culture and village
identity, but often little education and few skills.
Private spoken and printed communications in Kurdish are legal;
however, the use of minority languages, including Kurdish, in
television and radio broadcasts, by political parties, and in schools
is restricted by a plethora of laws and even articles of the
Constitution (see Section 2.a.); these restrictions are invoked
arbitrarily. Although some senior politicians, including the Prime
Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem,
and the head of the intelligence service have asserted that the
Government should allow Kurdish broadcasting, no changes to the
applicable laws were made.
The Government circumscribes the activities of organizations such
as the MKM, a corporation with branches in several cities outside the
southeast, which was established to promote Kurdish language and
culture (see Section 2.a.).
The Ministry of Education tightly controls the curriculum in
schools (except foreign-language schools not part of the Turkish
system). The small numbers of Greek-language students have little
opportunity to continue their education in Turkey, and consequently
many go to Greece, often never to return.
No accurate accounting of the Romani population exists, but it may
be significant in regions near Bulgaria and Greece. No incidents of
public or government harassment directed against Roma were reported.
However, experts claim that Roma experience discrimination, for
example, regarding employment. In June the head of the Diyanet issued a
circular instructing muftis to educate the public about Turkish Roma
and stressing that Islam considers all persons born equal and without
any sins. The circular instructed muftis to dispel myths that lead to
discrimination against Roma.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers, except police and military
personnel, have the right to associate freely and form representative
unions. This right encompasses civil servants, including
schoolteachers.
The Constitution stipulates that no one shall be compelled to
become, remain a member of, or withdraw from, a labor union. The law
states that unions and confederations may be founded without prior
authorization based on a petition to the governor of the province of
the prospective union's headquarters. Unions are independent of the
Government and political parties. They must obtain official permission
to hold meetings or rallies and must allow police to attend their
conventions and record the proceedings. The Constitution requires
candidates for union office to have worked 10 years in the industry
represented by the union. The Supreme Court in 1998 banned the Disk-
affiliated union in the leather sector, Deri-Is, because it violated
this article in the Constitution and prohibited it from appealing to a
higher court. It applied to the ECHR for redress. The International
Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association has stated
that this provision is extremely prejudicial to the interests of the
trade unions and has urged that it be repealed.
Just over 13 percent of the total civilian labor force (15 years of
age and above) are unionized. The labor force numbers around 22
million, with approximately 43 percent employed in agriculture. There
are four confederations of labor unions: The Turkish Confederation of
Workers Unions (Turk-Is); the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade
Unions (Hak-Is); the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DISK);
and the National Confederation (Misk). There are also 3 public
employees unions and 27 independent unions. Unions and their officers
have a statutory right to express their views on issues directly
affecting members' economic and social interests.
Prosecutors may ask labor courts to order a trade union or
confederation to suspend its activities or to go into liquidation for
serious infractions, based on alleged violation of specific legal
norms. However, the Government may not dissolve a union summarily.
The constitutional right to strike is restricted. For example, the
Constitution does not permit strikes by civil servants, workers engaged
in the protection of life and property, and those in the mining and
petroleum industries, sanitation services, national defense, and
education. The right to strike is suspended for the first 10 years of a
company's operations in the nine free trade zones (see Section 6.b.).
Collective bargaining is required before a strike. The law
specifies the steps that a union must take before it may strike or
before an employer may engage in a lockout. Nonbinding mediation is the
last of those steps. A party that fails to comply with these steps
forfeits its rights. Unions are forbidden to engage in secondary
(solidarity), political, or general strikes, or in slowdowns. The
employer may respond to a strike with a lockout but is prohibited from
hiring strikebreakers or using administrative personnel to perform jobs
normally done by strikers. Article 42 of Law 2822, governing collective
bargaining, strikes, and lockouts, prohibits the employer from
terminating workers who encourage or participate in a legal strike. In
sectors in which strikes are prohibited, disputes are resolved through
binding arbitration.
The Government has the statutory power under Law 2822 to suspend
strikes for 60 days for reasons of national security or public health
and safety. Unions may petition the Council of State to lift such a
suspension. If this appeal fails, and the parties and mediators still
fail to resolve the dispute, the strike is subject to compulsory
arbitration at the end of the 60-day period. The ILO's Committee of
Experts and the Committee on the Application of Standards regard the
Government's application of Law 2822 as too broad, and they have called
on the Government to limit recourse to compulsory arbitration to
essential services in the strict sense of the term. The Government
asserts that the law does not contradict the Committees' principles.
According to the Labor Ministry, from January through November
there were 19 strikes in the public sector involving 11,879 workers and
32 strikes in the private sector involving 6,565 workers. During the
same period there were also 2 lockouts in the private sector involving
2,483 workers.
Public and private sector workers throughout the country went on
strike during the summer to protest efforts by the Government and
employers to keep pay raises in line with the Government's planned
inflation rate of 25 percent.
Some labor union members faced government limits on freedom of
speech and assembly (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.), while some civil
service organizations continued to demonstrate for the right to strike
and for higher salaries. Legislation providing the right to strike for
civil servants was introduced in the last parliamentary session but was
not adopted. Civil servants currently have the right to organize and
engage in collective bargaining.
All defendants were acquitted in the trial, begun in 1996, against
Turk-Is Chairmanship Council officials who were charged with violating
the Associations Law when Turk-Is announced support for political
parties during the 1995 election. No action has been taken in a second
trial against Turk-Is officials charged with holding illegal
demonstrations in 1995 to protest a deadlock in collective bargaining.
With government approval, unions may and do form confederations and
join international labor bodies, as long as these organizations are not
hostile to Turkey or to freedom of religion or belief. The
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), of which
Turk-Is had been an affiliate for years, approved DISK as an affiliate
in 1992; Hak-Is became a member in 1997.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All industrial
workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and most
industrial and some public sector agricultural workers are organized.
The law requires that, in order to become a bargaining agent, a union
must represent not only 50 percent plus 1 of the employees at a given
work site, but also 10 percent of all the workers in that particular
industry. This barrier has the effect of favoring established unions,
particularly those affiliated with Turk-Is, the confederation that
represents nearly 73 percent of organized labor.
The Ministry of Labor reportedly manipulated membership figures to
prevent unions from acquiring bargaining rights or to rescind such
rights. The ICFTU reports that, as a result of the law, workers in many
sectors of economic activity are not covered by a collective agreement.
The ILO has called on the Government to rescind this 10 percent
rule, stating that it violates ILO Convention 98. However, both Turk-Is
and the Turkish employers' organization favor retention of the 10
percent rule, since each confederation has an established membership
area and does not want the status quo upset. In 1994 the Government
informed the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards that the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security proposed to remove the 10 percent
numerical restriction and that it had communicated its proposal to the
social partners. The ILO took note of the Government's statement that
it continued to study removal of this requirement despite objections
from employer and worker organizations. However, since then the
Government has taken no further action.
The law on trade unions stipulates that an employer may not dismiss
a labor union representative without rightful cause. The union member
may appeal such a dismissal to the courts, and if the ruling is in the
union member's favor, the employer must reinstate him and pay all back
benefits and salary. These laws generally are applied in practice.
The ILO has urged the Government to take the necessary measures to
ensure that workers have effective protection against antiunion
discrimination. Some private sector employers continued to try to
eliminate unions. A total of 414,000 workers in the public sector were
dismissed within the last 2 years. As a result of the privatization of
128 entities in 12 sectors, 10,746 workers were laid off.
The continuing state of emergency in the southeast has resulted in
restrictions on labor organizations in four provinces. A law enacted in
1984 provides for the establishment of free trade zones, which are
intended to attract domestic and especially foreign investment, and to
promote international trade. There are nine such zones operating in
Mersin, Antalya, the Aegean region, Trabzon, Istanbul (two), Eastern
Anatolia, Mardin, and Rize. Union organizing and collective bargaining
are permitted in the zones. However, the right to strike is suspended
for the first 10 years of operation of a particular business in the
zone. In the meantime, labor disputes that cannot be settled by the
parties are subject to compulsory arbitration. Workers inside the zones
are paid in foreign exchange rather than in Turkish currency, giving
them a hedge against inflation.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
statutes prohibit compulsory labor, including that performed by
children, and the Government generally enforces these provisions in
practice; however, trafficking in foreign women and girls for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution and labor laws forbid the full-time
employment of children younger than age 15, with the exception that
those 13 and 14 years of age may engage in light, part-time work if
enrolled in school or vocational training. The Constitution also states
that ``no one shall be required to perform work unsuited to his/her
age, sex, and capacity.'' With this article and related laws, the
Government undertakes to protect children from work unsuited to their
age and capacity, such as underground mining and from working at night.
According to Article 67 of the Labor Law, children who attend school
can work no more than 7.5 hours a day, inclusive of school time. The
Ministry of Labor effectively enforces these laws only in largescale
industrial and service sector enterprises. Children working in
agriculture, in household-based establishments, in establishments with
three or fewer workers, in apprenticeship training centers, and those
working as domestic servants are subject to the Code of Obligations,
which fails to provide a minimum age of employment. However, according
to Article 174 of the Code of Obligations, children between the ages of
12 and 16 years may not work at night and may work for no more than 8
hours a day.
Child labor is widespread. According to a June United Nations
Children's Fund report, 1.07 million children between the ages of 6 and
14 and 2.4 million children between the ages of 15 and 17 are in the
labor force. This represents about six percent of all children aged 6
to 14, and 60 percent of those aged 15 to 17. According to an October
1999 State Statistics Institute report, 961,000 children work in family
businesses and do not receive wages, 257,000 are seasonal workers, and
387,000 are wage earners. Some 1.1 million of the working children are
boys. Child labor is used most often in small-sized enterprises.
According to official data, 87 percent of working children are employed
by small-sized enterprises having 1 to 9 workers, 7 percent work in
medium-size enterprises (10 to 24 workers), and 6 percent are employed
by large-scale enterprises (more than 25 workers).
In practice many children work because families need the
supplementary income. An informal system provides work for young boys
at low wages, for example, in auto repair shops. Girls rarely are seen
working in public, but many are kept out of school to work in
handicrafts, especially in rural areas. The bulk of child labor occurs
in rural areas and often is associated with traditional family economic
activity, such as farming or animal husbandry. It is common for entire
families to work together to bring in the harvest.
The gradual elimination of child labor is a national priority. The
seventh 5-year development plan, which ran through this year, committed
the Government to enact legislation to restrict further child labor and
to adopt legislation to conform to relevant international conventions.
The Government recognizes the serious problem of child labor and works
with the ILO to document its extent and to determine solutions.
The Ministry of Labor, the ILO'S International Program on the
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) government partner, actively has been
combating child labor since 1992, when it established a child labor
unit and trained Ministry of Labor inspectors specifically in child
labor issues. In 1996 the Government and the ILO signed an agreement to
extend IPEC until December 2001. Currently some 70 of the 700 field
inspectors are trained to handle child labor issues, while the total
number of establishments falling within the jurisdiction of the
Ministry is 4 million. Labor inspectors only cover areas that are
defined in the labor laws. Many children are working in areas that are
not covered by labor laws, such as agriculture or the informal economy
and are therefore beyond the reach of the inspectorate.
With the introduction in 1998 of the 8-year compulsory education
program (previously, 5 years were compulsory), the Government expected
the number of child workers to be reduced significantly, since children
are required to attend school until age 14. As yet, no statistics are
available concerning the impact of the mandatory 8-year education on
child labor.
Small enterprises prefer child labor because it is cheaper and
provides practical training for the children, who subsequently are
preferred for future employment in the same workplace. If children
employed in these businesses are registered with a Ministry of National
Education training center, they go to the center once a week for
training, and the centers are obliged by law to inspect their
workplaces. Currently there are 318 centers located in 80 cities. These
centers provide apprenticeship training in 86 occupations. Only 22.8
percent of working children take advantage of these schools.
The Constitution prohibits compulsory labor, including that
performed by children, and the laws generally are enforced; however,
trafficking in foreign girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is
a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor is obliged
legally to set minimum wages at least every 2 years through a minimum
wage board, a tripartite government-industry-union body. In recent
years, it has done so annually. However, during the year there were two
adjustments: the nominal minimum wage was increased in January by 15
percent and again in July by 10 percent, compared with an annual
inflation rate of nearly 34 percent. Public workers who are part of
collective labor agreements also received an inflationindexed increase
and a 5 percent prosperity rate increase. The monthly gross minimum
wage rates, which became effective in July, were approximately $180
(118.8 million TL) for workers over age 16, and $110 (75 million TL)
for workers under 16.
The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. It would be difficult for a single worker, and
impossible for a family, to live on the minimum wage without support
from other sources. Most workers earn considerably more. According to
the results of an August survey conducted by the Public Workers' Labor
Union, a four-member family requires $834 (534 million TL) per month to
live above the poverty line. Workers covered by the labor law, who
constitute about one-third of the total labor force, also receive a hot
meal or a daily food allowance and other fringe benefits that,
according to the Turkish Employers' Association, make basic wages alone
account for only about 37.3 percent of total compensation.
The labor law sets a 45-hour workweek, although most unions have
bargained for fewer hours. The law prescribes a weekly rest day and
limits the number of overtime hours to 3 per day, for up to 90 days in
a year. The Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor effectively
enforces wage and hour provisions in the unionized industrial, service,
and government sectors, which cover about 12 percent of workers.
The law mandates occupational health and safety regulations, but in
practice the Government does not carry out effective inspection and
enforcement programs. Law 1475 allows for the shutdown of an operation
if a five-person committee, which includes safety inspectors, employee,
and employer representatives, determines that the operation endangers
workers' lives. In practice financial constraints, limited safety
awareness, carelessness, and fatalistic attitudes result in scant
attention to occupational safety and health by workers and employers
alike. The law sets out procedures under which workers may remove
themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Government deals with the problem
of trafficking in persons through laws relevant to prostitution and
illegal immigration. The Ministries of Justice and the Interior are
responsible for the problem, and the police, especially the immigration
and organized crime authorities, enforce antitrafficking laws. Under
the Penal Code, it is illegal to abduct and detain a woman or child.
However, this law relates more to the old custom of kidnaping a bride,
in which punishment is suspended if adbuctor and abductee get married.
A further provision prohibits enticement to prostitution; however,
penalties are light (up to 2 years' imprisonment). A further article of
the Penal Code makes it a crime to send a prostitute from one place to
another by force or fraud. These laws, and those dealing with illegal
immigration, are most relevant to trafficking in persons.
Turkey is a major destination and transit country for trafficking
in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution. The
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and domestic NGO's
stated that most trafficked women in the country are from Albania,
Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. Arrests (and in most cases,
deportations) of nationals from Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine rose from
6,700 in 1998 to approximately 11,000 in 1999, according to IOM.
According to the Turkish National Police, 232 Moldovan, 293 Romanian,
and 175 Ukrainian women were extradited in 2000. African and Asian
women use Turkey as a transit point to other countries in Europe.
Organized crime groups appear to be the primary trafficking
organizations. The Ministry of the Interior's organized crime
department is responsible for combating trafficking. According to
NGO's, victims of trafficking receive no governmental assistance and
the trafficking cycle continues. Many women and girls come to the
country believing that they have legitimate work as models,
entertainers, governesses, or translators. In some cases, girls from
Romanian orphanages have been kidnaped. Most of the activity occurs in
Istanbul, Izmir, and Trabzon. Once in the country, the trafficked women
and girls are in debt bondage to their traffickers, who are members of
the mafia (mainly Russian). Women who attempt to escape often are
beaten, gang-raped, or killed. The Government addresses this problem
with laws relating to illegal migration and unregistered prostitution;
registered prostitution is legal.
Reportedly there is almost no trafficking in Turkish women or
girls. There were no reports of trafficking in children for the purpose
of forced labor; legislation in this area addresses the issue (see
Section 6.d.).
There is little formal interagency cooperation in dealing with the
problem of trafficking. Representatives from the Ministries of
Interior, Justice, and Health, among other ministries and NGO's, have
met on this issue. The Alien's Department of the police is the most
active governmental entity addressing this problem.
The Government does not provide any formal protection, aid, or
education to victims of trafficking. Since the women being trafficked
are not usually from Turkey, preventive education is less applicable.
Women's shelters are open to women regardless of citizenship.
__________
TURKMENISTAN
Turkmenistan, a one-party state dominated by its president and his
closest advisers, continues to exercise power in a Soviet-era
authoritarian style despite Constitutional provisions nominally
establishing a democratic system. The seriously flawed December 1999
parliamentary elections and the passage of a law exempting President
Saparmurat Niyazov from term limits were backward steps. Niyazov, head
of the Turkmen Communist Party since 1985 (renamed the Democratic Party
in 1992) and President of Turkmenistan since its independence in 1991,
legally may remain in office until his death. Niyazov retained his
monopoly on power, and the Democratic Party, the renamed Communist
Party, remained the sole political party in the country. The Government
registered no parties during the year and continued to repress all
opposition political activities. Emphasizing stability and gradual
reform, official nation-building efforts focused on fostering Turkmen
nationalism and the glorification of President Niyazov. The 50-member
unicameral Parliament (Mejlis) has no genuinely independent authority,
and in practice the President controls the judicial system.
The Committee on National Security (KNB) has the responsibilities
formerly held by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB); namely,
to ensure that the regime remains in power through tight control of
society and repression of dissent. The KNB reportedly exercises wide
discretion over issues such as exit visas and Internet access and works
to limit personal freedoms. The Ministry of Internal Affairs directs
the criminal police, which works closely with the KNB on matters of
national security. Both forces committed serious human rights abuses.
Turkmenistan is largely a desert with cattle and sheep raising,
intensive agriculture in irrigated areas, and huge oil and gas
reserves. Its economy remains dependent on central planning mechanisms
and state control, although the Government has taken a number of small
steps to make the transition to a market economy. Agriculture,
particularly cotton cultivation, accounts for nearly half of total
employment. Gas, oil and gas derivatives, and cotton account for almost
all of the country's export revenues. Negotiations between the
Government and an international gas consortium concerning the
construction of a gas export pipeline across the Caspian Sea--the
Trans-Caspian Pipeline--stalled in the latter half of the year. While
the idea for the pipeline still exists, the Government is focusing
instead on negotiating large gas deals with Russia and Ukraine. It is
also considering projects for pipelines through Iran and Afghanistan,
as well as a pipeline to China.
The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor. The
Government continued to commit serious human rights abuses, and the
authorities in particular severely restricted political and civil
liberties. Citizens do not have the ability to change their government
peacefully. In 1999 one political prisoner died in custody under
suspicious circumstances. Security forces continued to beat and
otherwise mistreat suspects and prisoners, and prison conditions
remained poor and unsafe. Both the criminal police and the KNB operate
with relative impunity and abused the rights of individuals as well as
enforced the Government's policy of repressing political opposition.
Arbitrary arrest and detention, prolonged pretrial detention, and
unfair trials remained problems. Approximately 12,000 prisoners were
amnestied and released during the year; 2 were political prisoners. An
additional 2,000 received a reduction of sentence. Interference with
citizens' privacy remained a problem. During the year, the Government
demolished hundreds of private homes in and around Ashgabat with very
little notice given to the owners in order to make room for large urban
building projects such as luxury apartments, government buildings, and
monuments; many displaced homeowners received little or no compensation
for their loss.
The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and does not
permit freedom of the press. In May the Government withdrew the
operating licenses of all private Internet providers, leaving only
state-owned Turkmen Telecom as a service provider. The Government
completely controls the media, censoring all newspapers and never
permitting independent criticism of government policy. Criticism of
officials is only permitted if it directed at those who have fallen out
of favor with the President. The focus of the media on President
Niyazov, around whom a personality cult has been built, intensified
during the year. The President's father and mother have been
incorporated more fully into the cult. Academic freedom has also
declined. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and association.
The Government imposes restrictions on nonregistered religious groups.
The law on religion reaffirms a number of important religious freedoms
but also tightens government control of religious groups. The
requirement that religious organizations have at least 500 Turkmen
citizens as members in a given locality to be registered legally has
prevented all but Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians from
legally establishing themselves. Repression of religious minorities
continued during the year, although it abated somewhat during the
summer following a government decree against unlawful searches that was
issued in April. At least 10 non-governmental groups were registered
during the year; 8 were affiliated with Sunni Muslim. Government
restrictions on travelling abroad, including for educational and
training purposes, tightened during the year. The Government has also
increased restrictions on internal travel, limiting travel of both
citizens and non-citizens to border cities and regions. Domestic
violence against women is a problem, and women experience societal
discrimination. The Government generally gave favored treatment to men
over women and to ethnic Turkmen over minorities.
In January 1999, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) opened an office in Ashgabat.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--In September 1999,
political prisoner and Russian citizen Khoshali Garayev was found
hanged in his cell in the maximum security prison in Turkmenbashi.
Following his death, the Government rejected requests in 1999 from the
Russian Government and international human rights organizations for an
investigation into the suspicious nature of Garayev's death (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The 1992 Constitution makes torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment illegal; however, there were widespread
credible reports that security officials frequently beat criminal
suspects and prisoners and often used force to obtain confessions.
There were credible reports that political prisoners are singled out
for cruel treatment. There were reports that prisoners needing medical
treatment have been beaten on their way to and from the hospital.
Security forces also used denial of medical treatment and food, verbal
intimidation, and placement in unsanitary conditions to coerce
confessions. In November four Protestants were tortured while in police
custody and at least three of them subsequently had their homes and
cars confiscated after being forced to sign a statement saying that
they voluntarily had donated all they owned as a gift to the President
(see Section 2.c.).
Prison conditions are poor, and prisons are unsanitary,
overcrowded, and unsafe. Disease, particularly tuberculosis, is
rampant. Food is poor and prisoners depend on relatives to supplement
inadequate food supplies. Those who do not receive food from relatives
suffer greatly. Facilities for prisoner rehabilitation and recreation
are extremely limited. Some prisoners have died due to overcrowding,
untreated illnesses, and lack of adequate protection from the severe
summer heat. In Turkmenbashy prison, inmates reportedly are housed 14
to a cell and are permitted visits from relatives once every 3 months,
who may bring food once every 2 months. In Kizlkaya prison, near
Dashoguz, prisoners are forced to work in a kaolin mine under hazardous
and unhealthy conditions (see Sections 2.b. and 6.c.). In September
1999, a political prisoner was found hanged in his cell under
suspicious circumstances (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.).
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions. The OSCE has repeatedly requested permission from the
Government to visit prisons, but has received no response.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Constitution states that citizens ``have
the right to freedom of belief and the free expression thereof and also
to obtain information unless it is a state, official, or commercial
secret.'' However, in practice those expressing views critical of or
different from those of the Government have been arrested on false
charges of committing common crimes (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
On January 5, the Government arrested Nurberdy Nurmamedov, the head
of the Agzybirlik (Unity) National Movement. Nurmamedov was convicted
of hooliganism and making death threats on a business associate; he was
given a 5-year term in a labor camp, but was amnestied on December 22.
Nurmamedov's son, Murat, was also convicted of hooliganism and
sentenced to 2 years of hard labor, but was put under house arrest
instead of going to prison. The arrests of Nurmamedov and his son
followed shortly after Nurmamedov's statements criticizing the December
12, 1999, Mejlis elections and the decision by the Mejlis to appoint
Niyazov president for life (see Section 2.a.).
In November 1999, the Government sentenced Parahat Yklimov, the
brother of Sapar Yklimov--a former government official who lives
outside the country--to 11 years' imprisonment for financial
misconduct. Prior to his arrest, he reportedly had been warned that his
brother should cease his political activities abroad. His family
reportedly was told by internal security organizations that he would be
released if his brother returned to the country.
The precise number of political detainees held at year's end was
unknown. By law a person accused of a crime can be held in pretrial
detention for up to 10 months. According to the Government, out of a
total of 22,000 prisoners countrywide, some 12,000 prisoners were
amnestied and released by year's end (see Sections 1.e and 3). Among
those amnestied were political prisoners Nurbedy Nurmamedov and Pirkuli
Tanrikuliev. A further 2,000 prisoners were granted a reduction in
sentence. In January 1999, the Government released dissident Gulgeldi
Annaniyazov.
In January there were reports that a Baptist pastor and his wife,
who were residing legally in the country, were deported to Ukraine. In
February the family of jailed Baptist Shageldi Atakov was exiled to a
small village outside of Mary (see Section 2.c.). In March the
authorities forcibly returned to Russia three Baptist preachers and
their families who had been living in Ashgabat and Mary (see Section
2.c.). Also in March, the Government arrested religious leader Hoja
Ahmed Orazgylychev and tore down an unregistered mosque and religious
school run by Orazgylychev and his followers; he subsequently was
released and sentenced to internal exile in Tedjen (see Section 2.c).
This occurred after he reportedly gave an interview to the Government
that was critical of the President.
In November 1999, President Niyazov announced plans to deport to
remote areas any government officials who were found to have committed
crimes. President Niyazov proposed that the officials, accompanied if
they desired by their families, would work off their sentences in
exile. Almost all prominent political opponents of the Government have
chosen to move to either Russia, Sweden, Norway, or the Czech Republic
for reasons of personal safety; none returned during year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
judicial independence; however, in practice, the judiciary is not
independent. The President's power to select and dismiss judges
subordinates the judiciary to the Presidency. The President appoints
all judges for a term of 5 years. The appointments are without
legislative review, except for the Chairman (Chief Justice) of the
Supreme Court, and the President has the sole authority to remove all
appointees from the bench before the completion of their terms.
The court system has not been reformed since the Soviet era. It
consists of a Supreme Court, 6 provincial courts (including 1 for the
city of Ashgabat only), and, at the lowest level, 61 district and city
courts. A Supreme Economic Court hears cases involving disputes between
state-owned enterprises and ministries, and, increasingly, commercial
disputes. The Government abolished all military courts in 1997.
Criminal offenses committed by members of the armed forces are tried in
civilian courts under the authority of the Office of the Prosecutor
General.
The law provides for the rights of due process for defendants,
including a public trial, the right to a defense attorney, access to
accusatory material, and the right to call witnesses to testify on
behalf of the accused. In practice authorities often deny these rights,
and there are no independent lawyers, with the exception of a few
retired legal officials, available to represent defendants. When a
person cannot afford the services of a lawyer, the court appoints one.
A person may represent himself in court.
Lower courts' decisions may be appealed, and the defendant may
petition the President for clemency. The President released over 12,000
inmates from prison in connection with general amnesties during the
year (see Section 1.d. and 3). In practice adherence to due process is
not uniform, particularly in the lower courts in rural areas. Even when
due process rights are observed, the authority of the government
prosecutor vis-a-vis the defense attorney is so great that it is very
difficult for the defendant to receive a fair trial. The Government
denied foreign diplomats access to several supposedly open court
proceedings.
At year's end, the Government held at least one political prisoner,
Mukhametkuli Aimuradov. In January the Government released political
prisoners Nurberdy Nurmamedov and Pirkuly Tanrikuliev as part of a
general amnesty (see Section 1.d.). In September 1999, Russian citizen
Khoshali Garayev, one of two persons convicted in secret before the
Supreme Court in 1995 for antigovernment activities and planning
terrorist actions against government officials, was discovered hanged
in his cell at the maximum security prison in Turkmenbashi. The
Government rejected all requests for an investigation into the
circumstances surrounding Garayev's death (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
In December 1998, he and Mukhamedkuli Aimuradov were sentenced to
additional concurrent terms of 18 years for allegedly attempting to
escape from this prison.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of protection
from arbitrary interference by the State in a citizen's personal life;
however, government authorities violated this right. There are no legal
means to regulate the conduct of surveillance by the state security
apparatus, which regularly monitors the activities of opponents and
critics of the Government. Security officials use physical
surveillance, telephone tapping, electronic eavesdropping, and the
recruitment of informers. Critics of the Government, and many other
people, report credibly that their mail is intercepted before delivery.
In the past, the authorities have dismissed children from school
and removed adults from their jobs because of the political activities
of relatives. Internal security organizations reportedly pressured
relatives of a former government official who left the country to
convince him to return (see Section 1.d.). The relatives of a democracy
activist convicted on charges of embezzlement lost a government job and
access to the state-run university (see Section 2.b.). The authorities
also threaten supporters of opposition political movements with loss of
employment and homes (see Section 2.b.). In October President Niyazov
called for background checks that would span three generations in order
to determine the ``moral character'' of university students prior to
entry (see Section 2.a.).
During the year, the Government demolished hundreds of private
homes in and around Ashgabat at very short notice in order to make way
for large government building projects such as a new sports stadium,
public monuments, and luxury apartments. Those who built their homes
without the appropriate approval from the Government were not offered
alternate accommodations despite their length of occupancy or degree of
hardship. Some of these families continue to live outdoors, near their
destroyed homes, for lack of any alternative. Others who had the proper
building permission have been offered apartments or plots of land in
compensation, but such compensation is often not at fair market value
(i.e. desert plots with no amenities) or inadequate for large families.
In April the President ordered the implementation of new procedures
restricting searches of private homes (see Section 2.c.). The measures
were formally approved by the legislature on June 15 and became
effective immediately.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
right to hold personal convictions and to express them freely; however,
in practice, the Government severely restricts freedom of speech and
does not permit freedom of the press. Criticism of the Government can
lead to personal hardship, including loss of opportunities for
advancement and employment.
The Government completely controls radio and television. It funds
almost all print media. The Government censors newspapers and uses
Turkmen language newspapers to attack its critics abroad; the Committee
for the Protection of State Secrets must approve prepublication
galleys. Russian-language newspapers from abroad are available by
subscription only and are dated. Some Russian and other foreign
newspapers are also available in several Ashgabat hotels. Owners of
satellite dishes have access to foreign television programming. Use of
satellite dishes in Ashgabat appears widespread, but the dishes are too
expensive for poorer residents outside of urban areas.
While Internet access is available, there is now only one provider
for the whole country. On May 29, the Government withdrew the licenses
of all private Internet providers, leaving state-owned Turkmen Telecom
as the sole Internet provider for the whole country. There are credible
reports that the Government took this measure in order to monitor
Internet activity, especially electronic mail. Internet access is
prohibitively expensive for most citizens. For normal usage, monthly
fees average $20 (400,000 manat at the street rate), which is the
amount of the minimum monthly wage.
In June 1999, the tri-language daily Ashgabat dropped its English
and Russian sections and now is printed in Turkmen only. There are no
Russian-language radio broadcasts and only one short Russian-language
news program on television each day. In order to regulate printing and
copying activities, the Government ordered in February 1998 that all
publishing houses and printing and copying establishments obtain a
license and register their equipment.
The Government prohibits the media from reporting the views of
opposition political leaders and critics, and it never allows even the
mildest form of criticism of the President in print. The focus of the
media on President Niyazov, to the exclusion of objective news
reporting, intensified during the year and amplified the cult of
personality centered around the President. Public criticism of
government officials is done almost exclusively by the President
himself. The Government has subjected those responsible for critical
foreign press items to threats and harassment.
In January the Government arrested and sentenced Nurberdy
Nurmamedov, the head of the Agzybirlik (Unity) National Movement, for
hooliganism and making death threats; his son Murat was sentenced for
hooliganism, as well (see Section 1.d.). The arrests followed shortly
after Nurmamedov's statements criticizing the December 12, 1999, Mejlis
elections and the decision by the Mejlis to appoint Niyazov president
for life.
All foreign correspondents who had applied for accreditation,
except the Reuters correspondent, had received it by year's end.
In January 1999 the Government arrested human rights and democracy
advocate Vyacheslav Mamedov for remarks on a Russian radio broadcast
attributed to him that were critical of the Government's treatment of
ethnic Russians. Mamedov was soon released but remained under
investigation, and his nongovernmental organization (NGO) remained
unregistered at year's end.
Intellectuals have reported that the security organs have
instructed them to praise the President in their art and have warned
them not to participate in receptions hosted by foreign diplomatic
missions. The Minister of Culture attends rehearsals of all theater
productions to ensure that they do not contain antigovernment or
antipresidential content. The Ministry of Culture must approve plays
before they open to the public.
The Government also significantly restricts academic freedom. It
does not tolerate criticism of government policy or the President in
academic circles, and it discourages research into areas it considers
politically sensitive, such as comparative law, history, or ethnic
relations. All publishing companies are state-owned and works by
authors of fiction who write about particular periods of history or
other topics that are out-of-favor with the Government are not
published. The government-controlled Union of Writers has in the past
expelled members who have criticized government policy; libraries have
removed their works. The Government abolished the Academy of Sciences
in 1998. No masters' degrees or doctorates have been granted in the
country since that time.
The Government increased restrictions on academic freedom during
the year. Following remarks by President Niyazov on September 27, in
which he criticized an elementary school history textbook for its
portrayal of Turkmen history, all copies of the book were recalled from
schools and most have been destroyed. Scholars are very reluctant to
begin textbook projects. During the year, exit visas for study and
training abroad, particularly for non-ethnic Turkmen, became more
difficult to obtain (see Section 2.d.).
President Niyazov called for background checks that would span
three generations in order to determine the ``moral character'' of
university students prior to entry (see Section 1.f.). The President
also decreed that foreign languages would only be taught in special
language centers located in specific schools.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
allows for peaceful assembly; however, the Government restricts this
right in practice. Permits are required for public meetings and
demonstrations. In the past, there were reports of spontaneous
demonstrations; for example, over bread prices. According to Human
Rights Watch, in August approximately 200 village women who aimed to
bring their grievances before the President were prevented from
entering Ashgabat by police forces. In September a group of
approximately 30 students who had been accepted to study in Turkey but
who had been denied exit visas demonstrated along with their parents in
front of the cabinet of ministers building.
The Constitution allows for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. Unregistered organizations
with political agendas are not allowed to hold demonstrations or
meetings. No political groups critical of government policy have been
able to meet the requirements for registration. The Government uses
laws on the registration of political parties to prevent the emergence
of potential opposition groups. At present the only registered
political party is the Democratic Party, the former Turkmen Communist
Party.
Social and cultural organizations without political aims are
allowed to function, but have found it difficult to register as legal
entities. However, during the year, the Government reportedly
registered at least 10 NGO's: 8 groups affiliated with Sunni Islam (see
Section 2.c.), 1 union of entrepreneurs and inventors, and 1
educational support group. Two registered NGO's that had experienced
legal difficulties and were in danger of being closed down by the
Government earlier in the year had resolved their legal disputes by
year's end. One of the NGO's was in the process of re-registration and
the other, which had not previously been registered, was not registered
but was operating normally.
Theoretically citizens have the freedom to associate with whomever
they please; however, the authorities have fired or threatened to fire
supporters of opposition movements from their jobs, removed them from
professional societies, and even threatened them with the loss of their
homes. In addition some citizens with links to foreigners are subject
to official intimidation. In July 1999, the Government arrested former
parliamentarian and democracy advocate Pirkuli Tanrikuliev on charges
of embezzlement after he discussed forming a new political party with
Western diplomats. Thereafter the Government convicted him, sentenced
him to 8 years in prison, and stripped him of his medical credentials.
Shortly before his arrest, his daughter lost her government job and his
youngest son was removed from the list of those accepted into the
state-run university. He was released under the presidential amnesty in
December.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and does not establish a state religion; however, the
Government imposes restrictions on most religious groups. Citizens are
overwhelmingly Muslim, but Islam does not play a dominant role in
society, in part due to 70 years of Soviet rule. The Government pays
the salaries of Muslim clerics.
There is no state religion, but a modest revival of Islam has
occurred since independence. The Government has incorporated some
aspects of Muslim tradition into its efforts to define a Turkmen
identity. Publication of the President's philosophical and spiritual
guidelines on what it means to be Turkmen, known as ``rukhname,'' has
been delayed several times. There is widespread concern over what
rukhname might mean for individual freedom. The state-supported Council
on Religious Affairs (CRA) is part of the government bureaucracy rather
than an organ for promoting interfaith dialog. The Russian Orthodox
council member wears presidential medals on his clerical vestments.
According to a Keston News Service report, the Council appears to
exercise direct control over the hiring, promotion, and firing of both
Sunni Muslim and Russian Orthodox clergy, despite the fact that this
role is not listed among the CRA's duties in the Law on Religion.
During the year, the Government registered 10 new NGO's, 8 of which
were affiliated with Sunni Islam (see Section 2.b.).
While it affirms a number of important religious freedoms, the Law
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which was amended
in 1995 and again in 1996, also provides for significant government
control of religion. Religious congregations are required to register
with the Government and must have at least 500 Turkmen citizens over
the age of 18 as adherents to be registered. This requirement has
prevented all but Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians from
setting up legal religious organizations. Moreover the Government
applies this 500-member standard on a local basis. A religious group
must have at least 500 adherents in each city in which they wish to be
registered.
This restriction also has caused problems for a number of minority
religions, including the Baha'i Faith, which was registered by the
Government in 1994 only to be deregistered in 1997 when the threshold
was raised to 500 adherents. Members of the Baha'i Faith have been
prevented from conducting services since 1997 and, in 1997 and 1998,
were questioned by internal security representatives for holding
private prayer meetings in their homes. Although the local Baha'i
community in Ashgabat was able to open its center for 1 day in March
1999 to celebrate the Faith's Nowruz (spring) holiday, this year the
community believed that they would not be permitted to open for Nowruz
and therefore did not request permission to open. However, the local
Baha'i community in Ashgabat was able to conduct a memorial service at
a local restaurant in January. In January 1999, the Armenian community
in Turkmenbashi applied to local authorities to use a church
appropriated during the Soviet era as a cultural center pending
registration as a religious organization; however, at year's end, it
had not yet received a response from the Government. The Halk Maslahaty
(People's Council) had not yet reduced the 500 person threshold by
year's end.
Although the law protects freedom of religion, the Government
states officially that proselytizing by unregistered religions--i.e.,
everything other than Sunni Islam and Orthodox Christianity--is
illegal. Government permission is required for any mass meetings or
demonstrations for religious purposes. The Government also restricts
the travel of clergy or members of religious groups to the country.
Islamic religious literature is distributed through the mosques.
Orthodox churches are permitted to offer religious literature.
Unregistered religious groups face government harassment if they
attempt to meet or distribute religious literature. In March border
officials confiscated religious materials being brought into the
country in bulk by a visiting group affiliated with an evangelical
Christian organization.
In August 1999, Shageldi Atakov, a prominent member of the Baptist
faith, was sentenced to 4 years in prison and fined $12,000 (686
million manats)--an astronomical sum considering average wages in the
country amount to $30 (approximately 156,000 manats) a month--for an
alleged illegal transfer of automobiles in 1994 that Atakov denied. On
February 3, the local Committee of National Security (KNB) chief
reportedly expelled Atakov's wife and children from Mary to Kaakha,
where they were told not to leave the town (see Section 1.d.). In March
the Government arrested Atakov's brother Chariyar on unknown charges
and imprisoned him for 15 days. Credible press reports indicate that a
series of efforts to intimidate Baptist congregations throughout the
country took place at the beginning and end of the year, including
raids of homes and confiscation of religious materials. In March the
authorities forcibly returned to Russia three Baptist preachers and
their families who had been living in Ashgabat and Mary (see Section
1.d). At year's end, there were many reports of Baptist churches in
several cities having been harassed by the Government.
The Government also harassed Pentecostals. On February 4, law
enforcement authorities reportedly beat the Pastor and confiscated
religious materials at a Pentecostal facility in Tejen. On February 6,
agents from the KNB broke up a service at a Pentecostal house of
worship in Ashgabat and recorded the names of all those present.
Muslims were also the target of mistreatment. In March the
Government arrested religious leader Hoja Ahmed Orazgylychev and tore
down an unregistered mosque and religious school run by him and his
followers. President Niyazov ordered that all copies of Orazgylychev's
Turkmen translation of the Koran be burned. Orazgylychev subsequently
was released and sentenced to internal exile (see Section 1.d.). He
earlier had criticized President Niyazov for directing that Turkmen
children dance around a Christmas tree during New Year's celebrations
(see Sections 1.d.).
In April President Niyazov ordered that Muslim madrassahs and other
religious schools be closed and that only two such schools, functioning
under the auspices of the government-controlled Muftiyat, be allowed.
The President ordered the implementation of new procedures
restricting searches of private homes in April, which the legislature
approved in June (see Section 1.f.). The period following these
measures reportedly saw a significant reduction of police harassment of
some religious believers in their private homes and a reduction in the
confiscation of religious property during the summer. However, there
was an increase in such activity during the last 4 months of the year.
In October KNB officials detained Seventh Day Adventist pastor
Pavel Fedotov at a Bible reading in Turkmenabad and charged him with
holding an unsanctioned meeting and confiscating videotapes; he was
released several days thereafter. In November four Protestants were
reportedly tortured by police because of their religious affiliations,
and at least three of them had their homes and cars confiscated after
being forced to sign a statement saying that they had voluntarily
donated all they owned as a gift to the President (see Section 1.c.).
Police continued to detain and harass the Protestants after the initial
incident.
The Seventh Day Adventist congregation in Ashgabat, whose church
was demolished on short notice in November 1999 as part of a Government
urban clearing project, has received neither compensation nor
alternative premises for worship.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes restrictions both
on freedom of movement within the country and on travel abroad. The
Government has tightened restrictions on travel to border cities and
regions, having declared large parts of the country closed. Throughout
the year, the President repeatedly told the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to maintain control over foreigners in the country. Citizens still
carry internal passports. These documents are used primarily as a form
of identification, rather than as a means of controlling movement.
Residence permits are not required, although the place of residence is
registered and noted in passports.
The Government uses its power to issue passports and exit visas as
a means of restricting international travel. Any citizen who wishes to
visit a foreign country must obtain an exit visa, which can take up to
5 weeks to process. Although not new, this policy became more onerous
in June 1999 when the country withdrew from the visa agreement of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. The official reason given by the
Government for this action was to secure the country's borders against
foreign criminal elements. Most citizens are permitted to emigrate
without undue restriction. During the year, exit visas for study and
training abroad, particularly for non-ethnic Turkmen, became more
difficult to obtain (see Section 2.a.).
The government-funded Council of World Turkmen provides assistance
to ethnic Turkmen abroad who wish to return to the country and apply
for citizenship; however, the Government discourages immigration by
ethnic Turkmen living in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries.
Immigration of non-Turkmen from other areas of the former Soviet Union
is discouraged by the unofficial policy of favoring employment of
ethnic Turkmen.
The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 1997 Law
on Refugees establishes the procedures and conditions for recognizing
refugee status and sets the legal, economic, and social rights of
refugees. The country currently provides first asylum if the person is
recognized under the mandate of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). The Government has granted refugee or asylee status to some
ethnic Turkmen from Afghanistan and has allowed some Tajik refugees and
migrants to reside in the country. The Government cooperates with the
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations that assist refugees. There
were no confirmed reports of the forced expulsion of those having a
valid claim to refugee status. There have been unconfirmed reports of
small numbers of refugees being forcibly returned by individual border
guards; however, according to the UNHCR, there is no clear pattern of
abuse or forced expulsion of refugees, with the exception of such low-
level harassment.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have no real ability to effect peaceful change in the
Government and have little influence on government policy or
decisionmaking. The 1992 Constitution declares Turkmenistan to be a
secular democracy in the form of a presidential republic. It calls for
the separation of powers between the various branches of government,
but vests a disproportionate share of power in the Presidency. In
practice President Niyazov's power is absolute, and the country remains
a one-man state. Despite the appearance of decisionmaking by consensus,
most decisions are made at the presidential level. In his address to
the Halk Maslahaty in July 1998, President Niyazov called for local
councils and village leaders to have greater power and authority to
deal with local issues; however, in reality even local leaders are
selected and dismissed by the President. In December 1999, the Halk
Maslahaty proposed, and the newly elected Mejlis (Parliament) approved,
a law making an exception to the constitutionally mandated maximum of
two 5-year terms for the President, but only for Niyazov, as the
country's first president, conferring on him a lifetime term in office.
In November 1998, the President announced that any Turkmen citizen
who would like to write to him with a complaint could do so directly.
Special mailboxes were set up throughout the country and, in the first
year, some 140,000 letters were received by the President. Citizens
still apparently write to the President because these letters are often
cited in the local media, but the numbers received during the year were
not reported.
In the 1992 presidential election, the sole candidate was
Saparmurat Niyazov, the incumbent and nominee of the Democratic Party.
The Government announced the election barely a month before voting day,
giving opposition groups insufficient time to organize and qualify to
submit a candidate. A 1994 national referendum extended the President's
term to 2002, obviating the need for the scheduled presidential
election in 1997. According to the official results, 99.9 percent of
those voting cast their ballots to extend his term. The policy of the
Democratic Party, according to its leadership, is to implement the
policy of the President. In August 1999, the Government changed the
national oath to require that citizens swear personal allegiance to
President Niyazov in particular, rather than just to the presidency as
a general institution.
The 50-member Mejlis routinely supports presidential decrees and
has no real independence. In the 1994 Mejlis elections, no opposition
participation was permitted. The Government claimed that 99.8 percent
of all eligible voters participated. President Niyazov promised in 1998
that the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1999 for a
reconstituted Mejlis would be ``free and fair'' and conducted on a
``wide democratic basis''; however, the elections were seriously
flawed. Although there were at least two candidates for each Mejlis
seat, every candidate was selected by the Government, and there was no
open discussion of the issues. The Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE declined to send an observation or
limited assessment mission for the elections. In its public
explanation, ODIHR cited serious concerns that the broad electoral
framework in the country fell short of its OSCE commitments. The
Government claimed that 98.9 percent of eligible voters participated.
Diplomatic observers noted many empty polling stations, extensive use
of mobile ballot boxes, and numerous instances of family voting.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women or
minorities in the political process; however, women are
underrepresented in government and politics. Thirteen members of the
50-member Mejlis are female, although women constitute over 50 percent
of the population. Women serve in the following positions: Minister of
Textiles, Prosecutor General, Chief of Presidential Protocol, Deputy
Minister of Health, Deputy Minister of Social Welfare, Deputy Minister
of Education, Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance, and Deputy
Chairman for Textiles and Foreign Trade. No women serve as provincial
governors. Minorities are represented in the Government, although
preference is given to ethnic Turkmen. The Mejlis consists of 48 ethnic
Turkmen, 1 ethnic Russian, and 1 ethnic Uzbek.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no local human rights monitoring groups, and government
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association would
preclude any effort to investigate and criticize publicly the
Government's human rights policies. Several independent journalists
based in Russia report on these issues in the Russian press and have
contact with international human rights organizations. On numerous
occasions in the past, the Government has warned its critics against
speaking with visiting journalists or other foreigners wishing to
discuss human rights issues.
In January 1999, President Niyazov signed a decree establishing a
human rights commission that he heads. The commission oversees the work
of law enforcement agencies, the military, and the judiciary, but it
appears to have little real authority. The commission is subordinate to
the National Institute for Democracy and Human Rights under the
President, which has been in operation since 1997. Its mandate is to
support the democratization of the government and society and to
monitor the protection of human rights. The Institute maintains four
full-time staff members to receive and resolve citizen complaints of
arbitrary action. Of the 2,590 complaints received during the year,
some 35 percent concerned appeals, pardons, and abuses by law
enforcement officials; 10 percent dealt with social and economic
problems; and 24 percent concerned housing. The remainder were in the
miscellaneous category. In general the Institute conducts a study of
the complaint and returns its findings to the individual and the
organizations involved. However, the Institute is not an independent
body, and its ability to obtain redress is limited by government
interests.
In January 1999, the OSCE opened an office in Ashgabat. There was
no further progress on negotiations on a memorandum of understanding
between the Government and the OSCE.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights and freedoms for all,
independent of one's nationality, origin, language, and religion. It
further specifies equal rights before the law for both men and women.
There is no legal basis for discrimination against women or religious
or ethnic minorities. However, cultural traditions and the Government's
policy of promoting Turkmen nationalism limit the employment and
educational opportunities of women and nonethnic Turkmen.
Women.--Anecdotal reports indicate that domestic violence against
women is common, but no statistics are available. The subject is not
discussed in society. There are no court cases available and no
references to domestic violence in the media. One unofficial group to
support battered women operates in Ashgabat.
Women are underrepresented in the upper levels of state-owned
economic enterprises and are concentrated in the health care and
education professions and in service industries. Women are restricted
from working in some dangerous and environmentally unsafe jobs. Under
the law, women enjoy the same inheritance and marriage rights as men.
However, in traditional Turkmen society, the woman's primary role is as
homemaker and mother, and family pressures often limit opportunities
for women wanting to enter careers outside the home and advance their
education. Religious authorities, when proffering advice to practicing
Muslims on matters concerning inheritance and property rights, often
favor men over women.
There is only one officially registered women's group, which is
headed by the Deputy Chairperson of the Mejlis and dedicated in honor
of the President's mother. The Government has no program specifically
aimed at rectifying the disadvantaged position of women in society, as
it does not acknowledge that women suffer discrimination.
Children.--The Government's social umbrella covers the welfare
needs of children. The Government has not taken effective steps to
address the environmental and health problems that have resulted in a
high rate of infant and maternal mortality. In September 1999, the
Government cut the number of years of basic education from 10 to 9
years; however, children now in their eighth, ninth, or tenth year of
education will be unaffected. There is little difference in the
education provided to girls and boys. Education is free and compulsory.
Class sizes in the country are increasing rapidly, facilities are
deteriorating, and funds for textbooks and supplies are decreasing. In
September the President called for a reduction in the number of
teachers by 10,000 before the end of the year. Educators are concerned
that this will further exacerbate crowded classrooms, overwork
teachers, and further reduce the quality of education in the country.
The ostensible reason for the reduction is to increase salaries for the
remaining teachers. However, past similar promises have been
unfulfilled, and teachers are routinely paid 2 to 3 months late. In
1998 the Ministry of Education (MED) increased the number of students
per class from 30 to 45. Wages for teachers and administrators are in
arrears in many districts; this, added to the fact that salaries are
low, has caused some teachers to leave the field and seek jobs in the
private sector, leaving classrooms overcrowded.
Bribery has become a main component of the admission process at
prestigious departments in universities. Although officially free,
admission to many faculties at Turkmen State University in Ashgabat
reportedly costs between $2,000 and $4,000. Paying bribes for good
grades is also a common practice. Furthermore, the MED has discouraged
schools from having contacts with NGO's and international
organizations.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. However,
during the annual cotton harvest, some schools in agricultural areas
are closed and children as young as 10 years of age work in the cotton
fields for up to 2 months (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
People with Disabilities.--Government subsidies and pensions are
provided for those with disabilities, although the pensions are
inadequate to maintain a decent standard of living. Those capable of
working generally are provided with jobs under still valid
preindependence policies that virtually guarantee employment to all.
According to existing legislation, facilities to allow access by the
disabled must be included in new construction projects. However,
compliance is inconsistent and most older buildings are not so
equipped. Care for the mentally retarded and mentally ill is provided
on the local level. Mentally retarded and mentally ill children are
placed in boarding schools, with educational and future employment
opportunities if their condition is mild. The psychological hospital in
Bekrova and the psychological clinic in Gok Tepe were closed over the
past year. To compensate a psychiatric hospital was opened in Dashoguz
for those in need of in-patient care. There is also a hospital for the
criminally insane in Lebap Velayat. Out-patient facilities exist in
Ashgabat, Yoloten, and Tedjen. In theory patients receive food,
clothing, and medical care at in-patient facilities but in practice,
supplies are inadequate and services are poor.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides for
equal rights and freedoms for all citizens. Turkmen comprise
approximately 77 percent of the population of about 5.2 million;
Uzbeks, 9 percent; and Russians, 7 percent. There are smaller numbers
of Kazakhs, Armenians, Azeris, and many other ethnic groups. Since
independence the country has not experienced ethnic turmoil.
As part of its nation-building efforts, the Government has
attempted to foster Turkmen national pride, in part through its
language policy. The Constitution designates Turkmen as the official
language, and it is a mandatory subject in school, although it is not
necessarily the language of instruction.
The Constitution also provides for the rights of speakers of other
languages to use them. While Russian remains in common usage in
commerce and in everyday life, the Government has intensified its
campaign over the past year for official business to be conducted
solely in Turkmen. Some high-ranking government officials have been
publicly criticized by the President for their failure to speak
Turkmen. In accordance with his wishes, Russian language usage in
newspapers has been cut back sharply during the past few years (see
Section 2.a.). In June 1999, the Government switched one of the Russian
language daily newspapers to Turkmen and reduced daily Russian news
broadcasts on state-run television to 30 minutes. In October 1999, the
state radio ceased entirely its daily 15-minute Russian language news
broadcast. During the year, there were no Russian language radio
broadcasts and only 15 minutes of news in Russian on television each
day. Nonethnic Turkmen employees at government ministries reportedly
were given until December 1999 to learn Turkmen, and there have been
reports that some government employees, such as doctors and teachers,
have been dismissed from their positions because they failed to learn
the language. The most prominent example was the rector of the
Polytechnical Institute in Ashgabat, who was dismissed from his
position in 1999 for his inability to speak Turkmen.
Non-Turkmen fear that the designation of Turkmen as the official
language places their children at a disadvantage educationally and
economically. They complain that some avenues for promotion and job
advancement are no longer open to them. Only a handful of non-Turkmen
occupy high-echelon jobs in the ministries, and there are reports that
managerial positions were closed to non-Turkmen. As a result of these
restrictions, more and more ethnic Russians view their situation in the
country as deteriorating and are seeking Russian citizenship.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Turkmenistan inherited the Soviet
system of government-controlled trade unions. There are no legal
guarantees entitling workers to form or join unions. The Colleagues
Union is the only legal central trade union federation permitted, and
it claims a membership of 1.3 million; its member unions are divided
along both sectoral and regional lines. Unions may not form or join
other federations.
While no law specifically prohibits the establishment of
independent unions, there are no such unions, and no attempts were made
to register an independent trade union during the year.
The law neither prohibits nor permits strikes and does not address
the issue of retaliation against strikers. Strikes are extremely rare
and no strikes were known to have occurred during the year.
There is no information available on union affiliation with
international unions. The country joined the International Labor
Organization in 1993.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does
not protect the right to collective bargaining. In practice in the
state-dominated economy, the close association of both the trade union
and the state-owned enterprise with the Government seriously limits
workers' ability to bargain, and workers often go months without pay or
receive their paychecks late.
The Ministry of Economics and Finance prepares general guidelines
for wages and sets wages in health care, culture, and some other areas.
In other sectors, it allows for some leeway at the enterprise level,
taking into account local factors. The Government determines specific
wage and benefit packages for each factory or enterprise.
The law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers
against union members and organizers, and there are no mechanisms for
resolving such complaints.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor; however, there were unconfirmed, anectodal
reports of trafficking in women (see Sections 5 and 6.f.) and reports
of prisoners being forced to work in a kaolin mine in Kizlkaya prison,
near Dashoguz, under hazardous and unhealthy conditions (see Section
1.c. and 2.b.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively, with the
exception of children who work in cotton harvesting in rural areas (see
Section 5 and 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 16 years; in
a few heavy industries, it is 18 years. The law prohibits children
between the ages of 16 and 18 years from working more than 6 hours per
day (the normal workday is 8 hours).
A 15-year-old child may work 4 to 6 hours per day but only with the
permission of the trade union and parents. This permission rarely is
granted. Violations of child labor laws occur in rural areas during the
cotton harvesting season, when teenagers work in the fields and
children as young as 10 years of age sometimes help with the harvest.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
generally enforces this prohibition effectively, with the exception of
cotton harvesting in rural areas (see Section 5 and 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage. In
December 1999, the Government raised the average wage in the state
sector to approximately $77 (400,000 manats) per month at the official
rate. While the Government subsidizes the prices of many necessities
and provides others free of charge, this wage falls short of the amount
required to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and his or
her family. Most households are multigenerational, with several members
receiving salaries, stipends, or pensions. Even so, many people lack
the resources to maintain an adequate diet, and meat is a luxury for
most citizens.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours with 2 days off.
Individuals who work fewer hours during the week or are in certain
high-level positions may also work on Saturdays.
The country inherited from the Soviet era an economic system with
substandard working conditions--one in which production took precedence
over the health and safety of workers. Industrial workers often labor
in unsafe environments and are not provided proper protective
equipment. Some agricultural workers are subjected to environmental
health hazards. The Government recognizes that these problems exist and
has taken some steps to address them, but it has not set comprehensive
standards for occupational health and safety. Workers do not always
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger
their health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are unconfirmed, anecdotal
reports of women from Turkmenistan traveling to Turkey and the United
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and working as prostitutes, especially before
the U.A.E. tightened its entry visa requirements for young women over
the past few years. The Government does not have programs in place to
combat trafficking in persons, but cooperates in educational efforts on
this topic. In November 1999, the Government and the International
Organization on Migration hosted a 1-day seminar on illegal migration
during which trafficking in women was discussed in detail.
__________
UKRAINE
Ukraine is governed by a directly elected president and a
unicameral parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), which is
elected partially according to proportional representation and
partially by direct constituency mandate. Incumbent President Leonid
Kuchma was reelected after two rounds of voting on October 31 and
November 14, 1999. There were some irregularities during the election
campaign and during the balloting, including those cited in the March 7
final report of the Office for Security and Cooperation of Europe/
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) which
stated that the presidential elections of October and November 1999
``failed to meet a significant number of the OSCE election related
commitments.'' However, almost all observers agreed that the election
results reflected the will of the electorate. Despite numerous flaws
and irregularities, previous national elections in 1998 and 1994 also
generally reflected the will of the electorate. The President appoints
the Cabinet and controls government operations. In an April referendum,
which observers described as flawed in several respects but probably
reflected the will of the people, voters approved several changes to
the Constitution which would expand presidential powers and increase
executive branch influence over Parliament. The Constitutional Court
later struck down two of the six proposed amendments; however,
constitutional changes had not been implemented by year's end. The
Constitution mandates an independent judiciary; however, the courts are
funded through the Ministry of Justice, are subject to political
interference and corruption, and are inefficient.
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (which controls the various police forces), and the Ministry of
Defense have equal responsibility for internal security and report to
the President through the Cabinet. The State Tax Administration also
has law enforcement powers, which it exercises through the tax police.
The armed forces largely have remained outside of politics. While
civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the
security forces, institutional government corruption sometimes can lead
to their improper use. The SBU and other government agencies have
interfered indirectly in the political process through criminal and tax
investigations of politicians, journalists, and influential
businessmen. Members of the security forces committed human rights
abuses.
Ukraine is making a difficult transition from a centrally planned
to a market-based economy. The private sector has continued to grow and
now represents a substantial portion of the economy. For the first time
since independence, the country experienced economic growth (5
percent). Nevertheless, the country remains in a serious economic
crisis. While the Government made some progress in key areas such as
privatization, energy, and the state budget, the country lacks many of
reforms needed to generate sustainable economic growth. Industrial
output has suffered years of sharp decline. A 1999 presidential decree
on agricultural reform led to a break-up of the Soviet-era state farm
system. Legislation enabling the granting of land titles was passed;
however, the property rights of former collective farm workers are weak
and poorly defined. Production in key areas such as wheat was
unreliable. The summer grain harvest was the worst since 1945, but the
winter crop was the best in years. According to official statistics,
about half of the work force is employed formally in manufacturing,
with the balance divided between services and agriculture; however, in
reality many industrial enterprises have reduced or stopped production.
Exports are diversified and include metals, chemicals, sugar, and
semifinished goods. The annual per capita gross domestic product for
the year was approximately $669. However, millions of employees go
months without being paid, and most individuals derive a significant
proportion of their income from the shadow economy. Inflation was 19
percent during the first half of the year, but averaged less than 0.5
percent per month since June. Investment remains at low levels, with
many potential investors discouraged by rampant corruption, onerous
taxation, and arbitrary licensing practices. Unemployment has affected
women disproportionately; 56 percent of those officially registered as
unemployed are women. Wealth is concentrated in the political elite and
among directors of state-dominated sectors such as metals, oil, and
gas.
The Government's human rights record was poor in some areas;
however, the Government continued to respect the rights of its citizens
in other areas. In previous years, police and military committed
extrajudicial killings; however, there were no reports of such
incidents during the year. A prominent journalist disappeared in
September. In November a decapitated body believed to be his was found.
Later that month, a prominent political opponent accused the President
of complicity in the disappearance. Those charges have not been proved
or disproved. The Government asserted that it is investigating the
journalist's disappearance and conducting tests to determine the
identity of the corpse; however, the case remains unsolved at year's
end, and the authorities' poor handling of the investigation proved a
source of great concern. Police and prison officials regularly tortured
and beat detainees and prisoners, sometimes resulting in death. The
beating of conscripts in the army by fellow soldiers was common and
sometimes resulted in death. Prison conditions are harsh and life-
threatening. There were instances of arbitrary arrest and detention.
Lengthy pretrial detention in very poor conditions was common, and
detainees often spent months in pretrial detention for violations that
involved little or no prison time if convicted. Long delays in trials
are a problem. The Government rarely punishes officials who commit
abuses. The SBU, police, and Prosecutor's Office have drawn domestic
and international criticism for their failure to take adequate action
to curb institutional corruption and abuse in the Government. Many
high-profile corruption cases have been dropped, ostensibly because of
lack of evidence. Anticorruption legislation has been enforced
selectively, mostly against government opponents and low-level
officials. Political interference and corruption affect the judicial
process. The judiciary is overburdened, inefficient, and lacks
sufficient funding and staff. These factors undermine citizens' right
to a fair trial. The criminal justice system has been slow to reform,
due to both lack of government effort and strained economic resources.
The Government continued to intrude in citizens' lives and infringe on
their privacy rights. The Government interfered with the news media and
restricted freedom of the press; however, a wide range of opinion is
available in newspapers and periodicals. Government interference was
particularly severe during the period preceding the April referendum on
amendments to the Constitution that would expand presidential powers by
limiting the power of the Parliament and in response to coverage of the
scandal surrounding the disappearance of an opposition journalist.
Self-censorship remained a significant problem. During the 1999
presidential election campaign, government authorities interfered in
the election process and stepped up pressure on the media through tax
inspections and other measures. The national broadcast media came under
particular pressure. There were some limits on freedom of assembly, and
there were some instances of restrictions on freedom of association.
Limitations on nonnative religious organizations constrained freedom of
religion. The Government took steps to return to religious groups
properties expropriated during the Soviet era. It returned two churches
that were rebuilt with government funds. Some limits on freedom of
movement, most notably the registration or ``propiska'' system,
remained. The Government took steps to support the return and
resettlement of exiled Tatars in Crimea. As many as 10 elected mayors
from several regions reported government harassment stemming from their
lack of support for President Kuchma during the 1999 presidential
campaign. The SBU monitored the activities of nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) during the year. Violence and discrimination
against women; violence against children; societal anti-Semitism; and
discrimination against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities are
problems. The Government discourages some workers from organizing
unions, and forced labor in the form of trafficking in women and girls
for sexual exploitation is a significant problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government agents. In previous years,
members of the police and military committed extrajudicial killings;
however, there were no reports of such incidents during the year.
There were reports in previous years that police beat persons at
alcohol corrective treatment centers and sometimes killed them (see
Section 1.c.).
Members of the armed forces killed soldiers during violent hazing
incidents in previous years (see Section 1.c.). According to a
government official, in 1998 10 to 12 military personnel were beaten to
death, and a total of 20 to 30 died as an indirect result of injuries
sustained from hazing.
Abuse of prisoners and detainees, and harsh prison conditions,
sometimes led to death (see Section 1.c.). Statistics on prison deaths
for this year were unavailable. In 1998 there were 1,901 deaths in
prison and detention facilities, many due to harsh conditions.
The pervasiveness of corruption, connections between government
officials and organized crime, and the political activities of
organized crime figures often blurred the distinction between political
and criminal acts. Politicians, politically connected businessmen, and
journalists have been the victims of possibly politically-motivated--
and sometimes fatal--attacks. There were allegations of government
involvement in the disappearance and presumed death of opposition
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze; however, those charges have not been
proven (see Section 1.b.).
No official statistics for contract killings during the year were
available.
The Government made no known progress in resolving a number of the
high profile killings of past years. No progress was made in solving
the 1999 murder of the security chief of the independent television
station STB or the 1999 killings of the chairman of the regional
arbitration court Borys Vihrov and the director of local television
station Igor Bondar in Odessa. The Government also made no known
progress in resolving the 1998 murders of former director of the
national bank Vadym Hetman, deputy head of the Crimean government
Aleksandr Safontsev, the mayor of Shakhtersk, or the campaign manager
of a Kiev mayoral candidate. Nor was there any progress in resolving
the 1997 murders of the governor of the Razoolnensky district, the
Crimean deputy minister for tourism and resorts, the murder of
prominent businessman Arkadiy Tabachnyk, or the bombing of the
intensive care unit in Simferopol. In May police arrested a suspect in
the 1995 killing of Member of Parliament Yevhen Shcherban.
b. Disappearance.--On September 16, prominent journalist Heorhiy
Gongadze disappeared. Gongadze was the editor of the on-line news
journal Ukrainska Pravda and was a frequent critic of both the
Government and leading business figures. In a July open letter
addressed to the Prosecutor General, he complained of government
harassment, including being followed and questioned by security forces.
In early November, police found a decapitated body outside of Kiev,
which Gongadze's friends and family believed was that of the missing
journalist. The Government asserted that it is conducting a full-scale
investigation of his disappearance. The body was sent to forensic
experts for examination, yet no positive identification was made by
year's end--authorities did not begin the process of conducting a DNA
test until mid-December. On November 28, the leader of the Socialist
Party, Oleksandr Moroz, accused the President and other senior
government officials of complicity in the disappearance of Gongadze. He
also released audio tapes purporting to be conversations between the
President, his Administration Chief Volodymyr Lytvyn, and Minister of
Internal Affairs Yuri Kravchenko discussing the desirability of
Gongadze's abduction. The tapes, provided by a former Presidential
security guard, were not authenticated officially by year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police and
prison officials regularly tortured and beat detainees and prisoners,
and there were numerous reports of such abuse. Amnesty International
(AI) and other human rights groups continued to receive regular reports
that Berkut (special militia units or riot police) troops tortured and
beat inmates as part of regular training exercises. The media reported
that police subjected detainees to the ``swallow,'' in which the
detainee is placed on his stomach and his feet are tied to his hands
behind him, forcing his back to arch. Another abuse is the ``baby
elephant,'' in which a gas mask is placed on the prisoner's head and
the flow of oxygen slowly reduced. Detainees also were subjected to a
method called the ``monument,'' in which a prisoner is suspended by his
hands on a rope and beaten. Requesting an attorney often leads to a
worse beating, and detainees may be beaten until they waive their right
to an attorney. There is no effective mechanism for registering
complaints about mistreatment or for obtaining redress for such
actions. Prisoners may address complaints to the Ombudsman, and that
office has received widespread reports of torture in pretrial
detention. However, the Ombudsman has no enforcement authority, and the
Government made little effort during the year to end such practices or
to punish officials who committed or abetted such abuses. According to
the Office of the Ombudsman, most of the complaints that it received
centered on human rights violations by law enforcement personnel. In
1999 the Ombudsman was criticized for failing to investigate whether
special police units beat prisoners during regular exercises in jail.
During the year, the Ombudsman made the treatment of prisoners a
priority and investigated conditions in at least two prisons. On
December 1, 1999, the Parliament passed an amendment to the Criminal
Code that prescribes up to 15 years' imprisonment for torture. However,
human rights monitors reported little difference in the treatment of
prisoners since adoption of this law.
Police also abused Roma, particularly in the Transcarpathian
region, and harassed and abused dark-skinned persons (see Section 5).
Police also harassed journalists and refugees (see Sections 2.a. and
2.d.). Police corruption also remained a serious problem.
Reports continued of harsh conditions and violence against
conscripts in the armed forces. Senior officers reportedly required
malnourished recruits to beg for food or money. Senior conscripts often
beat recruits, sometimes to death (see Section 1.a.). Punishment
administered for committing or condoning such activities did not serve
as an effective deterrent to the further practice of such abuses.
Between 1991 and 1998, 450 soldiers were convicted of violent
harassment of their colleagues; approximately 200 military personnel
were prosecuted in 1998 for violent hazing (10 to 12 conscripts were
beaten to death, and 20 to 30 died from injuries related to hazing).
Some politically active individuals were wounded in violent
attacks. In February unknown assailants beat parliamentarian Oleksandr
Yeliashkevych near a hotel where several Members of Parliament live.
Five suspects were charged in the October 1999 bombing in which
presidential candidate Natalia Vitrenko was wounded slightly, and more
than 30 others were injured. No progress was reported in resolving the
April 1999 wounding by gunshot of Kiev municipal government official
Mykola Pidmogylny or the November 1999 shooting of Vinnytsia Mayor
Dmytro Dvorkis.
Members of the press were hurt in violent incidents throughout the
year. In July Anatoliy Zhuchynsky, a reporter for the Vinnytsia
newspaper 33 Channel, was assaulted outside his home. He linked the
attack to his political reporting. In August two men assaulted
Valentyna Vasylchenko, a reporter for the Cherkassy newspaper Antenna,
in the stairway outside her apartment. She attributed the attack to her
coverage of criminal groups. In September Nikolay Severin, an editor of
an independent paper in Luhansk, was attacked by brick-wielding
assailants outside his home. He blamed the assault on his critical
reporting.
No progress was made in resolving the 1999 firebombing of the
office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis in Simferopol or the 1999 bombing
of the office of the Communist Party leader Leonid Hrach in Simferopol.
Accusations by opposition presidential candidate Marchuk linking the
presidential administration to a false bomb threat that disrupted a
1999 meeting between Marchuk and local residents were never proven.
In 1998 the Government created a penal department to oversee reform
of the penal system and to serve as the administrative center of the
penal system. The new department originally was placed under the
oversight of the Ministry of Interior, but it was given the status of
an independent government agency by presidential decree in 1999.
However, human rights groups report that this change in status has not
affected its practices. The Government failed to punish prison and
police officials who committed or condoned violence against prisoners.
There was no improvement during the year in prison conditions,
which are harsh, life-threatening, and do not meet minimum
international standards. Prison officials intimidated and mistreated
inmates. Due in part to the severe economic crisis, prisons and
detention centers were severely overcrowded and lacked adequate
sanitation and medical facilities. According to official statistics,
funding for prisons decreased by almost 14 percent over the last 3
years. During the year, the Government announced a general amnesty for
34,800 inmates intended to relieve overcrowding. Because the country
lacks a well-developed system of suspended sentences, and the law does
not differentiate between misdemeanors and felonies, at least one-third
of inmates were convicted of only minor violations.
Conditions in pretrial detention facilities routinely failed to
meet minimum international standards. Inmates sometimes were held in
investigative isolation for extended periods and subjected to
intimidation and mistreatment by jail guards and other inmates.
Overcrowding is common in these centers. For example, the pretrial
detention center in Kiev, houses 3,500; it was constructed to hold
2,850 persons.
According to official sources, information on the physical state of
prison walls and fences as well as pretrial detention blocks is
considered to be a government secret. However, the press reported
freely about harsh prison conditions. In 1998 there were 1,901 deaths
in prisons and detention facilities, which was more than 3 times the
death rate of the general population. Poor sanitary conditions result
in deaths from diseases such as tuberculosis and dysentery. There are
frequent incidents of murder by fellow inmates and suicide.
Conditions in the Interior Ministry's Corrective Labor and
Treatment Centers for Alcoholics (LTP's), where violent alcoholics are
confined forcibly by court decision, differ little from those in
prisons. Virtually no treatment is available. According to statistics
from March, 12 LTP's with some 3,000 inmates continued to operate.
Although some centers were transferred to the Health Ministry during
the year, the Government had not lived up to its earlier commitment to
transfer all of the LTP's to the ministry. Police have the right to
take forcibly any person appearing drunk in public to special sobering
centers. Human rights groups reported cases of police mistreatment,
robbing, or beating of detainees at such centers (see Section 1.a.). In
August 1999, the Government issued a decree directing the closure of
such centers by the end of this year; however, some centers remained
open at year's end.
The Government continued to allow prison visits from human rights
monitors; however, these monitors reported that it can be difficult to
obtain access to prisons. Cases were reported in which prisoners were
not permitted correspondence and family visits were allowed only once
per year. Prisoners may complain to the Ombudsman about the conditions
of detention, but human rights groups reported that inmates were
punished for initiating complaints.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. The law provides that authorities may detain
a suspect for 3 days without a warrant, after which an arrest order
must be issued. The Constitution stipulates that only courts may issue
arrest warrants, but under its transitional provisions, the
Prosecutor's office retains the right to issue search and arrest
warrants until 2001. The maximum period of detention after charges have
been filed is 18 months, but the law does not limit the aggregate time
of detention before and during a trial. The law permits citizens to
contest an arrest in court or appeal to the prosecutor. The
Constitution requires immediate notification of family members
concerning an arrest, but this action often is not taken in practice.
By law a trial must begin no later than 3 weeks after indictment,
but this requirement rarely is met by the overburdened court system.
Months may pass before a defendant finally is brought to trial, and the
situation did not improve during the year. Complicated cases can take
years to go to trial. Although the 1996 amendment to the Criminal
Procedures Code provides for bail, it is used rarely. Restrictions on
travel outside a given area sometimes are employed. Accused persons
usually are held without bail in pretrial detention for several months.
As of October, there were 228,000 prisoners, 48,000 of whom were
persons held in pretrial detention. The Constitution provides
compensation for unlawful or arbitrary arrest, detention, or
conviction, but there are no known cases in which this provision was
invoked. Reports indicated that this inaction is a result of lack of
faith in the judiciary rather than the absence of unlawful or arbitrary
detentions.
The law stipulates that a defense attorney be provided without
charge to the indigent from the moment of detention or the filing of
charges, whichever comes first. There are insufficient numbers of
defense attorneys to protect suspects from unlawful, lengthy
imprisonment under extremely poor conditions. Although the concept of
providing attorneys from the state system exists in principle, public
attorneys often refuse to defend indigents for the low government fee.
While in custody, a suspect or a prisoner is allowed by law to talk
with a lawyer in private; however, human rights groups reported that
the client-attorney privilege occasionally was denied by prison or
investigative officials. To protect the defendant, each investigative
file must contain a document signed by the defendant attesting that the
charges against him, his right to an attorney, and his right not to
give evidence against himself or his relatives have been explained to
him. An appeals court may dismiss a conviction or order a new trial if
this document is missing. As defendants increasingly became aware of
their rights, they insisted on observance of these procedures. However,
many persons remained unaware of these safeguards.
The Government occasionally charges persons who are openly critical
of the Government (usually opposition politicians or editors and
journalists from the opposition press) with criminal libel or tax
evasion charges (see Section 2.a.). In August Oleksandr Tymoshenko, the
husband of then-Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and a business
associate were arrested on charges of embezzlement of state funds.
Tymoshenko's efforts to reform the energy sector had drawn strong
opposition, most notably from powerful businesspersons closely tied to
the Government. Although the investigation of the men reportedly was
underway for some time, some observers believed that timing of the
arrests was intended to pressure Tymoshenko.
In May 1999, police officers in Mukachevo detained some 70 persons,
primarily Roma, in a local market for illegal trading. The detainees
were held without charges for 2 days and forced to perform manual labor
for police officers. In July 1999, three Romani women were detained for
failing to produce identification. They were ordered to clean the
police station but they were released when a leader of a Romani NGO
intervened on their behalf. There were no reports of incidents
targeting Roma during the year.
Police also arbitrarily detained persons for extensive document
checks and vehicle inspections (see Section 1.f.).
Official corruption is widespread. The Government apparently
enforced anticorruption statutes selectively for political ends. While
anticorruption statutes were applied increasingly against lower-level
officials, such enforcement reportedly is lacking against high-level
officials. In 1999 Vasylkiv Mayor Valeriy Popovych was detained briefly
on corruption charges after complaining of government harassment due to
his support for opposition candidate Moroz during the October 1999
presidential election. Charges against Popovych were dropped in
January; however, in February he resigned his post under pressure from
regional authorities. In 1999 a number of persons arraigned on criminal
and corruption charges claimed that they were victimized because of
their support for the former Prime Minister, who is currently on trial
abroad for money laundering, and government opponent Pavlo Lazarenko.
Former government officials Petro Shkudun, Mykola Syvulsky, and Vasyl
Koval claimed that their cases were motivated politically due to their
links to Lazarenko. In December 1999, Koval was sentenced to serve five
years in prison on corruption charges. In June Syvulsky again was
arrested on corruption charges while serving as an aide to former
Deputy Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who had been associated with
Lazarenko.
The Government does not employ forced exhile.
e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary is subject
to considerable political interference from the executive branch and
also suffers from corruption and inefficiency. The courts are funded
through the Ministry of Justice, which allows the Government to
influence the judicial process. The presidential administration also
reportedly continues the old Soviet tradition of weighing in by
telephoning justices directly.
The establishment of an independent judicial system provided for in
the Constitution still awaits the passage of implementing legislation.
As a result, the judiciary continues to operate according to Soviet
principles. Most judges and prosecutors were appointed during the
Soviet era, and court officials are attuned closely to the Government's
interests. The High Judicial Council, which approves the appointment of
and disciplines judges, consists primarily of senior executive branch
representatives, including the Prosecutor General and the Chairman of
the State Security Service. Human rights lawyers claimed that the
judiciary was not free from government influence, particularly at the
regional and local levels. For example, court chairmen are appointed
directly by the executive and wield considerable influence over the
outcome of a case through case assignments, the control of staff and
promotions, and the control of social benefits available to judges.
Court chairmen reportedly deliberately overburden independent-minded
judges with too many cases and then instigate disciplinary actions
against them for not completing their casework. There are credible
reports that court chairmen regularly followed executive instructions.
The Ministry of Justice and court chairmen also controlled judges'
housing. Judges whose rulings were not in accord with the executive
branch were provided with apartments far from city centers or are
ignored altogether when new apartments became available.
The judiciary lacks sufficient staff and funds, which engenders
inefficiency and corruption. The court system receives all its funding
from the Ministry of Justice. Budgetary funds allocated by the
Government in 1999 covered only half of the judiciary's requirements
for the year; funding levels for the year were said to be similarly
inadequate. In 1999 the Supreme Court challenged in the Constitutional
Court the legality of the Government's practice of arbitrarily limiting
the judiciary's budget. In its petition, the Supreme Court complained
that the district courts received only 51 percent of required funding,
military courts 33 percent, and oblast courts 62 percent. In 1999 the
Constitutional Court ruled that the Government's practice of limiting
the judiciary's budget was unconstitutional. This attempt by the
Government to cut the judiciary's budget, and similar attempts in
recent years, demonstrated clearly the dependence of the court system
on the executive and the Government's willingness to make use of that
dependence.
The authority and independence of the judicial system also are
undermined by the poor record of compliance with court decisions in
civil cases. Provisions calling for criminal punishment for
noncompliance with court decisions rarely are used. Compliance is
particularly poor if the decision clashes with government interests.
The Prosecutor General, the head of the Supreme Court, the chairmen of
regional courts, and the chairmen of the Kiev municipal court (or the
deputies of these officials) can suspend court decisions, which leads
to interference, manipulation, and corruption.
Many local observers regard the Constitutional Court as the
country's most independent judicial body. Human rights groups state
that overall the Constitutional Court has maintained a balance of
fairness. However, in March the Court ruled that the President's
proposed referendum on expanding presidential authority was
constitutional, although it threw out two of the six original
questions. Observers believed that this decision indicated a
propresidential bias.
There has been little progress in implementing the provisions of
the 1996 Constitution that provide for a thorough restructuring of the
court system, to be accomplished by June 2001, including the
introduction of appellate courts. In an effort to meet the June 2001
deadline, the President established a council on judicial reform in
August; however, the council has had little impact and at year's end,
Parliament had not passed a new law on the judiciary. Pending the
passage of the required enabling legislation, the court system still is
organized along Soviet lines, with the exception of the Constitutional
Court.
The court system consists of the Constitutional Court, general
jurisdiction courts, and arbitration and commercial courts. General
jurisdiction courts and arbitration courts are organized on three
levels: district courts; regional courts; and the Supreme Court and
Supreme Arbitration Court. General jurisdiction courts are divided into
criminal and civil sections. Military courts only hear cases involving
military personnel.
The Constitutional Court consists of 18 members, appointed for 9-
year terms in equal numbers by the President, the Parliament, and the
Congress of Judges. The Consitutional Court is the ultimate interpreter
of legislation and the Constitution, and it determines the
constitutionality of legislation, presidential edicts, cabinet acts,
and acts of the Crimean Autonomous Republic. The President, at least 45
Members of Parliament, the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, and the
Crimean legislature can request the Constitutional Court to hear a
case. Citizens may apply to the Constitutional Court through the
Ombudsman, although in practice the Ombudsman has yet to exercise this
right. In some limited cases, the Constitutional Court can interpret
law for individual citizens, when the applying citizen provides
compelling proof that a constitutional provision is violated, or that
it is interpreted differently by different government bodies. However,
of some 8,000 such petitions only 4 were accepted for review as of
early 1999.
Under the current court system, cases are decided by judges who sit
singly, occasionally with two public assessors (``lay judges'' or
professional jurors with some legal training), or in groups of three
for more serious cases. The Constitution provides for public,
adversarial trials, including a judge, public assessors, state
prosecutor, defense, and jury (when required by law). With some
qualifications, these requirements are upheld in practice. However,
implementing criminal procedure legislation establishing juries has not
been adopted. Complicated cases can take years to go to trial. In the
interim, defendants usually wait in pretrial detention. The 1996
amendment to the Soviet-era Criminal Procedures Code provides for bail,
but to date it has been used rarely (see Section 1.d.).
Organized crime widely is alleged to influence court decisions. The
Justice Ministry reported that in 1997 135 judges were disciplined, 22
dismissed, and 5 prosecuted for bribery. No higher court judge has been
disciplined to date. Criminal elements routinely use intimidation to
induce victims and witnesses to withdraw or change their testimony. The
law requires that a special police unit protect judges, witnesses,
defendants, and their relatives. However, the unit has not yet been
formed, and trial participants are vulnerable to pressure. There is a
witness protection law, but it is in abeyance because of lack of
funding. Under a law adopted in March, the names and addresses of
victims and witnesses can be kept confidential, if they request
protection due to fear for their lives.
Prosecutors, like the courts, also are organized into offices at
the rayon, oblast, and republic levels. They are responsible ultimately
to the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Parliament for a 5-year term. Regional and district
prosecutors are appointed by the Prosecutor General.
Although by law prosecutors and defense attorneys have equal
status, in practice prosecutors are much more influential. The
procuracy, in its pretrial investigative function, acts in effect as a
grand jury. A prosecutor may initiate investigation through his own
office or conduct investigations initiated by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs or the SBU. Prosecutors also have the right to issue warrants
without court approval and to suspend court decisions, thus effectively
placing the procuracy above the courts in the legal hierarchy. In
several cases, the procuracy has used its judicial review powers to
annul court decisions unfavorable to the presidential administration's
economic or political interests and ordered the case reexamined by a
different court. The Office of the Prosecutor General practices
selective prosecution and initiates investigations against the
political or economic opponents of the President and his allies. The
Prosecutor General ignores parliamentary and court requests for
investigations into high-ranking persons if the accused is a
presidential ally.
The Constitution considerably curtails the prosecutor's authority,
limiting it to prosecution, representing the public interest in court,
oversight of investigations, and implementation of court decisions.
However, in the absence of new criminal and criminal procedure codes to
implement constitutional restrictions, the transitional provisions of
the Constitution permit the prosecutor's office to conduct
investigations and oversee general observance of the law. In November
1997, the Constitutional Court interpreted the Procuracy Law, ruling
that citizens can dispute prosecutors' decisions in court.
The Constitution includes procedural provisions to ensure a fair
trial, including the right of a suspect or witness to refuse to testify
against himself or his relatives. However, pending passage of
legislation to implement these constitutional provisions, a largely
Soviet-era criminal justice system remains in place. While the
defendant is presumed innocent, conviction rates have changed little
since the Soviet era. Nearly all completed cases result in convictions.
According to official statistics, in the first half of 1999, there
were 114,600 convictions, between 36 and 39 percent of which resulted
in prison sentences. A total of 494 defendants were acquitted, which is
an increas of 11 percent from the corresponding period in 1998. In the
first half of the year, there were 113,902 convictions and 375
acquittals. However, as judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in
conviction back to the prosecutor for ``additional investigation''
(which usually leads to the dropping of the case), these statistics are
somewhat misleading. Additionally evidence indicates that suspects
often bribe court officials to drop charges before cases go to trial,
to lessen sentences, or to commute them.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
Although the Constitution requires that courts issue search warrants,
this provision has not yet been implemented, and prosecutors continue
to issue search warrants. The SBU may conduct intrusive surveillance
and searches without a warrant, with the consent of the Prosecutor
General, who nominally oversees this function of the SBU. However, the
extent to which the Prosecutor General utilizes his authority to
monitor SBU activities and to curb excesses by security officials is
unknown. The Constitution provides citizens with the right to examine
any dossier on them in possession of the SBU and to sue for physical
and emotional damages incurred by an investigation. However, this right
does not exist in practice, because the necessary implementing
legislation has not been passed.
Some remnants of Soviet control mechanisms persist. There are no
probable cause statutes, and police officials and militia personnel
have the right to stop persons and vehicles arbitrarily to initiate
extensive document checks and vehicle inspections. In February the
Ministry of Interior ordered traffic police to end the practice of
stopping vehicles without reason; however, the order had little effect
in practice. Police may detain a person arbitrarily for up to 3 hours
to verify identity. There have been reports that police sometimes
abused this right.
Journalists whose news reports are critical of the Government or
who covered opposition politicians reported that frequently they were
followed by SBU agents and that their telephones were wiretapped (see
Section 2.a.).
Under the current ``propiska'' registration system, all internal
passports contain a stamp indicating residence and matrimonial status
(see Section 2.d.). The Government has indicated its intent to
eliminate the propiska system, but little progress has been made to
date.
The Law on Public Organizations prohibits members of the police,
SBU, and armed forces from joining political parties. Prior to the 1998
parliamentary elections, mass--perhaps coerced--enrollment of public
sector and government employees augmented the ranks of progovernment
parties, particularly the People's Democratic Party (see Section 2.b).
There were no reported cases of the political abuse of psychiatry;
however, the press and human rights groups have reported several cases
of abuse of psychiatry for economic reasons. Persons involved in
property, inheritance, or divorce disputes were diagnosed wrongfully
with schizophrenia and confined to psychiatric institutions. The
disputes often entail the corruption of psychiatric experts and court
officials. In February Parliament adopted a new Law on Psychiatry which
bans abuse of psychiatry for political and nonmedical reasons and
provides safeguards against such abuse. However, human rights monitors
report that the law was not implemented by year's end, and the old
Soviet system of classifying mental illness is still in use. Persons
diagnosed with mental illness may be confined and treated forcibly,
declared not responsible for their actions, and stripped of their civil
rights without being present at the hearings or notified of the ruling.
In the meantime, the 1988 old Soviet psychiatric regulation remains in
force. There are some 1.2 million registered psychiatric patients in
the country. Within 3 days after forcible confinement to a hospital, a
patient must be examined by three doctors. Patients (including
convicted prisoners) subsequently must be examined by the senior
regional psychiatric commission within half a year. According to the
Ukrainian Psychiatric Association, the Health Care Ministry has not
always cooperated with human rights groups attempting to monitor abuse
of psychiatry.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and a 1991 law
provide for freedom of speech and of the press; however, in practice
the Government interfered with the news media and restricted these
rights through the widespread use of tax inspections, libel cases,
subsidization of friendly media, and intimidation of journalists. In
addition journalists reported feeling more subtle forms of pressure, in
particular to provide positive coverage of the President, which
resulted in more self-censorship. The Government owns or controls most
of the national radio and television channels, which is the primary
source of information for most citizens. However, there is a wide
variety of newspapers and periodicals available, which espouse
different political points of view, and individuals can and frequently
do criticize the Government without reprisal. Though limited in
readership, internet publications, in particular Ukrainska Pravda,
played a key role in covering the disappearance of Heorhiy Gongadze and
the scandal surrounding allegations of Presidential involvement in the
case (see Section 1.b.). Government attempts to control the press were
reported by the media.
The print media, both independent and government-owned,
demonstrated a tendency toward self-censorship on matters that the
Government and in particular the President deemed sensitive. Private
newspapers have been established and are free to function on a purely
commercial basis, although very few are profitable. However, they are
subject to various pressures, such as control of access to affordable
state-subsidized newsprint; dependence on political patrons who may
facilitate financial support from the State Press Support Fund; close
scrutiny from government officials, especially at the local level; and
politically motivated visits by tax inspectors. In 1997 the President
issued a decree on support of the press that requires the Cabinet to
draw up a list of publications needing government support, including
those published by central and local governments, public organizations,
associations, unions, educational institutions, and newspaper
employees. The journalistic community believed that this decree was
intended to control the press by supporting loyal members. In December
the President issued a decree defending freedom of the press; however,
observers report it has had little impact. The dependence of much of
the press on government patronage has inhibited criticism, particularly
at the local level. The State Committee for Information Policy has
warned some periodicals against fomenting ethnic tensions and
conducting antistate propaganda and has applied to the Prosecutor's
Office to open investigations into those newspapers. In December a
court in Kharkiv fined the local chapter of PROSVITA, an organization
that promotes Ukrainian language and culture, and ordered it to cease
publication of its newspaper on the grounds that it had published an
anti-Semitic article. The case presented the first time a court has
punished a publication for anti-Semitic writings.
The Committee on Protection of State Secrets enjoys broadly defined
powers over all media. In 1997 the Cabinet adopted a regulation that
further defined state secrets to include information on executions, the
state of prisons, pretrial detention blocks, and centers for the
forcible treatment of alcoholics. (The ``state of prisons'' refers to
the physical state of the prison walls and fences, not prison
conditions.) The press is able to report about harsh prison conditions
without any inhibition. Journalists report that, in general, the
committee has not interfered with their activities (see Section 1.c.).
The Government pressured media outlets to support an April
referendum on amending the Constitution to increase presidential
powers. In March the Tax Administration temporarily froze the accounts
of the newspaper Silski Visti, (which opposed the referendum and
supported Socialist candidate Oleksandr Moroz during the presidential
election), and confiscated its paper stock. In September the Tax
Administration fined Silski Visti more than $178,000 (1 million
hryvnia) for tax evasion. In October Silski Visti temporarily suspended
publication due to heavy financial pressures. The paper resumed
publication, but continued to experience financial problems.
In April the newly founded newspaper Itogi was subjected to
eviction, disconnection of its phone lines, and tax inspections of its
main investor after publishing an article critical of a senior
government official. The newspaper went out of business after
publishing only five issues.
The Government, both central and local, regularly targeted
opposition newspapers with unannounced tax inspections or fire and
building code inspections. Prior to the 1999 presidential election, the
Government forced at least one opposition newspaper, Polytyka, to
close. Government officials initiated more than 20 criminal and civil
libel cases against Polytyka's editor, Oleg Lyashko, asking more than
$40 million (220 million hryvnia) in damages. Lyashko was acquitted in
one of two criminal libel cases that charged him with slandering the
President and his staff, but that acquittal was overturned in December
1999. At a December hearing, Lyashko's trial was tentatively set for
January 2001. In January the State Committee for Information Policy
refused to register Lyashko's new publication Svoboda. In February the
Committee reversed its decision, and Svoboda began publication.
However, government officials subsequently pressured Lyashko to change
the tone of coverage in Svoboda, and the newspaper has experienced
financial difficulties that prevented its regular basis publication. In
March Lyashko was assaulted in the entryway to his home after
publishing an article critical of an Odesa businessman. Although he
initially blamed the Government, Lyashko later accused the businessman
of orchestrating the attack. There has been no further investigation
into the case, and no one has been charged with the assault.
The newspaper Den, which supported presidential candidate and
former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk during the 1999 presidential
campaign, was subjected to 25 tax inspections between January and July
1999. After Marchuk joined the Government as Secretary of the National
Security and Defense Council during the year, Den became less critical
of the Government and the repeated tax inspections ceased.
In 1999 the Parliament adopted a resolution on the media that
called for investigations into all complaints of harassment of nonstate
media outlets by the Tax Inspectorate, the Prosecutor General's Office,
or the presidential administration. Journalists reported that the
resolution had little impact.
Government officials also frequently use criminal libel cases or
civil suits based on alleged damage to a ``person's honor and
integrity'' to punish critics. Article 7 of the Civil Code allows
anyone, including public officials, to sue for damages if circulated
information is untrue or insults a person's honor or dignity. Article
125 of the Criminal Code prescribes imprisonment of up to 3 years for
libel. There is no distinction between private individuals and public
officials (except for the President), nor is there a limit to the
amount of damages that may be awarded. Consequently, any journalist who
publishes an article critical of a public official risks being sued for
damages.
The Prosecutor General can file criminal libel charges. According
to Ministry of Justice statistics, 123 persons were convicted in 1998
for criminal libel. Of these seven cases resulted in prison sentences.
According to the Union of Journalists of Ukraine, journalists lose two
of every three cases against them in the courts. In 1999 approximately
2,250 libel cases were filed. Exact figures for this year are not
available; however, media analysts expect a similar number of cases for
the year. Journalists complain that because the law does not limit
damages, it can be used to drive opposition newspapers out of business.
On occasion fines were so large that accounts were frozen and
equipment confiscated by the Tax Inspectorate to enforce payment. It is
clear that a large number of libel and personal dignity suits are
motivated politically. Moreover, even when the actions of the Tax
Inspectorate are overturned by subsequent court decisions, the damage
to the newspapers' finances can be irreparable. Their accounts remain
frozen until all appeals are completed. Independent newspapers face
further financial pressure as they try to compete with propresidential
newspapers, which are sold at a price significantly below cost.
Newspapers aligned with the presidential administration reportedly
often are financed by wealthy presidential allies. The threat of
multiple lawsuits for large amounts of money also was used to pressure
owners of opposition newspapers to sell their shares to their political
opponents.
In March the Lviv newspaper Express, which had been critical of the
local government, was fined $26,785 (150,000 hryvnia) for libel.
Journalists and students protested the decision, and in April the
regional court overturned the lower court's decision. Journalists
sometimes were subjected to physical attacks related to their
professional activities. Some journalists reported threats of arrest or
assaults when investigating crime and official corruption (see Section
1.c.). The intermeshing of organized crime and many public officials
makes it difficult to assess whether these attacks and threats were
motivated politically.
Despite government pressure and media self-censorship, the variety
of newspapers and periodicals on the market, each espousing the view of
its respective sponsor, provides a variety of opinion. Foreign
newspapers and periodicals circulate freely.
The broadcast media, the primary source of news and information for
most citizens, are either state-owned or, in the case of private
stations, subject to pressure from the Government, which took steps
during the year to strengthen its control over this sector. In 1998 the
Government transferred over state-owned broadcasting and transmission
facilities from the Derzhteleradio (State Committee for Television and
Radio) directly to the Information Ministry (later reorganized as the
State Committee for Information Policy). The President and the
Parliament each appoint half of the members of the National Council for
Television and Radio Broadcasting, which issues licenses and allocates
broadcasting time. President Kuchma did not name his half of the eight-
member board until June, after the Parliament replaced its original
four members in May. In the absence of a functioning council, the
Government had virtually unchallenged control over media licensing
prior to the 1999 presidential election and in the lead-up to the April
referendum.
Other state agencies took advantage of the lack of a working
council to harass opposition stations. For example, the frequency of
arbitrary tax inspections increased considerably without a working
council. The State Electro-Communications Inspectorate increased the
fees for broadcast frequencies tenfold in 1999 without the prior
approval of the council. Fee increases disproportionately affected
independent stations, since state channels were permitted to ignore
payment of their frequency fees. The law entitles private and foreign
companies to obtain a license to establish and operate their own
transmission facilities.
Prior to the 1999 presidential election, the Government increased
pressure on the broadcast media, using tax inspections and other
measures, and forced at least five local television stations (four in
the Crimea and one in Dnipropetrovsk) to close. Numerous sources
charged that the administration continued to use government agencies,
particularly the Tax Inspectorate, to pressure the opposition media and
businesses supporting its political opponents. Prior to the 1999
presidential election, the independent television station STB, one of
the more balanced and independent media outlets, faced increasing
harassment by government entities. It was threatened with closure and
the arrest of its owners if it did not cede financial and editorial
control to presidential supporters. Its staff suffered physical
assaults, threatening phone calls, robbery, and lawsuits. In August
1999, the State Tax Administration froze STB's bank accounts for
failure to pay sufficient taxes. By October 1999, the station was sold
and had changed its news programming to take a more pro-Kuchma
approach. During the 1999 presidential election campaign, several
regional television outlets were taken off the air by government
authorities, allegedly to prevent coverage of opposition presidential
candidates. The presidential campaign saw a marked imbalance in the
coverage of candidates on national television and radio channels, with
opposition candidates receiving very limited and often negative
coverage at the national level. Opposition candidates had more success
in obtaining access to smaller local and regional television channels.
In the period leading up to the April referendum on constitutional
amendments that would expand presidential powers, television coverage
was overwhelmingly propresidential and proreferendum.
There is no known government censorship of books, film, or theater.
While major universities are state owned, they operate for the most
part under full autonomy. However, academic freedom is an
underdeveloped and poorly understood concept. Nepotism and bribery
reportedly are common during entrance exams and also influence the
granting of degrees. Administrators of universities and academic and
research institute directors possess the power to silence colleagues by
denying them the ability to publish, withholding pay and housing
benefits, or directly terminating them. This atmosphere tends to limit
the spirit of free inquiry. Restrictions by the Communications Ministry
on the mailing of scientific documents also have caused concern.
The State Secrets Committee maintains offices for the protection of
state secrets in state scientific and research institutes, including
those not conducting any classified research. An April 1998
presidential edict allows only government-designated contractors to
provide Internet access at state institutions that have such censorship
offices. Human rights groups feared that this edit may limit the
freedom of information for universities and scientific research
institutes. A July presidential decree identified the development of
the Internet as a priority of national information policy and
instructed the Government to design a state program to develop the
Internet network. A 1999 presidential decree sought to require that all
communication companies and Internet providers be licensed and their
equipment be fitted for wiretapping (implicitly by the security
services). However, the decree was blocked by Parliament in 1999.
All private and religiously affiliated universities operated
without any reported state interference or harassment.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
and law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice; however, there were some instances in
which this right was restricted. The 1988 law on public assembly
circumscribes freedom of assembly by stipulating that organizations
must apply for permission to their respective local administration at
least 10 days before a planned event or demonstration. The Criminal
Code prescribes up to 6 months in prison, 1 year of corrective labor,
or a fine for repeatedly staging unauthorized demonstrations. The 1996
Constitution requires that demonstrators merely inform the authorities
of a planned demonstration in advance; however, authorities insist that
all demonstrations meet the restrictive requirements of the 1988 law.
Under the 1988 law, demonstrators are prohibited from inciting violence
or ethnic conflict and from calling for the violent overthrow of the
constitutional order. In practice unlicensed demonstrations are common,
and most but not all occur without police interference, fines, or
detention. There were no reports of cases of interference during the
year.
Communist groups complain that the authorities failed to punish
Ukrainian nationalist groups who harassed them during their
demonstrations. Ukrainian nationalist groups in turn complained that
the authorities do not protect them from harassment by Communist
groups. On December 22, a local court ordered antipresidential
protestors occupying a large square in central Kiev to vacate the area
because of impending holiday celebrations. Demonstrations by the group
outside of Parliament and other Government buildings also were banned.
On the same day the court decision was reached, the demonstrators
announced that they would dismantle all but one of the protest tents
erected on the square, and would resume demonstrations after the
holidays if warranted. The demonstrations ended peacefully December 23.
The Constitution, law, and government regulations restrict freedom
of association to varying degrees. These restrictions generally apply
to organizations that are considered dangerous, such as those which
advocate violence or racial and religious hatred, or which threaten the
public order or health.
A government requirement that a political party have
representatives in at least half of the country's regions in order to
register officially has limited the ability of Russian, Crimean, Tatar,
and Romanian groups to organize (see Section 3).
The Ministry of Justice, with the Prosecutor General's consent, has
the authority to warn, fine, or suspend operations of political parties
for illegal operations. Suspension can be for up to 3 months and can be
extended for 6 months upon the Ministry's request.
In 1998 the Constitutional Court invalidated the 1993 Crimean law
on citizens' associations, thus outlawing regional Crimean parties. A
1992 law on public organizations prohibits the Government from
financing or materially supporting political parties. According to this
law, political parties may not receive funds from abroad or maintain
accounts in foreign banks. The law prohibits police authorities,
members of the SBU, and armed forces personnel from joining political
parties.
Prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections, the mass--perhaps
coerced--enrollment of public sector and government employees augmented
the ranks of progovernment parties, particularly the People's
Democratic Party (see Section 1.f.).
Freedom of association also is restricted through a strict
registration requirement that lends itself to political manipulation
and corruption; however, in practice such regulations seldom are
employed to restrict this freedom. Groups must register with the
Government to pursue almost any purpose. The Ministries of Internal
Affairs, Justice, Economy, and Foreign Economic Relations, as well as
the State Committees on Religion and Broadcasting and other government
bodies have registration functions and used this power to limit freedom
of association (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
For example, after almost a year of attempting to register as a
national organization, a Luhansk-based group for the protection of gay
rights, the Nash Mir Gay and Lesbian Center, succeeded in registering
in November 1999. According to group representatives, local officials
indicated that the group was not registered because it was a gay rights
group. The group reported this year that it is functioning without
problems.
Groups must be registered with the Government to engage in almost
any activity, whether commercial, political, religious, or
philanthropic. Unregistered groups are prohibited from opening bank
accounts, acquiring property, or entered into contracts.
The registration law gives the Government the right to inspect the
activities of all registered groups. This law requires that a party
specify all its activities in its charter, but the party is not
required to notify authorities of all its meetings. A change in the
group's charter necessitates reregistration.
A registered group may not duplicate any function or service that
the Government is expected to provide. For example, human rights
lawyers who wished to represent prisoners were prohibited from
establishing an association because the Government is required by the
Constitution to provide lawyers for the accused. However, this
requirement is not always enforced. In the
mid-1990's, AI was refused registration under the pretext that
human rights protection is the function of the State. It continued to
apply and eventually was registered.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on
Freedom of Conscience and Religion provide for separation of church and
state and the right to practice the religion of one's choice and the
Government generally respects these rights in practice, with the
exception of some nonnative religions, which experienced difficulties
registering, buying, or leasing property. The Government generally
permits religious organizations to establish places of worship and to
train clergy. The Government has continued to expedite allotment of
land plots for construction of new houses of worship and to return
religious buildings and sites to their former owners.
Although in past years the Government's protection of religious
freedom had deteriorated for nonnative religious organizations (defined
as all organizations other than Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Jewish),
nonnative religions reported less difficulty in obtaining visas and
registering. The Government did not discriminate against individual
believers of nonnative religions; however, their organizations faced
ongoing difficulty in carrying out their activities during the year.
Through burdensome licensing requirements and informal means, local
authorities restricted nonnative religions as well as Christian
denominations other than Greek Catholic and Orthodox. The Government
took steps to return properties expropriated during the Soviet era to
religious groups.
A 1993 amendment to the 1991 Law on the Freedom of Conscience and
Religion restricts the activities of nonnative, foreign-based,
religious organizations. The amendment narrowly defines the permissible
activities of members of the clergy, preachers, teachers, and other
foreign citizen representatives of foreign-based religious
organizations. They may preach, minister religious ordinances, or
practice other canonical activities ``only in those religious
organizations which invited them to Ukraine and with official approval
of the governmental body that registered the statutes and the articles
of the pertinent religious organization.'' Although the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints had complained in 1998 that this
restriction prevented the transfer of its missionaries between cities,
church leaders subsequently have not reported any difficulties in
transferring missionaries between cities.
All religious organizations are required by the 1991 Religion Law
to register with the State Committee on Religious Affairs. If a group
chooses to register as a national organization, it must register with
the central office of the State Committee for Religious Affairs, and
each of its local groups must register with the local office of the
State Committee in the region where it is located. Those groups that
choose to register as local organizations must register only with the
regional office of the State Committee. This status is necessary to own
property or carry out many economic activities, such as publishing
religious materials or opening bank accounts. This process is supposed
to take not more than 1 month (or 3 months in cases in which either the
central or regional committee decides that an expert opinion is
necessary to determine the legitimacy of a group applying for
registration). However, in practice this process generally exceeds 1
month. The regional offices also supervise the compliance of religious
organizations with the provisions of the law. Some nonnative religious
organizations credibly reported that, especially at the local or
regional levels, officials of the state committee refused to register
their organizations for protracted periods, thus effectively delaying
their activities and limiting freedom of association (see Section
2.b.). However, there were fewer reports than in prior years of
nonnative religious groups experiencing such registration problems.
Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox Church in
the central, southern, and eastern regions of the country and the Greek
Catholic Church in the west, exerted significant political influence at
the local and regional levels and pressured local officials not to
register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent or
purchase property. Each of the two dominant denominations, within their
respective spheres of influence, also reportedly pressured local
officials to restrict the activities of the other.
The ongoing dispute among competing Orthodox Christian
administrative bodies claiming to be ``the Ukrainian Orthodox Church''
remained deadlocked. The Government has been unable to stop
disagreements between the Orthodox believers and Greek Catholics in the
western part of the country where the two communities were contentious
and often engage in bitter disputes over church buildings and property
in over 600 localities. The Kiev Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church
complained of harassment by local authorities in the predominantly
Russian-speaking eastern region of the country, while the Moscow
Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church complained that local governments
ignored the appropriation of its churches in the Ukrainian-speaking
western region. In 1999 Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of Kiev Patriarchate and his followers were assaulted by
supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate in Mariupol (see Section 5).
According to the State Committee for Religious Affairs, the
transfer of most places of worship to their original owners according
to a 1992 decree on restitution was nearing completion. In 1996 and
1997, 105 buildings were returned; in 1998, 92 were returned; and in
1999 103 were returned. About 40 buildings were returned during the
first half of the year. There still were about 340 former houses of
worship that were used for nonreligious purposes, but 275 of them were
not claimed by religious groups. In the fourth quarter of 1999, local
authorities in the oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpatia,
Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi, as
well as in Sevastopol, returned 42 former houses of worship to
religious groups. In August the local Government returned a former
Mosque to the Muslim community in Crimea.
Numerous Jewish congregations have negotiated successfully with
local authorities for worship space. In 1996 a Kiev arbitration court
decided in favor of transferring the title of the former Kiev Central
Synagogue, which in Soviet times was used as a puppet theater, to a
Chabad Hasidic congregation. By December 1997, the puppet theater had
vacated the building, and in the spring of 1998, the building reopened
again as a synagogue. The synagogue was rededicated this year after
extensive renovation. The decision set an important precedent for the
judiciary's role in religious property restitution. According to Jewish
community representatives, progress on restitution is generally
satisfactory, although more could be done. In the first quarter of the
year, two synagogues were returned to the Jewish community.
The pace of restitution of Christian churches has slowed in recent
years, since the buildings that remain in state possession tend to be
prime properties currently being used as museums, concert halls, or
city halls. All religions have enjoyed equal opportunity to regain
control over former community property. Problems in obtaining
restitution resulted from inadequate legislation, bureaucratic inertia,
and the difficulty of locating alternative quarters for current
occupants. In February 1999, a presidential order instructed all local
governments to complete the handover of former religious property
whenever possible by the end of 1999 and banned privatization of
religious communities' property. However, restitution is not complete.
The committee attributed delays in returning other properties to lack
of funds and the difficulties involved in finding alternative space for
current users.
In July a dispute arose over efforts by a Jewish organization to
build a memorial park at an ancient Jewish cemetery and holocaust
massacre site in Sambor, a town in Lviv Oblast. City authorities
deferred the project after local nationalist groups demanded that the
site also commemorate non-Jewish victims of the Nazis buried on the
site. Efforts to reach a compromise stalled when the Nationalists
demanded that no Jewish symbols appear at the site, that no Hebrew be
used on inscriptions, and that Christian crosses be displayed.
Nationalist groups later installed make-shift crosses at the site. At
year's end, work on the memorial had stopped, and the crosses remained.
A number of religious properties were returned to Christian
churches during the year. In the first quarter of the year, the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church received 17 buildings. In May the Kiev
Patriarchate received the newly rebuilt, historic St. Michael's
Cathedral in central Kiev for its exclusive use. The Cathedral, which
had been destroyed by Stalin in 1936, was rebuilt with significant
local government funding. In September the Moscow Patriarchate received
for its use the newly rebuilt Uspensky Cathedral of the Lavra
Monastery, which also was restored using government funds.
In June four foreign public school teachers with religious
affiliations were deported from Sevastopol after being accused of
illegal religious activity incompatible with their work visa status.
Although the central Government in Kiev offered to assist them with an
appeal of this decision, the teachers decided voluntarily to depart the
country.
During the year, the Government made significant efforts to ensure
that pilgrims of the Bratslav Hasidic sect were able to visit the tomb
of their founding rabbi in the city of Uman on the occasion of the
Jewish New Year.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice;
however, there are some limits. In particular the Government has not
yet fulfilled its pledge to abolish mandatory registration--the
propiska system--and replace it with an informational residence
register (see Section 1.f.). Regulations impose a nationwide
requirement to register at the workplace and place of residence in
order to be eligible for social benefits, thereby complicating freedom
of movement by limiting access to certain social benefits to the place
where one is registered. For example, persons who move to other regions
for work in the private sector may be denied formal access to free
medical care and other services provided by the Government. Residence
without registration carries a fine under the administrative code, but
this provision rarely is enforced. Human rights groups reported cases
of persons being stripped of their residence registration, evicted from
their homes, and made homeless through criminal fraud or court error.
Police also arbitrarily detained persons for extensive document checks
and vehicle inspections (see Section 1.f.).
Citizens who wished to travel abroad were able to do so freely.
Exit visas are required for citizens who intend to take up permanent
residence in another country. There were no known cases of exit visas
being denied to citizens during the year. The Government may deny
passports to individuals in possession of state secrets, but denials
may be appealed. A lapse in an Israeli-Ukrainian student exchange
agreement in 1999 led to concerns about the ability of several hundred
students to travel overseas for study in Israel. While negotiations
continued between the Ukrainian and Israeli Governments over the
renewal of the lapsed exchange agreement, the Ukrainian Government took
steps to ensure that the students in question could travel to Israel.
The exchange agreement was renewed in April.
Citizenship law provides the right to citizenship for all
individuals who were born or lived in the country before independence
and to their descendants who lived outside the country as of November
13, 1991. In order to be eligible, persons must not be citizens of
other countries and must submit their application by year's end. An
amendment to the law in April extended the application deadline to 2005
for Ukrainians returning from the far north and east in Russia and for
former military officers. Dual citizenship is not recognized. A 1997
amendment to the Citizenship Law also provides the right to citizenship
for deported victims of political oppression, such as the Crimean
Tatars. Refugees can acquire citizenship if they have lived legally in
the country for 5 years and can communicate in the Ukrainian language.
Since independence over 1.5 million Ukrainians have returned to the
country, while over 1 million persons, mostly ethnic Russians, have
left the country.
The Government has not supported a foreign-funded program to
facilitate the travel to the country of some emigrants who qualify for
resettlement as refugees. More than 260,000 Crimean Tatars have
returned from exile to Crimea, mainly from Central Asia. According to
government officials, as of September between 220,000 and 230,000
Tatars had acquired Ukrainian citizenship. Crimean Tatar leaders have
complained that their community has not received adequate assistance in
resettling and that an onerous process of acquiring citizenship has
excluded many of them from participating in elections and from the
right to take part in the privatization of land and state assets.
However, the 1997 amendment to the Citizenship Law waives some of the
usual residence and language requirements for returning deportees and
expedites the acquisition of citizenship. The amendment facilitates the
acquisition of citizenship by Crimean Tatars who were deported victims
of political oppression. It allows deported persons, including Crimean
Tatars, to acquire citizenship without a mandatory 5-year term of
residence in the country and without Ukrainian language proficiency. In
1999 the Rada further amended the Citizenship Law to allow deported
persons or their descendents living in the country for 5 years to
acquire citizenship automatically without having to renounce any
foreign citizenship that they may possess. Previously Crimean Tatars
had difficulty obtaining documents from Uzbekistan to confirm that they
had relinquished their Uzbek citizenship.
The 1993 Law on Refugees governs the treatment of refugees and
entitles refugees to all of the benefits accorded to citizens. The
Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), and refugee status initially is given for a 3month term and is
subject to further extension. According to government statistics, 2,898
persons (more than half of whom are Afghans) were granted refugee
status between January and October. A commitment was made to award
refugee status to all Afghans who arrived in the country before 1995.
Under the new Citizenship Law, legally registered refugees can apply
for citizenship after 5 years of permanent residence. Under the Refugee
Law, refugees are entitled to material assistance. The Cabinet decided
to start allocating funds in the 1999 national budget for payment of
refugee pensions and small allowances for indigent refugees, plus
transportation fare to a refugee center. In cooperation with the UNHCR
in 1997, the Government established a refugee receiving center for 200
persons in Vinnytsya. The Government planned to open four other centers
elsewhere; however, no additional center had been opened by year's end.
Instances of police harassment of certain categories of refugees
apparently diminished during the year.
According to the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration,
the Government has a first asylum policy. This means that persons who
travel directly from their home country to Ukraine as refugees are
assured refugee status. However, there were some problematic cases in
1999.
There were no reports during the year that persons were forced to
return to a country where they feared persecution. In 1999, four
Uzbeks, including two exiled Uzbek oppositionists, reportedly were
arrested without a warrant, denied counsel, and deported forcibly to
Uzbekistan without a hearing, despite protests by human rights groups.
The four claimed to have been tortured and forced to give false
testimony; nonetheless, they were sentenced later that year by an Uzbek
court to between 8 and 15 years in prison.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right and the ability to change the government
peacefully. The Constitution provides universal suffrage for citizens
at least 18 years of age and for periodic elections every 4 years for
the Parliament and every 5 years for the President. A presidential
election was held on October 31 and November 14, 1999. Parliamentary
elections took place in 1994 and in 1998.
Power is divided between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. Although nominally independent, the judicial branch in
practice is influenced heavily by the executive (see Section 1.e.). The
President appoints the Prime Minister, who appoints the remainder of
the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, as well as certain other appointments,
such as the Prosecutor General, is subject to parliamentary approval.
The Constitution grants the President limited power to pass binding
decrees and directives that have the power of law.
The voting process in connection with the April referendum on
amendments to the Constitution that would increase presidential powers
was conducted in a generally free and fair manner; however, there were
some serious problems. While most observers agreed that there were few
procedural irregularities on voting day, the period leading to the
referendum was marked by unbalanced media coverage and inappropriate
involvement of government officials in turning out the vote and
influencing voters on behalf of President Kuchma. Voter turnout was
reported to be higher than during the October 1999 presidential
election, raising suspicions of manipulation on the part of the
presidential administration. For example, an unusually high number of
voters were allowed to vote before election day. Pollsters reported
that exit poll results on turnout were notably lower than results
reported by the Government. However, it is believed that the outcome of
the referendum generally reflected the will of the people.
In June by-elections were held to fill 10 vacant parliament seats.
Opposition candidates complained of voting irregularities, a lack of
access to the media, and government pressure on behalf of
propresidential candidates. However, observers believed that it was
unlikely that these problems significantly altered the outcome of the
election.
As many as 10 elected mayors reported continued harassment by the
Tax Administration and law enforcement bodies, allegedly at the
direction of presidentially appointed regional governors. The mayors
attributed this pressure to their lack of support for President Kuchma
during the 1999 presidential election. In February Vasylkiv Mayor
Valeriy Popovych resigned under pressure after being detained and
released on corruption charges. In September Myrhorod mayor Vasyl
Tretetsky was removed from office by the city council. The press
reported that the regional governor threatened council members with the
loss of family members' jobs if they did not oust Tretetsky. In
September Romny mayor Viktor Strelchenko resigned, reportedly after
being told that the city would not receive heating fuel from regional
authorities if he remained in office. Cherkasy mayor Volodymyr Olinyk,
who ran for president in 1999 but dropped out in favor of another
opposition candidate, was under criminal investigation and complained
of SBU monitoring of his activities.
International observers noted violations of election day procedures
in the 1999 presidential elections, with more numerous and serious
violations occurring in the second round of voting. However, the
violations reportedly were not widespread nor systematic. The most
serious problems were unbalanced media coverage and the coordinated and
inappropriate involvement of government officials in both rounds of the
election on behalf of President Kuchma. The OSCE also was concerned
over pressure exerted on voters in prisons, hospitals, and educational
institutions on behalf of President Kuchma. A representative of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared that the
elections were ``far from fair and democratic.'' OSCE observers noted
that unauthorized persons, including SBU officers, present in polling
stations, especially during the runoff election and had reports of
militia involvement in campaigning. After the first round of voting,
three regional administrators were dismissed, allegedly for failing to
produce sufficient votes for President Kuchma in their districts. After
the second round of voting, President Kuchma dismissed two oblast
governors and six rayon (regional) heads in those regions were Kuchma
received fewer votes than Communist Party rival Symonenko. Very high
voter turnouts, particularly in western districts, aroused suspicion of
ballot stuffing on President Kuchma's behalf in the second round of
voting. However, observers concluded that it was unlikely that these
problems significantly altered the final outcome of the election, in
view of President Kuchma's 18-point margin of victory.
In the 1999 preelection period, various forms of government
pressure on the media served to limit the independence of the press
(see Section 2.a.). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
found that state media coverage of the presidential campaign was biased
strongly in favor of President Kuchma. The Government allegedly used
official agencies, especially the Tax Inspectorate, to disrupt or
eliminate the businesses of political opponents prior to the elections.
Presidential candidate Yevhen Marchuk reported that police ordered a
meeting with voters evacuated in Luhansk in August 1999, citing an
anonymous bomb threat (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Political
candidates also reported difficulty in renting meeting halls, closure
of their local campaign offices by government officials, confiscation
of campaign vehicles, and pressure on employees from directors of
state-owned enterprises. Many opposition presidential candidates
complained that the SBU overstepped its mandate and interfered in the
campaign to the benefit of President Kuchma. These reports appear
credible. There are confirmed reports that the SBU monitored NGO's
engaged in nonpartisan political activity (see Sections 1.f. and 4).
Presidential candidates complained about the presidential
administration's dominance over the media and the illegal involvement
of state officials in Kuchma's campaign. The Supreme Court declared in
November 1999 that it did not have the right to question the decision
of the Central Election Committee or to declare an election null and
void but that it could only order recounts in specific polling
stations.
Women are active in government and politics, but are
underrepresented and they hold a disproportionately small percentage of
offices. Women hold 37 of the 450 seats in the Rada. Only two women
hold ministerial posts. The 18-member Constitutional Court has two
female members.
Jews are well represented among the political elite and hold
several parliamentary seats. Many Crimean Tatars are unable to
participate fully in the political process, primarily due to
citizenship problems (see Section 2.d.). The Government's requirement
that a political party have representatives in at least half of the
country's regions in order to register officially has limited the
ability of Russian, Crimean Tatar, and Romanian minority groups to
organize (see Section 2.b.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally
are cooperative and responsive to their views. However, human rights
groups reported more difficulties in investigating penal conditions,
which are a significant human rights concern. There are confirmed
reports that the SBU monitored NGO's engaged in nonpartisan political
activity during the 1999 presidential election campaign (see Section
3).
A 1998 law created the Parliamentary Commissioner on Human Rights,
which is a constitutionally mandated independent human rights
ombudsman. Parliament elected the first Ombudsman in April 1998. The
Ombudsman serves a 5-year term and, in principle, is invested by law
with very broad powers. In November the Ombudsman delivered her first
human rights report to Parliament. The report noted that despite
legislative guarantees, the country lacks effective mechanisms for
protection of human rights. The Ombudsman's office reported that it had
received more than 100,000 letters since its inception; however, many
of those letters were requests for information rather than complaints
of human rights violations. The office's staff grew by 30 percent
during the year to approximately 60 full- and part-time workers.
However, the office was underfunded, and employees sometimes were
unpaid.
The law provides the Ombudsman with unrestricted and unannounced
access to any public official, including the President; unrestricted
access to any government installation; and the oversight of
implementation of human rights treaties and agreements to which the
country is a party. However, the law provides no penalties for those
who obstruct the Ombudsman's investigations, nor does it create
sufficient enforcement authority for the Ombudsman. The law required
the Government to submit amendments to existing laws to provide the
legal framework for the operation of the Ombudsman's office. The
Ombudsman's office itself drafted some 70 amendments to this effect,
but those amendments had not been enacted at year's end. All citizens
and current residents can address their concerns to the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman also serves as the intermediary between citizens and the
Constitutional Court, since citizens cannot address the Court directly.
The Ombudsman made combating of trafficking in persons (see Section
6.f.) and improving prison conditions a priority during the year.
Citizens have the right to file appeals with the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations.
According to one human rights expert, some 13,000 appeals were made to
the court in 1998 and some 200 cases were accepted by the court for
review.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, and other grounds; however, due in part to the absence of an
effective judicial system, the Government does not enforce these
provisions effectively. The Government has not prosecuted anti-Semitic
acts, under the law forbidding the sowing of interethnic hatred.
Women.--Violence against women is reportedly pervasive. While
statistics compiled by the U.N. Development Program show that the
number of reported rapes and attempted rapes decreased in recent years,
surveys indicated that the majority of rapes and other cases of
physical abuse went unreported. Past surveys by women's groups
indicated that between 10 and 15 percent of women had been raped, and
over 25 percent physically abused, in their lifetimes.
The Criminal Code outlaws rape and ``forced sex with a materially
dependent person,'' which may allow prosecution for spousal rape.
Spousal abuse also is illegal, but authorities often pressure women not
to press charges against their husbands. Separate statistics on
prosecutions for wife beating or on average sentences are not
available. In 1997, the last year for which statistics are available,
1,510 criminal cases were opened for rape, 822 for sexual abuse, and 3
for sexual compulsion. Information on convictions was not available.
Violence against women does not receive extensive media coverage,
despite the efforts of human rights groups to highlight the problem.
Hot lines, shelters, and other practical support for victims of abuse
are practically nonexistent, although there are some shelters run by
private organizations. In 1998 Kiev municipal authorities opened the
country's first state-funded women's center. In 1998 the Government
announced plans to establish a network of shelters throughout the
country, but by year's end, it had not yet begun to implement these
plans.
Ukraine is a significant source country for girls and women
trafficked to Central and Western Europe and the Middle East for sexual
exploitation (see Section 6.f.). A 1998 amendment to the Criminal Code
imposes harsh penalties for--among other offenses--trafficking in human
beings, including for sexual exploitation and pornography; however, the
effectiveness of this step has not yet been established. The
authorities rarely prosecute men for engaging women in the rapidly
growing sector of sexually exploitative work.
Women's groups reported that there was widespread sexual harassment
in the workplace, including coerced sex. Apart from the law that
prohibits forced sex with a ``materially dependent person,'' which
applies to employees, legal safeguards against harassment are
inadequate. In the only known case of prosecution for sexual harassment
in the workplace, Pravda Ukrayiny editor Oleksandr Horobets was
convicted in 1999 of sexual harassment of a subordinate and sentenced
to 7 months in prison. However, the fact that Horobets was the editor
of an opposition newspaper calls into question the motives of the
procuracy in prosecuting the case.
Labor laws establish the legal equality of men and women, including
equal pay for equal work, a principle that generally is observed.
However, the economic crisis has harmed women disproportionately. Women
are much more likely to be laid off than men. Women constitute
approximately 56 percent of the unemployed population, and as much as
90 percent of newly unemployed persons. Industries that are dominated
by female workers are also those with the lowest relative wages and the
ones that are most likely to be affected by wage arrears problems.
The Constitution and the Law on Protection of Motherhood and
Childhood prohibit the employment of women in jobs that are hazardous
to their health, such as those that involved heavy lifting. However,
despite implementation of a government program to combat dangerous
labor, these laws remain poorly enforced. The Ministry of Labor
estimated that 15 percent of working women are employed in hazardous
jobs. Furthermore human rights groups maintained that management
selectively observed the law only as necessary to lay off or fire
female workers. Many women's rights advocates feared that the law may
be used to bar women from the best paying blue-collar jobs. By law
pregnant women and mothers with small children enjoy paid maternity
leave until their children reach the age of three years. However, this
benefit is a disincentive for employers to hire women for responsible
or career track jobs.
Few women attain top managerial positions in state and private
industry. A March business survey found that half of private sector
employees are women. According to the survey, women run 30 percent of
private small businesses and 13 percent each of large and medium
businesses. According to government statistics, 69.2 percent of the
country's 213,000 state administration jobs were held by women,
including 45.2 per cent of the managerial positions. However, of the
highest ``first'' and ``second'' category offices, only 5.6 percent in
central or local governments are filled by women. (These numbers do not
include the ``power ministries"--the Ministries of Defense, Internal
Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and the SBU, which have substantially more
male employees at all levels.)
Educational opportunities for women generally have been, and
continue to be, equal to those enjoyed by men. However, the Government
limited the number of women who can receive military officer training
to only 20 percent of the total number of students accepted. The
military limited the role of women to certain functions. This limited
their chances for promotion and training opportunities and they were
left with low-paying routine positions in the military.
Children.--The Government is committed publicly to the defense of
children's rights, but the deep economic crisis severely limited its
ability to ensure these rights. The low priority that both the public
and the Government attached to children's rights is reflected in the
absence of groups that aggressively promote children's rights. For
example, the widely acknowledged problem of growing violence and crime
in and outside schools, especially the notoriously violent vocational
schools, largely is ignored by the public and the Government.
Education is free, universal, and compulsory until the age of 15.
However, the public education system has deteriorated as a result of
government financial disarray. Teachers often went unpaid for months.
Increasing numbers of children from poor families dropped out of
school, and illiteracy, which was previously very rare, has become a
problem. Health care is provided equally to girls and boys, but
economic problems have worsened the overall quality of the health care
system.
There were higher numbers of homeless children, who usually fled
poor orphanage or poor domestic conditions. According to government
statistics, 100,000 children are registered as homeless; of those, 14
percent are under age 7. Although statistics were unavailable, drug use
and child prostitution are widespread and received substantial media
attention during the year. Several charity groups were formed to assist
these children, but they have not been able to reduce the problem. In
January President Kuchma issued a decree aimed at reducing homelessness
among children; however, the effect of that decree is unknown. In 1997
the All-Ukrainian Committee for Protection of Children released survey
results that revealed that every fifth or sixth child of both sexes
under age 18 suffered from sexual harassment (including every third
girl), and that every 10th girl is raped.
Deteriorating conditions in the state orphanages led the Government
to encourage families to provide foster homes for orphans and to
facilitate the establishment of private, government-supervised
orphanages. There are 75 such orphanages with some 800 children. To
curb illegal adoption, an April 1998 amendment to the Criminal Code
prescribed up to 15 years' imprisonment for trafficking in children and
illegal adoption (see Section 6.f.). However, there had been no known
successful cases of its application as of year's end.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
the disabled, but the Government has done little to support programs
targeted at increasing opportunities for the disabled. The law mandates
access to buildings and other public facilities for the disabled, but
it is enforced poorly.
Religious Minorities.--Anti-Semitism exists on an individual and
societal basis. However, the central Government generally discouraged
it. Some ultranationalist groups and newspapers continued to publish
and distribute anti-Semitic tracts regularly. Anti-Semitic publications
also are imported from Russia and distributed without the necessary
state license. During the year, President Kuchma and Prime Minister
Yushscenko repeatedly and publicly spoke about the need for the
peaceful coexistence of ethnic and religious groups. Authorities opened
criminal cases against publications for fomenting interethnic hatred.
Moreover, the Procuracy warned certain publications against publishing
anti-Semitic material. In 1999 the Shimon Dubnov Ukrainian Academy of
Jewish History and Culture filed suit against the nationalist newspaper
Vechirniy Kiev for publishing anti-Semitic criticism of the Academy's
collection of scholarly articles, ``Judeophobia Against Ukraine,''
which was published in 1998. The case still was pending at year's end.
Anti-Semitic incidents continue to occur but, according to local
Jewish organizations, have declined in number over recent years and
they were concentrated in western regions of the country.
In October large crosses were erected on prominent elevations near
Sevastopol. In November the crosses were cut down. Although Orthodox
religious leaders accused Tatars of dismantling the crosses, the Tatars
denied involvement, and no one was held formally responsible for the
act.
During the year, there were no arrests made in the 1997 firebombing
of the Kharkiv Israeli cultural center, nor have there been any
prosecutions for the desecration of Jewish cemeteries in 1997.
There were occasional statements by Ukrainian Orthodox Church
officials (both Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates) denouncing the spread of
nonnative religions and sharply criticizing their missionary
activities. Evangelical Christian missionaries reported some instances
of societal discrimination against members of their churches, such as
salary cuts, layoffs, and public criticism for betraying ``native
religions.''
Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox Church and
the Greek Catholic Church, pressured local and regional officials not
to register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent
or purchase property. Both these denominations also reportedly
pressured officials to restrict the activities of the other.
Tension also persists between the different branches of the
Orthodox Church. In April 1999, a violent scuffle took place in the
southeastern city of Mariupol between supporters of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the entourage of Patriarch
Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate). Filaret
had come to Mariupol to consecrate a cross erected on the future site
of a Kiev Patriarchate church. A scuffle broke out when opponents tried
to pull down the cross. Filaret received minor injuries, and several of
his followers were treated at a local hospital for concussions and
minor injuries.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The frequent harassment of
racial minorities is an increasing problem. The police routinely detain
dark-skinned persons for arbitrary document checks (see Section 1.c.).
In addition there were increased reports of racially motivated violence
against persons of African and Asian heritage. Representatives of these
groups claimed that police officials routinely ignored, and sometimes
abetted, violence against them.
Roma face considerable societal discrimination. Opinion polls have
shown that among all ethnic groups, the level of intolerance is highest
toward Roma. In the Transcarpathian region in particular, Roma continue
to be subject to violence and abuse by police (see Section 1.c.).
The Constitution provides for the ``free development, use, and
protection of the Russian language and other minority languages in
Ukraine.'' This compromise builds on a 1991 law on national minorities,
which played an instrumental role in preventing ethnic strife by
allowing individual citizens to use their respective national languages
in conducting personal business and by allowing minority groups to
establish their own schools. Nonetheless, some pro-Russian
organizations in the eastern part of the country complained about the
increased use of Ukrainian in schools and in the media. They claimed
that their children are disadvantaged when taking academic entrance
examinations, since all applicants are required to take a Ukrainian
language test. According to official statistics, there are 16,352
Ukrainian schools, 2,399 Russian schools, 98 Romanian schools, 67
Hungarian schools, 11 Moldovan schools, 9 Crimean-Tatar schools, and 3
Polish schools in the country.
In May a popular folk singer was killed at a cafe in Lviv,
allegedly by Russian-speakers who objected to his singing Ukrainian
songs. The murder sparked protests and prompted a national debate over
the use of Ukrainian and Russian languages. In July the city council
issued a decree banning the broadcast of ``amoral songs'' in public
places, which some observers interpreted as a prohibition against
Russian language music. However, the decree never was enforced and in
August the local procuracy declared the decree unlawful. Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar minorities credibly complain of discrimination by the
Russian majority in Crimea and demand that the Ukrainian and Tatar
languages be given equal treatment to Russian. According to Tatar
leaders, unemployment is as high as 50 percent in their community. In
January 1999, the office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis (the unofficial
Tatar parliament) was firebombed in Simferopol. As of October, no one
had been charged in the crime, though Tatars blamed Russian
chauvinists. In May 1999, on the anniversary of Stalin's deportation of
the Tatars to central Asia, 35,000 Tatars demonstrated for official
recognition of the Mejlis, Tatar representation in the Crimean
parliament, and for official status for the Tatar language. In response
President Kuchma created a presidential Tatar advisory committee that
included all members of the Mejlis. Tatar leaders reported that during
the year the committee helped promote Tatar interests at the national
level. Also in May 1999 Tatar protesters erected a tent camp in front
of the Crimean government building. The camp was dismantled after the
Crimean Prime Minister Serhiy Kunitsyn agreed to the protesters'
demands for the creation of a council to represent Tatar interests in
the Crimean government, for the right of Tatars returning from central
Asia to own land, and for the creation of Tatar schools. A
demonstration held on the anniversary of the deportation of Crimean
Tatars in May was much smaller and less politicized.
The Crimean Government, pleading insufficient funds, did not assent
to requests from the Crimean Tatar community for assistance in
reestablishing its cultural heritage through Tatar language
publications and educational institutions. However, the central
Government is working with the UNHCR, OSCE, and the International
Organization for Migration on support for the Crimean Tatar community.
The majority of the more than 260,000 Crimean Tatars who have
returned to the country from exile in central Asia have received
citizenship. According to Tatar leaders, approximately 30,000 to 40,000
of them still lack citizenship, a decrease from 67,000 in 1999. Crimean
Tatar leaders have complained that their community has not received
adequate assistance in resettling, and that the onerous process of
acquiring citizenship has excluded many of them from participating in
elections and from the right to take part in the privatization of land
and state assets (see Section 2.d.).
Romanians called for university-level instruction in Romanian or
the establishment of a Romanian technical college. There are 86
Romanian-language schools in the Chernivtsi oblast.
Rusyns (Ruthenians) called for status as an official ethnic group
in the country. At a congress held in Uzhhorod in 1999, representatives
of the Rusyn community called for Rusyn-language schools, a Rusyn-
language department at Uzhhorod University, and for Rusyn to be
included as one of the country's ethnic groups in the 2001 census.
According to Rusyn leaders, more than 700,000 Rusyns live in the
country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to join trade unions to defend ``professional, social and
economic interests.'' Under the Constitution, all trade unions have
equal status, and no government permission is required to establish a
trade union. The 1992 Law on Citizens' Organizations (which includes
trade unions) stipulates noninterference by public authorities in the
activities of these organizations, which have the right to establish
and join federations on a voluntary basis. In principle all workers and
civil servants (including members of the armed forces) are free to form
unions. In practice the Government discourages certain categories of
workers, for example, nuclear power plant employees, from doing so. A
new trade union law designed to replace Soviet-era legislation was
adopted by Parliament and signed into law by the President in 1999. In
January independent unions challenged the law. The grounds that it was
as unconstitutional, and in late October, the Constitutional Court
ruled that some provisions of the 1999 Labor Union Law were
unconstitutional. The court rejected the requirement that unions must
register with the Ministry of Justice and the condition that unions
have a certain level of membership and regional representation in order
to qualify for national status. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) has stated that the law violated ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of
Association.
The successor to the Soviet trade unions, known as the Federation
of Trade Unions (FPU), has begun to work independently of the
Government and has been vocal in advocating workers' right to strike.
The FPU has supported the protests of miners and other professions over
unpaid wages. However, as during the Soviet era, most FPU affiliates
work closely with management. Following President Kuchma's 1998
appointment of the head of the FPU-affiliated coal miners' union to be
director of the national coal monopoly, the FPU ended support for
striking miners. Enterprise managers are free to join the FPU. In 1997
the FPU leadership created a political party, the All-Ukrainian Party
of Workers, which is virtually indistinguishable from the FPU.
Independent unions now provide an alternative to the official
unions in many sectors of the economy. The Independent Miners' Union of
Ukraine (NPGU), unions representing pilots, civil air traffic
controllers, locomotive engineers, aviation ground crews, and other
unions operate either independently or within one of three national
confederations. While exact membership is unknown, estimates for
independent union membership ranged from 100,000 to 300,000, while
estimates for FPU-affiliated unions ranged from 17 to 23 million
members. Independent unions have claimed unsuccessfully a share of the
former Soviet trade unions' huge property and funds, especially the
social insurance benefits fund, a Soviet-era legacy traditionally
controlled by the official unions.
Independent unions claimed that the new trade union law is more
restrictive than the old Soviet legislation. To acquire national
status, a union must have representation in more than half of the 14
regions of the country, or in onethird of the enterprises in a
regionally based sector, or have a majority of union members in the
sector. National status and registration confer the right to acquire
space, property, to maintain bank accounts, and to enter legally
binding agreements. These new requirements are likely to make it
difficult for miners and sailors to organize. Another contentious
requirement is mandatory registration by the Justice Ministry. All
unions were required to reregister with the Justice Ministry by April.
As of October, nearly all FPU-affiliated unions and 14 independent
unions were registered. The largest independent union, the Independent
Miners Union, was not registered because it lacks the geographic
presence necessary for national status. As of October, the Justice
Ministry had not applied the administrative sanctions against
unregistered unions that were foreseen in the new law. Registration
determines participation of a union in the national collective
bargaining agreement with the Government, as well as membership on the
Social Insurance Fund Board (see Section 6.b.). Independent unions
stated that the Justice Ministry denied registration to unions not
loyal to the Government. They also reported that management in many
enterprises cited the new law in refusing to deal with independent
unions. Additionally management no longer is obligated to provide free
accommodation and telephone lines to unions. However, the law gives
unions a say in labor safety and division of newly built housing.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike ``to defend one's
economic and social interests.'' The Constitution states that strikes
must not jeopardize national security, public health, or the rights and
liberties of others. The law does not extend the right to strike to
members of the procuracy, judiciary, armed forces, security services,
law enforcement agencies, and public servants. However, a 1998 Law on
Labor Disputes Resolution extends the right to strike to employees of
``continuing process plants,'' for example, metallurgical factories,
provided that they give 15 days' advance notice of their intent to
strike. The law prohibits strikes that jeopardize life or health, the
environment, or that can hinder disaster, accident, or epidemic-related
operations. According to the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) 1999 report, the law does not allow strikes in the
transport sector. Workers who strike in prohibited sectors can receive
up to three years imprisonment.
The law does not prohibit specifically strikes based on political
demands. The law prohibits strikes based on demands to change the
constitutional order, state borders, or the administrative division of
the country, as well as on demands that infringe on human rights. The
Government has relied on the prosecutors and the courts to deal with
strikes that it considered illegal. The law does not extend the
immunity from discipline or dismissal to strikers who take part in
strikes that later are declared illegal by the courts. A union that
organizes an illegal strike is liable for strike-inflicted losses.
According to official statistics, there were 15 strikes in the
first quarter of the year. There are no official restrictions on the
right of unions to affiliate with international trade union bodies. The
NPGU is a member of the Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine, and
General Workers' Union.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Law on
Enterprises states that joint worker-management commissions should
resolve issues concerning wages, working conditions, and the rights and
duties of management at the enterprise level. Overlapping spheres of
responsibility frequently impeded the collective bargaining process.
The Government, in agreement with trade unions, established wages in
each industrial sector and invited all unions to participate in the
negotiations. The 1998 Law on Labor Disputes Resolution provides for
the establishment of an arbitration service and a National Mediation
and Reconciliation Service to mediate labor disputes. During the first
4 months of the year, the service mediated 414 labor disputes.
According to official statistics, in 1999 the service mediated 421
labor disputes.
The manner in which the collective bargaining law is applied
prejudices the bargaining process against independent unions and favors
the official unions (affiliates of the FPU). Most workers never are
informed that they are not obligated to join the official union.
Renouncing membership in the official union and joining an independent
union can be bureaucratically onerous and typically is discouraged by
management. The collective bargaining law prohibits antiunion
discrimination. Under the law, disputes should be resolved by the
courts. There have been cases in which such disputes have not been
settled in a fair and equitable manner.
Under the new trade union law, an independent union also can be
removed easily from the collective bargaining process at the enterprise
level. Under the old law, if several unions at an enterprise failed to
agree on joint representation, the larger union, that is the FPU
represented labor in the bargaining process. The new law failed to
address this problem.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the Labor Code prohibit forced and compulsory labor, and it generally
is not known to occur; however, the country is a major source of girls
and women trafficked for sexual exploitation (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
The law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
children; however, there were no reports of such practices, apart from
victims of traffickers.
Human rights groups described as compulsory labor the common use of
army conscripts and youths in the alternative service for refurbishing
and building private houses for army and government officials. In 1998
student groups protested against a presidential decree obliging college
and university graduates, whose studies have been paid for by the
Government, to work in the public sector at government-designated jobs
for 3 years or to repay fully the cost of their education. Students
described the decree as an anticonstitutional attempt to introduce
compulsory labor, as the Constitution provides for free choice of job
and one's agreement to work. The Government stated that the decree
would cover only students who entered higher education institutions in
1997 and thereafter. The extent of enforcement of the decree is
unknown. In the past, human rights groups reported complaints from
medical and law students that they had been forced to accept
government-assigned jobs for 3 years to repay the cost of their
education or not receive their diplomas. However, no recent complaints
have been reported.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum employment age is 17; however, in certain
nonhazardous industries enterprises may negotiate with the Government
to hire employees between 14 and 17 years of age, with the consent of
one parent. The Constitution provides for general secondary education.
School attendance is compulsory until the age of 15, a regulation
vigorously enforced by the Ministry of Education. However, since the
Soviet era, the number of dropouts has increased significantly, mostly
because of rising poverty. The Criminal Code prescribes up to 5 years
in prison for involving children in criminal activities, drinking,
begging, prostitution, gambling, or other exploitation. The Government
does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but
there were no reports that it occurred, apart from victims of
traffickers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of
Child Labor in October.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage is
$21.70 (118 hryvnia), and the minimum monthly pension is $4.70 (24.9
hryvnia). The average monthly salary is $41.60 (228.8 hryvnia), which
does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
Moreover millions of persons go unpaid for many months because of
shrinking budget revenue. In July Parliament declared the official
subsistence level to be about $50 (270.1 hryvnia) per month. Although
the practice of underreporting sources of income is widespread, it is
estimated that in fact some 50 percent of the population effectively
lives in poverty.
The Labor Code provides for a maximum 40-hour workweek, a 24hour
period of rest per week, and at least 24 days of paid vacation per
year. Stagnation in some industries, for example, defense,
significantly reduced the workweek for some categories of workers.
The law contains occupational safety and health standards; however,
these frequently are ignored in practice. Lax safety standards and
aging equipment caused many serious accidents, resulting in
approximately 47,000 work-related injuries in 1999. According to
official statistics, these were 85 serious industrial accidents in
which 141 workers were killed and 332 were injured occurred during the
first half of the year. Mining accidents killed 212 miners during the
first half of the year. In the coal mining sector, it is estimated
there are 5.2 deaths for every million tons of coal extracted.
In theory workers have a legal right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardizing continued employment;
however, in reality, independent trade unionists reported that
asserting this right would result in retaliation or perhaps dismissal
by management.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and girls is a
significant problem. The country is a major source and transit country
of women and girls trafficked to Central and Western Europe, the United
States, and the Middle East for sexual exploitation, and reports of
trafficked women and girls from Ukraine also have come from Australia,
Japan, and South Africa. The International Organization for Migration
estimated in 1998 that 100,000 citizens had been trafficked abroad for
this purpose since 1991. Between 1991 and 1997 Israeli authorities
deported 1,500 Russian and Ukrainian women who had been trafficked
there; and Italian officials estimated in 1999 that at least 30,000
Ukrainian women were employed in Italy in exploitative situations. In
Israel where many Ukrainian women are trafficked, the Government fails
to protect the victims and routinely jails the Ukrainian women on
charges of prostitution prior to their deportation.
The Parliament passed an amendment to the criminal code in 1998
that imposes harsh penalties for, among other offenses, trafficking in
human beings, including for sexual exploitation and pornography. In
1999 the Government established special police units to investigate
trafficking crimes; however, the effectiveness of these units and of
the amended Criminal Code has not yet been established. In 1999 the
Human Rights Ombudsman established a National Coordinating Council for
the Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings; however, the
organization has yet to demonstrate its effectiveness. Trafficking is
becoming a higher priority for law enforcement agencies, but these
agencies often lack the financial and personnel resources to combat
well-established criminal organizations that run trafficking
operations. The Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1999 established
special antitrafficking units at the national and oblast levels. These
units became operational this year; however, they have had limited
impact. NGO's claimed that the local militia received bribes in return
for ignoring this problem. Moreover, some reports allege that local
public officials abeted or assisted organized criminal groups in
trafficking women abroad.
The authorities do not prosecute men routinely for engaging women
in the rapidly growing sector of sexually exploitative work. In the
past three years, 37 criminal cases have been brought against alleged
traffickers, most of which ended in acquittals. Sentences for those
convicted of trafficking generally were not severe and usually consist
of fines. In November a Greek man and two Ukrainian women were
convicted of trafficking in human beings and sentenced to seven years
and five years in prison, respectively. This case marked the first time
convicted traffickers received jail sentences. In 1999 two women who
were sentenced to 5-year suspended sentences and fined $150 (680
hryvnia) for trafficking. In August 1999, authorities in the
Netherlands arrested a Ukrainian national and three Dutch nationals for
trafficking women to sex clubs in the southern Netherlands from
Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Romania. No update on the results of
these arrests were available at year's end. Also in 1999, a man was
given a suspended sentence and fined for trafficking women to brothels
in the former Yugoslovia and engaging them in prostitution, and three
persons were arrested on suspicion of selling 200 young women and girls
to be used as forced labor in night clubs or as prostitutes in Turkey,
Greece, and Cyprus.
Women who are trafficked out of the country often are recruited by
firms operating abroad and subsequently are taken out of the country
with legal documentation. They are solicited with promises of work as
waitresses, dancers, or housemaids, or are invited by marriage agencies
allegedly to make the acquaintance of a potential bridegroom. Once
abroad the women find the work to be very different from what was
represented to them initially.
The Government, primarily due to lack of funds, is unable to assist
victims effectively. Some NGO's, such as the domestic NGO La Strada,
began offering some support services for victims of trafficking, but
these groups also suffered from a shortage of funds. For example, La
Strada described a case in February in which seven Ukrainian mothers
contacted the NGO to request help for their daughters who were
trafficked into prostitution in Montenegro. The NGO became frustrated
with the lack of assistance from the Government because there was no
central point of contact to address the situation or provide
assistance. With foreign assistance, four regional trafficking
prevention centers were opened in addition to the three already in
existence. Centers now operate in Donetsk, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk,
Chernyvtsy, Kherson, Rivne, and Zhytomyr. The centers offered job-skill
training, have telephone hot lines, and serve as referral centers for
health, legal, and psychological counseling. In addition to the three
cities with trafficking prevention centers, hot lines operate in
Luhansk, Odesa, Kharkiv, Ternopil, and Sevastopol. In the first half of
the year, La Strada hot lines received 1,040 calls, 684 of which were
from callers classified as potential victims. Winrock, an NGO also
involved in antitrafficking efforts, reported more than 2,600 calls to
its hot lines in the first quarter of the year.
In September 1999, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a national
program for the prevention of trafficking in women and children,
involving 20 ministries, local governments, international
organizations, donors, and domestic and international NGO's. The
program was to combat trafficking as well as to assist victims;
however, severe budget constraints limited the ability of the
Government to implement the program effectively. The Ombudsman made
public statements that the issue of trafficking was a priority (see
Section 4). The Ministry of Education introduced a curriculum on
trafficking prevention and awareness in high schools. NGO's conducted
general awareness programs.
__________
UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a
longstanding constitutional monarchy with a democratic, parliamentary
government. Some central government powers have been devolved to
locally elected bodies in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The
judiciary is independent, but Parliament may supercede its decisions
through legislation.
Throughout the country, police forces are under the effective
control of civilian officials. The intelligence agency MI-5 has the
authority to act in support of other law enforcement agencies in the
prevention and detection of serious domestic crime, but information
collected by that agency generally is not admissible as evidence in
trials. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland has a
complex and controversial role, due to the special and difficult
circumstances in the region with respect to law and order. In some
areas of Northern Ireland, because of the continuing threat of
violence, army units operate to reinforce the RUC. Individual members
of UK police forces committed human rights abuses in some instances.
A highly developed, diversified, market-based economy with
extensive social welfare services provides most residents with a high
standard of living. Higher than average unemployment rates prevail
among certain demographic groups, including youth and racial
minorities, and in Northern Ireland, among Catholics.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Individual members of the police
occasionally abused detainees. Prison conditions, including
overcrowding and the number of prison suicides, also remained problems.
There are some limits on freedom of assembly and association related to
the security situation in Northern Ireland. The Government continued to
take steps to combat violence against women. Societal discrimination
against women, nonwhite minorities, and the Traveller (nomadic)
community are problems, as are child abuse and occasional societal
violence against minorities. Trafficking in women is an acknowledged
problem. In October the Human Rights Act came into effect, allowing for
the enforcement of provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights in UK courts.
In Northern Ireland, power was devolved in December 1999 under the
terms of the Good Friday Agreement, which established local government
institutions, including a legislative assembly and a power-sharing
executive. In February 2000, due to the lack of progress on weapons
decommissioning by republican paramilitary groups, the Ulster Unionist
Party (UUP) threatened to withdraw from the executive in protest. The
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland suspended the institutions in
February in order to prevent UUP withdrawal. In May, after the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) pledged to put its weapons
completely and verifiably beyond use, the Government lifted the
suspension, allowing devolution to resume. In October Executive First
Minister David Trimble of the UUP refused to allow executive ministers
of the republican Sinn Fein Party to participate in meetings of the
North-South Ministerial Council, because there had been no progress on
the weapons issue. At year's end, Sinn Fein ministers were challenging
Trimble's move in court.
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (HRC) initiated a
comprehensive consultation process on a bill of rights specific to
Northern Ireland, as mandated by the Good Friday Agreement. The
commission also provides legal advice and assistance to citizens. The
HRC Chief Commissioner urged the Government to grant the commission
additional funding and enhanced powers. Under the terms of its creation
in 1999, the HRC can make the case for such changes in a report to the
Government in 2001.
The police force in Northern Ireland has had a complex and
controversial role and under some circumstances continues to rely on
support from British Army units. Approximately 13,000 British troops
were stationed in Northern Ireland, the lowest number since the early
1970's. The Good Friday Agreement mandated wide-ranging reforms in
policing and criminal justice with the aim of developing fair,
effective, and representative law-enforcement institutions that have
the confidence of all parts of the community. In November Parliament
passed a Northern Ireland Police Bill based on the recommendations of
the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland (commonly
known as the Patten Commission). In March the criminal justice review
mandated by the Good Friday Agreement publicly proposed as part of its
findings reforms in the Northern Ireland prosecution system and in the
procedures for making judicial appointments; its recommendations are
expected to be implemented beginning in 2001.
In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, the Government in
September completed the staged release of 433 prisoners affiliated with
paramilitary organizations that maintain a complete and unequivocal
cease-fire--although ``punishment'' attacks continued in areas under
the influence of these groups. Several paramilitary dissident groups in
Northern Ireland committed acts of violence aimed at disrupting the
peace process. During the year, over 250 violent sectarian attacks took
place in Northern Ireland. Loyalists carried out 86 punishment
shootings and 72 punishment beatings, while republicans carried out 50
punishment shootings and 54 beatings.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by the Government.
The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), an independent watchdog
organization, concluded its inquiry into the police investigation of
the death of Roger Sylvester, a black man who died in 1999 after being
restrained by police officers. The PCA certified that the circumstances
had been investigated to its satisfaction and forwarded an
investigation report to the Crown Prosecution Services (CPS). In
November the CPS ruled that there was insufficient evidence to file
criminal charges against the police officers involved in Sylvester's
case. Sylvester's family called for an independent inquiry.
In December the CPS also ruled out filing criminal charges against
police officers involved in the 1999 shooting death of Henry Stanley.
Amnesty International expressed concern over the CPS decisions not to
prosecute in the Sylvester and Stanley cases, which the organization
considers ``strong prima facie evidence'' cases.
In May a London court set a February 2001 trial date for a police
officer charged in the murder of James Ashley, who was shot and killed
during a police raid on his home in 1998. In connection with the case,
four other police officers face trial.
According to the PCA's Annual Report, deaths in police custody fell
to 47 during the 12 months ending in March 2000, compared with 65
during the same period the previous year. The report states that 11 of
the deaths occurred because of natural causes, 9 were due to alcohol or
drugs, and 12 were suicides. The PCA supports the abolition of the
offense of ``being drunk and incapable'' and recommends that drunks be
dealt with by nurses and paramedics rather than by the police.
According to the Home Office, the provisional number of deaths in
police custody in England and Wales during the calendar year was 47; in
Scotland it was 3.
There also were a number of deaths in custody in prison due to
suicide and natural causes (see Section 1.c.).
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is assisting the
family of Jim McDonnell in the formal inquest into his death in 1996 in
Northern Ireland's Maghaberry Prison. Fellow prisoners charged that
prison staff beat him.
In April the European Court of Human Rights declared admissible 4
cases brought by the families of 12 individuals killed by the security
forces (or with alleged security force collusion) in Northern Ireland
in the 1980's and 1990's. The families contend that the Government
violated, inter alia, Article 2 (the right to life) of the European
Convention on Human Rights and charge that the deceased were killed
unjustifiably by the State or its agents through excessive use of force
and that the State failed to comply with its procedural obligations by
not effectively investigating the deaths. One of the cases had earlier
been included in an inquiry into the use of lethal force (including
allegations that the authorities sanctioned a shoot-to-kill policy)
conducted in 1984-87 by John Stalker.
In 1998 the Government opened a new judicial inquiry, presided over
by a panel of three prominent judges from the UK and other Commonwealth
countries, to establish the facts of the events of January 30, 1972, in
Northern Ireland--"Bloody Sunday"--when 13 unarmed civil rights
demonstrators in Londonderry were killed by British soldiers, but for
which no member of the security forces was ever held accountable. The
inquiry spent 2 years gathering testimony and evidence from other
victims, journalists, and government officials. Formal hearings began
in March in Londonderry. Following the August resignation from the
panel of Sir Edward Somers due to personal reasons, the Government
appointed John Toohey, a former judge on the Australian High Court. The
disruption resulted in a 2-month delay in the proceedings, which
resumed in November. The inquiry is expected to hear testimony from
approximately 800 to 1,000 witnesses and continue for another 2 to 3
years.
David Copeland was convicted in June of a series of bombings in
London in 1999 and sentenced to six life sentences. The bombings,
motivated by racism and homophobia, killed three people.
Under the criteria of the 1998 Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act,
the Government determined that the main republican and loyalist
paramilitary groups were abiding by a cease-fire. Despite the fact that
the groups are considered to be maintaining a cease-fire, killing and
wounding by both republican and loyalist groups in Northern Ireland
continued. The groups that the Government determined were not
maintaining a total and unequivocal cease-fire are the Real IRA (RIRA),
the Continuity IRA, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the Red
Hand Defenders, and the Orange Volunteers.
The PIRA was blamed widely for three May killings, including the
killing of a dissident republican activist. While the PIRA did not
comment or deny involvement, media reports attributed these crimes to
the group.
More than 10 deaths in Northern Ireland during the year were
attributed to feuding among the principal loyalist paramilitary groups.
Victims included reputed members of key loyalist paramilitaries,
including Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) leader Richard Jameson.
In August the feud between the UFF/UDA and the UVF intensified when
a display of strength by the UFF/UDA on the Shankill Road in Belfast
led to gunfire and attacks on houses. During the following week, Bobby
Mahood and Jackie Coulter (the latter connected with the UFF) were shot
and killed, as was Sam Rocket, a UVF supporter. In August the
Government revoked the release of Johnny Adair, a leader of the
loyalist UFF who had benefited from early release in October 1999, for
his role in the violent feuding. Subject to the approval of the
Sentencing Board, the Government is recommending that Adair serve the
duration of his original prison term. In December the factions
announced a ``truce.''
Although a number of suspects were questioned, no one was charged
with the murder of lawyer Rosemary Nelson, who died in a car bomb
attack in 1999. The Red Hand Defenders, a loyalist splinter group,
claimed responsibility, and human rights groups continued to express
concern about alleged police collusion in the murder. Nelson, known for
taking on high-profile civil rights cases, claimed as early as 1997
that RUC officers made death threats against her.
In December 1999, a coalition of six human rights organizations
stated that Nelson's death constituted a failure by the Government to
meet its international obligations to ensure that lawyers are able to
perform their jobs without fear for their safety. These organizations
called for a full public inquiry into all the circumstances of Nelson's
murder. In his April 2000 report to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers expressed concern over the extent and thoroughness of the
official investigation into Nelson's complaints of RUC threats.
Cognizant of the controversy surrounding Nelson's case, in 1999 the
RUC appointed Deputy Chief Constable of Norfolk Colin Port to take over
the investigation of the murder. Port's 80-member investigative team
interviewed 7,000 potential witnesses. In March police made the first
arrest of the case, questioning a man who was a member of the Royal
Irish Regiment at the time of the murder; he was charged with an
unrelated offense. In May the Independent Commission for Police
Complaints (ICPC) ruled that there was ``insufficient evidence'' to
discipline the RUC officers accused of threatening Nelson. In August
Port appeared on the television program ``Britain's Most Wanted'' to
appeal for individuals with information relating to the murder to come
forward.
No one has been charged in the UK for the 1998 bombing in Omagh
that killed 29 persons. The RIRA claimed responsibility for the
bombing. While authorities have collected information that identifies
individuals alleged to be responsible for the bombing, much of it
cannot be used as evidence. In October news organizations identified
the alleged perpetrators, which prompted complaints from victims'
families that a future trial could be jeopardized. Witnesses who could
make prosecution possible have been reluctant to come forward. Family
members of victims have criticized Sinn Fein for refusing to assist in
the police investigation. While over 20 suspects were detained, only 1,
Colm Murphy, was charged (for aiding and abetting the crime) and faces
trial in the Republic of Ireland.
In September a Belfast coroner conducted a public inquest into the
Omagh bombing. Unlike inquests in England and Wales, coroner's courts
in Northern Ireland do not reach verdicts apportioning blame, but
instead make ``findings'' confined solely to the facts surrounding
violent, sudden, or unexplained death. Human rights groups have argued
in other inquests that this narrow definition shields wrongdoers,
including soldiers and police officers, and unnecessarily keeps family
members from learning the truth of the circumstances regarding their
relative's death.
Human rights groups continued to call for an independent inquiry
into the December 1997 killing of Billy ``King Rat'' Wright, leader of
the Loyalist Volunteer Force, in the high security Maze Prison by
members of INLA. The facts of the killing call into question the
prison's security standards: The watchtower in the courtyard where the
killing took place allegedly was unmanned at the time, the perpetrators
had weapons smuggled to them, and they apparently had knowledge of
Wright's whereabouts. The jury at the coroner's inquest in February
1999 stated that ``person or persons unknown and undetected'' were
involved. In July the Government refused ``on security grounds'' to
answer a parliamentary question about the identity the official in
charge of the prison on the day of Wright's murder.
In June a Belfast coroner abandoned plans for an inquest into the
1997 death of Robert Hamill. Hamill's case received widespread
attention because four RUC officers in a nearby vehicle allegedly did
not act while Hamill was beaten to death by a mob. The coroner said
that he feared that key witnesses would be in danger if they were
called to give evidence. In 1999 one of the six suspects was acquitted
of the killing but found guilty of a minor offense. The trial judge
expressed concerns about the inaction of the police. Human rights
groups argue that the RUC had intervened successfully in similar
circumstances in the past. Moreover, they charge that the RUC's failure
to intervene made the identification and prosecution of the murderers
more difficult. The police ombudsman was directing the police
investigation at year's end. Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern called
for an independent public inquiry. The family provided the Government
with evidence that it says makes a definitive case for such an inquiry.
The investigation into the 1989 murder of defense attorney Patrick
Finucane continued. Finucane was killed in front of his family by
members of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA). Human rights
organizations have alleged security force collusion in the murder. In
July two RUC officers were arrested and questioned about the murder,
which was being reviewed in a third round of independent investigations
by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir John Stevens. In
August the inquiry seized documents related to the case from the
British Army. William Stobie was arrested in 1999 and charged with the
murder, although in August the charges were reduced to aiding and
abetting murder. Stobie has claimed he was an RUC informer at the time
of Finucane's murder and said he warned police of a ``hit'' by the UDA,
although it was unclear whether he knew Finucane was the target. Human
rights organizations, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence
of Judges and Lawyers, and Finucane's family continued to press the
Government for an independent public inquiry into the killing. They
cited the possible existence of new evidence that would support charges
of collusion between government officials and loyalist paramilitary
groups in Finucane's murder.
While British Army regulations normally bar from service those
guilty of ``serious crimes,'' Scots Guards Jim Fisher and Mark Wright
continued to serve in their regiment, to which they were reinstated in
1998 after being convicted of and serving time in prison for the 1992
murder of Peter McBride. In 1999 McBride's family won a judicial review
against the British Army Board that sanctioned the soldiers'
reinstatement. In November the board reaffirmed its decision, allowing
the pair to remain in the service.
Former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet left the UK on March 2
after Home Secretary Jack Straw announced that he would not extradite
Pinochet to Spain for alleged human rights abuses because he was too
ill to stand trial.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains was established
jointly by the British and Irish Governments in 1999 to facilitate the
location of the remains of nine victims of IRA paramilitary violence
from the 1970's. The commission succeeded in locating the remains of
three persons in 1999, but suspended its work in May, pending the
receipt of additional information from the IRA. Work had not resumed by
year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment; however, individual members of the police
occasionally abused detainees. Human rights organizations maintain that
such abuse, while not widespread, is a matter of serious concern (see
Sections 1.a. and 5). Detainees who claim physical mistreatment have
the right to an immediate medical examination. A trial judge must
examine such a claim. Confessions obtained by abusive treatment are not
admissible in court, and judges can exclude even voluntary confessions.
Reports by official bodies and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) have suggested that the public lacks confidence in existing
procedures for making complaints against the police. According to a
February 2000 Council of Europe committee report, more complainants
have been taking their cases to the civil courts rather than filing
complaints. The report states that even where complaints are filed and
point to likely police culpability, criminal or disciplinary action
against police officers has been rare, and convictions or disciplinary
action even rarer; in many cases, police officers under investigation
took medical retirement. According to the report, of 36,731 complaints
recorded in the 1996-97 period studied by the committee, only 141
resulted in legal or disciplinary action (latest statistics available).
While accepting the need for reform of the complaint procedures, the
Government disputed some of the conclusions reached in the report,
pointing out that it omitted to mention over 1,000 disciplinary actions
taken and the informal resolution of 32 percent of cases to the
satisfaction of the complainants.
Following these reports, the Government has engaged in an ongoing
process to reform the police complaints system. In 1999 the Government
phased in new complaint procedures. Among other things, the new
procedures instituted a formal written warning procedure in serious
cases and lowered the burden of proof in civil misconduct proceedings.
In May 2000, the Home Office published a consultation document based on
two separate studies conducted by a management consulting firm and a
human rights group. The paper recommended that complaints against the
police be handled by a new body, whose name would better reflect its
independent nature than the current Police Complaints Authority. It
also recommended that the new body have the ability to independently
investigate the most serious complaints, including deaths in custody.
The Home Office, after receiving and incorporating feedback on its May
paper, issued a further report in December on its proposed framework
for a new police complaints system, much of it based on the two groups'
recommendations.
Two RUC officers, Michael Magowan and Darren James Neill, were
convicted and imprisoned in May for the 1998 assault on 18-year-old
Bernard Patrick Griffin. Griffin, a Catholic, was arrested, beaten,
verbally abused, and threatened. Griffin was then charged with assault.
The truth emerged when a third officer present, Andrew Lea, confessed
to his superiors; Lea was fined $1,600 (1,000 pounds). Magowan and
Neill received 1- and 2-year sentences, respectively, and face RUC
disciplinary charges of criminal conduct, which could result in
dismissal.
The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland began operation in
November. The ombudsman has extensive powers to investigate complaints
in Northern Ireland filed against the police or referred by the RUC
Chief Constable, the Police Authority of Northern Ireland, or the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The ombudsman is to supervise
automatically cases involving death or serious injury and may
investigate other cases. The ombudsman can recommend to the Director of
Public Prosecutions (DPP) that charges be brought against officers,
although the final decision rests with the DPP. The ombudsman can
direct the Chief Constable to take disciplinary action against police
officers. Unlike the ICPC, which must rely on the complaints and
discipline branch of the RUC to provide investigators, the ombudsman
has an independent investigative staff.
Prior to being replaced by the ombudsman in November, the ICPC
received 2,036 complaints; in November and December the ombudsman
received about 540 complaints. In addition 2,396 cases were passed on
from the ICPC to the ombudsman. Of the 2,390 cases completed by both
organizations during the year, 7 led to informal disciplinary action
and 9 led to formal criminal charges.
Legislation implementing the 1999 Patten Report on Policing in
Northern Ireland was enacted in November. The law changes the
operational name of the RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland
(PSNI), imposes hiring quotas to increase Catholic representation in
the service (now only 8 percent of the total), and introduces new human
rights standards and wider use of community policing practices. The law
establishes a new policing board comprised of 9 public members and 10
political party representatives from the Assembly. The reform remains
controversial. Chris Patten, author of the original recommendations,
has endorsed the bill and urged full participation in the new
institutions. However, the nationalist parties object to the bill for
not strictly following all recommendations of the Patten Commission,
while unionist critics argue that reforms will undermine the
effectiveness of the police. By year's end, the impasse over
implementation had not been resolved.
The Independent Assessor of Military Complaints continued to
coordinate investigations into complaints of abuses committed by the
Army in Northern Ireland. During the year, some 20 formal and 550
informal complaints were received; most involved allegations of verbal
abuse or excessive helicopter flights adjacent to residential areas.
The police and military in Northern Ireland continued to use
plastic bullets to quell civil disturbances. The Patten Commission
recommended the use of plastic bullets ``only as a last resort, short
of the use of firearms'' and recommended that the Government conduct
research to find ``an acceptable, effective and less potentially lethal
alternative'' to plastic bullets. The Government accepted these
recommendations. New guidelines mandate that plastic bullets only be
used to avert the risk of loss of life or serious injury; formerly,
their use was sanctioned to protect property or to preserve the peace.
During disturbances in July, the police relied on water cannons to
repel a disorderly crowd.
In total the security forces fired 25 plastic bullets during the
year, compared with 111 in 1999. According to RUC rules, plastic
bullets should be aimed below the rib cage; nevertheless, the use of
plastic bullets in prior years resulted in 17 deaths and numerous head
and upper body injuries. Plastic bullet use in Northern Ireland is
criticized severely by human rights monitors, although the European
Court of Human Rights ruled in 1984 that using them to quell serious
riots did not contravene the European Convention on Human Rights. The
U.N. Committee Against Torture, the European Parliament, and human
rights NGO's have called for a ban on their use.
The Patten Commission recommended the closure ``forthwith'' of
Northern Ireland's three holding centers used to detain and interrogate
individuals suspected of terrorist offences. Human rights organizations
have long called for their closure because of repeated complaints of
police mistreatment during interrogations. One facility, at
Castlereagh, was closed in 1999, and a second, Strand Road, was closed
in September; the RUC contends that it cannot quickly close the third
center, Gough, because it lacks the capacity in existing police
stations to cope with the demands of questioning hundreds of terrorist
suspects per year. Audio and video recordings are now made of all
interrogations in the holding centers, and the number of complaints
against the police by persons arrested under emergency legislation has
diminished significantly.
The independent commissioner for holding centers in Northern
Ireland made unannounced visits to holding centers in order to observe
interrogations and interview detainees. The number of complaints,
generally for verbal harassment or ``technical assault,'' dropped
substantially.
David Adams was assaulted during his arrest and initial
incarceration at the Castlereagh interrogation center in 1994. In 1998
a Belfast court awarded Adams $48,000 (30,000 pounds) for exemplary
damages. Adams later was sentenced to 25 years for conspiracy to
murder. Following the court decision on damages, an independent inquiry
into Adams's treatment was initiated by the assistant chief constable
of Strathclyde. On the basis of his report, the DPP declined to pursue
charges against any of the officers involved. An application by Adams
for judicial review of the DPP's decision was denied in June.
Police occasionally harassed Travellers and members of other
minorities. Separate 1999 and 2000 reports pointed out that minorities
are more likely to be stopped and searched than whites. In 1999 the
Home Secretary ordered the police to recruit 8,000 officers from ethnic
minorities within 10 years. In response the London Metropolitan Police
increased recruitment of minority officers and hired additional
recruits in 1999, which brought the total number of minority officers
to less than 4 percent of the force. However, one-third of UK police
forces have recruited no additional minorities.
The armed forces have a procedure to handle complaints of
harassment, racial and otherwise. Service personnel also have the right
to submit complaints to employment tribunals. In 1998 the services
entered into a 5-year partnership agreement with the Commission on
Racial Equality (CRE) to promote racial equality practices. During the
year, the armed forces registered 77 internal harassment complaints,
including 28 for sexual harassment, 9 for racial harassment, and 31 for
bullying or other harassment.
Both loyalist and republican paramilitary groups in Northern
Ireland continued to intimidate or carry out ``punishment'' attacks on
victims who live in areas under paramilitary influence. The attacks
often are intended to maintain or extend the control of paramilitary
groups in a given region. Targets include group members who have broken
ranks or individuals accused of ``antisocial'' activities such as drug
trafficking or carjacking. The attackers have used iron pipes, baseball
bats, sledgehammers, and spiked clubs to beat their victims and shot
them in the knees and legs. The authorities recorded over 200 such
incidents during the year. Human rights groups say that available
statistics underreport the true number of casualties because many of
the victims are too intimidated to report paramilitary punishment
attacks.
A bomb damaged Hammersmith Bridge in London in June. In September
terrorists fired a missile, believed to be a rocket propelled grenade,
at the MI-6 building, headquarters of Britain's Secret Service. Neither
attack resulted in injuries, and no one publicly claimed
responsibility.
Prison conditions generally met minimum international standards.
The chief inspector of prisons' annual report expressed disappointment
that prison management had failed to recognize and eliminate problems
independently or to followup on negative reports in previous years. The
inspector described the treatment of prisoners and the conditions in
several prisons as unacceptable, but noted some improvements in other
institutions. The Prison Service made attempts to correct the problems
of overcrowding and poor facilities maintenance in its prisons, through
an investment of some $1.72 million (1.1 million pounds) in maintenance
projects during the 1999-2000 period and a reduction in the number of
prisoners required to ``double up'' in cells through the addition of
500 new places. In August the deputy governor at Feltham, a juvenile
prison, resigned in protest over what he termed dangerous and
antisocial conditions. An October Prison Service report criticized
procedural failures at Felham in the case of Zahid Mubarek, an Asian
man who was beaten to death by a fellow inmate, Robin Stewart. Stewart
had been charged with racially motivated crimes and continued to write
racist letters from prison, but nonetheless was housed in the same cell
with Mubraek. In August four warders at the Portland Young Offenders
Institute were suspended from their duties pending investigation of
allegations of abuse over a 14 year period. The prison population in
England and Wales as of December decreased by 2 percent over the same
time the previous year from 65,279 inmates to 63,881.
Prison suicides decreased during the last year. The Prison Service
reported 139 deaths of prisoners in England and Wales during the year,
compared with 148 such deaths in 1999. Of these deaths, 82 were self-
inflicted (91 in 1999) and 54 were due to natural causes (57 in 1999).
The Scottish prison service reported 19 deaths in custody in 2000: The
causes of 13 were unresolved pending the results of routine inquests, 5
were suicides, and 1 was due to natural causes.
Human rights groups have been particularly critical of Special
Security Units (SSU's), which are used to hold prisoners deemed to pose
an exceptional risk of escape. Citing small group isolation, the lack
of adequate exercise, work, educational opportunities, and natural
daylight, as well as strict enforcement of noncontact visits through a
glass barrier, human rights groups maintain that SSU imprisonment
violates international standards. At year's end, 7 prisoners remained
in SSU's; none was imprisoned for Northern Ireland terrorist-related
crimes.
Separate and distinct prison regimes exist for Northern Ireland and
Scotland, administered through the Northern Ireland Office and the
Scottish Office.
The number of female prisoners continued to rise. According to a
1999 Home Office report, women now commit 20 percent of all crime, and
the number of women sent to prison doubled in the previous 6 years.
Implementing the recommendations of a 1999 report by its women's policy
group, the Prison Service adopted new procedures governing admission to
mother and baby units and standards for their management.
Faced with a large increase in the number of asylum seekers, the
Government in December housed 1,195 immigration detainees in regular
prisons, where normally they are held separately from convicted
prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial. According to human rights
groups, 28 regular prisons house some immigration detainees. The U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other groups cite a lack of
specialized skills among regular prison officials in dealing with
immigration detainees. The UNHCR, which regularly visits detention
centers and has excellent relations with the Government and detention
center officials, continues to criticize the Government's ``expectation
of noncompliance'' by asylum seekers. In March the Government opened a
new center to house asylum seekers for short periods while their cases
are decided. The Home Office was also in the process of finalizing
rules for the treatment of asylum seekers in detention centers, which
has been called for by the chief inspector for prisons for England and
Wales.
The Prison Service stated that three prisoners were convicted in
1999 of offenses related to the situation in Northern Ireland. The
requests by all three for repatriation to the Republic of Ireland
remained under consideration. Since the prisoners committed their
offenses after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, they are not
covered by its provisions for the early release of prisoners.
The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons and
immigration detention centers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The authorities can and
often do make arrests or detain suspects without judicial warrants,
especially in Northern Ireland, when they believe that they have
reasonable cause to suspect wrongdoing. The 1994 Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act allows police officers to stop and search vehicles and
pedestrians if a police officer of at least superintendent rank (or a
chief inspector if no superintendent is available) ``reasonably
believes'' it is expedient to do so to prevent acts of violence. The
authorization is limited to a 24-hour period but is renewable under
certain circumstances.
In July Parliament enacted the 2000 Terrorism Act, which is
scheduled to come into force in February 2001. The law reforms
mechanisms and powers used to deal with terrorism relating to Northern
Ireland and extends them to all forms of domestic and foreign terrorism
across the United Kingdom. It replaces the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989, the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act of 1996 (Amended in 1998), and sections of the Criminal
Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act of 1998, incorporating many
provisions of those acts into the new law. Certain other provisions of
those laws, applicable only to Northern Ireland, are to be extended for
a maximum of 5 years, based on the special security situation that
continues to exist there.
The new act widens the definition of terrorism to include actions
or threats of action that are designed to influence the Government or
intimidate the public to advance a political, religious, or ideological
cause that involves serious violence against a person or serious damage
to property, endangers a person's life, creates a serious risk to the
health or safety of the public, or is designed to seriously interfere
with an electronic system. It gives police the power to arrest and
detain suspected terrorists for up to 48 hours without judicial review,
or, under limited circumstances, legal representation. Under the law,
the Government may ban organizations involved with any form of
international or domestic terrorism and prosecute individuals who
participate in or support such organizations. The law also enhances the
Government's power to seize assets related to terrorist activities.
The act also provides for special emergency powers applicable to
Northern Ireland for a period of up to 5 years maximum--or less if the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland determines that the security
situation allows it. These powers include special entry, arrest,
search, and seizure authority without a warrant under certain
circumstances, nonjury, single-judge ``Diplock Court'' trials for
``scheduled'' offenses, and a lower standard of admissibility of
confessions than in ordinary courts.
Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, have
expressed objections over certain temporary and permanent provisions of
the new act. These objections focus on the broad definition of
terrorism employed in the law, the proscriptive powers of the state,
and the powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation. They argue that
the act effectively reverses the burden of proof in suspected terrorism
cases and fails to provide adequate safeguards against abuse by law
enforcement officials.
Suspects arrested without warrants must be released within 24 hours
(or 36 hours if a serious offense is involved) unless brought before a
magistrates' court or arrested under Terrorism Act provisions. The
court may authorize extension of detention by 36 hours and on further
application by another 24 hours, versus the 48-hour scheme extant in
Northern Ireland (see Section 1.e.).
Defendants awaiting trial have a statutory right to bail unless
there is a risk that they would flee, commit an offense, interfere with
witnesses, or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, or unless they
were on bail when the alleged offense was committed. Defendants who are
remanded in custody are protected by statutory custody time limits,
which restrict the period for which they can be held while awaiting
trial to a maximum of 182 days, unless the court grants an extension.
According to data supplied by the Home Office, at year's end 6,791
defendants were in custody awaiting trial. Of those in custody, 6,094
had been awaiting trial for less than 24 weeks, while 196 had been
waiting longer than 48 weeks. On balance the time spent awaiting trial
decreased from 1999. The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act includes measures
to reduce delays in criminal proceedings by introducing procedural
reforms and further limiting the time allowed for the prosecution of
cases.
The law gives administrative detention power to immigration
officers. There is no time limit to such detention and no right to have
it reviewed by a court. At year's end, approximately 1,500 asylum
seekers were detained. They are detained either in immigration
detention centers or in regular prisons (where they are normally held
separately from convicted prisoners and those awaiting trial).
Occasionally they are held in police cells, if for no more than 48
hours and pending removal from the country or transfer to another
accommodation (see Section 1.c.).
Unlike those accused of criminal offenses, asylum seekers are given
no written statement about why they were detained, although the
practice is to provide them with updates on the status of their claims
and the time required for their adjudication. Asylum seekers do not
have an automatic right to apply for bail, and bail application, which
can be made to immigration appellate authorities, requires a relatively
high level of surety.
The Government does not use exile (also see Section 2.d.).
Paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland also continued to
threaten individuals and families to compel them to leave the province.
Estimates of the number of people who fled into exile since the signing
of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 range as high as 800.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
provides citizens with a generally fair and efficient judicial process.
There are several levels of courts. The vast majority of criminal
cases are heard by magistrates' courts, which are managed by locally
based committees. Their decisions may be appealed to the Crown Court,
which also hears criminal cases requiring a jury trial, or to the High
Court. Crown Court convictions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal,
which may in turn refer cases involving points of law to the House of
Lords. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (which consists of
senior judges and is functionally distinct from the legislative arm) is
the final court of appeal. The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC)
operates as an additional appellate body to investigate suspected
miscarriages of justice in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It
considers cases after the judicial appeals process is exhausted and
where there is significant new evidence that casts doubt on the
conviction. In Scotland similar appeals may be made to the Scottish
Office.
The law provides for a fair trial, and the authorities respect and
enforce the law in this regard. Defendants enjoy a presumption of
innocence until proven guilty, the right to question witnesses against
them, and the right to appeal to successively higher courts.
The 1998 Human Rights Act took effect in October, bringing the
European Convention on Human Rights into British Law (see Section 4).
Under this law, all public bodies must act in a manner compatible with
the convention. The law provides citizens with the right to take
alleged violations of the convention by a public authority into British
courts. The Government derogated from Article 5(3) of the convention,
dealing with the prompt resolution of a case after arrest or detention
and included this derogation in the Human Rights Act. NGO's criticize
this derogation.
In July Parliament passed the 2000 Terrorism Act, which replaced
several other related laws (see Section 1.d.). Under the new law, the
testimony of a senior police officer, corroborated by a suspect's
silence under questioning, can be considered evidence of a suspect's
membership in a terrorist organization. The act also criminalizes
membership in a proscribed terrorist organization or the support of
such an organization, including the provision of money or other
property. The act allows for the seizure and forfeiture of assets
belonging to a person convicted of fundraising or otherwise assisting
or supplying property to be used for the purposes of terrorism. Human
rights groups, including Liberty, have criticized the criminalization
of membership in a terrorist organization as violating the right to
freedom of expression and association.
Under the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, judges have
the power to instruct juries that they may draw an inference of guilt
from a defendant's refusal to answer questions during interrogation or
trial, although no conviction can be based solely on such an inference.
Human rights groups and the U.N. Human Rights Committee sharply
criticize this provision, which they consider an abrogation of the
right against self-incrimination. A similar provision is in effect in
Northern Ireland. Based on a 1996 European Court of Human Rights
judgment, the 1999 Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order codifies
guidelines issued by the Attorney General that prohibited the drawing
of inference from silence when a suspect is questioned before being
permitted access to an attorney.
Indigent defenders have the right to free counsel of their choice,
with some exceptions. Criminal proceedings must be held in public
except those in juvenile court and those involving public decency or
security. In a trial under the Official Secrets Act, the judge may
order the court closed, but sentencing must be public.
In Northern Ireland, special ``emergency'' restrictions affect due
process. The 2000 Terrorism Act extends the application of most
provisions of the 1991 Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act (EPA)
for a year, subject to another 12-month extension. Trials for certain
terrorist-related offenses are conducted automatically in ``Diplock
courts'' without a jury unless they specifically are ``scheduled out''
to ordinary jury courts. Diplock courts were established to avoid cases
being heard by juries that might make decisions along sectarian lines,
as well as to protect jurors from intimidation. If judges decide to
convict, they must justify the decision in a document that becomes part
of the court record. An appellate court may overturn the decision on
either factual or legal grounds. During the year, 89 persons were tried
in Diplock courts, of whom 39 either pled or were found guilty. An
internal review of the Diplock court system was completed in July. It
concluded that, due to the risk of juror intimidation, the time was not
yet right to achieve the Government's objective of resuming jury trials
for all offenses. The Government accepted this conclusion. The Diplock
courts, and the Government's latest decision to retain them, have been
criticized widely by human rights groups.
Provisions of the EPA extended under the Terrorism Act establish
lower standards for the use of uncorroborated confessions in Northern
Ireland than in normal cases, and such confessions have in the past
been used as the sole basis for conviction. Additionally, these
provisions permit the police to prevent any suspected terrorist from
contacting legal counsel for up to 48 hours after arrest under certain
circumstances, at the request of a police officer with the minimum rank
of superintendent. After a detainee has asked to see a lawyer and has
done so, this period is renewable in subsequent 48-hour increments
until the detainee is charged or released. Human rights groups have
criticized these provisions, arguing that a detainee is most likely to
need counsel in the first few hours; lack of counsel during that time
makes false or coerced confessions and the abuse of detainees more
likely. According to the Northern Ireland office, 92 requests for
access to lawyers were made through June, none of which were delayed.
The 1996 Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act reduced defense
lawyers' access to potential evidence held by the prosecution,
including information as to how the evidence was collected. According
to the Committee on the Administration of Justice, a local NGO, this
practice may be contrary to U.N. guidelines on the role of prosecutors.
In light of allegations of security force collusion in the killings
of Patrick Finucane and Rosemary Nelson (see Section 1.a.), there is
continuing concern about harassment of lawyers by members of the RUC.
The Human Rights Commission and the Law Society (the solicitors'
professional association) received complaints from attorneys during the
year and were considering undertaking a study to assess the full extent
of the problem, since there is evidence that the number of incidents is
underreported. The RUC maintains that it has zero tolerance for
misbehavior toward attorneys and specifically has addressed the issue
in its new code of ethics.
In March a nine-member panel of legal professionals, drawn from the
civil service and private practice, issued the Northern Ireland
Criminal Justice Review, which was mandated by the Good Friday
Agreement. The review's 294 recommendations are intended to improve the
criminal justice system so that it will enjoy the confidence of all
parts of the community while delivering justice efficiently and
effectively. The report recommends the creation of a single independent
prosecuting authority called the Public Prosecution Service for
Northern Ireland that would be responsible for all prosecutions,
including minor offences that are now prosecuted by the police. The
review also recommends creation of a nonpolitical Northern Ireland
Attorney General to oversee the Prosecution Service. It calls for the
establishment of a single minister-level Department of Justice once
responsibility for justice is devolved to Northern Ireland. To ensure
that judicial appointments faithfully reflect the composition of
Northern Ireland society, the review recommends the establishment of a
Judicial Appointments Commission, which would include input from the
First Minister and Deputy First Minister, to introduce local political
responsibility and accountability into the appointments process. The
review also makes recommendations on restorative justice, juvenile
justice, community safety, victims and witnesses, and sentencing and
prisons.
During a 6-month consultation period ending in September, the
Government accepted comments on the review from human rights NGO's and
political parties. In October the Government stated that it fully
endorses the general approach taken in the report. Legislation is
expected in 2001.
In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, the Government
concluded the process of releasing prisoners affiliated with
paramilitary organizations that maintained a cease-fire. By year's end,
433 paramilitary prisoners, including 229 republicans and 193 loyalists
(and 11 ``others'') had been released under the 1998 Northern Ireland
(Sentences) Act, commonly referred to as the early release program.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Warrants normally are required for a police search of
private premises; however, under the 2000 Terrorism Act a police
officer may enter and search ``any premises if he or she reasonably
suspects a terrorist is to be found there.'' The Government compensates
persons whose houses or property have been damaged during house
searches.
In July the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) became
law. The RIPA allows the Government to monitor the content of private
electronic communications after obtaining a warrant. In addition law
enforcement agencies may require individuals and businesses to disclose
encryption keys under certain circumstances. In October the Government
enacted regulations under the RIPA allowing businesses to monitor the
electronic communications of employees. The regulations are expected to
be challenged under the Human Rights Act.
In Northern Ireland, paramilitary attacks on the homes and families
of police and politicians decreased significantly, but the security
forces believe that such groups continue to conduct surveillance and
retain the capability to target police and politicians.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Strongly held common-law
tradition, an independent press, and a democratic political system
combine to secure freedom of speech and of the press. Viewpoints
critical of the Government are well represented.
The print media are dominated by a handful of national daily
newspapers, all privately owned and independent (although often
generally aligned with a political party). About half of the electronic
media are run by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which is
funded by the Government but enjoys complete editorial independence.
Corporations under renewable government license run the remainder.
In May Barry Michael George was charged with the 1999 murder of
Jill Dando, a leading television personality. George, whose trial was
scheduled for February 2001, was believed to have been obsessed with
Dando.
Press organizations and human rights groups continued to criticize
the 1981 Contempt of Court Act, which allows courts to order a
journalist to disclose a source if it is deemed to be in the interests
of justice. The 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act also contains
provisions that compel journalists to give evidence in cases where
police can prove it is necessary to their investigation. The Official
Secrets Act, another law cited by journalists as unduly restrictive,
prohibits the defense that the information is already in the public
domain or that its publication is in the public interest.
In November Parliament passed the Freedom of Information Act (FIA).
The FIA provides for public access to information held by the
government. Certain information, including information related to the
Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service, is subject to an
absolute exemption from disclosure. In addition, the Government may
refuse to disclose other ``exempt'' information, including information
relating to national security and the operation of any ministerial
private office, if the public interest in maintaining the exemption
outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Critics, including the NGO
Campaign for Freedom of Information, charge that the exemptions are
overly broad.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for the right of peaceful assembly, but that right is limited routinely
where it would impose a cost on public convenience. Police dispersed a
May 1 anticapitalist demonstration in London after participants rioted,
stoned police, and damaged cars and businesses. Several persons were
injured, and a number of protesters arrested.
In Northern Ireland the annual ``marching season'' posed
significant problems for the Government since the right of assembly
conflicted with the concerns of local residents in some communities who
perceived the parades as the celebration of Protestant ``triumphs'' in
historical battles. The 1998 Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act
transferred responsibility for ruling on disputed marches from the RUC
to a Parades Commission. Of the 3,304 parades held during the year, 260
were considered contentious. Of these the Parades Commission imposed
restrictions on 188. The courts refused the Orange Order's bid for a
judicial review of the act. The Orange Order claimed that the law's
provisions violated the Human Rights Act's provisions for freedom of
speech and assembly.
In response to the Parades Commission's decisions in June and July
not to allow the Orange Order parade down the nationalist Garvaghy Road
in Portadown, the Orange Order called for widespread protests
throughout Northern Ireland. Loyalist demonstrators blocked streets,
and some hijacked and burned cars; the protests caused widespread
disruption, and businesses were forced to close early. The two parades
at Drumcree on July 2 and 9 took place relatively peacefully amid a
massive security presence, but on several intervening evenings loyalist
protesters on Drumcree Hill became violent and attacked police and army
security forces. The Portadown Orange Lodge called for peaceful
protests but did not condemn the violence. The Apprentice Boys' Siege
of Derry parade on August 12 largely was peaceful.
The law provides for freedom of association, but that right is
sometimes limited. Under the 2000 Terrorism Act, it is an offense,
punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment, to belong to or profess to
belong to an organization proscribed by the Home Secretary. Individuals
are also subject to prosecution for supporting or inviting support for
a proscribed organization, arranging or addressing meetings by
proscribed organizations, or wearing clothing or carrying or displaying
articles that would reasonably arouse suspicion of membership in a
proscribed organization. Amnesty International has expressed concern
that these powers may infringe on the rights to freedom of association
and expression.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Government policy provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
Members of all faiths and denominations enjoy freedom of worship. The
Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.
Those who believe that their freedom to worship has been abrogated have
the right to appeal to the courts for relief. The Church of England
(Anglican) and the Church of Scotland (Presbyterian) have the status of
state religions, although their status has come under increasing
scrutiny. A January university report on religious discrimination
commissioned by the Home Office claimed that the establishment of the
Church of England causes ``religious disadvantage'' to other religious
communities. The Home Office at year's end still was considering the
report.
The Church of Scientology asserts that it faces discrimination
because the Government does not treat Scientology as a religion.
Ministers of Scientology are not regarded as ministers of religion
under prison regulations or for immigration purposes. In 1999 the
independent Charity Commission rejected a Church of Scientology
application for charitable tax status accorded to most religious
groups, and concluded that it is not a religion for the purposes of
charity law.
The 1988 Education Reform Act requires that government schools hold
a daily act of nondenominational Christian worship. A parental right of
withdrawal exists for children who do not wish to participate, and
safeguards exist for teachers who do not wish to participate in or
conduct religious education. The act provides for alternative
collective worship for other faiths. Teachers' organizations have
called for government review of the act. Some ``voluntary schools''
provided by religious groups enjoy state support. While the majority of
these schools are Anglican or Catholic, there are a small number of
Methodist and Jewish schools.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement
within the country and in foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation.
In 1997 the Home Secretary revoked all exclusion orders preventing
individuals linked to terrorism in Northern Ireland from traveling to
Great Britain. When the Prevention of Terrorism Act was renewed in
1998, it did not include provisions for exclusion orders. However, the
Home Secretary has the power to activate other statutes implementing
exclusion orders at any time.
The Government cooperates closely with the UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum is
provided under a temporary protection process. Applicants are given 6
months' ``leave to enter the country'' on arrival. They then can apply
for an automatic 3-year extension of their stay and may apply for
refugee status at any time. Asylum applications are considered in
accordance with the criteria set out in the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Some asylum
seekers are detained while the Government reviews their cases (see
Section 1.d.); some are detained in regular prisons (see Section 1.c.).
Faced with growing numbers of asylum applicants, the Government
passed legislation in 1996 and 1999 designed to deter illegal entrants
and the abuse of the asylum process, streamline the appeals process,
and restrict benefits provided to asylum seekers. In December the
Government issued guidelines for use by the courts in considering
asylum claims by women. Judges were urged to consider forms of
persecution more likely to be faced by female asylum applicants,
including female genital mutilation and forced prostitution. The
Government's policy, and the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act in
particular, have been criticized by the UNHCR and NGO's for being
detrimental to refugee rights. In particular Amnesty International in a
September report claims that the Government's practice of dispersing
asylum seekers throughout the county and issuing them vouchers for the
purchase of food and other items stigmatizes asylum seekers and denies
them access to community services.
At year's end, 66,195 asylum applications were outstanding,
compared with 101,475 outstanding a year earlier. The Government
decided on 110,065 initial asylum applications, granting asylum in
10,185. Under a special program to clear the asylum backlog, the
Government also granted leave to remain in 10,330 cases. An additional
11,365 cases were refused asylum, but were granted ``exceptional leave
to remain.''
There were no reports that persons were forced to return to
countries where they feared persecution.
Feuding among loyalist paramilitary groups resulted in the
expulsion of over 200 families from their homes in the Shankill region
of West Belfast as each group sought to expel from the neighborhood
families allegedly sympathetic to their rivals. This scale of violent
eviction had not been experienced in Northern Ireland since 1972.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government and freely
exercise that right. The lower chamber of Parliament (the House of
Commons, the center of legislative power) is elected in periodic,
multiparty elections. The upper chamber (the House of Lords), with the
power to revise and delay implementation of laws, is made up of
hereditary and appointed life peers and senior clergy of the
established Church of England. In the first stage of a government
reform program, the House of Lords agreed in 1999 to remove all but 92
of its over 900 hereditary peers who, with approximately 500 life peers
and 26 clergy, make up the current House of Lords. Possible additional
reforms are being debated, which would further reduce the size of the
chamber, democratize selection of members, and add representatives of
faiths other than Anglicanism as de jure members.
The Government is formed on the basis of a majority of seats in the
House of Commons, which are contested in elections held at least every
5 years. Participation in the political process is open to all persons
and parties. All citizens 18 years of age and older may vote. As in the
rest of the country, Northern Ireland has city and district councils
but with fewer powers. England and Wales also have County Councils. The
Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament, and the Welsh
Assembly have control over matters of regional importance, such as
education, health, and some economic matters. Foreign affairs and
defense continue to be the responsibility of the central government.
Due to continuing problems with the decommissioning of paramilitary
weapons, the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive (established under
the terms of the Good Friday Agreement) were suspended in February. The
institutions were restored in May following intensive British-Irish
talks with the parties and an initiative on weapons by the IRA.
The small number of remaining UK overseas territories have an
aggregate population of approximately 190,000. They enjoy varying
degrees of self-government on the British model, with appointed
governors.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
they and minorities face no legal constraints on voting or holding
office. Women constitute 18 percent of the members of the House of
Commons and approximately 16 percent of those in the House of Lords.
Some 28 Members of Parliament have identified themselves as members of
minority ethnic groups.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and
responsive to their views.
A number of international nongovernmental human rights
organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
are based in the country. The Government cooperates fully with
international inquiries into alleged violations of human rights.
The 1998 Human Rights Act, which incorporated the provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, took effect in
October 2000 for the entire United Kingdom. Proceedings under the Human
Rights Act can be brought only by victims of a breach of convention
rights by a public authority. The Home Office has a human rights unit
to carry out human rights policy and legislation. NGO's have criticized
the Government for its failure to create a government-wide Human Rights
Commission. In Northern Ireland the Human Rights Commission was
established as an outcome of the peace process. While cases still may
be taken to the European Court of Human Rights, all domestic remedies
under the 1998 act must be exhausted first.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The 1976 Race Relations Act prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color, nationality, or national or ethnic origin and outlaws
incitement to racial hatred. These protections were extended to
Northern Ireland in 1997. However, some groups continued to experience
official and societal discrimination.
The Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of
religion by public authorities. Employment discrimination on the
grounds of religious or political opinion was outlawed specifically in
Northern Ireland by the Fair Employment Act. The 1998 Fair Employment
and Treatment Order extended the prohibition on discrimination to the
provision of goods, facilities, services, and premises. The Government
respects and enforces all antidiscrimination laws, which concentrate on
employment and the supply of goods and services. The Northern Ireland
Equality Commission began operation in August 2000 to oversee
antidiscrimination policy.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. In 1999 a
government report, ``Living Without Fear,'' indicated that one in four
women experience domestic violence at some stage in their lives, that
reported incidents of rape more than tripled over the past 10 years,
that two women per week are killed by their current or former partners,
and that women fear personal attack more than any other crime.
According to a February 2000 Home Office study, the 6,000 rapes and
17,5000 indecent assaults recorded by the police yearly vastly
underreport of the real scale of sexual violence against women. The
study estimates the true number of rapes and assaults at between
118,000 and 295,000. The research was released as part of a package of
government grants and projects aimed at improving the conviction rate
for rape and providing women with better protection against domestic
violence. Reports of violence against women in Northern Ireland have
increased.
Criminal penalties for rape, including spousal rape, sexual
assault, and domestic violence are substantial, and these laws are
enforced strictly; however, conviction rates for rape tend to be lower
than for other crimes. In the 12 months ending in September, 37,263
sexual offences were recorded in England and Wales, a decrease of 0.4
percent over the same period in 1999. The law provides for injunctive
relief, personal protection orders, and protective exclusion orders
(similar to restraining orders) for women who are victims of violence.
The Government provides shelters, counseling, and other assistance for
battery or rape and offers free legal aid to battered women who are
economically reliant on their abusers.
Criminal action for sexual harassment cases must be prosecuted
under assault legislation since no law specifically prohibits sexual
harassment. Women's groups have complained that civil suits concerning
sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of gender sometimes
take up to 3.5 years to appear before an industrial tribunal.
The law provides for equal opportunity between the sexes, but women
experience some discrimination in practice. The 1975 Sex Discrimination
Act, as amended in 1986, prohibits both direct and indirect
discrimination in training, housing, and the provision of goods and
services, as well as in employment. Women have equal rights regarding
property and divorce. According to the Government's Equal Opportunities
Commission (which supports persons who bring discrimination cases
before industrial tribunals and courts and produces guidelines on good
practice for employers), significant progress has been made towards
equal opportunity for women since the commission was established in
1975. The introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 was an
important change in the effort to equalize pay. However, a February
report for the Government's Women's Unit found that women in full-time
work earn on average 84 percent of the earnings of male full-time
workers.
Trafficking in women is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
Women's issues within the Government are represented at the cabinet
level by the Minister for Women, who heads up the Women's Unit, which
engages in dialog with women and advises the Government but has no
authority for direct action.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its systems of public education
and medical care. The Government provides free, compulsory education to
age 16 and further education to age 18 if the student so desires.
While there is no societal pattern of abuse directed against
children, indications are, despite a lack of reliable data, that child
abuse is nevertheless a problem. Since the paramilitary cease-fires,
reports of violence against children in Northern Ireland have
increased.
Concern and publicity surrounding pedophiles is growing. As part of
a government drive to protect the young from child abusers, previously
secret registers of pedophiles are available to any employer who runs
an organization where persons under age 18 could be at risk (schools,
children's homes, or voluntary organizations). In addition suspected
child abusers and convicted pedophiles are banned from working with
children. Childcare organizations must consult a list before offering
anyone a job, paid or otherwise, and it is illegal for them to hire
anyone named on it.
Various laws covering England and Wales stipulate that children
have the right to apply for court orders, to give or withhold consent
for medical treatment (for those capable of making an informed
decision), to make complaints to the relevant local authority, to have
their ethnic, linguistic, and religious background considered in
decisions affecting them, to have reasonable contact with their
families (usually applied in a circumstance where there was abuse), and
in general to be consulted regarding their desires.
In February rules were introduced in England and Wales to reduce
the intimidation that young suspects may feel when tried in an adult
court. The rules include a ban on robes and wigs and uniformed security
officers in the courtroom and affect all defendants under age 18 who
face serious criminal charges in crown courts. The changes were in
response to a 1999 European Court of Human Rights ruling that two young
boys' rights were violated by the intimidating nature of their trial.
Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the police can arrest and
detain children as young as 10 years old for up to 7 days.
In January the Government published a consultation document
proposing that laws be amended to make it illegal for parents to hit
their children with an implement or hit them on the head or face. It
did not propose to outlaw completely spanking or hitting. The proposals
are the result of a European Court of Human Rights ruling in 1998 that
a 9-year-old boy's rights were violated by his stepfather's caning. The
1998 School Standards and Framework Act extended the ban on corporal
punishment in state schools to private schools and nursery schools.
Child welfare groups have called for all corporal punishment of
children to be outlawed.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health and has been illegal in the United Kingdom since
1985, is practiced by immigrant populations from countries in which the
practice is common. The extent to which the procedure is carried out in
the UK is unknown, but the Government continues to work to eradicate
it.
People with Disabilities.--The 1995 People With Disabilities
Discrimination Act outlaws discrimination against disabled persons in
the provision of access to public facilities by employers of more than
15 workers, service providers (apart from those providing education or
running transport vehicles), and anyone selling or renting property. In
addition all businesses are required to accommodate disabled customers.
Adaptations must be ``reasonable,'' bearing in mind the circumstances
and size of the business. The 1993 Education Act requires local
education authorities to make provision for the special educational
needs of disabled children.
In April the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) was launched. The
DRC provides a hot line for disabled people and employers, legal advice
and support for individuals, and policy advice to the Government. The
DRC also has the power to conduct formal investigations, arrange
conciliation, require persons to adopt action plans to ensure
compliance with law, and apply for injunctions to prevent acts of
unlawful discrimination.
Government regulations require that all new buildings meet the
access requirements of all persons with impaired mobility and that all
taxis be wheelchair accessible. In 1992 the Government promulgated
similar regulations for sensory-impaired persons. However, while
generally improved, access to many buildings, especially older
buildings, including transportation centers, remains inadequate.
Religious Minorities.--According to the NGO the Board of Deputies
of British Jews, the number of anti-Semitic incidents in Britain during
the year was 398, compared with 270 in 1999 (adjusted figure). Public
manifestations of anti-Semitism are confined largely to the political
fringe, either far right or Islamist. In reaction to the October
violence in the West Bank and Gaza, a number of synagogues were
attacked by persons throwing bricks or other objects through the
windows and anti-Semitic leaflets were posted in Manchester,
Birmingham, and London. A Jewish man was stabbed in London in October
in an apparent racist attack.
Although there is some evidence that unemployment rates among
Catholics remain higher than among Protestants in Northern Ireland,
government programs and continued economic growth in the region have
resulted in a decrease in the overall unemployment rate.
The 1989 Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act, as amended, aims
to end even unintentional or indirect discrimination in the workplace,
and a public tribunal adjudicates complaints. All public sector
employers and all private firms with over 10 workers must report
annually to the Equality Commission on the religious composition of
their work force and must review their employment practices at least
once every 3 years. Noncompliance can bring criminal penalties and the
loss of government contracts. Victims of employment discrimination may
sue for damages. Although critics of the act assert that its targets
and timetables are too imprecise, most leaders of the Catholic
community regard it as a positive step.
While the active recruitment of Catholics by the Northern Ireland
Civil Service produced rough proportionality in overall numbers, the
service acknowledges that Catholics remain significantly
underrepresented in its senior grades. Government efforts to increase
the recruitment of Catholics into the police (currently 92 percent
Protestant) and related security jobs in Northern Ireland have been
hampered by widespread antipathy in the Catholic community to the
security forces as well as by intimidation by republican organizations
opposed to any cooperation with the police or security forces. Despite
past efforts, the percentage of Catholic officers in the force has not
changed significantly. The new policing bill mandates that a 50:50
religious balance be maintained in new recruitment until the religious
composition of the police reflects the mix in society at large. Critics
of this approach contend that it will violate the UK's international
commitments.
The fear of intercommunal violence has, over the years, led to a
pattern of segregated communities in Northern Ireland. Protestant and
Catholic families have moved away from mixed or border neighborhoods.
According to the RUC, there were 28 arson/bomb attacks and 3 other
acts of violence directed at both Protestant and Catholic churches in
Northern Ireland during the year.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Despite legal prohibitions
against race discrimination, persons of African and Afro-Caribbean,
South Asian, or Middle Eastern origin and Travellers face occasional
acts of societal violence and some discrimination. According to an
official report in October, 21,700 racially related offenses were
recorded in the 1999-2000 period. Incitement to racial hatred is a
criminal offense punishable by a maximum of 2 years' imprisonment. The
Government strictly enforces the laws and regulations in this area.
In June David Copeland was convicted of a series of racially
motivated bombings in London that killed three people (see Section
1.a.). In November Robert Stewart, an inmate at the Felham young
offender institution, was convicted of the March murder of his Asian
cellmate, Zahid Mubarek. Prior to the commission of the murder, Stewart
had been charged with racially motivated offenses, and had written a
number of racist letters while in prison (see Section 1.c.).
The government-appointed but independent Commission for Racial
Equality provides guidelines on good practice, supports persons taking
court action under the 1976 Race Relations Act, and may initiate its
own court actions. After investigating a complaint, the CRE may issue a
notice requiring that the discrimination be stopped. The CRE then
monitors the response to its notice for 5 years.
According to a February announcement by Scotland Yard, the number
of black and Asian officers in the metropolitan police increased by 20
percent since the release of the Lawrence Report. However, minority
officers still represent only about 4 percent of the metropolitan
police force. More than one-third of police forces did not increase
minority recruitment, the rate of which is substantially below the
level required to meet targets set by the Home Office.
A series of reports in 1999 and 2000, both independent and
commissioned by police, show that minorities are more likely to be
stopped and searched by police than whites (see Section 1.c.).
In March the Police Complaints Authority announced that it would
conduct a new inquiry into the police handling of the death of Ricky
Reel, a young Asian found drowned in the Thames River in 1997. His
family believes that Reel was the victim of a racial attack and claim
that police failed to investigate the crime properly.
Travellers, nomadic populations consisting of Roma, Irish, and
``new'' Travellers, estimated to number 100,000 persons, experience
marginalization, educational discrimination, and police and societal
harassment greater than that of the settled population, according to
human rights groups. U.N. Committees on both the Rights of the Child
and the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have expressed similar
concerns. In August 1997, the Government passed the Race Relations
(Northern Ireland) Order, which for the first time gave specific legal
protection to minority ethnic groups there, including the Traveller
community. In January a study by Dundee University revealed
institutionalized racism towards the Scottish Traveller community. In
particular it showed that racist and intolerant attitudes among health
professionals prevented Travellers from receiving proper medical care.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and
join unions, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
1999 Employment Relations Act established the country's first
procedures for statutory, as distinct from voluntary, union
recognition. The Department of Trade and Industry began to promulgate
implementing regulations during the summer of 2000. Additional
regulations are being issued as they are completed. For example,
beginning on September 4, 2000, workers are entitled to be accompanied
at disciplinary and grievance hearings by a trade union
representative--even if an employee's workplace is not unionized.
Unions are free of government control. The Employment Relations Act
affords significant new protection to union organizing efforts and, for
the first time, confirms the statutory right to strike. The act sets
minimum employment standards for the first time in labor law.
Unions participate freely in international organizations. The
general secretary of the International Confederation of Trade Unions
(ICFTU), the general secretary of the Trade Union Advisory Committee to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the
workers' representative on the governing body of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) are all former British trade union leaders.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is longstanding and widespread, covering about 30 percent of
the work force. Unionization is heaviest in the public sector. Under
the Employment Relations Act, labor-management contracts are, for the
first time, legally enforceable.
Under the 1999 act, unions can file a request for recognition,
identifying the proposed bargaining unit, to the Central Arbitration
Committee (CAC). The act covers employers with more than 20 workers and
encompasses an estimated two-thirds of all workplaces.
Once the CAC determines the appropriate bargaining unit, it
assesses whether a union is likely to have majority support. If union
members already make up a majority of the bargaining unit, the CAC can
issue a declaration that the union is recognized for collective
bargaining without a ballot. In those instances where the CAC orders a
ballot (typically, when the majority of bargaining unit employees are
not already union members), the employer must cooperate by providing a
list of names and giving the union access to the workplace to campaign.
Unions win recognition when a majority of those voting agree, including
at least 40 percent of those in the bargaining unit.
Although the law encourages voluntary agreements between employers
and unions, the CAC can, if necessary, impose a legally binding
procedure for bargaining about pay, hours, and holidays. To date no
union has filed a case before the CAC. This reflects the Trades Union
Council's (TUC) explicit preference that its member unions should
secure workplace agreements through negotiation rather than in the
courts. The TUC acknowledged that the right to take a unionization
dispute to the CAC has boosted its organizing efforts.
Workers are protected against dismissal or other retaliation for
campaigning or voting for or against recognition. Unions no longer are
required to name members when initiating a strike ballot, to minimize
opportunities for retaliation. The law also prohibits the compilation
of lists of union members and labor activists for use by employers and
employment agencies. This is aimed at ``blacklists,'' as operated in
the past. Dismissed strikers are able to claim unfair dismissal if
fired within 8 weeks of when they first undertook a legal strike.
Union members are protected against ``being subject to any
detriment'' due to union activity or membership. This protection goes
further than the previous language of ``action short of dismissal taken
against him as an individual.'' Heretofore, it was legal for employers
to withhold fringe benefits otherwise available to nonunion employees.
At the same time, the 1999 act retains key policies implemented by
previous governments, notably ballots and notice before strikes,
abolition of the closed shop, secondary boycotts, and prohibition
against mass picketing.
There are no export processing zones. The Employment Relations Act
also extends its protection to contract and part-time workers in an
attempt to close loopholes that previously allowed some employers to
evade labor regulations. Foreign workers are protected to the full
extent of the law.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited and is not
practiced.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--School attendance until age 16 is compulsory. Children
under age 16 are not permitted to work in an industrial enterprise
except as part of an educational course. Forced and bonded child labor
is prohibited, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition
(see Section 6.c.). The UK ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
forms of child labor on March 23 and ILO Convention 138 on the minimum
age for employment in June.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The country's first minimum wage
went into effect on April 1, 1999. As of October 1 the adult minimum
wage was $5.50 (3.70). The youth wage was raised to $4.75
(3.20) on June 1, 2000.
When introduced in 1999, the new pay thresholds were expected to
benefit some 1.5 million workers directly. However, according to
government figures in October, nearly 300,000 workers still were paid
less than the minimum wage a year after its introduction. Government
departments aggressively are instructing employers that they must bring
pay practices into compliance. The Board of Inland Revenue examined
7,000 employers by October and had recovered $4 million (2.7 million
pounds) on behalf of underpaid employees.
Recognizing that the national minimum wage is a new institution,
the Government asked the Low Pay Commission (incorporating academics,
employers, and trade unions), created in 1998, to review the standard's
implementation and make recommendations by July 2001.
Currently the national minimum wage, by itself, does not provide a
decent standard of living for most workers with families. But other
elements of the welfare state fill the gap. Of nearly 28 million
workers, some 6 million (21 percent) benefit from some social insurance
scheme or another. This is in addition to free universal access to the
National Health Service. The working families' tax credit and disabled
person's tax credit--both implemented as of 1999--are designed to
ensure a working family a weekly income of $320 (200 pounds), which
constitutes a living wage.
As of April, the Government also introduced a minimum income
guarantee for low-income pensioners. This increases the basic state
pension that all retired employees receive. And the Government also
announced that, as of April 2001 the threshold of total personal assets
will be raised to allow more low-income pensioners to avail themselves
of this benefit.
The Government introduced a working time directive in 1998 to bring
domestic legislation into compliance with the European Union's 48-hour
workweek. New 1999 legislation significantly raised the maximum
compensation level for unfair dismissal claims from $19,200 to $80,000
(12,000 to 50,000 pounds). Regulations from 1999 enhanced parental
leave provisions for employees with more than a year's continuous
service. The Human Rights Act, which came into force on October 2,
2000, added additional rights in the workplace.
The 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act stipulates that the health
and safety of employees not be placed at risk. In practice the act is
updated constantly. The Health and Safety Executive effectively
enforces regulations on these matters and may initiate criminal
proceedings in appropriate cases. Workers' representatives actively
monitor enforcement of the act. Workers can remove themselves from
hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No laws specifically criminalize
trafficking in persons, which is a growing problem. A July Home Office
report on reforming the law on sexual offences recommended the creation
of a new crime of trafficking a person for the purpose of sexual
exploitation. The police successfully prosecuted traffickers under
other laws, such as those against procuring and living off of immoral
earnings. Under the 1999 Immigration and Asylum act, persons found
importing illegal immigrants can be fined $3,600 (2,000 pounds).
A May Home Office report on trafficking in women estimated that up
to 1,400 women were trafficked into the country in 1998. The report
highlighted that police largely are unaware of the scale of the problem
and do not treat it as a priority. The Government was considering the
report's recommendations, which include the creation of a new crime
category of ``sexual exploitation,'' allowing trafficked women to sue
their exploiters, and a focus on prevention campaigns in host
countries.
On June 21, 58 ethnic Chinese suffocated in the back of a truck
while attempting to enter the country illegally. Three persons were
arrested and face trial in the UK in connection with the deaths.
__________
UZBEKISTAN
Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights. The
Constitution provides for a presidential system with separation of
powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In
practice President Islam Karimov and the centralized executive branch
that serves him dominate political life. First chosen president in a
1991 election that most observers considered neither free nor fair,
Karimov had his stay in office extended to 2000 by a 1995 plebiscite.
Parliament subsequently voted to make the extension part of Karimov's
first term, thus making him eligible to run again in 2000. He was
elected to a second term in January against token opposition with 92.5
percent of the vote under conditions that were neither free nor fair.
The Oliy Majlis (Parliament) consists almost entirely of regional
officials appointed by the President and members of parties that
support the President. Despite constitutional provisions for an
independent judiciary, the executive branch heavily influences the
courts in both civil and criminal cases.
There is effective civilian control over the military. The Ministry
of Interior (MVD) controls the police. The police and other MVD forces
are responsible for most normal police functions. The National Security
Service (NSS)--the former KGB--deals with a broad range of national
security questions, including corruption, organized crime, and
narcotics. The police and the NSS committed numerous serious human
rights abuses.
The Government has stated that it is committed to a gradual
transition to a free market economy. However, continuing restrictions
on currency convertibility and other government measures to control
economic activity have constrained economic growth and led
international lending organizations to suspend or scale back credits.
The economy is based primarily on agriculture and agricultural
processing; the country is a major producer and exporter of cotton. It
is also a major producer of gold and has substantial deposits of
copper, strategic minerals, gas, and oil. The Government has made some
progress in reducing inflation and the budget deficit, but government
statistics understate both, while overstating economic growth. There
are no reliable statistics on unemployment, which is believed to be
high and growing. The Government is taking some modest steps to reduce
the host of formal and informal barriers that constrain the nascent
private sector.
The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and the
Government continued to commit numerous serious abuses. However, there
were positive human rights developments in a few areas. Citizens cannot
exercise their right to change their government peacefully. The
Government has not permitted the existence of an opposition party since
1993. Election and registration laws restrict the possibility that any
real opposition parties form or mount a campaign. There were credible
reports that security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths of
several citizens in custody. Police and NSS forces tortured, beat, and
harassed persons. The security forces arbitrarily arrested or detained
pious Muslims and other citizens on false charges, frequently planting
narcotics, weapons, or forbidden literature on them. Prison conditions
are poor, and detention can be prolonged. The judiciary does not always
ensure due process and often defers to the wishes of the executive
branch. Parliament passed a law on judicial reform that was awaiting
presidential approval at year's end. The Government also demonstrated a
commitment to permitting International Committee for the Red Cross
(ICRC) access to detained persons and prisoners. Police and NSS forces
infringed on citizens' privacy, including the use of illegal searches
and wiretaps. Those responsible for documented abuses rarely are
punished.
The crackdown that followed the explosion of five terrorist bombs
in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, continued during 2000. Among those
arrested and tried were persons with close links to avowed Islamist
Uzbeks abroad who, the Government believes, were responsible for the
bombings. However, other victims of the crackdown included members of
the secular opposition, human rights activists, and thousands of
overtly pious Muslims and members of Islamist political groups. While
it is not possible to estimate the number of those arrested, observers
believe that the scale surpasses any previous such action. The Moscow-
based human rights group Memorial has documented over 1,400 cases of
persons imprisoned between January 1999 and April 2000. The
organization credibly estimates that the total number arrested and
tried in that time frame was between 4,000 and 5,000. By year's end,
well over 5,000 persons were in prison as a result of the crackdown.
The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and the press,
and an atmosphere of repression stifles public criticism of the
Government. Although the Constitution expressly prohibits it, press
censorship continues, and the Government sharply restricts citizens'
access to foreign media. A 1999 decree requires all Internet service
providers to route their connections through a government server. The
primary purpose of this measure, according to the Government, is to
prevent access to information that the Government considers harmful.
Despite the law, private Internet providers have proliferated during
the year.
The Government limits freedom of assembly and association. The
Government continues to ban unauthorized public meetings and
demonstrations. The Government has not yet implemented a 1999 law that
improves the formal legal framework for the formation, registration,
and operation of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The Government
continues to deny registration to opposition political parties as well
as to other groups that might be critical of the Government. For
example, the Ministry of Justice has denied repeated applications for
registration of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) and the
Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU), citing
technical deficiencies in the applications. Unregistered opposition
parties and movements may not operate freely or publish their views.
The Government restricts freedom of religion. The Government harassed
and arrested hundreds of Islamic leaders and believers on questionable
grounds, citing the threat of extremism. The Government tolerates the
existence of minority religions but places strict limits on religious
activities. Although the Government had registered over 174 minority
religious communities by year's end, several others were prevented from
registering by local officials. Unlike in 1999, university authorities
did not expel students for wearing Islamic dress during the year.
The Government continues to voice rhetorical support for human
rights, but does not ensure these rights in practice. Although the
election, religion, and media laws contain elements that theoretically
support human rights, in reality the Government does not respect such
provisions. The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, which was formed
in 1997, reports that it is assisting hundreds of citizens in
redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve allegedly
unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police. The
Ombudsman's office issued reports identifying the most serious types of
violations of human rights by government officials; however, most of
the successfully resolved cases were relatively minor. The Government
pardoned and released imprisoned human rights activist Mahbuba Kasimova
at year's end.
Domestic violence against women is a problem, and despite a
constitutional prohibition, there continues to be significant
traditional, societal discrimination against women. The Government
undertook cooperation with women's NGO's. Trafficking in women and
girls for the purposes of prostitution occurs. Workplace discrimination
against some minorities persists. There are some limits on worker
rights.
Beginning in August, insurgents from the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) conducted significant armed incursions in Uzbekistan
and neighboring states. Over two dozen members of the Uzbek police and
armed forces were killed in the conflict as were at least 30
insurgents. During the conflict, the Government ordered the evacuation
of least five villages in the Surkhandarya region near the border with
Tajikistan. After spending 2 months in a temporary camp, the villagers
were transferred in November to a newly constructed settlement more
than 200 kilometers away, where they complained to international
observers of poor conditions and abusive treatment.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political killings; however, security forces
committed killings. Security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths
of several prisoners in custody. According to human rights activists
and other observers, many of those killed in custody were interned at a
new prison near Jaslik in Karakalpakstan, where conditions were thought
to be extremely harsh. Nearly all the inmates of this facility, which
opened in the spring of 1999, were accused of religious extremism.
Although there is specific information available on only a handful of
deaths due to mistreatment in custody, human rights observers and
relatives of prisoners claim that the number of such cases throughout
the country during the year reached several dozen. Law enforcement
officials warned families not to talk about their relatives' deaths.
Government officials acknowledge that some inmates of Jaslik died, but
attribute the deaths to illness and the extremely hot climate rather
than mistreatment.
The country's regulations require that every death in custody be
investigated by a medical examiner. In most cases, deaths apparently
due to beating are ascribed to heart failure. However, in June Batirjon
Karimov, a guard at a prison in Almalyk, was convicted and sentenced to
6 years in prison for beating a prisoner to death. The court convicted
Karimov of Articles 103 and 104 of the Criminal Code: Driving someone
to suicide and intentionally causing severe bodily harm, respectively.
The victim, Akmal Latipov, who had just been brought to the prison,
allegedly slashed his wrist with a razor when Karimov began to beat
him, in order to escape the beating. A forensic medical examination
established the cause of Latipov's death to be blows to the head
inflicted by Karimov.
According to the World Organization Against Torture, Rustam
Norbaev, a possible member of the political Islamic movement Hizb ut-
Tahrir, was arrested on March 13 and died in pretrial detention in
Yakkabaga on March 18, allegedly after being tortured. Officials
claimed that Norbaev hanged himself.
Negmat Karimov, who was sentenced in July 1999 to 20 years in
prison for alleged involvement in the terrorist conspiracy behind the
1999 Tashkent bombings, died in prison in Navoi on March 22. According
to his parents, his body showed multiple signs of beating. Karimov also
was convicted on charges related to religious extremism.
In late December, Amanullah Nosirov, a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir
convicted in 1999, died in prison in Navoi. According to acquaintances
of the deceased, he died of injuries sustained while being beaten.
Nosirov was the brother of Haffezullah Nosirov, an alleged leader of
Hizb ut-Tahrir who was convicted in March (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
Hazratkul Kodirov, a former resident of a village near the Tajik
border that had been evacuated during clashes with the IMU, died near
the end of December, allegedly from injuries sustained during police
interrogation (see Section 2.d.). (According to other residents of the
village, police used beatings to force up to 39 men to confess to
collaborating with the IMU.) Kodirov's brother alleged that the body
bore 50 small holes and that the genital area was ``destroyed.''
Hazratkul had given an interview to the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) in November deploring conditions in the resettlement
camp.
Shukhrat Parpiev, who was sentenced in December 1998 to 15 years in
prison, died in the Jaslik prison on May 5. According to an
acquaintance, Parpiev was not religious, but had been arrested because
he was seen with a known religious figure suspected of extremism.
Parpiev's body allegedly was bruised badly, and had a broken clavicle,
crushed skull, and broken ribs.
In an open letter to the President, 33 Tashkent residents protested
the military hazing death on June 13 of Dmitriy Popov, a recruit who
suffered from heart problems. Popov was allegedly beaten by senior
soldiers on June 7. The HRSU commented that such deaths were not
uncommon in the military. At year's end, military prosecutors were
planning on bringing a criminal case against five soldiers who
allegedly participated in the beating.
There were no reported politically motivated killings by the
insurgent IMU, although there were casualties on both sides of the
conflict. During and after the armed incursions of August and
September, Uzbek military forces laid mines on the border with
Tajikistan. Press reports indicate that such mines have killed at least
13 Tajik civilians. The Ministry of Defense asserts that all minefields
are clearly marked and that it has informed the Tajik Government of
their locations in accordance with international norms.
b. Disappearance.--There were no new reports of politically
motivated disappearances.
It is widely believed that Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, missing since
March 1998, fled the country to avoid arrest and was not abducted by
security forces. There were no reported developments in the 1995
disappearance of Imam Abduvali Mirzaev or in the 1997 disappearance of
his assistant, Nematjon Parpiev. Most independent observers believe
that the two missing Islamic activists are either dead or in NSS
custody.
There was one report of a person who has disappeared after being
taken into custody. Bakhodir Khasanov, an instructor of French at the
Alliance Francaise, was apprehended by plainclothes officers in front
of witnesses on July 17. Authorities have not yet acknowledged that he
is being held (see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the law prohibits these practices, both police
and NSS routinely beat and otherwise mistreat detainees to obtain
confessions, which they then used to incriminate the detainees. Both
the frequency of allegations of torture and the alleged severity of the
treatment increased during the reporting period.
In December Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a major report on
torture in Uzbekistan that details dozens of allegations based on
interviews with victims and their families. The report claimed that the
number of allegations and the degree of brutality of torture were
increasing. The most common torture techniques are beating, often with
blunt weapons, and asphyxiation with a gas mask. There were numerous
unverifiable reports of interrogators raping detainees with objects
such as bottles, and of threatening to rape both detainees and their
family members.
Although it is routine for police to beat confessions out of
detainees, anecdotal evidence suggests that those suspected (sometimes
only because of their piety) of Islamist political sympathies are
treated more harshly than criminals.
According to his family, noted writer Mamadali Makhmudov, who
claimed that he and five other defendants were tortured during 5 months
of detention prior to his August 1999 trial, continued to suffer
mistreatment in prison. Family visits to him in Jaslik prison in May
and June revealed that his fingernails had been pulled out and that he
was in generally very poor health. On July 4, the Interior Ministry
said that Makhmudov's health was satisfactory and that he did not
request medical treatment. In December acquaintances reported that
Makhmudov nonetheless had been transferred to a hospital prison.
In a trial concluded in the Akmol Ikramov regional court in
Tashkent on September 6, 15 members of Hizb ut-Tahrir all alleged that
they had been tortured during pretrial detention. According to those
attending the trial (international monitors were barred from the
courtroom), the defendants alleged that guards and interrogators had
used beatings and electricity, and had forced them to sign blank
statements. Several alleged that guards had raped them. The defendants
were sentenced to between 12 and 16 years each.
Prison conditions are poor, and worse for male than for female
prisoners. Males and females are housed in separate facilities. Prison
overcrowding is a problem. Human rights activists reported that the
incarceration of 10 to 15 persons in cells designed for 4 is common.
Tuberculosis and hepatitis are endemic in the prisons, making even
short periods of incarceration potentially deadly. Reportedly there are
severe shortages of food and medicines, and prisoners often rely on
visits by relatives to obtain both. Brutal treatment by guards and an
especially harsh and polluted desert environment were said to make
conditions at Jaslik prison the worst in the country. By year's end,
however, human rights observers had learned from witnesses that
conditions in Jaslik had improved substantially. According to the
Committee for the Legal Assistance of Prisoners, there are between 500
and 800 total inmates at Jaslik. Although the law allows all prisoners
to have occasional family visitors, the remoteness of Jaslik makes such
visits rare and difficult. Most of the prisoners transferred to Jaslik
were convicted for their alleged participation in unauthorized Islamic
groups. The Government operates labor camps, where conditions of
incarceration have been reported to be less severe than in prisons.
An amnesty signed by the President on the occasion of the September
1 Independence Day, may affect up to 25,000 of the country's 63,000
prisoners, according to government press releases. The amnesty does not
apply to those convicted of political crimes. While there was no
official report on the number of prisoners actually released, human
rights activists estimate it to be around 10,000.
The Government in December decided it would permit prison visits by
human rights monitors such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces
continued to arrest and detain individuals arbitrarily, without warrant
or just cause. A Soviet-era detention law provides that police may hold
a person suspected of committing a crime for up to 3 days. At the end
of this period, the detained person must be declared officially a
suspect, charged with a crime, or released. A person officially
declared a suspect may be held for an additional 3 days before charges
are filed. A prosecutor's order is required for arrests, but not for
detentions, prior to the filing of charges. In practice these legal
protections frequently are ignored. In some cases, police circumvent
the rules by claiming that the detainee is being held as a potential
witness and not as a suspect; there are no regulations concerning the
length of time witnesses may be detained. A court date must be set
within 15 days of arrest (or filing of charges) and the defendant may
be detained during this period. A defendant may not have access to
counsel while in detention but only after the first interview with an
investigator. Once the trial date is set, detainees deemed not to be
violent may be released on their own recognizance pending trial. No
money need be posted as bond, but in such cases the accused usually
must sign a pledge not to leave the city. In practice this procedure
rarely is used. During the period between arrest and trial, defendants
are almost always kept in pretrial detention, which has been known to
last as long as 2 years.
In the March trial in Guliston of Hizb ut-Tahrir activist
Haffezullah Nosirov and 11 others, the defendants were tried on average
6 months after arrest. Many claimed that authorities used the interim
period to torture them into signing confessions. The trial marked the
first time since June 1999 that international observers were permitted
to attend a trial of accused religious extremists.
In ordinary criminal cases, the police generally are capable of
identifying and arresting only those reasonably suspected of the crime.
However, both the police and NSS are far less discriminating in cases
involving perceived risks to national security. Prosecutors have
brought charges against at least 140 persons in connection with the
bombings, including at least 12 in during this year. All those tried
have been convicted. Twenty of these were sentenced to death, with most
reportedly already executed. Hundreds of other defendants have also
been convicted of terrorism, most allegedly linked to those convicted
of the bombings or other actions attributed to the IMU.
It is common government practice to violate the human rights of
both immediate and extended family members of those the Government has
targeted. For example, Bakhodir Khasanov, an instructor of French at
the Alliance Francaise, was detained and held incommunicado in the
basement of the Ministry of the Interior on July 17. This is the fourth
time that authorities have detained Khasanov. The security services'
interest in Khasanov apparently stems from the fact that many in the
Khasanov family are pious Muslims, although Bakhodir himself has
claimed that he is not especially religious. Bakhodir's father and
brother are both currently imprisoned. His brother Ismail was convicted
in August 1999 for alleged links to Islamic extremists and was retried
on additional charges of being involved in events in Yangiabad,
although those events took place while he was in prison. In November
1999, police arrested Khasanov's 70-year-old father after planting Hizb
ut-Tahrir leaflets on him. He signed a confession after police forced
him to watch them beating his son Ismail, and is now serving 3 years in
prison.
Kamoletdin Sattarov of Andijon was convicted of anti-State activity
in July after police allegedly planted two Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets on
him. His brother Muradjon was jailed in 1999 for membership in Hizb ut-
Tahrir. Kamoletdin has admitted that Muradjon had gotten involved with
the group but denied that he shared his brother's political or
religious passions. Investigators in Kamoletdin's case found individual
appeal forms of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in his home
and used them as evidence against him (see Section 4).
All male members of the family of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov
remain in jail, and allegedly are beaten periodically by interrogators
trying to learn Nazarov's whereabouts. Similarly, three brothers of
exiled democratic opposition leader Mohammed Solikh are imprisoned
because of their family ties (see Sections 1.c. and 3).
Family members of missing Andijon Imam Abdu Kori Mirzaev reported
that they were harassed and kept under constant surveillance.
According to NGO reporting, Uzbek Imam Khadji Khudjaev was arrested
by Russian police in August, apparently at the request of the Uzbek
Government, and was extradited to Uzbekistan in November to face
charges of involvement in the February 1999 Tashkent bombings.
Police in Nukus allegedly planted drugs on a Baptist pastor in
July, and held him without charge until his release in late September
(see Section 2.b.).
Police routinely planted small amounts of narcotics, weapons,
ammunition, or Islamic literature on citizens either to justify arrest
or to extort bribes. The most frequent victims of this illegal practice
have been suspected members of nonofficial Islamic organizations such
as Hizb ut-Tahrir. They usually were sentenced to between 15 and 20
years in prison. The total number of those either tried and convicted
or still in pretrial detention is unknown, but human rights activists
contend that there are well over 1,000 and perhaps several thousand.
Many of those in detention are political detainees.
In December the Parliament passed judicial reform legislation,
which, according to an international NGO that reviewed the laws,
mandates notable, if incremental improvements. The reforms included
modifications to the criminal justice system to make it adversarial and
reduce the power of the procuracy, improvements in the appeals process
to ensure greater access to the courts, and increases in the
independence of the courts from the executive branch of government.
In general, the Government does not hold political detainees
indefinitely, but brings them to trial eventually. Because there is no
free press or public record of arrests, it is not possible to determine
the number of detainees awaiting trial. Estimates by human rights
activists are usually in the range of several thousand.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judicial authority; however, the judicial branch takes its
direction from the executive branch and has little independence in
practice. Under the Constitution, the President appoints all judges for
5-year terms. They may be removed for crimes or failure to fulfill
their obligations. Power to remove judges rests with the President,
except for Supreme Court judges, whose removal also must be confirmed
by Parliament.
The system of courts of general jurisdiction is divided into three
tiers: District courts, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. In
addition a Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing laws,
decrees, and judicial decisions to ensure their compliance with the
Constitution. Military courts handle all civil and criminal matters
that occur within the military. There is a system of economic courts on
the regional level that deals with economic cases between judicial and
legal entities.
Decisions of district and regional courts of general jurisdiction
may be appealed to the next level within 10 days of ruling. The
Criminal Code has reduced the list of crimes punishable by death to
murder, espionage, and treason, eliminating the economic crimes that
were punishable by death in the former Soviet code. Officially, most
court cases are open to the public but may be closed in exceptional
cases, such as those involving state secrets, rape, or young
defendants. However, except for the first trial in June 1999, all
trials of those suspected of involvement in the February 16 terrorist
bombings were closed to international observers and the public on
security grounds. In similar fashion, many trials of alleged Islamic
extremists have been closed. International trial monitors or foreign
diplomats only rarely are permitted to observe court proceedings.
State prosecutors play a decisive role in the criminal justice
system. They order arrests, direct investigations, prepare criminal
cases, and recommend sentences. If a judge's sentence does not agree
with the prosecutor's recommendation, the prosecutor has a right to
appeal the sentence to a higher court. There is no protection against
double jeopardy. Judges whose decisions have been overturned on more
than one occasion may be removed from office. Consequently, judges
rarely defy the recommendations of prosecutors. As a result, defendants
usually are found guilty.
The Government still uses the Soviet practice of trial by a panel
of three judges: one professional judge and two lay assessors who serve
5-year terms and are selected from workers' collectives. The judge
presides and directs the proceedings. However, in practice, judges
often defer to the Government and its prosecutors on legal and other
matters. Defendants have the right to attend the proceedings, confront
witnesses, and present evidence. The State provides legal counsel
without charge, but by law the accused also has the right to hire an
attorney. In practice the right to an attorney often is violated and
there are numerous examples of denial of this right.
In a March trial of 48 alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Termez,
the judge allegedly appointed the police investigator who developed the
prosecution's case as the defense attorney for six of the defendants.
Police allegedly tortured detained Imam Abduvakhid Yuldashhev on at
least two occasions in August and September, to force him to sign
statements refusing the services of defense attorneys.
The Government typically held unannounced trials of large groups of
those alleged to be extremists, and rarely let international observers
attend. Human rights observers contended that these groupings of
defendants were arbitrary, since the prosecution only occasionally
argued that those on trial actually were connected to one another.
Defendants often claimed that the confessions on which the prosecution
typically based its cases were extracted by torture. Judges ignored
these claims and invariably convicted the accused, handing down severe
sentences--usually from 15 to 20 years' imprisonment. Torture and
mistreatment of detainees are explicitly outlawed. Lawyers may, and
occasionally do, call on judges to reject confessions thus extracted
and to investigate claims of such treatment. There has been no report
of a judge opening an investigation into claims of torture.
In one such trial that ended on April 14 in Tashkent, 12 defendants
were convicted of anti-State activity, belonging to illegal groups, and
other charges. Two of the defendants were sentenced to 20 years, and
eight more to 17 years. One defendant, Abdulaziz Mavlianov, an employee
of the Tashkent office of the ICRC, allegedly confessed only to having
given about $15 (10,000 soum) and some publicly available information
to the main defendant, alleged Islamist activist Toirjon Abdusamatov.
At his trial, Mavlianov renounced that confession, which he had never
signed. Despite the relatively innocuous nature of the alleged
activities that led to his conviction, he was sentenced to 17 years in
prison.
In practice most defense lawyers are unskilled at defending their
clients. Courts often do not allow all defense witnesses to be heard,
and written documents are given more weight than courtroom witnesses.
In the March trial of Haffezullah Nosirov and 10 other alleged members
of Hizb ut-Tahrir, defendants were convicted in part on the basis of
written testimony from Bakhrom Abdullaev, an alleged terrorist who
reportedly had been executed in January. Furthermore, the judge in the
case refused the defense's request to question the other (living)
witnesses whose written statements formed the remainder of the
prosecution's case. In his retrial, Sattarov was sentenced to 10 years
in prison, which was 1 year more than his original sentence.
In November the Government staged a trial of 12 alleged
conspirators in the 1999 Tashkent bombings, 9 of whom were being tried
in absentia. Since the court made no formal effort to notify the
defendants directly of the charges against them, the proceedings
violated the International Convention on Civil and Political rights.
Although the State appointed lawyers for the missing defendants, they
put up only a token defense, lasting less than 3 hours after a 2-week
prosecution case. Several of the lawyers stated openly that they were
unable to defend their clients because they had no opportunity to
consult with them. Two of the absent defendants, IMU leaders Tohir
Yuldashev and Jumaboy Khojiev (a.k.a. Juma Namangani), were sentenced
to death. Other defendants received sentences of between 12 and 20
years in prison.
The Constitution provides a right of appeal to those convicted;
however, such proceedings usually are formalistic exercises that
confirm the original conviction. For example, the appeal of Imam
Abdurakhim Abdurakhmanov on August 8 lasted only 20 minutes, and the
judge did not permit testimony. Abdurakhmanov, who had been sentenced
to 17 years in prison and reportedly was subjected to torture prior to
trial, was not allowed to be present at the appeal. However, a judge in
the Andijon regional court, after hearing an appeal in August, ordered
a retrial of Kamoletdin Sattarov, on the grounds that he was not
represented properly at the original trial earlier that month.
Authorities arrested and tried unfairly relatives of suspects and
members of opposition groups (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
In April the Moscow-based human rights organization Memorial
published a list of over 1,400 individuals arrested and convicted for
political and religious reasons from January 1999 to April 2000 (see
Section 2.c.). The organization credibly estimates that, including
those it can document, a total of between 4,000 and 5,000 such persons
have been imprisoned. While most were convicted of conspiracy against
the constitutional order, many were convicted of nonpolitical offenses
such as tax evasion, misappropriation of funds, or illegal possession
of narcotics or firearms. It is widely believed that in the latter
cases, arresting officers planted the incriminating materials.
On September 5, the Chairman of the Supreme Court claimed that
there were 2,000 persons in jail for crimes against the State. At the
same news conference and again the following day, the Minister of
Justice explicitly rejected the notion that these or any other
prisoners could be classified as ``political,'' on the grounds that all
had been tried and convicted of crimes. However, the fact that nearly
all convictions are based on forced confessions makes it impossible to
determine what percentage of those convicted actually violated the law.
Moreover, the alleged ``crimes,'' as interpreted by the courts,
encompass criticism of the Government and possession of religious
beliefs that the Government defines as extremist. Therefore, most of
those convicted of crimes against the State are political prisoners.
In December the Government proposed a draft agreement with the ICRC
allowing the ICRC access to all prisoners. The draft agreement was
modeled after the ICRC's own proposals and met all ICRC conditions for
undertaking a program of prison visits.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Authorities infringe on these rights. By law only a
prosecutor may issue a search warrant or authorize electronic
surveillance. There is no provision for a judicial review of such
warrants. Security agencies routinely monitor telephone calls and
employ surveillance and wiretaps in the cases of persons involved in
opposition political activities.
A Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and
other legislation (see Section 2.c.) prohibits private teaching of
religion. Students who in 1997 and 1998 were expelled from schools for
wearing religious dress were not allowed to reenroll in 2000 (see
Section 2.c.). Unlike in 1999, students were not arrested for wearing
religious dress during this year.
Police arrested, detained, and beat family members of suspects that
they were seeking (see Sections 1.c and 1.d.). Authorities also
frequently forced relatives of alleged religious extremists to undergo
public humiliation at neighborhood assemblies organized for that
purpose. For example, the mother of IMU leader Juma Namangani was
summoned to a school auditorium in late August where an assembly of
neighbors confronted her. Relatives of soldiers killed in the
insurgency insulted her and smeared her face with black paint. Local
leaders shamed her for bringing Namangani into the world until she
tearfully apologized and cursed her son.
Both the wife and mother of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov were
forced to undergo similar public humiliation in February and March.
The Government does not allow general distribution of foreign
newspapers and other publications. However, two or three Russian
newspapers and a variety of Russian tabloids and lifestyle publications
are available. A modest selection of other foreign periodicals is
available in Tashkent's major hotels, and authorized groups can obtain
foreign periodicals through subscription. The authorities do not permit
rebroadcast of Russian programming that is critical of the Government
(see Section 2.a.).
In May postal authorities confiscated a package addressed to human
rights activist Mikhail Ardzinov. The package contained documents from
a Moscow human rights conference as well as copies of the Erk Party
newspaper. In the notice sent to Ardzinov, authorities claimed that the
material was confiscated on the basis of a statute prohibiting the
mailing of items of artistic or cultural significance.
In March police confiscated six copies of the Uzbekistan chapter of
the 1999 HRW World Report from a HRW representative who was observing
the trial of the 12 men on trial for membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir (see
Section 1.d.). According to an international NGO, the presiding judge
at the trial characterized the distribution of the report as the
clandestine distribution of leaflets. In November customs authorities
confiscated several copies of the journal of the unregistered Birlik
Democratic Movement that had been mailed to a private citizen. Customs
claimed that the material was illegal and anticonstitutional. In the
same month, Customs opened mail sent from HRW's New York office to its
Tashkent office and confiscated several copies of a published list of
political and religious prisoners in Uzbekistan compiled by the Moscow-
based human rights organization Memorial. In explaining the
confiscation, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told
HRW that it took issue with the content of the Memorial report.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
``freedom of thought, speech, and convictions''; however the Government
continues to restrict these rights severely.
A 1991 law against ``offending the honor and dignity of the
President'' limits the ability to criticize the President. Ordinary
citizens remain afraid to express views critical of the President and
the Government in public. The 1998 Mass Media law formally provides for
freedom of expression, protects the rights of journalists, and
reiterates the constitutional ban on censorship. Nonetheless, several
articles of the law, and the lack of due process provided for in their
implementation, allow the Government to use the law to silence critics.
The law established an interdepartmental government commission which
issues licenses to approved media outlets. In May a new law changed the
term of validity of these licenses from 1 year to 5 years, a move
welcomed by those in the media. The interdepartmental commission is
empowered to revoke licenses and close media outlets without a court
judgment.
According to the Mass Media Law, journalists are responsible for
the accuracy of the information contained in their news stories,
potentially subjecting them to prosecution. The law prohibits stories
that incite religious confrontation and ethnic discord or advocate
subverting or overthrowing the constitutional order (see Section 2.b.).
The Constitution prohibits censorship; however, it is widely
practiced and the Government tolerates little, if any, criticism of its
actions. The last opposition newspaper to be published was that of the
Erk Democratic Party, which has been banned within the country since
1993 but is published sporadically abroad.
There are no private publishing houses, and government approval is
required for all publications. Newspapers are generally printed by
state-owned printing houses, which refuse to print any edition that
does not bear the prior approval of the Committee for the Protection of
State Secrets. In these circumstances, journalists who want to ensure
that their work is published practice self-censorship.
In April authorities closed an independent Urgench newspaper,
Panorama (circulation 500). Panorama's publisher, Konstantin Aksianov,
had purchased his own presses and thus was able to produce and
distribute the newspaper without censorship by the Committee for the
Protection of State Secrets. However, private printing presses require
licenses and in April, the State Press Committee, without explanation,
revoked Panorama's license to print and warned other printers not to
print the newspaper.
Information remains very tightly controlled. The Uzbekistan
Information Agency cooperates closely with the presidential staff to
prepare and distribute all officially sanctioned news and information.
Nearly all newspapers are organs of government ministries. Private
persons and journalist collectives may not establish newspapers unless
they meet the media law's standards for establishment of a ``mass media
organ,'' including founders acceptable to the Government. A handful of
private newspapers containing advertising, horoscopes, and similar
features, but no news or editorial content, are allowed to operate
without censorship. Limited numbers of foreign periodicals are
available (see Section 1.f.).
Four state-run channels that fully support the Government and its
policies dominate television broadcasting. A cable television joint
venture between the state broadcasting company and a foreign company
broadcasts the Hong Kong-based Star television channels, including the
BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Cable News Network world news, to Tashkent and
a few other locations. Access to cable television is beyond the
financial means of most citizens.
There are between 30 and 40 privately owned local television
stations and 3 privately owned radio stations. Generally, broadcasters
practice self-censorship and enjoy some leeway in reporting critically
on local government.
The interdepartmental commission closed two television stations in
1999. One of them was allowed to reopen in 2000. Officials claimed that
the stations did not meet technical requirements for relicensing and
that there was no political element to the closings. Foreign observers
noted that the two were among the most independent in the country and
interpreted the closings as a warning to other broadcasters to be
careful of their content. Shukhrat Babajanov, the owner of ALC, a
station in Urgench that has been prohibited from reopening,
unsuccessfully sued the Government in February for damages resulting
from the station's closing. He appealed and lost again in March. ALC
had also lost its registration temporarily in 1997, allegedly for
technical violations of regulations. It was believed widely at the time
that the real reason for the 1997 closure was that the owner had been a
member of the Erk political party in the early 1990s. Babajanov and his
former employees were subjected to harassment and veiled threats by
police during the summer.
As these cases illustrate, enforcement of the registration and
licensing requirements can be strict, and the Government's
implementation of the media law does not function smoothly. Because the
registration committee meets irregularly and because the annual re-
registration requirement has only recently been revised, up to one half
of independent television stations have been forced to operate with
expired licenses, making them vulnerable to a government shut down.
During the 1999 election season, owners reportedly believed that the
Government was intentionally delaying re-registration in order to
ensure that the stations broadcast nothing unfavorable. However, in
2000 most owners reported that tensions between them and the Government
eased substantially.
Private radio and television broadcasters formed an independent
professional association in 1998. The association resisted both
generous incentives and heavy pressure from the Government to elect the
Government's candidate as chairman. Government officials openly
threatened members of the group and the opposition candidate who was
elected. Since that time, the Government has arbitrarily denied the
group's registration application on seven occasions, three during the
last year. In one unsuccessful effort to win registration, the
association even changed its name from ANESMI to MEDIA. Ministry of
Justice officials reportedly advised the group privately that it never
would be registered. The lack of registration effectively restricts
MEDIA's ability to attract international funding and operate legally.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America are not
permitted to broadcast from within the country, despite the
Government's 1992 contractual agreement to allow this activity. The
Government allows both organizations to have correspondents in the
country. The BBC World Service was required to broadcast on a very low
FM frequency that most radios would not be able to receive, and then
only after the BBC had agreed on paper to restrictions amounting to
self-censorship. (However, observes agree that there is no evidence
that the BBC actually engages in self-censorship.) The World Service is
permitted to broadcast only 2 hours per day: Two 30-minute broadcasts
per day in Uzbek, and two 30-minute broadcasts per day in Russian, 7
days a week.
Since February 1999, all Internet service providers have been
required to route their connections through a state-run server. The
avowed main purpose of this directive was to prevent the transmission
of what the State considers to be harmful information, including
material advocating or facilitating terrorism, material deemed hostile
to the constitutional order, and pornography. By year's end, the
Government had re-routed all but one provider, but did not yet possess
the equipment and expertise necessary to complete implementation of the
decree. The Government has issued regulations and taken technical steps
to filter access to content that it considers objectionable. Despite
these restrictions, the availability of Internet access has expanded as
the number of service providers and Internet cafes have grown.
The Government has granted academic institutions a degree of
autonomy, but freedom of expression still is limited.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, it also states
that the authorities have the right to suspend or ban rallies,
meetings, and demonstrations on security grounds, and in practice the
Government restricted the right of peaceful assembly. The Government
must approve demonstrations but does not grant permits to demonstrators
routinely. In November 1999, a group of 30 to 40 veiled Muslim women
gathered in front of the office of the Tashkent hokim (local governor)
to protest the incarceration of their relatives. The police ordered
them to disperse after refusing their request to meet with the hokim.
Some members of the group report that they have been under intermittent
surveillance since that time. In August shopkeepers at a Tashkent
bazaar spontaneously took to the streets to protest a rise in rental
fees set by the Government. Police responded to contain the crowd, but
no violence was reported.
The Constitution provides for the right of freedom of association;
however the Government restricts the exercise of this right. The
Government refuses to register opposition political parties and
movements. The Constitution places broad limitations on the types of
groups that may form and requires that all organizations be registered
formally with the Government in accordance with procedures prescribed
by law. A 1996 analysis by foreign legal observers concluded that,
while the Law on Political Parties provides theoretical protections for
minority parties and permits a wide range of fund raising, it also
gives the Ministry of Justice broad powers to interfere with parties
and to withhold financial and legal support to those opposed to the
Government. There are no registered opposition parties (see Section 3).
In the early 1990's, the Government repeatedly denied the attempts
by the Birlik Movement and Erk Party to register. Harassment by
security forces drove the leaders of these organizations into voluntary
exile. These organizations made no attempt to register during the year,
reportedly because their remaining adherents were afraid of government
reprisals.
The Constitution and a 1991 amendment to the law on political
parties ban parties of an ethnic or religious nature. Authorities cited
these statutes in denying registration to the Islamic Renaissance Party
(IRP) in 1992. In the early 1990's, opposition activists announced the
formation of the religious Adolat-True Path Party but never pursued
formal registration, claiming that their members were afraid of
government reprisals. Leaders and members of these parties, denied a
voice in the political process and forced to flee repression, now form
the core of the IMU, which launched an armed insurgency in Uzbekistan
and neighboring countries during the year.
The Law on Public Associations as well as the Law on Political
Parties prohibits registration of organizations whose purpose includes
subverting or overthrowing the constitutional order, as well as
organizations whose names already are registered. In the past,
officials have used the latter provision to block human rights NGO's
and independent political parties from registering by creating another
NGO or party with the identical name.
The Government has refused to register the two principal
independent human rights organizations. The Human Rights Society of
Uzbekistan sought registration unsuccessfully four times between 1992
and 1996. During the year, authorities refused to approve a visa to
permit the HRSU's leader-in-exile to return to the country and to
preside over a new founding convention, the required first step for a
new registration application. In April authorities refused permission
for the HRSU to host an international human rights conference in
Tashkent (see Section 4).
The Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU),
headed by longtime human rights activist Mikhail Ardzinov, held its
founding convention and filed registration papers in 1997, but the
Government has not yet formally approved or denied the application. In
both cases, the Government claims that the registration applications
were not made properly and need to be resubmitted. Neither the HRSU nor
the IHROU resubmitted applications during the year; there was no
indication that they would be registered. The Government's repeated
refusals to register these organizations appear politically motivated.
The Government has approved the registration of only one human rights
NGO, the Committee for Protection of Individual Rights, which was
formed with government support in 1996.
The process for government registration of NGO's and other public
associations is also difficult and time-consuming, with many
opportunities for obstruction. Although unregistered organizations
often can disseminate literature, hold meetings, and use letterhead
stationery without government interference, they do not exist as legal
entities and have no real access to the media or government.
A law on nongovernmental, noncommercial organizations passed in
April 1999 provides a relatively benign legal framework for their
registration and functioning. In particular the requirements for
registration are simpler than they had been under previous legislation.
However, the law contains several vaguely worded provisions that, in
practice, may result in arbitrary enforcement of decisions harmful to
NGO's. The real effect of the law depends on the implementing
regulations, which had not yet been promulgated more than 1.5 years
after passage of the law.
Nonpolitical associations and social organizations usually may
register, although complicated rules and a cumbersome government
bureaucracy often make the process difficult. Some evangelical
Christian churches (see Section 2.c.) found it difficult to obtain
registration.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and for the principle of separation of church and state;
however, in practice the Government only partially respects these
rights. The Government perceives unofficial Islamic activity as an
extremist security threat and outlaws it. During the year, the
Government arrested hundreds if not thousands of members of such groups
and sentenced them to between 15 and 20 years in jail. The Government
permits persons affiliated with mainstream religions, including
approved Muslim groups, Jewish groups, the Russian Orthodox Church, and
various other denominations, such as Catholics and Lutherans, to
worship freely and generally registers more recently arrived religions.
However, the religion law forbids or severely restricts activities such
as proselytizing and importing and disseminating religious literature.
The Government is secular and there is no official state religion.
Although the laws treat all religious confessions equally, the
Government shows its support for the country's Muslim heritage by
funding an Islamic university and subsidizing citizens' participation
in the Hajj. The Government promotes a moderate version of Islam
through the control and financing of the Spiritual Directorate for
Muslims (the Muftiate), which in turn controls the Islamic hierarchy,
the content of imams' sermons, and the volume and substance of
published Islamic materials.
In May 1998, the Parliament passed two laws that restrict religious
activity. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations
provides for freedom of worship, freedom from religious persecution,
separation of church and state, and the right to establish schools and
train clergy. However, the law also severely limits religious activity.
It restricts religious rights that are judged to be in conflict with
national security, prohibits proselytizing, bans religious subjects in
public schools, prohibits private teaching of religious principles,
forbids the wearing of religious clothing in public by anyone other
than clerics, and requires religious groups to obtain a license to
publish or distribute materials.
The second legislative change enacted in May 1998 consisted of a
series of revisions to the Criminal and Civil Codes that stiffened the
penalties for violating the religion law and other statutes on
religious activities. It provided for punishments for activities such
as organizing a banned religious group, persuading others to join such
a group, and drawing minors into a religious organization without the
permission of their parents.
The Criminal Code was amended again in May 1999 with two changes
that affected religious freedom. The changes draw a distinction between
``illegal'' groups, which are those that are not registered properly,
and ``prohibited'' groups, which are banned altogether. The first
measure makes it a criminal offense punishable by up to 5 years in
prison to organize an illegal religious group or to resume the
activities of such a group (presumably after being denied registration
or being ordered to disband). Furthermore, the measure punishes any
participation in such a group by up to 3 years in prison. The second
measure sets out penalties of up to 20 years in prison and confiscation
of property for ``organizing or participating'' in the activities of
religious extremist, fundamentalist, separatist, or other prohibited
groups. In practice, the courts ignore the theoretical distinction and
frequently convict members of disapproved Muslim groups under both
statutes.
The Religion Law requires all religious groups and congregations to
register and provides strict and burdensome criteria for their
registration. In particular it stipulates that each group present a
list of at least 100 Uzbek citizen members (compared with the previous
minimum of 10) to the local branches of the Ministry of Justice. This
provision enables the Government to ban any group simply by denying its
registration petition. Government officials designed the law to target
Muslims who worship outside the system of state-organized mosques. A
special commission created in August 1998 may grant exemptions to the
religious law's strict requirements and register groups that have not
been registered by local officials. The commission has granted
exemptions to 51 such groups, including congregations with fewer than
100 Uzbek members. However, no formal procedures or criteria have been
established to bring a case before this commission.
In a February 29 roundtable on religious freedom, Government
officials (from the Committee on Religious Affairs, Parliament, and the
National Center for Human Rights) called for clarifications that would
bring religion law and practice into line with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and on May 25 President Karimov
suggested that the Parliament consider improvements to the religion
law. However, no action was taken by year's end.
In August an expert from the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination noted the serious restrictions on freedom of
religion in Uzbekistan, targeting primarily Muslims worshipping outside
the state-organized mosques.
Christian churches generally are tolerated as long as they do not
attempt to win converts among ethnic Uzbeks. Christians who are ethnic
Uzbeks are secretive about their faith and rarely attempt to register
their organizations. Christian congregations that are of mixed ethnic
background are reluctant to list their Uzbek members on registration
lists due to fear of incurring official displeasure. Since the law
prohibits participation in unregistered groups, some minority churches
have not submitted registration applications because they know that
they are unable to comply with the law's requirements and prefer not to
identify themselves to the authorities. Although church leaders cite
high registration fees and the 100-member rule as obstacles to
registration, the most frequent problem is the lack of an approved
legal address, which is required in order to submit an application.
Some groups have been reluctant to invest in the purchase of a property
without assurance that the registration would be approved. Others claim
that local officials arbitrarily withhold approval of the addresses
because they oppose the existence of Christian churches with ethnic
Uzbek members.
In August 1999, the central Government undertook to register
minority religious groups whose applications had been blocked by local
officials. Twenty churches received their registration immediately, and
most new applications since that time have been approved; however,
there have been exceptions. A Baptist congregation in Gazalkent
attempted to register unsuccessfully throughout the year.
Representatives of the group claimed that local officials were blocking
its registration. The deputy mayor of Gazalkent allegedly told church
leaders at one point that its application might be approved if it
removed from its membership list all names of ethnic Uzbek origin.
Another Baptist congregation in Guliston was denied registration in
December ostensibly on the grounds that its proposed church was in a
residential area. Although two Jehovah's Witness congregations are
registered, eight others that have attempted to register during the
last year were unsuccessful. Church officials believe that the fact
that many members of these groups are Uzbek nationals is at the root of
the bureaucratic obstructionism that they are facing. The Committee on
Religious Affairs (CRA) denied the Greater Grace Christian Church of
Samarkand permission to have a Finnish, rather than Uzbek, pastor. The
church's application for registration was therefore blocked until this
issue is resolved. The Tashkent International Protestant Church was
denied registration because its members were not Uzbek citizens.
However, the CRA gave permission for the church to meet and hold
services. The church has appealed to the Presidential Commission on the
Implementation of the Religion Law, which has authority to grant
exceptions to the requirements of the law. By year's end, the
Commission had not met.
At year's end, the Government had registered 1,979 religious
congregations and organizations, 1,805 of which were Muslim. The 174
registered minority religious groups include 47 Korean Christian, 32
Russian Orthodox, 30 Pentecostal (``full gospel''), 23 Baptist, 10
Seventh-Day Adventist, 8 Jewish (1 Ashkenazy, 6 Bukharan, 1 mixed), 7
Baha'i, 4 Lutheran, 3 Roman Catholic, 2 Jehovah's Witnesses, and 2
Krishna Consciousness groups. Several of these congregations had fewer
than the required 100 members but received exemptions from the
requirement. An additional 335 applications had been denied, 323 of
which were from Muslim groups. The number of mosques has increased
significantly from the 80 or so permitted in the entire Soviet Union to
1,800 registered currently, but has decreased from the 4,000 or more
that opened after the country gained independence and before
registration procedures were in place.
Authorities tolerate many Christian evangelical groups, but often
harass those that openly try to convert Muslims to Christianity. Police
occasionally have broken up meetings of unregistered groups. Leaders of
such groups have been assessed fines or even imprisoned. In August
police allegedly detained a group of unregistered Baptists meeting in a
private apartment in Chirchik for 2 days, during which police allegedly
beat them. After a similar incident in October 1999 in Karshi, the
Committee on Religious Affairs claimed that it took steps to ensure
that police allow such Baptist congregations, which consider
registration to be inconsistent with their religious beliefs, to meet
undisturbed for worship.
In July police in Nukus, Karakalpakstan, arrested Nikolai
Rodzinski, pastor of a small unregistered Baptist group, after
allegedly planting narcotics in his bicycle pack; he was released in
late September. Rodzinski came to the attention of the police because
members of his congregation participated in a summer youth camp
sponsored by the registered Korean Christian church ``Mir.'' Karakalpak
authorities closed the camp in July and in August ordered Pastor
Vladimir Kim to close his church, on the grounds that the camp had
taught religion to minors without parental consent, a violation of the
religion law. Kim maintains that all parents had signed consent forms.
The Nukus Full Gospel Church has not reopened since the August 1999
presidential pardon of Pastor Rashid Turibayev, who had been imprisoned
on religious and falsified narcotics charges. Nukus authorities have
not returned the property confiscated in 1999 after Turibayev and two
associates were convicted, and have not returned title to the church
building to the Full Gospel Church headquarters in Tashkent. Local
observers claim that after their release, the three were subjected to
regular police harassment. Turibayev now lives in Kazakhstan where he
is preaching to a Full Gospel congregation.
Central government officials, as well as many Christian leaders,
view these and other incidents of harassment as isolated cases of local
officials misapplying the law.
The Government's most serious abuses of the right to religious
freedom were committed against Muslims. The Government's campaign
against independent Muslim groups, begun in the early 1990's, resulted
in numerous serious human rights abuses during the period covered by
this report. The campaign has been directed at three types of Muslims:
Alleged Wahhabists, including those educated at medrassas (schools)
abroad and followers of missing imams Nazarov of Tashkent and Mirzaev
of Andijon; those suspected of being involved in the 1999 Tashkent
bombings or of being involved with the IMU, whose roots are in
Namangan; and suspected members of Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout the
country.
The line between the so-called Wahhabists and those suspected of
being involved in the 1999 bombings and the IMU insurgency in 2000 is
not always apparent, even to an unbiased observer. Both Wahhabism and
the IMU stem from the growth of independent Islam that the Government
has sought to suppress since the early 1990's. Based on the court
record, the distinction is that the Government considers the Wahhabists
to be extremists and potential terrorists and those suspected of
involvement in the bombings to be active terrorists. The Government
does not consider repression of these groups to be a matter of
religious freedom, but instead to be directed against those who oppose
and even may take up arms against the political order. However,
authorities are highly suspicious of those who are more pious than is
the norm, including frequent mosque attendees, bearded men, and veiled
women. In practice this approach results in abuses against many devout
Muslims for their religious beliefs.
On September 5, President Karimov signed a decree promising full
amnesty to repentant Uzbek citizens who have joined ``terrorist groups
under the influence of religious extremists'' abroad, but who have not
participated in the insurgency.
Following both the December 1997 murder of police officials in
Namangan and the February 1999 terrorist bombings in Tashkent, police
detained hundreds and perhaps thousands of suspected Wahhabists. The
majority of those detained were released after questioning and
detention that lasted as long as 2 months. The police routinely planted
narcotics, ammunition, and, beginning in 1999, religious leaflets, on
citizens to justify their arrest.
To determine whom to arrest, the Government used the local mahalla
(neighborhood) committees as a source of information. Shortly after the
February 1999 Tashkent bombings, President Karimov directed that each
committee assign a ``defender of the people,'' whose job it was to
assure that young persons in the neighborhoods were not joining
independent Islamic groups. The committees identified for police those
residents who appeared suspicious. In an interview with the Associated
Press in September, an official of the Committee on Religious Affairs
said that the mahallas had identified 10,700 persons with extremist
tendencies. Asked how mahalla officials know who is an extremist, the
official replied ``you can see it in their eyes.'' Human rights
observers noted that in practice the committees often perceived as
suspicious those same individuals who already had been detained by the
police in the wake of either the 1997 murders of officials in Namangan
or the 1999 Tashkent bombings, and who subsequently had been released
because there was no evidence against them. There were dozens of cases
involving persons who previously had been detained and released who
were rearrested and tried during the year.
The absence of a free press and the rarity of public trials make it
impossible to determine how many persons have been incarcerated.
Nonetheless, the Moscow-based human rights organization, Memorial, has
compiled a list of over 1,400 documented cases of persons allegedly
imprisoned for political and religious reasons from January 1999 to
April 2000 (see Section 1.e.). Memorial estimated that the total number
of such prisoners was between 4,000 and 5,000. Human Rights observers
estimate credibly that from 30 to 50 persons were convicted for alleged
Islamic extremism each week during the reporting period. The number of
those in pretrial detention is unknown but is probably several hundred.
Nearly all those listed were accused of being Muslim extremists. By the
end of June of this year, the Government had convicted 128 persons for
direct involvement in the bombing plot. Of these, at least 18 received
death sentences, most of which reportedly have been carried out.
Pavlonazar Khodjaev was sentenced to death in May for allegedly
having links to the IMU and helping plan a terrorist action near
Yangiabad. Khodjaev's father had been imprisoned in 1999, according to
human rights activists, because of his refusal to divulge to
authorities the whereabouts of Pavlonazar and another of his sons. The
elder Khodjaev was beaten to death in Jaslik prison in July 1999.
Abdurakhim Abdurakhmanov, an independent Tashkent imam and follower
of Imam Nazarov, was arrested on or about April 27. The Government held
him in incommunicado and did not inform his family of his whereabouts.
Abdurakhmanov had been fired from his job as leader of the Kokoldash
Madrassa in 1996 and was arrested, severely beaten, and imprisoned
briefly in 1998 after police claimed to have found narcotics and a
false passport on him. After the recent arrest, officials questioned
his wife and sister-in-law, accusing them of Wahhabism. He was
convicted in July and sentenced to 17 years in prison. At his trial he
claimed that he was tortured.
A leading independent Muslim cleric, Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, has
been missing since March 1998, when dozens of police and security
agents raided and searched his home. Although his family claims that
the security services abducted him, the Government and many observers
believe that he fled to avoid arrest.
There was one new development in the October 1999 release of
leading Islamic figure Imam Abduvakhid Yuldashev, who was rearrested on
July 23. Since his arrest he allegedly has been mistreated severely. He
was held incommunicado for some 6 months and was twice beaten into
signing documents refusing counsel. Another Islamic activist, Abdurauf
Gafurov, remains free after his 1999 release.
There were no reported developments in the 1995 disappearance of
Imam Abduvali Kori Mirzaev or the 1997 disappearance of his assistant,
Nematjon Parpiev; or the 1992 disappearance of Abdullah Utaev, leader
of the outlawed Islamic Renaissance Party.
Several persons arrested for religious reasons apparently died from
mistreatment in custody (see section 1.a.).
Students who in 1997 and 1998 were expelled from schools for
wearing religious dress were not allowed to re-enroll in 2000 (see
Section 1.f.).
Synagogues function openly; Hebrew education (long banned under the
Soviets), Jewish cultural events, and the publication of a community
newspaper take place undisturbed.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for free
movement within the country and across its borders, and the Government
generally respected these rights; however, at times it limited this
right. Citizens must have permission from local authorities in order to
resettle in a new city. The Government rarely grants this permission to
those who wish to move to Tashkent. The Government requires citizens to
obtain exit visas for foreign travel or emigration, but grants these
permits routinely. All citizens have a right to a passport, and the
Government does not restrict this right. The new passports serve as
both internal identity cards and, when properly certified, as external
passports. Every citizen must carry such a document when traveling
inside or outside the country. Police occasionally confiscate these
documents, severely restricting a person's right to travel.
Movement within the country of foreigners with valid visas
generally is unrestricted. However, in mid-year, mountainous regions in
the South and East of the country were closed to traffic because of the
IMU insurgency. Visitors require special permission to travel to
certain areas, such as Termez, on the Afghan border.
Several Uzbek human rights activists were able to leave and reenter
the country without encountering problems from the Government. The
Government has not returned the passport of human rights activist
Mikhail Ardzinov which police had confiscated in June of 1999. This
restricted his freedom of movement within the country and prevented him
from attending international conferences.
The law on citizenship stipulates that citizens do not lose their
citizenship if they reside overseas. However, since Uzbekistan does not
provide for dual citizenship, those acquiring other citizenship lose
Uzbek citizenship. In practice the burden is on returning individuals
to prove to authorities that they have not acquired foreign citizenship
while abroad. There were reports during the year that some ethnic
Russians attempting to return after residing abroad were denied
residence permits and new passports.
There is no law concerning the rights of refugees and asylum
seekers, and the Government does not recognize the right of first
asylum. The Government does not adhere to the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Protection of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
considers asylum seekers from Tajikistan and Afghanistan to be economic
migrants, and such individuals are subject to harassment and bribe
demands when seeking to regularize their status. They may be deported
if their residency documents are not in order. However, the Government
agreed in August 1999 that it would not force those who have received
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate refugee status to
leave the country. The UNHCR reports that the policy appears to be
working, and that police rarely harass mandate refugees.
The population includes ethnic Koreans, Meskhetian Turks, Germans,
Greeks, and Crimean Tartars deported to Central Asia by Stalin during
World War II. These groups enjoy the same rights as other citizens.
Although they are free to return to their ancestral homelands,
absorption problems in those countries have slowed that return.
Although there are no official statistics, observers including the
UNHCR estimate that there are 30,000 Tajik and 8,000 Afghan refugees in
the country. As of December 31, there were 1,351 UNHCR mandate
refugees, with roughly 450 cases pending decision. According to the
UNHCR there were no cases of forced repatriation of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
During the August conflict with the IMU, the Government ordered the
evacuation of least five villages in the Surkhandarya region near the
border with Tajikistan. After spending 2 months in a temporary camp,
the villagers were transferred in November to a newly constructed
settlement over 200 kilometers away. Conditions in the settlement are
reportedly extremely poor and residents are suffering from a shortage
of food. Several of the residents have told international observers
that police have detained and beaten most of the men in an effort to
find those who may have collaborated with the IMU. Estimates of the
number in police detention at year's end ranged from 39 to over 120.
One resident, Hazratkul Kodirov, died in late December, according to
his brother, from injuries sustained during interrogation (see Section
1.a.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
While the Constitution provides for this right, in reality citizens
cannot change their government through peaceful and democratic means.
The Government severely represses opposition groups and individuals and
applies strict limits on freedom of expression. No opposition groups
participated in government or were allowed to function legally.
The Government is highly centralized and is ruled by a strong
presidency. President Karimov, formerly the first secretary of the
Communist Party in Uzbekistan under Soviet rule, was elected in a
limited multicandidate election in 1991. A 1995 Sovietstyle referendum
and subsequent parliamentary decision extended Karimov's first term
until 2000. He was reelected in January to a second term with 92.5
percent of the vote. Karimov's opponent, Abdulhafiz Jalalov ran a token
campaign, and admitted on election day that he himself had voted for
Karimov. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
declined to monitor the presidential election on the grounds that the
preconditions did not exist for it to be free and fair.
President Karimov and the executive branch retain control through
sweeping decree powers, primary authority for drafting legislation, and
control of virtually all government appointments, most aspects of the
economy, and the security forces.
Most government officials are members of the People's Democratic
Party of Uzbekistan (PDP), formerly the Communist Party and still the
country's largest party. However, the party as such does not appear to
play a significant role in the Government, and the President resigned
his chairmanship of the party in 1996. There are four other parties;
however, these were created with government assistance and are loyal to
President Karimov. All five parties participated in the December 1999
elections to the Oliy Majlis, during which 93 percent of the electorate
reportedly cast their vote. However, parties that competed in the
parliamentary elections, as well as the numerous independent
candidates, were congenial to the Government and did not represent a
real choice for voters.
Because the voters lacked a choice, the OSCE and many international
observers concluded that the December 1999 legislative elections fell
short of adherence to accepted standards of free and fair elections.
Local and regional hokims (governors)--who are appointed by the
president--exerted a strong influence on the selection of candidates
and the conduct of campaigns. Nearly half (110 out of 250) of those
elected were not from party lists but were either hokims themselves or
were nominated by the hokims' local assemblies. Only 16 of the 250
winning candidates had been nominated by citizens' initiative groups.
These candidates generally were allowed on the ballot only if the
hokims approved them.
The Oliy Majlis is constitutionally the highest government body. In
practice, despite assistance efforts by international donors to upgrade
its ability to draft laws independently, its main purpose is to confirm
laws and other decisions drafted by the executive branch rather than to
initiate legislation.
New laws governing the conduct of parliamentary and presidential
elections, as well as a law creating a Central Election Commission,
came into effect in 1998. These laws, combined with the 1997 law on
political parties, make it extremely difficult for opposition parties
to come into being, to nominate candidates, and to campaign. The
procedures to register a candidate are burdensome and the Central
Election Commission has authority to deny registration. For example, a
presidential candidate is prohibited from campaigning before being
registered, but must present a list of 150,000 signatures in order to
be registered. The Central Election Commission must deny registration
of presidential candidates who are found to ``harm the health and
morality of the people.'' The 1998 statutes deleted a previous
provision allowing recourse to the Supreme Court to candidates whose
parties are denied registration. The Ministry of Justice has the right
to suspend parties for up to 6 months without a court order.
Citizens initiative groups of 100 members or more may nominate
candidates to the Parliament by submitting signatures of at least 8
percent of the voters in the electoral district. Other interest groups
are forbidden from participating in campaigns and candidates may meet
with voters only in forums organized by precinct election commissions.
The 1998 laws repeal the right of parties to fund their candidates'
campaigns directly. Instead, parties must turn over all campaign money
to the Central Election Commission, which then distributes the funds
equally among the candidates. Only the Central Election Commission may
prepare and release presidential campaign posters. In August 1999, the
Parliament enacted minor modifications to the election laws, but these
have had little practical effect.
According to the Law on Political Parties, judges, public
prosecutors, NSS officials, servicemen, foreign citizens, and stateless
persons (among others) cannot join political parties. By law the
Government prohibits formation of parties based on religion or
nationality; those that oppose the sovereignty, integrity and security
of the country and the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens;
or those that promote war, or social, national, or religious hostility.
Political organizations that seek to overthrow the Government, or sow
national or racial hatred, are prohibited. Moreover, the Government has
refused to register democratic political opposition organizations.
Membership in unregistered political organizations is not forbidden
officially, but membership in unregistered organizations with a
prohibited goal or premise is forbidden.
The Government continues to persecute members of unregistered,
political opposition groups using such methods as arbitrary arrest,
conviction on falsified charges, surveillance, and loss of employment.
The leaders of the two largest unregistered opposition groups in the
country--Mohammed Solikh of the Erk Democratic Party and Abdurakhim
Polat of the Birlik Democratic Movement--were forced into exile in the
early 1990's. After the February 1999 Tashkent bombings, persecution of
members of these groups intensified. The Government repeatedly has
accused Erk leader Solikh, who ran against Karimov for the presidency
in 1992, of being a leader of the terrorist plot behind the bombings.
Solikh was 1 of the 9 defendants-in-absentia in the November show trial
of 12 alleged bombing conspirators. He was convicted and sentenced to
15.5 years in prison. Two of Solikh's brothers (Rashid and Muhammed
Bekhjanov) were imprisoned since soon after the bombings and were
convicted on political charges in August 1999, along with noted poet
and former Solikh associate Mamadali Makhmudov and another defendant
affiliated with the Birlik party.
Dozens of Erk and Birlik activists reported that after the bombings
they were subjected to various forms of harassment: Frequent
surveillance; restrictions on movement; searches of their homes;
lengthy police interrogations; and, occasionally, detentions.
Traditionally, women participate much less than men in government
and politics, and are underrepresented in these areas. There are 17
female deputies in the 250-member Parliament. There are 2 women (both
with the rank of Deputy Prime Minister) among 28 members of the
Cabinet; 1 is charged specifically with women's issues.
There are nine ethnic Russians or Ukrainians, six Karakalpaks,
three Kazakhs, one Korean, and one Armenian in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government restricts and harasses local NGO's working on human
rights and refuses to register the country's two main human rights
organizations. Both the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister
of Justice accused publicly both local and international human rights
organizations of giving support to the country's enemies.
In the verdict in the case of Kamoletdin Sattarov in Andijon in
July, the court ordered destroyed 17 individual appeal forms from the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights that police had found in
Sattarov's home on February 3. Uzbek citizens exercising their right to
free speech had filled out six of these forms; eleven were blank. The
prosecution treated the forms, as well as two Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets,
as evidence of Sattarov's antistate activities. He was sentenced to 9
years in prison. Upon appeal in August, the regional court voided the
verdict of the Andijon court and ordered a new trial. In his retrial,
Sattarov was sentenced to 10 years in prison, 1 year more than his
original sentence. However, the judge ordered that the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights forms be returned to Sattarov's family.
Sattarov's appeal of this verdict summarily reconfirmed the new
sentence in December.
Security forces continue to harass and abuse human rights
activists. The chairman of the HRSU, Abdumannob Polat, lives in
voluntary exile. Neither the IHROU nor the HRSU resubmitted
applications to register during the year. However, HRSU's attempt to
hold a congress of its members, required in order to submit a new
registration application, was blocked by local officials on December 22
(see Section 2.b.)
On December 21, President Karimov pardoned and released Mahbuba
Kasimova, an IHROU human rights activist and member of the Birlik
Democratic Movement. Kasimova, who had been sentenced to 5 years in
prison in a 3-hour trial in July 1999, had received international
attention as a political prisoner. There were no developments in the
case of Ismail Adilov, another IHROU activist who was imprisoned in
1999 on charges widely believed to be fabricated.
One international human rights group, HRW, has permission to
operate in the country and has had an office in Tashkent since 1996.
The group operates independently and has no affiliation with the
Government.
The Government registered one human rights NGO in 1996. The
registered NGO, the Committee for Protection of the Rights of
Individuals, was formed with the support of the Government but also has
ties to opposition figures. Some sources affiliated with other groups
have questioned its independence from the Government. The organization
acts as the Uzbek affiliate of the International Society for Human
Rights based in Germany.
Since 1997 there has been a human rights Ombudsman's office
affiliated with the Parliament. The Ombudsman may make recommendations
to modify or uphold decisions of state agencies, but the
recommendations are not binding. The Ombudsman is prohibited from
investigating disputes within the purview of courts. The Ombudsman
replaced the parliamentary human rights commissioner, who had
insufficient trained staff to carry out in-depth investigations of
human rights violations and did not vigorously pursue allegations
against the police and security forces. The office of the Ombudsman
increased its staff and received authorization to open regional offices
throughout the country. The Ombudsman issues reports identifying the
most serious types of violations of human rights by government
officials. The office claims that it has assisted hundreds of citizens
in redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve
allegedly unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police
and local officials. Most of the successfully resolved cases appear
relatively minor. In February the current Ombudsman, Sayora Rashidova,
sponsored a roundtable to discuss problems with the country's religion
law. Non-state attendees included the mufti, the Russian Orthodox
Church, academics, an international NGO, the OSCE, and various
diplomatic missions.
The National Human Rights Center of Uzbekistan, created by
presidential decree in 1996, has as its purpose to educate the
population and government officials about the principles of human
rights and democracy. The center's chief activity is to hold seminars
and training, and it is not involved in human rights advocacy. The
center has worked closely with international organizations such as the
UNDP and the OSCE.
The Government is willing to discuss human rights matters with
organizations such as the OSCE, as well as with foreign embassies. The
UN has not sent human rights commission members or special rapporteurs
to the country. The Government is generally willing to hold an open
dialog with international human rights NGO's, and held several high-
level discussions with representatives of HRW during 1999.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language or Social Status
Both the Constitution and the 1992 law on citizenship prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, language, or social
status; however, societal discrimination against women persists.
Women.--Spousal abuse is common, but both local activists and the
police say they have no statistics on the issue. At a September 1999
seminar on domestic violence, representatives of NGO's with crisis
centers reported that the number of women seeking assistance is growing
rapidly. Wife beating is considered a personal family affair rather
than a criminal act, and thus such cases usually are handled by family
members or elders within the community (mahalla) and rarely come to
court.
In December a U.S.-based NGO, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights,
released a major study on Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan. While the
lack of reporting prevented the authors from determining the number of
cases annually, the study concluded that domestic violence is
widespread and that the Government has failed to combat or even
acknowledge the problem. Another U.S.-based NGO, Winrock International,
which helps develop women's organizations in Uzbekistan, agreed with
the conclusions of the study but noted that public officials were
willing to speak openly about the problem of domestic violence in
Uzbekistan.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution occurs,
particularly to the Persian Gulf, Turkey and South Korea (see Section
6.f.). Prostitution within the country is a growing problem stemming
from the worsening economic situation.
Due to tradition, women, particularly in rural areas, usually marry
before age 20, bear many children, and confine their activities to
within the family. In rural areas, women often find themselves working
in the cotton fields during the harvest season. However, women are not
impeded formally from seeking a role in the workplace. The barriers to
equality for women are cultural, not legal, and women who open
businesses or seek careers are not hindered legally.
Although the law prohibits discrimination against women,
traditional cultural and religious practices limit their role in
everyday society. For these reasons, women are underrepresented
severely in high-level positions. In 1995 President Karimov issued a
decree on measures to increase the role of women in society,
particularly extending their participation in state and social
administration and coordinating the activities of ministries and social
organizations as they relate to women's issues. In this connection, a
deputy prime minister position was created in 1995 charged with
furthering the role of women in society. This cabinet level official is
also head of the National Women's Committee. The edict also mandated
the formation of regional women's committees throughout the country,
headed by government-appointed officials. In September the National
Women's Committee sponsored a meeting commemorating the fifth
anniversary of the Beijing Conference. According to NGO participants at
this meeting, the Government for the first time showed a willingness to
work together with NGO's on a common plan of action.
The President declared 1999 to be the ``year of the woman.'' In
April 1999 the Government promulgated a law extending additional rights
to women; it reduced the workweek to 35 hours for female employees of
the State and reduced the optional retirement age for women to 54 years
(after 20 years of employment). Government-sponsored activities also
included a series of seminars, newspaper articles, public service
announcements, and television programs that increased awareness of
women's issues.
Several dozen NGO's address the needs of women. For example, the
Businesswomen's Association in Tashkent, in addition to providing
resources and information about developing small enterprises, operates
a store that sells clothing and crafts. A center in Tashkent conducts
seminars on sexual harassment, domestic violence, and the legal rights
of women. Another center in Samarkand operates a crisis hot line and
provides educational services on alcoholism, sexually transmitted
diseases, and family counseling.
In parts of the country, some women and girls resort to suicide by
self-immolation. There are no reliable statistics on the extent of this
problem, since most cases go unreported. However, representatives of
women's groups continue to observe an increase in self-immolation.
After marriage many women or girls move into the husband's home, where
they occupy the lowest rung on the family social ladder. A conflict
with the husband or mother-in-law, who by tradition exercises complete
control over the young bride, usually is the stimulus for suicide.
A 1997 research study indicated that the number of women enrolling
in higher education was diminishing; for example, women's enrollment in
the finance and banking institute dropped from 65 percent in 1991 to
about 25 percent in 1997. Cutbacks in government funding to
universities and the need for families to fund a higher percentage of
educational costs leaves many families in the position of being able to
fund the education of only one child, either a son or a daughter. The
report stated that university faculty ``steer'' women into occupations
traditionally performed by females and suggested that administrators
may practice a policy of deliberately barring entrance to women in some
fields.
Children.--The Constitution provides for children's rights, stating
that parents are obliged to support and care for their children until
they reach majority at age 18. Traditional Uzbek values reinforce the
cohesion of families; in most cases, several generations of a family
live together. In theory the State provides free universal primary
education and health care; however, in practice shortages and budget
difficulties mean that some services must be paid for privately. The
State grants monetary allowances to families based on their number of
children. The country has a very high birth rate; over one-half of the
population is under the age of 18.
Nine years of formal schooling are compulsory, and the average
length of schooling is over 11 years. The U.N. Development Program
reports that 100 percent of children complete secondary school.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Trafficking in
girls for the purpose of prostitution occurs (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--One of the country's first laws, adopted
only 2 months after independence in 1991, provided support for the
disabled. This law was aimed at ensuring that the disabled have the
same rights as other citizens. However, little effort is made to bring
the disabled into the mainstream. The State cares for the mentally
disabled in special homes. The Government has not mandated access to
public places for the disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Government statistics dating
from 1992 show that the population of approximately 23 million is about
71 percent Uzbek, 8 percent Russian, 5 percent Tajik, 4 percent Tatar,
and 3 percent Kazakh, with many other ethnic groups represented. The
statistics may underestimate the actual number of ethnic Tajiks. The
figures treat ethnic Tajiks whose mother tongue was Uzbek as ethnic
Uzbeks. Moreover, some Tajiks choose for a variety of reasons to
declare themselves to be ethnic Uzbeks.
Ethnic groups other than Uzbeks, particularly Russians, frequently
complain that job opportunities are limited for them. Senior positions
in the government bureaucracy and business generally are reserved for
ethnic Uzbeks, although there are numerous exceptions to this rule.
The 1992 citizenship law does not impose language requirements for
citizenship. Nonetheless, the language issue remains very sensitive.
Uzbek has been declared the state language, and the Constitution
requires that the President speak Uzbek. However, the language law
provides for Russian as ``the language of interethnic communication.''
Russian is spoken widely in the main cities, and Tajik is spoken widely
in Samarkand and Bukhara. The 1989 language law originally required
that Uzbek would be the sole method of official communication by 1998,
but subsequently was modified and now stipulates no specific date. The
Government also is in the process of replacing the Cyrillic alphabet
with the Latin alphabet. However, realizing the difficulties for Uzbeks
and minorities alike, the Government has delayed the full transition to
both the Uzbek language and the Latin alphabet to 2005.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 law on unions specifically
provides that all workers have the right voluntarily to form and join
unions of their choice, and that trade unions themselves voluntarily
may associate territorially or sectorally. Membership in trade unions
is optional. The law also declares all unions independent of the
State's administrative and economic bodies (except where provided for
by law), and states that trade unions should develop their own
charters, structure, and executive bodies and organize their own work.
However, in practice the overall structure of trade unions has not
changed significantly since the Soviet era. Independence has eliminated
subordination to Moscow but has not altered the centralized trade union
hierarchy, which remains dependent on the Government. No alternative
union structures exist.
A few new professional associations and interest groups have been
organized, such as a union of entrepreneurs, a union of renters, and an
association of private physicians and pharmacists. Registered
professional associations for judges and lawyers formed in 1997; both
organizations are quasigovernmental. An association of broadcasters
that formed in 1998 has failed to gain government registration (see
Section 2.b.). The main activity of all registered associations is
professional development. They do not license members and have no
formal role in advocating the interests of members in relation to the
Government.
According to the law, the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions
(CFTU) has a consultative voice in the preparation of all legislation
affecting workers and is entitled to draft laws on labor and social
issues. Trade unions are described legally as organizations that defend
the right to work and to protect jobs. They have lost their previous
role in state planning and in the management of enterprises. The
emphasis now is on the unions' responsibility for ``social protection''
and social justice--especially unemployment compensation, pensions, and
worker retraining.
The trade union law does not mention strikes or cite a right to
strike. However, the law does give the unions oversight for both
individual and collective labor disputes, which are defined as those
involving alleged violations of labor laws, worker rights, or
collective agreements.
There were no reports of strikes. This circumstance likely reflects
the absence of truly representative trade unions, as the standard of
living fell and growing unemployment raised social tensions. The
absence of labor activism also reflects the Communist legacy of
docility in the face of authority. However, both union and government
officials assert that the lack of strikes reflects general support for
the Government's policies and common interest in social stability.
The 1992 law on unions provides that unions may choose their own
international affiliations; however, none have done so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions
may conclude agreements with enterprises. Privatization is still in its
very early phase. As a result, there is no experience with negotiations
that could be described as adversarial between unions and private
employers. The State is still the major employer, and the state-
appointed union leaders do not view themselves as having conflicts of
interest with the State.
The Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Finance in consultation
with the CFTU, set the wages for various categories of state employees.
In the small private sector, management establishes wages or negotiates
them with those who contract for employment.
The law forbids discrimination against union members and their
officers.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
specifically prohibits forced labor, including by children, except as
legal punishment or as may be specified by law; however, some abuses
including trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution occur (see Section 6.f.). No statute specifically
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and large-scale
compulsory mobilization of youth and students (by closing schools) to
help with the cotton harvest continues. Student labor is paid poorly,
and students sometimes must pay for their food. Adults, including
teachers and passersby in automobiles and busses, similarly are forced
into the harvest effort.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum working age is 16 years; 15-year-olds can
receive state permission to work but have a shorter workday. In rural
areas, younger children and the elderly often help to harvest cotton
and other crops (see Section 6.c.). The Labor Ministry has an
inspection service, which is responsible for enforcing compliance with
these and other regulations governing employment conditions, and
enforces them effectively.
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by anyone, including
children; however, trafficking in girls for forced prostitution and
compulsory mobilization for the cotton harvest occur (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, in
consultation with the CFTU, sets the minimum wage. As of September 1,
it was less than $4 (2,450 soum) per month. The minimum wage is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family.
The standard workweek is set at 41 hours and requires a 24-hour
rest period. Some factories apparently have reduced work hours in order
to avoid layoffs. Overtime pay exists in theory but is not always paid.
Pay arrearages of 3 to 6 months are not uncommon for workers in
state-owned industries. The problem appears to be growing.
The Labor Ministry establishes occupational health and safety
standards in consultation with the unions. There is a health and safety
inspectorate in the Ministry. The local press occasionally published
complaints about the failure of unions and government authorities to do
enough to promote worker safety. Although written regulations may
provide adequate safeguards, workers in hazardous jobs often lack
protective clothing and equipment. Workers are permitted to leave jobs
that are hazardous without jeopardizing their employability in other
jobs; however, in practice, high rates of underemployment make such
action difficult.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws relating specifically
to trafficking in persons. Trafficking in women and girls for the
purpose of forced prostitution occurs, particularly to the Persian
Gulf, South Korea, and Turkey (see Section 5). However, there are no
reliable statistics on this problem, and it does not seem to be carried
out on a large scale. Uzbekistan is a source country, but not a
destination or transit point, for trafficking in persons. The
Government has not had occasion to assist with international
investigations of trafficking or to extradite citizens accused of
trafficking in other countries.
Anecdotal reports from NGO's indicate that the number of young
women from Uzbekistan who are forced into prostitution abroad is
growing. The Government has not acknowledged the problem publicly, but
has taken some measures to combat it. According to NGO representatives,
the police force in Samarkand formed a special unit on trafficking in
women in 1998, but the unit's effectiveness is hampered by a lack of
resources. Border guards at airports were directed to give more
scrutiny to unaccompanied young women traveling to Turkey, the United
Arab Emirates, and South Korea; they are authorized to deny such women
permission to leave the country. There is no government program to
educate or assist potential victims; however, the State University for
World Economy and Diplomacy sponsored a series of lectures on domestic
violence and trafficking in women during the year.
__________
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia \1\ (Yugoslavia), a
constitutional republic consisting of the Republic of Serbia and the
Republic of Montenegro, has a president and a parliamentary system of
government based on multiparty elections. The new federal Government,
which was formed on November 4, dropped any claim to being the sole
successor state of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(which dissolved in 1992), and was recognized by the international
community. Vojislav Kostunica was elected President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia on September 24, and took office on October 7,
after mass demonstrations by citizens protesting Slobodan Milosevic's
attempts to manipulate the Federal Election Commission and force a
second election round led Milosevic to concede defeat. Prior to
Kostunica's election, former Yugoslav President Milosevic had brought
Serbia closer to open dictatorship than ever before. Immediately
following the 1999 war in Kosovo, Milosevic moved to consolidate his
weakened position in Serbia through a campaign of intimidation and
violence against his political opponents, representatives of the
independent media, student groups, civil society, and even, in certain
cases, members of the regime. Prior to the September elections,
Milosevic, who is also President of the Socialist Party of Serbia
(SPS), continued to dominate all formal and informal governing
institutions in the country. Although the SPS lacked majorities in both
the Federal and Serbian Parliaments, it controlled key administrative
positions. The SPS also controlled the governing coalition with the
Yugoslav Left (JUL), controlled by Milosevic's wife, Mira Markovic, and
the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), controlled by Vojislav Seselj, an
extreme ultranationalist known for his radical politics during the wars
in Croatia and Bosnia, who resigned from his government position in
October. Milosevic also controlled the judiciary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The report on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is discussed
in three separate sections on Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro and
addresses the human rights situations in each of these entities. Since
federal authority was exercised effectively only over the Republic of
Serbia throughout the year, the human rights situations in Kosovo and
Montenegro are dealt with in separate sections following this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a key element of his hold on power, President Milosevic until
his electoral defeat effectively controlled the Serbian police, a
heavily armed force of some 80,000 officers that is responsible for
internal security. Having been forced to withdraw from Kosovo in 1999,
the police then repressed opponents of the regime in Serbia. In
addition, Milosevic ignored the constitutional role of the Supreme
Defense Council, essentially establishing himself as commander in chief
of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), which, along with the police, was employed
in the brutal campaign against the citizens of Kosovo in 1999. Several
times in the past, Milosevic had purged those officers in both the
police and military who either failed to follow his orders or who
directly challenged his policies in Kosovo, Serbia, or Montenegro. The
security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
Following the war in Kosovo, international economic sanctions
remained in place much of the year. The international community began
to remove those sanctions after Kostunica's election. The economy
inherited by the new Government suffered from continued exclusion from
international financial institutions and from the damage inflicted on
infrastructure during 10 years of war. Economic performance is poor due
to the general inefficiency in the economy, corruption, and continued
resistance to reform and privatization. Unemployment and
underemployment remain high, reaching at least 60 percent, as the
Milosevic Government was unable or unwilling to introduce necessary
restructuring measures. The Milosevic Government also failed to
implement needed sweeping economic reforms to help the economy,
including privatization, due to the influence of the regime's crony
system.
Under Milosevic the Government's human rights record remained
extremely poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses.
Milosevic attempted to prevent citizens from exercising their right to
change their government. The police were responsible for numerous
serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances,
torture, brutal beatings, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Impunity
for those who committed human rights abuses was a serious problem.
Often, serious crimes such as murder remained uninvestigated and
unsolved. The judicial system was not independent of the Government,
suffered from corruption, and did not ensure fair trials. Under the
Milosevic regime, there were many cases of political detainees and
political prisoners. However, under Kostunica, the new Government
released two prominent political prisoners--journalist Miroslav
Filipovic in October and human rights activist Dr. Flora Brovina in
November. In December Kostunica also pardoned opposition activist
Bogoljub Arsenijevic, known as ``Maki.'' Under the Milosevic regime,
the authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Milosevic
Government severely restricted freedom of speech and of the press and
used overbearing police intimidation and economic pressure to control
tightly the independent press and media. Most journalists continued to
practice self-censorship. The Milosevic Government restricted freedom
of assembly and association. Police repressed citizens who opposed the
Milosevic regime and severely beat scores of democratic opposition
protesters throughout Serbia, sending many to hospitals. The Milosevic
Government infringed on freedom of worship by minority religions and
restricted freedom of movement. The regime enacted legislation to
manipulate the electoral process, most recently in the summer, when
Milosevic made changes to the Constitution that allowed him to be
elected by popular vote to another term as President of Yugoslavia.
Milosevic banned objective international observers from monitoring the
September 24 elections for Yugoslav President and attempted to falsify
election results. The Federal and Serbian Governments' record of
cooperation with international human rights and monitoring
organizations remained poor. The Milosevic Government routinely
hindered the activities of local human rights groups.
The Federal Government remained uncooperative with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It
again failed to meet its obligations under numerous U.N. Security
Council Resolutions to comply fully with the Tribunal's orders, and
failed to transfer or facilitate the surrender to the Tribunal of
persons on its territory indicted for war crimes or other crimes
against humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (These persons
include Milosevic and four of his top aides, who were indicted in 1999
for their role in the Kosovo war). Violence and discrimination against
women remained serious problems. Police repression and official and
societal discrimination against Muslims in the Sandzak region, Roma,
and other minorities persisted. The regime limited unions not
affiliated with the Government in their attempts to advance worker
rights. There was some child labor. Serbia is a source, transit, and
destination country for trafficking in women and girls, and trafficking
is a serious problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed
extrajudicial killings. In November the Democratic Opposition of Serbia
(DOS) Minister of the Interior, Bozo Prelevic, reported that he had
received evidence suggesting that the head of the Republican State
Security service, Rade Markovic, was involved in the April 1998 killing
of Slavko Curuvija, the publisher of an independent Belgrade tabloid
newspaper and weekly news magazine (see Section 2.a.).
The number of political and extrajudicial killings increased, and
there were many indications of complicity at the highest political
levels. The targets of such attacks were not limited to opposition
activists. Numerous deaths of persons close to the regime in the first
half of the year suggested efforts on the part of the Government to
consolidate its authority and remain in power. Typically no one was
arrested for such killings.
The most notable politically motivated killing was that of Zeljko
Raznatovic, also known as ``Arkan"--a notorious paramilitary commander
from the Croatian and Bosnian wars who was indicted by the ICTY.
Raznatovic was killed inside Belgrade's Intercontinental Hotel in
January. After his death, rumors began circulating of a falling out
with the Milosevic regime. There was an official investigation into his
death; however, it yielded no conclusive results.
A number of other prominent political figures were killed during
the year. In view of the high level of corruption among the political
elite, the precise mix of criminal and political motives for these
crimes was difficult to determine. Pavle Bulatovic, the former Yugoslav
Minister of Defense and a close associate of the Milosevic family, was
killed while dining in a restaurant in February. Another close
Milosevic associate, Zika Petrovic, the head of Yugoslav Airlines, was
shot and killed in April while walking his dog near Belgrade's central
police station.
Belgrade investigative judge Nebojsa Simeunovic was reported
missing in early November. On December 3, police in Belgrade found his
body washed up on the banks of the Sava River. Judge Simeunovic had
refused to sign warrants for the arrest of DOS party leaders and
striking miners during the October popular campaign to unseat
Milosevic. He also was in charge of the investigation of several
politically sensitive cases, including the 1997 killing of Radovan
Stojicic-Bazda and the February killing of Pavle Bulatovic.
Eight Albanians taken from Kosovo by withdrawing Yugoslav forces
and detained in prisons within Serbia died in detention during the year
(see Section 1.c.).
In March, criminals Branislav ``Dugi'' Lainovic and ``Bata''
Vucurovic were killed in Belgrade and Vojvodina, respectively. Neither
apparently was involved in politics when killed, but both played
significant roles in paramilitary operations in Croatia in the early
1990's and had links to former Serbian State Security leaders.
On November 21, two Serbian police officers were killed and several
were wounded in an attack by the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo,
Medvedja, and Bujanovac (UCPMB), an offshoot of the disbanded Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). On November 27, a 10-year-old boy was killed by
an antitank mine planted by the Yugoslav army as his family fled the
Presevo valley region for Kosovo. These incidents escalated tensions
that had been building throughout the year in the region of
southeastern Serbia that borders on Kosovo and encompasses the
municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja. This region is
populated by both ethnic Albanians and Serbs. In November thousands of
ethnic Albanians fled the region for neighboring Kosovo and Macedonia,
due to fear of a buildup of Serbian police and military forces.
Skirmishes between Serbian police and armed Albanian UCPMB members
occurred throughout the year, resulting in the reported deaths of
several Serbian police as well as some UCPMB members and a few
civilians.
b. Disappearance.--Police were responsible for disappearances.
The most notable disappearance was that of former Serbian President
Ivan Stambolic, who disappeared while on a daily jog in a park near his
home in Belgrade in August. Many observers noted that the timing of
Stambolic's disappearance (only a few weeks ahead of scheduled
elections), and the fact that state-run media remained largely silent
on the issue, suggested complicity by the Milosevic regime and the
Serbian security service. The Serbian State Prosecutor's office began
an investigation into the case in late November, but it had not yielded
any results at year's end.
In April Jan Svetlik, an opposition councilor from Zrenjanin, was
abducted by two unknown assailants and kept outside of town for several
hours during a session of the local parliament. The abduction allowed
the ruling SPS to retain its parliamentary majority despite the fact
that two of its own members earlier had defected to the opposition.
Police failed to identify the assailants.
Federal and Serbian government authorities have not cooperated
fully with efforts to account for the thousands of disappearances of
individuals from Kosovo during the first 6 months of 1999, nor have
they allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or
other international organizations access to many detention facilities.
Some 5,500 persons are missing; some 700 are being detained in Serbian
prisons (see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Yugoslav and Serbian law prohibits torture and other cruel
forms of punishment; however, security authorities regularly and
systematically used torture, beatings in detention, and other forms of
abuse against citizens and members of the political opposition. The
majority of cases of torture occurred before detainees were charged
with offenses or during the period between the filing of charges and
the commencement of the trial. Freed prisoners reported being subject
to beatings with rubber batons, metal batons, and wooden bats, as well
as use of electroshock, starvation, withholding of medical care, and
having their hands bound tightly with plastic bands.
On May 17 and 18 in Belgrade, police beat peaceful protesters and
used excessive force to disperse street protests against the
Government's closing of television Studio B and Radio B2-92 (see
Section 2.b.). In June police beat four persons at a police station in
Zajecar after they put up opposition posters.
In July Bojan Aleksov, a human rights monitor who worked with the
Safe House Project for Conscientious Objectors from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Women
in Black Against War, was arrested by police in Belgrade after being
removed forcibly from his car. During his 23-hour detention, Aleksov
repeatedly was threatened with death and interrogated about his human
rights work and his connections with the international community. The
police tortured Aleksov severely, including by forcing him to stand on
his toes while they beat him with a truncheon all over his body.
Despite running a fever, the police denied him water for up to 5 hours
and kept him awake throughout the night. On the following morning,
three police officers beat Aleksov on the soles of his feet, the palms
of his hands, and other parts of his body, using a baton. Aleksov
finally was forced to write a 12-page confession dictated to him by an
officer, which outlined his human rights work and his contacts and
visits with international organizations and officials. Under threat of
death, Aleksov then was forced to agree to work for the State Security
Service. Finally, the police forced Aleksov to repeat parts of the
signed statement on video and made him repeat his ``confession'' three
times in order to appear convincing enough. In response to this case,
Amnesty International (AI) called for an investigation and the
temporary suspension of the officers suspected of beating Aleksov
pending final results of that investigation. No investigation was
conducted by year's end.
In early September police also beat an Otpor activist, a minor, and
forced him to eat one of the movement's posters. A lawyer representing
the activist was prevented from attending the interrogation and was not
able to contact the activist.
In August police interrogated and beat 19-year-old Rom Sasa
Mustafic and threatened his wife, Demira Gezvira, in Belgrade. Mustafic
was arrested by police, accused of theft, and allegedly beaten with a
stick and punched in the stomach, ribs, back, and head. On September
26, a traffic police officer reportedly beat and threatened Skender
Gasi, a 27-year-old Rom from Kosovo, in Belgrade. According to local
NGO reports, Gasi did not file a complaint against the officer because
he feared reprisals.
In November in Vojvodina police beat and threatened a Hungarian
journalist (see Section 5).
In September police detained seven Bulgarian election observers who
entered Serbia despite not receiving official credentials. Police beat
three of the observers, in one case causing a ruptured eardrum, and
confiscated mobile telephones, money, and personal belongings.
Police beat journalists (see Section 2.a.).
There were numerous beatings of members of the political opposition
by unidentified groups of men, apparently State Security agents or
thugs employed by the Milosevic regime. On February 26, several men
attacked and severely beat student Milos Dosen as he pasted up a poster
in Belgrade that belonged to Otpor (``Resistance''), a student-led,
nonviolent political movement that opposes the Milosevic regime.
Despite videotape that showed the attackers and their vehicle's license
plates in clear view, police did not investigate the incident.
On April 11, in Novi Sad, two unidentified men beat Radoje Cvetkov,
secretary for urbanism in the Novi Sad executive council, which is
controlled by an opposition party.
In June police beat a 19-year-old Otpor activist for 3 hours after
they found the student movement's material in his car in Lapovo.
According to Human Rights Watch, on September 2, police beat Mile
Milic, a DOS candidate for the Lajkovac municipal assembly, after
arresting him for hanging DOS posters. On September 3 in Indjija, SPS
activists severely beat a minor who was hanging DOS posters. AI
reported that on September 4, police beat Darko Pavlovic, an Otpor
activist who was arrested in Sabac while hanging DOS posters. On
September 8 in Vladicin Han, police detained and beat six Otpor
activists. After reportedly tying up the six activists, the police used
their fists and batons to beat them on the genitals, kidneys, and
heads. One activist, Aleksandar Radic, had a rope placed around his
neck. Only after several hundred persons gathered in front of the
police station were the activists allowed to leave and seek medical
treatment. On September 15, AI reported that police beat two Otpor
activists who were spraying antigovernment graffiti in Belgrade and
arrested them. They both were sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment for
``offenses against public peace and order.'' Lawyers representing the
activists claimed that they were not granted access to their clients
before the hearing, and were not permitted to be present while the
arresting officer gave evidence.
During the election demonstrations in October, police beat some
demonstrators and used tear gas to control crowds (see Section 2.b.).
Serbian Renewal Movement President Vuk Draskovic was wounded
slightly after a bullet grazed his head in an attack in Montenegro in
June by gunmen reportedly linked to Milosevic's regime (see Montenegro
annex).
In June a crowd that emerged from the offices of the ruling
Socialist Party attacked activists distributing leaflets in Barajevo.
In early March, unknown assailants damaged the car of Zarko Korac,
leader of the Social Democratic Union.
Prison conditions do not meet minimum international standards.
Torture and beatings were reported. There were reports that Albanians
held in prisons included young children, the elderly, and persons who
were blind and deaf (see Section 1.d.). Overcrowding and lack of food,
medical care, and heating in winter all are problems.
A total of eight Albanians taken from Kosovo by withdrawing
Yugoslav forces and detained in prisons within Serbia died in
detention; two were confirmed to have died in August, reportedly one of
a heart attack and one of cancer.
A series of prison riots occurred in November. The unrest began in
Sremska Mitrovica and spread to prisons in Nis and Pozarevac, as well
as Padinska Skela prison near Belgrade and the juvenile penitentiary in
Valjevo. Prison inmates demanded an improvement in prison living
conditions and an expansion of a proposed amnesty bill for Kosovar
Albanian prisoners in Serbia to include other Serbian criminals.
Several inmates alleged that they were victims of severe beatings in
prison by guards. Prisoners also alleged that they were denied access
to health care. Hundreds of ethnic Albanians were evacuated from the
Pozarevac prison after they were threatened by Serbs for not joining
the protests. One Serb prisoner died after falling off the roof of the
Nis prison and several persons reportedly were injured during the
riots. In response, the Government pledged emergency funds to improve
prison conditions and on November 10, authorities released 14 Serbs and
1 ethnic Albanian from the Pozarevac prison. In exchange, inmates
agreed to put down their weapons and to allow guards back in the
prison.
On December 14, a military court in Nis sentenced nine Serbian
military policemen and one lawyer to prison terms totaling 7 years for
extorting money from Kosovar Albanian prisoners.
Although the Milosevic regime generally permitted some prison
visits by human rights monitors with sporadic access often subject to
the whim of local officials, access generally was poor. On several
occasions, outside monitors, including representatives of the ICRC,
were denied access to individuals reportedly held by Serbian police,
especially draft evaders and Kosovar Albanians whom retreating security
forces transferred from Kosovo after hostilities ceased. However, the
ICRC had no access to or information about persons detained in military
detention facilities at year's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention was common in Serbia under Milosevic, with such abuses aimed
at opponents of the regime apparently on a daily basis.
Defense lawyers and human rights workers complained of excessive
delays by Serbian authorities in filing formal charges and opening
investigations. The ability of defense attorneys to challenge the legal
basis of their clients' detention often was hampered further by
difficulties in gaining access to detainees or acquiring copies of
official indictments and decisions to remand defendants into custody.
In some cases, judges prevented defense attorneys from reading the
court file. Investigative judges in Serbia often delegated their
responsibility for carrying out investigations to the police or members
of the State Security Service and rarely questioned their accounts of
the investigation--even when it was obvious that confessions were
coerced from the accused. Results of such sham investigations then were
used in court to convict defendants on fabricated charges.
According to the Humanitarian Law Center, at least 10 Kosovar
Albanian minors were being held in the country's prisons in January.
These children were among the approximately 2,000 civilians removed
from Kosovo when the Yugoslav Army withdrew its forces in 1999. Serbian
authorities reportedly sold dozens of these prisoners back to their
families in Kosovo for prices as high as $25,000 (DM 50,000). Numerous
human rights groups have documented an open-air market in northern
Kosovo where lawyers purporting to represent these prisoners go to
strike deals with families or friends of those imprisoned to secure
their release. Despite the exchange of large sums of money, the lawyers
often are never seen again. Human Rights groups also noted that in
those cases where prisoners are released, the extorted ``fees'' were
divided between the lawyers, judges, and police involved in individual
cases and prisons. Human rights organizations believe that the
Government still holds approximately 700 Kosovar Albanian political
prisoners and detainees. The Government claims that some of these
prisoners and detainees were convicted of common crimes.
Visits to political detainees were rare and often were supervised
by police. Local human rights NGO's attempted to visit prisoners, with
mixed results. The ICRC was able to visit many, if not all, of the
approximate 700 Kosovar Albanian political detainees inside Serbia.
However, it is not clear that the ICRC has been able to arrange more
than an occasional visit.
Opposition politicians faced harassment by police under the
Milosevic regime. On February 29, Belgrade police detained and
interrogated Ivan Kovacevic, the Serbian Renewal Movement spokesman and
a member of the Serbian Parliament. In March a total of 42 members of
Vojvodina's League of Social Democrats were arrested in Novi Sad. They
were handing out flyers asking for citizens to assemble in front of a
construction site, where the regime was blocking the city's efforts to
begin rebuilding a bridge destroyed during the NATO bombing campaign.
In May three members of Otpor--Momcilo Veljkovic, Radojko Lukovic,
and Dusan Ignjatovic--were arrested after friends of Marko Milosevic,
the President's son, beat them severely outside a cafe in Pozarevac,
Milosevic's hometown. The Otpor activists claim that they were beaten
after they came to the defense of another activist, Dragan Milovanovic,
who was being pressured by Marko Milosevic's associates to join the
Socialist Party of Serbia.
The beating set off a wave of protests, and the opposition
scheduled demonstrations in Pozarevac a week later, which it ultimately
was forced to cancel due to intimidation by the Milosevic regime. As a
part of its effort to intimidate and prevent the demonstrations, police
arrested Nenad Canak, the President of the Vojvodina League of Social
Democrats, as he drove to Pozarevac. Police also arrested and
interrogated dozens of others, including journalists, opposition
politicians, and Otpor activists across Serbia in Nis, Novi Sad,
Kragujevac and Pozarevac.
Several days later, Veljkovic and Lukovic were released by the
district prosecutor Bosko Papovic, who did not find grounds to
prosecute. Papovic in turn was dismissed from his post by the
Government, and the activists were rearrested and served a total of 2
months in prison. The judge appointed by the Milosevic regime claimed
that releasing the students earlier would ``upset the public.''
In June police in Leskovac arrested 10 persons, including Igor
Olujic, a leading human rights lawyer with the Belgrade-based
Humanitarian Law Center, Dobrosav Nesic, president of the Leskovac NGO
Council for Human Rights, and several opposition party activists. Those
detained were protesting peacefully the arrest a few days earlier of
Otpor activist Vladimir Stojkovic. During the arrest, police used
excessive force against several persons, including Bojana Ristic, a
representative from the Serbian Renewal Movement who also serves in the
Parliament.
Also in June 20 members of Otpor were arrested in Smederevska
Palanka. Police in Ivanjica detained an 11-year-old boy for waiving an
Otpor flag in public. Police also questioned the boy's father about his
support for Otpor. In September police arrested Otpor activist Branko
Ilic in Arilje for the 10th time during the year. By the end of June,
Otpor announced that since the winter, more than 1,000 of its activists
had been arrested by the police.
Opposition candidates in the Sandzak region of Serbia reported that
tactics of the Milosevic regime greatly interfered with campaigning.
Police arrested Coalition Sandzak activists for handing out leaflets
and banned opposition rallies from taking place.
As the regime intensified its crackdown, in July Yugoslav Army
members arrested four Dutchmen, two British citizens, and two Canadians
near Montenegro's borders with Serbia and Kosovo. All were charged with
espionage. The British citizens charged that they were beaten by the
police and nearly lynched by VJ soldiers. Officials of the arrestees'
countries had difficulty obtaining consular access to them after their
transfer to federal prison facilities in Belgrade. Following
Milosevic's ouster, all were released, and the charges against all
eventually were dropped (see Montenegro annex).
Federal statutes permit the police to detain criminal suspects
without a warrant and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without
charging them or granting them access to an attorney. Serbian law
separately provides for a 24-hour detention period. The police often
combine the two for a total 4-day detention period. After this period,
police must turn over a suspect to an investigative judge, who may
order a 30-day extension and, under certain legal procedures,
subsequent extensions of investigative detention of up to 6 months.
Exile is not permitted legally, and there were no reports of its
use.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice, Federal and Serbian courts
largely were controlled by the Milosevic regime and rarely challenged
the will of the state security apparatus. Judicial corruption also is
widespread. While judges are elected for fixed terms, they may be
subjected to governmental pressure. Serbian authorities frequently deny
a fair public trial to non-Serbs and persons whom they believe oppose
the regime.
Since 1998 republic-level judges no longer have mandates for life
and are required to seek office periodically through election. This
process involves obtaining Justice Ministry approval for each judge's
candidacy. Local observers fear that the provision in effect makes
judges functionaries of the Government, who easily may be removed if
they do not cooperate.
The court system comprises local, district, and supreme courts at
the republic level, as well as a Federal Court and Federal
Constitutional Court to which republic Supreme Court decisions,
depending on the subject, may be appealed. There is also a military
court system. According to the Federal Constitution, the Federal
Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and
regulations and relies on the constituent republic authorities to
enforce its rulings.
The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia remains in force. Considerable confusion and room for
abuse remain in the legal system because the 1990 Constitution of
Serbia has not yet been brought into conformity with the 1992
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under federal law,
defendants have the right to be present at their trial and to have an
attorney represent them, at public expense if needed. The courts also
must provide interpreters. The presiding judge decides what is read
into the record of the proceedings. Either the defendant or the
prosecutor has the right to appeal the verdict.
Defense lawyers, especially those representing minority clients,
have filed numerous complaints about flagrant breaches of standard
procedures, arguing that they undermine their clients' rights. Even
when individual judges admitted that the lawyers were correct, the
courts ignored or dismissed the complaints. For example, in Pozarevac,
district prosecutor Bosko Papovic conceded that two Otpor activists
were innocent of charges that they had conspired to kill associates of
Marko Milosevic. Nevertheless, the two youth activists were imprisoned
for 2 months, in May and June. Papovic, along with 15 other judges who
defended his decision, subsequently was fired (see Section 1.d.).
Many legal scholars have expressed concern over the 1998 Act on
Lawyers, which they believe restricts the freedom of lawyers and
interferes with the independence of lawyers in their dealings with
clients. They believe that the law gives too much authority to the
lawyers' chambers, both at the republic and federal levels, which the
Helsinki Committee alleges would enable the Government to exercise
stricter control over the profession. According to a Serbian
Constitutional Court judge, the law enabled the regime to interfere
with the lawyer-client relationship, which even during the Communist
era was upheld to a greater degree.
In June the Government debated the passage of a law against
terrorism in the Serbian Parliament. With its sweeping powers, the law
would have allowed police essentially to arrest anyone, including NGO
and media representatives, whom they deemed to be working for the
removal of the Government. The law allowed for a minimum sentence of 3
years' imprisonment in such cases. Finally, the law extended the period
of detention during which police could conduct their investigation from
3 to 30 days. Although the bill was not signed into law, the threat of
its passage hampered many opposition activities against the Milosevic
regime.
Under Milosevic, the Government also violated norms of judicial
fairness by pursuing cases previously brought against individuals and
groups charged under the Yugoslav Criminal Code with jeopardizing the
territorial integrity of the country and for conspiring or forming a
group with intent to commit subversive activities (undermining the
``constitutional order''). Most of the cases involved alleged
violations under Article 136 of the Federal Penal Code related to
``association to conduct enemy activity,'' or Article 125 concerning
``terrorism.'' There is no clear estimate as to how many persons remain
imprisoned on these specific charges.
Among the most prominent is the case of Dr. Flora Brovina who was
transferred from Kosovo to a prison in Nis in July 1999. Dr. Brovina,
who is known for her human rights work on behalf of women and children
in Kosovo, was tried and convicted on terrorism charges and in December
1999 sentenced to 12 years' incarceration. Dr. Brovina was freed on
November 1 by a special pardon from President Kostunica.
The Serbian court system convicted 143 ethnic Albanians in a mass
trial in Nis in May. The men, who received sentences ranging from 7 to
13 years' imprisonment, were convicted of being members of the KLA,
terrorism, and attacking police. The trial was criticized widely by
human rights groups because little effort was made to establish
individual, as opposed to collective, guilt. In addition, defense
witnesses were not allowed to testify, and the judge reportedly
admitted that there could have been ``shortcomings'' in the
prosecution's evidence.
On July 6, six ethnic Albanians in Serbia accused of terrorism and
supporting the KLA were sentenced to a total term of 46 years in
prison. Human rights NGO's noted that the trial was unfair and that
allegations of torture were widespread. The court failed to investigate
the allegations of torture and accepted a filmed confession made while
the men were in police custody, which already had been aired on Serbian
State television. AI noted that this was in clear violation of the
Yugoslav Code of Criminal Procedure.
A spokesperson for the Serbian Judges Association stated that as of
July, 50 of its members had been forced to resign due to pressure from
the regime. This followed the dismissal by the Government of 16 judges
for their alleged work with the political opposition, including Djordje
Rankovic and district prosecutor Bosko Papovic, who spoke out against
the case of the two Otpor activists who were beaten by associates of
Marko Milosevic in Pozarevac (see Section 1.d.).
Ukshin Hoti, leader of UNIKOMB, a political party that advocates
Kosovo's unification with Albania, was in detention for the entire
year. Hoti was in a Nis jail and was reportedly in poor health. His
lawyers have been denied access to him since February 1998. Hoti was
serving a 4-year sentence in a prison in Nis and was to be released on
May 17, 1999. However, the Pristina-based Council for Human Rights was
unable to locate Hoti as of July 1999 and there was no further
information at year's end.
In December, President Kostunica pardoned opposition activist
Bogoljub Arsenijevic, known as ``Maki.''
The Government continued to hold an estimated 700 ethnic Albanians
as political prisoners. Visits to political prisoners are rare and are
often supervised by police. Local human rights NGO's have attempted to
visit prisoners, with mixed results. The ICRC has been able to visit
many, if not all, of the Kosovar Albanian political prisoners inside
Serbia.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Under the Milosevic Government, the authorities
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Federal law gives republic
ministries of the interior sole control over the decision to monitor
potential criminal activities, a power that is abused routinely. It is
widely believed that the authorities monitor opposition and dissident
activities, eavesdrop on conversations, read mail and e-mail, and
wiretap telephones. Although illegal under provisions of federal and
Serbian law, the federal post office registers all mail from abroad,
ostensibly to protect mail carriers from charges of theft.
The law includes restrictions on searches; however, officials often
ignored them. Police raided the Belgrade and Mladenovac offices of
Otpor in early September without a search warrant. The previous day,
police raided Otpor's Novi Sad office. They confiscated computers,
several thousand Tshirts, posters, buttons, and information about the
movement's activists. Despite the law, the police did not leave any
notification of the items they removed from Otpor's premises. The
Serbian Helsinki Committee stated that the raids violated Article 21 of
the Serbian Constitution, according to which police may enter a premise
with a warrant or, if no warrant is obtained, in order to ``save people
and property.'' Before the September 24 elections, as part of its
crackdown on independent political activists, police also repeatedly
raided the offices of CESID, a Serbian election monitoring NGO,
confiscating files and computers.
A government law requiring universal military service is enforced
only sporadically; it was not enforced vigorously during the year. The
informal practice of the military has been not to call up ethnic
Albanians. However, in Montenegro VJ troops forcibly conscripted youths
during the year. Of approximately 100,000 draft evaders living abroad
at the start of the year to avoid punishment, 40 percent were estimated
to be ethnic Albanian. This number in part reflects the large number of
conscription-age men in Yugoslavia's Albanian community. Leaders of
Kosovo's Albanian and Sandzak's Muslim communities maintained that when
forced compliance of these groups with universal military service did
occur, it was an attempt to induce young men to flee the country.
According to an amnesty bill passed in 1996, up to 12,000 young men for
whom criminal prosecution for draft evasion already had started were
granted amnesty. Others who did not fall into this category were told
that if they returned to Yugoslavia their cases would be reviewed on a
``case-by-case'' basis, a policy that has not inspired confidence among
offenders. A law passed in October 1998 stated that draft dodgers who
did not report for military service would forfeit their right to
inheritance. In many cases Yugoslav officials have refused to issue
proper travel documents to children born to asylum seekers (see Section
2.d.). A new amnesty bill was pending at year's end. The proposed law
would grant amnesty to draft evaders, deserters, those who refused to
bear arms, and to most political prisoners convicted under Article 136
of the Penal Code (association to conduct enemy activity), but not to
political prisoners convicted under Article 125 (terrorism). Many
ethnic Albanian political prisoners were reportedly convicted under
Article 125, but the exact number is unknown.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--Federal law provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Milosevic regime
severely restricted these rights in practice. The October 1998 Law on
Public Information, which was used to silence the independent media
during the Kosovo war, continued to be applied to journalists and
members of the political opposition. The regime arrested dozens of
journalists and levied the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of
dollars in fines in apparent efforts to silence the independent media.
The regime took over independent television and radio stations and shut
down others. State-controlled media coverage was biased severely in
favor of Milosevic's coalition parties, the SPS and JUL, particularly
in early September. State media carried minimal coverage of opposition
parties, and what was covered was cast in a negative light. The regime
also severely restricted international media coverage of the September
elections by denying entry visas to many foreign journalists and by
placing travel restrictions within Serbia on others. In addition,
during the preelection period the regime forced international news
organizations to broadcast through state-controlled facilities where
reports could be censored or blocked.
The Milosevic regime also cracked down on opposition politicians
and politically active NGO's, particularly in the months preceding the
September elections. Police arrested almost a dozen DOS candidates and
raided several DOS offices. In the Sandzak region, police arrested
opposition activists for handing out leaflets (see Section 1.d.). Many
observers suggested that the disappearance of former Serbian President
Ivan Stambolic in late August was meant to be a threatening message to
SPS politicians not to stray from Milosevic's party (see Section 1.b.).
Police also brought over a thousand members of the Otpor movement into
police stations for questioning. Some of these interrogations resulted
in beatings (see Section 1.c.).
While the media climate greatly improved after Kostunica's election
victory, media independence remained a problem. Observers noted that
after the DOS took control of state-owned Radio-Television Serbia,
coverage leading up to the December 23 parliamentary elections strongly
favored DOS candidates. Other media outlets also lack professionalism.
In March an indictment was filed against Dusan Mihajlovic, an
opposition party leader; however, the case was not pursued. Mihajlovic
was charged with ``spreading false information and disturbance of
citizens'' because of remarks he made on a television news program
criticizing a Milosevic speech.
In May independent journalist Miroslav Filipovic, who also worked
closely with the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and as a
correspondent for the Belgrade-based daily Danas, was arrested on
charges of ``espionage'' and ``spreading false information'' following
a series of articles investigating Yugoslav Army abuses in Kosovo.
Formal charges were not brought against Filipovic until June. A closed
trial held in July was protested by human rights NGO's, as was the 7-
year sentence that Filipovic received. Both the prosecution and the
defense appealed the sentence. The Filipovic case attracted significant
attention from many international press and human rights groups. In
addition over 300 journalists from Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia
signed a letter to Milosevic protesting the harsh sentence against
Filipovic and demanding his release. On October 10, the Supreme
Military Court in Belgrade overturned the guilty verdict against
Filipovic on procedural grounds and sent the case back to court for a
new trial. Kostunica pardoned Filipovic in October, and the charges
against Filipovic were dropped.
The Government fined the newspaper Glas Javnosti $5,000 (300,000
dinars) under the Public Information Act, and Slavoljub Kacarevic,
director and editor-in-chief of the newspaper, was fined $2,000
(120,000 dinars) for an article published on June 14. Also in June, in
Leskovac a car belonging to two independent journalists was vandalized
outside the police station while the two were covering protests.
In July independent publishers were forced to reduce the number of
pages in their newspapers because the amount of paper supplied by the
only domestic newsprint manufacturer was insufficient. The Federal
Government turned down a request to import additional paper supplies
even as leading Belgrade dailies Blic, Danas, and Glas Javnosti, and
weeklies Vreme and NIN, used their last reserves of paper.
According to the Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM)
network, more than 140 radio and television stations were banned inside
Serbia under Milosevic, and, as of April, more than $625,000 (37.5
million dinars) in fines were imposed on independent media under the
Public Information Act. Despite this repression, ANEM reported that
dozens of independent radio and television stations still were
broadcasting.
In mid-January, broadcasting equipment was stolen from the Belgrade
television station Studio B. As a result, over 2 million viewers were
unable to receive the station's signal. Although no one was ever
charged with the crime, ANEM believed that the theft was in direct
response to Studio B's broadcast of opposition-related programming.
In a controversial news conference in February, former Serbian
Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj threatened violence against
independent journalists.
In March the police attacked a technician and security guard at
Studio B and confiscated transmission equipment from the premises. In
addition eight print and electronic media outlets were fined for
alleged violations of the Law on Public Information. Six additional
independent radio and television stations were closed in March.
Foreign journalists were expelled from Serbia and denied entry
visas periodically throughout the year, especially during the period
prior to the September elections.
Following the beating of the three Otpor activists in Pozarevac in
May, there was a wave of arrests as independent journalists publicized
the assault. Studio B and the independent dailies Blic and Danas were
fined for ``false reporting'' after they informed the public of the
attack.
On May 17, police moved against four of the largest independent
media outlets--Studio B, B2-92, Radio Index, and Blic--and closed down
the building from which they all operated. Radio Pancevo remained the
only source of independent information in the Belgrade area until later
that same night when its transmission also was blocked. On May 17 and
18 in Belgrade, police beat peaceful protesters and used excessive
force to disperse street protests against the Government's closing of
television Studio B and Radio B2-92 (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
In June security guards beat Hanibal Kovac, a correspondent for
Radio Free Europe, in Sabac in a recreation center controlled by a
member of the Serbian Radical Party. The guards reportedly told Kovac
that he was ``first on the list and that other reporters would get the
same.'' Police also beat up a reporter in Novi Sad for wearing an Otpor
T-shirt.
On June 2, Dusika Radulovic, owner of a small independent newspaper
Borske Novine was sentenced to 3 months in prison for publishing an
article that allegedly libelled members of the local government. On
June 9, satirist Boban Miletic was sentenced to 5 months in prison for
ridiculing Milosevic during a public reading of his latest book.
Also in June, a television crew from Radio Kraljevo was arrested
along with Democratic Party officials and four Otpor activists in
Kraljevo.
In August journalist Zoran Lukovic was arrested and sent to prison
to serve a 5-month sentence for ``spreading false information.''
Lukovic was convicted in March 1999 with another journalist, Srdjan
Jankovic, and with Slavko Curuvija, editor of the Belgrade daily
tabloid Dnevni Telegraf. Curuvija was murdered in Belgrade in April
1999, allegedly by members of Milosevic's secret service (see Section
1.a.). Lukovic was pardoned and released at the end of the year.
In August the NGO Reporters without Borders protested the
Government's jamming of radio broadcasts by opposition station Radio
Jasenica and the private station Radio Globus. A press release issued
by the organization pointed to ``a policy of increasing repression
against independent media'' prior to the September election. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also
highlighted media repression in the period prior to the elections.
In August five cable networks in Novi Sad stopped broadcasting news
from television stations in Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia, and Hungary
following a Yugoslav Information Ministry ban on broadcasting
``political propaganda programs.'' Critics charged that the ban was an
attempt to prevent 200,000 viewers in the region from having access to
independent media during the September election campaign.
The Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia (NUNS) noted in
August that ``repression of the authorities against the media in Serbia
increased in the past few months.'' In addition the NUNS noted in its
Dossier of Repression that the Information Act ``in the past few months
has become an auxiliary means of carrying out repression.'' The NUNS
confirmed ANEM's report that the independent media were charged the
equivalent of hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines by the regime.
On November 27, two policemen beat Hungarian journalist Peter Aradi
and threatened to kill him. Otpor reported that Aradi was taken to the
police station in Senta, a town near the Hungarian border, where he was
interrogated, beaten, and threatened before being released the
following day (see Section 5). Also in November, three plainclothes
police officers from the Serbian Interior Ministry detained Milos
Antic, assistant editor of the Nedeljni Telegraf, and interrogated him
for 2 hours at the police station in Belgrade. They pressured him to
reveal his sources for an article he had written about Milosevic's
alleged attempts to crack down on prodemocracy protesters during the
October 5 demonstrations; the officers said they were acting under
orders of a prosecutor preparing a case against Milosevic.
In 1998 the Parliament passed the Universities Law. It severely
curtails academic freedom by allowing the Government to appoint rectors
and governing boards and hire and fire deans of faculties. Deans in
turn can hire and fire professors--in effect taking away tenure and
promoting regime loyalists inside the universities. The law also
discourages political activism among students. After October 5, the new
Government reinstated all previously dismissed professors.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Federal and
republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of peaceful assembly;
however, under Milosevic, the Serbian and Federal Governments severely
restricted this right.
In Kragujevac in February, Otpor was prevented from collecting
contributions to assist the independent newspaper Nezavisna Svetlost in
paying a fine levied against it under the Public Information Law.
On April 14, police stopped buses with opposition supporters
traveling to rallies in Belgrade. On May 9, police stopped an
opposition rally in Pozarevac by blocking opposition supporters' access
to the town. On May 17 and 18, police used excessive force to disperse
opposition street protests in Belgrade (see Section 1.c.). Police
banned opposition rallies in the Sandzak region (see Section 1.d.).
During the election demonstrations in October, police beat some
demonstrators and used tear gas.
Federal and republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of
peaceful association; however, under Milosevic the Serbian and Federal
Governments severely restricted this right. By the end of the summer
virtually anyone wearing an Otpor T-shirt was subject to arrest or
harassment by the police.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The laws at both the federal and Serbian
republic level provide for freedom of religion; however, under
Milosevic, there were incidents of government infringement on freedom
of worship by minority groups, and the legal system provided little
protection for the religious rights of minority groups.
Although in the past the Milosevic regime was allied closely with
and gave preferential treatment to the Serbian Orthodox Church, a split
between the two widened considerably during the year. The split began
with the onset of violence in Kosovo and widened with the regime's
continued repression of the political opposition.
The Government repressed Muslims in the Sandzak region along the
border between Serbia and Montenegro. Reports of harassment in the
Sandzak region indicated that it was carried out mostly by federal
Yugoslav army troops.
The Government made no progress in the restitution of property that
belonged to the Jewish community, despite Milosevic's past promises to
resolve the disputes. The Orthodox and Catholic Churches have had
similar difficulties with the restitution of their property confiscated
by the Communist regime.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement; however, under Milosevic, the Federal and Serbian governments
restricted this right in practice. The federal government makes
passports available to citizens; however, the authorities under the
Milosevic Government restricted Yugoslav citizens from reentering the
country. The Milosevic regime continued to restrict the right of
Sandzak Muslims and ethnic Albanians from southern Serbia to travel by
holding up the issuance or renewal of passports for unusually long
periods of time. It also reserved the option of prosecuting individuals
charged previously with violating exit visa requirements. Throughout
Milosevic's rule, opposition politicians and activists routinely were
harassed and arrested as they traveled in Serbia. The Government placed
travel restrictions on journalists. Freedom of movement was also
restricted in travel between Serbia and Montenegro because of the trade
blockade imposed by Serbian authorities.
As Federal authorities had yet to repeal legislation targeting
conscientious objectors and draft evaders from the war in Kosovo, many
men could not travel freely throughout the country due to fear of
arrest. Those conscientious objectors and draft evaders who fled Serbia
could not return to the country for the same reason. Passports were
denied as a matter of course to conscientious objectors and draft
evaders. NGO representatives from 19 Serbian towns gathered in
Montenegro in May and called for a general amnesty for conscientious
objectors and draft evaders. AI and other NGO's noted that indictments
continued to arrive at the homes of draft evaders and conscientious
objectors. In several cases, trials against the men were conducted in
absentia. After October 5, freedom of movement improved significantly.
However, isolated incidents were reported late in the year of draft
evaders from Montenegro stopped in Belgrade airport and sent back to
Montenegro to face old charges in military courts. Draft evaders would
be amnestied by a law being considered by the Federal Parliament at
year's end.
Following their exodus from Kosovo, there were reports that Serb
refugees were prevented from traveling to Belgrade in 1999. Reports
continue to indicate that their freedom of movement is restricted, with
many of them being confined to Southern Serbia.
Citizens reported difficulties at borders and the occasional
confiscation of passports. Sandzak Muslims and ethnic Albanians
complained of harassment at borders when reentering the country.
Yugoslav embassies overseas generally are considered to apply a
double standard when issuing passports to their citizens; ethnic Serbs
have a much easier time obtaining passports than members of ethnic
minorities.
Many inhabitants of Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts
of the former Yugoslavia, as well as large numbers of refugees, have
not been able to establish their citizenship in Yugoslavia, leaving
them in a stateless limbo. The Government suspended the processing of
citizenship applications during the NATO bombing. Government officials
claimed that the country's citizenship application records were
destroyed in the bombing, and did not resume processing applications.
The conflicts that have occurred in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in
recent years have led to widespread displacement of persons. Under
Milosevic, the Government imposed numerous restrictions on free
movement into and within Yugoslavia.
Approximately half a million refugees from Bosnia and Croatia and
some 220,000 more recent internally displaced persons from Kosovo,
mainly Serbs and Roma, are living in the country. Unemployment among
these groups is estimated at over 60 percent due to the country's poor
economic climate. Up to 25 percent of the refugee population has moved
more than three times since arrival in Serbia. Most Serb displaced
persons from Kosovo are housed with host families; some 50,000 are in
collective centers. A report by the U.S. Committee for Refugees
describes collective centers for refugees as varying widely in quality
and population density, ranging from ``decent'' to ``dismal, drafty,
and crowded.''
There are approximately 45,000 displaced Roma in Yugoslavia. Roma
faced a difficult position during the Kosovo conflict. As neither Serb
nor Albanian, the Roma in Kosovo tended to adapt to the ethnic group
they perceived as dominant. As a result, many of Kosovo's Roma were
perceived as Serb collaborators by returning ethnic Albanians, and many
fled Kosovo for other areas of Yugoslavia (see Kosovo annex). Living
conditions for Roma in Serbia are extremely poor. Local municipalities
are often reluctant to accept Roma, hoping that if they refuse to
provide shelter or assistance, the Roma may move on (see Section 5).
The Yugoslav Government has been very slow to issue passports to
refugees. This is a particular problem for parents who seek asylum. For
example, Yugoslav officials in Germany refuse to issue passports to
children born in Germany who have a German government document
certifying their birth. When these asylum seekers who have been refused
in Germany return to Yugoslavia with their children, the children
travel on the basis of this document. Yugoslav authorities take the
paper at the port of entry and issue a receipt for it. The children
then have no documentation in a country where documentation is a basic
requirement.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia noted in 1997
that the 1997 citizenship law would give the Ministry of Interior
almost complete control over the granting of citizenship. The
Government served notice that it plans to limit severely the granting
of citizenship to refugees from the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia.
The Government also plans to revise the eligibility status of a large
number of persons; refugees who have been granted citizenship since
1992 may stand to lose their Yugoslav citizenship if they have acquired
the citizenship of a former Yugoslav republic.
Observers in the Sandzak region also noted that Muslim residents
who were forced to flee to Bosnia from Sandzak in 1992 and 1993 may not
be permitted to return to Serbia, particularly if they obtained Bosnian
passports in the interim.
The Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). There were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Federal and Serbian Constitutions provide for this right;
however, in practice, under Milosevic, citizens in Serbia consistently
were discouraged and often were prevented from exercising this right by
the regime's domination of the mass media, control of the police, and
manipulation of the electoral process. The regime persistently sought
to undermine the effectiveness of the opposition leadership throughout
Serbia through financial controls. In July Milosevic altered the
Constitution to permit his candidacy in the September federal
elections.
Throughout the summer, the Milosevic regime continuously exerted
undue pressure on persons and groups attempting to peacefully change
their government (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., and 2.b.). In one such
instance, police in August halted the distribution of humanitarian
assistance by the Leskovac Human Rights Board, an organization that
encouraged citizens to participate in September's elections.
Kostunica came to power as President of Yugoslavia after mass
demonstrations in early October by citizens protesting Slobodan
Milosevic's attempts to manipulate the Federal Election Commission and
Constitutional Court to force a second round of elections. Kostunica
ran against Milosevic in the September 24 elections under the DOS
Party, an 18-party alliance. Milosevic banned international observers
from monitoring the elections; the opposition reported election fraud
in some areas, particularly in southern Serbia and the voting in
Kosovo. In Kosovo many polling stations were not opened on the
September 24 election day. Although the DOS claimed victory for
Kostunica, the Yugoslav Federal Election Commission claimed that
neither candidate had won an outright majority and called for a second
ballot. This sparked citizen protests in Belgrade and a general strike
in favor of the opposition beginning on October 2, which culminated in
a mass demonstration on October 5 by half a million citizens calling
for Milosevic to give up power. Kostunica declared himself President of
Yugoslavia that night and 2 days later Milosevic conceded electoral
defeat. A federal government was formed by the DOS and the SNP
(Socialist People's Party). At the Serb republic level, a three-way
interim power sharing government was formed by the DOS, the SPS
(Socialist Party of Serbia), and the Serbian Renewal Movement until the
December 24 republic elections. Milan Milutinovic remained President of
the Republic of Serbia.
There are no legal restrictions that hinder women's participation
in government and politics, and women are active in political
organizations; however, they are underrepresented greatly in party and
government offices, holding less than 10 percent of ministerial-level
positions in the Serbian and Federal Governments. Until Milosevic's
defeat, his wife Mira Markovic was an exception. She was the leading
force in the neo-Communist Yugoslav Left Party, through which she
exerted extraordinary and disproportionate influence on policy makers,
including her husband. On November 27, female political activists
announced that 10 DOS parties agreed to fill at least 30 percent of the
places on the party list for the Serbian parliamentary elections with
female candidates.
There are no legal restrictions on the role of minorities in
government and politics; however, they are underrepresented and ethnic
Serbs and, to a certain extent, Montenegrins dominate the country's
political leadership. Montenegro boycotted the September 23 elections.
Few members of other ethnic groups play any role at the top levels of
government or the state-run economy; however, Rasim Ljajic, a Sandzak
Muslim leader, was appointed the Federal Minister for Minority Affairs
in November. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo refused to take part in the
electoral process at the Serbian republic and federal level, including
most recently in federal presidential elections in September. Serbs in
Kosovo participated in the September elections, but with low voter
turnout.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Milosevic regime routinely hindered the activities of and
regularly rejected the findings of human rights groups.
A number of independent human rights organizations operate in the
country, researching and gathering information on abuses, and
publicizing such cases. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center and
the Center for Antiwar Action research human rights abuses throughout
the country and, on occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The
Belgrade-based Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia publishes
studies on human rights issues and cooperates with the Pristina-based
Helsinki Committee in monitoring human rights abuses in Kosovo. In the
Sandzak region, two committees monitor abuses against the local Muslim
population and produce comprehensive reports. Most of these
organizations offer advice and help to victims of abuse.
Throughout the summer, Serbian police cracked down on Belgrade's
human rights NGO's, including the Helsinki Committee, the Center for
Anti-War Action, and Women in Black Against War. Each organization
reports that it was visited and harassed by police in an effort to
intimidate the NGO's and document their sources of international
support. In June police closed the offices of Women in Black Against
War. In a related move, the premises of the Forum for Ethnic Relations
also were shut and sealed.
In August the Yugoslav Army announced that it would bring charges
against Natasa Kandic, the head of the Humanitarian Law Center. The
Yugoslav Army's Information Service alleged that Kandic breached the
Law on Information when she published the article ``I Will Not Keep
Quiet About Horrors'' in the independent newspaper Danas. Kandic
published a defiant response to the army. The VJ did not initiate
charges against Kandic, and threats and harassment against her stopped
after October 5.
Citing ``political activities,'' police in Leskovac removed the
Human Rights Protection Committee from the register of social
organizations and citizens' associations in the southern Serbian town
in August. At the same time, criminal charges were filed against the
director of the organization for the improper receipt of money.
With some exceptions, the Milosevic Government's Federal Ministry
of Foreign Affairs systematically denied visas to international
nongovernmental human rights organizations.
In 1999 as a result of their actions in Kosovo, the ICTY formally
indicted as war criminals former President Milosevic and four other
senior officials, including Serbian President Milan Milutinovic,
Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Chief of Staff of the
Yugoslav Army Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Minister of Internal
Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic. President Kostunica has made public
statements that he opposes the extradition of any indictees to the
ICTY.
On December 11, a court in Uzice convicted and sentenced nine men
for ``kidnaping'' indicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Stevan Todorovic
and handing him over to NATO forces in Bosnia in September 1998. On
December 13 in the Hague, Todorovic pled guilty to ethnic cleansing.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
While federal and republic-level laws provide for equal rights for
all citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social
status, and prohibit discrimination against women, in practice the
legal system provides little protection to such groups.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem and the traditionally
high level of domestic violence persisted. The few official agencies
dedicated to coping with family violence have inadequate resources and
are limited in their activity by social pressure to keep families
together at all costs. Few victims of spousal abuse ever file
complaints with the authorities. There is no trained police unit to
provide protection or assistance to female victims of sexual or other
violence. The Center for Autonomous Women's Rights in Belgrade offers a
rape and spousal abuse hot line, as well as sponsors a number of self-
help groups. The Center also offered help to refugee women (mostly
Serb), many of whom experienced extreme abuse or rape during the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The Criminal Code does not
recognize spousal rape as a criminal offense; rape is defined as forced
sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married.
The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Women do not enjoy status equal to men, and relatively few women
obtain upper level management positions in commerce. Traditional
patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women should be
subservient to the male members of their family, long have subjected
women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly among
minority communities, women are little more than serfs without the
ability to exercise their right to control property and children. Women
legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work; however, according to
the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, women's average
wage is 11 percent lower than the average wage of men. Women are
granted maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months
available. Women are active in political and human rights
organizations. Women's rights groups continue to operate with little or
no official acknowledgement.
Children.--The State attempts to meet the health and educational
needs of children. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory
schooling. However, economic distress has affected children adversely
in both the education and health care systems.
Prior to the conflict in Kosovo, the division of Kosovo into
unofficial parallel Serb and Albanian administrative systems resulted
in Serb and ethnic Albanian elementary age children being taught in
separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in private
shifts. Older ethnic Albanian children were attending school in private
homes. The quality of education thus was uneven before the conflict
started, and the tension and division of society in general was
replicated to the detriment of the children (see Kosovo annex).
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--Facilities for persons with disabilities
are inadequate and the Government did not make any efforts during the
year to address the problem. The law prohibits discrimination against
persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision
of other state services. The law mandates access to new official
buildings, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely
intertwined as to be inseparable. Incidents of discrimination against,
and harassment of, religious minorities continued, especially in
Serbian Sandzak.
The Keston Institute reported that on September 26, a group of 13
young men attacked 2 Romani women and one Romani man, all members of a
Romani Pentecostal church in Leskovac, with sticks, bats, and chains.
The attack took place 2 days after three young men interrupted the
church's evening services and threatened the congregation, throwing
firecrackers and shouting that they would force the Roma to leave town.
The church reported the incidents to the local police, who advised them
to file charges against the men. As of November 24, the attackers had
not been found, but no further incidents had occurred.
Societal violence against the Catholic minority in Vojvodina,
largely consisting of ethnic Hungarians and Croats, was reported. In
addition, Catholic churches frequented by the Croat minority were
attacked, although there were few reports of this type of activity
during the year.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Albanian leaders in the
cities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja in southeastern Serbia
complained of discrimination by Serbian authorities. Very few ethnic
Albanians are employed by municipal governments in the region. In part,
the problem is due to the refusal of Serbian authorities to recognize
the credentials of ethnic Albanians who completed their higher
education in Kosovo under the post-1989 parallel system.
There were incidents of official discrimination against the Romani
population and skinheads and police occasionally violently attacked
Roma (see Section 1.c.). The European Roma Rights Center reported that
a group of skinheads attacked two 15-year-old Romani boys in Vranje on
April 29. The boys were punched and beaten with baseball bats; one boy
reported two broken ribs. In Nis a group of skinheads beat a 15-year-
old Rom. Two of the attackers eventually were fined $10 (600 dinars).
In May a 13-year-old Romani girl was attacked by a group of her fellow
students and several skinheads with a knife. After the incident, police
interrogated the girl and threatened to arrest her parents if she did
not admit she was lying. In August several Romani families in Belgrade
reported that skinheads repeatedly throw rocks at their houses, often
breaking windows, shout racist insults, and threaten to set Romani
houses on fire.
Roma have the right to vote, and there are two small Romani parties
in Serbia. One of the four deputy mayors In Kragujevac is a Rom.
However, prejudice against Roma is widespread. For example, in Sabac,
in western Serbia, Roma are barred from using a municipal swimming pool
that is owned by the president of the local branch of the Serbian
Radical Party. According to Human Rights Watch, on June 7, police
leveled Roma homes in Belgrade, alleging that they were built in breach
of zoning laws; police made racial insults and slapped and kicked some
of the Roma who were forced out of their homes. Local authorities often
ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Romani community.
In Vojvodina in November police beat and threatened Hungarian
journalist Peter Aradi. Otpor reported that police dragged Aradi from a
table in a pizzeria where he was dining, threw him to the floor, and
placed a gun barrel in his mouth. He then was taken to the police
station and beaten. Before Aradi was released, the police reportedly
forced him to kneel, hold a Bible, and ``say something in Serbian.''
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Unions
are either official (government affiliated) or independent. The total
labor force is approximately 2.3 million persons. The government-
controlled Alliance of Independent Labor Unions (Samostalni Sindikati,
or SSS) claims 1.8 million members but probably numbers closer to 1
million in reality. The largest independent union is the United Branch
Independent Labor Unions (Nezavisnost), which has about 170,000
members. The third largest union is the Association of Free and
Independent Trade Unions (AFITU), which has about 50,000 members. Most
other independent unions are sector specific, for example, the
Independent Union of Bank Employees (12,000 members). Due to the poor
state of the economy, over one-half of union workers are on long-term
mandatory leave from their firms pending increases in production. The
independent unions, while active in recruiting new members, have not
yet reached the size needed to mount countrywide strikes. The
independent unions also claim that the Milosevic regime prevented
effective recruiting through a number of tactics, which included
preventing the busing of workers to strikes, threatening the job
security of members, and failing to grant visas to foreign visitors who
support independent unions.
The largely splintered approach of the independent unions has
resulted in few achievements in terms of increased wages or improved
working conditions. The Nezavisnost union gained new members as a
result of its well-organized and tough bargaining positions during
strikes of teachers and health workers in 1998 but has not led any
strikes since then; it has focused instead on political action
campaigns aimed at raising workers' political awareness. The official
union lost credibility with some of its members because it ultimately
accommodated the Milosevic regime's position on these strikes.
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions' 2000 Annual
Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights alleges that Serbia's labor
laws still favor the official trade union and heavily restrict the
right to strike. The report also alleges that the independent union
Nezavisnost continued to face discrimination.
The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains
constrained.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While this
right is provided for under law, collective bargaining remains at a
rudimentary level of development. Individual unions continue to be very
narrow in their aims, unable to join with unions in other sectors to
bargain for common purposes. The history of trade unionism in the
country has centered not on bargaining for the collective needs of all
workers but rather for the specific needs of a given group of workers.
Thus, coal workers, teachers, health workers, and electric power
industry employees have been ineffective in finding common denominators
(e.g., job security protection, minimum safety standards, universal
workers' benefits, etc.) on which to negotiate. The overall result is a
highly fragmented labor structure composed of workers who relate to the
needs of their individual union but rarely to those of other workers.
Additionally, job security fears, which stem from the high rate of
unemployment, limited workers' militancy.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
generally is not known to occur; however, the country served as a
source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in women and
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in
villages and farming communities it is not unusual to find younger
children at work assisting their families. Moreover, children can be
found in a variety of unofficial ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car
windows or selling small items such as cigarettes, although this
practice apparently is somewhat less widespread, since adults lacking
other options for employment have taken many of these jobs. With an
actual unemployment rate (registered unemployed plus redundant workers
who show up at the workplace but perform only minimal work) in excess
of 60 percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal
sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is
prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur, apart from girls
who are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections
6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises,
including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies
generally observe minimum wage standards. The monthly minimum wage is
approximately $15 (900 dinars). However, this figure is roughly
comparable to unemployment benefits and (at least theoretically) is
paid to workers who have been placed in a mandatory leave status. The
actual minimum wage is at the low end of the range of average net
salaries, $50 (3,000 dinars) per month. The minimum wage is
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. The cost of food and utilities alone for a family of four is
estimated to be $120 (7,200 dinars) per month. According to one report,
workers' salaries fell 34 percent during the year. Private enterprises
use the minimum wage as a guide but tend to pay somewhat higher average
wages.
Reports of sweatshops operating in the country are rare, although
some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor
conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little
meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations,
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In light of the
competition for employment and the high degree of government control
over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons, and trafficking is a problem. There are laws
that could be used to prosecute traffickers although the Milosevic
regime showed little interest in addressing the problem. There
continues to be little information available on trafficking, although
Serbia is a source, transit, and destination country for women and
girls trafficked to other parts of Europe for forced prostitution.
There were no reports of individuals prosecuted for trafficking.
Belgrade is a transit point, and to a lesser extent, a destination
point, for trafficking in women and girls. Reportedly women from
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Romania are trafficked to and
through the country. There were also reports that women were trafficked
through the country to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they either stayed and
were forced to work as prostitutes or were trafficked to other
countries. Women are trafficked to Italy, Greece, Germany, the
Netherlands, France, and other Western European countries. Women
trafficked to Italy often are sent through Montenegro (see Montenegro
annex).
Women often are recruited to work abroad through advertisements for
escort services, waitresses, and personal advertisements for marriage
offers or lonely hearts columns, and then forced into prostitution.
Federal legislation allows escort agencies to be registered and
advertise; many of these agencies are involved in trafficking.
There are no statistics available for children trafficked to other
countries; however, the International Helsinki Federation for Human
Rights reports that children, mostly Roma, are kidnaped and used for
prostitution, begging, and stealing.
There are no Government trafficking prevention programs or services
for victims. A very small number of NGO's deal with trafficking issues.
Awareness of human trafficking is low; however, the problem received
some media attention.
Kosovo
Kosovo continued to be administered under the civil authority of
the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),
pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. This resolution
recognized the continuing sovereignty of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) over Kosovo but also called for ``substantial
autonomy and meaningful self-administration.'' UNMIK began to establish
a civil administration in June 1999, following the conclusion of the
NATO military campaign that forced the withdrawal of Yugoslav military,
police, and paramilitary forces from the province. The chief
administrator of UNMIK during the year was the Special Representative
of the Secretary General (SRSG), Dr. Bernard Kouchner. Within UNMIK the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was made
responsible for institution building, democratization, and human
rights. To provide for greater Kosovar inclusion in civil
administration and to circumvent the risk of quasigovernmental or
``shadow'' governmental entities, in February UNMIK established the
Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). Under the direction of
the SRSG and his designated representatives, international and local
experts shared policy and advisory responsibility for providing social
services and collecting revenues. On October 28, UNMIK conducted
elections throughout Kosovo for members of municipal assemblies with
wide participation by both political parties and voters other than
Serbs. Serbs, citing security concerns and a lack of freedom of
movement, declined to register and boycotted the elections. Although
there were some logistical problems and voting irregularities, the
elections were held without significant violence or obstacles. Election
observers concluded that they were carried out in accordance with
international democratic standards and met the criteria for credible
elections. The elected municipal assemblies were sworn in and took
their seats in November; the SRSG appointed members of municipal
assemblies in three Serb-majority municipalities where there was no
election, and these took their seats in December. UNMIK Regulation
1999/24 established that applicable law in Kosovo would include UNMIK
regulations and those laws in effect in Kosovo as of March 22, 1989,
the code in effect before the regime of Slobodan Milosevic abolished
the political autonomy of Kosovo. This created a complex and in some
cases incomplete set of codes. UNMIK issued a series of interim
regulations to address the civil and legal responsibilities of
governmental entities and private individuals. UNMIK regulations bound
all public officials, including judges, to respect international human
rights law. The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the
legacy of ethnic conflict and Yugoslav oppression was an obstacle to
judicial independence, and some judges and prosecutors reportedly were
subject to outside pressure, particularly in cases involving ethnic
disputes.
The U.N.-authorized, NATO-led peacekeeping force for Kosovo (Kosovo
Force, or KFOR), which included forces from all 19 NATO countries and
over 20 non-NATO members, maintained internal security and defense
against external threats. KFOR also assisted UNMIK's multinational
civilian police corps (U.N. International Police, or CIVPOL) in its
role as uniformed and criminal police. Of 4,718 regular, border, and
special police positions authorized for Kosovo, contributing countries
deployed about 4,000. The OSCE-run Kosovo Police Academy trained over
3,000 local police officers for the newly established Kosovo Police
Service (KPS). The KPS partnered with CIVPOL in field training. CIVPOL
later began to transfer basic policing functions to KPS in some areas,
while continuing to provide oversight. Several hundred additional KPS
recruits continued training, and the OSCE was on schedule to have over
4,000 KPS trained by the spring of 2001. The Kosovo Protection Corps
(KPC), a civilian emergency preparedness service agency that
incorporated disarmed former fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA), began training to respond to civil and medical emergencies. The
International Organization for Migration (IOM) coordinated several
dozen humanitarian projects for the KPC, often in collaboration with
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Some members of KFOR, CIVPOL,
and the KPC occasionally committed abuses.
A long history of mismanagement by Yugoslav Federal and Serbian
authorities left the economy in poor condition even before armed
conflict resulted in the massive destruction of property and economic
enterprises. Key industries before the conflict were mining,
metallurgy, and related manufacturing enterprise. The prewar economy
also had a substantial agrarian sector. Unemployment among the
predominantly ethnic Albanian population was estimated at 62 percent.
Unemployment rates were much higher among Serb and other minority
communities, although some Serbs continued to receive stipends or
pensions from Yugoslavia. International organizations and donors
continued their programs to improve the infrastructure and provide a
regulatory climate conducive to enterprise and investment. About 70
percent of small and medium-sized private enterprises restarted
activities. However, the instability of the region, coupled with the
destruction of property records and a still weak legal and regulatory
framework, caused private capital investment to lag. The privatization
of state enterprises stalled pending the resolution of significant
property issues. Domestic energy generation capacity was about 50
percent of demand, and energy import arrangements remained uncertain.
Remittances from relatives abroad and foreign aid were important
sources of national income. Significant criminal economic activity took
place, especially in the fuel sector. International financial
institutions estimated gross domestic product at less than $400 per
capita.
UNMIK generally adhered to international human rights standards in
its administration of the province; however, serious problems remained,
largely as a result of ongoing interethnic tensions. A few killings
resulted from attacks that appeared to be politically motivated.
Citizens continued to be killed by landmines planted by combatants
during the 1999 conflict. Some kidnapings and disappearances continued.
Approximately 3,600 persons also were missing and unaccounted for as a
result of the armed conflict in 1999, including approximately 2,750
Albanians, 500 Serbs, and 300 members of other ethnic groups. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
exhumed 3,620 remains in 1999 and 2000, of which about 1,260 remains
were still unidentified. There were some reports of the excessive use
of force by KFOR and CIVPOL during arrests. Early in the year some KPC
members were accused of committing incidents of intimidation and
extortion. In the course of carrying out their law and order
enforcement functions, KFOR and CIVPOL at times used arbitrary arrest
and detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem. The
judiciary was subject to bias and outside influence, particularly in
interethnic cases, and did not always ensure due process. Some
newspapers engaged in hate speech or printed articles providing
personal details of alleged war criminals or collaborators. After some
of those individuals were attacked, UNMIK issued a temporary regulation
that prohibited articles that might encourage criminal activity or
violence. Some observers in both the local and international media
criticized this regulation as an infringement of freedom of the press.
In order to prevent the potential for large, unruly gatherings, UNMIK
occasionally limited freedom of assembly. There were some limits on
freedom of movement. Over 150,000 Kosovar Albanians returned to the
province during the year; only a few ethnic Serbs and other minorities
returned. Rape, violence, and discrimination against women remained
serious problems. Religious tension and violence continued. Ethnic
Albanians destroyed approximately 20 Serbian Orthodox churches during
the year, with a total of 100 destroyed since June 1999 in retaliation
for Yugoslav troops' earlier destruction of mosques. Societal violence
against ethnic Serbs, Roma, and other minorities was widespread, but
decreased somewhat during the year. A total of 245 civilians were
killed and 522 cases of arson were reported during the year. Most
murders of minorities were rooted in ethnic retaliation; other killings
more often were connected to criminal enterprise, political
factionalism, and private feuds. Societal discrimination continued to
target Roma, in retaliation for the group's alleged collusion with
Serbs in the period before and during the NATO bombing campaign. The
approximately 100,000 Serbs who remained in Kosovo live primarily in
the north or in enclaves under the protection of KFOR. While a few
Serbs and other minorities who left Kosovo in 1999 came back, security
conditions did not permit large-scale organized returns. Worker rights
are not developed fully, and child labor persists. Trafficking in women
and girls to and through the province was a serious problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--KFOR forces killed
several individuals during operations. UNMIK and military authorities
investigated these killings, but found no circumstances in which those
responsible had acted improperly. On February 15, snipers wounded two
KFOR soldiers. The soldiers responded by killing an Albanian and
wounding at least four persons whom they said were firing at them from
the rooftops. More than 35 other Albanians were detained on suspicion
of involvement in the sniping. In August KFOR troops killed two
Albanian males, claiming self-defense; some reports suggested that the
two Albanians were shot in the back, and KFOR relieved at least one
soldier of his duties pending investigation. On December 17, in
Leposavic (Leposaviq), \2\ two Serbs were killed and one wounded after
rioters protesting the arrest of a Serb man for the attempted murder of
a KPS officer surrounded a U.N. police station guarded by KFOR soldiers
and took seven KFOR soldiers hostage. One Serb was killed by gunfire; a
KFOR commander reported that soldiers had fired warning shots that may
have ricocheted and hit a protester. The other Serb died of a heart
attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Throughout this report, dual town names are given: The Serb
town name, followed by the Albanian name in parenthesis, except where
towns universally are known by one name.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January authorities accused a KFOR soldier, Sergeant Frank
Ronghi, of raping and killing a 12-year old Albanian girl. A military
tribunal subsequently convicted Ronghi and sentenced him to life in
prison.
In July 1999, KFOR arrested three members of a Kosovo Serb family
for shooting and killing an Albanian man and wounding a second. In July
the court trying the case heard credible evidence from KFOR that KFOR
snipers were responsible for the shootings when called to the scene of
an altercation (see Section 1.d.).
Several killings appeared to be politically motivated. Some
killings and attacks apparently were related to the October municipal
elections. The majority of reported political intimidation attempts,
which included drive-by shootings, kidnaping, and arson, were said to
be aimed at representatives of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK),
led by Ibrahim Rugova, although other political parties subsequently
reported nonlethal attacks as well. The LDK's rival, the Democratic
Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Hashim Thaci, the former head of the KLA,
often was cited as being behind the attacks, although nonpolitical
motives including clan rivalry, criminality, and competition for
economic resources also were suspected in some cases. UNMIK police
rarely were able identify perpetrators. Human Rights Watch (HRW)
reported that on June 15, two men wearing KLA badges killed senior LDK
politician Alil Dreshaj. On August 4, the burned body of Shaban Manaj,
an LDK politician and lawyer from Istok (Istog), was discovered
following his disappearance 2 weeks earlier. On November 23, Xhemail
Mustafa, cofounder of the LDK and President Rugova's press adviser was
killed by unknown gunmen in the stairwell of his apartment building in
Pristina. No arrests had been made by year's end. Attacks against LDK
functionaries occurred in most other regions of the province as well.
Unknown assailants killed two former KLA officers in April and May,
respectively, shooting Besim Mala, also known as ``Commander Murrizi,''
in the streets of Pristina, and Ekrem Rexha, also known as ``Drini,''
in Prizren. UNMIK police attributed their killings to business
disputes, rather than political motives. On July 12, a supporter of
Ramush Haradinaj, a politician and former senior KLA commander, was
murdered. On September 20, police found the body of Skender Gashi, a
KPC officer and former KLA commander, in Orahovac (Rahovec); he had
disappeared 2 days earlier. Local speculation included political,
ethnic, and criminal motives for these killings, while the police
attributed the murders to personal disputes.
Unknown assailants killed one journalist, Shefki Popova, in
September in Vucitrn (Vushtrri) (see Section 2.a.). Popova was listed
as a Social Democratic Party candidate in Vucitrn (Vushtrri)'s
municipal elections.
The number of killings in the province decreased from the total
recorded up to June 1999, when Yugoslav armed forces and Serbian police
withdrew from the province, and also from the total recorded in the
second half of 1999, about 400 killings. According to available
figures, there were 245 murders during the year, including 146
Albanians, 55 Serbs, 9 Bosniaks, 12 Roma, and 23 of unknown or
``other'' category, including 2 KFOR soldiers. U.N. police made arrests
in only 2 to 3 percent of murder cases. Most murders of Serbs and other
minorities were ethnically motivated (see Section 5), but the majority
of murders of Albanians apparently were connected to family and
economic rivalries and criminal activities.
On February 29 in Srbica (Skenderaj), a Kosovar Albanian, Faton
Hajrizi, killed a KFOR soldier. Hajrizi was arrested for the killing a
number of times during the year and escaped from prison. He was
rearrested in December and remained in custody at year's end. A second
KFOR soldier was found dead, a presumed homicide, at the end of April;
no perpetrator has been identified.
Rexhep Luci, Pristina's director of urban planning, was killed in
September. Kosovars and outside observers attributed the killing to
Luci's role in heading up UNMIK's program to tear down illegal
construction. Local commentators expressed grave concern that the
killing would hinder efforts by Kosovar officials to establish civil
order.
On November 22, an explosion at the Pristina residence of Stanimir
Vukicevic, the Yugoslav representative in Kosovo, killed one man and
injured three others. The attack apparently was intended to protest the
participation of Kosovo in the December Serbian parliamentary
elections.
In December 1999, an ethnic Albanian former judge was killed. He
had worked in the Serbian judicial system.
The International Crisis Group reported that in November 1999, five
persons were abducted and killed by persons claiming either to be
members of the Provisional KPC or the Policia Ushtarake, the KLA's
military police, which was outlawed by UNMIK. Their bodies were found
around the KLA compound in Lukare, north of Pristina. Four were
identified; three as Roma, one as an Albanian woman. All four had been
accused locally of having ``collaborated'' with Serb forces.
Although there was credible evidence of Yugoslav agents and special
forces teams in Kosovo, there were no confirmed reports of killings by
Yugoslav or official Serbian forces inside the province.
Some Kosovar Serbs continued efforts begun in 1999 to expel
Albanians and other ethnic groups from the northern part of Mitrovica.
In February, during an increase in violence in that city, groups of
Serbs, reportedly including Serbian police, attacked ethnic Albanians
on several occasions, killing eight civilians. The attacks were viewed
as retaliation for a grenade attack on a U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) bus that killed two Serbs traveling from Mitrovica.
During the month of February, over 1,500 Albanians, Muslim Slavs, and
Turks fled their homes in the north side of the city, and Serbs
withdrew from southern Mitrovica, where they were a minority (see
Section 5).
As a result of the 1999 armed conflict, certain rural areas of the
province were filled with unexploded landmines and ordnance. Landmines
and ordnance explosions killed 93 persons from June 1999 to April and
injured more than 300. The U.N. Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC)
in Pristina accredited 16 international demining organizations in
Kosovo. Well over 1,000 persons were involved in the demining effort in
the province, clearing 8,980 mines, 4,932 cluster bomb units, and 5,774
other ordnance. KFOR and MACC cleared over 16,000 houses, 1,165
schools, 1,056 miles of roads, and 124 miles of rail tracks.
International organizations and NGO's undertook a widespread public
education campaign on mines.
Virtually no town or settlement escaped the effects of the
Milosevic regime's campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1999, with reports
of dozens, sometimes hundreds, of civilians murdered in each town.
Kosovo's still fragile investigative, judicial, and penal systems, in
addition to ICTY, worked to ensure that perpetrators were identified
and punished. Beginning in mid-1999, the ICTY began its program inside
Kosovo, and carried out investigations in support of ongoing and future
proceedings against presumed war criminals, including exhuming mass
graves to permit the identification of victims of the war and ethnic
cleansing. By year's end, the ICTY completed the exhumation of remains,
begun in 1999, of some 529 graves, uncovering for identification the
remains of 3,600 persons over the 2-season exhumation period. In May
UNMIK issued a regulation establishing the Victim Recovery and
Identification Commission (VRIC), primarily charged with identification
of remains. Working with families on the basis of information they
provided, details of the events, and the recovery of clothing and
personal effects, the VRIC was able to positively identify victims. The
remains of about 1,400 victims were unidentified at year's end.
UNMIK suspended efforts to create a local Kosovo War and Ethnic
Crimes Court due to lack of funding, concern over the scope of its
mandate, and possible redundancy in view of the presence of
international judges.
Proceedings began in the Kosovo courts to adjudicate about 40 cases
of alleged war crimes and genocide arising from the conflict, as well
as murder cases dating from the period starting in June 1999. Of these,
one war crimes case was decided on September 20, with the conviction in
Gnjilane (Gjilan) of Kosovar Serb Milos Jokic for murder, attempted
murder, and rape. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
b. Disappearance.--Individual disappearances and kidnapings
continued. In June an angry crowd of Serbs attacked UNMIK offices in
Strpce (Shterpce) over the disappearance of a Serb shepherd. Marjan
Melonasi, a journalist for Radio-Television Kosova who was half
Serbian, disappeared in Pristina around September 9 (see Section 2.a.).
Human rights organizations and police confirmed the kidnaping or
disappearance of several young women each month. Most but not all of
these victims reportedly eventually reappeared or were found, many
after they were raped.
As a result of the 1999 armed conflict, and despite the efforts of
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the ICTY, and
other local and international organizations, the fate of over 3,600
persons (2,750 Albanians presumed taken by Serbs, 500 Serbs presumed
taken by Albanians, and 300 members of other ethnic groups) remained
unknown at year's end. Withdrawing Yugoslav forces also took more than
2,000 Albanian detainees with them into Serbia; Serbian authorities
released over 1,300 by year's end, reputedly after payment to Serb
middlemen by detainees' families in most cases.
Both the ICTY and the VRIC, assisted by other international
governmental and nongovernmental entities, continued their work to
identify bodies exhumed from mass gravesites (see Section 1.a.). ICTY
and other international experts did not expect to find many new mass
graves. A clear gap continued between the 1,260 unidentified remains
and the 3,600 persons reported to the ICRC as missing and unaccounted
for at year's end. Efforts by governments, international organizations,
and NGO's to determine the fate of these missing persons, including
through pressure on Yugoslavia, did not lead to any results.
In August the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights named a
Special Envoy for Persons Deprived of Liberty in Connection with the
Armed Conflict in Kosovo. In September the SRSG announced the
establishment of an office in Pristina for detainees and missing
persons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of
punishment, and CIVPOL and KFOR largely respected the law in practice;
however, there were sporadic reports of the use of excessive force
during arrests and other abuses. Military authorities reported in
September that nine members of a KFOR unit, including four officers,
were disciplined following an investigation into allegations of
excessive force, beating of suspects, and sexual assault on women at
checkpoints and while on patrol. KFOR used tear gas to disperse a
peaceful demonstration in Mitrovica (see Section 2.b.).
Some reports suggested that KPC members were responsible for
incidents of intimidation and extortion, and in several zones such
misconduct may have been organized and condoned by the local KPC
leadership. In response UNMIK and KFOR put into place a KPC
disciplinary code and a compliance enforcement framework, which
assigned responsibility for investigating and disciplining KPC
compliance violations and criminal actions. At KFOR's insistence, all
six KPC zone commanders were rotated in October. By the end of the
year, documented instances of KPC non-compliance had decreased
significantly.
International organizations reported that in the first half of
1999, Serb forces subjected ethnic Albanian women to illegal
confinement, rape and other forms of torture. ICTY has ruled that the
definition of war crimes includes the Serb use of rape and sexual
assault against ethnic Albanians. Kidnapings and mass rapes occurred in
Djakovica (Gjakova), Pec (Peja), and Drenica, using local hotels and
army camps as mass rape sites, and gang rapes of women occurred in
their homes or on the side of the road. Assailants killed male family
members who tried to intervene and women who tried to escape. According
to credible information, individual KLA soldiers and other Albanians
raped Serb and Roma women in the months following Yugoslavia's
withdrawal in 1999. Since then, police have registered over 95
individual rape and attempted rape complaints, but there has been no
strong ethnic pattern, nor evidence to suggest organized sexual abuse
of minority women. However, rape is underreported significantly due to
the cultural stigma attached to victims and their families (see Section
5).
Numerous attacks on political figures, particularly members of the
LDK, were reported, both before and after the October municipal
elections (see Section 3). In most cases, no suspects were found;
however, local observers blamed many of these attacks on the rival PDK
party and former KLA fighters. Nonpolitical motives including clan
rivalry, criminality, and competition for economic resources also were
suspected in some cases.
In early December, unknown assailants attempted to kill Hajvas
Berisha, a former commander of the KLA and a KPS member, in Pristina.
UNMIK arrested three of the alleged assailants; however, because the
case involved a family blood feud, no charges were filed against the
assailants because the case was settled out of court through
traditional Albanian feud mediation methods.
KFOR arrested a group of Serbs in Gracanica in September in
possession of a large cache of explosives and arms. The Serbs
reportedly were planning terrorist acts against UNMIK and other
international entities. Two were reportedly officers of a special
forces unit of the Yugoslav Army (VJ).
There were some reports of attacks and intimidation of UNMIK and
KFOR officials. In February, a KFOR soldier was shot by unknown
assailants while escorting Serb children from school in Gnjilane
(Gjilan), apparently in retribution for the killing of two Albanian
males by KFOR soldiers earlier in the year. On September 12, Vjosa
Dobruna, the Kosovar co-chair of the Department of Civil Society and
Democratic Governance, reported that her car was broken into and moved
from its parking place; nothing was missing or stolen. On December 7,
Serbs beat a U.N. policeman during an inspection of suspected weapons
caches in northern Mitrovica. On December 19, unknown persons attacked
the UNMIK building in Zubin Potok with automatic gunfire and grenades.
Prison conditions meet prisoners' basic needs of food, sanitation,
and access to medical care; however, facilities are in need of further
refurbishment and repair. Some facilities are overcrowded. UNMIK
established the Kosovo Correction Service (KCS), and the OSCE provided
training for over 400 of a planned force of 700-plus corrections
officers. The KCS, which included international corrections experts as
interim administrators, operated 3 prisons in Prizren (with a capacity
100 inmates), Dubrava (with a capacity of 520), and Lipljan (Lipjan).
The latter is to be restricted to women and juveniles and eventually
after further renovation is to offer space for mentally disturbed
prisoners and detainees after further renovation. CIVPOL and KFOR
operated four additional detention centers in Pristina, Mitrovica, Pec
(Peja), and Gnjilane (Gjilan). KFOR also held detainees accused of war
crimes and serious ethnic offenses at Camp Bondsteel, but planned to
turn over all detention responsibilities to the KCS by early 2001. In
the absence of currently suitable detention facilities for mentally
disturbed prisoners, police released a visibly disturbed female
detainee from the Mitrovica detention center on August 22; she
reportedly committed suicide 3 days later.
Male and female prisoners are separated, and there is a separate
facility in Lipljan (Lipjan) for females and juveniles, but there have
been cases of older youths who have been held with the general adult
population.
Prisons and detention centers permitted the ICRC full access to
prisoners and detainees. In the absence of a formal agreement but
pursuant to OSCE's mandate for human rights monitoring under UNSCR
1244, they also offered ad hoc access to the OSCE human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Under UNMIK regulation
1999/24, issued in December 1999, which incorporated a local law in
effect as of March 1989 and current practice, police may detain
criminal suspects for up to 72 hours without charging them or granting
them access to an attorney; however, in many cases, sources reported
that CIVPOL used the 72-hour detention authority as a means of minor
punishment with no intention of filing charges. The applicable rules of
criminal procedure permit pretrial detention for up to 6 months, but
UNMIK has decreed by regulation that this period may be extended by up
to an additional 6 months in specific circumstances, in the case of
crimes punishable by a sentence of over 5 years.
In some instances, the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) intervened to
continue the detention of persons ordered released by the courts but
deemed an ongoing security threat. In July the prosecutor in Gnjilane
(Gjilan) declined to press charges against Afrim Zeqiri, an ethnic
Albanian accused of shooting three Serbs in May, including a child, and
an international judge complied with the order to release him (see
Section 5). Given the ethnic sensitivity of the case, UNMIK asked KFOR
to hold the accused pending review by an international prosecutor. The
case has since gone before another panel of ethnic Albanian judges, and
was found without merit. Zeqiri has not been released. COMKFOR also
held until July two ethnic Albanians accused of killing two Serbs in
July 1999, despite the fact that the Pristina district court ordered
their release in November 1999. Some accused persons were held for
several months pending the five district courts' becoming operational
in January and February. For example, in Gnjilane (Gjilan) district, 12
defendants accused of serious crimes were awaiting trial when the court
began hearing cases in February; most of these had been in detention
for some time, some as long as 7 months. In May 41 Serb and Roma
prisoners in Mitrovica went on a hunger strike for several weeks to
protest the delay in holding their trials.
Some observers argued that ethnic bias played a significant role in
abuses of due process. In July 1999, authorities arrested three members
of the Serb Momcilovic family accused of killing an Albanian and
wounding another. The newly appointed prosecutor for Gnjilane (Gjilan)
indicted the three in January; their trial took place in April,
subsequently was adjourned, and did not reconvene until the end of
July. Although at that point there was evidence exonerating the
defendants of murder, the court ordered further gathering of evidence
before convicting them on weapons charges in August and sentencing them
to time served. In the meantime, the other 11 (ethnic Albanian)
defendants awaiting a functioning court in Gnjilane (Gjilan) were tried
in February. Observers also argued that the Momcilovics' detention was
prolonged unnecessarily due to the court's refusal in April to admit a
video that tended to exonerate them, and to KFOR's failure to perform a
sufficiently detailed investigation into the initial incident and
transmit the evidence in a timely manner.
Some 300 persons remained in pretrial detention in CIVPOL and KCS
prisons and detention facilities and 57 persons remained in KFOR
detention.
At the end of the year, the Yugoslav authorities continued to
detain approximately 700 Kosovar Albanians in prison in Serbia, charged
with alleged crimes arising from the Kosovo conflict. Federal and
Serbian laws regarding conspiracy, threats to the integrity of the
Government, and terrorism are vague and were abused by the Milosevic
regime. Yugoslav authorities released over 1,300 detainees, allegedly
through the payment of bribes in some cases. The ICRC was able to gain
permission for some family members to visit detainees in Serbia under
restricted conditions.
There were no reports of political detainees.
Exile is not permitted legally, and there were no reported
instances of its use. However, the continued fear of ethnic Serbs and
other minorities of revenge against them by Kosovar Albanians led large
numbers to leave Kosovo (about 150,000 Serbs left during and after
Yugoslavia's withdrawal), sometimes more or less voluntarily and
sometimes under harassment by Albanians. The departure of Serbs and
other minorities continued throughout the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Applicable law provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the legacy of ethnic conflict and years
of Yugoslav oppression were an obstacle to judicial independence, and
some judges and prosecutors reportedly were subject to outside
pressure, particularly in cases involving ethnic disputes.
Supported by an Advisory Judicial Commission, UNMIK re-established
a court system in Kosovo that included the Supreme Court, 5 district
courts, 18 municipal courts, the Commercial Court, 13 offices of the
Public Prosecutor, and a number of courts for minor offenses. Of those
officials appointed by the UNMIK SRSG, 324 judges and 52 prosecutors
began work, as well as 377 lay judges to assess the facts of the case.
The judicial corps is almost exclusively Albanian; 8 of 12 Serbian
appointees refused to serve. UNMIK also appointed members of other
minorities, who are serving.
Approximately 15 UNMIK-appointed international judges and
prosecutors work in the district courts alongside local judges in
sensitive ethnic cases. UNMIK planned for at least two international
judges and one international prosecutor in each of the five judicial
districts. UNMIK appointed 405 judges and prosecutorial personnel and
refurbished judicial facilities. Courts in all five districts began
operations.
The law provides for the right of defendants to be present at their
trials and to have legal representation, at public expense if
necessary; however, local judicial and legal personnel by and large had
not worked in the legal system since 1989, and the full exercise of
defendants' rights was not ensured.
The defense bar was weak and disorganized as well as rooted in a
more passive approach to defense due to years of practice under
Socialist and authoritarian codes. A program was underway to improve
the bar at year's end. Legal personnel were in the initial stages of
learning and applying international human rights laws and conventions.
Since UNMIK and the Kosovar legal community have not approved a new bar
examination, recent law students and legal personnel may not practice.
Serb lawyers and judges refused to participate in the judicial
system established by UNMIK, reportedly encouraged by the Milosevic
regime not to accept the Kosovo system by participating in it. This
practice effectively denied adequate representation and due process to
Serb defendants.
When they began hearing cases in January and February, the courts
faced a high backlog of criminal cases of all kinds. By June the courts
had tried 695 criminal cases, the vast majority of them petty crimes
and crimes against property; only 13 of them were murder cases, and
most resulted in fines or prison sentences under 6 months. An update on
the number of cases tried was unavailable at year's end.
There was a perception by human rights observers that in cases with
Serb defendants or victims, a fair trial was unlikely due to ethnic
bias. In July two Kosovar Albanians allegedly shot and injured three
Serb Orthodox clerics (see Sections 2.a. and 5). Police arrested the
accused, who were charged with attempted murder. When confusion and
miscommunication led the victims missing a court date, the Albanian
judge and prosecutor ordered the release of the defendants from
pretrial detention. The court president subsequently rescheduled the
hearing, and UNMIK assigned an international prosecutor to the case.
After the NATO campaign and Yugoslavia's withdrawal from Kosovo,
Kosovar Albanian judges were unanimous in rejecting Yugoslav and
Serbian law. On December 12, 1999, UNMIK issued Regulation 1999/24,
which defined applicable law in Kosovo to include both UNMIK
regulations and legal codes in effect as of March 1989, when Kosovo
lost its autonomy. Local legal and judicial personnel were enjoined to
apply the Kosovo code in effect in 1989 first, and to proceed to the
Yugoslav and Serbian codes to the extent that the first was incomplete.
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 bound all public officials to respect
international human rights laws and conventions; although they
initially largely were unacquainted with these, international
organizations and NGO's implemented programs to increase awareness and
application.
Kosovar and European legal experts reviewed the compilation of
applicable criminal law to ensure compliance with generally accepted
international standards. Legal experts then reviewed a criminal code
for Kosovo based on the regulation's guidance, but have not yet issued
the new codes.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Under UNMIK, authorities generally respected these
rights; however, individuals occasionally accused KFOR and U.N. Police
of using excessive force and improper behavior in executing weapons
searches in private homes, including breaking down doors and destroying
personal property.
In Mitrovica Serbs in the northern part of the city continued to
seize Albanian property, resulting in over 60 reported illegal house
occupations during the summer months. Albanians in the southern part of
Mitrovica continued to refuse Serbs access to their property there as
well. Civilians were also responsible for the destruction, often
through arson, of private property (see Section 5). There were a
growing number of credible reports of violence and intimidation being
used to force Serbs to sell their homes to Albanians at attractive
prices.
Respect for private property rights has proved problematic.
Withdrawing Yugoslav forces destroyed most existing property records
and this, combined with the disruption of 10 years of Serbian
authoritarianism and discrimination and the massive property
destruction during the conflict, cast doubt over how current occupants
of vacated properties could remain where they were living, how owners
could reclaim rightfully their property, where returnees and internally
displaced persons (IDP's) could live and build, and how potential
investors could gain title to land before investing significant sums.
UNMIK created by regulation the Housing and Property Directorate and
the Housing and Property Claims Commission responsible for resolving
property issues and adjudicating disputes including claims for
restitution of property lost through discrimination, requests for
registration of informal property transaction, and claims by refugees
and IDP's who lost their property. However, the Directorate and only
had offices in Pristina, although with mobile teams heard disputes
elsewhere. The regulation setting up the Housing and Property Claims
Commission removed court jurisdiction over private (as opposed to
commercial) property disputes. As a result, most property disputes
remained unresolved. There were locally administered ad hoc solutions,
and unregulated construction proceeded even as solutions for those
persons without accommodation still were lacking.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--UNMIK regulations provide a
framework for recognition of these rights, prohibit hate speech, and
regulate media conduct; however, local media and some international
media organizations and attorneys criticized UNMIK regulations on
speech and the press as undemocratic and an infringement on the freedom
of speech and of the press.
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 requires that public officials respect
international human rights laws and conventions, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes freedom of
speech and of the press. Through its regulation establishing the
Department of Post and Telecommunications, UNMIK asserts control over
broadcasting infrastructure; the OSCE oversees the Department of Media
Affairs. In February UNMIK issued Regulation 2000/4, which prohibited
hate speech and speech that incites ethnic violence.
In June UNMIK issued Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37 on the conduct
and organization of both broadcast and print media and established the
office of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) and the Media Appeals
Board. The TMC is responsible for publishing a broadcast code of
conduct and issuing licenses, for issuing temporary codes of conduct
for print media, and for imposing sanctions, up to and including
closing down offending media organs, in the event of violations of
UNMIK regulations or published codes of conduct.
Newspapers resumed publishing, and by year's end, there were seven
daily newspapers and seven weeklies or monthlies. All newspapers
published in Kosovo were printed in Albanian; journals in Serbo-
Croatian were printed elsewhere and imported. The main dailies are
aligned with different political parties. While flourishing, the print
media often acted irresponsibly, publishing inflammatory articles that
provided personal data including names and addresses of alleged war
criminals or collaborators and inciting violence against political
personalities. For example, the daily Dita published an article on
Petar Topoljski, an UNMIK Serb employee who subsequently was murdered
(see Section 5). In reaction UNMIK promulgated Regulations 2000/36 and
2000/37, which prohibited the publication in both the print and
broadcast media of personal information that would pose a threat to the
life, property, or security of persons through vigilante justice or
otherwise.
In July Dita accused Serbian Orthodox priests of war crimes. The
Orthodox Church denied that photographs published with the article
depicted any known priests. Two ethnic Albanians subsequently attacked
and injured a priest and two seminarians, (see Sections 1.e. and 5).
The newly appointed TMC fined the newspaper $12,200 (DM 25,000). In its
decision on Dita's appeal of the fine, the Media Appeals Board ruled
that since the situation in Kosovo approximated a state of emergency,
UNMIK's regulation did not violate international human rights laws and
that Dita's article violated the UNMIK Regulation. However, the Board
decided that the TMC did not apply proper procedures in fining Dita,
and overturned the penalty.
At year's end, there were over 50 radio and 9 television stations.
While the television broadcasts were exclusively in Albanian, several
radio stations broadcast in Serbo-Croatian for a Serbian audience, and
others, notably Radio Kontact (which also broadcast in Albanian,
Turkish, and English) aimed at a broader multiethnic audience.
There were some attacks on journalists. Radio Kontakt was the
target of a grenade attack on April 17. On June 20, Valentina Cukic, an
editor of Serbian language programming for Radio Kontakt, was shot and
wounded in Pristina while wearing her KFOR press identification. Radio
Kontakt previously had sought protection from CIVPOL, KFOR, and the
OSCE in response to threats and violence against the station, which
promotes multiethnic programming. In response, CIVPOL provided
protection details for Radio Kontakt personnel, as well as security at
the station premises. A writer for the daily Bota Sot claimed that an
unknown assailant threw an explosive device into his yard in Prizren in
August. In September unknown assailants shot, stabbed, and killed
Shefki Popova, a newspaper reporter, outside his apartment in Vucitrn
(Vushtrri). A radio journalist, Marjan Melonasi, disappeared the same
weekend (see Section 1.b.). In October Dita reported that LDK
sympathizers on their way to a rally near Urosevac (Ferizaj) beat a
radio reporter. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the intimidation of
journalists, like other public figures, is underreported due to
concerns for personal safety.
The University of Pristina was in full operation beginning with the
2000-01 academic year, with new and pre-1989 staff. The university
terminated and expelled six professors who cooperated with Yugoslavia
by teaching after 1989, when Kosovo lost its autonomy and a shadow
education system was established. UNMIK respected academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--UNMIK generally
respected freedom of assembly; however, occasionally it limited this
right.
On February 11, in Mitrovica Serbs in the northern part of the city
violently forced Albanians out of their homes, killing eight in the
process. Approximately 100,000 Albanian Kosovars marched in protest to
Mitrovica from Pristina and other towns en route. Although the march
itself was peaceful, KFOR prevented any attempt by the marchers to
cross the bridge over the Ibar River into north Mitrovica and used tear
gas to disperse those demonstrators who would not leave the bridge area
at the end of the march.
Several demonstrations protested against UNMIK and the
international community for not doing enough to locate missing persons,
including a May hunger strike by about 15 persons in Pristina. In
September about 60 persons who had been released from detention in
Serbia went on a hunger strike in Dubrava to protest the continued
detention of ethnic Albanians by the Belgrade regime.
In September local civil society representatives, joined by
political parties and international representatives, organized a ``Day
Against Violence'' as one element of reconciliation initiatives
discussed at an overseas conference in July on reconciliation.
In its regulations governing the definitions of and registration
requirements for both political parties and NGO's, UNMIK stated
specifically that such regulations did not affect the right to
association and UNMIK generally respected this right.
c. Freedom of Religion.--UNMIK respected the right to freedom of
religion, and Regulation 1999/24 binds local officials to respect this
right under international human rights laws and conventions.
The effects of the Milosevic regime's oppression in Kosovo still
are felt strongly. While the Milosevic regime and its local
paramilitaries targeted persons and properties based largely on
ethnicity, most Albanians are Muslims, and Yugoslav forces destroyed or
damaged a number of mosques and other Islamic facilities prior to their
withdrawal in June 1999. Given the strong association between Serbs and
the Serbian Orthodox Church, ethnic Albanians attacked churches as
symbols of the Serbian regime. Following Yugoslavia's withdrawal in
1999, over 100 Serbian Orthodox churches were burned or destroyed in
retaliation (see Section 5). In light of societal violence against
properties owned by the Orthodox Church, UNMIK authorities took steps
in the months following the conflict to ensure that members of all
religious groups could worship safely, including deploying KFOR
security contingents at Orthodox religious sites throughout the
province. Because the security situation improved at the end of the
year, KFOR began transferring responsibility for security at a very
limited number of Orthodox churches to CIVPOL and the KPS.
In July Dita accused Serbian Orthodox priests of war crimes. The
Orthodox Church denied that photographs published with the article
depicted any known priests. Two ethnic Albanians subsequently attacked
and injured a priest and two seminarians, (see Sections 1.e., 2.a., and
5).
Kosovo's leading Orthodox cleric, Bishop Artemije, continued to
reside in Gracanica, near Pristina, citing safety concerns, rather than
in the diocesan seat in Prizren. Other leading Orthodox clerics also
left their home parishes to reside in Gracanica.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Applicable law provides for freedom of
movement; however, both the aftermath of war and practical obstacles
restricted such movement in practice. Serbian and Yugoslav forces
carried out a deliberate campaign of ``identity cleansing'' during the
war, confiscating and destroying citizen identification documents and
destroying the central and municipal archives and civil registers, with
the result that many Kosovars had no documentation of identity. Some
persons who retained Yugoslav passports found them invalid or
unrecognized by neighboring countries due to the war. UNMIK published a
regulation in March that authorized the Central Civil Registry to issue
travel documents to any person registered as a habitual resident of
Kosovo. The complexities of registering mass numbers of persons without
any personal documentation drew out the process. In the interim, the
SRSG issued individual travel letters in limited cases, but only a few
countries recognized these documents. In September the U. N. submitted
a sample travel document to member states for approval. However,
because UNMIK was unable to issue identity cards until the end of the
year, new travel documents were not issued.
While precise figures are unavailable, substantial numbers of Serbs
and Roma fled Kosovo following the conflict. Many displaced Serbs did
not register with international agencies, but there are estimates of up
to 150,000 Kosovar Serbs in Serbia, with an undetermined small
additional number in Macedonia and approximately 30,000 displaced
Kosovar Serbs, Roma, and other minorities in Montenegro. Numbers of
displaced Roma are also difficult to estimate, although some sources
report that as many as 25,000 Roma fled Kosovo in the aftermath of the
conflict. Most did not return. Those who remained in Kosovo or who did
return led lives restricted by the ethnic threats from some of their
Albanian neighbors (see Section 5).
After Milosevic withdrew Yugoslav troops in June 1999, the UNHCR
oversaw the return of some 882,000 Kosovar refugees and IDP's from
surrounding regions and other countries; about 150,000 have returned
since the beginning of the year. While UNMIK and the international
community were able to address many of the most pressing problems of
the returnees, problems remained in obtaining sufficient housing,
social services for the most vulnerable, property records, and
education. Based on the establishment of a civil administration by
UNMIK, several countries that had offered temporary refuge to ethnic
Albanians forced by Milosevic to leave Kosovo ended their programs and
began forcing the refugees to return to Kosovo, which tested the
capacity of the province to absorb returnees. In October UNMIK asked
countries to suspend returns until March of 2001.
About 100,000 Serbs, 30,000 Roma, and 67,000 other minorities
remained in Kosovo. Most of the 150,000 Serbs and about 30,000 Roma who
fled when Yugoslav forces withdrew did not return, except in individual
cases, due to fear of ethnic violence should they return without
sufficient security safeguards and due to lack of economic opportunity,
housing, and other basic services. UNMIK, the UNHCR, and the
international community began a minority stabilization program to
address some of these assistance needs. Although the high level of
anti-Serb violence that characterized the period just after
Yugoslavia's withdrawal decreased significantly, ethnically motivated
violence and crime continued to be serious problems for minorities (see
Section 5). Several villages that were once ethnically mixed have
become almost entirely Albanian, with Serb residents moving to Serb
villages elsewhere in Kosovo or leaving altogether. KFOR and UNMIK
provided security to enclaves and minority settlements, and escorted
minority members who left their residence areas to visit family, gather
fuel, shop for food and other goods, attend school, and receive medical
care. KFOR regularly escorted convoys of private vehicles, and the
UNHCR provided buses to transport Serbs in larger numbers between
enclaves and into Serbia. In February a rocket attack on a UNHCR bus
killed two Serbs and wounded several more; as a result, the UNHCR
suspended bus service for several weeks (see Section 5). Serbs
throughout Kosovo and Roma in some areas reported that they were afraid
to leave their enclaves due to fear of intimidation and attack by
ethnic Albanians. On November 8, unknown assailants shot and killed
four displaced Ashkali who had returned to their village of Dosevac
(Dashevc) near Srbica (Skenderaj) to rebuild their houses, which were
destroyed during the war (see Section 5). Most minorities--including
Bosniaks, Egyptians, Ashkali, Gorani, and some Roma--lived alongside
ethnic Albanians and reported that their security situation improved
over the course of the year, although incidents of violence and
harassment continued to occur and their freedom of movement is
restricted in some areas of Kosovo. The Turkish community is more
closely integrated with Albanians and is less threatened than other
minorities. The remaining Roma in Kosovo largely were settled in
enclaves and settlements and were dependent almost wholly on
humanitarian aid.
In April the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) endorsed a
Declaration and Platform for Joint Action, under which key Albanian
leaders visited those areas where local Albanians and Roma were trying
to establish more cooperative interethnic relations, thus encouraging a
climate conducive to the return of those who fled the province earlier.
Roma still experienced difficulty in obtaining freedom of movement. The
degree of harassment by neighboring Albanians varied, with a greater
degree of difficulty for the Roma living in Kosovo Polje (Fushe
Kosova), Obilic (Obiliq), Podujevo (Podujeva), Lipljan (Lipjan), and
Gnjilane (Gjilan) (see Section 5). However, there were areas, notably
around Urosevac (Ferizaj) and Djakovica (Gjakova) where Roma,
Egyptians, and Albanians reportedly cohabited without major incidents.
Both Roma and Serb families were reluctant to send their children to
school, citing security concerns.
In early May UNMIK established the Joint Committee on Returns with
participation from KFOR, the UNHCR, and the Serb National Council to
facilitate and coordinate returns of minorities to Kosovo.
In Mitrovica there were restrictions on freedom of movement due to
ethnically based harassment (see Section 5).
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution during the year.
UNMIK and local authorities cooperated with the UNHCR to assist
returning refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
From 1989 until NATO's intervention, Kosovar Albanians expressed
their frustration with the province's status within Serbia through a
boycott of the political system and did not attempt to affect the
Government through the electoral process. After the withdrawal of
Yugoslav forces in 1999, UNMIK, the OSCE, and other international
actors, including donors, began to prepare for municipal elections,
with the aim of eventually organizing elections for a Kosovo-wide
government. One of the most critical elements of the establishment of
both a civil administration and an electoral process was the
registration of Kosovo's legitimate residents, following Yugoslavia's
``identity cleansing'' (see Section 2.d.).
At the conclusion of the electoral registration effort by the OSCE,
about 901,000 of an estimated population of over 1 million persons
successfully registered. UNMIK established a Central Election
Commission, which was charged with establishing electoral rules and
with organizing the operational details of the elections; there were
also municipal election commissions in each of the 30 municipalities
where elections were held. Pursuant to a registration process
established in March, 22 political parties, 1 coalition of 6 parties, 3
citizens' initiatives (grassroots organizations formed for political
purposes), and 16 independent candidates registered to run for office.
Serbs, citing security concerns and a lack of freedom of movement, did
not participate in the registration process and boycotted the October
municipal elections. Many Turks, due to a dispute with UNMIK over the
use of the Turkish language in official documents and procedures also
did not participate, although one Turkish political party did. Other
minorities participated in registration and in the elections. Several
fielded political parties and citizens' initiatives that won municipal
seats in the vote or agreed to accept appointed seats after the
elections.
Campaigning for the municipal elections began officially on
September 13. Earlier in the summer, there was an increase in violence
that appeared to be related to the election. Political parties,
especially the LDK but also the PDK and other parties, reported attacks
on political figures, both before and after the October municipal
elections (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In most cases, no suspects were
found; however, local observers blamed many of these attacks on the
rival PDK party and former KLA fighters. Nonpolitical motives including
clan rivalry, criminality, and competition for economic resources also
were suspected in some cases. For example, in June an LDK official was
beaten in Urosevac (Ferizaj). On July 18 and 21, LDK officials were
attacked in Lipljan (Lipjan). On August 2, Sejdi Koca, an LDK leader in
Srbica (Skenderaj), was shot; during that week an LDK official also was
shot in Podujevo (Podujeva). On August 18, a bomb attack damaged the
office of the Party of Democratic Action, Kosovo's Bosniak party. It
was not clear whether the attack was directed at the party office, the
office of a Turkish political party nearby where an employee was
slightly injured, or the office of the Serb Center for Peace and
Tolerance. Supporters of rival political parties challenged LDK
activists in Lipljan (Lipjan) several times, once disrupting a rally by
hurling objects. The PDK reported that unknown arsonists burned down a
neighborhood office in Pristina on September 22. A local newspaper
reported that LDK supporters beat a radio journalist. In mid-November,
an unknown assailant shot and badly wounded Shkelzen Hyseni, the newly
elected LDK assemblyman in Pec (Peja). On November 30, LDK branch
committee member Ejup Visoka was shot twice in a drive-by shooting in
Podujevo (Podujeva); he was wounded in the arms and stomach. Also in
November, unknown assailants attacked the wife of Elez Nikqi, Rugova's
bodyguard, cutting her across the throat.
After investigating several of these incidents, on October 3 the
OSCE's Election Complaints and Appeals Sub-Commission (ECAC) imposed on
political parties a series of penalties. These penalties included fines
of up to $2,400 (DM 5,000) and, in one case, a candidate being stricken
from the PDK list of candidates.
Despite the violence in some areas prior to election day, the
elections themselves were held on October 28 without significant
violence. Voter turnout was high (about 75 percent). International and
domestic observers reported some irregularities and logistical flaws.
In Pristina a few underage persons were observed voting. Voters' lists
were incomplete and cumbersome. Late polling station openings and a
lack of crowd-flow systems at many stations resulted in long lines and
occasional minor crowd unrest. Election officials were able to address
most problems during the course of the day. The Council of Europe
observer mission concluded that the elections were carried out in
accordance with international democratic standards and met the criteria
for credible elections. The LDK won 58 percent of the overall vote,
compared with 27 percent for the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and
less than 8 percent for the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). A
number of small parties won the remaining votes. On November 27, newly
elected municipal assemblies were sworn in. Members of the assemblies
in three Serb-majority municipalities where elections were boycotted
were selected and sworn in during December.
Yugoslav authorities organized polling sites inside Kosovo for
those who wished to vote in Yugoslavia's federal elections on September
24. According to UNMIK, which did not itself support this electoral
activity but which sent out several hundred ``witnesses,''
approximately 45,000 of roughly 60,000 eligible Kosovar Serbs turned
out, but only a handful of Kosovar Albanians voted. The Yugoslav
elections were peaceful; however, the voting was conducted in a
disorganized, illegitimate, and fraudulent manner. The Serbian
opposition alleged fraud and vote tampering in the northern part of the
province, including one stolen ballot box in Leposavic and opposition
election observers being denied access to polling areas. On December
23, Serbian parliamentary elections took place throughout Serbia,
including Kosovo. Although KFOR and CIVPOL monitored the security
climate, there was no international ``witnessing'' effort. No security
incidents were reported.
Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244, UNMIK established the Joint
Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) for Kosovo, intended not only
to provide a joint U.N.-Kosovar administration of services and revenue
collection but also to supplant self-appointed administrators and
officials throughout the province. The JIAS includes the SRSG, the
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), the IAC, and 20 administrative
departments. The 36-member KTC is designed to reflect the pluralistic
ethnic and political range of Kosovar society and is the highest level
Kosovar advisory body. The eight-member IAC makes policy
recommendations and serves as an executive board for the administrative
departments and also includes minority representation. The departments,
each with a Kosovar and an international co-head, provide social and
administrative services, collect and manage revenues, and implement
policies established by the other elements of the JIAS. The structure
is mirrored on the municipal level, where municipal councils were
elected on October 28.
No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government
and politics; however, they are underrepresented. According to women's
groups, few women traditionally entered politics because of a lack of
interest, money, education, and family support. Nonetheless, women held
7 of the 36 KTC seats, women led at least 2 political parties, and the
UNMIK electoral regulation required that party candidate lists for the
municipal elections include a set quota of 30 percent women. However,
the ``open list'' ballot apparently allowed voters to vote around
female candidates, resulting in only 76 women elected to office in the
October municipal elections, or 8.26 percent of total municipal
assembly seats. In addition UNMIK appointed two women as co-heads of
departments under the JIAS.
No legal restrictions exist on participation by ethnic minorities
in government and politics. The Kosovar co-head positions in JIAS
departments are shared by minority groups, with two such positions
reserved for Serbs and two for other minority members. A prominent Serb
observer sits on the Interim Administrative Council; five Serbs hold
positions and five other members of ethnic minorities hold positions on
the KTC, as well as one Roman Catholic cleric. Although Kosovar Serbs
boycotted the municipal elections, several ethnically based political
parties registered candidates.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
UNMIK and the OSCE continued their encouragement of the development
of civil society, including domestically based NGO's. A broad range of
U.N. agencies and numerous international organizations and NGO's
pursued operations in the province to assist with administration and to
provide relief to all Kosovars as they faced the aftermath of war. This
included assistance to hundreds of thousands of returning refugees,
support for the search for the missing, and social services to
ameliorate the effects of trauma. UNMIK issued a regulation in November
1999 on NGO registration. Over 300 domestic NGO's are registered and
active in the province.
Human rights monitors including those of the OSCE, as well as some
associated with domestically based NGO's, were active in documenting
ethnically or politically motivated killings, disappearances, attacks,
and incidents of intimidation. Monitors and observers also looked into
reported abuses by members of the KPS, KPC, CIVPOL, and KFOR. The ICRC
gained full access to prisons and detention centers throughout Kosovo
in exercise of its humanitarian mandate (see Section 1.c.). UNSC
Resolution 1244 gave the OSCE the mandate for human rights monitoring.
Although UNMIK and the OSCE did not reach agreement on procedures, OSCE
monitors generally were able to carry out their mandate on an ad hoc
basis in most courts and gained limited access to prisons and detention
centers.
In June UNMIK established the office of Human Rights Ombudsperson
to ensure Kosovars' rights under international human rights laws and to
investigate allegations of abuses. Marek Nowicki of Poland was
appointed to the position in August, and the Ombudsperson's office
opened on November 21.
UNMIK cooperated with the ICTY and ICTY investigators and field
teams made numerous trips to the province to investigate alleged war
crimes committed there and to gather data, particularly through the
exhumation of victims, necessary to the prosecution of such crimes.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
UNMIK's regulation on applicable law specifically prohibits
discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, or ethnic
origin.
Women.--Rape and a high level of domestic violence remained
serious, persistent problems. There are no governmental agencies
dedicated to coping with family violence. Applicable criminal law, as
defined by UNMIK regulation, is incomplete in addressing both domestic
violence and sexual crimes. Several domestic and international NGO's
pursue activities to assist women, but they are constrained to some
extent by a tradition of silence about domestic violence, sexual abuse,
and rape. In Kosovo's traditionally male-dominated society, it is
culturally acceptable for men to beat their wives; credible sources
report that violence against women has increased in the post-conflict
period. Few victims of spousal abuse ever file complaints with the
authorities.
Rape is underreported significantly due to the cultural stigma
attached to victims and their families. Tradition prevents much
discussion of the topic of rape among ethnic Albanians, since the act
is seen as dishonoring the entire family. The prevalence of rape by
Yugoslav and Serbian forces during the conflict has heightened the
profile of rape as a form of war crime, but few individual women have
come forward publicly. There has been a reluctance to file charges with
the ICTY, for example. U.N. Police registered over 95 rapes and rape
attempts in the province during the year. However, there is credible
anecdotal evidence, supported by customary practice, that rape is
underreported significantly.
The province served increasingly as a transit point and destination
for trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
Section 6.f.).
Women traditionally do not share status equal to men, and
relatively few women obtain upper level management positions in
commerce or government, although there is no legal restriction on their
doing so. Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold
that women should be subservient to the male members of their families,
long have subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, women
often are little more than serfs, without the ability to exercise a
right to control property and children. Women widowed by the recent war
risked losing custody of their children due to an Albanian custom
requiring children to be given to the deceased father's family. While
legally women and men equally are entitled to inherit property, it is
customary that family property passes to men only. Particularly in
rural areas, when a man dies, his widow often is returned to her birth
family and his family assumes his land, leaving the widow without
property.
UNMIK's Office of Gender Affairs worked to coordinate gender issues
throughout the programs of all UNMIK offices. It identified a network
of gender focal points in all JIAS departments and in UNMIK's regional
and municipal offices that were responsible for initiating and
implementing gender policy in their respective areas and for
facilitating consultation between UNMIK and women's organizations.
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 binds government officials to abide by the
provisions of international human rights law and conventions, but that
requirement has not yet benefited women's lives in rural areas.
In population centers, the presence of UNMIK and an unprecedented
number of international and nongovernmental organizations has opened a
large number of previously unavailable jobs to women. UNMIK police and
the OSCE launched an aggressive campaign to recruit women for the
Kosovo Police Service (they make up 17 to 20 percent of the force).
Women are increasingly active in political and human rights
organizations. Women led two political parties, and several
professional women worked as NGO and human rights activists.
Children.--UNMIK established the JIAS Departments of Education and
Science and of Health and Social Welfare, which address concerns about
children's education and health. Following Kosovo's loss of autonomy in
1989, Albanian parents refused to send their children to Serb-run
public schools and developed a ``shadow'' education system. The quality
of education was uneven and the divisions inherent in society were
replicated in children's schooling. In 1999 conflict and the Serb
ethnic cleansing campaign disrupted the spring term of the school year.
Although many schools reopened for the 1999-2000 academic year,
extensive damage to many school buildings, a lack of educational
materials, and persistent electrical power outages hindered the full
functioning of the education system. Serb and Roma parents were
reluctant to send their children to the reopened schools despite the
efforts of the authorities to provide security. As the school year
progressed, international organizations rebuilt and equipped schools
and the numbers of students enrolled increased.
All schools opened on time for the 2000-2001 academic year. UNMIK
issued a regulation on August 30 making enrollment in public school
compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 15 (with only minor
exceptions). The regulation made no provision for a waiver due to
ethnic concerns. At least one school, in Pones (Ponesh), enrolled
Serbian in addition to Albanian children, but most minority children
continued to attend separate schools. In rural areas, lack of
transportation made families reluctant to send girls to school since
the prospect of future employment was slim.
Economic problems and the aftermath of the conflict also affected
the health care system, with adverse consequences for children. The
health situation for children remained particularly poor. Humanitarian
aid officials blamed the high rate of infant and childhood mortality,
as well as increasing epidemics of preventable diseases, primarily on
poverty that led to malnutrition, poor hygiene, and the deterioration
of public sanitation. The high levels of air and water pollution, as
well as the environmental effects of the uncontrolled release of toxic
substances, including lead at the Trepca industrial complex, likely
contributed to poor health conditions as well.
The province served as a destination and transit point for
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
Section 6.f.).
There was no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--Although the law prohibits
discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment,
education, or in the provision of state services, inadequate facilities
and the level of unemployment posed obstacles to the employment of the
disabled. The law mandates access to new official buildings; however,
it is not enforced in practice.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are intertwined so
closely that it is difficult to clearly identify discriminatory acts as
primarily religious in origin rather than ethnic. Kosovar Serbs, in
particular, identify themselves with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which
defines not only their religious but also their cultural and historical
perspectives. However, the views of all ethnic groups have been
influenced strongly by religion, and some instances of ethnic
discrimination or tension may have religious roots.
Although UNMIK continued to take steps to ensure that members of
all religious groups could worship safely, Bishop Artemije, the leading
cleric of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, remained at a
monastery in Gracanica, near Pristina, rather than at his seat in
Prizren (see Section 2.c.). Despite the KFOR presence, there were
attacks on Orthodox churches. In April in Mitrovica a crowd of rock-
throwing Albanians attacked Serbs and their KFOR escorts during a
religious ceremony for Orthodox Easter. On April 28, unknown
perpetrators rigged an antitank device that blew up the church in
Grncar (Gerncar); since the Easter service was postponed, congregants
were not harmed. After the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces in 1999,
ethnic Albanians attacked Serbian Orthodox churches and burned or
otherwise destroyed over 100 of them, including 20 during the year. On
December 22, unknown assailants threw a hand grenade at the only
functioning Serbian Orthodox church in Pristina, breaking windows and
causing other damage. The daily newspaper Dita published a story in
July that alleged that Orthodox priests committed war crimes (see
Section 2.a.), and assailants subsequently shot and wounded a Serbian
Orthodox priest and two seminary students in a drive-by shooting.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the high level of
retaliatory anti-Serb violence that followed Yugoslavia's 1999
withdrawal dropped significantly, ethnically motivated violence and
crime continued to affect minorities. Serbs, Roma, and other minorities
were victims of murder, kidnaping, assault, and property crimes,
especially arson.
On February 2, unknown assailants killed Josip Vasic, a prominent
doctor and member of the Serb National Council in Gnjilane (Gjilan).
Also on February 2, unknown assailants fired on a KFOR-escorted, UNHCR
bus traveling to Mitrovica from the Serb village of Banja carrying 49
Serbs, and killed 2 persons. In Novo Brdo (Novoberde) district, unknown
assailants stabbed the last remaining Serb in one village, a woman, in
February. On February 18, a Serb man was found dead in Podujevo
(Podujeva) with gunshot wounds to the mouth and eye and his identity
card pinned to his chest. On March 11, the body of a Serb man was found
near Gracanica Lake; he had been shot and killed. On April 3, the body
of a Serb man was found, bound and shot, in Pristina. On May 16, police
found the remains of Petar Topoljski, a Serbian UNMIK employee,
following publication by the Pristina-based newspaper Dita of an
article identifying Topoljski as a member of a Serb paramilitary unit
(See Section 2.a.). On August 27, an 80-year-old Serbian farmer was
shot and killed in Crkvena Vodica. On September 14, a Serb woman was
shot and killed in her home in Kamenica. On October 4, the body of a
60-year-old Serb shepherd with gunshot wounds was found near Strpce
(Shterpce) after he was reported missing. Assailants killed Serbs in
incidents throughout the year in Gnjilane (Gjilan) district. In March
and April alone, 60 Serb families there sold their property and
departed for Serbia.
Serb children also were targeted. On August 18, 10 children were
wounded by a grenade thrown from a passing car onto a basketball court
in the Serb village of Crkvena Vodica. On August 27, a Kosovar Albanian
intentionally ran over four Serbian children in two different villages,
causing the death of one child and the serious injury of several
others. On May 28, an ethnic Albanian male opened fire on a group of
Serb men in front of a shop in Gnjilane (Gjilan), killing three
persons, including a 4-year-old child (see Section 1.d.).
Serbs were also victims of beatings, grenade attacks, and arson. A
total of 522 cases of arson were reported during the year.
In June local Serbs in Srbica (Skenderaj) allegedly attacked
members of the Albanian Behrami family, killing two. In the village of
Cubrelj (Cubrel), a group of Serbs killed two Albanians on June 12, the
first anniversary of the conclusion of the NATO military campaign.
Other minorities were also victims of violence. In January unknown
persons killed four members of a Bosniak family in Prizren. In April 15
Albanian men beat a 70-year-old Bosniak woman in Pec (Peja).
On April 3, unknown assailants kidnaped Metodije Halauska, an 86-
year-old Czech man, from his home in Pristina, beat him, and shot him
in the back of the head.
On January 12, four members of a family of Torbesh (Muslim Slavs)
were shot and killed in their home by an unknown assailant in Prizren.
On May 24, an Albanian youth shot and wounded a Gorani woman in
Pristina, reportedly because she did not speak Albanian. Minority
communities in Prizren were subject to violent attacks, intimidation,
and arson during the year.
On November 8, unknown assailants shot and killed four displaced
Ashkali who had returned to their village of Dosevac (Dashevc) near
Srbica (Skenderaj) to rebuild their houses, which were destroyed during
the war. Three members of an Ashkali family died in the Lipljan
(Lipjan) area during the first week of August when a fire set off a
grenade in their courtyard. It was not clear whether the grenade had
been placed as a booby trap. In November in Urosevac (Ferizaj), unknown
assailants murdered a 13-year-old Gorani boy and burned his body.
There were reports of the ethnically motivated murder of Roma by
unidentified Albanians. Roma were targeted because they are perceived
as Serb collaborators by ethnic Albanians. On March 4, unknown persons
shot and killed a 50-year-old Romani woman in Gusica and then set her
house on fire. On March 27, a Rom was found strangled to death in Istok
(Istog). On April 19, in Pec (Peja) two unidentified men shot and
killed a Romani man. In April the European Roma Rights Center reported
that two Romani boys and a Romani woman were killed by unknown
assailants in Pec (Peja). In August three Roma were killed and one was
injured by a mortar bomb tied to their fence in Mali Alas, near
Pristina.
Roma also were subject to beatings, harassment, and attacks on
property. According to the European Roma Rights Center, on April 13,
four armed men who represented themselves as members of the KLA,
allegedly took a Romani man out of his house in Prizren, beat him, and
threatened him. On May 17, an unidentified man beat a Rom in Trebovic.
Numerous Roma were injured by hand grenades thrown at their houses.
Unknown persons also burned Romani houses in Prizren, Gnjilane
(Gjilan), Gorna Brnjica, Pec (Peja), Orahovac (Rahovec), and other
cities.
The remaining Roma in Kosovo largely were settled in enclaves and
encampments and were almost wholly dependent on humanitarian aid to
survive. In Kosovo Polje (Fushe Kosove), Podujevo (Podujeva), Lipljan
(Lipjan), and Gnjilane (Gjilan), there was some degree of harassment by
neighboring Albanians, especially in the latter two towns. The UNHCR
reported discrimination by Albanian hospital workers against Roma.
Civilians were responsible for the destruction, often through
arson, of private property. There was a growing number of credible
reports of violence and intimidation being used to force Serbs to sell
their homes to Albanians at attractive prices. Of the approximately
120,000 homes damaged by Yugoslav and Serbian forces and paramilitaries
from 1998 on, 50,000 houses were beyond repair and, despite the efforts
of international organizations another 38,000 houses were not habitable
(see Section 1.f.).
Serbs and Roma who did not leave when Yugoslav forces withdrew
lived primarily in enclaves, except for the Serbs in the north of the
province, where Serbs and Albanians effectively partitioned Mitrovica.
Serbs lived largely in the northern Kosovo municipalities of Leposavic,
Zubin Potok, and Zvecan, and in the northern part of Mitrovica, and in
scattered enclaves under KFOR protection elsewhere. KFOR and UNMIK
provided security to these enclaves, settlements, and camps, and
escorted minority members who left their residence areas as well as
convoys of private Serb vehicles. The UNHCR provided buses to transport
Serbs in larger numbers between enclaves and into Serbia to take care
of personal business.
In Mitrovica Serb and Albanian Kosovars restricted each other's
freedom of movement (see Section 2.d.). After Serbian forces withdrew
in 1999, many ethnic Serbs from throughout Kosovo fled to Mitrovica and
occupied homes, including those belonging to ethnic Albanians in the
northern part of that town. Ethnic Albanians who sought to return to
their homes in the north were subject to violence and intimidation by
ethnic Serbs, and about 1,500 who live in the northern section of town
reported repeated harassment. For example, in April a group of Serbs
set fire to 3 Albanian homes and damaged over 20 U.N. vehicles in north
Mitrovica. Ethnic Serbs stationed near the bridges monitored persons
who crossed the Ibar River from southern Mitrovica into the northern
part of the town. Serbs in the northern part of the city continued to
seize Albanian property, resulting in over 60 reported illegal house
occupations during the summer months. At the same time, ethnic Serbs,
including some who owned property there, were unable to move freely in
the southern part of the town without similar harassment from ethnic
Albanians.
Politically, both Serbs and Roma made some progress. The Serbs in
particular, through the Gracanica-based Serb National Council (SNV),
participated in the JIAS organs and negotiated with the international
community for increased assistance and programs in addition to more
effective security.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Under Yugoslav law, workers had the
right to join or form unions; however, in practice neither the official
nor the independent unions were effective in protecting workers'
rights. Applicable law, pending further agreed regulations and
legislation, is that in effect in March 1989, when labor and employment
law reflected socialist structures inappropriate to and unenforceable
in existing conditions. In creating the JIAS Department of Labor and
Employment, UNMIK included in its responsibilities policy
recommendations on labor practices and the rights of workers and
recognized labor as one element of an eventual tripartite commission
but made no mention of a specific right of association.
After the war, labor organizations, which had focused during the
1990's on members' welfare, redirected their focus to traditional labor
issues. The dominant group, the Confederation of Independent Trade
Unions of Kosovo (BSKP), was founded in 1990 and its membership reached
a high point of about 260,000 members in the mid-1990's. Its current
president is a member of the KTC.
With most Albanians unemployed during the period under Milosevic,
the BSKP focused more on assisting its membership to survive than on
collective bargaining. The organization is working with international
entities, including the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), to rebuild
its membership and its collective bargaining ability. Other trade union
organizations include the Independent Trade Union of Miners and the
Union of Education, Science, and Culture of Kosova, a rival educators'
union to the one with membership in the BSKP. All three unions have
expressed interest not only in participating in the drafting of labor
legislation but also in the terms for privatization of state
enterprises.
The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains
constrained in practice, although there are no legal impediments to
their doing so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While draft
labor legislation includes the right to organize and bargain
collectively, no applicable law currently specifically addresses this
right. Collective bargaining is at a rudimentary level of development.
The history of trade unionism was centered not on bargaining for the
collective needs of all workers but rather for the specific needs of a
given group. Thus, workers in various sectors were ineffective in
finding common denominators (e.g., job security protection, minimum
safety standards, universal benefits, etc.) on which to negotiate.
Given the poor state of the economy and the high unemployment rate,
wages other than those paid by international and nongovernmental
organizations rarely are paid on time, and there is little possibility
for negotiation by labor organizations.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and is not
generally known to occur; however, the province served as a
destination, source and transit point for trafficking in women and
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Under labor law dating from before 1989, the minimum age
for employment was 16, although in villages and farming communities it
is not unusual to find younger children at work assisting their
families. Moreover, children can be found in a variety of unofficial
``retail'' jobs, typically washing car windows or selling newspapers
and small items such as cigarettes. With an unemployment rate in excess
of 60 percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal
sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is
prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur; however, girls
are trafficked to, from, and through the province for the purpose of
forced prostitution (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--After the withdrawal of Yugoslav
forces and authorities in June 1999, there was no effective minimum
wage rate, as Kosovar Albanians refused to recognize the Yugoslav-
Serbian legal code. The unemployment level exceeded 60 percent, and the
average wage paid to those who had work was insufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. While many
international agencies and NGO's paid wages adequate to support a
worker and family, UNMIK determined that wages for any jobs that
eventually would be part of the province's own governmental structure,
even if funded by the international community at present, should be set
at a level estimated to be supportable by the consolidated budget.
Salaries under the Kosovo Consolidated Budget are barely enough to
support a worker and a family.
Reports of sweatshops operating in the province are rare, although
some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor
conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little
meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the
enforcement of established occupational safety and health standards,
and focused their efforts instead on economic survival.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking is a serious and growing
problem. Throughout the year, nothing in the applicable law, as defined
by UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, provided an effective legal framework
under which to address trafficking. The province was mainly a
destination point, but it was also a transit point for women and girls
trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution.
UNMIK police raided several brothels and nightclubs throughout the
year in Pristina, Pec (Peja), and Prizren, and found more than 50 women
of Ukrainian, Moldovan, Bulgarian, and Romanian origin working as
prostitutes under slave-like conditions. There were also reports of
trafficked women from Albania, Belarus, and African countries. Security
authorities also reported that women and girls are being smuggled
through Kosovo to Macedonia, Albania, and Italy. Evidence suggested
that trafficking in women was an example of a coordinated effort
between ethnic Serbs and Albanians, like other areas of organized
crime. There were several kidnapings and disappearances of young women
who subsequently were not located. Some local sources believed that
these women were the victims of traffickers in some cases, although
there is no clear evidence that this was the case. Pristina and Kosovo
Polje (Fushe Kosova) are major centers for trafficking. In November
UNMIK and KFOR arrested 7 Kosovar Serb men for kidnaping and operating
houses of prostitution; 12 Moldovan women were found and brought to a
local NGO.
Women are recruited to work in cleaning jobs and are abducted and
forced into prostitution. While some women were aware that they would
enter the sex industry, they were not aware that they effectively would
be imprisoned and unable to earn money. Trafficking victims have
reported that they were subject to physical violence, rape, denial of
access to health care, and confiscation of their passports.
Because prostitution is punishable under provincial law, women are
often afraid to report their traffickers due to fear of arrest. In
Mitrovica one woman who was believed to be a trafficking victim was
convicted of prostitution. However, UNMIK police have been active in
investigating and intervening in incidents of trafficking.
According to the IOM, the presence of a large international
community that purchases sex services has contributed to the increase
in the number of brothels that are involved in trafficking.
Several international agencies and NGO's established programs to
assist the victims of trafficking with material support in returning to
their countries of origin or homes, if they so wished. The IOM launched
an awareness campaign directed at UNMIK, KFOR, and local men who
purchase the services of women who were most likely to be trafficking
victims.
Montenegro
Montenegro, constitutionally a constituent republic (together with
Serbia) of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), made
progress in its efforts to build a multiparty, multiethnic,
parliamentary democracy; however, a deeply rooted patronage system and
corruption continued to be dominant features of political life. During
the year, the Government increasingly was excluded from federal
functions by then Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. The Government
remains minimally subordinate to Yugoslavia in foreign affairs and
defense matters. Units of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) are stationed in
Montenegro. President Milo Djukanovic was elected in 1997 and until the
end of December headed a reform coalition, which won power in 1998
parliamentary elections that international election observers judged to
be generally free and fair. Events during the year effectively steered
the Government further away from the federal control of Milosevic's
regime in Belgrade. Milosevic's attempts to deny Montenegro its
constitutional voice in federal functions, in particular by closing
Supreme Defense Council meetings to Djukanovic and by Milosevic's
unilateral amendments of the Yugoslav Constitution on July 6, further
undercut Montenegro's already weak role and authorities in the
Federation. With Djukanovic's efforts to redefine Montenegro's
relations with Serbia through political discussions rebuffed,
Montenegro acquired a large degree of de facto independence,
establishing its own currency, central bank, customs and diplomatic
service, and an embryonic army. The Government respects the
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
The republic police, under the authority of the Ministry of the
Interior, has primary responsibility for internal security. However,
the Yugoslav Second Army, which has federal jurisdiction in the
republic and is under federal authority, not Montenegrin government
control, made repeated attempts to usurp control over the civilian
police. Some members of the security forces committed human rights
abuses.
The economic transition from a state-owned to a market-based system
encountered delays and resistance. The industrial sector remains
largely in the hands of the republic Government and is very
inefficient. The economy suffered further as a result of NATO's air
campaign against Serbia in 1999 and years of sanctions and isolation,
although the Government reported that the economy grew during the year.
Official unemployment remains significant, and rose to at least 42
percent, but a large unofficial economy provides jobs for much of the
officially unemployed. Economists estimate that actual unemployment
averages 22 to 23 percent. At the same time, the Government's budgetary
shortfall grew as it raised the minimum wage and strove to pay pensions
on time to ensure social peace. The anticipated budget deficit during
the year was expected to approximate the amount of assistance provided
by foreign donors. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (including
the unofficial economy) was forecast at $935 for the year.
The republic Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. There
were a number of political killings, including at least one allegedly
linked to Milosevic and another linked to a VJ-supported paramilitary
group. Police and VJ troops abused persons, and VJ troops harassed and
intimidated citizens. VJ troops and Montenegrin police were responsible
for numerous arbitrary arrests and detentions. Montenegrin police
reportedly infringed on citizens privacy rights. Both republic and
federal authorities restricted freedom of speech and of the press in
some areas. Both VJ troops and Montenegrin police restricted freedom of
movement. Violence and discrimination against women are problems.
Discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities continued to be
a problem. There were reports of harassment and intimidation of Muslims
in the Montenegrin Sandzak region by paramilitary groups linked to the
VJ. Trafficking of women and girls for the purposes of forced
prostitution continued to be a problem; both federal and Montenegrin
authorities allegedly are involved in such trafficking.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by agents of the
republic Government; however, political killings occurred. On May 31,
one of President Djukanovic's closest advisers, Goran Zugic, was shot
and killed in front of his home in Podgorica by unknown assailants. No
one claimed responsibility. The killing widely was considered to be the
result of orders from of Milosevic; however, according to some
accounts, Montenegrin criminal circles may have been responsible. There
was no conviction in the case by year's end.
Paramilitaries who served in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia and who
were subordinated to the Yugoslav Army in Montenegro were a threat to
the Djukanovic Government until Milosevic's downfall. There were
widespread fears that Milosevic could order these forces to destabilize
Montenegro at any moment. The paramilitaries, largely members of the
Seventh Military Police Battalion, in one instance, killed a
Montenegrin policeman outside a Podgorica bar on the eve of the
September federal elections.
In August Milenko Vujovic, a friend and business colleague of
President Djukanovic's brother Alexsandar, was shot and killed in
Herceg Novi. While the crime apparently was motivated by money, some
accounts alleged that the killing was politically motivated.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of
punishment; however, Montenegrin police reportedly at times abused
persons. A member of the radical Yugoslav Left (JUL) party (founded by
Milosevic's wife Mira Markovic) claimed that he was beaten by the
Montenegrin police after being arrested for allegedly defacing public
buildings in Podgorica on the eve of the September 24 federal
elections. Other members of JUL complained of being detained without
explanation and abused up by the police in Herceg Novi for putting up
pro-Milosevic posters during the federal election campaign. In October
masked assailants beat a member of a pro-Serbian political party. The
police never located the assailants, and the Minister of Interior
declined to appear before Parliament to discuss this or the previous
incident in Podgorica. In Niksic police arrested and beat members of a
local gang. After the arrests, police imposed a near blockade of the
city in an effort to catch other members of the gang.
The VJ's Seventh Military Police Battalion--known for its fierce
loyalty to Milosevic--intimidated citizens and created a climate of
fear. VJ troops reportedly beat religious worshippers early in the year
(see Section 2.c.). Members of that battalion also harassed and
intimidated Muslims in the Sandzak region. In June batallion members
entered Bijelo Polje (a town in northern Montenegro with a large Muslim
population) in armored vehicles to ``inspect'' the town's center. At
about the same time, members of this unit surrounded the police station
in Berane (another multiethnic northern Montenegrin town) to underscore
their demands for the release of a colleague who was arrested the night
before in a drunken brawl. Members of this unit reportedly engaged in
similar activities in October in the towns of Kolasin, Danilovgrad, and
Mojkovac. In Plav, a northern town with a large ethnic Albanian
population, members of the Seventh Military Police Battalion reportedly
regularly engaged in live fire practice near the Albanian quarter.
In August VJ troops opened fire on a truck that failed to stop at a
checkpoint near Bar. The driver managed to escape without injury.
The Yugoslav Army held major exercises in areas adjacent to the
Montenegrin capital before and during the June 11 local elections and
the September 24 federal elections. These maneuvers and aggressive VJ
patrolling of major tourist areas during the height of the tourist
season were intended to intimidate the Djukanovic regime and its
supporters.
On June 15, gunmen reportedly linked to Milosevic's regime
attempted to kill Vuk Draskovic, the leader of one of the principal
opposition parties in Serbia, when he was vacationing at his apartment
in Budva on the Montenegrin coast. Draskovic had survived a car
accident in October 1999 that many believe was staged by the Serbian
Security Service. There was no conviction in the case by year's end.
Prison conditions reportedly meet prisoners' minimum needs, but
problems remain.
The Government generally permits prison visits by human rights
monitors, including the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, at times Montenegrin police
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, and the Yugoslav Army on
occasion also arbitrarily detained and arrested individuals.
For example, in early February VJ forces arrested and detained two
Montenegrins accused of desertion and draft evasion. In July VJ
personnel arrested four Dutch, two British, and two Canadian citizens
near Montenegro's borders with Serbia and Kosovo. All were charged with
espionage. The British citizens claimed they were beaten by the police
and nearly lynched by VJ soldiers. Following Milosevic's removal, all
were released, and the charges against all eventually were dropped by
the federal authorities.
The Montenegrin police harassed citizens by applying traffic laws
selectively, based on the individual's political preferences. In at
least one instance, police stopped a political opponent and known
critic of Djukanovic, removed his license, and confiscated his vehicle
for a minor traffic violation.
Forced exile is prohibited and is apparently not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary and the Government generally respects this
provision in practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair
judicial process; however, a backlog of cases, a lack of resources, and
corruption remain problems. Furthermore, the judges are poorly paid
patronage appointees. However, the Minister of Justice promotes legal
reform actively and has made some progress in reforming the Criminal
Code. The court system consists of local, district, and supreme courts
at the republic level. There is also a military court system under the
control of federal authorities.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial and,
according to most observers, the judiciary makes an effort to enforce
this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices; however, police
reportedly used surveillance and eavesdropping against members of the
pro-Milosevic opposition Socialist People's Party, who charge that the
Djukanovic Government both wiretaps their telephones and opens their
mail. The intelligence service of the Yugoslav Army carries out
electronic surveillance of key Djukanovic government telephones. The
public dissemination of Yugoslav intelligence intercepts of cellular
telephone conversations of Western diplomats in May made clear that the
Yugoslav security service possesses and uses this capability.
In November 1999, the Montenegrin assembly passed a law granting
general amnesty to persons who evaded the draft from June 1998 to June
1999. All persons reportedly received amnesty out of an expected
14,000.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the republic Government
and the federal authorities restricted this right in some areas. Media
and information laws do not protect the press; to a large extent libel
laws discourage a free press.
The print media is not independent. Djukanovic effectively controls
the print media, with the exception of the opposition daily, Dan, as
well as the State public broadcasting station, Radio/TV Montenegro. A
small, moderate, and pro-Yugoslav party that belongs to Djukanovic's
coalition credibly charged that Djukanovic uses the media to promote
independence sentiment while not permitting his coalition partner to
make the case for remaining in a democratic Yugoslavia. However, during
the year, the Government continued to take steps to encourage
independent radio media by allocating more frequencies to independent
radio stations and reducing the fees charged to them.
Lack of professionally trained staff, low professional standards,
and lack of funds all hinder the development of an independent media.
Under Milosevic the Yugoslav federal authorities failed to respect
the basic principles of freedom of the press in Montenegro. In early
spring, the federal authorities, in conjunction with officials of the
extreme left Yugoslav Left (JUL) party, set up transmitters on Yugoslav
Army communications sites in Montenegro. They began broadcasting pro-
Yugoslav, anti-Montenegrin propaganda (the so-called YU-INFO TV)
despite a federal law that delegates to each republic the
responsibility to allocate broadcast frequencies. YU-INFO TV still was
broadcasting in Montenegro at the end of the year. Subsequently in
August, the Milosevic regime established a studio in a Yugoslav Army
facility in downtown Podgorica that used military transmitters to
rebroadcast pro-Milosevic programs produced by Serbian TV (RTS). These
actions were taken without consultation with the Montenegrin
authorities.
In late summer, the Federal authorities also disconnected
Montenegrin TV from the Serbian cable network in Vojvodina's capital
city, Novi Sad.
Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints
are available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications from
abroad. However, the supply is limited due to the economic situation
and the relatively small demand.
Academic freedom generally is respected, although faculty and
students at Podgorica University, who favored the Belgrade regime or
the preservation of the Federation, were reluctant to discuss political
matters as tensions grew between Montenegro and Serbia.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right. On the Serbian New Year in mid-January, the
Government permitted a large opposition gathering to take place but had
large numbers of police standing by. In February the police broke up a
small opposition rally when the demonstrators appeared to be moving on
the main government building. The opposition held rallies without
problems during the June and September local and federal election
campaigns, respectively.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government generally respected this right in practice.
The Constitution specifically recognizes the existence of the
Serbian Orthodox Church, but not other faiths. The Montenegrin Orthodox
Church lost its independence after the First World War, becoming part
of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and was only recently re-established.
The re-established Montenegrin Orthodox Church is registered with the
Government of Montenegro Ministry of Interior in Cetinje, the former
capital, as a nongovernmental organization (NGO). The Government of
Montenegro has been careful to remain neutral in the dispute between
followers of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Montenegrin Orthodox
Church, but political parties have used this issue in pursuit of their
own agendas. Pro-Serbian parties strongly support moves for the
establishment of an official state religion, while proindependence
parties have pushed for the official recognition of the Montenegrin
Orthodox Church.
Tensions between the unofficial Montenegrin Orthodox Church and the
Serbian Orthodox Church worsened during the year. Violence allegedly
broke out between members of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and of the
Serbian Orthodox Church in late 1999 when on November 21, 1999, Father
Dragan Stanisic of the Serbian Orthodox Church reportedly hit
Montenegrin Orthodox Metropolitan Mihajlo in the face during a
confrontation on a road near Cetinje. According to press reports,
Father Stanisic's followers then attacked Mihajlo's car, although
Stanisic denies that the incident ever occurred. Approximately 250
persons demonstrated to protest the incident in Cetinje, and
authorities summoned riot police and reinforcements to prevent further
incidents.
The rift between the churches was highlighted again in January when
a Serbian Orthodox priest delayed the traditional Christmas celebration
by calling on the audience to leave the hall because Montenegrin
Orthodox Metropolitan Mihailo was present. Police reportedly had
prevented a parallel Montenegrin Orthodox celebration from taking place
in a separate location in the town on the same day. The Serbian
Orthodox Church then publicly protested the Government's tolerance of
the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.
The Djukanovic Government sought to defuse tensions between the
churches. However, there were reports that Yugoslav paramilitaries
exacerbated such tensions. For example, in Niksic early in the year,
several members of the Seventh Military Police Battalion reportedly
intimidated a Montenegrin Orthodox priest in his church and beat
several of his parishioners. On another occasion, Serbian nationalists
near the former capital city of Cetinje beat up a Montenegrin Orthodox
priest on his way to a church gathering, prompting retaliation from his
supporters.
The Montenegrin Orthodox Church has claimed holdings of the Serbian
Orthodox Church in Montenegro. The Serbian Orthodox Church remains the
dominant faith in Montenegro and has rejected the property claims.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The republic Constitution provides for
freedom of movement, and the Government generally respects this right
in practice; however, the establishment of numerous police checkpoints
that carried out document checks restricted this right.
The Yugoslav Army restricted this right even more seriously. Army
checkpoints close to the borders with Albania and Bosnia limited
movement by residents. In the Herceg Novi, Niksic, and Pljevlja areas,
VJ restrictions on freedom of movement in border areas generated
antimilitary demonstrations and intervention by the republic's
political authorities. However, these restrictions were not eased until
the defeat of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade.
There was no official mechanism by which refugees or foreign
nationals could establish residency. A new citizenship law was passed
in 1999. The new law, while stringent in its requirements, provides a
legal and equitable means for persons to acquire Montenegrin
citizenship.
The Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR reports that an estimated 60,000
refugees and internally displaced persons live in the republic. The
large influx of Albanian refugees from Kosovo largely has returned to
Kosovo; however, a smaller but significant number of Serb and Roma
refugees from Kosovo have replaced them. Conditions for refugees vary;
those with relatives or property in the country have been able to find
housing and in some cases employment. Roma refugees, on the other hand,
live mostly in collective centers, with little or no access to health
care or education.
In September before the Yugoslav federal elections, Serbian
Minister for Refugees Bratislava Morina promised financial aid for
Serbs and Roma from Kosovo in what was perceived by observers to be an
attempt to influence voters in favor of Milosevic.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Montenegrin Constitution provides citizens with the right to
change their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in
practice with respect to republic institutions, but not with federal-
level institutions. In 1998 President Djukanovic became the first
president popularly elected in elections that foreign observers
considered generally free and fair. The republic government invited the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to observe
both the presidential elections in 1997 and the parliamentary elections
in 1998, which also were judged to be free and fair. The OSCE sent
observers to monitor the June 11 local elections in Herceg Novi and
Podgorica, and reported that these were well conducted. In Herceg Novi,
Djukanovic's coalition was defeated by the pro-Milosevic opposition
party. For most of the year, the Government enjoyed the support of a
multiethnic coalition in the republic assembly.
President Milosevic dominated Yugoslavia's political system until
he lost power in the September federal elections. He sought to
consolidate his power at the federal level at the expense of
Montenegro, and by manipulating power within the Federation, Milosevic
effectively forced Montenegro out of the Federation's institutions
while leaving it open to the Federal Government's charges that its
actions violated Yugoslavia's Constitution. President Djukanovic did
not participate in the September 23 federal elections and called for
citizens to boycott them. The Montenegrin Parliament declared the July
6 amendments to Yugoslavia's Constitution, including one that allowed
Milosevic to run for another presidential term, unconstitutional, and
Djukanovic used this declaration as a basis for his decision not to
participate in the elections. The Government did not impede voting and
some 600 polling stations were set up in private homes, Socialist
People's Party (SNP) offices, Serbian firms, and VJ establishments.
However, overall voter turnout was low.
Despite the Montenegrin Government's legal rights under
Yugoslavia's Constitution, federal authorities under Milosevic's
control continued to refuse to recognize the 20 Montenegrin members
delegated to the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly by the
Montenegrin Parliament. The Montenegrins in the federal body, including
the Speaker of the upper house, were not changed to reflect the results
of 1998 Montenegrin parliamentary elections. Moreover, in violation of
past practice, Milosevic installed Momir Bulatovic as Federal Prime
Minister, ignoring the Montenegrin Government's desire to have a voice
in the selection of the federal Prime Minister. Milosevic's control
over the federal courts was demonstrated when the Federal
Constitutional Court ruled against the Montenegrin Government in 1999
in disallowing the Montenegrin authorities' attempt to select all 20
Montenegrin representatives to the Federal Assembly's Chamber of the
Republics. The ruling was a reversal of a 1993 decision, which allowed
Milosevic's ruling coalition in Serbia at the time to name all 20
Serbian representatives to the upper chamber while he was the President
of the Serbian republic.
There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in
government and politics; however, they are underrepresented greatly in
party and government offices. There are no female ministers in the
Government, and there are only five deputy ministers and three Members
of Parliament. However, a woman plays a key role in the presidency of
Djukanovic's ruling Democratic Party of Socialists.
No legal restrictions affect the role of minorities in government
and politics; however, they are underrepresented and ethnic
Montenegrins and Serbs dominate the republic's political leadership.
Ethnic Albanians participate in the political process, and their
parties, candidates, and voters participated in the 1997 and 1998
elections. Ethnic Muslims also participate. Albanians and Muslims
followed Djukanovic's call to boycott the September 24 federal
elections. The area of the republic primarily inhabited by ethnic
Albanians was established as a separate voting district in the 1998
parliamentary elections and, in proportion to the region's population,
five representatives were elected to the Parliament from the district.
Ethnic Albanian parties captured two of the seats, with the multiethnic
program of the pro-Djukanovic Coalition capturing the other three
seats. Several ministerial and deputy ministerial positions in the
coalition government are held by ethnic Albanians and Muslims.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without government restriction, and republic officials generally are
cooperative and responsive to their views. Local NGO's include the
Montenegrin Helsinki Committee, the Center for Democracy and Human
Rights, and S.O.S., a support group for abused women and children. In
addition the Montenegrin Government's pledge to cooperate with the ICTY
continues. The Chief prosecutor visited the country in August.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
While federal and republic laws provide for equal rights for all
citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, or social status, and
prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal system
provides little protection to such groups.
Women.--The traditionally high level of domestic violence
persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family
violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by
social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of
spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities.
The country served as a transit point for trafficking in women for
the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Women do not enjoy status equal to men in the republic, and few
women hold upper level management positions in government or commerce.
Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women
should be subservient to the male members of their family, long have
subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly
among minority communities, women are little more than serfs without
the ability to exercise their right to control property and children.
However, women legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work and 12
to 18 months of maternity leave. They are active in human rights and
women's organizations.
Children.--The Government attempts to meet the health and
educational needs of children, but insufficient and inefficient
resources impeded this goal. The educational system provides 8 years of
mandatory schooling. When IDP's began arriving from Kosovo in 1998, the
republic government initially refused to extend this educational
benefit to Kosovar Albanians. However, after having consulted with and
received promises of assistance from international organizations, the
Government announced late in that year that displaced children soon
also would be allowed to attend school. Although ethnic Albanian
children have access to instruction in their native language, the
Government came under criticism for not also developing a curriculum in
which ethnic Albanians could learn about their own culture and history.
This situation reportedly remains unchanged. Most Roma child refugees
from Kosovo do not receive any education.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
The country served as a transit point for trafficking in girls for
the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--Facilities for the disabled are
inadequate. The law prohibits discrimination against the disabled in
employment, education, or in the provision of state services. The law
mandates access to new official buildings, and the Government enforces
these provisions in practice.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely
intertwined as to be inseparable.
With the exception of tensions and incidents of violence (see
Section 2.c.) between the Serbian Orthodox Church and Montenegrin
Orthodox Church, relations with and between religious minorities are
generally peaceful. Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox communities coexist
within the same communities and often use the same municipally owned
properties to conduct worship services.
Seventh-Day Adventists and members of Jehovah's Witnesses are
officially registered religions in the republic. However, their
followers report that their efforts to build and renovate church
buildings have been impaired by persons they believe to be loyal to the
local Serbian Orthodox Church.
Ethnic Minorities.--In 1999 the Government began a pilot program in
ethnic Albanian communities, which devolved extensive authority,
including taxation, to locally elected officials. An Albanian
Democratic Union member also was appointed to the post of Minister of
Minorities to ensure that equal representation and opportunities would
exist for all ethnic groups. Members of the ethnic Albanian and Bosniak
(ethnic Muslim) minorities are represented in the cabinet. However,
societal discrimination against minorities exists. Harassment and
intimidation against Muslims in the Sandzak region by Serbian
nationalists and VJ troops continued (see Section 1.c.).
In the week prior to the September 24 federal elections, there were
reports that several hundred Bosniaks and ethnic Albanians from
Montenegro left the country for Kosovo or Bosnia. There were no direct
reports of violence or intimidation, but several families reported that
they left because of an increase in military conscription and an
increased military presence. Most of the families were able to return
home within 1 week.
There is no official discrimination against the Romani population;
however, prejudice against Roma is widespread. Local authorities often
ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Romani community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Most if
not all of the workforce in the official economy is organized. Both
official, government-affiliated unions and independent unions exist.
Because the independent labor movement largely is fragmented and access
to international labor organizations is limited, there have been few
tangible results in the form of improved working conditions or higher
wages.
Unions may affiliate with international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--This right is
provided for under law, but collective bargaining remains at a
rudimentary level of development. Instead of attempting to make
progress on the collective needs of all workers, negotiations generally
center on advancing the needs of a specific group of workers. Job
security fears prevail, as a result of the high unemployment rate, and
these fears limit the groups' militancy.
One factor impeding the collective bargaining power of the workers
was the weak economy, in which high unemployment gave employers the
upper hand in setting wages and work conditions, as workers competed
for whatever jobs existed.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
generally is not known to occur; however, the republic served as a
transit point for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The official minimum age for employment is 16 years,
although in farming communities, it is not unusual to find younger
children assisting their families. Moreover, children can be found in a
variety of unofficial retail jobs, typically washing car windows or
selling small items such as cigarettes. The high unemployment rate
ensures that there is little demand for child labor in the formal
sector. Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited by law and
generally is not known to occur; however, girls are trafficked through
the republic for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c.
and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises,
including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies
generally observe the minimum wage standard, which is $47 (94 DM) per
month. However, this figure is comparable to unemployment benefits or
wages paid to those on mandatory leave. The gross average wage is
approximately $175 (350 DM) per month, with a disposable average wage
(after social contributions and payroll taxes) of approximately $90
(180 DM) per month. This amount is insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. Data for 1999 (latest
available) suggests that households spent almost all of their resources
on basic needs, such as food, clothing, and housing.
The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little meaning in an
economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations,
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In view of the
competition for employment, and the high degree of government control
over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically forbids
trafficking in persons; however, in practice trafficking is a growing
problem and traffickers rarely are prosecuted. However, traffickers
arrested in the spring during police raids on a brothel were
prosecuted. The country is a destination and transit country for
trafficked women and children. Women are trafficked from Romania,
Ukraine, Moldova, China, and Russia, often through Belgrade and on to
Western European countries and Kosovo. Trafficking has increased since
the 1999 war in Kosovo, and Italian police weekly intercepted illegal
immigrants from Montenegro. Many of these immigrants reported being
victims of a trafficking scheme, some of whom were charged as high as
$1,500 (DM 3,000) to be transported. This included a large number of
women and girls who were trafficked to other parts of Europe for
prostitution.
Trafficked women often respond to employment advertisements for
jobs abroad as babysitters, hairdressers, maids, waitresses, models, or
dancers. According to the International Helsinki Federation, although
some women may be aware that they are going to work in the sex
industry, they are unaware of the slavery-like conditions they may
face. Many women are sold several times in different countries to
nightclub owners. Their passports often are confiscated. Women have
reported being beaten and raped by their traffickers.
The International Helsinki Federation reports that police and local
authorities do little to stop trafficking and are often clients of
nightclubs that keep trafficked women as prostitutes. Women found
during police raids of bars and nightclubs during the year often were
prosecuted for prostitution and deported. In some cases club owners
were arrested and prosecuted for enabling prosecution; however, their
sentences are generally short. The Government as a rule repatriates
victims, but does not provide any other services, and there are no
victim protection programs.
A small number of NGO's work on trafficking. There is at least one
shelter for victims. Awareness of the problem is low.
NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
----------
ALGERIA
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in April 1999 to a 5-
year term. Bouteflika had served as Foreign Minister in a previous
government. The President is the constitutional head of state, appoints
and dismisses the Prime Minister, and may dissolve the legislature.
According to the Constitution, the Prime Minister appoints the cabinet
ministers; however, in practice the President has taken a key role in
designating the members of the Cabinet. The military establishment
strongly influences defense and foreign policy. Bouteflika was regarded
throughout the 1999 election campaign as the candidate most favored by
the dominant security establishment and the most likely winner. At the
end of the campaign, the other six candidates withdrew, credibly
charging massive fraud by the military, and Bouteflika was elected
easily, although with a turnout as low as 30 percent. The presidential
election campaign was marked by increased openness; however,
international observers and political parties pointed out numerous
problems with the conduct of the elections. A September 16, 1999
national referendum, which asked citizens whether they agreed with
Bouteflika's peace plan (which includes an amnesty program for the
extremists fighting to overthrow the Government), was free of charges
of fraud, and Bouteflika's peace plan won a reported 98 percent
majority, with a reported 85 percent turnout. Bouteflika is not
affiliated formally with any political party, but he has the
parliamentary support of a seven-party coalition. In June 1997, Algeria
held its first parliamentary elections since January 1992 and elected
the first multiparty parliament in the country's history. The
cancellation of the 1992 elections, which the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS) was poised to win, suspended the democratization process and a
transition to a pluralistic republic, and escalated fighting, which
still continues, between the security forces and armed insurgent groups
seeking to overthrow the Government and impose an Islamic state. The
Government does not always respect the independence of the judiciary.
The Government's security apparatus is composed of the army, air
force, navy, the national gendarmerie, the national police, communal
guards, and local self-defense forces. All of these elements are
involved in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and are
under the control of the Government. The security forces committed
serious human rights abuses, although allegations of such abuses
continued to decline.
The economy is slowly developing from a state-administered to a
market-oriented system. The Government has implemented stabilization
policies and structural reforms. However, privatization of state
enterprises has made little progress, and there has been little
progress on reform of the banking and housing construction sectors. The
state-owned petroleum sector's output represented about a quarter of
national income and more than 96 percent of export earnings during the
year. Noncompetitive and unprofitable state enterprises constitute the
bulk of the nonhydrocarbon industrial sector. The agricultural sector,
which produces grains, fruit, cattle, fiber, vegetables, and poultry,
makes up 10 to 12 percent of the economy. Algeria is a middle-income
country; annual per capita income is approximately $1,600. Officially,
about 30 percent of the working-age population is unemployed, and about
70 percent of persons under the age of 30 cannot find adequate
employment.
Despite measurable improvements, particularly in addressing
problems of torture and arbitrary detention, the human rights situation
was generally poor and serious problems persisted, including
significant government restrictions on citizens' political and
association rights and failure to account for past disappearances; the
massacre of civilians by armed terriorist groups also continued. There
are significant limitations on citizens' right to change their
government. The security forces committed extrajudicial killings,
tortured, beat or otherwise abused detainees, and arbitrarily arrested
and detained, or held incommunicado, individuals suspected of
involvement with armed Islamist groups; however, the incidence of such
abuses by security forces continued to decline. Security force
involvement in disappearances from previous years remains unresolved.
Security forces sometimes reach the sites of massacres too late to
prevent or halt civilian casualties; however, there were no reports
that security forces were complicit in massacres that took place during
the year. An international nongovernmental organization (NGO) noted
during the year that the country's poor prison conditions improved
during the year. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trial delays
are problems, although the practice of detention beyond the legal limit
appears to be less frequent. Although the Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, executive branch decrees restrict some of the
judiciary's authority. The authorities do not always respect
defendants' rights to due process. Illegal searches and infringements
on citizens' privacy rights also remained problems.
There was no overt censorship of information; however, while the
print media is relatively free, news media practiced self censorship.
Newspapers reported frequently on terrorist violence and on surrenders
under the amnesty program, about which there was a wide range of views
expressed in the media. The independent press commented openly and
regularly on political matters and other significant issues. In some
cases, newspapers represented specific political and economic
interests. Electronic media continued to express only government
policy. The Government also continued to restrict freedom of speech,
press, assembly, association, and movement, although to a lesser degree
than in the previous year. The Government also places some restrictions
on freedom of religion. During the April 1999 presidential election,
the candidates who ultimately withdrew from the election credibly
reported irregularities, such as government ballot-box stuffing through
manipulation of military votes. During the 1997 legislative, municipal,
and provincial elections, there were credible reports of
irregularities, such as government harassment of oppositionparty
observers and fraud in vote-tally procedures. Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, and the International
Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) visited the country during
the year at the invitation of the Government. Domestic violence against
women, the Family Code's limits on women's civil rights, and societal
discrimination against women remained serious problems. Child abuse is
a problem. Amazigh (Berber) ethnic, cultural, and linguistic rights
continue to be an issue, although these concerns are represented by at
least two political parties with seats in Parliament. Child labor is a
problem.
Armed groups committed numerous serious abuses and killed hundreds
of civilians. There was an increase in violence compared with 1999.
Armed terrorists continued their widespread campaign of insurgency,
targeting government officials, families of security-force members, and
civilians. Many of the killings appeared to be related to opposition to
the amnesty program. According to the Government, more than 5,000
insurgents have availed themselves of the amnesty program so far, and
the armed groups have become smaller; however, a hard-core insurgent
force remains.
Armed groups killed numerous civilians, including infants, in
massacres and with small bombs. Bombs left in cars, cafes, and markets
killed and maimed persons indiscriminately. Some killings also were
attributed to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. Press reports
estimated that approximately 2,500 civilians, terrorists, and security
force members died during the year in domestic turmoil. The violence
now seems to take place primarily in the countryside, as the security
forces largely have forced the insurgents out of the cities. There were
numerous instances in which armed groups kidnaped women, raped them,
and forced them into servitude.
After his 1999 election, President Bouteflika acknowledged that a
more accurate accounting of the number of persons killed during the
previous 8 years placed the total at about 100,000.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The security forces
committed extrajudicial killings, mostly during clashes with armed
terrorist groups, although the number of such killings continued to
decrease during the year. For example, in early March, the army found
and killed 12 suspected terrorists 280 miles southwest of Algiers. On
June 20, troops backed by gunships and artillery attacked guerrillas,
killing 16 persons. Security force killings of terrorists decreased by
approximately 10 percent compared to 1999. The Government maintains
that security forces resort to lethal force only in the context of
armed clashes with terrorists. The Government also contends that, as a
matter of policy, disciplinary action is taken against soldiers or
policemen who are guilty of violating human rights, and such
disciplinary action reportedly was taken during the year. Human Rights
Watch and other groups claim that security forces failed to intervene
in some past situations to prevent or halt massacres of civilians,
although there were no claims that this occurred during the year.
One person died from the injuries he sustained in June after police
rounded up and beat 200 persons who had been attending a local mosque
(see Section 1.c.).
In December 1999, one person died of a heart attack the day after
being beaten by police who had responded to a terrorist attack in the
town of Dellys. The case received considerable print-media attention,
and the government-funded National Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH)
investigated the incident. After the investigation and ensuing trials,
21 members of the security forces were prosecuted and the local
commanders of 2 different security services were investigated and
suspended from their duties.
There were reports that progovernment militia killed one or two
civilians during the year. The Government handled the killings as
common murder cases.
On November 22, 1999, prominent FIS leader Abdelkader Hachani, who
had spoken out in favor of peace and reconciliation, was shot and
killed in Algiers. On December 13, 1999, authorities arrested a
suspect, who had the murder weapon in his possession. The Government
completed its investigation into the incident, but had not made public
the results by year's end.
Armed groups targeted both security-force members and civilians,
and such killings increased by approximately 20 percent compared with
1999. In many cases, terrorists randomly targeted civilians in an
apparent attempt to create social disorder. Armed groups killed
numerous civilians, including infants, in massacres and with small
bombs. Bombs left in cars, cafes, and markets killed and maimed persons
indiscriminately (see Section 1.g.). Some killings also were attributed
to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. The violence now seems to take
place primarily in the countryside, as the security forces largely have
forced the insurgents out of the cities. Increasingly the killing of
civilians appeared to be a result of opposition to President
Bouteflika's amnesty program and to facilitate the theft of goods
needed by the armed groups. As well as the use of small bombs,
terrorist tactics included creating false roadblocks outside the cities
by using stolen police uniforms, weapons, and equipment. Press reports
estimated that approximately 2,500 civilians, terrorists, and security
force members died during the year in domestic turmoil. For example, on
March 18, terrorists killed 19 persons, including 7 children, during
the Eid festival. On May 4, militants killed 19 persons and injured 26
when they reportedly opened fire on a bus after the driver refused to
stop at a false roadblock 45 miles south of Algiers. There was an
increase in violence during the summer. More than 200 persons
reportedly were killed during July alone. On July 11, militants shot
and killed 11 men who were sleeping in their tents while camping in
Tipaza. At least nine persons were killed on July 17 when an armed
group stopped their bus and sprayed it with machine-gun fire. On July
28, 270 miles west of Algiers, militants killed eight civilians and
wounded six in an attack on a nomad family, cutting the throats of six
children between the ages of 6 months and 4 years. On September 20, six
persons, including three children, reportedly were shot and killed
during an ambush by militants. On December 16, armed intruders killed
16 students and a security guard, and injured 5 other students at a
high school dormitory in the town of Medea. On December 17, terrorists
opened fire on a bus near the town of Tenes, killing 14 travelers.
After his 1999 election, President Bouteflika acknowledged that a more
accurate accounting of the number of persons killed during the previous
8 years placed the total at about 100,000.
b. Disappearance.--There were no credible reports during the year
of disappearances in which the security forces were implicated.
However, there have been credible reports of disappearances occurring
over a period of several years, many of which involved the security
forces. In September 1998, the Ministry of Interior established an
office in each district to accept cases from resident families of those
reported missing. In May the Ministry of Justice reported that it had
received 3,019 complaints of disappearance and had clarified 1,146 of
them. However, credible sources state that the offices have not
provided any useful information to the families of those who
disappeared. By year's end, the Ministry of Interior had agreed to
investigate 4,700 cases. The Ministry reports that it has provided
information to the families in 3,000 of those cases. In 1,600 of the
cases, families have requested administrative action to obtain death
certificates for their missing relatives. However, there were no
prosecutions of security-force personnel that stemmed from these cases.
Families of the missing persons, defense attorneys, and local human
rights groups insist that the Government could do more to solve the
outstanding cases. The Government asserts that the majority of reported
cases of disappearances either were committed by terrorists disguised
as security forces or involved former armed Islamist supporters who
went underground to avoid terrorist reprisals.
In September Amnesty International reported that more than 4,000
persons had disappeared since 1994 after being detained by security
forces. AI stated that some died in custody from torture or were
executed, but that many others reportedly were alive. Local NGO sources
state that a few of the persons who disappeared have been released from
captivity by the security forces, but that there has been no public
information about these cases, due to the fear of reprisal against
those released. Human rights activists assert that a number of the
persons who disappeared still are alive in the hands of the security
forces, but offer no evidence to support this assertion.
Terrorist groups continued to kidnap scores of civilians. In many
instances the victims disappeared and the families were unable to
obtain information about their fate. Armed groups kidnaped young women
and held them captive for extended periods for the purpose of rape and
servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Both the Constitution and legislation ban torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, according to
local human rights groups and defense lawyers, the police at times
resort to torture when interrogating persons suspected of being
involved with, or having sympathies for, armed insurgency groups. There
were no reports of torture during the year at the Algiers police
facility called Chateau Neuf, as had been the case in the past.
There continued to be reports of police abuse of detainees during
the year. After its October visit (see Section 4), Amnesty
International stated that although there were ``substantially fewer''
cases of torture ``in comparison to some years ago,'' such cases
nevertheless ``continue to occur.'' Many victims of torture hesitate to
make public such allegations due to fear of government retaliation.
Accusations of torture were made by those accused of involvement in
terrorist activities. The Interior Ministry and the ONDH have stated
publicly that the Government would punish those persons who violated
the law and practiced torture. Government officials reported in
November that between 350 and 400 security officials had been punished
for ``human rights abuses,'' although the Government provided no
details regarding the abuses that such officials committed or the
punishment that they received. There is no independent mechanism
available to verify the Government's claims.
In early August, the Government announced new policies concerning
the Police Judiciaire (PJ), the officers who interrogate suspects when
they first are arrested to determine whether there are grounds for
prosecution. Local judges now are to grade the performance of PJ
officers operating in their jurisdiction in an effort to ensure that
the officers comply with the law in their treatment of suspects. In
addition, any suspect held in preventative detention is to undergo a
medical examination at the end of the detention, whether the suspect
requests it or not.
In March in the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the
authorities beat and intimidated demonstrators who were attempting to
draw attention to the problem of persons who had disappeared. The
Government arrested 40 persons during two separate demonstrations that
occurred about a week apart; however, those arrested were released
after a short time (see Section 2.b.). In June following a bomb blast
in Dellys, police rounded up a group of 200 persons who had been
attending the local mosque. The group was taken to police headquarters
and beaten. One person died from the injuries he sustained. Members of
the group took legal action against the police and, as a result, the
local chiefs of the police and the Gendarmerie were fired and two of
the offending officers were arrested. In November police used force to
disrupt a march by families of persons who had disappeared, which
coincided with a visit to that city by Amnesty International (see
Section 2.b.).
In December 1999, a terrorist bomb killed and injured police in the
town of Dellys. Within hours security forces rounded up and detained
more than 100 persons of both sexes and a variety of ages. Police
officers beat many of the detainees and threw them into the crater made
by the terrorist bomb. One of the mistreated persons died of a heart
attack the next day. A senior regional police commander ordered the
police to stop these actions. In response to complaints from the
mistreated persons, the authorities suspended the local commanders of 2
different security services and prosecuted 21 members of the security
forces (see Section 1.a.).
Armed terrorist groups committed numerous abuses, such as
beheading, mutilating, and dismembering their victims, including
infants, children, and pregnant women. These groups also used bombs
that killed and injured persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
Terrorists also committed dozens of rapes of female victims, many of
whom subsequently were murdered. There were also frequent reports of
other young women being abducted, raped for weeks at a time by group
leaders and other members, and forced into servitude (see Sections
1.a., 1.b., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
Prison conditions remain generally poor, with significant
overcrowding. However, an international NGO stated during the year that
conditions had improved considerably. A decrease in prison population
reduced overcrowding somewhat. Moreover, prisoners were found generally
to be in good health and benefiting from adequate food and expanded
visitation rights. The provision of adequate medical treatment to
prisoners still is limited, but the Government reportedly is addressing
the issue.
In general the Government does not permit independent monitoring of
prisons or detention centers. However, in October 1999, March and again
in May, the Government allowed International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to visit prisons. The ICRC in April decided no longer to seek
access to military prisons because it lacked any credible evidence that
these prisons held civilians. The ICRC did not visit FIS leaders in
prison or under house arrest.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces
continued arbitrarily to arrest and detain citizens. Human rights
activists state that this practice continued to diminish during the
year. The Constitution stipulates that incommunicado detention in
criminal cases prior to arraignment may not exceed 48 hours, after
which the suspect must be charged or released. According to the 1992
antiterrorist law, the police may hold suspects in prearraignment
detention for up to 12 days; they also must inform suspects of the
charges against them. In practice the security forces generally adhered
to this 12-day limit during the year.
In March in the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the Government
arrested 40 persons during two separate demonstrations occurring about
a week apart; however, those arrested were released after a short time
(see Section 2.b.). In November police used force to disrupt a march by
families of the disappeared, and arrested five persons. Four
subsequently were released; the fifth was tried and convicted of
attacking a security officer (see Section 2.b.).
FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from prison in 1997,
remains under house arrest and is allowed to receive visits only from
members of his family (see Section 2.d.), although he has made numerous
press statements and conducted interviews while under house arrest.
Jailed oppositionist and FIS vice president Ali Benhadj, who had been
held incommunicado from 1992 until 1998, now is allowed contact with
members of his family, who speak to the press on his behalf.
The 1992 Antiterrorist Law suspended the requirement that the
police obtain warrants in order to make an arrest. During the year, the
police made limited use of this law. However, according to defense
attorneys, police who execute searches without a warrant routinely fail
to identify themselves as police and abuse those who ask for
identification (see Section 1.f.). Police and communal guards sometimes
detain persons at checkpoints (see Section 2.d.). There are reports of
police arresting close relatives of suspected terrorists in order to
force the suspects to surrender. According to Amnesty International, on
April 4, police arrested 73-year-old El-Hadj M'lik in front of several
witnesses. He had been questioned previously concerning his sons, one
of whom is believed to be a member of a terrorist group. Security
officials reassured the family, on two separate occasions, that M'lik
would be returned to them. However, he had not been returned by year's
end, and the Government provided no information regarding his
whereabouts.
Prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. Persons accused of
crimes sometimes did not receive expeditious trials; however, long-term
detention appeared to decrease somewhat during the past year (see
Section 1.e.). Hundreds of state enterprise officials who were arrested
on charges of corruption in 1996 remained in detention. Three or four
of the higher ranking detainees were released during the year.
Under the state of emergency, the Minister of Interior is
authorized to detain suspects in special camps that are administered by
the army. In 1995 the Government announced that it had closed the last
camp and released the 641 prisoners there. Local human rights activists
and NGO's state that no such camps now exist. They note that the
Government continues to keep some former prisoners under surveillance
and requires them to report periodically to police.
Forced exile is not a legal form of punishment and is not known to
be practiced. However, there are numerous cases of selfimposed exile
involving former FIS members or individuals who maintain that they have
been accused falsely of terrorism as punishment for openly criticizing
government policies.
One such case was resolved in September when Ali Bensaad, a
professor at the University of Constantine, who had been in exile in
Germany, returned to the country. The former exile was issued a limited
(6-month) passport, which allowed him to return. Bensaad is pursuing
redress in the court system for the ``machinations'' he claims were
perpetrated against him by former high-ranking officials.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the Government does not
always respect the independence of the judicial system. In November
1999, President Bouteflika named a commission to review the functioning
of the judiciary and to recommend ways to improve it. In August after
the commission submitted its report, the President announced a massive
reorganization of the judiciary. He replaced 80 percent of the heads of
the 187 lower courts and 99 percent of the presidents of the 37 higher-
level courts. Most of the court heads were reassigned to new locations;
however, a number were replaced outright. Whereas only a few courts
previously were headed by women, 19 now have female heads.
The judiciary is composed of the civil courts, which try cases
involving civilians, and the military courts, which have tried
civilians for security and terrorism offenses. There is also a
Constitutional Council, which reviews the constitutionality of
treaties, laws, and regulations. Although the Council is not part of
the judiciary, it has the authority to nullify laws found
unconstitutional.
Regular criminal courts try those individuals accused of security-
related offenses. Long-term detentions of suspects awaiting trial again
appeared to decrease somewhat during the year.
According to the Constitution, defendants are presumed innocent
until proven guilty. They have the right to confront their accusers and
may appeal the conviction. Trials are public, and defendants have the
right to legal counsel. However, the authorities do not always respect
all legal provisions regarding defendants' rights, and continue to deny
due process. Some lawyers do not accept cases of individuals accused of
securityrelated offenses, due to fear of retribution from the security
forces. Defense lawyers for members of the banned FIS have suffered
harassment, death threats, and arrest.
There are no credible estimates of the number of political
prisoners; some estimate the number to be several thousand. An unknown
number of persons who could be considered political prisoners are
serving prison sentences because of their Islamist sympathies and
membership in the FIS. There are credible estimates that the Government
released 5,000 political prisoners after Bouteflika's 1999 election.
International humanitarian organizations did not request visits
with political prisoners during the year; therefore, it is unclear
whether the Government would permit such organizations to visit
political prisoners. In general the Government does not permit
independent monitoring of prisons or detention centers; however, over
the past 18 months, it has permitted the ICRC to monitor general prison
conditions in civilian prisons (see Section 1.c.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--Authorities frequently infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the home,
but the state of emergency authorizes provincial governors to issue
exceptional warrants at any time. Security forces also entered
residences without warrants. According to defense attorneys, police who
execute searches without a warrant routinely fail to identify
themselves as police and abuse those who ask for identification.
Security forces deployed an extensive network of secret informers
against both terrorist targets and political opponents. The Government
monitors the telephones of, and sometimes disconnects service to,
political opponents and journalists (see Sections 2.a. and 3). There
are reports of police arresting close relatives of suspected terrorists
in order to force the suspects to surrender (see Section 1.d.).
Armed terrorists entered private homes either to kill or kidnap
residents or to steal weapons, valuables, or food. After massacres that
took place in their villages, numerous civilians fled their homes.
Armed terrorist groups consistently used threats of violence to extort
money from businesses and families across the country.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law.--
Armed groups were responsible for numerous, indiscriminate,
nonselective killings. Terrorists left bombs at several markets and
other public places during the year, killing and injuring dozens of
persons. In rural areas, terrorists continued to plant bombs and mines,
which often targeted security force personnel. For example, on
September 29, a group of at least 100 armed men seized control of the
roads leading into Bani Yassi, a small town 56 miles east of Algiers
near Tizi Ouzou. The group then destroyed the barracks of the local
communal police with an explosive device, entered the wreckage after
the explosion, and killed those police officers who were not killed in
the explosion. On November 4, one soldier was killed and two others
were injured in a bomb blast at an electrical pylon in the mountainous
region of Zaccar, about 40 miles southwest of Algiers. On December 5,
three people were killed and 11 were injured in an explosion in Tiaret
(200 miles west of Algiers).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech; however, the Government restricts this right in
practice. A 1990 law specifies that freedom of speech must respect
``individual dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the
national defense.'' The state of emergency decree gives the Government
broad authority to restrict these freedoms and to take legal action
against what it considers to be threats to the state or public order.
However, the Government did not enforce these regulations strictly, and
the independent press reported regularly on security matters without
penalty. Reporting by government-controlled press organs frequently
included deflated numbers of civilians and government forces killed,
and inflated terrorist casualty counts; however, there were no credible
allegations of inflated terrorist surrenders under the amnesty program
during the year, as had been the case in the past. Government
discrepancies were noted frequently in independent newspapers.
In March 1994, the Government issued an interministerial decree
that independent newspapers could print security information only from
official government bulletins carried by the government-controlled
Algerian Press Service (APS). Independent newspapers openly ignored the
directive, and the trend toward increased openness about security-force
losses continued during the year. The Government continued to provide
the press with more information than in the past about the security
situation. Journalists deliberately did not report on current possible
abuses by security forces to avoid difficulties with the Government,
although there was significant coverage of NGO activity aimed at
publicizing such abuses committed in the past. According to the
Ministry of Health, it no longer forbids medical personnel from
speaking to journalists, and such personnel spoke to the press during
the year. The Government's definition of security information often
extended beyond purely military matters to encompass broader political
affairs. In 1995 FIS officials who had been freed from detention in
1994 received direct orders from the Justice Ministry to make no
further public statements. This ban remains in force. In general,
journalists exercised self-censorship by not publishing criticism of
specific senior military officials.
For a second consecutive year, there were no reports that the
Government put journalists under ``judicial control.'' In previous
years, the Government used this practice to harass journalists who
wrote offending articles by requiring the journalists to check in
regularly with the local police and preventing them from leaving the
country. According to a Europe-based NGO that specializes in press
freedom, the Government continued to refrain from harassing journalists
under criminal defamation statutes during the year, as had been its
practice in the past.
There were no newspapers allied with Islamist political parties in
print, due to government pressure; however, legal Islamist political
parties have access to the existing independent press, in which they
may express their views without government interference.
The Government maintains an effective monopoly over printing
companies and newsprint imports. However, at least two newspapers were
in the final stages of negotiations with private firms to print
newspapers and import newsprint, which would circumvent such government
control. There was no abuse of the Government's power to halt newspaper
publications during the year.
The Government continued to exercise pressure on the independent
press through the state-owned advertising company, which was created in
1996. All state-owned companies that wish to place an advertisement in
a newspaper must submit the item to the advertising company, which then
decides in which newspapers to place it. In an economy in which state
companies' output and government services still represent approximately
two-thirds of national income, government-provided advertising
constitutes a significant source of advertising revenue for the
country's newspapers. Advertising companies tend to provide significant
amounts of advertising to publications with a strong anti-Islamist
editorial line and to withhold advertising from newspapers on political
grounds, even if such newspapers have large readerships or offer cheap
advertising rates.
President Bouteflika stated in November 1999 that the media
ultimately should be at the service of the State. Radio and television
remained under government control, with coverage biased in favor of the
Government's policies and the government-supported party, the National
Democratic Rally (RND). Parliamentary debates are televised live.
Satellite-dish antennas are widespread, and millions of citizens have
access to European and Middle Eastern broadcasting. A five-member
delegation from Reporters Without Borders visited the country in June.
The group was allowed to meet freely with the interlocutors of their
choice and concluded that the press enjoyed increasing freedom.
However, the delegation also noted a number of continued barriers to
full press freedom.
Many artists, intellectuals, and university educators fled the
country after widespread violence began in 1992; however, some
continued to return during the year. There was a growing number of
academic seminars and colloquiums that occurred without governmental
interference. The Government continues to interfere in seminars that
were political or economic in content (see Section 2.b.). The only
reported strike at a university during the year occurred in October at
Bab Izzouar University, where a small number of professors went on
strike to protest work conditions. After a week, the teachers returned
to work (see Section 6.a.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of assembly; however, the 1992 emergency law and
government practice sharply curtail this right. Citizens and
organizations must obtain permits from the appointed local governor
before holding public meetings. While the Government frequently grants
licenses to political parties, NGO's, and other groups to hold indoor
rallies, in most instances outdoor demonstrations are not permitted.
Some unlicensed groups continue to be active, including groups
dedicated to the cause of persons who have disappeared. Such groups
continued to hold regular demonstrations outside government buildings.
However, in March in the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the
authorities beat and intimidated demonstrators attempting to draw
attention to the cause of persons who disappeared. The Government
arrested 40 persons during two separate demonstrations occurring about
a week apart. However, those arrested were released after a short time.
In November police again disrupted a march by families of persons who
had disappeared. In this instance, which coincided with a visit to that
city by Amnesty International, the police used force, and arrested five
persons. Four subsequently were released; the fifth was tried and
convicted of attacking a security officer.
The Government refused to permit, in the name of public order, a
proposed march in October to protest the Israeli Government's actions
against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall.
When a group of protesters attempted to hold a rally despite the ban,
they were dispersed in a nonviolent manner.
The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
the 1992 Emergency Law and government practice severely restrict it.
The Interior Ministry must approve all political parties before they
may be established (see Section 3). In January the Government refused
to approve the Wafa Party because of its perceived ties to the FIS. In
August 40 members of Parliament petitioned the Government, demanding an
explanation of the Government's refusal to recognize the Party. In
November the Minister of Justice responded, stating that the Wafa Party
would not be recognized because it included large numbers of members
who belonged to the outlawed FIS. The Government closed the Party's
offices on November 13. The Front Democratique, which is headed by
former Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, applied for registration but
received no response within the time period specified by law for
governmental decision on such cases (see Section 3). The Interior
Ministry licenses all nongovernmental associations and regards all
associations as illegal unless they have licenses. It may deny a
license to, or dissolve, any group regarded as a threat to the
Government's authority, or to the security or public order of the
State. After the Government suspended the parliamentary election in
1992, it banned the FIS as a political party, and the social and
charitable groups associated with it. Membership in the FIS remains
illegal, although at least one former FIS leader announced publicly
that he intended to form a cultural youth group.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares Islam to be the
state religion but prohibits discrimination based on religious belief,
and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however,
there are some restrictions. Islam is the only legal religion, and the
law limits the practice of other faiths; however, the Government
follows a de facto policy of tolerance by not inquiring into the
religious practices of individuals.
The law prohibits public assembly for purposes of practicing a
faith other than Islam. However, there are Roman Catholic churches in
the country, including a cathedral in Algiers (the seat of the
Archbishop), which conduct services without government interference. In
1994 the size of the Jewish community diminished significantly, and its
synagogue since has been abandoned. There are only a few smaller
churches and other places of worship; non-Muslims usually congregate in
private homes for religious services.
Because Islam is the state religion, the country's education system
is structured to benefit Muslims. Education is free to all citizens
below the age of 16, and the study of Islam is a strict requirement in
the public schools, which are regulated by the Ministry of Education
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Private primary and secondary
schools are not permitted to operate.
The Government appoints preachers to mosques and gives general
guidance on sermons. The Government monitors activities in mosques for
possible security-related offenses, and bars their use as public
meeting places outside of regular prayer hours. The Ministry of
religious affairs provides some financial support to mosques and has
limited control over the training of imams.
Conversions from Islam to other religions are rare. Because of
safety concerns and potential legal and social problems, Muslim
converts practice their new faith clandestinely. The Family Code, which
is based on Shari'a (Islamic law), prohibits Muslim women from marrying
non-Muslims, although this regulation is not always enforced. The code
does not restrict Muslim men from marrying non-Muslim women.
Non-Islamic proselytizing is illegal, and the Government restricts
the importation of non-Islamic literature for widespread distribution.
Personal copies of the major works of other religions, such as the
Bible, may be brought into the country. Non-Islamic religious texts and
music and video selections no longer are difficult to locate for
purchase. The Government prohibits the dissemination of any literature
that portrays violence as a legitimate precept of Islam.
Under both Shari'a and the law, children born to a Muslim father
are Muslim, regardless of the mother's religion. Islam does not allow
conversion to other faiths at any age. In 1994 the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA) declared its intention to eliminate Jews, Christians, and
polytheists from Algeria. The GIA has not yet retracted that
declaration and, as a result, the mainly foreign Christian community
tends to curtail its public activities.
The country's 9-year civil conflict has pitted self-proclaimed
radical Muslims against the general Islamic population. Approximately
100,000 civilians, terrorists, and security forces have been killed
during the past 9 years. Extremist selfproclaimed ``Islamists'' have
issued public threats against all ``infidels'' in the country, both
foreigners and citizens, and have killed both Muslims and non-Muslims,
including missionaries. The majority of the country's terrorist groups
do not, as a rule, differentiate between religious and political
killings. During the year, terrorists continued attacks against the
Government and civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of domestic
and foreign travel, and freedom to emigrate; however, the Government at
times restricts these rights. In the spring of 1999, the Government
allowed travel abroad by representatives of organizations pursuing
information on relatives who allegedly ``disappeared'' due to the
actions of the security forces. These organizations, which were hosted
by human rights NGO's, held public discussions on those who had
disappeared.
The Government does not allow foreign travel by senior officials
from the banned FIS. FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from
prison in 1997, remains under house arrest (see Section 1.d.). The
Government also does not permit young men who are eligible for the
draft and who have not yet completed their military service to leave
the country if they do not have special authorization; such
authorization may be granted to students and to those individuals with
special family circumstances. The Family Code does not permit married
females under 19 years of age to travel abroad without their husband's
permission, although this provision generally is not followed in
practice.
Under the state of emergency, the Interior Minister and the
provincial governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons
regarded as threats to public order. The Government also restricts
travel into four southern provinces, where much of the hydrocarbon
industry and many foreign workers are located, in order to enhance
security in those areas.
The police and the communal guards operate checkpoints throughout
the country. They routinely stop vehicles to inspect identification
papers and to search for evidence of terrorist activity. They sometimes
detain persons at these checkpoints.
Armed groups intercept citizens at roadblocks, using stolen police
uniforms and equipment in various regions to rob them of their cash and
vehicles. According to press reports, armed groups sometimes killed
groups of civilian passengers at these roadblocks (see Section 1.a.).
The Constitution provides for the right of political asylum, and
the Government occasionally grants asylum. The Government cooperates
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. For example, it
cooperates with the UNHCR on programs to help refugee Sahrawis, former
residents of the Western Sahara who left that territory after Morocco
took control of it in the 1970's. The Government also has worked with
international organizations that help the Tuaregs, a nomadic people of
southern Algeria and neighboring countries. There were no reports of
the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government; however, there are significant limitations to this right in
practice. The strong prerogatives of the executive branch, supported by
the entrenched power of the military and the bureaucracy, prevent
citizens from exercising this right. The withdrawal of six presidential
candidates in 1999 amidst credible charges of fraud, and the election
of President Bouteflika highlighted the continued dominance of the
military elite in the process of selecting the country's political
leadership.
President Bouteflika was elected in an April 15, 1999 presidential
election that was seriously flawed by the withdrawal 1 day before of
all other candidates, who charged that the military already had begun
to implement plans to produce a fraudulent Bouteflika victory. Until
those allegations surfaced, the campaign had been conducted fairly,
with all candidates widely covered in both state-owned and private
media. The conduct of the campaign--although regulated as to the use of
languages other than Arabic, and as to the timing, location and
duration of meetings--was free, and all candidates traveled extensively
throughout the country. One potential candidate was denied the ability
to run because the electoral commission determined that he could not
prove that he had participated in Algeria's war of independence against
France, a legal requirement for candidates for President born before
July 1942. With the withdrawal of the other candidates and the absence
of foreign observers, it was impossible to make an accurate
determination of turnout for the election, although it apparently was
as low as 30 percent; the Government claimed a 60 percent turnout.
Under the Constitution, the President has the authority to rule by
decree in special circumstances. The President subsequently must submit
to the Parliament for approval decrees issued while the Parliament was
not in session. The President did not exercise such authority during
the year. The Parliament has a popularly elected lower chamber, the
National Popular Assembly (APN), and an upper chamber, the National
Council, two-thirds of whose members are elected by municipal and
provincial councils. The President appoints the remaining one-third of
the National Council's members. Legislation must have the approval of
threequarters of both the upper and lower chambers' members. Laws must
originate in the lower chamber.
In June 1997, Algeria held its first elections to the APN since
elections were canceled in January 1992, and elected the first
multiparty parliament in the country's history. Candidates representing
39 political parties participated, along with several independent
candidates. Under a system of proportional representation, the
government-supported party, the National Democratic Rally, won a
plurality of 154 seats out of a total of 371. In their final report,
neutral observers stated that, of 1,258 (of the country's 35,000)
voting stations that they assessed, 1,169 were satisfactory, 95 were
problematic, and 11 were unsatisfactory. In November 1997, the
provincial election commissions announced the results of their
adjudication of the appeals filed by various political parties. The RND
lost some seats but remained the overall victor in the Assembly
elections.
In 1997 the appointed previous legislature, the National Transition
Council (CNT), changed the law that regulates political parties. Under
the controversial law, potential parties require official approval from
the Interior Ministry before they may be established. To obtain
approval, a party must have 25 founders from across the country whose
names must be registered with the Interior Ministry. A party headed by
one of the six presidential candidates who withdrew from the April
elections registered in September 1999. Two parties failed to receive
registration. In January the Government refused to approve the Wafa
party because of its perceived ties to the FIS (see Section 2.b.). The
Front Democratique, which is headed by former Prime Minster Sid Ahmed
Ghozali, applied for registration but received no response within the
time period specified by law for governmental decision on such cases.
No party may use religion, Amazigh heritage, or Arab heritage as a
basis of organizing for political purposes. The law also bans political
party ties to nonpolitical associations and regulates party financing
and reporting requirements.
The more than 30 existing political parties represent a wide
spectrum of viewpoints and engage in activities that range from holding
rallies to printing newspapers. The Government continues to ban the FIS
as a political party (see Section 2.b.). With the exception of the
leading progovernment party, the RND, and the Front de Liberation
National (FLN), political parties sometimes encounter difficulties when
dealing with local officials, who hinder their organizational efforts.
The Government monitors private telephone communications, and sometimes
disconnects telephone service to political opponents for extended
periods (see Section 1.f.). Opposition parties have very limited access
to state-controlled television and radio, although the independent
press publicizes their views.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. The new
cabinet, named in August, has no female members. Eleven of the 380
members of the lower house of Parliament are women. In September 1999,
President Bouteflika appointed the first-ever female provincial
governor. A woman heads a workers' party, and all the major political
parties except one had women's divisions headed by women.
The Amazighs, an ethnic minority centered in the Kabylie region,
participate freely and actively in the political process. Two major
opposition parties originated in the Amazigh-populated region of the
country: The Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for Culture and
Democracy. These two parties represent Amazigh political and cultural
concerns in the Parliament and the media. The two Amazighbased parties
were required to conform with the 1997 changes to the Electoral Law
that stipulate that political parties must have 25 founders from across
the country.
The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, do not play an important
role in politics, due to their small numbers, estimated in the tens of
thousands, and their nomadic existence.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The most active independent human rights group is the Algerian
League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), an independent
organization that has members throughout the country. The LADDH is not
allowed access to the authorities or to prisons beyond the normal
consultations allowed between a lawyer and a client. The less-active
Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH) is an independent organization
based in Constantine. The LADH has members throughout the country who
follow individual cases. Human rights groups report occasional
harassment by government authorities in the form of obvious
surveillance and cutting off of telephone service.
Unlike in previous years when such visits were banned, delegations
from Amnesty International, the ICRC, Human Rights Watch, Freedom
House, the FIDH, and Reporters Without Borders visited the country at
the Government's invitation. Amnesty International visited in May and
again in October, and, after its May visit, claimed that during the
visit its delegation was ``able to move around the country freely and
no restrictions were imposed'' on its activities. However, Amnesty
International did not seek meetings with members of the FIS in prison
or under house arrest. The organization stated that there had been ``a
significant drop in the level of violence and killings, and the reports
of arbitrary arrests, prolonged incommunicado detention, torture,
disappearances, and unfair trials have also diminished significantly.''
However, Amnesty International maintained that many serious concerns
had not been addressed, including resolving past abuses such as
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Moreover, during its October
visit, Amnesty International claimed that the Government was not
cooperating adequately or providing the organization with quality
information. The organization also claimed that the Government was
staging demonstrations opposing the Amnesty International visit. In
September and October, the ICRC conducted its third visit to the
country to monitor general conditions in the civilian prisons. ICRC
president Jakob Kellenberger commented during the visit on the
constructive nature of the dialog between the ICRC and the Government.
A delegation from Human Rights Watch met with government officials in
May. The delegation stated that it was ``allowed to travel freely and
meet with officials, lawyers, nongovernmental organizations, and
victims and families of victims of abuses by the Government and armed
groups.'' Freedom House visited July 3-10, and again in November, in
order to assess the possibility of establishing programs involving
support for the rule of law, including women's rights, freedom of the
press, and judicial reform.
The National Observatory for Human Rights was established by the
Government in 1992 to report human rights violations to the
authorities. It prepares an annual report with recommendations to the
Government.
The Government has a national ombudsman, who receives individual
complaints and presents an annual report to the President. Provincial
representatives are designated to accept individual grievances and to
make them known to the authorities. Most such complaints concerned
bureaucratic unresponsiveness and lack of jobs and housing (see Section
5).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on birth, race,
sex, belief, or any other personal or social condition; however, women
continue to face legal and social discrimination.
Women.--Women's rights advocates assert that spousal abuse is
common, but there are no reliable statistics regarding its extent.
Spousal abuse is more frequent in rural than urban areas, especially
among less-educated persons. There are no specific laws against spousal
rape. Rape is illegal, and in principle a spouse could be charged under
the law. However, there are strong societal pressures against a woman
seeking legal redress against her spouse for rape, and there have been
no reports of the law being applied in such cases. Battered women must
obtain medical certification of the physical effects of an assault
before they lodge a complaint with the police. However, because of
societal pressures, women frequently are reluctant to endure this
process. There are very few facilities offering safe haven for abused
women, and many more are needed. Women's rights groups have experienced
difficulty in drawing attention to spousal abuse as an important social
problem, largely due to societal attitudes. There are several rape
crisis centers run by women's groups, but they have few resources. In
August 1998, the Government released figures indicating that the
whereabouts of 319 women remain unknown, and that there were 24 reports
by women of rape. Most human rights groups believe that the actual
number is much higher. There is a rape crisis center that specializes
in caring for women who are victims of rape by terrorists.
Some aspects of the law and many traditional social practices
discriminate against women. The 1984 Family Code, which is based in
large part on Shari'a, treats women as minors under the legal
guardianship of a husband or male relative. For example, a woman must
obtain a father's approval to marry. Divorce is difficult for a wife to
obtain except in cases of abandonment or the husband's conviction for a
serious crime. Husbands generally obtain the right to the family's home
in the case of divorce. Custody of the children normally is awarded to
the mother, but she may not enroll them in a particular school or take
them out of the country without the father's authorization. Only males
are able to confer citizenship on their children. Muslim women are
prohibited from marrying nonMuslims; Muslim men may marry non-Muslim
women (see Section 2.c.).
The Family Code also affirms the Islamic practice of allowing a man
to marry up to four wives, although this rarely occurs in practice. A
wife may sue for divorce if her husband does not inform her of his
intent to marry another woman prior to the marriage.
Women suffer from discrimination in inheritance claims; in
accordance with Shari'a, women are entitled to a smaller portion of an
estate than are male children or a deceased husband's brothers.
According to Shari'a, such a distinction is justified because other
provisions require that the husband's income and assets are to be used
to support the family, while the wife's remain, in principle, her own.
However, in practice women do not always have exclusive control over
assets that they bring to a marriage or income that they earn
themselves. Females under 19 years of age may not travel abroad without
their husbands' permission (see Section 2.d.). However, women may take
out business loans and are the sole custodians of their dowries. In its
2000 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of
Experts noted that the Government has stated that, despite
incorporating equality between men and women into the legislative and
regulatory texts governing the workplace, in practice women still are
confronted with discriminations in employment resulting from
stereotypes that exist regarding a woman's place in society.
While social pressure against women pursuing higher education or a
career exists throughout the country, it is much stronger in rural
areas than in major urban areas. Women constitute only 10 percent of
the work force. Nonetheless, women may own businesses, enter into
contracts, and pursue opportunities in government, medicine, law,
education, the media, and the armed forces. About 25 percent of judges
are women, a percentage that has been growing in recent years.
President Bouteflika's changes to the judiciary in August increased the
number of courts headed by women (see Section 1.e).
Although the 1990 Labor Law bans sexual discrimination in the
workplace, the leaders of women's organizations report that violations
are commonplace. Labor Ministry inspectors do little to enforce the
law.
There are numerous small women's rights groups. Their main goals
are to foster women's economic welfare and to amend aspects of the
Family Code.
During the year, extremists sometimes specifically targeted women.
There were numerous incidents of women being killed and mutilated in
massacres. Armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnaped young women and
held them captive for extended periods for the purposes of rape and
servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.).
Children.--The Government is committed in principle to protecting
children's human rights. It provides free education for children 6 to
15 years of age, and free medical care for all citizens--albeit in
often rudimentary facilities. The Ministry of Youth and Sports has
programs for children, but such programs face serious funding problems.
Child abuse is a problem. Hospitals treat numerous child abuse cases
every year, but many cases go unreported. Laws against child abuse have
not led to notable numbers of prosecutions against offenders. Legal
experts maintain that the Penal and Family Codes do not offer children
sufficient protection. NGO's that specialize in care of children cite
an increase in domestic violence aimed at children, which they
attribute to the ``culture of violence'' developed during the years
since 1992 and the social dislocations caused by the movement of rural
families to the cities to escape terrorist violence. Such NGO's have
educational programs aimed at reducing the level of violence, but lack
funding.
People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate
accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled.
Public enterprises, in downsizing the work force, generally ignore a
law that requires that they reserve 1 percent of their jobs for the
disabled. Social security provides for payments for orthopedic
equipment, and some nongovernmental organizations receive limited
government financial support. The Government also attempts to finance
specialized training, but this initiative remains rudimentary.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Amazighs are an ethnic
minority centered in the Kabylie region. Amazigh nationalists have
sought to maintain their own cultural and linguistic identity while the
Government's Arabization program continues. The law requires that
Arabic be the official language and requires, under penalty of fines,
that all official government business be conducted in Arabic. The law
also requires that Arabic be used for all broadcasts on national
television and radios for dubbing or subtitling all non-Arabic films,
for medical prescriptions (although the law is not followed in
practice), and for communications equipment. As part of the national
charter signed in 1996, the Government and several major political
parties agreed that the Amazigh culture and language were major
political components of the country's identity. In September 1999
President Bouteflika stated that the Amazigh language would never be an
official language.
There are professorships in Amazigh culture at the University of
Tizi Ouzou. The government-owned national television station broadcasts
a brief nightly news program in the Amazigh language. Amazighs hold
influential positions in government, the army, business, and
journalism.
The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, live an isolated, nomadic
existence and are relatively few in number.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to establish
trade unions of their choice. About two-thirds of the labor force
belong to unions. There is an umbrella labor confederation, the General
Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and its affiliated entities, which
dates from the era of a single political party. The UGTA encompasses
national syndicates that are specialized by sector. There are also some
autonomous unions, such as syndicates for Air Algeria pilots (SPLA),
airport technicians (SNTMA), and teachers (CNES).
Workers are required to obtain government approval to establish a
union. The 1990 law on labor unions requires the Labor Ministry to
approve a union application within 30 days. The Autonomous Syndicates
Confederation (CSA) has attempted since early 1996 to organize the
autonomous syndicates, but without success. The application that the
CSA filed with the Labor Ministry still was pending at year's end,
although the CSA continues to function without official status. The law
prohibits unions from associating with political parties and also
prohibits unions from receiving funds from foreign sources. The courts
are empowered to dissolve unions that engage in illegal activities. The
labor union organized by the banned FIS, the Islamic Syndicate of
Workers (SIT), was dissolved in 1992 because it had no license.
Under the state of emergency, the Government is empowered to
require workers in both the public and private sectors to stay at their
jobs in the event of an unauthorized or illegal strike. According to
the 1990 Law on Industrial Relations, workers may strike only after 14
days of mandatory conciliation, mediation, or arbitration. The law
states that arbitration decisions are binding on both parties. If no
agreement is reached in arbitration, the workers may strike legally
after they vote by secret ballot to do so. A minimum level of public
services must be maintained during public sector service strikes.
In February the Agricultural Services Department went on strike for
increased salaries. On March 28 and 29, The National Customs Union went
on strike to demand the implementation of a previously negotiated
agreement on salaries. On April 3, the air traffic controllers
(Syndicat National des Personnels de la Circulation Aerienne) went on
strike as a part of extended salary negotiations. In May steelworkers
went on strike for assurances of job security. In that same month, the
National Teacher's Union (Union National des Personnels de l'Education
et de la Formation--UNPEF) went on strike for increased salaries and
better housing. There also were various taxi strikes throughout the
country during the year. The workers received varying numbers of
concessions to their demands as a result of the strikes. In October a
small number of professors at Bab Izzouar University went on strike to
protest work conditions (see Section 2.a.).
Unions may form and join federations or confederations, affiliate
with international labor bodies, and develop relations with foreign
labor groups. For example, the UGTA has contacts with French unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining for all unions, and the Government
permits this right in practice. The law prohibits discrimination by
employers against union members and organizers, and provides mechanisms
for resolving trade union complaints of antiunion practices by
employers. It also permits unions to recruit members at the workplace.
The Government has established an export processing zone in Jijel.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is incompatible with the Constitution's provisions on individual
rights, and the Penal Code prohibits compulsory labor, including by
children; however, while the Government generally enforces the ban
effectively, armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnap young women and
hold them captive for weeks at a time, during which group members rape
them and force them into servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5,
and 6.f.).
In its 2000 report, the ILO's Committee of Experts noted that the
law that requires persons who have completed a course of higher
education or training to perform a period of service of between 2 and 4
years in order to obtain employment or work in an occupation, is not
compatible with relevant ILO conventions dealing with forced labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Inspectors
from the Ministry of labor enforce the minimum employment age by making
periodic or unannounced inspection visits to public sector enterprises.
They do not enforce the law effectively in the agricultural or private
sectors. Economic necessity compels many children to resort to informal
employment, such as street vending. The Government prohibits forced and
bonded labor by children and generally enforces this prohibition (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law defines the overall
framework for acceptable conditions of work but leaves specific
agreements on wages, hours, and conditions of employment to the
discretion of employers in consultation with employees. The Government
fixes by decree a monthly minimum wage for all sectors; however, this
is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. The minimum wage is approximately $105 (8,000 dinars) per
month. Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for ensuring
compliance with the minimum wage regulation; however, their enforcement
is inconsistent.
The standard workweek is 40 hours. There are well-developed
occupation and health regulations codified in a 1991 decree, but
government inspectors do not enforce these regulations effectively.
There were no reports of workers being dismissed for removing
themselves from hazardous working conditions. Because employment
generally is based on very detailed contracts, workers rarely are
subjected to conditions in the workplace that they were not informed of
beforehand. If workers are subjected to such conditions, they first may
attempt to renegotiate the employment contract and, that failing,
resort to the courts.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons. Armed terrorist groups frequently kidnaped
young women and held them captive for weeks at a time, during which
group members raped them and forced them into servitude (see Sections
1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, and 6.c.). There is a rape crisis center in
Algiers that specializes in caring for women who are victims of rape by
terrorists.
__________
BAHRAIN
Bahrain is a hereditary emirate with few democratic institutions
and no political parties. The Al-Khalifa extended family has ruled
Bahrain since the late 18th century and dominates all facets of its
society and government. The Constitution confirms the Amir as
hereditary ruler. The Amir, Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa, governs
the country with the assistance of his uncle as Prime Minister, his son
as Crown Prince, and an appointed cabinet of ministers. In 1975 the
Government suspended some provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
including those articles relating to the National Assembly, which was
disbanded and never reinstituted. Citizens belong to the Shi'a and
Sunni sects of Islam, with the Shi'a constituting over two-thirds of
the indigenous population. However, Sunnis predominate politically and
economically because the ruling family is Sunni and is supported by the
armed forces, the security services, and powerful Sunni and Shi'a
merchant families. The political situation generally was calm during
the year; there were a few incidents of low-level political unrest, but
there has not been significant unrest since 1996. There are few
judicial checks on the actions of the Amir and his Government, and the
courts are subject to government pressure.
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public security. It
controls the public security force (police) and the extensive security
service, which are responsible for maintaining internal order. The
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is responsible for defending against
external threats. It did not play a role in internal security during
the year. Security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
Bahrain has a mixed economy with government domination of many
basic industries, including the important oil and aluminum sectors.
Possessing limited oil and gas reserves, the Government is working to
diversify its economic base, concentrating on light manufacturing and
the services sectors, particularly banking, financial services, and
consulting. The Government has used its modest oil revenues to build a
highly advanced transportation and telecommunications infrastructure.
Economic growth is highly dependent on global oil prices, but the
economy remains stable. The Government encouraged private national and
international investment and moved to privatize some of its state-run
industries. The country is a regional financial and business center.
Tourism, particularly via the causeway linking Bahrain to Saudi Arabia,
is also a significant source of income. Citizens enjoy a high standard
of living.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
some areas and improved in other areas; however, its record was poor in
some areas, particularly workers' rights. The Government denies
citizens the right to change their government; however, the political
situation continued to improve due to the decrease in political and
civil unrest compared to last year, and an effort by the Amir to
develop relations with the Shi'a community. Security forces continued
to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners. Impunity remains a
problem; there were no known instances of any security forces personnel
being punished for human rights abuses committed either during the year
or in any previous year. The Government continued to use arbitrary
arrest and detention, incommunicado and prolonged detention, and
involuntary exile; however, in 1999 upon assuming power, one of the
Amir's first official acts was to pardon or release over 400 prisoners,
detainees, and exiles. During the year, the Amir pardoned a combined
total of approximately 500 prisoners and detainees, some of whom had
been detained for political reasons. The judiciary remains subject to
government pressure, and there are limits on the right to a fair public
trial, especially in the Security Court. The Government continued to
infringe on citizens' privacy rights. The Government imposed some
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press and restricted
freedom of assembly and association. The Government also imposes some
limits on freedom of religion and movement. Violence against women and
discrimination based on sex, religion, and ethnicity remain problems.
The Government restricts worker rights, and there were instances of
forced labor.
In December 1999, the Amir stated that all citizens are ``equal
before the law'' and allowed Shi'a to apply for jobs in the BDF and the
Ministry of the Interior for the first time in 4 years. These policies
continued during the year.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
There were no investigations or prosecutions of any security force
personnel for alleged extrajudicial killings committed in previous
years.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment are prohibited by law; however there are credible reports
that prisoners often are beaten, both on the soles of their feet and
about the face and head, burned with cigarettes, deprived of sleep for
long periods of time, and in some cases subjected to electrical shocks.
The Government has difficulty in rebutting allegations of torture and
of other cruel, inhuman, or degrading practices because it permits
incommunicado detention and detention without trial. There were no
known instances of officials being punished for human rights abuses
committed either during the year or in any previous year, and there is
an appearance of impunity.
Opposition and human rights groups allege that the security forces
sometimes threaten female detainees with rape and inflict other forms
of sexual abuse and harassment on them while they are in custody. Such
allegations are difficult to confirm or deny. Young prisoners are
housed separately until the age of 15.
Credible observers say that the prisons generally meet minimum
international standards. Local defense attorneys report that their
clients continued to receive improved care and treatment. In addition
the release of hundreds of detainees from jail, perhaps as many as
1,200 in 1999 and 2000 (see Section 1.d.), and the reduced number of
arrests during the year, eased overcrowding. At the Government's
invitation, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
continued the series of visits to prisons that it started in late 1996.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are serious problems. The Constitution states that ``no
person shall be arrested, detained, imprisoned, searched or compelled
to reside in a specified place . . . except in accordance with the
provisions of the law and under the supervision of the judicial
authorities.'' However, in practice, in matters regarding arrest,
detention, or exile, the 1974 State Security Act takes precedence.
Under the State Security Act, persons may be detained for up to 3 years
without trial for engaging in activities or making statements regarded
as a threat to the broadly defined concepts of national harmony and
security, and the Government continued to arrest and detain citizens
arbitrarily. The scope of the State Security Act extends to any case
involving arson, explosions, or attacks on persons at their place of
employment or because of the nature of their work. Detainees have the
right to appeal such detentions after a period of 3 months and, if the
appeal is denied, every 16 months thereafter from the date of the
original detention.
Government security forces used the State Security Act during the
year to detain persons deemed to be engaging in antigovernment
activities, including persons who attempted to exercise their rights of
free speech, assembly, and association, or other rights. Activities
that also may lead to detention, questioning, warning, or arrest by the
security forces include: Membership in illegal organizations or those
deemed subversive; painting antigovernment slogans on walls; joining
antigovernment demonstrations; possessing or circulating antigovernment
writings; preaching sermons considered by the Government to have an
antigovernment political tone; and harboring or associating with
persons who committed such acts. However, there was greater tolerance
of activities such as public demonstrations during the year, and the
number of persons detained was less than in 1999.
In addition to overseeing the security service and police, the
Ministry of Interior also controls the Office of the Public Prosecutor,
whose officers initially determine whether sufficient evidence exists
to continue to hold a prisoner in investigative detention. The Ministry
is responsible for all aspects of prison administration. In the early
stages of detention, prisoners and their attorneys have no recourse to
any authority outside the Ministry of Interior. The authorities rarely
permit visits to inmates who are incarcerated for security-related
offenses and such prisoners may be held incommunicado for months, or
sometimes years. However, prisoners detained for criminal offenses
generally may receive visits from family members, usually once a month.
At the beginning of the year, security forces were estimated to be
holding over 800 persons in detention for security-related offenses.
During the year, some were arrested, released, and then arrested again.
At year's end, the total number of persons detained was reduced;
however, as many as 750 persons still remained in detention. During the
year, the Government pardoned as many as 300 persons detained in
connection with antigovernment activities. One of the Amir's first
official acts was to pardon or release over 400 detainees, prisoners,
and exiles. In January and April, the Amir pardoned an additional 223
prisoners and detainees, some of whom had been detained for political
reasons.
Several Shi'a clerics were arrested in 1996 for signing a 1994
petition to the Amir calling for the restoration of the National
Assembly. Four of the clerics, Abdul Wahab Hussain, Hassan Mushaimaa,
Hassan Sultan, and Haji Hassan Jarallah, remain in jail. The most
prominent member of the group, Abdul Amir Al-Jamri, was pardoned in
1999, although he is still subject to government restrictions (see
Section 2.c.). On March 22, the Government rearrested Abdul Wahab
Hussain only hours after a judge ordered his release (see Section
2.c.).
Abdul Jahil Abdula Khadim, a shop owner, remained in detention at
year's end. He was detained in 1998 after a young man who worked in his
store died from police mistreatment.
While the authorities reserve the right to use exile and the
revocation of citizenship to punish individuals convicted or suspected
of antigovernment activity, there were no reports of exile orders
issued during the year. In the past, the Government has revoked the
citizenship of persons that it considered to be security threats. The
Government considers such persons to have forfeited their nationality
under the Citizenship Act of 1963 because they accepted foreign
citizenship or passports, or engaged in antigovernment activities
abroad. Bahraini emigre groups and their local contacts have challenged
this practice, arguing that the Government's revocation of citizenship
without due process violates the Constitution. The Amir pardoned 12
exiles during the year. According to the emigre groups, as many as 450
citizens continue to live in exile. This total includes both those
prohibited from returning to Bahrain and their family members who live
abroad with them voluntarily.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the courts are subject to government
pressure regarding verdicts, sentencing, and appeals.
The civil and criminal legal system consists of a complex mix of
courts, based on diverse legal sources, including Sunni and Shi'a
Shari'a (Islamic law), tribal law, and other civil codes and
regulations. The 1974 State Security Act created a separate, closed
security court system, which has jurisdiction in cases of alleged
antigovernment activity.
The Bahrain Defense Force maintains a separate court system for
military personnel accused of offenses under the Military Code of
Justice. Military courts do not review cases involving civilian,
criminal, or security offenses.
Defense attorneys are appointed by the Ministry of Justice and
Islamic Affairs. Some attorneys and family members involved in
politically sensitive criminal cases complain that the Government
interferes with court proceedings to influence the outcome or to
prevent judgments from being carried out. There are also occasional
allegations of corruption in the judicial system.
In past cases, the Amir, the Prime Minister, and other senior
government officials have lost civil cases brought against them by
private citizens; however, the court-ordered judgments are not always
implemented expeditiously. Members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family are
well represented in the judiciary and generally do not recuse
themselves from cases involving the interests of the Government.
A person who is arrested may be tried in an ordinary criminal court
or, if recommended by the prosecution, in the Security Court. Ordinary
civil or criminal trial procedures provide for an open trial, the right
to counsel (with legal aid available when necessary), and the right to
appeal. Criminal court proceedings generally do not appear to
discriminate against women, children, or minority groups. However,
there is credible evidence that persons accused of antigovernment
crimes and tried in the criminal courts were denied fair trials. Those
accused were not permitted to speak with an attorney until their
appearance before the judge at the preliminary hearing. Trials in the
criminal courts for antigovernment activities are held in secret.
Security cases are tried in secret by judges on the Supreme Court
of Appeals, sitting as the Security Court. Family members usually are
not permitted in the court until the final verdict is rendered.
Procedures in the Security Court do not provide for even the most basic
safeguards. The Security Court is exempt from adhering to the
procedural protections of the Penal Code. Defendants may be represented
by counsel, but they seldom see their attorneys before the actual day
of arraignment. Convictions may be based solely on confessions,
including confessions that may have been elicited under torture, and
police evidence or testimony that may be introduced in secret. The
defense may not review the evidence against the defendant prior to
trial proceedings. Defense lawyers complain that they rarely are given
sufficient time to find witnesses. There is no right to judicial review
of the legality of arrests. There is no judicial appeal of a Security
Court verdict, but the defendant may request clemency from the Amir.
The Security Court tried one individual, Abdul Wahab Hussain, during
the year (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
The number of political prisoners is difficult to determine because
the Government does not release data on security cases; however, the
total is believed to be less than 100. Such cases are not tried in open
court, and visits to prisoners convicted of security offenses are
restricted strictly. The Government denies that there are any political
prisoners and claims that all inmates incarcerated for committing
security offenses were convicted properly of subversive acts such as
espionage, espousing or committing violence, or belonging to terrorist
organizations.
In accordance with tradition, the Government releases and grants
amnesty to some prisoners, including individuals imprisoned for
political activities, on major holidays. The Government reported that
the Amir pardoned over 288 prisoners and detainees during the year,
although it was uncertain how many such persons were political
prisoners rather than common criminals (see Section 1.d.). The
prisoners were expected to be released in small groups over the course
of several months.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--During the year the Government infringed on citizens'
right to privacy, using illegal searches and arbitrary arrests as
tactics to control political unrest, although reports of such
violations of citizens' rights to privacy continued to decline. Under
the State Security Law, the Ministry of Interior is empowered to
authorize entry into private premises without specific judicial
intervention. Telephone calls and personal correspondence are subject
to monitoring. Police informer networks are extensive and
sophisticated.
There were reports that security forces entered private homes
without warrants and took into custody residents who were suspected of
either participating in, or having information regarding,
antigovernment activities. While conducting these raids, security
forces confiscated, damaged, or destroyed personal property for which
owners were not compensated by the Government. Security forces also set
up checkpoints at the entrances to villages, requiring vehicle searches
and proof of identity from anyone seeking to enter or exit. Whenever
possible the Government jams, either in whole or in part, foreign
broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary (see
Section 2.a.). A government-controlled proxy prohibits user access to
Internet sites considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic (see
Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
right ``to express and propagate'' opinions; however, citizens in
practice are not free to express their public opposition to the
Government in speech or writing. Press criticism of ruling family
personalities and of government policy regarding certain sensitive
subjects--such as sectarian unrest and the dispute with Qatar over the
Hawar islands--is strictly prohibited. However, when the Amir assumed
power in 1999, the Government allowed the press somewhat greater
latitude. The Amir stated in his December 1999 National Day speech that
the press and public have a duty to question the Government about
developments in the country, and he repeated that sentiment on several
occasions during the year in press interviews and in a meeting with the
Bahrain Journalists Association (BJA) Board. Columnists and reporters
wrote about several sensitive issues, criticizing the services offered
by the Ministries of Interior and Defense and discussing the state
budget, subjects that were off-limits in the past. However, later in
the year, when some journalists tried to expand the scope of their
criticisms to include political reform and reactivation of the
Constitution, they were warned by the authorities to either support the
government position or avoid the issues altogether.
Local press coverage and commentary on international issues is
open, and discussion of local economic and commercial issues also is
relatively unrestricted. Many individuals express critical opinions
openly on domestic political and social issues in private settings but
do not do so to leading government officials or in public forums.
The Information Ministry exercises extensive control over all local
media. Newspapers are owned privately, but they routinely exercise
self-censorship of stories on sensitive topics, and defer to
Information Ministry demands. In some cases, editors of privately owned
newspapers also hold government positions. The Government does not
condone unfavorable coverage of its domestic policies by the
international media and occasionally has revoked the press credentials
of offending journalists. Because the Ministry controls foreign
journalists' residence permits, unfavorable coverage in some cases has
led to deportation. However, there were no reports that the Government
revoked press credentials during the year. The Government generally
afforded foreign journalists access to the country and did not limit
their contacts.
In late September, the newly formed BJA elected its first board of
directors. Some journalists view the lack of competition for the
chairmanship of the board, and the preponderance of government
employees accepted as BJA members, as a signal that it will not be a
truly independent organization.
The State owns and operates all radio and television stations.
Radio and television broadcasts in Arabic and Farsi from neighboring
countries and Egypt may be received without interference. However,
international news services, including the Associated Press, United
Press International, and Agence France Presse, sometimes complain about
press restrictions. The Cable News Network is available on a 24-hour
basis by subscription, and the British Broadcasting Corporation World
News Service is carried on a local channel 24 hours a day free of
charge. However, the Government generally jams, wholly or partially,
foreign broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary
(see Section 1.f.).
Most senior government officials, ruling family members, and major
hotels, as well as affluent private citizens, use satellite dishes to
receive international broadcasts. Prior government approval to access
satellite dishes and for the importation or installation of dishes is
no longer required (see Section 3). Bahrain Television's satellite
subscription service does not offer access to the Qatar-based Al-Jazira
channel, which otherwise broadcasts widely throughout the Middle East
and North Africa. Government officials believe Al-Jazira's news and
talk shows are biased against the country.
Access to the Internet is provided through the National Telephone
Company (BATELCO). A government-controlled proxy prohibits user access
to sites considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic. The software
used is unreliable and often inhibits access to uncontroversial sites
as well. E-mail access to information is unimpeded, although it may be
subject to monitoring (see Section 1.f.).
Although there are no formal regulations limiting academic freedom,
in practice academics try to avoid contentious political issues.
University hiring and admissions policies appear to favor Sunnis and
others who are assumed to support the Government rather than focusing
on professional experience and academic qualifications. However, there
continued to be some improvement in the hiring of qualified individuals
in a nondiscriminatory manner during the year, and a few Shi'a
professors, including women, were hired.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Despite the
Constitution's provision for the right of free assembly, the Government
prohibits all public political demonstrations and meetings and controls
religious gatherings that may take on political overtones. Permits are
required for most other public gatherings, and permission is not
granted routinely. Unauthorized public gatherings of more than five
persons are prohibited by law. The Government monitors any gatherings
that might take on a political tone and frequently disperses such
meetings. During the year, the Government authorized two
demonstrations, one in Manama on October 6 and one at the University on
October 7, to protest Israeli government actions against Palestinians
in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. Demonstrations were
held on October 13 without government approval.
The Constitution provides for the right of free association;
however, the Government restricts this right. The Government prohibits
political parties and organizations. Some professional societies and
social and sports clubs traditionally have served as forums for
discreet political discussion, but they are restricted by law from
engaging in political activity. Only the Bahraini Bar Association is
exempt from the regulations that require that the charters of all
associations include a commitment to refrain from political activity.
The Bar Association successfully had argued that a lawyer's
professional duties may require certain political actions, such as
interpreting legislation or participating in a politically sensitive
trial. In January 1998, after the Bar Association sponsored a lecture
in which prodemocracy speakers publicly attacked the Government, the
Government told current board members that they would not be allowed to
stand for reelection. Although the decision has not been reversed, the
Bar Association continues to operate without hindrance. Other organized
discussions and meetings by the Bar Association no longer are
discouraged actively.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that Islam is the
official religion and also provides for freedom of religion; however,
the Government does not tolerate political dissent, including from
religious groups or leaders. The Government subjects both Sunni and
Shi'a Muslims to control and monitoring. Members of other religions who
practice their faith privately do so without interference from the
Government. The Government funds, monitors, and closely controls all
official religious institutions. These include Shi'a and Sunni mosques,
Shi'a Ma'tams (ceremonial centers), Shi'a and Sunni Waqfs (charitable
foundations), and the religious courts, which represent both the
Ja'afari (Shi'a) and Maliki (Sunni) schools of Islamic jurisprudence.
While the Government rarely interferes with what it considers
legitimate religious observations, it actively suppresses any activity
deemed overtly political in nature. In the past, the Government
occasionally has closed mosques and Ma'tams for allowing political
demonstrations to take place on or near their premises and has detained
religious leaders for delivering political sermons or for allowing such
sermons to be delivered in their mosques. The Government also may
appropriate or withhold funding in order to reward or punish particular
individuals or places of worship. There were no reported closures of
Ma'tams or mosques during the year.
The High Council for Islamic Affairs is charged with the review and
approval of all clerical appointments within both the Sunni and Shi'a
communities, and it maintains program oversight for all citizens
studying religion abroad. Public religious events, most notably the
large annual commemorative marches by Shi'a, are permitted but are
monitored closely by the police. There are no restrictions on the
number of citizens permitted to make pilgrimages to Shi'a shrines and
holy sites in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. However, stateless residents who
do not possess Bahraini passports often have difficulties arranging
travel to religious sites abroad. The Government monitors travel to
Iran and scrutinizes carefully those who choose to pursue religious
study there.
Proselytizing by non-Muslims is discouraged, anti-Islamic writings
are prohibited, and conversions from Islam to other religions, while
not illegal, are not tolerated well by society. However, Bibles and
other Christian publications are displayed and sold openly in local
bookstores that also sell Islamic and other religious literature. Some
small groups worship in their homes. Notable dignitaries from virtually
every religion and denomination visit the country and frequently meet
with the Government and civic leaders. Religious tracts of all branches
of Islam, cassettes of sermons delivered by Muslim preachers from other
countries, and publications of other religions are readily available.
In early July 1999, the Amir pardoned prominent Shi'a cleric Abdul
Amir Al-Jamri, who had been in prison since 1996. Since his release,
the Government has monitored Al-Jamri's movements. It also has denied
him the right to issue marital status certificates, a lucrative source
of income for many clerics. Several other clerics associated with Al-
Jamri remain in jail. On March 22, the Government rearrested Shi'a
cleric leader Abdul Wahab Hussain only hours after a judge released him
following more than 4 years in detention without charge. The
authorities neither brought charges against Hussain nor provided an
explanation for his rearrest. Hussain remained incarcerated in a Manama
jail at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some limits on
these rights. Citizens are free to move within the country and change
their place of residence or work. However, passports may be denied on
political grounds. Approximately 3 percent of the indigenous
population, the bidoon, mostly stateless Shi'a of Persian-origin, do
not have passports and are unable to obtain them readily, although they
may be given travel documents as Bahraini residents (see Section 5).
The Government occasionally grants citizenship to Sunni residents, most
of whom are from the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt.
Citizens living abroad who are suspected of political or criminal
offenses may face arrest and trial upon return to the country. Under
the 1963 Citizenship Law, the Government may reject applications to
obtain or renew passports for reasonable cause, but the applicant has
the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil Court. The
Government also has issued temporary passports, valid for one trip a
year, to individuals whose travel it wishes to control or whose claim
to citizenship is questionable. A noncitizen resident, including a
bidoon of Iranian origin, also may obtain a laissez-passer (travel
document), usually valid for 2 years and renewable at Bahraini
embassies overseas. The holder of a laissez-passer also requires a visa
to reenter the country.
Although the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees, it has not formulated a formal policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum. The Government usually does not accept
refugees due to the country's small size and limited resources.
However, in practice refugees who arrive are not repatriated to
countries from which they have fled. Many Iranian emigres who fled Iran
after the Iranian revolution have been granted permission to remain in
the country, but they have not been granted citizenship.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government or their
political system peacefully, and the Government controls political
activity. Since the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1975, there
have been no formal democratic political institutions. The Prime
Minister makes all appointments to the Cabinet. The relevant ministries
fill all other government positions. About one-third of the cabinet
ministers are Shi'a Muslim, although they do not hold security-related
offices. The Government continues to view most substantive reform as a
threat to stability and has taken only halting steps to expand
political participation. The ordinary citizen may attempt to influence
government decisions through submission of personal written petitions
and informal contact with senior officials, including appeals to the
Amir, the Prime Minister, and other officials at their regularly
scheduled public audiences, called majlises.
In 1992 the Amir established by decree a Consultative Council
(Majlis Al-Shura). Its 40 members are divided mainly between Sunni and
Shi'a (20 Sunni and 18 Shi'a) who are appointed by the Amir. Majlis
members are selected to represent major constituent groups, including
representatives from the business, labor, professional, and religious
communities. There are no members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family or
religious extremists in the Majlis. In addition to legislation
submitted for its review by the Cabinet, the Majlis may initiate debate
independently on nonpolitical issues. The Majlis also may summon
cabinet ministers to answer questions; however, its recommendations are
not binding on the Government. The Majlis held its eighth session from
October 1999 to May, and began a new session on October 3.
During the year, the Majlis debated a number of contentious social
and economic issues, including unemployment, privatization, child care,
and education reform, and drafted proposals on these and other subjects
for government consideration. In 1999 a Majlis Human Rights Committee
was formed. The Committee's deliberations and its first report, which
was presented to the Amir in a well-publicized event, have been closely
held. According to the Speaker of the Majlis, the Government responded
favorably to all of the Majlis's recommendations by incorporating them
into legislation or by taking other appropriate actions.
Women are greatly underrepresented in government and politics;
however, there are now four women in the Majlis, whereas there had been
none before. There still are no women at the ministerial levels of
Government. The majority of women who choose to work in government do
so in a support capacity, and only a few have attained senior positions
within their respective ministries or agencies.
In September the Amir appointed the first Christian and Jewish
members to the Consultative Council; an ethnic Iranian Bahraini also
was appointed.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no local human rights organizations. Because of the
restrictions on freedom of association and expression, any independent,
domestically based investigation or public criticism of the
Government's human rights policies faces major obstacles. Several
political opposition groups in exile report on the human rights
situation. Such groups include the Damascus-based Committee for the
Defense of Human Rights in Bahrain, the London-based Bahrain Freedom
Movement, the Beirut-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain,
and the Copenhagen-based Bahrain Human Rights Organization. These
groups are composed of small numbers of emigres living in self-imposed
exile and reportedly receive funding from sources hostile to the
Government.
The Government maintains that it is not opposed to visits by bona
fide human rights organizations. In recent years, the Government has
allowed increased access by international human rights organizations.
In June 1999, the Government received a delegation from Amnesty
International, which issued a brief statement that noted that it was
invited by the Government but was not allowed to meet with all persons
to whom it requested access. Middle East Watch and Human Rights Watch
representatives also visited the country in 1999. In 1996 the
Government invited the ICRC to undertake visits to the country's
prisons. The ICRC continued to visit the country's prisons throughout
the year (see Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality, equal opportunity, and the
right to medical care, welfare, education, property, capital, and work
for all citizens. However, in practice these rights are protected
unevenly, depending on the individual's social status, ethnicity, or
sex.
Women.--Violence against women occurs, but incidents usually are
kept within the family. In general there is little public attention to,
or discussion of, the problem. During the year, a few articles appeared
in the local press discussing violence against women and the need for
laws to defend women who are abused. No government policies explicitly
address violence against women. Women's groups and health care
professionals state that spouse abuse is common, particularly in poorer
communities. There are very few known instances of women seeking legal
redress for violence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the courts are
not receptive to such cases.
It is not uncommon for foreign women working as domestic workers to
be beaten or sexually abused (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.). Numerous
cases have been reported to local embassies and the police. However,
most victims are too intimidated to sue their employers. Courts
reportedly have allowed victims who do appear to sue for damages,
return home, or both.
Shari'a governs the legal rights of women. Specific rights vary
according to Shi'a or Sunni interpretations of Islamic law, as
determined by the individual's faith, or by the court in which various
contracts, including marriage, have been made.
While both Shi'a and Sunni women have the right to initiate a
divorce, religious courts may refuse the request. Although local
religious courts may grant a divorce to Shi'a women in routine cases,
occasionally Shi'a women seeking divorce under unusual circumstances
must travel abroad to seek a higher ranking opinion than that available
in the country. Women of either branch may own and inherit property and
may represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the
absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit all property. In
contrast, Sunni women--in the absence of a direct male heir--inherit
only a portion as governed by Shari'a; the balance is divided among
brothers, uncles, and male cousins of the deceased.
In divorce cases, the courts routinely grant Shi'a and Sunni women
custody of daughters under the age of 9 and sons under age 7, although
custody usually reverts to the father once the children reach those
ages. In all circumstances except mental incapacitation, the father,
regardless of custody decisions, retains the right to make certain
legal decisions for his children, such as guardianship of any property
belonging to the child, until the child reaches legal age. A noncitizen
woman automatically loses custody of her children if she divorces their
citizen father.
Women may obtain passports and leave the country without the
permission of the male head of the household. Women are free to work
outside the home, to drive cars without escorts, and to wear the
clothing of their choice. Women increasingly have taken jobs previously
reserved for men. The Labor Law does not discriminate against women;
however, in practice, there is discrimination in the workplace,
including inequality of wages and denial of opportunity for
advancement. Women constitute about 20 percent of the work force. The
Government has encouraged the hiring of women, enacted special laws to
promote female entry into the work force, and is a leading employer of
women. The Labor Law does not recognize the concept of equal pay for
equal work, and women frequently are paid less than men. Generally
women work outside the home during the years between secondary school
or university and marriage. Some women complain that admissions
policies at the National University are aimed at increasing the number
of male students at the expense of qualified female applicants,
especially Shi'a women. Nevertheless, women make up the majority of
students at the country's universities.
There are women's organizations that seek to improve the status of
women under both civil and Islamic law. Some women have expressed the
view that, despite their participation in the work force, women's
rights are not advancing significantly and that much of the lack of
progress is due to the influence of Islamic religious traditionalists.
However, other women desire a return to more traditional values and
support calls for a return to traditional Islamic patterns of social
behavior.
Children.--The Government has stated often its commitment to the
protection of children's rights and welfare within the social and
religious framework of this traditional society. It generally honors
this commitment through enforcement of its civil and criminal laws and
extensive social welfare network. Public education for citizen children
below the age of 15 is free; it is not available for the children of
foreign workers. While the Constitution provides for compulsory
education at the primary levels (usually 12 or 13 years of age),
authorities do not enforce attendance. Limited medical services for
infants and preadolescents are provided free of charge.
The social status of children is shaped by tradition and religion
to a greater extent than by civil law. Child abuse is rare, as is
public discussion of it; the preference of the authorities always has
been to leave such matters within the purview of the family or
religious groups. The authorities actively enforce the laws against
prostitution, including child prostitution, procuring, and pimping.
Violators are dealt with harshly and can be imprisoned, or, if a
noncitizen, deported. In the past, the authorities reportedly returned
children arrested for prostitution and other nonpolitical crimes to
their families rather than prosecute them, especially for first
offenses. There were no reports of child prostitution during the year.
Some legal experts have called on the Government to establish a
separate juvenile court. However, other citizens insist that the
protection of children is a religious, not a secular, function and
oppose greater government involvement. Independent and quasi-
governmental organizations such as the Bahraini Society for the
Protection of Children and the Mother and Child Welfare Society play an
active part in protecting children by providing counseling, legal
assistance, advice, and, in some cases, shelter and financial support
to distressed children and families.
In 1998 there were numerous arrests and detentions of juveniles in
connection with the political unrest. These children generally were
released without charges within several days of their arrests. However,
those juveniles charged with security offenses received the same
treatment as adult prisoners, that is, incommunicado detention and
trial before a State Security Court. There were very few reports of
arrests and detentions of juveniles during the year, and apparently
those who were arrested were released.
People with Disabilities.--The law protects the rights of the
disabled and a variety of governmental, quasi-governmental, and
religious institutions are mandated to support and protect disabled
persons. The regional (Persian Gulf) Center for the Treatment of the
Blind is headquartered in the country, and a similar Center for the
Education of Deaf Children was established in 1994. Society tends to
view the disabled as special cases in need of protection rather than as
fully functioning members of society. Nonetheless, the Government is
required by law to provide vocational training for disabled persons who
wish to work and maintains a list of certified, trained disabled
persons. The Labor Law of 1976 also requires that any employer of over
100 persons must engage at least 2 percent of its employees from the
Government's list of disabled workers; however, the Government does not
monitor compliance. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs works
actively to place the disabled in public sector jobs, such as in the
public telephone exchanges. The Government's housing regulations
require that access be provided to disabled persons. Greater emphasis
has been given in recent years to public building design that
incorporates access for the disabled; however, the law does not mandate
access to buildings for persons with disabilities.
Religious Minorities.--Although there are notable exceptions, the
Sunni Muslim minority enjoys a favored status. Sunnis receive
preference for employment in sensitive government positions and in the
managerial ranks of the civil service. While the defense and internal
security forces are predominantly Sunni, Shi'a citizens now are allowed
to hold posts in these forces; however, they do not hold significant
positions. In the private sector, Shi'a citizens tend to be employed in
lower paid, less skilled jobs.
Educational, social, and municipal services in most Shi'a
neighborhoods, particularly in rural villages, are inferior to those
found in Sunni urban communities. In an effort to remedy societal
discrimination, the Government has built numerous subsidized housing
complexes that are open to all citizens on the basis of financial need.
In order to ease both the housing shortage and strains on the national
budget, in 1997 the Government revised its policy in order to permit
lending institutions to finance mortgages on apartment units.
After demonstrations in support of Palestinians on October 13 (see
Section 2.b.), several youths and men reportedly boarded a bus carrying
Catholic parishioners and took Bibles from the parishioners throwing
some of the Bibles out of bus windows.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A group of approximately 9,000
to 15,000 persons, mostly Shi'a of Persian-origin but including some
Christians, are stateless. Many are second- or third-generation
residents whose ancestors emigrated from Iran. Although they no longer
claim Iranian citizenship, most have not been granted Bahraini
citizenship. Without citizenship, bidoon legally are unable to buy
land, start a business, or obtain government loans, although in
practice many do. The law does not address the citizenship rights of
persons who were not registered with the authorities prior to 1959,
which creates a legal problem for such persons and their descendants,
and results in economic and other hardships. The Government maintains
that many of those who claim to be bidoon actually are citizens of Iran
or other Gulf states who have chosen voluntarily not to renew their
foreign passports. Bidoon and citizens who speak Farsi rather than
Arabic as their first language also face significant social and
economic obstacles, including difficulty finding employment. There were
unconfirmed reports that over 200 bidoon families received citizenship
during the year.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The partially suspended 1973
Constitution recognizes the right of workers to organize; however,
independent trade unions do not exist. The Constitution provides for
``freedom to form associations and trade unions on national bases and
for lawful objectives and by peaceful means,'' in accordance with the
law, and states that ``no person shall be compelled to join or remain
in any association or union.''
Labor regulations permit the formation of elected workers'
committees in larger companies. Worker representation is based on a
system of Joint Labor-Management Committees (JLC's) that are
established by ministerial decree. One JLC was established in November,
bringing the total to 20.
The JLC's are composed of equal numbers of appointed management
representatives and worker representatives who are elected from and by
company employees in elections organized by management. Each committee
is chaired alternately by a management and worker representative. The
selection of worker representatives appears to be fair. Under the law,
the Ministry of Interior may exclude worker candidates with criminal
records or those deemed a threat to national security, but the
Government has not taken such action in recent years.
The elected worker representatives of the JLC's select the 11
members of the General Committee of Bahrain workers (GCBW), which was
established by law in 1983, and which oversees and coordinates the work
of the JLC's. The GCBW also hears complaints from Bahraini and foreign
workers and assists them in bringing their complaints to the attention
of the Ministry of Labor or the courts. In 1998 elections were held for
3-year terms for representatives to the GCBW. Workers from a variety of
occupations were elected to the body, including Sunni and Shi'a
Muslims, foreign workers, and one woman. The elections, which were by
secret ballot, appeared to be free and fair.
Although the Government and company management are not represented
on the GCBW, the Ministry of Labor closely monitors the body's
activities and a Ministry representative attends and supervises GCBW
general meetings. It approves the GCBW's rules and the distribution of
the GCBW's funds. Some senior JLC and GCBW officials have been
harassed. The JLC-GCBW system represents nearly 70 percent of the
country's indigenous industrial workers. Both the Government and labor
representatives readily admit that nonindustrial workers and foreign
workers clearly are underrepresented in the system. The Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs supports the formation of JLC's in all public
and private sector companies that employ more than 200 workers, and a
JLC was established in the textile sector in 1999.
Although foreign workers constitute 67 percent of the work force,
they are underrepresented in the GCBW. Foreign workers participate in
the JLC elections, and five foreign workers currently serve on JLC's.
However, none sits on the board of the GCBW. It is a long-term goal of
both the Government and the GCBW to replace foreign workers with
citizens throughout all sectors of the economy and to create new jobs
for citizens seeking employment.
The Labor Law is silent on the right to strike, and there were no
strikes during the year. Actions perceived to be detrimental to the
``existing relationship'' between employers and employees or to the
economic health of the State are forbidden by the 1974 Security Act.
There were no recent examples of major strikes, but walkouts and other
job actions have been known to occur in the past without governmental
intervention and with positive results for the workers.
Internationally affiliated trade unions do not exist. The GCBW
represents workers in the Arab Labor Organization, but does not belong
to any international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--As in the case
of strikes, the Labor Law neither grants nor denies workers the right
to organize and bargain collectively outside the JLC system. While the
JLC's are empowered to discuss labor disputes, organize workers'
services, and discuss wages, working conditions, and productivity,
workers have no independent, recognized vehicle for representing their
interests on these or other labor-related issues. Minimum wage rates
for public sector employees are established by Council of Ministers'
decrees. Private businesses generally follow the Government's lead in
establishing their wage rates.
There are two export processing zones. Labor law and practice are
the same in these zones as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by law; however, in practice the labor laws apply
for the most part only to citizens, and abuses occur, particularly in
the cases of domestic workers and those working illegally. The law also
prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces
this prohibition effectively.
Foreign workers, who make up at least 67 percent of the workforce,
in many cases arrive in the country under the sponsorship of an
employer and then switch jobs while continuing to pay a fee to their
original sponsor. This practice makes it difficult to monitor and
control the employment conditions of domestic and other workers; the
Government took no substantive action during the year to stop the
practice.
Labor Law amendments passed in 1993 stiffened the penalties for job
switching to include jail sentences of up to 6 months for the sponsor
of every illegally sponsored worker; however, sponsors have not
received jail sentences. In such cases, the workers involved usually
are deported as illegal immigrants after the case is concluded. During
the summer and fall of 1998, the Government conducted an amnesty
program under which undocumented foreign workers were permitted either
to legalize their status or leave the country without penalty. On
October 1, the Government again gave illegal immigrants 3 months (until
December 31) to legalize their status or leave the country.
The sponsorship system leads to additional abuses. There are
numerous credible reports that employers withhold salaries from their
foreign workers for months, even years, at a time, and may refuse to
grant them the necessary permission to leave the country. The
Government and the courts generally work to rectify abuses brought to
their attention, but they otherwise focus little attention on the
problem, and the fear of deportation or employer retaliation prevents
many foreign workers from making complaints to the authorities (see
Section 6.e.).
Labor Laws do not apply to domestic servants. There are numerous
credible reports that domestic servants, especially women, are forced
to work 12- or 16-hour days, given little time off, and subjected to
malnutrition, and verbal and physical abuse, including sexual
molestation and rape. Between 30 to 40 percent of the suicide cases
handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals are foreign maids
(see Section 6.e.).
Foreign women employed as hotel and restaurant staff typically are
locked in a communal house when not working and driven to work in a
van. Many are involved in prostitution and reportedly trade sexual
favors with hotel managers in exchange for time off from work (see
Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years of age.
Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 16 may not be employed in
hazardous conditions or at night and may not work more than 6 hours per
day or on a piecework basis. Child labor laws are enforced effectively
by Ministry of Labor inspectors in the industrial sector; child labor
outside that sector is monitored less effectively, but it is not
believed to be significant outside family-operated businesses, and even
in that sector it is not widespread. Some children work in the market
areas as car washers and porters. While the Constitution calls for
compulsory education at the primary levels, authorities do not enforce
attendance (see Section 5). The law prohibits forced and bonded child
labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage scales, set by
government decree, exist for public sector employees and generally
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The
minimum wage for the public sector is $278.25 (105 dinars) a month.
Wages in the private sector are determined on a contract basis. For
foreign workers, employers consider benefits such as annual trips home,
housing, and education bonuses as part of the salary.
The Labor Law, enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs, mandates acceptable conditions of work for all adult workers,
including adequate standards regarding hours of work (maximum 48 hours
per week) and occupational safety and health.
The Ministry enforces the law with periodic inspections and routine
fines for violators. The press often performs an ombudsman function on
labor problems, reporting job disputes and the results of labor cases
brought before the courts. Once a worker has lodged a complaint, the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs opens an investigation and often
takes remedial action. The Fourth High Court has jurisdiction over
cases involving alleged violations of the Labor Law. Complaints brought
before the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs that cannot be settled
through arbitration by law must be referred to the Court within 15
days. In practice most employers prefer to settle such disputes through
arbitration, particularly since the court and labor law generally are
considered to favor the employee.
The Labor Law specifically favors citizens over foreign workers and
Arab foreigners over other foreign workers in hiring and firing.
Because employers include housing and other allowances in their salary
scales, foreign workers legally can be paid lower regular wages than
their citizen counterparts, although they sometimes receive the same or
a greater total compensation package because of home leave and holiday
allowances. Western foreign workers and citizen workers are paid
comparable wages, with total compensation packages often significantly
greater for the former. Women are entitled to 60 days of paid maternity
leave and nursing periods during the day. However, women generally are
paid less than men.
In 1993 the Government strengthened the Labor Law by decree of the
Amir, announcing that significant fines and jail sentences would be
imposed upon private sector employers who fail to pay wages required by
law. This law applies equally to employers of citizens and foreign
workers and was intended to reduce abuses against foreign workers, who
sometimes are denied the required salaries (see Section 6.c.). The law
provides equal protection to citizen and foreign workers, but all
foreign workers still require sponsorship by citizens or locally based
institutions and companies. According to representatives of several
embassies with large numbers of workers in the country, the Government
generally is responsive to embassy requests to investigate foreign
worker complaints about unpaid wages and mistreatment. However, foreign
workers, particularly those from developing countries, often are
unwilling to report abuses for fear of losing residence rights and
having to return to their native countries. Sponsors are able to cancel
the residence permit of any person under their sponsorship and thereby
block them for a year from obtaining entry or residence visas from
another sponsor, although the sponsor may be subject to sanctions for
wrongful dismissal. Foreign women who work as domestic workers often
are beaten or sexually abused (see Section 5). Between 30 to 40 percent
of suicide cases handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals are
foreign maids (see Section 6.c.).
Under the Labor Law, workers have the right to remove themselves
from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, many foreign workers become in essence indentured
workers, and are unable to change employment or leave the country
without their sponsors' consent (see Section 6.c.).
Prostitution is pervasive among foreign women, especially among
hotel and restaurant staff. Such women typically are locked in a
communal house when not working and driven to work in a van. Many
female hotel employees reportedly trade sexual favors with hotel
managers in exchange for time off from work (see Section 6.c.).
__________
EGYPT
According to its Constitution, Egypt is a social democracy in which
Islam is the state religion. The National Democratic Party (NDP), which
has governed since its establishment in 1978, has used its entrenched
position to dominate national politics and maintains an overriding
majority in the popularly elected People's Assembly and the partially
elected Shura (Consultative) Council. President Hosni Mubarak was
reelected unopposed to a fourth 6-year term in a national referendum in
September 1999. The Cabinet and the country's 26 governors are
appointed by the President and may be dismissed by him at his
discretion. The judiciary is independent; however, there is no
appellate process for verdicts issued by the military or State Security
Emergency courts.
There are several security services in the Ministry of Interior,
two of which are involved primarily in combating terrorism: The State
Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), which conducts investigations
and interrogates detainees, and the Central Security Force (CSF), which
enforces curfews and bans on public demonstrations, and conducts
paramilitary operations against terrorists. The President is the
commander in chief of the military; the military is a primary
stabilizing factor within society but generally does not involve itself
in internal issues. The security forces committed numerous serious
human rights abuses; however, the use of force in the campaign against
suspected terrorists appeared more limited than in previous years.
Egypt is in transition from a Government-controlled economy to a
free market system. The Government continued its privatization program,
although some key sectors of the economy (such as banking, oil/gas,
insurance, and textiles) still are dominated by State-owned
enterprises. Agriculture remains the largest employer and is almost
entirely in private hands. The tourism sector generates the largest
amount of foreign currency. Petroleum exports, Suez Canal revenues, and
remittances from approximately 2 million citizens working abroad are
the other principal sources of foreign currency. These income sources
are vulnerable to external shocks. Over the past decade, the Government
has enacted significant economic reforms, which have reduced the budget
deficit, stabilized the exchange rate, reduced inflation and interest
rates significantly, and built up substantial reserves. However, low
international oil prices, the 1997 Luxor terrorist attack, and the
effects of the Southeast Asia economic crisis all negatively affected
foreign exchange earnings in from 1997 through 1999, causing the trade
and current account balance deficits to widen and negatively affecting
the exchange rate. After initially attempting to stabilize the exchange
rate by drawing down reserves, increasing interest rates, rationing
foreign exchange, and implementing restrictive trade measures, the
Government allowed the exchange rate to depreciate slowly in the second
half of 2000. Continued progress in economic development depends
primarily upon implementation of a wide range of structural reforms,
the pace of which has slowed significantly over the past 1 to 2 years.
The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is about $1,400 per year.
Official statistics place 34.4 percent of wage earners in the
agricultural sector, and knowledgeable observers estimate that perhaps
3 to 5 percent of those engage in subsistence farming. The annual
population increase is 1.9 percent.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in some areas, and its record improved somewhat over the previous year,
primarily due to a decrease in terrorist activity by Islamic
extremists; however, the Government's record was poor with respect to
freedom of expression and its treatment of detainees, among other
areas. The dominant role of the President and the entrenched NDP
control the political scene to such an extent that citizens do not have
a meaningful ability to change their Government. In parliamentary
elections that were held between October 18 and November 15, the NDP
won 172 seats, independent candidates won 255 seats, and opposition
parties won 17 seats. However, many of the independents elected were
former members of the NDP who rejoined the party after being elected,
leaving the People's Assembly balance at 388 NDP members, 37
independents, and 17 opposition party members out of 444 elected
members, with two seats unresolved at year's end. Due to courtordered
supervision by the judiciary of the voting and vote-counting, the
process was fairer and more transparent than past parliamentary
elections; however, there were significant problems, including the
arrests of thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the months
before the elections.
The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981 and was
renewed for another 3 years in June, continues to restrict many basic
rights. The security forces continued to arrest and detain suspected
members of terrorist groups. In combating terrorism, the security
forces continued to mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest
and detain persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, and
occasionally engage in mass arrests. In actions unrelated to the
antiterrorist campaign, local police killed, tortured, and otherwise
abused both criminal suspects and other persons. The Government took
disciplinary action against police officers accused of abusing
detainees, including prosecution of several offenders, but it did not
pursue most cases or seek adequate punishments. The investigation that
the Public Prosecutor reopened and expanded in 1999 regarding police
brutality and torture during a 1998 police investigation of a double
murder in the largely Coptic village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate,
continued without resolution throughout the year.
Prison conditions remain poor. The Ministry of Interior released
more than 1,300 political detainees and prisoners, bringing the total
number of detainees released since 1998 to more than 7,000. The use of
military courts to try civilians continued to infringe on a defendant's
right to a fair trial before an independent judiciary. During the year,
the Government did not refer any new cases involving civilians to the
military courts; however, the military court issued its verdict on
November 19 in a trial involving 20 leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood,
who were referred to the court in October 1999 on charges of illegal
political activity. Three of the defendants were sentenced to 5 years
in prison, 12 were sentenced to 3 years, and five were acquitted. Most
observers believe that the Government was seeking to undermine Muslim
Brotherhood participation in the elections to professional syndicates
and the People's Assembly.
The Government used the Emergency Law to infringe on citizens'
privacy rights. Although citizens generally express themselves freely,
the Government partially restricts freedom of the press. The Government
significantly restricts freedom of assembly and association. The
Government places restrictions on freedom of religion. Despite
difficulties due to an inadequate legal framework and periodic
Government harassment, a number of local human rights groups are
active. Although the Government does not recognize them legally, it
allows these groups to operate openly.
Domestic violence against women is a problem. Although the
Government enforces the 1996 decree banning the practice of female
genital mutilation (FGM), many families persist in subjecting their
daughters to the traditional practice. Women and Christians face
discrimination based on tradition and some aspects of the law. Adult
literacy rates are 63 percent for males and 34 percent for females.
There were no reports of terrorist attacks against Christians during
the year, but in incidents unrelated to terrorism 1 Christian was
killed and 10 were wounded by Muslim extremists. New year's violence in
Sohag governorate resulted in the deaths of 21 Christians and 1 Muslim.
Child labor remains widespread, despite Government efforts to eradicate
it. Exposure of workers to hazardous working conditions and other
abuses of the law by employers continue, and the Government does not
enforce the labor laws effectively. The Government limits workers'
rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, police committed extrajudicial
killings, and such killings also may have occurred in certain
antiterrorist operations.
Human rights organizations and the press reported on the death in
custody of the following eight persons during the year, all of whom
allegedly were tortured while being detained by police under suspicion
of criminal activity: Sami Hosni Ahmed, Ahmed Hassan Ahmed, Mohamed
Tawfik Hassan Sayyed, Sayyed Kenawi Selim, Abdel Hamid Ramadan Abdel
Hamid Zahran, Ahmed Mohamed Eissa, Haytham Mohamed Abdel Aziz, and
Mohamed Islam Nasr Eddine (see Section 1.c.). In addition, several
cases of death under police torture from previous years remain
unresolved.
Mohammed Mahmoud Hamouda died in prison during the year, reportedly
due to diabetes and cardiac problems, during the Government's
investigation of a case in which 16 persons were accused of heresy
against Islam (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
The London-based Islamic Observation Center announced on December
22 that 37-year-old Mohammed Saad Osman Ahmad died in Tora prison in
early December due to untreated leukemia. Ahmad allegedly had completed
a 5-year prison sentence in 1998 but was not released.
On June 6, the Banha Criminal Court (Daqahliyya governorate)
sentenced police Captain Abdel Nasser Zeidan of the Shubra AlKheima
investigations department to a 1-year suspended sentence for killing a
suspected thief. The officer reportedly raided the home of 19-year-old
Mosaad Ahmed Youssef in March without an arrest or search warrant and
shot him three times in the back and head. On August 10, the Mansoura
criminal court acquitted a police major and four other policemen in the
April 9, 1998 death under torture of Waheed Al-Sayyid Ahmad Abdallah
(see Section 1.c.).
As part of ongoing antiterrorist campaigns, on October 19, security
forces killed two members of the ``Islamic Group of Egypt'' (IG) in
Aswan, including Alaa Abdel Razek Atiyya, who reportedly was in charge
of IG armed operations in Qena, Sohag, and Luxor. There were no reports
of killings of relatives of suspected extremists by security forces in
apparent vendettas.
A trade dispute between a Christian clothing merchant and a Muslim
customer on December 31, 1999, escalated into violent exchanges between
Muslims and Christians in Sohag governorate, resulting in the deaths of
21 Christians and 1 Muslim. One trial concluded in September and
another was ongoing at year's end (see Section 5).
On June 22, a State Security Emergency court sentenced four members
of a terrorist group from the upper (southern) Egyptian city of Dairout
who were accused of murder and attempted murder of policemen and
Christians in the early 1990's to 5 years' imprisonment at hard labor
(see Sections 1.e. and 5.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of new cases of
politically motivated disappearances.
In November the Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners
reported on a total of 26 unresolved disappearances, including 3
previously unreported cases of persons who disappeared in 1996 and
1997. The Center learned that three persons previously reported missing
are in prison, and that two disappearances did not involve police. The
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) continues to investigate
30 previously reported disappearances. EOHR has provided these names to
the U.N. Committee on Disappearances, but the Government reportedly has
denied any involvement in these cases.
On February 8, the Court of Cassation accepted an appeal by the
Minister of Interior of a 1999 court decision ordering him to pay Bahaa
Al-Amary, the wife of former Libyan Foreign Minister Mansur Kikhiya,
$27,000 (100,000 Egyptian pounds). Kikhiya's family sued the Government
following reports that he had been kidnaped from Cairo by Libyan
agents, taken to Libya, and executed there in 1994. The court awarded
the sum as compensation for the Ministry of Interior's inability to
protect a foreign dignitary on Egyptian soil. The Court of Cassation
ordered that the case be retried due to a technicality. The lower court
had not tried the case by year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the infliction of ``physical or
moral harm'' upon persons who have been arrested or detained; however,
torture and abuse of detainees by police, security personnel, and
prison guards is common.
Under the Penal Code, torture of a defendant or giving orders to
torture are felonies punishable by hard labor or 3 to 10 years'
imprisonment. If the defendant dies under torture, the crime is one of
intentional murder punishable by a life sentence at hard labor. Arrest
without due cause, threatening death, or using physical torture is
punishable by temporary hard labor. Abuse of power to inflict cruelty
against persons is punishable by imprisonment of no more than 1 year or
a fine of no more than $33 (125 Egyptian pounds). In addition, victims
may bring a criminal or civil action for compensation against the
responsible Government agency. There is no statute of limitation in
such cases.
Despite these legal safeguards, there were numerous credible
reports that security forces tortured and mistreated citizens. Reports
of torture and mistreatment at police stations remain frequent. While
the Government has investigated torture complaints in criminal cases
and punished some offending officers, the punishments do not conform to
the seriousness of the offense.
While the law requires security authorities to keep written records
of detained citizens, human rights groups report that such records
often are not available, not found, or that the police deny any
knowledge of the detainee when inquiries are made about specific cases,
effectively blocking the investigation of torture complaints.
Human rights groups believe that the SSIS continues to employ
torture. Torture takes place in SSIS offices, including its
headquarters in Cairo, and at Central Security Force camps. Torture
victims usually are taken to an SSIS office, where they are handcuffed,
blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious
beliefs, and political views. Torture is used to extract information,
coerce the victims to end their antigovernment activities, and deter
others from similar activities.
In January the EOHR released a report documenting in detail 13
cases of torture that occurred in police stations during the latter
half of 1999, 2 of which ended in death. Methods of torture employed by
the police, as reported by victims, included: Being stripped and
blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just
touching the floor; beaten with fists, metal rods, or other objects;
doused with hot or cold water; flogged on the back; burned with
cigarettes; and subjected to electrical shocks. Some victims, including
female detainees or family members of detainees, report that they have
been forced to strip and threatened with rape.
Human rights organizations and the press reported on the death in
custody of eight persons, reportedly under police torture, during the
year (see Section 1.a.). All were being held on suspicion of criminal
activity. The Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners
reported the death under torture of Ahmed Mohamed Eissa on February 10
in New Valley Prison. Upon receiving a report of the death, the Public
Prosecutor investigated the case and took testimony from inmates. The
Public Prosecutor referred the Deputy Chief of Wadi Natroun Prison, a
prison officer, and two policemen to the criminal court on charges of
beating an inmate to death and forging a prison report stating that the
death was from natural causes. The Shebeen El-Kom criminal court is
reviewing the case, but no date for a court hearing had been set by
year's end.
The EOHR is investigating the following deaths in custody after
receiving complaints from family members of the deceased, who believe
they died under torture: Sami Hosni Ahmed, who died on February 9 at
the Boulaq police station in Cairo, just hours after his arrest; Ahmed
Hassan Ahmed, who died on March 2 at the Shubra Al-Kheima police
station in Qalyubia, 4 days after his arrest; 17-year-old Mohamed
Tawfik Hassan Sayyed, who died on March 5 in the Gamaliyya district of
Cairo; Sayyed Kenawi Selim, who died on March 7 in the Imbaba district
in Cairo, 10 days after his arrest on suspicion of theft; Abdel Hamid
Ramadan Abdel Hamid Zahran, who died on March 11 at the Qalyub police
station in Qalyubia, shortly after returning from interrogation in the
Qalyub Security Directorate. An autopsy report in the Zahran case
reportedly cited respiratory and cardiac failure as the cause of death
and noted a blood clot in the brain, broken ribs, and bruises in the
kidney area.
In addition, the press reported the following deaths in custody,
which reportedly were due to police torture or mistreatment: Haytham
Mohamed Abdel Aziz, who reportedly died in Alexandria prison under
suspicious circumstances (according to the press, a forensic postmortem
showed several obvious bruises, as well as tuberculosis) and Mohamed
Islam Nasr Eddine, a 49-year old Pakistani sentenced to life at hard
labor for drug possession, who reportedly died in Qanatir prison from
severe failure of the circulatory system. The latter incident was under
police investigation at year's end.
Regarding judicial action on previous cases of death under torture,
on August 10, the Mansoura criminal court acquitted a police major and
four other policemen in the April 9, 1998 death under torture of Waheed
Al-Sayyid Ahmad Abdallah. According to a human rights organization, the
accused police major paid Abdallah's family to change their testimony,
which led to the acquittal. On November 16, the Aswan Criminal Court
ruled on case in which Mohei Eddin Ahmed Mohamed, who was suspected of
theft at a construction site, was tortured for 3 days in a police
station, which led to his death in March 1999. A fellow worker who
reportedly tried to intervene on the suspect's behalf, Haroun Ahmed
Hamdallah, also was tortured and left paralyzed. The court dismissed an
Aswan police officer from the force and sentenced him to 7 years in
prison, and dismissed an assistant officer and sentenced him to 3 years
in prison. The Government took no action during the year on several
outstanding cases of death under torture, including the case of Gamel
Mohammed Abdallah Mustafa (in 1998), the case of a businessman in the
province of Qalyubia (1997), and the case of Mohammed Badr Al-Din Gomah
(1996). The Government also took no action regarding the appeal of 1-
year sentence given to a policeman convicted of engaging in torture in
1994. No further government action appears likely in these cases.
At year's end, the public prosecution continued to interview
residents of the village of Al-Kush regarding a 1998 murder
investigation, during which, according to local observers, dozens of
suspects reportedly were tortured and mistreated. The public
prosecution reopened and expanded the case in August 1999, 5 months
after it had decided that medical evidence did not support allegations
of police torture (see sections 2.c and 5.).
Prison conditions remain poor. Government authorities reported the
renovation or construction of 14 prisons during the past 6 years.
Nonetheless, human rights groups report that overcrowding and unhealthy
conditions continue. Cells are poorly ventilated, food is inadequate in
quantity and nutritional value, drinking water often is polluted, and
medical services are insufficient. Such conditions contribute to the
spread of disease and epidemics. The use of torture and mistreatment in
prisons continues to be common. In August 1999, the Public Prosecutor
ordered his subordinates to visit prisons under their jurisdiction
randomly at least once a month. He also instructed them to inspect
prison records and to investigate complaints raised by prisoners.
Inspections began after the announcement and continued during the year.
Results of the inspections were unavailable.
Relatives and lawyers often are unable to obtain access to prisons
for visits. In January the Ministry of Interior opened to visits the
Fayyoum prison, which had been closed since 1997. Prisons in Abu Zaabal
and Tora remain closed to visits. During the year the Human Rights
Center for the Assistance of Prisoners obtained 66 rulings by the
Higher Administrative court to open the prisons for visits to
individual prisoners; 30 other cases are pending before the courts.
Human rights groups report that despite the rulings, visits continue to
be refused at several prisons. At other prisons, restrictions have been
placed on visits to prisoners who are incarcerated for political or
terrorist crimes, limiting the number of visits allowed each prisoner
and the total number of visitors allowed in the prison at any one time.
In September the Ministry of Interior ordered that prisoners who
have served their sentences be released directly rather than
transferred to State Security Directorates for processing, which in the
past resulted in delayed releases for some prisoners. The Human Rights
Center for the Assistance of Prisoners reported that the policy had not
been put into effect by year's end for political prisoners, who still
were being transferred to State Security for processing after serving
their sentences.
In principle human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisoners
in their capacity as legal counsel; however, in practice they often
face considerable bureaucratic obstacles that prevent them from meeting
with prisoners. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
does not have access to prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--As part of the
Government's antiterrorist campaign, security forces conducted mass
arrests and detained hundreds of individuals without charge. Police
also at times arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Under the
provisions of the Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981,
the police may obtain an arrest warrant from the Ministry of Interior
upon showing that an individual poses a danger to security and public
order. This procedure nullifies the constitutional requirement of
showing that an individual likely has committed a specific crime to
obtain a warrant from a judge or prosecutor.
The Emergency Law allows authorities to detain an individual
without charge. After 30 days, a detainee has the right to demand a
court hearing to challenge the legality of the detention order and may
resubmit his motion for a hearing at 1month intervals thereafter. There
is no maximum limit to the length of detention if the judge continues
to uphold the legality of the detention order, or if the detainee fails
to exercise his right to a hearing.
In addition to the Emergency Law, the Penal Code also gives the
State broad detention powers. Under the Penal Code, prosecutors must
bring charges within 48 hours or release the suspect. However, they may
detain a suspect for a maximum of 6 months, pending investigation.
Arrests under the Penal Code occur openly and with warrants issued by a
district prosecutor or judge. There is a system of bail. The Penal Code
contains several provisions to combat extremist violence. These
provisions broadly define terrorism to include the acts of ``spreading
panic'' and ``obstructing the work of authorities.''
During the year, security forces arrested large numbers of persons
allegedly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Government
has declared an illegal organization. Attorneys for those arrested say
that during the year approximately 5,000 persons were arrested; a
domestic human rights organization documented 694 arrests. Most of
those arrested had been released by year's end. Public prosecution
officials claim that none of the 5,000 was detained administratively
and that those still in detention are being held pending investigation
of specific charges. On November 19, a military court issued its
verdict in a trial involving 20 leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood
referred to the court in October 1999 on charges of illegal political
activity. Three were sentenced to 5 years in prison, 12 were sentenced
to 3 years, and 5 were acquitted. Most observers believe that the
Government was seeking to undermine Muslim Brotherhood participation in
the elections to the People's Assembly and professional syndicates (see
Sections 1.e., 2.b., and 3).
Police also detained students participating in demonstrations
several times during the year. Approximately 75 students were arrested
in May when protests at Al-Azhar University against the novel ``A
Banquet for Seaweed'' turned violent (see Section 2.a.). In October at
Cairo University and Ayn Shams University, police arrested
approximately 40 students protesting Israeli actions against
Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. According
to human rights organizations, all those arrested in the two incidents
had been released by year's end, some on bail pending investigation of
charges.
In contrast to previous years, there were no confirmed reports
during the year that converts to Christianity were subjected to
harassment by the security services. Hassan Mohamed Ismail Mohamed, one
of four converts previously prevented from traveling, was able to
travel abroad in August (see Section 2.c.).
Human rights groups reported that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
persons detained under the Emergency Law have been incarcerated for
several years without charge. The courts have ordered the release of
several of these detainees, but prison officials reportedly have
ignored the orders. The Ministry of Interior frequently reissues
detention orders to return detainees to prison. During the year more
than 1,300 political detainees and prisoners were released, bringing
the total number of detainees released in the past 3 years to more than
7,000. Following the releases, revised prison population estimates by
local human rights organizations indicate that there are approximately
15,000-16,000 political detainees; it is not clear how many among them
are charged and awaiting trial, convicted and serving sentences, or
detained without charge.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent;
however, cases involving national security or terrorism may be handled
by military or State Security Emergency courts, in which constitutional
protections may not be observed. In addition, judicial orders sometimes
are ignored by the authorities. The Constitution provides for the
independence and immunity of judges and forbids interference by other
authorities in the exercise of their judicial functions. The President
appoints all judges upon recommendation of the Higher Judicial Council,
a constitutional body composed of senior judges and chaired by the
president of the Court of Cassation. The Council regulates judicial
promotions and transfers. In the last few years, the Government has
added lectures on human rights and other social issues to its training
courses for prosecutors and judges.
In the civilian court system there are criminal courts, civil
courts, administrative courts, and a Supreme Constitutional Court.
There are three levels of regular criminal courts: Primary courts,
appeals courts, and the Court of Cassation, which represents the final
stage of criminal appeal.
The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic tradition; hence,
there are no juries. Misdemeanors that are punishable by imprisonment
are heard at the first level by one judge and at the second level by
three judges. Felonies that are punishable by imprisonment or execution
are heard in criminal court by three judges. Criminal courts also have
a State Security division to hear cases considered affecting state
security; in these courts the defendant may appeal on procedural
grounds only. The Court of Cassation hears appeals of criminal court
rulings. Civil courts hear civil cases and administrative courts hear
cases contesting government actions or procedures; both systems have
upper-level courts to hear appeals. The Supreme Constitutional Court
hears challenges to the constitutionality of laws or verdicts in any of
the courts.
A lawyer is appointed at the court's expense if the defendant does
not have one. Appointed lawyers are drawn from a roster that is chosen
by the Bar Association; however, expenses are incurred by the State.
Any denial of this right is grounds for appeal of the ruling. However,
detainees in certain high security prisons alleged that they were
denied access to counsel or that such access was delayed until trial,
thus denying counsel the time to prepare an adequate defense. A woman's
testimony is equal to that of a man's in court. There is no legal
prohibition against a woman serving as a judge, although in practice no
women serve as judges (see Section 5).
Defense lawyers generally agree that the regular judiciary respects
the rights of the accused and exercises its independence. In the past,
criminal court judges have dismissed cases in which confessions were
obtained by coercion. However, while the judiciary generally is
credited with conducting fair trials, under the Emergency Law, cases
involving terrorism and national security may be tried in military or
State Security Emergency courts, in which the accused do not receive
all the constitutional protections of the civilian judicial system.
In 1992 following a rise in extremist violence, the Government
began trying cases of persons accused of terrorism and membership in
terrorist groups before military tribunals. In 1993 the Supreme
Constitutional Court ruled that the President may invoke the Emergency
Law to refer any crime to a military court. This use of military and
State Security Emergency courts under the Emergency Law since 1993 has
deprived hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right
to be tried by a civilian judge.
The Government defends the use of military courts as necessary in
terrorism cases, maintaining that trials in the civilian courts are
protracted and that civilian judges and their families are vulnerable
to terrorist threats. Some civilian judges have confirmed that they
fear of trying high visibility terrorism cases because of possible
reprisal. The Government claims that civilian defendants receive fair
trials in the military courts and enjoy the same rights as defendants
in civilian courts.
However, the military courts do not ensure civilian defendants due
process before an independent tribunal. While military judges are
lawyers, they are also military officers appointed by the Minister of
Defense and subject to military discipline. They are neither as
independent nor as qualified as civilian judges in applying the
civilian Penal Code. There is no appellate process for verdicts issued
by military courts; instead, verdicts are subject to a review by other
military judges and confirmation by the President, who in practice
usually delegates the review function to a senior military officer.
Defense attorneys have complained that they have not been given
sufficient time to prepare defenses and that judges tend to rush cases
involving a large number of defendants.
During the year, the Government did not refer any civilians to the
military courts. However, on February 24, the Government executed two
members of the ``Jihad Group in Egypt'' who had been sentenced by
military courts to death in absentia in 1994 and 1997. On November 19,
a military court issued its verdict in a case that the Government
referred to it in October 1999 involving 20 professional leaders of the
Muslim Brotherhood charged with belonging to an illegal group. Fifteen
of the defendants were given sentences ranging from 3 to 5 years, and 5
were acquitted. The arrests and trial before the military courts
coincided with preparations for elections to the boards of professional
syndicates and to the People's Assembly; verdicts and sentencing took
place after delays, and after the Assembly elections were over (see
Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 3).
The State Security Emergency courts share jurisdiction with
military courts over crimes affecting national security. The President
appoints judges to these courts from the civilian judiciary upon the
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and, if he chooses to appoint
military judges, the Minister of Defense. Sentences are subject to
confirmation by the President but may not be appealed. The President
may alter or annul a decision of a State Security Emergency court,
including a decision to release a defendant.
During the year, State Security Emergency courts issued verdicts in
five cases. On April 13, a State Security Emergency Court, trying the
case of 14 defendants alleged to be members of the Islamic Group,
sentenced 1 defendant to death, 1 to life in prison, and the other 12
to sentences ranging from between 3 and 10 years. On June 5, a State
Security Emergency Court upheld an earlier ruling issued in absentia
against Muhammad Mustafa Hassan, who allegedly was a member of the
``Returnees from Afghanistan'' group. Hassan was sentenced to 10 years
at hard labor. On June 22, a State Security Emergency court sentenced
four members of a terrorist group from the upper (southern) city of
Dairout who were accused of murder and attempted murder of policemen
and Christians in the early 1990's to 5 years in prison. On September
5, a State Security Emergency Court passed a verdict in the case of 16
defendants led by Manal Wahid Mana'a who were accused of heresy against
Islam (see Section 2.c.). The court sentenced Mana'a to 5 years' hard
labor, three other defendants to 3 years' hard labor, seven defendants
to 1 year hard labor, two defendants to 6 months in prison, and two
defendants to a fine of $375 (1000 Egyptian pounds). One of the
defendants died in prison, reportedly from ill health during the
investigation. On September 15, a State Security Emergency Court ruled
in the case of 10 defendants, 4 of them women, accused of propagating
extremist ideas in Giza and Alexandria from 1990 to 1999. The court
sentenced two of the defendants to 15 years' hard labor, one to 3
years' hard labor, two to 3 years in prison, and five (including the
four women) to 1 year in prison.
On November 18, the State Security division of the South Cairo
criminal court (in which the defendant may appeal on procedural grounds
only) began hearing the government's case against Saad Eddin Ibrahim,
Director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies (see
Sections 2.a. and 4).
According to local human rights organizations, there are
approximately 15,000-16,000 political detainees. It is not clear how
many among them are charged and awaiting trial, convicted and serving
sentences, or detained without charge (see Section 1.d.).
International humanitarian organizations do not have access to
political prisoners (see Section 1.c.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity and secrecy
of homes, correspondence, telephone calls, and other means of
communication; however, the Emergency Law abridges the constitutional
provisions regarding the right to privacy, and the Government used the
Emergency Law to infringe on these rights. Police must obtain warrants
before undertaking searches and wiretaps. Courts have dismissed cases
in which warrants were issued without sufficient cause. Police officers
who conduct searches without proper warrants are subject to criminal
penalties, although penalties seldom are imposed. The Emergency Law
empowers the Government to place wiretaps, intercept mail, and search
persons or places without warrants. Security agencies frequently place
political activists, suspected subversives, journalists, foreigners,
and writers under surveillance, screen their correspondence (especially
international mail), search them and their homes, and confiscate
personal property.
The Ministry of Interior has the authority to stop specific issues
of foreign-published newspapers from entering the country on the
grounds of protecting public order; it exercises this authority
sporadically (also see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government partially
restricts these rights. Citizens openly speak their views on a wide
range of political and social issues, including vigorous criticism of
Government officials and policies, but generally avoid certain topics,
such as direct criticism of the President.
Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for
Development Studies, was put on trial November 18 in a case that most
observers believe will have broad implications for freedom of
expression. Local observers believe that Ibrahim was prosecuted because
of public remarks that he made regarding high-ranking officials that
exceeded unwritten limits regarding freedom of expression. Ibrahim was
charged with violating the Penal Code by disseminating abroad false
information about Egypt, bribing public officials in order to obtain
media coverage of Ibn Khaldoun Center activities, misappropriating
funds obtained from the European Union (EU), and falsifying documents
in order to obtain funds. He also was charged with violating a 1992
military decree prohibiting any citizen or domestic organization from
accepting foreign funds without Government permission (his organization
accepted $246,226 (261,000 Euros) from the EU). Twenty-seven employees
of the Center also were charged with aiding and abetting Ibrahim in the
alleged activities. The Government arrested Ibrahim and closed the Ibn
Khaldoun Center on June 30. Ibrahim and the other defendants were
released on bail on August 10, and Ibrahim was charged formally on
September 26. At the November 18 opening session of Ibrahim's trial
before a Higher State Security Court, the three-judge panel granted a
defense request for continuance and postponed the next hearing until
mid-January 2001.
Observers remain concerned about several aspects of the ongoing
trial, especially regarding questions of due process: First, Ibrahim
and many of the other defendants were not served formally with their
indictments or court papers prior to the trial; second, Ibrahim's
request for discovery of the documents that were confiscated from the
Ibn Khaldoun Center, which his lawyers claimed were necessary to
prepare his defense, had not been granted by the judicial authorities
by year's end; and third, Ibrahim is being tried in a State Security
Court, from which defendants may appeal once only on procedural
grounds, but may not appeal the verdict itself (see Section 1.e.).
In May the Public Prosecutor dropped the Government's case against
EOHR secretary general Hafez Abu Se'da. Abu Se'da and EOHR attorney
Mustafa Zidane had been charged in December 1998 with violating two
articles of the Penal Code (dissemination of false information or
inflammatory propaganda that harms public security or public interests
and accepting foreign funds with the intent to harm national
interests). The charges were dropped in February, and Abu Se'da instead
was charged with violating a 1992 military decree prohibiting any
Egyptian individual or organization from accepting foreign funds
without Government permission, before the case ultimately was dropped
altogether in May. The charges against Zidane also were dropped. The
charges were based on an EOHR report that was critical of police
conduct during a 1998 murder investigation in Sohag. The State Security
Prosecutor alleged that the EOHR had accepted $25,000 from the British
Embassy in Cairo to publish the critical report. In fact, the money was
provided by the British Embassy to support a women's legal aid project
begun in 1995 (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
The Government owns stock in the three largest daily newspapers,
and the President appoints their editors in chief. Although these
newspapers generally follow the government line, they sometimes
criticize government policies. The Government also holds a monopoly on
the printing and distribution of newspapers, including those of the
opposition parties. The Government used its monopolistic control of
newsprint to limit the output of opposition publications.
Opposition political parties publish their own newspapers but
receive a subsidy from the Government and, in some cases, subsidies
from foreign interests as well. Most newspapers are weeklies, with the
exception of the dailies Al-Wafd and AlAhrar, both of which have small
circulations. Opposition newspapers frequently publish criticism of the
Government. They also give greater prominence to human rights abuses
than do state-run newspapers. All party newspapers are required by law
to reflect the platform of their party. The Government suspended
publication of the semiweekly newspaper Al-Shaab in May following a
decision by the Political Parties Committee to withdraw recognition
from the Islamist-oriented Socialist Labor Party (see Section 3).
The Constitution restricts ownership of newspapers to public or
private legal entities, corporate bodies, and political parties. There
are numerous restrictions on legal entities that seek to establish
their own newspapers, including a limit of 10 percent ownership by any
individual. In January 1998, the People's Assembly approved a law that
requires newspapers managed by joint stock companies to obtain the
approval of the Prime Minister prior to publishing. Given government
restrictions, a joint stock company is the only feasible incorporation
option for publishers.
The Government permitted the establishment of one new publication
during the year and allowed two others to resume publication. The
Ministry of Culture began publishing a new weekly newspaper, Al-Qahira,
using the existing license of another publication. In May the Court of
Ethics ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to review a
government appeal of a January 1999 Supreme Constitutional Court ruling
on a 1981 decree that abolished a monthly publication called Al-Mawqif
Al-Arabi, thus allowing publication of the monthly to resume after
nearly 20 years. In August the Higher Administrative Court overturned a
1999 government decision to revoke the license of the newspaper Sawt
Al-Umma for alleged violations by the publisher of joint stock company
regulations. The newspaper later resumed publication.
Several other publications failed to obtain licenses or lost
related court cases, thereby losing the right to publish. In June the
Higher Administrative Court overturned a lower court decision that
would have allowed the newspaper Al-Karama to be published, after the
publisher contested the Prime Minister's refusal to act on his request
for approval of a joint stock company formed to publish the paper. In
June the Higher Administrative Court upheld a lower court decision to
stop publication of the Liberal Party publication Akhbar Al-Beheira,
based on an article in the Political Parties Law providing that no
party with fewer than 10 members in parliament may publish a newspaper.
Because of the difficulties in obtaining a license in Egypt,
several publishers of newspapers and magazines developed for the
country's market have obtained a foreign license. Most of these
publications are printed in the free trade zone. Newspapers and
magazines published under a foreign license may be distributed with
government permission. However, the Department of Censorship in the
Ministry of Information has the authority also to censor or halt
distribution of publications printed in the free trade zone under a
foreign license. In April the Ministry confiscated one issue of the
foreign-licensed newspaper AlTadamun, reportedly due to an article it
contained that supported Iraq. The English-language weekly newspaper
the Middle East Times reported no government censorship of its articles
during the year. The newspaper closed its offices and moved to Cyprus
in October for financial reasons. The Center for Human Rights and Legal
Assistance in 1999 organized a legal challenge to the constitutionality
of the Information Ministry's censorship of offshore publications. The
Supreme Constitutional Court began hearing the case in December, but
had not issued a decision by year's end.
The Penal Code, Press Law, and Publications Law govern press
issues. The Penal Code stipulates fines or imprisonment for criticism
of the President, members of the Government, and foreign heads of
state. The Supreme Constitutional Court agreed in 1998 to review the
constitutionality of those articles of the Penal Code that specify
imprisonment as a penalty for journalists convicted of libel. The case
was scheduled to begin in January 2001. The Press and Publication Laws
ostensibly provide protection against malicious and unsubstantiated
reporting. Financial penalties for violations were increased
substantially in 1996 when relevant provisions of the Penal Code were
revised, but the judicial process remains long and costly, creating a
bar to realistic legal recourse for those wrongly defamed. In recent
years, opposition party newspapers have within limits published
articles critical of the President and foreign heads of state without
being charged or harassed. The Government continues to charge
journalists with libel. In October 1999, the Public Prosecutor charged
editor Mohamed Hassan Al-Banna and journalist Fouad Fawaz of the weekly
newspaper Al-Khamis with insulting Libyan leader Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi.
The case reportedly was settled out of court during the year.
In 1996 the People's Assembly approved a revised Press Law
following criticism of a more restrictive revision that had been
approved in 1995. The People's Assembly also revised certain articles
in the Penal Code pertaining to libel and slander. In addition in 1997
the Supreme Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional Article 195
of the Penal Code under which an editor in chief could have been
considered criminally responsible for libel contained in any portion of
the newspaper. The Court ruled that the correct standard of
responsibility should be ``negligence.'' The courts subsequently
applied this lesser standard.
Courts tried several prominent cases of slander during the year. In
April the Court of Cassation upheld a 1999 criminal court conviction of
four journalists from the opposition daily newspaper Al-Shaab of
libeling Youssef Wally, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Agriculture. Editor in chief Magdy Hussein and reporter Salah Bedewi
were sentenced to 2 years in prison, and each was fined about $5,300
(20,000 Egyptian pounds). Cartoonist Essam Hanafi received the same
fine and a 1-year sentence. A fourth AlShaab journalist, Adel Hussein,
was convicted of libel and fined the same amount. In a separate case in
May, five journalists from Al-Shaab (Magdy Hussein, Essam Hanafi,
Talaat Rumeih, Adel Hussein, and Amer Soliman) were given sentences
ranging from fines of about $2000 (7,500 Egyptian pounds) to 6 months
in prison for slandering businessman Hussein Sabour. Hussein, Bedewi,
and Hanafi all were released by year's end. In April the Court of
Misdemeanors sentenced five journalists from the newspaper AlAhrar
(Salah Qabadaya, Hossam Soliman Moussa, Mohamed Abdel Fahim Aboul Nour,
Hisham Mohamed Mustafa, and Nabil Sadek Rizkallah) to 6 months in
prison at hard labor and fines of about $2000 (7,500 Egyptian pounds)
each for slander against Egypt Air President Fahim ElRayyan. During the
year the courts also acquitted six journalists of slander and dismissed
one case. Journalist Ashraf Ayoub's 1-year sentence for libel in 1999
was dropped during the year, after the newspaper that he worked for,
AlAhali, published a retraction and the businessman who had charged
Ayoub withdrew his complaint.
On occasion, and based on authority granted to him by law, the
Public Prosecutor may issue a temporary ban on the publication of news
pertaining to cases involving national security in order to protect the
confidentiality of the cases. The length of the ban is based on the
length of time required for the prosecution to prepare its case. In
contrast to 1999, the Public Prosecutor did not ban any news items
during the year.
The law provides penalties for individuals who disclose information
about the State during emergencies, including war and natural
disasters. The penalties include fines up to $1,700 (6,000 Egyptian
pounds) and prison sentences up to 3 years. There were no reports in
which the law was applied in practice during the year.
In 1998 the People's Assembly approved a law that prohibits current
or former members of the police from publishing workrelated information
without prior permission from the Interior Minister.
Various ministries legally are authorized to ban or confiscate
books and other works of art upon obtaining a court order. The Islamic
Research Center at Al-Azhar University has legal authority to censor,
but not to confiscate, all publications dealing with the Koran and
Islamic scriptural texts. In recent years the Center has passed
judgment on the suitability of nonreligious books and artistic
productions. In 1995 an administrative court ruled that the sole
authority to prohibit publication or distribution of books and other
works of art is vested in the Ministry of Culture. This decision
invalidated a 1994 advisory opinion by a judiciary council that had
expanded Al-Azhar's censorship authority to include visual and audio
artistic works. The same year, President Mubarak stated that the
Government would not allow confiscation of books from the market
without a court order, a position supported by the then-Mufti of the
Republic, who is now the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar.
The Islamic Research Center at Al-Azhar University ruled during
1999 in favor of distribution of the book ``My Father Adam: The Story
of the Creation Between Legend and Reality,'' written by Abdel Sabour
Shahine. An Islamist lawyer sued the Sheikh of Al-Azhar and several
other senior Islamic figures in an effort to block publication of the
book; a court rejected the suit on February 28. The plaintiff's appeal
of the decision was pending at year's end.
The Islamic Research Center also issued a statement on May 17
denouncing the novel ``A Banquet for Seaweed,'' by Syrian author Haidar
Haidar, for insulting religious values. The novel, originally published
in 1983, was reissued by the Ministry of Culture as part of a series on
Arabic literature. Al-Shaab newspaper (of the pro-Islamist Socialist
Labor Party) declared the book blasphemous for ridiculing Islam, and
initiated a campaign against the book and against the Minister of
Culture for reprinting it. Student demonstrations against the book at
Al-Azhar University on May 8 turned violent, leading to the arrest of
75 students (see Sections 1.d. and 3). The Minister of Culture
initially defended his decision and later relented and agreed to recall
the book, but by then copies reportedly had sold out.
There were no court-ordered confiscations of books during the year.
During the year, one author was tried and convicted for his writings. A
State Security misdemeanor court sentenced author Salaheddine Mohsen to
a 6-month suspended sentence in July for ``insulting heavenly
religions'' in his book ``The Shivering Light.'' At the time of his
arrest, police confiscated approximately 100 copies of Mohsen's books,
which he had published himself. On December 23, Mohsen was arrested at
Cairo airport for attempting to leave the country. Upon the appeal of
the State Security Prosecutor, who claimed that the sentence was too
lenient, the Government ordered that Mohsen be retried. The retrial was
pending at year's end. An appeal to the Court of Cassation by author
Ala'a Hamed still was pending at year's end. Hamed previously was
convicted in 1998 for the alleged pornographic content of his book
``The Bed.''
The Ministry of Interior regularly confiscates leaflets and other
works by Muslim fundamentalists and other critics of the State. During
the year, hundreds of suspected members of the illegal Muslim
Brotherhood were arrested (see Sections 1.d. and 3). In many cases the
press reported that police confiscated written materials such as
leaflets during the arrests. On November 19, 15 persons were convicted
of offenses related to membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, including
possession of leaflets and other written materials related to the
organization, and were given sentences ranging from 3 to 5 years in
prison.
The Ministry of Interior also has the authority, which it exercises
sporadically, to stop specific issues of foreignpublished newspapers
from entering the country on the grounds of protecting public order
(also see Section 1.f.). The Ministry of Defense may ban works about
sensitive security issues. The Council of Ministers may order the
banning of works that it deems offensive to public morals, detrimental
to religion, or likely to cause a breach of the peace.
The Ministry of Information owns and operates all domestic
television and radio stations. The Government refuses to license
private broadcast stations or to privatize the State's broadcast media.
In addition to public television, the Government also offers several
pay-for-view television channels. Government control and censorship of
the broadcast media is significant.
Plays and films must pass Ministry of Culture censorship tests as
scripts and as final productions. However, many plays and films that
are highly critical of the Government and its policies are not
censored. The Ministry of Culture also censors foreign films that are
to be shown in theaters, but it is more lenient when the same films are
released in videocassette format. Government censors ensure that
foreign films made in Egypt portray the country in a favorable light.
Censors review scripts before filming, are present during filming, and
have the right to review the film before it is sent out of the country.
An appeals court had not yet reviewed the case against the film
``Birds of Darkness'' by year's end. The plaintiffs charge that it is
insulting to lawyers. Two related cases against the movie were dropped
in 1997.
Moderate Muslims and secularist writers still are subject to legal
action by Islamic extremists. Cairo University professor Nasr Abu Zeid
and his wife continue to live abroad following the 1996 Court of
Cassation ruling that affirmed lower court judgments that Abu Zeid is
an apostate because of his controversial interpretation of Koranic
teachings. In August the Supreme Constitutional Court rejected Abu
Zeid's contestation of the constitutionality of the 1996 ruling.
The Government does not restrict directly academic freedom at
universities. However, some university professors claim that the
Government tightened its control over universities in 1994 through a
law authorizing university presidents to appoint the deans of the
various faculties. Under the previous law, faculty deans were elected
by their peers. The Government has justified the measure as a means to
combat Islamist influence on campus. The Government also occasionally
bans books for use on campuses.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
significantly restricts freedom of assembly. Under a 1923 law, citizens
must obtain approval from the Ministry of Interior before holding
public meetings, rallies, and protest marches. The Interior Ministry
selectively obstructs meetings scheduled to be held on private property
and university campuses (also see Section 4). In January security
officials prohibited the Group for Democratic Development from
conducting a planned seminar on Islamic groups. In October the
Government permitted the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies to
hold a conference on the subject of human rights in the Arab world,
which the Government had prohibited in 1999.
The Government significantly restricts freedom of association. In
June the Supreme Constitutional Court overturned on procedural grounds
Law 153 pertaining to the formation, function, and funding of non-
governmental organizations (NGO's) and private foundations, which had
been passed by the People's Assembly in June 1999. The previous law
governing NGO's, Law 32, was reinstated until a new law could be
passed, which had not happened by year's end. Law 153 and the
subsequent implementing regulations were controversial, and had drawn
mixed reactions from local and international NGO's and activists, some
of whom charged that the law and regulations placed unduly burdensome
restrictions on NGO's. While many NGO's were registered under Law 153,
its overturn and the reinstatement of Law 32 left a number of NGO's
that had not yet registered under either Law 153 or Law 32 in an
unsettled status regarding registration. (Those that succeeded in
registering under Law 153 still were considered registered after the
law was overturned.) Three human rights organizations were registered
as NGO's during the year: The Center for Human Rights Legal Assistance,
the Center for Human Rights Studies and Information, and the Arab
Organization for Human Rights. The Arab Organization for Human Rights
had sought licensing since 1985. Several other human rights
organizations that applied for registration, including the Egyptian
Organization for Human Rights, the Human Rights Center for the
Assistance of Prisoners, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights
Studies, were not registered by year's end. The EOHR sued to force the
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs to register the organization,
because the Ministry had not replied to EOHR's application within
limits mandated under both Law 32 and Law 153. There was no decision on
the case by year's end. In September the security services barred
Mamdouh Nakhla, a Coptic Orthodox lawyer and human rights activist,
from membership on the board of the Youssef El-Rami Charity Society,
for ``security reasons.'' Nakhla filed a lawsuit against the Ministers
of Interior and Social affairs; no court date had been set by year's
end.
Under 1993 legislation governing professional syndicates, at least
50 percent of the general membership of an association must elect the
governing board. Failing a quorum, a second election must be held in
which at least 30 percent of the membership votes for the board. If
such a quorum is unattainable, the judiciary may appoint a caretaker
board until new elections can be set. The law was adopted to prevent
wellorganized minorities, specifically Islamists, from capturing or
retaining the leadership of professional syndicates. Members of these
syndicates have reported that Islamists have used irregular electoral
techniques such as physically blocking polling places and limiting or
changing the location of polling sites.
On June 28, the Government postponed nationwide elections for the
Lawyers' Syndicate that had been scheduled for July 1 on the grounds
that syndicate offices were inadequate to allow voting by the
syndicate's more than 85,000 members. Local observers believe the
elections were postponed to prevent victories by Islamists and other
oppositionists, as had occurred in previous syndicate elections. In
October 1999, the Court of Cassation upheld an earlier court decision
to lift the Government sequestration of the Syndicate and to allow
elections. Several Administrative Court rulings during the year
supported the Syndicate's right to hold elections in its offices, but
the elections had not taken place by year's end.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
belief and the practice of religious rites; however, the Government
places restrictions on this right. Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslims.
There is a small number of Shi'a Muslims. Approximately 10 percent of
the population, or 6 million of 64 million, are Christians, the
majority of whom belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church. There are other
small Christian denominations, as well as a Jewish community that
numbers approximately 200 persons.
Under the Constitution, Islam is the official state religion and
primary source of legislation. Accordingly, religious practices that
conflict with Shari'a (Islamic law) are prohibited. However, in Egypt
the practice of Christianity or Judaism does not conflict with Shari'a
and, for the most part, members of the non-Muslim minority worship
without harassment and maintain links with coreligionists abroad.
All mosques must be licensed, and the Government is engaged in an
effort to control them legally. The Government appoints and pays the
salaries of the imams who lead prayers in mosques, proposes themes for
them, and monitors their sermons. In December the Minister of Awqaf
announced that the Government now controls 52,000 mosques and 11,000
mosques located in private buildings. (There are over 70,000 mosques in
the country.) In an effort to combat extremists, the Government has
announced its intention to bring all unauthorized mosques under its
control by 2002.
Neither the Constitution nor the Civil and Penal Codes prohibit
proselytizing or conversion. However, during the past 2 decades,
several dozen Christians who were accused of proselytizing or who had
converted from Islam to Christianity have been harassed by police or
arrested on charges of violating Article 98(F) of the Penal Code, which
prohibits citizens from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or
inciting sectarian strife. No such incidents occurred during the year;
however, in June Aziz Tawfik, a Christian who allegedly was engaged in
proselytizing activities, was detained briefly by State Security
forces. He reportedly was mistreated during his detention. He was
released the same day and reportedly has not been harassed since.
There are no restrictions on the conversion of non-Muslims to
Islam. However, in cases involving conversion from Islam to
Christianity, authorities have charged several converts with violating
laws prohibiting the falsification of documents. In such instances,
converts, who fear government harassment if they officially register
the change from Islam to Christianity, have altered their
identification cards and other official documents themselves to reflect
their new religious affiliation. There were no reports of such arrests
or harassment during the year.
In 1997 human rights activist Mamdouh Naklah filed suit seeking
removal of the religious affiliation category from government
identification cards. Naklah challenged the constitutionality of a 1994
decree by the Minister of Interior governing the issuance of new
identification cards. The court referred the case to the State
Commissioner's Office, which in May issued an opinion noting that the
legal challenge had not been filed within 60 days of the decree's
issuance, as required by law. However, the advisory opinions of the
State Commissioner's Office are not binding. The court now is expected
to try the case, although no date has been set.
An 1856 Ottoman decree still in force requires non-Muslims to
obtain what is now a presidential decree to build a place of worship.
In addition, Interior Ministry regulations issued in 1934 specify a set
of 10 conditions that the Government must consider prior to issuance of
a presidential decree permitting construction of a church. These
conditions include the location of the proposed site, the religious
composition of the surrounding community, and the proximity of other
churches. The Ottoman decree also requires the President to approve
permits for the repair of church facilities.
In response to strong criticism of the Ottoman decree, President
Mubarak took several steps to facilitate church repairs. In December
1999, President Mubarak issued a decree making the repair of all places
of worship subject to a 1976 civil construction code. The decree is
significant symbolically because it places churches and mosques on
equal footing before the law. The practical impact of the decree has
been to facilitate significantly church repairs. During the year, the
Government issued 29 permits for church-related construction, including
4 permits for the construction of new churches, 19 permits for churches
previously constructed without authorization, and 6 permits for the
demolition and reconstruction of existing churches. In addition, the
Government reported that local authorities issued more than 350 permits
for church-related repair during the year.
However, the approval process for church construction is
timeconsuming and insufficiently responsive to the wishes of the
Christian community. Although President Mubarak reportedly has approved
all requests for permits presented to him, Christians maintain that the
Interior Ministry delays--in some instances indefinitely--submission to
the President of their requests. They also maintain that security
forces have blocked them from utilizing permits that have been issued.
For example, a permit issued in 1993 to repair structural damage to a
110-year-old church in a village next to Luxor remains unenforced due
to ``security reasons.'' During the summer, newspapers published a May
22 letter from the secretary general of Assiyut governorate to the head
of the Assiyut counsel directing that all church repair requests be
screened by security before approved.
In January 1996, human rights activist Mamdouh Naklah filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of the Ottoman decree. In December
1998, an administrative court referred Naklah's case to the State
Commissioner's Office. In September the Office issued an opinion that
the decree is unconstitutional, but that Naklah had no standing to file
the suit. The opinion is not biding; the court had not ruled on the
case by year's end.
The Minister of Awqaf, Hamdy Zaqzouq, who is responsible for
administering religious trusts, established in 1996 a committee to
address a dispute with the Coptic Orthodox Church that originated in
1952. At that time, the Government seized approximately 1,500 acres of
land from the Church and transferred title to the Ministry of Awqaf.
Based on the committee's recommendations, more than 800 acres have been
returned to the Church. The committee continues to review claims to the
remaining disputed property.
The Constitution requires schools to offer religious instruction.
Public and private schools provide religious instruction according to
the faith of the student.
The Government occasionally prosecutes members of religious groups
whose practices deviate from mainstream Islamic beliefs and whose
activities are believed to jeopardize communal harmony. For example, on
November 11, 1999, the State Security Prosecutor arrested 50 persons in
Cairo suspected of heresy against Islam. On November 15, 1999, 30 of
the detainees were released and the remaining 20 were charged with
degrading Islam, inciting strife, and meeting illegally. The lead
defendant, a woman named Manal Wahid Mana'a, was accused of attempting
to establish a new Islamic offshoot. On September 5, a State Security
Emergency Court in Boulaq sentenced 16 of the defendants, including
Mana'a to 5 years' hard labor, 3 other defendants to 3 years' hard
labor, 7 to 1 year of hard labor, 2 to 6 months in prison, and 2 to a
fine of $375 (1000 Egyptian pounds). One of the defendants died in
prison, reportedly from ill health, during the investigation (see
Sections 1.e. and 1.a.).
On September 15, a State Security Emergency Court handed down a
ruling in the case of 10 defendants, 4 of whom were women, accused of
propagating extremist ideas in Giza and Alexandria from 1990 to 1999.
The court sentenced two defendants to 15 years' hard labor, one to 3
years' hard labor, two to 3 years in prison, and five (including the
four women) to 1 year in prison (see Section 1.e.).
In August 1999, the public prosecutor reopened and expanded an
investigation of police torture of mostly Christian detainees that took
place during the police investigation in August and September 1998 of
the murder of Samir Aweda Hakim and Karam Tamer Arsal in the largely
Coptic village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate. By October
approximately 300 of 1,000 residents involved in the incident had been
reinterviewed. It remains unclear whether religion was a factor in the
actions of the police officers. Some human rights groups outside Egypt
believe that religion was a factor in the Al-Kush murder investigation,
but most human rights and Christian activists in Egypt do not. Police
abuse of detainees is a widespread practice that occurs regardless of a
detainee's religious beliefs (see Section 1.c.).
On June 5, a criminal court in Sohag city convicted Shayboub
William Arsal of the murder of Hakim and Arsal. The court sentenced
Shayboub to 15 years in prison at hard labor. An appeal was pending at
year's end. The Christian community of Al-Kush believes that Shayboub,
a Christian resident of Al-Kush, was accused and convicted of the crime
because of his religion. The public prosecution in Sohag has taken no
action on charges of witness tampering in Shayboub's trial that were
raised in 1998 against Bishop Wisa and Arch-Priest Antonious.
On July 16, the Dar Al-Salaam court sentenced a Christian, Suryal
Gayed Ishak, to 3 years' hard labor for ``insulting Islam'' during a
public dispute. Ishak's attorney appealed the conviction, claiming that
Ishak was accused falsely of instigating the new year's violence in Al-
Kush (see Section 5). The appeal was scheduled to be heard in January
2001.
Some Christians allege that the Government is lax in protecting
Christian lives and property against extremists (see Section 5).
In September the Maadi Community Church, an independent
interdenominational Protestant church, obtained recognition from the
Government, which allows the Church to buy property and hold services.
In 1960 President Gamal Abdel Nasser issued a decree (Law 263 for
1960) banning Baha'i institutions and community activities. All Baha'i
community properties, including Baha'i centers, libraries, and
cemeteries, were confiscated. This ban has not been rescinded.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and foreigners are free to
travel within the country except in certain military areas. Males who
have not completed compulsory military service may not travel abroad or
emigrate, although this restriction may be deferred or bypassed.
Unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their
fathers to obtain passports and travel; married women require the same
permission from their husbands. Citizens who leave the country have the
right to return.
The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum and/or refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no reports of the forced
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution. Egypt
grants first asylum for humanitarian reasons or in the event of
internal turmoil in neighboring countries. The Government cooperates
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Asylum seekers generally are screened by UNHCR representatives, who
issue a refugee identification card if the Ministries of Interior and
Foreign Affairs approve. While recognized refugees are permitted to
reside in Egypt legally, they may not acquire citizenship except in
rare cases. During the year, approximately 6,400 recognized refugees
resided in the country, including more than 2,500 Somalis and 2,400
Sudanese. Although there is no pattern of abuse of refugees, during
random security sweeps, the Government temporarily detained some
refugees who were not carrying proper identification. Following
intervention by the UNHCR, the refugees were released.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) dominates the 454-seat
People's Assembly, the Shura Council, local governments, the mass
media, labor, and the large public sector, and controls the licensing
of new political parties, newspapers, and private organizations to such
an extent that, as a practical matter, citizens do not have a
meaningful ability to change their government.
In September 1999 President Hosni Mubarak was elected unopposed to
a fourth six-year term in a national referendum. According to official
results he received 94 percent of the vote. The referendum followed the
constitutionally mandated nomination by the People's Assembly. Under
the Constitution, the electorate is not presented with a choice among
competing presidential candidates.
During the year, Egypt held elections for the People's Assembly.
Due to court-ordered supervision by the judiciary of the voting and
counting, the process was significantly cleaner and more transparent
than previous elections; however, there were a number of problems. The
elections were held in stages between October 18 and November 15 in
order to allow for supervision by a member of the judiciary at each
polling place. Out of a total of 444 elected seats, the ruling NDP won
172 seats, independent candidates won 255 seats, and opposition parties
won 17 seats. Elections for two seats in Alexandria still had not been
held by year's end due to a court-imposed delay because of procedural
irregularities. Many of the independents elected were former members of
the NDP who rejoined the party after being elected, thus leaving the
People's Assembly actual balance at 388 NDP members, 37 independents
(17 of them affiliated with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood), and 17
opposition party members. Seven of those elected were women and three
were Christians. President Mubarak also appointed 10 members to the
Assembly, of whom 4 were women and 4 Christians.
Despite the overall improvement in the electoral process, there
still were problems affecting the elections' fairness, particularly in
the period leading up to elections and outside some polling stations on
election days. During the months preceding the elections, the
Government arrested thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood on
charges of belonging to an illegal organization. Most observers believe
that the Government was seeking to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood's
participation in the People's Assembly and professional syndicate
elections through intimidation. In addition previous convictions on
such charges legally precluded many potential candidates from running.
Violence among supporters of various candidates marred the
elections at some polling places and resulted in the deaths of 9
persons. At a few locations, the security presence was so heavy as to
inhibit voters' access to the polls. There were also reports of voter
harassment by security forces in jurisdictions in which the Muslim
Brotherhood was expected to do well. The EOHR conducted a small-scale
monitoring effort, but there was no systematic, large-scale independent
monitoring of the elections.
The People's Assembly debates Government proposals, and members
exercise their authority to call cabinet ministers to explain policy.
The executive initiates almost all legislation. Nevertheless, the
Assembly maintains the authority to challenge or restrain the executive
in the areas of economic and social policy, although it may not modify
the budget except with the Government's approval. The Assembly
exercises limited influence in the areas of security and foreign
policy, and retains little oversight of the Interior Ministry's use of
Emergency Law powers. Many executive branch initiatives and policies
are carried out by regulation through ministerial decree without
legislative oversight. The military budget is prepared by the executive
and not debated publicly. Roll-call votes in the Assembly are rare.
Votes generally are reported in aggregate terms of yeas and nays, and
thus constituents have no independent method of checking a member's
voting record.
The Shura Council, the upper chamber of Parliament, has 264
members. Two-thirds of the members are elected popularly and the
President appoints one-third. One half of the Shura seats are up for
reelection or reappointment every 3 years. In 1998 the NDP won all 88
seats up for election. One Coptic Christian, from Alexandria, won a
seat. The President made 47 appointments (including an additional three
over the 44 open seats to replace deceased members). Those appointed
included nine women, eight Coptic Christians, and two members of
opposition parties.
There are 13 recognized opposition parties. The law empowers the
Government to bring felony charges against those who form a party
without a license. New parties must be approved by the Political
Parties Committee, a semiofficial body that includes a substantial
majority of members from the ruling NDP and some members from among the
independent and opposition parties. Decisions of the Parties Committee
may be appealed to the civil courts. If a court overturns a denial, the
party is not registered automatically. Both the Committee and the
People's Assembly sometimes ignore court decisions. During the year the
Committee approved one party (the Nasserist ``National Accord'' party)
and rejected the applications of two others. These rejected parties
filed an appeal of the Committee's decision. Six other appeals were
pending before the Administrative Court at year's end.
The Political Parties Committee also may withdraw recognition from
existing political parties. On May 20, the Committee withdrew
recognition from the Socialist Labor Party and suspended publication of
the party newspaper Al-Shaab. The Committee justified its decision by
citing the emergence of several splinter factions within the party.
Members of the Socialist Labor Party charged that the emergence of such
factions was a Government-backed conspiracy to punish the party and
newspaper for having instigated student demonstrations that turned
violent at Al-Azhar University in early May (see Section 2.a.).
The Muslim Brotherhood remains an illegal organization and may not
be recognized as a political party under current laws, which prohibit
political parties based on religion. Muslim Brothers are known publicly
and openly speak their views, although they do not explicitly identify
themselves as members of the organization. They remain subject to
government pressure (see Section 1.d.). Seventeen independent
candidates backed by the Muslim Brotherhood were elected to the
People's Assembly in the fall parliamentary elections.
Women and minorities are underrepresented in Government and
politics. The Constitution reserves 10 Assembly seats for presidential
appointees, and during the year President Mubarak included four
Christians and four women among his appointees. In addition to the
appointments, seven women and three Copts were elected in the fall. The
ruling NDP nominated three Coptic candidates in the parliamentary
elections. Two women and 2 Copts serve among the 32 ministers in the
Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights organizations continue to face difficulties
registering as legal organizations. In June the Supreme Constitutional
Court overturned on procedural grounds Law 153 pertaining to the
formation, function, and funding of non-governmental organizations
(NGO's) and private foundations, which had been passed by the People's
Assembly in June 1999. The previous law governing NGO's, Law 32, was
reinstated until a new law could be passed, which had not happened by
year's end. Law 153 and the subsequent implementing regulations, were
considered controversial, and had drawn mixed reactions from local
NGO's and international activists, some of whom charged that the law
and regulations placed unduly burdensome restrictions on NGO
operations.
While many NGO's were registered under Law 153, its overturn and
the reinstatement of Law 32 left a number of NGO's that had not yet
registered under either Law 153 or Law 32 in an unsettled status
regarding registration (see Section 2.b.). Three human rights
organizations were registered as NGO's during the year: The Center for
Human Rights Legal Assistance, the Center for Human Rights Studies and
Information, and the Arab Organization for Human Rights. Several other
human rights organizations that applied for registration, including the
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, the Human Rights Center for the
Assistance of Prisoners, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights
Studies, were not registered by year's end (see Section 2.b.).
Despite years of nonrecognition, the EOHR and other groups
sometimes obtain the cooperation of Government officials. The
Government allows EOHR field workers to visit prisons in their capacity
as legal counsel, to call on some Government officials, and to receive
funding from foreign human rights organizations. However, many local
and international human rights activists have concluded that government
restrictions on NGO activities, including limits on organizations'
ability to accept funding, have inhibited significantly reporting on
human rights abuses.
In May the Public Prosecutor dropped the Government's case against
EOHR secretary-general Hafez Abu Se'da. Abu Se'da and EOHR attorney
Mustafa Zidane had been charged in December 1998 with dissemination of
false information or inflammatory propaganda that harms public security
or public interests and with accepting foreign funds with the intent to
harm national interests. The charges against Abu Se'da were dropped in
February, and he was instead charged with violating a 1992 military
decree prohibiting any Egyptian individual or organization from
accepting foreign funds without Government permission, before the case
ultimately was dropped altogether in May. The charges against Zidane
also was dropped. The charges were based on an EOHR report that was
critical of police conduct during a 1998 murder investigation in Sohag
(See sections 2.a. and 2.c.).
The case of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center
for Development Studies, who was put on trial beginning on November 18
for charges that included disseminating abroad false information about
the country and accepting foreign funds without government permission,
also had a chilling effect on the work of human rights organizations,
which exist largely on foreign funding (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.)
In October the Government permitted the Cairo Institute for Human
Rights to hold a conference on the subject of human rights in the Arab
world, which the Government had prohibited in 1999. In January security
officials prohibited the Group for Democratic Development from
conducting planned seminar on Islamic groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality of the sexes and equal
treatment of non-Muslims; however, aspects of the law and many
traditional practices discriminate against women and Christians.
Women.--Domestic violence against women is a significant problem
and is reflected in press accounts of specific incidents. According to
a national study conducted in 1995 as part of a comprehensive
demographic and health survey, one of every three women who have ever
been married has been beaten at least once during marriage. Among those
who have been beaten, less than half have ever sought help. Smaller,
independent studies confirm that wife beating is common. In general,
neighbors and extended family members intervene to limit incidents of
domestic violence. Due to the value attached to privacy in the
country's traditional society, abuse within the family rarely is
discussed publicly. Spousal abuse is grounds for a divorce, but the law
requires the plaintiff to produce eyewitnesses, a difficult condition
to meet. Several NGO's offer counseling, legal aid, and other services
to women who are victims of domestic violence. These activists believe
that in general the police and the judiciary consider the ``integrity
of the family'' more important than the well being of the woman. The
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs operates more than 150 family
counseling bureaus nationwide, which provide legal and medical
services.
The Government prosecutes rapists, and punishment for rape ranges
from 3 years in prison to life imprisonment at hard labor. If a rapist
is convicted of abducting his victim, he is subject to execution;
however, there were no reports of the execution of rapists. In 1999 the
Government abolished an article of the Penal Code that permitted a
rapist to be absolved of criminal charges if he married his victim.
However, marital rape is not illegal. Although reliable statistics
regarding rape are not available, activists believe that it is not
uncommon, despite strong social disapproval. When ``honor killings'' (a
man murdering a female for her perceived lack of chastity) occur,
perpetrators generally receive lighter punishments than those convicted
in other cases of murder. There are no reliable statistics regarding
the extent of honor killings.
Prostitution and sex tourism are illegal, but known to occur.
The law provides for equality of the sexes; however, aspects of the
law and many traditional practices discriminate against women. By law,
unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their
fathers to obtain passports and to travel; married women of any age
require the same permission from their husbands (see Section 2.d.).
Only males may confer citizenship. In rare cases, this means that
children who are born to Egyptian mothers and stateless fathers are
themselves stateless. A woman's testimony is equal to that of a man's
in the courts. There is no legal prohibition against a woman serving as
a judge, although in practice no women serve as judges. The Court of
Cassation postponed to January 2001 the cases of two attorneys, Fatma
Lashin and Amany Talaat, who are challenging the Government's refusal
to appoint them as Public Prosecutors. (To become a judge, one must
first serve as a Public Prosecutor.)
Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally correspond to
an individual's religion. In January the Parliament passed a new
Personal Status Law that made it easier for a Muslim woman to obtain a
divorce without her husband's consent, provided that she is willing to
forego alimony and the return of her dowry. (The Coptic Orthodox Church
does not permit divorce.) However, an earlier provision of the draft
law that would have made it easier for a woman to travel without her
husband's consent, was rejected.
Under Islamic law, non-Muslim males must convert to Islam to marry
Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry Muslim
men. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's
inheritance, while Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance
rights. A sole female heir receives half her parents' estate; the
balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits
all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs face strong social
pressure to provide for all family members who require assistance;
however, this assistance is not always provided.
Women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law,
academia, the arts, and business. Labor laws provide for equal rates of
pay for equal work for men and women in the public sector. According to
Government figures, women constitute 17 percent of private business
owners and occupy 25 percent of the managerial positions in the four
major national banks. Social pressure against women pursuing a career
is strong, and women's rights advocates say that Islamist influence
inhibits further gains. Women's rights advocates also point to other
discriminatory traditional or cultural attitudes and practices, such as
female genital mutilation and the traditional male relative's role in
enforcing chastity and chaste sexual conduct.
A number of active women's rights groups work in diverse areas,
including reforming family law, educating women on their legal rights,
promoting literacy, and combating FGM.
Children.--The Government remains committed to the protection of
children's welfare and attempts to do so within the limits of its
budgetary resources. Many of the resources for children's welfare are
provided by international donors, especially in the field of child
immunization. Child labor is widespread, despite the Government's
commitment to eradicate it (see Section 6.d.). UNICEF has reported on
the practice of poor rural families making arrangements for a daughter
to be employed as a domestic servant in the home of wealthy citizens
(see Sections 6.c.).
The Government provides public education, which is compulsory for
the first 9 academic years (typically until the age of 15). The
Government treats boys and girls equally at all levels of education.
The Government enacted a Child Law in 1996. The law provides for
privileges, protection, and care for children in general. Six of the
law's 144 articles set rules protective of working children (see
Section 6.d.). Other provisions include: A requirement that employers
set up or contract with a child care center if they employ more than
100 women; the right of rehabilitation for disabled children; a
prohibition on sentencing defendants between the ages of 16 and 18 to
capital punishment, hard labor for life, or temporary hard labor; and a
prohibition on placing defendants under the age of 15 in preventive
custody (although the prosecution may order that they be lodged in an
``observation house'' and be summoned upon request).
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is common despite the Government's commitment to
eradicating the practice and NGO efforts to combat it. Traditional and
family pressures remain strong; a study conducted during the year
estimates the percentage of women who have ever been married who have
undergone FGM at 97 percent. The survey showed that attitudes may be
changing slowly; over a 5-year period, the incidence of FGM among the
daughters (from ages 11 to 19) of women surveyed fell from 83 to 78
percent. FGM generally is performed on girls between the ages of 7 and
12, with equal prevalence among Muslims and Christians.
In 1997 the Court of Cassation upheld the legality of a 1996 decree
banning FGM that was issued by the Minister of Health and Population
Planning. In addition to attempting to enforce the decree, the
Government supports a range of efforts to educate the public. A
discussion of FGM and its dangers has been added to the curriculum of
the school system. The Government broadcasts television programs
criticizing the practice. Government ministers speak out against the
practice, and senior religious leaders also support efforts to stop it.
The Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the most senior Islamic figure in the country,
and the leader of the Coptic Orthodox community, Pope Shenouda, have
stated repeatedly that FGM is not required by religious doctrine.
However, illiteracy impedes some women from distinguishing between the
deep-rooted tradition of FGM and religious practices. Moreover, many
citizens believe that FGM is an important part of maintaining female
chastity, which is a part of religious tradition, and the practice is
supported by some Muslim religious authorities and Islamist political
activists. A number of NGO's actively work to educate the public about
the health hazards of the practice.
People with Disabilities.--There are no laws specifically
prohibiting discrimination against the disabled, but the Government
makes serious efforts to address their rights. It works closely with
U.N. agencies and other international aid donors to design job-training
programs for the disabled. The Government also seeks to increase the
public's awareness of the capabilities of the disabled in television
programming, the print media, and in educational material in public
schools. There are approximately 5.7 million disabled persons, of whom
1.5 million are disabled severely.
By law, all businesses must designate 5 percent of their jobs for
the disabled, who are exempt from normal literacy requirements.
Although there is no legislation mandating access to public
accommodations and transportation, the disabled may ride Government-
owned mass transit buses free of charge, are given priority in
obtaining telephones, and receive reductions on customs duties for
private vehicles. A number of NGO's are active in efforts to train and
assist the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--The Constitution provides for equal public
rights and duties without discrimination due to religion or creed. For
the most part, the Government upholds these constitutional protections.
However, discrimination against Christians exists. There are no
Christians serving as governors, university presidents, and deans.
There are few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services
and armed forces. Although there was improvement in a few areas such as
coverage of Christian subjects in the mass media, discriminatory
government practices include: Suspected statistical underrepresentation
of the size of the Christian population; bias against Christianity and
Coptic history in the educational curricula; failure to admit
Christians into public university training programs for Arabic language
teachers (because the curriculum involves study of the Koran);
discrimination against Christians in the public sector; and
discrimination against Christians in staff appointments to public
universities.
The approximately 6 million Coptic Christians have been the objects
of occasional violent assaults by the Islamic Group and other
terrorists. Some Christians have alleged that the Government is lax in
protecting Christian lives and property (see Section 2.c.). However,
there were no reports of terrorist attacks against Christians during
the year. In incidents unrelated to terrorism, 1 Christian was killed
and 10 were wounded in four assaults linked to Muslim extremists. Madgy
Ayyad Mas'oud was killed on July 26 in a village in Giza by
unidentified gunmen, reportedly because he built a church (with
official approval) to which extremists objected. Two men were arrested
on July 31 and charged with premeditated murder in connection with the
case; the trial had not begun by year's end. On December 11, Father
Hezkiyal Ghebriyal, a 75-year-old Coptic Orthodox priest, was stabbed
and seriously wounded in the village of Bardis, near Sohag. Police
arrested the suspected attacker, who remained in prison at year's end,
pending an ongoing investigation. Several other Christians were wounded
in sectarian disputes in other provinces.
On April 15, the Tanta Criminal Court sentenced to 3 years in
prison the assailant who stabbed a Christian priest in Mahalla in
August 1999. On June 22, a State Security Emergency court sentenced to
5 years' imprisonment with hard labor four members of a terrorist group
from the upper (southern) Egyptian city of Dairout who were accused of
murder and attempted murder of policemen and Christians in the early
1990's. As of the end of the year, the Court of Cassation had not yet
set a date to hear an appeal by the Public Prosecutor seeking a heavier
sentence in the case of Ahmad and Ibrahim Nasir, who were sentenced to
7 years in prison for the September 1999 murder of a monk in Assiut.
A trade dispute between a Christian clothing merchant and a Muslim
customer on December 31, 1999, in the village of Al-Kush in Sohag
governorate, escalated into violent exchanges between Muslims and
Christians in the area, resulting in the deaths of 21 Christians and 1
Muslim on January 2, 2000. The violence also resulted in the injury of
39 persons in Al-Kush and 5 persons in the neighboring municipality of
Dar Al-Salaam. Approximately 200 businesses and homes in the area were
damaged. Following the incident, President Mubarak sent the Minister of
Local Administration to Al-Kush as his emissary. The Minister of
Housing and the Public Prosecutor also visited Al-Kush to investigate.
The Government subsequently provided $800 (3000 Egyptian pounds) to
each of the families of those who were killed, and $130 (500 Egyptian
pounds) to each person who was injured. The Government relocated and
rebuilt 65 kiosks damaged in the riots; the placement of the kiosks had
been a subject of longstanding dispute between Christian and Muslim
merchants. The Christian community estimates that Christian residents
and merchants lost $962,000 (3,609,400 Egyptian pounds) worth of
merchandise and personal property during the looting. The Ministry of
Social Affairs thus far has disbursed $14,000 (52,900 Egyptian pounds)
in compensation. The Coptic Orthodox Church has provided $175,000
(655,450 Egyptian pounds) in compensation. Several individuals and
organizations have provided donations to the Christian community in Al-
Kush.
Coptic Orthodox Pope Shenouda stated publicly that negligence on
the part of the police and local leaders led to an increase in the
number of victims and an escalation of the violence. Although rumors
reportedly played a significant role in exacerbating the violence, no
incitement charges were brought. The Government did not investigate
police conduct; however, the director of State Security for Sohag
governorate, Sa'id Abu AlMa'aly, was removed from his position in
March.
On March 11, the Public Prosecutor announced the indictment of 135
persons for involvement in the sectarian violence in Al-Kush and Dar
Al-Salaam, on charges ranging from unlawful assembly to murder. Charges
initially raised against a local priest were dropped. On September 5,
the Sohag criminal court handed down the verdicts in the cases of 39
persons charged with crimes (including arson and theft but not murder)
committed in Dar AlSalaam. Among 21 persons convicted, 4 were sentenced
to 10 years in prison, 4 to 2 years, 12 to 1 year, and 1 to 6 months;
the remaining 19 defendants were acquitted. On June 4, the Sohag
criminal court began hearing the case of 96 defendants charged with
crimes (including murder) committed in Al-Kush. Observers criticized
the decision by the trial judge on December 7 to release on personal
recognizance for the Ramadan and Christmas holidays 89 defendants (51
Muslims and 38 Christians), who faced charges from inciting violence to
murder. The trial was ongoing at year's end.
There were reports of forced conversions of Coptic girls to Islam.
Reports of such cases are disputed and often include inflammatory
allegations and categorical denials of kidnapping and rape. Observers,
including human rights groups, find it extremely difficult to determine
whether compulsion was used, as most cases involve a Coptic girl who
converts to Islam when she marries a Muslim boy. According to the
Government, in such cases the girl must meet with her family, with her
priest, and with the head of her church before she is allowed to
convert. However, there are credible reports of Government harassment
of Christian families that attempt to regain custody of their
daughters, and of the failure of the authorities to uphold the law
(which states that a marriage of a girl under the age of 16 is
prohibited, and between the ages of 16 and 21 is illegal, without the
approval and presence of her guardian) in cases of marriage between an
underage Christian girl and a Muslim boy.
There is no legal requirement for a Christian girl or woman to
convert to Islam in order to marry a Muslim. However, if a Christian
woman marries a Muslim man the Coptic Orthodox Church excommunicates
her. Ignorance of the law and societal pressure, including the
centrality of marriage to a woman's identity, often affect her
decision. Family conflict and financial pressure also are cited as
factors. In addition conversion is a means of circumventing the legal
prohibition on marriage between the ages of 16 and 21 without the
approval and presence of a girl's guardian. Most Christian families
would object to a daughter's wish to marry a Muslim. If a Christian
girl converts to Islam, her family loses guardianship, which transfers
to a Muslim custodian, who is likely to grant approval. The law is
silent on the matter of the acceptable age of conversion.
Anti-Semitism is found in both the Government press and in the
press of the opposition parties. The Government has criticized anti-
Semitism and advised journalists and cartoonists to avoid anti-
Semitism. There have been no violent anti-Semitic incidents in recent
years directed at the tiny Jewish community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join trade unions but are
not required to do so. A union local, or workers' committee, may be
formed if 50 employees express a desire to organize. Most union
members, about 27 per cent of the labor force, are employed by
stateowned enterprises. The law stipulates that ``high administrative''
officials in Government and the public sector may not join unions.
There are 23 trade unions, all required to belong to the Egyptian
Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the sole legally recognized labor
federation. The International Labor Organization's Committee of Experts
repeatedly has emphasized that a law that requires all trade unions to
belong to a single federation infringes on freedom of association. The
Government has shown no sign that it intends to accept the
establishment of more than one federation. The ETUF leadership asserts
that it actively promotes worker interests and that there is no need
for another federation. ETUF officials have close relations with the
NDP, and some are members of the People's Assembly or the Shura
Council. They speak vigorously on behalf of worker concerns, but public
confrontations between the ETUF and the Government are rare. Disputes
more often are resolved by consensus in private.
The labor laws do not provide adequately for the rights to strike
and to engage in collective bargaining. Strikers may face prison
sentences of up to 2 years. Although the right to strike is not
provided, strikes occur. The Government considers strikes a form of
public disturbance and therefore illegal. According to a press report
in March, the Minister of Military Production referred five striking
workers from a Helwan arms factory to military prosecution.
There were 17 strikes during the year. Strikes mainly were over
issues of wage cuts, dismissals, and anticipated privatization. Most of
the strikes took place in Alexandria, Cairo, and the Delta (northern
Egypt), the country's industrial centers. Most of the strikes occurred
in public sector companies and lasted for 1 day. Most strikes involved
hundreds of workers, and in one instance more than a thousand workers
were involved. Bonuses and incentives tied to the previous year's
production typically are disbursed in January, and failure to disburse
the bonuses often leads to a strike. ETUF or government officials
successfully mediated most of the strikes.
Some unions within the ETUF are affiliated with international trade
union organizations. Others are in the process of becoming affiliated.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Under the law,
unions may negotiate work contracts with public sector enterprises if
the latter agree to such negotiations, but unions otherwise lack
collective bargaining power in the state sector. The International
Labor Organization (ILO) for years has claimed that the Labor Code
undermines the principle of voluntary bargaining by providing that any
clause of a collective agreement that is liable to impair the economic
interest of the country is null and void. Under current circumstances,
collective bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense because
the Government sets wages, benefits, and job classifications by law.
Firms in the private sector generally do not adhere to such
Government-mandated standards. Although they are required to observe
some Government practices, such as the minimum wage, social security
insurance, and official holidays, firms often do not adhere to
Government practice in nonbinding matters, including award of the
annual Labor Day bonus. There are no legal obstacles to establishing
private sector unions, although such unions are not common.
Labor law and practice are the same in Egypt's six export
processing zones (EPZ's) as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor; however, the Criminal Code authorizes sentences
of hard labor for some crimes. Although the law does not prohibit
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, such practices are
not known to occur (see Section 6.d.). Domestic and foreign workers
generally are not subject to coerced or bonded labor, although UNICEF
has reported on the practice of poor rural families making arrangements
for a daughter to be employed as a domestic servant in the home of
wealthy citizens (see Sections 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Under the 1996 Child Law (see Section 5), the minimum age
for employment is 14 in nonagricultural work. The Labor Law of 1996 and
associated ministerial decrees greatly limit the type and conditions of
work that children below the age of 18 may perform legally. Provincial
governors, with the approval of the Minister of Education, may
authorize seasonal work for children between the ages of 12 and 14,
provided that duties are not hazardous and do not interfere with
schooling. Preemployment training for children under the age of 12 is
prohibited. It is prohibited for children to work for more than 6 hours
a day. One or more breaks totaling at least 1 hour must be included.
Children may not work overtime, during their weekly day off, between 8
p.m. and 7 a.m., or for more than 4 hours continuously. Education is
compulsory, free, and universal for the first 9 academic years
(typically until the age of 15).
The Government takes seriously the problem of child labor, and took
steps to improve the situation. For example, Prime Minister Atef Ebeid
and First Lady Suzanne Mubarak are involved personally with the
problems of working children through their leadership positions on the
National Council for Children and Motherhood. The Government worked
closely during the year with international organizations--in particular
UNICEF and the International Labor Organization (ILO)--as well as
international and domestic NGO's and labor unions to implement programs
designed to address child labor and its root causes. However, in
general the Government does not devote adequate resources to implement
its child labor policies. Statistical information on the number of
working children is difficult to obtain and often out of date. A
comprehensive study prepared by the Government's statistical agency in
1988 indicated that 1,309,000 children between the ages of 6 and 14
were employed. In November 1999, the Minister of Social Affairs
reportedly stated that 1 million children participate in agricultural
labor, and NGO's estimate that up to 1.5 million children work.
Government studies also indicate that the concentration of working
children is higher in rural than urban areas. Nearly 78 percent of
working children are in the agricultural sector. However, children also
work as domestic servants, as apprentices in auto repair and craft
shops, in heavier industries such as construction, in brickmaking and
textiles, and as workers in tanneries and carpet-making factories.
While local trade unions report that the Ministry of Labor adequately
enforces the labor laws in state-owned enterprises, enforcement in the
private sector, especially in the informal sector, is lax. Many of
these children are abused, overworked, and exposed to potentially
hazardous conditions by their employers, and the restrictions in the
Child Law have not improved conditions due to lax enforcement on the
part of the Government. There were only two reported cases during the
year in which the Government enforced child labor laws. In September
Ministry of Interior officials raided 16 electrical workshops in
various Cairo neighborhoods and found 30 children between the ages of 6
and 12 working there. In another case, authorities found 4 children
working in a Cairo restaurant that serves alcoholic beverages. Both
cases were referred to the Prosecutor General's office. According to
Article 74 of the Child Law of 1996, establishment owners are subject
to fines of $27 to $133 (100 to 500 Egyptian pounds) for each illegal
child worker; in the case of repeat offenders the fines are doubled.
Investigations into the cases were ongoing at year's end.
Although the law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
labor by children, UNICEF has reported on the practice of poor rural
families making arrangements for a daughter to be employed as a
domestic servant in the home of wealthy citizens (see Sections 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--For Government and public sector
employees, the minimum wage is approximately $34 (about 128 Egyptian
pounds) a month for a 6day, 36-hour workweek, as compared to the same
wages for a 42hour workweek in 1999. The minimum wage, which is set by
the Government and applied nationwide, is enforced effectively by the
Ministry of Administrative Development. The minimum wage does not
provide for a decent standard of living for a worker and family;
however, base pay commonly is supplemented by a complex system of
fringe benefits and bonuses that may double or triple a worker's take-
home pay. The minimum wage also is binding legally on the private
sector, and larger private companies generally observe the requirement
and pay bonuses as well. Smaller firms do not always pay the minimum
wage or bonuses.
The Ministry of Labor sets worker health and safety standards,
which also apply in the export processing zones; however, enforcement
and inspections are uneven.
The law prohibits employers from maintaining hazardous working
conditions, and workers have the right to remove themselves from
hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits prostitution and sex
tourism. There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from,
within, or through the country.
__________
IRAN
The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a
populist revolution toppled the Pahlavi monarchy. The Constitution
ratified after the revolution by popular referendum established a
theocratic republic and declared as its purpose the establishment of
institutions and a society based on Islamic principles and norms. The
Government is dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergy. The Head of State,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution
and has direct control of the armed forces, internal security forces,
and the judiciary. Mohammad Khatami was elected to a 4-year term as
President in a popular vote in February 1997. A popularly elected 290-
seat unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles, develops and
passes legislation. All legislation passed by the Majles is reviewed
for adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles by a Council of
Guardians, which consists of six clerical members, who are appointed by
the Supreme Leader, and six lay jurists, who are appointed by the head
of the judiciary and approved by the Majles. The Constitution provides
the Council of Guardians with the power to screen and disqualify
candidates for elective offices based on an ill-defined set of
requirements, including the candidates' ideological beliefs. The
judiciary is subject to government and religious influence.
Several agencies share responsibility for internal security,
including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of
Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was
established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known
as Basijis, and gangs of thugs, known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers
of the Party of God), who often are aligned with specific members of
the leadership, act as vigilantes, and are released into the streets to
intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators, journalists, and
individuals suspected of counter-revolutionary activities. Both regular
and paramilitary security forces committed numerous, serious human
rights abuses.
Iran has a mixed economy that is heavily dependent on export
earnings from the country's extensive petroleum reserves. The
Constitution mandates that all large-scale industry, including
petroleum, minerals, banking, foreign exchange, insurance, power
generation, communications, aviation, and road and rail transport, be
owned publicly and administered by the state. Large charitable
foundations called bonyads, most with strong connections to the
Government, control the extensive properties and businesses
expropriated from the Pahlavi family and individuals associated with
the monarchy. The bonyads exercise considerable influence in the
economy, but do not account publicly for revenue and pay no taxes.
Basic foodstuffs and energy costs are subsidized heavily by the
Government. Oil exports account for nearly 80 percent of foreign
exchange earnings. Private property is respected. Although economic
performance improved somewhat during the year due to the worldwide
increase in oil prices, performance is affected adversely by government
mismanagement and corruption. Unemployment was estimated to be at least
25 percent, and inflation was an estimated 25 percent.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although
efforts within society to make the Government accountable for its human
rights policies continued, serious problems remain. The Government
restricts citizens' right to change their government. Systematic abuses
include extrajudicial killings and summary executions; disappearances;
widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment, reportedly
including rape; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and
detention; and prolonged and incommunicado detention. Judicial
proceedings were instituted against some government officials for
misconduct. However, perpetrators often committed such abuses with
impunity. A group of 20 police officials was brought to trial in March
for their actions in an attack on a Tehran University student dormitory
in July 1999. All but two were cleared, including the senior official
involved. In December 18 former officials of the Intelligence Ministry
were tried before a military court for the killings of four dissidents
in 1998. The proceedings were closed and the results of the trial were
not made public by year's end.
The judiciary suffers from government and religious influence, and
does not ensure that citizens receive due process or fair trials. The
Government uses the judiciary to stifle dissent and obstruct progress
on human rights. The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights,
and restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association. The
Government closed nearly all reform-oriented publications during the
year and brought charges against prominent political figures and
members of the clergy for expressing ideas viewed as contrary to the
ruling orthodoxy. However, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance
continued to issue licenses for the establishment of newspapers and
magazines, some of which challenged government policies. The Government
restricts freedom of religion. Religious minorities, particularly
Baha'is, continued to suffer repression by conservative elements of the
judiciary and security establishment. In July 10 Iranian Jews were
tried and convicted on charges of illegal contacts with Israel, and
sentenced to between 2 and 13 years in prison. Three others were
acquitted. The trial procedures were unfair, and violated numerous
internationally recognized standards of due process. The selection of
candidates for elections effectively is controlled by the Government.
Intense political struggle continued during the year between a broad
popular movement that favored greater liberalization in government
policies, particularly in the area of human rights, and certain hard-
line elements in the government and society, which view such reforms as
a threat to the survival of the Islamic republic. In many cases, this
struggle is played out within the Government itself, with reformists
and hardliners squaring off in divisive internal debates. Reformers and
moderates won a landslide victory in the February Majles election, and
now constitute a majority of that body; however, the Council of
Guardians and other elements within the Government blocked much of the
early reform legislation passed by the Majles.
The Government restricts the work of human rights groups and
continues to deny entry to the country to the U.N. Special
Representative for Human Rights in Iran. Violence against women occurs,
and women face legal and societal discrimination. The Government
discriminates against religious and ethnic minorities and restricts
important workers' rights, including freedom of association and the
right to organize and bargain collectively. Child labor persists.
Vigilante groups, with strong ties to certain members of the
Government, enforce their interpretation of appropriate social behavior
through intimidation and violence.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government has
been responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. Human rights
groups reported that security forces killed at least 20 persons while
violently suppressing demonstrations by Kurds that occurred in the wake
of the February 1999 arrest of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader
Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey (see Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 5). Human
Rights Watch reported at least four student deaths in July 1999, when
government-sanctioned agitators attacked a student dormitory during
protests in Tehran (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to death in the
absence of sufficient procedural safeguards. In 1992 the domestic press
stopped reporting most executions; however, executions continue in
substantial numbers, according to U.N. and other reporting. The U.N.
Special Representative cited an estimated 130 executions from January
through July, most of which were reported in the media. The Government
has not cooperated in providing the Special Representative with a
precise number of executions carried out in Iran. Exiles and human
rights monitors allege that many of those executed for criminal
offenses, such as narcotics trafficking, actually are political
dissidents. Supporters of outlawed political organizations, such as the
Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, are believed to make up a large number
of those executed each year. A November 1995 law criminalized dissent
and applied the death penalty to offenses such as ``attempts against
the security of the State, outrage against high-ranking Iranian
officials, and insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against
the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.'' U.N. representatives,
including the U.N. Special Representative on Human Rights in Iran, and
independent human rights organizations, continue to note the absence of
procedural safeguards in criminal trials. Harsh punishments are carried
out, including stoning and flogging (see Section 1.c.). However, cases
of stoning apparently are declining, and the U.N. Special
Representative reports no cases over the past year in which such a
sentence was carried out. The law also allows for the relatives of
murder victims to take part in the execution of the killer.
The Government's investigation into the murder of several prominent
Iranian dissidents and intellectuals in late 1998 continued throughout
the year. The case involved the murders, over a 2-month period from
October to December 1998, of prominent political activists Darioush and
Parvaneh Forouhar and writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Pouandeh.
Political activist Pirouz Davani disappeared in the same time period
and never has been found (see Section 1.b.). In February after several
senior figures of the leadership blamed the disappearances and murders
on ``foreign hands,'' it was revealed that active-duty agents of the
Ministry of Intelligence had carried out the killings. Minister of
Intelligence Qorban Ali Dori-Najafabadi and several of his senior
deputies resigned their posts following these revelations.
Supervision for the case was placed in the hands of the Military
Prosecutor's office. In June 1999, the Prosecutor's Office released an
initial report on the investigation, identifying a cell within the
Ministry of Intelligence led by four ``main agents'' as responsible for
the murders. The leader among the agents reportedly was a former Deputy
Minister of Intelligence, Saeed Emami, who, the Government stated, had
committed suicide in prison by drinking a toxic hair removal solution
several days prior to release of the Government's June report. The
report also indicated that 23 persons had been arrested in connection
with the murders and that a further 33 were summoned for interrogation.
In the early part of the year, the Government announced that 18 men
would stand trial in connection with the killings. The trial began in
late December in a military court. The proceedings were closed.
However, news reports indicated that 15 defendants pled guilty during
the opening stages of the trial. The identity of the defendants is
still unknown, but former Minister of Intelligence Dori-Najafabadi has
not been charged. Results of the trial had not been announced by year's
end (see Section 1.e.).
Frustration over the slow pace of the murder investigation and
doubt about the government's willingness to follow the case to its
conclusion were frequent topics of criticism of the Government
throughout the year, particularly by those advocating greater adherence
to the rule of law. Reform-oriented journalists and prominent cultural
figures declared publicly their demands for a full accounting in the
case and speculated that responsibility for ordering the murders lay at
the highest level of the Government. Several citizens, including
prominent investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, were arrested in
connection with statements they have made about the case (see Sections
1.c. and 1.e.). In December, just before Ganji's case went to trial,
the Military Court arrested a lawyer for the family of one of the
victims for violating a public ban on comments regarding the case.
One organization in 1999 reported eight deaths of evangelical
Christians at the hands of the authorities in the past 10 years (see
Section 2.c.). In 1999 an investigative reporter alleged that officials
within the Intelligence Ministry were responsible for the murders of
three prominent evangelical ministers in 1994, a crime for which three
female members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization had been convicted
(see Section 2.c.).
Numerous Sunni clerics have been murdered in recent years, some
allegedly by government agents (see Section 2.c.).
The Government announced in September 1998 that it would take no
action to threaten the life of British author Salman Rushdie, or anyone
associated with his work, ``The Satanic Verses,'' despite the issuance
of a fatwa against Rushdie's life in 1989. The announcement came during
discussions with the United Kingdom regarding the restoration of full
diplomatic relations. Several revolutionary foundations and a number of
Majles deputies within Iran repudiated the Government's pledge and
emphasized the ``irrevocability'' of the fatwa, or religious ruling, by
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, calling for Rushdie's murder. The 15
Khordad Foundation raised the bounty it earlier had established for the
murder of Rushdie.
The Istanbul Court of Appeal upheld in 1998 the conviction of an
Iranian national for complicity in the 1996 murders of Zahra Rajabi and
Ali Moradi, both of whom were associated with the National Council of
Resistance (NCR), an exile group that has claimed responsibility for
several terrorist attacks within Iran. The U.N. Special Representative
reported in 1998 that Italian security authorities continued their
investigation into the 1993 killing in Rome of Mohammad Hossein Naghdi,
the NCR's representative in Italy.
b. Disappearance.--No reliable information is available on the
number of disappearances. In the period immediately following arrest,
many detainees are held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and
family members.
Pirouz Davani, a political activist who disappeared in late 1998
along with several other prominent intellectuals and dissidents who
later were found murdered, remains unaccounted for and is believed to
have been killed for his political beliefs and activism (see Section
1.a.).
A Christian group reported that between 15 and 23 Iranian
Christians disappeared between November 1997 and November 1998 (see
Section 2.c.). Those who disappeared reportedly were Muslim converts to
Christianity whose baptisms had been discovered by the authorities. The
group that reported the figure believes that most or all of those who
disappeared were killed.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however,
there are numerous, credible reports that security forces and prison
personnel continue to torture detainees and prisoners. Some prison
facilities, including Tehran's Evin prison, are notorious for the cruel
and prolonged acts of torture inflicted upon political opponents of the
Government. Common methods include suspension for long periods in
contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and,
most frequently, severe and repeated beatings with cables or other
instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners also
have reported beatings about the ears, inducing partial or complete
deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete
blindness. Stoning and flogging are prescribed expressly by the Islamic
Penal Code as appropriate punishment for adultery (see Section 1.a.).
In November investigative journalist Akbar Ganji went on trial for
statements he allegedly made during an April conference in Berlin on
Iranian politics (see Sections 2.a. and 1.e.). He was arrested in April
upon his return to Iran and held over the next 6 months for long
periods in solitary confinement. Ganji told the court that he was
beaten and tortured in prison. Ganji previously had written articles
implicating former President Rafsanjani in a series of murders of
dissidents and intellectuals apparently carried out by security forces.
In March a gunman shot and severely wounded newspaper editor Saeed
Hajarian, a senior political advisor to President Khatami. The methods
used raised widespread suspicions that the security forces were
involved in the attack. The gunman later was arrested and sentenced
along with four other defendants to 15-year prison sentences.
On July 8, 1999, the Government and individuals acting with the
consent of the authorities, used excessive force in attacking a
dormitory during student protests in Tehran, including reportedly
throwing students from windows. Approximately 300 students were injured
in the incident. The U.N. Special Representative has noted numerous
credible reports that students arrested following the demonstration
were tortured in prison (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 2.b.).
In May 1999, Brigadier General Gholam-reza Naqdi, a senior Tehran
police official, and several associates, who were accused of using
torture to coerce confessions during the 1998 trial of former mayor of
Tehran Gholam Hossein Kharbaschi, went on trial. It reportedly was the
first prosecution of a government official for torture since the 1979
revolution. The charges were based on the accusations of numerous
Tehran municipality officials and district mayors that authorities had
used torture to coerce admissions of guilt and statements that
implicated the former mayor. The trial of Naqdi was conducted in closed
session before a military court. Naqdi was cleared of most charges and
resumed his duties with the Tehran police force.
In August 1999, President Khatami was quoted in public remarks as
criticizing the use of torture. He defended the rights of prisoners as
a legitimate concern based on ``Islam and human conscience.''
Prison conditions are harsh. Some prisoners are held in solitary
confinement or denied adequate food or medical care in order to force
confessions. Female prisoners reportedly have been raped or otherwise
tortured while in detention. Prison guards reportedly intimidate family
members of detainees and torture detainees in the presence of family
members. The U.N. Special Representative reported receiving numerous
reports of prisoner overcrowding and unrest. He cited a reported figure
of only 8.2 square feet (2.5 square) of space available for each
prisoner.
The Government does not permit visits to imprisoned dissidents by
human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices
remain common. There is reportedly no legal time limit for
incommunicado detention, nor any judicial means to determine the
legality of detention. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or
in local Revolutionary Guard offices. Although reliable statistics are
not available, international observers believe that between scores and
hundreds of citizens are detained for their political beliefs.
The security forces often do not inform family members of a
prisoner's welfare and location. Prisoners also may be denied visits by
family members and legal counsel. In addition, families of executed
prisoners do not always receive notification of the prisoners' deaths.
Those who do receive such information reportedly have been forced on
occasion to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.
Mohammed Chehrangi, an advocate for the cultural rights of Azeris,
was arrested in December 1999. Azeri groups claim that Chehrangi was
arrested to prevent his registration as a candidate in the February
Majles elections (see Sections 3 and 5).
In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested by security
forces in the cities of Isfahan and Shiraz. Among the group were
several prominent rabbis, teachers of Hebrew, and their students, one a
16-year-old boy. They were held for 14 months or more without formal
charges until their trial began in May. The delay in clarification of
charges appeared to violate Article 32 of the Constitution, which
states in part that in cases of arrest ``charges with the reasons for
accusation must, without delay, be communicated and explained to the
accused in writing, and a provisional dossier must be forwarded to the
competent judicial authorities within a maximum of 24 hours so that the
preliminaries to the trial can be completed as swiftly as possible.''
Ten of the 13 eventually were convicted of charges relating to illegal
contacts with Israel. Governments around the world criticized the
detentions and trial as unfair and in violation of due process (see
Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
As many as 1,500 students were detained in the wake of student
protests on July 8, 1999, and subsequent riots. Many of them remained
in prison throughout the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.).
Numerous publishers, editors and journalists either were detained,
jailed, fined, or prohibited from publishing their writings during the
year (see Section 2.a.). The Government appeared to follow a policy of
intimidation toward members of the media that it considers to pose a
threat to the current system of Islamic government.
Adherents of the Baha'i Faith continue to face arbitrary arrest and
detention. The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a
small number of Baha'is in detention at any given time. According to
the U.N. Special Representative and Baha'i groups, at least 10 Baha'is
are in prisons, including 2 who were convicted of either apostasy or
``actions against God'' and sentenced to death. In March 1999, the four
remaining detainees from the 1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute of
Higher Learning were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging
from 3 to 10 years (see Section 2.c.).
The Government enforced house arrest and other measures to restrict
the movements and ability to communicate of several senior religious
leaders whose views on political and governance issues are at variance
with the ruling orthodoxy. Several of these figures dispute the
legitimacy and position of the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei. The clerics include Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Tabataei-Qomi,
who has been under house arrest in Mashad for more than 15 years;
Ayatollah Mohammad Shirazi, who remains under house arrest in Qom; and
Ayatollah Ya'asub al-Din Rastgari, who has been under house arrest in
Qom since late 1996. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the former
designated successor of the late Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini,
and an outspoken critic of the current Supreme Leader, remains under
house arrest and heightened police surveillance (see Section 2.a.). The
followers of these and other dissident clerics, many of them junior
clerics and students, reportedly have been detained in recent years and
tortured by government authorities.
Throughout the year, Iran and Iraq exchanged prisoners of war
(POW's) and the remains of deceased fighters from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
war, adding to the large number of Iraqi POW's returned by Iran in
1998. However, a final settlement of this issue between the two
governments was not achieved, despite such predictions by Iranian
government officials in late 1998. A June 1998 press report described
joint Iran-Iraq search operations to identify the remains of those
missing in action.
The Government does not use forced exile, but many dissidents and
ethnic and religious minorities leave the country due to a perception
of threat from the Government.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The court system is not
independent and is subject to government and religious influence. It
serves as the principal vehicle of the State to restrict freedom and
reform in the society.
There are several different court systems. The two most active are
the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses,
and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter were established in
1979 to try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic
Republic, including threats to internal or external security, narcotics
crimes, economic crimes (including hoarding and overpricing), and
official corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged
transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a military court
investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security
duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A
press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers
in the media. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review cases.
The judicial system has been designed to conform, where possible,
to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic
sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a
cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi resigned
as the head of the judiciary in August 1999, and was replaced by
Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. The head of the Supreme Court and
Prosecutor General also must be clerics.
Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive in the
civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right to a
public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of
appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury
system in the civil and criminal courts. If a situation is not
addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the Government
advises judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and
interpretation of Islamic law, rather than rely on statutes enacted
during the Pahlavi monarchy.
Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, in which crimes against
national security and other principal offenses are heard, are notorious
for their disregard of international standards of fairness.
Revolutionary Court judges act as both prosecutor and judge in the same
case, and judges are chosen in part based on their ideological
commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often is prolonged and
defendants lack access to attorneys. Indictments often lack clarity and
include undefined offenses such as ``antirevolutionary behavior,''
``moral corruption,'' and ``siding with global arrogance.'' Defendants
do not have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary
trials of 5 minutes duration occur. Others are show trials that are
intended merely to highlight a coerced public confession. In 1992 the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded that ``the chronic abuses
associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Courts are so numerous and so
entrenched as to be beyond reform.'' The Government has undertaken no
major reform of the Revolutionary Court system since that report.
In October a former member of a vigilante group, Amir Farshad
Ibrahimi, was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment for defamation after
he stated in a videotape that Ansar-e Hezbollah vigilantes had received
payments from senior clerics and conservative political figures to
organize and carry out attacks on their political opponents. Two
prominent lawyers active in civil liberties cases, Shirin Ebadi and
Mohsen Rahimi, were given suspended sentences and prohibited from
practicing law for 5 years for their role in distributing the tape.
In November a Revolutionary Court began the trials of 16 writers,
intellectuals, and political figures who took part in an April
conference in Berlin on the implications of the February Majles
elections (see Section 3). The 16 defendants, who were arrested in Iran
after the conference and charged with taking part in antigovernment and
anti-Islamic activities, included investigative journalist Akbar Ganji,
newspaper editor Mohammed Reza Jalaipour, Member of Parliament Jamileh
Kadivar, women's rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahji,
opposition politician Ezzatollah Sahabi, student leader Ali Afshari,
and others, including a translator for the German Embassy in Tehran.
The trial was ongoing at year's end.
In late December, a military court began the trials of 18 persons
in connection with the killings of several prominent dissidents and
intellectuals in late 1998. The results of the trial had not been
announced by year's end (see Section 1.a.).
The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system continued
to be a subject of wide debate throughout the year. The clerical
courts, which were established in 1987 to investigate offenses and
crimes committed by clerics, and which are overseen directly by the
Supreme Leader, are not provided for in the Constitution, and operate
outside the domain of the judiciary. In particular, critics alleged
that the clerical courts were used to prosecute certain clerics for
expressing controversial ideas and for participating in activities
outside the area of religion, including journalism.
During the latter part of the year, a Special Clerical Court began
the trial of Hojatoleslam Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, a cleric who
participated in the Berlin conference, on charges of apostasy and
``corruption on earth,'' which potentially carry the death penalty.
Eshkevari has called for more liberal interpretations of Islamic law in
certain areas. In November 1999, former Interior Minister and Vice
President Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a 5-
year prison term for allegedly publishing ``anti-Islamic articles,
insulting government officials, promoting friendly relations with the
United States,'' and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in the pages of Khordad, a newspaper
that was established by Nouri in late 1998 and closed at the time of
his arrest. Nouri used the public trial to attack the legitimacy of the
SCC (see Section 2.a.).
In April 1999, a branch of the SCC convicted Hojatoleslam Mohsen
Kadivar, a Shi'a cleric and popular seminary lecturer, to 18 months in
prison for ``dissemination of lies and confusing public opinion'' in a
series of broadcast interviews and newspaper articles. Kadivar
advocated political reform and greater intellectual freedom and
criticized the misuse of religion to maintain power. In an interview
published in a newspaper, Kadivar criticized certain government
officials for turning criticism against them into alleged crimes
against the State. He also observed that such leaders ``mistake
themselves with Islam, with national interests, or with the interests
of the system, and in this way believe that they should be immune from
criticism.'' He also allegedly criticized former Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khomeini and demonstrated support for dissident cleric
Ayatollah Montazeri. Kadivar's trial was not open to the public.
In July 1999, the SCC banned the daily newspaper Salaam and
indicted its publisher, Mohammad Mousavi Khoeniha, on charges of
``violating Islamic principles,'' ``endangering national security,''
and ``disturbing public opinion.'' Khoeniha, a cleric, later was
sentenced to a 5-year jail term. The charges involved the publication
by Salaam of documents related to the unsolved murders of dissident
intellectuals in late 1998, which indicated a possible connection to
senior officials in the plotting of the murders. The closure of the
newspaper led to peaceful protests by students at Tehran University
that later grew into widespread rioting after aggressive
countermeasures were taken by security forces (see Section 2.b.).
It is difficult for many women to obtain legal redress. A woman's
testimony in court is worth only half that of a man's, making it
difficult for a woman to prove a case against a male defendant.
The Government frequently charges members of religious minorities
with crimes such as ``confronting the regime'' and apostasy, and
conducts trials in these cases in the same manner as is reserved for
threats to national security. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who resigned as
head of the judiciary in August, stated in 1996 that Baha'i Faith was
an espionage organization. Trials against Baha'is have reflected this
view (see Section 2.c.). The trial of 13 Iranian Jews on charges
related to espionage for Israel was marked throughout by a lack of due
process. The defendants were held for over 1 year without being charged
formally or given access to lawyers. The trial was closed, and the
defendants were not allowed to choose their own lawyers. Following the
trial, defense lawyers told news reporters that they were threatened by
judiciary officials and pressured to admit their clients' guilt (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
In December 1999, authorities rearrested former Deputy Prime
Minister and longtime political dissident Abbas Amir-Entezam after an
interview with him was published in an Iranian newspaper. Amir-Entezam
has spent much of the past 20 years in and out of prison since being
arrested on charges of collaboration with the United States following
the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by revolutionary militants in
1979. In his original trial, Amir-Entezam was denied defense counsel
and access to the allegedly incriminating evidence that was gathered
from the overtaken U.S. Embassy and used against him. Since then he has
appealed for a fair and public trial, which has been denied him. He has
been a frequent victim of torture in prison; he suffered a ruptured
eardrum due to repeated beatings, and kidney failure resulting from
denial of access to toilet facilities, and an untreated prostate
condition. He reports having been taken on numerous occasions before a
firing squad, told to prepare for death, only to be allowed to live.
Amir-Entezam remained in prison at year's end (see Section 1.c.).
Independent legal scholar and member of the Islamic clergy
Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was convicted by the SCC in
1998 for his outspoken criticism of the treatment of women under the
law, was released from prison in early in 1999; however, the Government
banned him from performing any clerical duties for 5 years. Human
Rights groups outside Iran noted reports that Saidzadeh's 1998 sentence
also included a prohibition on publishing. He has ceased authoring a
monthly column on legal issues, many focusing on the rights of women,
since the time of his detention.
In December Judiciary Chief Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi announced an
initiative to reform the Iranian judicial system. He said that the
country is ``still a long way off from having a reformed and developed
judicial organization.'' He also announced that 40 judges, clerks, and
``middle-men'' had been arrested on corruption charges.
No estimates are available on the number of political prisoners.
However, the Government often arrests, convicts, and sentences persons
on questionable criminal charges, including drug trafficking, when
their actual ``offenses'' are political.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that ``reputation, life,
property, (and) dwelling(s)'' are protected from trespass except as
``provided by law;'' however, the Government infringes on these rights.
Security forces monitor the social activities of citizens, enter homes
and offices, monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without
court authorization.
Organizations such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah, an organization of
hardline vigilantes who seek to enforce their vision of appropriate
revolutionary comportment upon the society, harass, beat, and
intimidate those who demonstrate publicly for reform or who do not
observe dress codes or other modes of correct revolutionary conduct.
This includes women whose clothing does not cover the hair and all of
the body except the hands and face, or those who wear makeup or nail
polish. Ansar-e Hezbollah gangs also have been used to destroy
newspaper offices and printing presses, intimidate dissident clerics,
and disrupt peaceful gatherings (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Ansar-e
Hezbollah cells are organized throughout the country and linked to
individual members of the country's leadership.
Vigilante violence includes attacking young persons considered too
``un-Islamic'' in their dress or activities, invading private homes,
abusing unmarried couples, and disrupting concerts or other forms of
popular entertainment. Authorities occasionally enter homes to remove
television satellite dishes, or to disrupt private gatherings in which
unmarried men and women socialize, or where alcohol, mixed dancing, or
other forbidden activities are offered or take place. Enforcement
appears to be arbitrary, varying widely with the political climate and
the individuals involved. Authorities reportedly are vulnerable to
bribes in some of these circumstances.
In 1998 security forces conducted a nationwide raid of more than
500 homes and offices owned or occupied by Baha'is suspected of having
connections to the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning (see Section
2.c.). During the raids, instructional materials, office equipment, and
other items of personal property were confiscated. The effort
apparently was designed to disrupt the operation of the Institute,
which serves as the only alternative source of higher education for
most Baha'is, who are denied entry to the state-controlled university
system.
Prison guards intimidated family members of detainees (see Section
1.c.). Opposition figures living abroad reported harassment of their
relatives in the country.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, except when published ideas are ``contrary to
Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights;'' however, the
Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press in practice.
After the election of President Khatami, the independent press,
especially newspapers and magazines, played an increasingly important
role in providing a forum for an intense debate regarding reform in the
society. However, basic legal safeguards for freedom of expression are
lacking, and the independent press has been subjected to arbitrary
enforcement measures by elements of the Government, notably the
judiciary, which see in such debates a threat to their own hold on
power.
Newspapers and magazines represent a wide variety of political and
social perspectives, some allied with particular figures within the
Government. Many subjects of discussion are tolerated, including
criticism of certain government policies. However, the 1995 Press Law
prohibits the publishing of a broad and ill-defined category of
subjects, including material ``insulting Islam and its sanctities'' or
``promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic
Republic.'' Generally prohibited topics include fault-finding comment
on the personality and achievements of the late Leader of the
Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; direct criticism of the current Supreme
Leader; assailing the principle of velayat-e faqih, or rule by a
supreme religious leader; questioning the tenets of certain Islamic
legal principles; sensitive or classified material affecting national
security; promotion of the views of certain dissident clerics,
including Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri; and advocating rights or
autonomy for ethnic minorities.
Oversight of the press is carried out in accordance with a press
law that was enacted in 1995. The law established the Press Supervisory
Board, which is composed of the Minister of Islamic Culture and
Guidance, a Supreme Court judge, a Member of Parliament, and a
university professor who is appointed by the Minister of Islamic
Culture and Guidance. The Board is responsible for issuing press
licenses and for examining complaints filed against publications or
individual journalists, editors, and publishers. In certain cases, the
Press Supervisory Board may refer complaints to the courts for further
action, including closure. The Press Court hears such complaints. Its
hearings are conducted in public and feature the presence of a jury
that is composed of clerics, government officials, and editors of
government-controlled newspapers. The jury is empowered to recommend to
the presiding judge the guilt or innocence of defendants and the
severity of any penalty to be imposed, although these recommendations
are not binding legally. In at least two cases in 1999 (against the
newspapers Jame-eh Salem and Adineh), recommendations made by Press
Court juries for relatively lenient penalties were disregarded by the
presiding judge in favor of harsher measures, including closure.
Perhaps because the judgments of the Press Courts have not been viewed
as sufficiently strict by some government officials, alleged violations
of the Press Law increasingly were referred to the Revolutionary and
Special Clerical Courts, in which defendants enjoy fewer legal
safeguards (see Section 1.e.).
In March the outgoing Parliament passed amendments to the Press Law
that gave the Press Court increased procedural and jurisdictional
power. The amendments allowed prosecution of individual journalists, in
addition to their editors and publishers, for a broad range of ill-
defined political offenses. The new Parliament (which was seated in
May), introduced a bill in August to reverse the restrictive
amendments. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei intervened with a letter
to the Speaker demanding that the bill be dropped from consideration.
Semiofficial vigilante groups appeared outside the Parliament, creating
an atmosphere of intimidation. Despite some strongly worded objections
from members, the bill was withdrawn.
Public officials frequently levy complaints against journalists,
editors, publishers, and even rival publications. The practice of
complaining about the writings of journalists crosses ideological
lines. Offending writers are subject to lawsuits and fines. Suspension
from journalistic activities and imprisonment are common punishments
for guilty verdicts for offenses ranging from ``fabrication'' to
``propaganda against the State'' to ``insulting the leadership of the
Islamic Republic.'' Police raid newspaper offices, and Ansar-e
Hezbollah mobs attack the offices of liberal publications and
bookstores without interference from the police or prosecution by the
courts.
The country's record on freedom of expression worsened during the
year. It remained a central issue in the struggle between hardliners
and political reformers. The Government continued its policy of issuing
licenses for new publications, some of which engaged in open criticism
of certain government policies. However, the Government issued such
licenses at a greatly reduced rate during the year. Beginning in late
April, the Press Court closed virtually all remaining newspapers
associated with the reform-oriented press. Over the course of a few
days, the 14 most prominent reform newspapers were ordered closed,
without hearings. By year's end, more than 30 independent newspapers
and journals were closed. A few mildly proreform newspapers continue to
publish; however, these have been restricted as well. ``Hamshahri,'' a
daily newspaper published by the Tehran municipality, was ordered to
restrict its circulation to the Tehran city limits. Others continue to
publish, but only with heavy self-censorship.
Dozens of individual editors and journalists were charged and tried
by the Press Court, and several prominent journalists were jailed for
long periods without trial. Others have been sentenced to prison terms
or exorbitant fines. Among those imprisoned were Mashallah
Shamsolvaezin, the editor of a number of now-banned newspapers; Latif
Safari, Shamsolvaezin's publisher; and independent journalists, such as
Akbar Ganji, Ahmed Zeidabadi, Massoud Behnoud, Ebrahim Nabavi, and
Ezzatollah Sahabi. In November Ganji went on trial for statements that
he made at a conference in Berlin on Iranian politics (see Sections
1.c. and 1.e.).
The Government monitors carefully the statements and views of
Iran's senior religious leaders to prevent disruptive dissent within
the clerical ranks. In November 1997, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri,
a cleric formerly designated as the successor to Iran's late Spiritual
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, called into question the authority of the
current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, criticizing his increasing
intervention in government policy. The comments sparked attacks by
Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs on Montazeri's residence and a Koranic school in
Qom run by Montazeri. The promotion of Montazeri's views were among the
charges brought against clerics Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah Nouri at
hearings of the Special Clerical Court in 1999 (see Sections 1.e.).
The press reported throughout the year that several persons were
jailed for expressing support for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. In October
it was reported that Akbar Tajik-Saeeki, identified as the prayer
leader at a Tehran mosque, was jailed by the Special Court for the
Clergy for signing a petition that protested the continued detention of
Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. Support for Montazeri was also one of the
charges included in the wide-ranging indictment of former Interior
Minister Abdollah Nouri (see Sections 1.e.). In December one of
Montazeri's sons was arrested for distributing his father's writings.
The 134 signatories of the 1994 Declaration of Iranian Writers,
which declared a collective intent to work for the removal of barriers
to freedom of thought and expression, remain at risk. In July 1999, the
Association of International Writers, known by its acronym PEN,
released a statement noting that authorities had never solved the
murders of signatories Ahmad Mirallai, Ghafar Hosseini, Ahmad Modhtari,
Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh, Ebrahim Zalzadeh, and Darioush and Parvaneh
Forouhar, nor the disappearance in late 1998 of Pirouz Davani. PEN had
reported in October 1998 that Declaration signatories Mohammad
Pouyandeh, Mohammad Mokhtari, Houshang Golshiri, Kazem Kardevani, and
Mansour Koushan were questioned by a Revolutionary Court in connection
with their attempts to convene a meeting of the Iran Writer's
Association. Mokhtari and Pouyandeh subsequently were murdered, while
signatory Mansour Koushan reportedly fled to Norway.
The Government directly controls and maintains a monopoly over all
television and radio broadcasting facilities; programming reflects the
Government's political and socio-religious ideology. Because newspapers
and other print media have a limited circulation outside large cities,
radio and television serve as the principal news source for many
citizens. Satellite dishes that receive foreign television broadcasts
are forbidden; however, many citizens, particularly the wealthy, own
them. In May 1999, the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance stated
in public remarks that the Government might support an easing of the
satellite ban. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei, who makes the ultimate
determination on issues that involve radio and television broadcasting,
quickly criticized any potential change as amounting to ``surrender''
to Western culture, effectively ending any further debate of the idea.
The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is charged with
screening books prior to publication to ensure that they do not contain
offensive material. However, some books and pamphlets critical of the
Government are published without reprisal. The Ministry inspects
foreign printed materials prior to their release on the market.
Legal scholar Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was
convicted by the SCC in 1998 for his outspoken criticism of the
treatment of women under the law, was released from prison early in
1999; however, the Government banned him from performing any clerical
duties for 5 years and prohibited him from publishing (see Section
1.e.).
The Government effectively censors Iranian-made films, since it is
the main source of funding for domestic film producers. Those producers
must submit scripts and film proposals to government officials in
advance of funding approval. However, such government restrictions
appear to have eased since the election of President Khatami.
President Khatami announced in September 1998 that the Government
would take no action to threaten the life of British author Salman
Rushdie, or anyone associated with his work ``The Satanic Verses.''
However, his remarks were repudiated by other parties, including the 15
Khordad Foundation, which claims to have financed a bounty for the
murder of Rushdie (see Section 1.a.).
Academic censorship persists. In his 1996 interim report, the U.N.
Special Representative noted the existence of a campaign to bring about
the ``Islamization of the universities,'' which appeared to be a
movement to purge persons alleged to ``fight against the sanctities of
the Islamic system.'' Government informers who monitor classroom
material reportedly are common on university campuses. Admission to
universities is politicized; all applicants must pass ``character
tests'' in which officials screen out applicants critical of the
Government's ideology. To obtain tenure, professors must cooperate with
government authorities over a period of years. Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs
disrupt lectures and appearances by academics whose views do not
conform with their own. In October 1999, a newspaper announced that a
post-graduate philosophy course taught by Professor Abdolkarim Soroush
at Tehran University was canceled due to threats to set fire to the
classroom by unidentified persons.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
permits assemblies and marches ``provided they do not violate the
principles of Islam''; however, in practice the Government restricts
freedom of assembly and closely monitors gatherings to ensure that they
do not constitute uncontrolled antigovernment protest. Such gatherings
include public entertainment and lectures, student gatherings, labor
protests, funeral processions, and Friday prayer gatherings. A
significant factor for groups in deciding whether to hold a public
gathering is whether it would be opposed by the semiofficial Ansar-e
Hezbollah, which uses violence and intimidation to disperse such
assemblies.
In August two leading reform intellectuals, Mohsen Kadivar and
Abdul Karim Soroush, were prevented by semiofficial club- and knife-
wielding vigilantes from addressing a student convention in
Khorramabad. Subsequent clashes between students and vigilantes
resulted in the death of a police officer and injuries. The authorities
arrested 150 persons.
On July 8, 1999, students at Tehran University who were protesting
proposed legislation by the Majles that would limit press freedoms and
the Government's closure of a prominent reformoriented newspaper, were
attacked by elements of the security forces and Ansar-e Hezbollah
thugs. Police forces reportedly looked on and allowed repeated attacks
against the students and their dormitory. Human Rights Watch reported
that, according to witnesses, at least 4 students were killed in the
assault on the dormitory, 300 were wounded, and 400 were detained. The
demonstrations continued to grow in subsequent days to include many
nonstudents. Looting, vandalism, and large-scale rioting began and
spread to cities outside Tehran. Student groups attempted to distance
their organizations from these later acts, which they blamed on
government-sanctioned agitators. The Government intervened to stop the
rioting and announced a July 14 counter-demonstration of regime
loyalists and off-duty government workers, many of whom were bussed in
from other cities for the demonstration.
In September 1999, the head of the Tehran Revolutionary Court,
Hojatoleslam Gholamhossein Rahbarpour, was quoted as saying that 1,500
students were arrested during the riots, 500 were released immediately
after questioning, 800 were released later, and formal investigations
were undertaken against the remaining 200. He also announced that four
student leaders were sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court for
their role in the demonstrations. The death sentences reportedly were
commuted to prison terms during the year. The Special Representative's
report stated that about two-thirds of the students who initially were
arrested subsequently were released, but noted that there has been no
formal accounting of all the persons arrested in connection with the
July 1999 demonstrations.
The Government arrested the leaders of the Iran Nations Party in
the aftermath of the July 1999 demonstrations. The party is a secular
nationalist movement that predates the revolution and is viewed as a
threat by certain elements of the Government. The party was accused of
inciting rioters and of encouraging disparaging slogans against
``sacred values.'' Agents of the intelligence service in late 1998
killed the former head of the Iran Nations Party, Darioush Forouhar,
along with his wife (see Section 1.a.).
In the aftermath of these events, the Government took action
against members of the security forces for their violent assault on the
student dormitory, and against student leaders, demonstrators, and
political activists, whom it blamed for inciting illegal behavior. In
August 1999, the commander of the security forces, General Hedayat
Lotfian, was summoned before the Parliament to explain the role of his
officers in the dormitory raid. He reportedly announced that 98
officers were arrested for their actions. In February 20 police
officers and officials were tried on charges of misconduct in
connection with the demonstrations. The court found that misconduct had
occurred, and ordered compensation for 34 injured students. However,
the court released all but two of the accused officers.
The Government forcefully suppressed demonstrations by Kurds in the
wake of the February 1999 arrest of PKK leader Abudullah Ocalan in
Turkey. Security forces reportedly killed 20 persons and made several
hundred arrests (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
The Government limits freedom of association. The Constitution
provides for the establishment of political parties, professional
associations, Islamic religious groups, and recognized religious
minorities, provided that such groups do not violate the principles of
``freedom, sovereignty, and national unity,'' or question Islam as the
basis of the Islamic Republic. President Khatami repeatedly has
declared as a major goal the development of civil society. A newspaper
reported in June 1999 that the Article Ten Commission, a government
body responsible for reviewing applications for the establishment of
political parties, guilds, societies, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's), released figures indicating that as of April, ``85 political,
115 specialized, and 26 religious minority organizations and
associations'' were active in the country.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of
religion. The Constitution declares that the ``official religion of
Iran is Islam and the sect followed is that of Ja'fari (Twelver)
Shi'ism,'' and that this principle is ``eternally immutable.'' It also
states that ``other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full
respect,'' and recognizes Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews (Iran's
pre-Islamic religions) as the only ``protected religious minorities.''
Religions not specifically protected under the Constitution do not
enjoy freedom of religion. This situation most directly affects the
nearly 350,000 followers of the Baha'i Faith, who effectively enjoy no
legal rights.
The central feature of the country's Islamic republican system is
rule by a ``religious jurisconsult.'' Its senior leadership, including
the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, the President, the head of the
Judiciary, and the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
(Parliament), is composed principally of Shi'a clergymen.
Religious activity is monitored closely by the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Adherents of recognized religious
minorities are not required to register individually with the
Government, although their community, religious, and cultural
organizations, as well as schools and public events are monitored
closely. Baha'is are not recognized by the Government as a legitimate
religious group; rather, they are considered an outlawed political
organization. Registration of Baha'i adherents is a police function.
Evangelical Christian groups are pressured by government authorities to
compile and hand over membership lists for their congregations.
Evangelicals have resisted this demand. Non-Muslim owners of grocery
shops are required to indicate their religious affiliation on the front
of their shops.
The population is approximately 99 percent Muslim, of which 89
percent are Shi'a and 10 percent are Sunni (mostly Turkomans, Arabs,
Baluchs, and Kurds living in the southwest, southeast, and northwest).
Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities compose less
than 1 percent of the population. Sufi brotherhoods are popular, but
there are no reliable figures available to judge their true size.
Members of religious minorities are allowed to vote, but they may
not run for President. All religious minorities suffer varying degrees
of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in the areas of
employment, education, and housing (see Section 5).
The Government allows recognized religious minorities to conduct
religious education of their adherents. This includes separate and
privately funded Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian schools. These
schools are supervised by the Ministry of Education, which imposes
certain curriculum requirements. With few exceptions, the directors of
these private schools must be Muslim. Attendance at these schools is
not mandatory for recognized religious minorities. All textbooks used
in course work must be approved for use by the Ministry of Education,
including religious texts. Religious texts in non-Persian languages
require approval by the authorities for use. This requirement imposes
sometimes significant translation expenses on minority communities.
Recognized religious minorities may provide religious instruction in
non-Persian languages, but often come under pressure from the
authorities when conducting such instruction in Persian. In particular,
evangelical Christian and Jewish communities have suffered harassment
and arrest by authorities for the printing of materials or delivery of
sermons in Persian.
Recognized religious minorities are allowed by the Government to
establish community centers and certain cultural, social, sports, or
charitable associations that they finance themselves. This does not
apply to the Baha'i community which, since 1983, has been denied the
right to assemble officially or to maintain administrative
institutions. Because the Baha'i Faith has no clergy, the denial of the
right to form such institutions and elect officers has threatened its
existence in the country.
University applicants are required to pass an examination in
Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction
in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious
minorities to higher education. Applicants for public sector employment
similarly are screened for their knowledge of Islam.
Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system,
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring
heavier punishments than Muslims. Muslim men are free to marry non-
Muslim women, but the opposite does not apply. Marriages between Muslim
women and non-Muslim men are not recognized.
The Government is highly suspicious of any proselytizing of Muslims
by non-Muslims and can be harsh in its response, in particular against
Baha'is and evangelical Christians. The Government regards the Baha'i
community, whose faith originally derives from a strand of Islam, as a
``misguided'' or ``wayward'' sect. The Government has fueled anti-
Baha'i and anti-Jewish sentiment in the country for political purposes.
The Government does not ensure the right of citizens to change or
recant their religious faith. Apostasy, specifically conversion from
Islam, may be punishable by death.
Although Sunni Muslims are accorded full respect under the terms of
the Constitution, some Sunni groups claim discrimination on the part of
the Government. In particular, Sunnis cite the lack of a Sunni mosque
in Tehran and claim that authorities refuse to authorize construction
of a Sunni place of worship in the capital. Sunnis also have accused
the state broadcasting company of airing programming insulting to
Sunnis. Numerous Sunni clerics have been killed in recent years, some
allegedly by agents of the Government. For example, Human Rights Watch
reported in 1998 the killing of Sunni prayer leader Molavi Imam Bakhsh
Narouie in the province of Sistan va-Baluchistan in the southeast. This
led to protests from the local community, which believed that
government authorities were involved in the killing.
Majdhub Alishahi, an adherent of the Sufi tradition, reportedly was
executed on charges of adultery and homosexuality after a coerced
confession in 1996. Sufi organizations outside the country remain
concerned about repression by the authorities of Sufi religious
practices.
The largest non-Muslim minority is the Baha'i Faith, estimated at
nearly 350,000 adherents throughout the country. The Baha'i Faith
originated in Iran during the 1840's as a reformist movement within
Shi'a Islam. Initially it attracted a wide following among Shi'a
clergy. The political and religious authorities of that time joined to
suppress the movement, and since then the hostility of the Shi'a clergy
to the Baha'i Faith has remained intense. Baha'is are considered
apostates because of their claim to a valid religious revelation
subsequent to that of the Prophet Mohammed. The Baha'i Faith is defined
by the Government as a political ``sect'' historically linked to the
Pahlavi monarchy and, therefore, as counterrevolutionary. Historically
at risk, Baha'is often have suffered increased levels of mistreatment
during times of political unrest.
Baha'is may not teach or practice their faith or maintain links
with coreligionists abroad. The fact that the Baha'i world headquarters
is situated in what is now the state of Israel (established by the
founder of the Baha'i Faith in the 19th century in what was then
Ottoman-controlled Palestine) exposes Baha'is to government charges of
``espionage on behalf of Zionism,'' in particular when Bahai's are
caught communicating with or remitting monetary contributions to the
Baha'i Faith headquarters.
Broad restrictions on Baha'is appear to be geared to destroying
them as a community. They repeatedly have been offered relief from
abuse in exchange for recanting their faith. Baha'i cemeteries, holy
places, historical sites, administrative centers, and other assets were
seized shortly after the 1979 revolution. None of these properties have
been returned and many have been destroyed. Baha'is are not allowed to
bury and honor their dead in keeping with their religious tradition. In
October 1998, three Baha'is were arrested in Damavand, a city north of
Tehran, on the grounds that they had buried their dead without
government authorization.
In the past, Baha'i marriages were not recognized by the
Government, leaving Baha'i women open to charges of prostitution. As a
result, children of Baha'i marriages were not recognized as legitimate
and, therefore, were denied inheritance rights. However, in April the
Government announced the elimination of the requirement that citizens
indicate religious affiliation at the time of registration of marriage.
This may allow Bahai's to register their marriages officially, and
thereby mitigate some of the legal obstacles that they face.
Manuchehr Khulusi was arrested in June 1999 while visiting fellow
Baha'is in the town of Birjand, and was imprisoned until his release in
May. During his imprisonment, Khulusi was interrogated, beaten, held in
solitary confinement, and denied access to his lawyer. The charges
brought against him still are unknown, but they were believed to be
related to his faith. The Islamic Revolutionary Court in Mashhad held a
2-day trial in September 1999 and then sentenced him to death in
February. Despite Khulusi's release, it is unclear if the conviction
and death sentence against him still stand.
Ruhollah Rowhani, a Baha'i, was executed in July 1998 after having
served 9 months in solitary confinement on a charge of apostasy, which
arose from his allegedly having converted a Muslim woman to the Baha'i
Faith. The woman claimed that her mother was a Baha'i and she herself
had been raised a Baha'i. Rowhani was not accorded a public trial, and
no sentence was announced prior to his execution.
Two other Baha'is, Sirus Zabihi-Moghaddam and Hadayat Kashefi-
Najafabadi, were tried alongside Rowhani and later sentenced to death
by a revolutionary court in Mashad for practicing their faith. The
sentences were reduced during the year to jail terms of 7 and 5 years,
respectively.
Baha'i group meetings and religious education, which often take
place in private homes and offices, are curtailed severely. Public and
private universities continue to deny admittance to Baha'i students, a
particularly demoralizing blow to a community that traditionally has
placed a high value on education. Denial of access to higher education
appears aimed at the eventual impoverishment of the Baha'i community.
The property rights of Baha'is generally are disregarded. Since
1979 large numbers of private and business properties belonging to
Baha'is have been confiscated. In 1999 three Baha'i homes in Yazd and
one in Arbakan were confiscated because their owners were members of
the Baha'i community. In September and October 1998, government
officers plundered more than 500 Baha'i homes throughout the country
and seized personal household effects, such as furniture and
appliances. Seizure of personal property, in addition to the denial of
access to education and employment, is eroding the economic base of the
Baha'i community.
In 1999 authorities in Khurasan intensified their efforts to
intimidate and undermine Baha'i education. Two teachers in Mashhad were
arrested and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. Their students were
given suspended sentences, to be reinstated if the students again
participated in religious education classes. Three more Baha'is were
arrested in Bujnurd in northern Khurasan for participating in religious
education gatherings. After 6 days in prison, they were released with
suspended sentences of 5 years. The use of suspended sentences appears
to be a new government tactic to discourage Baha'is from taking part in
monthly religious gatherings.
In September 1998, authorities began a nationwide operation to
disrupt the activities of the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning. Also
known as the ``Open University,'' the Institute was established by the
Baha'i community shortly after the revolution to offer opportunities in
higher education to Baha'i students who had been denied access to the
country's high schools and universities. The Institute employed Baha'i
faculty and professors, many of whom had been dismissed from teaching
positions by the Government as a result of their faith, and conducted
classes in homes or offices owned or rented by Baha'is. During the
operation, which took place in at least 14 different cities, 36 faculty
members were arrested, and a variety of personal property, including
books, papers, and furniture, either were destroyed or confiscated.
Government interrogators sought to force the detained faculty members
to sign statements acknowledging that the Open University now was
defunct and pledging not to collaborate with it in the future. Baha'is
outside the country report that none of the 36 detainees would sign the
document. All but 4 of the 36 persons detained during the September
1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute had been released by November 1998.
In March 1999, Dr. Sina Hakiman, Farzad Khajeh Sharifabadi,
Habibullah Ferdosian Najafabadi, and Ziaullah Mirzapanah, the four
remaining detainees from the September 1998 raid, were convicted under
Article 498 of the Penal Code and sentenced to prison terms ranging
from 3 to 10 years. In the court verdict, the four were accused of
having establishing a ``secret organization'' engaged in ``attracting
youth, teaching against Islam, and teaching against the regime of the
Islamic Republic.'' According to Baha'i groups outside Iran, the four
taught general science and Persian literature courses. In July 1999,
Mirzapanah, who had been sentenced to 3 years in prison, became ill and
was hospitalized. Prison authorities allowed him to return home upon
his recovery on the understanding that they could find him whenever
necessary. The other three were released in December 1999.
The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a small
number of Baha'is in arbitrary detention, some at risk of execution, at
any given time. There were at least 10 Baha'is reported to be under
arrest for practicing their faith at year's end, 2 under sentence of
death.
Baha'is regularly are denied compensation for injury or criminal
victimization. Government authorities claim that only Muslim plaintiffs
are eligible for compensation in these circumstances. In practice,
Baha'is continue to be denied most forms of government employment (see
Section 5).
In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a
government policy directive on the Baha'is. According to the directive,
the Supreme Revolutionary Council instructed government agencies to
block the progress and development of the Baha'i community, expel
Baha'i students from universities, cut Baha'i links with groups outside
Iran, restrict employment of Baha'is, and deny Baha'is ``positions of
influence,'' including those in education. The Government claims that
the directive is a forgery. However, it appears to be an accurate
reflection of current government practice.
In his 1996 report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance recommended
``that the ban on the Baha'i organization should be lifted to enable it
to organize itself freely through its administrative institutions,
which are vital in the absence of a clergy, so that it can engage fully
in its religious activities.'' In response to the Special Rapporteur's
concerns with regard to the lack of official recognition of the Baha'i
Faith, government officials stated that Baha'is ``are not a religious
minority, but a political organization that was associated with the
Shah's regime, is against the Iranian Revolution, and engage in
espionage activities.'' The Government asserted to the Special
Rapporteur that, as individuals, all Baha'is were entitled to their
beliefs and protected under other articles of the Constitution as
citizens.
The Christian community is estimated at approximately 117,000,
according to government figures. Of these the majority are ethnic
Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans. Protestant denominations and
evangelical churches also are active, although non-ethnically-based
groups report a greater degree of restrictions on their activities.
The authorities have become particularly vigilant in recent years
in curbing what is perceived as increasing proselytizing activities by
evangelical Christians, whose services are conducted in Persian.
Conversion of a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion can be considered
apostasy. Government officials have reacted to this perceived activity
by closing evangelical churches and arresting converts. Members of
evangelical congregations are required to carry membership cards,
photocopies of which must be provided to the authorities. Worshipers
are subject to identity checks by authorities posted outside
congregation centers. Meetings for evangelical services have been
restricted by the authorities to Sundays, and church officials have
been ordered to inform the Ministry of Information and Islamic Guidance
before admitting new members to their congregations.
As conversion by a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion may be
considered apostasy under traditional Shari'a (Islamic law) practices
enforced in the country, non-Muslims may not proselytize Muslims
without putting their own lives at risk. Evangelical church leaders are
subject to pressure from authorities to sign pledges committing them
not to evangelize Muslims or to allow Muslims to attend church
services.
One organization reported in 1999 the deaths of 8 evangelical
Christians at the hands of authorities in the past 11 years, and
between 15 and 23 disappearances between November 1997 and November
1998.
Oppression of evangelical Christians continued during the year.
Christian groups reported instances of government harassment of
churchgoers in Tehran, in particular against worshipers at the Assembly
of God congregation in the capital. Cited instances of harassment
included conspicuous monitoring outside Christian premises by
Revolutionary Guards to discourage Muslims or converts from entering
church premises and demands for presentation of identity papers of
worshipers inside. Iranian Christians International (ICI) detailed the
cases of Alireza and Mahboobeh Mahmoudian, converts to Christianity and
lay leaders of the Saint Simon the Zealot Osgofi Church in Shiraz, who
were forced to leave the country permanently in June 1998 after
continued harassment by the authorities. The ICI reported that Alireza
Mahmoudian had lost his job because of his conversion and had been
beaten repeatedly by Basiji and Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs on the orders
of government officials from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance. His
wife, Mahboobeh, also had been the subject of intimidation, principally
through frequent and aggressive interrogation by government officials.
Estimates of the size of the Iranian Jewish community vary from
25,000 to 30,000. These figures represent a substantial reduction from
the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 Jews who resided in the country prior to
the 1979 revolution.
While Jews are a recognized religious minority, allegations of
official discrimination are frequent. The Government's antiIsrael
policies, coupled with a perception among radicalized Muslim elements
in Iran that Jewish citizens support Zionism and the State of Israel,
create a threatening atmosphere for the small Jewish community. Jewish
leaders reportedly are reluctant to draw attention to official
mistreatment of their community due to fear of government reprisal.
Some outside Jewish groups cite an increase in anti-Semitic
propaganda in the official and semiofficial media as adding to the
pressure felt by the Jewish community. One example cited is the
periodic publication of the anti-Semitic and fictitious Protocols of
the Elders of Zion, both by the Government and by periodicals
associated with hard-line elements of the Government. In 1986 the
Iranian Embassy in London was reported to have published and
distributed the Protocols in English. The Protocols also were published
in serial form in the country in 1994 and again in January 1999. On the
latter occasion they were published in Sobh, a conservative monthly
publication reportedly aligned with the security services.
There appears to be little restriction or interference with
religious practice or education; however, Jews were eased out of most
government positions after 1979. Jews are permitted to obtain passports
and to travel outside the country; however, with the exception of
certain business travelers, they are required by the authorities to
obtain government clearance (and pay additional fees) before each trip
abroad. The Government appears concerned about the emigration of Jews
and permission generally is not granted for all members of a Jewish
family to travel outside the country at the same time (see Section
2.d.).
In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested in the cities of
Shiraz and Isfahan. Among the group were several prominent rabbis,
teachers of Hebrew, and their students. The charges centered on alleged
acts of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense punishable by death.
The 13 were jailed for over 1 year, largely in solitary confinement,
without official charges or access to lawyers. In April the defendants
were appointed lawyers, and a closed trial commenced in a revolutionary
court in Shiraz. Human rights groups and governments around the world
criticized the lack of due process in the proceedings. The Special
Representative characterized them as ``in no way fair.'' On July 1, 10
of the 13, along with 2 Muslim defendants, were convicted on charges of
illegal contact with Israel, conspiracy to form an illegal
organization, and recruiting agents. They received prison sentences
ranging from 4 to 13 years. Three were acquitted. Their lawyers filed
an appeal and on September 21 an appeals court overturned the
convictions for forming an illegal organization and recruiting agents,
but upheld the convictions for illegal contacts with Israel. Their
sentences were reduced to between 2 and 9 years' imprisonment.
Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the March 1999 arrest of the
13 Jewish individuals coincided with an increase in antiSemitic
propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hardline elements
of the Government. Since the beginning of the trial, Jewish businesses
in Tehran and Shiraz have been targets of vandalism and boycotts, and
Jews reportedly suffered personal harassment and intimidation.
Human Rights Watch reported the death in May 1998 of Jewish
businessman Ruhollah Kakhodah-Zadeh, who was hanged in prison without a
public charge or legal proceeding. Reports indicate that Kakhodah-Zadeh
may have been killed for assisting Jews to emigrate. As an accountant,
Kakhoda-Zadeh had provided powerof-attorney services for Jews departing
the country.
The Government restricts the movement of several senior religious
leaders, some of whom have been under house arrest for years (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.), and often charges members of religious
minorities with crimes such as drug offenses, ``confronting the
regime,'' and apostasy (see Section 1.e.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some restrictions
on these rights. Citizens may travel to any part of the country,
although there have been restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas during
times of occasional heavy fighting. Roadblocks and security checks are
common on routes between major cities. Citizens may change their place
of residence without obtaining official permission. The Government
requires exit permits (a validation stamp placed in the traveler's
passport) for draft-age males and citizens who are politically suspect.
Some citizens, particularly those whose skills are in short supply and
who were educated at government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit
permits. The Government restricts the movement of certain religious
minorities and of several religious leaders (see Sections 1.d. and
2.c.).
Citizens returning from abroad sometimes are subject to search and
extensive questioning by government authorities for evidence of
antigovernment activities abroad. Cassette tapes, printed material,
personal correspondence, and photographs are subject to confiscation.
The Government permits Jews to travel abroad, but often denies them
the multiple-exit permits normally issued to other citizens. The
Government normally does not permit all members of a Jewish family to
travel abroad at the same time. Baha'is often experience difficulty in
obtaining passports. Women must obtain the permission of their husband,
father, or other living male relative in order to obtain a passport.
Married women must receive written permission from their husbands
before embarking on a trip outside the country.
The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government generally cooperates
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. Although the
Government generally provides first asylum, the Government increased
pressure on some refugees to return to their home countries,
particularly as the economy has worsened.
The country hosts a large refugee population, mostly Afghans who
fled during the Soviet occupation. The Government and the UNHCR
estimate that there are approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees in
the country. Most subsist on itinerant labor, often moving from place
to place within the country. Between April and December, the government
and the UNHCR operated a joint program intended to facilitate the
repatriation of Afghans who did not have a well-founded fear of
persecution. Approximately 133,000 Afghans returned voluntarily with
UNHCR assistance, and another 50,000 returned with help from the
Government. There were reports in late 1998 and early 1999 of a surge
in the numbers of Afghans forcibly repatriated to their country by
government officials and military personnel. Reasons cited were a
worsening economic situation and anger over the murders in August 1998
of nine Iranian diplomats and journalists stationed at the Iranian
Consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif. There also were reports
during this period of civilian mob attacks against groups of Afghan
refugees, which resulted in numerous deaths.
The UNHCR estimates that there were about 386,000 Iraqi Kurdish and
Arab refugees in the country at year's end. Many of these Iraqi
refugees originally were expelled by Iraq at the beginning of the Iran-
Iraq war because of their suspected Iranian origin. In numerous
instances, both the Iraqi and Iranian Governments dispute their
citizenship, rendering many of them, in effect, stateless. Other Iraqi
refugees arrived following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Although the Government claims to host more than 30,000 refugees of
other nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans,
Somalis, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, it has provided no information
about them or allowed the UNHCR or other organizations access to them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The right of citizens to change their government is restricted. The
Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, is selected for a life
term by the Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader may also be removed
by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly itself is restricted to
clerics, who serve an 8-year term and are chosen by popular vote from a
list approved by the Government. There is no separation of state and
religion, and clerics dominate the Government. The Government represses
any attempts to separate state and religion, or to alter the State's
existing theocratic foundation. The selection of candidates for
elections effectively is controlled by the Government.
The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed of
six Islamic clergymen and six lay members who review all laws for
consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution. The Council also
screens political candidates for ideological, political, and religious
suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a theocratic state;
clerics who disagree with government policies also have been
disqualified.
Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President, members
of the Majles, and the Assembly of Experts. Mohammad Khatami, a former
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who was impeached in 1992 by
the Majles for ``liberalism'' and ``negligence,'' was elected President
in May 1997. The Interior Ministry estimated that over 90 percent of
the eligible population voted in that election. During the campaign,
there was considerable government intervention and censorship. For
example, the Council of Guardians reviewed 238 candidates, including a
woman, but allowed only 4 individuals to run. Three were clerics; all
were men. Khatami won nearly 70 percent of the vote, with his greatest
support coming from the middle class, youth, minorities, and women. The
election results were not disputed, and the Government did not appear
to have engaged in fraud.
Elections were held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member Assembly
of Experts. The Council of Guardians disqualified numerous candidates,
which led to criticism from many observers that the Government
improperly predetermined the election results.
In February 1999, elections for nationwide local councils were held
for the first time since the 1979 revolution. Government figures
indicated that roughly 280,000 candidates competed for 130,000 council
seats across the nation. Women were elected to seats in numerous
districts. The Councils do not appear to have been granted the autonomy
or authority that would make them effective or meaningful local
institutions; doing so could be viewed as a threat to the control of
the central Government.
Iran held elections for its 290 seat Majles in February. Of over
6,000 candidates, 576 were disqualified before the elections by the
Council of Guardians, which represented a substantial decrease from the
44 percent who were disqualified before the 1996 elections. Most of
those disqualified were outspoken advocates of political reform,
including some of the most prominent supporters of President Khatami.
In addition, an Azeri activist was arrested in December 1999,
reportedly to prevent him from registering to run in the elections (see
Sections 1.d. and 5). However, candidates with a wide range of views
were permitted to run. The elections resulted in a landslide victory
for moderate and reform candidates, who now constitute a large majority
in the Majles. Vigorous parliamentary debates take place on various
issues. However, the Supreme Leader and other conservatives within the
Government used constitutional provisions to block much of the early
reform legislation passed by the Majles.
Women are underrepresented in government. They hold 9 of 290 Majles
seats. There are no female cabinet members. In 1997 President Khatami
appointed the first female vice president (for environmental
protection) since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Masoumeh Ebtekar,
following his inauguration. Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance
Ataollah Mohajerani appointed a second woman to a senior post, Azam
Nouri, when he chose her in 1997 as his Deputy Minister for Legal and
Parliamentary Affairs. President Khatami appointed a woman to serve as
Presidential Adviser for Women's Affairs.
Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians elect deputies to specially
reserved Majles seats. However, the UN Special Representative noted in
his September report frequent assertions that religious minorities are,
by law and practice, barred from being elected to a representative body
(except to the seats in the Majles reserved for minorities), and from
holding senior government or military positions. Religious minorities
are allowed to vote, but they may not run for president.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government continued to restrict the work of local human rights
groups. The Government denies the universality of human rights and has
stated that human rights issues should be viewed in the context of a
country's ``culture and beliefs.''
Various professional groups representing writers, journalists,
photographers, and others attempt to monitor government restrictions in
their field and harassment and intimidation against individual members
of their professions. However, their ability to meet, organize, and
effect change is curtailed severely by the Government.
International human rights NGO's such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International are not permitted to establish offices in or
conduct regular investigative visits to the country. Human Rights Watch
and members of a European judicial monitoring NGO were permitted to
send representatives to Shiraz for the trial of 13 Iranian Jews on
espionage charges (see Section 2.c.). However, they were not permitted
to monitor the trial proceedings.
The ICRC and the UNHCR both operate in the country. However, the
Government did not allow the U.N. Special Representative for Human
Rights in Iran to visit the country during the year. The Special
Representative last was allowed entry into the country to gather
information for his yearly report in 1996. However, the Special
Representative corresponded with government officials during the year,
and received several replies to his correspondence.
The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was established in 1995
under the authority of the head of the judiciary, who sits on its board
as an observer. In 1996 the Government established a human rights
committee in the Majles. Most observers believe that these bodies lack
independence. The U.N. Special Representative published statistics
provided by the IHRC indicating that in the period from March 1998 to
March 1999, 1,051 files were opened on the basis of complaints received
by the organization. Of those the highest number of complaints were
related to the judiciary. Of a total of about 3,000 currently active
files, approximately 1,000 were related to women and women's issues.
In April 1999, Mohammad Zia'i Far, secretary of the IHRC, stated in
a press interview that illegal detention centers continue to exist in
Iran. The press also reported that the IHRC sought permission from the
Special Court for the Clergy to visit imprisoned cleric Mohsen Kadivar
in Evin Prison in March 1999 (see Section 1.e.). The request reportedly
was never answered. Kadivar was released during the summer. In 1998
Ziaei-Far reportedly complained about the use by police of ``special
detention centers'' to conduct coercive interrogations of detainees
(see Section 1.c.) and acknowledged widespread human rights violations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
In general the Government does not discriminate on the basis of
race, disability, language, or social status. The Government does
discriminate on the basis of religion and sex.
Women.--Although reported cases of spousal abuse and violence
against women occur, the statistics on such reports are not available
publicly. Abuse in the family is considered a private matter and seldom
is discussed publicly. In May 1999, the President's Advisor on Women's
Affairs was quoted in the press as stating that ``one cannot claim that
violence against women does not take place in Iran.'' The Special
Representative noted in his September report that media reporting on
the situation of women has diminished, in part due to the closure of
the reformoriented press (see Section 2.a.).
Women have access to primary and advanced education; however,
social and legal constraints limit their professional opportunities. In
September the Majles approved a controversial bill to allow single
women to travel abroad for graduate education. The legislation was
under consideration by the Council of Guardians at year's end. Women
are represented in many fields of the work force, and the Government
has not prevented women from entering many traditionally male-dominated
fields, including medicine, dentistry, journalism and agriculture.
However, many women choose not to work outside the home. A 1985 law
enacted by the Government instituted 3 months of paid maternity leave,
and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing mothers to feed their
babies. Pension benefits for women were established under the same law,
which also decreed that companies hiring women should provide day-care
facilities for young children of female employees.
The State enforces gender segregation in most public spaces, and
prohibits women mixing openly with unmarried men or men not related to
them. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses and enter
public buildings, universities, and airports through separate
entrances. Women are prohibited from attending male sporting events,
although this restriction does not appear to be enforced universally.
While the enforcement of a conservative Islamic dress codes has varied
with the political climate since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in
1989, what women wear in public is not entirely a matter of personal
choice. Women are subject to harassment by the authorities if their
dress or behavior is considered inappropriate, and may be sentenced to
flogging or imprisonment for such violations. The law prohibits the
publication of pictures of uncovered women in the print media,
including pictures of foreign women. There are penalties for failure to
observe Islamic dress codes at work (see Section 6.a.).
Discrimination against women is reinforced by law through
provisions of the Islamic Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those
sections dealing with family and property law. Shortly after the 1979
revolution, the Government repealed the Family Protection Law, a
hallmark bill that was adopted in 1967, which gave women increased
rights in the home and workplace, and replaced it with a legal system
based largely on Shari'a practices. In 1998 the Majles passed
legislation that mandated segregation of the sexes in the provision of
medical care. The bill provided for women to be treated only by female
physicians and men by male physicians and raised questions about the
quality of care that women could receive under such a regime,
considering the current imbalance between the number of trained and
licensed male and female physicians and specialists.
In October the Parliament passed a bill to raise the legal age of
marriage for women from 9 to 15. However, the Council of Guardians in
November rejected the bill as contrary to Islamic law, although even
under the current law, marriage at the minimum age is rare. All women,
no matter the age, must have the permission of their father or a living
male relative in order to marry. The law allows for the practice of
Siqeh, or temporary marriage, a Shi'a custom in which a woman or a girl
may become the wife of a married or single Muslim male after a simple
and brief religious ceremony. The Siqeh marriage can last for a night
or as little as 30 minutes. The bond is not recorded on identification
documents, and, according to Islamic law, men may have as many Siqeh
wives as they wish. Such wives are not granted rights associated with
traditional marriage.
The Penal Code includes provisions that mandate the stoning of
women and men convicted of adultery (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.). Under
legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to divorce, and
regulations promulgated in 1984 substantially broadened the grounds on
which a woman may seek a divorce. However, a husband is not required to
cite a reason for divorcing his wife. In 1986 the Government issued a
12-point ``contract'' to serve as a model for marriage and divorce,
which limits the privileges accorded to men by custom and traditional
interpretations of Islamic law. The model contract also recognized a
divorced woman's right to a share in the property that couples acquire
during their marriage and to increased alimony rights. Women who
remarry are forced to give up to the child's father custody of children
from earlier marriages. In 1998 the Majles passed a law that granted
custody of minor children to the mother in certain divorce cases in
which the father is proven unfit to care for the child (the measure was
enacted because of the complaints of mothers who had lost custody of
their children to former husbands with drug addictions and criminal
records). Muslim women may not marry non-Muslim men. The testimony of a
woman is worth only half that of a man in court (see Section 1.e.). A
married woman must obtain the written consent of her husband before
traveling outside the country (see Section 2.d.).
Children.--Most children have access to education through the 12th
grade (it is compulsory to age 11), and to some form of health care.
There is no known pattern of child abuse.
People with Disabilities.--There is no available information
regarding whether the Government has legislated or otherwise mandated
accessibility for the disabled. However, the Cable News Network
reported in 1996 on the harsh conditions in an institution for retarded
children who had been abandoned by their parents. Film clips showed
children tied or chained to their beds, in filthy conditions, and
without appropriate care. It is not known to what extent this
represents the typical treatment of the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Members of all religious minorities suffer
varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly
in the areas of employment, education, and housing. Applicants for
publicsector employment are screened for their adherence to Islam. The
law stipulates penalties for government workers who do not observe
``Islam's principles and rules.'' Article 144 of the Constitution
states that ``the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an
Islamic army,'' which is ``committed to an Islamic ideology,'' and must
``recruit into its service individuals who have faith in the objectives
of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted to the cause of achieving its
goals.'' Apostasy, or conversion from Islam to another religion, is
punishable by death.
The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities suffer
varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly
in the areas of employment, education, and public accommodations (see
Section 2.d.). For example, members of religious minorities generally
are barred from becoming school principals. Muslims who convert to
Christianity also suffer discrimination. Apostasy, or conversion from
Islam to another religion, may be punishable by death.
University applicants are required to pass an examination in
Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction
in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious
minorities to higher education.
Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system,
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits and incurring
heavier punishments than Muslims.
Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the arrest of 13 Jewish
individuals in February and March 1999, as well as their subsequent
trial during the year, coincided with an increase in anti-Semitic
propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hard-line
elements of the Government (see Section 2.c.). They also note that the
Shirazi Jewish community, one of the oldest remaining Jewish
communities outside Israel, had been under close surveillance by
government authorities prior to the arrests and had been warned by the
authorities against certain activities, such as the publication in
Persian of scriptures and guidelines for the treatment of kosher foods.
In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a
government policy directive to block the progress of Baha'is (see
Section 2.c.).
Properties belonging to the Baha'i community as a whole, such as
places of worship and graveyards, were confiscated by the Government in
the years after the 1979 revolution and, in some cases, defiled.
Baha'is are prevented from enrolling in universities. However, other
Government restrictions have eased; Baha'is currently may obtain ration
booklets and send their children to public elementary and secondary
schools. Thousands of Baha'is who were dismissed from government jobs
in the early 1980's receive no unemployment benefits and have been
required to repay the Government for salaries or pensions received from
the first day of employment. Those unable to do so face prison
sentences (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Kurds seek greater autonomy
from the central Government and continue to suffer from government
discrimination. The Kurds' status as Sunni Muslims is an aggravating
factor in their relations with the Shi'a-dominated government. These
tensions predate the revolution. Kurds often are suspected by
government authorities of harboring separatist or foreign sympathies.
These suspicions have led to sporadic outbreaks of fighting between
government forces and Kurdish groups. Human Rights Watch reported in
September 1997 that in the wake of the Gulf War and the creation of an
autonomous Kurdish zone in northern Iraq, Iranian authorities increased
their military presence in Kurdish areas of Iran, which often led to
human rights abuses against Kurds. Abuses included destruction of
villages, forced migrations, and widespread mining of Kurdish property.
In 1994 government agents killed Dr. Abdul Rahman Gassemlou, a
representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran in Vienna.
In the wake of the February 1999 arrest of Kurdish Workers Party
leader Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey, Iranian Kurds demonstrated in
numerous cities in Iranian Kurdistan. In several instances, security
forces suppressed the demonstrations by force. Human rights groups
reported at least 20 deaths and several hundred arrests during the
violence (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
Azeris are well integrated into the Government and society, but
complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. The Government
traditionally has viewed Azeri nationalism as threatening, particularly
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of an
independent Azerbaijan. Mohammed Chehrangi, an advocate for the
cultural rights of Azeris, was arrested in December 1999. Azeri groups
maintain that the arrest was made to prevent his registration as a
candidate for the February parliamentary elections (see Sections 1.d.
and 3).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code grants workers the
right to establish unions; however, the Government does not allow
independent unions to exist. A national organization known as the
Worker's House, founded in 1982, is the sole authorized national labor
organization. It serves primarily as a conduit for the Government to
exert control over workers. The leadership of the Worker's House
coordinates activities with Islamic labor councils, which are made up
of representatives of the workers and one representative of management
in industrial, agricultural, and service organizations of more than 35
employees. These councils also function as instruments of government
control, although they frequently have been able to block layoffs and
dismissals.
In 1991 the Government published a new Labor Code that allowed
employers and employees to establish guilds. The guilds issue
vocational licenses and help members find jobs.
The Government does not tolerate any strike deemed to be at odds
with its economic and labor policies. In 1993 the Parliament passed a
law that prohibits strikes by government workers. It also prohibits
government workers from having contacts with foreigners and stipulates
penalties for failure to observe Islamic dress codes and principles at
work. Nevertheless, strikes occur, and apparently in increasing numbers
as the economy has worsened. A European-based labor organization that
follows Iranian labor issues reported 181 protests and strikes by
workers in the period from March 1998 to March 1999. These reportedly
included strikes and protests by oil, textile, electrical
manufacturing, and metal workers, and by the unemployed.
Newspapers in 1999 reported an ``unauthorized rally'' by thousands
of workers over the Government's labor policies and the poor economy.
Instances of late or partial pay for government workers reportedly are
common.
There are no known affiliations with international labor
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers do not
have the right to organize independently and negotiate collective
bargaining agreements. No information is available on mechanisms used
to set wages. It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in
the export processing zones differ from the law and practice in the
rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Penal Code
provides that the Government may require any person who does not have
work to take suitable employment; however, this does not appear to be
enforced regularly. This provision has been criticized frequently by
the International Labor Organization (ILO) as contravening ILO
Convention 29 on forced labor. There is no information available on the
Government's policy on forced and bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Law prohibits employment of minors under 15
years of age and places special restrictions on the employment of
minors under age 18. Education is compulsory until age 11. The law
permits children to work in agriculture, domestic service, and some
small businesses. By law women and minors may not be employed in hard
labor or, in general, night work. Information on the extent to which
these regulations are enforced is not available. There is no
information available on the Government's policy on forced and bonded
labor by children (see Section 6.c.). A 1985 law provides for 3 months
of paid maternity leave, and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing
mothers to feed their babies.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code empowers the
Supreme Labor Council to establish annual minimum wage levels for each
industrial sector and region. It is not known if the minimum wages are
adjusted annually or enforced. The Labor Code stipulates that the
minimum wage should be sufficient to meet the living expenses of a
family and should take inflation into account. Under current poor
economic conditions, many middle-class citizens must work two or even
three jobs to support their families. The daily minimum wage was raised
in March 1997 to $2.80 (8,500 rials). This wage apparently is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. Information on the percentage of the working population covered
by minimum wage legislation is not available.
The Labor Code establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum,
with 1 weekly rest day, normally Fridays, and at least 12 days of paid
annual leave and several paid public holidays.
According to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired by
the Labor Minister or his representative, is responsible for promoting
workplace safety and health. The Council reportedly has issued 28
safety directives, and oversees the activities of 3,000 safety
committees established in enterprises employing more than 10 persons.
Labor organizations outside the country allege that hazardous work
environments are common in Iran, and result in thousands of worker
deaths per year. It is not known how well the Ministry's inspectors
enforce regulations. It is not known whether workers may remove
themselves from hazardous situations without risking the loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
IRAQ
Political power in Iraq\1\ lies exclusively in a repressive
oneparty apparatus dominated by Saddam Hussein and members of his
extended family. The provisional Constitution of 1968 stipulates that
the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party governs Iraq through the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC), which exercises both executive and legislative
authority. President Saddam Hussein, who is also Prime Minister,
Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary General of the Regional Command of
the Ba'th Party, wields decisive power. Saddam Hussein and his regime
continued to refer to an October 1995 nondemocratic ``referendum'' on
his presidency, in which he received 99.96 percent of the vote. This
``referendum'' included neither secret ballots nor opposing candidates,
and many credible reports indicated that voters feared possible
reprisal for a dissenting vote. Ethnically and linguistically the Iraqi
population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, Assyrians, Yazidis, and
Armenians. The religious mix is likewise varied and consists of Shi'a
and Sunni Muslims (both Arab and Kurdish), Christians (including
Chaldeans and Assyrians), Jews (most of whom have emigrated), and a
small number of Mandaeans. Civil uprisings have occurred in recent
years, especially in the north and the south. The Government has
reacted with extreme repression against those who oppose or even
question it. The judiciary is not independent, and the President may
override any court decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The United States does not have diplomatic representation in
Iraq. This report draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government
sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Government's security apparatus includes militias attached to
the President, the Ba'th Party, and the Interior Ministry. The security
forces play a central role in maintaining the environment of
intimidation and fear on which government power rests. Security forces
committed widespread, serious, and systematic human rights abuses.
The Government owns all major industries and controls most of the
highly centralized economy, which is based largely on oil production.
The economy was damaged by the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, and Iraq has
been under U.N. sanctions since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Sanctions
ban all exports, except oil sales, under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 986 and subsequent resolutions (the ``oil-for-food''
program). Under the program, Iraq also is permitted, under U.N.
control, to import food, medicine, supplies for water, sanitation,
electricity, agricultural, and educational projects, and spare parts
for the oil sector.
The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor.
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
Government continued to execute summarily perceived political opponents
and leaders in the Shi'a religious community. Reports suggest that
persons were executed merely because of their association with an
opposition group or as part of a continuing effort to reduce prison
populations. The Government continued to be responsible for
disappearances and to kill and torture persons suspected of--or related
to persons suspected of--economic crimes, military desertion, and a
variety of other activities. Security forces routinely tortured, beat,
raped, and otherwise abused detainees. Prison conditions are extremely
poor. The authorities routinely used arbitrary arrest and detention,
prolonged detention, and incommunicado detention, and continued to deny
citizens the basic right to due process. The judiciary is not
independent. The Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy
rights.
The Government restricts severely freedom of speech, press,
assembly, association, religion, and movement. The U.N. Commission on
Human Rights and the U.N. General Assembly passed resolutions in April
and November respectively criticizing the Government's suppression of
these freedoms. Human rights abuses remain difficult to document
because of the Government's efforts to conceal the facts, including its
prohibition on the establishment of independent human rights
organizations, its persistent refusal to grant visits to human rights
monitors, and its continued restrictions designed to prevent dissent.
Denied entry to Iraq, the Special Rapporteur bases his reports on the
Government's human rights abuses on interviews with recent emigres from
Iraq, interviews with opposition groups and others that have contacts
inside Iraq, and on published reports. Violence and discrimination
against women occur. The Government has enacted laws affording a
variety of protections to women; however, it is difficult to determine
the practical effects of such protections. The Government neglects the
health and nutritional needs of children, and discriminates against
religious minorities and ethnic groups. The Government restricts
severely trade union rights. Child labor persists, and there were
instances of forced labor.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) have controlled most areas in the three northern
provinces of Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniah since the Government
withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative personnel from
the area after the 1991 Kurdish uprising. The KDP and the PUK fought
one another from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to
unify their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July
1999. The ceasefire has held; however, reunification measures have not
been implemented. The KDP, PUK, and opposition groups committed human
rights abuses. The PUK held municipal elections in February, the first
elections held in the Kurdish-controlled areas since 1992. Foreign and
local election observers reported that the elections generally were
fair.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government
committed numerous political and other extrajudicial killings. The
Government has a long record of executing perceived opponents. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur, the international media, and other groups all have
reported a heightened number of summary executions in Iraq since 1997,
assertions that are supported in detail by several sources in Iraq. The
Special Rapporteur has stated that ``the country is run through
extrajudicial measures.'' The list of offenses requiring a mandatory
death penalty has grown substantially in recent years and now includes
anything that could be characterized as ``sabotaging the national
economy,'' including forgery, as well as smuggling cars, spare parts,
material, heavy equipment, and machinery. The Special Rapporteur also
noted that membership in certain political parties is punishable by
death, that there is a pervasive fear of death for any act or
expression of dissent, and that there are recurrent reports of the use
of the death penalty for such offenses as ``insulting'' the President
or the Ba'th Party. ``The mere suggestion that someone is not a
supporter of the President carries the prospect of the death penalty,''
the Special Rapporteur stated. Government killings occurred with total
impunity and without due process.
The regime periodically executed large numbers of political
detainees en masse. During the year, the Special Rapporteur continued
to receive reports referring to a ``prison cleansing'' execution
campaign taking place in Abu Ghurayb, Radwaniyah, and other prisons.
Opposition groups, including the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the Iraqi
National Congress (INC), and others with a network inside the country
provided detailed accounts of summary executions, including the names
of hundreds of persons killed.
On three occasions in January and February, prison officials
reportedly executed 91 prisoners at Abu Ghurayb; some of the prisoners
were accused of theft, some were accused of trafficking in drugs, and
some reportedly were affiliated with a political opposition group.
According to opposition groups, prison officials reportedly executed 58
prisoners who were held in solitary confinement at Abu Ghurayb; 14 were
charged with political crimes and 44 were charged with common crimes.
According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and
the Center for Human Rights of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the
Government executed nearly 200 prisoners at Abu Ghurayb prison between
October and December 1999. The prisoners were detained originally for
their opposition activities against the Government.
The Government's motive for such high numbers of summary
executions--estimated at over 3,000 since 1997--may be linked to
reported intimidation of the population and reduction of prison
populations. As in previous years, there were numerous credible reports
that the regime continued to execute persons thought to be involved in
plotting against Saddam Hussein or the Ba'th Party. These executions
included high-ranking civilian, military, and tribal leaders. For
example, according to various opposition groups, government officials
reportedly executed Republican Guard Brigadier General Abd al-Karim al-
Dulaymi and between 25 and 38 other Republican Guard officers on
suspicion of disloyalty during the year. According to Human Rights
Watch, the Government executed four Special Security Forces officers,
including staff Colonel Kadhim Jawad Ali and Ali Muhammad Salman. On
December 28, 1999, the Government executed Captain Husayn Hashim Muhsin
on suspicion of disclosing military information. On December 29, 1999,
the Government executed by firing squad five members of the Republican
Guard allegedly for participating in antigovernment activities.
Government agents targeted for killing family members of defectors.
For example, government agents reportedly killed Safiyah Hassan who
allegedly criticized publicly the Government for killing her husband
and two sons, Hussein and Saddam Kamal. Her husband and sons had been
senior government officials; however, the brothers defected to Jordan
in 1996. The Government offered the men immunity if they returned to
the country; however, upon their return government agents killed them
and their father.
On June 3, the Government reportedly killed Jordanian citizen Dawud
Sulayman al-Dalu and did not disclose information about the charges
against him. According to the Iraqi National Party, government
officials killed seven employees of the Central Computer Department in
Baghdad because they allegedly purchased computer equipment from the
UAE; the Government reportedly believed that the equipment would be
used to send information abroad.
In October security forces reportedly beheaded a number of women
suspected of prostitution and some men suspected of facilitating or
covering up such activities (see Section 5). Security agents reportedly
decapitated numerous women and men in front of their family members.
According to Amnesty International (AI), the victim's heads were
displayed in front of their homes for several days. Thirty of the
victims' names reportedly were published, including three doctors and
one medical assistant.
During the year, a former officer from the Mukhabarat reported that
he participated in a 1998 mass murder at Abu Ghurayb prison following a
Revolutionary Command Council directive to ``clean out'' the country's
prisons.
In 1998 and 1999, the Government killed a number of leading Shi'a
clerics, prompting the former Special Rapporteur in 1999 to express his
concern to the Government that the killings might be part of a
systematic attack by government officials on the independent leadership
of the Shi'a Muslim community. The Government had not responded to the
Special Rapporteur's letter by year's end.
Observers attributed the August 1999 death of Iraq's chief
architect Husam Bahnam Khuduri to poisoning. Although not widely used
in recent years, the use of slow-acting poisons such as thallium (a
radioactive substance that can be dissolved in drinking water) was a
preferred method of political killings in the late 1980's and early
1990's. Khuduri reportedly had extensive knowledge about the
construction of Saddam Hussein's palaces, tunnels, and bunkers. While
the official obituary did not state a cause of death, acquaintances
reported that Khuduri showed signs of being under the effect of a slow-
acting poison several days before he died. Several weeks before Khuduri
died, he was interviewed for a satirical documentary about the regime
by French filmmaker Joel Solar; according to Solar, Khuduri appeared
healthy during the interviews.
Reports of deaths due to poor prison conditions continued (see
Section 1.c.). Many persons who were displaced forcibly still live in
tent camps under harsh conditions, which also results in many deaths
(see Sections 2.d. and 5).
The Government reportedly does not investigate political or
extrajudicial killings, and no investigations were made into the
hundreds of killings committed by security forces in 1999, or in
killings from previous years.
As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread
killings of Kurds in the north of the country during the ``Anfal''
Campaign of 1988 (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). Both the Special
Rapporteur and HRW have concluded that the Government's policies
against the Kurds raise issues of crimes against humanity and
violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
Political killings and terrorist actions continued in the
Kurdcontrolled north of the country. For example, unknown persons
killed the leader of the Democratic Nationalist Union of Kurdistan,
Sirbit Mahmud. In July unknown assailants killed parliamentary deputy
Osman Hassan. In July PUK forces killed 4 members of the Iraqi
Communist Workers Party and KDP forces killed several members of the
Turkoman Front.
In June 1999, the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA)
reported that the partially decomposed body of Helena Aloun Sawa, an
Assyrian woman who had been missing for a month, was discovered. AINA
concluded that the murder ``resembles a well-established pattern'' of
complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks against Assyrian
Christians in the north. However, the KDP reported that there did not
appear to be a ``political or racial'' motive. In June 1999, the KDP
appointed a commission to further investigate the killing. No results
of the investigation were reported by year's end.
b. Disappearance.--The Special Rapporteur continued to receive
reports of widespread disappearances. The whereabouts of journalist and
Baghdad professor, Hashem Hasan, who was arrested as he attempted to
leave the country in September 1999, remained unknown at year's end
(see Section 2.c.). The status of six members of the Assyrian community
of Baghdad, arrested in October 1996, is unknown. Hundreds still are
missing in the aftermath of the brief Iraqi military occupation of
Erbil in August 1996. Many of these persons may have been killed
surreptitiously late in 1997 and throughout 1998, in the reported
``prison-cleansing'' campaign (see Section 1.a.). Thirty-three members
of the Yazidi community of Mosul, who were arrested in July 1996, still
are unaccounted for. Sources inside the country reported the existence
of special prison wards that hold individuals whose whereabouts,
status, and fate is not disclosed (see Section 1.c.).
The Government continued to ignore the more than 16,000 cases
conveyed to it in 1994 and 1995 by the United Nations, as well as
requests from the Governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the
whereabouts of those missing from Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait,
and from Iran on the whereabouts of prisoners of war that Iraq captured
in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The majority of the 16,496 cases known to
the Special Rapporteur are persons of Kurdish origin who disappeared
during the 1988 Anfal Campaign. The Special Rapporteur estimated that
the total number of Kurds who disappeared during that period could
reach several tens of thousands. HRW estimates the total at between
70,000 and 150,000, and AI at more than 100,000. The second largest
group of cases known to the Special Rapporteur consists of Shi'a
Muslims who were reported to have disappeared in the late 1970's and
early 1980's as their families were expelled to Iran due to their
alleged Persian ancestry.
In 1997 and 1999, AI documented the repeated failure by the
Government to respond to requests for information about persons who
have disappeared. The report detailed unresolved cases dating from the
early 1980's through the mid-1990's, particularly the disappearances of
Aziz Al-Sayyid Jassem, Sayyid Muhammad Sadeq Muhammad Ridha Al-Qazwini,
Mazin Abd Al-Munim AlSamarra'i, the six Al-Hashimi brothers, the four
Al-Sheibani brothers, and numerous persons of Iranian descent or of the
Shi'a branch of Islam. The report concludes that few of these victims
became targets of the regime for any crime; rather, they were arrested
and held as hostages in order to force a relative, who may have escaped
abroad, to surrender. Others were arrested due to their family's link
to a political opponent or simply because of their ethnic origin (see
Section 1.d.).
The Special Rapporteur and several human rights groups continued to
request that the Government provide information about the 1991 arrest
of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim Al-Khoei and 108 of his
associates. The Ayatollah died while under house arrest in Al-Najaf.
Other individuals who were arrested with him have not been accounted
for, and the Government refuses to respond to queries regarding their
status. Similarly AI identified a number of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr's
aides who were arrested in the weeks prior to his killing in February
1999 (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 1.g.). Their whereabouts remain
unknown. In its November 1999 report, AI identified eight aides of Al-
Sadr who disappeared.
The Government failed to return, or account for, a large number of
Kuwaiti citizens and citizens of other countries who were detained
during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Government officials, including
military leaders known to have been among the last to see the persons
who disappeared during the occupation, have refused to respond to the
hundreds of outstanding inquiries about the missing. Of 609 cases of
missing Kuwaiti citizens under review by the Tripartite Commission on
Gulf War Missing, only 3 have been resolved. The Government denies
having any knowledge of the others and claims that any relevant records
were lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. In a December report to the
U.N. Security Council, the U.N. Secretary General criticized the
Government's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations on the issue
of the missing Kuwaiti citizens. Iran reports that 5,000 Iranian
prisoners from the IranIraq War are unaccounted for by Iraq.
In addition to the tens of thousands of reported disappearances,
human rights groups reported during the year that the Government
continued to hold thousands of other Iraqis in incommunicado detention
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, the security
services routinely and systematically tortured detainees. According to
former prisoners, torture techniques included branding, electric shocks
administered to the genitals and other areas, beating, pulling out of
fingernails, burning with hot irons and blowtorches, suspension from
rotating ceiling fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of
limbs, denial of food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark
and extremely small compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm
family members and relatives. Evidence of such torture often was
apparent when security forces returned the mutilated bodies of torture
victims to their families. There are persistent reports that the
families are made to pay for the cost of executions. Iraqi refugees who
arrive in Europe often reported instances of torture to receiving
governments, and displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their
claims. AI noted that Iraqi authorities have failed to investigate
these reports.
During the year, the Special Rapporteur continued to receive
reports that arrested persons routinely are subjected to mistreatment,
including prolonged interrogations accompanied by torture, beatings,
and various deprivations. For some years, the Special Rapporteur has
expressed concern about cruel and unusual punishments prescribed by the
law, including amputations and brandings. During the year, authorities
reportedly introduced tongue amputation as a punishment for persons who
criticize Saddam Hussein or his family. In September government
authorities reportedly amputated the tongue of a person who allegedly
criticized Saddam Hussein. Following the amputation, authorities
reportedly drove him around in an open truck and broadcast his alleged
crime and punishment.
Human rights organizations, and opposition groups continued to
receive reports of women who suffered from severe psychological trauma
after being raped while in custody. Security forces also reportedly
assault sexually both regime officials and opposition members in order
to blackmail them into compliance. Former Mukhabarat member Khalid Al-
Janabi reported that a Mukhabarat unit, the Technical Operations
Directorate, uses rape and sexual assault in a systematic and
institutionalized manner for political purposes. The unit reportedly
also videotaped the rape of female relatives of suspected
oppositionists and used the videotapes for blackmail purposes and to
ensure their future cooperation (see Section 1.f.).
The security forces allegedly raped women who were captured during
the Anfal Campaign and during the occupation of Kuwait. The Government
never has acknowledged these reports, conducted any investigation, nor
taken action against those who committed the rapes.
There were reports that Uday Hussein ordered security forces to
torture members of the country's national soccer team during the year.
For example, three soccer players who lost an October game in the Asian
Cup quarter finals reportedly were whipped and detained for three days.
A former Iraqi international soccer player stated in August 1999 that
he and his teammates were tortured on Uday Hussein's orders for not
winning matches. These claims lend credence to previous similar
reports.
KDP forces reportedly entered Assyrian villages on different
occasions and beat villagers (see Section 2.d.). Assyrian groups
reported several instances of mob violence by Muslims against
Christians in the north in recent years (see Section 5).
Prison conditions are extremely poor. There reportedly are numerous
official, semiofficial, and private prisons throughout the country.
Overcrowding is a serious problem. In May 1998, Labor and Social
Affairs Minister Abdul Hamid Aziz Sabah stated in an interview that
``the prisons are filled to five times their capacity and the situation
is serious.'' Sabah was dismissed from his post after the interview,
and the government-owned daily newspaper Babel reiterated the
Government's longstanding claim that it holds virtually no prisoners.
It is unclear to what extent the mass executions committed pursuant to
the ``prison cleansing'' campaign have reduced overcrowding (see
Section 1.a.).
Certain prisons are infamous for routine mistreatment of prisoners.
Abu Ghurayb, Baladiat, Makasib, Rashidiya, Radwaniyah, and other
prisons reportedly have torture chambers. There are numerous mentally
ill prisoners at Al-Shamma'iya prison in Baghdad, which reportedly is
the site of torture and a number of disappearances. The Al-Radwaniyah
detention center is a former prisoner-of-war facility near Baghdad and
reportedly the site of torture as well as mass executions (see Section
1.a.). This prison was the principal detention center for persons
arrested following the civil uprisings of 1991.
During the year, the Special Rapporteur reported receiving
information about two detention facilities in which prisoners are
locked in metal boxes the size of coffins that reportedly are opened
for only 30 minutes each day. There also were reports that in Sijn al-
Tarbout prison and Quortiyya prison, prisoners are fed only liquids. A
multistory underground detention and torture center reportedly was
built under the general military hospital building close to the Al-
Rashid military camp on the outskirts of Baghdad. The Center for Human
Rights of the Iraqi Communist Party stated that the complex includes
torture and execution chambers. A section reportedly is reserved for
prisoners in a ``frozen'' state--that is, those whose status, fate, or
whereabouts are not disclosed.
Hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of Iranian
origin, who had disappeared in the early 1980's during the IranIraq
war, reportedly are being held incommunicado at the Abu Ghurayb prison.
According to a report received by the Special Rapporteur in 1998, such
persons have been detained without charge for close to 2 decades in
extremely harsh conditions. The report states that many of the
detainees were used as subjects in the country's outlawed experimental
chemical and biological weapons programs.
Reports of deaths due to poor conditions in prisons and detention
facilities also continued during the year. The Iraqi Communist Party
reported that 13 prisoners died at Makaseb detention center in December
1999 and January as a result of torture and poor prison conditions. The
13 prisoners reportedly were among the Shi'a detained in the aftermath
of the protests following the February 1999 assassination of Sheik Al-
Sadr (see Section 1.g.). In August the ICP reported that three
political prisoners died from illnesses contracted in Abu Ghurayb
prison. The prisoners reportedly were denied medical treatment.
The Government does not permit visits by human rights monitors.
Iraqi Kurdish regional officials reported that prisons in the three
northern provinces were open to the International Committee for the Red
Cross (ICRC) and other international monitors. According to the ICRC,
regular and consistent improvement in conditions were observed on their
weekly prison visits to declared prisons. However, both the PUK and the
KDP reportedly maintain private, undeclared prisons, and both groups
reportedly deny access to ICRC officials.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
Legal Code explicitly prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however,
the authorities routinely engaged in these practices. The Special
Rapporteur continued to receive reports of widespread arbitrary arrest
and detention, often for long periods of time, without access to a
lawyer or the courts. As indicated in the November 1999, AI report
entitled, ``Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression,'' many thousands of
persons have been arrested arbitrarily in recent years because of
suspected opposition activities or because they are related to persons
sought by the authorities. Those arrested often are taken away by
plainclothes security agents who offer no explanation and produce no
warrant to the person or family members (see Section 1.f.). The
authorities deny detainees legal representation and visits by family
members. In most cases, family members do not know the whereabouts of
detainees and do not make inquiries due to fear of reprisal. Many
persons are taken away in front of family members who hear nothing
further until days, months, or years later, when they are told to pick
up the often-mutilated corpse of their relative. There also were
reports of the widespread practice of holding family members and close
associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see Section
1.f.).
In April security forces reportedly arrested a number of Republican
Guard and Special Security Forces personnel following what the
Government claimed was a coup attempt.
Mass arbitrary arrests and detentions often occur in areas where
antigovernment leaflets have been distributed. Other arrests have no
apparent basis. For example, in July 1999, Ahlam Khadom Rammahi, a
housewife who left Iraq in 1982, traveled from London using her British
passport to visit her mother. Police arrested Rammahi on August 5,
1999. No reason was stated for the arrest, and government officials did
not inform her family of her whereabouts. AI reported that Rammahi was
released on September 1999 as a result of international pressure. She
subsequently was able to rejoin her family in the United Kingdom.
According to international human rights groups, numerous foreigners
arrested arbitrarily in previous years also remain in detention.
The Government reportedly targets the Shi'a Muslim community for
arbitrary arrest and other abuses. Security forces arrested hundreds of
persons in al-Najaf, Karbala, and the Shi'a section of Baghdad
following an anonymous distribution of antigovernment leaflets. In the
weeks preceding the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr
and two of his sons, many of Al-Sadr's aides were arrested, and their
whereabouts still were unknown at year's end (see Sections 1.a. and
1.g.). Hundreds more reportedly were arrested and the houses of many
demolished in the weeks following the killing (see Section 1.g.).
Although no statistics are available, observers estimate the number
of political detainees to be in the tens of thousands, some of whom
have been held for decades.
The Government announced in June 1999 a general amnesty for Iraqis
who had left the country illegally or were exiled officially for a
specified period of time but failed to return after the period of exile
expired (see Section 2.d.). No citizens are known to have returned to
the country based upon this amnesty. An estimated 1 to 2 million self-
exiled citizens reportedly remain fearful of returning to the country.
The PUK and the KDP reportedly hold approximately 500 political
detainees in the north of the country. The KDP and PUK reached
agreement for the mutual release of political prisoners in 1999. In
March the KDP released 10 PUK prisoners and the PUK released 5 KDP
prisoners (see Section 1.g.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent,
and there is no check on the President's power to override any court
decision. In 1999 the Special Rapporteur and international human rights
groups observed that the repressive nature of the political and legal
systems precludes application of the rule of law. Numerous laws lend
themselves to continued repression, and the Government uses
extrajudicial methods to extract confessions or coerce cooperation with
the regime.
There are two parallel judicial systems: The regular courts, which
try common criminal offenses, and the special security courts, which
generally try national security cases but also may try criminal cases.
In addition to the Court of Appeal, there is the Court of Cassation,
which is the highest court.
Special security courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving
espionage and treason, peaceful political dissent, smuggling, currency
exchange violations, and drug trafficking. According to the Special
Rapporteur and other sources, military officers or civil servants with
no legal training head these tribunals, which hear cases in secret.
Authorities often hold defendants incommunicado and do not permit
contact with lawyers. The courts admit confessions extracted by
torture, which often serve as the basis for conviction. Many cases
appear to end in summary execution, although defendants may appeal to
the President for clemency. Saddam Hussein may grant clemency in any
case that suits his political goals or personal predilection. There are
no Shari'a (Islamic law) courts; however, regular courts are empowered
to administer Islamic law in cases involving personal status, such as
divorce and inheritance.
Procedures in the regular courts theoretically provide for many
protections. However, the regime often assigns to the security courts
cases that, on their legal merits, would appear to fall under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Trials in the regular courts are
public, and defendants are entitled to counsel, at government expense
in the case of indigents. Defense lawyers have the right to review the
charges and evidence brought against their clients. There is no jury
system; panels of three judges try cases. Defendants have the right to
appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation.
The Government shields certain groups from prosecution for alleged
crimes. For example, a 1990 decree grants immunity to men who commit
``honor crimes,'' a violent assault with intent to commit murder
against a female by a relative for her perceived immodest behavior or
alleged sexual misconduct (see Section 5). A 1992 decree grants
immunity from prosecution to members of the Ba'th Party and security
forces who kill anyone while in pursuit of army deserters. Unconfirmed
but widespread reports indicate that this decree has been applied to
prevent trials or punishment of government officials. The PUK declared
during the year that ``honor crime'' immunity would not apply in the
area under its control.
It is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners,
because the Government rarely acknowledges arrests or imprisonments,
and families are afraid to talk about arrests. Many of the tens of
thousands of persons who disappeared or were killed in recent years
originally were held as political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government frequently infringed on citizens'
constitutional right to privacy, particularly in cases allegedly
involving national security. The law defines security offenses so
broadly that authorities effectively are exempt from the legal
requirement to obtain search warrants, and searches without warrants
are commonplace. The regime routinely ignored constitutional provisions
designed to protect the confidentiality of mail, telegraphic
correspondence, and telephone conversations. The Government
periodically jammed news broadcasts from outside the country, including
those of opposition groups. The security services and the Ba'th Party
maintain pervasive networks of informers to deter dissident activity
and instill fear in the public.
In November 1999, the Government expelled more than 4,000 families
that had sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War.
In 1999 and previous years, the regime periodically sealed off
entire districts in Kirkuk and conducted day-long, housetohouse
searches, evidently as part of its ``Arabization'' campaign to harass
and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkomans from the region (see Sections 2.d.
and 5). Government officials also take hostage members of minority
groups to intimidate their families into leaving their home regions
(see Sections 1.d., 2.d., and 5).
The authorities continued systematically to hold family members and
close associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see
Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 1.g.). For example, former General Najib
Al-Salahi, who fled to Jordan in 1995, reported that some of his
relatives had been arrested and harassed since he left the country and
criticized publicly the Government. In June General Al-Salahi
reportedly received a videotape of security forces raping a female
family member. He subsequently received a telephone call from an
intelligence agent who stated that another female relative was being
held and warned him to stop speaking out against the Government. The
Special Rapporteur reported that security forces killed the mother of a
prominent opposition leader.
In the past, the authorities demolished the houses and detained and
executed family members of Shi'a who protested government actions (see
Section 1.g.).
The Special Rapporteur noted that guilt by association is
facilitated by administrative requirements imposed on relatives of
deserters or other perceived opponents of the regime. For example,
relatives who do not report deserters may lose their ration cards for
purchasing government-controlled food supplies, be evicted from their
residences, or face the arrest of other family members. The Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October and
December 1999 that authorities denied food ration cards to families
that failed to send their young sons to the ``Lion Cubs of Saddam''
compulsory weapons-training camps (see Section 5). Conscripts are
required to secure a guarantor to sign a document stating that the
named conscript would not desert military service and that the
guarantor would accept personal responsibility if the conscript
deserted.
The Special Security Office reportedly continued efforts to
intimidate the relatives of opposition members. Relatives of citizens
outside the country who were suspected of sympathizing with the
opposition were forced to call the suspected opposition members to warm
them against participating in opposition conferences or activities
during the year.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Following the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah
Mohammad Sadeq Al-Sadr and his sons (see Section 1.a.), there were
widespread reports of military assaults on protesters in areas of
Baghdad heavily populated by Shi'a, and in cities with a Shi'a majority
such as Karbala, Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Basra, in which hundreds of
persons were killed. While a funeral for Al-Sadr was prohibited,
spontaneous gatherings of mourners took place in the days after his
death. Government security forces used excessive force in breaking up
these illegal gatherings, killing hundreds of persons. For example, in
the Shi'a district of Al-Thawra in Baghdad, a crowd of tens of
thousands was attacked by government security forces using automatic
weapons and armored vehicles. The attack resulted in the deaths of
approximately 25 mourners (although estimates range up to 400)
including, according to one report, the imam of the Al-Thawra mosque.
According to Shi'a sources, martial law was declared throughout the
region in reaction to the Al-Sadr killing.
Authorities continued to target alleged supporters of Al-Sadr
during the year. In February security officials reportedly executed 30
religious school students who had been arrested after Al-Sadr's
killing. In March numerous Shi'a who fled the country in 1999 and
earlier in the year, told HRW that security forces interrogated,
detained, and tortured them. In May six other students who were
arrested following the killing were sentenced to death. It was unknown
whether the death sentences had been carried out by year's end.
As a reprisal for the disturbances following Al-Sadr's killing, the
Government expelled approximately 4,000 Shi'a families from Baghdad and
sent them to the south and west in 1999 and during the year.
The Government continued to ``Arabize'' certain Kurdish areas, such
as the urban centers of Kirkuk and Mosul, through the forced movement
of local residents from their homes and villages and their replacement
by Arabs from outside the area (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
Landmines in the north, mostly planted by the Government before
1991, continued to kill and maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid
during the Iran-Iraq War; however, the army failed to clear them before
it abandoned the area. The mines appear to have been planted
haphazardly in civilian areas. Landmines also are a problem along the
Iraq-Iran border throughout the central and southern areas in the
country. There is no information on civilian casualties or the
Government's efforts, if any, to clear old mine fields in areas under
the central Government's control. According to reports by the U.N.
Office of Project Services, the Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian
Peoples' Aid, over 3,000 persons have been killed by landmines in the
three northern governates since the 1991 uprising. The Special
Rapporteur repeatedly has reminded the Government of its obligation
under the Landmines Protocol to protect civilians from the effects of
mines. Various nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued efforts
to remove landmines from the area and increase awareness of the mine
problem among local residents.
In December 1998, the Government declared that mine-clearing
activity was subversive and ordered NGO workers performing such
activity to leave the country. In April 1999, a New Zealander working
for the U.N. mine-clearing program in the north was shot and killed at
close range by an unknown assailant. The KDP arrested a person who
claimed to have killed the U.N. worker on behalf of Saddam Hussein's
Fedayeen.
After the 1991 Gulf War, victims and eyewitnesses described war
crimes perpetrated by the regime, including deliberate killing,
torture, rape, pillage, and hostage-taking as directly related to the
Gulf War. HRW and other organizations have worked with various
governments to bring a genocide case at the International Court of
Justice against the Government for its conduct of the Anfal campaign
against the Kurds in 1988.
No hostilities were reported between the two major Iraqi Kurdish
parties in de facto control of northern Iraq. The KDP and the PUK
agreed in September 1998 to unify their administrations; however,
little progress was made toward implementing the agreement. In October
1999, senior officials from the two parties agreed on a series of
measures, including prisoner exchanges, the return of internally
displaced persons (IDP's) to their homes, and arrangements for freedom
of movement between their respective areas. Most of the measures were
not implemented; however, the PUK and KDP conducted a small prisoner
exchange in March (see Section 1.d.). In April the ICRC reported that
IDP's on both sides still were living in tents or in open, unheated
buildings (see Section 2.d.).
Armed hostilities and resulting deaths were reported between the
KDP and the Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF), the PUK and the IWCP, the PUK
and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the KDP and the PKK. There
were a number of bomb attacks on civilian targets during the year in
both the KDP- and PUK-controlled areas, which killed at least 12
persons.
KDP forces attacked the Erbil headquarters of the ITF in July,
killing at least two persons and injuring several others. Tension
between the KDP and the ITF had been building for months as the KDP
leadership expressed frustration that the ITF failed to accept the KDP
as the local authority. The ITF complained that the KDP interfered in
its internal affairs.
In July the PUK reportedly ordered all opposition groups to move
their offices out of Sulaymaniah's city center following a number of
bombings; the IWCP reportedly refused to move. PUK security forces
subsequently killed at least six IWCP members and arrested several
others at an IWCP office in Sulaymaniah. PUK forces also killed several
IWCP members who were inside a car. In connection with this dispute,
the PUK closed the IWCPaffiliated Independent Women's Organization and
the Women's Protection Center in July and detained temporarily 12 women
who had been staying at an abused women's shelter within the Center.
There were repeated military incursions by Turkish security forces
into northern Iraq during the year. In late 1999, the Turkish airforce
targeted PKK positions in both KDP and PUK controlled areas. In April,
May, and August, Turkish troops again were deployed to the region. In
one incident, Turkish troops killed 38 Kurdish civilians. In July the
PUK attempted to push the PKK out of its territory and fighting ensued.
Both the PKK and the PUK suffered a number of casualties. In December
hundreds of Turkish troops were deployed to the region, threatening to
intervene on the PUK's behalf. Subsequently, the PUK and the PKK
declared a cease-fire.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press ``in compliance with the
revolutionary, national, and progressive trend;'' however, in practice
the Government does not permit freedom of speech or of the press, and
does not tolerate political dissent in areas under its control. In
November the U.N. General Assembly criticized the Government's
``suppression of freedom of thought, expression, information,
association, and assembly.'' The Special Rapporteur stated in October
1999 that citizens lived ``in a climate of fear'' in which whatever
they said or did, particularly in the area of politics, involved ``the
risk of arrest and interrogation by the police or military
intelligence.'' He noted that ``the mere suggestion that someone is not
a supporter of the President carries the prospect of the death
penalty.''
The Government and the Ba'th Party own all print and broadcast
media, and operate them as propaganda outlets. They generally do not
report opposing points of view that are expressed, either domestically
or abroad. A 1999 Freedom House report rated Iraqi press freedom at 98
out of a possible 100 points, with 0 being the most free and 100 being
the most controlled. Several statutes and decrees suppress freedom of
speech and of the press, including: Revolutionary Command Council
Decree Number 840 of 1986, which penalizes free expression and
stipulates the death penalty for anyone insulting the President or
other high government officials; Section 214 of the Penal Code, which
prohibits singing a song likely to cause civil strife; and the 1968
Press Act, which prohibits the writing of articles on 12 specific
subjects, including those detrimental to the President, the
Revolutionary Command Council, and the Ba'th Party.
According to the Special Rapporteur, journalists are under
continuous pressure to join the Ba'th party and must follow the
mandates of the Iraqi Union of Journalists, headed by Uday Hussein.
According to Iraqi sources, in 1999 Uday Hussein dismissed hundreds of
union members who had not praised Saddam Hussein and the regime
sufficiently or often enough (see Section 6.a.). In September 1999,
journalist and Baghdad University professor Hashem Hasan was arrested
after declining an appointment as editor of one of Uday Hussein's
publications. The Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) sent a
letter of appeal to Uday Hussein; however, Hassan's fate and
whereabouts remain unknown (see Section 1.b.).
The Ministry of Culture and Information periodically holds meetings
at which they issue general guidelines for the press. Foreign
journalists must work from offices located within the ministry building
and are accompanied everywhere they go by ministry officers, who
reportedly restrict their movements and make it impossible for them to
interact freely with citizens. Many Western news services are
represented in Baghdad by bureaucrats who are based in the Ministry of
Culture and Information.
The Government regularly jams foreign news broadcasts (see Section
1.f.). Satellite dishes, modems, and fax machines are banned although
some restrictions reportedly were lifted in 1999. Security forces
reportedly raided homes of persons suspected of using satellite dishes
during the year. In October the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified
all diplomatic missions and international organizations that they would
need to obtain government approval before bringing ``any technical
apparatus'' into the country. During the year, the Government opened
five Internet cafes where persons are permitted to view websites
provided by the Ministry of Culture and Information.
Books may be published only with the authorization of the Ministry
of Culture and Information. The Ministry of Education often sends
textbooks with proregime propaganda to Kurdish regions; however, Kurds
routinely remove propaganda items from such textbooks.
The Government does not respect academic freedom and exercises
strict control over academic publications. University staff are hired
and fired depending on their support for the Government.
In the north, many independent newspapers have appeared over the
past 8 years, as have opposition radio and television broadcasts. The
absence of central authority permits significant freedom of expression,
including criticism of the regional Kurdish authorities; however, most
journalists are influenced or controlled by various political
organizations. Satellite services and related equipment for telephone,
fax, Internet, and television services are available. Although the
rival Kurdish parties in the north, the PUK and KDP, state that full
press freedom is allowed in areas under their respective control, in
practice neither effectively permits distribution of the opposing
group's newspapers and other literature.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts
this right in practice. Except in Kurdishcontrolled northern areas,
citizens legally may not assemble other than to express support for the
regime. The Government regularly orchestrates crowds to demonstrate
support for the regime and its policies through financial incentives
for those who participate and threats of violence against those who do
not. Widespread military and paramilitary attacks on persons who
violated restrictions on peaceful assembly were reported throughout the
year (see Section 1.g.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. The Government controls
the establishment of political parties, regulates their internal
affairs, and monitors their activities. New political parties must be
based in Baghdad and are prohibited from having any ethnic or religious
character. The political magazine Alef-Be, which is published by the
Ministry of Culture and Information, reported in December 1999 that two
political groups would not be permitted to form parties because they
had an insufficient number of members. The magazine reprinted the
conditions necessary to establish political parties, which include the
requirement that a political group must have at least 150 members over
the age of 25. A 1999 law also stipulates that new parties must ``take
pride'' in the 1958 and 1968 revolutions, which created the republic
and brought the Ba'th party to power. Several parties are outlawed
specifically, and membership in them is a capital offense (see Section
3). A 1974 law prescribes the death penalty for anyone ``infiltrating''
the Ba'th Party.
In contrast, in the Kurdish-controlled north, numerous political
parties and social and cultural organizations exist.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the Government severely restricts this right in
practice. Islam is the official state religion.
The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs monitors places of
worship, appoints the clergy, approves the building and repair of all
places of worship, and approves the publication of all religious
literature.
Over 95 percent of the population are Muslim. The (predominantly
Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority, while Sunni
Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent (approximately 18 to 20 percent are
Sunni Kurds, 13 to 16 percent are Sunni Arabs, and the rest are Sunni
Turkomans). The remaining approximately 5 percent consist of Christians
(Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenian Orthodox),
Yazidis, and a small number of Jews and Mandaeans.
The Government does not recognize political organizations that have
been formed by Shi'a Muslims or Assyrian Christians. These groups
continued to attract support despite their illegal status. There are
religious qualifications for government office; candidates for the
National Assembly, for example, ``must believe in God'' (see Section
3).
Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs
traditionally have dominated economic and political life. Sunni Arabs
are at a distinct advantage in all areas of secular life, including
civil, political, military, and economic. Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are not
distinct ethnically. Shi'a Arabs have supported an independent country
alongside Sunni Arabs since the 1920 Revolt, many joined the Ba'th
Party, and Shi'a formed the core of the army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
War.
The Government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of
murder, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the
religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim
population. Despite nominal legal protection of religious equality, the
regime has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy and those who follow the
Shi'a faith. Forces from the Mukhabarat, General Security (Amn Al-Amm),
the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the
Ba'th Party have killed senior Shi'a clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques
and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 civil
uprising), arrested tens of thousands of Shi'a, interfered with Shi'a
religious education, and prevented Shi'a adherents from performing
their religious rites. Security agents reportedly are stationed at all
the major Shi'a mosques and shrines and search, harass, and arbitrarily
arrest worshipers.
The following government restrictions on religious rights remained
in effect during the year: Restrictions and outright bans on communal
Friday prayer by Shi'a Muslims; restrictions on the loaning of books by
Shi'a mosque libraries; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a programs on
government-controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication of
Shi'a books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on funeral
processions other than those organized by the Government; a ban on
other Shi'a funeral observances such as gatherings for Koran reading;
and the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings that
commemorate Shi'a holy days. Shi'a groups report that they captured
documents from the security services during the 1991 uprising, which
listed thousands of forbidden Shi'a religious writings. Security forces
reportedly still were encamped in the shrine to Imam Ali at Al-Najaf,
one of Shi'a Islam's holiest sites, and at the former Shi'a theological
school in Al-Najaf; security forces have been there since 1991.
In June 1999, several Shi'a opposition groups reported that the
Government instituted a new program in the predominantly Shi'a
districts of Baghdad that used food ration cards to restrict where
individuals could pray. The ration cards, part of the U.N. oil-for-food
program, reportedly are checked when the bearer enters a mosque and are
printed with a notice of severe penalties for those who attempt to pray
at an unauthorized location. Shi'a sources outside the country who
reported this policy believe that it is aimed not only at preventing
unauthorized religious gatherings of Shi'a, but at stopping Shi'a
adherents from attending Friday prayers in Sunni mosques, to which many
pious Shi'a have turned since the closure of their own mosques.
Shi'a groups reported numerous instances of religious scholars
being subjected to arrest, assault, and harassment in the past several
years, particularly in the internationally renowned Shi'a academic
center of Najaf. This followed years of government manipulation of the
Najaf theological schools. AI reported that the Government deported
systematically tens of thousands of Shi'a (both Arabs and Kurds) to
Iran in the late 1970's and early 1980's, on the basis that they were
of Persian descent. According to Shi'a sources, religious scholars and
Shi'a merchants who supported the schools financially, were prime
targets for deportation. In the 1980's, during the IranIraq war, it was
reported widely that the Government expelled and denied visas to
thousands of foreign scholars who wished to study at Najaf. After the
1991 popular uprising, the Government relaxed some restrictions on
Shi'a attending the schools, perhaps believing that this would reduce
popular anger over the arrests and executions of religious leaders.
However, the revival of the schools appears greatly to have exceeded
the Government's expectations, and led to an increased government
crackdown on the Shi'a religious establishment, including the
requirement that speeches by imams in mosques be based upon government-
provided material that attacked fundamentalist trends. A campaign of
arrests in Mosul against fundamentalist trends was reported in
September 1999.
Authorities continued to target alleged supporters of Al-Sadr
during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). Two months prior to the
anniversary of Al-Sadr's killing, security forces were deployed around
shrines, mosques, and other religious institutions, and mosques were
closed except during prayer time. In February security officials
reportedly executed 30 religious school students who had been arrested
after Al-Sadr's killing. In May six other students who were arrested
following Al-Sadr's killing were sentenced to death. It was unknown
whether the death sentences had been carried out by year's end. As a
reprisal for the disturbances following Al-Sadr's killing, the
Government expelled approximately 4,000 Shi'a families from Baghdad and
sent them to the south and west in 1999 and during the year.
The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with
religious pilgrimages, both of Muslim citizens who wish to make the
Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of citizen and noncitizen Muslim pilgrims
who travel to holy sites in the country (see Section 2.d.).
Approval procedures established by the U.N. Sanctions Committee
require advance notification to regional air controllers and coalition
military aircraft for flights undertaken for religious and humanitarian
purposes that originate from and return to the country. In 1998 the
U.N. Sanctions Committee offered to disburse vouchers for travel and
expenses to pilgrims making the Hajj; however, the Government rejected
this offer. In 1999 the Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds
to cover Hajjrelated expenses via a neutral third party. The Government
again rejected the opportunity. In both years, the Government insisted
that these funds would be accepted only if they were paid in cash to
the central bank. As a result, in both 1998 and 1999, no Iraqi pilgrims
were able to take advantage of the available funds. According to press
reports, only 4,000 Iraqi pilgrims made the Hajj in 1999, despite the
availability of 22,000 spaces.
In 1999 the Government flew several airplanes full of elderly Hajj
pilgrims unannounced to Saudi Arabia.
Twice each year--on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram
and 40 days later in the month of Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from throughout
the country and around the world travel to the Iraqi city of Karbala to
commemorate the death there centuries ago of the Imam Hussein. The
Government for several decades has interfered with these ``Ashura''
commemorations by preventing processions on foot into the city. In 1998
and 1999, violent incidents were reported between Iraqi pilgrims on one
side and Ba'th party members and security forces enforcing the ban on
the other. In May the Government prohibited persons from making the
pilgrimage to Karbala. Security forces opened fire on persons who
attempted to walk from Al-Najaf to Karbala (see Section 1.g.).
The Government also has sought to undermine the identity of
minority Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups.
The Special Rapporteur and others reported that the Government has
engaged in various abuses against the country's 350,000 Assyrian and
Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from
northern areas and repression of political rights (see Section 2.d.).
Most Assyrians live in the northern governates, and the Government
often has accused them of collaborating with Iraqi Kurds. In the north,
Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military
forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal
Campaign and reportedly tortured and executed many Assyrians. Both
major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the Government
occasionally targets Assyrians, as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkomans,
in expulsions from Kirkuk in order to attempt to Arabize the city (see
Section 2.d.).
The Government imposes some repressive measures on Yazidis (see
Section 5). For example, 33 members of the Yazidi community of Mosul,
arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for (see Section 1.b.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts movement within
the country of citizens and foreigners. Persons who enter sensitive
border areas and numerous designated security zones are subject to
arrest. Police checkpoints are common on major roads and highways.
The Government requires citizens to obtain specific government
authorization and expensive exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens may
not make more than two trips abroad annually. Before traveling abroad,
citizens are required to post collateral, which is refundable only upon
their return. There are restrictions on the amount of currency that may
be taken out of the country. Women are not permitted to travel outside
the country alone; male relatives must escort them (see Section 5).
Prior to December 1999, every student who wished to travel abroad was
required to provide a guarantor who would be liable if the student
failed to return. In December 1999, authorities banned all travel for
students (including those in grade school), cancelled spring and summer
holidays, and enrolled students in compulsory military training and
weapons-use courses.
In what appeared to be an effort to lure citizens living abroad
back to the country, government radio announced in June 1999 an amnesty
for teachers who left the country illegally after the Gulf War. Shortly
thereafter the Revolutionary Command Council decreed a general amnesty
for all citizens who either had left the country illegally or who had
failed to return after the period of exile had expired (see Section
1.d.). The decree stated that ``charges of illegal departure, forging
official documents towards this purpose, and disrupting public duties
that were pressed before the issuance of this decree shall be dropped
effective immediately.'' In October 1999, Justice Minster Shabib Al-
Maliki announced that authorities may seize assets belonging to Iraqis
living outside the country who did not return in response to the
amnesty decree. A special ministerial committee was formed to track and
monitor Iraqis inside the country who received money from relatives
living abroad.
A November 1999 law placed additional penalties on citizens who
attempt to leave the country illegally. Under the law, a prison term of
up to 10 years and ``confiscation of movable and immovable property''
is to be imposed on anyone who attempts to leave illegally. Similar
penalties face anyone found to encourage or assist persons banned from
travel, including health care professionals, engineers, and university
professors. In January the director of the Real Estate Registration
Department stated that pursuant to the decree, the Government
confiscated the property of a number of persons.
The Government restricts foreign travel by journalists, authors,
university professors, doctors, scientists, and all employees of the
Ministry of Information. Security authorities interrogate all media
employees, journalists, and writers upon their return from foreign
travel. In December 1999, Captain Ammar Yasir Mahyush and retired Major
Jasim Muhsin Ala reportedly were executed for their attempt to flee the
country in February 1999.
The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with
religious pilgrimages, both of Muslim citizens who wish to make the
Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of citizen and noncitizen Muslim pilgrims
to holy sites in Iraq (see Section 2.c.).
Foreign spouses of citizens who have resided in the country for 5
years (1 year for spouses of government employees) are required to
apply for naturalization as citizens. Many foreigners thus become
subject to travel restrictions. The penalties for noncompliance
include, but are not limited to, loss of the spouse's job, a
substantial financial penalty, and repayment of any governmental
educational expenses. The Government prevents many citizens who also
hold citizenship in another country, especially the children of Iraqi
fathers and foreign-born mothers, from visiting the country of their
other nationality.
The U.N. Secretary General estimates that there are more than half
a million IDP's remaining in the three northern provinces (Erbil,
Dohuk, and Sulaymaniah), most of whom fled government-controlled areas
in early 1991 during the uprising that followed the Gulf War. As
reported by the Special Rapporteur, the Government continued its
``Arabization'' policy by discriminating against and forcibly
relocating the non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkomans, and
Assyrians living in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour, Tuz, Khoramatu,
and other districts. Most observers view the policy as an attempt to
decrease the proportion of non-Arab citizens in the oil-rich Kirkuk
region, and thereby secure Arab demographic control of the area. For
example, Kurdish grade school teachers and low-ranking civil servants
are reassigned systematically outside of Kirkuk province, which has
been renamed Al-Ta'mim (``Nationalization''). The Revolutionary Command
Council has mandated that new housing and employment be created for
Arab residents who have been resettled in Kirkuk, while new
construction or renovation of Kurd-owned property reportedly is
prohibited. Non-Arabs are not permitted to sell their homes, except to
Arabs, nor register or inherit property. In contrast, in September the
Ta'mim Voice newspaper reported that a significant sum of money would
be made available to Arab citizens of Kirkuk to fund construction.
As part of the Arabization process, the Government continued to
deport Kurdish and Turkoman families. Regional Kurdish authorities
report that between January and June, 155 families (a total of 875
individuals) were expelled to the Kurdish-controlled north. The
authorities estimate that since 1991, more than 94,000 persons have
been displaced. Persons may avoid expulsion if they relinquish their
Kurdish, Turkoman, or Assyrian identity and register as Arabs. Persons
who refuse to relinquish their identity may have their assets
expropriated and their ration cards withdrawn prior to being deported.
According to numerous deportees in the north, the Government
generally uses a systematic procedure to evict and deport non-Arab
citizens. Frequently, a security force official demands that a family
change its ethnicity from Kurdish or Turkoman to Arab. Subsequently,
security officials frequently arrest the head of household and tell the
other family members that the person will be imprisoned until they
agree to settle elsewhere in the country. Such families frequently
choose to move to the north; family members must sign a form that
states that the departure is voluntary and they are not allowed to take
any property or their food ration cards issued under the U.N. oil-for-
food program. The Government frequently transfers the family's house to
an Arab Ba'th Party member.
Those expelled are not permitted to return. The Special Rapporteur
reported in 1999 that citizens who provide employment, food or shelter
to returning or newly arriving Kurds are subject to arrest. In order to
encourage departure and prevent displaced persons from returning, the
Government reportedly has placed landmines in the area around Kirkuk,
and has declared it a military and security zone. Roads into the area
are fortified with military checkpoints. The Government denies that it
expels non-Arab families.
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees remain abroad. Apart from those
suspected of sympathizing with Iran, most fled after the Government's
suppression of the civil uprising of 1991; others are Kurds who fled
during the Anfal Campaign of 1988. Of the 1.5 million refugees who fled
following the 1991 uprisings, the great majority, particularly Kurds,
have repatriated themselves to areas in the north, outside government
control.
The Government does not provide first asylum or respect the rights
of refugees.
Approximately 12,000 Turkish Kurds who have fled civil strife in
southeastern Turkey remain in northern areas controlled by the central
Government. The UNHCR is treating such displaced persons as refugees
until it reaches an official determination of their status.
The KDP and PUK reiterated their September 1998 agreement to begin
returning to their rightful homes the many thousands of persons that
each had expelled as a result of intra-Kurdish fighting in the three
northern provinces; however, little effort to implement the agreement
took place during the year. In April the ICRC observed that the
displaced persons in the north still were living in tents or in open,
unheated public buildings (see Section 1.g.).
In August 1999, the KDP reportedly imposed a blockade on eight
Assyrian villages near Aqra. ICRC monitors reportedly intervened on the
villages' behalf, and the blockade subsequently was lifted. However,
KDP forces reportedly reentered one of the villages a couple of days
later, rounded up the villagers, and publicly beat two of them. AINA
reported that a similar raid occurred in another village. The KDP
denied that the blockade or village raids occurred.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
President wields power over all instruments of government. Almost all
important officials either are members of Saddam Hussein's family or
are family allies from his home town of Tikrit. Although the Government
has taken steps to increase the perception of democracy, the political
process still is controlled firmly by the State. The 1995 so-called
referendum on Saddam Hussein's presidency was not free and was
dismissed as a sham by most international observers. It included
neither voter privacy nor opposing candidates, and many credible
reports indicated that voters feared possible reprisal if they cast a
dissenting vote. A total of 500 persons reportedly were arrested in
Karbala, Baghdad, and Ramadi provinces for casting negative ballots,
and a member of the intelligence services reportedly was executed for
refusing to vote for the President.
There are strict qualifications for parliamentary candidates; by
law the candidates for the National Assembly must be over 25 years old
and ``believe in God, the principles of the July 17-30 revolution, and
socialism.'' Elections for the National Assembly were held in March;
220 of the 250 parliamentary seats were contested and the 30 remaining
seats were filled by presidential appointees. Out of the 250 seats, 165
seats reportedly were won by members of the Ba'th Party, 55 by
independents, and 30 were appointed by Saddam Hussein to represent the
northern provinces. According to the Special Rapporteur, the Ba'th
Party allegedly instructed a number of its members to run as nominally
independent candidates.
Full political participation at the national level is restricted to
members of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, who are estimated to
constitute about 8 percent of the population. The political system is
dominated by the Party, which governs through the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC). The council is headed by President Saddam Hussein.
However, the RCC exercises both executive and legislative authority.
The RCC dominates the National Assembly, which is completely
subordinate to it and the executive branch.
Opposition political organizations are illegal and severely
suppressed. Membership in certain political parties is punishable by
death. In October security forces reportedly executed eight persons on
charges of forming an opposition organization (see Sections 1.a. and
2.b.). In 1991 the RCC adopted a law that theoretically authorized the
creation of political parties other than the Ba'th Party. However, in
practice the law is used to prohibit parties that do not support the
President and the Government. New parties must be based in Baghdad and
are prohibited from having any ethnic or religious character. In 1999
various media published articles claiming that Saddam Hussein
instructed officials in October 1999 to consider the formation of new
political parties, a state council, and a new constitution. However, a
Ministry of Culture and Information magazine later reported that the
only two groups that attempted to form a party were refused for having
an insufficient number of members.
The Government does not recognize the various political groupings
and parties that have been formed by Shi'a Muslims, Kurds, Assyrians,
Turkomans, or other communities. These political groups continued to
attract support despite their illegal status.
Women and minorities are underrepresented in government and
politics. The law provides for the election of women and minorities to
the National Assembly; however, they have only token representation.
In the north of the country, all central government functions have
been performed by local administrators, mainly Kurds, since the
Government withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative
personnel from the area after the 1991 uprising. A regional parliament
and local government administrators were elected in 1992. This
parliament last met in May 1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de
facto control of northern Iraq, the KDP and the PUK, battled one
another from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to unify
their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July 1999.
The ceasefire has held; however, reunification measures were not
implemented. The PUK held municipal elections in February, which were
the first elections held in the Kurdish-controlled areas since 1992.
Foreign and local election observers reported that the elections
generally were fair.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not permit the establishment of independent
human rights organizations. Citizens have established several human
rights groups abroad and in northern areas not under government
control. Monitors from most foreign and international human rights
groups are not allowed in the country. However, the Government allows
several international humanitarian and aid organizations to operate in
the country.
The Government harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N.
personnel throughout the country, maintained a threat to arrest or kill
relief workers in the north, and staged protests against U.N. offices
in the capital (see Sections 1.g. and 2.a.).
As in previous years, the Government did not allow the U.N. Special
Rapporteur to visit Iraq, nor did it respond to his requests for
information.
In April and again in November, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
and the U.N. General Assembly criticized the ``systematic, widespread,
and extremely grave violations of human rights'' by the Government,
which resulted in ``all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained
by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror.''
For the eighth consecutive year, the Commission called on the U.N.
Secretary General to send human rights monitors to ``help in the
independent verification of reports on the human rights situation in
Iraq.'' The U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities made a similar request. The Government
continued to ignore these calls.
The Special Rapporteur nonetheless was able to gather more
evidence, in part due to interviews with current and past government
officials that illustrated the systemic nature of human rights
violations. He dispatched members of his staff to Kuwait, Jordan, and
other locations to interview victims of government human rights abuses.
The Government operates an official human rights group that
routinely denies allegations of abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and the legal system provide for some rights for
women, children, and minorities; however, in practice the Government
systematically violates these rights.
Women.--Domestic violence against women occurs but little is known
about its extent. Such abuse customarily is addressed within the
tightly knit family structure. There is no public discussion of the
subject, and no statistics are published. Spousal violence constitutes
grounds for divorce and criminal charges; however, suits brought on
these charges reportedly are rare. Under a 1990 law, men who kill
female family members for ``immoral deeds'' may receive immunity from
prosecution for such honor crimes (see Section 1.e.).
In October security forces reportedly beheaded a number of women
suspected of prostitution and some men suspected of facilitating or
covering up such activities (see Section 1.a.).
In April the PUK abolished in the Kurdish-controlled territories
provisions of the Iraqi Penal Code that legitimized honor crimes.
The Special Rapporteur has noted that there is an unusually high
percentage of women in the Kurdish areas, reportedly as a result of the
disappearances of tens of thousands of Kurdish men during the Anfal
Campaign. The Special Rapporteur reported that the widows, daughters,
and mothers of the Anfal Campaign victims are dependent economically on
their relatives or villages because they may not inherit the property
or assets of their missing family members.
Evidence concerning the Anfal Campaign indicates that the
Government killed many women and children, including infants, by firing
squads and in chemical attacks.
The Government states that it is committed to equality for women,
who make up about 20 percent of the work force. It has enacted laws to
protect women from exploitation in the workplace and from sexual
harassment; to permit women to join the regular army, Popular Army, and
police forces; and to equalize women's rights in divorce, land
ownership, taxation, and suffrage. It is difficult to determine the
extent to which these protections are afforded in practice. Women are
not allowed to travel outside the country alone (see Section 2.d.).
There are several women's organizations in the PUK-controlled
regions in the north.
Children.--The Government claims that it has enacted laws to make
education for girls compulsory. No information is available on whether
the Government has enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare
of children. However, the Special Rapporteur and several human rights
groups have collected a substantial body of evidence indicating the
Government's continued disregard for the rights and welfare of
children. The evidence allegedly includes government officials taking
children from minority groups hostage in order to intimidate their
families to leave cities and regions where the regime wishes to create
a Sunni Arab majority (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.).
The Government's failure to comply with relevant U.N. Security
Council resolutions has led to a continuation of economic sanctions.
There were widespread reports that food and medicine that could have
been made available to the general public were stockpiled in warehouses
rather than ordered, or diverted for the personal use of some
officials. The executive director of the U.N. office in charge of the
oil-for-food program confirmed the insufficient placement of orders in
a January letter to the Government, in which he expressed concern about
the low rate of submission of applications in the health, education,
water, sanitation, and oil sectors. He also stated that of the $570
million worth of medicines and medical supplies that had arrived in
Iraq through the oil-for-food program in 1998 and 1999, only 48 percent
had been distributed to clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies.
The Government's management of the oil-for-food program did not
take into account the special requirements of children between the ages
of 1 and 5, despite the U.N. Secretary General's specific injunction
that the Government modify its implementation procedures to address the
needs of this vulnerable group. In 1999 UNICEF issued the results of
the first surveys of child and maternal mortality in Iraq that have
been conducted since 1991. The surveys were conducted between February
and May 1999, in cooperation with the Government in the southern and
central regions, and in cooperation with the local Kurdish authorities
in the north. The surveys revealed that in the south and center parts
of the country, home to 85 percent of the population, children under 5
years old are dying at more than twice the rate that they were a decade
ago. In contrast mortality rates for children under 5 years old in the
Kurdishcontrolled north dropped in the period from 1994 to 1999. The
Special Rapporteur criticized the Government for ``letting innocent
people suffer while [it] maneuvered to get sanctions lifted.'' Had the
Government not waited 5 years to adopt the oil-for-food program in
1996, he stated in October 1999, ``millions of innocent people would
have avoided serious and prolonged suffering.''
For the seventh year, the Government held 3-week training courses
in weapons use, hand-to-hand fighting, rappelling from helicopters, and
infantry tactics for children between 10 and 15 years of age. Camps for
these ``Saddam Cubs'' operated throughout the country. Senior military
officers who supervised the course noted that the children held up
under the ``physical and psychological strain'' of training that lasted
for as long as 14 hours each day. Sources in the Iraqi opposition
report that the army found it difficult to recruit enough children to
fill all of the vacancies in the program. Families reportedly were
threatened with the loss of their food ration cards if they refused to
enroll their children in the grueling course. The Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October 1999 that
authorities were denying food ration cards to families that failed to
send their young sons to Saddam Cubs compulsory weapons-training camps
(see Section 1.f.). Similarly, authorities reportedly withheld school
examination results to students unless they registered in the Fedayeen
Saddam organization.
People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the
Government's policy towards the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--The country's cultural, religious, and
linguistic diversity is not reflected in its political and economic
structure. Various segments of the Sunni Arab community, which itself
constitutes a minority of the population, effectively have controlled
the Government since independence in 1932. Shi'a Arabs, the religious
majority of the population, have long been economically, politically,
and socially disadvantaged. Like the Sunni Kurds and other ethnic and
religious groups in the north, the Shi'a Arabs of the south have been
targeted for particular discrimination and abuse (see Section 2.c.).
Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by
Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years.
Although few Jews remain in the country, government officials
frequently make anti-Semitic statements. For example, during the year,
a Ba'th Party official stated that the ``lowly Jews . . . are
descendants of monkeys and pigs and worshippers of the infidel
tyrant.''
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Arabs are denied equal
access to employment, education, and physical security. Non-Arabs are
not permitted to sell their homes except to Arabs, nor to register or
inherit property. The Government continued to relocate forcibly the
non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians living
in Kirkuk, Sinjar, and other districts (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct
ethnic group, as well as the descendants of some of the earliest
Christian communities. These communities speak a different language
(Syriac), preserve traditions of Christianity, and have a rich cultural
and historical heritage that they trace back over 2,000 years. Although
these groups do not define themselves as Arabs, the Government, without
any historical basis, defines Assyrians and Chaldeans as such,
evidently to encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated
regime (see Section 2.c.).
The Government does not permit education in languages other than
Arabic and Kurdish. Public instruction in Syriac, which was announced
under a 1972 decree, never has been implemented. Thus, in areas under
government control, Assyrian and Chaldean children are not permitted to
attend classes in Syriac. In areas of the north under Kurdish control,
classes in Syriac have been permitted since the 1991 uprising against
the Government. By October 1998, the first groups of students were
ready to begin secondary school in Syriac in the north; however, some
Assyrian sources reported that regional Kurdish authorities refused to
allow the classes to begin. Details of this practice (for example, the
number of students prepared to start secondary courses in Syriac and
the towns where they were located) were not available, and Kurdish
regional authorities denied that they engaged in such a practice. In
November 1999, the Kurdistan Observer reported that the central
Government had warned the administration in the Kurdish region against
allowing Turkoman, Assyrian, or Yazidi minority schools.
Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by
Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years. Assyrians
continue to fear attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (KWP), a
Turkish-based terrorist organization that operates against indigenous
Kurds in northern Iraq. The Christians reported feeling caught in the
middle of intraKurdish fighting. Some Assyrian villagers reported being
pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a campaign
by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the PKK access to possible food
supplies.
Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in Erbil in 1998
and 1999. Although the bombings have not been linked to any particular
faction or group, Assyrians believe that they are part of a terror
campaign designed to intimidate them into leaving the north. The
Assyrian Democratic Movement, the Assyrian Patriotic Party, and other
groups have criticized the investigation into these incidents conducted
by the Kurdistan Regional Government. There were no reported arrests by
year's end.
In June 1999, the Assyrian National News Agency reported a ``well-
established pattern'' of complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks
against Assyrian Christians in the north (see Section 1.a.).
The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many
Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some
would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct
from Muslim Kurds. However, the Government, without any historical
basis, has defined the Yazidis as Arabs. There is evidence that the
Government has compelled this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to
join in domestic military action against Muslim Kurds. Captured
government documents included in a 1998 HRW report describe special
all-Yazidi military detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal
campaign to ``pursue and attack'' Muslim Kurds. The Government imposes
the same repressive measures on Yazidis as on other groups (see Section
2.c.).
Citizens considered by the Government to be of Iranian origin must
carry special identification and often are precluded from desirable
employment. Over the years, the Government has deported hundreds of
thousands of citizens of Iranian origin.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions independent of
government control do not exist. The Trade Union Organization Law of
1987 established the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions (IGFTU),
a government-dominated trade union structure, as the sole legal trade
federation. The IGFTU is linked to the Ba'th Party, which uses it to
promote party principles and policies among union members.
Workers in private and mixed enterprises, but not public employees
or workers in state enterprises, have the right to join local union
committees. The committees are affiliated with individual trade unions,
which in turn belong to the IGFTU.
In 1999 Uday Hussein reportedly dismissed hundreds of members of
the Iraqi Union of Journalists for not praising Saddam Hussein and the
regime sufficiently (see Section 2.a.). Also in 1999, Uday Hussein
reportedly jailed at least four leaders of the Iraqi National Students
Union for failing to carry out his orders to take action against
students known for their criticism of the situation in the country.
The 1987 Labor Law restricts the right to strike. No strike has
been reported over the past 2 decades. According to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, severe restrictions on the right to
strike include penal sanctions.
The IGFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of
Arab Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation
of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries for public sector
workers (the majority of employed persons) are set by the Government.
Wages in the much smaller private sector are set by employers or
negotiated individually with workers. Government workers frequently are
shifted from one job and work location to another to prevent them from
forming close associations with other workers. The Labor Code does not
protect workers from antiunion discrimination, a failure that has been
criticized repeatedly by the Committee of Experts of the International
Labor Organization (ILO).
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor
theoretically is prohibited by law; however, the Penal Code mandates
prison sentences, including compulsory labor, for civil servants and
employees of state enterprises accused of breaches of labor
``discipline,'' including resigning from a job. According to the ILO,
foreign workers in Iraq have been prevented from terminating their
employment to return to their native countries because of government-
imposed penal sanctions on persons who do so. There is no information
available on forced and bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The employment of children under age 14 is prohibited,
except in small-scale family enterprises. Children reportedly are
encouraged increasingly to work in order to support their families
because of the country's harsh economic conditions. The law stipulates
that employees between the ages of 14 and 18 work fewer hours per week
than adults. Each year the Government enrolls children as young as 10
years of age in a paramilitary training program (see Section 5). There
is no information available on forced and bonded labor by children (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no information
available on minimum wages.
Theoretically, most workers in urban areas work a 6-day, 48-hour
workweek. Hours for government employees are set by the head of each
ministry. Working hours for agricultural workers vary according to
individual employer-employee agreements. Occupational safety programs
are in effect in state-run enterprises. Inspectors theoretically
inspect private establishments, but enforcement varies widely. There is
no information on workers' ability to remove themselves from work
situations that endanger their health or safety, or on those who
complain about such conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There was no information available on
whether trafficking in persons is prohibited by law, or whether persons
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Israel \1\ is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty system
and free elections. There is no Constitution; a series of ``basic
laws'' provide for fundamental rights. The legislature, or Knesset, has
the power to dissolve the Government and limit the authority of the
executive branch. Labor and One Israel party leader Ehud Barak was
elected Prime Minister in May 1999 and took office in July 1999 at the
head of a broad centrist coalition Government. On December 9, following
the breakdown of his coalition, Barak resigned as Prime Minister; prime
ministerial elections were scheduled to be held on February 6, 2001.
The judiciary is independent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The human rights situation in the occupied territories is
discussed in the annex appended to this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been in a state of war with
most of its Arab neighbors. It concluded a peace treaty with Egypt in
1979 and with Jordan in 1994, and a series of agreements with the
Palestinians beginning in 1993. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel
occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan
Heights. The international community does not recognize Israel's
sovereignty over any part of the occupied territories. Throughout its
existence, Israel has experienced numerous terrorist attacks.
An historic process of reconciliation between Israel and the
Palestinians began with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and continued
with the September 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration
of Principles (DOP). In September 1995, Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. In January 1997, the parties concluded the
Hebron Protocol and in October 1998, Israel and the PLO signed the Wye
River Memorandum. In September 1999, the Israeli Government and the PLO
signed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. The parties held intensive
working-level talks between March and June and met at Camp David in
July; however, the Government and the PLO did not reach an agreement.
Internal security is the responsibility of the Israel Security Agency
(the ISA--formerly the General Security Service, or GSS, and also known
as Shin Bet, or Shabak), which is under the authority of the Prime
Minister's office. The police are under the authority of the Minister
of Internal Security. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are under the
authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The IDF includes a
significant portion of the adult population on active duty or reserve
status and plays a role in maintaining internal security. The Foreign
Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset reviews the activities of
the IDF and the ISA. Some members of the security forces committed
serious human rights abuses.
Israel has an advanced industrial economy, and citizens enjoy a
relatively high standard of living, with a per capita income of over
$17,000. Unemployment remained at about 9 percent during the year, but
was substantially higher in the country's peripheral regions and among
lower-skilled workers. The country's economic growth has been
accompanied by an increase in income inequality. The longstanding gap
in levels of income within the Jewish population and between Jewish and
Arab citizens continues. The 14 towns with the highest unemployment
rate in the country all are populated by Arab citizens. A heavy
reliance on foreign workers, principally from Asia and Eastern Europe,
is a source of social problems. Such workers generally are employed in
agriculture and the construction industry and constitute about 6
percent of the labor force. Since the implementation of an economic
stabilization plan in 1985, the country has moved gradually to reduce
state intervention in the economy through privatization of several
state-owned companies and through deregulation. State-owned companies
continue to dominate such fields as electricity generation and
transmission, oil refining, shipping, and international air travel.
However, individuals generally are free to invest in private interests
and to own property. The Government owns and manages 77 percent of the
country's land area, and as a matter of policy it does not sell land.
The Jewish National Fund (JNF), an organization established in 1897 for
the purchase and management of land for the Jewish people, owns 8
percent of the country's land area, including a considerable amount
transferred directly from the Government, and manages another 8 percent
on behalf of the Government. Foreigners and citizens of all religions
are allowed freely to purchase or lease the 7 percent of land not
controlled by the Government or the JNF. In March the High Court of
Justice ruled that the Government's use of the JNF to develop public
land was discriminatory, since the JNF's statute prohibits the sale or
lease of land to non-Jews.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, its record worsened late in the year regarding its treatment
of non-Jewish citizens. Historically, Israel's main human rights
problems have arisen from its policies and practices in the occupied
territories and from its fight against terrorism. However, in October
police used excessive force to disperse demonstrations in the north of
the country that coincided with the outbreak of violence in the
occupied territories, killing 13 Arab citizens and injuring over 300
(see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g. of the annex for a discussion of
casualties in the occupied territories). There also are credible
reports that police failed to protect Arab lives and property in
several incidents in which Jewish citizens attacked the homes of Arab
citizens. A landmark decision by the High Court of Justice in September
1999 prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, including
violent shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, sleep
deprivation for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to
extreme temperatures. Since the September 1999 ruling, domestic and
international NGO's have been unable to substantiate sporadic
allegations that security forces tortured detainees. There were
numerous credible allegations that police beat persons in detention.
Detention and prison conditions, particularly for Palestinian security
detainees held in Israel do not provide inmates with sufficient living
space, food, and access to medical care. Following the IDF withdrawal
from its self-declared ``security zone'' in southern Lebanon in May and
the concurrent collapse of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), all of the
prisoners from the Al-Khiam prison in southern Lebanon, where Lebanese
guards routinely committed abuses, were released. The Government
continued to detain without charge Palestinians, some of them for
lengthy periods; the number of such detainees increased following the
outbreak of violence in September. In April an Israeli High Court
ruling declared illegal the holding of Lebanese detainees as
``bargaining chips'' in Israeli prisons. Subsequently, authorities
released 13 Lebanese prisoners, all of whom had been held without
charge, or had already completed their terms. At year's end, there were
approximately 20 Lebanese prisoners in custody, two of whom--Sheikh al-
Karim Obeid and Mustafa Dirani--were held without charge. Legislation
that would enable Obeid and Dirani to be held as ``members of enemy
forces not entitled to prisoner-of-war status'' passed a first reading
during the year. Following the outbreak of violence in September, the
Government detained without charge hundreds of persons in Israel, the
West Bank, and Gaza, and imposed severe restrictions on the movement of
persons and some restrictions on the movement of goods between Israel
and the West Bank and Gaza and between cities in the West Bank and
Gaza--i.e., closure, which has been in effect to varying extents since
1993 (see Section 2.d. of the annex).
The Government continued to fund shelters and crisis centers;
however, violence and discrimination against women persists.
Discrimination against the disabled persists. The Government made
little headway in reducing institutionalized legal and societal
discrimination against Israel's Christian, Muslim, and Druze citizens,
who constitute just over 20 percent of the population, but do not share
fully the rights provided to, and obligations imposed on, the country's
Jewish citizens. Prior to October, the Government did not take tangible
steps to improve the situation of the country's non-Jewish citizens,
which was one of the main factors that contributed to large Israeli
Arab demonstrations in October. The demonstrations and clashes between
the police and Israeli Arabs brought renewed attention to the different
treatment accorded to the Jewish and Arab sectors of the country. In
October the Government approved a $975 million economic assistance plan
for Arab citizens to be phased in over 4 years; however, some human
rights groups criticized the plan as inadequate. The Knesset did not
approve the plan by year's end. Trafficking in women for the purpose of
forced prostitution is a continuing problem. In June the Government
passed a law that prohibits the trafficking of persons for the purpose
of prostitution.
In early October, there were many instances of societal violence
between Arab and Jewish citizens, which coincided with violent events
in the country.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings during the year.
In October police used excessive force to disperse demonstrations
in the north of the country that coincided with the outbreak of
violence in the occupied territories (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.
of the annex), killing 13 Arab citizens and injuring 300 with a
combination of live ammunition and rubber-coated steel bullets (see
Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Demonstrators did not have firearms; however,
some demonstrators reportedly threw rocks and firebombs. International
and domestic human rights groups assert that police used rubber-coated
metal bullets and live ammunition against demonstrators who posed no
imminent danger of death or serious injury to security forces or
others.
On September 28, opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple
Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. On September 29, Palestinians
held large demonstrations and threw stones at police in the vicinity of
the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live
ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and
injuring about 200 (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the annex). In
response to this violence, Palestinians held demonstrations throughout
the occupied territories and Israel. On October 1, Israeli Arab leaders
called a general strike, which received widespread support from Arab
citizens, thousands of whom demonstrated throughout the country. On
October 1, police used live ammunition and rubber-coated metal bullets
to disperse demonstrations in Um-al-Fahem, killing two persons and
injuring hundreds of others. On October 2, police killed six persons
and injured numerous others during demonstrations in Jat, Nazareth,
Arrabe, and Sakhnin. Police also used live ammunition and rubber
bullets to disperse demonstrations in other towns and villages in the
north of the country, injuring hundreds of demonstrators. On October 3,
police killed three persons during demonstrations in Nazareth and Kfar
Manda.
In October and November, coinciding with violence in Israel and the
occupied territories, there were numerous violent incidents along the
Israel-Lebanese border. On October 7, IDF personnel reportedly killed 2
persons and injured 25 during demonstrations along the border. On
October 9, the IDF reportedly fired live ammunition on a group of about
500 Palestinian demonstrators who were throwing rocks and Molotov
cocktails, and trying to cross the border into Israel; IDF personnel
reportedly killed 1 person and injured 10.
On October 21, Prime Minister Barak proposed establishing a
commission of examination to study the violence that occurred in early
October. However, Israeli Arab leaders rejected Barak's offer and
demanded that the Government establish a legal commission of inquiry,
which would operate independently of the Government, have subpoena
power, and automatically bestow immunity on anyone who testified before
it. On November 8, in response to pressure from both Arab and Jewish
citizens, Barak announced the establishment of the Legal Commission of
Inquiry, which reportedly is to have considerable ability to collect
information. The Commission is headed by a High Court justice, and its
members include an Arab judge from a Nazareth court, and a professor
from Tel Aviv University. In December the Legal Commission of Inquiry
began its investigation; however, it did not reach any conclusions by
year's end.
There also are credible reports that police failed to protect Arab
lives and property in several incidents in which Jewish citizens
attacked Arab citizens. On October 7, a group of about 200 Israeli Jews
attacked Arab homes in Nazareth Illit (Upper Nazareth), including the
home of an Arab Member of the Knesset. On October 8, a group of about
1,000 Israeli Jews attacked Arab homes in Nazareth. The attackers
allegedly targeted Arab citizens due to their anger over the Hizballah
kidnaping of three IDF soldiers and the attack on Joseph's Tomb in the
West Bank in early October (see Sections 1.b. and 2.c. of the annex).
Many of the Arabs exited their homes and attempted to defend themselves
and their property (see Section 5). Police reportedly arrived at the
scene late, did not take action beyond inserting themselves between the
two groups, and fired live ammunition, rubber bullets, and tear gas at
the Arab citizens. Two Israeli Arabs were killed and approximately 50
others were injured in these incidents. International and domestic
human rights groups reported that the police were responsible for the
deaths and injuries; however, some residents of Nazareth reported that
some members of the Jewish crowd had firearms. Large crowds of Jews
also attacked Arab homes, businesses, and two mosques in other areas of
the country (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Arab protesters also attacked
Jewish-owned businesses and at least one synagogue (see Sections 1.c.
and 5).
During the year, 22 Israelis died and 244 were injured in terrorist
attacks carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals in Israel and
the occupied territories (also see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the
annex). For example, on November 1, a car bomb in Jerusalem killed two
Israelis and injured eleven others, including four children.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack. On
November 22, a car bomb in Hadera killed three Israelis and injured 61.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad also claimed responsibility for this attack.
b. Disappearance.--On October 10, Hizballah guerrillas kidnaped
three IDF soldiers. At year's end, the soldiers were believed to be
held in Lebanon.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Laws and administrative regulations prohibit the physical
abuse of detainees; however, security forces sometimes abused
Palestinians suspected of security offenses. A landmark decision by the
High Court of Justice in September 1999 prohibited the use of a variety
of abusive practices, including violent shaking, painful shackling in
contorted positions (``Shabbeh''), sleep deprivation for extended
periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures. Since
the September 1999 ruling, domestic and international NGO's have been
unable to substantiate sporadic allegations that security forces
tortured detainees.
Prior to the High Court's 1999 decision, laws and administrative
regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees were not
enforced in security cases. The head of the ISA was empowered by
government regulation to authorize security officers to use ``moderate
physical and psychological pressure'' (which included violent shaking)
while interrogating detainees. These practices often led to excesses.
In November 1999, the Attorney General issued revised guidelines that
denied blanket immunity from prosecution for interrogators; however, it
remains theoretically possible that the State could decline to
prosecute interrogators who used prohibited methods in cases of extreme
urgency.
In October police used live ammunition and rubber-coated metal
bullets to disperse demonstrators in the north of the country, killing
13 Arab citizens and injuring over 300 (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
Demonstrators reportedly did not have firearms; however, in some cases
they reportedly threw rocks and firebombs. On October 1, police beat
severely a woman who screamed at a police officer during a
demonstration. The incident was videotaped and broadcast on domestic
and international television.
There were numerous credible allegations from human rights groups
that police beat persons in detention; reports of such beatings
increased in October following demonstrations and the numerous
subsequent police arrests of suspected or actual participants in the
demonstrations (see Section 1.d.). For example, on October 26, police
arrested an Arab citizen, Amneh Aqayleh, on suspicion of participating
in demonstrations in Nazareth. Police brought Aqayleh to the Kishon
detention center for interrogation where they reportedly beat him.
Police also reportedly arrested and beat some Jewish demonstrators. For
example, according to Amnesty International police arrested and beat
Yoav Bar following a demonstration in Wadi Nisnas, breaking his hand,
two of his ribs, and two of his teeth. According to Amnesty
International, police also reportedly arrested and beat youths
following demonstrations in the north of the country (see Section
1.d.).
According to local and international human rights NGO's, in some
cases police reportedly delayed ambulances and medical personnel from
entering Arab villages to treat persons who were injured during the
clashes (see Section 2.d.). According to police officials, the streets
often were too crowded and volatile for the ambulances to enter the
villages safely. According to some observers, local leaders broadcast
requests over mosque loudspeakers that demonstrators return home in
order to clear the way for ambulances.
In early October, police failed to protect Arab lives and property
when a group of approximately 1,000 Jewish citizens attacked Arab
Israeli homes in Nazareth. Police fired live ammunition, rubber
bullets, and tear gas at Arab citizens. Two persons were killed and 50
persons were injured (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
During the year, 244 Israelis were injured in terrorist attacks
carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals in Israel and the
occupied territories (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the annex).
Conditions vary in incarceration facilities in Israel and the
occupied territories, which are administered by the Israeli Prison
Service (IPS), the IDF, or the national police. IPS prisons, which
generally house Israeli citizens convicted of common crimes, usually
provide inmates with sufficient living space, food, and access to
medical care. In general, IPS inmates are not subject to physical abuse
by guards, and prisoners receive basic necessities. Inmates receive
mail, have television sets in their cells, and receive regular visits.
Prisoners receive wages for prison work and benefits for good behavior.
Many IPS prisons have drug treatment, educational, and recreational
programs. The IPS established a national police unit to investigate
allegations of offenses committed by guards, including complaints about
the use of force against inmates.
Since the closure in 1995 of the main IDF detention camps in the
occupied territories, all security detainees (i.e., those detained and
held without charge by security forces) from the occupied territories
who are held for more than a few days are transferred to facilities
within Israel. During the year, security detainees usually were held in
the IDF's Megiddo prison, in IPS facilities, and in special sections of
police detention facilities. Prisoners incarcerated for security
reasons are subject to a different regimen, even in IPS facilities.
They often are denied privileges given to prisoners convicted on
criminal charges such as furloughs and some family visits. According to
the Government, security detainees may receive financial assistance
from the Palestinian Authority (PA), food from their families, and
medical supplies from the ICRC and other aid organizations. Security
detainees include some minors. Detention facilities administered by the
IDF are limited to male Palestinian detainees and are guarded by armed
soldiers. The total number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel,
approximately 1,354 at the beginning of the year, reached 1,832 by
year's end. The number of administrative detainees (held without charge
or trial) was between 10 and 15 at year's end, including one Israeli
Arab (see Section 1.d.). Under the terms of the Sharm el-Sheikh
Memorandum, the Government released a total of 350 Palestinian security
prisoners in 1999 (in addition to the 250 prisoners released in late
1998 pursuant to the Wye River Accords). On May 1, Palestinian
prisoners throughout the country began a hunger strike to protest
prison conditions and their continued incarceration. Following
negotiations with government and PA officials, the prisoners agreed to
suspend the hunger strike on May 31. The Government agreed to remove
prisoners from solitary confinement and to allow family members to
visit inmates, and the prisoners agreed to refrain from planning
terrorist attacks from prison.
Conditions at the Russian Compound, which is run by police and
houses a combination of security and common prisoners and detainees in
Jerusalem, were criticized in 1997 as ``not fit to serve as lock-up''
by High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak. Conditions in other
IDF facilities have improved in some respects. For example, inmates are
given more time for exercise outside their cells. Nevertheless,
recreational facilities remain minimal, and there are strict
limitations on family visits to detainees. Visits were prevented for
long periods of time during closures.
Conditions at some national police detention facilities are poor.
Such facilities are intended to hold criminal detainees prior to trial
but often become de facto prisons. Those held include some security
detainees and some persons who have been convicted and sentenced.
Inmates in the national police detention facilities often are not
accorded the same rights as prisoners in the IPS system. Moreover,
conditions are worse in the separate facilities for security detainees
maintained both in police facilities and in IPS prisons.
In 1996 the Government began a reform program for the country's
detention facilities. To date, there have been some improvements,
including the opening of a model detention center near Netanya;
however, problems, including dilapidation and overcrowding persist. The
1997 Arrest and Detention law provided for the right to live in
conditions that would not harm the health or dignity of the detainee,
access to adequate health care, the right to a bed for each detainee,
and access to exercise and fresh air on a daily basis. The Government
has made significant strides towards implementing this legislation,
though problems remain.
Children's rights groups have expressed particular concern over the
separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of
children. Overcrowding, poor physical conditions, lack of social
workers, and denial of visits by parents are among the key problems. In
addition to some Israeli minors held in criminal cases, there are
juveniles among Palestinian detainees. Children's rights activists had
recommended the construction of a separate detention facility for
children, and after a prolonged legal battle, separate prison
facilities were built for Arab and Jewish children.
All incarceration facilities are monitored regularly by various
branches of the Government, by members of the Knesset, by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and by human rights
groups (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
In September 1999, the Government acknowledged that it trained,
debriefed, and paid the salaries of the Lebanese administrators and
staff of the Al-Khiam prison in southern Lebanon, where prisoners
allegedly were tortured routinely. Following the IDF withdrawal from
its self-declared ``security zone'' and the concurrent collapse of the
SLA, all of the prisoners in Al-Khiam were released.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest of citizens, and the Government generally observes
this prohibition. Defendants are considered innocent until proven
guilty and have the right to writs of habeas corpus and other
procedural safeguards. However, a 1979 law permits administrative, or
preventive, detention (i.e., without charge or trial), which is used on
occasion in security cases. In such cases, the Minister of Defense may
issue a detention order for a maximum of 1 year, though such orders may
be extended. Within 24 hours of issuance, detainees must appear before
a district judge who may confirm, shorten, or overturn the order. If
the order is confirmed, an automatic review takes place after 3 months.
Detention orders were confirmed in all cases during the year. Detainees
have the right to be represented by counsel and to appeal detention
orders to the High Court of Justice; however, the security forces may
delay notification of counsel with the consent of a judge. According to
human rights groups and legal experts, there were cases in which a
judge denied the Government's request to delay notification of counsel.
At detention hearings, the security forces may withhold evidence from
defense lawyers on security grounds. The Government also may seek to
renew administrative detention orders. However, the security services
must ``show cause'' for continued detention, and, in some instances,
individuals were released because the standard could not be met.
In felony cases and in ordinary security cases, a district court
judge may postpone for 48 hours the notification of arrest to the
detainee's attorney. The postponement may be extended to 7 days by the
Minister of Defense on national security grounds or by the police
inspector general to conduct an investigation. Moreover, a judge may
postpone notification for up to 15 days in national security cases.
The 1997 Arrest and Detention Law more narrowly defined the grounds
for pretrial detention in criminal and security cases and reduced to 24
hours the length of time a person may be held without charge; however,
this law does not extend to administrative detention cases. Human
rights groups allege abuse of detention orders in cases in which they
assert that the accused did not pose a clear danger to society.
Children's rights activists have recommended separate legislation to
define when and how a child may be arrested and how long children may
be detained. According to media reports and children's rights groups,
during and following the violence in the north, police sometimes beat
youths while arresting them (see Sections 1.c.).
Most of the protections afforded to Israelis are not extended to
Palestinian detainees, who fall under the jurisdiction of military law
even if they are detained in Israel. With IDF redeployment in the West
Bank, detention centers there were closed in 1995. As a result, all
Palestinian detainees held for longer than 1 or 2 days are incarcerated
in Israel (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
Police arrested hundreds of persons mainly in the north of the
country in connection with the demonstrations and disturbances that
began in September; approximately two-thirds of the persons arrested
were Arab citizens and about one-third were Jewish citizens. According
to domestic and international human rights organizations, police
continued to arrest Arab citizens whom they suspected of participating
in the disturbances over a month after the demonstrations ended. On
October 26, the Northern Police Commander announced to the press that
his office compiled a list of hundreds of persons who participated in
the demonstrations and that the police intended to arrest many of them.
According to human rights organizations, police lacked any evidence
against a significant number of Israeli Arabs that they arrested. There
also were credible reports that police tricked some Israeli Arabs into
confessing that they threw stones during demonstrations. Many of the
persons arrested, including some minors, also reportedly were held
without bail until the end of criminal proceedings against them.
Several detainees brought appeals to the High Court of Justice;
however, the Court upheld this practice on the grounds that calm had
not yet returned to the country. According to Amnesty International, at
least 10 Arab citizens detained in connection with the disturbances in
October were denied access to counsel for up to 1 week.
In December for the first time since 1994, the Government placed an
Israeli Arab, Jhasan Athamnah, in administrative detention where he was
being held on secret evidence at year's end.
At year's end, the Government held 1,832 Palestinians in custody.
Those held were a mixture of common prisoners, administrative
detainees, and security detainees. The Government continues to deny the
ICRC access to one Lebanese citizen, Mustafa Dirani (held without
charge since 1994). The Government granted the ICRC access to Sheikh
Obeid (held without charge since 1989) for the first time in December
1999, and allowed the ICRC four additional visits during the year.
However, following the October kidnaping of IDF soldiers by Hizballah
guerrillas (see Section 1.b.), the Government suspended ICRC access to
Sheikh Obeid. In May 1998, the High Court of Justice ruled that the
Government was entitled to continue holding them for use in a possible
exchange of hostages to obtain the return of an Israeli who still may
be held by hostile forces. The High Court's ruling stressed that
national security needs took precedence over the detainees' individual
rights under Israeli and international law. However, in April the High
Court declared illegal the detention of individuals to be used as
``bargaining chips;'' the Government subsequently released 13 Lebanese
prisoners. However, Obeid, Dirani, and approximately 18 other Lebanese
prisoners remained in custody at year's end; the former are
administrative detainees, and the latter have been charged and
convicted of crimes. The Government claims that Obeid and Dirani are
security threats and attempted to pass legislation that would allow the
continued detention without charge of ``members of enemy forces not
entitled to prisoner-of-war status.'' The bill had passed a first
reading by year's end. Two legal advisors to the Knesset criticized the
bill, claiming that it contravened domestic and international laws.
Six Iraqis, held since they attempted to enter the country
illegally from Jordan, were deported to Holland, Sweden, and Finland,
where they obtained refugee status.
The law prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the Government
respects this prohibition in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision.
However, in the past the judiciary routinely acquiesced to the
Government's position in security cases. The September 1999 landmark
High Court of Justice decision barring the use of torture (see Section
1.c.) marked a major change in this practice, as did the April ruling
prohibiting the holding of detainees for use as ``bargaining chips.''
The judiciary generally provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system is composed of civil, military, religious,
labor relations, and administrative courts, with the High Court of
Justice as the ultimate judicial authority. The High Court of Justice
is both a court of first instance (in cases involving government
action) and an appellate court (when it sits as the Supreme Court).
Each of the cited courts, including the High Court of Justice, have
appellate courts or jurisdictions.
The law provides for the right to a hearing with representation by
counsel, and authorities observe this right in practice. A regional and
national system of public defenders operated by the Ministry of Justice
was inaugurated in 1996 and now employs about 700 attorneys through 5
regional offices. Under the system, economically disadvantaged persons
who face sentences of 5 years or longer, and all persons who are
accused of crimes with sentences of 10 years or longer receive
mandatory legal representation. Judges also have discretionary power to
appoint an attorney in all cases. Since the system was implemented,
representation has increased to about 70 percent. All non-security
trials are public except those in which the interests of the parties
are deemed best served by privacy. Cases involving national security
may be tried in either military or civil courts and may be partly or
wholly closed to the public. The prosecution must justify closing the
proceedings to the public in such cases, and the Attorney General
determines the venue. Adult defendants have the right to be represented
by counsel even in closed proceedings but may be denied access to some
evidence on security grounds. Under the law, convictions may not be
based on any evidence denied to the defense. In addition, convictions
may not be based solely on a confession by the accused, although in
practice security prisoners have been sentenced on the basis of the
coerced confessions of both themselves and others.
According to human rights organizations, the legal system often
imposes far stiffer punishments on Christian, Muslim, and Druze
citizens than on Jewish citizens. For example, human rights advocates
claim that Israeli Arabs are more likely to be convicted of murder
(which carries a mandatory life sentence) than Jewish Israelis. The
courts reportedly also are more likely to detain Arab-Israelis until
the conclusion of proceedings. The Government notes that the judicial
system is independent and disputes the charge that the court system
systematically discriminates against non-Jewish citizens. According to
press reports, following the demonstrations that took place in
September and October, 66 percent of those arrested were Arab Israelis,
and 84 percent of those detained until the conclusion of proceedings as
of late October were Arab Israelis (see Section 1.d.).
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Privacy of the individual and the home generally are
protected by law; however, the Government uses laws that provide that
authorities may interfere with mail and monitor telephone conversations
in certain circumstances. In criminal cases, the law permits
wiretapping under court order; in security cases, the order must be
issued by the Ministry of Defense. Under emergency regulations,
authorities may open and destroy mail on security grounds.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--In May Israeli forces withdrew from southern
Lebanon in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. Prior to
the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May, violence continued
there and in northern Israel. An estimated 20 Hizballah guerrillas, and
25 Lebanese civilians were killed in southern Lebanon prior to the
Israeli withdrawal. Israeli forces and the SLA responded to Hizballah,
Amal, and Palestinian guerrilla attacks as all sides engaged in
recurring violence. For example, on February 8, in response to
Hizballah attacks, Israel conducted air strikes on electrical power
transformer stations and other targets, injuring over 1 dozen
civilians. In retaliation for Hizballah attacks in May, Israel shelled
military and civilian targets in the south, killing two persons.
Israeli forces conducted air strikes and artillery barrages on
Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian targets, including civilian
infrastructure, inside Lebanon. During the May IDF withdrawal from
southern Lebanon and the concurrent collapse of the SLA, at least four
Lebanese civilians were killed by Israeli helicopter gunfire. In
response to a Hizballah bombing in November, Israel launched airstrikes
on Hizballah positions in the south, injuring one civilian.
There were over 110 Lebanese civilian injuries prior to the IDF
withdrawal, with most of the injuries involving minor wounds from
shrapnel and broken glass. Civilians accounted for over 70 percent of
the injured.
Attacks by Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerillas resulted in
numerous deaths and injuries. An estimated 9 Israeli soldiers were
killed in southern Lebanon and northern Israel by roadside bombs,
ambushes, and cross border attacks. Additionally 40 Israeli civilians
were injured in shelling and cross border attacks.
On October 7, Hizballah launched shells on IDF positions in the
Sha'ba farms area in the Golan Heights; no injuries reportedly resulted
from the shelling. The shelling reportedly served as cover for the
kidnaping of three IDF soldiers in the north (see Section 1.b.). In May
Hizballah attacks in the north of Israel killed 1 person and injured
12. On October 20, IDF fire repulsed a cross border infiltration
attempt by unidentified Lebanese insurgents; two were killed and the
third was injured.
On November 26, Hizballah guerillas bombed an Israeli patrol
station in the Sha'ba farms area, killing 1 IDF soldier. In October
Hizballah guerillas kidnaped 3 Israeli soldiers on patrol in the north
of Israel, demanding that the Israeli government release all remaining
Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons (see Section 1.b.). At year's
end, the soldiers were believed to be held in Lebanon.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
the press, and the Government generally respects this right in
practice. The law authorizes the Government to censor any material
reported from Israel or the occupied territories regarded as sensitive
on national security grounds. A censorship agreement signed in 1996
between the Government and media representatives continued the trend of
liberalization of the Government's censorship regime. The agreement,
which now applies to all media organizations in the country, provides
that military censorship is to be applied only in cases involving
national security issues that have a near certainty of harming the
country's defense interests. All media organizations can appeal the
censor's decision to the High Court of Justice. Moreover, a clause
prohibits the military censor from shutting down a newspaper for
censorship violations and from appealing a court judgement against it.
News printed or broadcast abroad may be reported without the censor's
review, which permits the media to run previously censored stories that
have appeared in foreign sources. Emergency regulations prohibit
persons from expressing support for illegal organizations. On occasion
in the past, the Government has prosecuted persons for speaking or
writing on behalf of terrorist groups. No such cases were filed during
the year. During the year, there were reports that the military censor
intervened in several cases related to national defense.
One Palestinian-owned newspaper is required to submit its entire
contents, including advertising, to the military censor by 4:00 p.m.
each day. The editor claims that this process caused his journalists to
practice self-censorship. Journalists and professional journalist
groups complained about limitations placed on their freedom of movement
within the occupied territories, between the West Bank and Gaza, and
between the occupied territories and Israel during the violent unrest
in September (see Section 2.d.). One media organization reported that
more than two dozen journalists were injured or harassed while covering
events in the occupied territories in October and November (see Section
2.a. of the annex). On October 5, during a demonstration in Jaffa,
demonstrators acting outside of government control assaulted a foreign
camera crew, injuring several journalists and breaking three cameras.
Foreign journalists are required to sign an agreement to submit
certain news stories and photographs for censorship; however, they
rarely are challenged for not doing so.
Individuals, groups, and the press freely address public issues and
criticize government policies and officials without reprisal. Laws
prohibit hate speech and incitement to violence. All newspapers are
privately owned and managed. Newspaper licenses are valid only for
Israel; separate licenses are required to distribute publications in
areas in the occupied territories still under Israel's authority.
Sixteen daily newspapers are published in Israel. There are about 90
weekly local newspapers and more than 250 periodical publications.
Directed by a government appointee, the quasi-independent Israel
Broadcast Authority (IBA) controls television Channel 1 and Kol Israel
(Voice of Israel) radio, both major sources of news and information.
The privately operated Channel 2, the country's first commercial
television station, is operated by three franchise companies and
supervised by the Second Television and Radio Authority, a public body
that also supervises 14 private radio stations. There are five cable
television companies that carry both domestic and international
networks.
The Government continued to attempt to close down the estimated 150
pirate radio stations operating out of Israel and the West Bank.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for the right of assembly, and the Government generally respects this
provision in practice.
During the year, there were a number of peaceful demonstrations
against withdrawal from the Golan Heights and for and against peace
negotiations with the Palestinians.
In early October, thousands of Arab citizens throughout the country
participated in demonstrations. In some cases demonstrators threw
stones and Molotov cocktails. The demonstrators were reacting to events
in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as against government
and police discrimination against Arab citizens (see Section 5). Police
killed 13 Arab citizens and injured over 300 others during
demonstrations in several towns and villages in the north (see Sections
1.a. and 1.c.). Human rights groups noted that the only fatalities and
serious injuries occurred in the north and criticized the Northern
Police Commander for authorizing the use of excessive force.
The law provides for the right of association, and the Government
generally respects this provision in practice. After the Hebron
massacre in 1994, the Cabinet invoked the 1948 ordinance for the
prevention of terror to ban the ultranationalist Kach and Kahane Chai
organizations, a ban that remains in effect. The decision provides for
imprisonment for anyone belonging to, or expressing support for, either
organization.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government generally respects this right. Approximately 80
percent of citizens are Jewish. Muslims, Christians, Druze, and members
of other religions make up the remaining 20 percent. Each recognized
religious community has legal authority over its members in matters of
marriage and divorce. Secular courts have primacy over questions of
inheritance, but parties, by mutual agreement, may bring cases to
religious courts. Jewish and Druze families may ask for some family
status matters, such as alimony and child custody in divorces, to be
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts.
Christians only may ask that child custody and child support be
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts.
Muslims have no recourse to civil courts in family-status matters.
Legislation passed in 1996 allows the rabbinical courts to sanction
either party who is not willing to grant a divorce.
Many citizens object to the Orthodox Jewish religious authorities'
exclusive control over Jewish marriage, divorce, and burial. These
authorities do not recognize marriages or conversions to Judaism
performed in Israel by Conservative or Reform rabbis. These issues have
been a source of serious controversy within society, particularly in
recent years, as thousands of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet
Union have brought with them family members not recognized as Jewish by
Orthodox authorities.
Many Jews who wish to be married in secular or non-Orthodox
religious ceremonies do so abroad. The Ministry of Interior recognizes
such marriages.
Under the Government's current interpretation and implementation of
Jewish personal status law, a Jewish woman is not allowed to initiate
divorce proceedings without her husband's consent; consequently there
are hundreds of so-called ``agunot'' in the country who cannot remarry
or have legitimate children because their husbands either have
disappeared or refused to grant a divorce.
In August Prime Minister Barak announced his plans to ``separate
religion from politics'' by promoting a ``civil-social revolution''
consisting of a number of measures including: Drafting a constitution,
folding the Ministry of Religious Affairs into the Ministry of Justice,
lifting restrictions on transportation during the Sabbath, allowing for
some form of civil marriages, eliminating the nationality clause from
identification cards, and introducing a new core curriculum in all
state-funded schools. These proposals triggered a national debate on
religion and society. By year's end, none of these proposed reforms had
been implemented.
A January 1999 High Court ruling enabled Reform and Conservative
rabbis to hold seats on the powerful municipal and religious councils.
In 1998 the High Court ruled that draft exemptions for yeshiva students
was illegal; however, it delayed implementation of the ruling several
times and gave the Knesset until December 21 to pass legislation on the
matter. On December 20, an 11-justice panel of the High Court rejected
the Government's request for another extension; however, it stated that
it would grant the IDF a ``reasonable period'' of time in which to
implement the ruling.
The Government provides proportionally greater financial support to
institutions in the Jewish sector compared with those in the non-Jewish
sector, i.e., Muslim, Christian, and Druze. For example, only 2.4
percent of the Ministry of Religious Affairs budget for 1999 was
allocated to the non-Jewish sector, although Muslims, Christians, and
Druze constitute 20 percent of the population. In 1998 the High Court
of Justice ruled that the budget allocation constituted ``prima facie
discrimination'' but that the plaintiff's petition did not provide
adequate information about the religious needs of the various
communities. The court refused to intervene in the budgetary process on
the grounds that such action would invade the proper sphere of the
legislature. However, during the year, the court ordered the Government
to allocate resources equitably to cemeteries of the Jewish and Arab
communities.
The status of a number of Christian organizations with
representation in Israel heretofore has been defined by a collection of
ad hoc arrangements with various government agencies. Several of these
organizations seek to negotiate with the Government in an attempt to
formalize their status.
Missionaries are allowed to proselytize, although the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints voluntarily refrains from doing so
under an agreement with the Government. A 1977 anti-proselytizing law
prohibits anyone from offering or receiving material benefits as an
inducement to conversion; however, there have been no reports of its
enforcement. On December 6, a law prohibiting some missionary activity
and the dissemination of some missionary material passed a first
reading in the Knesset.
Jehovah's Witnesses suffered verbal abuse, assaults, theft, and
vandalism; however, they reported that the police response to their
complaints improved significantly during the year.
The Government has recognized only Jewish holy places under the
1967 Protection of Holy Sites Law. The Government states that it also
protects the holy sites of other faiths, and that it has provided funds
for some holy sites of other faiths.
A group of more than 100 Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform women
continued a long legal battle to hold women's prayer services at the
Western Wall during the year. In May the High Court ruled that women
may read from the Torah and wear prayer shawls at the Western Wall.
Both legislators and the state prosecutor's office sought to overturn
the ruling; however, they were not successful as of year's end.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice for citizens, except with
regard to military or security zones or in instances where citizens may
be confined by administrative order to their neighborhoods or villages.
However, following the outbreak of violence in late September, the
Government imposed some restrictions on the movement of persons within
the country as well as between Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and
between cities inside the West Bank and Gaza (also see Section 2.d. of
the annex). The Government continued to restrict the movements of two
Jewish settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged to
extremist Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of administrative
orders issued by the IDF central command (see Section 2.d. of the
annex).
Citizens are free to travel abroad and to emigrate, provided they
have no outstanding military obligations and are not restricted by
administrative order. During the year, the Government generally
continued to permit Muslim citizens to make the Hajj. However for
security reasons, the Government imposes some restrictions on its
Muslim citizens who perform the Hajj, including requiring that they be
over the age of 30. The Government does not allow persons to return if
they leave the country without formal permission. The Government
justifies these restrictions on the grounds that Saudi Arabia remains
officially at war with Israel and that travel to Saudi Arabia therefore
is considered subject to security considerations.
The Government states that non-Jewish female citizens who marry
non-citizen men may retain their citizenship. The Government also
asserts that the male spouses of non-Jewish citizens may acquire
citizenship under the family reunification program, except in cases
where the man has a criminal record or is suspected of posing a threat
to security. However, Christian, Muslim, or Druze women who have
married men from Arab states or the West Bank and Gaza have complained
about losing their Israeli citizenship and right to reenter Israel.
During the demonstrations and disturbances in late September,
police reportedly closed roads and entrances to some Arab villages and
cities around the country. According to human rights groups, police
also sometimes delayed ambulances and medical personnel from entering
Arab villages to treat persons who were injured during the clashes (see
Section 1.c.). Journalists complained about limitations placed on their
freedom of movement during the violence in Israel and the occupied
territories (see Section 2.a.).
The Government welcomes Jewish immigrants, their Jewish or non-
Jewish family members, and Jewish refugees, on whom it confers
automatic citizenship and residence rights under the Law of Return.
This law does not apply to non-Jews or to persons of Jewish descent who
have converted to another faith. Other than the Law of Return and the
family reunification statutes there is no immigration law that provides
for immigration to the country, or for political asylum or refugee
status. The law does allow individuals to live in the country as
permanent residents.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees. The Government does not provide asylum to
refugees from states with which the country remains in a state of war.
The issue of first asylum did not arise during the year. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution. Six Iraqis who had been held in detention found asylum in
Europe during the year (see Section 1.d.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage for adult citizens. The last national elections were held in
May 1999. On December 9, Ehud Barak resigned as Prime Minister; the
next prime ministerial elections were scheduled to be held on February
6, 2001.
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with an active multiparty
system in which a wide range of political views are represented.
Relatively small parties, including those whose primary support is
among Israeli Arabs, regularly win seats in the Knesset. Elections are
by secret ballot.
There are no legal impediments to the participation of women and
minorities in government; however, they are underrepresented. Women
hold 15 of 120 Knesset seats, compared with 9 female members in the
previous Knesset. There are 11 Arabs and 2 Druze in the Knesset; most
represent parties that derive their support largely or entirely from
the Arab community. Of the Knesset's 12 committees, 2 (including the
Committee on the Status of Women) are chaired by a woman. There are two
women in the Cabinet, but no Arab ministers. However, there is an Arab
Deputy Foreign Minister. Four women, but no Arab or Druze citizens,
serve on the 14-member High Court of Justice. During the year, the
Government appointed an Arab to a 6-month term on the High Court; the
Government did not renew his appointment at the end of his term.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials generally cooperate with
investigations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex or marital
status. The law also prohibits discrimination by both government and
nongovernmental entities on the basis of race, religion, political
beliefs, and age. Local human rights groups are concerned that these
laws often are not enforced, either as a result of institutionalized
discrimination, or because resources for implementing those laws, or
mechanisms for their enforcement, sometimes are lacking.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. There continued to be
action, both in and out of Government, to reduce violence against women
in Jewish and Arab communities. Funding to combat such violence
increased significantly in 1998 and has remained level since. In 1998
the Government appointed a commission to address the subject of
domestic violence; on the basis of the commission's recommendations,
the Government allotted a supplementary budget allocation to combat
domestic violence during the year. Groups that focus on domestic
violence include a committee established by the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs that includes Jewish and Arab NGO's as well as
government representatives, and a coalition of human rights
organizations; however, women's rights activists reported that most of
the groups are funded privately. Twenty-three women were killed by
their husbands or other male relatives during the year. According to
one prominent women's group, between 150,000 and 200,000 women suffer
from domestic violence each year, and some 7 percent of these are
abused on a regular basis. According to women's organizations,
approximately 2,800 women were assaulted sexually and approximately
1,200 were victims of incest during the year; about 44 percent of the
women were under age 18. Only a small percentage of the victims
complained to the police.
Arab human rights advocates also have formed a coalition to raise
public awareness of so-called family ``honor killings,'' a term
commonly used for the murder of a female by a male relative for alleged
misconduct. At least 5 of the 23 women killed during the year by male
relatives were killed in family ``honor'' cases; families often attempt
to cover up the cause of such deaths.
The Government provides partial funding for 12 shelters for
battered women, including 1 exclusively for Arab women and 1 for ultra-
Orthodox Jewish women. Women's rights advocates consider this number
inadequate. The Government also provides funding for 13 rape crisis
centers. There are 25 domestic violence prevention and treatment
centers, which mainly are funded privately.
According to the 1991 Domestic Violence Law, a district or
magistrate court may prohibit access by violent family members to their
property. Women's groups cooperate with legal and social service
institutions to provide women's rights education. While sentences
handed down to men convicted of rape have increased in recent years,
women's rights activists argue that the penalties are not sufficiently
harsh.
Unlike in past years, there were no reports that Jewish religious
extremists attacked physically women whom they considered to be dressed
immodestly in public.
Prostitution per se is not illegal; however, the operation of
brothels and organized sex enterprises is outlawed.
Trafficking in women has become a significant problem in recent
years. According to recent studies, every year hundreds of women from
the former Soviet Union are brought to Israel by well-organized
criminal networks and forced to work illegally as prostitutes (see
Section 6.f.).
In 1998 Israel adopted a comprehensive sexual harassment prevention
law; since that time several prominent cases have increased public
awareness of the issue. For example, in July the Government lifted the
immunity of then Transportation Minister Yitzhak Mordecai following
complaints that he had sexually harassed three women. As of July, the
Civil Service Commission had received 55 complaints of sexual
harassment in the Ministry of Defense.
Women's advocacy groups report that women routinely receive lower
wages for comparable work, are promoted less often, and have fewer
career opportunities than their male counterparts. Despite 1996
legislation that provides for class action suits and requires employers
to provide equal pay for equal work, including important side benefits
and allowances, women's rights advocates charged that deep gaps
remained. For example, the wage gap between men and women for year-
round, full-time employment is about 30 percent, and only 2 percent of
women serve in positions of senior management in large companies.
According to recent reports, 51 percent of doctoral students are women,
but women compose only 23 percent of the senior faculty members at
universities and only 9.5 percent of full professors.
Legislation in 1993, reinforced by a 1994 ruling of the High Court
of Justice, has increased the percentage of women on the boards of
government-owned companies. Women currently occupy 39 percent of
director slots, up from 28.8 percent in 1997.
The adjudication of personal status law in the areas of marriage
and divorce is left to religious courts, where Jewish and Muslim women
are subject to restrictive interpretations of their rights (see Section
2.c.). Under personal status law, a Jewish woman is not allowed to
initiate divorce proceedings without her husband's consent;
consequently there are estimated to be thousands of so-called
``agunot'' who cannot remarry or have legitimate children because their
husbands either have disappeared or have refused to grant a divorce.
The 1995 Rabbinical Courts Law allows rabbinical tribunals to
impose sanctions on husbands who refuse to divorce wives who have ample
grounds for divorce, such as abuse. However, in some cases rabbinical
courts have failed to invoke these sanctions. In addition, there have
been cases in which a wife has failed to agree to a divorce, but a
husband has been allowed to remarry; this permission is not given to
wives. Such imbalances have been used by husbands to extort concessions
from their wives in return for agreeing to a divorce. Rabbinical courts
also may exercise jurisdiction over and issue sanctions against non-
Israeli persons present in Israel.
Religious law can be even more restrictive for Muslims: some
Islamic law courts have held that Muslim women may not request a
divorce, but that women may be forced to consent if a divorce is
granted to a man.
Jewish women are subject to the military draft; however, they have
been barred from combat positions. In 1997 the Knesset passed
legislation that opens all military professions, including combat
positions, to women; however, the legislation was not implemented by
year's end. In response to a High Court of Justice ruling, the Israeli
Air Force (IAF) since 1996 has permitted women to enter pilot training.
At year's end, three women were operating as navigators in F-4's and F-
16's and one woman was nearing completion of pilot training. Recent IAF
rulings allow female flight surgeons to participate in combat rescue
missions and permit women to serve as flight mechanics for combat
helicopter patrols.
In March the Knesset passed the Equality of Women Law, which
provides for equal rights for women in the workplace, the military,
education, health, housing, and social welfare, and entitles women to
protection from violence, sexual harassment, sexual exploitation, and
trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of
children. However, in practice resources sometimes are insufficient,
particularly with respect to low-income families. Government spending
is proportionally lower in predominantly Arab areas than in Jewish
areas, which adversely affects children in Arab villages and cities.
Education is compulsory to age 15, or until the child reaches the 10th
grade, whichever comes first. Government ministries, children's rights
groups, and members of the legislature often cooperate on children's
rights issues. The Government provides an extensive health care program
for children. There is a broad network of mother and child clinics,
which provide prenatal care as well as postnatal follow-up.
The Government has legislated against sexual, physical, and
psychological abuse of children and has mandated comprehensive
reporting requirements. Although there has been a sharp increase in
reported cases of child abuse in recent years, activists believe that
this is largely due to increased awareness of the issue rather than a
growing pattern of abuse. There are five shelters for children at risk.
The Ministry of Justice formed a committee with police and NGO
representatives that is attempting to assess the scope of child
prostitution. Children's rights activists estimate that there may be
several hundred prostitutes among the nation's children, and they warn
that the phenomenon is unlikely to be eradicated until the social
problems that give rise to it--including child abuse and schools that
give up too readily on dropouts--are addressed.
NGO's in the field of children's welfare concentrate their efforts
on public education, on promoting the concept of children's rights as
citizens, on improving legal representation for minors, and on
combating the problems of poverty, which are most notable for the
Bedouin children of the south. There has been concern about the
children of the country's growing population of foreign workers, many
of whom reside in the country illegally. Children of such families,
believed to number in the thousands, exist in a legal and social limbo,
without access to schools or adequate health services.
Privately funded children's rights information centers have been
established in some communities, and the Government assists in funding
additional centers in other cities.
People with Disabilities.--The Government provides a range of
benefits, including income maintenance, housing subsidies, and
transportation support for disabled persons, who constitute about 10
percent of the population. Existing antidiscrimination laws do not
prohibit discrimination based on disability, and these citizens
continue to encounter difficulties in areas such as employment and
housing. A law requiring access for the disabled to public buildings is
not widely enforced. There is no law providing for access to public
transportation for the disabled. A 1996 law extended disability
assistance for deaf children from the age of 14 to maturity. Extended
protests by disabled organizations 1999 led to an increase in
government spending in support of the disabled.
During the year, the Government implemented a law seeking to
rehabilitate and integrate the mentally disabled into the community;
however, government discrimination against the mentally disabled
remained a problem. According to the Ministry of Health, there are
between 60,000 to 80,000 mentally disabled persons in the country;
however, only 4 percent of the Ministry of Health's $5 billion (20
billion NIS) budget is allocated for mental health services.
Additionally, 80 percent of the mental health budget is allocated to
psychiatric hospitals where less than 6,000 of the mentally disabled
reside; the remaining tens of thousands of mentally disabled persons
live on their own with little or no government support to help them
integrate into the community.
Religious Minorities.--Tensions between secular and religious
elements of society continued to grow during the year. The non-Orthodox
Jewish community in particular has complained of discrimination and
intolerance (see Section 2.c.).
Evangelical Christians, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Reform and
Conservative Jews complained of incidents of harassment, threats, and
vandalism directed against their buildings, and other facilities, many
of which were committed by two ultraorthodox groups Yad L'Achim and Lev
L'Achim. In civic areas where religion is a determining criterion, such
as the religious courts and centers of education, non-Jewish
institutions routinely receive less state support than their Jewish
counterparts.
During the demonstrations and disturbances in October, there were
several incidents involving attacks on synagogues and mosques. In
October Arab protesters attacked a synagogue in Shafar'am. Jewish
protesters attacked mosques in Acco and Tiberias.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government does not provide
Israeli Arabs, who constitute approximately 20 percent of the
population, with the same quality of education, housing, employment,
and social services as Jews. In addition, government spending is
proportionally far lower in predominantly Arab areas than in Jewish
areas; on a per capita basis, the Government spends two-thirds as much
for Arabs than for Jews. According to the National Insurance Institute,
42 percent of Israeli Arabs live below the poverty line, compared with
20 percent of the total population. The Government also follows a
disproportionately restrictive policy on issuing building permits to
Arab citizens, resulting in the issuance of proportionately more
building demolition orders against Arab-built structures. Ministers in
the Barak Government publicly acknowledged the continuing disparities
in government funding for Israel's non-Jewish citizens. Following the
demonstrations and disturbances in September and October (see Sections
1.a. and 1.c.), the Government approved a $975 million (4 billion NIS)
economic assistance plan for the country's Arab citizens to be phased
in over 4 years. Most of the money included in the plan is allocated
for education and new infrastructure development. Israeli Arab leaders
and human rights groups criticized the plan because it was not based on
a comprehensive survey of the economic and development needs of the
country's Arab population and was considered inadequate to meet that
population's needs. Critics also pointed out that only half of the
total sum represented newly allocated money. The Government did not
implement the plan by year's end, and according to newspaper reports,
the Government's 2001 budget proposal did not include details about
funding for the plan.
The Government appointed an Arab citizen to the board of the Israel
land authority in November 1999. This marked the first representation
of non-Jews on this body, half of whose members represent organizations
forbidden by statute to transfer land to non-Jews. In March the High
Court of Justice ruled on an October 1995 petition brought by an Arab
couple that was barred from buying a home in Katzir, a Jewish
municipality, which was built on state-owned land. The High Court ruled
that the Government's use of the Jewish National Fund to develop public
land was discriminatory, since the fund's by-laws prohibit the sale or
lease of land to non-Jews. The High Court noted that its ruling in the
case would not affect previous land allocations and that
differentiating between Jews and non-Jews in land allocation might be
acceptable under unspecified ``special circumstances.'' Following the
High Court's decision, the Government established an interministerial
committee to examine the issues involved in implementing the decision.
The Israel Lands Administration had not implemented the ruling in this
case by year's end and the Ka'adan family still was not allocated a
plot of land in Katzir. Israeli Arab organizations have challenged the
1996 ``Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel,'' which listed as
priority goals increasing the Galilee's Jewish population and blocking
the territorial contiguity of Arab villages and towns, on the grounds
that it discriminates against Arab citizens; the Government continues
to use this document for planning in the Galilee.
Relative to their numbers, Israeli Arabs are underrepresented in
the student bodies and faculties of most universities and in higher
level professional and business ranks. Arabs constitute only 8.7
percent of the students at major universities in the country. Well-
educated Arabs often are unable to find jobs commensurate with their
level of education. Arab citizens hold only 50 of the country's 5,000
university faculty positions. The Government states that it is
committed to granting equal and fair conditions to Israeli Arabs,
particularly in the areas of education, housing, and employment. A
small number of Israeli Arabs have risen to responsible positions in
the civil service, generally in the Arab departments of government
ministries. In 1994 a civil service commission began a 3-year
affirmative action program to expand that number, but it has had only
modest results. Arab citizens compose 6.2 percent of the civil service
and less than 2 percent of the positions in the four senior-most civil
service grades. In October the Knesset passed a bill that minorities
and underrepresented populations must be granted ``appropriate
representation'' in the civil service, and on the boards of government
corporations.
In practice, few Israeli Arabs serve in the military or work in
companies with defense contracts or in security-related fields. The
Israeli Druze and Circassian communities are subject to the military
draft, and although some have refused to serve, the overwhelming
majority accepts service willingly. Some Bedouin and other Arab
citizens who are not subject to the draft serve voluntarily. Those who
do not serve in the army have less access than other citizens to those
social and economic benefits for which military service is a
prerequisite or an advantage, such as housing, new-household subsidies,
and government or security-related industrial employment. Under a 1994
government policy decision, the social security child allowance for
parents who did not serve in the military and did not attend a yeshiva
(including Arabs) was increased to equal the allowance of those who had
done so.
Israeli Arab groups allege that many employers use the prerequisite
of military service to avoid hiring non-Jews. For example, a September
1999 survey revealed that 40 percent of employment ads in one weekend
newspaper listed ``army service necessary.'' Jobs included ice cream
sales, typist, bus driver, and customer service.
There are approximately 130,000 Bedouin in the Negev; of this
number about half live in 7 state planned communities and the other
half live in 45 settlements that are not recognized by the Government.
The recognized Bedouin villages receive basic services from the
Government; however, they are among the poorest communities in the
country. The unrecognized villages were declared illegal by the
National Planning and Building Law of 1965 when the lands on which they
sit were rezoned as nonresidential and the Government claimed
ownership. According to the Government, recognizing these villages
would conflict with its attempts to establish new villages in ``an
orderly manner, and would leave disputes over the land unresolved.''
Residents of the unrecognized villages pay taxes to the Government;
however, they are not eligible for government services. Consequently,
such villages have none of the infrastructure, such as electricity,
water, and sewers, provided to recognized communities. The lack of
basic services has caused difficulties for the villagers in regard to
their education, health care, and employment opportunities. New
building in the unrecognized villages is considered illegal and subject
to demolition. Private efforts have supplied some unrecognized villages
with water, and the courts have ordered the provision of limited health
and education services. The Government has yet to fulfill its
commitment to resolve the legal status of unrecognized Arab villages.
Eight villages have been recognized officially since 1994, but nearly
100 more, of varying size and with a total population of nearly 70,000
persons, remain in limbo. Of the eight villages that have been
recognized, the Government has yet to actually implement the decisions.
In 1998 the High Court of Justice ordered the Ministry of Education to
provide electricity to schools in several unrecognized villages in the
Negev. In March 1999, the High Court ordered the Ministry of Health to
provide within 2 months six permanent health clinics to serve the
unrecognized villages; however, the clinics had not been built by
year's end. In November the High Court ruled that the Government must
build a school for the children in the unrecognized village of Beer
Hadaj within 4 months. During the year, the Ministry of Interior and
the Attorney General declared that residents of Husseinya, an
unrecognized village, could list their village's name as their place of
residence on their identification cards.
Arab children make up about a quarter of the public school
population, but Government resources for them are less than
proportionate to those for Jewish children. Many schools in Arab
communities are dilapidated and overcrowded, lack special education
services and counselors, have poor libraries, and have no sports
facilities. According to a report issued during the year, only 54
percent of Arab students finish high school compared with 89 percent of
Jewish students. According to 1998 statistics, 58 percent of the
teachers in Jewish schools had university degrees compared with 39
percent of the teachers in Arab schools. The disparity in government
resources for education also affects Bedouin children from the
unrecognized villages. Currently, preschool attendance for Bedouin
children is the lowest in the country, and the dropout rate for Bedouin
high school students is the highest. Arab groups also note that the
public school curriculum stresses Israel's Jewish culture and heritage.
Israeli Arab students also are not eligible to participate in a
special education program to provide academic assistance to students
from disadvantaged backgrounds. A petition was filed with the High
Court of Justice in May 1997 charging that the Ministry of Education's
refusal to provide this program to Israeli Arab students was
discriminatory. The Attorney General's office agreed that the policy
constituted impermissible discrimination but asked for 5 years to
expand the program to Israeli Arab students. The petitioners rejected
this proposal as being too slow. The court held hearings in the case
twice in 1999; however, it still had not ruled on the proper
implementation period by year's end.
Unresolved problems of many years' standing also include claims by
Arab groups that land expropriation for public use has affected the
Arab community disproportionately; that Arabs have been allowed too
little input in planning decisions that affect their schools and
municipalities; that mosques and cemeteries belonging to the Islamic
Waqf (religious endowment) have been neglected or expropriated unjustly
for public use; and that successive governments have blocked the return
to their homes of citizens displaced in the early years of the
country's history. The Government has yet to agree with the pre-1948
residents of the northern villages of Bir Am and Ikrit, and their
descendants, regarding their long-term demand to be allowed to rebuild
their houses. In 1997 a special interministerial panel recommended that
the Government allow the villagers to return to Bir Am and Ikrit. The
High Court has granted the Government several extensions for
implementing the recommendation, including 2 extensions during the
year. The Government stated that a special interministerial panel
currently is examining economic aspects of the issue.
In early October, there were many instances of societal violence
between Arab and Jewish citizens which coincided with violent events in
Israel and the occupied territories (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and the
annex). For example, on October 3, an Israeli Arab shot and killed an
Israeli Jew on a road in the north of the country. On October 7, a
group of about 200 Israeli Jews attacked Arab Israeli homes in
predominantly Jewish Upper Nazareth. On October 8, a group of about
1,000 Israeli Jews attacked Arab Israeli homes in Nazareth. Two persons
were killed and approximately 50 persons were injured in these attacks
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Jewish citizens also attacked Arab homes,
businesses that employed Arabs, and two mosques in other areas of the
country. During the October disturbances, Arab protesters also attacked
Jewish-owned businesses throughout the country, and in at least one
case Arab crowds attacked a synagogue.
In 1991 the Government launched Operation Solomon, which airlifted
14,000 Ethiopian immigrants to the country. There were occasional
reports of societal discrimination during the year.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join and establish labor
organizations freely. Most unions belong to Histadrut (the General
Federation of Labor in Israel), or to a much smaller rival federation,
the Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit (National Federation of Labor). These
organizations are independent of the Government. Histadrut members
democratically elect national and local officers, and officials of its
affiliated women's organization Na'amat, from political party lists of
those already in the union. Plant or enterprise committee members are
elected individually. About 650,000 workers are members of Histadrut,
and much of the non-Histadrut work force is covered by Histadrut's
collective bargaining agreements.
The right to strike is exercised regularly. Unions must provide 15
days' notice prior to a strike unless otherwise specified in the
collective bargaining agreement. However, unauthorized strikes occur.
Strike leaders--even those organizing illegal strikes--are protected by
law. If essential public services are affected, the Government may
appeal to labor courts for back-to-work orders while the parties
continue negotiations. There were a number of strikes in both the
public and private sectors during the year by employees protesting the
effects of privatization. Worker dismissals and the terms of severance
arrangements often were the central issues of dispute.
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip who worked in Israel
were not able to join Israeli trade unions or organize their own unions
in Israel. Palestinian trade unions in the occupied territories are not
permitted to conduct activities in Israel (see Section 6.a. of the
annex). However, nonresident workers in the organized sector are
entitled to the protection of Histadrut work contracts and grievance
procedures. They may join, vote for, and be elected to shop-level
workers' committees if their numbers in individual establishments
exceed a minimum threshold. Palestinian participation in such
committees is minimal.
Labor laws apply to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and to the
Syrian Druze living on the Golan Heights.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Citizen workers
fully exercise their legal rights to organize and bargain collectively.
While there is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion
discrimination, the law against discrimination could be cited to
contest discrimination based on union membership. No antiunion
discrimination has been reported.
Nonresident workers may not organize their own unions or engage in
collective bargaining, but they are entitled to be represented by the
bargaining agent and protected by collective bargaining agreements.
They do not pay union membership fees, but are required to pay a 1
percent agency fee, which entitles them to union protection by
Histadrut's collective bargaining agreements. The Ministry of Labor may
extend collective bargaining agreements to nonunionized workplaces in
the same industrial sector. The Ministry of Labor also oversees
personal contracts in the unorganized sectors of the economy.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, specifically including child forced labor,
and neither citizens nor nonresident Palestinians working in Israel are
generally subject to this practice; however, women are trafficked for
the purpose of prostitution (see Section 6.f.). Civil rights groups
charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal
workers' lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to
involuntary servitude (see Section 6.e.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Children who have attained the age of 15 years, and who
are liable to compulsory education under the compulsory education law,
may not be employed unless they work as apprentices under the
Apprenticeship Law. Notwithstanding these provisions, children who are
14 years old may be employed during official school holidays.
Employment of those 16 to 18 years of age is restricted to ensure time
for rest and education.
There are no reliable data on illegal child workers. They are
concentrated among the country's Arab population and its most recent
Jewish immigrants. Illegal employment is found primarily in urban,
light-industrial areas. Children's rights groups have called for more
vigorous enforcement of child labor laws, combined with a parallel
effort to deal with the causes of illegal child labor. The Government
specifically prohibits forced child labor, and it generally does not
occur.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Legislation in 1987 established
a minimum wage at 45 percent of the average wage, calculated
periodically and adjusted for cost of living increases. At year's end,
the minimum wage was about $700 (2,800 NIS) per month. The minimum wage
often is supplemented by special allowances and generally is sufficient
to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living. Union
officials have expressed concern over enforcement of minimum wage
regulations, particularly with respect to employers of illegal
nonresident workers, who sometimes pay less than the minimum wage.
By law the maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47 hours a
week, 8 hours per day, and 7 hours on the day before the weekly rest,
which must be at least 36 consecutive hours and include the Sabbath. By
national collective agreements, the private sector established a
maximum 45-hour workweek in 1988. The public sector moved to a 5-day,
42-plus hour workweek in 1989, while the military adopted it in 1993.
Employers must receive a government permit to hire nonresident
workers from the occupied territories, certifying that no citizen is
available for the job. All Palestinians from the occupied territories
are employed on a daily basis and, unless they are employed on shift
work, are not authorized to spend the night in Israel. The Government
has in the past considered, but not acted on, a change in this
provision to allow Palestinian workers to remain overnight for a week
at a time. Palestinians without valid work permits are subject to
arrest. Due to security concerns, the Government stopped issuing
permits for Palestinian workers following the outbreak of violence in
October.
Nonresident workers are paid through the employment service of the
Ministry of Labor, which disburses wages and benefits collected from
employers. The Ministry deducts a 1 percent union fee and the workers'
required contributions to the National Insurance Institute (NII), the
agency that administers the Israeli social security system,
unemployment benefits, and other benefits. Despite these deductions,
Palestinian workers are not eligible for all NII benefits. They
continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel and the
bankruptcy of a worker's employer. They do not have access to
unemployment insurance, general disability payments, low-income
supplements, or child allotments. By contrast, Israeli settlers in the
occupied territories who work in Israel have the same benefits as other
Israeli workers. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long
criticized this inequality in entitlements. Since 1993 the Government
has agreed to transfer the NII fees collected from Palestinian workers
to the Palestinian Authority, which is to assume responsibility for all
the pensions and social benefits of Palestinians working in Israel.
There was increased public debate over the role in the workplace
and society of foreign workers, who are estimated to number at least
180,000, perhaps half of them undocumented and employed illegally. The
majority of such workers come from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia,
and most are employed in the construction and agricultural sectors. The
law does not allow such workers citizenship or permanent residence. As
a result, they and their families live in a legal and social limbo.
Government deportations of such workers take place without benefit of
due process. In August press reports stated that the Government ordered
an increase in deportations of undocumented foreign workers; however,
the deportations were not carried out. Human rights groups argue that
since foreign worker residency permits are tied to specific employment,
workers have little leverage to influence their work conditions. In May
the Ministry of Interior acknowledged that it had prevented labor
organizations from distributing pamphlets on labor rights to foreign
workers who arrived at the airport. Following the outbreak of violence
in September, the Government implemented a closure policy, which
prevented thousands of Palestinians from getting to their jobs in
Israel (see Section 2.d.). On December 17, in response to pressure for
additional workers from the construction and agricultural sectors, the
Government announced that it would grant temporary permits to several
thousand additional foreign workers.
Along with union representatives, the Labor Inspection Service
enforces labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace, although
resource constraints affect overall enforcement. Legislation protects
the employment rights of safety delegates elected or appointed by the
workers. In cooperation with management, these delegates are
responsible for safety and health in the workplace.
Workers do not have the legal right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
However, collective bargaining agreements provide some workers with
recourse through the work site labor committee. Any worker may
challenge unsafe work practices through government oversight and legal
agencies.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women for the purpose of
prostitution is a continuing problem. According to Amnesty
International (AI), every year hundreds of women from the former Soviet
Union are brought to Israel by well-organized criminal networks and
forced through violence and threats to work illegally as prostitutes.
According to some local NGO's, thousands of women are trafficked into
the country annually.
In June the Government enacted a law that prohibits the trafficking
of persons for the purpose of prostitution. Prostitution per se is not
illegal; however, the operation of brothels and organized sex
enterprises is outlawed, as are many of the human rights abuses
perpetrated by traffickers and pimps, such as assault, rape, abduction,
and false imprisonment. Section 201 of the Penal Code stipulates that
it is a criminal offense, punishable by between 5 and 7 years'
imprisonment, to force or coerce a person to engage in prostitution.
Section 202(b) of the Penal Code makes it a criminal offense to induce
a woman to leave Israel with the intent to ``practice prostitution
abroad.'' In March the Knesset passed the Equality of Women Law (see
Section 5); Section 6(b) of the law stipulates that every woman is
entitled to protection from violence, sexual harassment, sexual
exploitation, and trafficking.
Traffickers reportedly often lure women into coming to the country
by offering them jobs in the service industry. In many cases,
traffickers meet women at the airport and confiscate all of their
official documents. Many trafficked women are forced to live and work
under extremely harsh conditions and to give most of the money they
earn to their bosses. The women reportedly often are raped and beaten,
and often are afraid to report their situation to the police because
they are in the country illegally.
According to press reports, brothels are ubiquitous despite being
illegal, and police officials estimate that there are 25,000 paid
sexual transactions every day. Police often detain trafficked women
following raids on brothels. The Minister of Interior has broad powers
to deport illegal aliens and to hold them in detention pending
deportation. The Ministry may issue deportation orders against any
person who is in the country without a residence permit and may hold
the deportee in detention following the issuance of a deportation
order. The deportee can appeal the deportation order to the Ministry
within 3 days of its issuance and also can challenge the order in the
High Court. However, trafficked women often do not challenge a
deportation order due to language barriers or a lack of information
about the appeals procedure. Many trafficked women are detained for
extended periods of time because of government orders that they stay in
the country to testify in the criminal proceedings against their
traffickers. Many women are reluctant or afraid to testify in trials
due to threats and intimidation by their traffickers. According to AI,
women refuse to testify in court in about 90 percent of all the cases
that are prosecuted. Since 1997 police have arrested and deported
approximately 1,200 women who were trafficked to the country for
prostitution. According to AI, the Government does not attempt to
determine whether or not a trafficked woman would be at risk for
persecution if she is deported to her country of origin, even in cases
in which the woman or girl has testified in criminal proceedings.
The Occupied Territitories
(including areas subject to the jurisdiction of the palestinian
authority)
Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East
Jerusalem during the 1967 War. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are now
administered to varying extents by Israel and the Palestinian Authority
(PA). Pursuant to the May 1994
Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement,
Israel transferred most responsibilities for civil government in the
Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the PA while retaining
responsibility for external security; foreign relations; the overall
security of Israelis, including public order in the Israeli
settlements; and certain other matters.
An historic process of reconciliation between Israel and the
Palestinians began with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and continued
with the September 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration
of Principles (DOP). In September 1995, Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. In January 1997, the parties concluded the
Hebron Agreement and in October 1998, Israel and the PLO signed the Wye
River Memorandum. In September 1999, the Israeli Government and the PLO
signed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. The parties held intensive
working-level talks between March and June and met at Camp David in
July; however, the Israeli Government and the PLO did not reach an
agreement. On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon
visited the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. On September
29, Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at police
in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal
bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4
persons and injuring approximately 200. Following this incident,
Palestinians began violent demonstrations against IDF soldiers,
settlers, and other Israeli civilians throughout the occupied
territories; these demonstrations and ensuing clashes--known to
Palestinians and many Israelis as the ``al-Aqsa Intifada''--between
Palestinians and IDF soldiers occurred daily through the end of the
year.
Israel and the Palestinian Authority have varying degrees of
control and jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel
continues to control certain civil functions and is responsible for all
security in portions of the occupied territories categorized as Area C,
which includes the Israeli settlements and 4 percent of the total West
Bank Palestinian population. In areas known as Area B, which includes
41 percent of the West Bank Palestinian population, the PA has
jurisdiction over civil affairs and shares security responsibilities
with Israel. The PA has control over civil affairs and security in Area
A, which includes 55 percent of the West Bank Palestinian population.
The PA also has jurisdiction over some civil affairs in Area C, as
specified in the Interim Agreement. Accordingly, this report discusses
the policies and practices of both the Israeli Government and the PA in
the areas in which they exercise jurisdiction and control.
Israel continues to exercise civil authority in parts of the West
Bank and Gaza through the Israeli Ministry of Defense's Office of
Coordination and Liaison, known by the Hebrew acronym MATAK, which
replaced the now defunct Civil Administration (CIVAD) in 1995. The
approximately 175,000 Israeli settlers living in Area C of the West
Bank and in the Gaza Strip are subject to Israeli law and, as citizens,
receive preferential treatment from Israeli authorities in terms of
protection of personal and property rights and of legal redress. The
body of law governing Palestinians in the territories derives from
Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, and Egyptian law, and Israeli
military orders. Certain laws and regulations promulgated by the PA
also are in force. The international community considers Israel's
authority in the occupied territories to be subject to the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War. The Israeli Government
considers the Hague Regulations applicable and states that it observes
the Geneva Convention's humanitarian provisions.
In January 1996, Palestinians chose their first popularly elected
Government in democratic elections that generally were well-conducted;
the 88-member Palestinian Council (PC) and the Chairman of the
Executive Authority were elected. The PA also has a cabinet of 30
ministers. Chairman Yasir Arafat continues to dominate the affairs of
government and to make major decisions. Most senior government
positions in the PA are held by individuals who are members of, or
loyal to, Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO. The Council meets
regularly and discusses a range of issues significant to the
Palestinian people; however, it does not have significant influence on
policy or the behavior of the executive. In Gaza the legal code derives
from British Mandate law, Egyptian law, and PA directives and laws. In
the West Bank, pre-1967 Jordanian law and PA laws apply. The PA states
that it is undertaking efforts to unify the Gaza and West Bank legal
codes; however, it has made little progress to date. The PA courts are
perceived as inefficient and the PA executive and security services
frequently ignore or fail to carry out court decisions.
Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consist of
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); the Israel Security Agency (the ISA--
formerly the General Security Service, or GSS, and also known as Shin
Bet, or Shabak); the Israeli National Police (INP); and the
paramilitary border police. Israeli military courts try Palestinians
accused of committing security crimes in Israeli-controlled areas.
Members of the Israeli security forces committed numerous serious human
rights abuses, particularly following the outbreak of violence in late
September.
The Palestinian Police Force (PPF) was established in May 1994 and
includes the Palestinian Public Security Force; the Palestinian Civil
Police; the Preventive Security Force (PSF); the General Intelligence
Service, or Mukhabarat; the Palestinian Presidential Security Force;
and the Palestinian Coastal Police. Other quasi-military security
organizations, such as the military intelligence organization, also
exercise de facto law enforcement powers. Palestinian police are
responsible for security and law enforcement for Palestinians and other
non-Israelis in PA-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Israeli settlers in the occupied territories are not subject to PA
security force jurisdiction. Members of the PA security forces
committed numerous serious human rights abuses throughout the year.
The economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is small, poorly
developed, and highly dependent on Israel. The economy relies primarily
on agriculture, services, and, to a lesser extent, light manufacturing.
Especially during periods of tension, Israel restricts the movement of
persons and products into Israel and Jerusalem from the West Bank and
Gaza, which frequently affects the ability of Palestinians to reach
their jobs in Israel. Since 1993 Israel has required Palestinians and
their vehicles to have Israeli permits to cross from the West Bank or
Gaza into Israel and Jerusalem. Approximately 125,000 West Bank and
Gazan workers, representing roughly 20 percent of the Palestinian work
force, normally are employed at day jobs in Israel, Israeli
settlements, and Jerusalem, making their employment subject to
disruption. Since 1993 Israel has applied ``closures,'' or enhanced
restrictions, on the movement of persons and products, often for
lengthy periods, in response to terrorist attacks or other changes in
the security environment. During periods of violent protest in the West
Bank or Gaza, or when it believes that there is an increased likelihood
of such unrest or of terrorist attacks, Israel imposes a tightened
version of closure. Comprehensive, tightened closures also are
instituted regularly during major Israeli holidays. During such
closures, Israel cancels all travel permits and prevents Palestinians--
even those with valid work permits--from entering Israel or Jerusalem.
Due to the ongoing unrest in the occupied territories, Israel imposed
88 days of tightened, comprehensive closure during the year, compared
with 15 days in 1999. In periods of extreme unrest in the West Bank and
Gaza, the Israeli Government also prohibits most travel between towns
and villages within the West Bank--an ``internal'' closure--impeding
the flow of goods and persons. During such internal closures, the
Government also bans travel on the safe passage route between the West
Bank and Gaza. Israel imposed at least 81 days of internal closure
during the year, compared with no days of internal closure in 1999. In
the past, Israel rarely imposed internal closure within Gaza; however,
during much of November and December the Israeli Government imposed
internal closure in Gaza. The prolonged periods of closure had a
significant negative impact on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza.
Israel's overall human rights record in the occupied territories
was poor; although the situation improved slightly during the first 9
months of the year, it worsened in several areas late in the year,
mainly due to the sustained violence that began in September. Israeli
security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses during
the year. Security forces killed 307 Palestinians and four foreign
nationals and injured at least 11,300 Palestinians and other persons
during the year. Israeli security forces targeted for killing a number
of Palestinians whom the Israeli Government stated had attacked or were
planning future attacks on Israeli settlements or military targets; a
number of bystanders reportedly also were killed during these
incidents. Since the violence began, Israeli security units often used
excessive force against Palestinian demonstrators. Israeli security
forces sometimes exceeded their rules of engagement, which provide that
live fire is only to be used when the lives of soldiers, police, or
civilians are in imminent danger. IDF forces also shelled PA
institutions and Palestinian civilian areas in response to individual
Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians or settlers; 7 Palestinians
and 1 foreign national were killed, and 131 Palestinians were injured
in these attacks. Israeli security forces abused Palestinians in
detention suspected of security offenses. However, a September 1999
landmark decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice prohibited the
use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent shaking,
painful shackling in contorted positions, and prolonged exposure to
extreme temperatures. Since the September 1999 ruling, domestic and
international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) have been unable to
substantiate sporadic allegations that security forces tortured
detainees. There were numerous credible allegations that police beat
persons in detention. Three Palestinian prisoners died in Israeli
custody under ambiguous circumstances during the year. Prison
conditions are poor. Prolonged detention, limits on due process, and
infringements on privacy rights remained problems. Israeli security
forces sometimes impeded the provision of medical assistance to
Palestinian civilians. Israeli security forces destroyed Palestinian-
owned agricultural land. Israeli authorities censored Palestinian
publications, placed limits on freedom of assembly, and restricted
freedom of movement for Palestinians.
The PA's overall human rights record was poor, and it worsened in
several areas during the year mainly due to the sustained violence that
began in late September. Palestinian security forces reportedly killed
several Israeli security force members during violent clashes with
Israeli soldiers or settlers. Members of Palestinian security services
and Fatah's Tanzim participated in violent attacks. Armed Palestinians,
some of them members of Palestinian security forces, fired at Israeli
civilians or soldiers from within or close to the homes of Palestinian
civilians; residents of the homes consequently bore the brunt of IDF
retaliation for these attacks. Palestinian security forces also failed
to prevent armed Palestinians from opening fire on Israelis in places
in which Palestinians were present. The extent to which senior PLO or
PA officials authorized such incidents is not clear. Palestinian
security forces in October reportedly impeded the provision of medical
assistance to an injured Israeli border policeman, who later died.
One Palestinian died in PA custody under ambiguous circumstances.
PA prison conditions are very poor. PA security forces arbitrarily
arrest and detain persons, and prolonged detention is a problem. Lack
of due process also is a problem. The courts are perceived as
inefficient, lack staff and resources, and do not ensure fair and
expeditious trials. The PA executive and security services frequently
ignore or fail to enforce court decisions. Lack of due process also is
a serious problem in the PA's state security courts. PA security forces
infringed on citizens' rights to privacy and restricted freedom of
speech and of the press. The PA continued to harass, detain, and abuse
journalists. PA harassment contributed to the practice of self-
censorship by many Palestinian commentators, reporters, and critics.
The PA placed some limits on freedom of assembly and association. In
February the PA police announced a ban on unlicensed public gatherings,
but this action was invalidated by the Palestinian High Court 2 months
later. Violence against women and ``honor killings'' persist. Societal
discrimination against women and the disabled is a problem. Child labor
is a problem.
Israeli civilians, especially settlers, harassed, attacked, and
occasionally killed Palestinians in the occupied territories. There
were credible reports that settlers killed at least 14 Palestinians
during the year. In one case, an Israeli civilian killed a Palestinian
who previously had attacked a settlement and killed an IDF soldier.
Settlers also caused economic damage to Palestinians by attacking and
damaging greenhouses and agricultural equipment, uprooting olive trees,
and damaging other valuable crops. The settlers did not act under
government orders in the attacks; however, the Israeli Government did
not prosecute the settlers for their acts of violence. In general
settlers rarely serve prison sentences if convicted of a crime against
Palestinians.
Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories harassed,
attacked, and occasionally killed Israelis, especially settlers.
Palestinians killed at least 18 Israeli civilians during the year. A
number of extremist Palestinian groups and individuals, including the
militant Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and the Palestine Islamic
Jihad (PIJ), continued to kill and injure Israelis. Five attacks and
roadside bombings were carried out in Israel and the occupied
territories. The PA made no arrests in any of these killings.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Israeli security
forces killed numerous Palestinians in response to a sustained violent
uprising late in the year. Most of the Palestinians were killed during
demonstrations and other violent clashes, and others were targeted
specifically by Israeli security forces.
In May Israeli security forces killed six Palestinians and wounded
up to 700 at demonstrations in which Palestinian demonstrators were
protesting the continued incarceration of Palestinian prisoners in
Israeli jails. Some protesters threw stones and Molotov cocktails, and
some demonstrators shot at Israeli settlers (see Section 1.c.).
Deaths due to political violence increased significantly during the
year due to the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' At least 365 persons were killed
between late September and the end of December in demonstrations,
violent clashes, and military and civilian attacks, including 325
Palestinians, 36 Israelis, 3 Jordanian citizens, and 1 German citizen.
Additionally, at least 10,962 persons were injured during this period,
including 10,600 Palestinians and 362 Israelis (see Sections 1.c. and
1.g.). On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited
the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. On September 29,
Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at police in
the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal
bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4
persons and injuring approximately 200. Following this incident,
Palestinians began violent demonstrations against IDF soldiers,
settlers, and other Israeli civilians throughout the occupied
territories; these demonstrations and ensuing clashes between
Palestinians and IDF soldiers occurred daily through the end of the
year.
Between late September and the end of the year, Israeli security
forces killed 227 Palestinians and 4 foreign nationals, and injured
over 10,600 Palestinians during violent demonstrations. Palestinian
demonstrators frequently threw stones and Molotov cocktails at IDF
soldiers. In some demonstrations, Palestinians also used firearms.
According to the IDF, Palestinians used firearms in about 30 percent of
the demonstrations between late September and mid-November. In
response, Israeli security forces used a variety of means to disperse
demonstrators, including tear gas, rubber-coated metal bullets, and
live ammunition. In many instances, Israeli security forces used
excessive force against demonstrators in contravention of their
official rules of engagement (see Section 1.g.).
Israeli Defense Force soldiers targeted for killing a number of
Palestinians during the year. A senior Israeli official stated to the
domestic press that the IDF deliberately targeted 10 Palestinians since
the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' According to the IDF, the
targeted persons were PA security officers or Fatah's Tanzim who
previously had attacked or were planning future attacks on Israeli
settlements or military targets. The Israeli Government stated that it
only targeted persons against whom it had overwhelming evidence and
only with the authorization of senior political leaders. PA officials
and some human rights organizations claimed that a number of the
targeted persons were not involved in the ongoing violence. IDF forces
also killed 6 Palestinian bystanders and injured over a dozen others
during these incidents (see Section 1.c.).
On November 9, Israeli helicopters fired rockets at a car in Beit
Sahour, killing Hussein Mohamed Salim Ubayyat, a Fatah official. Two
Palestinian women walking on the road nearby were killed and seven
other civilian bystanders were injured in the attack (see Section
1.c.). An IDF spokesman later announced that Ubayyat had been targeted
because of his prior involvement in a number of attacks against Israeli
military and civilian targets.
On December 31, IDF soldiers killed Dr. Thabet Ahmad Thabet, a
high-ranking member of Fatah, while he was in his car near his home.
There also were a number of instances in which is was unclear
whether Israeli security forces targeted their victims. On November 17,
IDF soldiers killed two Palestinian National Security Forces officers
in Jericho. The IDF stated that the officers were part of a terrorist
cell that previously had attacked IDF positions and some settlements.
The PA stated that the two officers were killed while on duty and
working to prevent Palestinian gunmen at a nearby refugee camp from
shooting at Israeli positions.
On November 22, IDF forces fired at 2 cars in Gaza, killing a
senior Tanzim member, Jamal Abdel Raziq, and 3 other Tanzim members.
The Israeli press reported that the 4 were terrorists who were
attempting to infiltrate the Morag settlement and that security forces
fired at the 2 cars after the drivers refused to stop at a road
blockade. According to press reports, Israeli security sources later
stated that the incident was an ``IDF-initiated operation'' against
Raziq, who reportedly had been involved in attacks on Israelis in Gaza.
On November 23, HAMAS member Ibrahim Abdel Karim Bani was killed
when a bomb exploded in the borrowed car he was driving. Israeli
security officials stated to the press that Bani Odeh was transporting
explosives to carry out a terrorist attack that detonated prematurely.
However, according to the PA and the Palestinian press, Bani Odeh was
on a list of 10 Palestinians that the IDF planned to target for
killing. PA security forces arrested Bani Odeh's cousin, who reportedly
confessed to having provided information to the IDF about Odeh's
whereabouts on the day he was killed.
On November 26, IDF soldiers fired on nine Palestinian youths,
killing five and injuring two. The Israeli press reported that the IDF
refused an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) request to
allow medical personnel access to the injured. Palestinian sources
stated that the IDF subsequently fired on the injured persons with
helicopter gunships. On November 27, Israeli radio, citing IDF sources,
described the incident as a ``proactive'' IDF-initiated action that
targeted known terrorists who had participated in previous attacks
against Israeli civilian and military targets, including two attacks
that took place earlier that day. The Israeli Government also stated
that it had reason to believe that the Palestinian youths were planning
an additional terrorist attack. Palestinian sources stated that the
youths were on their way to visit friends when they were fired upon by
the IDF.
On December 10, IDF soldiers fired on two Palestinians who
reportedly were planting a roadside bomb near Bethlehem, killing
Mahmoud Mugrabi, a member of Fatah. According to press reports quoting
a senior IDF official, Mugrabi's name was on a list of ten reputed
terrorists that the IDF had targeted for killing.
Israeli security force personnel killed several Palestinians in
unclear circumstances. According to eyewitnesses and a credible
Palestinian human rights organization, on October 6, an IDF soldier
shot an unarmed 14-year-old boy on the porch of his home near Hebron;
he later died. On December 11, Israeli security forces shot and killed
Anwar Hmeiran, a member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. According to
Palestinian eyewitnesses, there were no clashes taking place at the
time of the shooting. On December 16, Mohammad Fahed Maali was killed
while reportedly walking past a clash between Israeli security forces
and Palestinian demonstrators in Jenin; according to the Palestinian
press, the Palestinian demonstrators did not use firearms in the
demonstration. IDF soldiers killed Abbas Othman Ewaywi, a member of
HAMAS. According to the IDF, Ewaywi was caught in crossfire between
Israeli and Palestinian security forces. However, Palestinian media and
eyewitnesses stated that there was no such exchange of gunfire when
Ewaywi was shot. HAMAS issued a leaflet the same day vowing revenge for
his death.
On September 30, a journalist videotaped and broadcast
internationally an exchange of fire between Israeli and Palestinian
security forces at Netzarim junction that resulted in the killing of
12-year-old Muhammad al-Dura. Many observers stated that the boy was
killed by IDF fire; however, the IDF conducted an investigation and
reported that it was not clear whether it was Israeli or Palestinian
gunfire that killed al-Dura.
The IDF generally did not investigate incidents in which security
forces killed and injured Palestinians. The IDF stated that it did not
investigate such incidents because of technical problems; because
Israel does not have full control over the occupied territories, and
the PA reportedly would not cooperate in investigations in Areas B and
C, the IDF stated that it could not conduct such investigations.
However, in certain high profile cases, such as the killing of Muhammad
al-Dura and the injuring of a foreign journalist, the IDF agreed to
investigate.
In several incidents, following attacks on Israeli civilians,
including settlers, IDF helicopters fired tank rounds and rockets from
helicopters on towns and cities in the West Bank and Gaza, killing and
injuring a number of persons and causing significant damage to
buildings (see Section 1.g.).
Prior to the outbreak of violence in late September, members of the
Israeli security forces killed three Palestinians at military
checkpoints and roadblocks inside the occupied territories. In these
instances, Israeli authorities stated that the individuals were shot
after failing to obey orders to halt. Palestinian eyewitnesses disputed
these accounts and charged that Israeli soldiers used excessive and
unnecessary force. On March 20, Israeli soldiers killed Halima al-Aloul
at the Kharas checkpoint near Hebron; al-Aloul was riding with her
husband, who allegedly failed to stop at the checkpoint. On March 30,
Murad al-Zaro was shot and killed by Israeli police officers near the
Shufat refugee camp in Jerusalem. Israeli police maintained that al-
Zaro failed to stop when ordered to do so; however, Palestinian
eyewitnesses claimed that police shot al-Zaro after he already had
stopped the car. On July 8, IDF soldiers killed a Palestinian woman in
Gaza while she was riding in a car. According to the IDF, the soldiers
fired because they believed that they heard shots fired from the car.
On August 16, IDF security forces mistakenly killed Mahmoud Assad
Abdullah al-Bazar in Surda village. According to the IDF, security
forces surrounded his house in the mistaken belief that a wanted HAMAS
terrorist was inside. According to his family members, al-Bazar went to
his roof to investigate noises and fired one shot in the air to
frighten presumed thieves. The IDF soldiers reportedly heard the shot
and opened fire on al-Bazar.
According to credible human rights organizations, Israeli security
forces sometimes impeded the provision of medical assistance to sick
and injured Palestinians (see Section 2.d.); Palestinians claim that
seven Palestinians died as a result. For example, on October 6, Israeli
security forces delayed an ambulance from reaching a Palestinian who
was wounded in a clash in Jerusalem; the Palestinian died later the
same day. On October 14, IDF soldiers did not allow a father to bring
his daughter into Nablus for medical treatment; she died the same day
of a ruptured appendix. On October 16, IDF soldiers refused to allow a
man into Nablus for kidney dialysis; he later died of kidney failure.
According to the Israeli Government, Palestinian medical personnel
sometimes used ambulances as shelter for Palestinians who had fired at
Israeli civilians and soldiers (see Section 1.c.).
In May Mohamad Abdel Jalil Fayez Saed from Askar refugee camp in
Nablus died from wounds sustained in a 1991 confrontation with the IDF
in which soldiers reportedly beat Saed for throwing stones at an IDF
foot patrol, which left him paralyzed.
Three Palestinian security detainees reportedly died in Israeli
custody during the year (see Section 1.c.). On January 14, Lafi al-
Rajabi died in a detention center near Nablus; his body reportedly bore
cuts and bruises. On June 19, Sami As'ad reportedly hanged himself in
Kishon prison; according to newspaper reports he previously had
attempted suicide. On August 11, Ramez Fayez Mohammed Rashing Elrizi
died in al-Nafha prison under ambiguous circumstances. The Israeli
Government did not publish official autopsies in these deaths.
Palestinian security forces reportedly killed several Israeli
security force members during violent clashes with Israeli soldiers or
settlers. Members of Palestinian security services and Fatah's Tanzim
participated in violent attacks. Armed Palestinians, some of them
members of Palestinian security forces, fired at Israeli civilians or
soldiers from within or close to the homes of Palestinian civilians;
residents of the homes consequently bore the brunt of IDF retaliation
for these attacks. Palestinian security forces also failed to prevent
armed Palestinians from opening fire on Israelis in places in which
Palestinians were present. The extent to which senior PLO or PA
officials authorized such incidents is not clear. Palestinian security
forces reportedly impeded the provision of medical assistance to an
injured Israeli border policeman, who later died.
On September 29, a Palestinian policeman killed one Israeli border
policeman and injured a second. The three police personnel were part of
a joint patrol.
On October 1, PA security forces shot a border policeman at
Joseph's Tomb, and then delayed an ambulance from reaching him in a
timely manner; the soldier bled to death.
One Palestinian died in PA custody during the year. On June 6,
Khalid Bahar was found dead in his prison cell; family members claim
that the prisoner died after being tortured (see Section l.c.). The PA
publicized the results of its autopsy report, which stated that the
prisoner had choked to death.
More than 35 Israelis and Palestinians died in politically related
violence perpetrated by individuals and groups during the year. Israeli
settlers harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see Section 1.c.). There were credible
reports that settlers killed at least 14 and injured a number of
Palestinians during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' usually by stoning their
vehicles, which caused fatal accidents, shooting them, or hitting them
with moving vehicles. For example, on October 1, unidentified Israeli
settlers opened fire on a car holding Palestinians, killing an 18-
month-old baby. On October 17, two settlers from Itamar opened fire
with machine guns on a group of Palestinians harvesting olives in a
field near Nablus, killing one person and injuring four. The
perpetrators of the attack were identified and taken into Israeli
police custody, but subsequently were released because the police
determined that the PA was not cooperating sufficiently with the
investigation. The PA denied this charge. The settlers did not act
under government orders in the attacks; however, the Israeli Government
did not prosecute the settlers for their acts of violence. In general,
settlers rarely serve prison sentences if convicted of a crime against
Palestinians.
Palestinian civilians harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed
Israelis, especially settlers. During the year, Palestinians killed 18
Israeli civilians and injured numerous others (see Section 1.c.).
Palestinians frequently threw stones and fired guns at Israeli
civilians during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' On October 8, Palestinian
civilians killed Israeli settler Hillel Lieberman from Elon Moreh.
Lieberman had been missing since the morning of October 7, when he told
a relative that he was going to ``pay a final visit'' to Joseph's Tomb
in Nablus, after the IDF had announced that it would withdraw from the
site. An unknown extremist group took responsibility for the killing.
On October 12, a Palestinian mob killed two IDF reservists in a
brutal attack in Ramallah. The mob attacked the soldiers' car until
Palestinian police intervened and brought the soldiers to the civil
police station. The mob followed, broke down the gate of the police
station, and kicked, burned, and beat to death the two reservists.
There were reports that Palestinian police personnel also participated
in the beating.
On October 30, unknown Palestinian gunmen killed one security guard
and injured another at the National Insurance Office in Jerusalem. On
November 9, Palestinian gunmen killed one woman and injured one man in
their car. On November 13, Palestinian gunmen killed a settler and two
IDF soldiers near Ramallah.
Several Palestinian officials made public statements justifying
Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians, and the PA made no arrests in
any of these killings. Additionally, Tanzim leaders made public
statements urging Palestinians to continue the violence. Following
Chairman Arafat's announcement on November 17 to stop firing on Israeli
civilians or security forces from Area A, there was a short-lived
significant decrease in the number of such incidents. Israeli observers
noted that Arafat's statement did not address attacks in Areas B and C.
Seven Israeli civilians were killed in bomb attacks and roadside
bombs for which several Palestinian extremist groups claimed
responsibility. For example, a roadside bomb near Kfar Darom settlement
in Gaza was detonated on November 20 as a settler schoolbus passed. A
teacher and a school maintenance worker were killed, and nine
passengers were wounded, including several children (see Section 1.c.).
Two Palestinian extremist groups claimed responsibility for the attack.
On November 23, two IDF soldiers were killed and three were injured in
2 separate bomb attacks in Gaza.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances during the year.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Israeli laws and administrative regulations prohibit the
physical abuse of detainees; however, security forces abused in
detention Palestinians suspected of security offenses. A landmark
decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice in September 1999
prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent
shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, sleep deprivation
for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme
temperatures. Prior to the High Court's decision, Israeli laws and
administrative regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees
were not enforced in security cases (see Section 1.c. of the Israel
report). The head of the then-GSS was empowered by government
regulation to authorize security officers to use ``moderate physical
and psychological pressure'' (which included violent shaking) while
interrogating detainees. These practices often led to excesses. Since
the September 1999 ruling, domestic and international NGO's have been
unable to substantiate sporadic allegations that security forces
tortured detainees.
Most convictions in security cases before Israeli courts are based
on confessions. A detainee may not have contact with a lawyer until
after interrogation, a process that may last days or weeks. The
Government does not allow ICRC representatives access to detainees
until the 14th day of detention. This prolonged incommunicado detention
contributes to the likelihood of abuse. Detainees sometimes claim in
court that their confessions are coerced, but judges rarely exclude
such confessions. According to Palestinian human rights groups, some
Palestinian detainees fail to make complaints either due to fear of
retribution or because they assume that such complaints would be
ignored. During the year, there were no known cases in which a
confession was thrown out because of improper means of investigation or
interrogation.
Israeli security forces injured at least 11,300 Palestinians during
violent demonstrations during the year (see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and
1.g.). In May IDF soldiers and Israeli police injured up to 700
Palestinians during protests in support of a hunger strike declared by
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. During the ``al-Aqsa
Intifada,'' Israeli security forces injured about 10,600 Palestinian
demonstrators.
The IDF injured several bystanders at demonstrations, including
journalists (see Section 2.a.). According to a November report by the
Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 10 journalists were hit by
IDF gunfire during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'', and 3 other journalists
were hit by gunfire from an unknown source. In at least one case, a
foreign photographer was hit by live ammunition during a demonstration
in which no IDF personnel were under fire.
Israeli authorities also frequently treat Palestinians in an
abusive manner at checkpoints, subjecting them to verbal and physical
harassment. According to press reports, on September 6, Israeli border
policemen physically abused three Palestinian workers near the village
of Abu Dis outside of Jerusalem. The officers took photos of themselves
with their victims; their trial was ongoing by year's end.
The PA does not prohibit by law the use of torture or force against
detainees, and PA security forces reportedly were responsible for
torture and widespread abuse of Palestinian detainees. Such abuse
generally took place after arrest and during interrogation. In 1995 the
Gaza civil police commander issued to police officers in the West Bank
and Gaza a directive forbidding torture during interrogation, and
directing the security forces to observe the rights of all detainees.
However, the directive does not have the force of law; Palestinian
security officers have not been issued formal guidelines on the proper
conduct of interrogations. The PA lacks adequate equipment to collect
and use evidence, and convictions are based largely on confessions. The
importance of obtaining confessions heightens the possibility of abuse.
PA security officials torture and abuse prisoners by threatening,
hooding, beating, and tying detainees in painful positions, forcing
them to stand for long periods of time, depriving them of sleep and
food, and burning detainees with cigarettes and hot instruments.
Palestinians also alleged that they had been shaken violently while in
PA custody. International human rights monitoring groups have
documented widespread arbitrary and abusive conduct by the PA. These
organizations state that use of torture is widespread and not
restricted to those persons detained on security charges. Human rights
groups state that Palestinians who are suspected of belonging to
radical Islamic groups are more likely to be treated poorly. In
February and March, the General Intelligence Service arrested,
detained, and physically abused dozens of Bir Zeit University students
who were arrested on charges of throwing stones at a foreign head of
state during a campus demonstration (see Section 2.b.). Several human
rights groups claimed that the students were tortured during detention.
During the year, one Palestinian died in PA custody. Family members
claim that the prisoner died after being tortured (see Section l.a.).
The PA publicized the results of its autopsy report, which stated that
the prisoner had choked to death.
Palestinian police and Tanzim members with firearms participated in
violent demonstrations and attacks. Palestinian security forces
sometimes fired at Israeli civilians or soldiers from within or close
to the homes of Palestinian civilians; residents of the homes
consequently bore the brunt of IDF retaliation for these attacks.
Palestinian security forces also sometimes failed to prevent armed
Palestinians from opening fire on Israeli civilians, soldiers, or
military targets.
In February Palestinian police failed to prevent an attack by a
Palestinian crowd against PA judges and prosecutors in Bethlehem. A
crowd of about 300 persons, mainly family members of one of the
criminal suspects on trial, stormed the courthouse, locked the judge
and prosecutors inside, threw stones, and demanded that the court
revoke sentences against two defendants in a murder trial. Police
officials were at the courthouse; however, they did not disperse the
crowd or make any arrests.
Israeli settlers harass, attack, and occasionally kill (see Section
1.a.) Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There were credible
reports that settlers injured a number of Palestinians during the ``al-
Aqsa Intifada,'' usually by stoning their vehicles, which at times
caused fatal accidents, shooting them, or hitting them with moving
vehicles. Human rights groups received several dozen reports during the
year that Israeli settlers in the West Bank beat Palestinians and
destroyed the property of Palestinians living or farming near Israeli
settlements. For example, according to Palestinian eyewitnesses, a
group of Israeli settlers beat a 75-year-old Palestinian woman in
April. At least five settlers from Brakha near Nablus reportedly
assaulted the woman, who was picking wild herbs near the settlement; a
passerby reportedly intervened and took the woman to a hospital. During
the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' there were numerous incidents in which
Israeli settlers physically attacked Palestinians or threw stones at
their homes and cars. Settlers also attacked and damaged crops, olive
trees, greenhouses, and agricultural equipment, causing extensive
economic damage to Palestinian-owned agricultural land. The settlers
did not act under government orders in the attacks; however, the
Israeli Government did not prosecute the settlers for their acts of
violence. In general settlers rarely serve prison sentences if
convicted of a crime against a Palestinian.
According to human rights organizations, Israeli settlers sometimes
attacked Palestinian ambulances and impeded the provision of medical
services to injured Palestinians (see Section 2.d.).
Palestinians harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed (see
Section 1.a.) Israelis, especially settlers. During demonstrations in
support of the Palestinian prisoner hunger strike in May, Palestinian
demonstrators shot Israeli settlers in Beit El and Jenin in the West
Bank. On May 21, an unknown Palestinian threw a Molotov cocktail at a
car of Jewish settlers, critically injuring a child. Palestinians
injured a number of Israeli settlers in attacks during the ``al-Aqsa
Intifada.'' For example, on October 19, unidentified Palestinian gunmen
shot at a large group of Israeli settlers who were hiking in an area
near Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, where there had been fierce fighting the
week before. One settler and one Palestinian were killed, and four
Israelis and a dozen Palestinians were injured in an exchange of
gunfire. Unidentified Palestinian gunmen fired on homes in Gilo, a
Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem, for at least 13 nights between
October and November, injuring seriously two persons. A number of
Israeli civilians were injured in armed attacks or bombings, for which
several Palestinian extremist groups claimed responsibility (also see
Section 1.a.).
Palestinian civilians attacked Israeli medical teams on several
occasions. For example, on October 2, Palestinian civilians reportedly
fired on an ambulance that was evacuating 4 IDF soldiers who had been
injured in a violent clash; the ambulance reportedly was delayed for
about 1 hour. Palestinian civilians also prevented the evacuation of
injured Israelis in several incidents; in one such case, the injured
person did not receive medical treatment and died from his wounds (see
Section 1.a.). According to the Israeli Government, Palestinian medical
personnel sometimes allowed ambulances and medical facilities to be
used as shelter for Palestinians who had fired at Israeli civilians and
soldiers (see Section 1.a.).
Conditions for Palestinians in Israeli prisons are poor. Facilities
are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate.
Palestinian inmates held strikes and protests in support of a number of
causes and to protest prison conditions throughout the year. On May 1,
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons began a hunger strike to
protest prison conditions and their continued incarceration. Following
negotiations with PA and Israeli government officials, the prisoners
agreed to suspend the hunger strike on May 31. The Israeli Government
agreed to remove prisoners from solitary confinement and to allow
family members to visit inmates, and the prisoners agreed to refrain
from planning terrorist attacks from prison. Three Palestinian
prisoners died in Israeli custody under ambiguous circumstances during
the year (see Section 1.a.).
Israel permits independent monitoring of prison conditions,
although human rights groups sometimes encounter difficulties gaining
access to specific detainees.
Prison conditions in PA facilities continue to be very poor. In
many cases, facilities are overcrowded, old, dilapidated, and
neglected. Food and clothing for prisoners are inadequate and must be
supplemented by donations from families and humanitarian groups.
Palestinian inmates held periodic strikes and protests throughout the
year in support of a number of causes and to protest prison conditions
and the practice of administrative detention. In some PA prisons, an
effort is made to house religious prisoners together. Male and female
inmates are housed separately. During the year, one Palestinian died in
PA custody under ambiguous circumstances (see Section 1.a.).
In August detainees held by the PSF in Ramallah staged a hunger
strike demanding an improvement in detention conditions. The PSF agreed
to meet the prisoners' demands. Prisoners in the PA-run Jneid Prison
also staged a hunger strike to protest being held for an extended
period of time without charge or trial (see Section 1.c.).
The PA permits independent monitoring of its prisons, although
human rights groups, humanitarian organizations, and lawyers reported
difficulties arranging visits or gaining access to specific detainees.
Human rights organizations state that their ability to visit PA jails
and detention centers varies depending on which security organization
controls the facility. Human rights organizations state that the
police, Preventive Security Force, and Mukhabarat generally were
cooperative in allowing them to inspect facilities and visit prisoners
and detainees. However, they said that the Military Intelligence
Organization was less responsive to such requests. Human rights
monitors state that prison authorities sometimes are capricious in
permitting them access to PA detention facilities and they rarely are
permitted to see inmates while they are under interrogation. Pursuant
to an agreement signed in September 1996, the ICRC conducts prison
visits but may be denied access to a detainee for 14 days. If abuses
occur, they frequently happen during this 2-week period.
Some PA security organizations, including the General Intelligence
Organization in the West Bank and the police, have appointed officials
to act as liaisons with human rights groups. These officers meet with
human rights organizations and members of the diplomatic community to
discuss human rights cases.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Israeli security
personnel may arrest without warrant or hold for questioning a person
suspected of having committed a criminal or security offense in the
occupied territories. Most of these arrests and detentions are for
alleged security offenses. Persons arrested for common crimes usually
are provided with a statement of charges and access to an attorney, and
may apply for bail. However, these procedures sometimes are delayed.
Israeli authorities intermittently issued special summonses for
those suspected of involvement in or knowledge of security offenses.
There were reports that some such summonses were issued immediately
before and during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' Israeli military order 1369
stipulates a 7-year prison term for anyone who does not respond to a
special summons delivered to a family member or posted in the MATAK
office nearest the suspect's home address. There were no reports during
the year that anyone was convicted of failing to respond to a summons.
Bail rarely is available to those arrested for security offenses.
Although Israeli law does not allow Israelis under the age of 16 to be
tried as adults, Israeli courts treat Palestinians over the age of 12
as adults. Defense for Children International (DCI) reported that over
420 Palestinian minors (below the age of 18 years) were arrested and
detained in Israeli prisons during the year, and that at year's end,
there were 200 minors in Israeli prisons. The IDF stated that 44 minors
were held in Israeli security facilities at year's end.
Israeli authorities may hold persons in custody without a warrant
for 96 hours; they must be released unless a warrant is issued.
Prearraignment detention may last up to 11 days for Palestinians
arrested in the occupied territories and up to 8 days for minors and
those accused of less serious offenses. Authorities must obtain a court
order for longer administrative detentions--up to 6 months from the
date of arrest. At hearings to extend detention for interrogation
purposes, detainees are entitled to be represented by counsel, although
the defense attorney often is not allowed to see or hear the evidence
against his client. Detainees either are released at the end of the
court-ordered detention or sent to administrative detention if they are
not indicted. If there is an indictment, a judge may order indefinite
detention until the end of the trial. Israeli regulations permit
detainees to be held in isolation during interrogation. Detainees have
the right to appeal continued detention.
Although a detainee generally has the right to consult with a
lawyer as soon as possible, in security cases authorities may delay
access to counsel for up to 15 days. Higher-ranking officials or judges
may extend this period. Access to counsel is denied routinely while a
suspect is being interrogated, which sometimes can last several weeks.
Authorities must inform detainees of their right to an attorney and
whether there are any orders prohibiting such contact.
A number of factors hamper contacts by Palestinians in Israeli
prison and detention facilities with their lawyers, families, and human
rights organizations. Israeli authorities claim that they attempt to
post notification of arrest within 48 hours; however, Palestinian
suspects often are kept incommunicado for longer than 48 hours. Even if
an arrest becomes known, it is often difficult to obtain information on
where a detainee is being held or whether the detainee has access to an
attorney. Palestinians generally locate detained family members through
their own efforts. Palestinians may check with a local ICRC office to
determine whether it has information on the whereabouts of a family
member. A senior officer may delay for up to 12 days notification of
arrest to immediate family members and attorneys. A military commander
may appeal to a judge to extend this period in security cases for an
unlimited period of time.
The Israeli Government routinely transfers Palestinians arrested in
the occupied territories to facilities in Israel, especially the prison
in Ashkelon and the military detention center in Megiddo. Israeli
authorities have been known to schedule appointments between attorneys
and their detained clients, only to move the clients to another prison
prior to the meetings. Authorities reportedly use such tactics to delay
lawyer-client meetings for as long as 90 days. Palestinian lawyers also
have difficulty traveling to meet with their clients during Israeli-
imposed closures. Israel requires Palestinian attorneys to acquire
permits to enter Israel to see their clients held in prisons there.
Human rights groups say that Palestinian lawyers from the Gaza Strip
have a harder time obtaining these permits than their West Bank
counterparts and that they are denied entry into Israel more frequently
than West Bank lawyers.
Male family members between 16 and 40 years of age, and any family
members with security records, generally are barred from visiting
relatives in facilities in Israel. Relatives of Palestinian prisoners
also complain that sometimes they only learn that visitation rights
have been canceled when they arrive at the prison following a trip of
many hours from the occupied territories. Following the outbreak of
violence in late September, the Israeli Government banned all family
visits for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. In November there
were negotiations between the Israeli Government, the ICRC, and the
Palestinian Prisoners' Society to restore visitation rights to
Palestinian prisoners. The Government of Israel offered to allow
spouses, children under the age of 10, and parents to apply for one-day
visitation passes; however, Palestinian prisoners rejected these
conditions.
Evidence used at hearings for administrative detentions is secret
and unavailable to the detainee or his attorney during the hearings;
the detainee and defense lawyer are required to leave the courtroom
when secret evidence is presented. Israeli authorities maintain that
they are unable to present evidence in open court because doing so
would compromise the method of acquiring the evidence. In July 1998,
the High Court of Justice ruled that only judges, rather than military
officials, may renew administrative detention orders beyond a 6-month
period. Detainees may appeal detention orders, or the renewal of a
detention order, before a military judge, but their chances for success
are very limited. During the year, some succeeded in persuading the
courts to shorten their detentions.
The overall number of Palestinian prisoners and administrative
detainees in Israeli jails declined for the fourth straight year until
mid-October, when the number increased. Human rights organizations
attributed the decrease to the absence of major terrorist attacks; in
the past, Israeli officials arrested Palestinians suspected of
terrorist connections after major terrorist attacks. The Israeli
Government released 16 Palestinian prisoners in March as a goodwill
gesture. According to the IDF, in mid-October there were 1,307
Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli prisons, military detention
centers, and holding centers, compared with 1,354 at the end of 1999.
According to the IDF, there were 1,402 Palestinian security prisoners
in Israeli prisons and detention centers as of mid-December. According
to human rights groups, 10 Palestinians were in administrative
detention at year's end, compared with 18 at the end of 1999. Several
have been held for more than 1 year. Many Palestinians under
administrative detention during the past 3 years have had their
detention orders renewed repeatedly without meaningful opportunity to
appeal.
PA security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The
PA does not have a uniform law on administrative detention, and
security officials do not always adhere to the existing laws in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Laws applicable in Gaza, which do not apply
to the West Bank, stipulate that detainees held without charge be
released within 48 hours. These laws allow the Attorney General to
extend the detention period to a maximum of 90 days during
investigations. Human rights organizations and the PA Ministry of
Justice assert that PA security officials do not always adhere to this
regulation. Prevailing law in the West Bank allows a suspect to be
detained for 24 hours before being charged. The Attorney General may
extend the detention period.
The PA Chairman has not signed the Basic Law, which was designed to
limit executive branch abuses and to delineate safeguards for citizens,
since it was passed by the Palestinian Council (PC) in 1996. The lack
of safeguards has contributed to the tendency of PA security forces to
refuse to carry out High Court of Justice orders to release detainees.
In some cases, the High Court ordered the release of prisoners detained
for years without trial, and PA security forces released the prisoners
several months or a year later. In November 1997, the High Court
ordered the release of HAMAS activist Mahmud Muslah; Muslah remained in
detention at year's end. In February 1999, the High Court ordered the
release of Wa'el Farraj, who has been detained without charges since
1996; Farraj remained in detention at year's end. According to the
Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens Rights, the High Court
ordered 9 detainees released during the year, compared with
approximately 60 detainees in 1999. The PA released approximately 60
security prisoners during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada''; however, human
rights groups estimate that the PA has held approximately 150 prisoners
for more than a year without charge. The total number of Palestinians
in PA jails reached between 500 and 900 prisoners by year's end,
including approximately 50 political and security detainees.
In past years, Palestinian security forces sometimes detained or
placed under house arrest the relatives of alleged security criminals.
In the past, lawyers and PA judicial officials acknowledged that, in
contravention of the law, PA security services sometimes arrested and
detained persons without informing judicial officials.
PA authorities generally permit prisoners--except those held for
security offenses--to receive visits from family members, attorneys,
and human rights monitors. PA security officials do not always permit
lawyers to see their clients. In principle detainees may notify their
families of their arrest, but this is not always permitted.
Human rights organizations reported in the past that lawyers
sometimes were denied access to their clients.
PA security services have overlapping or unclear mandates that
often complicate the protection of human rights. Under existing law in
the West Bank, only the PA's civil police force is authorized to make
arrests. In practice all security forces are known to detain persons at
various times. The operating procedures and regulations for the conduct
of PA security personnel in the various services still are not well
developed and have not yet been made fully available to the public.
There are many detention facilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
administered by the overlapping PA security services, a situation that
complicates the ability of families, lawyers, and even the Ministry of
Justice to track detainees' whereabouts and to determine their numbers.
Security services, including Preventive Security, General Intelligence,
Military Intelligence, and the Coast Guard have their own interrogation
and detention facilities. In general these services do not, or only
sporadically, inform families of a relative's arrest. Most PA security
officers remain unaware of proper arrest, detention, and interrogation
procedures, as well as basic human rights standards. Human rights
groups have provided basic human rights training to a number of PA
security services. During the year, at least 36 PA security officials
participated in human rights courses, bringing the total number of
security officials who have graduated from human rights courses to
nearly 1,600 since the PA's establishment in 1994.
PA security forces continued to harass and arbitrarily arrest and
detain journalists, political activists, and human rights advocates who
criticized the PA and its policies. A number of journalists were
arrested and detained and television stations were shut down for
expressing views or covering topics unacceptable to the Palestinian
Authority (see Section 2.a.).
In January PA security forces rearrested Abdel Sattar Qassem.
Security forces had arrested Qassem and seven other signatories of a
petition that accused the PA of corruption in November 1999. The PA
released Qassem in July.
On February 26, PA police arrested and detained for 1 week
approximately 30 Bir Zeit University students who reportedly threw
stones at a foreign head of state during a demonstration (see Section
2.b.). In May PA security forces arrested 20 persons for participating
in an anti-PA rally in Ramallah organized by the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) following the funeral of one of its
members who died during clashes with the IDF near Ramallah (see Section
2.b.).
Neither the Israeli Government nor the PA forcibly deported anyone
from the occupied territories during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Israeli law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision.
Palestinians accused by Israel of security offenses in the occupied
territories are tried in Israeli military courts. Security offenses are
defined broadly and may include charges such as membership in outlawed
organizations. Charges are brought by military prosecutors. Serious
charges are tried before three-judge panels; lesser offenses are tried
before one judge. Defendants have the right to counsel and to appeal
verdicts to the Court of Military Appeals, which may accept appeals
based on the law applied in the case, the sentence, or both. The right
of appeal does not apply in all cases and sometimes requires court
permission. The Israeli military courts rarely acquit Palestinians of
security offenses, but sentences sometimes are reduced on appeal.
Trials sometimes are delayed for several reasons: Witnesses,
including Israeli military or police officers, do not appear; the
defendant is not brought to court; files are lost; or attorneys fail to
appear, sometimes because they have not been informed of the trial date
or because of travel restrictions on Palestinian lawyers. These delays
add pressure on defendants to plead guilty to minor offenses; if they
do, an ``expedited'' trial may be held, in which a charge sheet is
drawn up within 48 hours and a court hearing scheduled within days.
By law most Israeli military trials are public, although access is
limited. Most convictions in military courts are based on confessions.
Evidence that is not available to the defendant or his attorney may be
used in court to convict persons of security offenses. There frequently
is no testimony provided by Palestinian witnesses either for or against
Palestinians on trial. Israeli authorities maintain that this is due to
the refusal of Palestinians to cooperate with the authorities. Physical
and psychological pressures and reduced sentences for those who confess
may induce security detainees to sign confessions. Confessions usually
are given in Arabic but translated into Hebrew for the record because,
authorities maintain, many Israeli court personnel speak Arabic but few
read it. Palestinian detainees seldom read Hebrew and therefore often
sign confessions that they are unable to read.
Crowded facilities and poor arrangements for attorney-client
consultations in prisons hinder legal defense efforts. Appointments to
see clients are difficult to arrange, and prison authorities often fail
to produce clients for scheduled appointments.
Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip accused of
security and ordinary criminal offenses are tried under Israeli law in
the nearest Israeli district court. Civilian judges preside, and the
standards of due process and admissibility of evidence are governed by
the laws of Israel, not military orders. Settlers convicted in Israeli
courts of crimes against Palestinians regularly receive lighter
punishment than Palestinians convicted in Israeli courts of similar
crimes against either Israelis or other Palestinians. In December the
Jerusalem magistrates court ordered an Israeli settler to pay
compensation of $17,500 to the family of a young Palestinian boy who
reportedly was killed by the settler's negligence about a decade
earlier.
There were no reports that the Israeli Government held political
prisoners.
The PA courts are inefficient, lack staff and resources and, as a
result, often do not ensure fair and expeditious trials, and the PA
executive and security services frequently ignore or fail to carry out
court decisions.
The PA inherited a court system largely based on structures and
legal codes predating the 1967 Israeli occupation. In the civil court
system, cases initially are tried in courts of first instance. There
are two appeals courts, one located in Gaza City and the other in
Ramallah, which handle appeals from the lower courts. The appeals
courts also function as the Palestinian High Court of Justice. The PA
executive at times does not respect decisions of the High Court, and
the Palestinian security agencies do not always enforce its rulings
(see Section 1.d.). In 1995 the PA established state security courts in
Gaza and the West Bank to try cases involving security issues. Three
military judges preside over each court. A senior police official heads
the state security court in Jericho, and three judges preside over it.
There is no right of appeal, but the PA Chairman reviews the court's
findings and he may confirm or reject the decision. The PA Ministry of
Justice has no jurisdiction over the state security courts, which are
subordinate only to the Chairman.
The Gaza legal code derives from British Mandate law, Egyptian law,
and PA directives and laws. Pre-1967 Jordanian law applies in the West
Bank. Bodies of law in the Gaza Strip and West Bank have been modified
substantially by Israeli military orders. According to the Declaration
of Principles and the Interim Agreement, Israeli military decrees
issued during the occupation theoretically remain valid in both areas
and are subject to review pursuant to specific procedure. The PA has
stated that it was undertaking efforts to unify the Gaza and West Bank
legal codes, but it has made little progress. Human rights advocates
claim that the PA's judiciary does not operate consistently.
The court system in general is recovering from years of neglect;
many of the problems predate PA jurisdiction. Judges and staff are
underpaid and overworked and suffer from a lack of skills and training.
Court procedures and record keeping are archaic and chaotic. The
delivery of justice often is slow and uneven. The ability of the courts
to enforce decisions is extremely weak, and there is administrative
confusion in the appeals process. A heavy caseload exacerbates these
systemic problems. The PA closed all civil courts in late September for
several weeks.
The PA Ministry of Justice appoints all civil judges for 10-year
terms. The Attorney General, an appointed official, reports to the
Minister of Justice and supervises judicial operations in both the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank. In the past, the Chief Justice had the
authority to appoint all judges in the West Bank. Human rights
organizations and judicial officials criticized the decision, saying
that it contravened existing law, which stipulated that a higher
judicial council should be responsible for appointing judges. During
the year, the Chairman authorized the establishment of the High
Judicial Council in accordance with legislation passed by the Council
in 1998. Human rights advocates and lawyers believe that this step may
enhance the judicial system.
The PA's state security courts often fail to afford defendants due
process. The PA usually ignores the legal limits on the length of
prearraignment detention of detainees suspected of security offenses.
Defendants often are brought to court without knowledge of the charges
against them or sufficient time to prepare a defense. They typically
are represented by court-appointed lawyers, who often are not
qualified. Court sessions often take place on short notice in the
middle of the night, and without lawyers present. In some instances,
security courts try cases, issue verdicts, and impose sentences in a
single session lasting a few hours.
During the year, the state security courts sentenced three persons
to death for committing murder. In two of the cases, the trials
reportedly were hasty, and the defendants did not have adequate
representation. For example, a state security court sentenced Raji
Saqir to death on July 3 after a 1-day trial, which occurred 1 day
after Saqir allgedly committed murder. Although no executions were
carried out during the year, in February 1999, a Palestinian colonel
was executed after the PA's state security court convicted him of
raping a young boy. Human rights groups criticized the decision; they
complained that the trial lasted for less than 2 hours, the defendant
did not have sufficient time to prepare his defense, there was no
appeals process, and the charges were ill-defined.
The state security courts adjudicated cases that fell far outside
the scope of the courts' original mandate. In addition to ``security''
cases, the courts have on occasion dealt with tax cases and economic
crimes, such as smuggling. In February the Chairman decreed that
``serious'' crimes, including homicide, rape, and drug trafficking, be
referred to state security courts. The decision prompted human rights
organizations to issue statements requesting the abolition of state
security courts and the referral of all cases to the regular civil
courts.
There were no reports during the year that persons were convicted
for their political beliefs. A credible Palestinian human rights
organization estimated that the PA held approximately 100 political
prisoners before the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' in late
September. In October the PA released most of the political prisoners.
The PA stated that this action was in response to Israeli warnings that
it would be bombing PA police facilities following the brutal killing
of two Israeli reserve soldiers in Ramallah (see Section 1.a.). A
Palestinian human rights organization estimated that the PA held 10
political prisoners at year's end.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Israeli military authorities in areas of the West Bank
under their control may enter private Palestinian homes and
institutions without a warrant on security grounds when authorized by
an officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel or above. In conducting
searches, the IDF has forced entry and sometimes has beaten occupants
and destroyed property. Israeli authorities state that forced entry may
occur lawfully only when incident to an arrest and when entry is
resisted. Authorities state that beatings and arbitrary destruction of
property during searches are punishable violations of military
regulations, and that compensation is due to victims in such cases. The
Israeli Government states that it does not keep consolidated
information on the claims against the Ministry of Defense for damages
resulting from IDF actions. In February IDF soldiers raided an elderly
Palestinian woman's home, reportedly searching for stone throwers; the
woman, who had been suffering from heart problems, died of a heart
attack.
Israeli security forces may demolish or seal the home (owned or
rented) of a Palestinian suspected of terrorism without trial. The
decision to seal or demolish a Palestinian's house is made by several
high-level Israeli officials, including the coordinator of the MATAK
and the Defense Minister. Residents of houses ordered demolished have
48 hours to appeal to the area commander; a final appeal may be made to
the Israeli High Court. A successful appeal generally results in the
conversion of a demolition order to sealing. After a house is
demolished military authorities prohibit the owner from rebuilding or
removing the rubble. Israelis suspected of terrorism are subject to
Israeli law and do not face the threat of home demolition. In August
Israeli security forces demolished the home of Nidal Daghlas near
Nablus, claiming that a HAMAS fugitive, Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, previously
had hidden in Daghlas' home. Human rights groups stated that the home
demolition was an arbitrary measure. On November 2, Israeli security
forces demolished two homes in Gaza following a nearby explosion.
In November 1999, the Israeli Government expelled 300 Bedouin
farmers from their homes in caves near the Jewish settlement of Ma'on,
stating that the area was a closed military zone. On March 29, the
Israeli High Court of Justice ordered that the farmers be allowed to
return to their homes. In April the IDF issued new deportation orders
to returnees who were not party to the original legal suit.
From late September through the end of the year, the IDF destroyed
numerous citrus orchards, olive and date groves, and irrigation systems
on Palestinian-owned agricultural land in both the West Bank and Gaza.
The IDF generally destroyed agricultural land following clashes at
demonstrations, shootings aimed at settlers, or bombings. The IDF
stated that it destroyed this land because Palestinian snipers
reportedly were using it for purposes of concealment.
The PA requires the Attorney General to issue warrants for entry
and searches of private property; however, Palestinian security
services frequently ignore these requirements. Police searched homes
without the consent of their owners. In some cases, police forcibly
entered premises and destroyed property.
PA security forces sometimes detained or placed under house arrest
the relatives of alleged security criminals (see Section 1.d.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Between late September and the end of the year,
Israeli security forces killed 227 Palestinians and 4 foreign
nationals, and injured over 10,600 Palestinians during violent
demonstrations. Palestinian demonstrators frequently threw stones and
Molotov cocktails at the IDF. In some demonstrations, Palestinians also
used firearms. According to the IDF, Palestinians used firearms in
about 30 percent of the demonstrations between late September and mid-
November. In response Israeli security forces used a variety of means
to disperse demonstrators, including tear gas, rubber-coated metal
bullets, and live ammunition. In many instances, Israeli security
forces used excessive force against demonstrators in contravention of
their official rules of engagement (see Section 1.a.). According to the
IDF, it does not have a policy of indiscriminate or excessive use of
force, and its rules of engagement establish a framework to deal with
threats faced by Israeli civilians and armed forces.
IDF regulations permit the use of both rubber-coated metal bullets
and live ammunition only when a soldier's life is in immediate danger,
to halt fleeing suspects, to disperse a violent demonstration, or to
fire on an individual unlawfully carrying firearms. According to human
rights organizations, a number of Palestinian deaths and injuries
reportedly occurred during demonstrations at which protesters did not
use live firearms.
According to IDF policy, soldiers are to direct fire at the legs
only, and may fire at a fleeing suspect only if they believe that a
serious felony has occurred and that they have exhausted other means to
apprehend the suspect. It is forbidden to open fire in the direction of
children or women, even in cases of severe public disorder, unless
there is an immediate and obvious danger to a soldier's life.
Palestinian medical relief organizations reported that 59.5 percent of
the gunshot wounds inflicted by Israeli security forces during
demonstrations were in the head or torso, and estimated that about one-
sixth of the Palestinians wounded during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada''
likely would be disabled permanently. According to human rights
organizations, a total of 82 Palestinians under the age of 18 years
were killed in the demonstrations. During some demonstrations,
bystanders, including journalists, medical personnel, and Palestinian
civilians were killed or injured by IDF fire (see Sections 1.a. and
2.a.).
The IDF fired tank rounds and rockets from helicopters on cities
and towns in the West Bank and Gaza, killing and injuring a number of
persons and causing significant property damage (see Section 1.a.). For
example, on October 12, in retaliation for the brutal killing by a
Palestinian mob of two IDF reservists (see Section 1.a.), IDF
helicopters attacked over 10 PA targets in Ramallah and Gaza, injuring
more than 20 bystanders and destroying buildings. On October 23, the
IDF shelled a neighborhood in Hebron, killing 1 person, in retaliation
for an earlier shooting incident in the Israeli-controlled area of
Hebron.
For at least 13 nights between October and December, Palestinian
gunmen from Beit Jala shot at homes in Gilo, a Jewish neighborhood in
East Jerusalem (see Section 1.c.). Two Israelis were injured seriously
in these attacks. In retaliation for these attacks, the IDF launched a
series of counterattacks on residential neighborhoods in Beit Jala,
Beit Sahour, and Bethlehem. One foreign national was killed and 36
Palestinians were injured in these counterattacks.
On October 31, in retaliation for the Palestinian killing of two
Israeli security guards, the IDF attacked with helicopters PA offices
in Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza. On November 15, the IDF responded with
force to many incidents involving Palestinian gunfire directed at Gilo
from Beit Jala, killing a foreigner and injuring a number of
Palestinians. On October 19, in response to Palestinians shooting at a
group of Israeli visitors at Joseph's Tomb, the IDF used helicopters to
attack a nearby Palestinian refugee camp, killing 1 person and injuring
several others. On November 20, IDF helicopters launched a series of
retaliatory attacks in the Gaza Strip in response to a bomb attack in
Gaza that killed 2 persons and injured 9; 50 persons reportedly were
injured in the IDF attacks and significant damage was done to a number
of PA buildings. On November 24, the IDF fired two tank rounds at the
town of Kufr Qalil in retaliation for shots fired on a nearby IDF post
by unidentified Palestinian gunmen; two Palestinians were killed by the
tank rounds.
The Israeli Government's imposition of external and internal
closures during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' contributed to intermittent
shortages of basic food, medical supplies, and gasoline in the West
Bank and Gaza.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Israeli Government generally
respects freedom of speech in the occupied territories; however, it
maintains a low level of censorship and prohibits public expressions of
support for Islamic extremist groups such as HAMAS and other groups
dedicated to the destruction of Israel. In March during the Pope's
visit to the region and in October during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' the
Israeli Government reportedly selectively enforced its standing
prohibition on the display of Palestinian political symbols, such as
flags, national colors, and graffiti in Jerusalem for the first time
since 1994. Such displays are punishable by fines or imprisonment, and
Israeli security forces reportedly detained and temporarily barred from
Jerusalem several Palestinian youths for waving the Palestinian flag.
Overall, Israeli censorship of specific press articles continued at a
low level; however, the Israeli Government did censor some articles
during the year. Israeli authorities monitor Arabic newspapers based in
East Jerusalem for security-related issues. Military censors review
Arabic publications for material related to the public order and
security of Israel. Reports by foreign journalists also are subject to
review by Israeli military censors for security issues, and the
satellite feed used by many foreign journalists is monitored. The
Israeli Government often closes areas to journalists when it imposes a
curfew or closure. Israeli authorities have denied entry permits to
Palestinian journalists traveling to their place of employment in
Jerusalem during closures of the territories; however, the journalists'
Israeli-issued press credentials have not been revoked.
The IDF requires a permit for publications sold in the occupied
territories still under its control. Publications may be censored or
banned for content deemed anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli. Possession of
banned materials is punishable by a fine and imprisonment. During the
year, the Israeli Government refused to allow publications, including
newspapers, into the Gaza Strip on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur.
At least 10 journalists reportedly were hit by IDF gunfire during
the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' and 3 other journalists were hit by gunfire
from an unknown source (see Section 1.c.). The IDF reportedly
restricted the free movement of mainly Palestinian journalists (see
Section 2.d.).
On October 13, in retaliation for the mob lynching of two Israeli
reserve soldiers (see Section 1.a.), the IDF launched rockets at the
PA's Voice of Palestine radio transmitter in Ramallah. In November the
IDF launched rockets against a PA-owned television transmitter in Gaza.
The PA restricted freedom of speech and of the press. In a number
of instances during the year, the PA took steps to limit free
expression, particularly regarding human rights issues and allegations
of corruption. Press freedom is subject to a 1995 press law that does
not protect the press adequately. PA security services further stifle
the independence of the press by closing down media outlets, banning
publications or broadcasts, and periodically harassing or detaining
members of the media (see Section l.d.). Palestinian commentators and
human rights groups state that, as a result, the practice of self-
censorship by journalists is widespread.
On May 5, PA officials arrested one of the leaders of a teachers'
strike and temporarily closed down the radio station that broadcast an
interview in which the leader accused the PA of inefficiency. The PA
continued to detain the strike leader at year's end. On May 21, the PA
closed the Watan and al-Naser television stations and the al-Manara
Radio station in Ramallah for nearly 4 days, after the stations
broadcast live coverage of an anti-PA demonstration in al-Bireh. On May
31, the PA arrested Samir Qumsiah, chairman of the Union of Private
Radio and Television Stations because he had issued a statement
criticizing the closing of the stations; the PA released Qumsiah 3 days
later.
On May 27, PA officials arrested Fathi Barqawi, a director general
of the news department at the Public Broadcasting Corporation in
Ramallah after he criticized Chairman Arafat publicly. Barqawi was
released a week later following intervention by prominent PA officials.
On June 20, Palestinian police arrested Abd al-Fattah Ghanem, a
presidential advisor on refugees, after he criticized the PA for
failing to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. Police held Ghanem
incommunicado for 7 days and denied him access to legal counsel for the
3 weeks that he was in detention.
During the year, the Palestinian Bar Association (PBA) stripped 31
lawyers of their membership in the association, their right to practice
law, and their ability to run in PBA elections. The lawyers reportedly
all were outspoken critics of the PA. In May the Palestinian High Court
temporarily reversed the decision to strip the lawyers of their PBA
membership and their right to practice law. However, on May 17 the PBA
placed the director of a West Bank NGO and candidate in the PBA
elections on the ``non-practicing'' register of lawyers, purportedly
because he worked for an NGO and not a law office (see Section 4).
In June PA police officials in Ramallah detained Maher Alami, a
West Bank journalist, for approximately 1 week. The PA police
reportedly warned Alami against writing articles critical of the PA.
After the October 12 brutal killing of two IDF reserve soldiers at
a Ramallah police station (see Section 1.a.), Palestinian police
confiscated film from several journalists who were at the scene. On
October 4, a foreign journalist filmed three members of the Palestinian
security forces distributing Molotov cocktails to several children. The
security forces detained the journalist and his crew for several hours
and destroyed the roll of film.
On November 21, PA security officials detained a Palestinian 2 days
after he criticized the peace process. After 21 days of detention,
security officials asked him to agree not to speak out against the PA;
he did not agree, but was released the same day.
Israeli-imposed closures disrupted the operations of West Bank and
Gaza universities, colleges, and schools during the year. Students and
staff had difficulty traveling to educational institutions in cities
and towns that were closed or placed under curfew by Israeli
authorities (see Sections 2.d. and 5). The November 1999 opening of the
southern safe passage route between Gaza and the West Bank afforded
Gazan students greater ability to pursue their education at West Bank
educational institutions. However, during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' the
Israeli Government closed the safe passage route, which impeded the
ability of Gaza students to attend West Bank universities.
The PA generally has authority over all levels of education in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip and it controls the budgets of all public
colleges. The PA did not interfere with education in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip during the year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Israeli
Government placed limits on freedom of assembly for Palestinians in the
occupied territories, largely through the imposition of internal
closures and curfews (See Section 2.d.). Israeli military orders ban
public gatherings of 10 or more persons without a permit. Since the
1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles, Israel has relaxed
enforcement of this rule, except in cases of Palestinian demonstrations
against land seizures or settlement expansions.
Israeli security forces killed more than 225 Palestinian
demonstrators and injured more than 11,000 during the year often in the
context of violent demonstrations (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
There were several large, peaceful demonstrations of Jewish
settlers in the West Bank and Jerusalem during the year.
The PA imposes some formal limits on freedom of assembly; however,
while it requires permits for rallies, demonstrations, and large
cultural events, these permits rarely are denied. In Gaza police
approval is required for ``political'' meetings at several specific
large meeting halls. Written permission also is required for buses to
transport passengers to attend political meetings. In West Bank cities,
the PA requires permits for outdoor rallies and demonstrations and
prohibits calls for violence, displays of arms, and racist slogans,
although this is not always enforced.
On February 29, students at Bir Zeit University staged a large
protest against PA policies and practices at which several
demonstrators threw stones at a foreign head of state. Following the
protest, PA police arrested about 30 students (see Section 1.d.). The
PA police commissioner also banned unlicensed public gatherings.
Several human rights groups and political factions filed a petition
with the Palestinian High Court protesting the action. On April 29, the
Court suspended the police order and gave the police commissioner 8
days to clarify the reasons for issuing the order. The police order had
not been enforced by year's end. In March hundreds of Palestinians
demonstrated in Ramallah to demand the release of the Bir Zeit
university students.
In May a number of persons participated in a PFLP rally in Ramallah
following the funeral of one of its members who died in clashes with
the IDF; Palestinian security forces arrested 20 demonstrators (see
Section 1.d.).
The Israeli Government generally respected freedom of association.
The PA placed some limits on freedom of association. However, the
PA permits Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-
help organizations to operate. There were periodic complaints during
the year from Palestinian political parties, social and professional
groups, and other NGO's that the PA attempted to limit their ability to
act autonomously. On April 21, the Preventive Security Force ordered
the closure of a democratization group office in Gaza because the
organization's by-laws reportedly were not in compliance with the NGO
law. The office remained closed at year's end (see Section 4).
The armed wings of several Palestinian political groups, including
Islamic opposition groups, were outlawed. While it is not illegal to
belong to the nonmilitary components of such groups, during times of
heightened security concern the PA has harassed and even detained
members of the political wings of these organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Israeli law provides for freedom of
worship, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
it does not ban any group on religious grounds. It permits all faiths
to operate schools and institutions. Religious publications are subject
to the Publications Laws. However, Israel's imposition of an internal
closure on the West Bank and Gaza for 81 days during the ``al-Aqsa
Intifada'' and total curfew on many Palestinian towns significantly
impeded freedom of worship for Muslims and Christians. During periods
of closure, Palestinians from the occupied territories were prevented
from traveling to pray on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in
Jerusalem, Islam's third holiest site. On several occasions the Israeli
Government prevented worshippers under the age of 45 from attending
Friday prayers on the Temple Mount; the Israeli Government stated that
it did so due to security concerns.
No PA law protects religious freedom; however, the PA generally
respects freedom of religion. In past years, there were allegations
that several converts from Islam to Christianity at times are subject
to societal discrimination and harassment by PA officials. However,
there was no pattern of PA discrimination and harassment against
Christians (see Section 5).
On October 7, following the IDF evacuation from the Jewish
religious site of Joseph's Tomb, about 1,000 Palestinian protesters
entered the religious site, burned it, and damaged the roof and an
outer wall in an unsuccessful attempt to demolish the tomb (see Section
5). Some Israeli Government officials criticized the PA for failing to
prevent the attack. The PA began to refurbish the tomb the following
day.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Israeli Government
restricted freedom of movement for Palestinians. Since March 1993,
Israel has required that all West Bank and Gaza residents obtain
permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem. However, Israel often denies
applicants permits with no explanation, and does not allow effective
means of appeal. In the past, Palestinian officials with VIP passes,
including PA cabinet officials and members of the Palestinian Council,
were subjected to long delays and searches at Israeli checkpoints in
the West Bank, despite the fact that they were traveling on special
passes issued by Israel. Prior to the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa
Intifada'' in September, there was only one report that this occurred;
however, in October and November Palestinian officials were delayed and
searched frequently. In general Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip find it difficult to obtain permits to work, visit, study, or
obtain medical care in Israel. Palestinian residents of Jerusalem
sometimes are prohibited by Israeli officials from entering the West
Bank, and they require written permits from Israel to travel to the
Gaza Strip. Prior to the November 1999 opening of the safe passage
route, residents of the Gaza Strip rarely were able to obtain
permission to travel to the West Bank, or residents of the West Bank to
enter the Gaza Strip; this was even true of residents of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip who regularly received permission to enter Israel. The
PA permits Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-
help organizations to operate. Israeli authorities permit only a small
number of Gazans to bring vehicles into Israel and sometimes do not
permit West Bank vehicles to enter Jerusalem or Israel. Except for
senior PA officials, and those using the safe passage to the West Bank,
Palestinians of all ages crossing between the Gaza Strip and Israel are
not permitted to travel by car across the main checkpoint. Instead,
they must travel along a narrow walkway almost a mile long. Israelis
moving into and out of the Gaza Strip are permitted to use their cars.
In November 1999, Israel and the PA implemented arrangements in the
1995 Interim Agreement to establish a safe passage route across Israel
between the Gaza Strip and the southern West Bank. A northern safe
passage route, also called for by the Interim Agreement, never was
established, despite several rounds of negotiations. The southern safe
passage route facilitated the movement of Palestinians between the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip to work, study, and visit, and alleviated some
of the problems associated with freedom of movement for Palestinians.
However, some Palestinian human rights groups criticized the safe
passage agreement because it maintains significant limits on freedom of
movement. The safe passage route was closed in October in response to
the ongoing violence. As of the end of November, a total of 15,000
Palestinians received approval to use the safe passage route and 2,900
applicants were refused permits to use the route.
Since March 1993, Israel also has applied varying levels of
``closure,'' or enhanced restrictions, on the movement of Palestinians
and their goods, often for lengthy periods, in response to terrorist
attacks and other changing security conditions. During periods of
violent protest in the West Bank or Gaza, or when it believes that
there is an increased likelihood of such unrest, the Israeli Government
imposes a tightened version of closure, called ``comprehensive,
external'' closure. Comprehensive closures also are instituted
regularly during major Israeli holidays. During such closures, the
Israel Government cancels travel permits and prevents Palestinians--
even those with valid work permits--from entering Israel or Jerusalem.
During comprehensive closures, the authorities restrict severely the
movement of goods between Israel and the occupied territories and
between the West Bank and Gaza. On October 8, in response to increased
violence, Israel imposed a prolonged comprehensive closure on the
occupied territories. Israel imposed 88 days of tightened,
comprehensive closure during the year, compared with 15 days in 1999.
During periods of extreme unrest in the West Bank and Gaza, the
Israeli Government also prohibits most travel between towns and
villages within the West Bank. These ``internal'' closures impede the
flow of goods and persons. Israel imposed at least 81 days of total or
near-total internal closure during the year, compared with no days of
internal closure during 1999. In the past, Israel rarely imposed
internal closure within Gaza; however, for much of November and
December, the IDF closed major roads in central Gaza, which blocked
transit from the north to the south and stranded thousands of workers
and students. Beginning in October, the Israeli Government further
constrained the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by
imposing total closures on specific areas or villages, sometimes for
weeks at a time, and by intermittently closing the Gaza Airport and the
Allenby and Rafah crossing points to Jordan and Egypt. Israel also
imposed a curfew in the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron. During the
curfews, Palestinians generally were confined to their homes for all
but a few hours per week during which they were allowed to buy food and
other provisions. The IDF did not impose a curfew on the Jewish
settlers in Hebron. On December 10, the IDF further restricted freedom
of movement by banning private Palestinian cars that contained only men
(but no women) from traveling on main roads in Areas B and C. The
prolonged closures and curfews imposed by Israel on Palestinian cities
and towns during the year had a significant negative impact on every
sector of the Palestinian economy. Israel's Ministry of Finance
estimates that since the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' there
has been a 30 to 50 percent decline in economic output in the occupied
territories. Unemployment of Palestinians nearly has quadrupled, the
poverty rate has doubled, and income losses were estimated at over $500
million.
The prolonged closure also affected students' ability to attend
school and university. In areas under curfew, all classes were
cancelled (see Section 5). Furthermore, teachers were unable to reach
their schools in different villages and towns, and university students
were unable to travel between Gaza and the West Bank due to the closure
of the safe passage route.
Human rights groups reported that between late September and the
end of the year, the IDF delayed or prohibited at least 94 ambulances
from crossing checkpoints (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). According to
the Israeli Government, Israeli ambulances and medical personnel
reportedly facilitated the medical evacuation of over 180 Palestinians
to Israel, Jordan, and other countries during the violent unrest.
In 1998 the Israeli Government established a ``continuous
employment program'' that allows selected Palestinian workers who have
been approved by the Ministry of Defense and who are married, are over
28 years old, and have worked in Israel for a long period of time, to
enter Israel to work in the event of a tightened closure. The program
was not implemented during the periods of tightened closure during the
year.
The Israeli Government continued to restrict the movements of
several Jewish settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged
to the extremist Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of
administrative orders issued by the IDF central command.
The Israeli Government requires all Palestinian residents to obtain
permits for foreign travel and has restricted the travel of some
political activists. Bridge-crossing permits to Jordan may be obtained
at post offices without a screening process. These restrictions on
residence, reentry, and family reunification only apply to Palestinian
residents of the occupied territories.
Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem, which Israel occupied
during the 1967 War, generally do not accept Israeli citizenship.
Therefore, they are issued a residence permit or Jerusalem
identification card by the Israeli Government. Israel applies the 1952
Law of Permanent Residency and its 1974 amendments to Jerusalem
identification card holders. This law stipulates that a Jerusalem
resident loses the right of residence if the resident leaves Israeli
territory for more than 7 years, acquires the nationality of another
country, or acquires permanent residence in another country. Such
persons are permitted to return only as tourists and sometimes are
denied entry. The Israeli Government does not apply these same
restrictions to Israeli citizens. In the past, invoking the 1952 law as
legal justification, the Israeli Interior Ministry stripped residency
rights from hundreds of East Jerusalem Palestinians. In the late
1990's, the pace of revocations increased as the Ministry applied
restricted policies, including a ``center of life'' test, which
required extensive documentation of continuous residence within
Jerusalem for the previous 7 years, to determine whether Palestinians
were eligible to retain their identification cards. The Ministry's
policy was the subject of numerous lawsuits, including one considered
by the High Court of Justice in 1999. In October 1999, then Minister of
Interior, Natan Sharansky announced that the Ministry no longer would
apply the ``center of life'' criteria used previously to revoke the
residency rights of East Jerusalem Palestinians. During the year, there
were 7 identity card revocations, compared with 394 revocations in
1999. In February the Israeli Ministry of Interior also published new
instructions regarding residency rights in Jerusalem. According to
these instructions, residents of Israel, whose identity cards had been
revoked since 1995 and who returned to live in Israel since 1998 and
had ``maintained proper contact'' were entitled to restoration of their
identity cards. During the year, 67 identity cards were restored.
Israeli authorities also place restrictions on family
reunification. Most Palestinians who were abroad before or during the
1967 War, or who have lost their residence permits for other reasons
since then, are not permitted to reside permanently with their families
in Jerusalem or the occupied territories. Foreign-born spouses and
children of Palestinian residents also experience difficulty in
obtaining permission to reside with their family members. For example,
a Palestinian with a West Bank identification card must apply to the
Israeli Government for permission to live with his or her Jerusalem-
resident spouse in Jerusalem. The Israeli Government occasionally
issues limited-duration permits and also issues a limited number of
Jerusalem identification cards as part of its family reunification
program. Israeli security authorities single out young (often
unmarried) Palestinian males for more stringent restrictions than other
Palestinians, citing them as more likely to be security risks. They
generally are prohibited from working in Israel.
The PA issues passports and identification cards for Palestinians
residing in the West Bank and Gaza. Bearers of Palestinian passports do
not need special exit permits from the PA; however, when leaving Israel
from Ben Gurion Airport they require permits in order to transit Israel
to reach the airport.
Palestinians who hold Jerusalem identification cards, issued by the
Israeli Government, must obtain travel documents from the Israeli
Government to travel abroad. Human rights groups report that
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem often do not apply for Israeli
travel documents because they fear that the application might prompt a
reexamination of their residency status and lead to the revocation of
their identity cards. On request, the Jordanian Government also issues
travel documents to Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Palestinians who wish to travel to Jordan must leave their Israeli
identification documents with Israeli authorities at the Allenby
Bridge. There also is a requirement that Palestinians from East
Jerusalem obtain a special permit to cross the Allenby Bridge, which
may be purchased from the Ministry of Interior for $40 (125 NIS).
Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip are
not allowed to cross between Israel and Jordan at the Sheikh Hussein or
Arava crossings.
Palestinians who reside in the West Bank or Gaza are required by
the Israeli Government to exit and enter with a Palestinian passport.
When Israel tightened its closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
during the year, the Government at times restricted the entry and
departure of Palestinians, even those with passports from other
countries.
The PA generally does not restrict freedom of movement.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Palestinian residents of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East
Jerusalem chose their first popularly elected government in 1996. They
elected an 88-member Palestinian Council and the Ra'iis (President or
Chairman) of the Executive Authority of the Council. Yasir Arafat won
almost 89 percent of the vote in a two-person race for Chairman. Some
700 candidates ran for Council seats. Council members were elected in
multimember electoral districts. As many as 35 of the elected members
were independent candidates. International observers concluded that the
election could reasonably be regarded as an accurate expression of the
will of the voters, despite some irregularities. During the year, the
Council debated numerous draft laws and resolutions. Some members of
the Council complained of its relative lack of power in relation to the
executive branch of government.
The last municipal elections took place in 1986. Municipal
elections were planned for June 1999; however, they did not take place.
On August 22, the Fatah Central Committee (FCC) appointed a committee
to devise a plan for holding local elections before year's end;
however, the PLO Central Council did not ratify the plan.
Most Palestinians in East Jerusalem do not recognize the
jurisdiction of the municipality of Jerusalem. Only a very small
percentage of Jerusalem's Palestinian population vote in the municipal
council elections. No Palestinian resident of Jerusalem sits on the
city council.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 5
women in the 88-member Council, and 1 woman serves in a ministerial-
level position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Israeli, Palestinian, and international NGO's monitor the Israeli
Government's human rights practices. The Israeli Government generally
cooperates with human rights and humanitarian NGO's; officials normally
agree to meet with human rights monitors. The Israeli Government
permits human rights groups to publish and hold press conferences. On
April 4, the Israeli Government refused to allow a Palestinian human
rights activist to travel to Cairo, Egypt for a regional meeting on
human rights; however, several months later the Government allowed the
activist to attend a meeting outside of the country (see Section 2.d.).
On October 17, pursuant to the meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh, a fact-
finding committee was established to examine the causes of the violent
events that began in late September, and to recommend ways to prevent
their recurrence. The committee began its work in December.
Local human rights groups, most of which are Palestinian, and
several international organizations monitor the PA's human rights
practices. The PA generally cooperates with these organizations, and PA
officials usually meet with their representatives; however, there were
instances in which it did not. Several Palestinian human rights
organizations work privately with the PA to overcome abusive practices
in certain areas. They also publish criticism if they believe that the
PA is not responding adequately to private encouragement. Human rights
groups state that the PA generally is cooperative when dealing with
certain types of human rights issues. Human rights organizations
reported that they sometimes were denied access to detainees in
Palestinian prisons during the year (see Section 1.d.).
The ICRC operates in the West Bank and Gaza under the terms of a
memorandum of understanding signed in September 1996 between the ICRC
and the PLO. The memorandum accords the ICRC access to all detainees
held by the PA and allows regular inspections of prison conditions. In
accordance with the agreement, the ICRC conducts routine visits of PA-
run prison facilities and sees PA-held prisoners throughout the year.
Other human rights groups, including the Palestinian Independent
Commission for Citizens' Rights and the Mandela Institute, also visited
PA prisons and detention centers on a regular basis. Some human rights
and international humanitarian organizations reported that they
occasionally were denied access to detainees in Palestinian prisons
during the year (see Section 1.d.). PA officials reportedly are less
responsive to queries regarding the PA's policies toward and treatment
of members of Islamist opposition groups than to queries on other
detainees.
In 1999 Palestinian NGO's repeatedly called on the PA to ratify a
law passed by the Council in December 1998, which would govern the
activities of NGO's and their relations with the PA. Ratification of
the law was delayed due to the PA's attempts to replace the Ministry of
Justice with the Ministry of Interior as the agency responsible for the
administration of NGO's. In January Chairman Arafat approved the NGO
law. At least 150 NGO's had been issued with registration certificates
by year's end.
On April 21, PSF officials closed a democratization group office in
Gaza because the NGO was not yet registered with the Ministry of
Interior (see Section 2.b.). After repeated unsuccessful attempts to
reopen the office, board members decided to close the office
permanently.
On May 17, the PBA placed the director of a West Bank NGO on the
``non-practicing'' register of lawyers reportedly because he worked for
an NGO and not a law office.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Under the complex mixture of laws and regulations that apply to the
occupied territories, Palestinians are disadvantaged under Israeli law
and practices compared with the treatment received by Israeli settlers.
This includes discrimination in residency and land use.
Women.--The problems of rape, domestic violence, and violence
related to ``family honor'' have gained greater attention in the
Palestinian community as a result of a significant effort by
Palestinian women's groups; however, public discussion generally
remains muted. Victims often are encouraged by relatives to remain
quiet and are punished themselves or blamed for the ``shame'' that has
been brought upon them and their families. The brother of a 14-year-old
girl who reportedly was raped and killed by her uncle and brother in
1998 still was awaiting trial at year's end. Women's groups seek to
educate women on these problems, but women's rights advocates claim
that few resources are available to shelter the victims of violence
because women's shelters are not accepted culturally in Palestinian
society. They also maintain that society has not been receptive to
providing counseling or outreach services to victims of violence, which
these advocates see as more widespread than is acknowledged. According
to women's groups, there are no reliable data on the incidence of
violence against women. Spousal abuse, sexual abuse, and ``honor
killings'' occur, but societal pressures prevent most incidents from
being reported and most cases are handled within the families
concerned, usually by male family members. In prior years, leaders of
HAMAS threatened and tried to intimidate Palestinian women who were
involved in programs aimed at empowering women and helping abused
women; there were no reports that this occurred during the year.
Palestinian women endure various forms of social prejudice and
repression within their own society. Because of early marriage, girls
frequently do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. Cultural
restrictions sometimes prevent women from attending colleges and
universities. While there is an active women's movement in the West
Bank, serious attention has shifted only recently from nationalist
aspirations to issues that greatly affect women, such as domestic
violence, equal access to education and employment, and laws concerning
marriage and inheritance. Women who marry outside of their faith,
particularly Christian women who marry Muslim men, often are disowned
by their families and sometimes are harassed and threatened with death
by members of their community. Local officials sometimes attempt to
convince such women to leave their communities in order to protect
themselves.
A growing number of Palestinian women work outside the home, where
they tend to encounter discrimination. There are no special laws that
provide for women's rights in the workplace. Women are underrepresented
in most aspects of professional life. Despite the fact that there is a
small group of women who are prominent in politics, medicine, law,
teaching, and NGO's, women for the most part are seriously
underrepresented in the decisionmaking positions in these fields.
Personal status law for Palestinians is based on religious law. For
Muslim Palestinians, personal status law is derived from Shari'a
(Islamic law), and the varied ecclesiastical courts rule on personal
status issues for Christians. In the West Bank and Gaza, Shari'a
pertaining to women is part of the Jordanian Status Law of 1976, which
includes inheritance and marriage laws. Under the law, women inherit
less than male members of the family do. The marriage law allows men to
take more than one wife, although few do so. Women are permitted to
make ``stipulations'' in the marriage contract to protect them in the
event of divorce and questions of child custody. However, only an
estimated 1 percent of women take advantage of this section of the law,
leaving most women at a disadvantage when it comes to divorce or child
custody. Ecclesiastical courts also often favor men over women in
divorce and child custody cases.
Children.--The PA requires compulsory education up to 12 years of
age. However, early marriage in certain sectors of society frequently
prevents girls from completing the mandatory level of schooling.
Currently British Mandate, Jordanian, and military laws, from which
West Bank and Gaza law is derived, offer protection to children under
the Labor and Penal Codes. Existing laws designed to protect children,
such as a law that sets the minimum employment age, are not always
enforced. While there is no juvenile court system, judges specializing
in children's cases generally sit for juvenile offenders. In cases in
which the child is the victim, judges have the discretion to remove the
child from a situation deemed harmful. However, the system is not
advanced in the protection it affords children.
The sustained closure imposed by Israel affected students' ability
to attend school during the year. In areas under curfew, all classes
were cancelled. Furthermore, teachers were unable to reach their
schools in different villages and towns (see Section 2.d.).
People with Disabilities.--There is no mandated accessibility to
public facilities in the occupied territories under either Israeli or
Palestinian authority. Approximately 130,000 Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza are disabled. Additionally, medical relief organizations
estimated that approximately one-sixth of the 10,600 Palestinians
injured during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' would be disabled permanently.
Some Palestinian institutions care for and train disabled persons;
however, their efforts are chronically underfunded. Many Palestinians
with disabilities are segregated and isolated from Palestinian society;
they are discriminated against in most spheres, including education,
employment, transportation, and access to public buildings and
facilities.
Religious Minorities.--In the past, there were reports that a small
number of Muslim converts to Christianity in the Palestinian community
sometimes were subject to societal discrimination and harassment by PA
officials. However, there was no pattern of PA discrimination and
harassment against Christians (see Section 2.c.).
On October 7, following the IDF withdrawal from the Jewish
religious site of Joseph's Tomb, about 1,000 Palestinian protesters
entered the religious site, burned it, and damaged the roof and an
outer wall in an unsuccessful attempt to demolish the tomb (see Section
2.c.). On October 12, Palestinian civilians reportedly burned a
synagogue in Jericho.
On November 21, Israeli settlers set a mosque on fire in Huwara,
reportedly in reaction to the killing of an Israeli settler by a
settler earlier in the day.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Labor affairs in the West Bank came
under Palestinian responsibility with the signing of the Interim
Agreement in September 1995. Until a new law being drafted by PA
authorities comes into effect, labor affairs in the West Bank are
governed by Jordanian Law 21 of 1965, as amended by Israeli military
orders, and in Gaza by PA decisions. The law permits workers to
establish and join unions without government authorization. The
previous Israeli requirement that all proposed West Bank unions apply
for a permit no longer is enforced. Israeli authorities previously
licensed about 35 of the estimated 185 union branches now in existence.
Following a process to consolidate trade unions in the West Bank, there
now are 12 trade unions there.
Palestinian workers in Jerusalem are governed by Israeli labor law.
They are free to establish their own unions. Although the Government
restricts Jerusalem unions from joining West Bank trade union
federations, this restriction has not been enforced. Palestinian
workers in Jerusalem may belong simultaneously to unions affiliated
with West Bank federations and the Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.
West Bank unions are not affiliated with the Israeli Histadrut
Federation. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who work in Israel
or Jerusalem are not full members of Histadrut, but they are required
to contribute 1 percent of their wages to Histadrut. Negotiations
between Histadrut and West Bank union officials to return half of this
fee to the Palestinian Union Federation were completed in 1996, but
funds have yet to be transferred.
Palestinians who work in Israel are required to contribute to the
National Insurance Institute (NII), which provides unemployment
insurance and other benefits. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza
are eligible for some, but not all, NII benefits. According to the
Interim Agreement, Palestinians working in Israel and Jerusalem
continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel, the bankruptcy
of a worker's employer, and allowances for maternity leave.
There are outstanding cases of Palestinian workers who have
attempted to sue their Israeli employers for non-payment of wages but
are unable to travel to the relevant courts because they are unable to
receive the proper permits.
The great majority of West Bank unions belong to the Palestinian
General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU). The PGFTU was involved in
the completion of the negotiations with Histadrut regarding workers'
fees. The reorganization of unions under the PGFTU is intended to
enable the West Bank and Gaza unions to better represent the union
members' interests; the reorganization had not been finalized by year's
end.
An estimated 92,000 workers in the West Bank are members of the
PGFTU, the largest union bloc, which consists of 12 trade unions in the
West Bank and 8 in Gaza. The organization has about 46,500 members in
Gaza. The PGFTU estimates actual organized membership, i.e., dues-
paying members, at about 30 percent of all Palestinian workers.
No unions were dissolved by administrative or legislative action
during the year. Palestinian unions that seek to strike must submit to
arbitration by the PA Ministry of Labor. If the union disagrees with
the final arbitration and strikes, a tribunal of senior judges
appointed by the PA decides what, if any, disciplinary action is to be
taken. There are no laws in the territories that specifically protect
the rights of striking workers. In practice, such workers have little
or no protection from an employer's retribution.
For several months, teachers throughout the West Bank held a
strike. On May 5, PA officials arrested one of the strike leaders and
closed down the radio station that broadcast an interview in which the
leader accused the PA of inefficiency (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). The
teachers suspended their strike on May 17, despite the fact that none
of their demands were met.
The PGFTU has applied for membership in the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A majority of
workers in the occupied territories are self-employed or unpaid family
helpers in agriculture or commerce. Only 35 percent of employment in
the territories consists of wage jobs, most with the U.N. Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA), the PA, or municipalities. Collective bargaining
is protected. Labor disputes are adjudicated by committees of 3 to 5
members in businesses employing more than 20 workers.
Existing laws and regulations do not offer real protection against
antiunion discrimination.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--PA law does not
prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor, including by
children, but there were no reports of such practices during the year.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum working age in the West Bank and Gaza is 14
years. Most observers agree that a significant number of Palestinian
children under the age of 16 years work. Many children under the age of
12 are engaged in some work activities. Most such employment is
believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban
street vendors. Some employment of children also is reported to occur
in small manufacturing enterprises, such as shoe and textile factories.
The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor by
children, but there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
The PA's capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. It has only
40 labor inspectors to inspect an estimated 65,000 enterprises. The
International Labor Organization and UNICEF are working with the PA to
study the nature and extent of the problem and to develop the capacity
to enforce and update child labor laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There currently is no minimum
wage in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The average wage for full-time
workers appears to provide a worker and family with a decent standard
of living.
In the West Bank, the normal workweek is 48 hours in most areas; in
Gaza the workweek is 45 hours for day laborers and 40 hours for
salaried employees. There is no effective enforcement of maximum
workweek laws.
The PA Ministry of Labor is responsible for inspecting workplaces
and enforcing safety standards in the West Bank and Gaza. The Ministry
of Labor states that new factories and workplaces meet international
health and safety standards but that older ones fail to meet minimum
standards. There is no specific legal protection afforded workers that
allows them to remove themselves from an unhealthy or unsafe work
setting without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, through, or from the occupied territories.
__________
JORDAN
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy ruled
by King Abdullah II bin Hussein since the death of his father, King
Hussein bin Talal, in February 1999. The Constitution concentrates a
high degree of executive and legislative authority in the King, who
determines domestic and foreign policy. In the King's absence, a
regent, whose authority is outlined in the Constitution, assumes many
of these responsibilities. The Prime Minister and other members of the
Cabinet are appointed by the King and manage the daily affairs of
government. The Parliament consists of the 40-member Senate, appointed
by the King, and the 80-member Chamber of Deputies, which is elected
every 4 years. The lower house asserts itself only intermittently on
domestic and foreign policy issues. The 1997 parliamentary elections
were marred by reports of registration irregularities, fraud, and
restrictions on the press and on campaign materials. According to the
Constitution, the judiciary is independent of other branches of
government; however, in practice it is susceptible to political
pressure and interference by the executive.
General police functions are the responsibility of the Public
Security Directorate (PSD). The PSD, the General Intelligence
Directorate (GID), and the military share responsibility for
maintaining internal security, and have authority to monitor the
activities of persons believed to be security threats. Elements of the
security forces continue to commit human rights abuses.
Jordan has a mixed economy, with significant but declining
government participation in industry, transportation, and
communications. The country has few natural resources and relies
heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from citizens working
abroad. During the year, the Government took steps to increase
privatization and to improve the country's investment climate during
the year. For example, in April the country acceded to the World Trade
Organization, which entailed extensive legislative and regulatory
reform. However, the economy continues to suffer from chronically high
unemployment, and GDP growth has remained between 1 and 2 percent since
1996. Price controls remain on bread, pharmaceuticals, gasoline, and
animal feed. Wages remain stagnant. International sanctions against
Iraq, historically the country's largest trading partner, continue to
inhibit export growth. Violence in the occupied territories late in the
year adversely affected the tourist industry, and many foreign
investment projects were frozen. Per capita gross domestic product in
1999 was approximately $1,542 (1,086 dinars). Many families, especially
those in rural areas, are unable to meet basic needs to subsist.
There continued to be significant problems in the Government's
human rights record. There are significant restrictions on citizens'
right to change their Government. Citizens may participate in the
political system through their elected representatives in Parliament;
however, the King has discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to dissolve Parliament, and to
establish public policy. Other human rights problems include
extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces, police abuse
and mistreatment of detainees; allegations of torture; arbitrary arrest
and detention; lack of transparent investigations and accountability
within the security services; prolonged detention without charge; lack
of due process of law and interference in the judicial process;
infringements on citizens' privacy rights; harassment of members of
opposition political parties and the press; and significant
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association.
The 1999 Press and Publications Law reduced somewhat the restrictions
outlined in previous legislation on the ability of journalists and
publications to function and report freely; however, significant
restrictions continued to be in effect. The Government imposes some
limits on freedom of religion, and there is official and societal
discrimination against adherents of unrecognized religions. The
evangelical Christian community reported fewer incidents of
governmental harassment during the year. There are some restrictions on
freedom of movement. Violence against women, restrictions on women's
rights, and societal discrimination against women are problems. The law
still allows for reduced punishments for violent ``honor crimes''
against women for alleged immoral acts. Child abuse remains a problem,
and discrimination against Palestinians persists. Abuse of foreign
servants is a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials; however,
security forces committed several extrajudicial killings.
In January police reportedly beat Mar'i Khalil Al-Jahran in a South
Shuna police station, where he bled to death.
In March security forces fired at a group of villagers of the Bedul
Tribe near Petra, killing a 21-year-old man and 2 teenagers. The
villagers were protesting the demolition of a home by members of the
Petra Regional Authorities; the home reportedly was built illegally on
government-owned land. The Ministry of Interior stated that security
forces acted in self-defense after villagers, armed with sticks,
stones, and firearms attacked a group of officials from the Petra
Regional Council who were attempting to carry out the demolition order.
Following the incident, the Government stated that it would investigate
and punish those responsible for the violence; however, by year's end,
the Government had not taken legal action against any party. The
Government did not launch an official investigation of the incident;
however, King Abdullah offered the villagers an extensive compensation
package, including economic assistance and increased land for housing.
In May police reportedly beat Musa Shalback in Hai Nazal after
pursuing him for allegedly stealing a car and hitting two pedestrians.
According to eyewitnesses, police handcuffed Shalback, severely beat
him, and subsequently took him at a local hospital. Shalback was in a
coma when he arrived to the hospital where he died from his injuries 10
days later. The Government stated that Shalback died as a result of
injuries sustained in a car crash that followed the pursuit. By year's
end, the Government had not responded to diplomatic inquiries about
this case.
On October 6, police used batons and tear gas to disperse
protesters in Baqaa refugee camp; one person was killed and six others
were injured during the protest. Protesters claim that police caused
the death and injuries, while police personnel claim that the
demonstrators caused the fatalities (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
On July 20, 16-year-old Amjad Salem Ahmad Smadi died at a police
station in Ajloun 45 minutes after police officers placed him in
custody for suspected robbery. Government officials initially reported
that Smadi hanged himself; however, family members and other residents
of Ajloun demanded an investigation into the death. In response the
Government formed an ad-hoc parliamentary committee to look into the
incident and transferred the police officers and the local prosecutor
to another part of the country. An unpublished forensics report
supported the original autopsy's conclusion that the death was a
suicide; however, the report also stated that Smadi was beaten prior to
his death. Human rights activists and family members believe that the
boy died as a result of the beatings and subsequently was hanged to
make it appear as if he had committed suicide. Neither diplomatic
representatives nor human rights activists were able to uncover
evidence to support either the family's claims or to refute the
Government's position.
The security services continue to be reluctant to conduct
transparent investigations into allegations of wrongful deaths that
occurred during police detention in previous years, thus promoting a
climate of impunity.
There were no developments in the investigation of the May 1999
death of Mahmoud Rashid Qasem Mohammed Ishtayeh, who died in a hospital
while in police custody. His family claimed that he died of injuries
suffered during a beating; however, prison officials maintained that
Ishtayeh died of natural causes.
There were no developments in the investigation of the police
officers who killed Maseed tribesmen in March 1998 or Mohammad Al-
Khattub and Ismail Suleiman Ajarmeh in February 1998.
Women continued to be victims of ``honor killings'' (see Section
5).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law provides prisoners with the right to humane
treatment; however, the police and security forces sometimes abuse
detainees physically and verbally during detention and interrogation
and allegedly also use torture. Allegations of torture are difficult to
verify because security officials frequently deny detainees timely
access to lawyers. The most frequently alleged methods of torture are
sleep deprivation, beatings on the soles of the feet, prolonged
suspension with ropes in contorted positions, and extended solitary
confinement. Defendants in high-profile cases before the State Security
Court claimed to have been subjected to physical and psychological
abuse while in detention. Government officials deny allegations of
torture and abuse.
A number of cases of beatings while in police custody were reported
to human rights activists during the year. Human rights activists
believe that there were many more incidents that were not documented.
Iraqi weightlifter Kazem Dashi claimed that he was beaten and
intimidated during his April detention (see Section 1.d.). Musa
Shalback died in a hospital in March 10 days after police reportedly
beat him in Hai Nazal (see Section 1.a.). Periodic detentions of
foreign workers continue and allegations of overcrowded cells and
physical abuse by guards persist.
Police on several occasions used force to disperse demonstrations
during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). For example, in April
newspapers reported that police used excessive force to disperse
student demonstrations at Jordan University, injuring a number of
protesters. The students were protesting the administration's recent
changes to the university's student council law, which were designed to
curb the influence of Islamists (see Section 2.c.).
On several occasions in October, police used force to disperse
large violent protests against the Israeli Government's actions in
Israel and the occupied territories (see Section 2.b.). For example, on
October 6, police used batons and tear gas to disperse protesters from
Baqaa refugee camp; one person was killed and six were injured during
the protest (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). Protesters claimed that
police caused the death and injuries, while police personnel claimed
that the demonstrators caused the fatalities. On October 8, police used
batons against at least five persons at a demonstration at Jordan
University. On October 24, police used tear gas and water cannons to
disperse a demonstration of between 20,000 and 30,000 persons who were
approaching a heavily mined border area. Police injured a number of
persons, including a journalist covering the protest (see Section
2.a.).
On August 7, a small group of Palestinians attacked an Arab member
of the Israeli Parliament at the Baqaa refugee camp. Police personnel
immediately escorted him away from the area. On November 19, an unknown
assailant shot and injured an Israeli diplomat. On December 5, unknown
gunmen shot and injured a second Israeli diplomat. In December police
officials arrested seven persons allegedly connected to these attacks.
Prisons and local police detention facilities are Spartan, and on
the whole are severely overcrowded and understaffed. Human rights
groups and prisoners complained of poor food and water quality,
inadequate medical facilities, and poor sanitation in certain
facilities. During the year, the Government opened a new prison
facility in an attempt to alleviate somewhat the problem of
overcrowding.
The Government holds some of the prisoners who are detained on
national security grounds in separate detention facilities maintained
by the GID. The Government holds other security detainees and prisoners
in regular prisons. Conditions in GID detention facilities are
significantly better than general police detention facilities. The
security prisoners often are separated from common criminals; however,
conditions for them do not differ significantly.
With some exceptions, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) is permitted unrestricted access to prisoners and prison
facilities, including GID facilities. In 1999 the Government formally
granted the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to
prisoners. However, the Government did not inform the UNHCR of the
presence of seven Libyan security detainees prior to their deportation
from the country, which effectively denied the UNHCR access to the
detainees (see Section 2.d.). Local human rights monitors are allowed
to visit prisons, but complain that the authorities require them to
undertake a lengthy and difficult procedure in order to obtain
permission for such visits.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The security forces
arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. Under the Constitution,
citizens are subject to arrest, trial, and punishment for the
defamation of heads of state, dissemination of ``false or exaggerated
information outside the country that attacks state dignity,'' or
defamation of public officials.
The Criminal Code requires that police notify legal authorities
within 48 hours of an arrest and that legal authorities file formal
charges within 10 days of an arrest; however, the courts routinely
grant requests from prosecutors for 15-day extensions as provided by
law. This practice generally extends pretrial detention for protracted
periods of time. In cases involving state security, the authorities
frequently hold defendants in lengthy pretrial detention, do not
provide defendants with the written charges against them, and do not
allow defendants to meet with their lawyers until shortly before trial.
Defendants before the State Security Court usually meet with their
attorneys only 1 or 2 days before their trial.
The Government detains persons, including journalists, for varying
amounts of time for what appear to be political reasons (see Section
2.a.). Human rights sources reported that more than 500 persons were
detained for security reasons and subsequently released within a short
period of time throughout the year. This number likely underestimates
the total number of political detainees. Human rights groups report
that there are a smaller number of long-term political detainees.
Local governors have the authority to enact the 1954 Preventing
Crimes Law, which allows them to place citizens under house arrest for
up to a year without formally charging them (see Section 2.d.). House
arrest may involve requiring persons to report daily to a local police
station and the imposition of a curfew. Persons who violate the terms
of their house arrest may be imprisoned for up to 14 days.
In April the GID arrested Hassan Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Hanieh and
held him without charge, legal representation, or access to the
government prosecutor for 20 days (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
On April 13, the GID allegedly detained without charge Iraqi
weightlifter Kazem Dashi at the Al-Ruwayshid border point; the GID
released Dashi the same day. Dashi claimed that he was beaten and
intimidated during his interrogation in GID custody (see Section 1.c.).
The Government denied the allegations.
In July the GID detained 12 persons from Salt without charge,
allegedly for security reasons. The Government stated that some of the
detainees were arrested because they were ``religious individuals'' and
that some were members of political parties. In December the Government
released all of the detainees; 4 of the 12 were charged after admitting
that they had planned terrorist activities and were required to post
bail.
In October following widespread protests against the Israeli
Government's actions in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, police
detained hundreds of persons. Police did not charge most of the
demonstrators and released them within 1 day.
The Government uses the threat of detention to intimidate
journalists into practicing self-censorship (see Section 2.a.). In past
years, police typically detained for 5 to 10 days numerous journalists
who criticized government officials or policies; some of the
journalists experienced abuse. When the Government did file charges,
convictions were rare; however, some proceedings lasted several years
with defendants required to appear in court regularly. During the year,
police arrested at least one journalist because of an article he wrote
(see Section 2.a.).
There was no further information on Basil Abu Ghoshe, who continued
to be detained despite having completed his sentence in 1998,
ostensibly for his own protection due to threats from a rival tribe.
The security services detained approximately 50 persons, described
in the press as ``Islamists,'' during the year. These detentions were
related to allegations of involvement in terrorist or strictly
political activities.
The Constitution prohibits the expulsion of any citizen, and the
Government does not routinely use forced exile; however, in 1999 the
Government allegedly expelled four HAMAS leaders, who subsequently
filed an appeal to reverse the expulsion. On June 25, the High Court
rejected on technical grounds an appeal by the defendants' attorney to
reverse the alleged order of expulsion. The case was considered closed
at year's end.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
independence of the judiciary; however, the judiciary is subject to
pressure from the executive branch. A judge's appointment to,
advancement within, and dismissal from the judiciary are determined by
a committee whose members are appointed by the King. The Ministry of
Justice has great influence over a judge's career and subverts the
judicial system in favor of the executive branch. There have been
numerous allegations that judges have been ``reassigned'' temporarily
to another court or judicial district in order to remove them from a
particular proceeding. Judges also complain of unlawful telephone
surveillance.
The judicial system consists of several types of courts. Most
criminal cases are tried in civilian courts, which include the appeals
courts, the Court of Cassation, and the Supreme Court. Cases involving
sedition, armed insurrection, financial crimes, drug trafficking, and
offenses against the royal family are tried in the State Security
Court. In 1997 the Parliament passed amendments to the law governing
the State Security Court that effectively extended its mandate
indefinitely. The amendments had been rejected earlier by the lower
house's judicial committee as ``undemocratic'' and contrary to the
principle of judicial independence.
Shari'a (Islamic law) courts have jurisdiction over marriage and
divorce among Muslims and inheritance cases involving both Muslims and
non-Muslims. Christian courts have jurisdiction over marriage and
divorce cases among Christians, but apply Shari'a law in inheritance
cases (see Section 5).
Most trials in the civilian courts are open. Defendants are
entitled to legal counsel, may challenge witnesses, and have the right
to appeal. Defendants facing the death penalty or life imprisonment
must be represented by legal counsel. Public defenders are provided if
the defendant in such cases financially is unable to hire legal
counsel. Shari'a as applied in the country regards the testimony of a
woman to be equal to half that of a man. This provision technically
applies only in religious courts; however, in the past it has been
imposed in civil courts as well, regardless of religion.
The State Security Court consists of a panel of three judges who
may be either civilians or military officers. Sessions frequently are
closed to the public. Defendants tried in the State Security Court
often are held in pretrial detention without access to lawyers,
although they may be visited by representatives of the ICRC. In the
State Security Court, judges have inquired into allegations that
defendants were tortured and have allowed the testimony of physicians
regarding such allegations. The Court of Cassation has ruled that the
State Security Court may not issue a death sentence on the basis of a
confession obtained as a result of torture. Defendants in the State
Security Court have the right to appeal their sentences to the Court of
Cassation, which is authorized to review issues of both fact and law.
Appeals are automatic for cases involving the death penalty.
In the past, defense attorneys have challenged the appointment of
military judges to the State Security Court to try civilian cases as
contrary to the concept of an independent judiciary. Military judges
appear to receive adequate training in civil law and procedure.
In the past, the press routinely carried details of cases tried
before the State Security Court, despite 1998 provisions in the Press
and Publication Law that prohibited press coverage of any case that was
under investigation, unless expressly permitted by the authorities. The
1999 Press and Publications Law permits journalists to cover court
proceedings ``unless the court rules otherwise'' (see Section 2.a.).
There was press coverage of trials in the State Security Court during
the year.
On September 18, the Security Court convicted 22 suspected members
of the ``Al-Qaeda'' terrorist network of planning attacks at tourist
sites around the country during millenium celebrations. The court
sentenced 6 of those convicted to death and 16 to prison sentences
ranging from 7 years to life.
In 1999 the Government expelled four HAMAS leaders (see Section
1.d.); there were credible reports of executive branch influence with
respect to the verdict. On June 25, the High Court rejected on
technical grounds an appeal by the defendants' attorney to reverse the
order of expulsion. The case was considered closed at year's end.
In late 1999, lawyers refused to represent an Israeli citizen who
was accused of forging official documents. The court convicted him and
he was sentenced to 1 year in prison.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires that security forces obtain
a warrant from the Prosecutor General or a judge before conducting
searches or otherwise interfering with these rights, and the security
services generally respect these constitutional restrictions; however,
in security cases, the authorities sometimes--in violation of the law--
obtain warrants retroactively or obtain preapproved warrants. Security
officers monitor telephone conversations and Internet communication,
read correspondence, and engage in surveillance of persons who are
considered to pose a threat to the Government or national security. The
law permits these practices if the Government obtains a court order.
Judges complain of unlawful telephone surveillance (see Section 1.e.).
In June the GID confiscated without a warrant a box of publications
from Hassan Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Hanieh, detained him without charge
for 20 days, then placed him under house arrest (see Sections 1.d. and
2.d.).
The Government did not block the entry of foreign publications (see
Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government imposes
some restrictions on these rights.
The 1998 Press and Publications Law and the 1999 revisions to the
law, combined with the 1998 Press Association Law, impose stringent
restrictions on the operation of newspapers. The Government also
intimidates journalists to encourage self-censorship. Private citizens
may be prosecuted for slandering the royal family, the Government, or
foreign leaders, and for ``sowing sedition.'' The Press and
Publications Law and the law governing the Jordan Press Association
(JPA) require membership in the JPA for persons to be considered
``legal'' journalists or editors, thus potentially excluding dozens of
practicing journalists from the profession. The JPA uses its authority
to enforce bans on journalists receiving funding from foreign sources
or having Israeli contacts (see Section 4). In August 1999, then Prime
Minister Abdul Raouf Rawabdeh issued an order directing government
offices to cooperate only with JPA members. Citizens generally do not
hesitate to criticize the Government openly, but are more circumspect
in regard to the King and the royal family.
The 1998 Press and Publications Law granted the Government wide
discretionary powers to issue fines, withdraw licenses, and order
shutdowns, which enabled it to control the editorial content of
newspapers. The law also prohibited reporting on criminal cases or
crimes at any stage of the investigation without prior authorization
from the public prosecutor. However, the 1999 amendments to the Press
and Publications Law, limit somewhat the Government's discretion to
issue fines, transfer the power to withdraw licenses to the judiciary,
limit significantly the Government's power to order shutdowns, and
allow journalists to cover court proceedings ``unless the court rules
otherwise.'' The 1999 amendments to the Press and Publications Law also
reduce the fine for violations at between $700 and $1,400 (500 to 1,000
dinars), down from between $7,000 and $14,000 (5,000 and 10,000 dinars)
under the 1998 Press and Publications Law (see Section 1.e.). It was
illegal under the 1998 Press and Publications Law to publish news,
opinion, information, reports, caricatures, or photos that disparage
the King or the royal family, pertain to the armed forces or security
services, harm national unity, disparage religion, offend an individual
or harm his reputation, disparage the heads of friendly states, harm
the country's relations with other nations, promote perversion or lead
to moral corruption, shake confidence in the national currency, or
feature false news or rumors. Although these restrictions were modified
by the 1999 amendments to the Press and Publications Law, prohibitions
on such activities still exist in the Penal Code and a number of other
laws.
According to the 1999 Press and Publications Law, all publications
must be licensed by the Government. The law provides that those who
seek to obtain a newspaper license must show proof of capital of
$700,000 (500,000 dinars) for a daily newspaper, $70,000 (50,000
dinars) for most other publications, and $7,000 (5,000 dinars) for
specialized publications. The law also requires that the editor in
chief of a newspaper be a citizen who permanently resides in the
country and a member of the JPA for at least 4 years. This last
provision reflects a reduction in the requirements from previous
legislation but places the onus of regulation on the JPA.
Persons accused of violating the Press and Publications Law are
tried in a special court for press and copyright cases. Journalists
also may be prosecuted for criminal and security violations in
connection with their work. Although a substantial number of cases are
dismissed before trial, many other cases linger in the courts for
years. The Government routinely uses detention and prosecution or the
threat of prosecution to intimidate journalists and thereby
successfully encourages self-censorship (see Section 1.d.).
The Penal Code authorizes the State to take action against any
person who incites violence, defames heads of state, disseminates
``false or exaggerated information outside the country that attacks
state dignity,'' or defames a public official.
In January security forces arrested engineering student Asim Ogla
Al-Maghayirah from the University of Science and Technology, accusing
him of affiliation with a banned political party (Al-Tahrir) and
distributing illegal pamphlets (see Section 2.b.).
On May 25, police arrested Basil Talluzi, a freelance journalist
and short-story writer for the independent weekly newspaper Al-Mir'ah
(The Mirror), for writing a satirical article about leaders in the Arab
world (see Section 1.d.). Talluzi was released the next day and
reported that he was not mistreated while in detention. The JPA claimed
credit for obtaining Talluzi's prompt release.
In October police reportedly beat and confiscated the film of a
reporter covering a demonstration against the Israeli Government's
actions in Israel and the occupied territories. The police officer
reportedly apologized and returned the film to the journalist the next
day (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
In September the JPA voted to expel Nidal Mansour, its own vice
president and the president of a nongovernmental organization (NGO),
the Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists (CFJ). Mansour
allegedly received foreign funding for CFJ activities (see Section 4).
As a result of his expulsion from the JPA, Mansour was not permitted to
keep his position as editor in chief of Al-Hadath newspaper. The Jordan
Times, an English language newspaper, published an article criticizing
the JPA's expulsion of Mansour. The JPA threatened the editor in chief
of the Jordan Times with disciplinary measures; she subsequently
published an apology letter. In October Mansour filed a complaint to
the High Court of Justice; the court suspended the expulsion order
pending review of the case.
In 1999 a columnist of Al-Arab Al-Yawm newspaper wrote an article
that was critical of the JPA. The JPA subsequently suspended for 2
years the newspaper's editor in chief, Azzam Yunis, along with three
other journalists. June Yunis appealed the action; however, his request
was denied.
In March the Government banned a book of poems written by Musa
Hawamdeh due to pressure from radical Islamists. In June the Shari'a
court charged Hawamdeh with apostasy. The complainant requested that
Hawamdeh publicly retract the controversial statements in his poem and
requested that the Shari'a judge order that he divorce his wife and
lose his rights to inherit property or manage his own wealth. The
Shari'a court referred the case to a civil court. In July both the
Shari'a and criminal courts acquitted Hawamdeh of all charges, without
his retracting any portion of the poem (see Section 2.c.).
According to local press reports, the Press and Publications
Department also banned a book of poetry by Ziyad Al-Anani in April; the
book contained a poem that reportedly was offensive to Islam. The
authorities did not bring charges against Al-Anani; the book was
published and distributed in Beirut, Lebanon due to the Jordanian ban
(see Section 2.c.).
Some journalists complained about high taxes on the media industry
and tariffs on paper, which they claim led them to reduce the size of
their publications. They also criticized the Government for its policy
of advertising predominantly in newspapers in which the Government owns
shares.
The Government did not block the entry of foreign publications. In
January the Government passed a bill that grants foreign media
operations ``absolute freedom of expression'' in the country. The bill
reportedly was passed in order to encourage foreign investment. Some
commentators criticized the Government for passing a bill that offers
full autonomy for foreign journalists while maintaining laws that
restrict freedom of expression for local journalists.
Radio and television news broadcasts are more restricted than the
print media. The Government is the sole broadcaster of radio and
television programs. The Government has commercial agreements with the
British Broadcasting Corporation, the London-based Middle East
Broadcasting Center, and Radio Monte Carlo that allows it to simulcast
regional programs using local radio transmitters. Jordan Television
(JTV) reports only the Government's position on controversial matters.
International satellite television and Israeli and Syrian television
broadcasts are available and unrestricted.
In December due to widespread criticism of local media coverage of
events in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, King Abdullah took steps to
reform the state media. For example, the King appointed new members to
the board of the Jordan Radio and Television Corporation (JRTVC) and
reportedly instructed the new director to discontinue the traditional
practice of placing items about the King first in the evening news
lineup. The Minister of Information also announced a plan to create an
independent regulatory commission.
The GID actively investigates Internet reports of ``crimes against
the king.''
The Government limits academic freedom. No university professors
were dismissed for their political views during the year; however, some
academics claim that they receive frequent threats of dismissal. In
March Jordan University granted the president of the university the
authority to appoint half of the university's 80-member student
council, including the chair (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
restricts freedom of assembly. Citizens must obtain permits for public
gatherings. Following a demonstration on October 6 in which one
protester was killed and six were injured, the Government banned all
demonstrations and public rallies. However, a number of demonstrations
subsequently were held with government acquiescence despite the ban.
Before the ban, the Government denied permits for public protests and
rallies that it determined pose a threat to security.
In February the Government twice refused requests by human rights
activists to hold demonstrations to protest a parliamentary vote
rejecting the repeal of Article 340, the so-called honor crimes law.
However, on February 14, Prince Ali bin Hussein and Prince Ghazi bin
Mohammed, led more than 5,000 persons in a march to Parliament to
demand the cancellation of Article 340. The Ministry of Interior denied
permits for an Islamic Action Front (IAF) counterdemonstration. Some
commentators criticized the Government for organizing and controlling
the demonstration instead of allowing human rights activists to
organize their own demonstration.
In March Jordan University's administration amended the Student
Council election law, granting the University president the authority
to appoint half of the University's 80-member student council,
including the chair. The amendment was viewed widely as an effort to
curb the influence of campus Islamists. Many students, including non-
Islamists, objected to the University's decision, and staged several
demonstrations throughout April to protest against the appointments.
Police used physical force, water cannons, and tear gas to disperse
demonstrations, injuring a number of students (see Section 1.c.).
On July 1, the Higher Coordination Committee for Opposition Parties
convened a rally to welcome home the three members of the Jordanian
Professional Association who were shot by Israeli soldiers at a protest
at the border between Israel and Lebanon.
In August the Islamic Action Front organized several large
demonstrations in support of Palestinian sovereignty over East
Jerusalem. There was heavy police presence at these demonstrations;
however, security forces did not prevent the demonstrations.
In October there were numerous large demonstrations against the
Israeli Government's actions in Israel and the occupied territories and
in support of Palestinians. Police used force to disperse demonstrators
during several violent demonstrations (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
The Government restricts freedom of association. The Government
requires, but routinely grants, approval for conferences, workshops,
and seminars.
The Government routinely licenses political parties and other
associations. There currently are 25 licensed political parties.
Membership in an unlicensed political party is illegal. The Government
may deny licenses to parties that it decides do not meet a list of
political and other criteria contained in the Political Parties Law.
The High Court of Justice may dissolve a party if it violates the
Constitution or the Political Parties Law.
In January security forces arrested engineering student Asim Ogla
Al-Maghayirah from the University of Science and Technology, reportedly
due to his affiliation with a banned political party (Al-Tahrir) and
because he allegedly distributed illegal pamphlets (see Section 2.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the
safeguarding of ``all forms of worship and religious rites in
accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom, unless such is
inconsistent with public order or morality;'' however, the Government
imposes some restrictions on freedom of religion. Citizens may not
always practice the religion of their choice. According to the
Constitution, Islam is the state religion.
Islamic institutions are managed by the Ministry of Religious
Affairs and Trusts, which appoints imams and subsidizes certain
activities sponsored by mosques. Religious institutions, such as
churches that wish to receive official government recognition, must
apply to the Prime Ministry for registration. The Protestant
denominations registered as ``societies'' come under the jurisdiction
of one of the recognized Protestant churches for purposes of family
law, such as divorce and child custody. The Government does not
recognize a number of religions.
Over 90 percent of the population are Sunni Muslim, and according
to official government statistics, approximately 6 percent are
Christian. Government and Christian officials privately estimate the
true figure to be closer to between 2 and 4 percent. The Government
does not recognize religious faiths other than the three main
monotheistic religions: Islam; Christianity; and Judaism. In addition
not all Christian denominations have been accorded official government
recognition. Officially recognized denominations include the Greek
Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Armenian Orthodox,
Maronite Catholic, and the Assyrian, Anglican, Lutheran, Seventh-Day
Adventist, United Pentecostal, and Presbyterian Churches. Other
churches, including the Baptist Church, the Free Evangelical Church,
the Church of the Nazarene, the Assembly of God, and the Christian
Missionary Alliance, are registered with the Ministry of Justice as
``societies'' but not as churches. There also are small numbers of
Shi'a and Druze, as well as adherents of the Baha'i Faith. The
Government does not interfere with public worship by the country's
Christian minority. However, although the majority of Christians are
allowed to practice freely, some activities, such as proselytizing or
encouraging conversion to the Christian faith--both considered
incompatible legally with Islam--are prohibited. Christians are subject
to aspects of Shari'a (Islamic law) that designate how inheritances are
distributed.
The Government does not recognize Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church
of Christ, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, but each
of these denominations is allowed to conduct religious services and
activities without interference.
The Government does not recognize the Baha'i Faith as a religion
but does not prohibit the practice of the faith. However, Baha'is, who
number approximately 800 citizens, face both official and societal
discrimination. The Government does not record the bearer's religion on
national identity cards issued to Baha'is, nor does it register
property belonging to the Baha'i community. Adherents of the Baha'i
Faith are considered as Muslims for purposes of family and inheritance
law. Unlike Christian denominations, the Baha'i community does not have
its own court to adjudicate personal status and family matters. Baha'i
personal status matters are heard in Shari'a courts.
Non-Jordanian Christian missionaries operate in the country but are
subject to restrictions. Christian missionaries may not proselytize
Muslims. Since late 1998, foreign Christian mission groups in the
country have complained of increased bureaucratic difficulties,
including refusal by the Government to renew residence permits.
The Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary (JETS), a Christian
training school for pastors and missionaries, which requested
registration from the Ministry of Education in 1998, was not registered
by year's end. Pending such registration, in 1999 authorities suspended
renewal of the residence permits of all of the seminary's 36 foreign
students and 2 members of the faculty. In 1998 and 1999, some non-
citizen Arab Muslim students were deported and asked to leave the
country as a result of their association with JETS. To date the
Ministry of Education's refusal to issue visas has affected 14 of 140
students and 4 staff members of the school.
In 1999 an employee of a small language school in Amman twice
applied for a residence permit from the Ministry of Interior. His
application was denied on both occasions, reportedly because government
officials believed that he had been trying to convert Muslims to
Christianity. He reapplied in April and was awaiting a response from
the Government at year's end.
In January GID officials contacted an official of Life Agape
(formerly Campus Crusade for Christ)--an organization associated with
the Baptist Church, which distributes Bibles and conducts Bible
studies--and asked him to sign a letter stating that he would not
``deal with Muslims.'' The GID officers told the official that if he
did not sign the letter his office would be closed. In February police
brought the letter to the Life Agape office, and escorted the official
to the police station, and then to meet with the Governor of the Amman
municipality. The following day, the Governor closed the Life Agape
office; no reason was specified on the Governor's order.
The Government notes individuals' religions (except for Baha'is) on
the national identity card and ``family book'' (a national registration
record issued to the head of every family that serves as proof of
citizenship) of all citizens.
The Constitution provides that congregations have the right to
establish schools for the education of their own members ``provided
that they comply with the general provisions of the law and be subject
to the control of government in matters relating to their curricula and
orientation.''
In February criticism of a poem entitled ``Yusef,'' which was
included in a book of poems published in May 1999 by Muslim poet Musa
Hawamdeh, began to circulate in mosques in Amman. Radical Islamists
escalated the criticism of the poem and the poet, calling for the poet
to be killed if he refused to recant the poem and for him to be
divorced forcibly from his Muslim wife. Criticism of the poem from the
Ministers of Religious Affairs and Information followed, and by the end
of March, the Government banned the book in which the offending poem
was published. In June Hawamdeh was summoned to a Shari'a court to face
allegations of apostasy; he was charged by the head of court clerks
with denying Koranic facts and defaming a prophet. The complainant
requested that Hawamdeh publicly retract the controversial statements
in his poem and requested that the Shari'a judge order that he divorce
his wife and lose his rights to inherit property or manage his own
wealth. The Shari'a court referred the case to a civil court. In July
both the Shari'a and criminal courts acquitted Hawamdeh of all charges,
without requiring him to retract any portion of the poem (see Section
2.a.).
According to local press reports, the Press and Publications
Department banned a second book of poetry, by Ziyad Al-Anani in April;
the book contained a poem that reportedly was offensive to Islam. The
authorities did not bring charges against Al-Anani. The book was
published and distributed in Beirut, Lebanon due to the Jordanian ban.
In June due to a dispute stemming from an intrachurch rivalry
between the Jerusalem Patriarchate and the Antioch Orthodox
Patriachate, the Government closed an Arab Orthodox church in Amman
that was aligned with the Antioch Patriarchate in Damascus, Syria. The
Government closed the church following a request from local Orthodox
hierarchy to enforce a 1958 law that grants the Jerusalem Patriarchate
authority over all Orthodox churches in the country. On November 29,
the Government gave permission to the church to open officially on
December 14 despite the fact that the dispute over authority had not
been resolved. The church opened as scheduled; however, the Government
closed it down 1 week later, stating that the church was in violation
of the 1958 law for associating itself with the Orthodox church. The
Government reportedly stated that the church has permission to reopen
under a different name.
In December 1999, the municipality of Amman closed the Roy and Dora
Whitman Academy--a nonprofit missionary school in Amman--on the basis
that it was not registered with the Ministry of Education. In April the
school received registration and reopened. In July the Ministry of
Labor approved official work permits for the academy's staff.
Shari'a in the country is applied in all matters relating to family
law involving Muslims or the children of a Muslim father; all citizens,
including non-Muslims, are subject to Islamic legal provisions
regarding inheritance. All minor children of a male citizen who
converts to Islam are automatically considered to be Muslim. Adult
children of a male Christian who has converted to Islam become
ineligible to inherit from their father if they do not themselves
convert to Islam. In cases where a Muslim converts to Christianity, the
act is not recognized legally by the authorities, and the subject
continues to be treated as a Muslim in matters of family and property
law. The minor children of a male Muslim who converts to Christianity
continue to be treated as Muslims under the law.
The law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing Muslims.
Conversion to the Muslim faith by Christians is allowed; however, a
Muslim may not convert to another religion. Muslims who convert to
other faiths complain of social and government discrimination. The
Government does not recognize the legality of such conversions. Under
Shari'a converts are regarded as apostates and legally may be denied
their property and other rights. However, this principle is not
applied. Converts from Islam do not fall under the jurisdiction of
their new religion's laws in matters of personal status and still are
considered Muslims under Shari'a, although the reverse is not true.
Shari'a prescribes a punishment of death for conversion; however, there
is no equivalent statute under civil law.
The Political Parties Law prohibits houses of worship from being
used for political party activity. The law was designed primarily to
prevent Islamist parliamentarians from preaching in mosques.
Religious instruction is mandatory for all Muslim students in
public schools. Christian and Baha'i students are not required to
attend courses in Islam.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for the right of
citizens to travel freely abroad and within the country except in
designated military areas; however, there are some restrictions on
freedom of movement. The law requires that all women, including foreign
women married to citizens, obtain written permission from a male
guardian--usually their father or husband--to apply for a Jordanian
passport. During the year, there were several cases in which mothers
reportedly were prevented from departing with their children because
authorities enforced requests from fathers to prevent their children
from leaving the country.
The GID sometimes withholds passports from citizens on security
grounds. Local governors have the authority to enact the 1954
Preventing Crimes Law, which allows them to place citizens under house
arrest for up to a year without formally charging them (see Section
1.d.). House arrest may involve requiring persons to report daily to
local police station and the imposition of a curfew. Persons who
violate the terms of their house arrest may be imprisoned for up to 14
days.
In April after the GID released Hassan Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Hanieh
following 20 days of detention without charge (see Section 1.d.), the
governor of Amman, required Abu Hanieh to report to a local police
station twice daily and to return home by 6:30 p.m. every evening.
Officials did not bring charges against Hanieh and rescinded the house
arrest in August.
Jordanians with full citizenship receive passports that are valid
for 5 years. Most Palestinians living in Jordan are citizens and
receive passports that are valid for 5 years. However, the Government
estimates that there are 150,000 Palestinian residents who are refugees
or children of refugees who arrived from Gaza after 1967 do not qualify
for citizenship. They receive 2-year passports valid for travel only.
In the period following the country's administrative and legal
disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, Palestinians residing in the
West Bank received 2-year passports valid for travel only, instead of
5-year Jordanian passports). In 1995 King Hussein announced that West
Bank residents without other travel documentation again would be
eligible to receive 5-year passports. However, the Government has
emphasized that these passports are for travel only and do not connote
citizenship, which only can be proven by presenting one's ``national
number,'' a civil registration number accorded at birth or upon
naturalization to persons holding citizenship. The national number is
recorded on national identity cards and in family registration books,
which are issued only to citizens.
The Jordanian Society for Citizens' Rights (JSCR) reported a small
number of cases in which Jordanian embassies overseas refused to issue
new passports to Jordanians of Palestinian origin who were domiciled in
foreign countries. Such Palestinians consequently were unable to return
to Jordan.
The Constitution specifically prohibits the deportation of
citizens. However, in July the High Court rejected an appeal
challenging the alleged expulsion of four HAMAS leaders, all four of
whom are citizens (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.).
There were credible reports that, due to a ban on his entering the
country, government officials stopped former Minister of Parliament,
Yaqoub Qarrash, at the border in January when he tried to return from
Saudi Arabia.
There is no law or statute that provides for the granting of
refugee status to asylum seekers. The Government generally cooperates
with the office of the UNHCR. The UNHCR must resettle refugees in other
countries. However, in April 1998, the Ministry of Interior signed a
memorandum of understanding with the UNHCR concerning the status and
treatment of refugees. Under the agreement, the Government admits
asylum seekers, including those who have entered the country
clandestinely, and respects the UNHCR's eligibility determinations
under the refugee definitions set forth in the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The agreement
provides protection against the forcible return of refugees from the
country, and recognizes the legal definition of a refugee as set forth
in the U.N. Convention. Since 1996 the UNHCR has held regular seminars
to train law enforcement officials in international refugee law,
including specialized courses for policewomen. The Government provides
first asylum. According to UNHCR figures, 55,626 persons have sought
asylum through the UNHCR since October 1990, and in approximately 8,389
cases (approximately 15 percent), applicants have been accorded refugee
status.
The Government estimates that over 200,000 Iraqis reside in the
country. Since 1991 thousands of Iraqis have applied for refugee status
and received legal and material assistance from the UNHCR. During the
year, 6,806 Iraqis applied for, and 641 were accorded, refugee status.
Additionally 1,753 out of the total 1,868 refugees accorded status
during the year were Iraqi nationals, reflecting applications from
previous years. The UNHCR also received applications for refugee status
during the year from Sudanese, Russians of Chechen decent, Somali, and
Eritrean asylum seekers.
For the 1999-2000 school year, the Government reverted to its
policy of denying Iraqi children admittance to school unless such
children are legal residents of the country or recognized as refugees
by the UNHCR.
According to the Government, it deported eight Libyan nationals
affiliated with ``international terrorist organizations'' in March. The
Government did not inform the UNHCR of the presence of the Libyans
prior to their deportation from the country. The Libyan Government
reportedly executed three of the eight Libyans upon their return to
Libya (see Section 1.c).
Almost 1.6 million Palestinian refugees are registered in Jordan
with the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).
The UNRWA counts another 800,000 Palestinians as either displaced
persons from the 1967 war, arrivals following the 1967 war, or
returnees from the Gulf between 1990 and 1991.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
There are significant restrictions on citizens' right to change
their government. Citizens may participate in the political system
through their elected representatives in Parliament; however, the King
has discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister
and Cabinet, to dissolve Parliament, and to establish public policy.
Appointments made by the King to high government posts do not require
legislative approval. Executive power is vested in the King (or, in his
absence, in the Regent), who exercises his power through his ministers
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
In June King Abdullah dismissed then Prime Minister Abdul Raouf
Rawabdeh and appointed Ali Abu Al-Ragheb as his successor. The King
also appointed 19 new members to the 29-member Cabinet.
The Parliament is composed of the 40-member Senate, appointed by
the King, and the popularly elected 80-member Chamber of Deputies. The
Parliament is empowered by the Constitution to initiate legislation,
and it can approve, reject, and amend legislation proposed by the
Cabinet. A group of 10 senators or deputies may submit draft bills for
consideration; however, in practice legislation is initiated and
drafted by the Cabinet of Ministers and submitted by the Government to
the Parliament for its consideration. Opposition Members of Parliament
have complained that attempts by members of the lower house to initiate
legislation receive no response from the Government. The King proposes
and dismisses extraordinary sessions of Parliament and may postpone
regular sessions for up to 60 days. If the Government amends or enacts
a law when Parliament is not in session, by law it must submit the law
to Parliament for consideration during the next session; however, this
does not always occur in practice.
The Electoral Law and the distribution of parliamentary seats
deliberately favor electorates in rural and southern Jordan, regions
with populations known for their traditional, pro-Hashemite views.
Over 500 candidates competed in the 1997 parliamentary elections,
despite a boycott by Islamist and other parties. There were many
reports of registration irregularities and fraud. Restrictions on the
press and on campaign materials also had a negative effect on the
campaign, which elicited much debate over the fairness of the Electoral
Law and its implementation. Voter turnout was significantly lower in
most urban areas than in rural areas. Centrist candidates with ties to
major tribes dominate the Parliament.
Municipal elections in July 1999 featured the participation of the
parties that had boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections; however,
low voter turnout necessitated a second day of balloting. The process
generally was regarded as free and fair.
The so-called one-man, one-vote amendment to the Electoral Law was
ratified by Parliament in 1997, nearly 4 years after it was first
enacted by royal decree. The amendment allows voters to choose only one
candidate in multiple-seat districts. In the largely tribal society,
citizens tend to cast their first vote for family members, and any
additional votes in accordance with their political leanings. The
amendment also limits representation in the largely Palestinian urban
areas. As a result, the amendment in practice also has tended to limit
the chances of other non-tribal candidates, including women, Islamists,
and other opposition candidates to be elected.
The next parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in 2001.
The Islamic Action Front publicly declared that it would boycott the
elections absent significant changes in the one-man, one-vote amendment
to the Electoral Law.
Women have the right to vote, and women's groups encourage women to
vote and to be active in the political process; however, they are
underrepresented at the national and local level. There is one female
minister and two female senators, but no women hold seats in the
Chamber of Deputies.
Of the 80 seats in the lower house, 9 are reserved for Christians,
6 for Bedouins, and 3 for the Circassian or Chechen ethnic minorities.
The Palestinian community, estimated to account for more than half
of the total population, is not represented proportionately in the
Government and legislature. Nine of 28 ministers, 6 of 40 senators, and
11 of 80 lower house deputies are of Palestinian origin. There also are
no Palestinians in any of the 12 governorships throughout the country.
The electoral system gives greater representation to areas that have a
majority of inhabitants of non-Palestinian origin.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights groups investigate
allegations of human rights abuses and publish and disseminate findings
critical of government policy. However, the Press and Publications Law
has restricted the publication of information about the military and
security services, which, in effect prevented the publication by
domestic groups of reports alleging torture and other abuses committed
by the security services. The 1999 amendments to the Press and
Publications Law removed these specific restrictions, but restrictions
still exist in the Penal Code and other legislation (see Section 2.a.).
The local chapters of the Arab Organization for Human Rights
(AOHR), the Jordanian Human Rights Organization (JHRO), and the JSCR
are registered with the Government. The groups drew public attention to
alleged human rights abuses and a range of other political issues. They
also have pressed the Government either to bring formal charges against
political detainees or to release them promptly. The AOHR and the JSCR
assert that the Government responds to only about 10 and 20 percent
respectively of the complaints that they submit on behalf of
individuals who allegedly were subjected to human rights violations by
the authorities. However, the JSCR reported that the Government
generally supported public workshops that it held in which citizens
discussed their viewpoints on sensitive social and political topics.
Local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are not permitted to
receive funds from foreign sources, and some NGO workers reported that
they feared they would be accused of accepting illegal funds from
abroad. In June the Jordan Bar Association (JBA) accused Asma Khadar of
the Mizan Group, a local NGO, of accepting foreign funds and threatened
to close the organization and disbar her. The JBA did not file formal
charges against Khadar or close the Mizan Group and the case was
considered closed by year's end.
The Government generally cooperates with international NGO's. The
ICRC usually is permitted full and unrestricted access to detainees,
including those held by the GID and the military intelligence
directorate (see Section 1.c.).
In March the Government formed the new Royal Commission for Human
Rights, which is chaired by Queen Rania. The mandate of the Commission
is to present recommendations on reforming current laws and practices
to King Abdullah and to institutionalize human rights in the country.
In November the Commission sponsored two human rights awareness
seminars with police and judicial officials in Amman and Aqaba. Members
of the Commission also intervened in a number of individual cases of
alleged human rights violations throughout the year.
The Government also established the National Team for Family
Protection and the Child Protection Center during the year (see Section
5). The Government controls the Parliamentary Public Freedoms
Committee, the Ombudsman, and the Human Rights Office at the Prime
Ministry.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law does not distinguish between citizens on the basis of race;
however, women, minorities, and others are treated differently under
the law and face discrimination in employment, housing, and other
areas.
Women.--Violence against women is common. Reported incidents of
violence against women do not reflect the full extent of the problem.
Medical experts acknowledge that spousal abuse occurs frequently.
However, cultural norms discourage victims from seeking medical or
legal help thus making it difficult to assess the extent of such abuse.
Abused women have the right to file a complaint in court against
their spouses for physical abuse but in practice familial and societal
pressures discourage them from seeking legal remedies. Marital rape is
not illegal. NGO's, such as the Jordanian Women's Union, which has a
telephone hot line for victims of domestic violence, provide assistance
in such matters. Wife battering technically is grounds for divorce, but
the husband may seek to demonstrate that he has authority from the
Koran to correct an irreligious or disobedient wife by striking her.
The Criminal Code allows leniency for a person found guilty of
committing a so-called ``honor crime,'' a violent assault with intent
to commit murder against a female by a relative for her perceived
immodest behavior or alleged sexual misconduct. Law enforcement
treatment of men accused of ``honor crimes'' reflects widespread
unwillingness to recognize the abuse involved or to take action against
the problem. Twenty-one such murders were reported during the year in
which the victims were strangled, stabbed, or shot several times. Human
rights monitors believe that many more such crimes were committed but
not documented as honor crimes. Moreover, most crimes of honor are not
reported by the press. The actual number of honor crimes is believed to
be significantly higher. One forensic medical examiner estimated that
25 percent of all murders committed in the country are honor crimes.
The police regularly imprison women who are potential victims of honor
crimes for their own protection. There were up to 40 women
involuntarily detained in this form of ``protective custody'' during
the year.
According to Article 340 of the Penal Code, a ``crime of honor''
defense may be invoked by a defendant accused of murder who ``surprises
his wife or any close female relative'' in an act of adultery or
fornication, in which case the perpetrator of the honor crime is judged
not guilty of murder. Although few defendants are able to meet the
stringent requirements for a crime of honor defense (the defendant
personally must have witnessed the female victim engaging in sexual
relations), most avoid trial for the crime of murder, and are tried
instead on the charge of manslaughter; even those convicted of murder
rarely spend more than 2 years in prison. (In contrast to honor crimes,
the maximum penalty for first-degree murder is death, and the maximum
penalty for second-degree murder is 15 years.) Such defenses also
commonly rely on the male relative having acted in the ``heat of
passion'' upon hearing of a female relative's alleged transgression,
usually without any investigation on the part of the assailant to
determine the veracity of the allegation before committing the assault.
Defenses in such cases fall under Article 98 of the Penal Code. Women
may not invoke these defenses for murdering a male relative under the
same circumstances, nor may they use them for killing men who attempt
to rape, sexually harass, or otherwise threaten their honor.
On January 11, a 29-year-old woman, who was being treated for self-
inflicted burns at a local hospital, was shot several times and killed
by her 28-year-old brother in an ``honor crime.'' An autopsy indicated
that the woman was 6 months' pregnant at the time of her death. A
criminal court originally sentenced the brother to death; however, the
court subsequently commuted his sentence to 10 years in prison.
After being released from protective custody on bail posted by her
uncle in April, 40-year-old Fathieh Mohammad reportedly was shot and
killed by her father, who subsequently turned himself in to the police,
stating that he had killed his daughter to ``cleanse his honor.'' The
police also apprehended one of Fathieh's brothers during the
investigation and subsequently arrested both her father and brother for
the crime. The case was pending at year's end.
In December police arrested a man for beating to death his 19-year-
old sister in November for ``reasons of honor.'' Police were
investigating a second brother for his suspected involvement in the
killing at year's end. Police exhumed the woman's body from a cemetery
in which she was buried illegally. Medical tests proved that the victim
had not engaged in sexual activity.
In February a criminal court sentenced Bassam Mahmoud to 15 years
in prison with temporary hard labor for killing his sister in 1999 to
``cleanse the honor.'' Mahmoud shot his 19-year-old sister Maysoon 21
times after bringing her home from the police station where she had
been charged with ``immoral'' behavior. Following his sentencing,
Mahmoud's family dropped all charges against him, and the court
subsequently reduced his 15-year sentence by half.
Also in February, a tribunal of judges reduced the sentence against
Samir Ayed, who in October 1999 had killed his sister in a ``fit of
fury'' to ``cleanse his honor,'' to 6 months in prison. Most activists
believe that even if Article 340 were repealed, honor crimes likely
would persist with sentences continuing to be reduced under Article 98.
In December 1999, the National Committee to Eliminate ``Crimes of
Honor'' presented leaders of the upper and lower houses of the
Parliament with a petition signed by 15,000 citizens demanding an end
both to crimes of honor and the legislation that protects perpetrators
of such crimes. In November 1999, the lower house rejected a
government-supported amendment that would have eliminated Article 340;
however, the upper house approved the same measure in December 1999.
The amendment was returned to the lower house for reconsideration. In
February the lower house again rejected the proposal to repeal Article
340.
In February the Government twice refused requests by human rights
activists to hold demonstrations in protest of the lower house vote.
However, on February 14, Prince Ali bin Hussein and Prince Ghazi bin
Mohammed led more than 5,000 persons in a march on Parliament to demand
the cancellation of Article 340. On the same day, the press reported
that the Islamic Action Front (IAF) issued a fatwa stating that the
cancellation of Article 340 would contradict Shari'a and would
``destroy our Islamic, social, and family values by stripping men of
their humanity when they surprise their wives or female relatives
committing adultery.'' The Ministry of Interior denied permits for an
IAF counterdemonstration, which drew protests from both sides of the
debate (see Section 2.b.).
Women experience legal discrimination in matters of pension and
social security benefits, inheritance, divorce, and the value of court
testimony. A woman's testimony is worth only half that of a man (see
Section 1.e.). The Government provides men with more generous social
security benefits than women. The Government continues pension payments
of deceased male civil servants to their heirs but discontinues
payments of deceased female civil servants.
Under Shari'a as applied in the country, female heirs receive half
the amount of a male heir's inheritance, and the non-Muslim widows of
Muslim spouses have no inheritance rights. A sole female heir receives
half of her parents' estate; the balance goes to designated male
relatives. A sole male heir inherits both of his parents' property.
Male Muslim heirs have the duty to provide for all family members who
need assistance. Men are able to divorce their spouses more easily than
women. Marriage and divorce matters for Christians are adjudicated by
special courts for each denomination (see Section 2.c.). Married women
are ineligible for work in the diplomatic service, and, until recently,
most women in the diplomatic corps automatically were assigned to
administrative positions. There are six female judges in the country.
The law requires a married woman to obtain her husband's permission
to obtain a passport (see Section 2.d.). Married women do not have the
legal right to transmit citizenship to their children. Furthermore,
women may not petition for citizenship for their non-Jordanian
husbands. The husbands themselves must apply for citizenship after
fulfilling a requirement of 15 years of continuous residence. Once the
husbands have obtained citizenship, they may apply to transmit the
citizenship to their children. However, in practice such an application
may take years and, in many cases, citizenship ultimately still may be
denied to the husband and children. Such children become stateless and
lack the rights of citizen children, such as the right to attend school
or seek other government services.
Civil law grants women equal pay for equal work, but in practice
this law often is ignored. Press and union leaders reported during the
year that that some employers in the private sector reportedly paid
their female employees well under the legal minimum wage, despite the
fact that the women were under contract. In January the Jordanian Food
Industry Factory reportedly fired a group of 28 women after they
demanded to be paid the legal minimum wage. The women reportedly blamed
their union and the Ministry of Labor for their inability to protect
workers (see Section 6.e.).
Social pressures discourage many women from pursuing professional
careers. Nonetheless, women have employment opportunities in many
professions, including engineering, medicine, education, the military,
and law. Women constitute approximately 16.5 percent of the work force
and 50 percent of university students. According to local NGO reports,
while female employees hold approximately 52 and 39 percent of jobs in
the education and health sectors respectively, they constitute only 7.5
percent of managerial posts and 10 percent of all jobs in the private
sector. Women's groups stress that the problem of discrimination is not
only one of law, but also of women's lack of awareness of their rights
or unwillingness to assert those rights. The U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization reported in 1995 that women who work in agriculture
average 15-hour days and earn less than men. The Jordanian chapter of
the Business and Professional Women's Club gives seminars on women's
rights and assists women in establishing small businesses. The chapter
also provided several programs for potential female voters and
candidates for the upcoming 2001 parliamentary elections. The
University of Jordan launched a new graduate degree program in women's
studies during the year to promote ``objective awareness between the
sexes.'' Members of the royal family work actively to improve the
status of women.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare in the areas of education and health. However, government
efforts in these areas are constrained by limited financial resources.
Education is compulsory until the age of 16; however, no legislation
exists to enforce the law or punish guardians for violating it, and
children who do not attend school or attend infrequently are not
considered truant. The law prohibits corporal punishment in schools;
however, such punishment is known to occur. Since the beginning of the
1999-2000 school year, the Government has denied Iraqi children
admittance to school unless they are legal residents of the country or
recognized as refugees by the UNHCR (see Section 2.d.).
Educational development, quality, and the relevance of education to
job market demand have been on the Government's agenda since 1985, with
few concrete results to date. Because there are government-run primary
schools in virtually every village, most students in the country have
access to primary education. The Government also grants fee reductions
and food and transportation supplements to families with many children
or to very poor families in order to make education more affordable.
In March Queen Rania established the National Team for Family
Protection (NTFP) to consolidate all issues concerning family safety.
On August 20, the Government opened ``Dar al Amman,'' the nation's
first child protection center. The facility provides temporary shelter,
medical care, and rehabilitation for children ages 6 to 12 years who
have suffered abuse.
The Government attempts to safeguard some children's rights,
especially regarding child labor. However, although the law prohibits
most children under the age of 16 from working, child vendors work on
the streets of Amman. The Ministry of Social Development has a
committee to address the problem and in some cases removes the children
from the streets, returns them to their families or to juvenile
centers, and may provide the families with a monthly stipend. However,
the children often return to the streets. Declining economic conditions
have caused the number of these children to increase steadily over the
last 10 years. Selling newspapers, tissues, small food items, or gum,
these street vendors, along with the other children who pick through
trash dumpsters to find recyclable cans to sell, sometimes are the sole
source of income for their families.
Although the problem is difficult to quantify, social and health
workers believe that there is a significant incidence of child abuse in
families, and that the incidence of child sexual abuse is significantly
higher than reported. The law specifies punishment for abuses against
children. Rape or sodomy of a child under 15 years of age carries the
death penalty.
The Family Protection Unit of the Public Security Department (PSD)
works with victims and perpetrators of domestic and sexual violence.
The unit deals primarily with child and spousal abuse, providing
multiple in-house services, including medical treatment for patients.
The unit cooperates with police to apprehend perpetrators of domestic
violence, facilitates participation in education and rehabilitation
programs, and refers patients to other facilities.
Illegitimate children are entitled to the same rights under the law
as legitimate children. However, in practice they suffer severe
discrimination in a society that does not tolerate adultery or
premarital sex. Most illegitimate children become wards of the State or
live a meager existence on the fringes of society. In either case,
their prospects for marriage and gainful employment are limited.
Furthermore, illegitimate children who are not acknowledged legally by
their fathers are considered stateless and are not given passports or
identity numbers.
Students must obtain a good behavior certificate from the GID in
order to qualify for admission under the university quota system.
Activists reported that the GID sometimes withholds these certificates
from deserving students reportedly due to a family member's allegedly
problematic record.
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), a procedure widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, rarely is practiced. However, one southern tribe
of Egyptian origin in the small village of Rahmah near Aqaba reportedly
practices FGM. One local Mufti issued a fatwa stating that FGM
``safeguards women's chastity and protects them against malignant
diseases by preventing fat excretions.'' However, the Mufti also stated
that as FGM is not a requirement of Islam, women who do not undergo
this procedure should not be embarrassed.
People with Disabilities.--High unemployment in the general
population restricts job opportunities for disabled persons, estimated
by the Ministry of Social Development to number 250,000. Thirteen
percent of disabled citizens receive monetary assistance from the
Government. The Government passed legislation in 1993 requiring future
public buildings to accommodate the needs of the disabled and to
retrofit existing public buildings; however, implementation has been
slow. During the year, the Greater Amman Municipality established a new
Special Buildings Codes Department for Special Needs Citizens to
enforce the implementation of the 1993 law. Since 1993 the Special
Education Department of the Ministry of Social Development has enrolled
approximately 11,000 mentally and physically disabled persons in public
and private sector training courses. It has placed approximately 2,000
disabled persons in public and private sector jobs. The law requires
that 2 percent of the available jobs be reserved for the physically
disabled. Private organizations and members of the royal family
actively promote programs to protect and advance the interests of the
disabled.
Indigenous People.--The country's indigenous people, nomadic
Bedouin and East Bank town dwellers, traditionally have been the
backbone of popular support for the Hashemite monarchy. As a result,
they generally have enjoyed considerable influence within the political
system. They are represented disproportionately in senior military,
security, and civil service jobs. Nevertheless, many Bedouin in rural
areas are severely disadvantaged economically. Many persons of East
Bank origin complain that the dynamic private sector largely is in the
hands of the Palestinian majority.
Religious Minorities.--In general Christians do not suffer
discrimination; however, there were some instances of official and
societal discrimination during the year (see Section 2.c.). Christians
hold government positions and are represented in the media and academia
approximately in proportion to their presence in the general
population. Baha'is face some societal and official discrimination.
Their faith is not recognized officially, and Baha'is are classified as
Muslims on official documents, such as the national identity card.
Christian and Baha'i children in public schools are not required to
participate in Islamic religious instruction.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government granted
citizenship to all Palestinians who fled to Jordan in the period after
the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and to a large number of refugees and
displaced persons who arrived as a result of the 1967 war. However,
most refugees who fled Gaza after 1967 are not entitled to citizenship
and are issued 2-year passports valid for travel only. In 1995 King
Hussein announced that West Bank residents without other travel
documentation would be eligible to receive 5-year Jordanian passports.
However, the Government has emphasized that these passports are for
travel only and do not connote citizenship (see Section 2.d.).
Palestinians residing in Jordan, who make up more than half of the
population, suffer discrimination in appointments to positions in the
Government and the military, in admittance to public universities, and
in the granting of university scholarships.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers in the private sector and in
some state-owned companies have the right to establish and join unions.
Unions must be registered to be considered legal. The law prohibits
union membership for the country's approximately 1.5 million foreign
workers. Over 30 percent of the work force are organized into 17
unions. Although union membership in the General Federation of
Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU), the sole trade federation, is not
mandatory, all unions belong to it. The Government subsidizes and
audits the GFJTU's salaries and activities. Union officials are elected
by secret ballot to 4-year terms. Although the Government cosponsors
and approves the timing of these elections and monitors them to ensure
compliance with the law, it does not interfere in the choice of
candidates.
Labor laws mandate that workers must obtain permission from the
Government in order to strike. Unions generally do not seek approval
for a strike, but workers use the threat of a strike as a negotiating
tactic. Strikes are prohibited if a labor dispute is under mediation or
arbitration. If a settlement is not reached through mediation, the
Ministry of Labor may refer the dispute to an industrial tribunal by
agreement of both parties. The tribunal is an independent arbitration
panel of judges appointed by the Ministry of Labor. The decisions of
the panel are binding legally. If only one party agrees, the Ministry
of Labor refers the dispute to the Council of Ministers and then to
Parliament. Labor law prohibits employers from dismissing a worker
during a labor dispute.
In April the Government refused a request by some 200 workers at
the Jordan Telecommunication Company (JTC) to form their own union to
safeguard their rights under the company's new privatized leadership.
The Ministry of Labor justified the refusal by saying that the workers
already were represented by the General Union for Public Workers, which
includes artists, barbers, restaurant and hotel industry employees, and
workers in social services.
In 1999 Pepsi-Cola Company fired 225 employees who staged an
illegal strike. The Ministry of Labor intervened and the company
reinstated 115 of the employees in 1999. Despite significant efforts by
the Ministry of Labor and the Food Workers Union, the company rehired
less than 10 percent of the remaining former employees during the year.
In January the Jordan Cable and Wire Company reinstated 20 of 220
workers that a labor court ruled were dismissed illegally in 1999.
However, the company subsequently forced the employees to take a paid
vacation and fired them again upon their return. No further action was
taken during the year.
The GFJTU belongs to the Arab Labor organization, the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, and to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have,
and exercise, the right to bargain collectively. The Constitution
prohibits antiunion discrimination, but the ICFTU claims that the
Government does not protect adequately employees from antiunion
discrimination and that the Government has dismissed public-sector
employees for political reasons. Workers may lodge complaints of
antiunion discrimination with the Ministry of Labor, which is
authorized to order the reinstatement of employees discharged for union
activities. There were no complaints of antiunion discrimination lodged
with the Ministry of Labor during the year. The national labor laws
apply in the free trade zones in Aqaba and Zarqa. Private sector
employees in these zones belong to one national union that covers both
zones and have the right to bargain collectively.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids compulsory labor except in a state of emergency such as war or
natural disaster, and it generally is not practiced; however, foreign
domestic servants often are subject to coercion and abuse and in some
cases work under conditions that amount to forced labor (see Section
6.e.). The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory
labor by children; however, such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Labor law forbids children under the age of 16 from being
employed, except as apprentices, and prohibits children under the age
of 17 from working in hazardous jobs, including at restaurants, night
clubs, and jobs involving heavy machinery and toxic materials. Children
under the age of 18 may not work for more than 6 hours continuously,
may not work between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m., and may not work
during weekends, religious celebrations, or national holidays.
Provisions in the labor laws do not extend to the informal sector,
which consists of agriculture, domestic labor, and family businesses.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children; however, such practices are not known to occur (see Section
6.c.).
In late 1999, the Ministry of Labor established a new division to
deal with issues of child labor. The division was established to
receive, investigate, and address child labor complaints and related
issues; however, it was not staffed adequately by year's end. The
Government also did not provide training for government officials who
are responsible for enforcing child labor laws. All child labor
enforcement responsibilities rest in the hands of 85 Ministry of Labor
inspectors. According to the law, employers that hire a child under the
age of 16 must pay a fine ranging from $140-$710 (100-500 dinars). The
fine is doubled if the offense is repeated. However, the Government did
not enforce laws regarding child labor during the year. Government
officials claim that if children are barred from working in practice,
they will lose important income on which their families depend, and may
turn to more serious violations of law, such as drug trafficking and
prostitution, for income.
Basic education is free and compulsory for 10 scholastic years for
citizens from the ages of 6 to 16. However, there are no provisions to
enforce the law or punish guardians for violating it (see Section 5).
The Government ratified International Labor Convention 182 on
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor; however, it has not
provided adequate financial support to implement its provisions.
Nonetheless, government policy has facilitated the work of NGO's in
this area. The Ministry of Social Development has programs to improve
conditions for indigent children and to rehabilitate children who have
committed petty crimes, who constitute a segment of working children.
There are no specific mechanisms for receiving, investigating, and
addressing child labor complaints relating to allegations of the worst
forms of child labor.
The Ministry of Labor in conjunction with the National Task Force
on Children and approximately 50 other local NGO's, developed a
National Plan of Action (NPA) and adopted it in a national workshop
held in 1998. The Ministry of Labor subsequently established a child
labor unit in late 1999, which is responsible for conducting national
research on child labor, adopting both preventative and remedial
measures, developing a database on child laborers and their families,
and training and monitoring Ministry of Labor inspectors about child
labor issues. The Ministry began implementing some of the provisions of
the NPA; however, the pace has been slow due to financial and
logistical difficulties.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that child labor, especially of child
street vendors is more prevalent now than it was 10 years ago due to
declining economic conditions (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national minimum wage is
$114 (80 dinars) per month for all workers except domestic servants,
those working in small family businesses, and those in the agricultural
sector. Workers earning the minimum wage find it difficult to provide a
decent standard of living for their families. The Government estimates
that the poverty level is at a monthly wage of about $125 (89 dinars)
per month for a family with 7.5 members. A study completed by the
Ministry of Labor in July 1999 found that 18.7 percent of the
population live at or below the poverty level; 1.5 percent live in
``abject'' poverty, defined by the Government as $58 (40.5 dinars) per
month for a family with 7.5 members. The Government provides minimal
assistance to at least 45,000 indigent families.
The law prohibits most workers from working more than the customary
48 hours per week. Hotel, restaurant, and cinema employees may work up
to 54 hours per week; the law requires overtime payment for hours in
excess of the standard workweek. Workers may not work more than 16
hours in any continuous period or more than 60 hours of overtime per
month. Employees are entitled to 1 day off per week.
Labor law does not apply to the agricultural sector, small family
businesses, or domestic servants. Domestic servants do not have a legal
forum to address their labor grievances and have no standing to sue in
court for nonpayment of wages. Abuse of domestic servants, most of whom
are foreign, is widespread. Imprisonment of maids and illegal
confiscation of travel documents by employers is common. Complaints of
beatings, insufficient food, and rape generally are not reported to
officials by victims, who fear losing their work permits and being
returned to their country. Domestic servants generally are not given
days off and frequently are called upon to work at any hour of the day
or night.
In February the Ministry of Labor announced that it would require
Egyptian workers to obtain work permits approved by the Governments of
both Egypt and Jordan, and that the Government would start applying
``more humane'' criteria when deciding whether to deport Egyptian
workers.
The law specifies a number of health and safety requirements for
workers, including the presence of bathrooms, drinking water, and first
aid equipment at work sites. The Ministry of Labor is authorized to
enforce health and safety standards. The law does not require employers
to report industrial accidents or occupational diseases to the Ministry
of Labor. Workers do not have a statutory right to remove themselves
from hazardous conditions without risking the loss of their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in women; however, the practice is not known to occur. A
1926 law specifically prohibits trafficking in children. There were no
reports that persons were trafficked in, to, from, or within the
country.
__________
KUWAIT
Kuwait is a constitutional, hereditary amirate ruled by princes
(Amirs), drawn from the Al-Sabah family. The Al-Sabahs have governed
the country in consultation with prominent commercial families and
other community leaders for over 200 years. The 1962 Constitution
provides for an elected national assembly and details the powers of the
Government and the rights of citizens, although it also permits the
Amir to suspend any or all of its provisions by decree. Although the
Amir suspended constitutional provisions from 1976-81 and from 1986-92,
since the 1992 elections when the National Assembly resumed
functioning, he has not taken this step. In May 1999, the Amir
dissolved a gridlocked Parliament. This was followed by
constitutionally mandated elections, which took place in July 1999. The
election campaign generally was considered to be free and fair;
however, there were some problems. Moreover only 14.5 percent of
citizens (males over the age of 21) have the right to vote. The
Constitution and law provide for a degree of judicial independence;
however, the Amir appoints all judges, and renewal of most judicial
appointments is subject to government approval.
The national police, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and
Kuwait State Security (KSS) are responsible for internal security under
the supervision of civilian authorities of the Ministry of Interior.
Members of the security forces committed a number of human rights
abuses.
With large oil reserves the economy is highly dependent on its
energy sector. The Government owns the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
and, despite its stated emphasis on an open market, it dominates the
local economy through direct expenditures and government-owned
companies and equities. The Government has initiated a program of
disposing of its stock holdings in private companies. According to
government statistics, 93 percent of the indigenous work force is
employed in the public sector, while foreigners constitute 98 percent
of the private sector workforce. Citizens enjoy one of the highest
standards of living in the world, and receive subsidized housing,
childcare, food allowances, and free education. Foreign workers receive
none of these benefits, and domestic servants and unskilled workers
often live in poor conditions. During the October 1999 to 2000 fiscal
year (FY), the country's estimated per capita gross domestic product
was $13,176 (4,005 dinars), 14 percent more than FY 1999. The increase
reflects the significant rise in oil revenues due to higher world oil
prices. The estimated 1999-2000 budget deficit was $6.8 billion. For
the current FY the budget surplus is estimated at $3 billion.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in many areas; however, its record was poor in some significant areas.
Citizens cannot change the head of state. Although under the
Constitution the National Assembly must approve the Amir's choice of
Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir), this authority is limited; if
the National Assembly rejects the Amir's nominee, the Amir then submits
three names from which the assembly must choose the new Crown Prince.
The Crown Prince appoints the members of the Government. However, the
elected National Assembly has demonstrated significant ability to
influence or overturn decisions of the Government and has on occasion
removed ministers through votes of no confidence or by forcing
ministers to resign. The Government bans formal political parties, and
women do not have the right to vote or seek election to the National
Assembly. A law promulgated in 1998 bans primaries previously conducted
by religious sects and tribes. Some police and members of the security
forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Prisons remain
overcrowded; however, the Government continued its renovation of
existing facilities and construction of a new maximum security prison.
The judiciary is subject to government influence, and a pattern of bias
against foreign residents exists. The Government infringes on citizens'
privacy rights in some areas. Security forces occasionally monitor the
activities of individuals and their communications. Men must obtain
government approval to marry foreign-born women. The Government uses
threats to induce informal censorship, and journalists practice self-
censorship. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and
association. The Government places some limits on freedom of religion
and movement. Deportation orders may be issued by administrative order,
and over 250 potential deportees are estimated to be held in detention
facilities, some for up to 3 to 6 months. Violence and discrimination
against women are problems. Discrimination against noncitizens
persists. The Government restricts some worker rights. The Labor Law
does not protect domestic servants regardless of citizenship, and their
situation worsened during the year. Unskilled foreign workers suffer
from the lack of a minimum wage in the private sector, from failure to
enforce the Labor Law, and at times physical abuse; some work under
conditions that, in effect, constitute indentured servitude. The
Government acknowledges that a serious problem exists in the case of
the ``bidoon,'' Arabs who have residency ties to the country--some
going back for generations, some for briefer periods--but who claim to
have no documentation of their nationality. There are an estimated
110,000 bidoon in the country, down from a pre-Gulf War level of
220,000. In June the National Assembly passed a law requiring that
bidoon register with the Government to begin a process in which some
could be documented as citizens. Those who failed to register would be
considered illegal residents. However, only 8,000 bidoon registered by
the cutoff date (in addition to the 36,000 who registered during a 1965
census). The Government maintains that many bidoon are concealing their
true nationality. It reports that 12,000 were documented during the
year as nationals of other states, primarily Syria and Saudi Arabia.
The Government stated that it would take punitive action against those
who did not rectify their stateless status by the deadline, and the
number of bidoon purchasing fraudulent passports reportedly is on the
rise.
The country suffered under Iraqi occupation from August 1990 to
February 1991, when an international coalition expelled Iraqi forces.
Many human rights violations committed by the Iraqi army during this
period remain unresolved, particularly the fate of 608 citizens and
other residents taken by Iraq and still unaccounted for.
Executive and legislative leaders continued to strengthen political
institutions by resolving major disagreements within the framework of
the Constitution and without recourse to extrajudicial measures.
RESPECT FOR HUMMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
There were no developments in the investigations into the
extrajudicial killings that occurred during the chaotic period after
the country's liberation in February 1991.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Iraqi authorities have not accounted for 608 citizens and other
residents of the country taken prisoner during Iraq's occupation. There
has been no significant development since 1994 in these disappearance
cases. The Government of Iraq has refused to comply with U.N. Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, which stipulates the release of
detainees. In 1999 Iraq ceased its participation in ICRC-sponsored
talks on their fate. It has refused to cooperate with the U.N.
Secretary General's high-level representative, Yuli Vorontsov, who was
appointed in February, under UNSCR 1284, to report on compliance by
Iraq with its obligations regarding these cases.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there
continue to be credible reports that some police and members of the
security forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Reported abuses
include blindfolding, verbal threats, stepping on toes, and slaps and
blows. Police and security forces were more likely to inflict such
abuse on noncitizens, particularly non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, than on
citizens.
The Government states that it investigates all allegations of abuse
and that it has punished at least some of the offenders. However, the
Government does not make public either the findings of its
investigations or what, if any, punishments are imposed. This omission
creates a climate of seeming impunity, which diminishes deterrence
against abuse.
Defendants have the right to present evidence in court that they
have been mistreated during interrogation. However, the courts
frequently dismiss abuse complaints because defendants are unable to
provide physical evidence of abuse. Members of the security forces
routinely do not reveal their identity during interrogation, a practice
that further complicates confirmation of abuse.
Prison conditions, including conditions for those held for security
offenses, meet minimum international standards in terms of food, access
to basic health care, scheduled family visits, cleanliness, and
opportunities for work and exercise. Continuing problems include
overcrowding and the lack of specialized medical care. Approximately
1,700 men and 250 women are serving sentences or awaiting trial in the
central prison. In March the Talha deportation center formally was
reconstituted as a minimum security prison and now holds approximately
900 persons who have been convicted of financial or traffic crimes.
Although Talha is no longer a deportation holding facility, deportees
also are held there occasionally. Unlike in the past, there have been
no reports of mistreatment of prisoners at Talha since its reopening.
An estimated additional 250 prisoners were being held at the
deportation facility in Shuwaikh; some of these detainees have been
held for up to 3 to 6 months (see Section 1.d.).
In March a new government directive was issued, which has improved
prison conditions throughout the system. Following its provisions, the
director of prisons increased prison staffing, ensured the steady
progress of renovations at the central prison, and accelerated the
construction of a new maximum-security prison. He also created a drug
rehabilitation program for inmates. Drug-related offenders make up the
majority of the prison population.
The National Assembly's Human Rights Committee closely monitored
prison conditions throughout the year, and the Government allowed the
ICRC access to all detention facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
Government occasionally arrests and detains persons arbitrarily. There
also were incidents of prolonged detention.
In general police officers must obtain an arrest warrant from state
prosecutors or a judge before making an arrest (see Section 1.f.),
although in misdemeanor cases the arresting officer may issue them.
Security forces occasionally detain persons at checkpoints in Kuwait
City (see Section 2.d.).
Under the Penal Code, a suspect may not be held for more than 4
days without charge. Security officers sometimes prevent families from
visiting detainees during this confinement. After 4 days, prosecutors
must either release the suspect or file charges. If charges are filed,
prosecutors may remand a suspect to detention for an additional 21
days. Prosecutors also may obtain court orders for further detention
pending trial.
During the 1999 election campaign, five parliamentary candidates
were arrested and charged with slander against the Government. One of
the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison (see Sections 2.a.
and 3); the sentence was not carried out and all charges were dropped.
Of the estimated 2,200 persons serving sentences or being detained
pending trial at the state security prison or state security detention
facilities, approximately 60 are being held on security grounds, a 65
percent reduction from last year. The other security prisoners and
detainees were released during the year after completing their
sentences, or after being acquitted or pardoned.
Of the approximately 2,500 Egyptians arrested in the wake of the
Kheitan riots in October 1999, all but 19 were released within a few
days. The 19 were tried, with 18 of them being acquitted and 1
sentenced to deportation.
The Government may expel noncitizens (including bidoon, i.e.,
stateless residents of Kuwait, some of whom are native born or long-
term residents), if it considers them security risks. The Government
also may expel foreigners if they are unable to obtain or renew work or
residency permits. There are approximately 100 bidoon and foreigners
held in detention facilities, some of them pending deportation. Some
detainees have been held for up to 3 to 6 months. Many deportation
orders are issued administratively, without the benefit of a trial.
However, the Government does not return deportees to their countries of
origin forcibly, allowing those who object to remain in detention. This
practice leads to prolonged detention of deportees, particularly
Iraqis, who do not wish to return to their own countries. It also plays
a role in the complex problem faced by bidoon deportees, who
essentially remain in detention because their stateless condition makes
the execution of the deportation order impossible (see Sections 2.d.
and 5).
The Talha deportation center, which had been criticized in previous
years by human rights groups, formally was reconstituted as a minimum
security prison in March. There were no allegations of the prolonged
detention of deportees in the facility during the year (see Section
1.c.).
The law protects citizens from exile, and there were no reports of
this practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
right to a fair trial and states that ``judges shall not be subject to
any authority;'' however, the Amir appoints all judges, and the renewal
of judicial appointments is subject to government approval. Judges who
are citizens have lifetime appointments; however, the majority of
judges are noncitizens. These noncitizen judges work under 1- to 3-year
renewable contracts, which undermines their independence. The Ministry
of Justice may remove judges for cause, but rarely does so. Foreign
residents involved in legal disputes with citizens frequently complain
that the courts show a bias in favor of citizens.
The secular court system tries both civil and criminal cases. The
Court of Cassation is the highest level of judicial appeal. Sunni and
Shi'a Muslims have recourse to courts of their respective branches for
family law cases. A Shi'a appellate court was established this year. In
the secular courts no groups are barred from testifying; however, in
all three court systems the testimony of one man is equal to the
testimony of two women.
Defendants have the right to confront their accusers and appeal
verdicts. The Amir has the constitutional power to pardon or commute
all sentences. Defendants in felony cases are required by law to be
represented in court by legal counsel, which the courts provide in
criminal cases. In misdemeanor cases, defendants have the right to
waive the presence of legal counsel, and the court is not required to
provide counsel to indigent defendants.
Both defendants and prosecutors may appeal court verdicts to the
High Court of Appeal, which may rule on whether the law was applied
properly as well as on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Decisions of the High Court of Appeal may be presented to the Court of
Cassation, which conducts a limited, formal review of cases to
determine only whether the law was applied properly.
In January Alaa Hussein, head of the Iraqi-installed
``provisional'' government during the occupation returned to the
country of his own volition to stand trial. A military court had
sentenced him to death in abstentia in 1993. In May a court upheld his
conviction for treason, as well as his death sentence. Hussein's trial
received extensive media attention and appears to have been conducted
in a fair and open manner. If the verdict stands after the case
completes the appeals process, the Amir must ratify the execution or
chose to commute the sentence. The appeals process was still underway
at year's end.
In January a court found two authors guilty of writing obscene,
blasphemous books in a case brought by anonymous citizens (see Section
2.a.).
There were no reports of political prisoners. The Government
continues to incarcerate 27 residents (10 Iraqis, 12 bidoon, 2
citizens, 2 Palestinians, and 1 Syrian) convicted of collaboration with
Iraq during the 1990-1991 occupation. During the year, 19 Iraqis, 5
bidoon, and 2 Palestinians who had been held on the same charge were
released by Amiri pardon. By law such collaboration is considered a
felony. Most of the persons convicted in the Martial Law Court in 1991,
and the Special State Security Court, which was abolished in 1995, did
not receive fair trials. Amnesty International faulted the trials in
general, and particularly noted the absence of any right of appeal of
the verdicts. In 1999 the Amir pardoned the remaining eight Jordanians
convicted by the martial law and state security courts.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for individual privacy and
sanctity of the home, and the Government generally respects these
rights in practice; however, the law, which generally requires police
to obtain a warrant to search both public and private property,
provides for a warrantless search if alcohol or narcotics are suspected
on the premises or if police are in hot pursuit of a suspect fleeing
the scene of a crime. A warrant may be obtained from the State
Prosecutor or, in the case of searches of private property, from a
judge. The security forces occasionally monitor the activities of
individuals and their communications.
The law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men
and requires men to obtain government approval to marry foreign-born
women. Although the Government may advise men against marriage to a
foreign national, there are no known cases of the Government refusing
permission for such marriages. The Government advises women against
marrying foreign nationals (see Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, printing, and publishing ``in accordance with the
conditions and manner specified by law,'' and, with a few exceptions,
citizens are free to criticize the Government at public meetings and in
the media; however, journalists practice self-censorship. Several laws
empower the Government to impose restrictions on freedom of speech and
the press. The effect of these laws diminished during the year as court
cases overruled punitive sentences that accompanied earlier
convictions. The Government, through the Ministry of Information,
practiced informal censorship by placing pressure on individual
publishers and editors believed to have ``crossed the line'' in
attacking government policies and discussing issues deemed offensive to
Islam, tradition, or the interests of the State.
Newspapers are privately owned and free to publish on many social,
economic, and political issues and frequently criticize government
policies and officials, including the Crown Prince/Prime Minister.
The Government ended prepublication censorship in 1992, but
journalists still censor themselves. The Press Law prohibits the
publication of any direct criticism of the Amir, official government
communications with other states, and material that serves to ``attack
religions'' or ``incite people to commit crimes, creates hatred, or
spreads dissension among the populace.''
In order to begin publication of a newspaper, the publisher must
obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Information.
Publishers may lose their license if their publications do not appear
for 6 months. This 6-month rule prevents publishers from publishing
sporadically--it is not used to suspend or shut down existing
newspapers. Individuals also must obtain permission from the Ministry
of Information before publishing any printed material, including
brochures and wall posters. The Government does not censor foreign
journalists and permits them open access to the country.
In February the Government threatened to shut down two newspapers.
Al-Siyassa and Al-Watan were charged with publishing false information
in an article about the Amir's decision regarding salaries for security
services personnel, which embarrassed the Amir. The managing editor of
Al-Siyassa was detained for 1 week, although never formally charged.
The Cabinet ordered the cancellation of both newspapers' licenses and
suspension of publication for 2 years. After significant public
criticism, particularly from the National Assembly, the Government
decided not to shut down the papers or penalize them further. The
crisis led to the resignations of the Cabinet (none were accepted) and
to proposals by members of the National Assembly to amend the article
of the Constitution that permits the Government to suspend publication
without review by the Assembly or the courts. No action was taken to
amend the article by year's end.
The law requires jail terms for journalists who ridicule religion
(see Section 2.c.). In contrast to prior years, there were no
prosecutions of print or broadcast journalists. There were two
prosecutions of individuals related to book publications. Under the
law, any citizen may initiate a court case against an author if the
citizen deems that the author has defamed Islam, the ruling family, or
public morals. Often these court cases are brought for political
reasons. In January in separate cases brought by anonymous citizens, a
court found two female authors, Leila Al-Othman and Alia Shuaib guilty
of writing ``obscene and blasphemous'' books. The books had been
published years ago. Both authors were sentenced to 2 months in prison
or a $160 (50 dinar) fine. An appeals court overturned Shuaib's
conviction in March and changed Al-Othman's sentence to a $3,000 fine
(912 dinars) and also fined her publisher $3,000 (912 dinars) (see
Section 1.e.).
During the 1999 election campaign, five parliamentary candidates
were arrested and charged with slander against the Government. One of
the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison, but the sentence
was not carried out, and charges against all five were dropped (see
Sections 1.d. and 3).
The Government owns and controls the radio and television
companies. Satellite dishes are widely available, and citizens with
such devices are free to watch all available programming. In September
state-owned Kuwait TV stopped telecasting certain women's Olympic
sports, including synchronized swimming and gymnastics, after an
Islamist National Assembly member criticized the station for showing
``immoral and pornographic'' sports and called on the Ministry of
Information officially to censor the Olympics. The Olympics continued
to be broadcast in their entirety on cable and satellite stations.
The Ministry of Information censors all books, films, videotapes,
periodicals, and other imported publications deemed morally offensive.
While the Ministry announced plans to censor the Internet, the methods
of enforcement and technical issues are still to be worked out.
Internet providers and web sites practiced self-censorship. The
Ministry has censored political topics as well and does not grant
licenses to magazines with a political focus. The General Organization
of Printing and Publishing controls the publication and distribution of
informational materials.
There is no government censorship of university teaching, research,
or publication. However, academics are subject to the same restraints
as the media with regard to criticism of the Amir or Islam.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
affirms the right to assembly; however, the Government restricts this
right in practice. Public gatherings must receive prior government
approval, as must private gatherings of more than five persons that
result in the issuance of a public statement. Informal weekly, family-
based, social gatherings of men, known as ``diwaniyas'' are protected
by the Constitution. Practically every adult male, including the Amir,
members of the Government, and members of the National Assembly hosts
or attends diwaniyas, at which every possible topic is freely
discussed. The diwaniya system contributes to the development of
political consensus and official decisionmaking. Women are not
precluded from holding diwaniyas; however, such diwaniyas are uncommon.
By tradition women are barred from male diwanyas.
The Constitution affirms the right of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. The Government bans
political parties. Several informal blocs, acting much like parties,
exist and are active in the National Assembly. The Government has made
no effort to constrain these groupings, which are organized on the
basis of common ideological goals. Many may be categorized as
``opposition'' groups.
All nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) must obtain a license
from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The Government uses its
power to license as a means of political control. The Ministry has
registered 52 NGO's, including professional groups, a bar association,
and scientific bodies. These groups receive government subsidies for
their operating expenses. Their members must obtain permission from the
Ministry before attending international conferences. However, since
1985, the Ministry has issued only three new licenses. The Ministry has
disapproved other license requests on the grounds that previously
established NGO's already provide services similar to those proposed by
the petitioners (see Sections 2.d. and 4).
In May 1999, in accordance with a 1993 decree that ordered
unregistered NGO's to cease activities, the Government announced a
crackdown on unlicensed branches of NGO's, whose activities it
previously had overlooked, including unlicensed branches of Islamic
charities, and required that they cease operations by mid-September
1999. No further action was taken pursuant to the announced crackdown
(see Sections 2.c. and 4).
c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion; although the
Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the Government places
some limits on this right. The Constitution also provides that the
State protect the freedom to practice religion in accordance with
established customs, ``provided that it does not conflict with public
policy or morals.'' The Constitution states that Shari'a (Islamic law)
is ``a main source of legislation.''
The procedures for registration and licensing of religious groups
are unclear. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs has official
responsibility for overseeing religious groups. Nevertheless in reality
officially recognized churches must deal with a variety of government
entities, including the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (for visas
and residence permits for pastors and other staff) and the Kuwaiti
Municipality (for building permits). While there reportedly is no
official government ``list'' of recognized churches, seven Christian
churches have at least some sort of official recognition that enables
them to operate openly. These seven churches have open ``files'' at the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, allowing them to bring in the
pastors and staff necessary to run their churches. Further by tradition
three of the country's churches are widely recognized as enjoying
``full recognition'' by the Government and are allowed to operate
compounds officially designated as churches: The Catholic Church (which
includes two separate churches), the Anglican Church, and the National
Evangelical Church of Kuwait (Protestant). The other four churches
reportedly are allowed to operate openly, hire employees, invite
religious speakers, etc., all without interference from the Government,
but their compounds are, according to government records, registered
only as private homes. The churches themselves appear uncertain about
the guidelines or procedures for recognition. Some have argued that
these procedures are purposely kept vague by the Government so as to
maintain the status quo. All other churches and religions have no legal
status but are allowed to operate in private homes.
The procedures for the registration and licensing of religious
groups also appear to be connected with government restrictions on
NGO's, religious or otherwise. In 1993 all unlicensed organizations
were ordered by the Council of Ministers to cease their activities.
This order has never been enforced; however, since that time all but
three applications by NGO's have been frozen. There were reports that
in the last few years at least two groups have applied for permission
to build their own churches, but the Government has not yet responded
to their requests. The Government's 1999 crackdown on unlicensed NGO's,
including unlicensed branches of Islamic charities, ceased early in the
year (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
Shi'a are free to conduct their traditional forms of worship
without government interference; however, members of the Shi'a
community have complained about the scarcity of Shi'a mosques due to
the Government's slowness or failure to grant approval for the
construction of new Shi'a mosques as well as the repair of existing
mosques. The community was particularly critical in May when the
municipality rejected a 9-year-old petition for construction of a Shi'a
mosque in the Al-Qurain area. Although the municipality apparently
relented due to direct government intervention, there are still
complaints about the lack of sufficient Shi'a mosques. There are
approximately 30 Shi'a mosques compared with the 1,300 Sunni mosques in
the country. However, Shi'a have noted some improvement in recent years
in that a small number of approvals have been granted for the
construction of Shi'a mosques.
Shi'a leaders also have complained that Shi'a who aspire to serve
as imams are forced to seek appropriate training and education abroad
due to the lack of Shi'a jurisprudence courses at Kuwait University's
College of Islamic Law. They also have expressed concern that certain
pending proposed legislation within the National Assembly does not take
beliefs specific to the Shi'a into account.
The Roman Catholic, Anglican, National Evangelical, Greek Orthodox,
Armenian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, and Greek Catholic Churches are
able to operate freely on their compounds, holding worship services
without government interference. These churches state that the
Government generally has been supportive of their presence, even
providing police security and traffic direction as needed. Other
Christian denominations (including Mormons, Seventh-Day Adventists,
Marthoma, and Indian Orthodox), while not recognized legally, are
allowed to operate in private homes or in the facilities of recognized
churches. Members of these congregations have reported that they are
able to worship without government interference, provided that they do
not disturb their neighbors and do not violate laws regarding assembly
and proselytizing.
Members of religions not sanctioned in the Koran, such as Hindus
and Buddhists, may not build places of worship, but are allowed to
worship privately in their homes without interference from the
Government.
The Government prohibits missionaries from proselytizing to
Muslims; however, they may serve non-Muslim congregations. The law
prohibits organized religious education for religions other than Islam,
although this law is not enforced rigidly. Informal religious
instruction occurs inside private homes and on church compounds without
government interference. However, there were reports that government
``inspectors'' periodically visit public and private schools outside of
church compounds to ensure that no religious teaching other than Islam
takes place.
The Government does not permit the establishment of non-Islamic
publishing companies or training institutions for clergy. Nevertheless,
several churches do publish religious materials for use solely by their
congregations. Further, some churches, in the privacy of their
compounds, provide informal instruction to individuals interested in
joining the clergy.
A private company, the Book House Company Ltd., is permitted to
import significant amounts of Bibles and other Christian religious
material--including, as of early in the year, videotapes and compact
discs--for use solely among the congregations of the country's
recognized churches. The Book House Company is the only bookstore that
has an import license to bring in such materials, which also must be
approved by government censors. There have been reports of private
citizens having non-Islamic religious materials confiscated by customs
officials upon arrival at the airport.
Although there is a small community of Christian citizens, a law
passed in 1980 prohibits the naturalization of non-Muslims. However,
citizens who were Christians before 1980 (and children born to families
of such citizens since that date), are allowed to transmit their
citizenship to their children.
According to the law, a non-Muslim man must convert to Islam when
he marries a Muslim woman if the wedding is to be legal in Kuwait. The
law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men (see
Section 1.f.). A non-Muslim woman does not have to convert to Islam to
marry a Muslim man, but it is to her advantage to do so. Failure to
convert may mean that, should the couple later divorce, the Muslim
father would be granted custody of any children.
The law requires jail terms for journalists who ridicule religion
(see Section 2.a.). During the year, Islamists used this law to
threaten writers with prosecution for publishing opinions deemed
insufficiently observant of Islamic norms. In January the Kuwaiti Court
of Misdemeanors found two female Kuwaiti authors, Alia Shuaib and Leila
Al-Othman, guilty of writing books that were blasphemous and obscene.
Shuaib and Al-Othman were sentenced to 2 months in prison which could
be suspended upon payment of a $160 (50 Kuwaiti dinars) fine. On March
26, a Kuwaiti appeals court acquitted Shuaib of the charges of
blasphemy and publishing works that ridicule religion. Al-Othman's
conviction of using indecent language was upheld. The court's judgments
represented the latest in a series of cases brought by Islamists
against secular authors. The court did not provide explanations for its
rulings (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.).
Early in the year, a Vatican representative arrived in the country
to establish a permanent mission. The mission, which currently is
headed by a charge d'affaires who temporarily resides at the Roman
Catholic Church, also is to represent Vatican interests in the smaller
Persian Gulf States and Yemen. The Church views the Government's
acquiescence to establishing relations with the Vatican as significant
in terms of government tolerance of Christianity.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some limits on
freedom of movement. Citizens have the right to travel freely within
the country and to change their work place as desired. Unmarried women
21 years old and over are free to obtain a passport and travel abroad
at any time. However, married women who apply for passports must obtain
their husbands' signature on the application form. Once she has a
passport, a married woman does not need her husband's permission to
travel, but he may prevent her departure from the country by contacting
the immigration authorities and placing a 24-hour travel ban on her.
After this 24-hour period, a court order is required if the husband
still wishes to prevent his wife from leaving the country. All minor
children must have their father's permission to travel outside of the
country. Citizens are free to emigrate and to return. Security forces
in Kuwait City occasionally set up checkpoints where they may detain
individuals. The checkpoints are mainly for immigration purposes and
are used to apprehend undocumented aliens.
The Government has the right to place a travel ban on any citizen
or foreigner who has a legal case pending before the courts. The
Government restricts the ability of members of NGO's to attend
conferences abroad (see Sections 2.b. and 4). The Government severely
restricts the ability of its bidoon population to travel abroad (see
Section 5).
There were no credible reports during the year that the Government
enforced the policy of prior years limiting the presence of workers
from nations whose leaders had supported Iraq in the Gulf War.
While the Government permits the ICRC to verify if deportees object
to returning to their countries of origin, it detains those with
objections until they either change their minds or make alternative
arrangements to travel to a third country (see Section 1.d.).
There is no legislation governing refugees, asylees, or first
asylum, and no clear standard procedure for processing a person's claim
to be a refugee. The Constitution prohibits the extradition of
political refugees. The Government states that it does not deport
anyone who claims a fear of persecution in their home country, but it
often keeps such persons in detention rather than grant them permission
to live and work in the country (see Section 1.d.). The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintains an office in the country
and has access to refugees in detention. There were no reports of
forced return of persons to counties where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens cannot change the head of state. Under the Constitution
the National Assembly has a limited role in approving the Amir's choice
of Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir). If the Assembly rejects the
Amir's nominee, the Amir then submits three names from which the
Assembly must choose the new Crown Prince. Only about 14 percent of
adult citizens have the right to vote. Women and citizens naturalized
for less than 20 years may not vote or seek election to the National
Assembly. Members of the armed forces, police, and other uniformed
personnel of the Ministry of Interior are prohibited from voting or
seeking election to the National Assembly.
Under the Constitution, the Amir holds executive power and shares
legislative power with the National Assembly. The Prime Minister is
appointed by the Amir and presides over a 16-member cabinet, which he
chooses in consultation with the Amir. In accordance with the practice
of the ruling family (but not specifically the Constitution), the Prime
Minister always has been the Crown Prince. The Constitution empowers
the Amir to suspend its provisions and to rule by decree. The Amir
dissolved the National Assembly from 1976-81, and in 1986 the Amir
effectively dissolved the Assembly by suspending the constitutional
provisions on the Assembly's election. The Assembly remained dissolved
until 1992, when elections were held. Since 1992 the constitutional
provisions with respect to the Assembly have been observed. The
Constitution provides that cabinet members sit in the National Assembly
and may vote on legislation. There are 50 elected National Assembly
members. Members serve 4-year terms, and National Assembly elections
have been held on schedule. Since the Government prohibits political
parties, Assembly candidates must nominate themselves. Nonetheless
informal political groupings are active in the Assembly. The
Constitution empowers the National Assembly to overturn any Amiri
decrees made during the dissolution, and the Assembly has done so in
some cases.
In May 1999, the Amir dissolved the National Assembly in response
to the political gridlock that emerged between Parliament and the
Government. Elections were held 2 months later as specified in the
Constitution.
The 1999 election campaign generally was free and fair; however,
there were some problems. Five parliamentary candidates were arrested
and charged with unlawful slander against the Government. Four of those
arrested received nominal fines, had their cases postponed, or were
acquitted. While the candidates were not required to withdraw from the
election, the fifth candidate withdrew, subsequently was convicted of
the charges in July, and was sentenced to 6 months in prison. The
sentence was not carried out (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
In December a by-election was held to fill the seat of a deceased
Assembly member. The election campaign was considered generally free
and fair; however, there were allegations of vote buying.
In 1998 the National Assembly passed legislation that bans
primaries previously conducted by religious sects and tribes. The
National Assembly's objective in passing this legislation was to
eliminate the process by which candidates were withdrawn from elections
and votes concentrated on the remaining candidates from these groups.
Charges filed against several hundred citizens in the Government's
attempt to enforce the ban on tribal primaries during the July 1999
elections were never brought to trial. During its fall session, the
National Assembly declined to lift the parliamentary immunity of the
two newly elected members the Public Prosecutor had sought to charge
with violating the ban on tribal primaries.
Women are disenfranchised and have little opportunity to influence
government. A May 1999 Amiri decree gave women the right to vote, to
seek election to the National Assembly beginning with the parliamentary
election scheduled for 2003, and to hold cabinet office. In November
1999, the Parliament vetoed the Amir's May decree on constitutional
grounds. Shortly thereafter members of the Assembly introduced
identical legislation, but it also was defeated. No new legislation has
been introduced by either the Government or by Assembly members. Women
do hold some relatively senior nonpolitical positions within some
ministries.
Members of the Shi'a minority generally are underrepresented in
high government positions. There is only one Shi'a member of the
Cabinet, the Minister of Commerce. Of 50 National Assembly members, 6
are Shi'a, as is the armed forces chief of staff.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government continued its practice of preventing the
establishment of new local human rights groups by not approving their
requests for licenses (see Section 2.b.). Since 1985 the Government has
issued only three licenses. The Government has refused other license
request on the grounds that previously established NGO's already
provide services similar to those proposed by the petitions. It also
continued to limit the ability of NGO members to attend conferences
abroad (see Sections 2.b. and 2.d.). Their members must obtain
permission from the Government before attending international
conferences.
The Government's 1999 crackdown on unlicensed NGO's, including
unlicensed branches of Islamic charities, ended early in the year (see
Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
The Government permits international human rights organizations to
visit the country and to establish offices. Several organizations
conduct fieldwork and report excellent communication with and
reasonable cooperation from the Government. The Government has
cooperated fully in the work of the U.N. Special Rapporteurs for Iran
and Iraq and the high-level representative of the Secretary General on
the issue of Kuwaitis missing in Iraq since the end of the Gulf War.
The National Assembly has an active Human Rights Committee, which
takes testimony from individuals about abuses, investigates prison
conditions, and makes nonbinding recommendations for redress. Despite
its designation as an advisory body, the Human Rights Committee has
shown that, in practice, it is able to mobilize government agencies to
address egregious human rights problems.
In July the Government submitted its first periodic report on the
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. After reviewing the presentation, a U.N. Human Rights Committee
report on July 28 noted 23 principal subjects of concern. In
particular, it cited discrimination against women in voting, marriage,
and nationality; a range of abuses against bidoon; and restrictions of
freedom of expression and association. The Committee urged immediate
steps to ensure that law and practice meet the standards required by
the covenant.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, national
origin, language, or religion. However, laws and regulations
discriminate in some cases against women and noncitizens, who face
widespread social, economic, and legal discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to some
local experts, domestic abuse of women occurs in an estimated 15
percent of all marriages. Each of the country's 50 police stations
reportedly receives on average 1 to 2 complaints of spousal abuse each
week, although this may be understated. Of the complaints received,
approximately 60 percent involve spousal abuse of noncitizen women. The
police and the courts generally seek to resolve family disputes
informally and may ask the offending spouse to sign a statement
affirming that he agrees to end the abuse. The police refer serious
cases to the Psychiatric Department at the Ministry of Health. The
courts have found husbands guilty of spousal abuse. ``Honor'' crimes
occur very infrequently; there is no provision in the Criminal Code
that allows for leniency in such cases. Rape and sexual assault remain
a serious problem, particularly for foreign domestic servants or
unskilled workers. There are no legally mandated restrictions on dress
for women.
In April the Government arrested seven men for allegedly beating a
19-year-old woman for not wearing a ``hijab'' (head scarf). The
Government acted quickly in bringing the seven men to trial,
criticizing the assault as a vigilante action by extremists. The case
prompted a lively debate in society and the press. Most citizens
expressed outrage, viewing the attack as a direct assault on their
personal freedoms, while Islamists urged against making hasty
judgments. Conflicting versions of what exactly occurred and the
motives involved emerged during the trial, and the criminal court
acquitted the seven accused men in June, finding that there was
insufficient evidence to convict them. In November the Court of Appeals
overturned the acquittal of five of the seven, and sentenced four to 1-
year imprisonment and ordered them to pay $6,000 (2,000 dinars) each in
compensatory damages. The fifth accused was ordered to pay $3,000
(1,000 dinars) with no jail term.
In June the National Assembly passed a law requiring the
segregation of sexes at private universities. A 1996 law already
requires the Government to segregate by sex the state-run university by
2001.
Some employers physically abuse foreign women working as domestic
servants, and there are continuing reports of rape of these women by
male employers and male coworkers. The local press gives the problem
considerable attention, and both the police and the courts have taken
action against employers when presented with evidence of serious abuse.
Some rapes resulted in unwanted pregnancies. Reportedly 12 domestic
servants killed children fathered by employers soon after birth.
Foreign-born domestic employees have the right to sue their employers
for abuse, but few do so fearing judicial bias and deportation. In July
the Government reduced the operations of a specialized police facility
designated to investigate complaints and provide some shelter for
runaway maids, which resulted in a further deterioration of conditions
for domestic employees (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
In May a Sri Lankan maid was beaten severely with a plastic water
pipe, strangled with a wire, and repeatedly tortured with a hot iron,
allegedly by a Kuwaiti couple who employed her. She had worked for this
family for over a year, during which time she reported that her
employers did not feed her regularly and withheld her salary. The maid
suffered permanent damage to her face, neck, ears, and arms. The case
had not yet gone to trial by year's end. The woman accused of the
assault was being held in jail; her husband, a policeman, remains free.
In June five male citizens belonging to various state security
organizations were arrested for the kidnap, rape, torture, and beating
of four female domestic servants. The police seized videotapes of the
crimes. The court hearing the case denied bail, and the five were
awaiting trial at year's end.
In August the criminal court postponed hearing the case of an
Indonesian domestic worker who was beaten to death with a vacuum
cleaner by her female employer. The entire family admitted to regularly
beating her with hard objects for several months. The Kuwaiti woman was
being held in prison without bail at year's end.
The employers who beat to death their Sri Lankan maid in August
1999 remained in jail awaiting trial at year's end. The case of the
Kuwaiti women charged in 1999 in the beating death of her Indian maid
had not gone to trial by year's end.
Runaway servants, including many women alleging physical or sexual
abuse, often seek shelter at their country's embassy for repatriation
or a change in employers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
Women continue to experience legal and social discrimination. Women
are denied the right to vote (see Section 3). Their testimony is not
given equal weight to that of males in the courts (see Section 1.e.).
Married women require their husbands' permission to obtain a passport
(see Section 2.d.). By law only men are able to confer citizenship;
therefore, children born to citizen mothers and stateless fathers are
themselves stateless. The Government forbids marriage between Muslim
women and non-Muslim men (see Sections 1.f. and 2.c.). Inheritance is
governed by Islamic law, which differs according to the branch of
Islam. In the absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit
all property, while Sunni women inherit only a portion, with the
balance divided among brothers, uncles, and male cousins of the
deceased.
In February women attempted to register for the 2003 elections.
Invoking the Government's denial of their registration attempt as a
basis, women's suffrage supporters filed four court cases, three of
which were rejected for ``lacking seriousness.'' An administrative
court referred the fourth case (filed by a male citizen) to the
Constitutional Court, which refused it on procedural grounds for
incorrectly framing the appeal. After the decision, First Deputy
Premier and Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah stated that he respected the
court's verdict, but that the Government would still push for women's
suffrage.
Women traditionally are restrained from choosing certain roles in
society, and the law restricts women from working in ``dangerous
industries'' and trades ``harmful'' to health. However, almost all
citizens work for the state in office jobs, and women are allowed into
most areas of the bureaucracy, including even oil well firefighting
units. Educated women maintain that the conservative nature of society
limits career opportunities. Nonetheless an estimated 33 percent of
women of working age are employed. The law provides for ``remuneration
equal to that of a man provided she does the same work.'' This
provision is respected in practice. Women work as doctors, engineers,
lawyers, bankers, and professors. A few have been appointed to senior
positions in the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Planning, and
the state-owned Kuwaiti Petroleum Corporation. There is one female
ambassador and two female undersecretaries; however, there are no
female judges or prosecutors.
In cases of divorce, the Government makes family entitlement
payments to the divorced husband, who is expected by law and custom to
provide for his children even though custody of minor children usually
is given to the mother. The law discriminates against women married to
foreign men. Such women are not entitled to government housing
subsidies, which are available to male citizens. The law also requires
women to pay residence fees for their husbands and does not recognize
marriage as the basis for granting residency to foreign-born husbands.
Instead the law grants residency only if the husband is employed. By
contrast male citizens married to foreign-born women do not have to pay
residency fees for their spouses, and their spouses' right to residency
derives from marriage.
Polygyny is legal and is more common among tribal elements of the
population. A husband is obliged to inform his first wife that he is
taking a second wife. The husband is obligated to provide the first
wife a separate household if that is her preference. A first wife who
objects to a second marriage may request a divorce, but the court's
determination of divorce and child custody would be made on grounds
other than the fact of the second marriage itself.
There are several women's organizations that follow women's issues,
among the most active of which are the Women's Cultural and Social
Society (WCSS) and the Women's Affairs Committee.
Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
Both boys and girls receive a free education, which extends through the
university level, including advanced degrees. The Government provides
free health care and a variety of other services to all children.
Citizen parents also receive a monthly government allowance for each
child.
The marriage of girls under the age of 17 is uncommon among the
urban population but remains a practice of the Bedouins in outlying
areas.
There were cases of male youths, some as young as 8 years old,
raped by men or gangs of other male youths.
There are reports of young boys, especially of South Asian origin,
being used as camel jockeys (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no institutionalized
discrimination against disabled persons in employment, education, or in
the provision of state services. Legislation passed by the National
Assembly in 1996 mandates accessibility for the disabled to all public
facilities, and provides an affirmative action employment program for
the disabled. However, this law has not been implemented fully. The
Government pays extensive stipends to disabled citizens, which cover
transportation, housing, job training, and social welfare.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The plight of the 110,000
bidoon remains a significant problem, and in June the Government
instituted a new program to address the issue. The bidoon, a term
meaning ``without,'' are Arabs who have residency ties to Kuwait--some
going back for generations, some for briefer periods--but who have no
documention of their nationality. The bidoon have been the objects of
harsh government policy since the mid-1980's. Since 1985 the Government
has eliminated the bidoon from the census rolls, discontinued their
access to government jobs and free education, and sought to deport
many. In 1993 the Government decreed that bidoon males no longer would
be allowed to serve in the military. Those presently in the armed
forces are being replaced gradually. The Government does not issue
travel documents to bidoon routinely, and if bidoon travel abroad
without documentation, they risk being barred from returning to the
country unless they receive advance permission from the immigration
authorities. Marriages pose special hardships because the offspring of
male bidoon inherit the father's undetermined legal status.
In June the National Assembly passed a law requiring that bidoon
register with the Government by June 27 to begin a process in which
they could be documented as citizens. Those who failed to register
would be considered illegal residents and subject to deportation. The
law provides that up to 2,000 bidoon may be naturalized each year, but
registration will not lead to citizenship for those who are judged to
have insufficient ties to the country. Only 8,000 bidoon registered by
the June 27 cutoff date, in addition to 36,000 who registered (or who
are descended from those who registered) during a 1965 census. The
Ministry of the Interior created an ``Executive Committee in Charge of
the Bidoon'' to resolve the issue. The Government has yet to state the
likely fate of the large majority of bidoon, who will be unable to
provide documentation proving Kuwaiti nationality. The Government
stated in March that it would take punitive action against those who do
not rectify their status by the deadline. It maintains that many bidoon
are concealing their true nationalities in order to remain in the
country, become citizens, and enjoy the generous benefits provided to
citizens. The Government has denied many bidoon official documents such
as birth certificates, marriage certificates, civil identification, and
drivers' licenses, and has pressured employers not to hire bidoon.
There were no reports during the year that the Government decided the
nationality of any bidoon without a hearing.
The Government grants legal status and issues a residency visa to
any bidoon who presents a passport, regardless of the country of
issuance. This led some bidoon to acquire passports from countries with
which they have no affiliation, but which have liberal ``economic
citizenship'' programs, although this practice has declined sharply
since 1997. The Government stated that 12,000 bidoon were documented
during the year as nationals of other states, primarily Syria and Saudi
Arabia. Once documented, bidoon are able to obtain residency permits
and other official papers. However, there also are credible reports of
government authorities encouraging bidoon to purchase counterfeit
passports in order to establish a claim to an alternate nationality.
Purchasing a fraudulent passport allows bidoon to receive a residency
permit and other civil documents, to marry, and to work. However, the
bidoon have problems obtaining visas to travel abroad on these
passports, as they are easily detected as fraudulent, and they may have
difficulty renewing these passports when they expire.
There were no credible reports during the year that the Government
enforced the policy of prior years limiting the presence of workers
from nations whose leaders had supported Iraq in the Gulf War. In prior
years since the end of the Gulf War, government policy had targeted
workers whose leaders supported Iraq, especially Palestinians,
Jordanians, and Yemenis. The Government argued that during the Iraqi
occupation, many of these workers' governments sided with the Iraqi
forces. The Government delayed or denied the issuance of work and
residency permits to persons in these groups, and in many cases
hindered those workers who were permitted to reside in the country from
sponsoring their families to join them. Many of these nationals
resorted to the purchase of third country passports in order to gain
entry to, or legalize their status in, the country. A government policy
to route the residency visas of these nationals through the State
Security Service led to a sharp increase in renewal denials in the
period immediately after the war (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). In 1999
diplomatic relations were restored with Yemen, Sudan, and Jordan; and
subsequently these policies apparently were relaxed (see Section 2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to join
unions. Nonetheless, the Government restricts the right of freedom of
association by stipulating that there be only one union per
occupational trade, and that unions may establish only one federation.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long criticized such
restrictions.
Approximately 50,000 persons, less than 5 percent of a total work
force of 1,226,134, are organized into 14 unions, 12 of which are
affiliated with the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF), the sole
legal trade union federation. The Bank Workers Union and the Kuwait
Airways Workers Union consisting of approximately 4,500 workers, are
independent of the KTUF. The law stipulates that any new union must
include at least 100 workers, of whom at least 15 are citizens. Both
the ILO and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) have criticized this requirement because it discourages unions
in sectors that employ few citizens, such as the construction industry
and the domestic servant sector. Despite past draft proposals and KTUF
complaints, no new labor law was enacted during the year.
The Government's pervasive oversight powers further erode union
independence. The Government subsidizes as much as 90 percent of most
union budgets, may inspect the financial records of any union, and
prohibits any union from engaging in political or religious activities,
which are vaguely defined. The law empowers the courts to dissolve any
union for violating labor laws or for threatening ``public order and
morals.'' Such a court decision may be appealed. The Amir also may
dissolve a union by decree. By law the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labor is authorized to seize the assets of any dissolved union. The ILO
has criticized this aspect of the law. Although no union has been
dissolved, the law subordinates the legal existence of the unions to
the power of the State.
According to government statistics, 997,338 foreign workers are
employed in the country. They constitute over 80 percent of the work
force but only 10 percent of the unionized work force. The Labor Law
discriminates against foreign workers by permitting them to join unions
only after 5 years of residence, although the KTUF states that this
requirement is not enforced and that foreigners may join unions
regardless of their length of stay. In addition the law stipulates that
foreigners may participate in unions only as nonvoting members. Unlike
union members who are citizens, foreign workers do not have the right
to elect their leadership. The law requires that union officials must
be citizens. The ILO has criticized the 5-year residency requirement
and the denial of voting rights for foreign workers. The KTUF
administers an Expatriate Labor Office, which is authorized to
investigate complaints of foreign laborers and provide them with free
legal advice. Any foreign worker covered under the Labor Law may submit
a grievance to the Labor Office regardless of union status. However,
such services are not utilized widely.
The law limits the right to strike. It requires that all labor
disputes must be referred to compulsory arbitration if labor and
management cannot reach a solution (see Section 6.b.). The law does not
have any provision ensuring strikers freedom from any legal or
administrative action taken against them by the State. However, the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has proved responsive to sit-ins
or protests by workers who face obvious wrongdoing by their employers.
Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The KTUF belongs to
the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the formerly
Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
the right to organize and bargain collectively, subject to certain
restrictions (see Section 6.a.). These rights have been incorporated in
the Labor Law and, according to all reports, have been respected in
practice.
The Labor Law provides for direct negotiations between employers
and ``laborers or their representatives'' in the private sector. Most
agreements are resolved in such negotiations; if not, either party may
petition the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor for mediation. If
mediation fails, the dispute is referred to a labor arbitration board,
which is composed of officials from the High Court of Appeals, the
Attorney General's office, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labor.
The Civil Service Law makes no provision for collective bargaining
between government workers and their employer. Technically, wages and
conditions of employment for civil service workers are established by
the Government, but in practice, the Government sets the benefit scales
after conducting informal meetings with officials from the civil
service unions. Union officials resolve most issues at the working
level and have regular access to senior officials.
The Labor Law prohibits antiunion discrimination. Any worker who
alleges antiunion discrimination has the right to appeal to the
judiciary. There were no reports of discrimination against employees
based on their affiliation with a union. Employers found guilty of
antiunion discrimination must reinstate workers fired for union
activities.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor ``except in cases specified by law for national
emergency and with just remuneration;'' however, some foreign workers
are treated like indentured servants (see Section 6.e.). The Government
does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but
such practices are not known to occur.
Foreign workers may not change their employment without permission
from their original sponsors unless they have been in the country for
over 2 years. Domestic servants are particularly vulnerable to abuses
from this practice because they are not protected by the Labor Law. In
many cases employers exercise control over their servants by holding
their passports, although the Government prohibits this practice and
has acted to retrieve the passports of maids involved in disputes.
Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled South
Asian workers, live much like indentured servants. They frequently face
poor working conditions and may encounter some physical abuse (see
Sections 5 and 6.e.). Domestic servants who run away from their
employers may be treated as criminals under the law. However, the
authorities usually do not enforce this provision. In some reported
cases, employers illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to
cover the costs involved in bringing them to the country.
There are also credible reports of widespread visa trading, a
system by which sponsors agree to extend their sponsorship to workers
outside of the country in exchange for a fee of $1,500 to $1,800.
Middlemen, generally foreigners, use the promise of Kuwaiti sponsorship
to attract workers from economically depressed countries, taking a
commission and remitting the rest to the nominal Kuwaiti sponsor. Once
in the country, such workers are farmed out to the informal sector or
find employment with parties that would otherwise be unable to sponsor
them. Foreign workers who are recruited with these traded visas not
only face possible prosecution for being engaged in illegal employment
(i.e., working for an employer other than their sponsor), but also
leave themselves extremely vulnerable to extortion by employers,
sponsors, and middlemen. Government efforts to crack down on such
abuses, such as by closing front companies for visa traders, have
failed to realize significant progress. There are laws aimed at curbing
visa trading, with penalties against both employers and visa traders,
but the laws seldom are enforced. Visa trading has resulted in growing
numbers of unemployed foreign workers who buy visas to enter the
country and then cannot find work.
For over 10 years, the ILO has criticized a 1979 legislative
decree, which requires prior authorization for public meetings and
gatherings, and provides for a penalty of imprisonment including an
obligation to work. The ILO also is critical of a 1980 legislative
decree respecting security, order, and discipline aboard ships,
breaches of which also may be punished by imprisonment with an
obligation to work.
There are reports of young boys, especially of South Asian origin,
being used as camel jockeys (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age is 18 years for all forms of work,
both full- and part-time. Employers may obtain permits from the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to employ juveniles between the
ages of 14 and 18 in certain trades. Education is compulsory for
children between the ages of 6 and 15. The Government does not prohibit
forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known
to occur (see Section 6.c.). There are reports of young boys,
especially of South Asian origin, being used as camel jockeys (see
Sections 5 and 6.c.). There also have been confirmed reports that some
South Asian and Southeast Asian domestic servants are under age 18.
Such underage workers reportedly falsify their ages in order to enter
the country. Some small businessmen employ their children on a part-
time basis.
Juveniles may work a maximum of 6 hours a day on the condition that
they work no more than 4 consecutive hours followed by a 1-hour rest
period.
In August Kuwait ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of
child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs
and Labor is responsible for enforcing all labor laws. An informal two-
tiered labor market ensures high wages for citizen employees, most of
whom are in government white collar or executive positions, while
foreign workers, even those in skilled positions, receive substantially
lower wages. There is no legal minimum wage in the private sector. In
the public sector, the monthly minimum wage is approximately $742 (226
dinars) for citizens and approximately $296 (90 dinars) for
noncitizens. The public sector minimum wage provides a decent standard
of living for a worker and family. Wages of unskilled workers in the
private sector do not always provide a decent standard of living. To be
eligible to sponsor family members for residency, government workers
must receive a minimum wage of $1,350 (450 dinars) a month, and private
sector workers must make at least $2,135 (650 dinars) a month. The
Council of Ministers approved a bill in August that would reduce this
amount to $1,350 (450 dinars) for all workers.
There are also credible reports of widespread visa trading, a
system by which sponsors agree to extend their sponsorship to workers
outside of the country in exchange for a fee of $1,500 to $1,800 (see
Section 6.c.).
The Labor Law establishes general conditions of work for both the
public and the private sectors, with the oil industry treated
separately. The Civil Service Law also prescribes additional conditions
for the public sector. The Labor Law limits the standard work week to
48 hours with 1 full day of rest per week, provides for a minimum of 14
workdays of leave each year, and establishes a compensation schedule
for industrial accidents. Domestic servants, who specifically are
excluded from the private sector Labor Law, frequently work long hours,
greatly in excess of 48 hours.
The ILO has urged the Government to extend the weekly 24-
consecutive-hour rest period to temporary workers employed for a period
of less than 6 months and workers in enterprises employing fewer than
five persons. The law pertaining to the oil industry provides for a 40-
hour workweek, 30 days of annual leave, and sick leave. Laws
establishing work conditions are not applied uniformly to foreign
workers.
Employers often exploit workers' willingness to accept substandard
conditions. Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled
South Asian workers, live much like indentured servants, are unaware of
their legal rights, and generally lack the means to pursue a legal
remedy. They frequently face contractual disputes and poor working
conditions, and may face physical and sexual abuse (see Sections 5 and
6.c.). Most are in debt to their employers before they arrive in the
country and have little choice but to accept the employer's conditions,
even if they contradict the contractual terms. It is not uncommon for
wages to be withheld for a period of months, or to be decreased
substantially. Many foreign workers are forced to live in ``housing
camps,'' which generally are overcrowded and lack adequate cooking and
bathroom facilities. Workers are housed 10 or more to a room in squalid
conditions, many without access to adequate running water. The workers
are only allowed off the camp compound on company transport or by
permission of the employer. Foreign workers' ability to change their
employment is limited, and, in some cases, employers' possession of
foreign workers' passports allows them to exercise control over such
employees (see Section 6.c). Many foreign workers go heavily into debt
and cannot afford to return home.
The Labor Law discriminates against foreign workers by limiting
their ability to join unions (see Section 6.a.). The KTUF administers
an Expatriate Labor Office, which is authorized to investigate
complaints of foreign laborers and provide them with free legal advice.
However, these services are not utilized widely. Any foreign worker may
submit a grievance to the labor office regardless of union status.
The Labor Law provides for employer-provided medical care and
compensation to workers disabled by injury or disease due to job-
related causes. The law also requires that employers provide periodic
medical examinations to workers exposed to environmental hazards on the
job, such as chemicals and asbestos. Foreigners must pay high fees for
medical care, both yearly and each time medical care is provided. Many
employers deduct the medical fees from employees' salaries. Adequate
and affordable health care remains a problem for many foreign workers.
No health insurance system exists.
The Government has issued occupational health and safety standards;
however, compliance and enforcement appear poor, especially with
respect to unskilled foreign laborers. To decrease accident rates, the
Government periodically inspects installations to raise awareness among
workers and employers, and to ensure that they abide by the safety
rules, control the pollution resulting from certain dangerous
industries, train workers who use new machines in specialized
institutes, and report violations. Workers have the right to remove
themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their
continued employment, and legal protection exists for workers who file
complaints about such conditions.
As noted domestic servants are not covered under the Labor Law.
Those who flee their employers may be treated as criminals, although
the authorities usually do not prosecute them. In some reported cases,
employers illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to cover the
costs involved in bringing them to the country. It is also a common
practice for employers illegally to withhold their passports. Maids pay
the same amount or more than unskilled or semi-skilled workers for
visas to work in the country.
Runaway servants often seek shelter at their country's embassy for
either repatriation or assistance in dealing with employers. The
numbers in need of assistance increased substantially during the year
as conditions for domestic employees worsened. Some embassies house
runaway servants: The Sri Lankan Embassy has between 700-800 nationals
in its care, the Indian Embassy 200, the Philippine Embassy 150, the
Indonesian Embassy 100, and the Bangladeshi Embassy 60. The total of
1,300 represents an increase of 1,000 in the past year. Although most
of these workers sought shelter due to contractual or financial
problems with their employers, some women also alleged physical and
sexual abuse. The Sri Lankan, Indian, and Philippine Embassies all
continue to report the steady occurrence of physical abuse and
mistreatment involving domestic servants, including withheld salaries,
overwork, and not being fed regularly or enough. Each government has
attempted to register its nationals who arrive to work in the country
as domestic employees and to regulate recruiting agents in their home
countries, without much result. In July the reduction of services
provided by the police facility designated to mediate between
embassies, domestic workers, and employers made it very difficult for
domestics to file complaints, receive withheld salary, and reach
settlement in cases of mistreatment. Domestic servants must now deal
with neighborhood police stations, whose personnel are untrained and
inexperienced in handling their cases and often side with the employer
(see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
Some countries either have warned their female citizens about such
work conditions or banned them from working in the country as domestic
servants. The Government of India officially banned its nationals from
working in Kuwait as domestic employees, but Indian nationals still buy
visas and enter Kuwait as domestic workers. Bangladesh has banned
female domestic servants from working in Kuwait since 1998. In August
the Egyptian Foreign Minister warned women seeking employment in all
Persian Gulf countries to ``exercise caution'' and to avoid being
forced into illegal activities.
The courts found in favor of the employee in an estimated 90
percent of the labor disputes they heard, but this success did not
result in improved conditions for foreign workers. Currently, no legal
mechanism exists for foreign workers to enforce settlements. There is
no compulsion for employers to obey court rulings, and workers often
did not receive court-ordered compensation. Employers also reportedly
use illegal methods to pressure foreign employees to drop cases against
them, such as withholding their passports, police intimidation and
brutality, and filing criminal charges against them for theft and other
crimes.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
to, from, within or through the country.
__________
LEBANON
Lebanon is a parliamentary republic in which, based on the
unwritten ``National Pact of 1943'' the President is a Maronite
Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the
Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim. President Emile Lahoud took office
in 1998 after an election heavily influenced by Syria. The Parliament
consists of 128 deputies, equally divided between Christian and Muslim
representatives. In parliamentary elections in August and September,
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri defeated incumbent Salim Al-Hoss.
President Lahoud named Hariri Prime Minister in October. According to
international observers, the elections were flawed and the outcome was
heavily influenced by the Syrian Government; however, there reportedly
were fewer voting irregularities than in the 1996 parliamentary
elections. The judiciary is independent in principle; however, it is
subject to political pressure.
Non-Lebanese military and paramilitary forces control much of the
country. Approximately 25,000 Syrian troops are stationed in locations
throughout the country, excluding the south. In addition, several armed
Palestinian factions are located in refugee camps, although their
freedom of movement is restricted significantly. The contingent of
approximately 2,000 Israeli army regulars and 1,500 Israeli-supported
militiamen that had controlled parts of the south withdrew from the
region completely by May. All undermined the authority of the central
Government and interfered with the application of law in the patchwork
of areas not under the Government's control. In 1991 the Governments of
Syria and Lebanon concluded a security agreement that provided a
framework for security cooperation between their armed forces. However,
an undetermined number of Syrian military intelligence personnel in the
country continue to conduct their activities independently of the
agreement.
In 1989 the Arab League brokered a peace settlement at Taif, Saudi
Arabia, to end the country's civil war. According to the Taif Accord,
the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were to determine the redeployment
of Syrian troops from their position in Lebanon's coastal population
areas to specified areas of the Biqa' Valley, with full withdrawal
contingent upon subsequent agreement by both Governments. The Syrian
Government has not carried out this partial redeployment, and strong
Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and decisionmakers makes
officials unwilling to press for a complete withdrawal. Since the Taif
Accord was signed, no government has requested formally the withdrawal
of Syrian forces. The Government's relationship with Syria does not
reflect the will of most of the country's citizens.
Until May Israel exerted control in or near its self-proclaimed
``security zone'' in the south through direct military action and
support for its surrogate, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). With the tacit
support of the Government, the Iranian-backed Shi'a Muslim faction
Hizballah, and, to a much lesser extent, the Lebanese Shi'a group Amal
and some Palestinian guerrillas were locked in a cycle of attack and
counterattack with Israeli and SLA troops. In May after 22 years of
occupation, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops withdrew from the south
and West Biqa', and the SLA disbanded. Following the withdrawal, the
Government deployed over 1,000 police and soldiers to the former
security zone. After the withdrawal, Hizballah guerrillas maintained
observation posts and conducted patrols along the border with Israel.
The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) also increased
its area of operations following the Israeli withdrawal. Palestinian
groups operate autonomously in refugee camps throughout the country.
The Government did not attempt to reassert state control over the
Palestinian camps or to disarm Hizballah.
The security forces consist of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
which may arrest and detain suspects on national security grounds; the
Internal Security Forces (ISF), which enforces laws, conducts searches
and arrests, and refers cases to the judiciary; and the State Security
Apparatus and the Surete Generale, both of which collect information on
groups deemed a possible threat to state security. The Surete Generale
is responsible for the issuance of passports and residency permits, the
screening and censoring of foreign periodicals, plays, documentaries,
television programs, and movies, and the censoring of those parts that
address national security issues and ``morale.'' The security forces
committed serious human rights abuses.
Before the 1975-90 hostilities, the country was an important
regional financial and commercial center. There is a market-based
economy in which the majority of the private sector work force is
employed in the services sector, such as banking and commerce. There is
a small industrial sector, based largely on clothing manufacture and
food processing. The annual gross national product is estimated to be
approximately $5,000 per capita. A reconstruction effort begun in 1992
is moving forward. Substantial remittances from abroad offset the trade
deficit and resulted in a balance of payment surplus. The economy has
been in recession since 1998. Almost all economic indicators pointed to
decline. The budget deficit stood at 46 percent of expenditure,
compared with 37 percent for the corresponding period in 1999, and
foreign investments dropped by 13 percent. The per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) is estimated at $4,700 and unemployment is
estimated to be as high as 20 percent. The country has a substantial
public debt of $22 billion (140 percent of the GDP).
The Government's overall human rights record was poor, and serious
problems remain, although there were some improvements in a few areas.
The right of citizens to change their government remains significantly
restricted by the lack of government control over parts of the country,
shortcomings in the electoral system, and Syrian influence. The August
and September parliamentary elections were flawed and suffered from
Syrian government influence. Members of the security forces used
excessive force and tortured and abused some detainees. Prison
conditions remained poor. Government abuses also included the arbitrary
arrest and detention of persons who opposed government policies.
Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials are problems, and
the courts are subject to political pressure. International observers
reported that trials of former SLA personnel were not free and fair.
The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights, and continued
surveillance of political activities during the year. The Government
partially limited press freedom by continuing to restrict radio and
television broadcasting in a discriminatory manner. Journalists
practice self-censorship. The Government continued to restrict freedom
of assembly, and imposes some limits on freedom of association. There
are some restrictions on freedom of religion. The Government imposes
some limits on freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against
women; abuse of children; discrimination against Palestinians; forced
labor, including by children; child labor; and the mistreatment of
foreign servants are problems.
Until the IDF withdrawal and the collapse of the SLA, artillery and
aerial attacks by the various contending forces in southern Lebanon
threatened life and property. These forces committed abuses, including
killings, bombings, and abductions. The SLA maintained a separate and
arbitrary system of justice in the zone formerly controlled by Israeli
forces, which was independent of Lebanese central authority. Prior to
the SLA collapse, its officials arbitrarily arrested, mistreated, and
detained persons, and sometimes expelled local residents from their
homes in the zone. Palestinian groups in refugee camps maintain a
separate, often arbitrary, system of justice for other Palestinians.
Palestinians sometimes may appeal for legal recourse to Lebanese
authorities, often through their agents in the camps. In the past,
there were reports that members of the various groups that control the
camps detained their Palestinian rivals and, in some instances, killed
them; however, there were no reports that this occurred during the
year.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government authorities during the
year.
Four persons died in custody during the year. In January a Sudanese
asylum seeker died of malaria in Zahle prison. Prison officials
reportedly did not offer him medical treatment before his death. An
elderly SLA member died in custody in June allegedly because prison
officials refused to provide him with his medicine, which was
manufactured in Israel. In November one SLA detainee died of cancer and
another SLA detainee died from high blood pressure. The Military Court
initiated an investigation into the two deaths to determine whether or
not the detainees received proper medical treatment; however, it had
not reached conclusions by year's end. The Government subsequently
announced that it would review the medical records of all former SLA
detainees (see Section 1.c.).
In October 1999, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a
Maronite church in Beirut (see Section 5).
In December 1999, Sunni extremists killed four LAF soldiers in an
ambush in the northern region of Dinniyeh after the soldiers attempted
to arrest two Sunni Muslims allegedly involved in a series of church
bombings. On December 31, 1999, the LAF retaliated by launching a
massive military operation against Sunni insurgents in the north. Five
civilians, 7 LAF soldiers, and 15 insurgents were killed in the
operation (see Section 5).
The judicial system continues to suffer from a backlog of hearings
into cases of death in custody, some as old as 6 years. Such cases
sometimes involve individuals connected to political groups or accused
of criminal activity.
There were no new developments in the case of the June 1999
killings of four judicial officials at a courthouse in Sidon. The
perpetrators reportedly are members of the outlawed Palestinian group
``Asbat al-Ansar''; however, government authorities did not arrest any
of the suspected gunmen, who are believed to be hiding in the
Palestinian refugee camp of Ain-Al Hilwah.
A military tribunal in 1999 sentenced Captain Camille Yared to 10
years in prison and 4 Lebanese Forces militiamen to death in absentia
for carrying out a 1996 bus bombing in Syria, which killed 11 persons.
The court also sentenced 13 other Lebanese Forces members to 7 years in
prison. An appeal in the case was scheduled to be held in January 2001.
There were no developments in the 1996 beating death of Akram
Arbeed, who allegedly was attacked while accompanying a candidate in
the 1996 parliamentary election. The case is still pending.
A court hearing in the 1998 appeal made by the prosecutor's office
regarding the 1976 killing of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy, Embassy
officer Robert Waring, and their driver, Zohair Moghrabi, has not been
scheduled following a court verdict declaring the suspect, Tawfiq
Mohammad Farroukh, not guilty of murder for his role in the killings.
The cycle of violence in and around the former Israeli controlled
security zone decreased significantly following the IDF withdrawal in
May. However, prior to the withdrawal, an estimated 20 Islamic
resistance guerrillas, 8 Israeli soldiers, and 25 Lebanese civilians
were killed in the south as Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerrillas
on the one hand, and Israeli forces and the SLA on the other, engaged
in recurring violence. For example, in May Hizballah attacks in the
north of Israel killed 1 person and injured 12. In retaliation for
these attacks, Israel shelled military and civilian targets in the
south, killing two persons. Israeli forces conducted air strikes and
artillery barrages on Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian targets,
including civilian infrastructure, inside Lebanon. For example, on
February 8, in response to Hizballah attacks Israel conducted air
strikes on electrical power transformer stations and other targets,
injuring over one dozen civilians.
There were over 110 civilian injuries prior to the May Israeli
withdrawal, with most of the injuries involving minor wounds from
shrapnel and broken glass. Civilians accounted for over 70 percent of
the injured.
During the May IDF withdrawal from the south and the concurrent
collapse of the SLA, Israeli forces killed at least four Lebanese
civilians.
On October 7, IDF personnel killed 2 persons and injured 25 along
the Israeli-Lebanese border during demonstrations against Israeli
government actions in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (see Section
2.b.). On October 7, Hizballah launched shells on IDF positions in the
She'ba farms area in the Golan Heights; no injuries reportedly resulted
from the shelling.
On November 25, Hizballah guerrillas bombed an Israeli patrol
station in the She'ba farms area, killing 1 IDF soldier. In response,
Israel launched airstrikes on Hizballah positions in the south,
injuring one person.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The Government did not take any judicial action against groups
known to be responsible for the kidnapings of thousands of persons
during the 1975-1990 civil war.
In 1999 the Government established a military commission to
investigate the fate of all those who disappeared during the civil war.
In September the commission concluded that all persons who disappeared
at least 4 years before the end of the civil war were dead. The
Government endorsed the commission report and then-Prime Minister Salim
al-Hoss called on all families to accept reality despite its
bitterness;'' however, many of the family members of persons who
disappeared rejected the commission's findings and called for the
creation of a new commission.
In October during violent clashes in Israel, the West Bank, and
Gaza, Hizballah guerillas kidnaped 3 Israeli soldiers on patrol in the
north of Israel, demanding that the Israeli Government release all
remaining Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons. At year's end,
Hizballah continued to hold captive the soldiers.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture is not banned specifically by the Constitution,
and there continued to be credible reports that security forces abused
detainees and, in some instances, used torture. Human rights groups
report that torture is a common practice. Violent abuse usually occurs
during the preliminary investigations that are conducted at police
stations or military installations, where suspects are interrogated in
the absence of an attorney. Such abuse occurs despite laws that prevent
judges from accepting any confession extracted under duress.
The Government held incommunicado most of the 2,400 SLA personnel
who surrendered to authorities following the IDF's withdrawal from the
south in May (see Section 1.d.). Some former SLA detainees reported
that they were abused or tortured. Amnesty International (AI) and other
human rights organizations reported that some detainees were beaten,
handcuffed, blindfolded, and forced to lie face down on the ground.
In 1999 police officials allegedly tortured in detention a number
of Sunni youths who were suspected in involvement in a series of church
bombings (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
In March ISF personnel used excessive force to disperse a
demonstration in front of the Prime Minister's residence protesting the
Government's expulsion of four Japanese Red Army members to Jordan. The
officers injured at least one demonstrator and a journalist (see
Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). The Government took no action against the
officers. Ten demonstrators were arrested but were released shortly
afterwards.
On April 17, in Beirut security forces used excessive force to
break up a demonstration calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces
from the country; 13 persons were injured, and 8 persons were arrested
and subsequently tried and sentenced by a military court (see Sections
1.d. and 1.e.).
On numerous occasions following the May IDF withdrawal from the
south, civilians threw rocks, hot oil, and Molotov cocktails at IDF
soldiers across the border, which resulted in some injuries. Hizballah
reportedly supported these cross-border attacks, and the Government did
little to halt them. On several occasions IDF troops returned fire and
sometimes injured civilians.
Abuses occurred in areas outside the State's authority, including
the Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that
members of the various groups that control the camps detained their
Palestinian rivals (see Section 1.d.).
Prison conditions are poor and do not meet minimum international
standards. The Ministry of Interior operates 18 prisons with a total
capacity of 3,840 inmates. However, prisons are overcrowded, with a
total population of about 8,375. Inmates lack heat, adequate toilet
facilities, and proper medical care. The Government has not budgeted
funds to overhaul the prison system. In September the Beirut Bar
Association organized a conference composed of local and international
participants to underscore the need for local penal reform. The head of
the Association described the country's prison facilities as ``unfit
for animals.'' The Government made an effort to carry out
rehabilitation for some inmates. Inmates at Roumieh prison participated
in vocational activities such as computer training courses in order to
provide them with skills upon release. In September 36 inmates in
Roumieh prison received certificates of accomplishment following
completion of a computer training program.
Three SLA detainees died of natural causes in custody during the
year; however, one detainee died allegedly because prison officials
refused to provide him with his medicine, which was manufactured in
Israel. One Sudanese detainee died of malaria during the year after
prison officials reportedly refused to offer him medical assistance
(see Section 1.a.). The Surete Generale, which mans border posts,
operates a detention facility. Hundreds of foreigners, mostly Egyptians
and Sri Lankans, are detained there pending deportation. They
reportedly are held in small, poorly ventilated cells.
Former Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja', who is serving four
life sentences for the murder or attempted murder of various political
figures during and after the civil war, is kept in solitary confinement
in a prison in the basement of the Ministry of Defense. He is permitted
minimal exercise and allowed only periodic visits from his family and
lawyers. He is not allowed to read newspapers or listen to the radio.
Government officials stated that his solitary confinement is necessary
for his own protection.
Local journalists and human rights organizations had access to
certain prisons during the year. Access to prisons controlled by the
Ministry of Defense was not permitted. Following the Israeli withdrawal
from the south, the Government did not grant independent monitors
access to former SLA soldiers in custody. In December government
officials stated that International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
representatives would be allowed to visit all SLA detainees; however,
the Government did not sign a memorandum of understanding by year's
end.
Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the south, Hizballah detained
and reportedly mistreated SLA members and suspected agents at unknown
locations. The SLA operated its own detention facility, Al-Khiam
prison, and there were frequent allegations of torture and mistreatment
of detainees (see Section 1.d.). Hizballah and the SLA occasionally
released and exchanged prisoners.
Hizballah did not permit prison visits by human rights monitors.
Before its May dissolution, the SLA allowed representatives of the ICRC
and family members of inmates to visit detainees at Al-Khiam prison.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government uses
arbitrary arrest and detention. The law requires security forces to
obtain warrants before making arrests; however, military prosecutors,
who are responsible for cases involving the military as well as those
involving espionage, treason, weapons possession, and draft evasion,
make arrests without warrants. Arresting officers are required to refer
a subject to a prosecutor within 24 hours of arrest, but frequently do
not do so.
The law requires the authorities to release suspects after 48 hours
of arrest if no formal charges are brought against them. Some
prosecutors flout this requirement and detain suspects for long periods
in pretrial confinement without a court order. The law authorizes
judges to remand suspects to incommunicado detention for 10 days with a
possible extension for an additional 10 days. Bail is available only to
those accused of petty crimes, not to those accused of felonies.
Defendants have the right to legal counsel, but there is no state-
funded public defender's office. The Bar Association operates an office
for those who cannot afford a lawyer, and the court panel on many
occasions has asked the Bar Association to appoint lawyers for
defendants.
Security forces continued the practice of arbitrary arrest.
Security forces detained and interrogated scores of citizens,
predominately Christian supporters of exiled General Michel 'Awn, and
of the jailed commander of the disbanded Lebanese Forces, Samir Ja'Ja'.
These detentions and searches of homes took place without warrants, and
detainees claim that they were not given access to lawyers. Most
detainees were released after they were forced to sign documents
stating that they would abstain from politics.
In 1999 police officials detained and allegedly tortured a number
of Sunni youths for suspected involvement in church bombings; however,
the youths later were released due to a lack of evidence (see Sections
1.a. and 5).
On April 13, authorities detained students from the National Free
Current, a pro-Awnist group, for distributing antigovernment and anti-
Syria leaflets (see Section 2.a.). In April ISF personnel arrested and
subsequently released a number of demonstrators (see Sections 1.c. and
2.b.). In September authorities detained nine Lebanese Forces activists
in connection with a rally protesting the Syrian presence in Lebanon
(see Section 2.b.); authorities released these detainees after they
paid a monetary fine.
The Government held incommunicado most of the 2,400 SLA members who
surrendered to the authorities following the IDF's withdrawal from the
south in May (see Section 1.c.).
The authorities often detain without charges for short periods of
time political opponents of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. Most
of the former senior government officials who were detained in 1999 on
charges of embezzlement or misuse of power were released on bail,
including former Minister of Petroleum Shahe Baroumian. The former
officials were detained without charge for prolonged periods of time in
Roumieh prison, in violation of due process. Legal actions still are
pending against them; however, they are free to travel abroad.
Palestinian refugees are subject to arrest, detention, and
harassment by state security forces, Syrian forces, various militias,
and rival Palestinians.
There were no allegations during the year of the transfer of
citizens by government authorities to Syria. In December the Syrian
Government transferred 46 Lebanese citizens, 7 Palestinian residents of
Lebanon, and 1 Egyptian citizen from Syrian prisons to Lebanese
custody. The Government announced that it will review each case;
persons who have completed their sentences will be released, and
persons with outstanding prison time will continue to serve out their
sentences. Human rights activists believe that there are remaining
Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons; however, the exact number is
unknown. Amnesty International reported in 1999 that ``hundreds of
Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested,
some over 2 decades ago, and remain in prolonged and often secret
detention in Syria.'' According to AI, Syrian forces operating in
Lebanon carried out searches, arrests, and detentions of Lebanese
nationals outside any legal framework.
In August Syria released Shaykh Hashem Minqara, a radical Sunni
member of the Islamic Unification Movement (``Tawheed''), who was
arrested by Syrian forces in 1985 and transferred to Syria.
Abuses occurred in areas outside the state's authority, including
the Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that
members of the various groups that control the camps detained their
Palestinian rivals.
Local militias, including Hizballah, continued to conduct arbitrary
arrests in areas outside central government control. There were
credible reports that Hizballah detained scores of former SLA
militiamen before handing them over to government authorities for
trial.
Prior to the Israeli withdrawal, the SLA operated its own detention
facility, Al-Khiam prison. There were frequent reports of torture and
mistreatment of detainees. Following the disbandment of the SLA in May,
all of the prison's 140 inmates were released. A number of former
inmates publicly recounted incidents of abuse by prison officials (see
Section 1.c.).
In April the Israeli Government released 13 Lebanese detainees who
were held without charge in Israel for as long as 14 years; the former
detainees returned to Lebanon under the auspices of the ICRC. Israel
continues to hold 21 Lebanese citizens, including Sheikh Abed Al-Karim
Obaid and Mustafa Dirani.
Exile as a form of punishment is not practiced regularly; however,
in 1991 the Government pardoned former army commander General Michel
'Awn and two of his aides on the condition that they depart the country
and remain in exile for 5 years; 'Awn remained in France at year's end.
'Awn was accused of usurping power. Former President Amine Gemayel, who
lived in France in exile for the past 12 years, returned to the country
in July.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent in
principle; however, it is subject to political pressure. The
Constitution provides for a constitutional council to supervise the
constitutionality of laws and stipulates that judges shall be
independent in the exercise of their duties; however, influential
politicians as well as Syrian and Lebanese intelligence officers
sometimes intervene to protect their supporters from prosecution.
The judicial system is composed of the regular civilian courts; the
Military Court, which tries cases involving military personnel and
military-related issues; the Judicial Council, which tries national
security cases; and the tribunals of the various religious
affiliations, which adjudicate matters of personal status, including
marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody.
The Judicial Council is a permanent tribunal of five senior judges
that adjudicates threats to national security. On the recommendation of
the Minister of Justice, the Cabinet decides whether to try a case
before this tribunal. Verdicts from this tribunal are irrevocable and
may not be appealed.
The Ministry of Justice appoints all other judges according to a
formula based on the religious affiliation of the prospective judge. A
shortage of judges has impeded efforts to adjudicate cases backlogged
during years of internal conflicts. Trial delays are aggravated by the
Government's inability to conduct investigations in areas outside of
its control. Defendants have the right to examine evidence against
them. The testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man.
In April the military court sentenced eight students to between 10
days and 6 weeks in prison following their participation in
demonstrations against the presence of Syrian troops in the country
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). All of the students had been
released by year's end.
In June the Military Court began trying the cases of the 3,033 SLA
militiamen who surrendered to the Government following the Israeli
withdrawal from the south. Some of the former SLA militiamen were
charged under Article 273 of the Penal Code for taking up arms against
the State, an offense punishable by death; others were charged under
Article 285 of the Penal Code for trading with the enemy, an offense
punishable by a minimum of 1 year in prison. Domestic human rights
groups and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) reported
that the trials were open to journalists and members of the public, but
were not fair. Amnesty International reported that ``such summary
trials,'' with barely 7 minutes spent on each individual neither allow
the innocent to be acquitted nor ensure the discovery of those who may
be guilty of war crimes. According to AI, the court tried between 23
and 43 persons each day. SLA lawyers who requested an adjournment to
study the files of detainees were granted additional time. However, in
most cases, defense lawyers received the file shortly before trial and
consequently were unable to argue the cases individually. The standard
defense presented by lawyers for the militiamen was that the Government
had been unable to defend citizens living under Israeli occupation for
the last 22 years. Therefore the residents had no choice but to work
with the occupiers.
By year's end, 2,035 former SLA members received sentences ranging
from 1 week to life imprisonment. About one-third of the former SLA
members received 1-year prison sentences and about one-third received
sentences of 3 to 4 weeks under Article 273 of the Penal Code, which
criminalizes taking up arms against the State. Two persons who were
implicated in the abuse and torture of prisoners at Al-Khiam prison
were sentenced to life in prison. The Military Prosecutor recommended
the death sentence for 37 former SLA militiamen for allegedly killing
members of ``the resistance'' (i.e., Hizballah). Twenty-one of these
militiamen were tried while in government custody; however, 16 were
tried in absentia. The Military Court denied every recommendation for
the death sentence and handed down lighter sentences in each case.
Following attacks by angry crowds on two former SLA members in their
villages, the court amended the sentences of some persons, barring them
from returning to their villages for several years. According to the
Government, these bans were issued to protect the former SLA members
and were difficult to enforce. There were no additional reports that
former SLA members who returned to their villages were subjected to
harassment. The Government released most of the 220 SLA militiamen who
were tried following the June 1999 SLA withdrawal from Jezzine in the
south; however, 9 remained in prison at year's end.
Hizballah applies Islamic laws in areas under its control.
Palestinian groups in refugee camps operate an autonomous and arbitrary
system of justice. The SLA also maintained a separate and arbitrary
system of justice before its May disbandment.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--While the authorities generally show little interest
in controlling the personal lives of citizens, they readily interfere
with the privacy of persons regarded as foes of the Government. Laws
require that prosecutors obtain warrants before entering houses except
when the army is in hot pursuit of armed attackers; however, in
practice the law is not respected.
The Government and Syrian intelligence services use informer
networks and monitor telephones to gather information on their
adversaries. The Army Intelligence Service monitors the movements and
activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 2.b.). The
Government concedes that telephone calls are monitored by security
services, but claims that monitoring occurs only with prior
authorization from competent judicial authorities. During September
1999 parliamentary hearings, the Speaker of Parliament, the Minister of
Interior, and the Surete Generale Director General publicly
acknowledged that government officials frequently monitor citizens'
private telephone conversations.
Politicians and human rights advocates report increasing and more
overt government intelligence services' surveillance of political
meetings and political activities across the religious and political
spectrum. In October 1999, the Parliament passed a law that authorized
surveillance in national security and law enforcement cases, but banned
its use against ministers and parliamentary deputies.
Militias and non-Lebanese forces operating outside the area of
central government authority frequently have violated citizens' privacy
rights. Various factions also use informer networks and the monitoring
of telephones to obtain information on their adversaries.
In August government officials raided the office of an Internet
service provider (ISP) based on allegations that the ISP was
distributing pornographic materials through the operation of a web site
targeted for the homosexual community (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press; however, the Government partially limits this
right in practice, particularly by intimidating journalists and
broadcasters into practicing self-censorship. In 1998 the Government
rescinded a total ban on satellite news; however, it continues to
censor television broadcasts on a case-by-case basis.
The country has a long history of freedom of opinion, speech, and
the press. Although there were repeated attempts to restrict these
freedoms during the year, daily criticism of government policies and
leaders continued. Dozens of newspapers and hundreds of periodicals are
published throughout the country, financed by various local and foreign
groups. While the press is independent, press content often reflects
the opinions of these financial backers.
The Government has several tools at its disposal to control freedom
of expression. The Surete Generale is authorized to approve all foreign
magazines and non-periodical works, including plays, books, and films,
before they are distributed in the market. The law prohibits attacks on
the dignity of the Head of State or foreign leaders. The Government may
prosecute offending journalists and publications in the Publications
Court, a special tribunal empowered to try such matters.
Moreover, the 1991 security agreement between Lebanon and Syria
contains a provision that effectively prohibits the publication of any
information deemed harmful to the security of either state. In view of
the risk of prosecution, journalists censor themselves on matters
related to Syria.
During the year, the Government did not bring charges against any
newspaper. In 1999 President Lahoud announced that under his tenure no
charges would be brought against any journalist because of his writings
or opinions. However, in June the Surete Generale banned seven foreign
publications for allegedly insulting the late Syrian President Hafez
Al-Asad. The Surete Generale seized at the airport four newspapers and
three magazines--The Herald Tribune, Le Monde, Liberation, the
Financial Times, the Economist, Time, and Newsweek. The Surete stated
that ``there were malicious attacks in some publications which were not
about political thinking but only sought to defame Al-Asad and hurt the
feelings of those upset by his death.'' In September the Government
banned an edition of The Economist because it contained an article
about Syria and the Middle East peace process, which was deemed
insulting to the Syrian Government. In December the State Prosecutor's
office questioned a journalist and two directors of An-Nahar newspaper
about an article that was critical of both the Lebanese and Syrian
security services. Following the interrogation, the State Prosecutor
released all three persons.
In April ISF personnel injured a journalist who was covering a
protest (see Section 1.c.). On April 13, authorities detained persons
for distributing antigovernment and anti-Syria leaflets. The Military
Court subsequently sentenced eight students to varying lengths of time
in prison. All of the students had been released by year's end (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
In May Dr. Muhammad Mugraby criticized the country's judicial
system at a press conference. The State Prosecutor's office requested
that the Bar Association lift Dr. Mugraby's immunity in order to
prosecute him for defaming the judiciary, and the Bar Association
complied with this request. However, Mugraby challenged the decision of
the Bar Association; the case was pending at year's end.
In June the Government cancelled the passport of a correspondent
for Al-Hayat newspaper, allegedly because she ``fraternized with the
enemy'' when she appeared publicly with an Israeli official. The
Government reissued the journalist's passport shortly after the
incident.
In June the Military Court sentenced a man to 1 year imprisonment
for calling on the public to celebrate the death of the late Syrian
president Al-Asad.
In August government officials raided the office of an Internet
service provider (ISP) based on allegations that the ISP was
distributing pornographic materials through operation of a website
aimed at the homosexual community. The Government also pressed charges
against the owner of the ISP and a human rights activist on national
security grounds (see Section 1.f.).
A court hearing remains pending in the case of An-Nahar journalist
Pierre Attallah, who was charged in absentia in June 1998 for defaming
the judiciary and entering Israel.
The country has a strong tradition of academic freedom and a
flourishing private educational system (a result of inadequate public
schools and a preference for religious community affiliation). Students
exercise the right to form campus associations, and the Government
usually does not interfere with student groups.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts
this right. In 1998 the Government lifted its longstanding decree
banning all demonstrations. Any group that wishes to organize a rally
must obtain the prior approval of the Ministry of Interior, which does
not render decisions consistently. Groups opposing government positions
sometimes do not receive permits. Various political factions such as
Amal, Hizballah, 'Awnists, and supporters of former Prime Minister
Hariri held several rallies during the year; the 'Awnists demonstrated
without a permit.
In June police forces prevented some 200 supporters of exiled
General Michel 'Awn from erecting two plaques at Nahr Al-Kalb, north of
Beirut; one plaque commemorated the Israel withdrawal from Lebanon and
the second plaque was left blank in anticipation of a withdrawal of
Syrian troops.
On several occasions during the year, military personnel used
excessive force to disperse protesters, sometimes arresting protesters
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
In October thousands of Palestinian refugees and Lebanese citizens
demonstrated peacefully on numerous occasions against Israeli
government actions in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right and does not interfere with
the establishment of private organizations; however, it imposes some
limits on this right. The law requires organizations to obtain from the
Ministry of Interior a receipt, which is essentially a permit, and may
be withheld by the Ministry.
The Ministry of Interior scrutinizes requests to establish
political movements or parties and to some extent monitors their
activities. The Army Intelligence Service monitors the movements and
activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 1.f.).
Syria does not allow groups that it considers openly hostile to
operate in areas under its control.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, there are some restrictions. Discrimination based on religion
is built into the system of government. There are no legal barriers to
proselytizing; however, traditional attitudes and edicts of the
clerical establishment discourage such activity.
The State is required to ensure the free exercise of all religious
rites provided that public order not be disturbed. The Constitution
also provides that the personal status and religious interests of the
population be respected. The Government permits recognized religions to
exercise authority over matters pertaining to personal status, such as
marriage, divorce, and inheritance. There is no state religion;
however, politics are based on the principle of religious
representation, which has been applied to every conceivable aspect of
public life.
A group that seeks official recognition must submit its dogma and
moral principles for government review to ensure that such principles
do not contradict popular values and the Constitution. The group must
ensure that the number of its adherents is sufficient to maintain its
continuity. Alternatively, religious groups may apply to obtain
recognition through existing religious groups. Official recognition
conveys certain benefits, such as tax-exempt status and the right to
apply the recognized religion's codes to personal status matters.
The unwritten ``National Pact'' of 1943 stipulates that the
President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament be a
Maronite Christian, a Sunni Muslim, and a Shi'a Muslim, respectively.
The Taif Accord, which ended the country's 15-year civil war in 1990,
reaffirmed this arrangement but resulted in increased Muslim
representation in Parliament and reduced the power of the Maronite
President. The Accord called for the ultimate abolition of political
sectarianism in favor of ``expertise and competence.'' However, little
substantive progress has been made in this regard. A ``Committee for
Abolishing Confessionalism,'' which was called for in the Taif Accord,
has not yet been formed. Christians and Muslims are represented equally
in the Parliament. Seats in the Parliament and Cabinet, and posts in
the civil service, are distributed proportionally among the 18
recognized groups (see Section 3).
Each recognized religious group has its own courts for family law
matters, such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
State recognition is not a legal requirement for religious worship or
practice. For example, although Baha'is, Buddhists, and Hindus are not
recognized officially, they are allowed to practice their faith without
government interference; however, their marriages, divorces, and
inheritances in the country are not recognized under the law.
The Government does not require citizens' religious affiliations to
be indicated on their passports; however, the Government requires that
religious affiliation be encoded on national identity cards.
An individual may change his religion if the head of the religious
group he wishes to join approves of this change. There are different
personal status codes for each of the 18 officially recognized
religious groups. Administered by representatives of the groups, these
codes govern many areas of civil law, including marriage, divorce,
inheritance, and child custody. Many families have relatives who belong
to different religious communities, and intermarriage is not uncommon;
however, intermarriage may be difficult to arrange in practice between
members of some groups because there are no procedures for civil
marriage. An attempt in 1998 by then-President Elias Hrawi to forward
legislation permitting civil marriage failed in the face of opposition
from the religious leadership of all confessions.
Article 473 of the Penal Code stipulates that one who ``blasphemes
God publicly'' faces imprisonment for up to a year.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice;
however, there were some limitations prior to the Israeli withdrawal
from the south. Travel to Israel is prohibited by law. All males
between 18 and 21 years of age are subject to compulsory military
service and are required to register at a recruitment office and obtain
a travel authorization document before leaving the country. Husbands
may block travel by their wives and minor children (see Section 5).
The LAF and Syrian troops maintain checkpoints throughout much of
the country. Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the south, the
Lebanese Army, the IDF, and the SLA maintained tight restrictions on
the movement of persons and goods in and out of Israel's self-declared
security zone. Following the Israeli withdrawal, dozens of customs and
military intelligence officers were dispatched to the south. In August
the Government deployed approximately 1,000 ISF and LAF officers to the
south; however the officers were not deployed to the border by year's
end. The ISF assumed responsibility for maintaining law and order in
most of the region. Following the withdrawal, the Government announced
that citizens no longer required permits to visit Jezzine. The U.N.
Interim Forces in Lebanon also increased its area of operations in the
country.
There are no legal restrictions on the right of all citizens to
return. However, many emigres are reluctant to return for a variety of
political, economic, and social reasons. The Government encouraged the
return to their homes of over 600,000 persons displaced during the
civil war. In 1999 and continuing during the year, the Central Fund for
the Displaced paid 13,500 squatter families approximately $65 million
(97.5 billion Lebanese pounds) to move out of the homes they occupied
and disbursed an additional $133 million (195 billion Lebanese pounds)
for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of homes that were damaged
during the civil war. Although some persons have begun to reclaim homes
abandoned or damaged during the war, the vast majority of displaced
persons have not attempted to reclaim and rebuild their property. The
resettlement process is slowed by tight budgetary constraints,
destroyed infrastructure, political feuds, the lack of schools and
economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security still is
incomplete in some parts of the country. During the year, the Ministry
of Displaced sponsored several reconciliation meetings between
Christian and Druze residents in eight villages throughout Chouf and
Aley.
Some 6,000 SLA militiamen and their families fled to Israel
following the Israeli withdrawal and concurrent collapse of the SLA in
May. Approximately 1,580 of these former SLA personnel returned to
Lebanon, several hundred relocated elsewhere outside of Israel, and
4,400 remained in Israel at year's end. The former SLA personnel who
returned to Lebanon faced trial for taking up arms against the State or
for trading with the enemy and most received prison sentences of
varying lengths (see Section 1.e.). Those who remain in Israel
reportedly wish to avoid facing trial or fear possible retribution. The
Government publicly stated that the former SLA militamen are welcome to
return to the country; however, they would face trial upon their
return.
Most non-Lebanese refugees are Palestinians. The U.N. Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) reported in 1999 that the number of Palestinian
refugees in the country registered with the UNRWA was about 370,000.
This figure, which includes only the families of refugees who arrived
in 1948, is presumed to include many thousands who reside outside the
country. Most experts estimate the actual number now in the country to
be fewer than 200,000. Most Palestinian refugees are unable to obtain
citizenship and are subject to governmental and societal
discrimination; however, Palestinian women who marry Lebanese men can
obtain citizenship (see Section 5).
The Government issues laissez-passers (travel documents) to
Palestinian refugees to enable them to travel and work abroad. In
January 1999, the Government eased the tight travel restrictions that
it previously imposed on Palestinians resident in the country and
entering from other countries by revoking a decision that had required
all Palestinian refugees who hold Lebanese travel documents to obtain
entry and exit visas when entering or leaving the country. However, in
March 1999, the Government stopped issuing visitors' visas to Jordanian
nationals who were born in Lebanon and are of Palestinian origin.
There are no legal provisions for granting asylum or refugee status
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not grant first
asylum. The Government grants admission and temporary (6 months) refuge
to asylum seekers, but not permanent asylum. The Government generally
cooperates with the offices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and UNRWA.
There are nearly 3,600 non-Palestinian refugees (mostly Iraqi Shi'a
and Kurds) residing in the country, according to the UNHCR. The Surete
Generale periodically detains non-Palestinian refugees, primarily
Iraqis and Sudanese, for illegal entry. Some of those detained are
registered with the UNHCR and are eligible for resettlement outside the
country. The Surete Generale denies UNHCR officials access to the
detainees. There were credible reports that the Surete Generale
detained Iraqi refugees and deported them back to Iraq.
The Government granted political asylum to Japanese Red Army (JRA)
member Kozo Okamoto, citing services rendered to the Arab cause and his
physical incapacity; Okamoto led the massacre at Israel's Lod airport
in 1972. The Government refused to grant asylum to four other JNA
members and deported them to Japan.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution states that citizens have the right to change
their government in periodic free and fair elections; however,
effective lack of control over parts of the country, defects in the
electoral process, and strong Syrian influence over politics and
decisionmakers significantly restrict this right. There was some
improvement in the parliamentary elections held in August and September
in that there were fewer incidents of voter fraud and tampering with
ballots than in the previous election; however, the electoral process
was flawed by serious shortcomings.
According to the Constitution, elections for the Parliament must be
held every 4 years. The Parliament, in turn, elects the President every
6 years. The President and Parliament nominate the Prime Minister, who,
with the President, chooses the Cabinet. According to the unwritten
``National Pact of 1943,'' the President is a Maronite Christian, the
Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker a Shi'a Muslim (see
Section 2.c.). Since the National Reconciliation Agreement reached in
Taif, Saudi Arabia in 1989, which revised the 6 to 5 ratio of Christian
to Muslim seats in Parliament, there has been a 50-50 balance between
Christian and Muslim Members of Parliament. The Taif Accord also
increased the number of seats in Parliament and transferred some powers
from the Maronite President to the Sunni Prime Minister and the
religiously mixed Cabinet.
Parliamentary elections in August and September were flawed. The
Syrian Government heavily influenced the electoral law governing the
process and also pre-approved all of the candidates on alliance slates
who ultimately won seats in the Cabinet. Security officials promoted
relatives and political allies, and government officials supervised
voting. The Government also used the official television station,
Teleliban to promote progovernment candidates and to denigrate the
leading opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
Officials applied inconsistent voting regulations, often favoring
progovernment candidates. Officials of various security services became
personally involved in promoting candidates who were political allies
or relatives. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Hoss lost his seat in a
contested election as did many progovernment candidates. Following his
overwhelming victory in the Beirut electoral districts, former Prime
Minister Hariri was appointed Prime Minister on October 23. Following
consultation between the Government and senior Syrian officials,
President Lahoud and Prime Minister Hariri reached an agreement on the
composition of the new Cabinet.
In 1998 the Parliament elected a new President after amending the
Constitution on a one-time basis to permit senior government officials
to run for office. (The Constitution prohibits senior government
officials from running for president unless they resign at least 2
years before the election. The amendment provided for a one-time
exception to this provision.) There was substantial criticism of the
Syrian role in influencing political leaders in the selection of the
presidential candidate; however, there was broad public support for the
new President, Emile Lahoud, who took office in November 1998. In 1999
municipal elections were held in 39 villages and towns. Local observers
reported that the elections were generally free and fair; however, they
were characterized by a number of irregularities, including the absence
of names from voting lists, the closure of the registration department
on voting day, and the presence of security personnel in polling
stations. By-elections in the areas formerly occupied by Israel are
scheduled to be held in 2001.
Women have the right to vote and there are no legal barriers to
their participation in politics; however, there are significant
cultural barriers, and women are underrepresented in government and
politics. No woman has ever held a cabinet position. In September 3
women were elected to the 128-seat Parliament.
Palestinian refugees have no political rights (see Section 5). An
estimated 17 Palestinian factions operate in the country, generally
organized around prominent individuals. Most Palestinians live in
refugee camps controlled by one or more factions. The leaders of the
refugees are not elected, but there are ``popular committees'' that
meet regularly with the UNRWA and visitors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several local human rights groups operate freely without overt
government restriction, including the Lebanese Association for Human
Rights, the Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights-Lebanon, and
the National Association for the Rights of the Disabled. Some of these
groups have sought to publicize the detention in Syria of hundreds of
Lebanese citizens and took credit in part for the release of a number
of Lebanese from Syrian jails during 1998 (see Section 1.d.). The Bar
Association and other private organizations regularly hold public
events that include discussion of human rights issues. Some human
rights groups reported harassment and intimidation by government,
Syrian, Hizballah, and SLA forces.
In July AI opened an office in the country.
During the year, government officials discussed human rights
problems with representatives of foreign governments and NGO's.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution calls for ``social justice and equality of duties
and rights among all citizens without prejudice or favoritism;''
however, in practice aspects of the law and traditional beliefs
discriminate against women. Religious discrimination is built into the
political system. The law gives preferences to the disabled for
employment in government positions. Discrimination based on race,
language, or social status is illegal and is not widespread among
citizens; however, foreign domestic servants often are mistreated.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The press reports
cases of rape with increasing frequency, and cases reported are thought
to be only a fraction of the actual number. There are no authoritative
statistics on the extent of spousal abuse. Most experts agree that the
problem affects a significant portion of the female population. In
general battered or abused women do not talk about their suffering for
fear of bringing shame upon their own families or accusations of
misbehavior upon themselves. Some religious courts legally can compel a
battered wife to return to the house in spite of physical abuse. Many
women are compelled to remain in abusive marriages because of social
and family pressures. Possible loss of custody of children and the
absence of an independent source of income also prevent women from
leaving their husbands. Doctors and social workers believe that most
abused women do not seek medical help because of shame or inability to
pay for treatment. The Government has no separate program to provide
medical assistance to battered women; however, it provides legal
assistance to victims of crimes who cannot afford it regardless of the
gender of the victim. In most of the cases, the police ignore
complaints submitted by battered or abused women. The Lebanese Council
to Resist Violence Against Women, which was founded in 1997, has been
active in working to reduce violence against women by offering
counseling and legal aid, and raising awareness about domestic
violence.
Foreign domestic servants often are mistreated, abused, and in some
cases, raped. Asian and African female workers have no legal recourse
available to them because of their low status and isolation from
society and because the labor laws do not protect them (see Section
6.e.). Because of such abuse, the Government prohibits foreign women
from working if they are from countries that do not have diplomatic
representation in the country.
The legal system is discriminatory in its handling of so-called
``honor crimes.'' According to the Penal Code, a man who kills his wife
or other female relative may receive a reduced sentence if he
demonstrates that he committed the crime in response to a socially
unacceptable sexual relationship conducted by the victim. However, in
1999 the law was amended to increase the severity of the sentence for
perpetrators of ``honor crimes.'' Several instances of honor crimes are
reported in the media every year.
Women have varying employment opportunities in government,
medicine, law, academia, the arts, and to a lesser degree, business.
However, social pressure against women pursuing careers is strong in
some parts of society. Men sometimes exercise considerable control over
female relatives, restricting their activities outside the home or
their contact with friends and relatives. Women may own property but
often cede control of it to male relatives for cultural reasons and
because of family pressure. In 1994 the Parliament removed a legal
stipulation that a woman must obtain her husband's approval to open a
business or engage in a trade. Husbands may block foreign travel by
their wives (see Section 2.d.). The testimony of a woman is equal to
that of a man (see Section 1.e.). During the year, the Government
amended some labor laws affecting women. For example, maternity leave
was extended and women no longer are forbidden from working at night.
Only men may confer citizenship on their spouses and children.
Accordingly, children born to citizen mothers and foreign fathers are
not eligible for citizenship. Citizen widows may confer citizenship on
their minor children.
Religious groups administer their own family and personal status
laws (see Section 2.c.). There are 18 recognized religious groups, each
of which differs in its treatment of marriage, family, property rights,
and inheritance. Many of these laws discriminate against women. For
example, Sunni inheritance law provides a son twice the inheritance of
a daughter. Although Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do
so only with the concurrence of their husbands. There is no law that
permits civil marriages, although such ceremonies performed outside the
country are recognized by the State. Only religious authorities may
perform marriages.
Children.--The plight of children remains a serious concern;
however, the Government has not allocated funds to protect them. Many
children, particularly in rural areas, take jobs at a young age to help
support their families. In lower income families, boys generally
receive more education, while girls usually remain at home to perform
housework. Illiteracy rates have reached 37.5 percent. In 1998 the
Government enacted a law making education free and compulsory until the
age of 12. However, public schools generally are inadequate, and the
cost of private education is a significant problem for the middle and
lower class. The Government also raised the age of child employment
from 8 to 13.
An undetermined number of children are neglected, abused,
exploited, and even sold to adoption agents. The normal procedure for
adoption is through religious homes or institutions authorized to
arrange adoption; however, the demand to provide infants for adoption
abroad results in illegal international adoptions. There are no
statistics available concerning the prevalence of the illegal adoption
of infants. Poor children often are compelled by their parents to seek
employment, and often take jobs that jeopardize their safety, including
in industry, car mechanic shops, and carpentry (see Section 6.d.).
Because of their ages, wages earned by such children are not in
conformity with labor regulations. The Government does not have
specific child protection laws to remove children from abusive
situations and does not grant NGO's adequate legislative standing to
litigate on behalf of abused minor children.
There are hundreds of abandoned children in the streets nationwide,
some of whom survive by begging, others by working at low wages. In
1999 the first Center for Street Children was opened to house and
rehabilitate street children. The Center has been active in gathering
children from various regions and providing a home for them. The Center
places disabled children in institutions and refers children with
police records to juvenile courts.
Juvenile delinquency is on the rise; many delinquents wait in
ordinary prisons for trial and remain there after sentencing. Although
their number is small, there is no adequate place to hold delinquent
girls; therefore, they are held in the women's prison in Ba'abda.
Limited financial resources have hindered efforts to build adequate
facilities to rehabilitate delinquents. The Government operates a
modern juvenile detention facility in Ba'asir, which opened in 1998.
The Committee for Children's Rights, formed in 1993 by prominent
politicians and some local NGO's, has been lobbying for legislation to
improve the condition of children. The Ministry of Social Affairs
oversees the Higher Council for Childhood and the National Committee
for Literacy. The Higher Council for Childhood prepared legal studies
and produced progress reports on national compliance with the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Ministry of Health requires
the establishment of health records for every child up to 18 years of
age.
People with Disabilities.--Over 100,000 persons became disabled
during the civil war. Care of the disabled generally is performed by
families. Most efforts to secure education, independence, health, and
shelter for the disabled are made by some 100 private organizations.
These organizations are relatively active, although poorly funded.
The heavily damaged cities make few accommodations for the
disabled. The Government does not mandate building code requirements
for nongovernment buildings for ease of access by the disabled,
although the Government in its rebuilding projects has constructed
sidewalks in some parts of Beirut that allow access for the disabled.
The private ``Solidere'' project for the reconstruction of downtown
Beirut has self-imposed requirements for disabled access. This project
is considered a model for future construction efforts around the
country.
During the year, the Parliament passed amendments to the law on
disabled persons, which stipulates that at least 3 percent of all
government and private sector positions should be filled by persons
with disabilities, provided that such persons fulfill the
qualifications of the position. The amendments provide the private
sector with tax reduction benefits if the number of disabled that were
hired exceeded the number specified in the law. The amendments also
impose new building codes in all government buildings and require that
public transportation be accessible for disabled persons.
Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religion is built
into the system of government (see Sections 2.c. and 3). The amended
Constitution of 1990 embraces the principle of abolishing religious
affiliation as a criterion for filling government positions, but few
practical steps have been taken to accomplish this aim. One notable
exception is the Lebanese Armed Forces, which, through universal
conscription and an emphasis on professionalism, has reduced
significantly the role of religious sectarianism in that organization.
Each religious group has its own courts for family law matters, such as
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
On October 3, 1999, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a
Maronite church in an eastern Beirut suburb. There were no arrests made
in this case during the year.
Throughout the fall of 1999, approximately six random bombings were
carried out against Orthodox churches and shops that sold liquor; the
bombings took place in the northern city of Tripoli and in surrounding
areas. The Government suspected that radical Sunni extremists carried
out the bombings in retaliation for Russian military operations in
Chechnya. Police officials detained and allegedly tortured a number of
Sunni youths for suspected involvement in these bombings; however, the
youths later were released due to a lack of evidence (see Section
1.d.).
In December 1999, Sunni extremists killed four LAF soldiers in an
ambush in the northern region of Dinniyeh after the soldiers attempted
to arrest two Sunni Muslims allegedly involved in a series of church
bombings. On December 31, 1999, the LAF retaliated by launching a
massive military operation against Sunni extremists in the north. Five
civilians, 7 LAF soldiers, and 15 extremists were killed in this
operation (see Section 1.a.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the United
Nations, an estimated 370,000 Palestinian refugees are registered in
the country (see Section 2.d.); however, it is believed that fewer
actually reside there. Most Palestinian refugees live in overpopulated
camps that have suffered repeated heavy damage as a result of fighting.
The Government generally has prohibited the construction of permanent
structures in the camps on the grounds that such construction
encourages the notion of permanent refugee settlement in the country.
Refugees fear that in the future the Government may reduce the size of
the camps or eliminate them completely.
The Government officially ended its practice of denying work
permits to Palestinians in 1991. However, in practice, very few
Palestinians receive work permits, and those who find work usually are
directed into unskilled occupations. They and other foreigners may own
a limited size plot of land but only after obtaining the approval of
five different district offices. The law applies to all foreigners, but
for political, cultural, and economic reasons it is applied in a manner
disadvantageous to Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, to the 25,000
Kurds in the country. The Government does not provide health services
to Palestinian refugees, who rely on UNRWA and UNRWA-contracted
hospitals.
In recent years, Palestinian incomes have declined as the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) closed many of its offices in the
country, which formerly employed as much as 50 percent of the
Palestinian work force. Palestinian children reportedly have been
forced to leave school at an early age because U.N. relief workers do
not have sufficient funds for education programs. The U.N. estimates
that 18 percent of street children are Palestinian. Drug addiction and
crime reportedly are increasing in the camps, as is prostitution,
although reliable statistics are not available. In August 1999, the
Fatah faction of the PLO expanded its operations in the Ain al-Hilwah
refugee camp by opening security offices and hiring personnel to
maintain order in the camps.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except government
employees, may establish and join unions and have a legal right to
strike. Worker representatives must be chosen from those employed
within the bargaining unit. About 900,000 persons form the active labor
force, 42 percent of whom are members of 160 labor unions and
associations. Twenty- two of the unions, with about 200,000 workers,
are represented in the General Confederation of Labor (GCL).
In general the Government does not control or restrict unions,
although union leaders allege credibly that in the past, the Government
has tried to interfere in elections for union officials.
Palestinian refugees may organize their own unions; however,
because of restrictions on their right to work, few Palestinians
participate actively in trade unions.
Unions are free to affiliate with international federations and
confederations, and they maintain a variety of such affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of
workers to organize and to bargain collectively exists in law and
practice. Most worker groups engage in some form of collective
bargaining with their employers. Stronger federations obtain
significant gains for their members and on occasion have assisted
nonunionized workers. There is no government mechanism to promote
voluntary labor-management negotiations, and workers have no protection
against antiunion discrimination.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is not
prohibited by law. In the absence of a prohibition against it, children
(see Section 5), foreign domestic servants, and other foreign workers
(see Section 6.e.) sometimes are forced to remain in situations
amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1946 Labor Code stipulates that workers between the
ages of 8 and 16 may not work more than 7 hours a day, with 1 hour of
rest provided after 4 hours. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor amended this
law to define workers under the age of 13 as child labor, in accordance
with international obligations. Children are prohibited from working
between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. The code also prohibits certain
types of mechanical work for children between the ages of 8 and 13, and
other types for those between the ages of 13 and 16. In 1999 the
Government passed legislation that prohibits children under the age of
16 from working in jobs that jeopardize their health, safety, or morals
and requires that employers give children at least 20 hours of annual
leave. In June the Parliament passed amendments to the Labor Code that
prohibit children under age 18 from working more than 6-hour days, with
1 hour of rest for days of more than 4 hours of work, and from working
between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. The proposed amendments would
also entitle children to 20 hours of annual paid leave. The Ministry of
Labor is responsible for enforcing these requirements; however, it does
not apply the law rigorously. Forced and bonded child labor is not
prohibited and sometimes occurs (see Section 6.c.).
Children between the ages of 10 and 14 constitute 0.6 percent of
the labor force (5,936 children in total), according to 1996 figures.
Most of these child laborers are Lebanese, but some are Syrian; they
work predominantly in the industrial, craft, and metallurgical sectors.
According to a 1995 UNICEF study, 60 percent of working children are
below 13 years of age and 75 percent earn wages below two-thirds of the
minimum wage. Nearly 40 percent of working children work 10 to 14 hours
per day, and few receive social welfare benefits. In addition,
approximately 52,000 children between the ages of 15 and 19 are in the
active labor force; they are not eligible for the minimum wage until
they reach the age of 21.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a legal
minimum wage, currently about $200 (300,000 Lebanese pounds) per month.
The law is not enforced effectively in the private sector. In theory
the courts could be called upon to enforce it, but in practice they are
not. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Trade unions attempt to ensure the
payment of minimum wages in both the public sector and the large-scale
private sector.
The Labor Law prescribes a standard 6-day workweek of 48 hours,
with a 24-hour rest period per week. In practice workers in the
industrial sector work an average of 35 hours a week and workers in
other sectors work an average of 30 hours a week. Foreign domestic
servants, mostly of Asian and African origin, often are mistreated,
abused, and raped. The employment contract for a foreign worker is
signed by a recruitment agency and the employer; workers rarely are a
party to the contract or, if they are a party, do not know what the
contract stipulates because it is written in Arabic. The passports of
foreign domestic workers are confiscated by the recruitment agency or
their employer when the workers arrive at the airport. Foreign domestic
servants are not protected by labor laws. Domestic servants often work
18 hours per day and, in most cases, do not receive time off for
vacations or holidays. There is no minimum wage for domestic servants;
their average wage is about $100 (150,000 Lebanese pounds) per month.
They have no entitlement to government financial assistance. Many
foreign workers leave their jobs--which is not against the law--but
their employers often report them as thieves to the police in order to
locate them and force them to return.
The law includes specific occupational health and safety
regulations. Labor regulations require employers to take adequate
precautions for employee safety. The Ministry of Labor is responsible
for enforcing these regulations, and it does so unevenly. Labor
organizers report that workers do not have the right to remove
themselves from hazardous conditions without jeopardizing their
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, the Penal Code stipulates that ``any
person who deprives another of freedom either by abduction or any other
means shall be sentenced to temporary hard labor.'' If forced
prostitution or forced rendering of sexual services occurs as a result
of the abduction, the Penal Code stipulates that the abductor be
sentenced to at least 1 year in prison. There were no reports that
persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
LIBYA
The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a dictatorship
that has been ruled by Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi (the ``Brother
Leader and Guide of the Revolution'') since 1969, when he led a
military coup to overthrow King Idris I. Borrowing from Islamic and
pan-Arab ideas, Qadhafi created a political system that rejects
democracy and political parties and purports to establish a ``third
way'' superior to capitalism and communism. Libya's governing
principles are derived predominantly from Qadhafi's ``Green Book.'' In
theory Libya is ruled by the citizenry through a series of popular
congresses, as laid out in the Constitutional Proclamation of 1969 and
the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People of
1977, but in practice Qadhafi and his inner circle control political
power. Qadhafi is aided by extragovernmental organizations--the
Revolutionary Committees and the Comrades Organization--that exercise
control over most aspects of citizens' lives. The judiciary is not
independent of the Government.
Libya maintains an extensive security apparatus, consisting of
several elite military units, including Qadhafi's personal bodyguards,
local Revolutionary Committees, and People's Committees, as well as the
``Purification'' Committees, which were formed in 1996. The result is a
multilayered, pervasive surveillance system that monitors and controls
the activities of individuals. The various security forces committed
numerous serious human rights abuses.
The Government dominates the economy through complete control of
the country's oil resources, which account for almost all export
earnings and approximately 30 percent of the gross domestic product.
Oil revenues constitute the principal source of foreign exchange. Much
of the country's income has been lost to waste, corruption, and
attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction and acquire
conventional weapons. Despite efforts to diversify the economy and
encourage private sector participation, the economy continues to be
constrained by a system of extensive controls and regulations covering
prices, credit, trade, and foreign exchange. The Government's
mismanagement of the economy has caused high levels of inflation,
increased import prices, and hampered economic expansion, which has
resulted in a decline in the standard of living for the majority of
citizens in recent years. Significant increases in the world price of
oil boosted petroleum revenues this year, masking the negative domestic
impact of the country's economic policy.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it
continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the
right to change their government. Qadhafi has used extrajudicial
killing and intimidation to control the opposition abroad and summary
judicial proceedings to suppress it at home. Security forces torture
prisoners during interrogations and as punishment. Prison conditions
are poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and
many prisoners are held incommunicado. Many political detainees are
held for years without charge. The Government controls the judiciary,
and citizens do not have the right to a fair public trial or to be
represented by legal counsel. The Government infringes on citizens'
privacy rights, and citizens do not have the right to be secure in
their homes or persons, or to own private property. The Government
restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and
religion. The Government imposes some limits on freedom of movement. In
September the Government reportedly expelled hundreds of sub-Saharan
workers following incidents of mob violence against the workers; the
authorities also were accused of responding slowly to the violence. The
Government prohibits the establishment of independent human rights
organizations. Violence against women is a problem. Traditional
attitudes and practices continue to discriminate against women, and
female genital mutilation (FGM) still is practiced in remote areas of
the country. The Government discriminates against and represses certain
minorities and tribal groups. The Government continues to repress
banned Islamic groups and exercises tight control over ethnic and
tribal minorities, such as Amazighs (Berbers), Tuaregs, and Warfalla
tribe members. The Government restricts basic worker rights, uses
forced labor, and discriminates against foreign workers. There have
been reports of slavery and trafficking in persons.
Colonel Qadhafi publicly called for violence against opponents of
his regime after violent clashes between Islamic activists and security
forces in Benghazi in September 1995. Outbreaks of violence between
government forces and Muslim militants continued in the eastern part of
the country. The Government encouraged reconciliation with opposition
groups during the year and invited dissidents living abroad to return,
promising that they would be safe. An opposition figure was appointed
Ambassador to the Arab League, but few other opposition figures
returned, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and the
likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear.
In April 1999, the Government surrendered the two men suspected of
the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 for trial before a Scottish court
seated in the Netherlands. As a result, U.N. sanctions against Libya
were suspended. The full lifting of the U.N. sanctions will require
that Libya cooperate with the investigation, accept responsibility for
the actions of its officials, pay appropriate compensation, and
renounce terrorism.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Violent clashes
between the security forces and militant Islamist opposition groups
increased following a lull toward the end of 1999. In the past, the
clashes were concentrated predominantly in the eastern region and
resulted in an undetermined number of deaths. Since a 1996 prison
mutiny in Benghazi and other attacks against the regime, the Government
has maintained tightened security measures. In the years following the
mutiny, the Government made hundreds of arrests, conducted military
operations in the areas of insurrection, and killed a number of
persons.
The Government uses summary judicial proceedings to suppress
domestic dissent and has used extrajudicial killings and intimidation
to control the opposition abroad. Prior to 1994, there were reports
that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living
abroad (see Sections 1.b. and 2.d.).
The U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya following
the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which killed
259 persons on board and 11 persons on the ground, and the bombing of
UTA flight 772 over Chad in 1989, which killed 171 persons. In April
1999, the Government surrendered the two men suspected of the Pan Am
bombing, which prompted the suspension of U.N. sanctions against Libya.
The suspects are being tried under Scottish law before a Scottish court
seated in the Netherlands. Following the conclusion of the UTA trial
and the appearance in the Netherlands of the two Libyan suspects in the
Pan Am 103 bombing, the full lifting of the now-U.S. and British
investigations; accept responsibility for the actions of its officials;
pay appropriate compensation; and renounce terrorism.
In March 1999, a French court convicted in absentia the six
defendants in the UTA bombing and sentenced them to life in prison. In
July the Government paid the French Government $31 million (17 million
dinars) to compensate the victims' families. Family members of the UTA
772 victims now are seeking indictments of more senior officials,
including Qadhafi.
In late November 1999, the Government paid compensation to the
British Government for the 1984 killing of British policewoman Yvonne
Fletcher outside the Libyan Embassy in London.
In September mobs of citizens in several locations reportedly beat
hundreds of sub-Saharan expatriate workers, attacking and, in some
cases, burning their places of residence and employment. Credible
reports indicate that as many as 50 individuals were killed and
hundreds of others injured. The mobs blamed the expatriate population
for increased crime and the appearance of HIV in Libya. Libyan security
forces were criticized by many African governments for their slow
reaction to these events (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
Prison conditions reportedly are poor and caused an unknown number
of deaths in custody (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--The regime in the past has abducted and killed
dissidents in the country and abroad. Dissident Mansour Kikhiya
disappeared from Cairo, Egypt in 1993. There is credible information
that, following his abduction, Kikhiya was executed in Libya in early
1994. There have been no reports of such abductions or killings since
1994.
Prisoners routinely are held in incommunicado detention (see
Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law provides for fines against any official using
excessive force; however, there are no known cases of prosecution for
torture or abuse. Security personnel reportedly routinely torture
prisoners during interrogations or for punishment. Government agents
reportedly periodically detain and torture foreign workers,
particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. Reports of torture are
difficult to corroborate because many prisoners are held incommunicado.
In April 1999, the U.N. Committee against Torture reported that it
continued to receive allegations of torture and recommended that the
authorities send a clear message to all its law enforcement personnel
that torture is not permitted under any circumstances.
Methods of torture reportedly include: Chaining to a wall for
hours, clubbing, applying electric shock, applying corkscrews to the
back, pouring lemon juice in open wounds, breaking fingers and allowing
the joints to heal without medical care, suffocating with plastic bags,
depriving of food and water, hanging by the wrists, suspending from a
pole inserted between the knees and elbows, burning with cigarettes,
attacking with dogs, and beating on the soles of the feet. In May three
defendants, (two Bulgarians and one Palestinian) all health
professionals in a much publicized case involving the HIV infection of
nearly 400 Libyan children, claimed that their confessions had been
obtained under duress (see Section 1.e.).
Prison conditions reportedly are poor. According to Amnesty
International (AI), political detainees reportedly were held in cruel,
inhuman, or degrading conditions, and denied adequate medical care,
which led to several deaths in custody. AI reported that Mohammad 'Ali
al-Bakoush, detained since 1989 without charge or trial, died in Abu
Salim prison in August 1999, reportedly as a result of poor conditions
of detention. Inmates protesting poor conditions mutinied in July 1996
at the Abu Salim prison. The prisoners went on a hunger strike and
captured guards to protest the lack of medical care, overcrowding, and
inadequate hygiene and diet provided at the facility. Security units
were dispatched to suppress the uprising; as many as 100 persons were
killed by security forces.
The Government does not permit prison visits by human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces
arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. By law the Government may hold
detainees incommunicado for unlimited periods. It holds many political
detainees incommunicado in unofficial detention centers controlled by
members of the Revolutionary Committees. Hundreds of political
detainees, many associated with banned Islamic groups, reportedly are
held in prisons throughout the country (but mainly in the Abu Salim
prison in Tripoli); many are held for years without charge. Hundreds of
other detainees may have been held for periods too brief (3 to 4
months) to permit confirmation by outside observers (see Section 1.c.).
In 1998 security forces arrested suspected members and sympathizers
of banned Islamic groups and monitored activities at mosques following
violent clashes in eastern Libya. In June 1998, at least 100
professionals in Benghazi and several other major cities were arrested
on suspicion of political opposition activities, specifically support
of or sympathy for the Libyan Islamic Group, an underground Islamic
movement that is not known to have used or advocated violence. Some
practicing Muslims have shaved their beards to avoid harassment from
security services. Qadhafi has criticized publicly Libyan
``mujaheddin'' (generally, conservative Islamic activists who fought
with the Afghan resistance movement against Soviet forces) as threats
to the regime (see Section 2.c.).
The 1994 Purge Law was established to fight financial corruption,
black marketeering, drug trafficking, and atheism. It has been enforced
by the ``Purification'' Committees since June 1996 (see Section 1.f.).
Scores of businessmen, traders, and shop owners have been arrested
arbitrarily on charges of corruption, dealing in foreign goods, and
funding Islamic fundamentalist groups, and dozens of shops and firms
have been closed. As part of the campaign to implement the Purge Law,
the wealth of the middle class and affluent has been targeted as well.
In March 1997, the Libyan General People's Congress approved a law
that provides for the punishment of accomplices to crimes of
``obstructing the people's power, instigating and practicing tribal
fanaticism, possessing, trading in or smuggling unlicensed weapons, and
damaging public and private institutions and property.'' The new law
provides that ``any group, whether large or small,'' including towns,
villages, local assemblies, tribes, or families, be punished in their
entirety if they are accused by the General People's Congress of
sympathizing, financing, aiding in any way, harboring, protecting, or
refraining from identifying perpetrators of such crimes. Punishment
under the Collective Punishment Law ranges from the denial of access to
utilities (water, electricity, telephone), fuels, food supplies,
official documents, and participation in local assemblies, to the
termination of new economic projects and state subsidies.
In May 1997, Qadhafi declared that if any member of a family was
found guilty of an offense, the individual's entire family was to be
considered guilty.
The Government does not impose exile as a form of punishment, and
it continued to encourage Libyan dissidents abroad to return, promising
to ensure their safety; however, with the exception of the recently
appointed Ambassador to the Arab League, formerly an opponent of the
regime, few returned, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and
the likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear. Prior to 1994, there
were reports that security forces hunted down and killed dissidents
living abroad (see Section 1.a.). Students studying abroad have been
interrogated upon their return (see Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent
of the Government.
There are four levels of courts: Summary courts, which try petty
offenses; the courts of first instance, which try more serious crimes;
the courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court, which is the final
appellate level.
Special revolutionary courts were established in 1980 to try
political offenses. Such trials often are held in secret or even in the
absence of the accused. In other cases, the security forces have the
power to pass sentences without trial, especially in cases involving
political opposition. The U.N. Special Rapporteur noted in 1996 a lack
of fairness in trials of capital cases. In the past, Qadhafi has
incited local cadres to take extrajudicial action against suspected
opponents. In May the attorney defending 16 health professionals who
were charged with infecting 400 Libyan children with HIV (see Section
1.c.) complained that he had been allowed to meet with his clients only
twice since their incarceration. The defendants (nine Libyans, one
Palestinian and six Bulgarians) were arrested in January 1999.
A large number of offenses, including political offenses and
``economic crimes,'' are punishable by death. A 1972 law mandates the
death penalty for any person associated with a group opposed to the
principles of the revolution, as well as for other acts
such as treason, attempting to change the form of government by
violence, and premeditated murder. The ``Green Book'' of 1988 states
that ``the goal of the Libyan society is to abolish capital
punishment''; however, the Government has not acted to abolish the
death penalty, and its scope has increased. In 1996 a law went into
effect that applies the death penalty to those who speculate in foreign
currency, food, clothing, or housing during a state of war or a
blockade, and for crimes related to drugs and alcohol.
In 1997 two civilians and six army officers were executed: The
civilians by hanging and the army officers by firing squad. At least
five others were given prison sentences, all convicted on charges of
being American spies, committing treason, cooperating with opposition
organizations, and instigating violence to achieve political and social
goals. The eight executed men were arrested with dozens of others in
connection with a coup attempt by army units composed of Warfalla tribe
members in October 1993. The men were convicted by the Supreme Military
Court and reportedly did not have lawyers for their trial. The
convicted persons allegedly were kept in secret locations and tortured
throughout their incarceration to obtain confessions of criminal
activity.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
Executions noted in 1996 ``the apparent lack of respect for fair trial
standards in trials leading to the imposition of capital punishment in
Libya.''
The private practice of law is illegal; all lawyers must be members
of the Secretariat of Justice.
The Government holds a large number of political prisoners. Amnesty
International estimates that there are hundreds of persons imprisoned
for political reasons.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government does not respect the right to privacy.
Security agencies often disregard the legal requirement to obtain
warrants before entering a private home. They also routinely monitor
telephone calls.
The security agencies and the Revolutionary Committees oversee an
extensive network of informants; one credible foreign observer
estimated that 10 to 20 percent of the population was engaged in
surveillance for the regime. Libyan exiles have reported that family
ties to suspected regime opponents may result in government harassment
and detention. The Government may seize and destroy property belonging
to ``enemies of the people'' or those who ``cooperate'' with foreign
powers. In the past, citizens have reported that the Government warned
members of the extended family of any regime opponent that they, too,
risk the death penalty.
The law passed by the General People's Congress in March 1997
formally codified the Government's previous threats of punishment for
families or communities that aid, abet, or do not inform the regime of
criminals and oppositionists in their midst (see Section 1.d.).
The 1994 Purge Law provides for the confiscation of private assets
above a nominal amount, describing wealth in excess of such
undetermined amounts as ``the fruits of exploitation or corruption.''
In 1996 the Government ordered the formation of hundreds of ``Purge''
or ``Purification'' Committees composed of young military officers and
students. The Purification Committees reportedly seized some
``excessive'' amounts of private wealth from members of the middle and
affluent classes; the confiscated property was taken from the rich to
be given to the poor, in an effort to appease the populace and to
strengthen the Government's power and control over the country. The
activities of the Purification Committees continued during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The authorities tolerate some
difference of opinion in People's Committee meetings and at the General
People's Congress; however, in general they severely limit freedom of
speech. This is especially true with regard to criticism of Qadhafi or
his regime. The occasional criticism of political leaders and policies
in the state-controlled media, which does occur is interpreted as a
government attempt to test public opinion or weaken a government figure
who may be a potential challenger to Qadhafi.
The regime restricts freedom of speech in several ways: By
prohibiting all political activities not officially approved, by
enacting laws so vague that many forms of speech or expression may be
interpreted as illegal, and by operating a pervasive system of
informants (see Section 1.f.) that creates an atmosphere of mistrust at
all levels of society.
The State owns and controls the media. There is a state-run daily
newspaper, Al-Shams, with a circulation of 40,000. Local Revolutionary
Committees publish several smaller newspapers. The official news
agency, JANA, is the designated conduit for official views. The regime
does not permit the publication of opinions contrary to government
policy. Such foreign publications as Newsweek, Time, the International
Herald Tribune, L'Express, and Jeune Afrique are available, but
authorities routinely censor them and may prohibit their entry into the
market.
Technology has made the Internet and satellite television widely
available in Libya. According to numerous anecdotal reports, both are
accessed easily in Tripoli.
The Government restricts academic freedom. Professors and teachers
who discuss politically sensitive topics face a risk of government
reprisal.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Public assembly
is permitted only with regime approval and in support of the regime's
positions.
Despite these restrictions, members of the Warfalla tribe staged
several informal protests in 1995 against the regime's decision to
carry out the death penalty against tribe members involved in the 1993
coup attempt. The Government responded by arresting hundreds of tribe
members and expelling others from the military and security forces. In
January 1997, eight Warfalla tribe members arrested for involvement in
the 1993 coup attempt were executed, and at least five others were
given prison sentences for allegedly being American spies (see Section
1.a.).
The last display of public discontent and resentment towards the
Government occurred when a riot broke out over a penalty called at a
soccer match in Tripoli in 1996. The rare instance of public unrest
began when a contentious goal was scored by the team that Qadhafi's
sons supported, and the referee called the play in their favor. The
spectators reportedly started chanting anti-Qadhafi slogans after the
referee made the call, and Qadhafi's sons and their bodyguards opened
fire in the air, then on the crowd. The spectators panicked and
stampeded out of the stadium and into the streets, where they stoned
cars and chanted more anti-Qadhafi slogans. The Government officially
admitted that 8 persons died and 39 were injured as a result of the
soccer riots, but there were reports of up to 50 deaths caused by the
gunfire and the stampede of the crowd. There is speculation that this
year's mob violence against sub-Saharan guest workers (see Sections
1.a. and 5) reflects dissatisfaction with the Government's efforts to
enhance ties to Africa, particularly the decisions to relax immigration
controls on sub-Saharan workers and to funnel greater economic
assistance to African nations.
The Government limits the right of association; it grants such a
right only to institutions affiliated with the regime. According to a
1972 law, political activity found by the authorities to be treasonous
is punishable by death. An offense may include any activity that is
``opposed to the principles of the Revolution.''
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of
religion. The country is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. In an apparent
effort to eliminate all alternative power bases, the regime has banned
the once powerful Sanusiyya Islamic sect. In its place, Qadhafi
established the Islamic Call Society (ICS), which is the outlet for
state-approved religion, as well as a tool for exporting the revolution
abroad. The ICS also is responsible for relations with other religions,
including Christian churches in the country. In 1992 the Government
announced that the ICS would be disbanded; however, its director still
conducts activities, suggesting that the organization remains
operational. Islamic groups whose beliefs and practices are at variance
with the state-approved teaching of Islam are banned. Although most
Islamic institutions are under state control, some mosques are endowed
by prominent families; however, they generally follow the government-
approved interpretation of Islam.
According to recent reports, individuals rarely are harassed
because of their religious practices, unless such practices are
perceived as having a political motivation. In June 1998, at least 100
professionals in Benghazi and several other major cities were arrested
on suspicion of political opposition activities, specifically support
of or sympathy for the Libyan Islamic Group, an underground Islamic
movement that is not known to have used or advocated violence. Some
practicing Muslims have shaved their beards to avoid harassment from
security services. Qadhafi has criticized publicly Libyan
``mujaheddin'' (generally, conservative Islamic activists who fought
with the Afghan resistance movement against Soviet forces) as threats
to the regime see Section 1.d.). Members of some minority religions are
allowed to conduct services. Christian churches operate openly and are
tolerated by the authorities. The authorities reportedly have failed to
honor a promise made in 1970 to provide the Anglican Church with
alternative facilities when they took the property used by the Church.
Since 1988 Anglicans have shared a villa with other Protestant
denominations. Christians are restricted by the lack of churches; there
is a government limit of one church per denomination per city. There
are two resident Catholic bishops, and a small number of priests. In
March 1997, the Vatican established diplomatic relations with Libya,
stating that Libya had taken steps to protect freedom of religion. The
Vatican hoped to be able to address more adequately the needs of the
estimated 50,000 Catholics in the country.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government usually does not restrict
the internal movement of citizens but has imposed blockades on those
cities and regions (primarily in the east) where antigovernment attacks
or movements originate. In 1996 after the escape of some 400
prisoners--during which residents purportedly harbored escapees--the
town of Dirnah was sealed off by government troops and also had its
water and electricity cut off.
The Government requires citizens to obtain exit permits for travel
abroad and limits their access to hard currency. A woman must have her
husband's permission to travel abroad (see Section 5). Authorities
routinely seize the passports of foreigners married to citizens upon
their entry into the country.
The right of return exists. The regime has called on students, many
of whom receive a government subsidy, and others working abroad, to
return to Libya on little or no notice. Students studying abroad have
been interrogated upon their return. Prior to 1994, there were reports
that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living
abroad (see Section 1.a.).
The Government has expelled noncitizens arbitrarily (see Section
6.e.). There were reports that in September the Government expelled
hundreds of sub-Saharan workers following incidents of mob violence
(see Section 1.a. and 5). Government authorities placed noncitizen,
primarily sub-Saharan guest workers in hastily built camps pending
their repatriation to their countries of origin. While there were no
reports of mistreatment associated with these camps, sanitary
conditions and access to health care reportedly were poor.
In April 1998, the Government accused at least 10 Tunisians of
suspected membership in, or support for, the Islamist group An-Nadha,
which is banned in Tunisia for activities in opposition to the Tunisian
Government, and forcibly returned them to Tunisia, where they
reportedly were subjected to abuse. In 1995 the Government expelled
approximately 1,000 Palestinian residents to indicate its displeasure
with the signing of the Interim Agreement between Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestinians resorted to living
in makeshift camps along the Egyptian border. The Government
subsequently allowed them to return, but over 200 Palestinians elected
to remain in the border camps, hoping to travel to the West Bank and
Gaza or resettle in Egypt. The governments of Egypt and Israel refused
to accept them, leaving them stranded in the deteriorating and squalid
conditions of the once temporary border encampments. They were removed
forcibly from their encampments to another location within the country
by police and military authorities in April 1997.
The Government expelled 132 Algerians in November 1997 (see Section
6.e.).
While the country has acceded to the 1969 Organization of African
Unity Convention on refugees, the law does not include provisions for
granting asylum, first asylum, or refugee status in accordance with the
provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, and the Government does not grant such
status. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that
by December, there were approximately 33,000 refugees in the country,
including some 30,000 Palestinians, 3,000 Somalis, and 100 of other
nationalities. During the year, UNHCR assisted approximately 1,000 of
the most vulnerable refugees in the country and supported income-
generating programs for refugee women. The Government provided housing
for approximately 850 Somali refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Major
government decisions are controlled by Qadhafi, his close associates,
and committees acting in his name. Political parties are banned.
Qadhafi appoints military officers and official functionaries down to
junior levels. Corruption and favoritism, partially based on tribal
origin, are major problems that adversely affect government efficiency.
In theory popular political participation is provided by the
grassroots People's Committees, which are open to both men and women,
and which send representatives annually to the national General
People's Congress (GPC). In practice the GPC is a rubber stamp that
approves all recommendations made by Qadhafi.
Qadhafi established the Revolutionary Committees in 1977. These
bodies consist primarily of youths who guard against political dissent.
Some Committees have engaged in show trials of regime opponents; in
other cases, they have been implicated in the killing of opponents
abroad. The Committees approve all candidates in elections for the GPC.
There is no reliable information on the representation of women and
minorities in the Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government prohibits the establishment of independent human
rights organizations. Instead it created the Libyan Arab Human Rights
Committee in 1989. The Committee is not known to have published any
reports.
The regime has not responded substantively to appeals from Amnesty
International on behalf of detainees. In 1994 the regime characterized
Amnesty International as a tool of Western interests and dismissed its
work as neocolonialist; its representatives last visited Libya in 1988.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these factors;
however, the Government does not enforce these prohibitions,
particularly discrimination against women and tribal minorities.
Women.--Although there is little detailed information on the extent
of violence against women, it remains a problem. In general the
intervention of neighbors and extended family members tends to limit
the reporting of domestic violence. Abuse within the family rarely is
discussed publicly, due to the value attached to privacy in society.
The 1969 Constitutional Proclamation granted women total equality.
Despite this legal provision, traditional attitudes and practices
prevail, and discrimination against women persists and keeps them from
attaining the family or civil rights formally provided them. A woman
must have her husband's permission to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
Although their status is still not equal to that of men, most
observers agree that, with the advent of oil wealth in the 1970's, the
opportunity for women to make notable social progress has increased.
Oil wealth, urbanization, development plans, education programs, and
even the impetus behind Qadhafi's revolutionary government all have
contributed to the creation of new employment opportunities for women.
In recent years, a growing sense of individualism in some segments of
society, especially among the educated young, has been noted. For
example, many educated young couples prefer to set up their own
households, rather than move in with their parents, and view polygyny
with scorn. Since the 1970's, educational differences between men and
women have narrowed.
In general the emancipation of women is a generational phenomenon:
Urban women under the age of 35 tend to have more ``modern'' attitudes
toward life and have discarded the traditional veil; at the same time,
older urban women tend to be more reluctant to give up the veil or
traditional attitudes towards family and employment. Moreover, a
significant proportion of rural women still do not attend school and
tend to instill in their children such traditional beliefs as women's
subservient role in society.
Employment gains by women also tend to be inhibited by lingering
traditional restrictions that discourage women from playing an active
role in the workplace and by the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist
values. Some observers have noted that even educated women tend to lack
self-confidence and social awareness and seek only a limited degree of
occupational and social participation with men.
Children.--The Government subsidizes education (which is compulsory
to age 15) and medical care and has improved the welfare of children;
however, declining revenues and general economic mismanagement have led
to cutbacks, particularly in medical services. Some nomadic tribes
located in remote areas still practice female genital mutilation (FGM)
on young girls, a procedure that is widely condemned by international
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health.
People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the
Government's efforts to assist the disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Arabic-speaking Muslims of
mixed Arab and Amazigh ancestry constitute 97 percent of the
population. The principal minorities are Amazighs and blacks. There are
frequent allegations of discrimination based on tribal status,
particularly against Amazighs in the interior and Tuaregs in the south.
The Government has manipulated the tribes to maintain a grip on power
by rewarding some tribes with money and government positions and
repressing and jailing members of various other tribes. The Government
also has attempted to keep the tribes fractured by pitting one against
another.
Foreigners constitute a significant part of the workforce. Sub-
Saharan Africans in particular have become targets of resentment, and
in September mobs of citizens in several locations reportedly beat
hundreds of sub-Saharan workers, attacking and, in some cases, burning
their places of residence and employment. Credible reports indicate
that as many as 50 individuals were killed, and hundreds of others
injured. The mobs blamed the expatriate population for increased crime
and the appearance of HIV in Libya. Libyan security forces were
criticized by many African governments for their slow reaction to these
events (see Section 5).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Independent trade unions and
professional associations are prohibited, and workers do not have the
right to form their own unions. The regime regards such structures as
unacceptable ``intermediaries between the revolution and the working
forces.'' However, workers may join the National Trade Unions'
Federation, which was created in 1972 and is administered by the
People's Committee system. The Government prohibits foreign workers
from joining this organization.
The law does not provide workers with the right to strike. In a
1992 speech, Qadhafi affirmed that workers have the right to strike but
added that strikes do not occur because the workers control their
enterprises. There have been no reports of strikes for years.
The official trade union organization plays an active role in the
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization
of African Trade Union Unity. The Arab Maghreb Trade Union Federation
suspended the membership of Libya's trade union organization in 1993.
The suspension followed reports that Qadhafi had replaced all union
leaders, in some cases with loyal followers without union experience.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense, because labor law
requires that the Government must approve all agreements.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--In its report this
year, the Committee of Experts of the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) stated that in Libya ``persons expressing certain
political views or views ideologically opposed to the established
political, social, or economic system may be punished with penalties of
imprisonment,'' including ``an obligation to perform labor.'' The ILO
report also noted that public employees may be sentenced to compulsory
labor ``as a punishment for breaches of labor discipline or for
participation in strikes, even in services whose interruption would not
endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the whole or part of
the population.''
There have been credible reports that the Government arbitrarily
has forced some foreign workers into involuntary military service or
has coerced them into performing subversive activities against their
own countries. Libyans, despite the Penal Code's prohibition on
slavery, have been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves,
mainly southern Sudanese women and children, who were captured by
Sudanese government troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan (see
Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 18, although
when Libya ratified ILO Convention 138 on Minimum Age for Employment in
1975, the minimum age specified was 15. Education is compulsory to age
15. There is no information available on the prevalence of child labor,
or on forced or bonded labor by children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The labor force consists of
approximately 1.2 million (1995 estimate) workers, including a
significant, but unknown number of expatriate workers (in a population
of 6 million). Wages, particularly in the public sector, frequently are
in arrears. A public sector wage freeze imposed in 1981 remains in
effect and has eroded real income significantly, particularly in the
face of consistently high inflation. There is no information available
regarding whether the average wage is sufficient to provide a worker
and family with a decent standard of living.
The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours. The Labor Law defines the
rights and duties of workers, including matters of compensation,
pension rights, minimum rest periods, and working hours.
Although foreign workers constitute a significant percentage of the
work force, the Labor Law does not accord equality of treatment to
them. Foreign workers may reside in the country only for the duration
of their work contracts and may not send more than half of their
earnings to their families in their home countries. They are subject to
arbitrary pressures, such as changes in work rules and contracts, and
have little option but to accept such changes or to depart the country.
Foreign workers who are not under contract enjoy no protection.
In 1997 the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
cited inadequate housing, threats of imprisonment to those accused of
disobeying disciplinary rules, and accusations of causing a variety of
societal problems as some of the problems in the Government's treatment
of foreign laborers.
The Government uses the threat of expulsion of foreign workers as
leverage against countries whose foreign policies run counter to
Libya's. The Government expelled approximately 1,000 Palestinian
residents in late 1995 to signal its displeasure with the agreement
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in 1996,
the regime threatened to expel thousands of Palestinian workers for
political and economic reasons (see Section 2.d.).
Over 130 Algerians were expelled in 1997 (see Section 2.d.).
Labor inspectors are assigned to inspect places of work for
compliance with occupational health and safety standards. Certain
industries, such as the petroleum sector, try to maintain standards set
by foreign companies. There is no information on whether a worker can
remove himself from an unhealthy or unsafe work situation without
risking continued employment.
In September mobs of citizens in several locations, reportedly beat
hundreds of foreign workers from sub-Saharan African, attacking and in
some cases burning their places of residence and employment. Many
African governments criticized Libyan security forces for their slow
reaction to these events (see Section 5).
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no information available
regarding whether the law prohibits specifically trafficking in
persons.
There have been reports of trafficking in persons. Libyans have
been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves, mainly southern
Sudanese women and children, who were captured by Sudanese government
troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan.
__________
MOROCCO
The Constitution provides for a monarchy with a Parliament and an
independent judiciary; however, ultimate authority rests with the King,
who presides over the Council of Ministers, appoints all members of the
Government, and may, at his discretion, terminate the tenure of any
minister, dissolve the Parliament, call for new elections, and rule by
decree. The late King Hassan II, who ruled for 38 years, was succeeded
by his son, King Mohammed VI, in July 1999. Since the constitutional
reform of 1996, the bicameral legislature consists of a lower house,
the Chamber of Representatives, which is elected through universal
suffrage, and an upper house, the Chamber of Counselors, whose members
are elected by various regional, local, and professional councils. The
councils' members themselves are elected directly. The lower house of
Parliament also may dissolve the Government through a vote of no
confidence. In March 1998, King Hassan named a coalition government
headed by opposition socialist leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi and
composed largely of ministers drawn from opposition parties. Prime
Minister Youssoufi's Government is the first government drawn primarily
from opposition parties in decades, and also represents the first
opportunity for a coalition of socialist, left-of-center, and
nationalist parties to be included in the Government. The November 1997
parliamentary elections were held amid widespread, credible reports of
vote buying by political parties and the Government, and excessive
government interference. The fraud and government pressure tactics led
most independent observers to conclude that the results of the election
were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the Government. After
a long appeals process, some of the results were overturned by the
Constitutional Council during the year and new by-elections were held.
In September the Government reported that various political parties had
engaged in vote-buying and fraud during indirect elections to replace
one-third of the 270 seats in the Chamber of Counselors, Parliament's
upper house. The Government criticized the electoral corruption,
indicating that it would investigate and prosecute those concerned;
however, few of the cases involving electoral fraud had been presented
before the courts or prosecuted by year's end. The judiciary
historically has been subject to bribery and government influence;
however, the Youssoufi Government continued to implement a reform
program to develop greater independence and impartiality.
The security apparatus includes several overlapping police and
paramilitary organizations. The Border Police and the National Security
Police are departments of the Ministry of Interior, the Judicial Police
falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and the Royal
Gendarmerie reports to the Palace. Some members of the security forces
continued to commit serious human rights abuses.
The economy is based on large phosphate reserves, a diverse
agricultural sector, fisheries, a sizable and growing tourist industry,
a growing manufacturing sector (especially textiles), and a dynamic,
deregulated telecommunications sector. There are considerable
remittances from citizens working abroad. The illegal production and
export of cannabis also is a significant economic activity,
particularly in the north. Economic growth is highly dependent on
agricultural output, which has been affected adversely by 2 consecutive
years of worsening drought. According to the Government's statistics,
the real gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by 0.7 percent in 1999. A
similar outcome is estimated for 2000.
The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in
most areas; however, the Government's record was generally poor in a
few areas, and there were some notable setbacks. Citizens do not have
the full right to change their government. While then-King Hassan II's
appointment of a first-ever opposition coalition government in 1998
marked a significant step toward democratization, officially recognized
corruption and votebuying in the September Chamber of Counselors
elections constituted a notable setback. There were reports of several
suspicious deaths in police custody. Some members of the security
forces occasionally tortured or otherwise abused detainees, and beat
protesters on numerous occasions. Despite some progress by the
Government, human rights groups continue to call for full disclosure of
all available information concerning citizens abducted by the
Government from the 1960's through the 1980's. Despite significant
efforts by the Government, prison conditions remain harsh. Authorities
sometimes arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. The judiciary
historically has been subject to corruption and Interior Ministry
influence; however, the Government continued to implement judicial
reforms in order to increase the level of the judiciary's independence
and impartiality. Nonetheless, human rights organizations and activists
alleged a lack of due process in several high-profile court trials,
including 2 controversial military court trials involving an air force
captain who, after criticizing corruption in the military to a foreign
news publication, ultimately was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for
violating the Military Code; five Sahrawi youths who, after being
arrested in Laayoune for throwing stones at police, were sentenced to 5
to 10 years' imprisonment for forming a criminal association; and
unemployed graduates who were detained during protests in Rabat in
June. At times authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The
Government's record on press freedom was inconsistent during the year.
While the Government permitted extensive coverage of formerly taboo
topics it systematically restricted press freedom on several specific
topics that it considers sensitive, and on which journalists continue
to practice self-censorship, including criticism of the Monarchy,
Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam. It
appeared that the Government also increased restrictions on both
domestic and international media to prevent reporting on some topics
with the potential to reflect negatively on the country's international
image. The Government censored and banned at least 12 domestic and
foreign publications during the year. On December 2, Prime Minister
Youssoufi used the highly controversial and longcriticized Article 77
of the Press Code to ban three investigative weekly newspapers. The
Government limited freedom of assembly and association. In numerous
incidents during the year, police beat and violently dispersed
demonstrators. The Government limited freedom of religion. Although
non-Muslim foreigners may practice their religions freely, missionaries
who proselytize face expulsion, and converts from Islam to other
religions continue to experience social ostracism. The Government
monitors the activities of mosques. During the summer, the Government
prevented members of an Islamist group, whose leader has questioned the
legitimacy of the Monarchy, from gaining access to campgrounds and
beaches for group prayer sessions, and arrested and jailed some of the
group's members. The Government at times restricts freedom of movement
and withholds the granting of passports for foreign travel. Domestic
violence and discrimination against women are common. Teenage
prostitution is a problem in urban centers. Berbers face cultural
marginalization, and continue to press the Government to preserve their
language and culture. Unions are subject to government interference,
child labor also is a problem, and the Government has not acted to end
the plight of young girls who are subjected to exploitative and abusive
domestic servitude.
However, there was further progress on some important human rights
issues during the year. In February and August, the courts sentenced to
prison terms five members of the security forces who were convicted for
their involvement in the beating deaths of prisoners. In order to
implement reforms enacted into law in 1999, the National Prison
Administration initiated a series of activities to improve living
conditions inside prisons, including the construction of family
visitation centers, manual skills training facilities, and visits by
various entertainers. In July the Royal Arbitration Commission that the
King established in 1999 to indemnify former political prisoners and
their families, released an initial grant of compensation totaling
approximately $14 million (140 million dirhams), which benefited 68
victims or their families; some of the grant money went to Sahrawis
from the Western Sahara who were in need of urgent provisional
financial and medical aid. The July compensation also supplemented an
initial Government allotment to the commission of roughly $4 million
(40 million dirhams) in April that went to meet the urgent medical
needs of 39 former prisoners and their survivors. The Government
continued to clear a backlog of unenforced legal judgments from
previous years. In May the Government allowed Islamist dissident Sheik
Abdessalam Yassine to leave his home after 11 years of house arrest for
refusing to acknowledge the religious authority of then-King Hassan II.
The Constitutional Council overturned a number of election results
considered fraudulent from the 1997 legislative elections, as well as
results from a by-election held in June. The King appointed the
Monarchy's first female royal counselor in March and confirmed the
appointment of the first female minister in September. In May the
Government accorded ``public utility'' status, which confers
organizations with financial benefits as recognition of their serving
the public interest, to two of the country's leading human rights
organizations, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and the
Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (OMDH). In October the
Government permitted an organization of former political detainees, as
well as hundreds of human rights activists, to travel to and hold a
remembrance ceremony at the notorious former secret detention center of
Tazmamart, whose existence the authorities formerly denied. Throughout
the year, the Human Rights Ministry held numerous human-rights-
awareness training sessions with teachers and some police personnel,
and the Government increased its efforts to introduce human rights as a
core subject of the national school curriculum. In September the
Government hosted a human rights training seminar for representatives
of Arab governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) in the
Arab world. During her visit in April to attend an international
conference on national human rights institutions and open a U.N.-
sponsored human rights information center, U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights Mary Robinson said that while there were still problems to
resolve, the country had achieved ``significant progress'' in human
rights over the past 2 years. In January the Human Rights Ministry
announced an agreement with the Moroccan Barristers Association to open
a network of legal support centers for victims of domestic violence.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings. According to a report in the February
newsletter of the AMDH, Ali Akzkane died on January 4 under suspicious
circumstances, while in police custody in the southern town of Tiznit,
after being apprehended during an attempted robbery. In response to a
January 13 newspaper article that called attention to the AMDH's report
and its request for a government investigation, the Inspector General
of the National Security Police in early March denied accusations of
police malfeasance in the death. According to the Inspector General,
Akzkane committed suicide in his jail cell 2 hours after being
incarcerated, and authorities immediately notified the public
prosecutor and regional doctor. An investigation ensued and, according
to the Inspector General, discussions with Akzkane's family revealed
that he had been suffering from depression. Results of the autopsy
reportedly attributed Akzkane's death to suicide. According to the
AMDH, it was contacted by the Government regarding the affair in
September and told that the authorities were reviewing the case. There
were no results in the investigation by year's end (see Section 1.c.).
The AMDH's bureau in Taounate (outside of Fez) reported suspicious
circumstances in the death of Mustapha Najiaji, after a Royal Armed
Forces patrol took him and another citizen into custody at 2 a.m. on
July 12; the press reported that security forces detained the two for
public drunkenness and possession of illegal narcotics. According to
the second citizen, the patrol took him and Najiaji to a ``bechouia''
(an administrative center under the jurisdiction of the Interior
Ministry that contains holding cells) and beat them until 3 a.m. The
security forces subsequently freed the second citizen after Najiaji
fell down, lost consciousness, and stopped breathing. According to the
AMDH report, at 4 a.m. the security forces at the bechouia notified the
public prosecutor that they had found Najiaji dead in his cell from a
suicide by hanging. The second citizen reportedly alleged in his
testimony to the public prosecutor that Najiaji died from beatings at
the hands of the security forces. According to the AMDH, the prosecutor
general of Fez orally transmitted the autopsy results to Najiaji's
family, and the family's lawyer reportedly had access to the results;
the results reportedly made reference to Najiaji having been the victim
of violence before his death. The AMDH expressed concern over the slow
handling of the case, which reportedly was pending with the general
prosecutor at the military court in Rabat at year's end. The Royal
Armed Forces patrol members involved in the case were not yet charged
by year's end (see Section 1.c.).
On November 27, security forces reportedly used violent means to
break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in the southern
city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted in the death of one
worker and injuries to eight others. Conflicting reports attributed the
death to either police abuse or ``natural causes'' (see Sections 1.c.,
1.d., 2.b., and 6.a.).
In their annual human rights report for 1999, which was released in
late January, the AMDH called on the Government ``to resolve
definitively and urgently the issue of deaths inside and outside police
stations and posts of the Gendarmerie.''
A police officer and two members of the Interior Ministry's
auxiliary forces were arrested in connection with the beating death of
Farah Mohammed near Oujda in August 1999. The public prosecutor at
Oudja's court of appeal subsequently ordered an investigation. Farah
Mohammed was stopped by police authorities for questioning in
connection with contraband trafficking of fuel across the Moroccan
border with Algeria. Eyewitnesses said that the police beat and kicked
him into unconsciousness at the time he was detained. He died in police
custody. Farah Mohammed's parents lodged an immediate complaint with
gendarmerie authorities as soon as they learned of their son's death,
which led to the immediate arrest of the police and military auxiliary
officers allegedly involved in the beating. The trial in the case still
reportedly was pending at year's end.
In August an appeals court in Settat (south of Casablanca)
convicted an auxiliary member of the security forces to 12 years'
imprisonment and a fine of approximately $6,000 (60,000 dirhams) for
the beating death of mint vendor Abdelaziz Warret in June 1999. Two
other auxiliary members of the security forces involved in the beating
death were sentenced to 4 months in prison. According to press reports
in June 1999, police in Berrechid arrested Warret, confiscated his
merchandise, and beat him until he fainted. He died later at a
hospital. When his family went to claim the body and to obtain a death
certificate, doctors refused to issue one. No explanation was given for
his arrest. An autopsy subsequently performed during the investigation
into Warret's death revealed that he died from internal hemorrhaging
caused by the beating.
In February a court in Tangiers convicted two police officers of
manslaughter in the 1996 beating death of a citizen returning from
Holland. According to reports of witnesses, port police stopped Mohamed
El-Feddaoui in Tangiers as he disembarked from a car ferry in his
automobile. The witnesses claim that El-Feddaoui subsequently was taken
to the police station and tortured to death by two police officers. The
two officers reportedly had been instructed by the port's police
commissioner to detain and torture Feddaoui. Both of the police
officers received 10 years' imprisonment for violence resulting in
manslaughter. The court sentenced the port police commissioner to 8
years' imprisonment for abusive detention and denial of his complicity
in the crime. The court also ordered all three to pay approximately
$35,000 (350,000 dirhams) each to Feddaoui's estate. According to press
reports, the AMDH principally was responsible for furnishing testimony
in the case (see Section 1.c.).
In September the court of appeal in Safi (south of Casablanca)
resumed a long-delayed case and summoned three police officers charged
with manslaughter in the 1996 death of Hassan Mernissi. According to
Mernissi's family, he was killed by the three police officers while in
incommunicado (``garde-a-vue'') detention in Safi's central police
station. Police reportedly had stopped Mernissi for drunkenness.
According to a lawyer representing Mernissi's family, witnesses present
in the police station at the time alleged that Mernissi was beaten to
death while in detention. The police officers maintained that the
allegedly drunk Mernissi knocked his head against the bars of his cell
until he died. The autopsy indicated that Mernissi bled to death.
Before the case was heard by court of appeal in Safi in early 1999, it
remained in the pretrial investigation stage for over 2 years. In
consideration of the Ramadan holiday, in December the trial was
postponed again until March 2001.
Human rights groups allege that poor medical care in prisons
results in unnecessary deaths; however, the Justice Ministry in 1999
assigned more doctors to prisons in an effort to improve prison health
facilities. However, resource constraints continue to contribute to
harsh conditions, including extreme overcrowding, malnutrition, and
lack of hygiene. Throughout the year, the National Prison
Administration continued to allow numerous site visits by members of
Parliament, the press, human rights groups, and foreign diplomats (see
Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no new cases of confirmed
disappearance for the fifth consecutive year; however, the AMDH claimed
during the year that the continued practice of incommunicado detention
without informing the family members of those detained (see Section
1.d.) was evidence of the continued practice of forced disappearance.
While the forced disappearance of individuals who opposed the
Government and its policies occurred over several decades, the
Youssoufi Government, upon taking office, pledged that such policies
would not recur, and that it would disclose as much information as
possible on past cases. Many of those who disappeared were members of
the military who were implicated in attempts to overthrow the
Government in 1971 and 1972. Others were Sahrawis or Moroccans who
challenged the Government's claim to the Western Sahara or other
government policies. Many of those who disappeared were held in secret
detention camps. While the Government in recent years quietly released
several hundred persons who had disappeared, including a release of
about 300 such detainees in June 1991, and although in October 1998 it
issued an announcement on those who disappeared, to this day hundreds
of Saharan and Moroccan families do not have any information about
their missing relatives, many of whom disappeared over 20 years ago. No
explanation for their incarceration has ever been provided. Local human
rights monitors have concluded that many others died while at the
notorious Tazmamart prison, which the Government since has closed. The
Government has acknowledged 34 of these deaths and has provided death
certificates to the families of all but 1 of the 34 who died.
In October 1998, in response to a directive issued by then-King
Hassan II that all human rights cases be resolved ``within 6 months,''
the Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH) announced the
release of information on 112 cases of disappearances. According to the
Council, 56 of the 112 who disappeared were deceased; family members of
33 of the deceased received death certificates from the Government. The
Council added that eight persons believed to have disappeared were
alive and living abroad, and that four were alive and in Morocco. Of
the remaining 44, the Council stated that it had no further
information. Human rights groups and families pointed out discrepancies
between their lists and those of the Government, asked the Government
for more data regarding these cases, and demanded full explanations of
the causes and circumstances of these deaths and disclosure of the
identities of those responsible. Some family groups claim that the
Government is not divulging details on at least 50 more cases. In
November 1998, the Council began meetings in various provinces with
groups representing families of persons who had disappeared in order to
collect data on their grievances and to conduct further research into
the fate of those who remain missing. In April 1999, the Council
announced that it would indemnify the 112 victims of politically
motivated disappearances. Human rights NGO's disputed the Council's
findings, claiming that they had compiled a list of over 600 potential
cases of such disappearances from the 1960's through the 1980's. The
NGO's called for the immediate release of all remaining political
prisoners, disclosure of the fate of those whose cases the Council did
not examine, delivery of the remains of the deceased to their families,
compensation for victims and their families, and punishment for those
responsible. On July 17, the Paris-based International Federation of
Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) published a communique in which it
estimated the number of persons who had disappeared in Morocco alone to
be ``between nearly 600 and several thousand.'' The FIDH claimed that
disappearances of Sahrawis in the Western Sahara could number up to
1,500, although conditions in the territory prevented full confirmation
of this figure. In October the Government for the first time permitted
an organization of former political detainees, as well as hundreds of
human rights activists, to travel to and hold a remembrance ceremony at
the notorious former secret detention center at Tazmamart, whose
existence the authorities formerly denied (see Section 2.a.).
In August 1999, in one of his first official acts, King Mohammed VI
established a new royal commission responsible for increasing the
Government's efforts to resolve the issue of those who had disappeared
and to reach an accommodation with former political prisoners and
members of their families. The new commission met with some family
members and local human rights organizations and began to draw up
guidelines for the resolution of issues involving individuals who had
disappeared.
Following up on the CCDH's December 1999 announcement to distribute
advance partial compensation to the neediest victims of forced
disappearance and arbitrary detention, Prime Minister Youssoufi
declared before Parliament in January that his government would
compensate financially the most urgent cases first. Youssoufi's
announcement came after the passing of the Government's January 1
deadline for receipt of compensation claims from former detainees and
their survivors by the Royal Arbitration Commission working under the
auspices of the CCDH. The number of claims filed totaled approximately
5,900. Human rights organizations contested the nature of the
compensation process, particularly the composition of the Arbitration
Commission, which they claimed lacked independence; the lack of
transparency in the commission's decision-making processes; and the
condition imposed by the commission that those filing claims must
accept the commission's findings as final, without appeal. In April the
CCDH announced the Government's allocation of a provisional
compensation fund totaling approximately $4 million (40 million
dirhams), as well as initial provisional compensation for 31 of the
neediest former prisoners who had been held in the notorious Tazmamart
prison, and 8 of the prisoners' surviving family members. Each prisoner
or surviving family member received up to approximately $14,500
(145,000 dirhams), a sum designed to cover urgent medical and financial
expenses caused by extended imprisonment. In July the Royal Arbitration
Commission announced final compensation settlements for 68 cases
(benefiting 354 persons, including some of those provisionally
compensated in April) that totaled approximately $14 million (140
million dirhams). Former prisoners or their survivors were designated
to receive between $25,000 and $350,000 (250,000 and 3,500,000
dirhams). In July the Arbitration Commission began distributing
preliminary compensation payments to some of the Sahrawis from the
Western Sahara who had disappeared or been detained, and their family
members. As with the April allotment, the Government stated that it
intended these initial payments as provisional compensation to cover
urgent medical and financial expenses for needy Sahrawis or their
surviving family members who appealed for compensation from the
Commission by December 31, 1999. The Government announced that
additional compensation in the form of final settlements could be
distributed pending the review by the Commission of petitions submitted
by Sahrawi claimants. Critics of the arbitration process continued to
criticize the Commission, claiming that its composition lacked
independence and that the Commission's stipulation that all of its
decisions were final was unfair. Numerous former prisoners and their
survivors refused to file a claim. Others criticized the small number
of cases settled, citing that over 5,800 cases remained. In the absence
of disclosure by the Government explaining its role in past
disappearances, the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice (FMVE--created
by victims of forced disappearance and their surviving family members)
continued to argue that the compensation process alone was inadequate
to redress past government actions; it requested the Government to go
beyond compensation to facilitate conciliation between citizens and the
Government through publicized investigations into disappearances and
arbitrary detentions. After the July compensation settlement was
announced, the OMDH issued a communique calling for more transparency
during the arbitration process. According to the OMDH, ``the fact of
not communicating these measures at the opportune time, even though the
measures were limited, helped sow ambiguity and misinformation, which
the issue could have done without.'' In speeches given in July and
December, King Mohammed VI addressed criticisms of the compensation
process by announcing imminent reform of the CCDH. According to the
King, the CCDH's composition, responsibilities, and work structure
would be changed. None of the King's proposed changes had been
implemented by year's end.
There were no developments in the disappearance of Abdullah
Sherrouq, a student who reportedly was detained by security services on
June 22, 1981. After 19 years, his family has been unable to learn
anything of his whereabouts or his fate, despite appeals by Amnesty
International (AI). In 1998 the CCDH listed Sherrouq as 1 of the 112
cases of disappearance acknowledged by the Government; according to the
council, Sherrouq disappeared in undetermined circumstances; he was 1
of the 44 for whom the Government said it possessed no further
information.
Associations that seek information on those who have disappeared,
including the FMVE, an executive coordinating committee of former
Sahrawi political prisoners, and a group specifically representing
Tazmamart prison survivors, operate openly, and call upon the
Government for full disclosure of events surrounding cases that date
back to the 1960's. Several front-page articles in newspapers
affiliated with parties in the governing coalition called at various
times during the year for full disclosure on all outstanding cases of
disappearance. The associations also call for compensation to families
of those who have disappeared, death certificates and the return of the
remains of those who died, and prosecution of responsible officials.
The Government has indicated that it would be more open about providing
information on these past cases, and met with the FMVE on a number of
occasions during the year to discuss its concerns. Throughout the year,
FMVE leaders also met with the CCDH and leaders of national political
parties. However, according to press reports in August, the FMVE's
leadership claimed that political parties were hesitant to help them
address the problem of past disappearances. Associations in the Western
Sahara that seek information on disappearances do not operate free from
government interference; there were reports that some members of these
associations were harassed and intimidated while seeking information on
missing Sahrawis. Some also continue to be denied passports (see
Section 2.d.).
Until July the Government paid a monthly stipend of $500 (5,000
dirhams) to 28 former prisoners who survived 18 to 20 years in solitary
confinement under harsh conditions at Tazmamart prison in connection
with the coup attempts in 1971 and 1972. After their release, the
Government prohibited them from speaking out publicly about their
detention. In exchange the Government gave the former prisoners
assurances that it would help them find jobs and reintegrate them into
society; however, none of them has obtained government assistance in
this regard, and some complain of being denied voter cards and
passports. After the final compensation settlement package from the
Royal Arbitration Commission to the 31 former Tazmamart prisoners in
July, the authorities ceased distributing the monthly stipends to the
28 who had been kept in solitary confinement.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and the Government claims that
the use of torture has been discontinued; however, some members of the
security forces still torture or otherwise abuse detainees. The Penal
Code requires capital punishment for perpetrators who commit acts of
torture or ``acts of barbarity,'' provided that such acts occur during
the commission of a crime. The Penal Code also stipulates sentences up
to life imprisonment for public servants who ``use or oblige the use of
violence'' against others in the exercise of their functions. By law,
pretrial investigating judges must, if asked to do so or if they
themselves notice physical marks that so warrant, refer the detained
person to an expert doctor. However, according to legal experts, this
obligation often is ignored in practice.
In February the AMDH reported the death under suspicious
circumstances of Ali Akzkane while he was in police custody in Tiznit
on January 4 after being apprehended during an attempted robbery. In
response to the AMDH's request for a government investigation, the
National Security Police denied accusations of malfeasance in Akzkane's
death, and attributed his death to suicide likely brought on by
depression. Results of an autopsy reportedly attributed Akzkane's death
to suicide. According to the AMDH, which was contacted by the
Government regarding the affair in September, the authorities were
reviewing the case at year's end (see Section 1.a).
In April a Moroccan court in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune
sentenced five Sahrawi youths to prison terms of between 5 and 10 years
for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their alleged
participation in a March 4 stone-throwing in the same city. One of the
lawyers representing the five Sahrawis alleged that the judicial police
who investigated the affair committed several illegal acts, including
torturing the youths during their detention (see Sections 1.d., 1.e.,
and 1.f.).
After his release from prison on May 4 after a royal pardon, Sadok
El-Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the Istiqlal party's
General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), contacted the AMDH with
accusations that he had been arrested arbitrarily, jailed, tortured,
and falsely convicted by authorities in June 1999 following his
participation in a national truckers strike. El-Kihal alleged that
security forces in the Gendarmerie of Taouriate (Oujda province)
tortured him for almost 24 hours, suspending him by his arms for
extended periods while beating his fingers and feet. El-Kihal also
alleged to AMDH that members of the Gendarmerie tied his hands behind
his back, bent him backward on his knees, and applied pressure to his
stomach while somebody forced their fingers down his throat. El-Kihal
alleged that two adjutants in the Gendarmerie participated in his
torture. El-Kihal said that his jailers wrote a false police report,
which they forced him to endorse with his thumbprint without first
allowing him to read it. El-Kihal alleged that it was this police
report that formed the basis of his conviction at the Oujda court of
appeals, which sentenced him to 2 years' imprisonment. The Istiqlal
party's Arabic-language daily, Al-Alam, published a UGTM communique on
September 30, 1999, regarding El-Kihal's treatment. El-Kihal
subsequently benefited from a royal pardon and was freed on May 4 (see
Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 6.a.).
In June a foreign diplomat met with a Sahrawi student, who claimed
to have been tortured by the authorities for suspected participation in
May 17 to 18 demonstrations near the Marrakech University campus. There
were conflicting accounts regarding the origins of the large-scale
demonstrations, during which mostly Sahrawi students clashed with
dozens of Marrakech police in violent exchanges that involved the
throwing of a Molotov cocktail by one student and the clubbing of
students by security forces. During the detention, police allegedly
attempted to force the student to inform on other Sahrawi students who
had participated in the demonstrations. During the meeting, the student
showed the foreign diplomat fresh burn marks that the police allegedly
inflicted with cigarettes (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e).
On May 17 in Rabat, police arrested 14 students at Mohammed V
University and charged them with arson, violence against the police,
erecting barricades, and impeding free movement. The students, 12 of
whom were Sahrawis, participated earlier in the day in a solidarity
protest with fellow Sahrawi students who were arrested the same morning
in Marrakech. According to a lawyer representing 13 of the accused
students, one of his clients claimed that police took him to an
unidentified location after his arrest, beat him severely, and
interrogated him regarding his activities and links with other Sahrawis
and human rights activists. Indicating his client's difficulty in
speaking in court, as well as his swollen face and eyes, the lawyer
requested the pretrial investigating judge to conduct a medical
examination of his client, which the judge refused. After a series of
hearings and delays, on November 17, the Rabat court of appeals
acquitted and freed all 14 students who were detained in mid-May.
According to a lawyer for the defense, all of the detained students
denied before the court any involvement in the demonstration. The
prosecution reportedly failed to produce any witnesses who could
confirm the students' participation in the May 17 incident (see Section
1.e.).
The AMDH's bureau in Taounate (outside of Fez) reported suspicious
circumstances in the death of Mustapha Najiaji after a Royal Armed
Forces patrol reportedly took him and another citizen into custody on
July 12; press reports stated that security forces detained the two for
public drunkenness and possession of illicit narcotics. According to
the AMDH report, the second citizen claimed that the patrol beat
Najiaji to death while the security forces claim that they found
Najiaji dead in his cell from suicide by hanging. The AMDH reported
that the prosecutor general of Fez orally transmitted the autopsy
results to Najiaji's family and that the family's lawyer had access to
the results; the results reportedly made reference to Najiaji having
been the victim of violence before his death. The AMDH expressed
concern over the slow handling of the case; it reportedly was pending
with the general prosecutor at the military court in Rabat at year's
end, and the Royal Armed Forces patrol members have yet to be charged
(see Section 1.a.).
In August the media reported a case of alleged torture by police in
a Casablanca police station. Abderrahmane Jamali alleged that police
officers in the Ain Sebaa-Hay Al-Hassani station tortured him for 3
days while he was detained in early August, once in the presence of a
citizen who had filed a complaint against him. Press reports alleged
that the incident began in late July when the plaintiff twice filed a
complaint against Jamali for abuse of confidence and theft. After the
prosecutor dismissed the first complaint for lack of proof, the
plaintiff requested a reopening and more thorough investigation of the
case. Press reports alleged that Jamali subsequently was detained,
tortured for 3 days, and then convicted and sentenced by a Casablanca
court to 5 months' imprisonment several days later. Jamali reportedly
fainted during the sentencing hearing. Jamali became ill within days of
his incarceration and, after his family sent a letter to the prison
director requesting the director's intervention, was sent to various
medical facilities. At Averroes hospital, doctors on August 11 detected
an infection allegedly transmitted by parasites found on rodents.
According to the Party of Progress and Socialism's French-language
daily newspaper Al-Bayane, doctors also found signs of ``physical
cruelty'' on Jamali's body. The marks reportedly included contusions
and bruises on his neck and knees, as well as a lesion on one of his
lungs. A doctor at Averroes wrote a letter to Al-Bayane claiming that
the infection Jamali contracted ``does not explain all of the signs
that we observed during (his) clinical examination.'' Afterwards,
Jamali filed complaints against three agents of the judicial police for
torture; the Casablanca police department issued a communique on August
18 stating that it had opened an investigation into the charges of
torture. Some newspapers called for an investigation into the court of
first instance's handling of the case because the judge and prosecutor
allegedly failed to inquire into the detainee's fragile state of
health, as required by law.
In September the media reported on two cases of alleged torture by
a deputy officer from the Royal Gendarmerie brigade in Zaio, in the
northeastern part of the country. According to the reports, the officer
tortured two persons in order to extort money from their family and
friends. In one of the cases, a cafe owner alleged that in September
the officer slapped him in front of his customers, used force to remove
him from his establishment, and subjected him to various forms of
torture at brigade headquarters. In the second case, an elderly woman
brought suit against the same officer for torturing her son and
extorting approximately $500 (5,000 dirhams) from her to stop the
torture. After he was informed of the cases, Zaio's municipal president
(who also is a Member of Parliament) reportedly referred the cases
immediately to the national authorities. An investigation into the
alleged torture was ongoing at year's end.
At the October 27 trial of 10 students at the University of Hassan
I in Settat, each of the students reportedly declared before the Settat
court of first instance that they were forced under duress and torture
to sign (by thumb prints) their police statements. According to a
communique from the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) political
party, two of its members who were involved in the incident ``were
victims of grave physical cruelty'' during their transfer to the police
station and during their detention (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
The OMDH filed a complaint on behalf of some of those who were
detained and abused by the police at the end of September 1999,
following several days of protests over a variety of social grievances
in Laayoune in the Western Sahara (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 1.f., and
2.b.). There was photographic and other evidence to substantiate claims
that the police systematically had beaten some of the persons they had
detained in connection with the protests. An investigation was opened
into the charges; however, after almost 15 months no police officials
have been charged in connection with the force used to break up the
protests, nor for the beatings inflicted on some of those detained by
the police. (Some police officials allegedly responsible subsequently
were transferred in 1999 and the chief of police in Laayoune was
relieved of his duties there.)
In its 2000 annual international human rights report released in
June, Amnesty International acknowledged that security forces involved
in several cases of torture had been arrested and prosecuted. However,
the organization noted that ``in the majority of cases, investigations
were either not opened into complaints and allegations of torture ...
or were opened but dismissed without adequate investigation.''
Frustrated by what it perceived to be the Interior Ministry's slow
implementation of measures to ensure a more humane Government with
greater transparency, which were urged by King Mohammed VI in 1999, the
OMDH in February publicized a memorandum it sent to Interior Minister
Ahmed Midaoui in January calling for a dialog between Midaoui's
ministry and human rights organizations. The OMDH appealed to the
Interior Minister to implement a series of proposed measures, including
measures reinforcing individual protections against torture through the
full implementation of the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, destroying police files
on former political prisoners or exiles, and ending illegal punitive
detention measures by local authorities.
In 1999 the OMDH published a special newspaper in which it called
on the Government to implement legislation that would criminalize the
use of torture and would control the conditions under which detainees
are kept in garde-a-vue detention and in prisons. The OMDH claimed that
most cases of torture submitted to the justice system involved
incidents that occurred in front of witnesses or in public areas.
According to the OMDH, torture in detention largely continues to escape
the notice of the judiciary. The OMDH noted that the implementation of
judges' instructions on eliminating the use of torture has been
``exceedingly slow.'' While the OMDH admitted that the use of torture
has diminished over the years, it claimed that it has not disappeared.
The OMDH alleged in its report that those who commit such abuses ``do
so with impunity in almost all cases.'' The NGO called on the
Government to harmonize domestic law with its responsibilities under
the U.N. Convention Against Torture, to ensure full independence for
the judiciary, and to punish those who resort to torture.
In February Human Rights Minister Mohammed Aujjar announced plans
by the newly formed NGO Association for the Rehabilitation of Torture
Victims (ARVT) to open a rehabilitation center in Casablanca designed
to assist former torture victims in overcoming torture-related trauma.
At an inaugural event, Prime Minister Youssoufi said that the center
constituted a new milestone in the consolidation of the rule of law.
Also in February, Mohammed Kholti, a retired secret police officer
who tortured political dissidents during the 1970's and 1980's publicly
asked for forgiveness in a letter sent to two national newspapers,
which published his plea. Kholti's act marked the first time that a
former member of the security forces had admitted to past use of
torture.
In April Reuter's news services reported the lifting of a 13year
ban on a book that described harsh conditions in a high security
prison. According to author Abdelkader Chaoui, his book, ``The
Unachieved Past,'' had been banned since its publication in 1987. The
book describes the harsh conditions in the Kenitra prison, in which the
author was held for 15 years. Chaoui was jailed in 1974 because of his
leftist political opinions and leadership role in a Marxist-Leninist
organization. In November in Marrakesh, King Mohammed awarded Chaoui a
literary prize for his most recent novel (see Section 2.a.).
In May the Government permitted the local publication and sale of a
comic book called ``They Even Starve Rats.'' Written and illustrated by
Abdelaziz Mouride, a leftist student whom the authorities arbitrarily
detained in 1974, sentenced to 22 years in prison, and then freed in
1984, the comic book recounts in vivid detail the torture, injustice,
and humiliation that the author and other political dissidents suffered
at the hands of the authorities. Using the third person to narrate his
experience, Mouride depicts the manner in which the authorities
kidnaped dissidents, tortured them in secret detention centers, staged
sham trials, and then incarcerated them in remote prisons, where some
lost their sanity or died. Mouride secretly was able to send out
drawings of his ordeals with visiting friends and relatives. Mouride
said that human rights organizations played the principal role in
securing his freedom in 1984 (see Section 2.a.).
Also in May, a delegation from the International Center for the
Rehabilitation of Torture Victims visited the country to discuss the
Government's compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Torture. The
delegation told Human Rights Minister Aujjar that it sought to hold its
next world congress in Morocco.
In an October 23 ``Open Letter to the Minister of Justice'' that it
distributed to domestic as well as international media, the AMDH for
the first time published a list containing 14 names of alleged former
torturers and officials involved in disappearances and arbitrary
detention. The first domestic newspaper to republish the list was Le
Journal. Some of the listed names were high-ranking officials currently
holding office, including the head of the Royal Gendarmerie and secret
services. Former Interior Minister Driss Basri's name also was included
in the list. In the letter, the AMDH called for ``the truth and pursuit
of those responsible for disappearances.'' The AMDH also criticized the
Justice Ministry for its alleged nonintervention in past cases of
torture and disappearance (see Section 2.a.).
In 1998 the Ministry of Justice and the prison administration
implemented a law that makes autopsies routine for any death that
occurs in detention, in order to allow allegations of torture to be
evaluated. The autopsies take place at the request of the family, human
rights NGO's, or the state prosecutor, and at the order of a judge.
Autopsies were used to prove allegations of abuse in at least two cases
during the year.
In incidents throughout the year, police continued to use force to
disperse several demonstrations by unemployed university graduates
associated with the National Association of Unemployed Graduates (known
by its French acronym, ANDC), an organization not recognized by the
Government, and ``Group 314'' (a separate organization of unemployed
state doctoral graduates of medicine and engineering), and other groups
to a lesser extent. In numerous incidents throughout the country during
the year, police beat demonstrators with batons in order to disperse
them (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.). On February 2, in the village
of Tarmilet, security forces used force, including rubber bullets, tear
gas, and water cannons, to remove striking workers who had blockaded a
water-bottling factory to protest lay-offs (see Sections 1.d., 1.f.,
2.b., 2.d., and 6.a.). On June 18 in Rabat, security forces again
resorted to force, using batons and tear gas to disperse ANDC
demonstrators and to remove Group 314 hunger strikers from the local
headquarters of an independent national union (see Sections 1.d., 1.e.,
and 2.b.). On July 26 and again on September 12, police violently
dispersed disabled, unemployed university graduates who were protesting
the denial of their right to employment (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and
5). On October 8 in Casablanca, police dispersed with tear gas 2,000 to
3,000 Islamists who were protesting the Israeli Government's actions
against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall
(see Section 2.b.). On October 23, security forces used violent means
to break up a demonstration by students who were preparing to begin a
march to protest transportation problems at Hassan I University in
Settat (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.). There were reports in the fall of
violent clashes at university campuses around the county between
security forces and JCO students engaged in student elections (see
Sections 1.e. and 2.b.). On November 27, security forces reportedly
used violent means to break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning
factory in the southern city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted
in the death of one worker and injuries to eight others (see Sections
1.a., 1.d., 2.b., and 6.a.). During the weekend of December 9 to 11,
security forces throughout the country used violent means to disperse
human rights activists, members of the JCO, and unemployed graduates
who separately gathered in Rabat and other large cities to demonstrate
for different reasons (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 2.a., 2.b., and 4).
In February a Tangiers court convicted two police officers of
manslaughter in the 1996 beating death of Mohamed El-Feddaoui at the
port of Tangiers, when the El-Feddaoui was returning from Holland. Both
police officers received 10-year jail terms for violence resulting in
manslaughter. The port police commissioner was sentenced to 8 years'
imprisonment for abusive detention and denial of complicity in the
crime (see Section 1.a.).
Prison conditions remain harsh; however, they have improved in
recent years, due in part to reforms undertaken at the suggestion of
the CCDH and the Minister of Justice, and to more transparency in the
functioning of the National Prison Administration. In August 1999, the
Government enacted new legislation designed to reform the prison
system. The new legislation replaced a royal decree that had governed
the prison system since 1915. Among the reforms in the legislation were
provisions mandating compensation for work performed by prisoners.
Prisoners with ``good conduct'' records also were accorded the right to
a furlough to visit family members during important holiday periods.
The new legislation outlawed the use of handcuffs, manacles, or other
devices used for physical restraint, except as required to restrain
violent prisoners and then only after consultation with prison medical
authorities. Procedures were established to allow the prisons to be
inspected by the press and human rights organizations, and members of
both the press and human rights organizations visited prisons after the
procedures were established. Visitors must receive authorization from
the Director of the Prison Administration to conduct prison visits.
Special provisions also accorded women the right to keep their children
with them in prison until the children reach the age of 2 or longer
with special permission from the Ministry of Justice. The new law
contained provisions that extended the function of the prison system
beyond that of punishment and incarceration to include rehabilitation
and preparation for a return to society.
Nonetheless, credible reports indicate that harsh treatment and
conditions continue, often as a result of chronic overcrowding. Despite
being designed to hold 4,000 inmates, Oukacha Central Prison in
Casablanca currently holds more than 7,000 prisoners. Human rights
groups allege that poor medical care in prisons results in unnecessary
deaths. To address this problem, the Government provided special funds
in the 1998-99 budget for the renovation of prison facilities, and
added doctors and health facilities to prisons. In addition to extreme
overcrowding, malnutrition and lack of hygiene continue to aggravate
the poor health conditions inside prisons (see Section 1.a.).
Press reports during the year called attention to the extremely
harsh conditions inside the detention center of Ain Atiq outside of
Rabat. While Ain Atiq's status as a detention or social center is not
defined clearly, it often receives homeless, vagrant, and mentally
disabled persons, in addition to juvenile delinquents. Negligence at
Ain Atiq reportedly has led to serious problems, such as hygienic and
nutritional deficiencies, and harsh general living conditions. The
center also is reportedly underequipped and understaffed to provide
adequate medical care. The AMDH reportedly is planning a study of the
center in the hopes of encouraging improvements. During the year, the
authorities used Ain Atiq to detain various demonstrators picked up
during protests. In June, July, and September security forces forcibly
dispersed unemployed, disabled protesters in downtown Rabat and
reportedly took them to Ain Atiq, where some allegedly remained for
over a month (see Sections 2.b. and 5). In the past, human rights
organizations have called for Ain Atiq's closure, as well as of other
similar centers.
Some press reports during the year also raised the problem of drug
trafficking and sexual abuse in prisons among inmates. The presence of
cannabis is widely recognized as a problem, as is sexual abuse of
inmates. In May prisoners in the Touchka prison at Errachidia allegedly
rioted to protest against, among other problems, sexual abuse among
inmates. Press reports during the year also raised the issue of some
prisoners being allowed to pay for the right to occupy their own cells.
In the first visit of its kind, Members of Parliament visited Sale
prison in February 1999 to investigate prison conditions and
allegations of overcrowding. Their visit followed that of the 2M
television station, which broadcast an exclusive report on prisons in
January 1999.
Although the Government generally did not permit prison visits by
human rights monitors in the past, since the tenure of the Youssoufi
Government began there has been close collaboration between the Justice
Ministry, the National Prison Administration, and human rights groups
on prison visits, which now are authorized explicitly by law.
Throughout the year, the National Prison Administration continued to
allow numerous site visits by Parliament, the press, human rights
groups, and foreign diplomats. The National Observatory of Moroccan
Prisons (ONPM) made over 15 visits during the year, taking extensive
notes of the numerous problems facing the prison system and recounting
these in the press. In addition to noting the harsh conditions caused
by chronic overcrowding (some estimates place the current inmate
population at as high as 52,000), the ONPM recommended that some of the
existing deteriorated penitentiaries dating from the 1920's be replaced
or renovated. According to Mohamed Lididi, the Administrator of the
National Prison Administration, 20 smaller prisons currently are being
built to supplement and replace some of the existing 43.
In addition to permitting an increasing number of visits, the
National Prison Administration initiated a series of activities to
improve living conditions inside prisons, including the construction of
family visitation centers, manualskills training facilities, and prison
visits by various entertainers. Early in the year, the civilian prison
in El-Jadida (near Casablanca) was expanded, with the addition of a
professional training center and a family meeting area. The training
center provides courses and vocational studies to inmates interested in
preparing themselves for post-prison employment. The family area allows
inmates to meet directly with their family members, and is equipped
with chairs, tables, and a small cafe. Telephone booths also were
installed for use by inmates. The improvements at El-Jadida were
duplicated inside other prisons, with the Prison Administration
devoting more resources to improving living conditions and inmate
rehabilitation. The ONPM received permission to organize an evening
music and dance program for female inmates in Oukacha prison in
Casablanca. In Sale prison near Rabat, the British Embassy and the
Prison Administration sponsored a musical performance by African
students. Several similar performances and cultural seminars occurred
at other prisons.
In November at Al-Akhawayn University in Ifrane, the Justice
Ministry hosted, in coordination with the Rabat-based organization
British Council and the London-based Penal Reform International, an
international seminar on reforming the prison system. The seminar was
attended by eminent international jurists and focused on identifying
constructive alternatives to incarceration. The director of the
penitentiary system participated in the seminar, speaking on the
evolution of the country's penal system. The new NGO the Moroccan
Prison Observatory participated as well.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Police continued to use
arbitrary arrest and detention. Although legal provisions for due
process have been revised extensively in recent years, reports indicate
that authorities sometimes ignore them. Although police usually make
arrests in public and during the day, they do not always identify
themselves and do not always obtain warrants. Garde-a-vue detention is
limited to 48 hours, with one 24-hour extension allowed at the
prosecutor's discretion. In state security cases, the garde-a-vue
period is 96 hours; this also may be extended by the prosecutor. It is
during this initial period, when defendants are denied access to
counsel, that the accused is interrogated and abuse or torture is most
likely to occur. Some members of the security forces, long accustomed
to indefinite precharge access to detainees, continue to resist the new
rules.
Under 1991 changes to the law, the police are obliged to notify a
person's next of kin of an arrest as soon as possible. However, lawyers
are not always informed promptly of the date of arrest, and thus are
not always able to monitor compliance with the garde-a-vue detention
limits. While the law provides for a limited system of bail, it rarely
is granted. However, defendants sometimes are released on their own
recognizance. The law does not provide for habeas corpus or its
equivalent. Under a separate code of military justice, military
authorities may detain members of the military without warrants or
public trial.
Although accused persons generally are brought to trial within an
initial period of 2 months, prosecutors may request up to five
additional 2-month extensions of pretrial detention. Thus, an accused
person may be kept in detention for up to 1 year.
During their February 2 operation to halt a strike at a
waterbottling factory in the village of Tarmilet (48 miles from the
capital), security forces reportedly arrested more than a dozen factory
workers, as well as random passersby. According to sources in the
Government, the workers and passersby later were released without
charges. The Democratic Confederation of Workers trade union, which is
aligned politically with the ruling USFP party, reported that security
forces also detained two of its regional delegates 2 weeks following
the February 2 incident. According to government sources, the two
officials were freed by royal pardon on May 1 (Moroccan Labor Day)
while an investigation into the incident was still underway (see
Sections 1.c., 1.f., 2.b., 2.d., and 6.a.).
In April a Moroccan court in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune
sentenced five Sahrawi youths to prison terms of between 5 and 10 years
for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their alleged
participation in a March 4 stone-throwing incident in the city. One of
the lawyers who represented the five Sahrawis alleged that the judicial
police who investigated the affair committed several illegal acts,
including unlawfully entering the homes of the youths and detaining
them, torturing them during their detention, and forcing the youths to
sign under duress police reports, which they were not allowed to read
and which they claimed contained falsehoods. The decision was appealed
to the court of appeals in Laayoune and was reportedly before the
Supreme Court in Rabat at year's end (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., and
1.f.).
On May 3, members of the ANDC and other unemployed persons in
Meknes staged a sit-in before a local police station to protest the
situation of the unemployed and alleged favoritism in local government
hiring practices. According to press reports, city officials called in
security forces, who used force to disperse the protesters. Twenty-
eight protesters were arrested and sent before the court of first
instance on May 4. The court, without explanation, adjourned a morning
hearing and sent the 28 back to the police station; the protesters were
summoned to the court again in the afternoon, then released without
charge (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In a May 17 communique, the OMDH
criticized the Government's use of violence against unemployed
graduates in various cities throughout the country, including at the
Meknes sit-in.
On May 26, the court of first instance in Marrakech sentenced 13
students to 3 years in prison for their alleged participation in
demonstrations on May 17-18 near the Marrakech University campus. The
13, 8 of whom were Sahrawis, were convicted on charges of armed
gathering, assault with weapons, contempt of public servants exercising
their duties, destruction of public goods, and impeding free movement.
Two others were sentenced to 2 months in prison, and in June one more
student was sentenced to 5 years in prison for setting fire to a public
vehicle, damaging municipal property, and contempt of a civil servant
exercising his duty. Thirty to 40 students reportedly were detained
initially by police.
Conflicting stories exist as to the origins of the large-scale
demonstrations, in which large numbers of Marrakech police resorted to
force to disperse dozens of mostly Sahrawi students, one of whom threw
a Molotov cocktail that destroyed a police car. One of the detained
students claimed to have been tortured by the authorities for suspected
participation in the demonstrations, and displayed fresh cigarette
burns to a foreign diplomat to support the allegations (see Sections
1.c., 1.e., and 2.b.).
On June 13, police arrested two regional leaders of the independent
Moroccan Workers' Union (UMT) outside the UMT's Rabat headquarters.
Police arrested the leaders on the UMT's premises following a
demonstration downtown by thousands of unemployed graduates associated
with the ANDC (a group unaffiliated with the UMT, although some of its
members also belong to the UMT). After security forces violently
dispersed the ANDC demonstration and arrested 28 of the protesters,
many ANDC members returned to the UMT's headquarters to regroup.
Security forces then arrived, encircled the building, and restricted
access to it. When the two UMT leaders left their union's building to
observe the situation, they were taken away by police and reportedly
held overnight. Both of the leaders later were released without charge.
All 28 ANDC protesters who were arrested downtown earlier in the day
later were released without charge.
On June 18 in Rabat, security forces resorted to force, using
truncheons and tear gas to disperse ANDC demonstrators and Group 314
hunger strikers from the UMT's Rabat headquarters. Security forces
reportedly arrested up to 100 protesters. Dozens of protesters were
reported injured, some seriously. Twenty-two of those arrested were
charged with ``using violence against agents of authority''; 19
received suspended sentences and 3 received 2 months' imprisonment.
Prime Minister Youssoufi convened an interministerial meeting on June
19 to address the violence and condition of the unemployed population.
Justice Minister Azziman then met with some members of the ANDC, which
still is unrecognized by the Government. On July 5, the Group 314
hunger strikers ended their 28-day strike after a meeting with the
Government, in which both sides pledged to engage in a substantive
dialog (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
In early October, over the period of several days, the Government
accused of espionage, detained, and held under house arrest three
French television journalists from France's FR3 television station, who
were reporting on a human rights demonstration at the notorious former
secret detention center of Tazmamart (see Section 2.a.).
There were confirmed reports that police arrested 21 strikers
involved in a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in Agadir on
November 27. All but one of the strikers later was released. Security
forces reportedly used violent means to break up the strike, which
reportedly resulted in the death of one worker and injuries to eight
others (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.b., and 6.e.).
From December 9 to 11, security forces violently attacked human
rights activists, JCO members, and unemployed graduates, who had been
demonstrating in Rabat and other large cities for different reasons,
and detained hundreds of persons. Most demonstrators were released
shortly thereafter (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., 2.a., 2.b., and 4).
Sadok El-Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the
Istiqlal party's union, the UGTM, contacted the AMDH during the year
with accusations that he had been arrested arbitrarily, jailed,
tortured, and falsely convicted by authorities in June 1999, following
his participation in a national truckers strike (see Sections 1.c.,
1.e., and 6.a.).
In December 1999, Moroccan security forces who reportedly were sent
from Rabat, detained one Sahrawi in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune
and two Sahrawis in the southern Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan and Agadir.
Alleged to be spies for the Polisario, the three reportedly were held 8
days before their appearance in an Agadir court and before their
families were informed of their detention. Family members and the AMDH
criticized the nature of the arrests, claiming them to be a violation
of human rights and due process, and proof that forced disappearances
still occur in the country. In a public trial abruptly convened on May
30 after a lengthy and largely unpublicized police investigation, the
three were convicted of threatening the internal security of the State
and sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison. In an appeals hearing on July
5, all three were sentenced to 4 years in prison (see Section 1.e.). On
September 27, security forces in civilian dress detained a fourth
Sahrawi at the Laayoune airport as he was about to board a flight. In
August the Sahrawi was charged before the court of first instance in
Agadir for spying for the Polisario Front and sentenced to 4 years in
prison for threatening the internal security of the state (see Section
1.e.).
After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the
religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh
Abdessalam Yassine was allowed to leave his Sale home on May 16.
Yassine's release came after a May 10 statement by Interior Minister
Midaoui before Parliament that Yassine ``leaves and returns to his
residence as he likes.'' Minister Midaoui also stated that Yassine was
free to take his case to court if he felt that his rights were being
abused. In February four members of Yassine's Justice and Charity
Organization were arrested for distributing a defiant memorandum from
Yassine to King Mohammed VI. All four were charged with ``violating the
sacred institution of the Monarchy''; however, authorities later
dropped the charges and released all four (see sections 2.a., 2.c., and
2.d.).
There are no known instances of forced exile. After King Mohammed
VI took the throne in July 1999, formerly exiled political dissident
Abraham Serfaty was allowed to return to the country in September of
that year. Serfaty, a member of the (now defunct) Communist Party and a
supporter of Western Saharan independence, was expelled from the
country in 1991 after having spent 17 years as a political prisoner. In
September Serfaty, a mining engineer by profession, was appointed by
King Mohammed VI as counselor to the newly established office
responsible for developing recently discovered hydrocarbon reserves in
the eastern part of the country.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; although the courts historically have been and
remain to some extent subject to extrajudicial pressures, including
bribery and government influence, the Government continued to implement
reforms intended to increase judicial independence and impartiality
during the year. Despite such efforts, the Government was criticized by
the Denmark-based Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), the
OMDH, and other groups for the slow pace of judicial reform. In January
the Prime Minister announced plans to create an independent ombudsman
that would investigate citizens' complaints and protect them from
abuses involving the judiciary. The press reported in November, and the
Ministry of Human Rights asserted, that the preparation of implementing
legislation for the ombudsman post was nearing completion. According to
press reports, in February Justice Minister Azziman reacted to
accusations about the slow pace of reforms by calling upon the
assistance of Supreme Court justices to increase and quicken the
investigation of judges suspected of professional malfeasance. In March
Azziman, through the High Council of the Magistrature, which often has
been criticized by human rights organizations for the nontransparent
nature of its deliberations, promoted a large number of judges whose
records were considered exemplary, and disciplined a smaller number of
judges. In November on public television Azziman reaffirmed the
Government's commitment to reforming the judiciary. In 1998 Azziman had
stated that judicial reform was his top priority, and addressed the
issue of corruption by disbarring and disciplining a number of judges.
With the encouragement of then-King Hassan II and the broad support of
the business community, the Justice Minister in 1999 oversaw the
creation of a system of commercial courts for business litigation to
boost investor confidence. In the same year, the Ministry of Justice
began to implement a 5-year reform plan that emphasized transparency,
accountability, and professionalism as top priorities. During the past
2 years, the administrative courts frequently have ruled against local
governments that exceeded their authority.
There are four levels in the common law court system: Communal and
district courts, courts of first instance, the Appeals Court, and the
Supreme Court. While in theory there is a single court system under the
Ministry of Justice, other courts also operate, including: The Special
Court of Justice, which handles cases of civil servants who are
implicated in corruption; administrative courts, which deal with the
decisions of the bureaucracy; commercial courts, which deal with
business disputes; and the military tribunal, for cases involving
military personnel and, on certain occasions, matters pertaining to
state security (although state security cases also may fall within the
jurisdiction of the regular court system).
Although there is a single court system for most nonmilitary
matters, family issues such as marriage, divorce, child support and
custody, and inheritance are adjudicated by judges trained in Shari'a
(Islamic law) as applied in the country. Judges considering criminal
cases or cases in nonfamily areas of civil law generally are trained in
the French legal tradition. All judges trained in recent years are
graduates of the National Institute for Judicial Studies, where they
undergo 3 years of study heavily focused on human rights and the rule
of law. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to become a judge, and the
majority of judges are not lawyers.
In general detainees are arraigned before a court of first
instance. If the infraction is minor and not contested, the judge may
order the defendant released or impose a light sentence. If an
investigation is required, the judge may release defendants on their
own recognizance. According to reliable sources, cases often are
adjudicated on the basis of confessions, some of which are obtained
under duress.
While appeal courts may in some cases be used as a second reference
for courts of first instance, they primarily handle cases involving
crimes punishable by 5 years or more in prison. In practice, defendants
before appeals courts who are implicated in such crimes consequently
have no method of appeal if a judgment goes against them. The Supreme
Court does not review and rule on cases sent to it by courts of appeal;
in its role as a court of cassation, the Supreme Court may overturn an
appellate court's ruling on procedural grounds alone. The absence of
appeals for defendants in such crimes therefore becomes more
problematic given the fact that an investigation into the case by a
``juge d'instruction'' (pretrial investigating judge) is only mandatory
in those crimes punishable by sentences of life imprisonment or death.
Justice Minister Azziman has stated that he would attempt to end
petty corruption in the judiciary by increasing judges' salaries and
ensuring punishment for bribe-takers, as well as attempt to end all
informal and inappropriate influences on judicial decision-making in
the court system. Nonetheless, the court system remains subject to
extrajudicial pressures. Despite recent increases, salaries for both
judges and their staffs remain modest; as a result, some observers
allege that petty bribery remains a routine cost of court business. In
some courts, especially in minor criminal cases, some observers allege
that defendants or their families must pay bribes to court officers and
judges to secure a favorable disposition.
However, throughout the year, the national media reported on a
number of arrests, convictions, and sentences of judicial officials for
their role in petty corruption. Reports also indicated that the Special
Court of Justice, despite its resource constraints, increasingly
prosecuted public servants for corruption. In October at the
recommendation of the Justice Ministry, the King approved new internal
statutory regulations for the High Council of the Magistrature.
According to press reports, the new regulations were implemented to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary.
After his appointment in 1997 by then-King Hassan II, Justice
Minister Azziman began to reduce the judiciary's relationship with the
Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, judges continue to work closely
with the Interior Ministry's local network of officials, or ``caids''
(although as judicial police, caids technically fall under the
jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry), who often legally are charged
with the responsibility of questioning criminal defendants. Caids
frequently prepare the written summary of an arrest and subsequent
interrogation. The summary is admissible in court as an element of the
evidentiary process and can carry great weight with the judge. After
the new Justice Minister's appointment, the Ministry of Justice began
to reassert its authority and control over judges.
The law does not distinguish political and security cases from
common criminal cases. In serious state security cases, communications
between the Ministry of Interior and the court are more direct. At the
Government's discretion, such cases may be brought before a specially
constituted military tribunal, which is subservient to other branches
of the Government, especially the military and the Ministry of
Interior.
Aside from external pressures, the court system also is subject to
resource constraints. Consequently, criminal defendants charged with
less-serious offenses often receive only a cursory hearing, with judges
relying on police reports to render decisions. Although the Government
provides an attorney at public expense for serious crimes (when the
offense carries a maximum sentence of over 5 years), appointed
attorneys often provide inadequate representation.
In 1999 Minister Azziman announced that in the preceding 12 months
the judicial system had enforced judgments in 60,000 out of 100,000
cases of civil litigation, which represented significant progress
toward eliminating a persistent backlog. The Justice Ministry continued
to make progress clearing this backlog during the year.
In 1998 the OMDH issued a report that assessed the status of the
judiciary. According to the OMDH, the Youssoufi administration took a
series of steps to improve the court system, including rooting out
high-level corruption, naming a new Director for Judicial
Administration at the Justice Ministry, reactivating a Justice Ministry
disciplinary body, publishing that body's deliberations and decisions,
and organizing free and fair elections to that body. Nevertheless, the
OMDH called for additional reforms, including changing laws to reduce
the Justice Minister's prerogative to suspend judges through the High
Council of the Magsitrature, revamping the Criminal Code (which the
OMDH stated offers insufficient protection for a fair trial),
strengthening the law on civil liberties, and compelling judges to
place their assets in a blind trust. The OMDH also called on the State
to punish those officials guilty of human rights abuses. Finally, the
OMDH noted the lack of resources necessary for documentation tracking
and for court facilities. At its fourth annual congress held in March,
during which it distributed its annual human rights report for 2000,
the OMDH called for the elimination of ``courts of exception''
(military tribunals, the Special Court of Justice, and the High Court),
for the strengthening of judges' independence, and greater resources
for the Justice Ministry.
During the year, the courts handled an increasing number of cases
that involved sensitive human rights issues, most of which were covered
openly and extensively by national and international media. Trial
subjects included freedom of the press, alleged Polisario Front
espionage, and Sahrawi student demonstrations in the capital and
Marrakech. Defense attorneys involved in these cases, most of whom were
prominent human rights activists and members of the AMDH and OMDH,
generally agreed that the majority of the judicial processes pertaining
to the cases were marked by significant irregularities, and that these
irregularities infringed on the rights to a fair trial for the accused.
Mustapha Adib, a young air force captain, was incarcerated in
December 1999 and tried before a military court for allegedly violating
the Military Code and libeling the military. The authorities detained
Adib after he spoke out against military corruption and harassment to a
journalist from the French newspaper Le Monde. On February 17, a
military court convicted Adib after 4 days of proceedings during which
the judge rejected nearly every legal motion advanced by the defense.
The court denied the defense's requests that the court make the trial
public, allow the defense to summon more than a dozen defense witnesses
and present documentary evidence, and recuse one of the military
judges, who was a former superior of Adib's. The judge whom the defense
asked to be recused allegedly was responsible for blocking Adib's
promotions after Adib made the allegations of corruption in a 1998
letter to then-Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed (now King Mohammed VI).
The military tribunal sentenced Adib to the maximum prison term of
5 years and expelled him from the air force. Human rights activists
criticized the unfair nature of the trial; the OMDH issued a report on
February 21 contending that closed trials unjustly influenced the
results and accused the court of partiality in refusing to recuse
Adib's former superior. After deciding on a ``silent defense'' to
protest the military court's conduct of the case, the attorney
representing Adib characterized the trial as a ``travesty of justice.''
Following an appeal on procedural grounds lodged by Adib's attorney
immediately following the end of the trial, and after Adib staged a 5-
day hunger strike in early May, the Supreme Court in June announced
that it would review the case. On June 14, the Supreme Court overruled
the military court and announced that the case would be retried by a
new military tribunal composed of different judges. Adib's defense team
called the decision a ``historic judgment.''
A newly constituted military court in Rabat retried Adib's case in
early October. After 3 days of hearings, during which the court again
refused to hear witnesses requested by the defense and rejected
multiple other defense motions, the military court found Adib guilty of
the charges initially brought against him. The court reduced Adib's
sentence to 2.5 years in prison and upheld his expulsion from the
military. Adib's lawyer criticized the verdict as ``neither just nor
equitable,'' and said that he would appeal the new verdict. On
September 28, before the retrial began, the international NGO
Transparency International recognized Captain Adib with one of its
Integrity Awards for his courage in fighting corruption, which Adib's
lawyer accepted for him in Canada. In early November, Amnesty
International identified Adib as a ``prisoner of conscience.''
On April 5, a Moroccan civil court in the Western Sahara city of
Laayoune sentenced five Sahrawi youth to prison terms of between 5 and
10 years for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their
alleged participation in a March 4 stone-throwing event in Laayoune,
which reliable sources say was spontaneous, unorganized, and lasted for
only 5 minutes. The demonstration followed similar protests by Sahrawi
students in several southern Moroccan and Western Sahara cities at the
end of February and early March that security forces dispersed
violently (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 2.b.).
Attendees at the trial, including human rights activists and an
attorney for the five defendants criticized the handling of the trial,
particularly the court's refusal to hear witnesses for the defense who
allegedly could have testified that at least two of the five defendants
had been elsewhere at the time of the incident. In addition to the
police reports, the court allegedly based its judgment on the testimony
of two witnesses, one of whom reportedly could not positively identify
the accused, and another who was not present at the trial, but who
claimed that he saw in his rear view mirror a youth throwing a bottle
at his car. The prosecution reportedly did not present any physical
evidence, nor did it present any witness who could testify that the
five accused were the ones who had thrown the bottle. The authorities
claimed that the youths threw rocks at several vehicles, including one
belonging to peacekeepers from the U.N. MINURSO contingent based in
Laayoune, and attempted to set fire to a truck. However, the youth were
acquitted of the arson charge during the trial.
A lawyer for the youths, who maintained the prosecution did not
prove an incriminating act, said that ``the verdict had nothing to do
with justice.'' The lawyer also alleged that the judicial police
investigating the affair committed several illegal acts by unlawfully
entering homes of the accused and detaining them, torturing the accused
during their detention, and forcing the accused under duress to sign
police reports, which they were not allowed to read and which they
claimed contained falsehoods. The decision was appealed to the court of
appeals in Laayoune and then reportedly to the Supreme Court in Rabat;
no final ruling had been made by year's end. Families of the five
Sahrawi youth also sent a letter to the Royal Palace in May requesting
a royal pardon (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.).
On May 26, the court of first instance in Marrakech sentenced 13
students to 3 years in prison for their alleged participation in a riot
on May 17 and 18 near their university campus. The 13 students, 8 of
whom were Sahrawis, were convicted on charges of armed gathering,
assault with weapons, contempt of public servants while exercising
their duties, destruction of public goods, and impeding free movement.
Two others were sentenced to 2 months, and in June one more student was
sentenced to 5 years for setting fire to a public vehicle, damaging
municipal property, and contempt of a civil servant exercising his
duty. Thirty to 40 students reportedly were detained by police
initially. According to one of the lawyers representing the students,
judicial authorities showed little concern for the need to respect due
process throughout the investigation of the events and the trial. There
were no arrest warrants and no evidence was presented against any of
those charged except the police statement of facts, which none of the
defendants had signed (all had been forced to provide their thumbprint
on the statement in lieu of a signature). The lawyers were not allowed
to present evidence in court that could have exonerated their clients.
For example, one of those convicted claimed that he had not been in
Marrakech during the events. He was not allowed to present the
testimony of friends in another city with whom he said he had been
visiting.
Students involved in the demonstrations and press reports claimed
that after an initial encounter between students and police, both the
police and students called in reinforcements to their respective sides.
A sit-in of roughly 60 students (not all Sahrawis) in the public street
in front of their residence then was held, which police reportedly
broke up by force after negotiations failed. When another sit-in was
organized, the police again forcibly dispersed students and arrested
several dozen (not all Sahrawis). Lawyers for the 13 defendants
appealed the court's conviction of their clients. According to Sahrawis
and Sahrawi defense lawyers in Rabat, an appellate court in Marrakesh
at the end of the summer upheld the original conviction. However, the
court reduced all of the 3-year sentences by 1 year each. Among those
detained by the police was a young Sahrawi student who claimed to have
been tortured by two police officers in an isolated area near the
university campus. The Sahrawi displayed fresh marks from cigarette
burns to a foreign diplomat to support the allegations (see Sections
1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
During the late evening of May 17 in Rabat, police arrested 14
students at Mohammed V University and charged them with arson, violence
against the police, erecting barricades, and impeding free movement.
The students, 12 of whom were Sahrawis, had participated earlier in the
evening in a solidarity protest for fellow Sahrawi students who had
been arrested that morning in Marrakech. The detained students
reportedly admitted to staging two sit-ins in solidarity with their
peers in Marrakech, but denied, as alleged by the authorities, any use
of force or violence against the police who arrested them. The police
contended that the students refused to disperse, then threw rocks at
them and their vehicles. According to students, near midnight the same
evening, police squads returned to the university, entered it, set up
checkpoints, detained students without identity cards, and broke into
dormitories in search of those who participated in the sit-ins earlier
in the day.
According to a lawyer who represented 13 of the accused students,
one of his clients said that police took him to an unidentified
location after his arrest, beat him severely, and interrogated him
regarding his activities and links with other Sahrawi and human rights
activists. Noting his client's difficulty in speaking in court and
drawing attention to his swollen face and eyes, the lawyer requested
the pretrial investigating judge to conduct a medical examination of
his client, which the judge refused. According to the lawyer, after
their arrest, the students were held incommunicado longer than the
legal limit of 48 hours, and nobody was informed of their whereabouts
during this time, as required by law. At preliminary legal proceedings
on May 22 at the Rabat court of appeals, all 14 of the accused
reportedly denied violent acts during the demonstration; however, in
three of the police reports submitted to the court, three of the
accused allegedly had admitted to violent acts. None of the depositions
by the accused were signed; all were marked only by the defendants'
thumbprints. After a series of hearings and delays, on November 17, the
Rabat court of appeals acquitted and freed all 14 students who were
detained in mid-May. According to a lawyer for the defense, all of the
detained students denied before the court any involvement in the
demonstration. The prosecution reportedly failed to produce any
witnesses who could confirm the students' participation in the May 17
incident (see Section 1.c.).
On October 27, 10 students at the University of Hassan I in Settat
were tried for their involvement in the October 23 demonstrations that
police broke up violently (see Section 2.b.). Each of the 10 students
reportedly declared before the court that they were forced under duress
and torture to sign (by thumb prints) their police statements.
According to a PPS political party communique, two of its members
involved in the incident ``were victims of grave physical cruelty''
during their transfer to the police station and during their detention.
The defendants' lawyers unsuccessfully requested that the case be
dropped on the grounds that the judicial police had not, as mandated by
law, notified family members of the students' arrest. The court
reportedly also refused the defense's request to have the students
examined by a doctor, as is permissible by law if signs of physical
distress are visible. At the end of the day-long trial, the Settat
court of first instance found all 10 students guilty of the charges and
sentenced them to from 3 to 5 months in prison (three were given
suspended sentences). Following an appeal lodged by defense lawyers, on
November 9, the Settat court of appeal reduced the sentences of the
seven students sent to prison, reducing four of them from 5 to 3 months
and three of them from 3 to 2 months.
In an abruptly convened trial, 14 students who had been arrested
during violent clashes between students and police at Mohammedia
University on November 21 were convicted of disturbance of public order
and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment and fines ranging from $50 to
$150 (500 to 1,500 dirhams). The alleged victims of the students'
vandalism did not appear at the trial to testify or be cross-examined
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
The Government pressed charges against 33 human rights activists
who were involved in a protest before Parliament on December 9: the
trial was scheduled for February 2001 (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a.,
2.b., and 4).
In December 1999, Moroccan security forces that reportedly were
dispatched from Rabat detained one Sahrawi in the Western Sahara city
of Laayoune and two Sahrawis in the southern Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan
and Agadir. Alleged to be spies serving the Polisario Front, the three
reportedly were held for 8 days before their appearance in an Agadir
court and before their families were informed of their detention.
Family members and the AMDH denounced the nature of the arrests,
calling them a violation of human rights, due process, and proof that
forced disappearances still occurred in Morocco. In a public trial
convened on May 30 after a lengthy and largely unpublicized police
investigation that was originally to be heard by a military tribunal,
the three were convicted of threatening the internal security of the
state and sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison by Agadir's court of
first instance. During an appellate hearing on July 5, at the request
of the public prosecutor all three were given the same sentence of 4
years. The abrupt convening of the public trial at the end of May also
coincided with the decision of judicial authorities to change the
jurisdiction of the case from the court of appeals to the court of
first instance. (The court of first instance deals with lesser crimes
punishable by sentences of 5 years and less; the court of appeals with
serious crimes involving sentences of 5 years and more.) According to a
lawyer representing the Sahrawis, during the trial the three accused
denied any relations with the Polisario Front, contradicting
confessions allegedly made during their detention (see Sections 1.b.
and 1.d.). On September 27, security forces in civilian dress detained
a fourth Sahrawi at the Laayoune airport as he was about to board a
flight to the Canary Islands. According to the Sahrawi's daughter, who
witnessed the incident, two members of the security forces drove away
with her father in a car with Casablanca license plates. Almost 10 days
later, the Sahrawi reappeared in Agadir and also was charged before the
court of first instance for spying for the Polisario Front. Two days
later, the fourth Sahrawi was sentenced to 4 years in prison for
threatening the internal security of the state.
Sadok El-Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the
Istiqlal party's union, the UGTM, contacted AMDH during the year with
accusations that he had been arrested arbitrarily, jailed, tortured,
and falsely convicted by authorities in June 1999 following his
participation in a national truckers strike. Arrested and jailed on
charges of forming a criminal gang and setting fire to a vehicle, El-
Kihal alleged that security forces in the Gendarmerie of Taouriate
(Oujda province) tortured him and wrote a false police report that they
forced him to endorse with his thumbprint without allowing him to read
it first. ElKihal contests that it was this police report that formed
the basis of his conviction at the Oujda court of appeals, which
sentenced him to 2 years' imprisonment. El-Kihal subsequently benefited
from a royal pardon and was freed on May 4 (see Sections 1.c., 1.d.,
and 6.a.).
During the evening of June 18, up to 100 members of the security
forces attacked the UMT headquarters in Rabat, where 12 Group 314
members were in the 11th day of a hunger strike. Using tear gas and
batons, security forces violently cleared all demonstrators from the
area, arresting up to 100 protesters and evacuating the hunger
strikers, who had been forced out by tear gas. Dozens of protesters
were reported injured, some seriously. Twenty-two of those arrested,
most of whom were ANDC members, were charged with ``using violence
against agents of authority.'' During their trial in July, 30 lawyers
representing the 22 defendants withdrew after the tribunal refused
their--and allegedly the prosecution's--request to summon witnesses. In
a press conference following their withdrawal, the lawyers said
``necessary conditions for a fair trial were absent.'' One lawyer
defending the ANDC members said that there were multiple procedural
errors in the conduct of the judicial investigation and the trial. The
lawyer also claimed that all of the police statements regarding the
defendants contained falsehoods, and that none of them had been signed.
After the lawyers withdrew, the defendants refused to participate in
the trial. The tribunal subsequently closed the proceedings to the
public and proceeded to sentence all 22 defendants. Nineteen of the
defendants received 2-month suspended sentences and $50 (500 dirhams)
fines and three were sentenced to 2 months in prison and $50 (500
dirhams) fines (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
During and following public demonstrations in the Western Sahara
city of Laayoune in September 1999, more than 150 persons were detained
by police authorities. Most were released within a matter of days;
however, 26 persons were tried on criminal charges for actions in
connection with the protests and sentenced to imprisonment for periods
ranging from 10 to 15 years. The OMDH claimed that the trial of these
persons was unfair and insisted that the defendants were not provided
adequate legal counsel for their defense. By year's end, none of the 26
persons convicted in 1999 had their sentences reduced or overturned
(see Sections 1.f. and 2.b.).
The Government continued to hold a number of political prisoners.
According to the AMDH and OMDH, seven political prisoners remained in
detention at year's end. In January King Mohammed VI pardoned 2,000
prisoners, 1 of whom was Arsalan Samouzi, a political prisoner who was
sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for insulting the royal family
during the reign of King Hassan II. The official Moroccan press agency,
MAP, quoted the Justice Minister as saying in a July 23 television
interview that there are no more political prisoners in detention. In
the past, the Ministry of Interior claimed that there were 55 Islamists
serving sentences for offenses that ranged from arms smuggling in the
1980's to participating in a bomb attack on a hotel in Marrakech in
1994. In the past, there also were claims that some of these Islamists
were imprisoned solely for calling for an Islamic state during the
1980's. The AMDH claims that 2 members of the ``Group of 26,'' an
Islamist group involved in smuggling arms into the country from Algeria
in the mid-1980's, remain in prison. The other 24 members completed
their sentences or otherwise were released at various times between
1994 and the end of the year. Various international human rights
groups' estimates of the number of persons in prison for advocating
independence for the Western Sahara vary from none to 700. Amnesty
International lists dozens of persons whom it considers to be political
prisoners. According to several human rights organizations, achieving
consensus on a definitively accurate number of political prisoners is
extremely difficult, mainly because conditions in the Western Sahara
complicate attempts to confirm whether Sahrawis were imprisoned solely
for their political affiliation or open advocacy of Western Saharan
independence, or whether they were imprisoned for other actions in
violation of the law. The AMDH claims that it knows of no persons
imprisoned for having overtly advocating Western Saharan independence.
Although the Government claims that it no longer holds political
prisoners, it permits international humanitarian organizations to visit
prisoners whom such organizations consider to be imprisoned for
political reasons.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that the home is inviolable
and that no search or investigation may take place without a search
warrant, and the law stipulates that a search warrant may be issued by
a prosecutor on good cause; however, authorities sometimes ignore these
provisions. Security forces allegedly entered homes in pursuit of
persons associated with a strike at a water-bottling factory in
February (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.b., 2.d., and 6.a.). One of the
lawyers representing five Sahrawi youths who were sentenced to jail
terms for their alleged participation in a March 4 stone-throwing
incident in Laayoune, alleged that the judicial police who investigated
the affair committed several illegal acts, including unlawfully
entering homes of the youths (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
During protests in Laayoune in the Western Sahara in September and
October 1999, police reportedly encouraged local thugs to break into,
loot, and destroy private shops. Following the protests in October
1999, police unlawfully entered homes to arrest persons associated with
the demonstrations. Human rights NGO's claimed that such police actions
created a ``climate of fear'' in the city, forcing some families to
flee the city or change residences nightly to avoid such police
actions. There reportedly was no official investigation into such
government actions by year's end (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and
2.a.).
Government security services monitor certain persons and
organizations, both foreign and Moroccan, and government informers
monitor activities on university campuses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression; however, the Government systematically
restricted press freedom regarding a few topics that the Government
considers sensitive, and appeared to increase restrictions on some
other topics with the potential to reflect negatively on the country's
international image. Nonetheless, newspapers and weeklies from across
the political spectrum, from Socialist to nationalist to Islamist,
publish freely, and the Government permitted extensive coverage during
the year of formerly taboo topics.
The Government owns the official press agency, Maghreb Arab Press
(MAP), and the Arabic daily Al-Anbaa. The Government also supports two
semiofficial dailies, the French-language Le Matin and the Arabic-
language Assahra. In addition the Government provides subsidies to the
rest of the press through price supports for newsprint and office
space. A 1958 decree grants the Government the authority to register
and license domestic newspapers and journals. Authorities may use the
licensing process to prevent the publication of materials that they
believe cross the threshold of tolerable dissent. Offending
publications may be declared a danger to state security and seized, the
publisher's license suspended, and equipment destroyed. The Ministry of
Interior may control foreign publications by collecting ``banned''
publications after they have been distributed. There were multiple
reports that authorities pressured domestic-based printers not to print
several newspapers, including two belonging to the JCO. In addition,
the administrators of the new weekly publication Demain alleged in
April that the authorities attempted to block the printing of their
publication because of its investigative editorial line. According to
Demain's administrators, the alleged attempt to influence the
magazine's editorial line led them to move the weekly's printing
operations to Spain. The media continue to engage regularly in self-
censorship to avoid the Government's attention and possible sanctions.
The Press Code empowers the Minister of Interior to confiscate
publications that are judged offensive by the Government. Under the
code, the Prime Minister may order the indefinite suspension of a
publication. The Press Code also empowers the Government to censor
newspapers directly by ordering them not to report on specific items or
events. In most past instances, government control of the media
generally has been exercised through directives and ``guidance'' from
the Ministry of Interior. However, during the year, the Government
fined several journalists for articles that they had published, and
sentenced one to prison. The King subsequently pardoned the journalist
who was sentenced to prison, and the fines issued against the other
journalists allegedly later were dropped. The Government generally
tolerates satirical and often stinging editorials in the opposition
parties' dailies. However, both law and tradition historically have
prohibited criticism on three topics: The Monarchy, Morocco's claim to
the Western Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam.
There were approximately 2,000 domestic and foreign newspapers,
magazines, and journals in circulation during the year.
Prior to Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine's release after 11 years of
house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the religious authority of
then-King Hassan II, the Government on February 5 temporarily
confiscated from newsstands in major cities several newspapers that
contained a 19-page memorandum addressed by Yassine in late January to
King Mohammed VI, in which Yassine asked the King to return to the
populace the wealth that he alleged that the King's late father had
stolen from the country. However, the Government permitted the three
publications to be put back on the newsstands the same day. On February
8 and 9, then-Communication Minister Larbi Messari declared that the
memorandum was not banned, that it was available on the Internet, and
that the concerned newspapers were back in circulation. Messari
reportedly said that the confiscation was ``incidental,'' and that
censorship was absurd and no longer practiced in the country. Four
members of the JCO were arrested in February for distributing the
memorandum in Tangiers and Ben Slimane (near Casablanca). All four were
charged with ``violating the sacred institution of the Monarchy.''
According to the AMDH, by February 7 the authorities had dropped the
charges and released all four (see Sections 1.d., 2.c., and 2.d.).
The Government banned the distribution of the February 15-21
edition of the Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent weekly magazine. The weekly
contained a letter by a Moroccan political scientist living abroad,
which criticized the reign of King Hassan II and challenged King
Mohammed VI to devote greater effort to much-needed reforms. According
to press reports, civilian authorities from a Casablanca commisariat
asked the national distributor of Jeune Afrique in Morocco not to
distribute the issue. In the main editorial column in the subsequent
edition of Jeune Afrique, the editors stated that they interpreted the
commissariat's request as a ban and decided to withdraw its 8,000
copies from Morocco rather than wait for its local distributor to
receive the written prohibition order it had requested from the
authorities; the distributor reportedly never received the order. On
February 16, Communication Minister Messari sent a letter to the
distributor demanding to know who in the Government had banned the
issue, claiming that the Communication Ministry was not involved. The
Government never established who gave the order to the local
commissariat.
The Government banned the distribution of the March 4 issue of the
French daily newspaper Le Figaro. The issue contained an article about
the fate of the late Mehdi Ben Barka, former National Union of Popular
Forces (UNFP--later to become USFP) party founding member and secretary
general who reportedly was killed in Paris in 1965 by French thugs,
allegedly at the request of the Moroccan secret service. The source of
the article reportedly at the time was a physician of thenKing Hassan
II. Although the Government gave no formal statement explaining the
ban, on May 5 then-Communication Minister Messari commented at a U.N.
Education and Science Organization (UNESCO)sponsored seminar on human
rights that ``I banned the Le Figaro issue ... because it contained
defamation threatening to a cause of our national history.''
On April 15, police at Marrakech airport seized and prevented the
distribution of two related leading weekly investigative newspapers,
the French-language Le Journal and its Arabiclanguage counterpart
Assahifa, after their arrival from printers in France. The two domestic
publications were banned at the orders of Prime Minister Youssoufi
after Le Journal published an interview that its editor in chief held
with Mohammed Abdelaziz, leader of the Polisario Front. The
Government's ban of the publications coincided with the visit to the
country of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson. The
Government explained the ban in a Communication Ministry communique the
same day, characterizing Le Journal's interview with Abdelaziz ``an
event organized by certain milieus hostile to our country (and) in
homage to the separatist (Sahrawi) impudence.'' The communique also
cited as explanation ``the extension of constant excesses in the
editorial line of the two publications with regard to the handling of
the question of our territorial integrity.''
Aboubakr Jamai, editor in chief of Le Journal, criticized the
government decision to censor the newspaper, claiming that other
Moroccan publications recently had published similar articles
containing material from interviews with the Polisario Front leader. At
a press conference convened on April 17 by Le Journal's and Assahifa's
parent corporation, Mediatrust, Jamai expressed concern that the ban
likely had more to do with his paper's aggressive reporting on other
topics. On April 17, the board of directors of the state-run television
station 2M fired the station's top three officials for, according to
Communication Minister Larbi Messari, having made a ``professional
mistake'' during an April 14 broadcast. The professional mistake is
widely believed to have been the station's televised reference in its
evening newscast to Le Journal's controversial interview with Polisario
Front leader Abdelaziz. On April 29, government spokesperson Khalid
Alioua apologized for the ban of Assahifa, calling it an error. Unlike
in Le Journal, Assahifa contained no reference to the interview with
Abdelaziz. On April 19, the AMDH reacted to the bans of the two
newspapers and the firing of 2M's leadership by issuing a communique
criticizing decisions that ``gravely threaten the freedom of the
press.''
On April 26, a Casablanca court convicted Mustapha Alaoui, the
editor of the Arabic-language daily Al-Ousbou, of libel and defamation
of Foreign Minister Mohammed Benaissa, for a controversial article
Alaoui published that alleged financial misfeasance in a real estate
matter involving Benaissa while the latter served abroad as an
ambassador. The court sentenced Alaoui to 3 months in prison, forbade
him to practice journalism for 3 years and ordered him to pay
approximately $100,000 (1,000,000 dirhams) in damages to Benaissa and a
$2,000 (20,000 dirhams) fine. On April 27, Khalid Mechbal, the editor
of the Tangiers-based weekly news publication Al-Shamal, also was
convicted of libel and defamation in a case lodged by Benaissa for
publishing a similar article. Mechbal received a 6-month suspended jail
term, was forbidden from practicing journalism for 1 year, and was
ordered to pay an approximately $2,000 (20,000 dirhams) fine. On May 3,
another court convicted Alaoui of libel and defamation for an article
he published concerning Fouad Filali, the estranged former brotherin-
law of King Mohammed VI; Alaoui was sentenced a 3-month suspended jail
term and ordered to pay approximately $10,000 (100,000 dirhams) in
damages and a $500 (5,000 dirhams) fine.
Journalists and human rights activists protested the court's
decision to invoke statutes from the Criminal Code--rather than the
Press Code--to punish the editors and ban them from exercising their
profession. The Moroccan National Press Union (SNPM) stated in an April
27 communique that ``the pronouncement of prison terms in issues of
publishing and the press flagrantly contradicts the rule of law and the
freedom of expression.'' On May 3, human rights activists and
journalists demonstrated in front of the Communication Ministry to
express their concerns about the convictions and other press censorship
cases. Mustapha Alaoui stated that ``not even in the time of the French
protectorate had a Moroccan journalist ever been forbidden from
exercising his profession.''
After immediately appealing the Casablanca court's decision, Alaoui
and Mechbal learned in late May that the King had pardoned them, and
allowed them to return to their professions without serving time in
jail. However, they still were obligated to pay the damages and the
fines. On July 6, while Alaoui awaited an appellate hearing to
determine the issue of damages and fines, the authorities banned
Alaoui's newspaper from publication, and forbade Casablanca printers
from printing it. According to press reports, on July 31, the
Casablanca court of appeal accepted reciprocal requests from lawyers
representing Alaoui and Benaissa to withdraw Alaoui's appeal and
Benaissa's civil litigation. The press reports indicated that the court
of appeal also reduced Alaoui's $2,000 (20,000 dirhams) fine to $100
(1,000 dirhams); however, independent sources alleged that Alaoui's
fine was dropped altogether, as were the damages that he originally was
ordered to pay to Benaissa in April.
On May 15, the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders (Reporters
Sans Frontieres--RSF) criticized Morocco for banning seven local and
foreign newspapers, and appealed to King Mohammed VI to ensure press
freedom. The International Committee to Protect Journalists also raised
the same concerns in a letter to Prime Minister Youssoufi in the
spring.
According to press reports in late May and early July, the
authorities allegedly blocked the publication of two newspapers, Al-Adl
Wal Ihsane and Rissalat Al-Futuwa, associated with Sheikh Yassine's
Justice and Charity Organization. The authorities reportedly ordered
printers of the two newspapers to suspend their distribution (see
Sections 1.d., 2.c., and 2.d.). In September the directors of the two
publications delivered to human right organizations and the press a
letter that claimed that government authorities had issued
administrative orders against the publication and sale of the two
newspapers. The directors also stated that various printers had been
threatened and pressured not to print the newspapers.
In its June 23-29 issue, the independent weekly Le Journal reported
that the secretary general of RSF had written a letter to Interior
Minister Midaoui protesting the Government's ``heavy surveillance'' of
a visiting French journalist, and its confiscation of the reporter's
videocassette tapes as he was leaving Rabat airport. The secretary
general asked Minister Midaoui to ``provide him with explanations'' of
the Government's actions. The French journalist allegedly was writing
an investigative article about Mehdi Ben Barka, a leftist political
leader allegedly kidnapped and murdered in Paris in 1965 by French
thugs at the request of the Moroccan secret service.
During a protest by disabled unemployed university graduates on
September 12, police reportedly attempted to remove the camera
equipment of one photojournalist covering the demonstration, and
jostled and threatened other news correspondents on the scene (see
Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
In its September 23-29 edition, Le Journal reported that government
authorities banned the distribution of a September issue of the London-
based magazine The Economist, which contained a report on Morocco's
August announcement of new oil finds in the eastern part of the
country. The Economist report questioned the scale of the findings as
announced by the Government. A local representative of The Economist
confirmed the banning.
On October 4, at a press briefing convened by the Government,
Interior Minister Midaoui publicly threatened Aboubakr Jamai, the
director of Le Journal, warning against publishing sensitive stories
related to Mohammed Abdelaziz, the leader of the Polisario Front.
Midaoui threatened to ban Le Journal again if the newspaper conducted
and published more such interviews. RSF responded to the incident with
a letter to Prime Minister Youssoufi, which related the NGO's concerns
about the recent decline in press freedoms.
In early October, over the period of several days, the Government
accused of espionage, detained, and held under house arrest three
French television journalists from France's FR3 television station, who
were reporting on a government-authorized human rights demonstration at
the notorious former secret detention center of Tazmamart. Despite
their possession of two authorization papers from the Government to
tape throughout the country, the journalists were stopped by security
forces after they had taped the former detention center the morning
before the October 7 demonstration. (Other domestic and international
media later filmed the same footage without incident.) Local justice
officials summoned the FR3 journalists to a nearby tribunal on October
8, but the journalists refused the officials' request to hand over the
material that had been taped at Tazmamart. The journalists then were
placed under house arrest in the city of Er-Rachidia by security forces
and kept under surveillance. During this time, the authorities
confiscated the journalists' video material, passports, and personal
belongings, and accused them of ``violating military secrets'' for
videotaping Tazmamart (which became a military weapons depot after the
secret detention center closed in 1991). After French officials
intervened, the authorities released the three journalists on October
9. Before leaving the country, the journalists signed a document
agreeing to return to cooperate with the legal investigation of the
affair. One of the FR3 journalists who was detained was Joseph Tual,
the French journalist who had been monitored in June and whose video
material then also was confiscated by security forces at Rabat airport.
On November 4, the Government withdrew the accreditation and
ordered the expulsion of Claude Juvenal, a Morocco-based French
correspondent for Agence France Presse (AFP). According to MAP, a
source from the Ministry of Culture and Communication stated that
Juvenal had ``breached professional ethics by engaging in initiatives
hostile to Morocco and its institutions.'' According to the
semiofficial daily newspaper Le Matin du Sahara, Juvenal had ``for
several years continually, and in sheer bad faith, cast doubt on,
criticized and misrepresented every initiative and reform undertaken by
Morocco.'' Juvenal's expulsion resulted in a strong negative reaction
from domestic and international media. The SNPM issued a communique
protesting the expulsion, stating that the authorities' justification
for the expulsion ``remains ambiguous and hence unacceptable.'' The
SNPM in its communiques and the RSF claimed that the expulsion
illustrated growing intolerance by the authorities toward press
freedom. A group of Morocco-based Spanish journalists wrote a letter to
Minister of Culture and Communication Mohammed Achaari, in which they
expressed their concerns that similar measures could be taken ``at any
moment against other journalists'' and informed the Minister that they
were seeking the protection of the Spanish Government and the European
Union for themselves. Minister Achaari refused to explain the reasons
for the expulsion when he was asked on national television.
On December 2, Prime Minister Youssoufi banned indefinitely three
independent weekly publications known for their politically sensitive
investigative reports. The Prime Minister banned the French weekly
publications Le Journal and Demain and the Arabic weekly Assahifa, a
sister publication of Le Journal, after they published or commented on
a 1974 letter alleging that Youssoufi had participated in coup plotting
with other leftist leaders and the military against then-King Hassan II
in 1972. In banning the three publications, Youssoufi used the highly
controversial and long-criticized Article 77 of the Press Code, which
allows both the Prime Minister and Interior Minister to ban any
publication that ``threatens the kingdom's political and religious
foundations.'' At their press conference on December 3, the three
editors in chief of the banned publications criticized the banning as
``a manifestation of intellectual terrorism.'' The SNPM denounced the
ban and the application of Article 77, urging the Government to
reconsider its decision and to reform the entire Press Code. The AMDH
also protested the ban, calling it a violation of the Constitution and
international conventions on human rights. International NGO's
criticized the banning as well. RSF called attention to the fact that
Youssoufi had promised to defend press freedoms upon assuming office in
1998, including revision of the entire Press Code. In mid-December, two
of the three weeklies filed a lawsuit against the government at the
administrative court of Rabat. In the meantime, Le Journal filed
paperwork to establish a new publication; approval of the application
was still pending at year's end.
Also in mid-December, the Government confiscated and prevented
distribution of the December 14-20 printed issue of the international
publication Courier International. The publication contained four pages
of articles written by the editors in chief of the three domestic
weeklies banned indefinitely by Youssoufi on December 2. In their
articles, the editors in chief attacked the Prime Minister's decision
to shut down their publications. The electronic versions of the
articles were available in the country on Courier International's
Internet web site.
Police reportedly confiscated journalists' photography equipment
during their December 9 and 10 violent dispersions of human rights
activists and JCO members in Rabat and other large cities (see Sections
1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.b., and 4).
In general press articles containing unflattering material that
routinely had been prevented from circulation in past years, with the
exception of those related to the topics the Government still considers
sensitive, were permitted free circulation during the year. These
included reports on corruption in the Government and military,
financial scandals at public institutions, sensitive human rights-
related court cases, torture, violence against women, the exploitation
of child maids, prostitution, poverty, abandoned children, and harsh
conditions inside prisons.
In an October 23 ``Open Letter to the Minister of Justice'' that it
distributed to domestic as well as international media, the AMDH for
the first time published a list containing 14 names of alleged former
torturers and officials involved in disappearances and arbitrary
detention. The first domestic newspaper to republish the list was Le
Journal. Agence France Presse then distributed the list of names abroad
through its wire services. Some of the listed names were high-ranking
officials currently holding office. In the letter, the AMDH called for
``the truth and pursuit of those responsible for disappearances.'' The
AMDH also criticized the Justice Ministry for its alleged
nonintervention in past cases of torture and disappearance (see Section
1.c.).
Also in October, the Government lifted its 17-year ban on the book
``For Bread Alone'' (``Le Pain Nu'') by the Moroccan writer Mohammed
Choukri. The book had been banned during King Hassan II's reign
reportedly for its sexually explicit overtones.
Throughout the year, journalists, NGO's, and human rights activists
increased their calls on the Government to enact a new public liberties
law, which Prime Minister Youssoufi announced that he would enact when
he assumed power in 1998. In January 1999, 42 NGO's addressed a
memorandum to the Prime Minister proposing amendments to the law that
governs the press, associations, and public gatherings. Their proposals
were aimed at easing current restrictions and giving associations more
freedom to organize and function. The present Public Liberties Law
dates from 1958, and many legal observers agree that the sole amendment
to the law, which was ratified in 1973, constituted a setback to civil
liberties. The amendment apparently introduced restrictions that
established firmer government control over the legal establishment of
associations and the associations' scope of action once they are
recognized legally and allowed to operate. In January before
Parliament, Youssoufi announced his intention to open a debate on the
law. However, unsatisfied with what it perceived to be the Government's
slow handling of the issue, the NGO network Espace Associatif held a
large roundtable conference in March in which it discussed reform of
the law and urged the Government to act more quickly and transparently.
In an April communique following the censorship of Le Journal and
Assahifa, the AMDH demanded ``the immediate modification of the Public
Liberties Law and abrogation of all constraints that hinder freedom of
the press.'' At the same time, the OMDH issued a communique expressing
frustration at the Government's slow progress with respect to the
reforms that the OMDH had called for on numerous occasions. In May the
Moroccan Barrister's Association also called for reform of the Public
Liberties Law.
In July and November, the King announced in two nationally
televised speeches that the Government was preparing legislation for
reforming the Public Liberties Law. Prime Minister Youssoufi's Cabinet
discussed draft legislation and reviewed a draft in mid-December. The
SNPM on December 19 rejected the draft Press Code contained in the
three-part legislation on the grounds that the SNPM had not been
consulted during the code's formulation. The SNPM claimed that the
draft text still permitted the Government to seize, confiscate, and ban
publications, and to punish those convicted of libel and defamation
with jail sentences. Domestic media and human rights activists long
have criticized these central provisions, which widely are perceived to
repress and stifle the freedom of expression. No final decisions were
made by year's end regarding the pubic liberties legislation. Before
presenting the draft legislation to the Cabinet in December, Prime
Minister Youssoufi presided over two interministerial discussions of
the law in May and July.
The Government controls Radio-Television Marocaine (RTM)
broadcasts. Another major broadcaster is the French-backed Medi-1,
which operates from Tangier and broadcasts throughout Morocco and other
parts of North Africa. While nominally private and independent, Medi-1
practices self-censorship, as do other media outlets. The Government
owns the only television stations whose broadcasts may be received in
most parts of the nation without decoders or satellite dish antennas.
In 1996 the Government purchased a majority share in 2M, formerly the
country's sole private station, which can be received in most urban
areas. The ostensible reason for the Government's action was to save 2M
from bankruptcy; the Government now owns 68 percent of 2M stock, and
the Minister of Communication, by virtue of his position, has become
the chairman of the board. A government-appointed committee monitors
broadcasts. Privatization of these stations continued to be a major
topic of political debate during the year, and the Government announced
in 1998 that it was preparing a plan for 2M's resale to the private
sector.
In its October 28-November 3 issue, the independent magazine Demain
reported that since July the Government had censored five broadcasts of
a local news team that worked for the Qatari satellite television
station Al-Jazira. According to Demain's and other press reports,
spokesmen for the government-controlled television stations stated that
the censored broadcasts (of domestic news items) were ``technical
problems'' experienced during satellite transmissions. In late October,
the SNPM criticized what it perceived to be a ban on the Qatari
station, charging that the government-controlled television stations
allowed other Arabic television stations to broadcast from the country.
The Government had recalled its ambassador to Qatar in mid-July,
allegedly in diplomatic retaliation for the Qatari Government's votes
against Morocco's bid to host the 2006 World Cup and its bid for the
presidency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The
Government also allegedly was concerned over what it perceived to be
several negative reports on Morocco that recently were produced by Al-
Jazira.
For the past 13 years, the popular humorist Ahmed Snoussi (also
known as Bziz) has been prohibited from performing in the country due
to his satire of those in power. While the authorities allowed Bziz to
perform at the Mohammed V Theater in Rabat during the summer, he still
is prohibited from performing live on television. He also faces
restrictions on performing on university campuses. In November the
authorities reportedly prevented him from accepting students'
invitations to perform at universities in both Rabat and Tangiers.
In April Reuters news services reported the lifting of a 13-year
ban on a book that described harsh conditions in a high-security
prison. According to the author, Abdelkader Chaoui, his book ``The
Unachieved Past'' had been banned since its publication in 1987. The
book described the harsh conditions of the Kenitra prison in which
Chaoui was held for 15 years. Chaoui was jailed in 1974 because of his
leftist political opinions (see Section 1.c.). In November in
Marrakesh, the King awarded Chaoui a literary prize for his most recent
novel.
After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the
religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh
Abdessalam Yassine was allowed to leave his Sale home on May 16.
Yassine's release came after a May 10 statement by the Minister of
Interior before Parliament that the Sheikh ``leaves and returns to his
residence as he likes.'' The Minister also stated that Sheik Yassine
was free to take his case to court if he felt his rights were being
abused. Yassine's books, articles, and audio cassettes were sold only
at some bookstores; however, editorials calling for his release prior
to the Government's action were published without impediment (see
Sections 1.d., 2.b., 2.c., and 2.d.).
In May the wire service Agence France Presse and the French daily
newspaper Le Monde reported that Government had banned the book
``Letter from Morocco,'' which was written by Christine Serfaty, the
wife of former political dissident Abraham Serfaty (who was allowed to
return to Morocco in September 1999 after 8 years of exile and 17 years
of imprisonment). According to the two sources, the preface of
Serfaty's book allegedly caused advisors at the Royal Palace to ban its
distribution; the preface referred to Serfaty's collaboration with a
French author on a controversial book, ``Notre Ami Le Roi,'' which has
been banned in Morocco since it was published in 1990 for its criticism
of the rule of then-King Hassan II. In an interview given by Abraham
Serfaty to Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent in September, the former exile
claimed that his wife's book had not been banned, but rather
``bookstores (in Morocco) that would like to import the book still
cannot.'' In October Christine Serfaty claimed in an interview with
Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent that she did not believe that a banning was
in effect because she had received copies of her book from abroad
through the postal system. However, she said that Moroccan bookstores
that ordered her book still were waiting to receive it from the
national distributor. The distributor reportedly sent the book to the
government agency responsible for reviewing publications before their
entry onto the market. The agency had yet to release the book to the
distributor by year's end.
Also in May, the Government permitted the local publication and
sale of a comic book called ``They Even Starve Rats.'' Written and
illustrated by Abdelaziz Mouride, a former leftist student whom the
authorities arbitrarily detained in 1974, sentenced to 22 years in
prison, and then freed in 1984, the comic book vividly recounts the
torture, injustice, and humiliation that he and other political
dissidents suffered at the hands of the authorities (see Section 1.c.).
Dish antennas permit free access to a wide variety of foreign
broadcasts and are available at low cost on the market. The antennas
are in wide use throughout the country. Residents of the north are able
to receive Spanish broadcasts with standard antennas. The Government
does not impede the reception of foreign broadcasts or Internet access.
The universities enjoy relative academic freedom in most areas, but
are barred from open debate on the Monarchy, the Western Sahara, and
Islam. Government informers monitor campus activities (see Section
1.f.) and rectors are approved by the Ministry of Interior. Police and
university students conducting elections clashed violently during the
fall at university campuses throughout the country (see Sections 1.c.,
1.e., and 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the law also permits the
Government to suppress even peaceful demonstrations and mass
gatherings, and at times police forcibly prevented and disrupted
gatherings during the year. Most conferences and demonstrations require
the prior authorization of the Ministry of Interior, ostensibly for
security reasons.
Throughout the year, many meetings and marches took place
peacefully without government interference; however, numerous
demonstrations involving unemployed demonstrators were disrupted by the
Government. Security forces often resorted to violent means to disperse
and prevent from marching unemployed demonstrators, including the ANDC,
the Group 314, disabled unemployed protesters, and other affiliated
groups. Security forces also used violent means to disperse human
rights activists and members of Islamist organizations late in the
year. In early October, the Denmark-based organization EMHRN noted that
``measures inspired by security police are still in existence; force is
being used, outside the law, with protesters and, notably, with
unemployed academics.''
During their February 2 operation in the village of Tarmilet (48
miles from the capital), security forces used force to remove striking
workers who had blockaded a water-bottling factory. The operation,
which involved a large-scale military presence and reportedly was led
by senior military officers, took place after a court order in January
had ruled in favor of the factory owners who charged the protesting
workers with interruption of means of production and obstructing the
freedom to work. Dozens of strikers and members of the security forces
were injured during the operation (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., 2.d.,
and 6.a.).
On two consecutive days in February, security forces violently
dispersed striking members of Group 314 (unemployed doctoral graduates
of medicine and engineering). Members of Group 314 conducted a sit-in
on February 10 at the Ministry of Employment and were dispersed by
charging security forces, who beat the protesters with their hands,
boots, and batons. Police arrested eight protesters, who later were
released without charges. Seven protesters reportedly were injured. On
February 11, approximately 300 members of Group 314 staged a sit-in
before the Wilaya (regional office of the Interior Ministry) of Rabat
to demand the release of the 8 members who were arrested the previous
day. Approximately 200 members of the security forces intervened to
disperse the demonstrators, again using violent methods. This time,
police arrested four protesters, who also later were released without
charges. Employment Minister Khalid Alioua denied during a February 10
press briefing that abusive acts against the group had occurred (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
On March 1, security forces in the Western Sahara city of Smara
violently dispersed Sahrawi students and their families who were
demonstrating in solidarity with Sahrawi students in the nearby
Moroccan city of Agadir. Police had disrupted violently demonstrations
by the Agadir students on February 28 and 29. The Agadir students were
protesting the December 1999 incarceration of three Sahrawis accused of
spying for the Polisario Front (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.). The
Sahrawi students and families in Smara organized a march toward the
police station, which security forces subsequently broke up forcefully.
Dozens of persons allegedly were injured, as were a dozen police
officers. According to reports, nobody was arrested during the protest.
Security forces used force to break up a May 3 demonstration in
Meknes by members of the ANDC and other unemployed protesters (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
On May 11, police violently broke up a peaceful demonstration in
front of the Tunisian Embassy, where approximately 50 human rights
activists had gathered to protest the Tunisian Government's treatment
of a Tunisian journalist (he was on a hunger strike) and his family.
After issuing an order to cease the demonstrations, police used force
to disperse the activists, pushing them, beating their legs with
batons, tearing up their posters, and pursuing them down side streets.
Police reportedly injured six protesters.
On May 12, at the Ministry of Finance, police used excessive force
to disperse approximately 500 engineers who were preparing to hold a
sit-in to protest their terms of employment. Police used batons to
disperse the protesters, clubbing a regional leader from the
independent Moroccan Workers Union, who was knocked unconscious and
required hospitalization. When the protesters regrouped nearby, the
police again pursued them, and used batons to disperse them. Some
police reportedly entered a ministry building and clubbed innocent
bystanders whom they mistook for protesters. The International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels issued a communique that
denounced police for using brutal methods against the protesters and
asked the Government ``to work to put an end to brutal attacks against
peaceful trade-union demonstrations.'' On May 17, the OMDH issued a
communique that strongly criticized the brutal police actions on May 11
and 12, and questioned the Government about ``the objective of using
violence against civil society'' at a time when royal speeches on human
rights urged a new and more humane relationship of authority between
the Government and citizens.
On May 17 and 18, police violently broke up student demonstrations
in Marrakech, initially detaining 30 to 40 mostly Sahrawi participants.
There were conflicting accounts regarding the origins of the large-
scale demonstriations (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
Within a 1-week period in June, security forces in the capital used
excessive force to break up both a march by unemployed graduates
associated with the ANDC and to evict 12 Group 314 hunger strikers from
UMT's Rabat headquarters. According to eyewitnesses, on June 13,
hundreds of security force members violently stopped up to 4,000
members of the ANDC from staging a protest march at the Parliament.
Security forces used batons, chased protesters down streets, and
violently dispersed large groups of marchers who had gathered before
the Parliament. Thirty-three protesters reportedly were injured during
the violent dispersal, 2 of them seriously. Over 20 persons were
arrested, all of whom later were released without charges. On the
evening of June 13, authorities detained two union leaders not involved
in the demonstrations and released them the following day without
charges (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
During the evening of June 18, up to 100 members of the security
forces attacked UMT headquarters in Rabat, where 12 Group 314 members
were in the 11th day of a hunger strike. The attack allegedly began
after ANDC demonstrators outside the headquarters threw rocks at
security forces. Security forces then reportedly threw the rocks back
at the demonstrators, breaking windows in the process, and fired tear
gas into the building. They subsequently used force to clear all
demonstrators from the area, arresting up to 100 persons. Security
forces them removed the hunger strikers, who had been forced out by the
tear gas. Later in the evening, the authorities cut the water and
electricity supply to the UMT's headquarters, which they restored the
following morning. Dozens of protesters were injured, some seriously.
Twenty-two of those arrested were charged with ``using violence against
agents of authority;'' 19 received suspended sentences and 3 received 2
months' imprisonment. Prime Minister Youssoufi convened an
interministerial meeting on June 19 to address the violence and
condition of the unemployed population. The Government stated that it
``affirms its choice of dialog and rejects all forms of pressure and
tension.'' Justice Minister Azziman then met with some members of the
ANDC. On July 5, the Group 314 hunger strikers ended their 28-day
strike after a meeting with the Government, in which both sides pledged
to engage in a substantive dialog (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
On July 26 in downtown Rabat, police violently dispersed disabled
unemployed university graduates, who were protesting the denial of
their right to employment. The protesters arrived in Rabat from
throughout the country to meet the Secretary of State in charge of the
disabled, whom they accused of reneging on promises to assist them. The
police reportedly removed the disabled protesters to the Ain Atiq
detention center, outside the capital. On September 12, police again
used force to break up a protest by approximately 40 disabled graduates
before the Parliament. There were reports of injured protesters and,
according to a communique issued by an association of unemployed
handicapped university graduates, police again removed uninjured
handicapped protesters to the Ain Atiq detention center. Police
reportedly attempted to remove forcibly camera equipment of one
photojournalist covering the demonstration, and jostled and threatened
other news correspondents on the scene. The SNPM issued a communique
criticizing the police treatment of the journalists, claiming that it
was not the first time security forces exhibited such behavior toward
them (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 5).
On October 9 in Casablanca, police dispersed with tear gas 2,000 to
3,000 Islamists who were protesting the Israeli Government's use of
force against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in
September and October. Islamist leaders had asked for and were refused
permission to hold the demonstration.
On October 23, security forces used violent means to break up a
demonstration by students preparing to begin a march to protest
transportation problems at Hassan I University in Settat (southeast of
Casablanca). Police intervened when the students were gathering on the
edges of the university for a march toward the Wilaya of Settat. The
police arrested 10 students, some of whom reportedly were not
participating in the march, and accused them of disobedience, inciting
disobedience, violence, and contempt of public servants while
exercising their functions. Numerous students reportedly were injured
in the violence, as well as two policemen. Press reports indicated that
security forces intervened once students belonging to the Justice and
Charity Organization inserted themselves into the march and began
chanting anti-Israeli and anti-American slogans. Security forces
reportedly clubbed students indiscriminately with truncheons, even
entering neighborhood cafes and cafeterias to do so. After two of its
youth members were detained in the incident, the political bureau of
the PPS political party issued a communique on October 27, in which it
claimed that security forces acted with ``unprecedented brutality'' in
pursuing and attacking students indiscriminately within university
grounds and in neighboring streets, and in conducting ``targeted
arrests.'' At their trial on October 27, the 10 students were sentenced
to between 3 and 5 months in prison (three were given suspended
sentences); the students' sentences later were reduced on appeal (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
On November 5, security forces reportedly used violent force to
break up a sit-in by ANDC members in the southern city of TanTan. The
local ANDC branch had called for a march to protest the lack of
employment opportunities in the city, irregularities in the region's
hiring practices, the lack of dialog with the authorities, and the
local governor's abusive treatment of ANDC members. The police
reportedly injured 25 demonstrators, 3 seriously, during the attack.
On November 21, security forces violently clashed with JCO students
at Mohammedia University (in the Casablanca suburbs) as the latter
prepared for annual student elections. According to news reports, over
100 students were injured and 14 arrested. Police claimed that they
responded because the students illegally remained on campus overnight
and committed acts of vandalism. The students were sentenced to 2
years' imprisonment and fines ranging from $50 to $150 (500 to 1,500
dirhams) (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). Other reports indicated that
similar although less violent clashes occurred between security forces
and JCO students at other university campuses around the country
engaged in student elections.
On November 27, security forces reportedly used violent means to
break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in the southern
city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted in the death of one
worker and injuries to eight others (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and
6.a.).
During the weekend of December 9-11, security forces throughout the
country used violent means to disperse human rights activists, members
of the JCO, and unemployed graduates who gathered separately in Rabat
and other large cities to demonstrate for different reasons. The three
groups decided to gather despite a prior Interior Ministry statement
that the gatherings were unauthorized and would be forbidden. On
December 9, human rights activists from the AMDH and Forum for Truth
and Justice (FMVE) gathered before the Parliament to demand trials for
those responsible for past arbitrary detention, forced disappearance,
and torture. Security forces violently attacked the demonstrators with
truncheons and arrested about 40 persons. Security forces also
reportedly confiscated journalists' photography equipment. After
spending 1 night in jail, 39 of the detained protesters appeared before
the court of first instance in Rabat the following day and were
released that evening. The Government pressed charges against 33 of the
demonstrators; the trial was scheduled for February 2001. The AMDH's
president Abderrahmane Benameur, who was among those arrested and
released, condemned the use of violence by security forces,
characterizing such violence as ``a step backward in human rights.'' On
December 17, the AMDH filed a lawsuit in Rabat's administrative court
against the Government for banning its demonstration. On December 10,
the FIDH issued a communique, in which it expressed its ``extreme
concern'' regarding the Government's suppression of peaceful
gatherings.
Later during the weekend, in Rabat and other large cities, security
forces again resorted to violent force to break up public gatherings by
members of the JCO. The JCO had called for peaceful nationwide protests
in large cities to demonstrate against the Government's banning of
their newspapers and to demand the legalization of their organization.
At the Rabat train station, security forces used truncheons to disperse
violently assembled JCO members, and arrested dozens of persons. The
authorities again confiscated photography equipment, including that of
demonstrators and of a British Broadcasting Company journalist. The
authorities charged 18 of those detained with holding an unauthorized
demonstration. Their trial was scheduled to take place in January 2001.
Security forces violently dispersed a similar demonstration in
Casablanca on the same day, arresting hundreds of additional JCO
demonstrators; all of the Casablanca demonstrators had been released by
year's end. Of the released demonstrators, 22 were scheduled to be
tried in early 2001.
On December 11, security forces used force to arrest members of the
ANDC who had gathered before the Parliament to protest against
Government inactivity regarding their unemployment. Those arrested
later were released.
During the year, there were no new developments related to the
police excesses in the Western Saharan city of Laayoune in September
and October 1999, in which police used brutal force to break up
demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates, miners, and
former Sahrawi political prisoners. Some who were detained during the
police violence were subjected to systematic beatings and other forms
of physical coercion. Most of those detained were released; however, 26
persons were charged and sentenced to between 10 and 15 years in prison
on charges of destruction of property during the protests. Despite
appeals lodged by defense lawyers during the year, none of the
sentences were reduced or overturned.
In the aftermath of the September 1999 protests, King Mohammed VI
immediately replaced the governor of the province, relieved the local
police chief of his duties, and dispatched military security forces to
the city to help restore order. A new royal commission was dispatched
quickly to the city by King Mohammed VI to explain to local residents
proposed new measures to decentralize authority in the region, which
would allow local residents more of a choice in their affairs, and to
propose elections to choose members to a royal advisory council on the
Western Sahara.
Despite these actions taken to restore confidence and order and to
lessen tensions, renewed violence broke out in late October 1999. There
were credible reports that police provoked the violence and there were
further credible reports that police authorities unlawfully entered
homes to arrest persons associated with the demonstrations in September
1999. Thirty-one persons reportedly were detained. Of these persons, 10
reportedly were released within 24 hours and the remainder released
within the following 2-week period.
No investigation has been initiated into the excessive use of force
by the police, nor have any charges against police been filed. There
also was no progress during the year on local elections to choose
members to the proposed royal advisory council on the Western Sahara.
However, there also were numerous peaceful protests during the
year. For example, on February 4, 60 Sahrawi students organized a sit-
in protest in front of the Ministry of Human Rights to protest what
they claimed to be the illegal detention of 3 Sahrawis who were
detained in December 1999 and accused of espionage activities on behalf
of the Polisario Front (see Sections 1.b. and 1.e.). The sit-in
proceeded peacefully. On February 18 and 19, teachers who were members
of two different trade unions protested without disruption for 2
consecutive days the freezing of family allowances and teacher
promotions. On March 4, hundreds of supporters and members of the NGO
Forum for Truth and Justice, which was created by former political
prisoners and their survivors, staged a sit-in before the notorious
Derb Moulay Cherif police station to demand an accounting for and
details regarding over 30 years of forced disappearance and arbitrary
arrest. Police did not intervene. On March 12, two large rallies took
place in Rabat and Casablanca that collectively involved over 200,000
persons. The march in Rabat was called by civil society in observance
of the international day for women. The march in Casablanca was a
counterdemonstration organized by Morocco's two major Islamist groups.
In spite of the large numbers of demonstrators and the political
sensitivity of the marches, they both proceeded peacefully and without
intervention by security forces (see Section 5). To protest government
inaction on their behalf, 115 members of Group 314 staged a 48-hour
hunger strike on March 17 and 18. The hunger strike proceeded
peacefully, without any incidents or intervention by security forces.
On May 3, journalists and human rights activists peacefully
demonstrated in front of the Ministry of Communication against several
cases of press censorship. On October 7, hundreds of former political
prisoners, their families, and human rights activists peacefully
demonstrated at Tazmamart, the notorious former secret detention
center. On October 8, several tens of thousands persons peacefully
participated in a march in Rabat led by the Prime Minister to
demonstrate their solidarity with Palestinians.
On November 5, 1999, Prime Minister Youssoufi revoked an order
issued earlier in the year by former Interior Minister Driss Basri to
ban all public meetings from government-owned facilities unless they
otherwise were authorized by the Government. Basri's decision triggered
protests by human rights activists who asserted that such tactics
constituted a serious violation of freedom of expression. Amid the
protests caused by Basri's order, government spokesman Khalid Alioua
stated that the Interior Ministry's decision had been ``badly
interpreted,'' and applied only to meetings in municipal council and
administration buildings, not to the public halls that routinely are
used by unions, parties, NGO's, and other groups.
According to Youssoufi's November 5, 1999 revocation, only a
declaration of a public meeting would be necessary for public meetings
to proceed. However, on November 25, 1999, several weeks following the
Prime Minister's revocation of Basri's order, government spokesperson
Khalid Alioua announced that--in apparent contradiction to the Prime
Minister's revocation--both a declaration and authorization must be
issued before public-venue meetings could proceed. Alioua attributed
the Government's decision to a series of illegal sit-ins and protests
in public spaces that had followed the revocation. Human rights
organizations reacted negatively to the announcement. The OMDH issued a
communique that criticized the decision as illegal. The OMDH cited the
1958 Public Liberties Code and Youssoufi's November directive in
asserting that a declaration alone suffices to proceed with a public
meeting, and that meetings may be prohibited only if deemed a threat to
public order. Since the Government's November 25 announcement, local
observers generally agree that the authorities indiscriminately apply
the authorization rule, allowing those demonstrations to proceed that
it considers inoffensive.
After violent police suppression of demonstrations in Rabat in
October 1998, Basri agreed in December 1998 to recognize officially the
ANDC, whose request for recognition had been pending for 7 years. Basri
also agreed to grant members of the group 5,000 taxi licenses. Members
of the ANDC also were invited by then-King Hassan II to a national
conference on unemployment in December 1998. In June 1999, the
Ministers of Interior and Employment toured the regions to instruct
walis (regional and city leaders appointed by the Interior Ministry)
and governors on how to take steps to reduce unemployment, and to
listen to the needs of the unemployed. However, despite repeated
meetings with the Ministers of Interior and Employment, the ANDC has
not obtained official recognition, and the promised taxi licenses have
not been issued.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government limits this right in practice. Under a 1958 decree, which
was amended substantially in 1973 to introduce restrictions on civil
society organizations, persons who wish to create an organization must
obtain the approval of the Ministry of Interior before holding
meetings. In practice the Ministry uses this requirement to prevent
persons suspected of advocating causes opposed by the Government from
forming legal organizations. Historically, extreme Islamist and leftist
groups have encountered the greatest difficulty in obtaining official
approval. Although there are over 20 active Islamist groups, the
Government has prohibited membership in 2, the JCO and Jama'a Islamia,
due to their perceived anti-Monarchy rhetoric. Political parties also
must be approved by the Ministry of Interior, which has used this power
to control participation in the political process. However, individual
Islamists are not barred from participating in recognized political
parties. The last known instance in which a proposed political party
failed to receive such approval was in 1996, when an Islamist group's
application was not approved. The group instead was permitted to
present candidates for the 1997 elections under the banner of an
existing party. One Islamist party, the Party for Justice and
Development (PJD--formerly the Popular Democratic Constitutional
Movement), won nine seats in Parliament in the 1997 elections. In by-
elections held in August, the PJD won two additional seats in
Parliament.
During the summer, the Government prevented members of the JCO from
gaining access to campgrounds and beaches for group prayer sessions,
and arrested and jailed some of the group's members (see Sections 1.d.,
2.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are tolerated
in practice. The Constitution provides that Islam is the official
religion, and designates the King as ``Commander of the Faithful,''
with the responsibility of ensuring ``respect for Islam.'' In 1996 a
small foreign Hindu community received the right to perform cremations
and to hold services, and other foreign communities enjoy similar
religious privileges. However, Baha'is face restrictions on the
practice of their faith. The Government monitors the activities of
mosques.
The Government does not license or approve religions or religious
organizations. The Government provides tax benefits, land and building
grants, subsidies, and customs exemptions for imports necessary for the
observance of the major religions.
Islamic law and tradition call for strict punishment for any Muslim
who converts to another faith. Citizens who convert to Christianity and
other religions sometimes face social ostracism, and in the past a
small number have faced short periods of questioning by the
authorities. Voluntary conversion is not a crime under the Criminal or
Civil Codes; however, the authorities have jailed some converts on the
basis of references to Koranic law. Any attempt to induce a Muslim to
convert is illegal. Foreign missionaries either limit their
proselytizing to non-Muslims or conduct their work quietly. The
Government cited the Penal Code prohibition on conversion in most cases
in which courts expelled foreign missionaries.
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs monitors Friday mosque sermons and
the Koranic schools to ensure the teaching of approved doctrine. The
authorities sometimes suppress the activities of Islamists, but
generally tolerate activities limited to the propagation of Islam,
education, and charity. Security forces commonly close mosques to the
public shortly after Friday services to prevent the use of the premises
for unauthorized political activity. The Government strictly controls
authorization to construct new mosques. Most mosques are constructed
using private funds.
After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the
religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh
Abdessalam Yassine was allowed to leave his Sale home on May 16. On May
17, Sheikh Yassine then received at his home leading council members of
his Justice and Charity Organization, attended a Sale mosque prayer
service on May 19, and gave a May 20 press conference that was attended
widely by domestic and foreign media representatives. In February prior
to Sheikh Yassine's release, the Government temporarily confiscated
several newspapers that printed a 19-page memorandum addressed by
Yassine to King Mohammed VI asking for the King to return to Moroccans
the wealth that Yassine alleged the King's late father had stolen from
them. On February 8 and 9, then-Communication Minister Larbi Messari
claimed that the memorandum was not banned, that it was available on
the Internet, and that the concerned newspapers were back in
circulation. Messari stated that the confiscation was ``incidental,''
and that censorship was absurd and no longer practiced. Four members of
the JCO were arrested in February for distributing the memorandum in
Tangiers and Ben Slimane (near Casablanca). All four were charged with
violating the ``sacred institution of the Monarchy.'' According to the
AMDH, by February 7, the authorities had dropped the charges and
released the four JCO members.
According to press reports in late May and early July, the
authorities allegedly blocked the publication of two newspapers--Al-Adl
Wal Ihsane and Rissalat Al-Futuwa--that were associated with the JCO,
ordering printers to suspend their distribution. Yassine's books,
articles, and audio cassettes were sold only at some bookstores, and
editorials that had called for his release were published without
impediment. The JCO has an active presence on university campuses and
occasionally had organized protests of Yassine's house arrest. However,
prominent members of the JCO are subject to constant surveillance and
sometimes are unable to obtain passports and other necessary documents.
During the summer, the Government prevented members of the JCO from
gaining access to campgrounds and beaches for group prayer sessions,
and arrested and jailed some of the group's members. In August two JCO
members were sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment for their
proselytizing activities on a beach in El-Jadida. During the same
month, Interior Minister Ahmed Midaoui declared before Parliament that
``we are one sole nation and nobody can impose upon others their own
vision of Islam,'' and that ``people go to beaches for recreational
purposes and we do not have Islamic beaches.'' He also added that ``we
cannot tolerate the appearance of sectarianism in our society'' (see
Sections 1.d., 2.a., 2.b., and 2.d.).
The teaching of Islam in public schools benefits from discretionary
funding in the Government's annual education budget, as do other
curriculum subjects. The annual budget also provides funds for
religious instruction to the parallel system of Jewish public schools.
The Government has funded several efforts to study the cultural,
artistic, literary, and scientific heritage of Moroccan Jews. In 1998,
the Government created a chair for the study of comparative religions
at the University of Rabat.
Since the time of the French protectorate (1912-1956), a small
foreign Christian community has opened churches, orphanages, hospitals,
and schools without any restriction or licensing requirement being
imposed. Missionaries who conduct themselves in accordance with
societal expectations largely are left unhindered. However, those whose
proselytizing activities become public face expulsion.
The Government permits the display and sale of Bibles in French,
English, and Spanish, but confiscates Arabic-language Bibles and
refuses licenses for their importation and sale, despite the absence of
any law banning such books. Nevertheless, Arabic Bibles reportedly have
been sold in local bookstores. There were no known cases in which
foreigners were denied entry into the country because they were
carrying Christian materials, as occurred in the past.
The small Baha'i community has been forbidden to meet or
participate in communal activities since 1983; however, there were no
reports during the year that the Government summoned members of the
Baha'i Faith for questioning or denied them passports, as had occurred
in previous years.
There are two sets of laws and courts--one for Jews and one for
Muslims--pertaining to marriage, inheritance, and family matters. The
family law courts are run, depending on the law that applies, by
rabbinical and Islamic authorities who are court officials. Parliament
must authorize any changes to those laws. Non-Koranic sections of
Muslim law on personal status are applied to non-Muslim and non-Jewish
persons.
The Government organizes events to encourage tolerance and respect
among religions. In April and May, the Government hosted the first
meeting of the ``Traveling Faculty of the Religions of the Book'' at
Al-Akhawayn University in Ifrane.
The Government annually organizes in May the ``Fez Festival of
Sacred Music,'' which includes musicians from many religions. The
Government has organized in the past numerous symposiums among local
and international clergy, priests, rabbis, imams and other spiritual
leaders to examine ways to reduce religious intolerance and to promote
interfaith dialog. Each year during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan,
the King hosts colloquiums of Islamic religious scholars to examine
ways to promote tolerance and mutual respect within Islam and between
Islam and other religions.
In late August, the King declared in a nationally televised speech
that 100 mosques throughout the country would be used as teaching
centers to fight illiteracy. In the first (and pilot) year of the
announced program, 10,000 citizens between the ages of 15 and 45 were
to receive literacy courses on Islam, civic education, and hygiene. If
successful, the program was expected to be expanded to include a larger
part of the population in subsequent years. The King designated 200
unemployed university graduates to administer the literacy courses
during the program's pilot stage, which began in September.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement; however, the Government restricts this right in certain
areas. The gendarmerie maintains checkpoints throughout the country, at
which drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations are examined for
validity. Although checkpoints have been maintained in the same places
for years, the degree of inspections of motorists has relaxed, while
the emphasis on inspecting trucks and buses continues. In addition
while there are continuing allegations that gendarmes demand small
bribes to clear vehicles, press reports indicate that gendarmes found
guilty of such behavior are punished. In 1998 the Gendarmerie Royale
began a campaign to combat such abuses within its ranks. In the
Moroccan-administered Western Sahara, authorities restrict movement in
areas regarded as militarily sensitive.
The Ministry of Interior restricts freedom to travel outside the
country in certain circumstances. In addition all civil servants and
military personnel must obtain written permission from their ministries
to leave the country. The OMDH and AMDH have compiled lists of
individuals who reportedly have been denied passports or who have
passports but are denied permission to travel. In February the AMDH
reported in the French-language weekly Quotidien du Maroc on 33 past
and previous cases in which the Interior Ministry has blocked the
issuance of passports to former political prisoners. On February 26,
the OMDH issued a communique protesting a lack of governmental action
on outstanding passport cases. The OMDH contended that the Government,
in resorting to arbitrary administrative delays, continues to harass
former political prisoners who seek to resume normal lives. The OMDH
also alleged that some citizens were forbidden by the Government to
leave Moroccan territory during the year. The communique listed no
names.
In March the investigative French-language weekly Le Journal
reported on two cases of former leftist political activists and
political prisoners who were unable to renew their passports. Pardoned
in 1992, Abdellah El-Harrif, the national secretary of a far-left
political party unrecognized by the Government, discovered during a
passport-renewal procedure that the authorities have sought his
whereabouts since 1996. Despite numerous inquiries to the Government to
determine the reason behind his particular status, El Harrif reportedly
had not received a response by year's end. However, he remained free to
continue his professional and political life without hindrance, and is
free to travel within the country. El Harrif's deputy, Mostapha Brahma,
reported similar difficulties. Brahma has been without a passport since
1994, the year of his pardon, and has received no answer from the
Interior Ministry, Human Rights Ministry, or the CCDH regarding the
nonissuance of his passport. According to press reports in November, a
former prisoner who was convicted in 1996 for ``threatening the sacred
institution of the monarchy'' and freed 3 years later, still was
waiting to receive his passport a year after submitting a passport
request.
According to press reports, before, during, and after their
February 2 operation in the village of Tarmilet (48 miles from the
capital) to remove striking workers from a water-bottling factory, a
reported 1,000 security forces encircled and sealed off the village.
Gendarmes erected blockades and strictly controlled access to the
village. According to the AMDH, security forces maintained checkpoints
near the village well after the February 2 confrontation with workers.
The operation, which involved a large-scale military presence and
reportedly was led by senior military officers, took place after a
court order in January had ruled in favor of the factory owners, who
had charged the protesting workers with interruption of means of
production and obstructing the freedom to work. Dozens of strikers and
members of the security forces were injured during the operation, in
which security forces used rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons
to remove strikers and their supporters from the factory and access
areas (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 2.b.).
After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the
religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh
Abdessalam Yassine was permitted to leave his Sale home on May 16 (see
Sections 1.d., 2.a, and 2.c.).
Moroccans may not renounce their citizenship, but the King retains
the power--rarely used--to revoke it. Tens of thousands of Moroccans
hold more than one citizenship and travel on passports from two or more
countries. While in Morocco, they are regarded as Moroccan citizens.
Dual nationals sometimes complain of harassment by immigration
inspectors.
The Government welcomes voluntary repatriation of Jews who have
emigrated. Moroccan Jewish emigres, including those with Israeli
citizenship, freely visit Morocco. The Government also encourages the
return of Sahrawis who have departed Morocco due to the conflict in the
Western Sahara, provided that they recognize the Government's claim to
the region. The Government does not permit Western Saharan nationalists
who have been released from prison to live in the disputed territory.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. While Morocco has from time to time provided political asylum
to individuals, the issue of first asylum never has arisen. There were
no reports of forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Constitutional provisions establishing periodic free elections
notwithstanding, citizens do not have the full right to change their
government. The King, as head of state, appoints the Prime Minister,
who is the titular head of government. Constitutional changes in 1992,
retained in the Constitution of 1996, authorize the Prime Minister to
nominate all government ministers, but the King has the power to
replace any minister at will. The Parliament has the theoretical
ability to effect change in the system of government. However, the
Constitution may not be changed without the King's approval. The
Ministry of Interior appoints the provincial governors and local caids
(district administrative officials). Municipal and regional councils
are elected.
The Government of Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi is the
first government formed from the political opposition since the late
1950's, and his 1998 appointment by then-King Hassan II marked a
significant step toward increased democratization. With the support of
the Monarchy, Youssoufi, who was sentenced to death in absentia in the
1970's but subsequently received a royal pardon in 1980, has declared
his intention to modernize the administrative and judicial structures
and to liberalize the economic and political system. Of the 41 cabinet-
level posts in the Government that Youssoufi appointed in 1998, only 4
posts (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Islamic Affairs) plus
the Secretary General of the Government and the Minister-Delegate for
Defense Administration were filled by holdovers from the former
Government. In 1999 King Mohammed VI replaced one of the four
holdovers, Interior Minister Driss Basri. In order to develop reforms,
the King granted cabinet ministers a greater degree of responsibility
for the management of their individual portfolios. In September Prime
Minister Youssoufi consolidated his Cabinet to include fewer
ministerial areas of responsibility. The Government now consists of 33
cabinet-level posts, but still contains 6 ``sovereign'' ministerial
posts directly appointed by the King (Interior, Foreign Affairs,
Justice, Islamic Affairs, Defense Administration, and Secretary General
of the Government).
Morocco created a bicameral legislature in 1997. Fourteen parties
have members in Parliament, and 7 are represented in the governing
coalition. While opposition parties urged in 1996 and 1997 that all
members of Parliament be elected directly by the citizenry, then-King
Hassan II proposed in 1996 the creation of a bicameral legislature, in
which all members of the lower house would be elected through universal
suffrage and the upper house by various regional, local, and
professional councils.
In June 1997, Morocco held municipal council elections, followed by
balloting for regional professional councils. In the wake of the June
1997 elections, political parties accused each other of manipulation
and vote-buying, and claimed government intervention on behalf of
candidates. The Election Commission examined numerous petitions during
the course of the electoral season in 1997 and recommended the reversal
of over 60 municipal election results, including in Tangier, Khoribga,
and Oujda, noted irregularities in four parliamentary races in
Casablanca, Chefchaouen, and Fez, and called for the results to be set
aside. The OMDH criticized the prominent role of the Interior Ministry
in the June 1997 elections, as well as the numerous allegations of
vote-buying, both by the Government and political parties, electoral
list manipulation by the Government, and electoral card falsification.
In August 1997, then-King Hassan II convoked a special session of
Parliament to ratify two laws creating a bicameral assembly, and, in
the same month, Parliament unanimously approved these laws, which
created a 325-seat lower house, the Chamber of Representatives, to be
filled by direct elections, and a 270seat upper house, the Chamber of
Deputies, whose members would be elected by various directly elected
professional and regional councils. There were widespread, credible
allegations of votebuying and government manipulation in the November
1997 legislative elections. The fraud and government pressure tactics
led most independent observers to conclude that the election results
were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the Government. All
opposition parties criticized the Government, and some called for a
boycott of Parliament. Two winners renounced their seats, alleging
unsolicited government interference on their behalf. The Election
Commission concurred that irregularities had occurred in two Casablanca
cases and recommended that new elections be held in those districts.
After a long appeals process initiated by the losers of the seats, new
elections for the seats were held on August 31, as well as elections
for four other seats throughout the country. The new elections followed
the formal invalidation of the six 1997 election results throughout the
year by the Constitutional Council. Press reports indicate that the
August 31 by-elections overall proceeded more fairly than in 1997,
despite allegations that two of the races involved some cases of vote-
buying. Also in August, the Constitutional Council invalidated an
additional by-election held in the Casablanca-Mechouar district in June
that allegedly involved vote-buying. Despite the invalidations by the
Constitutional Council throughout the year, the body continued to
attract criticism for the alleged slow pace of its deliberations.
On September 15, Morocco held indirect elections to replace, for
the first time since the body's inception, one third of the 270 seats
in the Chamber of Counselors. After the polls had closed, Interior
Minister Midaoui reported in a nationally televised press conference
that various political parties had engaged in votebuying and fraud.
Criticizing the electoral corruption, Minister Midaoui claimed that his
ministry had done everything it could to prevent fraudulent practices,
including conducting investigations into 108 cases, at least 26 of
which the Interior Ministry was certain involved fraud. The Interior
Minister also reported that the Ministry had turned the cases over to
the Justice Ministry for further action, and that the Government ``is
going to do its duty.'' However, by year's end, few of the cases
involving electoral fraud had been presented before the courts and
prosecuted. According to press reports, the Constitutional Council also
had received several hundred grievances relating to the election from
throughout the country.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There is 1
female minister delegate in the 33-member Cabinet. There are no women
among the 325 members of the Chamber of Representatives, and only one
woman in the 270-seat Chamber of Counselors. Women occupy only 84 out
of 22,000 seats (or .34 percent) of local communal councils throughout
the country.
In March for the first time in the country's history, King Mohammed
VI appointed a female royal counselor. In August the King also
appointed a woman to head the National Office of Oil Research and
Exploration, an office created as part of the Government's efforts to
exploit newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the east. In September
the King confirmed the first-ever female ministerial appointment; she
is to be responsible for a newly reorganized ministry overseeing the
status of women, the first time a ministry has been charged explicitly
with the issue. In October the King appointed the first woman to head
the National Office of Tourism.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are three nationally organized and officially recognized
nongovernmental human rights groups: The Moroccan Organization for
Human Rights, the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights
(LMDDH), and the Moroccan Association for Human Rights. A fourth group,
the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDDH), was formed in
1992 by former AMDH members. There are also numerous regional human
rights organizations. The Government maintains close and collaborative
relations with all of these groups.
Founded in the 1979 and 1988, respectively, the AMDH and OMDH have
spent years struggling to end human rights abuses. During this time,
they were subjected to harassment and restrictions by the Government.
Some of their former leaders now occupy high posts in the Youssoufi
Government, particularly in the human rights field. In May the
Government accorded the two organizations ``public utility'' status,
which confers organizations financial benefits as recognition of their
serving the public interest.
In October the OMDH hosted a regional congress on protecting human
rights defenders and promoting democracy in the Arab world. The
congress was attended by Arab jurists and the Human Rights Minister.
The congress called for constitutional reforms throughout the Arab
world that would protect democracy and ensure public freedoms.
During the weekend of December 9-11, security forces throughout the
country used violent means to disperse human rights activists, members
of the JCO, and unemployed graduates who separately gathered in Rabat
and other large cities to demonstrate for different reasons. On
December 9, human rights activists from the AMDH and FMVE gathered
before the Parliament to demand trials for those responsible for past
arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, and torture. Security forces
violently attacked the demonstrators with truncheons and arrested about
40 persons. Security forces also reportedly confiscated journalists'
photography equipment. After spending 1 night in jail, 39 of the
detained protesters appeared before the court of first instance in
Rabat the following day and were released that evening. The Government
pressed charges against 33 of the demonstrators; the trial was
scheduled for February 2001. The AMDH's president, Abderrahmane
Benameur, who was among those arrested and released, condemned the use
of violence by security forces, characterizing such violence as ``a
step backward in human rights.'' On December 17, the AMDH filed a
lawsuit in Rabat's administrative court against the Government for
banning its demonstration. On December 10, the FIDH issued a communique
in which it expressed its ``extreme concern'' regarding the
Government's suppression of peaceful gatherings (see Sections 1.c.,
1.d., 1.e., 2.a., and 2.b.).
Two new prominent national human rights NGO's, the FMVE and the
ONPM, were formed in 1999. Created by victims of forced disappearance
and surviving family members, the FMVE's principal goal is to encourage
the Government to address openly the issue of past forced
disappearances and arbitrary detention. It also lobbies for reparations
for former political prisoners that extend beyond financial
compensation. Created by lawyers, doctors, journalists, former inmates,
and entertainment personalities, the ONPM's main purpose is improving
the treatment and living conditions of prisoners. ONPM also supports
penal reform efforts. Both the FMVE and the ONPM maintained
collaborative relations and fairly regular contact with government
authorities throughout the year.
In March the Moroccan Barrister's Association opened a human rights
center in Rabat. The Human Rights Minister and other government
officials attended its opening. The barrister's association plans to
use the center to train lawyers in human rights laws and standards. The
center is to undertake studies on reforming existing legal texts to
ensure harmonization with international human rights conventions.
Additionally, the center intends to track and monitor court cases and
verdicts with human rights implications.
On December 8, the Government signed an agreement with the
Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (ADFM) to cooperate on gender
equality programs.
Amnesty International has local chapters in Rabat, Casablanca, and
Marrakech. These chapters participate in AI international letter-
writing campaigns involving issues outside Morocco. In September AI
held a national youth forum outside the capital that focused on human
rights awareness training and children's rights. The Government hosted
a visit by AI secretary general Pierre Sane in June 1999, during which
Sane met with senior government officials and announced that AI would
consider Morocco as a site for a regional office and would hold its
International Congress in Marrakech later that year. However, later in
June 1999, articles in the French and domestic press reported that the
Government had decided not to host the conference, allegedly because of
fears that AI delegates would organize protests in Rabat concerning the
human rights situation in the Western Sahara. The conference was not
held. Amnesty International chose Lebanon as the site for its regional
office, which opened in the fall.
In the latter part of the year, the Government and Amnesty
International discussed and signed two cooperation agreements on human
rights education and public awareness. In September Human Rights
Minister Aujjar received an Amnesty International delegation from
Norway, which presented a draft 10-year program on cooperation for the
country's new focus on human rights education. Amnesty International
and the Government still were negotiating an official agreement on the
draft program at year's end. The Government and the Moroccan chapter of
Amnesty International signed a similar cooperation agreement on a human
rights public awareness program on December 9, the 52nd anniversary of
the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
According to the MAP news agency, the Paris-based International
Federation of Human Rights Leagues decided in March to hold its next
world congress in Morocco, reportedly because of the country's progress
in the area of human rights. FIDH officials visited the country in
January to meet with Human Rights Minister Mohammed Aujjar, Prime
Minister Youssoufi, and other government officials, and to discuss
preparations for the congress, which was scheduled to take place in
January 2001. The FIDH's world congress reportedly is the first to be
held by an international human rights organization in the Arab world.
In Cairo in March, the Arab League Council chose the Moroccan
academic and jurist Khalid Naciri as the next president of the Arab
Commission for Human Rights. Naciri is to occupy the post for 2 years,
heading the commission's review of human rights questions in the Arab
world. Naciri was a founding member of the OMDH and once served as its
president.
In October at its general assembly session held in Cairo, the Arab
Human Rights Organization (OADH) elected two Moroccans to serve 3-year
posts on the organization's Council of Secretaries. The two Moroccans
also are active members of the OMDH. Also in October, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, in collaboration with the Ministry of
National Education and Boston University, conducted a pilot program to
introduce the teaching of international humanitarian law to educators.
The program is part of the Government's current efforts to reform the
education system, including by integrating the teaching of human rights
into the national curriculum.
In April U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson
visited the country to attend an international conference on national
human rights institutions and to open a U.N.-sponsored human rights
information center. During her visit, her second in as many years,
Robinson said that while there still were problems to resolve,
particularly with respect to unemployment and the plight of women, the
country had achieved ``significant progress'' in human rights during
the past 2 years.
At the end of her stay, Robinson inaugurated the opening of a
center for human rights documentation, training, and information.
Cosponsored by the Human Rights Ministry, the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, and the U.N. Development Program, the center is intended to
operate as an independent entity and to provide a framework for dialog
between governmental and nongovernmental bodies concerned with human
rights. The center's work is to be directed toward persons involved in
the application and implementation of laws related to human rights,
including police officers, judges, lawyers, and representatives of
human rights advocacy NGO's.
Prime Minister Youssoufi chairs a human rights commission that
reviews cases of past and present human rights issues. The commission
is composed of members of the Government, including the Ministers of
Justice, Human Rights, and Interior.
The Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights, a 10-year-old
advisory body to the King, counsels the Palace on human rights issues,
and was the organization charged by the King to resolve cases related
to persons who had disappeared. The CCDH is composed of five working
groups responsible for promoting the protection of human rights. They
include groups on penal law; prison conditions; communications with
human rights NGO's; inhuman conditions of refugees in Polisario-
controlled camps in Tindouf, Algeria; and economic, social, and
cultural rights. In his annual Throne Day speech on July 30 and again
in a December 9 speech before the CCDH in commemoration of the 52nd
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, King Mohammed
announced plans to reform the Council's structures, responsibilities,
and working methods. Critics of the CCDH welcomed the King's
announcements on the recomposition of the Council, which they have long
maintained lacks true independence and the political will to address
openly and fairly sensitive human rights issues. None of the announced
reforms of the CCDH had been instituted by year's end.
Throughout the year, the Human Rights Ministry held human rights
awareness training sessions with educators and some police personnel.
The sessions were directed at school inspectors at both the primary and
secondary school levels. Up to 75 additional such training sessions are
planned; the inspectors in turn are expected to transfer the training
to teachers for integration into their teaching programs. Officials at
the Human Rights Ministry state that some police officers and other
enforcement officials also are being trained. The Government increased
efforts to introduce human rights as a core subject of the national
school curriculum during the year; in September Human Rights Minister
Aujjar stated that the Government planned to establish an experimental
phase-in program during the 2000-2001 school cycle, with plans for
human rights to become a core component of the national curriculum
within the next 2 years.
In September the country cohosted a human rights training seminar
for representatives of Arab governments and nongovernmental
organizations in the Arab world. The seminar included discussions on
education in human rights, education in democracy, and the rights of
women in the Arab world.
In January the Human Rights Ministry announced its intention to
open, in collaboration with the Moroccan Barristers Association, a
network of support centers charged with providing legal and
psychological assistance to needy citizens. Targeted at children and
women who have suffered physical or psychological violence, the centers
are to be staffed by doctors, lawyers, psychologists, and teachers.
Officials at the Human Rights Ministry say that the Ministry also
intends to involve the participation of police officers at the centers.
The primary mission of the centers is to provide quick, effective, and
direct assistance to those in difficult situations, with an emphasis on
clients' legal rights. The centers were scheduled to open in early
2001.
Also in January, Mohamed Said Saadi, then-Secretary of State for
Social Protection, the Family, and Children, announced his department's
plans, in collaboration with the European Union, to open a national
center dealing with women's issues. The center would provide training,
documentation, and information on women's issues. Saadi also announced
the creation of bureaus within government ministries that would be
responsible for overseeing the respect for equal employment and
promotion opportunities for women.
At the end of October, the Ministry of Human Rights hosted a
conference in Rabat on ``Human Rights, Cultural Identities and Social
Cohesion in the Mediterranean Region,'' which represented a follow-up
to a dialog initiated in 1995. Attended by Morocco's human rights
community and European leaders, such as former Portuguese President
Mario Soares and former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, the 2-
day conference focused on issues in the Mediterranean region such as
human rights, migration, culture, and the impact of economic
development on human rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Although the Constitution states that all citizens are equal, non-
Muslims and women face discrimination in the law and traditional
practice.
Women.--Spousal violence is common. Although a battered wife has
the right to file a complaint with the police, as a practical matter
she would do so only if prepared to bring criminal charges. While
physical abuse is a legal ground for divorce, a court only grants it if
the woman is able to provide two witnesses to the abuse. Even medical
certificates are not sufficient. If the court finds against the woman,
she is returned to her husband's home. Consequently, few women report
abuses to the authorities.
The Criminal Code provides for severe punishment for men convicted
of rape or sexually assaulting a woman or a girl. The defendants in
such cases bear the burden of proving their innocence. However, sexual
assaults often go unreported because of the stigma attached to the loss
of virginity. While not provided for by law, victims' families may
offer rapists the opportunity to marry their victims in order to
preserve the honor of the family. The law is more lenient toward men
with respect to crimes committed against their wives; for example, a
light sentence may be accorded a man who murders his wife after
catching her in the act of adultery. However, ``honor crimes,'' a
euphemism that refers to violent assaults with intent to commit murder
against a female for her perceived immodest or defiant behavior, are
extremely rare.
In February local police in the city of Azrou in the Middle Atlas
region, initiated an operation against prostitution, which resulted in
a series of arrests of prostitute, arraignments of brothel leaders, and
closings of brothels that previously had been tolerated (see Section
6.f.).
Women suffer various forms of legal and cultural discrimination.
The civil-law status of women is governed by the Code of Personal
Status (sometimes referred to as the ``Moudouwana''), which is based on
the Malikite school of Islamic law. Although the Code of Personal
Status was reformed in 1993, women's groups still complain of unequal
treatment, particularly under the laws governing marriage, divorce, and
inheritance.
In order to marry, a woman generally is required to obtain the
permission of her ``tuteur,'' or legal guardian, usually her father.
Only in rare circumstances may she act as her own ``tuteur.''
It is far easier for a man to divorce his wife than for a woman to
divorce her husband. Under Islamic law and tradition, rather than
asking for a divorce, a man simply may repudiate his wife outside of
court. Under the 1993 reforms to the Code of Personal Status, a woman's
presence in court is required in order for her husband to divorce her,
although women's groups report that this law frequently is ignored.
However, human rights activists reported that in one NGO-sponsored test
in the late 1990's, officials refused to order a divorce without the
wife being present, despite offers of bribes. Nevertheless, women's
groups complain that men resort to ruses to evade the new legal
restrictions. The divorce may be finalized even over the woman's
objections, although in such cases the court grants her unspecified
allowance rights.
A woman seeking a divorce has few practical alternatives. She may
offer her husband money to agree to a divorce (known as a khol'a
divorce). The husband must agree to the divorce and is allowed to
specify the amount to be paid, without limit. According to women's
groups, many men pressure their wives to pursue this kind of divorce. A
woman also may file for a judicial divorce if her husband takes a
second wife, if he abandons her, or if he physically abuses her.
However, divorce procedures in these cases are lengthy and complicated.
In November 1998, the Minister of Islamic Affairs proposed the
institutionalization of additions to the basic marriage contract that
would outline the rights and duties agreed upon between husband and
wife and permit legal recourse for the enforcement of the contract.
Under the Criminal Code, women generally are accorded the same
treatment as men, but this is not the case for family and estate law,
which is based on the Code of Personal Status. Under the Code of
Personal Status, women inherit only half as much as male heirs.
Moreover, even in cases in which the law provides for equal status,
cultural norms often prevent a woman from exercising those rights. For
example, when a woman inherits property, male relatives may pressure
her to relinquish her interest.
While many well-educated women pursue careers in law, medicine,
education, and government service, few make it to the top echelons of
their professions. Women constitute approximately 35 percent of the
work force, with the majority in the industrial, service, and teaching
sectors. In 1998 the Government reported that the illiteracy rate for
women was 67 percent (83 percent in rural areas), compared with 41
percent for men (50 percent in rural areas). Women in rural areas
suffer the most from inequality. Rural women perform difficult physical
labor. Girls are much less likely to be sent to school than are boys,
especially in rural areas, where the quality of schooling is inferior
to urban areas and demands on girls' time for household chores often
prevent school attendance. Some families also keep girls at home
because of rural schools' lack of facilities. However, women who do
earn secondary school diplomas have equal access to university
education.
The Government and the King continued to promote their proposal to
reform the Personal Status Code in order to advance women's rights.
Islamists and some other traditional segments of society firmly opposed
the proposal, especially with respect to its more controversial
elements, such as reform of women's legal status in marriage and family
law issues. On March 12, an estimated 50,000 demonstrators marched
peacefully in Rabat in observance of the International Day for Women
and in support of political reform in the area of women's rights. On
the same day, Islamist groups organized a peaceful counterdemonstration
in Casablanca that drew an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons
protesting such reform (see Section 2.b.). In October the Denmark-based
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network repeated concerns expressed by
domestic civil society organizations late in the year about the future
of the proposal to reform the Personal Status Code. According to the
EMHRN, the plan to integrate women into the development process that
the Government prepared in its discussions with civil society ``has
been pushed to one side.''
According to press reports and reliable sources, in early July, an
unspecified number of imams of state-administered mosques sermonized
against the social work of Aicha Ech-Chenna, president of the NGO
Feminine Solidarity, and attacked her character; during prayer
services, one of these imams allegedly threatened Ech-Chenna. Ech-
Chenna's NGO primarily focuses on encouraging the social reintegration
of marginalized and abandoned single mothers with illegitimate
children. Some opposed to Ech-Chenna's work have characterized it as
encouraging prostitution. After the reported attack on EchChenna's
character and other threats, a group of domestic NGO's issued a
communique in late July that criticized ``any attempt to use religion
and mosques to subdue the voice of women.'' The communique also held
the Government primarily ``responsible for anything that occurs within
mosques.'' According to reliable sources, the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs took disciplinary actions against the imam who had threatened
Ech-Chenna, stripping him of his position and removing him from the
mosque. In early November, at the beginning of the third annual
``Solidarity Campaign'' to help impoverished and needy citizens, the
King decorated Ech-Chenna for her social work.
In January Mohamed Said Saadi, then-Secretary of State for Social
Protection, the Family, and Children, announced his department's plans,
in collaboration with the European Union, to open a national center
dealing with women's issues. The center would provide training,
documentation, and information on women's issues. Saadi also announced
the creation of bureaus within government ministries that would be
responsible for overseeing the respect for equal employment and
promotion opportunities (See Section 4). The national center was
scheduled to open in Rabat in early 2001.
According to a 1997 government survey, 76 NGO's work to advance
women's rights and to promote women's issues. Among these are the
Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, the Union for Women's Action,
and the Moroccan Association for Women's Rights, which advocate
enhanced political and civil rights, as well as numerous NGO's that
provide shelters for battered women, teach women basic hygiene, family
planning, and child care, and educate illiterate women.
Children.--The law provides for compulsory education for children
between the ages of 7 and 13; however, not all children between these
ages attend school due to family decisions and shortfalls in government
resources, and the Government does not enforce the law. The Government
conducts an annual campaign to vaccinate children against childhood
diseases.
The Government has had difficulty addressing the problem of child
labor (see Section 6.d.). Young girls in particular are exploited as
domestic servants. Teenage prostitution in urban centers has been
estimated in the thousands by NGO activists (see Section 6.f.). The
clientele consists of both foreign tourists and citizens. More young
girls than boys are involved; however, young boys also work as
prostitutes (see Section 6.f.). The practice of adoptive servitude, in
which urban families employ young rural girls and use them as domestic
servants in their homes, is prevalent. Credible reports of physical and
psychological abuse in such circumstances are widespread. Some
orphanages have been charged as knowing accomplices in the practice.
More often parents of rural girls ``contract'' their daughters to
wealthier urban families and collect the salaries for their work as
maids. Adoptive servitude is accepted socially, is unregulated by the
Government, and has only recently begun to attract public criticism.
However, at the end of the year, the Moroccan UNICEF chapter and the
National Observatory of Children's Rights (ONDE), presided by Princess
Lalla Meryem, began a human rights awareness campaign regarding the
plight of child maids. The campaign received widespread and extensive
media exposure, including coverage in official publications.
Another problem facing orphans of both sexes is their lack of civil
status. Civil status is necessary to obtain a birth certificate,
passport, or marriage license. In general men are registered at local
government offices; their wives and unmarried children are included in
this registration, which confers civil status. If a father does not
register his child, the child is without civil status and the benefits
of citizenship. It is possible for an individual to self-register;
however, the process is long and cumbersome. While any child,
regardless of parentage, may be registered within a month of birth, a
court order is required if registration does not take place in that
time. Abandoned children sometimes receive kafala (state-sponsored
care).
Several NGO's, including the Bayti Association and the Moroccan
League for the Protection of Children, work to improve legal protection
for children and to help at-risk children. In December the French
Government awarded Najat Mjid, Bayti's president of 17 years, France's
prestigious Human Rights Award in recognition of her activism on behalf
of Moroccan children. Also in December, the United Nations nominated
Mjid for the post of Special Rapporteur on the Traffic and Exploitation
of Children. There are several shelters in the major cities that
provide food and lodging for street children, while other NGO's work to
reduce the exploitation of street children and to cure those street
children with drug addictions.
People with Disabilities.--A high incidence of disabling disease,
especially polio, has resulted in a correspondingly high number of
disabled persons. Current statistics from the Government estimate the
number of disabled persons in Morocco at 2.2 million, or 7 percent of
the population. While the Ministry of Social Affairs attempts to
integrate the disabled into society, in practice this is left largely
to private charities. The annual budget for the ministerial department
in charge of disabled affairs is only .01 percent of the overall annual
budget. Even nonprofit special-education programs are priced beyond the
reach of most families. Typically, disabled persons are supported by
their families; some survive by begging. The Government continued a
pilot training program for the blind sponsored in part by a member of
the royal family. In March the Government created a special commission
for the integration of the disabled, presided over by Prime Minister
Youssoufi. The commission is responsible for developing programs that
facilitate societal integration of disabled persons. Also in March, the
Government organized a ``National Day of the Disabled,'' which is aimed
at increasing public awareness of issues affecting the disabled. On
March 30, King Mohammed VI visited a center for disabled children in
the Khemisset province and donated $720,000 (7,200,000 dirhams) to a
project to expand the center's activities. There are no laws mandating
physical changes to buildings to facilitate access by the disabled.
On July 26 and again on September 12, police used force to break up
protests by disabled, unemployed university graduates (see Sections
1.c., 2.a., and 2.b.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution affirms, and
the Government respects, the legal equality of all citizens. The
official language is Arabic. Both French and Arabic are used in the
news media and educational institutions. Science and technical courses
are taught in French, thereby precluding the large, monolingualArabic-
speaking population from participation in such programs. Educational
reforms in the past decade have stressed the use of Arabic in secondary
schools. Failure to transform the university system to a similar extent
has led to the disqualification of many students from higher education
in lucrative fields. This especially is true among the poor, for whom
French training is not always affordable.
About 60 percent of the population claim Berber heritage. Berber
cultural groups contend that Berber traditions and the Berber language
(which consists of three dialects) rapidly are being lost. Their
repeated requests to King Hassan II to permit the teaching of Berber
languages in the schools led to a 1995 royal speech authorizing the
necessary curriculum changes; however, such changes have not been
implemented. Official media broadcast in the Berber language for
limited periods each day.
In 1996 a number of Berber associations issued a communique
petitioning the Government to recognize their language as an official
language and to acknowledge their culture as a part of Moroccan
society. These associations claimed that the Government refuses to
register births for children with traditional Berber names, discourages
the public display of the Berber alphabet, limits the activities of
Berber associations, and continues to Arabize the names of towns,
villages, and geographic landmarks. The Government thus far has made no
response to the petition, although Prime Minister Youssoufi
acknowledged Berber culture as an integral part of Moroccan identity in
a speech before Parliament in 1998. A full page of a major national
newspaper is devoted on a monthly basis to articles and poems on Berber
culture, which are printed in the Berber language, although with Latin
script.
On March 14, the Government prevented a sit-in before the
Parliament by two Berber NGO's, Tamaynout and the Moroccan Association
for Research and Cultural Exchange(AMREC). The two NGO's filed a
declaration for the sit-in on March 13; however, they received a letter
later the same day from the Wali of Rabat banning the sit-in on the
grounds that it threatened public order and security.
In late 1999, Tamaynout published a report on violations of the
cultural rights of Berber. As evidence the report cited the refusal of
the authorities to recognize Berber names and to use the Berber
language in commercial advertisements, and threats by the authorities
of physical abuse if shop owners displayed such advertisements in their
establishments. According to Tamaynout, Massinisa, a related NGO based
in Tangiers, was contacted by government authorities and threatened on
the evening before its congress. The report also stated that the
government television channel 2M did not broadcast any Berber-language
programs, despite the fact that Berbers pay taxes for the channel in
the form of payments for other government-provided services. In its
report, Tamaynout asked for government recognition of the Berber
language and an end to harassment of Berber associations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Although workers are free to
establish and join trade unions, the unions themselves are not
completely free from government interference. About half a million of
the country's 9 million workers are unionized in 17 trade union
federations. Three federations dominate the labor scene: The Union
Marocaine du Travail (UMT), the Confederation Democratique du Travail
(CDT), and the Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains (UCTM). The
UMT has no political party affiliation. The CDT is affiliated with the
ruling Socialist Union of Popular Forces of Prime Minister Youssoufi,
and the UGTM with the Istiqlal party, the second partner in the ruling
coalition. It is widely believed that the Ministry of Interior has
informants within the unions who monitor union activities and the
election of officers. Sometimes union officers are subject to
government pressure. Union leadership does not always uphold the rights
of members to select their own leaders. There has been no case of the
rank and file voting out its current leadership and replacing it with
another.
Workers have the right to strike and do so. Work stoppages normally
are intended to advertise grievances and last 24 to 72 hours or less.
In May a report by the International Labor Organization (ILO) noted
that there were allegations of violations of the right of association
and threats to freedom of opinion and speech. The report cited arrests
and jailings of union members as examples of violations of the right of
association. The report also noted allegations that the Government
hampered collective bargaining by its civil servants.
In addition to numerous short-term strikes intended to highlight
grievances, there were a number of narrowly focused work stoppages
during the year. During a February 2 operation in the village of
Tarmilet (48 miles from the capital), security forces used force,
including rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons, to remove
striking workers who had blockaded a water bottling factory to protest
layoffs of temporary workers. The operation, which involved a large-
scale military presence and reportedly was led by senior military
officers, took place after a court order in January had ruled in favor
of the factory owners, who charged the protesting workers with
interruption of means of production and obstructing the freedom to
work. Dozens of strikers and members of the security forces were
injured during the operation. Security forces also reportedly arrested
random passersby in addition to more than a dozen factory workers.
According to sources in the Government, the workers and passersby later
were released without charge. The Democratic Confederation of Workers
trade union, which is aligned politically with the ruling USFP party,
reported that security forces also detained two of its regional
delegates 2 weeks after the February 2 incident. The two officials
reportedly were freed by royal pardon on May 1 (Moroccan Labor Day)
while an investigation into the incident was still ongoing. The owner
of the factory and others involved in the incident reportedly claimed
that security forces resorted to force only after the protesters
initiated violence against unarmed police (see Sections 1.c., 1.d.,
1.f., 2.b., and 2.d.).
Arrested and jailed on charges of forming a criminal gang and
setting a vehicle on fire during a national truckers strike in June
1999, Sadok El Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the UGTM,
contacted the AMDH after his May 4 release with accusations that he had
been arrested, jailed, tortured, and falsely convicted by authorities
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
On November 27, security forces reportedly used violent means to
break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in the southern
city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted in the death of one
worker and injuries to eight others. Conflicting reports attributed the
death to either police abuse or ``natural causes.'' There were
confirmed reports that police arrested 21 of the strikers, 17 of whom
were women, and ransacked the striking workers' dormitories inside the
canning facility. All but one of the strikers later was released. The
strikers were protesting their employer's alleged negligence in failing
to pay its social security contributions. According to press reports,
the striking personnel reportedly obeyed Labor Code regulations in
filing an intent-to-strike notification 5 days before the November 22
strike. Members of the striking workers' trade union and politicians
affiliated with it called on the Prime Minister to initiate an
immediate investigation into the incident and free those detained.
According to the workers' trade union, within 1 week after the
incident, the cannery already had hired 60 new workers to replace the
strikers.
In August during labor unrest near Casablanca, the nephew of a
private transportation company owner drove a bus into a crowd of
striking workers, killing 3 persons and wounding 12, in an attempt to
end the occupation and obstruction of the company's bus depot. The
workers were demonstrating to have their salaries increased to the
level of the new national minimum wage and to compel the company to
make its contributions to the national social security administration,
as required by law. Government security forces arrested the nephew and
son of the owner, the owner himself, and local thugs the company
allegedly hired to intimidate the strikers. The owner's daughter also
was charged in the case. An investigation into the affair was opened,
and the Palace announced that it would offer $10,000 (100,000 dirhams)
to the families of each of the victims. The AMDH and the OMDH issued a
joint press release encouraging the Government to ensure due process
and enforce the rule of law. Union leaders sent a letter to the King
and the Cabinet criticizing the attack and seeking their intervention
to salvage labor-management relations throughout the country. There
were no further developments in the ongoing investigation by year's
end.
Unions may sue to have labor laws enforced, and employers may sue
unions when they believe that unions have overstepped their authority.
Unions belong to regional labor organizations and maintain ties
with international trade union secretariats. The UMT is a member of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is implied in the constitutional
provisions on the right to strike and the right to join organizations.
Trade union federations compete among themselves to organize workers.
Any group of eight workers may organize a union and a worker may change
union affiliation easily. A work site may contain several independent
locals or locals affiliated with more than one labor federation.
In general the Government ensures the observance of labor laws in
larger companies and in the public sector. In the informal economy,
such as in the family workshops-dominated handicrafts sector, employers
routinely ignore labor laws and regulations, and government inspectors
lack the resources to monitor violations effectively.
The laws governing collective bargaining are inadequate. Collective
bargaining has been a longstanding tradition in some parts of the
economy, such as the industrial sector, and is becoming more prevalent
in the service sector, including banking, health, and the civil
service. The wages and conditions of employment of unionized workers
generally are set in discussions between employer and worker
representatives. However, wages for the vast majority of workers are
set unilaterally by employers.
Employers wishing to dismiss workers are required by law to notify
the provincial governor through the labor inspector's office. In cases
in which employers plan to replace dismissed workers, a government
labor inspector provides replacements and mediates the cases of workers
who protest their dismissal. Any worker who is dismissed for committing
a serious infraction of work rules is entitled by law to a court
hearing.
There is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion discrimination.
Under the ostensible justification of ``separation for cause,''
employers commonly dismiss workers for union activities that are
regarded as threatening to employer interests. The courts have the
authority to reinstate such workers, but are unable to enforce rulings
that compel employers to pay damages and back pay. Ministry of Labor
inspectors serve as investigators and conciliators in labor disputes,
but they are few in number and do not have the resources to investigate
all cases. Unions have resorted increasingly to litigation to resolve
labor disputes.
Labor law reform is such a controversial issue that a draft revised
labor code has remained under discussion among the social partners and
in parliamentary committee for more than 20 years.
Labor law applies equally to the small Tangier export zone. The
proportion of unionized workers in the export zone is about the same as
in the rest of the economy, roughly 5 percent.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by royal decree, and when authorities become aware
of instances of forced labor, courts enforce the decree; however, in
practice the Government lacks the resources to inspect all places of
employment to ensure that forced labor is not being used, and forced
labor persists in the practice of adoptive servitude.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but
does not enforce this prohibition effectively. The practice of adoptive
servitude, in which families employ young girls and use them as
domestic servants, is socially accepted, and the Government does not
regulate it. Credible reports of physical and psychological abuse in
such cases are widespread (see Sections 5, 6.d., and 6.f.). Forced
prostitution occurs, especially in cities with large numbers of
tourists (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--In October the Government ratified ILO Convention 182,
which prohibits the worst forms of child labor. Abuse of child labor
laws is common, particularly in the informal sector. Education is
compulsory for children between the ages of 7 and 13, although not all
children attend school. Special regulations pertain to the employment
of children between the ages of 12 and 16. In practice children often
are apprenticed before age 12, particularly in the informal handicraft
industry. The use of minors is common in the small family-run workshops
that produce rugs, ceramics, wood work, and leather goods. Children,
particularly rural girls, also are employed informally as domestic
servants and usually receive little or no wages. Safety and health
conditions, as well as wages in businesses that employ children often
are substandard. The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children;
however, the Government does not enforce the law effectively (see
Section 6.c.). The practice of adoptive servitude often is
characterized by physical and psychological abuse (see Sections 5,
6.c., and 6.f.). The Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the
Ministry of Health and with the support of UNICEF, is pursuing a
strategy to ensure basic education and health services for child
workers.
Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing child
labor regulations, which generally are well observed in the
industrialized, unionized sector of the economy. However, the
inspectors are not authorized to monitor the conditions of domestic
servants. The Government maintains that the informal handicrafts sector
is difficult to monitor.
The Government lacks the resources to enforce laws against child
labor, and there is general acceptance of the presumption that, to
properly learn traditional handicraft skills, it is necessary for
children to start working at a young age. In addition many citizens
claim that having children working to learn a craft is better than
having them live on the streets, where they sometimes turn to juvenile
delinquency, prostitution, and substance abuse.
In September authorities in Fez announced plans to open four
centers for the protection of children handicraft workers. Cosponsored
by UNICEF, the centers are to provide children's rights education to
child workers, their families, and employers. The centers are to take
in street children and provide them with handicraft training and
recreational opportunities. Health services for children also are
planned for each center. One center opened in late September and three
others were scheduled to open by the end of March 2001.
In 1997 the Government announced a new voluntary labeling system
for carpet exports to certify that no child labor was involved in
production. The system is cosponsored by German rug importers. However,
the Government does not monitor nonparticipating handicraft producers
that violate child labor laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The threat of a general strike
in April led to negotiations among the Government, the Employers
Association, and the labor confederations over increasing the minimum
wage and improving health and social benefits. All three parties agreed
to a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage effective July 1, raising
it to approximately $180 (1,800 dirhams) per month in the
industrialized sector and to approximately $9 (90 dirhams) per day for
agricultural workers; however, not all private sector businesses had
implemented the agreed-upon wage increase by year's end. Neither the
minimum wage for the industrialized sector nor the wage for
agricultural workers provides a decent standard of living for a worker
and family, even with government subsidies for food, diesel fuel, and
public transportation. Unions continue to appeal unsuccessfully for a
minimum wage of approximately $200 (2,000 dirhams). In many cases,
several family members combine their income to support the family. Most
workers in the industrial sector earn more than the minimum wage. They
generally are paid between 13 and 16 months' salary, including bonuses,
each year.
The minimum wage is not enforced effectively in the informal and
handicraft sectors. However, as a result of the agreement reached in
the April negotiations, the Government no longer pays less than the
minimum wage to workers at the lowest civil service grades. To increase
employment opportunities for recent graduates, the Government allows
firms to hire them for a limited period through a subsidized internship
program at less than the minimum wage.
The law provides for a 48-hour maximum workweek with no more than
10 hours worked in any single day, premium pay for overtime, paid
public and annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and
safety, including a prohibition on night work for women and minors. As
with other labor regulations and laws, these are not observed
universally.
Occupational health and safety standards are rudimentary, except
for a prohibition on the employment of women in certain dangerous
occupations. Labor inspectors attempt to monitor working conditions and
accidents, but lack sufficient resources. While workers in principle
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger
health and safety without jeopardizing their continued employment,
there were no reports of any instances in which a worker attempted to
exercise this right.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; under the Penal Code, perpetrators are
prosecuted either as scam artists, corrupters of minors, or persons who
force others into prostitution.
Prostitution is prevalent and forced prostitution occurs,
particularly in cities with large numbers of tourists, as well as near
towns with large military installations. In 1998 a case was reported in
which a girl allegedly had been held against her will and forced to
work for 5 years in a brothel in Hajeb until she escaped at age 19.
According to the Party of Progress and Socialism's French-language
daily newspaper Al-Bayane, in February local police in the city of
Azrou in the Middle Atlas region, initiated a surprise operation
against prostitution there. Coming after the nomination of a new
director to lead the Interior Ministry's regional security force, the
operation resulted in a series of arrests of prostitute, arraignments
of brothel leaders, and closings of brothels that previously were
tolerated. Al-Bayane claimed that Azrou is home to numerous brothels
that lure vulnerable women in desperate situations (see Section 5.).
Forced prostitution involving Moroccans also occurs abroad. In 1999
a Moroccan woman who had been recruited to be a domestic servant in
Saudi Arabia, escaped a prostitution ring there and informed police,
which led to the arrest of her Moroccan handlers, an extended family
group numbering about 40 persons. This same group of Moroccans had been
involved in organizing similar such activities throughout the Persian
Gulf region.
Voluntary teenage prostitution in urban centers has been estimated
in the thousands by NGO activists. The clientele consists of both
foreign tourists and citizens. More young girls than boys are involved;
however, young boys also work as prostitutes (see Section 5).
The practice of adoptive servitude, in which families employ young
girls and use them as indentured servants, is prevalent and accepted
socially, and the Government does not regulate it. Reports of physical
and psychological abuse in such cases are widespread; reports of sexual
abuse are less frequent. Some orphanages have been charged as knowing
accomplices in providing these young child maids; however, more often,
parents of rural girls ``contract'' their daughters as maids to
wealthier urban families and collect their salaries (see Sections 5 and
6.d.).
Several domestic NGO's, as well as a branch of Terre Des Hommes, a
Swiss-based international NGO, help victims of trafficking by assisting
and rehabilitating street children, educating delinquents and runaways,
assisting single mothers to become financially independent, educating
youths and prostitutes about the dangers of unprotected sex, and
advocating women's rights issues.
__________
WESTERN SAHARA
The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a
dispute between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front, an
organization seeking independence for the region. The Moroccan
Government sent troops and settlers into the northern two-thirds of the
Western Sahara after Spain withdrew from the area in 1975, and extended
its administration over the southern province of Oued Ed-Dahab after
Mauritania renounced its claim in 1979. The Moroccan Government has
undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara
as part of its long-term efforts to strengthen Moroccan claims to the
territory.
Since 1973 the Polisario Front has challenged the claims of Spain,
Mauritania, and Morocco to the territory. Moroccan and Polisario forces
fought intermittently from 1975 until the 1991 ceasefire and deployment
to the area of a U.N. peacekeeping contingent, known by its French
initials, MINURSO.
In 1975 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory
opinion on the status of the Western Sahara. The Court held that while
some of the region's tribes had historical ties to Morocco, the ties
were insufficient to establish ``any tie of territorial sovereignty''
between the Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. The Court added
that it had not found ``legal ties'' that might affect the applicable
U.N. General Assembly resolution regarding the decolonization of the
territory, and, in particular, the principle of selfdetermination for
its people. Most Sahrawis (as the majority of persons living in the
territory are called) live in the area controlled by Morocco, but there
is a sizable refugee population near the border with Morocco in
Algeria, and, to a lesser extent, in Mauritania. The majority of the
Sahrawi population lives within the area delineated by a Moroccan-
constructed berm, which encloses most of the territory.
Efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to resolve the
sovereignty question collapsed in 1984 when the OAU recognized the
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, the civilian arm of the Polisario
Front. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest.
In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario Front accepted the U.N. plan for
a referendum that would allow the Sahrawis to decide between
integration with Morocco or independence for the territory. The
referendum was scheduled for January 1992, but was postponed because
the parties were unable to agree on a common list of eligible voters--
despite the previous acceptance by both parties of an updated version
of the Spanish census of 1974 as the base for voter eligibility. A
complicated formula for determining voter eligibility ultimately was
devised and, in August 1994, MINURSO personnel began to hold
identification sessions for voter applicants.
The initial U.N voter identification effort ended in December 1995
and, after several fruitless efforts to persuade the two parties to
cooperate, the U.N. Security Council formally suspended the
identification process in 1996. The United Nations and friendly
governments continued to urge the two parties to seek a political
solution to the conflict. In March 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as his
personal envoy to examine possible approaches for a peaceful
settlement. Baker visited the region, and negotiations between the
Moroccan Government and the Polisario began in May 1997. In September
1997, representatives of Morocco and the Polisario met in Houston in
the United States and consented to a series of compromise agreements on
the 1991 U.N. settlement plan to hold a referendum under U.N. auspices.
According to the Houston Accords, the identification of potential
voters, the referendum campaign, and the vote were to take place by
December 1998; however, operational considerations again delayed the
scheduled referendum, and Annan's latest reports to the Security
Council during the year expressed doubt that the referendum could be
held before 2002.
In August 1998, MINURSO completed identification of voters in all
uncontested tribal groupings. In November 1998, the U.N. Secretary
General visited the region to examine ways to achieve compromise on
several contested elements of the settlement plan in order to move the
referendum process forward. After his consultations, the Secretary
General proposed a series of measures in December 1998 to both parties.
The measures proposed were aimed at establishing procedures among the
parties to allow MINURSO to begin the identification process of three
``contested tribes.'' After agreement between the parties was reached
on the contested tribes, MINURSO began the identification process of an
additional 65,000 potential voters. The identification process of the
three contested tribes was completed in December 1999. Only 4 percent
of the applicants in this phase of the identification process were
deemed eligible to vote in the referendum. Roughly 80,000 appeals also
have been registered by those who were deemed ineligible to vote after
the first round of the identification process. Approximately 50,000
additional appeals were filed after the completion of the
identification process for the 3 ``contested tribes,'' bringing the
total number of appeals to nearly 130,000. MINURSO has not yet begun to
adjudicate appeals from the identification process, due to continuing
differences between the parties over who should be eligible to appeal,
on what grounds, and by what process.
As the end of MINURSO's mandate drew near in February, U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan urged a review of the situation. Annan
requested Baker to consult the parties to explore ways to achieve an
``early, durable and peaceful'' settlement to their dispute. Baker
visited Algeria, Morocco, and the Western Sahara in April to consult
with all of the interested parties. Baker sought to reconcile
differences over the U.N. Settlement Plan or find other approaches that
might resolve the dispute. He returned without a consensus and
described the process as being in the same position as in 1997 and
1998. At the invitation of Annan, the Government of Morocco and the
Polisario met in London in May and again in June in an attempt to
resolve the parties' longstanding differences over the settlement plan,
and to explore other avenues to resolve their dispute over the
territory; however, little progress was made. In June Baker called on
the parties to meet again, emphasizing that consideration should be
given to finding a solution that reached a compromise between full
independence for the territory and its full integration with Morocco. A
technical meeting of the parties in Geneva in July to discuss the
appeals process, confidence-building measures in the territory, and the
fate of more than 1,600 Moroccan prisoner's of war (POW's) still held
by the Polisario also failed to produce any breakthroughs. Annan made
clear in three reports to the U.N. Security Council during the year
that disputes between the parties over various issues in the Settlement
Plan likely would delay the holding of the referendum for the
foreseeable future.
Since 1977 the Saharan provinces of Layounne, Smara, and Boujdour
have participated in local elections that are organized and controlled
by the Moroccan Government. The southern province of Oued Ed-Dahab has
participated in Moroccancontrolled elections since 1983. Sahrawis whose
political views are aligned with the Moroccan Government fill all the
seats allotted to the Western Sahara in the Moroccan Parliament.
The civilian population living in the Western Sahara under Moroccan
administration is subject to Moroccan law. U.N. observers and foreign
human rights groups maintain that Sahrawis have difficulty obtaining
Moroccan passports, that the Government monitors the political views of
Sahrawis more closely than those of Moroccan citizens, and that the
police and paramilitary authorities react especially harshly against
those suspected of supporting independence and the Polisario Front. The
Moroccan Government limits access to the territory, and international
human rights organizations and impartial journalists sometimes have
experienced difficulty in securing admission.
After years of denying that Sahrawis were imprisoned in Morocco for
Polisario-related military or political activity, the Government of
Morocco released more than 300 such prisoners in 1991. Entire families,
and Sahrawis who had disappeared in the mid-1970's, were among those
released. The Government of Morocco has failed to conduct a public
inquiry or to explain how and why those released spent up to 16 years
in incommunicado detention without charge or trial. The former Sahrawi
detainees have formed an informal association whose principal objective
is to seek redress and compensation from the Government of Morocco for
their detention. A delegation of this association continued to meet
with various government officials, human rights organizations, members
of the press, and diplomatic representatives in both Rabat and in
Layounne during the year. They reported that little progress has been
made in gaining the Moroccan Government's recognition of their
grievances. However, in July the Government, through the Arbitration
Commission of the Royal Advisory Council on Human Rights (CCDH), began
distributing preliminary compensation payments to Sahrawis who had
disappeared or been detained in the past, and their family members. The
Government announced that it intended such initial payments to be
provisional funds for Sahrawis with urgent medical or financial needs
who had appealed for compensation by December 31, 1999, and that more
compensation could be distributed pending the results of the
Commission's review of petitions by Sahrawi claimants. However, only a
small number of those Sahrawis who formerly had disappeared or been
detained have filed compensation claims because of their perceptions
that the process is flawed administratively and one-sided in favor of
the Government.
In December 1999, Moroccan security forces that reportedly were
dispatched from Rabat detained one Sahrawi in the Western Saharan city
of Laayoune and two Sahrawis in the southern Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan
and Agadir. The Government alleged that the three were spies for the
Polisario Front. They reportedly were held for 8 days before their
appearance in an Agadir court and before their families were informed
of their detention. Family members and the Moroccan Association for
Human Rights (AMDH) claimed that the arrests were a violation of human
rights and due process, and proof that forced disappearances still
occur in Morocco. A public trial was convened abruptly on May 30 after
a lengthy and largely unpublicized police investigation that originally
was to have culminated in a proceeding before a military tribunal.
However, the case ultimately was tried in Agadir's court of first
instance, and the three Sahrawis were convicted of threatening the
internal security of the State and sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison.
According to a lawyer who represented the Sahrawis, during the trial
the three defendants denied any relations with the Polisario Front,
contradicting government allegations that the three confessed during
their postarrest detention. During an appellate hearing on July 5, at
the request of the public prosecutor all three were given 4-year
sentences. On September 27, security forces in civilian dress detained
a fourth Sahrawi at the Laayoune airport as he was about to board a
flight to the Canary Islands. According to the Sahrawi's daughter, who
witnessed the incident, two members of the security forces drove away
with her father in a car with Casablanca license plates. Almost 10 days
later, the Sahrawi reappeared in Agadir and was charged before the
court of first instance for spying for the Polisario Front. Two days
later, the fourth Sahrawi was sentenced to 4 years in prison for
threatening the internal security of the State.
On April 5, a Moroccan civil court in the Western Sahara city of
Laayoune sentenced five Sahrawi youth to prison terms of between 5 and
10 years for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their
alleged participation in a March 4 stone-throwing incident in Laayoune.
Reliable sources said that the incident was spontaneous, unorganized,
and lasted only 5 minutes.
The stone-throwing demonstration followed similar protests by
Sahrawi students in several southern Moroccan and Western Sahara cities
at the end of February and in early March, which security forces
brutally dispersed in violent clashes. The February and March
demonstrations came in response to the December 1999 incarceration of
three Sahrawis accused of spying for the Polisario Front. Attendees at
the trial, human rights activists, and an attorney for the five
defendants criticized the handling of the trial, particularly the
court's refusal to hear witnesses for the defense who allegedly could
corroborate claims by at least two of the defendants that they were not
present at the demonstrations. The court allegedly based its judgment
on police reports and the testimony of two witnesses, one of whom
reportedly could not identify positively the accused; the other was not
present at the trial, but claimed that he saw in his rear view mirror a
youth throwing a bottle at his car. The prosecution reportedly did not
present a bottle as evidence nor did it present a witness who could
testify that any of the five accused had thrown the bottle. The
authorities claimed that the youths threw rocks at several vehicles,
including one belonging to peacekeepers from the MINURSO contingent
based in Laayoune, and attempted to set fire to a truck. However, the
youths were acquitted of the arson charge during the trial. An attorney
for the youths, who maintained that the prosecution produced no
evidence of an incriminating act, stated that ``the verdict had nothing
to do with justice.'' The attorney also alleged that the judicial
police investigating the affair committed several illegal acts by
unlawfully entering homes of the accused and detaining them, torturing
them during their detention, and forcing them under duress to sign
police reports, which they were not allowed to read and which contained
falsehoods. The decision was appealed before the court of appeals in
Laayoune, which reportedly sent it to the Supreme Court in Rabat. A
hearing on the case had not been held by year's end. Families of the
five youths also sent a letter to the Moroccan royal palace in May
requesting a royal pardon; however, the King took no action by year's
end.
In its annual human rights report released in June, Amnesty
International noted that some members of the Moroccan security forces
in Morocco and the Western Sahara who were involved in several cases of
torture were arrested and prosecuted. However, the organization also
noted that ``in the majority of cases, investigations were either not
opened into complaints and allegations of torture . . . or were opened
but dismissed without adequate investigation.''
During the year, there were no new developments related to police
abuses committed in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune in September
and October 1999, when police authorities there used brutal force to
break up demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates,
miners, and former Sahrawi political prisoners who were protesting a
variety of social grievances. Police detained roughly 150 persons
during the protests in September 1999 and 31 in October 1999. Police
subjected some of those who were detained during violence in September
1999 to systematic beatings and other forms of physical coercion. Most
of those detained were released; however, 26 persons were charged and
sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison on charges of destruction of
property during the protests. Despite appeals lodged by defense lawyers
during the year, none of these sentences were reduced or overturned.
In the aftermath of the September 1999 protests, King Mohammed VI
immediately replaced the governor of the province, relieved the local
police chief of his duties, and dispatched military security forces to
the city to help restore order. A new royal commission was dispatched
quickly to Laayoune in early October 1999 to explain to local residents
proposed new measures to decentralize authority in the region, which
would allow local residents more choice in their affairs, and to
announce a new election to choose members to a proposed new royal
advisory council on the Western Sahara.
Despite the actions taken to restore confidence and order and to
lessen tensions, renewed violence broke out in late October 1999. There
were credible reports that the police provoked the violence, and there
were further credible reports that police authorities unlawfully
entered homes to arrest persons associated with the demonstrations in
September 1999. Police reportedly detained 31 persons. Of these
individuals, 10 persons reportedly were released within 24 hours and
the remainder released within the following 2-week period. There was no
investigation during the year into the excessive use of force by the
police during either September 1999 or October 1999. There was also no
progress during the year on local elections to choose members to the
proposed new royal advisory council on the Western Sahara that the King
had announced in October 1999.
A number of other Sahrawis remain imprisoned for peaceful protests
supporting Saharan independence. Youths released in previous years
report that the Moroccan police continue to monitor them closely.
The Polisario Front claims that the Moroccan Government continues
to hold several hundred Sahrawis as political prisoners and
approximately 300 as POW's. However, the Government of Morocco formally
denies that any Sahrawi former combatants remain in detention.
Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
have stated that Morocco indeed has released all Polisario former
combatants. A committee that represents former Sahrawi prisoners also
believes that the Government of Morocco no longer holds any of those
Sahrawis who were detained illegally during the 1970's and 1980's. The
committee based this determination on interviews with family members of
individuals who had been detained during that period.
The Government of Morocco claims that 30,000 Sahrawi refugees are
detained against their will by the Polisario in camps around Tindouf,
Algeria. The Polisario denies this charge. According to credible
reports, the number of refugees in Tindouf far exceeds 30,000, but the
allegation that they wish to leave remains unsubstantiated.
The ICRC reported that the Polisario now holds 1,481 Moroccan
POW's. A group of 185 POW's was repatriated to Morocco in a
humanitarian airlift conducted under ICRC auspices in November 1995. In
April 1997, Polisario leaders offered to release 85 Moroccan POW's as a
good will gesture during U.N. envoy Baker's first meetings in Tindouf,
but Morocco and the Polisario could not agree on the conditions of
their release. On February 25, the Polisario released 186 Moroccan
POW's, many of whom had been in detention for more than 20 years.
Another 201 were released to the ICRC and repatriated to Morocco on
December 14. The U.N. settlement plan calls for the release of all
POW's after the voter identification process is complete. Foreign
diplomats and representatives of international organizations privately
urged the Polisario throughout the year to release the remaining
Moroccan POW's, and emphasized that their continued detention 9 years
after the cessation of hostilities was a violation of their human
rights. During visits to the POW camps outside Tindouf, Algeria in
April and November, the ICRC determined that all the Moroccan POW's
were in extremely bad health. There also are credible reports that the
Polisario authority used the POW's in forced labor. The Polisario
leadership has refused to comply with repeated requests that all of the
POW's be released on humanitarian grounds, despite the fact that most
of the POW's have been in detention for more than 20 years and that
their health was deteriorating seriously due to the poor conditions
under which they are held.
There were no new cases of disappearance for the fourth consecutive
year in that part of the Western Sahara under Moroccan administration.
While the forced disappearance of individuals who opposed the
Government of Morocco and its policies occurred over several decades,
the Government in 1998 pledged to ensure that such policies do not
recur, and to disclose as much information as possible on past cases.
Many of those who disappeared were Sahrawis or Moroccans who challenged
the Government's claim to the Western Sahara, or other government
policies. Many of those who disappeared were held in secret detention
camps. Although the Government released more than 300 such detainees in
June 1991 and in October 1998 issued an announcement on those who had
disappeared, hundreds of Sahrawi and Moroccan families still do not
have any information about their missing relatives, many of whom
disappeared over 20 years ago (see Section 2.b. of the Morocco report).
On July 17, the Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights
Leagues (FIDH) published a communique in which it claimed that
disappearances of Sahrawis in the Western Sahara could number up to
1,500, although conditions in the territory prevented full confirmation
of this figure.
Freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and
association remain very restricted in the Western Sahara. According to
Amnesty International, Moroccan authorities continue to deny the
registration of the independent newspaper Sawt Al-Janoub.
Freedom of movement within the Western Sahara is limited in
militarily sensitive areas, both within the area controlled by the
Government of Morocco and the area controlled by the Polisario. Both
Moroccan and Polisario security forces sometimes subject travelers to
arbitrary questioning. There were no reports of detention for prolonged
periods during the year.
During the year, Amnesty International and news articles in
Morocco-based media highlighted the deteriorating situation in
Polisario Front camps near Tindouf in southwestern Algeria, where
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association, and movement
remain very restricted.
There is little organized labor activity in the Western Sahara. The
same labor laws that apply in Morocco are applied in the Moroccan-
controlled areas of the Western Sahara. Moroccan unions are present in
the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara but are not active. The 15
percent of the territory outside Moroccan control does not have any
major population centers or economic activity beyond nomadic herding.
The Polisario-sponsored labor union, the Sario Federation of Labor, is
not active in the Western Sahara.
A group of phosphate miners participated in the demonstrations in
Layounne in September and October 1999. They claimed that the
government-owned phosphate company, for which they work, has failed to
respect a contract that had been negotiated between the miners and the
company's former Spanish management when Spain withdrew from the
territory and relinquished control of the mines to Morocco. The miners
stated that they held a series of meetings in late 1999 with officials
of the government-owned phosphate company after the demonstrations, but
that no agreement was reached about enforcement of what they believed
to be their contractually protected rights.
There were no strikes, other job actions, or collective bargaining
agreements during the year. Most union members are employees of the
Moroccan Government or state-owned organizations. They are paid 85
percent more than their counterparts outside the Western Sahara as an
inducement to Moroccan citizens to live there. Workers in the Western
Sahara were exempt from income and value-added taxes and received
subsidies on such commodities as flour, oil, sugar, fuel, and
utilities.
Moroccan law prohibits forced labor, which does not appear to exist
in the Western Sahara.
Regulations on the minimum age of employment are the same as in
Morocco. Child labor appears to be less common than in Morocco,
primarily because of the absence of industries most likely to employ
children, such as rug-knotting and other traditional handicrafts. A
government work program for adults, the Promotion Nationale, provides
families with enough income that children need not be hired out as
domestic servants. Children in the few remaining nomadic groups
presumably work as shepherds along with other group members.
The minimum wage and maximum hours of work are the same as in
Morocco. However, in practice workers in some fish processing plants
may work as many as 12 hours per day, 6 days per week, well beyond the
10-hour day, 48-hour week maximum stipulated in Moroccan law.
Occupational health and safety standards are the same as those enforced
in Morocco. They are rudimentary, except for a prohibition on the
employment of women in dangerous occupations.
__________
OMAN
The Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy that has been ruled by the Al
Bu Sa'id family since the middle of the 18th century. It has no
political parties, but does have one representative institution, which
is directly elected by voters selected by the Government. The current
Sultan, Qaboos Bin Sa'id Al Sa'id, acceded to the throne in 1970.
Although the Sultan retains firm control over all important policy
issues, he has brought tribal leaders--even those who took up arms
against his family's rule--and other notables into the Government. In
accordance with tradition and cultural norms, much decisionmaking is by
consensus among these leaders. In 1991 the Sultan established a 59-seat
Consultative Council, or Majlis Al-shura, which replaced an older
advisory body. Beginning with the September elections, Council members
are chosen directly by the vote of 175,000 government-selected
electors. The Council was expanded to 83 seats for the September
elections. The Council has no formal legislative powers but may
question government ministers, even during unrehearsed televised
hearings, and recommend changes to new laws on economic and social
policy, which sometimes leads to amendments to proposed decrees. In
December 1997, the Sultan appointed 41 persons as members of the new
Council of State (Majlis Al-Dawla), which with the current Consultative
Council forms the bicameral body known as the Majlis Oman (Council of
Oman). In late 1996, the Sultan promulgated by decree the country's
``Basic Charter'' (also known as the Basic Law), which provides for
citizens' basic rights in writing for the first time. The courts are
subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence.
The internal and external security apparatus falls under the
authority of the Royal Office, which coordinates all intelligence and
security policies. The Internal Security Service investigates all
matters related to internal security. The Royal Oman Police, whose head
also has cabinet status, performs regular police duties, provides
security at airports, serves as the country's immigration agency, and
maintains a small coast guard. In the past, there were credible reports
that security forces occasionally abused detainees.
Since 1970 Oman has used its modest oil revenue to make impressive
economic progress and improve public access to health care, education,
and social services. The economy is mixed, with significant government
participation in industry, transportation, and communications. The
Government seeks to diversify the economy and stimulate private
investment.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
some areas; however, its record was poor in other areas, particularly
with respect to citizens' rights to change or criticize the Government.
Human rights abuses have included mistreatment of detainees, arbitrary
arrest, prolonged detention without charge, and the denial of due
process; however, there were no reports of such abuses during the year.
The Government restricted freedom of expression and association and did
not ensure full rights for women and workers.
The 1996 Basic Charter provides for many basic human rights, such
as an independent judiciary, and freedoms of association, speech, and
the press. The Basic Charter states that the Government was to strive
to issue all enabling laws within 2 years of November 1996; however,
this has not occurred. Only certain laws pertaining to the legal code
for family and interpersonal relationships, to judicial reform, and to
aspects of the Finance Ministry, had been enacted by year's end. There
has been no public statement made by the Government noting the end of
the 2-year period since issuance of the Basic Charter and proposing a
new target date for implementation.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There have been allegations in the past that the security
forces abused some detainees, particularly during interrogation. The
abuse does not appear to have been systematic and often varied
depending upon the social status of the victim, the official involved,
and the location of the incident (for example, whether the abuse
occurred in a rural or an urban area). The authorities have made
efforts to prevent such abuse, and there were no confirmed incidents of
such abuse in recent years. Unlike in previous years, there were no
reports that detainees sometimes were left in isolation with promises
of release or improved treatment as a means to elicit confessions or
information. Judges have the right to order investigations of
allegations of mistreatment. The 1996 Basic Charter, which has not yet
been implemented in this area, specifically prohibits ``physical or
moral torture'' and stipulates that all confessions obtained by such
methods are to be considered null and void. There were no reports of
torture during the year.
On one or two occasions the police used tear gas and physical force
to control demonstrations and some arrests were made.
Prison conditions appear to meet minimum international standards.
In the past, access to some prisoners was restricted severely.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The police may obtain
warrants prior to making arrests but are not required by law to do so.
However, within 24 hours of arrest, the authorities must obtain court
orders to hold suspects in pretrial detention, and the police are
required to file charges or ask a magistrate judge to order continued
detention. However, in practice the police do not always follow these
procedures. Judges may order detentions for 14 days to allow
investigation and may grant extensions if necessary. There is a system
of bail. The 1996 Basic Charter provides for certain legal and
procedural rights for detainees; however, these provisions have yet to
be implemented.
Police handling of arrests and detentions constitutes incommunicado
detention in some instances. The police do not always notify a
detainee's family or, in the case of a foreign worker--the worker's
sponsor--of the detention. Sometimes notification is made only just
prior to the detainee's release. The authorities post the previous
week's trial results (including the date of the trial, the name of the
accused, the claim, and the sentence) near the magistrate court
building in Muscat. The police do not always permit attorneys and
family members to visit detainees. Judges occasionally intercede to
ensure that security officials allow such visits.
On one or two occasions the police used tear gas and physical force
to control demonstrations and some arrests were made.
The Government does not practice exile as a form of punishment. The
1996 Basic Charter prohibits exile; however, the provisions concerning
exile have yet to be implemented.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1996 Basic Charter affirms the
independence of the judiciary; however, the various courts are
subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence. The Sultan
appoints all judges, acts as a court of final appeal, and intercedes in
cases of particular interest, especially in national security cases.
However, there have been no reported instances in which the Sultan has
overturned a decision of the magistrate courts or the commercial
courts.
The judiciary comprises the magistrate courts, which adjudicate
misdemeanors and criminal matters; the Shari'a (Islamic law) courts,
which adjudicate personal status cases such as divorce and inheritance,
and which are administered by the Ministry of Justice; the commercial
courts; the Labor Welfare Board; and the Rent Dispute Committee, which
hears tenant-landlord disputes.
The magistrate court system was established by royal decree in 1984
to take over all criminal cases from the Shari'a courts; it is
independent and its president reports directly to the Sultan. Regional
courts of first instance handle misdemeanor cases, which are heard by
individual judges. All felonies are adjudicated at the Central
Magistrate Court in Muscat by a panel made up of the President of the
Magistrate Court and two judges. All rulings of the felony panel are
final except for those in which the defendant is sentenced to death.
Death sentences must be approved by the Sultan.
The Criminal Appeals Panel also is presided over by the President
of the Magistrate Court in Muscat, and includes the court's vice
president and two judges. This panel hears appeals of rulings made by
all courts of first instance. In the past, specially trained
prosecutors from the Royal Oman Police (ROP), all of whom are trained
as policemen as well as prosecutors carried out the role of public
prosecutor in criminal cases; however, as a step toward implementing a
November 1999 Royal decree affirming the independence of the judiciary,
prosecutors were made independent of the ROP.
The Criminal Code does not specify the rights of the accused. There
are no written rules of evidence, codified procedures for entering
cases into the criminal system, or any legal provision for a public
trial. Criminal procedures have developed by tradition and precedents
in the magistrate courts. In criminal cases, the police provide
defendants with the written charges against them; defendants are
presumed innocent and have the right to present evidence and confront
witnesses. The prosecution and the defense direct questions to
witnesses through the judge, who is usually the only person to question
witnesses in court. A detainee may hire an attorney but has no explicit
right to be represented by counsel.
The 1996 Basic Charter affirms both right to counsel and
government-funded legal representation for indigents; however, these
provisions have yet to be implemented, and the Government does not pay
for the legal representation of indigents. Judges often pronounce the
verdict and sentence within 1 day of the completion of a trial.
Defendants may appeal jail sentences longer than 3 months and fines
over the equivalent of $1,300 (480 rials) to a three-judge panel.
Defendants accused of national security offenses and serious felonies
do not have the right of appeal.
A State Security Court tries cases involving national security and
criminal cases that the Government decides require expeditious or
especially sensitive handling. Magistrate court judges have presided
over trials in the State Security Court. Defendants tried by the
Security Court are not permitted to have legal representation present.
The timing and the location of the Court's proceedings are not
disclosed publicly. The Court does not follow legal procedures as
strictly as the magistrate courts, although prominent civilian jurists
form the panel. The Sultan has exercised his powers of leniency,
including in political cases.
The Shari'a courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice, and
apply Shari'a law as interpreted under the Ibadhi school of Islamic
jurisprudence. Preliminary courts of first instance are located in each
of the 59 ``wilayats,'' and are presided over by a single judge, or
qadi. Appeals of the rulings of the courts of first instance involving
prison sentences of 2 weeks or more or fines greater than $270 (100
rials) must be brought within 1 month before the Shari'a Court of
Appeals in Muscat. Panels of three judges hear appeals cases. Court of
Appeal rulings themselves may be appealed, within a 1-month period, to
the Supreme Committee for Complaints, which is composed of four
members, including the Minister of Justice and the Grand Mufti of the
Sultanate.
In 1997 the Government promulgated into law the provisions of the
1996 Basic Charter pertaining to ``family law,'' i.e., law that falls
under the purview of the Shari'a courts. The effect of this new law has
been to regularize the nature of the cases and the range of
corresponding judgments within the Shari'a court system.
The Authority for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes (ASCD),
better known as the commercial courts system, was established by royal
decree in 1981 to decide all cases related to commercial matters.
Subsequent decrees have empowered the commercial courts to decide labor
disputes referred to it by government departments, commercial disputes
to which the Government is a party, and arbitration cases involving
private parties. The ASCD is financially and administratively
independent of the Ministry of Justice and reports directly to the
Minister of Commerce and Industry. The ASCD is made up of the Chairman,
Deputy Chairman, a number of judges appointed by royal decree, and
members of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Cases are heard
in regional courts for suits involving not more than $27,000 (10,000
rials).
In November 1999, the Sultan issued several royal decrees to
establish a law on judicial authority and to affirm the independence of
the judiciary as called for in the 1996 Basic Charter. The decrees
formally established the judiciary as an independent, hierarchical
system composed of a Supreme Court, an appeals court, primary courts
(one located in each region), and, within the primary courts,
divisional courts. Within each of the courts there are to be divisions
to handle commercial, civil, penal, labor, taxation, general, and
personal cases (the latter under Shari'a). The general prosecutor,
which currently falls under the Royal Omani Police Chief Inspector, is
to become an independent legal entity. Implementation of these decrees
is expected to take place in early 2001.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The police are not required by law to obtain search
warrants. There is a widespread belief that the Government eavesdrops
on both oral and written communications, and citizens are guarded in
both areas. Citizens must obtain permission from the Ministry of
Interior to marry foreigners, except nationals of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries. Such permission is not granted automatically.
Delays or denial of permission have resulted in secret marriages within
Oman. Marriages in foreign countries can lead to denial of entry into
Oman of the foreign spouse and prevent a legitimate child from claiming
citizenship rights.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law prohibits criticism of the
Sultan in any form or medium. The authorities tolerate criticism of
government officials and agencies, but such criticism rarely receives
media coverage. The announced 1996 Basic Charter provides for freedom
of opinion expressed in words, writing, or all other media within the
limits of the law; however, these provisions have yet to be
implemented.
The 1984 Press and Publication Law authorizes the Government to
censor all domestic and imported publications. Ministry of Information
censors may act against any material regarded as politically,
culturally, or sexually offensive. Journalists and writers generally
censor themselves to avoid government harassment. Editorials generally
are consistent with the Government's views, although the authorities
tolerate some criticism on foreign affairs issues. The Government
discourages in-depth reporting on controversial domestic issues and
seeks to influence privately owned dailies and periodicals by
subsidizing their operating costs.
In late 1997, the Government began to permit the entry onto the
market of foreign newspapers and magazines containing reports or
statements deemed critical of Oman, including articles critical of the
Sultan. The lifting of the boycott against Israel in December 1994
eliminated prohibitions on publications from or about Israel that
otherwise meet censorship standards. However, in August 1999, the
Ministry of Information stopped distribution of a London-based, Arabic-
language magazine that contained an interview with a representative of
the Israeli trade mission in Oman. Customs officials sometimes
confiscate video cassette tapes and erase offensive material despite
the fact that there are no published guidelines on what is viewed as
``offensive.'' The tapes may or may not be returned to their owners.
Government censorship decisions are changed periodically without
apparent reason. There is a general perception that the confiscation of
books and tapes at the border from private individuals and restrictions
on popular novels have eased somewhat; however, it reportedly has
become more difficult to obtain permission to distribute in the local
market books that censors decide have factual errors about Oman
(including outdated maps).
The Government controls the local radio and television companies.
They do not air any politically controversial material. The Government
does not allow the establishment of privately owned radio and
television companies. However, the availability of satellite dishes has
made foreign broadcast information accessible to the public. The
Government, through its national telecommunications company, provides
full, uncensored Internet access to citizens and foreign residents;
however, as use of the Internet to express views not normally permitted
in other media has grown, the Government has taken some steps to
monitor and control its use. Warnings have appeared on web sites that
criticism of the Sultan or personal criticism of government officials
is likely to be censored; however, at least some of these sites have
operated without apparent interference.
The appropriate government authority, such as Sultan Qaboos
University, the police, or the relevant ministry, must approve public
cultural events, including plays, concerts, lectures, and seminars.
Most organizations avoid controversial issues due to fear that the
authorities may cancel their events.
Academic freedom is restricted, particularly regarding
controversial matters, including politics. Professors may be dismissed
for going beyond acceptable boundaries.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law does not
ensure freedom of assembly; all public gatherings require government
sponsorship. The authorities do not always enforce this requirement,
and gatherings sometimes take place without formal government approval.
Over the course of 8 days in October, rare public demonstrations in
support of the Palestinians and against Israeli and United States
policies took place at Sultan Qaboos University and other venues. Most
demonstrators were young men, and most demonstrations were peaceful.
Some demonstrations included rock throwing and vandalism of private
vehicles. On one or two occasions the police used tear gas and physical
force to control demonstrations and some arrests were made. The
Government, after 8 days of demonstrations, took quiet action to
prohibit further demonstrations. Regulations implemented in 1994
restricting most types of public gatherings remain in effect. The 1996
Basic Charter provides for limited freedom of assembly, but these
provisions have not yet been implemented.
The law states that the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, and
Vocational Training must approve the establishment of all associations
and their bylaws; however, some groups are allowed to function without
formal registration. The Government uses the power to license
associations to control the political environment. It does not license
groups regarded as a threat to the predominant social or political
views of the Sultanate. Formal registration of foreign associations is
limited to a maximum of one association for any nationality. The 1996
Basic Charter's provisions in this area--not yet in effect--regulate
the formation of associations. In February a royal decree was
promulgated that allowed for the formation of nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) in the area of services for women, children, and
the elderly.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion, which is
affirmed by the 1996 Basic Charter. The 1996 Basic Charter provides
that Shari'a is the basis for legislation and preserves the freedom to
practice religious rites, in accordance with tradition, provided that
such freedom does not breach public order. Discrimination against
individuals on the basis of religion or sect is prohibited.
Implementing decrees for the 1996 Basic Charter in this area have not
yet been established. Non-Muslim religious organizations must be
registered with the Government and the Government restricts some of
their activities.
Most citizens are Ibadhi or Sunni Muslims, but there is also a
minority of Shi'a Muslims. Non-Muslims are free to worship at churches
and temples built on land donated by the Sultan. There are many
Christian denominations, which utilize two plots of donated land on
which two Catholic and two Protestant churches have been built. Hindu
temples also exist on government-provided land. Land has been made
available to Catholic and Protestant missions in Sohar and Salalah.
In June the departure from the country of a foreign Baha'i due to
termination of his employment may have been hastened by the
proselytizing activities of his wife. The authorities requested members
of the Baha'i community to sign statements that they will not
proselytize, in accordance with the country's law and custom.
The Government prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing. It also
prohibits non-Muslim groups from publishing religious material,
although religious material printed abroad may be brought into the
country. Members of all religions and sects are free to maintain links
with coreligionists abroad and undertake foreign travel for religious
purposes.
The police monitor mosque sermons to ensure that the preachers do
not discuss political topics and stay within the state-approved
orthodoxy of Islam. The Government expects all imams to preach sermons
within the parameters of standardized texts distributed monthly by the
Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel
by citizens within the country except to military areas. Foreigners
other than diplomats must obtain a government pass to cross border
points. To obtain a passport and depart the country, a woman must have
authorization from her husband, father, or nearest male relative.
However, a woman having an Omani identity card (which also must be
authorized by a male relative) may travel to certain Gulf Cooperation
Council countries without a passport.
Until the promulgation of the Basic Charter, the Government did not
have a policy on refugees or a tradition of harboring stateless or
undocumented aliens. The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits the extradition
of political refugees; however, this provision has not yet been
implemented. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise
during the year. Oman offered temporary refuge to several thousand
Yemenis displaced by a civil war in 1994. They returned to Yemen after
the war. Tight control over the entry of foreigners into the country
effectively has screened out would-be refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Oman is an autocracy in which the Sultan retains the ultimate
authority on all important foreign and domestic issues. The country has
no formal democratic political institutions, and its citizens do not
have the ability peacefully to change their leaders or the political
system.
The Sultan promulgated the country's first defacto written
constitution, known as the Basic Charter, in November 1996. Although it
has immediate force of law, most laws and regulations to implement its
provisions have not yet been enacted; it is expected that this process
may take until 2001 or beyond to be completed. The law does not provide
for political parties or direct elections. Citizens have indirect
access to senior officials through the traditional practice of
petitioning their patrons, usually the local governor, or wali, for
redress of grievances. Successful redress depends on the effectiveness
of the patron's access to appropriate decisionmakers. The Sultan
appoints the governors. The Sultan makes an annual 3-week tour of the
country, accompanied by his ministers. The tour allows the Sultan to
listen directly to his subjects' concerns.
In 1991 Sultan Qaboos established a Consultative Council, or Majlis
Al-shura. In 1994 he expanded the number of Council seats to 80 from
the original 59, which resulted in the allocation of 2 members for
districts with a population of more than 30,000. Due to the population
increase from 1994 to 2000, the number of seats was expanded further to
82 for the 1997 elections and to 83 for the September elections. Unlike
in 1999, when the Government selected the Council members from several
nominees who were elected only by prominent persons in each district,
the Government established a new system beginning with the September
elections under which council members, male and female, are elected
directly by receiving the most votes from eligible voters in their
districts. In the October 1997 elections, 55,000 men and women, 3
percent of the total population, were eligible to nominate Council
members in all districts throughout the country. In the September
elections, the Government selected more than 175,000 men and women to
register to vote, of whom 114,000 registered and 100,000 voted. The
number of eligible female voters increased from 5,000 to 52,000. In
August a royal decree abolished the prior procedure under which voters
(or electors) had volunteered as candidates for Council seats, had
their police records checked by the Government, and relied on
government approval of their decision to run. If the Sultan decided not
to appoint them, the nominees with the most votes did not win
appointment to the Council. Under the new procedures, candidates are
not subject to government scrutiny, and the Sultan no longer ratifies
winning candidates. At least two sitting members of the Council were
excluded from standing for reelection in September because of their
criticism of ministers during previous council sessions.
The Council has no formal legislative powers, which remain
concentrated in the Sultan's hands; however, it serves as a conduit of
information between the people and the government ministries. No
serving government official is eligible to be a Council member. The
Council may question government ministers in public or in private,
review all draft laws on social and economic policy, and recommend
legislative changes to the Sultan, who makes the final decision. During
the year, the membership of the Majlis Al-Dawla (Council of State),
which was established in 1997, was increased from 41 to 48 members. The
precise responsibilities of the Council of State and its relationship
to the existing Consultative Council have yet to be clarified. The
Council of State and the Consultative Council together form the Majlis
Oman, or Council of Oman. A royal directive issued in April prohibited
members of the Council of Oman from serving more than two 3-year terms.
The Sultan publicly has advocated a greater role for women in both
the public and private sectors; however, women remained
underrepresented in government and politics. In the 1997 elections, the
Government selected two women from among the nominees to serve on the
Consultative Council. In December 1997, the Sultan appointed 4 women to
the 41-member Majlis Al-Dawla; during the year he appointed 5 women to
the now 48-member body. In 1999 the Sultan, for only the second time,
appointed a woman to the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI)
board.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government prohibits the establishment of human rights groups.
The existing restrictions on the freedom of speech and association do
not permit any activity or speech critical of the Government. There
were no known requests by international human rights organizations to
visit.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex, ethnic origin, race, religion, language, sect, place of residence,
and social class; however, decrees to implement its provisions have not
been promulgated. Institutional and cultural discrimination based on
gender, race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
Women.--There is no evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse although
observers say that allegations of such abuse in the Shari'a courts are
not uncommon. Definitive information is scant and difficult to collect.
Doctors do not have a legal responsibility to report either spouse or
child abuse cases to the courts. Battered women may file a complaint
with the police but more often seek family intervention to protect them
from violent domestic situations. Likewise, families seek to intervene
to keep such problems out of public view. There have been reports that
employers or male coworkers have sexually harassed foreign women
employed in such positions as domestic servants and hospital nurses.
Foreign women employed as domestic servants and garment workers have
complained that their employers have withheld their salaries and that
government officials have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to
investigative procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals
known to be abusing domestic servants are not always brought to account
for their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask
their governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse (see Section
6.e.).
Most women live within the confines of their homes. They continue
to face many forms of discrimination. Illiteracy among older women
hampers their ability to own property, participate in the modern sector
of the economy, or even inform themselves of their rights. Government
officials frequently deny women land grants or housing loans and prefer
to conduct business with a woman's husband or other male relative.
Women require permission from a male relative to leave the country (see
Section 2.b.).
Some aspects of Islamic law and tradition as interpreted in the
country also discriminate against women. Shari'a favors male heirs in
adjudicating inheritance claims. Many women are reluctant to take an
inheritance dispute to court for fear of alienating the family.
Since 1970 conditions for women have improved dramatically in
several areas. Whereas in 1970 no schools existed for girls, the most
recent figures available from the Ministry of Education report an
enrollment rate nearing 90 percent for all girls eligible for
elementary school. In the 1997-98 school year, female students
constituted approximately 50 percent of the total number of students
attending public schools. Women constitute roughly half of the 5,000
students at Sultan Qaboos University. In November 574 women and 497 men
received bachelor's degrees as members of the 11th graduating class,
while 2 women and 9 men received master's degrees. The university has a
quota system with the apparent goal of increasing the number of men
studying certain specialties. Reportedly, women are being limited to 50
percent of the seats in the medical department. Restrictions on women
studying engineering and archeology were lifted in September 1998. The
quota system is expected to allow women to constitute a majority in
some other departments.
Women also have made gains in the work force. Some educated women
have attained positions of authority in government, business, and the
media. Approximately 30 percent of all civil servants are women; of
these, 59 percent are citizens. In both the public and private sectors,
women are entitled to maternity leave and equal pay for equal work. The
government bureaucracy, the country's largest employer of women,
observes such regulations, as do many private sector employers. Many
educated women still face job discrimination because prospective
employers fear that they might resign to marry or raise families. In
the past, several female employees in the Government have complained
that they have been denied promotion in favor of less capable men.
Unlike the case in previous years, when government grants for study
abroad were limited almost exclusively to males, such grants are now
awarded based on merit, and in 1999 were divided evenly between men and
women.
Within the Government, women's affairs are the responsibility of
the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, and Vocational Training. The
Ministry provides support for women's affairs through support for and
funding of the Oman Women's Association (OWA) and local community
development centers (LCDC's). The OWA consists of 25 chapters with an
active membership of more than 3,000 women. Typical OWA activities
include sponsoring health or sociological lectures, kindergarten
services, and handicraft training programs. The OWA also provides an
informal counseling and support role for women with divorce-related
difficulties, girls forced to marry against their will, and women and
girls suffering from domestic abuse. The main purpose of the 50 LCDC's
located throughout the country is to encourage women to improve the
quality of life for their families and to improve their contributions
to the community. LCDC activities focus on health and sociology
lectures, child care issues, and agricultural and traditional
handicraft training programs.
Children.--The Government has made the health, education, and
general welfare of children a budgetary priority. Primary school
education is free and universal but not compulsory. Most children
attend school through secondary school, to age 18. No significant
sectors or groups within the population are prevented from receiving an
education. The infant mortality rate continues to decline, and
comprehensive immunization rates have risen. There is no pattern of
familial or other child abuse. Government officials have publicly
called for greater awareness and prevention of child abuse.
A few communities in the interior and in the Dhofar region still
practice female genital mutilation (FGM). FGM is condemned widely by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health. Experts believe that the number of such cases is
small and declining annually.
People with Disabilities.--The Government has mandated parking
spaces and some ramps for wheelchair access in private and government
office buildings and shopping centers. Compliance is voluntary, yet
widely observed. Students in wheelchairs have easy access to Sultan
Qaboos University. The Government has established several
rehabilitation centers for disabled children. Disabled persons,
including the blind, work in government offices. While the Government
now charges a small fee to citizens seeking government health care, the
disabled generally are not charged for physical therapy and prosthetics
support.
Religious Minorities.--Some members of the Shi'a Muslim minority
claim that they face discrimination in employment and educational
opportunities. However, some members of this same community occupy
prominent positions in both the private and public sectors.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In the past, citizens of east
African origin complained that they frequently faced job discrimination
in both the public and private sectors. Some public institutions
reportedly favor hiring members of one or another regional, tribal, or
religious group. However, no group is banned from employment.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The current law stipulates that ``it
is absolutely forbidden to provoke a strike for any reason.'' The
Government has not yet promulgated a new labor law that was first
drafted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in 1994. In the
last quarter of 1996, the Consultative Council recommended some changes
to the draft, but the Government has not yet issued the new law.
Government officials have stated that the new labor law is to be
consistent with international labor standards.
Labor unrest is rare. There have not been any known job actions
within the last 7 years.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The current law
does not provide for the right to collective bargaining; however, it
requires that employers of more than 50 workers form a joint labor-
management committee as a communication forum between the two groups.
The implementation of this provision is uneven, and the effectiveness
of these committees is questionable. In general the committees discuss
such matters as the living conditions at company-provided housing. They
are not authorized to discuss wages, hours, or conditions of
employment. Such issues are specified in the work contracts signed
individually by workers and employers and must be consistent with the
guidelines of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.
The current law defines conditions of employment for some citizens
and foreign workers. It covers domestic servants and construction
workers but not temporary workers or those with work contracts that
expire within 3 months. Foreign workers constitute at least 50 percent
of the work force and as much as 80 percent of the modern-sector work
force.
Work rules must be approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labor and posted conspicuously in the workplace by employers of 10 or
more workers. Similarly any employer with 50 or more workers must
establish a grievance procedure. Regardless of the size of the company,
any employee, including foreign workers, may file a grievance with the
Labor Welfare Board. Sometimes worker representatives file collective
grievances, but most grievances are filed by individual workers. Lower
paid workers use the procedure regularly. Plaintiffs and defendants in
such cases may be represented by legal counsel.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1973 Labor Law
prohibits forced or bonded labor, and although the enabling laws have
not yet been implemented, the 1996 Basic Charter affirms that forced or
bonded labor for any person is prohibited; however, governmental
investigative and enforcement mechanisms are lacking. Foreign workers
sometimes find themselves in situations amounting to forced labor. In
such cases, employers withhold letters of release (documents that
release workers from employment contracts), which allow them to change
employers. Without such a letter, a foreign worker must continue to
work for his current employer or become technically unemployed, which
is sufficient grounds for deportation. Many foreign workers are not
aware of their right to take such disputes before the Labor Welfare
Board. Others are reluctant to file complaints for fear of retribution
from unscrupulous employers. In most cases, the Board releases the
worker from service and awards compensation for time worked under
compulsion. Employers face no other penalty than to reimburse the
worker's back wages.
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and instances
of forced or bonded child labor are unknown.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1973 Labor Law prohibits children under the age of 13
from working. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor enforces this
prohibition; however, in practice the enforcement often does not extend
to some small family businesses that employ underage children,
particularly in the agricultural and fisheries sectors. Children
between 13 and 16 years of age may be employed but must obtain the
Ministry's permission to work overtime, at night, on weekends or
holidays, or perform strenuous labor. Child labor does not exist in any
industry.
Although primary school education is not compulsory, most children
attend school to age 18 (see Section 5).
The law specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor by children
and it is not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs
and Labor issues minimum wage guidelines for various categories of
workers. In July 1998, the Government raised the minimum wage for most
citizens to about $270 (100 rials) per month, plus $54 (20 rials) for
transportation and housing. Minimum wage guidelines do not apply to a
variety of occupational categories, including small businesses that
employ fewer than five persons, the self-employed, domestic servants,
dependent family members working for a family firm, and some categories
of manual labor. Many foreigners work in occupations that are exempt
from the minimum wage law, and the Government is lax in enforcing
minimum wage guidelines, where applicable, for foreign workers employed
in menial jobs. However, highly skilled foreign workers frequently are
paid more than their Omani counterparts.
The minimum wage is sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The compensation for foreign manual
laborers and clerks is sufficient to cover living expenses and to
permit savings to be sent home.
The private sector workweek is 40 to 45 hours and includes a rest
period from Thursday afternoon through Friday. Government workers have
a 35-hour workweek. While the law does not designate the number of days
in a workweek, it requires at least one 24-hour rest period per week
and mandates overtime pay for hours in excess of 48 per week.
Government regulations on hours of employment are not always enforced.
Employees who have worked extra hours without compensation may file a
complaint before the Labor Welfare Board, but the Board's rulings are
not binding.
Every worker has the right to 15 days of annual leave during the
first 3 years of employment and 30 days per year thereafter. Employers
provide many foreign nationals, including domestic servants, with
annual or biannual round trip tickets to their countries of origin.
All employers are required by law to provide first aid facilities.
Work sites with over 100 employees must have a nurse. Employees covered
under the Labor Law may recover compensation for injury or illness
sustained on the job through employer-provided medical insurance. The
health and safety standard codes are enforced by inspectors from the
Department of Health and Safety of the Directorate of Labor. As
required by law, they make regular onsite inspections.
There have been reports that employers or male coworkers have
sexually harassed and abused foreign females employed in such positions
as domestic servants and hospital nurses. Foreign women employed as
domestic servants and garment workers have complained that their
employers have withheld their salaries and that government officials
have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to investigative
procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals known to be
abusing foreign domestic servants are not always held accountable for
their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask their
governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse (see Section 5).
The law states that employers must not place their employees in
situations involving dangerous work; however, the law does not
specifically grant a worker the right to remove himself from dangerous
work without jeopardy to his continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
QATAR
Qatar, an Arab state on the Persian Gulf, is a monarchy with no
constitution or political parties. Qatar is governed by the ruling Al-
Thani family through its head, the Amir. The current Amir, Sheikh Hamad
bin Khalifa Al-Thani, took power from his father in June 1995 with the
support of leading branches of the Al-Thani family, and in consultation
with other leading Qatari families. This transition of authority did
not represent a change in the basic governing order. The Amir holds
absolute power, the exercise of which is influenced by religious law,
consultation with leading citizens, rule by consensus, and the right of
any citizen to gain access to the Amir to appeal government decisions.
The Amir generally legislates after consultation with leading citizens,
an arrangement institutionalized in an appointed advisory council that
assists the Amir in formulating policy. In 1999 the Amir convened a
constitutional committee to draft a permanent constitution that would
provide for parliamentary elections. The committee has met regularly
and is projected to complete its recommendations by 2002. In March
1999, citizens were permitted to participate in the election of a
national body, the Central Municipal Council, for the first time. The
judiciary is nominally independent, but most judges hold their
positions at the Government's pleasure.
The country has efficient police and security services. The
civilian security force, controlled by the Interior Ministry, comprises
two sections: The police and the General Administration of Public
Security and the investigatory police (Mubahathat), which is
responsible for sedition and espionage cases. The Interior Ministry has
a special state security investigative unit (Mubahith) that performs
internal security investigations and gathers intelligence. In addition,
there is an independent civilian intelligence service (Mukhabarat).
There were one or two allegations that members of the security forces
tortured civilians in detention.
The State owns most basic industries and services, but the retail
and construction industries are in private hands. Oil is the principal
natural resource, but the country's extensive natural gas resources are
playing an increasingly important role. Rapid development in the 1970's
and 1980's created an economy in which foreign workers, mostly South
Asian and Arab, outnumber citizens by a ratio of 4 or 5 to 1. The
Government has embarked on a program of ``Qatarization,'' which is
aimed at reducing the number of foreign workers. Many government jobs
are offered only to citizens and private sector businesses are
encouraged to recruit citizens as well.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
many areas, and there were improvements in freedom of expression;
however, its record was poor in areas, such as citizens' right to
change the Government. Citizens do not have the right to change their
government. There were one or two allegations that members of the
security forces tortured civilians in detention during the year.
Arbitrary detention in security cases, and restrictions on the freedoms
of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and on workers'
rights, continued to be problems. However, the Government continued to
take some steps to ease restrictions on the practice of non-Muslim
religions. Despite female suffrage, in practice women's rights are
restricted by social customs. Domestic servants are mistreated and
sometimes abused. Noncitizens, who make up the majority of the
residents of the country, face discrimination in the workplace.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Government officially proscribes torture; however,
there were one or two reports of alleged torture. There were
unconfirmed allegations in previous years that some of the defendants
in the trial of the 1996 coup plotters (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.) had
been tortured while in police custody; government officials have denied
the allegations. The Government administers most corporal punishment
prescribed by Islamic law but does not allow amputation.
Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
The Government does not permit domestic human rights groups to
exist, and no international human rights organization has asked to
visit the country or its prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest; however, the police have the discretion to arrest
persons based on a low level of suspicion, and arbitrary detention in
security cases remains a problem. The authorities generally charge
suspects within 48 hours. Suspects generally are presented to the
Attorney General within 24 hours of arrest. The Attorney General
decides whether to hold the suspect up to a maximum of 4 days, after
which time the suspect is presented before a judge, who may order the
suspect released or remanded to custody to await trial. The accused is
entitled to legal representation throughout this process. Suspects who
are detained in security cases generally are afforded access to
counsel; however, they may be detained indefinitely while under
investigation. There were no known cases of incommunicado detention
during the year.
In 1998 Ministry of Education official Abdulrahman Al-Nuaimi
distributed a letter criticizing the Amir's decision to allow women to
vote and run for office in the Municipal Council elections as well as
other purportedly anti-Islamic actions. The Amir ordered the arrest of
Abdulrahman Al-Nuaimi, and he remains in detention.
In September 33 of the persons arrested and tried for involvement
in a February 1996 coup attempt, including Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin
Hamad Al-Thani, who was named as the prime suspect in the coup bid,
were found guilty and sentence to life in prison; 85 were acquitted.
The 33 found guilty have appealed. Prosecutors had called for the death
penalty for all those accused.
The Government has used forced exile on rare occasions. There were
no reported cases this year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is nominally
independent; however, most judges are foreign nationals who hold
residence permits granted by the civil authorities, and thus hold their
positions at the Government's pleasure. The number of citizen judges is
increasing.
The judiciary deals with the bureaucracies of three ministries.
Civil (or Adlea) courts are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, and
Shari'a (Islamic law) courts fall under the Ministry of Endowments and
Islamic Affairs. The prosecutors fall under the Ministry of Interior.
There are two types of courts: The civil courts, which have
jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, and the Shari'a courts,
which have jurisdiction in family and criminal cases. There are no
permanent state security courts; however, although there have been no
cases before these courts since the Amir assumed power, they have not
been abolished formally by law and remain an option. Defendants tried
by all courts have the right to appeal. The original case and the
appeal in Shari'a courts are no longer heard by the same judge, and
procedural loopholes that permitted this practice in the past are to be
closed as part of a pending judicial reform package.
The legal system is biased in favor of citizens and the Government.
A Muslim litigant may request the Shari'a courts to assume jurisdiction
in commercial or civil cases. Non-Muslims are not allowed to bring
suits as plaintiffs in the Shari'a courts; however, they may file suit
in the civil courts. This practice prevents non-Muslim residents from
obtaining full legal recourse. Trials in the civil courts are public,
but in the Shari'a courts only the disputing parties, their relatives,
associates, and witnesses are allowed in the courtroom. Lawyers do not
play a formal role except to prepare litigants for their cases.
Although non-Arabic speakers are provided with interpreters, foreigners
are disadvantaged, especially in cases involving the performance of
contracts. However, provided that the foreign defendant's sponsor or
embassy agree, the defendant is entitled to legal representation
throughout the trial and pretrial process.
Defendants appear before a judge for a preliminary hearing within 7
days of their arrest. Judges may extend pretrial detention for 1 week
at a time to allow the authorities to conduct investigations. Lengthy
pretrial detention is not known to occur. Defendants in the civil
courts have the right to be represented by defense attorneys but are
not always permitted to be represented by counsel in the Shari'a
courts.
Shari'a trials usually are brief. Shari'a family law trials often
are held without counsel. After both parties have stated their cases
and examined witnesses, judges usually deliver a verdict after a short
deliberation. Criminal cases normally are tried within 2 to 3 months
after suspects are detained. Suspects are entitled to bail, except in
some instances, such as in cases of violent crime. Bail may be provided
by citizens or noncitizens. Foreigners who are charged with minor
crimes may be released to a citizen sponsor. They are prohibited from
departing the country until the case is resolved.
After a public trial of persons arrested for involvement in the
1996 coup attempt, trial judges sentenced 33 defendants to life
imprisonment. Nine of them were tried in absentia. Another 85
defendants were acquitted on all charges. A decision regarding the
convicted defendants' appeal was pending at year's end. The trial was
considered fair.
There are no known political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Traditional attitudes of respect for the sanctity of
the home and the privacy of women provide a great deal of protection
against arbitrary intrusion for most citizens and residents. A warrant
must be obtained before police may search a residence or business,
except in cases involving national security or emergencies. Search
warrants are issued by judicial authorities. There were no reports of
unauthorized searches of homes during the year. The police and security
forces are believed to monitor the telephone calls of suspected
criminals, of those considered to be security risks, and of selected
foreigners.
With prior permission, which is usually granted, citizens may marry
foreigners of any nationality and apply for residence permits or
citizenship for their spouses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Government reduced
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press in 1996 and
permitted a noticeable expansion of press freedom, some restrictions
still remain. The Government lifted formal censorship of the media in
1995, and since then the press has been essentially free of government
interference. However, journalists continue to practice self-
censorship, due to real or perceived social and political pressures.
Some journalists reportedly were subjected to pressure by the
Government during the year after they published articles critical of
the Government. Although explicit criticism of citizens' public or
private affairs is not common, a number of such reports have been noted
in local newspapers, especially Arabic-language newspapers. One Arabic-
language newspaper even polled its readers to determine the most
popular and least popular ministers. The Minister of Education was a
frequent target of criticism; other criticism tended to be targeted at
organizations rather than individuals.
There were no reports of instances of political censorship of
foreign news media or broadcasts of foreign programs on local
television over the past year. The Censorship Office in the Ministry of
Information was abolished (together with the Ministry) in 1996.
Pornography and expressions deemed hostile to Islam still are subject
to censorship, and censors still work at broadcast media under the
overall supervision of the Ministry of Religious Endowments.
Citizens enjoy broad freedom of speech but are restricted by the
social and family restraints of a very traditional society. There is no
apparent fear of government monitoring of private speech. However, the
larger foreign population does not believe it enjoys the same freedoms
and acts accordingly.
Television and radio are state owned, but the privately owned
satellite television channel Al-Jazeera operates freely. During the
year, radio and television call-in programs and talk shows criticized
the Amir for meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister at the U.N.
Millennium Summit in September, and the Government was criticized for
allowing the Israeli Trade Office to remain open prior to the November
Islamic Summit. Various government ministers are regularly criticized
on a popular radio talk show.
A Ministry of Education official who wrote a letter in 1999
critical of the Amir's decision to allow women to vote and run for
office in the Municipal Council elections remains in custody (see
Section 1.d.).
Customs officials screen imported print media, videocassettes, and
other such items for pornography, but have stopped blocking the
importation of non-Muslim religious items (see Section 2.c.).
A growing number of citizens and residents have access to the
Internet, which is provided through the state-owned telecommunications
monopoly. Internet service is censored for pornographic content through
a proxy server, which blocks those web sites containing certain key
words and phrases. A user who believes that a site is censored
mistakenly may submit the web address to the Internet service provider
to have the site reviewed for suitability. The Government is responsive
to such submissions.
There is no legal provision for academic freedom. Most instructors
at the University of Qatar exercise self-censorship.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
severely limits freedom of assembly. The Government generally does not
allow political demonstrations; however, it permitted one peaceful
demonstration of about 3,000 participants in October, under the aegis
of the Central Municipal Council, that protested the Israeli
Government's actions against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and
Gaza.
The Government severely limits freedom of association. The
Government does not allow political parties or membership in
international professional organizations critical of the Government or
of any other Arab government. Private social, sports, trade,
professional, and cultural societies must be registered with the
Government. Security forces monitor the activities of such groups.
c. Freedom of Religion.--There is no constitutional protection for
freedom of religion. The state religion is Islam, as interpreted by the
conservative Wahhabi order of the Sunni branch. The Government
officially prohibits public worship by non-Muslims; however, it
tolerates and protects services conducted privately with prior
notification to the authorities. The Government allows Shi'a Muslims to
practice their faith freely; however, community leaders have agreed to
refrain from certain public practices, such as self-flagellation.
The Government and ruling family are inextricably linked to the
practice of Islam. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs controls the
construction of mosques, the administration of clerical affairs, and
instruction in the Koran. The Minister of Islamic Affairs is a member
of the Amir's cabinet and participates in policymaking at the highest
level. The only official government holidays aside from the
independence day are the Eid Al-Fitr, following the holy month of
Ramadan, and the Eid Al-Adha, which commemorates the end of the Hajj.
The Amir participates in widely publicized ``Eid prayers'' and each
year personally finances the Hajj pilgrimages of many who cannot afford
to travel to Mecca.
During the year, the Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox churches in
effect received de facto official recognition. However, formal
recognition apparently has not yet been granted. There reportedly is a
verbal commitment by the Government to allow the churches to operate
openly in a manner that apparently reflects de facto government
recognition. For example, priests of the three churches have been asked
to wear their clerical garb and may apply to be sponsors for visitor
visas for other church representatives. In addition, church
representatives may import reasonable amounts of Bibles and other
religious literature for use by their congregations. In February the
Government identified a parcel of land on which it plans to allow the
construction of three churches, one each for the Catholic, Anglican,
and Orthodox communities. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture met with
diplomats and representatives of the churches to discuss initial design
plans. The Government recognizes and allows marriages between non-
Muslims to be conducted by the Roman Catholic Church. Such progress for
Christians is due, in large part, to their status as ``people of the
book'' in that the Koran accords special status to Christians and Jews.
The Government intends to permit Hindus and Buddhists neither to
worship openly nor to establish temples because it claims that there is
no Koranic justification for tolerance of polytheistic religions.
Non-Muslims may not proselytize, and conversion from Islam is
theoretically a capital offense. However, there is no record of an
execution for such a conversion since independence in 1971.
The Government formally prohibits the publication, importation, and
distribution of Bibles and other non-Islamic religious literature.
However, in practice individuals generally are not prevented from
importing Bibles and other religious items for personal use. In
previous years, there were sporadic reports of confiscation of such
materials by customs officials. During the year, some Christian worship
groups reported having no trouble importing instructional materials
(i.e., Sunday school materials and devotionals) for use by the groups.
Police provide traffic control for authorized Catholic masses, which
may be attended by 1,000 or more persons at Easter and Christmas.
There are no restrictions on non-Muslims providing religious
instruction to their children; however, the public schools provide
compulsory instruction in Islam. The public schools generally are
closed to foreigners, most of whose children attend private schools.
Practice of Islam confers advantage in civil life. For example,
non-Muslims do not have the right to bring suit in the Shari'a (Islamic
law) courts. These courts are utilized to settle the majority of civil
claims; thus, non-Muslims are at a distinct disadvantage.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on internal
travel, except around sensitive military and oil installations. In
general, women do not require permission from male guardians to travel.
However, men may prevent female relatives from leaving the country by
providing their names to immigration officers at ports of departure.
Technically, women employed by the Government must obtain official
permission to travel abroad when requesting leave, but it is not known
to what extent this regulation is enforced. Citizens critical of the
Government face restrictions on their right to travel abroad.
All citizens have the right to return. Foreigners are subject to
immigration restrictions designed to control the size of the local
labor pool. Foreign workers must have the permission of their sponsor
(usually their employer) to enter and depart the country, but their
dependents may leave the country without restriction. Foreign women who
are married to citizens are granted residence permits and may apply for
citizenship; however, they are expected to relinquish their foreign
citizenship.
The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. Those attempting to enter
illegally, including persons seeking asylum from nearby countries, are
refused entry. Asylum seekers who are able to obtain local sponsorship
or employment are allowed to enter and may remain as long as they are
employed.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government or the
political system peacefully. The political institutions combine the
characteristics of a traditional Bedouin tribal state and a modern
bureaucracy. Under the amended Provisional Constitution, the Amir must
be chosen from and by the adult males of the Al-Thani family. There are
no political parties or organized opposition groups. However, in 1999
citizens had the opportunity for the first time to choose officials for
the Central Municipal Council in free and fair elections.
The Amir exercises most executive and legislative powers, including
appointment of cabinet members. On March 8, 1999, citizens elected a
29-member Central Municipal Council. For the first time, men and women
age 18 and older were permitted both to vote and to run as candidates.
The Council is a nonpartisan body that addresses issues such as street
repair, green space, trash collection, and public works projects. Its
role is to advise the Minister of Municipalities and Agriculture. The
Council cannot change policy on its own.
In November 1998, the Amir announced his intention to form a
constitutional committee to draft a permanent constitution that would
provide for democratic parliamentary elections. The constitutional
committee was inaugurated in July 1999 and includes a number of
government officials, academics, and prominent business leaders. In
addition to subcommittees on the legislature, executive, and judiciary,
it includes a subcommittee on human rights. The committee has met
regularly and is projected to complete its recommendations by 2002. The
Amir reiterated in his remarks to the committee members that he expects
their efforts to lead to the establishment of an elected parliamentary
body.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Women have
the right to vote and run as candidates for the Central Municipal
Council; none were elected to the Council in the 1999 elections.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not permit local human rights organizations to
exist. No international human rights organizations are known to have
asked to investigate conditions in the country. However, Amnesty
International and foreign embassies were invited to send observers to
sessions of the public trial of those accused in the 1996 coup attempt.
Foreign observers attended the trial sessions held during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law proscribes discrimination in the workplace; however,
institutional, cultural, and legal discrimination based on gender,
race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
Women.--According to the Family Development Center, the country's
leading nongovernmental organization (NGO) on women's issues, violence
against women is not widespread. Some foreign domestic servants,
especially those from South Asia and the Philippines, have been
mistreated by employers. In most cases, the mistreatment involves late
or nonpayment of wages (see Section 6.c.), but also includes
allegations of rape and physical abuse (see Section 6.e.). Foreign
embassies provide shelter for maids who have left their employers as a
result of abuse or disputes. According to Shari'a, all forms of
physical abuse are illegal. The maximum penalty for rape is death. The
police actively investigate reports of violence against women. In the
last few years, the Government demonstrated an increased willingness to
arrest and punish offenders, whether citizens or foreigners. Offenders
who are citizens usually receive lighter punishments than do
foreigners. Abused domestic workers usually do not press charges for
fear of losing their jobs.
The legal system allows leniency for a man found guilty of
committing a ``crime of honor,'' a euphemism that refers to a violent
assault against a woman for perceived immodesty or defiant behavior;
however, such honor killings are rare. In 1999 a former minister and
Gulf War hero, Ali Saeed Al-Khayareen, was accused of killing his two
half-sisters for their alleged sexual misconduct. Al-Khayareen was held
for a few months at the Al-Rayyan detention center, but eventually the
women's family decided to accept monetary compensation, and he was
released late in 1999.
The activities of women are restricted closely both by law and
tradition. For example, a woman is prohibited from applying for a
driver's license unless she has permission from a male guardian. This
restriction does not apply to noncitizen women. The Government adheres
to Shari'a as practiced in the country in matters of inheritance and
child custody. Muslim wives have the right to inherit from their
husbands. However, they inherit only one-half as much as male
relatives. Non-Muslim wives inherit nothing, unless a special exception
is arranged. In cases of divorce, Shari'a is followed; younger children
remain with the mother and older children with the father. Both parents
retain permanent rights of visitation. However, local authorities do
not allow a noncitizen parent to take his or her child out of the
country without permission of the citizen parent. Women may attend
court proceedings but generally are represented by a male relative;
however, women may represent themselves. According to Shari'a, the
testimony of two women equals that of one man, but the courts routinely
interpret this on a case-by-case basis.
Women largely are relegated to the roles of mother and homemaker,
but some women are now finding jobs in education, medicine, and the
news media. Women appear to receive equal pay for equal work; however,
they often do not receive equal allowances. These allowances generally
cover transportation and housing costs. Increasingly, women receive
government scholarships to pursue degrees at universities overseas. The
Amir has entrusted his second wife, who is the mother of the Heir
Apparent, with the high-profile task of establishing a university in
Doha. In 1996 the Government appointed its first female undersecretary,
in the Ministry of Education, and in March a woman was appointed vice
president of Qatar University. Although women legally are able to
travel abroad alone (see Section 2.d.), tradition and social pressures
cause most to travel with male escorts. There also have been complaints
that citizen husbands take their foreign spouses' passports and,
without prior approval, turn them in for Qatari citizenship documents.
The husbands then inform their wives that the wives have lost their
former citizenship. In other cases, foreign wives report being
forbidden by their husbands or in-laws to visit or to contact foreign
embassies.
There is no independent women's rights organization, nor has the
Government permitted the establishment of one.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
rights through a well-funded, free public education system (elementary
through university) and a complete medical protection program for the
children of citizens. However, children of most foreigners are denied
free education and have only limited medical coverage.
Very young children, usually of African or South Asian background,
have been used as jockeys in camel races. Little information is
available on wages and working conditions for these children (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--The Government has not enacted
legislation or otherwise mandated provision of accessibility for the
disabled, who also face social discrimination. The Government maintains
a hospital and schools that provide high-quality, free services to the
mentally and physically disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Shi'a Muslims fill many positions in the
bureaucracy and are prominent in business. However, they experience
discrimination in employment in some sensitive areas, such as security.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government discriminates
against some citizens of non-Qatari origin. In the private sector, many
citizens of Iranian origin occupy some of the highest positions.
However, they rarely are found in senior decisionmaking positions in
government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The right of association is limited
strictly, and all workers, including foreigners, are prohibited from
forming labor unions. Despite this restriction, almost all workers have
the right to strike after their case has been presented to the Labor
Conciliation Board and ruled upon. Employers may close a place of work
or dismiss employees once the Conciliation Board has heard the case.
The right to strike does not exist for government employees, domestic
workers, or members of the employer's family. No worker in a public
utility or health or security service may strike if such a strike would
harm the public or lead to property damage. Strikes by expatriate
workers are rare but do occur. The Conciliation Board is widely
perceived to be objective, particularly with regard to the most common
complaints of expatriate workers, the nonpayment of wages, and poor
living conditions. The press reports work actions and grievances over
these issues.
The Labor Law provides for the establishment of joint consultative
committees composed of representatives of the employer and workers. The
committees do not discuss wages but may consider issues such as
organization and productivity, conditions of employment, training of
workers, and safety measures and their implementation.
Since 1995 the country has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
rights standards.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are
prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining. In general wages are
set unilaterally by employers without government involvement. Local
courts handle disputes between workers and employers.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor. Three-quarters of the work force are
foreign workers, who are dependent on a single employer for residency
rights. This leaves them vulnerable to abuse. For instance, employers
must give consent before exit permits are issued to any foreign
employee seeking to leave the country. Some employers temporarily
withhold this consent to force foreign employees to work for longer
periods than they wish. Some unskilled workers and domestic servants
are vulnerable to late payment of wages; it is government policy to
assist laborers, usually through the Labor Board, under such
circumstances. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively; however,
some very young children work as jockeys in camel races (see Sections 5
and 6.d., 6.e., and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Minors between the ages of 15 and 18 may be employed with
the approval of their parents or guardians and some children may work
in small, family-owned businesses. However, child labor is rare.
Education is compulsory for citizens through the age of 15. Very young
children, usually of African or South Asian background, are used as
jockeys in camel races (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). Little
information is available on wages and working conditions for these
children. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children
and generally enforces this prohibition effectively with respect to
citizen children (see Section 6.c.).
Minors may not work more than 6 hours a day or more than 36 hours a
week. Employers must provide the Ministry of Labor with the names and
occupations of their minor employees. The Ministry may prohibit the
employment of minors in jobs that are judged dangerous to the health,
safety, or morals of minors. Employers also must obtain permission from
the Ministry of Education to hire a minor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage,
although a 1962 law gives the Amir authority to set one. The average
wage provides a decent standard of living for workers and their
families. The law prescribes a 48-hour workweek with a 24-hour rest
period, although most government offices follow a 36-hours-per-week
work schedule. Employees who work more than 48 hours per week, or 36
hours per week during the Muslim month of Ramadan, are entitled to
overtime pay. This law is adhered to in government offices and major
private sector companies. It is not observed with respect to domestic
and personal employees. Domestic servants frequently work 7 days per
week, and more than 12 hours per day with few or no holidays, and have
no effective way to redress grievances against their employers.
The Government has enacted regulations concerning worker safety and
health, but enforcement, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of
Energy and Industry, is lax. The Department of Public Safety oversees
safety training and conditions, and the state-run petroleum company has
its own set of safety standards and procedures. The Labor Law of 1964,
as amended in 1984, lists partial and permanent disabilities for which
compensation may be awarded, some connected with handling chemicals and
petroleum products or construction injuries. The law does not
specifically set rates of payment and compensation. Laborers who suffer
work-related sickness or injuries receive free medical treatment
provided by the Government.
Foreign workers may enter the country on a visitors visa and then
convert this visa to a work visa once in the country. A sponsor is need
to convert a visitor's visa to a work visa, and the worker must have
their sponsor's permission to depart the country. Any worker may seek
legal relief from onerous work conditions, but domestic servants
generally accept their situations in order to avoid repatriation. The
Government also penalizes citizen employers who violate residence and
sponsorship laws. Some foreign domestic servants have been mistreated
by their employers. Such mistreatment normally involves the nonpayment
or late payment of wages but also may involve rape and physical abuse
(see Section 5). It is not known if workers have the right to remove
themselves from hazardous work conditions without fear of dismissal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons.
On January 19, the Government arrested and repatriated several
women from the former Soviet Union who were transported to the country
to work as prostitutes.
Very young children, usually of African or South Asian background,
have been used as jockeys in camel races (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
__________
SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without elected representative
institutions or political parties. It is ruled by King Fahd Bin Abd Al-
Aziz Al Saud, a son of King Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud, who unified the
country in the early 20th century. Since the death of King Abd Al-Aziz,
the King and Crown Prince have been chosen from among his sons, who
themselves have had preponderant influence in the choice. A 1992 royal
decree reserves for the King exclusive power to name the Crown Prince.
Crown Prince Abdullah has played an increasing role in governance since
King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995. The Government has declared the
Islamic holy book the Koran, and the Sunna (tradition) of the Prophet
Muhammad, to be the country's Constitution. The Government bases its
legitimacy on governance according to the precepts of a rigorously
conservative form of Islam. Neither the Government nor society in
general accepts the concept of separation of religion and state. The
Government prohibits the establishment of political parties and
suppresses opposition views. In 1992 King Fahd appointed a Consultative
Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura, and similar provincial assemblies. The
Majlis, a strictly advisory body, began holding sessions in 1993 and
was expanded in 1997. The judiciary is generally independent but is
subject to influence by the executive branch and members of the royal
family.
Police and border forces under the Ministry of Interior are
responsible for internal security. The Mutawwa'in, or religious police,
constitute the Committee to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue, a
semiautonomous agency that enforces adherence to Islamic norms by
monitoring public behavior. The Government maintains general control of
the security forces. However, members of the security forces committed
human rights abuses.
The oil industry has fueled the transformation of Saudi Arabia from
a pastoral, agricultural, and commercial society to a rapidly
urbanizing one, characterized by large-scale infrastructure projects,
an extensive social welfare system, and a labor market comprised
largely of foreign workers. Oil revenues account for around 55 percent
of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 percent of government
income. Agriculture accounts for only about 6 percent of GDP.
Government spending, including spending on the national airline, power,
water, telephone, education, and health services, accounts for 24
percent of GDP. About 40 percent of the economy is nominally private,
and the Government is promoting further privatization of the economy.
In 1995 the Government began an aggressive campaign to increase the
number of Saudi nationals represented in the public and private work
forces. The campaign has restricted employment of some categories of
foreign workers by limiting certain occupations to Saudis only,
increasing fees for some types of work visas, and setting minimum wages
for some job categories in order to increase the cost to employers of
non-Saudi labor. In August 1998, the Government announced that citizens
had to constitute at least 5 percent of the work force in private
sector companies by October 1998, an amount that, according to a 1995
ministerial decree, should be 15 percent. Despite a crackdown on
illegal workers and the citizens who employ or house them, the program
has continued to fall short of its goal of increasing the Saudi
percentage of the work force by 5 percent each year.
The Government's human rights record remained generally poor in a
number of areas; however, its record showed limited improvement in some
areas. Citizens have neither the right nor the legal means to change
their government. Security forces continued to abuse detainees and
prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and facilitate
incommunicado detention; in addition there were allegations that
security forces committed torture. Prolonged detention without charge
is a problem. Security forces committed such abuses, in contradiction
to the law, but with the acquiescence of the Government. Mutawwa'in
(religious police, who constitute the Committee to Promote Virtue and
Prevent Vice) continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and
foreigners. The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights. The
Government prohibits or restricts freedom of speech, the press,
assembly, association, religion, and movement. However, during the year
the Government tolerated a wider range of debate and criticism in the
press concerning domestic issues. Other continuing problems included
discrimination and violence against women, discrimination against
ethnic and religious minorities, and strict limitations on worker
rights. The Government views its interpretation of Islamic law as its
sole source of guidance on human rights and disagrees with
internationally accepted definitions of human rights. However, during
the year, the Government initiated limited measures to participate in
international human rights mechanisms. For example, it invited to the
country the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers and acceded to (with reservations) the U.N. Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political killings.
In November 1998, several Mutawwa'in attacked and killed an elderly
Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a
traditional Shi'a practice). Attempts by Mutawwa'in to cover up the
killing were unsuccessful. After investigating the incident, the
Government stated that medical reports indicated that the man's death
resulted from a drop in his blood pressure because of old age. The
Government stated that the death was not a criminal incident.
The investigation of the 1996 Al-Khobar bombing, which killed 19
U.S. servicemen, continued. The Government has not yet issued a report
of its findings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There were credible reports that the authorities abused
detainees, both citizens and foreigners. Ministry of Interior officials
are responsible for most incidents of abuse, including beatings and
sleep deprivation. In addition, there were allegations of torture.
Although the Government has ratified the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, it has
refused to recognize the authority of the Committee Against Torture to
investigate alleged abuses. In 1998 the Government pledged to cooperate
with U.N. human rights mechanisms, and it announced in April the
establishment of a committee to investigate allegations of torture
pursuant to its obligations under the convention (see Section 4).
However, although the Government asks for details of reports of torture
and other human rights abuses made by international human rights
groups, it does not permit international observers to investigate such
reports. The Government's general refusal to grant members of
diplomatic missions access to the Ministry of Interior detention
facilities, or allow members of international human rights groups into
the country, hinders efforts to confirm or discount reports of abuses.
The Government's past failure to criticize human rights abuses has
contributed to the public perception that security forces may commit
abuses with impunity.
The Mutawwa'in continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens
and foreigners of both sexes (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.c.).
The Government punishes criminals according to its interpretation
of Shari'a (Islamic law). Punishments include flogging, amputation, and
execution by beheading, stoning, or firing squad. The authorities
acknowledged 120 executions during the year, an increase from 100 in
1999. Executions included 62 persons convicted of murder, 21 convicted
of narcotics-related offenses, 22 convicted of rape, and 10 convicted
of armed robbery. The executions also included two women for murder and
three for drug trafficking. The men were executed by beheading and the
women were executed by firing squad. The government of Nigeria
criticized Saudi Arabia for the execution of seven Nigerians convicted
of bank robbery. In accordance with Shari'a, the authorities may punish
repeated thievery by amputation of the right hand. There were 27
reports of amputations, including 7 reports of multiple amputations
(right hand, left leg) for the crime of highway robbery during the
year. Persons convicted of less serious offenses, such as alcohol-
related offenses or being alone in the company of an unrelated person
of the opposite sex, sometimes were punished by flogging with a cane.
On April 16, the Associated Press reported that 5 persons had been
sentenced to 2,600 lashes and 6 years in prison, and 4 persons to 2,400
lashes and 5 years' imprisonment, for ``deviant sexual behavior.''
Amnesty International reported in July that six men were executed on
charges of deviant sexual behavior, some of which were related to their
sexual orientation. Amnesty International was uncertain whether the six
men who were executed were among the nine who were sentenced to
flogging and imprisonment in April.
During the year, a court ordered that the eye of an Egyptian man be
removed as punishment for an attack 6 years ago in which he was
convicted of throwing acid on another Egyptian man. The victim, who
lost his eye in the attack and suffered other disfigurement, had urged
the court to implement Al-Qisas, the Shari'a provision stipulating that
the punishment be commensurate with the crime. Press accounts stated
that the convicted man's eye was removed at a hospital in August.
Prison and jail conditions vary throughout the Kingdom. Prisons
generally meet internationally accepted standards and provide air-
conditioned cells, good nutrition, regular exercise, and careful
patrolling by prison guards. However, some police station jails are
overcrowded and unsanitary. Authorities generally allowed family
members access to detainees.
Boards of Investigation and Public Prosecution, organized on a
regional basis, were established by King Fahd in 1993. The members of
these boards have the right to inspect prisons, review prisoners'
files, and hear their complaints. However, the Government does not
permit human rights monitors to visit prisons or jails. The Government
does not allow impartial observers of any type access to specialized
Ministry of Interior prisons, where it detains persons accused of
political subversion.
Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) are present at the Rafha refugee camp, which houses
former Iraqi prisoners of war and civilians who fled Iraq following the
Gulf War. According to UNHCR officials, there was no systematic abuse
of refugees by camp guards. When isolated instances of abuse have
surfaced in the past, the authorities have been responsive and willing
to investigate allegations and reprimand offending guards. The camp
receives a high level of material assistance and is generally
comfortable and well-run. However, the Government generally confines
refugees to the camp, except in the event of approved emigration.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest; however, some officers make arrests and detain
persons without following explicit legal guidelines. There are few
procedures to safeguard against abuse, although the Government claims
that it punishes individual officers who violate regulations. There
have been few publicized cases of citizens successfully obtaining
judicial redress for abuse of the Government's power of arrest and
detention.
In accordance with a 1983 Ministry of Interior regulation,
authorities usually detain suspects for no longer than 3 days before
charging them. However, serious exceptions have been reported. The
regulation also has provisions for bail for less serious crimes. Also,
authorities sometimes release detainees on the recognizance of a patron
or sponsoring employer without the payment of bail. If they are not
released, authorities typically detain accused persons for an average
of 2 months before sending the case to trial or, in the case of some
foreigners, summarily deporting them. There is no established procedure
providing detainees the right to inform their family of their arrest.
The Mutawwa'in have the authority to detain persons for no more
than 24 hours for violations of the strict standards of proper dress
and behavior. However, they sometimes exceeded this limit before
delivering detainees to the police (see Section 1.f.). Current
procedures require a police officer to accompany the Mutawwa'in at the
time of an arrest. Mutawwa'in generally complied with this requirement.
During the year, in the more conservative Riyadh district, the number
of reports received of Mutawwa'in accosting, abusing, arresting, and
detaining persons alleged to have violated dress and behavior standards
was comparable to 1999. The Jeddah district also received a similar
number of reports as in the previous year.
In January the Government arrested 16 Filipino Christians during a
raid on a prayer service. Government officials maintained that the
religious service was attended by such a large number of persons that
it could not be considered private. All of the detainees subsequently
were released and deported to the Philippines (see Section 2.c.).
According to Amnesty International, Hashim Al-Sayyid Al-Sada, a Shi'a
cleric suspected of political or religious dissent, was arrested in his
home in April and reportedly has been held incommunicado since then
(see Section 2.c.). In June the Government arrested an Indian Christian
for possession of a videotape of a religious event. He was released
after spending 2 months in jail and was deported to India (see Section
2.c.). On November 30, the police detained five Christian worshipers
for about an hour for questioning regarding their activities (see
Section 2.c.). In December the authorities raided a worship service and
arrested six Filipino citizens; three remained in custody at year's end
(see Section 2.c.).
Political detainees who are arrested by the General Directorate of
Investigation (GDI), the Ministry of Interior's security service,
commonly are held incommunicado in special prisons during the initial
phase of an investigation, which may last weeks or months. The GDI
allows the detainees only limited contact with their families or
lawyers.
The authorities may detain without charge persons who publicly
criticize the Government or may charge them with attempting to
destabilize the Government (see Sections 2.a. and 3). In January the
Government announced that it had released, under its annual Ramadan
amnesty, 4,637 prisoners and detainees, including 1,807 foreigners. It
is unclear whether there were any political detainees or prisoners
among those released.
There is no reliable information about the total number of
political detainees.
Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of a U.S.
military facility in Saudi Arabia, authorities have detained,
interrogated, and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a
Muslims suspected of fundamentalist tendencies or Iranian sympathies.
The Government reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of
Shi'a arrested in the aftermath of the bombing. Government security
forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest suspicion, hold them in
custody for lengthy periods, and then release them without explanation
(see Section 2.c.).
The Government did not use forced exile, and there were no reports
that it revoked citizenship for political purposes during the year.
However, it previously has revoked the citizenship of opponents of the
Government who reside outside the country (see Section 3).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The independence of the judiciary
is prescribed by law and usually is respected in practice; however,
judges occasionally accede to the influence of the executive branch,
particularly members of the royal family and their associates, who are
not required to appear before the courts. Moreover, the Ministry of
Justice exercises judicial, financial, and administrative control of
the courts.
The legal system is based on Shari'a. Shari'a courts exercise
jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. These courts base
judgments largely on a code derived from the Koran and the Sunna,
another Islamic text. Cases involving relatively small penalties are
tried in Shari'a summary courts; more serious crimes are adjudicated in
Shari'a courts of common pleas. Appeals from Shari'a courts are made to
the courts of appeal.
Other civil proceedings, including those involving claims against
the Government and enforcement of foreign judgments, are held before
specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Commission for the
Settlement of Labor Disputes and the Board of Grievances.
The Government permits Shi'a Muslims to use their own legal
tradition to adjudicate noncriminal cases within their community.
The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed
personnel and civil servants who are charged with violations of
military regulations. The Minister of Defense and Aviation and the King
review the decisions of courts-martial.
The Supreme Judicial Council is not a court and may not reverse
decisions made by a court of appeals. However, the Council may review
lower court decisions and refer them back to the lower court for
reconsideration. Only the Supreme Judicial Council may discipline or
remove a judge. The King appoints the members of the Council.
The Council of Senior Religious Scholars is an autonomous body of
20 senior religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice. It
establishes the legal principles to guide lower-court judges in
deciding cases.
The law grants defendants the right to a lawyer and translator;
however, defendants usually appear without an attorney before a judge,
who determines guilt or innocence in accordance with Shari'a standards.
The courts generally do not provide foreign defendants with
translators. Defense lawyers may offer their clients advice before
trial or may attend the trial as interpreters for those unfamiliar with
Arabic. Public defenders are not provided. Individuals may choose any
person to represent them by a power of attorney filed with the court
and the Ministry of Justice. Most trials are closed.
A woman's testimony does not carry the same weight as that of a
man. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two
women. In the absence of two witnesses, or four witnesses in the case
of adultery, confessions before a judge almost always are required for
criminal conviction--a situation that repeatedly has led prosecuting
authorities to coerce confessions from suspects by threats and abuse.
Female parties to court proceedings such as divorce and family law
cases generally must deputize male relatives to speak on their behalf.
Sentencing is not uniform. Laws and regulations state that
defendants should be treated equally; however, foreign residents
sometimes receive harsher penalties than citizens. Under Shari'a as
interpreted and applied in Saudi Arabia, crimes against Muslims receive
harsher penalties than those against non-Muslims. In the case of
wrongful death, the amount of indemnity or ``blood money'' awarded to
relatives varies with the nationality, religion, age, and sex of the
victim. A sentence may be changed at any stage of review, except for
punishments stipulated by the Koran.
Provincial governors have the authority to exercise leniency and
reduce a judge's sentence. In general members of the royal family and
other powerful families are not subject to the same rule of law as
ordinary citizens (see Sections 1.a. and 3). For example, judges do not
have the power to issue a warrant summoning any member of the royal
family.
The King and his advisors review cases involving capital
punishment. The King has the authority to commute death sentences and
grant pardons, except for capital crimes committed against individuals.
In such cases, he may request the victim's next of kin to pardon the
murderer--usually in return for compensation from the family or the
King.
There is insufficient information to determine the number of
political prisoners. The Government does not provide information on
political prisoners or respond to inquiries about them. It does not
allow access to political prisoners by international humanitarian
organizations. Moreover, the Government conducts closed trials for
persons who may be political prisoners and in other cases has detained
persons incommunicado for long periods while they are under
investigation. Amnesty International estimates the number of political
prisoners to be between 100 and 200.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government infringes on these rights. The sanctity
of family life and the inviolability of the home are among the most
fundamental of Islamic precepts. Royal decrees announced in 1992
include provisions calling for the Government to defend the home from
unlawful intrusions, while laws and regulations prohibit officials from
intercepting mail and electronic communication except when necessary
during criminal investigations. Nonetheless, there are few procedural
safeguards against government interference with one's privacy, family,
home, or correspondence.
The police generally must demonstrate reasonable cause and obtain
permission from the provincial governor before searching a private
home; however, warrants are not required.
Customs officials routinely open mail and shipments to search for
contraband, including material deemed pornographic and non-Muslim
religious material. Customs officials confiscated or censored materials
considered offensive, including Christian Bibles and religious
videotapes (see Section 2.c.). The authorities also open mail and use
informants and wiretaps in internal security and criminal matters.
Security forces used wiretaps against foreigners suspected of alcohol-
related offenses. Informants (know as ``mukhbir'') and ward bosses
(known as ``umdas') report ``seditious ideas'' or antigovernment
activity in their neighborhoods to the Ministry of the Interior.
The Government enforces most social and Islamic religious norms,
which are matters of law (see Section 5). Women may not marry
noncitizens without government permission; men must obtain approval
from the Ministry of Interior to marry women from countries outside the
six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In accordance with Shari'a,
women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims; men may marry
Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims.
Mutawwa'in practices and incidents of abuse varied widely in
different regions of the country but were most numerous in the central
Nejd region. In certain areas, both the Mutawwa'in and religious
vigilantes acting on their own harassed, assaulted, battered, arrested,
and detained citizens and foreigners (see Section 1.d.). The Government
requires the Mutawwa'in to follow established procedures and to offer
instruction in a polite manner; however, Mutawwa'in did not always
comply with the requirements. The Government has not criticized
publicly abuses by Mutawwa'in and religious vigilantes but has sought
to curtail such abuses.
Mutawwa'in enforcement of strict standards of social behavior
included the closing of commercial establishments during the five daily
prayer observances, insisting upon compliance with strict norms of
public dress, and dispersing gatherings of women in public places.
Mutawwa'in frequently reproached citizen and foreign women for failure
to observe strict dress codes, and arrested men and women found
together who were not married or closely related.
Some professors believe that informers monitor comments made in
university classrooms (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government severely limits
freedom of speech and the press. However, the authorities allow the
press some freedom to criticize governmental bodies and social policies
through editorial comments and cartoons.
The authorities do not permit criticism of Islam or the royal
family, and criticism of the Government is limited. However, during the
year the authorities tolerated increasing criticism of governmental
bodies and social policies in editorial comments and cartoons. For
example, some newspapers published criticism of specific cabinet
ministries and ministers for their handling of a disease outbreak,
while another published a column criticizing the Minister of Finance
for lack of transparency in the Government's spending of oil revenues.
One newspaper published a column in support of allowing women to drive
by disputing the arguments of a member of the Council of Senior Islamic
Scholars who opposes such actions. The press also carried an extensive
discussion on human rights following the publication of an Amnesty
International report critical of government human rights practices.
While nearly all media reports concurred with the Government's
dismissive response to the Amnesty International report, one editorial
that circulated widely called on regional governments to listen to
criticism and review their human rights practices (see Section 4).
Persons whose criticisms align them with an organized political
opposition are subject to arrest and detention until they confess to a
crime or sign a statement promising not to resume such criticisms,
which is tantamount to a confession. Writer Zuheir Kutbi claims that he
has been imprisoned six times for his writings. Due to his
imprisonment, Kutbi has been deprived of employment and his passport,
and lives under government surveillance.
The print media are privately owned but publicly subsidized. A 1982
media policy statement and a 1965 national security law prohibit the
dissemination of criticism of the Government. The media policy
statement urges journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote
Arab interests, and preserve the cultural heritage of the country. The
Ministry of Information appoints, and may remove, the editors in chief.
It also provides guidelines to newspapers on controversial issues. The
Government owns the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), which expresses official
government views.
In November the Government approved a wide-ranging new press law
that would permit the creation of professional journalism societies and
permit the publication of foreign newspapers in the Kingdom. The new
law states that local publications will be subject to censorship only
in emergencies and pledges to protect free expression of opinion;
however, the law obliges authorities to censor foreign publications
that defame Islam and harm the interests of the state or the ``ethics
of the people.'' It is not yet clear whether the implementation of the
new law will change current practices regarding freedom of expression.
Newspapers typically publish news on sensitive subjects, such as
crime or terrorism, only after it has been released by the SPA or when
it has been authorized by a senior government official. Two Saudi-
owned, London-based dailies, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, are
widely distributed and read in the country. Both newspapers tend to
practice self-censorship in order to comply with government
restrictions on sensitive issues. The authorities continue to censor
stories about the country in the foreign press. Censors may remove or
blacken the offending articles, glue pages together, or prevent certain
issues of foreign publications from entering the market. However, the
Ministry of Information continued to relax its blackout policy
regarding politically sensitive news concerning the country reported in
the international media, although press restrictions on reporting of
domestic news remain very stringent. The Government's policy in this
regard appears to be motivated in part by pragmatic considerations:
Saudi access to outside sources of information, such as Arabic and
Western satellite television channels and the Internet, is increasingly
widespread.
In February Information Minister Fuad Al-Farsi imposed a ban of 1
week on the daily sports newspaper Ar-Reyadi because of a column by a
popular sports journalist, Prince Abdulrahman bin Saud, that attacked
another sports journalist. The ban was lifted after 2 days.
The editors of two Yemeni newspapers, Al-Wahdawi and Al-Ihya Al-
Arabi, claimed that actions taken against the newspapers by the Yemeni
Ministry of Information, including filing a lawsuit, detaining a
journalist, and suspending publication of one of the newspapers, were a
direct result of pressure applied by the Saudi Government after the
newspapers had published articles critical of Saudi Arabia.
In December a newspaper reported that while one of its reporters
was investigating a story about the illegal slaughtering of animals by
a restaurant, local police arrested, fingerprinted, interrogated, and
then released the reporter. In a front-page commentary, the newspaper
stated that local police were protecting the restaurant's owners.
The Government tightly restricts the entry of foreign journalists
into the Kingdom.
The Government owns and operates the country's television and radio
companies. Government censors remove any reference to politics,
religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex from foreign
programs and songs. There are well over 1 million satellite receiving
dishes in the country, which provide citizens with foreign broadcasts.
The legal status of these devices is ambiguous. The Government ordered
a halt to their importation in 1992 at the request of religious leaders
who objected to foreign programming being made available on satellite
channels. In 1994 the Government banned the sale, installation, and
maintenance of dishes and supporting devices; however, the number of
dishes continues to increase, and residents legally may subscribe to
satellite decoding services that require a dish.
In December the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars ruled that
watching the popular Ramadan television series ``Tash Ma Tash'' was
contrary to proper Islamic conduct. The program, which was broadcast on
a government channel, mildly parodied bureaucratic delays and social
problems. The Government did not publicize the Council's ruling nor did
it stop airing the program.
The Government bans all books, magazines, and other materials that
it considers sexual or pornographic in nature. The Ministry of
Information compiles and updates a list of publications that are
prohibited from being sold in the country.
Access to the Internet is available legally only through Saudi
servers, which are monitored heavily by the Government. Some citizens
attempt to circumvent this control by accessing the Internet through
servers in other countries. The Government attempts to block all web
sites that it deems sexual, pornographic, politically offensive, or
``unIslamic.'' However, such web sites are accessible from within the
country. According to Human Rights Watch, in April the Government
closed a women-only Internet cafe in Mecca after a court complaint that
the cafe was being used for ``immoral purposes.''
The Government censors all forms of public artistic expression and
prohibits cinemas and public musical or theatrical performances, except
those that are considered folkloric.
Academic freedom is restricted. The authorities prohibit the study
of evolution, Freud, Marx, Western music, and Western philosophy. Some
professors believe that informers monitor their classroom comments and
report to government and religious authorities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
strictly limits freedom of assembly. It prohibits public demonstrations
as a means of political expression. Public meetings are segregated by
sex. Unless meetings are sponsored by diplomatic missions or approved
by the appropriate governor, foreign residents who seek to hold
unsegregated meetings risk arrest and deportation. The authorities
monitor any large gathering of persons, especially of women. The
Mutawwa'in dispersed groups of women found in public places, such as
restaurants. Government policy permits women to attend cultural and
social events at diplomatic chanceries and residences only if they are
accompanied by a father, brother, or husband. However, in practice
police often implement the policy in an arbitrary manner. On many
occasions during the year, authorities actively prohibited women from
entering diplomatic chanceries or residences to attend cultural events
and lectures. However, for several years authorities have allowed
unescorted Saudi women to attend women-only cultural events hosted at a
diplomatic mission.
In October citizens took part in a number of illegal demonstrations
protesting the Israeli Government's actions against Palestinians in
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. According to media
accounts, the authorities did not interfere with two demonstrations
conducted by women at universities and another outside a mosque;
however, the authorities dispersed several other small, apparently
spontaneous public demonstrations against Israel in Riyadh, AlJawf
province, and elsewhere.
The Government strictly limits freedom of association. It prohibits
the establishment of political parties or any type of opposition group
(see Section 3). By its power to license associations, the Government
ensures that groups conform to public policy. The Government licenses a
large number of humanitarian organizations and tribal and professional
societies, such as the Saudi Chemists Society and the Saudi Pharmacists
Society. The Government claims that such groups operate without
government interference because they are not detrimental to public
security.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion does not exist. Islam
is the official religion and all citizens must be Muslims. The
Government prohibits the public practice of other religions. Private
worship by non-Muslims generally is permitted.
Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy and the Government has declared
the Islamic holy book, the Koran, and the Sunna (tradition) of the
Prophet Muhammad, to be the country's Constitution. The Government
bases its legitimacy on governance according to the precepts of the
rigorously conservative and strict interpretation of the Hanbali school
of the Sunni branch of Islam and discriminates against other branches
of Islam. Neither the Government nor society in general accepts the
concepts of separation of religion and state, and such separation does
not exist.
Islamic practice generally is limited to that of the Wahabi order,
which adheres to the Hanbali school of the Sunni branch of Islam as
interpreted by Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab, an 18th century Arabian
religious reformer. Practices contrary to this interpretation, such as
visits to the tombs of renowned Muslims, are discouraged. The practice
of other schools of Sunni Islam is discouraged, and there is
institutionalized discrimination against adherents of the Shi'a branch
of Islam. The Government supervises almost all mosques in the country
and funds their construction, maintenance, and operations.
The Ministry of Islamic affairs directly supervises, and is a major
source of funds for, the construction and maintenance of almost all
mosques in the country. The Ministry pays the salaries of imams (prayer
leaders) and others who work in the mosques. A governmental committee
is responsible for defining the qualifications of imams. The Mutawwa'in
are government employees, and the president of the Mutawwa'in holds the
rank of cabinet minister. The spreading of Muslim teachings not in
conformance with the officially accepted interpretation of Islam is
prohibited. Writers and other individuals who publicly criticize this
interpretation, including both those who advocate a stricter
interpretation and those who favor a more moderate interpretation than
the Government's, reportedly have been imprisoned and faced other
reprisals.
The Shi'a Muslim minority (roughly 900,000 persons) lives mostly in
the eastern province, in which Shi'a constitute about one-third of the
population. Members of the Shi'a minority are the objects of officially
sanctioned political and economic discrimination. Prior to 1990, the
Government prohibited Shi'a public processions during the Islamic month
of Muharram and restricted other processions and congregations to
designated areas in the major Shi'a cities. Since 1990 the authorities
have permitted the celebration of the Shi'a holiday of Ashura in the
eastern province city of Qatif, provided that the celebrants do not
undertake large, public marches or engage in self-flagellation (a
traditional Shi'a practice). The celebrations are monitored heavily by
the police. No other Ashura celebrations are permitted in the Kingdom,
and many Shi'a travel to Qatif or to Bahrain to participate in Ashura
celebrations.
Early in the year, a Shi'a sheikh was taken into custody, and three
other sheikhs were arrested for unknown reasons near the border with
Jordan. Human Rights Watch reported that at least seven additional
Shi'a religious leaders reportedly remained in detention for violating
restrictions on Shi'a religious practices.
According to Amnesty International, Hashim Al-Sayyid Al-Sada, a
Shi'a cleric suspected of political or religious dissent, was arrested
in his home in April and reportedly has been held incommunicado since
then (see Section 1.d.).
The Government seldom permits private construction of Shi'a
mosques. Shi'a have declined government offers to build statesupported
mosques because the Government would prohibit the incorporation and
display of Shi'a motifs in any such mosques. The Government actively
discourages Shi'a travel to Iran to visit pilgrimage sites, although
Shi'a citizens are permitted to visit holy sites in Iraq.
Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, authorities have detained,
interrogated, and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a
suspected of subversion (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). The Government
reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of Shi'a who were
arrested in the aftermath of the Al-Khobar bombing. Government security
forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest suspicion, hold them in
custody for lengthy periods, and then release them without explanation
(see Section 1.d.).
In April in the city of Najran, in the southwest region bordering
Yemen, rioting by members of the Makarama Ismaili Shi'a eventually led
to an attack by an armed group of Shi'a on a hotel that contained an
office of the regional governor. Security forces responded, leading to
extended gun battles between the two sides. Some press reports
indicated that the rioting followed the arrest of a Makarama Ismaili
Shi'a imam and some of his followers on charges of ``sorcery.'' Various
other reports attributed the unrest to the closure of two Ismaili Shi'a
mosques and the provincial governor's refusal to permit Ismailis to
hold public observances of the Shi'a holiday of Ashura. Still other
reports attributed the unrest to a local crackdown on smuggling and
resultant tribal discontent. Officials at the highest level of the
Government stated that the unrest in Najran was not the result of
Shi'a-Sunni tension or religious discrimination. After the unrest ended
the Government stated that 5 members of the security forces were
killed, and Ismaili leaders claimed that as many as 40 Ismaili
tribesmen were killed. There was no independent confirmation of these
claims.
Magic is widely believed in and sometimes practiced, often in the
form of fortune-telling and swindles. However, under Shari'a the
practice of magic is regarded as the worst form of polytheism, an
offense for which no repentance is accepted, and which is punishable by
death. There are an unknown number of detainees held in prison on the
charge of ``sorcery,'' or the practice of ``black magic'' or
``witchcraft.'' In a few cases, self-proclaimed ``miracle workers''
have been executed for sorcery involving physical harm or apostasy. In
1999 the Al-Bilad newspaper reported that the Interior Ministry ordered
the execution of a Sudanese man convicted of practicing magic in Jeddah
for 3+ years. The man claimed to be an herbal medicine expert and had
treated a number of women with tonics and potions; he reportedly
possessed 16 spell books and related paraphernalia. The man reportedly
confessed to conspiring with Jinns (beings made of fire that coexist
with humans) in ``efforts to separate wives from their husbands.''
During the year, foreign imams were barred from leading worship
during the most heavily attended prayer times and prohibited from
delivering sermons during Friday congregational prayers. The Government
claims that its actions were part of its ``Saudiization'' plan to
replace foreign workers with citizens.
Under Shari'a conversion by a Muslim to another religion is
considered apostasy. Public apostasy is a crime punishable by death if
the accused does not recant.
The Government prohibits public non-Muslim religious activities.
Non-Muslim worshippers risk arrest, lashing, and deportation for
engaging in overt religious activity that attracts official attention.
During the year, senior officials in the Government publicly
reaffirmed the right of non-Muslims to engage in private religious
worship. In an address to the 56th session of the U.N. Committee on
Human Rights in April, Prince Turki bin Muhammad bin Saud Al-Kabir,
Director of the International Organizations Department of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, stated that ``non-Muslims enjoy full freedom to
engage in their religious observances in private'' (see Section 4). The
media widely disseminated Prince Turki's speech and the media
increasingly acknowledges the right to private non-Muslim worship. Such
private non-Muslim worship occurs on a wide scale throughout the
country, including on the premises of several foreign embassies.
Other high-level officials have confirmed that the Government does
not sanction investigation or harassment of such private worship
services. These officials ascribe any residual harassment of private
worship services or seizure of personal religious materials such as
Bibles or icons to individuals and organizations acting on their own
authority and in contradiction of government policy. Representatives of
Christian denominations present in the country report that the
Government is not interfering with private worship services as long as
those services remain discreet.
However, in January the Government arrested 16 Filipino Christians
during a raid on a prayer service. Government officials maintained that
the religious service was attended by such a large number of persons
that it could not be considered private. After 6 weeks of detention,
all of the detainees were released and deported to the Philippines. On
November 30, religious police broke up a worship service of about 60
Christians. Police seized Bibles, musical instruments, and documents
relating to other Christian activities. Police detained five of the
worshipers for questioning, then released them after they signed a
confession. None of the worshipers was arrested. In June the Government
arrested an Indian Christian for possession of a videotape of a
religious event. He was released in August after spending 2 months in
jail and then deported to India (see Section 1.d.). On December 8 in
Riyadh, the authorities raided a gathering of 12 Filipino Christians
after a worship service. The authorities arrested six of the
individuals; two were released the same day, one subsequently was
released, and three remained in custody at year's end.
Proselytizing by non-Muslims is illegal, although there were no
reports during the year of arrests for proselytizing. Persons wearing
religious symbols of any kind in public risk confrontation with the
Mutawwa'in. This general prohibition against religious symbols also
applies to Muslims. A Christian wearing a crucifix or a Muslim wearing
a Koranic necklace in public would be admonished. In certain areas,
both the Mutawwa'in and vigilantes acting on their own harassed,
assaulted, battered, arrested, and detained citizens and foreigners
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.).
Customs officials routinely open mail and shipments to search for
contraband, including material that is deemed pornographic, and non-
Muslim religious material. Customs officials confiscated or censored
materials considered offensive, including Bibles and religious
videotapes.
Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools at all
levels. All children receive religious instruction, which generally is
limited to that of the Hanbali school of Islam.
In accordance with Shari'a, Saudi women are prohibited from
marrying non-Muslims, but Saudi men may marry Christians and Jews, as
well as Muslims.
The Government requires noncitizens to carry Iqamas, or legal
resident identity cards, which contain a religious designation for
``Muslim'' or ``non-Muslim.''
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts the travel of
Saudi women, who must obtain written permission from their closest male
relative before the authorities allow them to board domestic public
transportation or to travel abroad (see Section 5). In 1999 the
Ministry of Interior announced that preparations were underway to issue
identity cards to women, which would have been a step toward allowing
women to establish independent legal identities from men and to secure
greater rights in many areas, including travel. However, the Ministry
announced in August that the current identification document system for
women would be maintained for another 3 years and thus identity cards
would not be issued. Men may travel anywhere within the country or
abroad.
Foreigners typically are allowed to reside or work in the country
only under the sponsorship of a citizen or domestic business. The
Government requires foreign residents to carry identification cards. It
does not permit foreigners to travel outside the city of their
employment or change their workplace without their sponsor's
permission. Foreign residents who travel within the country may be
asked by the authorities to show that they possess letters of
permission from their employer or sponsor.
Sponsors generally retain possession of foreign workers' passports.
Foreign workers must obtain permission from their sponsors to travel
abroad. If sponsors are involved in a commercial or labor dispute with
foreign employees, they may ask the authorities to prohibit the
employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved.
Some sponsors use this as a pressure tactic to resolve disputes in
their favor or to have foreign employees deported. There were numerous
reports of the Government prohibiting foreign employees involved in
labor disputes from departing the country until the dispute was
resolved (see Section 5).
The Government seizes the passports of all potential suspects and
witnesses in criminal cases and suspends the issuance of exit visas to
them until the case is tried or otherwise concluded. As a result, some
foreign nationals are forced to remain in the country for lengthy
periods against their will. The authorities sometimes confiscate the
passports of suspected oppositionists and their families. The
Government actively discourages Shi'a from traveling to Iran to visit
pilgrimage sites. The Government still punishes Shi'a who travel to
Iran without permission from the Ministry of the Interior, or those
suspected of such travel, by confiscating passports for up to 2 years
(see Section 5).
Citizens may emigrate, but the law prohibits dual citizenship.
Apart from marriage to a Saudi national, there are no provisions for
foreign residents to acquire citizenship. However, foreigners are
granted citizenship in rare cases, generally through the advocacy of an
influential patron.
The 1992 Basic Law provides that ``the state will grant political
asylum if the public interest mitigates'' in favor of it. The language
does not specify clear rules for adjudicating asylum cases. In general
the authorities regard refugees and displaced persons like other
foreign workers: They must have sponsors for employment or risk
expulsion. Of the 33,000 Iraqi civilians and former prisoners of war
given refuge in the country at the end of the Gulf War, none has been
granted permanent asylum; however, the Government has underwritten the
entire cost of providing safe haven to the Iraqi refugees and continues
to provide excellent logistical and administrative support to the UNHCR
and other resettlement agencies.
Approximately 27,000 of the original 33,000 Iraqi refugees had been
resettled in other countries or voluntarily repatriated to Iraq at
year's end. Most of the approximately 5,400 remaining refugees, as well
as 160 Afghan refugees, are restricted to the Rafha refugee camp. The
UNHCR has monitored over 3,000 persons voluntarily returning to Iraq
from Rafha since December 1991 and found no evidence of forcible
repatriation (see Section 1.c.).
The Government has allowed some foreigners to remain temporarily in
the country in cases where their safety would be jeopardized if they
were deported to their home countries.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. There
are no formal democratic institutions, and only a few citizens have a
voice in the choice of leaders or in changing the political system. The
King rules on civil and religious matters within certain limitations
established by religious law, tradition, and the need to maintain
consensus among the ruling family and religious leaders.
The King is also the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince serves as
Deputy Prime Minister. The King appoints all other ministers, who in
turn appoint subordinate officials with cabinet concurrence. In 1992
the King appointed 60 members to a Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-
Shura. This strictly advisory body began to hold sessions in 1993. In
1997 the King expanded the council to 90 members. There are two Shi'a
on the Council. The Council engages in debates that, while closed to
the general public, provide advice and views occasionally contrary to
the Government's proposed policy or recommended course of action. The
Government usually incorporates the Majlis' advice into its final
policy announcements or tries to convince it that the Government's
policy is correct.
The Council of Senior Islamic Scholars is another advisory body to
the King and the Cabinet. It reviews the Government's public policies
for compliance with Shari'a. The Government views the Council as an
important source of religious legitimacy and takes the Council's
opinions into account when promulgating legislation.
In June the press reported on the first meeting of a newly
established ``Royal Family Council,'' which is composed of the Crown
Prince and representatives of major branches of the extended royal
family. The Council's stated purpose is to consider ``major decisions
regarding the family.'' Its role in government, if any, is not clear.
Communication between citizens and the Government usually is
expressed through client-patron relationships and by affinity groups
such as tribes, families, and professional hierarchies. In theory, any
male citizen or foreign national may express an opinion or air a
grievance at a majlis, an open-door meeting held by the King, a prince,
or an important national or local official. However, as governmental
functions have become more complex, time-consuming, and centralized,
public access to senior officials has become more restricted. Since the
assassination of King Faisal in 1975, Saudi kings have reduced the
frequency of their personal contacts with the public. Ministers and
district governors more readily grant audiences at a majlis.
Typical topics raised in a majlis are complaints about bureaucratic
delay or insensitivity, requests for personal redress or assistance,
and criticism of particular acts of government affecting family
welfare. Broader ``political'' concerns--social, economic, or foreign
policy--rarely are raised. Complaints about royal abuses of power are
not entertained. In general journalists, academics, and businessmen
believe that institutionalized avenues of domestic criticism of the
regime are closed. Feedback is filtered through private personal
channels and has affected various policy issues, including the Middle
East peace process, unemployment of young Saudi men, and the
construction of new infrastructure.
The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), an
opposition group, was established in 1993. The Government acted almost
immediately to repress it. In 1994 one of its founding members,
Mohammed Al-Masari, fled to the United Kingdom, where he sought
political asylum and established an overseas branch of the CDLR. In
1996 internal divisions within the CDLR led to the creation of the
rival Islamic Reform Movement (IRM), headed by Sa'ad Al-Faqih. Al-
Masari expressed the CDLR's ``understanding'' of two fatal terrorist
bombings of U.S. military facilities in 1995 and 1996 and sympathy for
the perpetrators. The IRM implicitly condoned the two terrorist attacks
as well, arguing that they were a natural outgrowth of a political
system that does not tolerate peaceful dissent. Both groups continue to
criticize the Government, using computers and facsimile transmissions
to send newsletters back to Saudi Arabia.
Women play no formal role in government and politics and are
actively discouraged from doing so. Participation by women in a majlis
is restricted, although some women seek redress through female members
of the royal family.
Two of the 90 members of the Majlis Ash-Shura are Shi'a.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no publicly active human rights groups, and the
Government has made it clear that none critical of government policies
would be permitted. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
reported that they have received no responses to their requests for
access to the country. However, the press carried an extensive
discussion on human rights following the publication in March of an
Amnesty International report critical of the Government's human rights
practices. While nearly all media reports concurred with the
Government's dismissive response to the report, one editorial that
circulated widely called on regional governments to listen to human
rights criticism and review their human rights practices (see Section
2.a.).
The Government generally does not permit visits by international
human rights groups or independent monitors. The Government disagrees
with internationally accepted definitions of human rights and views its
interpretation of Islamic law as the only necessary guide to protect
human rights. The Government generally ignores or criticizes as attacks
on Islam citations by international monitors or foreign governments of
government human rights abuses.
However, during the year the Government initiated limited measures
to participate in international human rights mechanisms, such as
inviting the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers to visit the country and acceding to the U.N. Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, with
reservations regarding aspects of the convention that it considers
contrary to Shari'a law (see Section 5). In an address to the 56th
session of the committee in April, Prince Turki bin Muhammad bin Saud
Al-Kabir, Director of the International Organizations Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the Government welcomed the
role of international human rights mechanisms. The media widely
disseminated Prince Turki's speech.
Although the Government has established a committee to investigate
allegations of torture in the country pursuant to its obligations under
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, it has refused to recognize the authority of
the Committee Against Torture to investigate alleged abuses (see
Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
There is legal and systemic discrimination based on sex and
religion. The law forbids discrimination based on race, but not
nationality. The Government and private organizations cooperate in
providing services for the disabled. The Shi'a religious minority
suffers social, legal, and sectarian discrimination.
Women.--The Government does not keep statistics on spousal abuse or
other forms of violence against women. However, based on the
information available regarding physical spousal abuse and violence
against women, such violence and abuse appear to be common problems.
Hospital workers report that many women are admitted for treatment of
injuries that apparently result from spousal violence. Some foreign
women have suffered physical abuse from their Saudi husbands. A Saudi
man may prevent his wife and any child or unmarried adult daughter from
obtaining an exit visa to depart the country (see Section 2.d.).
Foreign embassies continued to receive many reports that employers
abuse foreign women working as domestic servants. Some embassies of
countries with large domestic servant populations maintain safehouses
to which their citizens may flee to escape work situations that include
forced confinement, withholding of food, beating and other physical
abuse, and rape. Often the reported abuse is at the hands of female
citizens. In general the Government considers such cases family matters
and does not intervene unless charges of abuse are brought to its
attention. It is almost impossible for foreign women to obtain redress
in the courts, due to the courts' strict evidentiary rules and the
women's own fears of reprisals. Few employers have been punished for
such abuses. There are no private support groups or religious
associations to assist such women.
By religious law and social custom, women have the right to own
property and are entitled to financial support from their husbands or
male relatives. However, women have few political or social rights and
are not treated as equal members of society. There are no active
women's rights groups. Women legally may not drive motor vehicles and
are restricted in their use of public facilities when men are present.
Women must enter city buses by separate rear entrances and sit in
specially designated sections. Women risk arrest by the Mutawwa'in for
riding in a vehicle driven by a male who is not an employee or a close
male relative. Women are not admitted to a hospital for medical
treatment without the consent of a male relative. By law and custom,
women may not undertake domestic or foreign travel alone (see Section
2.d.). In 1999 the Ministry of Interior announced that preparations
were underway to issue identity cards to women, which would have been a
step toward allowing women to establish independent legal identities
from men. However, the Ministry announced in August that the current
identification document system for women would be maintained for
another 3 years, and that identity cards therefore would not be issued.
In public a woman is expected to wear an abaya (a black garment
that covers the entire body) and to cover her head and face. The
Mutawwa'in generally expect women from Arab countries, Asia, and Africa
to comply more fully with Saudi customs of dress than they do Western
women; nonetheless, in recent years they have instructed Western women
to wear the abaya and cover their hair as well. During the year,
Mutawwa'in continued to admonish and harass women to wear their abayas
and cover their hair.
Some government officials and ministries still bar accredited
female diplomats in the country from official meetings.
Women also are subject to discrimination under Shari'a as
interpreted in Saudi Arabia, which stipulates that daughters receive
half the inheritance awarded to their brothers. In a Shari'a court, the
testimony of one man equals that of two women (see Section 1.e.).
Although Islamic law permits polygyny, with up to four wives, it is
becoming less common due to demographic and economic changes. Islamic
law enjoins a man to treat each wife equally. In practice such equality
is left to the discretion of the husband. Some women participate in Al-
Mesyar (or ``short daytime visit'') marriages, in which the women
relinquish their legal rights to financial support and nighttime
cohabitation. Additionally, the husband is not required to inform his
other wives of the marriage, and any children resulting from such a
marriage have no inheritance rights. The Government places greater
restrictions on women than on men regarding marriage to non-Saudis and
non-Muslims (see Section 1.f.). While Shari'a provides women with a
basis to own and dispose of property independently, women often are
constrained from asserting such rights because of various legal and
societal barriers, especially regarding employment and freedom of
movement.
Women must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but
men may divorce without giving cause. In doing so, men are required to
pay immediately an amount of money agreed upon at the time of the
marriage, which serves as a one-time alimony payment. Women who
demonstrate legal grounds for divorce still are entitled to this
alimony. If divorced or widowed, a Muslim woman normally may keep her
children until they attain a specified age: 7 years for boys, 9 years
for girls. Children over these ages are awarded to the divorced husband
or the deceased husband's family. Numerous divorced foreign women
continued to be prevented by their former husbands from visiting their
children after divorce.
Women have access to free but segregated education through the
university level. They constitute over 58 percent of all university
students but are excluded from studying such subjects as engineering,
journalism, and architecture. Men may study overseas; women may do so
only if accompanied by a spouse or an immediate male relative.
Women make up approximately 5 percent of the formal work force and
own about 4 percent of the businesses, although they must deputize a
male relative to represent the business. Most employment opportunities
for women are in education and health care, with lesser opportunity in
business, philanthropy, banking, retail sales, and the media. Despite
limited educational opportunities in many professional fields, some
female citizens are able to study abroad and return to work in
professions such as architecture and journalism. Many foreign women
work as domestic servants and nurses. In 1997 the Government authorized
women to work in a limited capacity in the hotel industry. Women who
wish to enter nontraditional fields are subject to discrimination.
Women may not accept jobs in rural areas if there are no adult male
relatives present with whom they may reside and who agree to take
responsibility for them. Most workplaces in which women are present are
segregated by sex. Frequently, contact with male supervisors or clients
is allowed only by telephone or fax machine. In 1995 the Ministry of
Commerce announced that women no longer would be issued business
licenses for work in fields that might require them to supervise
foreign workers, interact with male clients, or deal on a regular basis
with government officials. However, in hospital settings and in the oil
industry, women and men work together, and, in some instances, women
supervise male employees.
In September Crown Prince Abdullah signed the U.N. Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, with
reservations regarding aspects of the Convention that the Government
considers contrary to Shari'a law.
Children.--The Government provides all children with free education
and medical care. Children are not subject to the strict social
segregation faced by women, although they are segregated by sex in
schools, beginning at the age of 7. In more general social situations,
boys are segregated at the age of 12 and girls at the onset of puberty.
It is difficult to gauge the prevalence of child abuse, since the
Government currently keeps no national statistics on such cases. One
major hospital has begun a program to detect, report, and prevent child
abuse. In general Saudi culture greatly prizes children, and initial
studies show that severe abuse and neglect of children appear to be
rare.
Trafficking in children for forced begging persists (see Sections
6.c., and 6.f.).
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is practiced among some foreign workers from East
Africa and the Nile Valley. It is not always clear whether the
procedure occurred in Saudi Arabia or the workers' home countries.
There is no law specifically prohibiting FGM.
People with Disabilities.--The provision of government social
services increasingly has brought the disabled into the public
mainstream. In October Riyadh governor Prince Salman Bin Abd Al-Aziz
announced that the Government was implementing new regulations designed
to integrate disabled persons into the mainstream of society; the
regulations had not been implemented by year's end. The media carry
features lauding the accomplishments of disabled persons and sharply
criticizing parents who neglect disabled children. The Government and
private charitable organizations cooperate in education, employment,
and other services for the disabled. The law provides hiring quotas for
the disabled. There is no legislation that mandates public
accessibility; however, newer commercial buildings often include such
access.
Foreign criminal rings reportedly bought and imported disabled
children for the purpose of forced begging (see Sections 5, 6.c. and
6.f.).
Police generally transport mentally ill persons found wandering
alone in public to their families or a hospital. However, there were
reports that police pick up mentally ill persons for minor violations,
detain them for a few weeks, and then release them, only to detain them
again later for similar violations. Police officials recognize the
problem but claim that according to Islam, family members should be
taking care of such individuals.
Religious Minorities.--Shi'a citizens are discriminated against in
government and employment, especially in national security jobs.
Several years ago the Government subjected Shi'a to employment
restrictions in the oil industry and has not relaxed them. Since the
1979 Iranian revolution, some Shi'a who are suspected of subversion
have been subjected periodically to surveillance and limitations on
travel abroad. Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of
a U.S. military installation, authorities have detained, interrogated,
and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a Muslims, including
Shi'a returning to the country following their travel to Iran (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
In April in the city of Najran, riots took place that led to
members of the Makarama Ismaili Shi'a community engaging in gun battles
with security forces that reportedly resulted in a number of deaths.
Conflicting unconfirmed reports attributed the unrest to religious
differences, smuggling, or land seizures (see Section 2.c.).
Under Saudi law, children of Saudi fathers are considered Muslim,
regardless of the country or the religious tradition in which they may
have been raised. In some cases, children raised in other countries and
in other religious traditions later taken by their Saudi fathers to
Saudi Arabia reportedly were coerced to conform to their fathers'
interpretation of Islamic norms and practices.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination
is illegal, there is substantial societal prejudice based on ethnic or
national origin. Foreign workers from Africa and Asia are subject to
various forms of formal and informal discrimination and have the most
difficulty in obtaining justice for their grievances. For example, pay
scales for identical or similar labor or professional services are set
by nationality such that two similarly qualified and experienced
foreign nationals performing the same employment duties receive varied
compensation based on their nationalities (see Section 6.b.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Government decrees prohibit the
establishment of labor unions, and strikes are prohibited; however,
several work stoppages were staged in Jeddah during the year by foreign
hospital, food processing, and construction workers who had not been
paid.
In 1995 Saudi Arabia was suspended from the U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
rights standards.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is forbidden. Foreign workers comprise about two-thirds of
the work force. There is no minimum wage; wages are set by employers
and vary according to the type of work performed and the nationality of
the worker (see Section 5).
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
prohibits forced or compulsory labor pursuant to a 1962 royal decree
that abolished slavery. Ratification of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, which prohibit forced labor,
gives them the force of law. However, employers have significant
control over the movements of foreign employees, which results in
situations that sometimes involve forced labor, especially in remote
areas where workers are unable to leave their place of work.
Some sponsors prevented foreign workers from obtaining exit visas
to pressure them to sign a new work contract or to drop claims against
their employers for unpaid salaries (see Section 2.d.). Some sponsors
also pressure foreign workers by refusing to provide them with a
``letter of no objection'' that would allow them to be employed by
another sponsor.
The labor laws, including those designed to limit working hours and
regulate working conditions, do not apply to foreign domestic servants,
and such domestic servants may not seek the protection of the labor
courts. There were credible reports that female domestic servants
sometimes were forced to work 12 to 16 hours per day, 7 days per week.
There were numerous confirmed reports of maids fleeing employers and
seeking refuge in their embassies (see Section 5). The authorities
often forced runaway maids to return to their places of employment.
There have been many reports of workers whose employers refused to
pay several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other
promised benefits. Foreign workers with such grievances, except
domestic servants, have the right to complain before the labor courts,
but few do so because of fear of deportation. The labor system is
conducive to the exploitation of foreign workers because enforcement of
work contracts is difficult and generally favors employers. Labor
courts, while generally fair, may take many months to reach a final
appellate ruling, during which time an employer may prevent the foreign
laborer from leaving the country. An employer also may delay a case
until a worker's funds are exhausted and the worker is forced to return
to his home country.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children. Nonetheless, with the rare exception of criminal begging
rings, and the possible exceptions of family businesses, forced or
bonded child labor does not occur (see Section 6.d.). Children, mainly
of South Asian and African origin, frequently are used for the purpose
of organized begging, particularly in the vicinity of the Grand Mosque
in Mecca during Islamic holidays (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 13 years, which may be
waived by the Ministry of Labor with the consent of a juvenile's
guardian. There is no minimum age for workers employed in family-
oriented businesses or in other areas that are construed as extensions
of the household, such as farming, herding, and domestic service. The
law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by children,
but it is not a problem, with the rare exception of forced child
begging rings, and possibly family businesses (see Section 6.c.).
Children under the age of 18 and women may not be employed in
hazardous or harmful industries such as mining or industries that use
power-operated machinery. While there is no formal government entity
responsible for enforcing the minimum age for employment of children,
the Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction and has acted as plaintiff in
the few cases that have arisen against alleged violators. However, in
general children play a minimal role in the work force.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legal minimum wage.
Labor regulations limit the work week to 48 hours, including no more
than 8 hours a day and no more than 5 hours without a break for rest,
prayer, and food. The regulations allow employers to require up to 12
additional hours of overtime per workweek at time-and-a-half pay. Labor
law provides for a 24-hour rest period, normally on Fridays, although
the employer may grant it on another day. The average wage generally
provides a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
The ILO has stated that the Government has not formulated
legislation implementing the ILO Convention on Equal Pay, and that
regulations that segregate work places by sex, or limit vocational
programs for women, violate ILO Convention 111.
Some foreign nationals who have been recruited abroad have
complained that after their arrival in Saudi Arabia they were presented
with work contracts that specified lower wages and fewer benefits than
originally promised. Other foreign workers reportedly have signed
contracts in their home countries and later were pressured to sign less
favorable contracts upon arrival. Some employees report that at the end
of their contract service, their employers refuse to grant permission
to allow them to return home. Foreign employees involved in disputes
with their employers may find their freedom of movement restricted (see
Section 2.d.). A large number of female domestic servants often were
subjected to abuse (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
``Saudiization'' is the Government's attempt to decrease the number
of foreigners working in certain occupations and to replace them with
Saudi workers. To accomplish this goal, the Government has taken
several long-term steps, most notably limiting employment in certain
fields to citizens, prohibiting renewal of existing contracts, and
requiring that 5 percent of the work force in private sector companies
be filled by citizen workers. The Government also requires firms to
increase the proportion of citizen workers by 5 per cent each year.
There is a limited number of persons, both influential and otherwise,
who attempted to circumvent the requirements of the law. For example,
employers have altered job descriptions or hired foreigners for
nominally low-level positions but in fact had them fill positions
reserved for citizens. In Jeddah fruit and vegetable vending jobs at a
large open-air market were Saudiized in late 1999. However, by early in
the year, the newly hired Saudi sellers had hired back many of the
fired foreigners to run the stalls for them at lower wages than they
had earned before the Saudiization occurred. Influential persons
effectively may circumvent the law because the Ministry of Labor is
reportedly unwilling to confront them.
The ongoing campaign to remove illegal immigrants from the country
has done little to Saudiize the economy because illegal immigrants
largely work in low-income positions, which most Saudis consider
unsuitable. In some cases, the campaign may have resulted in enhanced
job security and wage stability for some legally employed immigrants in
low-income positions. The Government is carrying out the campaign by
widely publicizing its enforcement of existing laws against illegal
immigrants and citizens who employ or sponsor illegal immigrants. In
addition to deportation for illegal workers and jail terms and fines
for citizens hiring illegal workers, the Government announced in 1998
that houses rented to illegal aliens would be ordered closed. In 1997
the Government offered an amnesty of several months' duration, which
allowed illegal immigrants and their employers or sponsors to avoid the
possibility of prosecution by voluntarily seeking expeditious
repatriation. As of September 1999, as many as 1.1 million persons
departed the country under terms of the amnesty or were deported for
violating residence and labor laws. During this process, the Government
yielded to domestic pressure and granted grace periods and exemptions
to certain categories of illegal immigrants (such as domestic servants,
drivers, and shepherds), thereby allowing many illegal immigrants to
legalize their status without leaving the country. The Government
announced in April that the grace period would expire in June and that
anyone staying illegally could be subject to imprisonment, a fine, and
questioning regarding who was assisting them. Illegal immigrants
generally are willing to accept lower salaries and fewer benefits than
legally employed immigrants. The departure or legalization of illegal
workers reduced the competition for certain jobs and thereby reduced
the incentive for legal immigrants to accept lower wages and fewer
benefits as a means of competing with illegal immigrants.
Labor regulations require employers to protect most workers from
job-related hazards and disease. Foreign nationals report frequent
failures to enforce health and safety standards. Farmers, herdsmen,
domestic servants, and workers in family-operated businesses are not
covered by these regulations. Workers risk losing employment if they
remove themselves from hazardous work conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits slavery and the
smuggling of persons into the country.
Children, mainly of South Asian and African origin, frequently are
used for the purpose of organized begging, particularly in the vicinity
of the Grand Mosque in Mecca during Islamic holidays. There were
reports that some of these children were smuggled into the country by
organized rings.
There were unconfirmed reports that women were trafficked into the
country to work as prostitutes.
__________
SYRIA
Despite the existence of some institutions of democratic
government, the political system places virtually absolute authority in
the hands of the President. Former President Hafiz Al-Asad died on June
10 after 30 years in power. Immediately following Al-Asad's death, the
Parliament amended the Constitution, reducing the mandatory minimum age
of the President from 40 to 34 years old, which allowed his son, Bashar
Al-Asad to be legally eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba'th
party. On July 10, Bashar was elected by referendum in which he ran
unopposed, and received 97.29 percent of the vote. Key decisions
regarding foreign policy, national security, internal politics, and the
economy are made by the President, with counsel from his ministers,
high-ranking members of the ruling Ba'th Party, and a relatively small
circle of security advisers. Although the Parliament is elected every 4
years, the Ba'th Party is ensured a majority. The Parliament cannot
initiate laws, but only assesses and sometimes modifies those proposed
by the executive branch. The Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary, but this is not the case in the exceptional (state of
emergency) security courts, which are subject to political influence.
The regular courts display independence, although political connections
and bribery can influence verdicts. In general all three branches of
government are influenced to varying degrees by leaders of the Ba'th
Party, whose primacy in state institutions is mandated by the
Constitution.
The powerful role of the security services in government, which
extends beyond strictly security matters, stems in part from the state
of emergency that has been in place almost continuously since 1963. The
Government justifies martial law because of the state of war with
Israel and past threats from terrorist groups. Syrian Military
Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence are military agencies, while
General Security, State Security, and Political Security come under the
purview of the Ministry of Interior. The branches of the security
services operate independently of each other and outside the legal
system. Their members commit serious human rights abuses.
The economy is based on commerce, agriculture, oil production, and
government services. There is a generally inefficient public sector, a
private sector, and a mixed public/private sector. The still-dominant
state role in the economy, a complex bureaucracy, overarching security
concerns, endemic corruption, currency restrictions, a lack of modern
financial services and communications, and a weak legal system hamper
economic growth. The Government has sought to promote the private
sector through investment incentives, exchange rate consolidation, and
deregulation, especially with regard to financial transactions
governing imports and exports. However, in recent years, diminished
foreign aid, drought, fluctuating prices for oil and agricultural
commodities, and regional recession have hurt the economy. Uncertainty
about the Middle East peace process and sporadic tension over Iraq has
diminished investor confidence in the region. Consequently, Syria
posted negative gross domestic product (GDP) rates of 4.4 percent in
1997, 1.2 percent in 1998, and an estimated 2 percent in 1999. A high
population growth rate of 3.3 percent continues to erode whatever
economic gains are made. It is estimated that real per capita GDP again
decreased in 1999. However, the Government has been very successful in
controlling the money supply, with inflation remaining in the 2 percent
range in 1998. Despite a 25 percent wage increase for public and
private sector employees and a 20 percent increase for pensions, wage
and benefits increases generally have not kept pace with cost of living
increases. The gap between the rich and poor remained, with many public
sector workers relying on second jobs to make ends meet.
The human rights situation remained poor, and the Government
continues to restrict or deny fundamental rights, although there were
improvements in some areas. The Ba'th Party dominates the political
system, as provided for by the Constitution, and citizens do not have
the right to change their government. The Government uses its vast
powers so effectively that there is no organized political opposition,
and there have been very few antiregime manifestations. Serious abuses
include the widespread use of torture in detention; poor prison
conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without
trial; fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts; an
inefficient judiciary that suffers from corruption and, at times,
political influence; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; denial
of freedom of speech and of the press, despite a slight loosening of
censorship restrictions; denial of freedom of assembly and association;
some limits on freedom of religion; and limits on freedom of movement.
The Government does not officially allow independent domestic human
rights groups to exist; however, there were reports that several
domestic human rights organizations and civil society groups began
meeting regularly during the year. Violence and societal discrimination
against women are problems. The Government discriminates against the
stateless Kurdish minority, suppresses worker rights, and child labor
occurs. In November the Government declared an amnesty for 600
political prisoners and detainees and a general pardon for some
nonpolitical prisoners and closed the Mazzah prison, which reportedly
held numerous political prisoners and detainees. In December the
Government transferred 54 Lebanese prisoners from Syrian to Lebanese
custody.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings during the year.
In November security forces killed 4 Bedouins during the
Government's intervention in armed clashes between Bedouin shepherds
and Druze residents of Suwayda Province (see Sections 1.c. and 5). In
October 1999, government forces moved against a residential compound
and boat dock owned by President Asad's brother, Rif'at Al-Asad. A
number of Rif'at's supporters, including military guards, were
sequestered in the compound, and the clash resulted in an unconfirmed
number of deaths, including government forces. The Government
reportedly claimed that the clash was the consequence of enforcing
``legal measures' that were taken against Rif'at and his supporters
because of ``violations of civil and military laws.''
There were reports in 1999 of corporal punishment of army recruits
that led to injury or death (see Section 1.c.).
In 1998 3 policemen were convicted in 1998 and sentenced to 10
years of hard labor by the Aleppo criminal court for the torture and
killing of a 50-year-old man accused of heroin dealing, marking the
first time since 1994 that members of the security forces were held
accountable for their actions.
There were no reports of deaths in detention; however, such deaths
have occurred in the past. Previous deaths in detention have not been
investigated by the Government, and the number and identities of
prisoners who died in prisons since the 1980's remain unknown.
In 1998 Lebanon's military prosecutor charged 18 members of the
Lebanese Forces, an outlawed rightwing Christian militia, with carrying
out the December 1996 bombing of a bus in Damascus. Eleven of the 18
persons charged were in custody. There were no further developments in
the case during the year.
b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
motivated disappearances. Despite inquiries by international human
rights organizations and foreign governments, the Government offered
little new information on the welfare and whereabouts of persons who
have been held incommunicado for years or about whom no more is known
other than the approximate date of their detention, including
Palestinians and Jordanian and Lebanese citizens who reportedly were
abducted from Lebanon during and after Lebanon's civil war (see Section
1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Despite the existence of constitutional provisions and
several Penal Code penalties for abusers, there was credible evidence
that security forces continued to use torture. Former prisoners and
detainees report that torture methods include administering electrical
shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects into the rectum;
beating, sometimes while the victim is suspended from the ceiling;
hyperextending the spine; and using a chair that bends backwards to
asphyxiate the victim or fracture the victim's spine. Although torture
may occur in prisons, torture is most likely to occur while detainees
are being held at one of the many detention centers run by the various
security services throughout the country, and particularly while the
authorities are trying to extract a confession or information about an
alleged crime or alleged accomplices.
The Government has denied the use of torture and claims that it
would prosecute anyone believed guilty of using excessive force or
physical abuse. Past victims of torture have identified the officials
who beat them, up to the level of brigadier general. If allegations of
excessive force or physical abuse are to be made in court, the
plaintiff is required to initiate his own civil suit against the
alleged abuser.
Courts do not order medical examinations for defendants who claim
that they were tortured (see Section 1.e). There were reports in 1999
of the corporal punishment of army recruits that led to injury or death
(see Section 1.a.).
There were credible reports of torture during the year, including
one prisoner who alleged he had been tortured while held in solitary
confinement for 3 months. The Government reportedly tortured some of
the Islamist prisoners who were detained during the large-scale arrests
in late 1999 and early 2000 (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
In October police used teargas and batons to disperse several large
demonstrations directed against diplomatic missions and international
agencies in reaction to the Israeli Government's use of force against
Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza; an indeterminate
number of demonstrators and police personnel were injured (see Section
2.b.).
In November 200 persons were injured during clashes in Suwayda
province involving Druze residents, Bedouin shepherds, and security
forces (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
Prison conditions vary but generally are poor and do not meet
minimum international standards for health and sanitation. Facilities
for political or national security prisoners generally are worse than
those for common criminals. The prison in Palmyra, where many political
and national security prisoners have been kept, is widely considered to
have the worst conditions. At some prisons, authorities allow
visitation, but in other prisons, security officials demand bribes from
family members who wish to visit incarcerated relatives. Overcrowding
and the denial of sufficient nourishment occurs at several prisons.
According to Human Rights Watch, prisoners and detainees are held
without adequate medical care, and some prisoners with significant
health problems reportedly are denied medical treatment. Some former
detainees have reported that the Government prohibits reading
materials, even the Koran, for political prisoners.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison or
detention center conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Emergency Law, which authorizes the
Government to conduct preventive arrests, overrides Penal Code
provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, including the need
to obtain warrants. Officials contend that the Emergency Law is applied
only in narrowly defined cases. Nonetheless, in cases involving
political or national security offenses, arrests generally are carried
out in secret, and suspects may be detained incommunicado for prolonged
periods without charge or trial and are denied the right to a judicial
determination for the pretrial detention. Some of these practices are
prohibited by the state of emergency, but the authorities are not held
to these strictures.
The Government has been known to detain relatives of detainees or
of fugitives in order to obtain confessions or the fugitive's surrender
(see Section 1.f.).
Defendants in civil and criminal trials have the right to bail
hearings and the possible release from detention on their own
recognizance. There is no bail option for those accused of national
security offenses. Unlike defendants in regular criminal and civil
cases, security detainees do not have access to lawyers prior to or
during questioning.
Detainees have no legal redress for false arrest. Security forces
often do not provide detainees' families with information on their
welfare or location while in detention. Consequently, many persons who
have disappeared in past years are believed to be in long-term
detention without charge or possibly to have died in detention. It
appears that the number of new disappearances has declined in recent
years, although this circumstance may be due to the Government's
success in deterring opposition political activity rather than a
loosening of the criteria for detention. Many detainees brought to
trial have been held incommunicado for years, and their trials often
have been unfair (see Section 1.e.). There were reliable reports that
the Government did not notify foreign governments when their citizens
were arrested or detained.
Pretrial detention may be lengthy, even in cases not involving
political or national security offenses. The criminal justice system is
backlogged. Many criminal suspects are held in pretrial detention for
months and may have their trials extended for additional months.
Lengthy pretrial detention and drawn-out court proceedings are caused
by a shortage of available courts and the absence of legal provisions
for a speedy trial or plea bargaining (see also Section 1.e.).
It is not known whether any Turkomen from among hundreds detained
in 1996 remain in detention.
There were reports of large-scale arrests of Syrian and Palestinian
Islamists between late December 1999 and February. Hundreds of persons
allegedly were arrested in the cities of Damascus, Hama, Aleppo, and
Homs. Most of those arrested reportedly were released after signing an
agreement not to participate in political activities; however, some may
remain in detention.
There were reliable reports that security forces arrested several
minors on unspecified political charges during the year. The minors
reportedly were held in adult facilities for 6 months, had no access to
legal counsel, and were not allowed visits from family members.
There were unconfirmed reports that a large number of Jordanian
prisoners were released between May and July. However, according to
Amnesty International (AI), only three of the released Jordanians had
been held for political reasons.
In May there were media reports that Communist Action Party leaders
Aslan 'Abd Al-Karim and Fateh Jamous and oppositionist Randa Ayoubi
were released from prison; they reportedly were not required to agree
to abstain from participating in political activities. In August Sheikh
Hashim Minqara, a leader of the Islamic Tawheed Movement who was
arrested in Lebanon in 1985 reportedly was released.
In November the Government declared an amnesty for 600 political
prisoners and detainees and a general pardon for some nonpolitical
prisoners, including some who were held under the Economic Penal Code.
The amnesty was covered in the media and reportedly was the first time
that the Government acknowledged that it held persons for political
reasons. There are credible reports that the 600 detainees, including
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Salvation Party, the
Communist Action Party, and some Kurds, are being released
incrementally. The Government also closed the Mazzah prison in
November, which reportedly held numerous political prisoners and
detainees.
In December the Government transferred 54 Lebanese political
prisoners and detainees from Syrian to Lebanese custody (see Section
1.e.).
A prisoner amnesty that was announced in July 1999 is believed to
have benefited some political prisoners and detainees. While the total
number of those released is unknown, AI identified six prisoners held
for political reasons who were released. Unconfirmed reports suggest
that as many as 600 prisoners may have been released. According to AI,
hundreds of persons held for political reasons also were released in
1998. Prior to the 1998-2000 releases, the last significant release of
political detainees took place in late 1995, with approximately 2,200
to 3,000 persons believed to have been released. Some former prisoners
reportedly were required to sign loyalty oaths or admissions of guilt
as a condition of their release. Most of those arrested in a mass
crackdown in 1980 have been released; however, some may remain in
prolonged detention without charge. Some union and professional
association officials detained in 1980 may remain in detention (see
Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). AI reported in 1998 that ``hundreds of
Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested,
some over two decades ago, and remain in prolonged and often secret
detention.''
The number of remaining political detainees is unknown. In June
prior to the November prison amnesty, AI estimated that there were
approximately 1,500 political detainees in the country; many of the
detainees reportedly are suspected supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood
and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th party. There also are Jordanian,
Lebanese, and Palestinian political detainees. According to Amnesty
International, security forces also detain family members of suspected
oppositionists (see Section 1.f.). Estimates of detainees are difficult
to confirm because the Government does not verify publicly the number
of detentions without charge, the release of detainees or amnestied
prisoners, or whether detainees subsequently are sentenced to prison
(see Section 1.e.).
In October 1998, the Jordanian Government requested that the Syrian
Government account for 429 named Jordanian nationals, 239 of whom
Jordan claims have been missing since they entered Syria, and 190 of
whom Jordan claims are imprisoned in Syria. Families of missing
Jordanians allege that there are more than 700 Jordanians in Syrian
detention. According to press reports, government sources stated that
the names provided by Jordan were being examined and that the
Government would respond officially. To date there has been no
published official response.
Former prisoners are subject to a so-called ``rights ban,'' which
begins from the day of sentencing and lasts until 10 years after the
expiration of the sentence. Persons subject to this ban are not allowed
to vote, run for office, or work in the public sector; they often also
are denied passports.
The Government has exiled citizens in the past, although the
practice is prohibited by the Constitution. The Government refuses to
reissue the passports of citizens who fled the country in the 1980's;
such citizens consequently are unable to return to the country.
There were no known instances of forced exile during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, but the two exceptional courts dealing with
alleged security cases are not independent of executive branch control.
The regular court system displays considerable independence in civil
cases, although political connections and bribery sometimes influence
verdicts.
The judicial system is composed of the civil and criminal courts,
military courts, security courts, and religious courts, which
adjudicate matters of personal status such as divorce and inheritance.
The Court of Cassation is the highest court of appeal. The Supreme
Constitutional Court is empowered to rule only on the constitutionality
of laws and decrees; it does not hear appeals.
Civil and criminal courts are organized under the Ministry of
Justice. Defendants before these courts are entitled to the legal
representation of their choice; the courts appoint lawyers for
indigents. Defendants are presumed innocent; they are allowed to
present evidence and to confront their accusers. Trials are public,
except for those involving juveniles or sex offenses. Defendants may
appeal their verdicts to a provincial appeals court and ultimately to
the Court of Cassation. Such appeals are difficult because the courts
do not provide verbatim transcripts of cases--only summaries prepared
by the presiding judges. There are no juries.
Military courts have the authority to try civilians as well as
military personnel. The venue for a civilian defendant is decided by a
military prosecutor. There were continuing reports that the Government
operates military field courts in locations outside established
courtrooms. Such courts reportedly observe fewer of the formal
procedures of regular military courts.
The two security courts are the Supreme State Security Court
(SSSC), which tries political and national security cases, and the
Economic Security Court (ESC), which tries cases involving financial
crimes. Both courts operate under the state of emergency, not ordinary
law, and do not observe constitutional provisions safeguarding
defendants' rights.
Charges against defendants in the SSSC often are vague. Many
defendants appear to be tried for exercising normal political rights,
such as free speech. For example, the Emergency Law authorizes the
prosecution of anyone ``opposing the goals of the revolution,''
``shaking the confidence of the masses in the aims of the revolution,''
or attempting to ``change the economic or social structure of the
State.'' Nonetheless the Government contends that the SSSC tries only
persons who have sought to use violence against the State.
Under SSSC procedures, defendants are not present during the
preliminary or investigative phase of the trial, during which the
prosecutor presents evidence. Trials usually are closed to the public.
Lawyers are not ensured access to their clients before the trial and
are excluded from the court during their client's initial interrogation
by the prosecutor. Lawyers submit written defense pleas rather than
oral presentations. The State's case often is based on confessions, and
defendants have not been allowed to argue in court that their
confessions were coerced. There is no known instance in which the court
ordered a medical examination for a defendant who claimed that he was
tortured. The SSSC reportedly has acquitted some defendants, but the
Government does not provide any statistics on the conviction rate.
Defendants do not have the right to appeal verdicts, but sentences are
reviewed by the Minister of Interior, who may ratify, nullify, or alter
sentences. The President also may intervene in the review process.
Accurate information on the number of cases heard by the SSSC is
difficult to obtain, although hundreds of cases are believed to pass
through the court annually. Many reportedly involved charges relating
to membership in various banned political groups, including the Party
of Communist Action and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th Party.
Sentences as long as 15 years have been imposed in the past. The
Government permitted delegates from AI to attend a session of the SSSC
in 1997; however there have been no visits by human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) since then (see Section 4).
The Economic Security Court (ESC) tries persons for alleged
violations of foreign exchange laws and other economic crimes. The
prosecution of economic crimes is not applied uniformly, as some
government officials or business persons with close connections to the
Government likely have violated the country's strict economic laws
without prosecution. Like the SSSC, the ESC does not ensure due process
for defendants. Defendants may not have adequate access to lawyers to
prepare their defenses, and the State's case usually is based on
confessions. Verdicts may be influenced by high-ranking government
officials. Those convicted of the most serious economic crimes do not
have the right of appeal, but those convicted of lesser crimes may
appeal to the Court of Cassation. A significant prisoner amnesty for
individuals convicted of economic crimes was announced in July 1999.
Theoretically this amnesty may have benefited thousands of persons. In
May late president Hafiz Al-Asad amended the Economic Penal Code to
allow defendants in economic courts to be released on bail. The bail
provision does not extend to those accused of forgery, counterfeiting,
or auto theft; however, the amendment is intended to provide relief for
those accused of other economic crimes, many of whom have been in
pretrial detention for long periods of time. These amendments to the
Economic Penal Code also limit the categories of cases that can be
tried in the ESC. In November the Government approved a general pardon
for nonpolitical prisoners and a reduction of sentences by one-third
for persons convicted of economic crimes, with a provision to commute
sentences entirely for persons who return embezzled funds to investors
within 1 year of the law's effective date.
Prisoner amnesties in July 1999 and November are believed to have
benefited some political prisoners and detainees. The Government also
transferred 54 Lebanese political prisoners and detainees from Syrian
to Lebanese custody in December (see Section 1.d.).
The Government has released virtually all of those arrested at the
time President Asad took power in 1970. However, at least two persons
arrested during that period may remain in prison, despite the
expiration of one of the prisoners' sentences.
The Government in the past denied that it held political prisoners,
arguing that, although the aims of some prisoners may be political,
their activities, including subversion, were criminal. The official
media reported that the 600 beneficiaries of the November amnesty were
political prisoners and detainees; this reportedly was the first time
that the Government acknowledged that it held persons for political
reasons. Nonetheless, the Emergency Law and the Penal Code are so
vague, and the Government's power so broad, that many persons were
convicted and are in prison for the mere expression of political
opposition to the Government.
The exact number of political prisoners is unknown.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Although laws provide for freedom from arbitrary
interference, the Emergency Law authorizes the security services to
enter homes and conduct searches with warrants if security matters,
very broadly defined, are involved. The security services selectively
monitor telephone conversations and fax transmissions. The Government
sometimes opens mail destined for both citizens and foreign residents.
It also prevents the delivery of human rights materials. In August
1999, authorities repealed a 5-year ban on entry of Jordanian
newspapers (also see Section 2.a.).
The Government continues its practice of threatening or detaining
the relatives of detainees or of fugitives in order to obtain
confessions, minimize outside interference, or prompt the fugitive's
surrender (see Section 1.d.). There have been reports that security
personnel force prisoners to watch relatives being tortured in order to
extract confessions. According to AI, security forces also detain
family members of suspected oppositionists (see Section 1.d.).
Security checkpoints continue to exist, although primarily in
military and other restricted areas. There are few police checkpoints
on main roads and in populated areas. Generally, the security services
set up checkpoints to search for smuggled goods, weapons, narcotics,
and subversive literature. The searches take place without warrants. In
the past, the Government and the Ba'th Party monitored and attempted to
restrict some citizens' visits to foreign embassies and cultural
centers.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
right to express opinions freely in speech and in writing, but the
Government restricts these rights significantly in practice. The
Government strictly controls the dissemination of information and
permits no written or oral criticism of the President, the President's
family, the Ba'th Party, the military, or the legitimacy of the regime.
The Government also does not permit sectarian issues to be raised.
Detention and beatings for individual expressions of opinion that
violate these unwritten rules sometimes occur, although not as
frequently as in the past.
The Emergency Law allows the Government broad discretion in
determining what constitutes illegal expression. It prohibits the
publishing of ``false information,'' which opposes ``the goals of the
revolution `` (see Section 1.e.). In the past, the Government has
imprisoned journalists for failing to observe press restrictions. In
May 1999, a defamation case filed against a journalist was reported
widely in the press. The case was believed to be the first in which a
journalist was tried for what he had published; he was cleared of guilt
by the court. State security services are known to threaten local
journalists, including with the removal of credentials, for articles
printed outside the country. There were reports that journalists
temporarily lost their credentials during the year after they allegedly
reported on issues deemed sensitive by the military. For example, in
September authorities revoked temporarily the credentials of a local
journalist who wrote an article that the Government deemed politically
sensitive.
The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture and
National Guidance censor the domestic and foreign press. They usually
prevent publication or distribution of any material deemed threatening
or embarrassing by the security services to high levels of the
Government. Censorship usually is stricter for materials in Arabic.
Commonly censored subjects include: The Government's human rights
record; Islamic fundamentalism; allegations of official involvement in
drug trafficking; aspects of the Government's role in Lebanon; graphic
descriptions of sexual activity; material unfavorable to the Arab cause
in the Middle East conflict; and material that is offensive to any of
the country's religious groups. In addition most journalists and
writers practice self-censorship to avoid provoking a negative
government reaction.
Recent trends toward a modest relaxation of censorship increased
during the year. In his July inaugural speech, President Bashar Al-Asad
emphasized the principle of media transparency. Since July both the
print and electronic media at times have been critical of Ba'th Party
and government performance and have reported openly on a range of
social and economic issues. While this relaxation of censorship did not
extend to domestic politics or foreign policy issues, it was a notable
departure from past practice. Damascus-based correspondents for
regional Arab media also were able to file reports on internal
political issues, such as rumored governmental changes, new political
discussion groups, and the possible introduction of new parties to the
Ba'th Party-dominated National Progressive Front. In November the Ba'th
Party Regional Command voted to amend the press law to allow
constituent parties of the National Progressive Front to publish
newspapers and to open party headquarters. In November the Prime
Minister rescinded a 1986 ban on the printing of publications by public
institutions without prior approval from the Prime Minister.
A group of 99 Syrian intellectuals published a petition in a
Lebanese newspaper in September calling for lifting martial law, ending
the state of emergency in effect since 1963, releasing political
prisoners, and expanding civil liberties in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. The Government did not respond directly
to the petition by year's end; however, the Government did take several
of the steps called for in the petition (see Section 1.d.). The
Government did not take action against any of the intellectuals who
signed the petition by year's end. In December a local human rights
organization published an open letter in a Lebanese newspaper calling
for the closure of the notorious Tadmur prison.
The media broadened somewhat their reporting on regional
developments, including the Middle East peace process. The media
covered some peace process events factually, but other events were
reported selectively to buttress official views. The government-
controlled press increased its coverage of official corruption and
governmental inefficiency. There are no privately owned newspapers,
although foreign-owned, foreign-published newspapers circulate
relatively freely. In August 1999, authorities repealed a 5-year ban on
entry of Jordanian newspapers (also see Section 1.f.).
The Government or the Ba'th Party owns and operates the radio and
television companies and the newspaper publishing houses. The Ministry
of Information closely monitors the radio and television news programs
to ensure adherence to the government line. The Government does not
interfere with broadcasts from abroad. Satellite dishes have
proliferated throughout all regions and in neighborhoods of all social
and economic categories, and in July the Government officially approved
regulations permitting the importation of satellite receivers. Cellular
telephone service was introduced early in the year, although
prohibitive cost severely limits the number of subscribers. Internet
access and access to e-mail is limited, although efforts are underway
to provide greater Internet access, especially to universities and
businesses. The Government blocks access to selected Internet sites
that contain information deemed politically sensitive or pornographic
in nature. The Government also blocks access to servers that provide
free e-mail services. In 1999 and in September, telephone service to
the offices and residences of several European embassies and the home
of an American officer was disrupted, allegedly because the lines had
been used to access Internet providers outside the country. Telephone
service in 1999 was restored in response to diplomatic protest by the
European embassies; however, diplomats and citizens continue to
experience regular disruptions of telephone service. The Ministry of
Culture and National Guidance censors fiction and nonfiction works,
including films. It also determines which films may not be shown at the
cultural centers operated by foreign embassies. The Government
prohibits the publication of books and other materials in Kurdish;
however, there are credible reports that Kurdish language materials are
available in the country (see Section 5).
The Government restricts academic freedom. Public school teachers
are not permitted to express ideas contrary to government policy,
although authorities allow somewhat greater freedom of expression at
the university level.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
assembly does not exist under the law. Citizens may not hold
demonstrations unless they obtain permission from the Ministry of
Interior. Most public demonstrations are organized by the Government or
the Ba'th Party. The Government selectively applied the law during the
year, permitting some demonstrations. The Government applies the
restrictions on public assembly in Palestinian refugee camps, where
controlled demonstrations have been allowed.
In October there were numerous demonstrations, most of which were
permitted or organized by the Government, and some of which were
directed against diplomatic missions and international agencies in
reaction to the Israeli Government's use of force against Palestinians
in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. On October 4, police did not take
adequate steps to protect diplomatic property during a violent
demonstration. However, during a subsequent violent demonstration on
October 6, police used tear gas, shields, batons, and threats of lethal
force to disperse rock-throwing demonstrators and protect diplomatic
property. Observers stated that the police acted with restraint. About
50 police personnel and numerous demonstrators were injured in the
demonstration (see Section 1.c.). The Government subsequently permitted
additional demonstrations with a significant security force presence;
such demonstrations remained peaceful.
In November there were large demonstrations in Suwayda province
following violent clashes between Bedouin shepherds and Druze residents
of the province (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
The Government restricts freedom of association. Private
associations must be registered with the Government in order to be
considered legal. Some groups have not been able to register,
presumably because the Government views them as political, even though
the groups presented themselves as cultural or professional
associations. Unregistered groups generally may not hold meetings;
however, there are credible reports that several domestic human rights
organizations and civil society groups held regular meetings during the
year. The Government usually grants registration to groups not engaged
in political or other activities deemed sensitive. The authorities do
not allow the establishment of independent political parties.
In 1980 the Government dissolved, and then reconstituted under its
control, the executive boards of professional associations after some
members staged a national strike and advocated an end to the state of
emergency. The associations have not been independent since that time
and generally are led by members of the Ba'th Party, although nonparty
members may serve on their executive boards. It is not known whether
any persons detained in 1980 crackdowns on union and professional
association officials remain in detention (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, it imposes restrictions in some areas. The only advantage
given to a particular religion by the Constitution is the requirement
that the President be a Muslim. There is no official state religion;
Sunni Muslims constitute the majority of the population.
All religions and orders must register with the Government, which
monitors fund raising and requires permits for all meetings by
religious groups, except for worship. Recognized religious groups
receive free utilities and are exempt from real estate taxes and taxes
on official vehicles. There is a strict de facto separation of church
and state. Religious groups tend to avoid any involvement in internal
political affairs. The Government, in turn, generally refrains from
becoming involved in strictly religious issues.
The Government considers militant Islam a threat to the regime and
follows closely the practice of its adherents. The Government has
allowed many new mosques to be built; however, sermons are monitored
and controlled, and mosques are closed between prayers.
There were credible reports of large-scale arrests of Syrian and
Palestinian Islamists affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Islamic Salvation Party in late 1999 and early 2000. Some of the
Islamist prisoners reportedly were tortured in detention. A number of
these prisoners reportedly were released during the year (see Sections
1.c. and 1.d.).
Although the law does not prohibit proselytizing, the Government
discourages such activity in practice, particularly when it is deemed a
threat to the generally good relations among religious groups. Foreign
missionary groups are present but operate discreetly. The Government
banned Jehovah's Witnesses as a politically-motivated Zionist
organization in 1964.
Officially all schools are government-run and nonsectarian,
although some schools are run in practice by Christian, Druze, and
Jewish minorities. There is mandatory religious instruction in schools,
with government-approved teachers and curriculums. Religion courses are
divided into separate classes for Muslim, Druze, and Christian
students. Jews have a separate primary school, which offers religious
instruction in Judaism, in addition to traditional subjects. Although
Arabic is the official language in public schools, the Government
permits the teaching of Armenian, Hebrew, Syriac (Aramaic), and
Chaldean in some schools on the basis that these are ``liturgical
languages.''
Religious groups are subject to their respective religious laws on
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance (see Section 5).
Government policy officially disavows sectarianism of any kind.
However, in the case of the Alawis, religion can be a contributing
factor in determining career opportunities. For example, members of the
President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in the security
services and military, well out of proportion to their percentage of
the population, which is estimated to be 12 percent (see Section 3).
For primarily political rather than religious reasons, Jews
generally are barred from government employment and do not have
military service obligations. Jews also are the only religious minority
group whose passports and identity cards note their religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government limits freedom of
movement. The Government restricts travel near the Golan Heights.
Travel to Israel is illegal. In November 1999, the Government eased
many of its travel restrictions, which made it easier for most citizens
to travel abroad. In December the Government lifted the ban on travel
to Iraq. Exit visas generally no longer are required for women, men
over 50 years old, and citizens living abroad. In the past, individuals
have been denied permission to travel abroad on political grounds,
although government officials deny that this practice occurs. The
authorities may prosecute any person found attempting to emigrate or
travel abroad illegally, or who is suspected of having visited Israel.
Women over the age of 18 have the legal right to travel without the
permission of male relatives. However, a husband may file a request
with the Ministry of Interior to prohibit his wife's departure from the
country (see Section 5). The Government's use of police checkpoints has
been reduced (see Section 1.f.).
In July the Government announced that emigres who did not complete
mandatory military service can pay a fee to avoid being conscripted
while visiting the country.
In November the Government temporarily sealed access to parts of
Suwayda province for several weeks to nonresidents following violent
clashes between resident Druze and Bedouin shepherds (see Section 5).
As of June 383,199 Palestinian refugees were registered with the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the country. In
general Palestinian refugees no longer report unusual difficulties
travelling in and out of the country, as was the case in the past. The
Government restricts entry by Palestinians who are not resident in the
country. The Government does not allow Palestinian residents of Gaza to
visit the country.
Citizens of any Arab country may enter the country without a visa.
However, citizens of Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia must demonstrate that
they have an invitation from a business or individual citizen.
There are no laws with provisions for dealing with refugees and
asylees in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government
cooperates on a case-by-case basis with the office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first
asylum but is selective about extending protection to refugees;
approximately 2,455 persons sought asylum through the UNHCR during the
first 9 months of the year. Although the Government denied any forced
repatriation of those who may have had a valid claim to refugee status,
in 1998 it apparently forcibly repatriated Iraqi, Somali, Algerian, and
Libyan refugees. As of August 1999, there were an estimated 21,319 non-
Palestinian refugees in the country, of whom about 3,962 were receiving
assistance from the UNHCR, including 1,315 refugees of Iraqi origin.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Although citizens ostensibly vote for the President and Members of
Parliament, they do not have the right to change their government. The
late President Hafiz Al-Asad was confirmed by unopposed referenda five
times after taking power in 1970. His son, Bashar Al-Asad, also was
confirmed by an unopposed referendum in July. Political opposition to
the President is not tolerated. The President and his senior aides,
particularly those in the military and security services, ultimately
make most basic decisions in political and economic life, with a very
limited degree of public accountability. Moreover, the Constitution
mandates that the Ba'th Party is the ruling party and is ensured a
majority in all government and popular associations, such as workers'
and women's groups. Six smaller political parties also are permitted
and, along with the Ba'th Party, make up the National Progressive Front
(NPF), a grouping of parties that represents the sole framework of
legal political party participation for citizens. While created
ostensibly to give the appearance of a multiparty system, the NPF is
dominated by the Ba'th Party and does not change the essentially one-
party character of the political system. Non-Ba'th Party members of the
NPF exist as political parties largely in name only and conform
strictly to Ba'th Party and government policies. There were reports in
the regional Arab media that the Government is considering legislation
to expand the NPF to include new parties and several parties previously
banned.
The Ba'th Party dominates the Parliament, which is known as the
People's Council. Although parliamentarians may criticize policies and
modify draft laws, the executive branch retains ultimate control over
the legislative process. Since 1990 the Government has allowed
independent non-NPF candidates to run for a limited allotment of seats
in the 250-member People's Council. The current number of non-NPF
deputies is 83, ensuring a permanent absolute majority for the Ba'th
Party-dominated NPF. Elections for the 250 seats in the People's
Council last took place in 1998.
The Government is headed by a Cabinet, which the President has the
discretion to change. In March former President Hafez Al-Asad accepted
the resignations of all of the members of his Cabinet who resigned
because the late President reportedly believed that the change would
improve government and economic performance. On March 13, the late
President appointed a new Cabinet consisting of 36 ministers; 26 Ba'th
Party members, 6 NPF ministers, and 4 ``independents'' aligned with the
Government.
Persons who have been convicted by the State Security Court may be
deprived of their political rights after they are released from prison.
Such restrictions include a prohibition against engaging in political
activity, the denial of passports, and a bar on accepting government
jobs and some other forms of employment. The duration of such
restrictions may last from 10 years to the remainder of the former
prisoner's life. The Government contends that this practice is mandated
by the Penal Code; it has been in effect since 1949.
Women and minorities, with the exception of the Jewish population
and stateless Kurds (see Section 5), participate in the political
system without restriction. Nonetheless, women are underrepresented in
Government. There are 2 female cabinet ministers and 26 female Members
of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not allow the existence of local human rights
groups. One or two human rights groups once operated legally but
subsequently were banned by the Government. However, there are credible
reports that several domestic human rights organizations and civil
society groups met regularly during the year.
Amnesty International (AI) visited Syria for 2 weeks in 1997, the
second major visit by an international human rights organization (after
a Human Rights Watch visit in 1995). These were the first such meetings
held by government officials with an international human rights
organization. There have been no such meetings since.
As a matter of policy, the Government in its exchanges with
international groups denies that it commits human rights abuses. It has
not permitted representatives of international organizations to visit
prisons. The Government states that it now responds in writing to all
inquires from NGO's regarding human rights issues, including the cases
of individual detainees and prisoners, through an interagency
governmental committee established expressly for that purpose. Human
Rights Watch reported in 1997 that the Government had not responded to
its request to account publicly for the possibly thousands of citizens
who were executed at Tadmur prison in the 1980's. The Government
usually responds to queries from human rights organizations and foreign
embassies on specific cases by claiming that the prisoner in question
has violated national security laws.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights and equal opportunity
for all citizens. In practice membership in the Ba'th Party or close
familial relations with a prominent party member or government official
can be important for economic, social, or educational advancement.
Party or government connections can pave the way for entrance into
better elementary and secondary schools, access to lucrative
employment, and greater power within the Government, the military, and
the security services. Certain prominent positions, such as that of
provincial governor, are reserved solely for Ba'th Party members. Apart
from some discrimination against Kurds, there are no apparent patterns
of systematic government discrimination based on race, sex, religion,
disability, language, or social status. However, there are varying
degrees of societal discrimination in each of these areas.
Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no reliable
statistics regarding the prevalence of domestic violence or sexual
assault. The vast majority of cases likely are unreported, and victims
generally are reluctant to seek assistance outside the family. There
are no laws against spousal rape. One preliminary academic study
suggested that domestic violence is the largest single reason for
divorces, and that such abuse is more prevalent among the less-educated
and person who live in rural areas. Battered women have the legal right
to seek redress in court, but few do so because of the social stigma
attached to such action. The Syrian Women's Federation offers services
to battered wives to remedy individual family problems. The Syrian
Family Planning Association also attempts to deal with this problem.
Some private groups, including the Family Planning Association, have
organized seminars on violence against women, which were reported by
the government press. There are no specifically designated shelters or
safe havens for battered women who seek to flee their husbands.
The Constitution provides for equality between men and women and
equal pay for equal work. Moreover, the Government has sought to
overcome traditional discriminatory attitudes toward women and
encourages women's education. However, the Government has not yet
changed personal status, retirement, and social security laws that
discriminate against women. Christians, Muslims, and other religious
groups are subject to their respective religious laws on marriage,
divorce, and inheritance (see Section 2.c.). In addition some secular
laws discriminate against women. For example, under criminal law, the
punishment for adultery is twice that as for the same crime committed
by a man. ``Honor'' crimes (a euphemism that refers to violent assaults
with intent to murder against a female by a male for alleged sexual
misconduct) do occur.
For Muslims personal status law on divorce is based on Shari'a
(Islamic law), and some of its provisions discriminate against women.
For example, husbands may claim adultery as grounds for divorce, but
wives face more difficulty in presenting the same argument. If a woman
requests a divorce from her husband, she may not be entitled to child
support in some instances. In addition under the law a woman loses the
right to custody of boys when they reach age 9 and girls at age 12.
Inheritance for Muslims is based on Shari'a. Accordingly Muslim
women usually are granted half of the inheritance share of male heirs.
However, Shari'a mandates that male heirs provide financial support to
the female relatives who inherit less. For example, a brother who
inherits an unmarried sister's share from their parents' estate is
obligated to provide for the sister's well-being. If the brother fails
to do so, she has the right to sue.
Polygyny is legal but is practiced only by a small minority of
Muslim men.
A husband may request that his wife's travel abroad be prohibited
(see Section 2.d.). Women generally are barred from travelling abroad
with their children unless they are able to prove that the father has
granted permission for the children to travel.
Women participate actively in public life and are represented in
most professions, including the military. Women are not impeded from
owning or managing land or other real property. Women constitute
approximately 7 percent of judges, 10 percent of lawyers, 57 percent of
teachers below university level, and 20 percent of university
professors.
Children.--There is no legal discrimination between boys and girls
in school or in health care. Education is compulsory for all children,
male or female, between the ages of 6 and 12. According to the Syrian
Women's Union, about 46 percent of the total number of students through
the secondary level are female.
Nevertheless, societal pressure for early marriage and childbearing
interferes with girls' educational progress, particularly in rural
areas, where dropout rates for female students remain high.
The law emphasizes the need to protect children, and the Government
has organized seminars on the subject of child welfare. Although there
are cases of child abuse, there is no societal pattern of abuse against
children. The law provides for severe penalties for those found guilty
of the most serious abuses against children.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
the disabled and seeks to integrate them into the public sector work
force. However, implementation is spotty. Regulations reserving 2
percent of government and public sector jobs for the disabled are not
implemented rigorously. The disabled do not have recourse to the courts
regarding discrimination. There are no laws that mandate access to
public buildings for the disabled. The Minister of Social Affairs
announced plans during the year to offer vocational training for
disabled persons through local NGO's and to mandate that the Government
hire 4 percent of its workforce from the disabled population.
Religious Minorities.--Although there is significant religious
tolerance, religion or ethnic affiliation can be a contributing factor
in determining career opportunities. For example, members of the
President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in the security
services and military, well out of proportion to their percentage of
the population. Nevertheless, government policy officially disavows
sectarianism.
There generally is little societal discrimination or violence
against religious minorities, including Jews. However, on October 12, a
group of Palestinians threw bricks, stones, and Molotov cocktails at a
synagogue in Damascus, apparently in reaction to the Israeli
Government's use of force against Palestinians in the occupied
territories. No one was injured in the attack; however, the synagogue
was damaged slightly and was closed for approximately 1 month. The
Government took immediate steps to ensure that the Jewish community
would be protected from further attacks, including arresting the
perpetrators and posting guards around synagogues and the Jewish
quarter of Damascus.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally
permits national and ethnic minorities to conduct traditional,
religious, and cultural activities. However, the Government's attitude
toward the Kurdish minority is a significant exception to this policy.
Although the Government contends that there is no discrimination
against the Kurdish population, it has placed limits on the use and
teaching of the Kurdish language. It also restricts the publication of
books and other materials written in Kurdish (see Section 2.a.),
Kurdish cultural expression, and, at times, the celebration of Kurdish
festivals. The Government tacitly accepts the importation and
distribution of Kurdish language materials, particularly in the
northeast region in which most of the Kurds in the country reside. Some
members of the Kurdish community have been tried by the Supreme State
Security Court for expressing support for greater Kurdish autonomy or
independence. Although the Asad Government stopped the previous
practice of stripping Kurds in Syria of their Syrian nationality (some
120,000 lost Syrian nationality under this program in the 1960's), it
never restored their nationality. As a result, those who had lost their
nationality and their children have been unable to obtain Syrian
nationality and passports, or even identification cards and birth
certificates. Without Syrian nationality, these stateless Kurds, who
according to UNHCR estimates number about 200,000, are unable to own
land, are not permitted to practice as doctors or engineers or be
employed by the Government, are ineligible for admission to public
hospitals, and have no right to vote, according to Human Rights Watch.
They also encounter difficulties in enrolling their children in school.
Stateless Kurdish men legally may not marry Syrian citizens.
In November there were violent clashes in Suwayda province,
reportedly stemming from a longstanding dispute between Bedouin
shepherds and Druze residents over grazing and property rights. There
were large demonstrations following the killings (see Section 2.b.).
The Government deployed 5,000 army troops and sealed off the area with
military checkpoints, temporarily preventing nonresidents from entering
the Suwayda province (see Section 2.d.). A number of Druze, Bedouin,
and security force personnel were killed and injured during the
clashes.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Although the Constitution provides
for this right, workers are not free to establish unions independent of
the Government. All unions must belong to the General Federation of
Trade Unions (GFTU), which is dominated by the Ba'th Party and is in
fact a part of the State's bureaucratic structure. The GFTU is an
information channel between political decisionmakers and workers. The
GFTU transmits instructions downward to the unions and workers but also
conveys information to decisionmakers about worker conditions and
needs. The GFTU provides the Government with opinions on legislation,
organizes workers, and formulates rules for various member unions. The
GFTU president is a senior member of the Ba'th Party. He and his deputy
may attend cabinet meetings on economic affairs. The GFTU controls
nearly all aspects of union activity.
The law does not prohibit strikes, except in the agricultural
sector. Nevertheless, workers are inhibited from striking because of
previous government crackdowns on strikers. In 1980 the security forces
arrested many union and professional association officials who planned
a national strike. Some of them are believed to remain in detention,
either without trial or after being tried by the State Security Court
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
The GFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions.
In 1992 Syria's eligibility for tariff preferences under the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences was suspended because the Government
failed to take steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights
to workers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively does not exist in any meaningful
sense. Government representatives are part of the bargaining process in
the public sector. In the public sector, unions do not normally bargain
collectively on wage issues, but there is some evidence that union
representatives participate with representatives of employers and the
supervising ministry in establishing minimum wages, hours, and
conditions of employment. Workers serve on the boards of directors of
public enterprises, and union representatives always are included on
these boards.
The law provides for collective bargaining in the private sector,
but any such agreement between labor and management must be ratified by
the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, who has effective veto power.
The Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
has long noted the Government's refusal to abolish the Minister's power
over collective contracts.
Unions have the right to litigate disputes over work contracts and
other workers' interests with employers and may ask for binding
arbitration. In practice labor and management representatives settle
most disputes without resort to legal remedies or arbitration.
Management has the right to request arbitration, but this right seldom
is exercised. Arbitration usually occurs when a worker initiates a
dispute over wages or severance pay.
Since the unions are part of the Government's bureaucratic
structure, they are protected by law from antiunion discrimination.
There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
There are no unions in the seven free trade zones. Firms in the
zones are exempt from the laws and regulations governing hiring and
firing, although they must observe some provisions on health, safety,
hours, and sick and annual leave.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--There is no law
prohibiting forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children. There were no reports of forced labor involving children or
foreign or domestic workers. Forced labor has been imposed as a
punishment for some convicted prisoners.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1959 Labor Law protects children from exploitation in
the workplace. Independent information and audits on government
enforcement are not available. Although it is not prohibited by law,
there were no reports of coerced or bonded labor (see Section 6.c.) due
to the relative ease with which a work permit may be obtained. In
December the Parliament approved legislation that raises the private
sector minimum age for employment from 12 to 15 years for most types of
nonagricultural labor, and from 16 to 18 years for heavy work. In all
cases, parental permission is required for children under the age of
16. The law prohibits children from working at night. However, all
these laws apply only to children who work for a salary. Those who work
in family businesses and are not technically paid a salary--a common
phenomenon--do not fall under the law. The Government claims that the
expansion of the private sector has led to more young children working.
Education is compulsory for all children, male or female, between the
ages of 6 and 12.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs monitors employment
conditions for persons under the age of 18, but it does not have enough
inspectors to ensure compliance with the laws. The Ministry has the
authority to specify the industries in which children 15 and 16 years
of age may work. The majority of children under age 16 who are working
do so for their parents in the agricultural sector without
remuneration. The ILO report found that 10.5 percent of children under
the age of 18 participate in the labor force, which amounts to 4.7
percent of the total work force. Working hours for youths of legal age
to work do not differ from those established for adults. Children under
the age of 16 are prohibited by law from working in mines, at petroleum
sites, or in other dangerous fields. Children are not allowed to lift,
carry, or drag heavy objects. The exploitation of children for begging
purposes also is prohibited. The Labor Inspection Department performs
unannounced spot checks of employers on a daily basis to enforce these
regulations; however, the scope of these checks is unknown.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs is responsible for enforcing minimum wage levels in the public
and private sectors. In August the Government increased public sector
minimum wages by 25 percent to $57 (2,664 Syrian pounds) per month,
plus other compensation (for example, meals, uniforms, and
transportation). In October the Government increased private sector
minimum wages by 25 percent to $53 (2,425 Syrian pounds) per month in
urban areas and $49 (2,237 Syrian pounds) in rural areas. These wages
still do not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. As a result, many workers in both the public and private
sectors take additional jobs or are supported by their extended
families. In the past, a committee of labor, management, and government
representatives submitted recommended changes in the minimum wage to
the Minister, and private sector salary increases matched those in the
public sector.
The statutory workweek for administrative staff is 6 days of 6
hours each, and laborers work 6 days a week of 8 hours each. In some
cases a 9-hour workday is permitted. The laws mandate 1 24-hour rest
day per week. Rules and regulations severely limit the ability of an
employer to dismiss employees without cause. Even if a person is absent
from work without notice for a long period, the employer must follow a
lengthy procedure of trying to find the person and notify him,
including through newspaper notices, before he is able to take any
action against the employee. Dismissed employees have the right to
appeal before a committee of representatives from the union,
management, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and the
appropriate municipality. Such committees usually find in favor of the
employee. Dismissed employees are entitled to 80 percent of salary
benefits while the dispute is under consideration. No additional back
wages are awarded should the employer be found at fault, nor are wage
penalties imposed in cases where the employer is not found at fault.
The law does not protect temporary workers who are not subject to
regulations on minimum wages. Small private firms and businesses employ
such workers to avoid the costs associated with hiring permanent
employees.
The law mandates safety in all sectors, and managers are expected
to implement them fully. In practice there is little enforcement
without worker complaints, which occur infrequently despite government
efforts to post notices on safety rights and regulations. Large
companies, such as oil field contractors, employ safety engineers.
The ILO noted in August 1998 that a provision in the Labor Code
allowing employers to keep workers at the workplace for as many as 11
hours a day might lead to abuse. However, there have been no reports of
such abuses. Officials from the Ministries of Health and Labor inspect
work sites for compliance with health and safety standards. Such
inspections appear to be haphazard, apart from those conducted in
hotels and other facilities that cater to foreigners. The enforcement
of labor laws in rural areas also is more lax than it is in urban
areas, where inspectors are concentrated. Workers may lodge complaints
about health and safety conditions, with special committees established
to adjudicate such cases. Workers have the right to remove themselves
from hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that
persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country. Standard labor
laws would be applied in the event of allegations of trafficking.
__________
TUNISIA
Tunisia is a republic dominated by a single political party.
President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic
Rally (RCD) party have controlled the Government, including the
legislature, since 1987. This dominance was reaffirmed in an
overwhelming RCD victory in the October 1999 legislative and
presidential elections, although 1999 revisions to the Constitution
allowed two opposition candidates to run against Ben Ali in
presidential elections, the first multicandidate presidential race in
the country's history. Approximately 20 percent of representation in
the Chamber of Deputies is reserved for opposition parties (34 of 182
seats), up from approximately 12 percent (19 of 163 seats) in the
previous Chamber, which was elected in 1994. The President appoints the
Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the 24 governors. The executive branch
and the President strongly influence the judiciary, particularly in
sensitive political cases.
The police share responsibility for internal security with a
paramilitary National Guard. The police operate in the capital and a
few other cities. In outlying areas, their policing duties are shared
with, or ceded to, the National Guard. Both forces are under the
control of the Minister of Interior and the President. The security
forces continued to be responsible for serious human rights abuses.
Tunisia has made substantial progress toward establishing an
export-oriented market economy based on manufactured exports, tourism,
agriculture, and petroleum. The per capita gross national product for
2000 was estimated to be $2,800, while real per capita income grew by
an estimated 2.7 percent. Over 60 percent of citizens are in the middle
class and enjoy a comfortable standard of living. The Government
reported that only 6.2 percent of citizens fell below the poverty line,
and that more than 80 percent of households owned their own homes. The
country has a high level of literacy (91.1 percent of adults between
the ages of 15 and 24 in 1999), low population growth rates (under 1.2
percent in 1999), and wide distribution of basic health care. The
Government devotes over 60 percent of the budget to social and
development goals.
The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in
some areas, particularly regarding the rights of women and children,
and it also took modest steps to allow a greater diversity of views in
the media; however, the Government's record remained poor in other
areas, and significant problems remain. There are significant
limitations on citizens' right to change their government. The ruling
RCD Party is firmly intertwined with government institutions throughout
the country, making it extremely difficult for opposition parties to
compete on a level playing field. The October 1999 presidential and
legislative elections marked a modest step toward democratic
development, with opposition presidential candidates allowed to run for
the first time, and opposition parties generally freer to campaign;
however, while observers agree that the outcome of the elections
generally reflected the will of the electorate, the campaign and
election processes greatly favored the ruling party, and there was wide
disregard for the secrecy of the vote, in which Ben Ali won 99.44
percent of the ballots cast for President.
There were reports of two extrajudicial killings by police. Members
of the security forces tortured and physically abused prisoners and
detainees. The Government asserts that police officials who commit
abuses are disciplined, but there have been no documented cases in
which security officials were disciplined for such abuse. Prison
conditions range from Spartan to poor. Security forces arbitrarily
arrest and detain persons. Lengthy pretrial detention and incommunicado
detention are problems. Provisions enacted in 1999 to lower the maximum
incommunicado detention period and require authorities to notify family
members at the time of arrest are not enforced evenly. The judiciary is
subject to executive branch control, lengthy delays in trials are a
problem, and due process rights are not always observed; however, in
July the Government set up a new court to oversee the proper
administration of sentences. The Government infringed on citizens'
privacy rights, including by intercepting mail and interfering with
Internet communication. Security forces also monitored the activities
of government critics and at times harassed them, their relatives, and
associates.
The Government continued to impose significant restrictions on
freedom of speech and of the press, although there was limited easing
of press restrictions during the year. Journalists practice
selfcensorship. The Government demonstrated a pattern of intolerance of
public criticism, using criminal investigations, judicial proceedings,
and travel controls (including denial of passports) to discourage
criticism and limit the activities of human rights activists. The
Government continued to use the mandatory prescreening of publications
and control of advertising revenue as a means to discourage newspapers
and magazines from publishing material that it considered undesirable.
The Government regularly seized editions of foreign newspapers
containing articles that it considered objectionable. However, the
Government eased its restrictions somewhat in a few areas; several
foreign journals returned to newsstands during the year after being
banned from sale following articles critical of the October 1999
presidential and legislative elections. The Government also improved
access to the Internet and continued to broadcast a monthly public
affairs program that permitted citizens to debate issues with
government officials. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and
association. The Government limits partially the religious freedom of
members of the Baha'i faith. The Government does not permit
proselytizing. The Government continued to restrict the freedom of
movement of government critics and their family members. The Government
subjected members of the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and other
human rights activists to harassment, interrogation, property loss or
damage, and denial of passports. The Government closed the headquarters
of the LTDH on November 27 and replaced its board with a judicial
administrator pending a scheduled January 2001 hearing. Four LTDH
members filed a complaint that the LTDH's national congress elections
that were held in October did not follow LTDH by-laws and were illegal.
The Government barred meetings by LTDH board members in the interim.
The Government continued to meet with the LTDH, but still refused to
approve the registration of the National Council for Liberties (CNLT)
nongovernmental organization (NGO) and continued to prosecute CNLT
members. CNLT spokesman Moncef Marzouki was sentenced to a 1-year
prison term for maintaining an illegal organization and distribution of
false news for writing a paper for a human rights conference held in
Morroco that criticized the Government's National Solidarity Fund
charity for lack of transparency. The Government permitted observers
from several international human rights groups to attend trials of
human rights activists. Violence against women occurs. The Government
continued to demonstrate its strong support for the rights of women and
children; however, legal discrimination against women continued to
exist in certain areas, such as property and inheritance law, which is
governed by Shari'a (Islamic law), and societal discrimination exists
in areas such as private sector employment. The Government took strong
measures to reduce official discrimination, including equal opportunity
for women as a standard part of its audits of all governmental entities
and state-owned enterprises; however, such measures are not extended to
the private sector. Child labor persists. Child labor continues to
decline, due principally to government efforts to address the problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, there were reports of a few
extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces.
According to the LTDH, on August 9 motorcycle police officers
kicked and beat Chaker Azouzi to death for failure to stop for police.
The Government stated that the police officer implicated in Azouzi's
death is being held pending a judicial investigation.
According to an LTDH communique, Riadh Ben Mohamed J'day was beaten
to death while he was held in police detention on September 17. The
Government claimed that J'day committed suicide by hanging himself by
his shirt from the bars in his cell, and that he died on the way to the
hospital.
The LTDH reported that El-Aid Ben Salah's cellmates beat him to
death on June 10 and that, despite his cries, prison guards did nothing
to save him. The Government stated that it has opened an investigation
into Ben Salah's death.
There was no progress in the investigation of the 1999 case of
Tahar Jelassi, who reportedly died as a result of torture by prison
guards for refusing to take off his clothes during a routine search at
Grombalia prison.
There were no developments during the year in the case of former
Islamist Tijani Dridi, who allegedly died in police custody in 1998.
The Government maintains that Dridi died on July 21 from injuries
sustained the previous day in a motorcycle collision.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Penal Code prohibits the use of torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, security
forces routinely used various methods of torture to coerce confessions
from detainees. The forms of torture included electric shock;
submersion of the head in water; beatings with hands, sticks, and
police batons; cigarette burns; and food and sleep deprivation. Police
also reportedly utilized the ``rotisserie'' method: Stripping prisoners
naked, manacling their wrists behind their ankles, and beating the
prisoners while they were suspended from a rod. A 1999 CNLT report on
prison conditions described other forms of torture, including the
falaqa, which consists of suspending a prisoner by the feet and
severely beating the soles of the feet; suspension of a prisoner from
the metal door of his cell for hours on end until the prisoner loses
consciousness; and confinement of the prisoner to the ``cachot,'' a
tiny, unlit cell. LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, who was released
from prison in 1999, and the CNLT both reported cases in which
prisoners committed self-mutilation in prisons to protest conditions
and then, as punishment, prison authorities sutured the prisoners'
self-inflicted wounds without anesthesia and put them into isolation or
into ``cachot.'' In the April 28 trial of Jallel Ben Brik Zoghlami, the
brother of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik, presiding judges did not
incorporate allegations of police brutality in their summary statements
(which serve as the trial record), and refused to open an investigation
into Zoghlami's claim that on April 26 police officers beat Zoghlami
(breaking his nose), Sihem Bensedrine, Taieb Nooman, and Ali Ben Salem
while holding them in detention (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The four
claimed that they were made to lay prostrate at a police station in the
El-Manar suburb of Tunis while police stomped and kicked them, and that
they subsequently filed a complaint of police brutality, which the
judge refused to accept.
According to Amnesty International (AI) and defense attorneys, the
courts routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and
mistreatment and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under
torture. In the April trial of Ahmed Amari and 23 others for membership
in the illegal Islamist organization An-Nahda, the presiding judges
refused to investigate the claim by defendants that their confessions
were extracted under torture, including a claim by Amari's attorney
that he still bore physical signs of torture (see Sections 1.d. and
1.e.).
In a November 1998 report, the U.N. Committee Against Torture
recommended that the Government reduce the prearraignment incommunicado
detention period from 10 days to 48 hours, noting that most abuses
occur during incommunicado detention. In August 1999, in order to
address U.N. concerns, the Government enacted amendments to the Penal
Code, which adopted the U.N. definition of torture, instructed police
to inform detainees of their rights, including, notably, the right of a
defendant to demand a medical examination while in detention, and
increased the maximum penalty for those convicted of committing acts of
torture from 5 to 8 years. In 1999 the Government also shortened the
maximum allowable period of prearraignment incommunicado detention from
10 to 6 days and added a requirement that the police notify suspects'
families on the day of their arrest. However, credible sources claimed
that the Government rarely enforces the new provisions. In its annual
report for 2000, Human Rights Watch stated that despite the reduction
of incommunicado detention from 10 to 6 days, torture continued to be a
problem, due to a climate of impunity ``fostered by a judiciary that
ignored evidence of torture and routinely convicted defendants on the
basis of coerced confessions.'' In its March 2000 report on torture,
the CNLT stated that ``torture continues to be practiced on a large
scale'' and affects not only political prisoners but common criminals
as well.
Human rights advocates maintain that charges of torture and
mistreatment are difficult to substantiate because government
authorities often deny medical examinations until evidence of abuse has
disappeared. The Government maintained that it investigates all
complaints of torture and mistreatment filed with the prosecutor's
office and claimed that alleged victims sometimes publicly accused
authorities of acts of abuse without taking the steps required to
initiate an investigation. However, the CNLT stated in its March report
on torture that police often refuse to register complaints and judges
dismiss complaints lodged by alleged victims of torture with little or
no investigation. For example, Abdelmounim Belanas, who was convicted
in 1999 of membership in the Tunisian Communist Workers Party (PCOT)
and was released in June, claimed that he filed two complaints against
the Government for torture that he was subjected to in 1995, 1997, and
1999, but that both of his complaints were dismissed (see Sections
1.e., 2.b. and 4). Absent a formal complaint, the Government may open
an administrative investigation but is unlikely to release the results
to the lawyers of affected prisoners. There have been no documented
cases in which security officials were disciplined for such abuse.
Eight alleged members of the Islamist organization Ansar were
convicted on November 24 and received sentences ranging from 3 to 17
years, largely on the basis of confessions that they claimed had been
extracted under torture and on the testimony of a single government
witness (see Section 1.d.).
There were reports that security forces severely beat students
during demonstrations in the south in February (see Section 2.b.).
Credible sources reported that security forces beat university students
during pro-Palestinian demonstrations in the greater Tunis area in
October (see Sections 2.b.).
Credible sources reported that plainclothes policemen beat French,
Algerian, and Moroccan journalists when they attempted to attend a
press conference at the home of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in April
(see Section 2.a.). On April 25, police attacked human rights activists
and attorneys as they left the Saint Augustin Clinic where Ben Brik was
holding a hunger strike (see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 4). Police beat
LTDH vice presidents Fadhel Ghedamsi and Khemais Ksila, Ksila's wife
Fatma, attorney Chawki Tabib, and CNLT member Omar Mestiri in the
attack. Khemais Ksila suffered a fractured vertebra and his wife
suffered bruises to her back as she attempted to stop police from
beating her husband, who was knocked unconscious from blows to the top
of his spinal column. Attorneys claimed that they filed a complaint but
that the judge refused to accept it. PCOT member Mohamed Hedi Sassi
claimed that security police attacked and beat him in July outside his
home and again in August after stopping his car. CNLT members Omar
Mestiri and Mohamed Bechir claimed that in December plainclothes
policemen beat them in front of the Ministry of Health, where they
attempted to lodge a formal protest of CNLT spokesman Moncef Marzouki's
July dismissal. Mestiri claimed that policemen drove him 60 kilometers
from Tunis and dropped him by the side of the road without money,
papers, or his glasses, and left him to return on foot. Sources also
claimed that Nejib Hosni and Raouf Ayadi had been hit and slapped by
plainclothes police, who prevented them from entering the CNLT
headquarters in December (see Sections 1.f. and 4).
According to defense attorneys and former prisoners, prison
conditions ranged from Spartan to poor and, in some cases, did not meet
minimum international standards. Credible sources reported that
overcrowding continued to be a serious problem, with 40 to 50 prisoners
typically confined to a single 194-square-foot cell, and up to 140
prisoners held in a 323-square-foot-cell. In a September 19 trial of 36
defendants who were charged with belonging to the illegal Islamist
organization An-Nahda, Zouer Yacoub stated that during his 3.5 year
pretrial detention, he was confined with 270 inmates, who shared 1
toilet and 1 sink, in a 323-square-foot cell (see Section 1.d.).
Defense attorneys reported that prisoners in the 9th of April prison in
Tunis were forced to share a single water and toilet facility with
their cellmates, creating serious sanitation problems, and credible
sources report that prison barbers use a single razor blade to shave
every 10 prisoners.
There were credible reports that conditions and prison rules were
harsher for political prisoners than for the general prison population.
One credible report alleged the existence of special cell blocks and
prisons for political prisoners, in which they might be held in
solitary confinement for months at a time. Another credible source
reported that highranking leaders of the illegal An-Nahda Islamist
movement have been held in solitary confinement since 1991. Other
sources alleged that political prisoners regularly were moved among
jails throughout the country, thereby making it more difficult for the
prisoners' families to deliver food to the prisoners. One prisoner
reported that he was moved 3 times while serving his 6-month sentence;
another reported serving his sentence in 10 different jails in 3 years.
The wife of Taoufik Chaieb (who was released following a presidential
pardon in August after serving a 4-year prison term for membership in
the illegal An-Nahda party) claimed that her husband was transferred to
five prisons during his 4-year prison term. The CNLT report alleged
that inmates are instructed to isolate newly arrived political
prisoners and are punished severely for any contact with them. Fethi
Chemki, the president of the Assembly for an Alternative to
International Development (RAID), who was convicted in June of
defamation for printing a CNLT report on prisons, claimed that he was
confined to a bunk bed located besides the cell's lavatories and
isolated by other prisoners, except those prisoners who were instructed
to provoke fights (see Sections 1.e, 2.a. and 4). Other prisoners,
including LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, alleged that the
authorities limited the quantity and variety of food that families of
political prisoners could bring to supplement prison fare.
Former National High Commissioner for Human Rights Rachid Driss,
whose former organization is government-funded, had conducted
bimonthly, unannounced prison inspections since 1996. Although Driss
has declared that prison conditions and prisoner hygiene were ``good
and improving,'' details of his inspections were not made public. Driss
was replaced in December by Zakaria Ben Mustapha, a former Minister of
Cultural Affairs.
The Government does not permit international organizations or the
media to inspect or monitor prison conditions. The LTDH announced in a
1999 communique that it had been granted permission to resume prison
visits; however, it made no visits during the year, and the
Government's willingness actually to allow such visits remained
uncertain.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. The law authorizes the police to make
arrests without warrants in the cases of suspected felons or crimes in
progress. A 1999 Penal Code amendment, provides for a maximum 3-day
detention period, renewable once (for a maximum of 6 days) by the
prosecutor, thus reducing from 10 days to 6 the time that the
Government may hold a suspect incommunicado following arrest and prior
to arraignment. The 1999 amendments also require arresting officers to
inform detainees of their rights and detainees' families of the arrest
at the time of arrest, and to make a complete record of the times and
dates of such notifications. Credible sources stated that the new law
rarely is enforced with respect to either common criminals or political
detainees. Detainees have the right to be informed of the grounds for
arrest before questioning and may request a medical examination.
However, they do not have a right to legal representation during the 6-
day incommunicado detention period. Attorneys, human rights monitors,
and former detainees maintain that the authorities illegally extend the
maximum limit of pre-arraignment detention by falsifying the date of
arrest. Ahmed Amari and 23 other defendants who were extradited from
Libya in July 1997 did not appear before a judge until April (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
On April 8, police arrested RAID members Fethi Chemki and Mohamed
Chouarbi, as well as Iheb El-Hani, the owner of a photocopy shop, and
charged the three with defamation, distribution of false news,
disturbing the public order, and belonging to an unrecognized
association in connection with their photocopying of the CNLT's March
report on torture. The Government reportedly detained hundreds of
secondary-level students and other youths in connection with two
demonstrations held in February and April (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
On April 25, the police arrested CNLT members Jallel Ben Brik Zoghlami,
Sihem Bensedrine, Ali Ben Salem, and Taieb Nooman during an altercation
between police and foreign journalists (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
The Government subjected the family members of Islamist activists to
arbitrary arrest (see Sections 1.f., 2.a., 2.d., 4, and 6.a.).
Detainees have a right to be represented by counsel during
arraignment. The Government provides legal representation for
indigents. At arraignment the examining magistrate may decide to
release the accused or remand him to pretrial detention. The law
permits the release of accused persons on bail, which may be paid by a
third party. In cases involving crimes for which the sentence exceeds 5
years or that involve national security, preventive detention may last
an initial period of 6 months and be extended by court order for two
additional 4-month periods. For crimes in which the sentence may not
exceed 5 years, the court may extend the initial 6-month pretrial
detention by an additional 3 months only. During this period, the court
conducts an investigation, hears arguments, and accepts evidence and
motions of both parties. In August 1999, the Government approved a law
that gives persons indicted for criminal acts the right to appeal their
indictment before the case comes to trial; previously, this right was
granted in civil cases only.
A case proceeds from investigation to a criminal court, which sets
a trial date. There is no legal limit to the length of time the court
may hold a case over for trial, nor is there a legal basis for a speedy
hearing. Complaints of prolonged detention of persons awaiting trial
were common, and President Ben Ali publicly has encouraged judges to
make better use of release on bail and suspended sentences. In a
September 19 trial, the attorney for Zouer Yacoub and 35 other
defendants extradited from Libya in 1997 and charged with belonging to
the illegal Islamist organization An-Nahda claimed that they had been
held in pretrial detention for 3.5 years (see Section 1.c.). Detainees
Abdelatif Bouhajila, Yassin Ben Zarti, Ridha Ben Ahmed, Fehra Fethi,
Sofiane Ben Hamida, Yousef Mourru, and two others charged with
conspiring with a foreign Islamist group (Ansar), held 3-month hunger
strikes to protest their 26-month long pretrial detentions. All eight
were convicted on November 24 and received sentences ranging from 3 to
17 years, largely on the basis of confessions that they claimed had
been extracted under torture and on the testimony of a single
government witness (see Section 1.c.).
Human rights activists reported that security forces arbitrarily
imposed administrative controls on former prisoners following their
release from prison. Although the Penal Code contains provisions for
the imposition of administrative controls following completion of a
prison sentence, only judges have the right to order a former prisoner
to register at a police station, and the law limits registration
requirements to 5 years. Human rights activists allege that these
requirements often are unreasonable and prevent former prisoners from
being able to hold a job. Numerous Islamists released from prison in
recent years have been subjected to these types of requirements. Radhia
Aouididi, who served a 3-year prison sentence for possession of a
fraudulent passport (having been refused a passport in 1996 because of
her fiance's membership in An-Nahda), was released from all
administrative controls in August. She had been subject to a
requirement to sign in daily at a police headquarters 9 miles from her
village for a 5-year period following her 1999 release (see Section
2.d.). Defense attorneys reported that some clients must sign in four
or five times daily, at times that are determined only the previous
evening. When the clients arrive at the police station, they may be
forced to wait hours before signing in, making employment impossible
and child care difficult. A new court, created by a 1999 law to oversee
the proper administration of sentences, began functioning in September.
The law allows judges to substitute community service for jail
sentences in minor cases in which the sentence would be 6 months or
less.
There likely are a sizable number of political detainees, although
there is no reliable estimate due to arbitrary government detention
practices and the lack of publicly available records of arrests.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government
observes this prohibition. According to reliable sources, some
political opponents in self-imposed exile have been prevented from
obtaining or renewing their passports in order to return. However, a
Government official stated in June that the Government had returned 200
passports and would return another 600 of citizens living abroad, many
of whom have been without a passport for years (see Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the executive branch and the President
strongly influence the judiciary. In practice the judicial branch is
part of the Ministry of Justice and the executive branch appoints,
assigns, grants tenure to, and transfers judges. In addition the
President is head of the Supreme Council of Judges. This situation
renders judges susceptible to pressure in politically sensitive cases.
The court system comprises the regular civil and criminal courts,
including the courts of first instance; the courts of appeal; and the
Court of Cassation, the nation's highest court; as well as the military
tribunals within the Defense Ministry.
Military tribunals try cases involving military personnel and
civilians accused of national security crimes. A military tribunal
consists of a civilian judge from the Supreme Court and four military
judges. Defendants may appeal the tribunal's verdict to the Court of
Cassation.
The Code of Procedure is patterned after the French legal system.
By law the accused has the right to be present at trial, be represented
by counsel, question witnesses, and appeal verdicts. However, in
practice judges do not always observe these rights. The law permits
trial in absentia of fugitives from the law. Both the accused and the
prosecutor may appeal decisions of the lower courts. Defendants may
request a different judge if they believe that a judge is not
impartial; however, in practice judges do not always permit this. For
example, lawyers for Nejib Hosni, who was convicted in December for
violating a courtordered 5-year suspension from practicing law,
requested that the trial judge recuse himself because, attorneys
claimed, he no longer was impartial because he already had found Hosni
in violation of the court order the week before. The judge refused the
defense's request. The Court of Cassation, which considers arguments on
points of law as opposed to the facts of a case, is the final arbiter.
Trials in the regular courts of first instance and in the courts of
appeals are open to the public. The presiding judge or panel of judges
dominates a trial, and defense attorneys have little opportunity to
participate substantively. Defense lawyers contend that the courts
often fail to grant them adequate notice of trial dates or allow them
time to prepare their cases. Some also reported that judges restricted
access to evidence and court records, requiring in some cases, for
example, that all attorneys of record examine the court record on one
specified date in judges' chambers, without allowing attorneys to copy
material documents. For example, in the case of RAID president Fethi
Chemki and two others, defense attorneys said that they initially were
not permitted access to documents that were the basis of the
Government's charge of defamation, then later were permitted to view
documents only in the judge's chambers (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and
4). Defense lawyers also claimed that the judges sometimes refused to
allow them to call witnesses on their clients' behalf, or to question
key government witnesses. In the trials of both Jallel Ben Brik
Zoghlami and Fethi Chemki, judges refused to permit defense attorneys
to call witnesses or present evidence on their clients' behalf (see
Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., and 4). Lengthy delays in trials also are a
problem (see Section 1.d.).
Throughout the year, the Government permitted observers from
Amnesty International, the International Human Rights Federation, and
other international human rights organizations to monitor trials. The
observers reported that the Government permitted them to conduct their
work freely (see Section 4). According to credible sources, throughout
the year the Government brought correspondents of foreign press
services in for questioning for attending and reporting on political
trials, and for writing articles critical of the Government in the
foreign press (see Section 2.a.).
Amnesty International and defense attorneys report that courts
routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and mistreatment,
and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under torture (see
Section 1.c.). In the April trial of Ahmed Amari and 23 others charged
with membership in the illegal organization Islamist An-Nahda, the
presiding judge refused to investigate allegations of torture, despite
defendants' testimony that their confessions were extracted under
torture (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Defense lawyers and human rights
activists claim that the length of court sessions sometimes prevents
reasoned deliberation.
There is no definitive information on the number of political
prisoners. Human Rights Watch reported that there might be hundreds of
political prisoners convicted and imprisoned for membership in the
Islamist group An-Nahda and the Communist Workers Party, for
disseminating information produced by these banned organizations, and
for aiding relatives of convicted members. Reliable sources estimate
that between 600 and 1,400 political prisoners were held in the prisons
at the beginning of the year. The Government releases prisoners on
national holidays, such as Independence Day or the anniversary of
President Ben Ali's accession to power. Several political prisoners
were released during the year, including PCOT members Fahem Boukkadous
and Abdelmounim Belanas (released on June 10), An-Nahda member Taoufik
Chaieb (released on August 30), RAID president and members Fethi Chemki
and Mohamed Chouarbi (released conditionally in May after serving 30
days in detention), and Jallel Ben Brik Zoghlami, brother of journalist
Taoufik Ben Brik (released in May after serving 19 days in detention)
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., 2.b., and 4). However, the Government
does not provide details on the numbers or types of prisoners released.
President Ben Ali stated in a July 28 speech to members of the RCD
ruling party that all prisoners are common criminals convicted of
crimes in accordance with the law.
The Government does not permit international humanitarian
organizations to visit prisons. In his February report, U.N. Special
Rapporteur Abid Hussein stated that the Government did not permit him
to visit any prisoners in the 9th of April prison in Tunis but
permitted him to visit former Social Democratic Movement (MDS)
secretary general Mohammed Moaada, who at the time was under house
arrest and police surveillance pending a government investigation of an
alleged meeting between Moaada and An-Nahda leaders in Europe in 1997.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the person, the
home, and for the privacy of correspondence, ``except in exceptional
cases defined by law.'' The law requires that the police obtain
warrants to conduct searches; however, police sometimes ignore the
requirement if authorities consider that state security is at stake or
that a crime is in progress. For example, human rights activist Mohamed
Hedi Sassi claimed that his home was ransacked in January while he was
held in police custody for failing to stop for an unmarked police car.
Authorities may invoke state security interests to justify
telephone surveillance. There were numerous reports of government
interception of fax and computer-transmitted communications. The law
does not authorize explicitly these activities, although the Government
has stated that the Code of Criminal Procedure implicitly gives
investigating magistrates such authority. Many political activists
experience frequent and sometimes extended interruptions of residential
and business telephone and fax services. Human rights activists accuse
the Government of using the 1998 Postal Code, with its broad but
undefined prohibition against mail that threatens the public order, to
interfere with their mail and interrupt the delivery of foreign
publications. Local phone, fax, and copy shops require persons to turn
over their identification cards when requesting to send faxes. Lawyers
and activists stated that the Government has increased its practice of
cutting off telephone service to activists; telephone service to the
offices, homes, and relatives of prominent human rights lawyers and
other activists frequently was cut off, sometimes for long periods.
Human rights lawyer Nejib Hosni claimed that his telephone service has
been disrupted since 1994 and human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui
claimed that her telephone service was disrupted numerous times
throughout the year (see Section 4). However CNLT member Moncef
Marzouki and journalist Taoufik Ben Brik, who were without telephone
service for prolonged periods, reported that their service was
reinstated in May.
The security forces monitor the activities of political critics,
and sometimes harass, follow, question, or otherwise intimidate their
relatives and associates. Members of the CNLT claimed that in December
plainclothes police prevented persons from entering the building in
which their headquarters were located, including neighbors who lived
there (see Sections 1.c. and 4). Police place journalists who write
articles critical of the Government, or who are active in human rights
organizations, under surveillance (see Section 2.a.).
Human rights activists, lawyers, and other political activists also
reported that they were under police surveillance. Lawyer Radhia
Nasraoui complained that police frequently follow and intimidate her
children. LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila reported that he continued
to be subjected to government surveillance and harassment since his
release in 1999. Although Ksila's telephone service was reconnected in
May, he reported that his mail was monitored and only bills were
delivered, and that he has been unable to work since 1996 (see Section
4). On April 10, the Government closed CNLT member Sihem Bensedrine's
publishing house, Aloes, and reopened it July 11. The Government stated
that it closed the publishing house because it provided a venue for
``disruptive activities'' when Bensedrine held a meeting in which
Taoufik Ben Brik announced his hunger strike to protest his indictment
for defamation for articles critical of the Government that he had
written and published in the foreign press (see Sections 2.a. and 4).
Bensedrine's telephone service was reconnected in July, after being out
of service for 15 months, but again was disrupted the week before the
December 25 LTDH hearing (see Section 4). Bensedrine reported that her
home and family still are under surveillance, but that her children had
not recently been the target of government harassment, as had been the
case in the past.
Human rights activists alleged that the Government subjected the
family members of Islamist activists to arbitrary arrest, reportedly
utilizing charges of ``association with criminal elements'' to punish
family members for crimes committed by the activists. For example, one
female medical doctor claimed that she has been unemployed since 1997
because police pressure hospitals not to hire her because her husband
was convicted of membership in An-Nahda. One man claimed that for 8
years, the Government refused to issue him a passport because his
brother was prosecuted for membership in An-Nahda. Human rights
activists also alleged that the relatives of Islamist activists who are
in jail or living abroad were subjected to police surveillance and
mandatory visits to police stations to report their contact with
relatives. The Government maintained that the Islamists' relatives were
members or associates of the outlawed An-Nahda movement and that they
were correctly subjected to legitimate laws prohibiting membership in
or association with that organization. The Government also reportedly
refused to issue passports to the family members of some human rights
activists, including the wife and children of human rights lawyer Nejib
Hosni.
Human rights activists allege that security forces arbitrarily
imposed administrative controls on prisoners following their release
from prison (see Section 1.d.) and confiscated national identity cards
from numerous former prisoners. For example, one man claimed that his
national identity card was confiscated when he left prison in June. A
credible source claimed that the Government confiscated the national
identity cards of as many as 10,000 persons who were either former
prisoners convicted of membership in An-Nahda or relatives of An-Nahda
members and their sympathizers.
Police presence is heavy throughout the country and traffic
officers routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine
their personal identification and vehicular documents (see Section
2.d.). The Government regularly prohibited the distribution of some
foreign publications (see Section 2.a.). The security forces often
question citizens seen talking with foreign visitors or residents,
particularly visiting international human rights monitors and
journalists (see Section 2.a.). For example, police attempted to remove
one man from a public trial for translating for a foreign observer.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression and of the press; however, in practice, the
Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press. The Government
relies upon direct and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and
encourage a high degree of self-censorship. The Government also uses
the Press Code, which contains broad provisions prohibiting subversion
and defamation, to prosecute individuals who express dissenting
opinions. In his February 2000 report, U.N. Special Rapporteur Abid
Hussain stated that the Government ``still has a long way to go to take
full advantage of its favorable economic context--and in particular the
right to freedom of opinion and expression,'' and cited concern over
the State's ``control of the national radio and television broadcasting
system and the major dailies.'' The Government responded to the Special
Rapporteur's report in a May/June Jeune Afrique article, stating that
the Special Rapporteur's report ``infringes on the rules of ethics that
are supposed to preside over missions executed within the framework of
special procedures,'' and that ``the contents of the report confirm the
clear impression, even the certainty, that the Special Rapporteur only
reproduced allegations propagated by fringe political extremist and
Islamic fundamentalist parties.'' In a speech before the RCD in July,
President Ben Ali stated that although the Government must protect the
right of citizens to hold dissenting opinions, those citizens who
criticize the country in the international media were ``traitors'' who
would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
The Government convicted RAID president Fethi Chemki and member
Mohamed Chouarbi of defamation under the Press Code for photocopying a
report published by the CNLT (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., 2.a., and 4).
Mustapha Ben Jaafar, secretary general of the Democratic Forum, was
investigated and detained for questioning in August on charges of
defamation and belonging to an unrecognized organization for a
communique that he distributed by e-mail, which criticized the
Government (see Section 4). The criminal investigation of CNLT members
Omar Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki, who were indicted in July 1999 for
belonging to an illegal organization, remains pending (see Sections
2.d. and 4). Charges brought against Marzouki in November and December
1999 for defamation, belonging to an unrecognized organization, causing
a public disturbance, and dissemination of false information, arising
out of Marzouki's publishing and distributing two communiques on behalf
of the CNLT, remained pending at year's end (see Section 4). In a
separate case, Marzouki was sentenced to a 1-year prison term on
December 30 for maintaining an illegal organization and distribution of
false news for a paper that he wrote for a human rights conference in
Morocco in September, which criticized the Government's National
Solidarity Fund charity for lack of transparency (see Section 4). The
criminal investigation of ousted MDS president Mohamed Moaada, which
opened in 1997, is ongoing.
The Government imposed a media blackout on coverage of student
protests and related arrests in February and in April (see Section
2.a.).
Although several independent newspapers and magazines--including
several opposition party journals--exist, the Government relies upon
direct and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and encourage a
high degree of self-censorship. Primary among these methods is ``depot
legal,'' the requirement that printers and publishers provide copies of
all publications to the Chief Prosecutor, Ministry of Interior, and
Ministry of Culture prior to distribution. The Government has not
permitted the Tunisian Bar Association to publish its internal bulletin
since July 1999. The Government delayed release from depot legal
numerous editions of the biweekly magazine Jeune Afrique for periods of
up to 9 days, and prohibited the sale of the October 24 issue, which
contained an article by noted historian and Islamic scholar Mohamed
Talbi in which Talbi described dissident journalist Taoufik Ben Brik as
a ``national hero.''
The Government since 1994 has refused to allow Amnesty
International's Tunisia chapter to distribute textbooks on human rights
written for high school students. However, the RSP party's sporadically
published newspaper issued two editions with critical and extensive
coverage of human rights issues. In a May statement in Jeune Afrique,
the Government claimed that depot legal is a ``simple formality to
preserve national cultural heritage'' and is not at all used to prevent
all ``undesirable publications.''
Similarly, distributors must deposit copies of publications printed
abroad with the Chief Prosecutor and various ministries prior to their
public release. While publishers need not wait for an authorization,
they must obtain a receipt of deposit before distribution. On occasion
such receipts reportedly are withheld, sometimes indefinitely. Without
a receipt, publications may not be distributed legally. For example,
publisher Sihem Bensedrine claimed that she deposited a request for
publication of Kalima magazine in December 1999 and is still awaiting a
receipt of filing. The Press Code contains broad provisions prohibiting
subversion and defamation, neither of which is defined clearly. The
code stipulates fines and confiscation for failure to comply with these
provisions. The Government routinely utilized this method to prevent
distribution of editions of foreign newspapers and magazines that
contained articles critical of the country. For example, the Government
prevented distribution of the French publications Figaro and
L'Observateur, which were embargoed until February. Le Monde, Le Canard
Enchaine, Le Point, and Liberation, which were banned in October 1999,
once again were permitted to distribute copies in August. The
Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung and the Financial Times have been
banned periodically since the October 1999 elections. The Government
also reportedly withheld depot legal to remove from circulation books
that it deemed critical of the Government. In addition the Government
provided official texts on major domestic and international events and
reportedly reprimanded publishers and editors for failing to publish
these statements.
The Government also relies on indirect methods, such as newsprint
subsidies and control of public advertising revenues, to encourage
self-censorship in the media. There were credible reports that the
Government withheld advertising orders, a vital source of revenues,
from publications that published articles that the Government deemed
offensive. According to credible sources, Le Temps and As-Sabbah were
forced to cease publication for 2 weeks in August due to financial
problems resulting from the Government's withholding advertising
orders.
The Government exerted further control over the media by
threatening to impose restrictions on journalists, such as refusing
permission to travel abroad, withholding press credentials, and
imposing police surveillance on those who wrote articles critical of
the Government. Members of the security forces also reportedly
questioned journalists regarding the nature of press conferences and
other public functions hosted by foreigners that the journalists
attended. According to credible sources, the Government throughout the
year brought correspondents of foreign press services in for
questioning for attending and reporting on political trials, and for
writing articles critical of the Government in the foreign press (see
Section 1.e.). The Government indicted journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in
April for defamation for publishing articles critical of the Government
in the foreign press. Charges subsequently were dropped in May after
Ben Brik held a 6-week hunger strike (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 2.a.,
and 4). Other journalists active in human rights organizations reported
that they were under police surveillance for weeks at a time (see
Section 1.f.). Two journalists reported that they were fired in July
due to government pressure after they wrote articles that the
Government deemed offensive.
On May 23, Le Monde's Tunisia correspondent, Riadh Ben Fadhl, was
shot twice in the shoulder at 6 a.m., the morning after he published an
article in Le Monde that was critical of President Ben Ali. The
official news agency, TAP, reported the shooting in all major
newspapers in an article that emphasized discrepancies in Ben Fahdl's
testimony, implying that the shooting was a failed suicide attempt. On
May 30, President Ben Ali appeared in a front-page photo with Ben
Fadhl, accompanied by an article in which Ben Fadhl asked the president
to open an official investigation into the shooting. The Government had
not announced the result of its investigation by year's end.
Several journalists from Al-Fajr, the publication associated with
the outlawed An-Nahda movement, remained in jail, serving sentences
that were imposed in the early 1990's. The Government maintains that
the arrests, indictments, and convictions were carried out in full
accordance with the law.
Visiting foreign journalists sometimes complain of being followed
by security officials. The Government confiscated cassette tapes of
interviews, notebooks, and the address book of French journalist Daniel
Mermet in February as he was departing the country after a week of
interviews with members of the human rights community. The Government
claimed that Mermet had failed to register his materials upon entering
the country. Reliable sources alleged that plainclothes policemen beat
French, Algerian, and Moroccan journalists and confiscated cameras and
film when the journalists attempted to attend a press conference at the
home of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in April (see Sections 1.c., 1.d.,
1.e., and 1.f.).
On May 3, for the third year in a row, the Committee to Protect
Journalists named President Ben Ali as one of its ``10 worst enemies of
the press.'' In its Report 2000, Reporters Sans Frontieres stated that
``journalists have adopted a habit of selfcensorship and those who
venture to be independent pay a high price.'' Both reports focused on
the presence of a restrictive atmosphere that leads to self-censorship
and control exercised through advertising revenues. The Tunisian
Newspaper Association remained expelled from the World Association of
Newspapers (WAN). The WAN expelled the Association in 1997 for its
failure to oppose repression of freedom of the press.
The Government owns and operates the Tunisian Radio and Television
Establishment (ERTT). The ERTT's coverage of government news is taken
directly from the official news agency, TAP. The Government banned the
broadcast of the April 8 funeral of former President Habib Bourguiba;
television and radio stations broadcast foreign soccer games and shows
about wildlife instead. In May 1998, the ERTT began broadcasting a live
public debate program entitled ``Face to Face,'' which gave ordinary
citizens the opportunity to debate public affairs issues with
government officials. Human rights activists described the program as
progress toward greater freedom of expression. There are several
government-owned regional radio stations and one national television
channel. Bilateral agreements with France and Italy permit citizens to
receive the French television channel France 2 and the Italian Rai-Uno;
however, the broadcast of France 2 has remained suspended since October
1999 because of its critical coverage of the 1999 elections. The
Government stated that the broadcast was terminated as part of a long-
term plan to provide more broadcast time to Tunisian programming.
Recent estimates place the number of satellite dishes (which have been
legal since 1996) in the country at well over 100,000. The Government
regulates their sale and installation.
The Government encouraged greater use of the Internet and lowered
Internet user fees and telephone connection fees again during the year.
There are no customs duties on computers. By September 1, the
Government reported that there were 35,000 subscribers (almost three
times the number reported in 1999) and an estimated 250,000 users of
the Internet. The Government used the Internet widely, with most
government ministries and agencies posting information on readily
accessible web sites. Some previously blocked sites, such as for the
French journal Le Monde, became available during the year. However, web
sites containing information critical of the Government posted by
international NGO's and foreign governments frequently are blocked,
including a report on Internet use in Tunisia by Human Rights Watch.
The only two Internet service providers in the country remain under the
control of the Tunisian Internet Agency, which was created in 1996 and
which regularly must provide lists of subscribers to the Government.
Human rights activists allege that the Agency regularly interferes with
and intercepts their Internet communications. The Press Code, including
the requirement that advance copies of publications be provided to the
Government, applies to information shared on the Internet (see Section
4).
The Government limits academic freedom. Like journalists,
university professors indicated that they sometimes practiced self-
censorship by avoiding classroom criticism of the Government or
statements supportive of the An-Nahda movement. Professors alleged that
the Government utilized the threat of tax audits, control over
university positions, and strict publishing rules to encourage self-
censorship. The presence of police on campuses also discouraged
dissent. A 1996 regulation requires professors to inform the Ministry
of Higher Education in advance of any seminars, including the list of
participants and subjects to be addressed. Copies of papers to be
presented in university settings or seminars must be provided to the
Ministry in advance. In February police arrested secondary school
students and others demonstrating in the south, and in April 40 other
secondary students were arrested in Tunis (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government imposes some
restrictions on this right. Groups that wish to hold a public meeting,
rally, or march must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Interior by
applying no later than 3 days in advance of the proposed event and
submitting a list of participants. The authorities routinely approve
such permits for groups that support government positions, but often
refuse permission for groups that express dissenting views. The
Government permitted the Tunisia chapter of Amnesty International in
May to hold a public conference in conjunction with the LTDH, the
Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), and the Young Lawyers
Association (AJA) in commemoration of International Freedom of the
Press Day, to hold a public meeting in Sfax in June, and to hold its
annual congress in July. However, on two separate occasions in March
and April, police forcibly broke up a seminar that AI attempted to hold
in its Tunis headquarters regarding human rights violations in Saudi
Arabia, physically abusing AI members (see Section 4). The Government
claimed that AI failed to submit the appropriate request. The
Progressive Socialist Assembly (RSP) opposition party reported that on
July 1, it was refused permission to hold a conference on Liberty and
Democracy at a Tunis hotel; it held the conference at RSP headquarters
instead. According to the LTDH, secondary students, joined by other
youths, held strikes during the second week of February in the southern
towns of Jbeniana, El-Amra, Zarzis, and El-Hamma. The strikes began in
schools, developed into marches and demonstrations, and in some cases
resulted in confrontations with security forces. The Government
reportedly arrested as many as 400 students in connection with the
demonstrations, including some minors who were placed in juvenile
detention centers (see Section 1.d.). The LTDH claimed that numerous
persons reported to the presiding magistrate that they were victims of
police brutality during detention (see Section 1.c.). Students involved
in the February demonstrations were charged with damaging property and
taking part in hostile demonstrations, and received sentences ranging
from 1 to 6 months. Some were acquitted, nine received presidential
pardons, and the remaining students served out their sentences. All had
been released by year's end. The protests and arrests never were
reported by the press.
Over a 3-day period in April, the Government arrested a reported 40
additional secondary-level students, mostly in the greater Tunis area,
for protesting a communique issued by the Government that announced a
change in the final exam week schedule. The Government later denied
that the communique had existed and restored the original exam
schedule. The students were released several hours later without
charge. During a March 28 to 29 hunger strike held by Sihem Bensedrine
and Fatma Ksila at ATFD headquarters to protest the confiscation of
passports, security officials posing as municipal workers closed off
the street to traffic and pedestrians, claiming that the building was
off limits due to a gas leak. The Government also cut off the phone and
fax lines to ATFD headquarters. Credible sources reported that security
forces beat university students during pro-Palestinian demonstrations
in the greater Tunis area in October (see Section 1.c.).
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of association, the
Government restricts this right by barring membership in political
parties organized by religion, race, or region. On these grounds, the
Government prosecutes members of the Islamist movement An-Nahda. For
example, in an April trial, and five September trials, the Government
indicted an estimated 75 alleged An-Nahda members, most of whom were
extradited from Libya in 1997 and had been held in pretrial detention
for over 3 years. In a September 19 trial, the presiding judge indicted
Ahmed Amari, Yousef Khirri, and Choukri Gargouri on multiple counts of
the same charge of membership in An-Nahda. The trial ultimately was
postponed until February 2001 to allow attorneys to interview their
clients and to have access to the Government's case against the
defendants. Human rights activists alleged that the Government extended
its prosecution of Islamist activists to include family members who
were not politically active (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.). A
criminal investigation against former MDS party leader Mohamed Moaada
remained open, a result of his alleged 1997 meeting with An-Nahda
leaders in Europe (see Section 1.e.).
The Government bans organizations that threaten disruption of the
public order and uses this proscription to prosecute members of the
PCOT. In July 1999, the courts convicted 17 students, professors, and
labor activists of membership in the PCOT. The Government released 16
of the PCOT members in 1999. The remaining PCOT prisoner, Fahem
Boukkadous, along with Abdelmounin Belanas, who was convicted of PCOT
membership in a separate trial in 1999, were released on June 10 after
holding a 4-week hunger strike. Three other PCOT members, Hamma
Hammami, Abdeljabbar Madouri, and Samir Taamallah, who were convicted
and given 9-year sentences in absentia, remain in hiding (see Section
1.c.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion. The
Constitution provides for the free exercise of other religions that do
not disturb the public order, and the Government generally observes and
enforces this right; however, it does not permit proselytizing and
partially limits the religious freedom of Baha'is.
The Government recognizes all Christian and Jewish religious
organizations that were established before independence in 1956.
Although the Government permits Christian churches to operate freely,
only the Catholic Church has formal recognition from the post-
independence Government. The other churches operate under land grants
signed by the Bey of Tunis in the 18th and 19th centuries, which are
respected by the post-independence Government.
The Government controls and subsidizes mosques and pays the
salaries of prayer leaders. The President appoints the Grand Mufti of
the Republic. The 1988 Law on Mosques provides that only personnel
appointed by the Government may lead activities in mosques, and
stipulates that mosques must remain closed except during prayer times
and other authorized religious ceremonies, such as marriages or
funerals. New mosques may be built in accordance with national urban
planning regulations but become the property of the State. According to
human rights lawyers, the Government regularly questioned Muslims who
were observed praying frequently in mosques.
The Government allows the Jewish community freedom of worship and
pays the salary of the Grand Rabbi. It also partially subsidizes
restoration and maintenance costs for some synagogues. In October 1999,
the provisional Jewish community elected a new board of directors, its
first since independence in 1956, which is awaiting approval from the
governor of Tunis. Once approval is obtained from the governor, which
reportedly is only a formality, the committee is expected to receive
permanent status. The governor of Tunis still had not granted the
committee permanent status by year's end. The acting board has changed
its name to the Jewish Committee of Tunisia. The Government permits the
Jewish community to operate private religious schools and allows Jewish
children on the island of Jerba to split their academic day between
secular public schools and private religious schools. The Government
also encourages Jewish emigres to return for the annual Jewish
pilgrimage to the historic El-Ghriba Synagogue on the island of Jerba.
The Government regards the Baha'i Faith as a heretical sect of
Islam and permits its adherents to practice their faith only in
private. Although the Government permits Baha'is to hold meetings of
their National Council in private homes, it reportedly has prohibited
them from organizing local councils. The Government reportedly
pressures Baha'is to eschew organized religious activities. There are
credible reports that prominent Baha'is periodically are called in by
police for questioning. The Government unofficially denied Baha'i
requests during the year for permission to elect local assemblies. The
Government also does not permit Baha'is to accept a declaration of
faith from persons who wish to convert to the Baha'i Faith. There were
credible reports that four members of the Baha'i Faith were
interrogated by Ministry of Interior officials in 1999 and pressured to
sign a statement that they would not practice their religion and would
not hold meetings in their homes.
In general the Government does not permit Christian groups to
establish new churches, and proselytizing is viewed as an act against
the public order. Foreign missionary organizations and groups do not
operate in the country. Authorities ask foreigners suspected of
proselytizing to depart the country and do not permit them to return;
however, there were no reported cases of official action against
persons suspected of proselytizing during the year.
Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools;
however, the religious curriculum for secondary school students also
includes the history of Judaism and Christianity. The Zeitouna Koranic
School is part of the Government's national university system.
Both religious and secular NGO's are governed by the same law and
administrative regulations on association that impose some restrictions
on freedom of assembly. For example, all NGO's are required to notify
the Government of meetings to be held in public spaces at least 3 days
in advance and to submit lists of all meeting participants to the
Ministry of Interior. There were credible reports that two Christian
religious organizations did not attempt to register because they
believed that their applications would be rejected, although they were
able to function freely under the auspices of their respective
churches. Neither group believed that it was a victim of religious
discrimination. A third group, composed of foreign Christians mostly
from Sweden and the United Kingdom, is active in providing medical and
social services in the city of Kasserine in the west. Despite its
ambiguous legal status, this group (with 15 to 20 members) reports that
it has been free to pursue its social and medical work without
interference and states that it does not believe that it has been
subject to religious discrimination.
Religious groups are subjected to the same restrictions on freedom
of speech and the press as secular groups. Primary among these
restrictions is ``depot legal,'' the requirement that printers and
publishers provide copies of all publications to the Chief Prosecutor,
the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Culture prior to
publication (see Section 2.a.). Similarly, distributors must deposit
copies of publications printed abroad with the Chief Prosecutor and
various ministries prior to their public release. Although Christian
groups reported that they were able to distribute previously approved
religious publications in European languages without difficulty, they
claimed that the Government generally did not approve either
publication or distribution of Arabic-language Christian material.
Moreover, authorized distribution of religious publications was limited
to existing religious communities, because the Government views public
distribution of both religious and secular documents as a threat to the
public order and hence an illegal act.
There was a credible report of a Muslim couple in Bizerte who had
converted to Christianity, and since 1998 have not been permitted to
renew their passports as a result of their conversion. Muslim women are
not permitted to marry outside their religion. Marriages of Muslim
women to non-Muslim men abroad are considered common-law, which are
prohibited and thus void when the couple returns to the country. Non-
Muslim women who marry Muslim men are not permitted to inherit from
their husbands, nor may the husbands and any children (who are
considered to be Muslim) from the marriage inherit from the non-Muslim
wife.
Although civil law is codified, judges are known to override
codified law with Shari'a (Islamic law) if codified law conflicts with
Shari'a. For example, codified laws provide women with the legal right
to custody over minor children; however, judges have refused to grant
women permission to leave the country with minor children, holding that
Shari'a appoints the father as the head of the family who must grant
children permission to travel.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and persons are free to change their place of residence or work
at will; however, in practice the Government restricts the freedom of
movement and foreign travel of those critical of it.
Amendments to the passport law in October 1998 transferred power
for canceling passports from the Ministry of Interior to the courts;
however, the amended law contains broad provisions that permit passport
seizure on undefined national security grounds and deny citizens the
right either to present their case against seizure or to appeal the
judges' decision. The Ministry of Interior must submit requests to
seize or withhold a citizen's passport through the Public Prosecutor to
the courts.
The Government arbitrarily withholds passports from citizens (see
Section 1.f.); however, it issued passports to numerous persons during
the year who had been denied them in the past. The Government returned
passports to a number of citizens, including high-profile members of
the human rights and Islamist communities, such as Sihem Bensedrine,
Moncef Marzouki, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, Radhia Nasraoui, Khemais Ksila,
Fatma Ksila, Mohamed Hedi Sassi, Iman Darwiche, Radhia Aouididi, Saida
Charbati, and Rachida Ben Salem (see Sections 1.d. and 4). According to
reliable sources, there are many others who still have not received
passports, including human rights lawyer Nejib Hosni, PCOT student
Nourredine Ben N'tiche, as well as many members of the Islamist
community. According to credible sources, some political opponents in
self-imposed exile have been prevented from obtaining or renewing their
passports in order to return (see Section 1.d.). However, the
Government stated that it had returned passports to approximately 200
citizens living abroad (see Section 1.d.).
The Government restricts internal travel during criminal
investigations. The Government dropped travel injunctions against human
rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui, who traveled abroad in June, CNLT member
Moncef Marzouki, who traveled abroad in June and September, LTDH vice
president Khemais Ksila, who traveled abroad in June, and CNLT member
Sihem Bensedrine. In October the Government lifted a court-ordered
travel injunction from a 1998 criminal indictment on CNLT secretary
general Omar Mestiri, which had prevented him from traveling outside
Tunis city limits. The investigation into the 1998 indictment remains
ongoing. In October Mestiri traveled abroad without hindrance. However,
Mestiri claimed that upon his return to Tunis in November, customs
officers searched him and confiscated all the books and documents in
his possession, including a recently released book on torture in
Tunisia, published by the Paris-based organization, the Committee for
the Respect of Human Rights and Freedom in Tunisia (CRDHLT) (see
Sections 2.a. and 4).
Police routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine
their personal identification and vehicular documents (see Section
1.f.).
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assisting refugees. The Government
acknowledged the UNHCR's determination of refugee status, which was
accorded to 450 individuals during the year. Approximately 20 cases
await determination by the UNHCR. The Government provides first asylum
for refugees based on UNHCR recommendations. There is no pattern of
abuse of refugees. Although a few refugees were deported during the
year, none were forced to return to countries where they feared
persecution. The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum and/or
refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides that the citizenry shall elect the
President and members of the legislature for 5-year terms; however,
there still are some significant limitations on citizens' right to
change their government. In October 1999, President Ben Ali was
reelected for a third 5-year term in the country's first multiparty
presidential elections, winning 99.44 percent of the vote. According to
the Constitution, this is to be his last term in office. The ruling RCD
party won all 148 directly elected seats in the legislative elections.
Observers agree that the outcome of the presidential and legislative
elections generally reflected the will of the electorate; however, the
campaign and election processes greatly favored the ruling party and
there was widespread disregard for the secrecy of the vote. The ruling
RCD party so dominates all levels of political activity that credible
electoral challenges have been extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the
results also reflected the general satisfaction of the vast majority
with President Ben Ali's rule, which derives in large part from his
success in promoting economic and social well-being. Opposition
presidential candidates were allowed to run for the first time and
opposition parties were able to campaign freely within the limits
dictated by the Government; however, given the overwhelming dominance
of the RCD, the playing field for the elections was not level. A
presidentially appointed independent election monitoring group
presented a confidential report to the President on the election
process, which reportedly uncovered numerous irregularities alleged by
opposition parties. In response, the Government enacted a law in April,
just before the May municipal elections, that requires voters to bring
copies of all party ballots (not just the ballot with ruling-party
candidates) into the voting booth, in order to help preserve the
secrecy of the vote.
The RCD party and its direct predecessor parties have controlled
the political arena since independence in 1956. The RCD dominates the
Cabinet, the Chamber of Deputies, and regional and local governments.
The President appoints the Cabinet and the 24 governors. The Government
and the party are integrated closely; the President of the Republic
also is the president of the party, and the party's secretary general
holds the rank of minister.
The Government amended the Constitution and Electoral Code in July
1999 to allow party presidents who have been in office for at least 5
years and whose parties were represented in the 1994 to 1999 Chamber of
Deputies (and who met other requirements such as those regarding age
and nationality) to run in the October 1999 presidential elections.
These criteria were a one-time alternative to the more restrictive
standing requirement that candidates for president must receive the
endorsement of 30 sitting deputies or municipal council presidents to
be eligible to run, and paved the way for the first multiparty
presidential elections, as Mohamed Belhaj Amor, secretary general of
the Popular Unity Front (PUP), and Abderrahman Tlili, secretary general
of the Union of Democratic Unionists party (UDU), entered the race.
Both candidates acknowledged flaws in the Electoral Code and criticized
the fact that the narrowly written criteria made only two persons
eligible to run against Ben Ali. At the same time, they stated that
they wanted to advance pluralism by seizing the opportunity to run.
However, after the elections, there were opposition complaints that,
despite some progress in liberalizing the electoral process, problems
remained, especially with regard to protection of the secrecy of the
ballot and the accuracy of the vote totals.
The 182-seat Chamber of Deputies does not function as a
counterweight to the executive branch; rather, it serves as an arena in
which the executive's legislative proposals are debated prior to
virtually automatic approval. Debate within the Chamber is often lively
and government ministers are summoned to respond to deputies'
questions, although heated exchanges critical of government policy are
not reported fully in the press. Regardless of the debate, the Chamber
has a history of approving all government proposals. The Chamber that
emerged from the October 1999 parliamentary elections was more
pluralistic than the Chamber in place from 1994 to 1999, as October
1998 changes in the Electoral Code reserved 20 percent of the seats for
the opposition parties, distributed on a proportional basis to those
parties that did not win directly elected district seats. Five
opposition parties currently hold 34 of 182 seats, or nearly 19
percent, compared with 4 opposition parties with 19 of 163 seats, or 12
percent, in the previous Parliament. The remaining 81 percent of the
seats were contested in winner-take-all, multiseat district races, in
which the ruling party won all 148 directly elected seats, up from 144
in the previous Parliament. Opposition politicians recognized that the
electoral changes ensured them more seats than they could have won in a
popular election. However, they also argue that the winner-take-all,
multi-seat district system permanently favors the RCD and essentially
freezes the opposition at the 20 percent level.
All six legally recognized opposition parties fielded parliamentary
candidates in the October 1999 elections. The Government provided
public financing to political parties, as called for in legislation
adopted in 1997. Under the legislation, each party represented in the
Chamber of Deputies received an annual public subsidy of approximately
$54,000 (60,000 dinars), plus an additional payment of $4,500 (5,000
dinars) per deputy. The Government also provided campaign financing
that corresponded to the number of district lists that each party
presented. Opposition politicians argued that the subsidy system
reinforces the favored position of the ruling party because its
dominance in the Parliament means that it receives the great majority
of the government funding. Moreover, with funding based on the number
of seats in Parliament, the opposition parties had no interest in
forming coalitions against the RCD, but concentrated instead on
competing with each other for the largest possible share of the 20
percent of seats reserved for the opposition. During the elections,
opposition parties found independent fundraising impossible, and those
that published newspapers or magazines faced difficulties in obtaining
paid advertisers.
In the May municipal elections, the RCD won an overwhelming
majority nationwide and retained the large majority of seats (and thus
the mayoralty) in each of 257 municipal councils, although the number
of opposition seats on the councils also increased significantly. The
RCD won all seats in the 192 districts where it ran uncontested, and 94
percent of the 4,128 seats nationwide. Opposition parties and
independent lists won a total of 243 seats in 60 municipalities, up
from a total of 10 seats nationwide in the 1996 elections. Opposition
representation on the councils was enhanced by 1998 Electoral Code
amendments, which provided that any party winning more than 3 percent
of the vote in a district would win or share 20 percent of the seats on
that council.
Opposition parties noted improvements in the administration of the
elections and conduct of the campaigns, although some opposition party
members claimed that they did not receive voting cards from local
authorities. The RCD campaign was far more restrained than in the
October 1999 legislative elections, and press coverage of opposition
parties was broader. The secrecy of the ballot generally was respected
under a new law requiring voters to enter a voting booth, although some
problems continued in that regard. While the Government's voter turnout
estimates appeared to be inflated, the percentages won by opposition
parties appeared credible, and opposition parties did well in a few
areas, including traditional RCD party strongholds.
Women participate in politics, but they are underrepresented in
senior government positions. Twenty-one of the 182 Deputies elected in
October 1999 were women, up from 13 of 163 deputies in the previous
Chamber. There are four women in the Cabinet: Two full ministers (the
Minister of Environment and Land Management and the Minister for Women
and Family Affairs) and two junior ministers (the Secretary of State
for Housing and the Secretary of State for Public Health).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Tunisian Human Rights League is the most active independent
advocacy organization, with 41 branches located throughout many parts
of the country. The organization receives and researches complaints and
protests individual and systemic abuses. The Government continued to
maintain the regular contact with the LTDH that it established in 1999.
Minister of Interior Abdullah Kallel met with LTDH president Taoufik
Bouderbala and other representatives of the League to address issues
such as the return of passports and the release of PCOT prisoners
Abdelmounim Belanas and Fahem Boukkadous (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., and
2.b.). However, LTDH officials reported that the Government still has
not provided any written responses to LTDH inquiries since 1994.
Although the Government permitted the League to hold meetings in
its offices, it continued to place significant obstacles in the way of
the League's effective operation. LTDH members and other human rights
activists reported government harassment, interrogation, property loss
or damage, unauthorized home entry, and denial of passports. Several of
the League's communiques appeared in independent newspapers during the
year and its 2000 National Congress was discussed in a local weekly
magazine, Realites, and independent daily journals. In January the LTDH
hosted human rights training for secondary school teachers in
conjunction with the Arab Institute for Human Rights. In May the LTDH
attended a conference on freedom of the press with Amnesty
International (see Section 2.b). However, in November a Tunis judge
ordered closed the LTDH headquarters and replaced the newly elected
board of directors with a judicial administrator pending the hearing of
a complaint filed by four LTDH members, who claimed that the National
Congress elections did not follow the League's by-laws and therefore
were illegal. Since the closure of their headquarters, LTDH members
claim that they have been under heavy police surveillance and that
plainclothes police have prevented them from entering private homes,
public restaurants, and buildings to meet. On December 25, the
Government held a hearing and postponed the LTDH's civil trial until
January 2001. On December 25, LTDH vice president Slahedine Jourchi was
interrogated by the Public Prosecutor regarding a press release he
published on December 11, but no charges had been filed against him by
year's end.
Although LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila was released in
September 1999, he claims he still is harassed and under constant
surveillance (see Section 1.f.). In a statement published in the May
issue of the biweekly magazine Jeune Afrique, the Government claimed
that it had completed its investigation of the February 1998 ransacking
and burglary of the law office of human rights activist Radhia Nasraoui
and had brought the perpetrators to justice. Human rights activists
believe that security forces carried out the 1998 ransacking and
burglary because some of the documents that the Government presented in
the 1999 PCOT trial were among the documents stolen from Nasraoui's
office. Although Nasraoui received a 6-month suspended sentence in the
PCOT trial, she was prevented from leaving the country in May to attend
an Amnesty International conference in Belgium. The Government claimed
that she still was under a travel injunction from her 1999 suspended
sentence. After verifying that Nasraoui's travel injunction had lapsed,
the Government gave her permission to travel the following day,
although Nasraoui ultimately decided not to travel because she already
had missed the conference (see Section 2.d.). Nasraoui was permitted to
travel out of the country in June.
The Government continued to refuse to authorize the Tunisian
National Council for Liberties to register as an NGO. The CNLT
initially applied for authorization in 1998. The court has not yet
acted on the March 1999 administrative appeal filed by the CNLT's
founders. The Government stated that the case was submitted to a court
of justice, and that the situation requires that the Government leave
the matter to the judiciary. Although not recognized by the Government,
the CNLT issued statements criticizing government human rights
practices. The CNLT published a report in March describing a broad
range of human rights abuses, and proclaimed 2000 as ``the year for the
eradication of torture and the conquest of liberty.'' Government
officials stated that, by publishing communiques in the name of an
unregistered NGO, CNLT members violated the Publications Code (which
requires that advance copies be provided to the Government), belonged
to an illegal organization, and threatened public order. In June the
Government convicted RAID president Fethi Chemki and member Mohamed
Chouarbi of defamation for reproducing the CNLT's March report. Iheb
El-Hani, a photocopy shop owner, who also was indicted in case, was
acquitted of all charges (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., and 2.a.).
There were no developments in the Government's 1999 criminal
investigation of the leader of the Tunisian Association of Young
Lawyers for meeting with CNLT members in his office. A court indicted
both CNLT members Omar Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki in July 1999, and
Marzouki again in November and December 1999, on several charges,
including belonging to an illegal organization, violating the
Publications Code, and spreading false information. There were no
results during the year in the Government's investigation into the
charges, and a trial had not begun by year's end (see Section 2.a.). In
a separate case based on a September indictment, Marzouki was sentenced
on December 30 to a 1-year prison term for maintaining an illegal
organization and distribution of false news for writing a paper used at
a human rights conference held in Morocco that criticized the
Government's National Solidarity Fund charity for lack of transparency.
Marzouki had 10 days to file an appeal of the ruling and had not been
imprisoned by year's end. Marzouki and CNLT member Mustapha Ben Jaafar,
both doctors, allege that the Government prohibits them from treating
patients in retaliation for their human rights activism. In July the
Minister of Health fired Marzouki from his job as a doctor and
professor at the Faculty of Medicine at Sousse University. The
Government claimed that Marzouki submitted a fraudulent medical
certificate to be excused for time off from his position when he
traveled abroad in June. Marzouki claimed that he was fired because he
made statements abroad that were critical of the Government. Marzouki's
family also claims to have suffered from Marzouki's activism. Security
police took CNLT member Mustapha Ben Jaafar briefly into custody in
August for interrogation. The Government also interrogated other
persons who entered the CNLT headquarters throughout the year. On the
weekend of December 10, plainclothes police barred entry to CNLT
headquarters. Omar Mestiri claimed that the police struck lawyers Nejib
Hosni and Raouf Ayadi in front of the headquarters when they attempted
to enter.
The Government issued passports to CNLT members Sihem Bensedrine,
Moncef Marzouki, and Mustapha Ben Jaafar; however, other CNLT members
were unable to obtain passports (see Sections 1.f., 2.a., and 2.d.).
The Arab Institute for Human Rights, headquartered in Tunis, was
founded in 1989 by the LTDH, the Arab Organization for Human Rights,
and the Union of Arab lawyers. It is an information, rather than an
advocacy, organization, and the Government supports its activities.
Amnesty International continued to maintain a Tunisian chapter. Its
members complained that the Tunis office suffered repeated loss of
telephone and fax service. Persons who were considering joining AI's
Tunisia chapter report that security officials discouraged them from
doing so. AI officials reported that they were under periodic police
surveillance. The Government denied two requests, one in March and
another in April, for AI to hold a seminar on human rights in Saudi
Arabia. The Government stated that AI had not submitted the appropriate
request. On July 11, the Government refused entry to AI researcher
Donatella Rovera, FIDH president Patrick Baudouin, and France-section
AI president Hassina Giraud upon their arrival at Tunis-Carthage
Airport. Although the Government gave no official explanation why the
three were refused entry, government officials have accused Amnesty
International of exaggerating reports of human rights violations in
Tunisia. However, the Government permitted AI to hold a public meeting
in Tunis in May in celebration of International Freedom of the Press
Day and a public meeting in Sfax in June, and to hold its annual
meeting in July (see Section 2.b.). The Government permitted numerous
foreign members of AI to enter the country and attend the July meeting.
Throughout the year, the Government permitted observers from AI,
the International Human Rights Federation, and other international
human rights organizations to monitor trials. The observers reported
that the Government permitted them to conduct their work freely (see
Section 1.e.). However, the Government reportedly blocked access to the
Internet web sites produced by some of these organizations and those
produced by the Committee to Protect Journalists (see Section 2.a.).
Human rights activists and lawyers complain of frequently interrupted
postal and telephone services (see Section 1.f.).
Human rights offices in certain ministries and a governmental body,
the Higher Commission on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, address and
sometimes resolve human rights complaints. The Higher Commission
submits confidential reports directly to President Ben Ali. There is a
Ministry of Human Rights, Communications, and Relations with the
Chamber of Deputies, which is within the Prime Minister's office and is
headed by Minister Afif Hendaoui. The first Minister for Human Rights,
Daly Jazi, was dismissed on April 5 after less than 5 months in the
position. The Government gave no reason for Jazi's dismissal. However,
Jazi subsequently was appointed as an advisor to the President.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that all citizens shall have equal rights
and responsibilities and be equal under the law, and the Government
generally upholds these rights in practice. Legal or societal
discrimination is not prevalent, apart from that experienced by women
in certain areas, such as inheritance, which is governed by Shari'a.
Shari'a provides that daughters receive only half the amount left to
sons.
Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no
comprehensive statistics to measure its extent. According to one family
court judge, women file 4,000 complaints of domestic violence each
year, but later drop approximately half of those complaints. The
Tunisian Democratic Women's Association operates the country's only
counseling center for women who are victims of domestic violence. The
center, located in Tunis, assists approximately 20 women per month.
Instances of rape or assault by someone unknown to the victim are rare.
Battered women first seek help from family members. Police intervention
often is ineffective because police officers and the courts tend to
regard domestic violence as a problem to be handled by the family.
Nonetheless, there are stiff penalties for spouse abuse. Both the fine
and imprisonment for battery or violence committed by a spouse or
family member are double those for the same crimes committed by an
individual not related to the victim. Although previously treated as a
taboo subject by the media, the Government in April presented a
televised panel discussion on domestic violence and in August President
Ben Ali ordered an investigation into the extent of domestic violence.
The Government had not released a report by year's end.
Women enjoy substantial rights and the Government has made serious
efforts to advance those rights, especially in the areas of property-
ownership practices and support to divorced women. The 1956 Personal
Status Code outlawed polygamy. A 1998 presidential decree created a
national fund to protect the rights of divorced women, ensuring that
the State would provide financial support to women whose former
husbands refused to make child support and alimony payments. The
Government has processed over 5,600 requests providing divorced women
over $8 million (11 million dinars) since the fund's inception.
Legislation requires civil authorities to advise couples on the merits
of including provisions for joint property in marriage contracts.
Nonetheless, most property acquired during marriage, including property
acquired solely by the wife, still is held in the name of the husband.
Inheritance law, based on Shari'a and tradition, discriminates against
women, and women still face societal and economic discrimination in
certain areas, such as private sector employment. The Government took
strong measures to reduce official discrimination, including adding
equal opportunity for women as a standard part of its audits of all
governmental entities and state-owned enterprises; however, it did not
extend such measures to the private sector.
Women are entering the work force in increasing numbers, employed
particularly in the textile, manufacturing, health, and agricultural
sectors. According to 1999 government statistics, women constituted 29
percent of the work force; there are an estimated 2,000 businesses
headed by women. Women constitute 37.1 percent of the civil service,
employed primarily in the fields of health, education, and social
affairs, at the middle or lower levels. Women constitute 60 percent of
all judges in the capital and 24 percent of the nation's total jurists.
Approximately 50.4 percent of university students enrolled in the 1999-
2000 academic year were women. The law explicitly requires equal pay
for equal work. The Government includes equal opportunity for women as
a standard part of its audits of all government ministries, agencies,
and state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, while the rate of
illiteracy has dropped markedly in both rural and urban areas, the rate
of female illiteracy in all categories is at least double that of men.
Among 10- to 14-year-old children, 5.5 percent of urban girls are
illiterate, compared with 2.2 percent of urban boys, and 27 percent of
rural girls compared with less than 7 percent of rural boys.
Several active NGO's focus, in whole or in part, on women's
advocacy, or research women's issues, and a cadre of attorneys
represent women in domestic cases. Media attention focuses on women's
economic and academic accomplishments, and usually omits reference to
culturally sensitive issues. The Government funded several studies and
projects designed to improve the role of women in the media. According
to a government study, women represented 25.2 percent of professional
journalists in 1998.
There is a separate Ministry for Women and Family Affairs, with a
relatively large budget to support its mission to ensure the legal
rights and improve the socioeconomic status of women. The Government
supports and provides funding to the National Women's Union, women's
professional associations, and the Government's Women's Research
Center.
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
public education, which is compulsory until age 16. Primary school
enrollment for the 1999-2000 scholastic year was slightly less than the
preceding year's, reflecting a decline in the birth rate; secondary
school enrollment showed an increase of 8 percent. The Government
reported that 99.1 percent of children attend primary school full-time.
The Government offers a maternal and child health program, providing
prenatal and postnatal services. It sponsors an immunization program
targeting preschool age children, and reports that over 95 percent of
children are vaccinated.
In 1995 the Government promulgated laws as part of a code for the
protection of children. The code proscribes child abuse, abandonment,
and sexual or economic exploitation. Penalties for convictions for
abandonment and assault on minors are severe. There is no societal
pattern of abuse of children. There is a Ministry for Children and
Youths and a Presidential Delegate to Safeguard the Rights and Welfare
of Children.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based
on disability and mandates that at least 1 percent of the public and
private sector jobs be reserved for the disabled. All public buildings
constructed since 1991 must be accessible to physically disabled
persons. Many cities, including the capital, have begun to install
wheelchair access ramps on city sidewalks. There is a general trend
toward making public transportation more accessible to disabled
persons. The Government issues special cards to the disabled for
benefits such as unrestricted parking, priority medical services,
preferential seating on public transportation, and consumer discounts.
Indigenous People.--The Government estimates that the small Amazigh
(Berber) minority constitutes less than 3 percent of the population.
Some older Amazighs have retained their native language, but the
younger generation has been assimilated into Tunisian culture through
schooling and marriage. Amazighs are free to participate in politics
and to express themselves culturally.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
stipulate the right of workers to form unions. The Tunisian General
Federation of Labor is the country's only labor federation. About 15
percent of the work force, including civil servants and employees of
state-owned enterprises, are members, and a considerably larger
proportion of the work force is covered by union contracts. There is no
legal prohibition against the establishment of other labor federations.
A union may be dissolved only by court order.
The UGTT and its member unions legally are independent of the
Government and the ruling party, but operate under regulations that
restrict their freedom of action. The UGTT's membership includes
persons associated with all political tendencies, although Islamists
have been removed from union offices. There are credible reports that
the UGTT receives substantial government subsidies to supplement modest
union dues and funding from the National Social Security Account. While
regional and sector-specific unions operate with more independence, the
central UGTT leadership follows a policy of cooperation with the
Government on its economic reform program.
Unions, including those representing civil servants, have the right
to strike, provided they give 10 days' advance notice to the UGTT and
it approves of the strike. However, this advance approval rarely is
sought in practice. There were numerous short-lived strikes over pay
and conditions, and over efforts by employers to impede union
activities. While the majority of these technically were illegal, the
Government did not prosecute workers for illegal strike activity, and
the strikes were covered objectively in the press. The International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions has characterized the requirement
for prior UGTT approval of strikes as a violation of worker rights. The
law prohibits retribution against strikers, but there have been cases
of employers punishing strikers nevertheless, which forces the strikers
to pursue costly and time-consuming legal remedies to protect their
rights.
Labor disputes are settled through conciliation panels in which
labor and management are represented equally. Tripartite regional
arbitration commissions settle industrial disputes when conciliation
fails.
Unions are free to associate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is protected by law and observed in
practice. Wages and working conditions are set in triennial
negotiations between the UGTT member unions and employers. Forty-seven
collective bargaining agreements set standards for industries in the
private sector and cover 80 percent of the total private sector
workforce. Each accord is negotiated by representatives of unions and
employers in the area the accord encompasses. The Government's role in
the private sector negotiations is minimal, consisting mainly of
lending its good offices if talks appear to be stalled. However, the
Government must approve (but may not modify) the agreements. When
approved the agreements set standards for all employees, both union and
nonunion, in the areas that they cover. The UGTT also negotiates wages
and work conditions of civil servants and employees of state-owned
enterprises. The Government is the partner for such negotiations. The
1999 triennial negotiation ended in February 2000. The agreements
signed provided for annual wage increases ranging from 4 to 6 percent.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. However,
the UGTT is concerned about antiunion activity among private sector
employers, especially the firing of union activists and the use of
temporary workers to avoid unionization. In certain industries, such as
textiles, hotels, and construction, temporary workers account for a
large majority of the work force. The Labor Code protects temporary
workers, but enforcement is more difficult than in the case of
permanent workers. The 1999 discussions on this issue between the UGTT
and the Government failed to achieve any results. A committee chaired
by an officer from the Labor Inspectorate of the Office of the
Inspector General of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and including a
labor representative and an employers' association representative,
approves all worker dismissals.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor by either adults or children, and it is not
known to occur. The Government abolished forced and compulsory labor in
1989.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. The minimum
age for light work in the nonindustrial and agricultural sectors is 13
years. The law also requires children to attend school until age 16.
Workers between the ages of 14 and 18 must have 12 hours of rest per
day, which must include the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Children
between the ages of 14 and 16 in nonagricultural sectors may work no
more than 2 hours per day. The total time that they spend in school and
work may not exceed 7 hours per day. The minimum age for hazardous work
is 18. Inspectors of the Ministry of Social Affairs examine the records
of employees to verify that employers comply with the minimum age law.
Nonetheless, young children often perform agricultural work in rural
areas and work as vendors in urban areas, primarily during the summer
vacation from school.
Observers have expressed concern that child labor continues to
exist disguised as apprenticeship, particularly in the handicraft
industry, and in the cases of teenage girls whose families place them
as household domestics in order to collect their wages. There are no
reliable statistics on the extent of this phenomenon; however, an
independent lawyer who conducted a study of the practice concluded that
hiring of underage girls as household domestics has declined with
increased government enforcement of school attendance and minimum work
age laws. The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the
Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides for a
range of administratively determined minimum wages, which are set by a
commission of representatives from the Ministries of Social Affairs,
Planning, Finance, and National Economy, in consultation with the UGTT
and the Employers' Association. The President approves the commission's
recommendations. On May 1, the industrial minimum wage was raised by
6.32 dinars to $138 (186.992 dinars) per month for a 48-hour workweek
and $121 (163.798 dinars) per month for a 40-hour workweek. The
agricultural minimum wage is $4.30 (5.809 dinars) per day. When
supplemented by transportation and family allowances, the minimum wage
provides for a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but
nothing more, as it covers only essential costs. The Labor Code sets a
standard 48-hour workweek for most sectors and requires one 24-hour
rest period per week. The few foreign workers have the same protections
as citizen workers.
Regional labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing standards.
They inspect most firms about once every 2 years. However, the
Government often encounters difficulty in enforcing the minimum wage
law, particularly in nonunionized sectors of the economy. Moreover,
more than 240,000 workers are employed in the informal sector, which
falls outside the purview of labor legislation.
The Ministry of Social Affairs has responsibility for enforcing
health and safety standards in the workplace. There are special
government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as mining,
petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions and
standards tend to be better in firms that are export oriented than in
those producing exclusively for the domestic market. Workers are free
to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing
their employment, and they may take legal action against employers who
retaliate against them for exercising this right.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, it prohibits slavery and bonded labor. There were
no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through
the country.
__________
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates
established in 1971. None has any democratically elected institutions
or political parties. Traditional rule in the emirates generally has
been patriarchal, with political allegiance defined in terms of loyalty
to the tribal leaders. Political leaders in the emirates are not
elected, but citizens may express their concerns directly to their
leaders via traditional mechanisms, such as the open majlis, or
council. In accordance with the 1971 Constitution, the seven emirate
rulers constitute a Federal Supreme Council, the highest legislative
and executive body. The Council selects a President and Vice President
from its membership; the President in turn appoints the Prime Minister
and Cabinet. The Constitution requires the Council to meet annually,
although individual leaders meet frequently in more traditional
settings. The Cabinet manages the Federation on a day-to-day basis. A
consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC), consisting of
advisors appointed by the emirate rulers, has no legislative authority
but questions government ministers in open sessions and makes policy
recommendations to the Cabinet. Each emirate retains control over its
own oil and mineral wealth, some aspects of internal security, and some
regulation of internal and external commerce. The federal Government
asserts primacy in matters of foreign and defense policy, some aspects
of internal security, and increasingly in matters of law and the supply
of some government services. The judiciary generally is independent,
but its decisions are subject to review by the political leadership.
Each emirate maintains its own independent police force. While all
emirate internal security organs theoretically are branches of one
federal organization, in practice they operate with considerable
independence.
The UAE has a free market economy based on oil and gas production,
trade, and light manufacturing. The Government owns the majority share
of the petroleum production enterprise in the largest emirate, Abu
Dhabi. The Emirate of Dubai is likewise an oil producer, as well as a
growing financial and commercial center in the Gulf. The remaining five
emirates have negligible petroleum or other resources and therefore
depend in varying degrees on federal government subsidies, particularly
for basic services such as health care, electricity, water, and
education. The economy provides citizens with a high per capita income,
but it is heavily dependent on foreign workers, who constitute at least
80 percent of the general population.
The Government generally respected its citizens' rights in some
areas and continued to improve in other areas; however, its record was
poor in other areas, particularly with respect to its denial of
citizens' right to change their government and its placement of
limitations on the labor rights of foreign workers. The Government
denied citizens the right to change their government. The Government at
times abused persons in custody, denied citizens the right to a speedy
trial and legal counsel during police investigations, and restricted
the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and religion. The
press continued to avoid direct criticism of the Government and
exercised self-censorship. Women continue to make progress in education
and in the work force. In April the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued
a directive allowing for the inclusion of women in the diplomatic
corps. However, some discrimination against women persists, including
informal restrictions on their ability to register businesses. The
Government limits worker rights, and abuse of foreign domestic servants
is a problem. There were reports of trafficking in persons.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or degrading treatment,
and there were no confirmed reports of torture; however, there are
consistent but unconfirmed reports from foreign prisoners of beatings
and coerced confessions by police during initial detention. The
Government conducted internal investigations of these reports, and
maintained that they were groundless. According to unconfirmed sources,
in March a Qatari journalist reportedly was subjected to sleep
deprivation and physical abuse during his 2-week detention after the
authorities arrested him for publishing a series of satirical columns
in the Dubai newspaper Gulf News (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
Shari'a (Islamic law) courts frequently impose flogging (except in
Dubai) on Muslims found guilty of adultery, prostitution, and drug or
alcohol abuse. In practice flogging is administered in accordance with
Shari'a in order as to prevent major or permanent injuries. The
individual administering the lashing swings the whip using the forearm
only. According to press accounts, punishments for adultery and
prostitution have ranged from 39 to 200 lashes. Individuals convicted
of drunkenness have been sentenced to 80 lashes. The federal Supreme
Court ruled in 1993 that convictions in the Shari'a courts do not
necessarily require the imposition of Shari'a penalties on non-Muslims,
but such sentences have been carried out in a few cases.
In February an Indonesian woman convicted of adultery by the
Shari'a court in the Emirate of Fujairah, was sentenced to death by
stoning after she purportedly insisted on such punishment. The sentence
was commuted on appeal to 1 year in prison, followed by deportation. In
June 1998, the Shari'a court in Fujairah sentenced three Omani
nationals convicted of robbery to have their right hands amputated. The
Fujairah prosecutor's office instead commuted the sentence to a term of
imprisonment.
In central prisons that hold long-term inmates, prisoners are
provided with food, medical care, and adequate sanitation facilities,
but sleep on slabs built into cell walls or on the floor. Each prisoner
is provided with four blankets. Only some blocks of the central prisons
are air-conditioned during the intense heat and humidity of the summer.
The Government gradually is phasing air conditioning into the prisons.
Currently, prisoners with medical conditions are placed in
airconditioned rooms during the summer months. Prisoners not under
investigation and not involved in drug cases may receive visitors up to
three times each week and may also make occasional local telephone
calls. In Dubai Emirate, most prisoners are allowed family visits and a
number of telephone calls.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arrest, search, detention, or imprisonment, except in
accordance with the law, and authorities generally respect these
provisions in practice. The law prohibits arrest or search without
probable cause.
Under the Criminal Procedures Code, the police must report arrests
within 48 hours to the Attorney General, who must determine within the
next 24 hours whether to charge, release, or order further detention
pending an investigation. The Attorney General may order that detainees
be held for up to 21 days without charge. After that time, the
authorities must obtain a court order for further detention without
charge.
Although the code does not specify a right to a speedy trial,
authorities bring detainees to trial in reasonable time with the
exception of drug-related cases, for which the authorities must inform
the Office of the President in the Abu Dhabi Emirate (also known as the
Diwan) of the charges. Trials may last a substantial period of time,
depending on the seriousness of the charges, number of witnesses, and
availability of judges. There is no formal system of bail, but the
authorities temporarily may release detainees who deposit money or an
important document such as a passport. The law permits incommunicado
detention, but there is no evidence that it is practiced. Defendants in
cases involving loss of life, including involuntary manslaughter, may
be denied release in accordance with the law. However, bail usually is
permitted, after a payment of ``diya,'' a form of financial
compensation for death or injury cases.
Review of criminal cases by the office of the President in Abu
Dhabi and bureaucratic delays in processing prisoners or releasing them
sometimes result in detainees serving additional, unnecessary time in
the central prisons (see Section 1.e.). Some bureaucratic delays have
kept prisoners incarcerated for as long as several months beyond their
court-mandated release dates.
According to unconfirmed sources, in March a Qatari journalist was
subjected to sleep deprivation and physical abuse during his 2-week
detention after the authorities arrested him for publishing a series of
satirical columns in the Dubai newspaper Gulf News (see Sections 1.c.
and 2.a.).
The Crown Prince of Dubai in August granted an amnesty for 200
citizen and 300 foreigner prisoners convicted of drug-related offenses.
The foreign prisoners were deported upon release. To celebrate the
success of the surgery performed in August on the President, the ruler
of the Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah ordered the release of 119 prisoners
who had been convicted on charges relating to financial crimes. The
release was followed by the issuance of amnesty orders by the ruler of
Umm Al-Quwain, which allowed for the release of an unspecified number
of prisoners, and by the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince, ordering the release
of 150 prisoners convicted of financial crimes.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
independence of the judiciary; however, its decisions are subject to
review by the political leadership.
There is a dual system of Shari'a and civil courts. The civil
courts generally are part of the federal system and are answerable to
the federal Supreme Court, located in Abu Dhabi, which has the power of
judicial review as well as original jurisdiction in disputes between
emirates or between the federal Government and individual emirates.
Courts and other elements of the judicial system in the Emirate of
Dubai tend to maintain independence from the federal system.
The Shari'a courts are administered by each emirate but also must
answer to the federal Supreme Court. In 1994 the President decreed that
the Shari'a courts, and not the civil courts, would have the authority
to try almost all types of criminal cases. The decree did not affect
the emirates of Dubai and Ras AlKhaimah, which have lower courts
independent of the federal system. Dubai has a special Shi'a council to
act on matters pertaining to Shi'a family law (see Section 5).
Legal counsel may represent defendants in both court systems. Under
the new Criminal Procedures Code, the accused has a right to counsel in
all cases involving a capital crime or possible life imprisonment. Only
the Emirate of Dubai has a public defender's office. If the defendant
is indigent, the Government will provide counsel. However, in Dubai the
Government provides indigents counsel only in felony cases. The Supreme
Court ruled in 1993 that a defendant in an appeals case has a
``fundamental right'' to select his attorney and that this right
supersedes a judge's power to appoint an attorney for the defendant.
The right to legal counsel is interpreted to provide that the
accused is entitled to an attorney only after the police have completed
their investigation. Thus, the police may question accused persons--
sometimes for days or weeks, as in narcotics cases--without the benefit
of legal counsel.
Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. There are no
jury trials. The number of judges sitting for a case depends on the
type of crime alleged; three judges normally sit for criminal cases.
All trials are public, except national security cases and those deemed
by the judge likely to harm public morality. Most judges are foreign
nationals, primarily from other Arab countries; however, the number of
citizens serving as public prosecutors and judges, particularly at the
federal level, continued to grow.
Each court system has an appeals process. Death sentences may be
appealed to the ruler of the emirate in which the offense was committed
or to the President of the Federation. Non-Muslims who are tried for
criminal offenses in Shari'a courts may receive civil penalties at the
discretion of the judge. Shari'a penalties imposed on non-Muslims may
be overturned or modified by a higher court.
The Diwan, following the traditional prerogatives of a local ruler,
maintains the practice of reviewing many types of criminal and civil
offenses (such as alcohol use, drug-related cases, firearm use, cases
involving personal injury, and cases affecting tribal harmony) before
cases are referred to the prosecutor's office. However, this practice
is not as prevalent as in past years, and such cases usually are
referred directly to the prosecutor's office. The Diwan also reviews
sentences passed by judges and reserves the right to return cases to
the courts on appeal. The Diwan's involvement leads to long delays
prior to and following the judicial process, causing prisoners to
remain in prison after they have completed their sentence. Although
there are reports of intervention by other emirates' rulers in specific
cases of personal interest, intervention does not appear to be routine.
The military has its own court system based on Western military
judicial practice. Military tribunals try only military personnel.
There is no separate national security court system. In Dubai convicted
criminals are eligible for executive pardon, often based on
humanitarian grounds, once they have served at least half of their
sentence.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits entry into homes without
the owner's permission, except in accordance with the law. Only police
officers and public prosecutors carrying a warrant are permitted entry
into homes. If the authorities enter a home without a warrant, their
actions are considered illegal. In an August case in Dubai, a judge
suppressed evidence that was obtained by police without a warrant.
Officers' actions in searching premises are subject to review, and
officers are subject to disciplinary action if they act irresponsibly.
Local custom and practice place a high value on privacy, and entry into
private homes without the owner's permission is rare. There is no known
surveillance of private correspondence. However, foreigners have
received sealed publications, such as magazines, through the
international mail in which pictures of the naked human figure have
been blackened over with a marking pen.
Family law for Muslims is governed by Shari'a and the local Shari'a
courts. As such, Muslim women are forbidden to marry non-Muslims. Such
a marriage may result in both partners being arrested and tried.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech; however, the Government limits this right in
practice. Most persons, especially foreign nationals, refrain from
criticizing the Government in public.
All published material is subject to Federal Law 15 of 1988, which
stipulates that all publications, whether books or periodicals, should
be licensed by the Ministry of Information. The law also governs
content and contains a list of proscribed subjects. Mindful of these
provisions, journalists censor themselves when reporting on government
policy, the ruling families, national security, religion, and relations
with neighboring states. However, following an October 1999 interview
with the semiofficial daily newspaper Al-Ittihad, in which Deputy Prime
Minister Sultan Bin Zayid Al-Nahyan stated that uncovering
inefficiencies in government was one of the duties of the press,
newspapers began publishing articles critical of alleged inefficiencies
in the delivery of services by the Ministries of Health, Education, and
Electricity and Water. In August the English-language daily newspaper
Gulf News featured a two-part expose on life in the Dubai women's
central prison. A rare look into a women's correctional facility, the
series included interviews with citizen and foreign prisoners,
describing in depth a typical day in the prison. In December a new
Arabic-language newspaper, Akhbar Al-Arab, owned by a member of the Al-
Nahyan ruling family, was established in Abu Dhabi.
However, in March the Ministry of Information and Culture filed a
lawsuit against the Dubai newspaper Gulf News in response to a series
of sharply satirical columns that it published by Qatari journalist
Abdul-Wahed Al-Mawlawi, which featured selfdeprecatory humor regarding
stereotypes of alleged shortcomings of Gulf Arabs. The Government
considered the articles to be offensive to Gulf citizens in general and
to the country's citizens in particular. According to unconfirmed
sources, the Government also arrested AlMawlawi about 1 week after the
publication of the last of the columns, reportedly subjected him to
sleep deprivation and physical abuse during his 2-week detention, then
expelled him to Qatar (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The Ministry
withdrew the lawsuit after the editor of the newspaper agreed to
publish on the front page of the Gulf News a one-page apology for
having caused any offense. In September the Government briefly banned
10 prominent citizens, including 4 university professors, from
publishing opinion pieces in the country's Arabic- and English-language
press. The Ministry of Information imposed the ban after the writers
took up the cause in the press of over 100 employees who had been laid
off by the government-financed Emirates Media Corporation. No official
justification was given for the ban, which was lifted against all 10
citizens by late October.
In September 1999, Emirates Media, which publishes Al-Ittihad and
owns Abu Dhabi's radio and television stations, issued a directive
forbidding all its employees, including journalists, from speaking with
representatives of foreign diplomatic missions without prior approval.
Also in 1999, Dubai Emirate announced plans to open a press club as
part of its effort to promote Dubai as a major regional communications
hub. The club provides facilities for the international press,
including access to information, and serves as a site for open
discussions between political figures and journalists. The country's
three English-language newspapers are privately owned, as are three out
of its six Arabic-language newspapers; however, privately owned
newspapers receive government subsidies. Foreign publications routinely
are subjected to censorship before distribution.
All television and radio stations, with the exception of Ajman
Emirate's local television station, are government owned and conform to
government reporting guidelines. These unpublished guidelines are not
always applied consistently. In July 1999, Emirates Media purchased
Ajman Emirate's satellite television station. Satellite receiving
dishes are widespread and provide access to international broadcasts
without apparent censorship. Censors at the Ministry of Information and
Culture review imported newspapers, periodicals, books, films, and
videos and ban any material considered pornographic, violent,
derogatory to Islam, supportive of certain Israeli positions, unduly
critical of friendly countries, or critical of the Government or the
ruling families. In June the state telephone and Internet monopoly
substantially lowered Internet prices for the third time in 3 years and
sought to encourage greater use of the Internet. The Internet monopoly
uses a proxy server that appears aimed, in most instances, at blocking
material regarded as pornographic or as promoting radical Islamic
ideologies. In most cases, the proxy server does not appear to block
news services or political expression unrelated to radical Islam, or
material originating from specific countries. However, the Internet
monopoly solicits suggestions from users regarding ``objectionable''
sites and sometimes has responded by briefly blocking some politically
oriented sites, which were, after an apparent review, later unblocked.
In October following the increase in violence in Israel, the West Bank,
and Gaza, Etislat established a web page depicting images of the dead
and injured, and containing a discussion forum and bulletin boards, in
which persons accessing the page could post their opinions.
The unwritten but generally recognized ban on criticism of the
Government also restricts academic freedom, although in recent years
academics have been more open in their criticism. Academic materials
destined for schools in the country are subject to censorship. At Zayid
University, the female students are banned from reading texts in which
the human body is pictured or sexuality is featured (see Section 5).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
tightly restricts the freedom of peaceful assembly. Organized public
gatherings require a government permit. Each emirate determines its own
practice on public gatherings. Some emirates are relatively tolerant of
seminars and conferences on sensitive subjects. Citizens normally
confine their political discussions to the numerous gatherings or
majlis, which are held in private homes. There are no restrictions on
such gatherings.
In October the Government issued permits for demonstrations
throughout the country to protest the Israeli Government's actions
against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza during the
fall. These public marches, in which both citizens and foreigners
participated, were peaceful in nature. Demonstrations, many of which
were organized by female students, also took place at universities.
The Government tightly restricts freedom of association.
Unauthorized political organizations are prohibited. All private
associations, including children's clubs, charitable groups, and hobby
associations, must be approved and licensed by local authorities;
however, this requirement is enforced only loosely in some emirates.
Private associations must follow the Government's censorship guidelines
if they publish any material.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The federal Constitution designates Islam
as the official religion, and Islam is also the official religion of
all seven of the individual emirates of the federal union. The federal
Constitution also provides for the freedom to exercise religious
worship in accordance with established customs, provided that it does
not conflict with public policy or violate public morals, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice; however, the
Government controls all Sunni mosques and prohibits proselytizing.
Virtually all Sunni mosques are government funded or subsidized;
about 5 percent of Sunni mosques are entirely private, and several
large mosques have large private endowments. The federal Ministry of
Awqaf and Religious Affairs distributes weekly guidance to both Sunni
and Shi'a sheikhs regarding religious sermons and ensures that clergy
do not deviate frequently or significantly from approved topics in
their sermons. All Sunni imams are employees of either the federal
Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs or individual emirate
ministries. In 1993 the Emirate of Dubai placed private mosques under
the control of its Department of Islamic Affairs and Endowments. This
change gave the Government control over the appointment of preachers
and the conduct of their work.
The Shi'a minority, which is concentrated in the northern emirates,
is free to worship and maintain its own mosques. All Shi'a mosques are
considered private and receive no funds from the Government. The
Government does not appoint sheikhs for Shi'a mosques. Shi'a Muslims in
Dubai may pursue Shi'a family law cases through a special Shi'a council
rather than the Shari'a courts.
In April the Ras Al-Khaimah Shari'a court ruled that anyone found
guilty of employing a magician to cast a spell on others would be
sentenced to death. The ruling followed the sentencing of a citizen to
4 months' imprisonment for allegedly hiring a magician to cast a spell
on her former husband and sister.
The Government does not recognize all non-Muslim religions. In
those emirates that officially recognize and thereby grant a legal
identity to non-Muslim religious groups, only a limited number of
Christian groups are granted this recognition. While recognizing the
difference between Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant
Christianity, the authorities make no legal distinction between
Christian groups, particularly Protestants. Several often-unrelated
Christian congregations are required to share common facilities because
of official limitations on the number of Christian denominations that
are recognized officially. Non-Muslim and non-Christian religions are
not recognized legally in any of the emirates. Partly as a result of
emirate policies regarding recognition of non-Muslim denominations,
facilities for Christian congregations are far greater in number and
size than those for non-Christian and non-Muslim groups, despite the
fact that Christians are a small minority of non-Muslim foreigners.
Major cities have Christian churches, some that were built on land
donated by the ruling families of the emirates in which they are
located. In Sharjah a new Catholic church was opened in 1997 and a new
Armenian Orthodox church in 1998, both with public ceremonies. The
Government of Dubai Emirate donated a parcel of land in Jebel Ali in
1998 for the construction of a facility to be shared by four Protestant
congregations and a Catholic congregation. Also in 1998, land was
designated in Jebel Ali for the construction of a second Christian
cemetery, and Abu Dhabi Emirate donated land for the expansion of
existing Christian burial facilities. In 1999 land was designated in
Ras Al-Khaimah Emirate for the construction of a new Catholic church.
Dubai permits one Hindu temple and two Sikh temples to operate.
There are no such temples elsewhere in the country. There are no
Buddhist temples; however, Buddhists, along with Hindus and Sikhs in
cities without temples, conduct religious ceremonies in private homes
without interference. In 1998 Abu Dhabi Emirate donated land for the
establishment of the country's first Baha'i cemetery. There are only
two operating cremation facilities and associated cemeteries for the
large Hindu community, one in Dubai and one in Sharjah. Official
permission must be obtained for their use in every instance, posing a
hardship for the large Hindu community, and neither accepts Hindus who
have died in other parts of the country for cremation or burial. The
remains of Hindus who die outside Dubai and Sharjah in all cases must
be repatriated to their home country at considerable expense.
Non-Muslims in the country are free to practice their religion but
may not proselytize publicly or distribute religious literature. The
Government follows a policy of tolerance towards non-Muslim religions
and in practice interferes very little in the religious activities of
non-Muslims. Apparent differences in the treatment of Muslim and non-
Muslim groups often have their origin in the dichotomy between citizens
and noncitizens rather than religious difference.
The Government permits foreign clergy to minister to foreign
populations, and non-Muslim religious groups are permitted to engage in
private charitable activities and to send their children to private
schools. Apart from donated land for the construction of churches and
other religious facilities, including cemeteries, non-Muslim groups are
not supported financially or subsidized by the Government. However,
they are permitted to raise money from among their congregants and to
receive financial support from abroad. Christian churches are permitted
to advertise openly certain church functions, such as memorial
services, in the press.
The conversion of Muslims to other religions is regarded with
extreme antipathy. While there is no law against missionary activities,
authorities have threatened to revoke the residence permits of persons
suspected of such activities, and customs authorities have questioned
the entry of large quantities of religious materials (Bibles, hymnals,
etc.) that they deemed in excess of the normal requirements of existing
congregations, although in most instances the questions have been
resolved and the items have been admitted.
There have been reports that customs authorities are less likely to
question the importation of Christian religious items than other non-
Muslim religious items, although in virtually all instances importation
of the material in question eventually has been permitted.
Although emirate immigration authorities routinely ask foreigners
to declare their religious affiliation, the Government does not collect
or analyze this information, and religious affiliation is not a factor
in the issuance or renewal of visas or residence permits.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no limitations on freedom of
movement or relocation within the country, except for security areas
such as defense and oil installations.
Unrestricted foreign travel and emigration are permitted to male
citizens, except those involved in financial disputes under
adjudication. A husband may bar his wife and children from leaving the
country. All citizens have the right to return. There is a small
population of stateless residents, many of whom have lived in the
country for more than one generation. Many stateless residents are
originally from Iran and South Asia; other stateless residents include
Bedouins or the descendants of Bedouins who are unable to prove that
they are of UAE origin. There is no formal procedure for
naturalization, although foreign women receive citizenship by marriage
to a citizen, and anyone may receive a passport by presidential fiat.
Because they are not of the original tribal groups, naturalized
citizens may have their passports and citizenship status revoked for
criminal or politically provocative actions. Such revocations are rare.
Citizens are not restricted in seeking or changing employment.
However, foreign nationals in specific occupations, primarily
professional, may not change employers without first leaving the
country for 6 months. During 1997 in an effort to liberalize employment
regulations, the federal Government removed the 6month ban from some of
these professions. Some foreign nationals involved in disputes with
employers, particularly in cases in which the employee has signed a
contract containing a clause not to compete, may be blacklisted by the
employer with immigration authorities, effectively preventing their
return for a specified period of time.
The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. It may detain persons seeking
refugee status, particularly non-Arabs, while they await resettlement
in a third country.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
There are no democratically elected institutions, and citizens do
not have the right to change their government or to form political
parties. Although there are consultative councils at the federal and
emirate levels, most executive and legislative power is in the hands of
the Federal Supreme Council. The seven emirate rulers, their extended
families, and those persons and families to whom they are allied by
historical ties, marriage, or common interest wield most political
power in their respective emirates. Decisions at the federal level are
generally made by consensus among the sheikhs of the seven emirates and
leading families.
A federal consultative body, called the Federal National Council,
consists of advisers appointed by the rulers of each emirate. The FNC
has no legislative authority but may question ministers and make policy
recommendations to the Cabinet. Its sessions usually are open to the
public.
The choice of appointing a new emirate ruler falls to the ruling
family in consultation with other prominent tribal figures. By
tradition rulers and ruling families are presumed to have the right to
rule, but their incumbency ultimately depends on the quality of their
leadership and their responsiveness to their subjects' needs. Emirate
rulers are accessible, in varying degrees, to citizens who have a
problem or a request.
Tradition rather than the law limits the political role of women.
Women are free to hold government positions, but there are few women in
senior positions. There are no female members of the FNC. In December
President Zayid's wife, Sheikha Fatima, who is chairwoman of the
Women's Federation, renewed her call for women to participate in the
country's political life. In 1998 Sheikha Fatima had announced the
Government's intention to appoint a number of women as special
observers at the FNC. These observers are to learn the procedures of
the FNC, and it is expected that some later may be appointed as
members. The observers have not been named yet. In a number of press
interviews, Sheikha Fatima has stated that women participate in the
preparation of legislation dealing with social issues through
recommendations made by the Women's Federation, and that women are only
``steps away'' from full political participation. At the same time, she
emphasized her view that the eventual appointment of women to the FNC
and other government positions would be ``a responsibility rather than
an honor,'' requiring careful prior preparation. Although the small
Shi'a minority has enjoyed commercial success, few Shi'a Muslims have
top positions in the federal Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no independent human rights groups. Government
restrictions on freedom of the press and public association make it
difficult for such groups to investigate and publicly criticize the
Government's human rights restrictions. A human rights section exists
within Dubai Emirate's police force to monitor allegations of human
rights abuses. Informal public discussions of human rights, press
reports of international human rights forums' activities, and media
coverage of selected local human rights problems, such as foreign
workers' conditions, are increasing public awareness of human rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law with regard
to race, nationality, religious beliefs, or social status. However,
there is institutional and cultural discrimination based on sex,
nationality, and religion.
Women.--There are reported cases of spousal abuse. Police units are
stationed at major public hospitals so that victims of abuse may file
complaints, or attending physicians may call upon the police to
interview suspected victims of abuse. However, women sometimes are
reluctant to file formal charges for social, cultural, and economic
reasons. When abuse is reported to the local police, authorities may
take action to protect women. The laws protect women from verbal abuse
or harassment from men, and violators are subject to criminal action.
There continue to be credible reports of abuse of female domestic
servants by some local and foreign employers (see Section 6.e.).
Prostitution has become an increasingly open phenomenon in recent
years, particularly in Dubai. Although no accurate statistics are
available, substantial numbers of women appear to be arriving from the
states of the former Soviet Union for temporary stays during which they
engage in prostitution and possibly other activities connected with
organized crime. Substantial numbers of prostitutes also appear to come
from Africa and Central and South Asia. In 1999 Dubai police
established special patrols in areas frequented by prostitutes in an
effort to control the phenomenon. There were credible reports of
trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
Women play a subordinate role in this family-centered society
because of early marriages and traditional attitudes about women's
duties. There are no legal prohibitions against women owning property
or businesses; however there are restrictions against female ownership.
Women must inherit property or businesses from a father or husband, or,
if unmarried, receive a grant of land from the ruling family in the
emirate in which they reside. In the case of women who are married, the
land must be granted to the husbands. Husbands may bar their wives and
children from leaving the country (see Section 2.d.), and a married
woman may not accept employment without her husband's written consent,
although such permission usually is granted. Shari'a, according to the
Maliki school of jurisprudence, is applied in cases of divorce. Women
are granted custody of female children until they reach the age of
maturity and are granted temporary custody of male children until they
reach the age of 12. If the mother is deemed unfit, custody reverts to
the next able female relative on the mother's side. A woman who
remarries may forfeit her right to the custody of children from a
previous marriage. Shari'a permits polygyny. In November the Government
issued a new ruling granting a woman a divorce if it can be proved that
her husband has deliberately stayed away from here for 3 months and has
not paid for her upkeep, or for the maintenance of her children.
There are no legal prohibitions against a woman owning her own
business. Traditionally, professional women, including doctors,
architects, and lawyers, have not faced restrictions in licensing
businesses in their names. However, there are credible reports that
women attempting to license businesses in the import-export sector,
particularly in the Emirate of Dubai, encounter greater scrutiny than
men. The Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce operates occasional programs to
encourage small business entrepreneurship on the part of women. A
woman's property is not commingled with that of her husband. Women who
work outside the home do not receive equal benefits, such as housing,
and may face discrimination in promotion. A draft 1998 law that would
entitle women to maternity leave of up to 2 months, compared with the
45 days granted under the current law, has yet to be approved by the
Government. A number of women's groups have been pressing the
Government to grant mothers 3 months of maternity leave at full pay and
to provide day care facilities at the workplace.
Opportunities for women have grown in government service,
education, private business, and health services. Women constitute 15
percent of the national workforce. The federal Government publicly has
encouraged women to join the work force, ensuring public sector
employment for all who apply. In April the Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs mandated the employment of women in the diplomatic
corps. According to the available statistics, women constitute 100
percent of nursery school teachers, 55 percent of primary school
teachers, 65 percent of intermediate and secondary school teachers,
54.3 percent of health care workers, and 39.8 percent of all government
employees. Women also constitute 4 percent of the military. Cultural
barriers and the lack of economic necessity have limited female
participation. A symposium promoting the rights of women in the labor
force was held in 1996. Participants called for increasing the rights
granted to women, including the elimination of the requirement that a
husband give approval before his wife may work.
Women continue to make rapid progress in education. They constitute
over 75 percent of the student body at the National University in Al-
Ain, largely because women, unlike men, rarely study abroad. In 1998
the Government established Zayid University, a second state-run
university, with campuses in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, exclusively for
women. However, academic materials are subject to censorship, and
female students are banned from reading texts in which the human body
is pictured or sexuality is featured (see Section 2.a.).
Women officially are encouraged to continue their education, and
government-sponsored women's centers provide adult education and
technical training courses. The federal armed forces accept female
volunteers, who may enroll in a special training course that was
started after the Gulf War. The Dubai Police College recruits women,
many of whom are deployed at airports, immigration offices, and women's
prisons. Over 200 women have graduated from the College so far.
The law prohibits cohabitation by unmarried couples. The Government
may imprison and deport noncitizen women if they bear children out of
wedlock. In the event that the courts sentence women to prison for such
an offense, local authorities, at the request of the prisoner, may hold
the newborn children in a special areas within the confines of the
prison or place them with a relative. In rare cases, children are held
in other facilities until the mother's release. In Dubai Emirate,
unmarried pregnant women must marry the father of the child; both
parties are subject to arrest for fornication.
Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
Children who are citizens receive free health care and education, and
are ensured housing. A family also may be eligible to receive aid from
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare for sons and daughters who are
under the age of 18, unmarried, or disabled. There is no pattern of
societal child abuse.
People with Disabilities.--There is no federal legislation
requiring accessibility for the disabled. However, the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs sponsors centers that provide facilities and
services to the disabled. Services range from monthly social aid funds,
special education, and transportation assistance, to sending a team to
the Special Olympics.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Discrimination based on
national origin, while not legally sanctioned, is prevalent.
Employment, immigration, and security policy, as well as cultural
attitudes towards foreign workers, are conditioned by national origin.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--There are no unions and no strikes.
The law does not grant workers the right to organize unions or to
strike. Foreign workers, who make up the bulk of the work force, risk
deportation if they attempt to organize unions or to strike.
Since 1995 the UAE has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation insurance programs because of the
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
rights standards.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does
not grant workers the right to engage in collective bargaining, and it
is not practiced. However, some professional associations are granted
greater freedom to raise work-related concerns, to lobby the Government
for redress, or to file a grievance with the Government. Workers in the
industrial and service sectors normally are employed under contracts
that are subject to review by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
The Ministry of Interior's Naturalization and Residency Administration
is responsible for reviewing the contracts of domestic employees as
part of residency permit processing. The purpose of the review is to
ensure that the pay satisfies the employee's basic needs and secures a
means of living. For the resolution of work-related disputes, workers
must rely on conciliation committees organized by the Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs or on special labor courts.
Labor laws do not cover government employees, domestic servants,
and agricultural workers. The latter two groups face considerable
difficulty in obtaining assistance to resolve disputes with employers.
While any worker may seek redress through the courts, this process puts
a heavy financial burden on those in lower income brackets.
In Dubai's Jebel Ali Free Zone, the same labor laws apply as in the
rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is illegal. However, some unscrupulous employment agents bring
foreign workers to the country under conditions approaching indenture.
There are credible reports that some women from Central Europe and
Central and South Asia, who are brought to the country for service
sector employment, later are forced into prostitution (see Section
6.f.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and
generally enforces this prohibition effectively. However, the use of
small children as camel jockeys is a problem. In September the Abu
Dhabi police took into protective custody and repatriated a 10-year-old
Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped from his village in
Pakistan and brought to the UAE to work as a jockey in camel races. In
1999 authorities acting on information provided by the Pakistani
Embassy, located and repatriated an 8-year-old Pakistani boy who
allegedly had been kidnaped to work as a camel jockey. Police
reportedly are investigating several such cases; however, to date no
charges have been filed. There continue to be credible reports that
hundreds of underage boys from South Asia, mainly between the ages of 4
and 10, continue to be used as camel jockeys (See Sections 6.d. and
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Labor regulations prohibit employment of persons under the
age of 15 and have special provisions for employing those 15 to 18
years of age. The Department of Labor enforces the regulations. Other
regulations permit employers to engage only adult foreign workers. In
1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age of 15
as camel jockeys and the use of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99
pounds. The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these
rules. However, credible sources report that almost all camel jockeys
are children under the minimum employment age (see Section 6.f.).
Relevant labor laws sometimes are enforced against criminal trafficking
rings, but not against those who own racing camels and employ the
children, because such owners come from powerful local families that
are in effect above the law. According to credible sources, there were
at least 20 cases during the year of underage camel jockeys who were
repatriated to their countries of origin. In September the Abu Dhabi
police took into protective custody and repatriated a 10-year-old
Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped from his village in
Pakistan and brought to the country to work as a camel jockey. Reports
of underage camel jockeys continued to surface in the local press
during the year. In 1999 authorities, acting on information provided by
the Pakistani Embassy, located and repatriated an 8year-old Pakistani
boy who allegedly had been kidnaped to work as a camel jockey. Also in
1999, a 4-year-old boy from Bangladesh, who had been used as a camel
jockey, was found wandering in the desert after being abandoned there
by his handlers. In 1998 a local newspaper reported the hospitalization
of a 5-year-old, 44-pound (20-kilogram) abandoned Bangladeshi child who
had been used as a jockey and whose leg had been broken by a camel.
Police reportedly are investigating several of these cases; however, no
charges have ever been filed.
Otherwise, child labor is not tolerated. The Government prohibits
forced and bonded child labor and generally enforces this prohibition
effectively (see Section 6.c.). The Government does not issue visas for
foreign workers under the age of 16 years. Education is compulsory
through the intermediate levels (approximately 13 to 14 years' old).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or
administrative minimum wage. Supply and demand determine compensation.
However, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, there
is an unofficial, unwritten minimum wage rate that would afford a
worker and family a minimal standard of living. The Labor and Social
Affairs Ministry reviews labor contracts and does not approve any
contract that stipulates a clearly unacceptable wage (see Section
6.b.).
The standard workday and workweek are 8 hours per day, 6 days per
week; however, these standards are not enforced strictly. Certain types
of workers, notably domestic servants, may be obliged to work longer
than the mandated standard hours. The law also provides for a minimum
of 24 days per year of annual leave plus 10 national and religious
holidays. In addition manual workers are not required to do outdoor
work when the temperature exceeds 112 degrees Fahrenheit.
Most foreign workers receive either employer-provided housing or
housing allowances, medical care, and homeward passage from their
employers. Most foreign workers do not earn the minimum salary of
$1,090 per month (or $817 per month, if a housing allowance is provided
in addition to the salary) required to obtain residency permits for
their families. Employers have the option to petition for a 6-month ban
from the work force against any foreign employee who leaves his job
without fulfilling the terms of his contract.
The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,
municipalities, and civil defense units enforce health and safety
standards. The Government requires every large industrial concern to
employ a certified occupational safety officer. An injured worker is
entitled to fair compensation. Health standards are not observed
uniformly in the housing camps that are provided for foreign workers.
Workers' jobs are not protected if they remove themselves from what
they consider to be unsafe working conditions. However, the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs may require employers to reinstate workers who
were dismissed for not performing unsafe work. All workers have the
right to lodge grievances with Ministry officials, who make an effort
to investigate all complaints. However, the Ministry is understaffed
and underbudgeted; complaints and compensation claims are backlogged.
Rulings on complaints may be appealed within the Ministry and
ultimately to the courts. However, many workers choose not to protest
for fear of reprisals or deportation. The press periodically carries
reports of abuses suffered by domestic servants, particularly women, at
the hands of some employers. Allegations have included excessive work
hours, nonpayment of wages, and verbal and physical abuse.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons, and there were reports that it occurred;
however, child smuggling, prostitution, and pornography are crimes.
South Asian boys, generally from Pakistan and Bangladesh, are
smuggled into the country by small, organized groups to be used as
camel jockeys. Some of the smuggled children reportedly are kidnaped
from their families in South Asia, but some apparently are sold to the
smugglers by their parents. Hundreds of underage camel jockeys
currently work in the country, many of them in the Abu Dhabi Emirate.
The largest camel-racing tracks (and associated stables and training
facilities) are in Al-Ain and Ghantoot in Abu Dhabi. The gangs provide
the stables with the youths, who generally are between the ages of 4
and 10. In May local authorities, working on information provided by
the Pakistani Embassy, broke up a smuggling ring involved in illegally
transporting underage Pakistani boys into the country to work as camel
jockeys. Local authorities prosecuted the foreign smugglers in this
case; however, the authorities did not investigate the citizens
involved in the scheme. In September the Abu Dhabi police took into
protective custody and repatriated a 10-year-old Pakistani boy who
allegedly had been kidnaped from his village in Pakistan and brought to
the country to work as a camel jockey. In November the Abu Dhabi police
rescued two young Pakistani boys, aged 4 and 6, from an Al-Ain camel
farm where they had been forced to work as camel jockeys. The boys
allegedly were kidnapped from Pakistan earlier in the year and
transported illegally to the country through Iran on forged passports.
Upon arrival in the country they reportedly were sold to a Pakistani
agent for $5,500. In 1999 authorities, acting on information provided
by the Pakistani Embassy, located and repatriated an 8-year-old
Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped to work as a camel
jockey. Also in 1999, a 4-year-old boy from Bangladesh who had been
used as a camel jockey was found wandering in the desert after being
abandoned there by his handlers. In 1998 a local newspaper reported the
hospitalization of a 5-year-old, 44-pound, abandoned Bangladeshi child
who had been used as a jockey and whose leg had been broken by a camel
(see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.).
In 1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age
of 15 as camel jockeys and of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99
pounds. The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these
rules. However, few jockeys meet these requirements and relevant labor
laws, while sometimes enforced against the criminal trafficking rings,
are not invoked against those who own racing camels and employ the
children, because such owners come from powerful local families that
are in effect above the law (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.).
Although no accurate statistics are available, substantial numbers
of women appear to be arriving from the states of the former Soviet
Union for temporary stays, during which they engage in prostitution and
possibly other activities connected with organized crime. Substantial
numbers of prostitutes also appear to come from Africa and Central and
South Asia. While the vast majority of these women are in the country
voluntarily, there are credible reports that some women from Central
Europe and Central and South Asia, who are brought to the country for
service sector employment, later are forced into prostitution. It is
unclear whether this activity is conducted with the full knowledge of
the women's citizen sponsors, or whether the women's generally
noncitizen agents are exploiting the sponsorship system to engage in
illicit activity (see Section 5).
In May three Central European women claimed that they were
recruited to come work in the country in the hotel business. However,
upon their arrival, their local sponsor seized their passports and
locked them in a villa with iron gates on the windows. The women claim
that they then were forced to work as prostitutes. The three women
eventually escaped and obtained protection at their country's embassy
in Abu Dhabi. They remained under their embassy's protection for
approximately 1 month, after which their passports were returned and
they were permitted to depart the country.
The Kazakhstan Government reported in June that it broke up a
trafficking ring that specialized in sending women to the UAE for
prostitution. Five member of the ring were arrested while trying to
board a woman and a 15-year-old girl on a flight to Dubai.
__________
YEMEN
The Republic of Yemen, comprising the former (northern) Yemen Arab
Republic (YAR) and (southern) People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
(PDRY), was proclaimed in 1990. Following a brief but bloody civil war
in mid-1994, the country was reunified under the Sana'a-based
government. President Ali Abdullah Saleh is the leader of the General
People's Congress (GPC), which dominates the Government. He was elected
by the legislature to a 5-year term in 1994, and was elected to another
5-year term in the country's first nationwide direct presidential
election in September 1999, winning 96.3 percent of the vote. The
Constitution provides that the President be elected by popular vote
from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and the election
was generally free and fair; however, there were some problems,
including the lack of a credible voter registration list. In addition
the President was not opposed by a truly competitive candidate because
the candidate selected by the leftist opposition did not receive the
minimum number of votes required to run from the GPC-dominated
Parliament (the other opposition party chose not to run its own
candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The President's sole
opponent was a member of the GPC. The first Parliament elected by
universal adult suffrage was convened in 1993. Parliamentary elections
were held again in 1997, with the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP),
formerly the main party of the PDRY and a previous coalition partner of
the GPC, leading an opposition boycott. The GPC won an absolute
majority in the 1997 Parliament, with the opposition Islamist and
tribal Yemeni Grouping for Reform (Islaah) as the only other major
party represented. International observers judged the elections as
reasonably free and fair, while noting some problems with the voting.
The Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive
authority, although it increasingly demonstrates independence from the
Government. Real political power rests with the executive branch,
particularly the President. The judiciary is nominally independent, but
is weak and severely hampered by corruption, executive branch
interference, and the frequent failure of the authorities to enforce
judgments.
The primary state security apparatus is the Political Security
Organization (PSO), an independent agency that reports directly to the
President. The Criminal Investigative Department (CID) of the police
reports to the Ministry of Interior and conducts most criminal
investigations and makes most arrests. The Central Security
Organization (CSO), also a part of the Ministry of Interior, maintains
a paramilitary force. The civilian authorities do not maintain
effective control of the security forces. Members of the security
forces, particularly the PSO, committed numerous, serious human rights
abuses.
Yemen is a very poor country; about 40 percent of the population
live in poverty. Its embryonic market-based economy, despite a major
economic reform program, remains impeded by excessive government
interference and widespread corruption. Its annual per capita gross
national product (GNP) fell from $377 in 1997 to $342 in 1998, but rose
to $368 in 1999. Agriculture accounts for approximately 22 percent of
GNP, industry for approximately 27 percent, and services for
approximately 51 percent. Oil is the primary source of foreign
exchange. Other exports include fish, livestock, coffee, and
detergents. Remittances from citizens working abroad (primarily in
Saudi Arabia and other Arab Persian Gulf states) also are important.
However, remittances were reduced sharply after Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf states expelled up to 850,000 Yemeni workers during the Gulf War
because of the Government's lack of support for the U.N. coalition. The
Gulf states also suspended most assistance programs, and much Western
aid was reduced. Foreign aid has begun to reemerge as an important
source of income. The unemployment rate is estimated at 35 percent, and
is highest in the southern governorates, where, prior to unity, most
adults were employed by the PDRY Government.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
some areas and continued to improve its human rights performance;
however, its record was poor in several other areas, and serious
problems remain. There are significant limitations on citizens' ability
to change their government. Security forces committed a number of
extrajudicial killings. Members of the security forces tortured and
otherwise abused persons, and continued to arrest and detain citizens
arbitrarily, especially oppositionists in the south and other persons
regarded as ``secessionists.'' However, during the year, the Government
issued directives intended to align the country's arrest,
interrogation, and detention procedures more closely with
internationally accepted standards, and such directives generally were
implemented in practice. Prison conditions are poor, and some detainees
were held in private prisons not authorized by the Government. However,
during the year, with the cooperation of the Government, the
International Committee of the Red Cross conducted a comprehensive
inspection of the country's prisons. PSO officers have broad discretion
over perceived national security issues. Despite constitutional
constraints, security officers routinely monitor citizens' activities,
search their homes, detain citizens for questioning, and mistreat
detainees. The Government fails to hold members of the security forces
accountable for abuses, and there were no convictions of security
officials for abuses during the year. Prolonged pretrial detention is a
serious problem, and judicial corruption, inefficiency, and executive
interference undermine due process. The Government continued to
implement a comprehensive long-term program for judicial reform. The
law limits freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government
frequently harassed, intimidated, and detained journalists. However,
harassment of journalists lessened during the year. Nonetheless,
journalists practice self-censorship. The Government at times limits
freedom of assembly. The Government imposes some restrictions on
freedom of religion, and places some limits on freedom of movement. The
Government adopted measures to decentralize government authority by
establishing locally elected governorate and district councils. In
February the Government hosted a major symposium of the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights (UNCHR), chaired by U.N. High Commissioner Mary
Robinson, on the human rights aspects of international development. The
Government displayed official receptiveness to and support for donor-
funded democracy and human rights programs. Violence and discrimination
against women are problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is
practiced on a limited scale, primarily along the coastal areas of the
Red Sea. Although the practice is discouraged publicly, the authorities
do not prohibit it. There is some discrimination against the disabled.
Discrimination against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities is a
problem. The Government influences labor unions. Child labor is a
problem.
There was a significant decrease in the number of kidnapings of
foreigners, which was at least in part the result of the Government's
establishment of a special court to try kidnapers and other violent
offenders. The campaign of bombings--the devices sometimes were little
more than noise bombs--that had continued for several years,
particularly in the southern governorates, appears to have abated,
although there were a few explosions during the year. Observers
attribute these bombings to tribal disputes, religious extremists, and
antigovernment political groups based in the country and abroad.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
committed a number of extrajudicial killings. There were some reports
during the year that security forces at checkpoints killed or injured
persons whom they believed were engaging in criminal activity and
resisting arrest.
In May security forces killed Ghassan Qasim Mani, a student in Al-
Dalah governorate, during a violent confrontation between security
forces and armed citizens. Another student and four police officers
were injured in the confrontation, which occurred while security
officials were conducting a weapons search in the vicinity of Al-
Jalilah.
In August Sabah Seif Salem reportedly died while being detained in
a prison in the Al-Udain district of Ibb governorate. Her family
claimed that security officials tortured her to extract a confession of
adultery. The director of Ibb security ordered that an autopsy be
performed and called in the head of AlUdain's security office for
questioning. The investigation found that Salem was pregnant when she
was detained for questioning and went into labor while in police
custody. She was transported to a clinic, but died as a result of
complications during childbirth. Salem's baby also died. The
investigation concluded that Salem had not been tortured (see Section
1.c.).
One police officer was killed and eight others wounded after
intervening to settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in
Aden governorate; several villagers were wounded, but none were
reported killed. The circumstances of the police officer's death were
unclear (see Section 1.f.).
No security officials were tried or convicted for abuses during the
year.
In July 1999, a court in Tawila in Al-Mahweet governorate convicted
the town's security chief and two police officers of first-degree
murder for torturing to death a teenager taken into their custody on
theft charges in March 1999. All three officials were fired. The
security chief was sentenced to 10 years in jail and ordered to pay
$19,000 (3,116,000 riyals) in compensation to the victim's family. The
two police officers each were sentenced to 5 years in jail.
There was credible evidence that security forces killed a prisoner
in detention in late 1997 or early 1998. Wadia Al-Shaibani, a 22-year-
old who was arrested in connection with the July 1997 bombings in Aden,
apparently died after suffering a beating at the Soleyban police
facility in Aden. Government authorities declined to investigate; they
claimed that AlShaibani committed suicide. The Human Rights Committee
of the Consultative Council (an advisory board to the President) in
1998 investigated Al-Shaibani's death; however, it was unable to
persuade the authorities to investigate the death or to bring charges
against security officials.
On October 12, terrorists in a small bomb-laden boat attacked the
USS Cole, a U.S. naval ship, as it refueled in Aden harbor. The
explosion killed 17 sailors and wounded 39 others. The investigation
into the attack was ongoing, and 6 suspects were in custody at year's
end.
Tribal violence resulted in a number of killings and other abuses,
and the Government's ability to control tribal elements remained
limited. In addition, tensions between the Government and various
tribes periodically escalated into violent confrontations (see Section
5).
Persons continued to be killed and injured in unexplained bombings
and shootings that occurred during the year. In most cases, it was
impossible to determine who was responsible for such acts or why they
occurred, and there were no claims of responsibility. The Government
accused southern oppositionists of perpetrating some incidents, but the
opposition denied any involvement. Some cases appeared to have
criminal, religious, or political motives; others appeared to be cases
of tribal revenge or land disputes. In June 1998, the President
established a committee to study the phenomenon of revenge killings and
to make recommendations on how to combat the problem. There was no news
on the committee's work or its findings at year's end.
In December 1998, a group of 16 Western tourists was kidnaped by
terrorists in Abyan governorate near Mudiyah. The next day, government
forces surrounded the area and attempted a rescue operation. Four of
the hostages and three of the terrorists were killed. There were
varying reports as to whether the government forces inadvertently
killed any of the hostages in the crossfire. However, at least two
apparently were shot deliberately by the kidnapers. The Government has
stated that its decision to intervene was based on its belief that the
hostages' lives were in immediate danger. The trial of the four
surviving terrorists, including Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) leader
Zein Al-Abidine Al-Mihdar (also known as Abu Hassan), began in January
1999, and in May 1999 they all were found guilty. Abu Hassan, who
during his trial publicly and repeatedly admitted to all charges
against him, a second Yemeni, Abdallah Al-Jundaydi, and a Tunisian,
were sentenced to death; the remaining defendant was sentenced to 20
years' imprisonment. The Tunisian's sentence was commuted to 20 years'
at the first appellate review, and the Supreme Court in October 1999
commuted Al-Jundaydi's sentence to 20 years as well. Abu Hassan's death
sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in October 1999 and approved
by President Saleh. He was executed by firing squad on October 17,
1999. There were no allegations of lack of due process in Abu Hassan's
trial or during the subsequent appeal process. The trial of seven
additional AAIA members on terrorism charges began in October 1999 and
ended in June; the group's leader and a second defendant were convicted
and received jail sentences of 7 and 3 years; the remaining five
defendants were acquitted (see Section 1.e.).
b. Disappearance.--Members of the security forces continue to
arrest and detain citizens for varying periods of time without charge
or notification to their families. Many detainees are associated with
the YSP or other opposition parties and are accused of being
``secessionists.'' Such detentions are temporary; detainees typically
are released within weeks or, at most, months. Those who are not
released eventually are charged.
In 1998 at the invitation of authorities, delegations from the
UNHRC and Amnesty International visited the country to investigate the
whereabouts of persons who have ``disappeared'' in custody since
unification. In 1997 the Government had promised AI that it would look
into 27 cases of persons who died after they reportedly ``disappeared''
while in government custody during the violence associated with the
civil war in 1994. In its follow-up report issued in July 1999, AI
criticized the Government for not keeping this promise. The Government
claims that it responded to AI and passed the results of its
investigations to the UNHRC, but that the information AI provided was
inadequate for effective investigation and conclusive action. Both the
U.N. Committee on Disappearances and AI also continue to allege that
there are hundreds of unresolved disappearances dating from the
preunity period in the former PDRY, particularly from its 1986 civil
war. The Government asserts that it cannot be held responsible for
cases that took place within the former PDRY prior to unity; however,
it has set up a computer database in the Ministry of Foreign Relations
to track disappearances, including those dating from the preunity
period. The Government states that the scarcity of records resulting
from the country's lack of an effective national registry hindered its
attempts during the year to create database files, especially for
persons who disappeared in the PDRY in the 1970's. AI has received no
credible reports of new disappearances in the last 6 years.
Some tribes seek to bring their political and economic concerns to
the attention of the Government by kidnaping and holding hostages.
Foreign businessmen, diplomats, and tourists are the principal targets.
During the year, eight foreigners were kidnaped (six men, one woman,
and one child), as well as a much higher number of citizens. A total of
159 foreigners have been kidnaped since 1992. The legal magazine Al-
Qistas, in a 1998 study, found that Sana'a, Marib, and Shabwa are the
areas in which a foreigner is most likely to be kidnaped. Kidnaping
victims rarely are injured, and the authorities generally have been
successful in obtaining the negotiated release of foreign hostages.
However, in June a Norwegian diplomat on vacation was killed near
Sana'a during an exchange of fire between checkpoint police and his
abductors.
There has been a marked decline in tribal kidnapings of foreigners,
from 13 cases involving 41 persons in 1997 to 10 cases involving 27
persons in 1998 to 9 cases involving 21 persons in 1999 to 6 cases
involving 8 persons during the year. Kidnapings had been a persistent
problem in the past, due to the judiciary's frequent failure to impose
sentences against accused kidnapers because some persons linked to
kidnapings were members of prominent tribes or had links with such
tribes. In most cases, the kidnapings were settled out of court, with
no suspects facing trial; however, this practice has changed. In August
1998, the Government issued by presidential decree a law that
stipulated severe punishments up to and including capital punishment
for persons involved in kidnaping, ``carjacking,'' attacking oil
pipelines, and other acts of banditry and sabotage. In October 1999,
the Government announced the establishment of a special court in Sana'a
to implement this law and created a special prosecutor to investigate
and try those charged under its provisions. In May the court sentenced
an individual who had kidnaped three German tourists in November 1999
to 12 years in jail. In June the kidnaper of an American in 1997, and
later a group of European tourists, received a 20-year sentence; in
July two additional kidnapers received 15-year jail sentences. The
arrests, trials, and convictions continue. The Government's prosecution
of persons charged with kidnaping appears to have had a deterrent
effect. There were no reports of tribal opposition or interference in
the arrests or the judicial process connected with these cases.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution is ambiguous on its prohibition of cruel
or inhuman punishment; however, members of the security forces tortured
and otherwise abused persons in detention. Arresting authorities are
known to use force during interrogations, especially against those
arrested for violent crimes. Detainees sometimes are confined in leg-
irons and shackles, despite the passage of a law in 1998 outlawing this
practice.
The Government has acknowledged publicly that torture takes place
but has claimed that the use of torture is not government policy.
Nevertheless, the Government has not taken effective steps to end the
practice or to punish those who commit such abuses. A government
prosecutor has cited illiteracy and lack of training among police and
security officials as reasons for the persistence of the use of undue
force in prisons; a human rights activist has suggested that corruption
and pressure from superiors to produce convictions also plays a role.
The immunity of all public employees from prosecution for crimes
allegedly committed while on duty also hinders accountability;
prosecutors must obtain permission from the Attorney General to
investigate members of the security forces, and the head of the Appeals
Court formally must lift their immunity before they are tried. Low
salaries for police officers, about $37 to $56 (6,000 to 9,000 riyals)
per month, also contribute to corruption and police abuse.
In August Sabah Seif Salem reportedly died while being detained in
a prison in the Al-Udain district of Ibb governorate. Her family
claimed that security officials tortured her to extract a confession of
adultery. The director of Ibb security directed that an autopsy be
performed and called in the head of Al-Udain's security office for
questioning. The investigation found that Salem was pregnant when she
was detained for questioning and went into labor while in police
custody. She was transported to a clinic, but died as a result of
complications during childbirth. Salem's baby also died. The
investigation concluded that Salem had not been tortured (see Section
1.a.).
In July 1999, a court convicted three security force officials of
murder for torturing a teenager to death (see Section 1.a.); however,
there were no reported convictions of security officers for abuses
during the year. In February Major Hisham Al-Ghazali, the most senior
of three CID officials convicted of torture in 1998, was reassigned to
investigative duties. Abdullah Al-Qaradi, the prosecutor for
investigation and security for Sana'a governorate, objected to the
reassignment, but he was overruled by the CID's Director General,
Hussein Ali Haitham.
In April 1999, Sana'a municipality police arrested Naji Saleh Al-
Khowlani for his alleged involvement in a car theft ring. Al-Khowlani
was held for 2 months, during which time prison officials reportedly
tortured him during regular nightly interrogation sessions in which
officials would attempt to elicit a confession and extract information
by burning him with a cigarette lighter. A medical report documented
burn marks and other injuries on Al-Khowlani's body. No action was
taken during the year to investigate this case.
The trial of seven alleged members of the AAIA on terrorism
charges, which began in October 1999, ended in June. The group's
leader, Saleh Haidara Al-Atwi, and another defendant, Haidara Nasser
Al-Mashraqi, were sentenced to 7 and 3 years in prison, respectively.
The remaining five defendants were acquitted. Two of the defendants
were tried in absentia. Four claimed that the prosecution coerced and
tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and confessions
(see Section 1.e.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting the
publication of details about the trial.
The eight Britons and two Algerians convicted in Aden in August
1999 of possession of illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to
commit terrorist acts in Aden claimed during their trial during the
year that they had been tortured; two claimed that they had been abused
sexually (see Section 1.e.).
In 1998 several individuals on trial in Aden in connection with a
series of bombings in 1997 testified publicly that they had been
tortured. One defendant claimed that he had been raped while in
custody. There is credible evidence that one other person arrested in
connection with the same bombings died as a result of beatings
inflicted by security officials. According to eyewitnesses who also
claimed to have been tortured, Wadia Al-Shaibani was beaten first in a
criminal security office in Aden, then transferred to the Soleyban
police facility, where he was tortured to death (see Section 1.a.). No
charges have been filed against security officials.
In a related case in 1998 in which 31 persons were accused of
conspiracy in Mahra governorate in 1997, several of the suspects
claimed that they had confessed only because they had been tortured.
Defense attorneys asserted the existence of films that would prove
their clients' allegations that they had been beaten, and asked the
judge to view the films. The judge denied this request. In late October
1998, the court sentenced three of the defendants to death, found one
innocent, and sentenced the others to jail for periods ranging from 6
to 10 years.
The Constitution may be interpreted as permitting amputations in
accordance with Shari'a (Islamic law). There have been no reports of
amputations since 1991. However, a small number of persons who have
been found guilty of theft and sentenced to amputation remain in jail
awaiting the implementation of their sentences. The Shari'a-based law
permits physical punishment such as flogging for some crimes. For
example, in July two individuals convicted of kidnaping were sentenced
to 80 lashes (the penalty for the consumption of alcohol) in addition
to a period of imprisonment because they had been intoxicated during
the commission of their crime. In Ibb governorate in January, Mohamed
Tahbit Al-Su'mi, after being tried and convicted, was stoned to death
for the 1992 rape and murder of his 12-year-old daughter. Capital
punishment usually is carried out by firing squad; stoning is almost
unheard of, but was approved in this case due to the unusual brutality
of the crime. In rare cases involving particularly egregious crimes,
such as the rape and murder of children, the law permits the ritual
display in public of the bodies of executed criminals. The ostensible
purpose of this practice is to demonstrate to the families of victims
that justice has been served and to prevent blood feuds between tribes.
Police used excessive force in September when they intervened to
settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in Aden governorate
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.).
Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, causing
numerous deaths and injuries (see Section 5).
Prison conditions are poor and do not meet internationally
recognized minimum standards. Prisons are overcrowded, sanitary
conditions are poor, and food and health care are inadequate. Inmates
depend on relatives for food and medicine. Many inmates lack mattresses
or bedding. Prison authorities often exact money from prisoners and
refuse to release prisoners until family members pay a bribe. Tribal
leaders misuse the prison system by placing ``problem'' tribesmen in
jail, either to punish them for noncriminal indiscretions or to protect
them from retaliation or violence motivated by revenge. Refugees,
persons with mental problems, and illegal immigrants sometimes are
arrested without charge and placed in prisons with common criminals.
Conditions are equally poor in women's prisons, in which children
likely are to be incarcerated along with their mothers. By custom and
preference, babies born in prison generally remain in prison with their
mothers. Female prisoners sometimes are subjected to sexual harassment
and violent interrogation by male police and prison officials. The law
requires male members of the families of female prisoners to arrange
their release; however, female prisoners regularly are held in jail
past the expiration of their sentences because their male relatives
refuse to authorize their release due to the shame associated with
their alleged behavior. The Government's Supreme National Committee for
Human Rights, working with the National Women's Committee, has
developed a plan to establish a shelter in Sana'a that would house 50
of these abandoned women and provide them with vocational education.
The committee is seeking donor assistance and hopes to establish
additional shelters in other governorates.
Unauthorized ``private'' prisons are a problem. Most such prisons
are in rural areas controlled by tribes, and many are simply a room in
a tribal sheikh's house. Persons detained in such prisons often are
held for strictly personal or tribal reasons and without trial or
sentencing. There are credible reports of the existence of private
prisons in government installations, although these prisons are not
sanctioned by senior officials. In July Mohamed Naji Alao, a
parliamentarian and founder of the human rights NGO the Organization
for the Defense of Human Rights, discovered that several private
prisons were being operated at government facilities in Sana'a. He
reported them to the President, who immediately ordered the unlawful
prisons closed, and the offenders arrested. In April 1999, the chairman
of the Sana'a governorate prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba,
inspected several illegal prisons operated by the Sana'a governor's
office and sent his findings to the Attorney General. According to Al-
Shaiba's findings, 19 individuals had been imprisoned beyond their
legal sentence; several prisoners were being detained in handcuffs
illegally; numerous individuals were being detained illegally in
connection with civil or commercial cases or because they had disobeyed
a tribal sheikh; and 43 persons from one region (Shibam Al-Gharas) were
being detained on the same charge (shooting at a truck). Al-Shaiba
informed the Attorney General that he had requested then-Sana'a
governor Naji Al-Sufi to release the illegally imprisoned individuals,
but that the governor had taken no action. Later that year, Al-Shaiba
reported being harassed by then-governor Al-Sufi. The Attorney General
took no action on the findings of the inspection report. Al-Shaiba took
a voluntary leave of absence from his post, and eventually left the
country. Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his post in October 1999, but
was never charged with a crime (see Section 1.e.).
During the year, the Government issued directives intended to align
the country's arrest, interrogation, and detention procedures more
closely with internationally accepted standards. For example, the
Ministry of Interior created new detention/interrogation centers in
each governorate (including four in Sana'a), to prevent suspects from
being detained with convicted criminals. The Government also formally
instructed police and prison officials that detainees be provided
adequate food, that prisoners be released upon completion of their
sentences, and that juveniles (with the exception of those convicted of
murder) be incarcerated in facilities separated from adults. In
addition, the Government created a female police force and developed
regulatory guidance for their activities to better respond to the needs
of female prisoners and female victims of crimes. The Government's
directives generally were implemented in practice.
In January the Government's Supreme National Committee for Human
Rights led a government initiative to establish and finance, along with
private sector contributions, a special ``charity fund'' to be used to
enable the release of prisoners who, in keeping with tribal or Islamic
law, were being held in prison pending payment of restitution to their
victims, despite having completed their sentences. The President
celebrated the Islamic holy month of Ramadan by appointing a high-level
interministerial committee, chaired by the Minister of Interior, to
inspect all major prisons in the country, both to identify prisoners
whom the fund could help and to investigate conditions. The inspection
committee immediately released persons being held illegally, developed
recommendations for reform, and arranged for the eventual release of
over 1,000 prisoners who had been held beyond their sentences (in
violation of the law) until they could pay restitution. The Human
Rights Committee of the Consultative Council continued to conduct spot
checks of prisons and to arrange for the expeditious release of persons
held improperly.
The Government tightly controls access to detention facilities by
NGO's, although it sometimes permits local and international human
rights monitors access to persons accused of crimes. During the year,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with the
Government's full cooperation, conducted a comprehensive inspection of
the country's major prisons. While serious problems remain, the ICRC
acknowledged the Government's commitment to penal reform and noted that
the Government had made significant improvements since the last ICRC
inspection (in 1995), especially with regard to the incarceration of
mentally ill persons.
The PSO does not permit access to its detention centers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides due
process safeguards; however, security forces arbitrarily arrest and
detain persons. Enforcement of the law is irregular and in some cases
nonexistent, particularly in cases involving security offenses.
According to the law, detainees must be arraigned within 24 hours of
arrest or be released. The judge or prosecuting attorney must inform
the accused of the basis for the arrest and decide whether detention is
required. In no case may a detainee be held longer than 7 days without
a court order. Despite these constitutional and other legal provisions,
arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without charge are common
practices. In April Parliament passed a new Police Law, which
established the mandate, duties, and procedures for police. Draft
provisions would have permitted police to conduct searches without a
warrant and to open fire on gatherings of five or more persons if
police suspected imminent violence or criminal activity. Following a
campaign by human rights organizations, opposition political parties,
and the press, Parliament amended the law to remove the provisions.
In September forces from the CSO used excessive force in attacking
the village of Qud Qarow in Aden governorate, reportedly arresting 30
persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.)
During the year, journalists continued to be detained briefly for
questioning concerning articles that they wrote that were critical of
the Government or that the Government considered sensitive (see Section
2.a.). However, there was a significant decrease in the number of such
incidents from the previous year.
The law provides detainees with the right to inform their families
of their arrests and to decline to answer questions without an attorney
present. There are provisions for bail. In practice many authorities
abide by these provisions only if bribed.
Defense lawyers claimed that the eight Britons and two Algerians
arrested in December 1998 for possessing illegal weapons and explosives
and conspiring to commit terrorist acts in Aden (see Sections 1.c. and
1.e.) were denied their right to legal counsel. They also contended
that defense doctors were not permitted to examine their clients in
order to investigate allegations of torture and sexual abuse. Several
months after the defense's request, the Government arranged for an
independent physician to examine those arrested; however, it did not
allow the defense to observe the examination and did not provide a
report. The trial concluded in August 1999, although according to the
law, the violation of the right to counsel should have suspended the
case. The court sentenced the main suspects to jail terms of 7 and 3
years, respectively. Five other defendants received jail terms ranging
from 5 to 7 years. The seven defendants appealed the verdict. Two of
the Britons received 7-month sentences and were ordered released for
time served; another, for reasons of poor health, was ordered released
for time served. The three returned to the United Kingdom in October
1999.
Citizens regularly complained that security officials did not
observe due process procedures when arresting and detaining suspects,
particularly those accused of involvement in political violence. There
also were complaints that private individuals hired lower-level
security officials to intervene on their behalf and harass their
business rivals. Security forces sometimes detained demonstrators (see
Section 2.b.). In August 1999, then-governor of Sana'a Naji Al-Sufi
reportedly ordered the arrest of Hafed Fadhil, a lawyer representing
the opposing party in a case involving one of the governor's friends.
In September 1999, he illegally detained judge Mohammed Saad Amer, a
member of the Sana'a appeals court, for 2 days (see Section 1.e.). The
governor was relieved of his post in October 1999.
In cases where a criminal suspect is at large, security forces
sometimes detain a relative while the suspect is being sought. The
detention may continue while the concerned families negotiate
compensation for the alleged wrongdoing. Arbitration, rather than the
court system, commonly is used to settle cases.
The Government has failed to ensure that detainees and prisoners
are incarcerated only in authorized detention facilities. The Ministry
of Interior and the PSO operate extrajudicial detention facilities. A
large percentage of the total prison population consists of pretrial
detainees. There have been allegations that a large number of persons
have been imprisoned for years without documentation concerning charges
against them, their trials, or their sentences.
Aziz Mohamed Musaid, who was arrested in Taiz in September 1998 and
charged with intent to commit adultery, has not yet been brought to
trial and remains in prison because the presiding judge, Abdul Jabar
Taha Al-Kharasani, has refused to adjudicate the case. The charges did
not appear to be supported by solid evidence, and the local press has
characterized Al-Kharasani as corrupt. In October 1999, Al-Kharasani
was ordered by the Minister of Interior to turn over his cases,
including Musaid's, to another judge, but he has refused to do so.
While some cases of those being held without charge have been
redressed through the efforts of local human rights groups and
government inspection missions (and some illegally detained prisoners
released), the authorities have not investigated or resolved these
cases adequately.
Unauthorized, private prisons also exist in tribal areas in which
the Government does not exercise authority effectively. Persons
detained in these prisons often are held for strictly personal reasons
and without trial or sentencing (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
The Government does not use forced exile. However, at the end of
the 1994 civil war, the Government denied amnesty to the 16 most senior
leaders of the armed, secessionist Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY)
who fled abroad. Although they were not forced into exile, they are
subject to arrest if they return. The trial of the so-called ``16''
concluded in March 1998 (see Section 1.c.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
``autonomous'' judiciary and independent judges; however, the judiciary
is not fully independent, and is weak and severely hampered by
corruption, executive branch interference, and the frequent failure of
the authorities to enforce judgments. Judges are appointed by the
executive branch, and some have been harassed, reassigned, or removed
from office following rulings against the Government. For example,
there were credible reports that in 1999 thengovernor of Sana'a Naji
Al-Sufi repeatedly interfered with and attempted to intimidate members
of the judiciary, including by assaulting a defense lawyer, detaining
at least two judges, and harassing the chairman of Sana'a governorate's
prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba, after Al-Shaiba reported to
the Attorney General that the governor's office was running illegal
prisons (see Section 1.c.). Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his post
in October 1999, but no legal action was taken against him. Al-Shaiba
has left the country. Many litigants maintain, and the Government
acknowledges, that a judge's social ties and susceptibility to bribery
sometimes have greater influence on the verdict than the law or the
facts of the case. Many judges are poorly trained, and some closely
associated with the Government often render decisions favorable to it.
The judiciary is hampered further by the Government's frequent
reluctance to enforce judgments. Tribal elements sometimes threaten and
harass members of the judiciary. For example, in August members of the
Bani Dhubian tribe kidnaped judge Abdu Rahman Abu Taleb, who was
presiding over a land dispute case involving the tribe.
There are five types of courts: Criminal; civil and personal status
(for example, divorce and inheritance); kidnaping/terrorism;
commercial; and court martial.
All laws are codified from Shari'a, under which there are no jury
trials. Criminal cases are adjudicated by a judge, who plays an active
role in questioning witnesses and the accused. Under the Constitution
and by law, the Government must provide attorneys for indigent
defendants; however, in practice this never occurs. Despite a
stipulation that the Government provide (and fund) legal aid to
indigent defendants, the law does not explicitly prohibit trying
criminal defendants without a lawyer, and the judicial budget currently
does not allow for defense attorneys. Judges sometimes ``appoint''
attorneys present in their courtrooms to represent indigent defendants;
however, such attorneys are not required legally to take the case,
although most accept in order to avoid displeasing judges before whom
they must appear later.
By law prosecutors are a part of the judiciary and independent of
the Government; however, in practice prosecutors look upon themselves
as an extension of the police. They do not receive the normal judicial
training that judges do, nor do they practice their legal obligation to
prosecute police who delay reporting arrests and detentions.
Defense attorneys are allowed to counsel their clients, address the
court, and examine witnesses. Defendants, including those in commercial
courts, have the right to appeal their sentences. Trials are public;
however, all courts may conduct closed sessions ``for reasons of public
security or morals.'' Foreign litigants in commercial disputes have
complained of biased rulings. However, some foreign companies have won
cases against local defendants, and some such decisions have been
enforced.
In addition to regular courts, the law permits a system of tribal
adjudication for noncriminal issues, although in practice tribal
``judges'' often adjudicate criminal cases as well. The results of such
mediation carry the same if not greater weight as court judgments.
Persons jailed under the tribal system usually are not charged formally
with a crime but stand publicly accused of their transgression.
Prior to unification, approximately half of the judges working in
southern Yemen were women. However, after the 1994 civil war,
conservative leaders of the judiciary reassigned many southern female
judges to administrative or clerical duties. Although several female
judges continue to practice in Aden, there are no female judges in
northern courts.
The Government continued the program it began in late 1997 to
reform the judiciary. This comprehensive, long-term reform program is
intended to improve the operational efficiency and statutory
independence of the judiciary by placing reform-minded personnel into
the courts; forming an inter-ministerial council to oversee the reform
project; publishing a judicial code of ethics; and making the Supreme
Court smaller, more efficient, and less corrupt. Foreign donors have
offered to provide assistance in implementing judicial reform, which
the Government has accepted. While the program has not yet been
completed, some attorneys cite improvements, including a reduction in
the number of Supreme Court justices from 90 to 40, an increase in
judges' salaries in order to deter corruption, an increase in the
Ministry of Justice's budget, and participation by judges in workshops
and study tours conducted by foreign judicial officials. However, the
reform program's effect is not yet clear. In October 1999, the
Government established a special court to try persons charged with
kidnaping, ``carjacking,'' attacking oil pipelines and other acts of
banditry and sabotage (see Section 1.b.). Several persons tried in this
special court have received lengthy jail sentences, which appears to
have had a deterrent effect on tribal kidnapings.
In February 1999, a U.N. Development Program (UNDP) team visited
the country to conduct an assessment that would serve as the basis of a
second judicial reform program, which was scheduled to begin in January
and end in 2002. In March 1999, the team noted the Government's
willingness to address long-standing issues of accountability and
transparency, and to implement laws more effectively. The program's
goals are to modernize Ministry of Justice equipment, improve the
country's legal libraries, provide special training for the Attorney
General's office, enhance public awareness of the rule of law, and
secure a building for the Supreme Court. The UNDP continues to seek
donor funding for the program.
Another judicial reform program, financed by international
assistance, was initiated in January and is to last through March 2002.
The program focuses on the Ministries of Justice and of Legal and
Parliamentary Affairs and is to provide training in business and
commercial law for judges; a diagnostic study of judicial education
curriculum; training on drafting of legislation; and a review of the
country's commercial laws to identify and fix gaps or inconsistencies.
The program is ongoing.
The security services continued to arrest and prosecutors charge
and try persons alleged to be linked to various shootings, explosions,
bombings, and other acts of violence. Citizens and human rights groups
alleged that the judiciary did not observe due process standards in
these cases.
Eight Britons and two Algerians who were arrested in December 1998
were tried from February to August 1999 in Aden on charges of
possessing illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit
terrorist acts. The 6-month trial did not meet minimum international
standards for due process. Defense lawyers claimed that the prosecution
lacked adequate evidence, and that the defendants were tortured,
sexually abused, and denied access to their lawyers (see Section 1.c.).
In August 1999, the court sentenced the main suspects, the 18-year-old
stepson and 17-year-old son of Islamic militant Abu Hamza Al-Masri, to
jail terms of 7 and 3 years, respectively. The Government has accused
Al-Masri, head of the London-based organization Supporters of Shari'a,
of involvement with the AAIA, which has carried out at least one fatal
terrorist act in Yemen. Five other defendants received jail terms
ranging from 5 to 7 years. The seven defendants appealed the verdict.
Two of the Britons received 7-month sentences and were ordered released
for time served; another, for reasons of poor health, was ordered
released for time served in early summer 1999. Their release was
delayed because both the defense and the prosecution appealed the
verdicts. The Appeals Court upheld the verdicts, and the three were
released. They returned to the United Kingdom in October 1999.
The trial of seven additional AAIA members on terrorism charges,
which began in October 1999, ended in June. Two were found guilty and
given jail sentences; the remaining five were acquitted. Two of the
defendants were tried in absentia. Four claimed that the prosecution
coerced and tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and
confessions (see Section 1.c.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting
the publication of details about the trial.
The Government claims that it does not hold political prisoners.
Local opposition politicians and human rights activists generally
accept this claim; however, some international human rights groups and
members of the opposition-in-exile dispute the claim.
At the end of the 1994 civil war, the President pardoned nearly all
who had fought against the central Government, including military
personnel and most leaders of the unrecognized DRY. The Government
denied amnesty to the 16 most senior leaders of the DRY (one of whom
now is presumed dead), who fled abroad. The DRY leaders are subject to
arrest if they return. In 1997 and 1998, the so-called ``16'' were
tried in absentia on various charges, including forming a secessionist
government, conspiracy, and forming a separate military. All but two
were found guilty, and in March 1998, a judge sentenced five of the
defendants to death and 3 to 10 years in jail. Six persons received
suspended sentences, and two were acquitted. Many opposition figures
have urged the President to issue an amnesty for those who received
sentences, in the interest of promoting reconciliation between the
north and south. The President has stated that it is up to the judicial
system to pass judgment. Defense attorneys have appealed to a higher
court, but no judgment has yet been rendered.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--Despite constitutional provisions against government
interference with privacy, security forces routinely search homes and
private offices, monitor telephones, read personal mail, and otherwise
intrude into personal matters for alleged security reasons. Such
activities are conducted without legally issued warrants or judicial
supervision. Security forces regularly monitor telephone conversations
and interfere with the telephone service of government critics and
opponents. Security forces sometimes detain relatives of suspects (see
Section 1.d.). Government informers monitor meetings and assemblies
(see Section 2.b.).
The law prohibits arrests or the serving of a subpoena between the
hours of sundown and dawn. However, persons suspected of crimes
sometimes are taken from their homes in the middle of the night,
without search warrants.
In September forces from the CSO used excessive force when they
intervened to settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in the
Buraiqah district of Aden governorate. The dispute was between a
businessman, who claimed to have purchased land in the adjacent
mountains where he had built a quarry, and armed villagers, who claimed
that they, not the Government, owned the land and were due
compensation. During an initial confrontation, one police officer was
killed and eight others wounded; several villagers were wounded, but
none were reported killed. The circumstances of the police officer's
death were unclear. In response, CSU forces charged the village,
reportedly arresting 30 persons, mistreating citizens, looting and
destroying houses, and leaving 200 families homeless.
Jews traditionally face social (but not legal) restrictions on
their residence and their employment (see Section 5).
According to a 1995 Ministry of Interior regulation, no citizen may
marry a foreigner without Interior Ministry permission (see Section 5).
This regulation does not carry the force of law, and appears to be
enforced irregularly. However, some human rights groups have raised
concerns about the regulation.
An estimated 16,000 persons use the Internet, and 5,371 persons
subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on
Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the
Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service
provider. According to Teleyemen (see Section 2.a.), the Government
blocks sexually explicit web sites; however, with the exception of
mowj.com, which is the web site of the Yemeni National Opposition Front
(MOWJ), it does not block politically oriented web sites. For example,
Abu Hamza's web page (see Section 1.e.) is not blocked. The Government
claims that it does not monitor Internet usage, but some persons
suspect their e-mail messages are read by security authorities. There
have been no reports that the Government has taken action against
Internet users.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution restricts freedom
of speech and of the press ``within the limits of the law,'' and the
Government influences the media and limits press freedom. Some security
officials attempt to influence press coverage by threatening,
harassing, and detaining journalists. Although most citizens are
uninhibited in their private discussions of domestic and foreign
policies, some are cautious in public, fearing harassment for criticism
of the Government. The Penal Code criminalizes, with fines and up to 5
years in jail, ``the humiliation of the State, the Cabinet, or
parliamentary institutions,'' the publication of ``false information''
that ``threatens public order or the public interest,'' and ``false
stories intended to damage Arab and friendly countries or their
relations with Yemen.''
The relative freedom of the press permitted between unification
(1990) and the civil war (1994) has not been reestablished. An
atmosphere of government pressure on independent and political party
journals continues at a higher level than before the civil war. The
international human rights group the Committee to Protect Journalists
continued to criticize the Government for restrictions, harassment, and
arbitrary detention directed at journalists.
The Ministry of Information influences the media by its control of
most printing presses, by subsidies to certain newspapers, and by its
ownership of the country's sole television and radio outlets. Only one
newspaper, the thrice-weekly Aden independent Al-Ayyam, owns its own
press. The Government selects the items to be covered in news
broadcasts, and often does not permit broadcast reporting critical of
the Government. However, during the 1999 presidential election
campaign, the media extensively covered both candidates and reported in
full the many critical comments made by the President's opponent. The
Government televises parliamentary debates but may edit them
selectively to remove criticism.
In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for the 1990 Press
Law. The new regulations specify that newspapers must apply annually to
the Government for licensing renewal, and that they must show
continuing evidence of about $4,375 (700,000 riyals) in operating
capital. Some journalists welcomed the new regulations, saying that
they were long overdue. Others claimed that they were designed to drive
some opposition newspapers out of business.
Although newspapers ostensibly are permitted to criticize the
Government, journalists sometimes censor themselves, especially when
writing on such sensitive issues as government policies toward the
southern governorates, relations with Saudi Arabia and other foreign
governments, and official corruption. The penalties for exceeding these
self-imposed limits can be arrest for libel, dismissal from employment,
or extrajudicial harassment. Editors-in-chief legally are responsible
for everything printed in their newspapers, regardless of authorship.
Some journalists reported being threatened by security officials to
change the tone and substance of their reporting. Journalists must have
a permit to travel abroad, although there were no reports that this
restriction was enforced during the year (see Section 2.d.).
During the year, journalists continued to be detained for
questioning for short periods of time for writing articles that were
critical of the Government or that the Government considered sensitive
subjects, primarily issues involving Saudi Arabia. However, there was a
decline in the number of such incidents from the previous year, and
most individual journalists and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate agree
that extralegal governmental harassment is less of a problem now than
it was in the recent past. Some journalists claim that most harassment
now comes from the police, in particular the CID, and no longer the
PSO. Cases and ongoing trials involving journalists often are not
resolved formally, but rather are settled through unofficial agreements
between the Government and the journalists.
Two cases during the year involved articles that criticized the
Government of Saudi Arabia. In February the Ministry of Information
filed a lawsuit against Dr. Qasim Sallam, the secretary general of the
opposition Arab Socialist Baath Party, and the party's newspaper, Al-
Ihya Al-Arabi, for an article Sallam wrote entitled ``The Danger-dom of
Saudi Arabia,'' which alleged that there were supporters of Israel in
the Saudi leadership. The case was pending at year's end. In August
1999, Jamal Ahmed Amer, a journalist for Al-Wahdawi newspaper and
member of the opposition Nasserist Party, was detained and held
incommunicado for 6 days for writing an article critical of Yemeni-
Saudi relations. Al-Wahdawi's editor, Abdelaziz Sultan, also was called
in for questioning. In February Amer was tried and found guilty of
``harming national interests'' and ``publishing an article not based on
accurate documents.'' The judge suspended publication of Al-Wahdawi for
1 month, banned Amer from practicing journalism for 1 year, and fined
Amer $31 (5,000 riyals). The editors of Al-Wahdawi and Al-Ihya Al-Arabi
claimed that the actions taken against them by the Ministry of
Information were a direct result of pressure by the Government of Saudi
Arabia. Amer's lawyer appealed the case, which was pending at year's
end. Amer continued to write for another newspaper, Al-Usbu'. He has
filed a suit against the Minister of Interior; this suit also was
pending at year's end.
In March Ali Al-Sarari, editor-in-chief of the YSP newspaper
AlThawri, received a suspended 3-month prison sentence for publishing a
story alleging that two soldiers were being held in the Mukallah
prosecutors office on attempted rape charges. The Government claimed
that the story was published to inflame north-south tensions.
Also in March, a Sana'a court dismissed the cases brought against
the Ministry of Information by the opposition Islaah, YSP, and
Nasserist parties. The parties had claimed that the official media had
neglected to broadcast the final communiques issued at the conclusion
of their party meetings and conferences in violation of the
Constitution's provision of equal media time for all political parties.
The official media provides extensive coverage of the GPC.
In May a CID officer destroyed journalist Khaled Al-Hammadi's
camera as he attempted to photograph a student demonstration at Sana'a
University, despite the fact that he had received permission to cover
the event.
Also in May, Hisham Ba Sharahil, the editor of Al-Ayyam, was
charged with ``instigating the use of force and terrorism'' and
``publishing false information'' for publishing an interview with
Islamic militant Abu Hamza Al-Masri (see Section 1.e.) in August 1999.
He also was charged with ``insulting public institutions'' for
publishing an article critical of the Director of Aden Security. The
trial was suspended to allow Ba Sharahil to undergo medical treatment.
In February Ba Sharahil also was called in for questioning in
connection with an article published in Al-Ayyam criticizing the Aden
municipal government's allowing the destruction of a building that once
had been a synagogue. He again was called in for question in April
following publication in Al-Ayyam of a letter of support for Ba
Sharahil in his dispute with the Director of Aden Security from the
secessionist Movement of Self-Determination for South Arabia (HATAM).
In June Al-Tajammu newspaper and its editor in chief, Abdulrahman
Abdullah, were tried for an article published in November 1999, which
accused the Supreme Court of corruption. Abdullah received a 6-month
suspended sentence, and the newspaper was fined.
In July security officials detained a journalist for Al-Balagh
newspaper for 6 days for reporting that an Iraqi teacher had raped six
female students in Amran governorate's College of Education. The story
turned out to be false, and the newspaper later apologized for
circulating it. Also in July, security officials harassed the
correspondents of the London-based Arabic Sayyidaty and the United Arab
Emirates-based Sahrat Al-Khalij magazines when they tried to report on
alleged serial killings at Sana'a University's medical school (see
Section 5).
In August Saif Al-Hadhri, the editor in chief of Al-Shumu
newspaper, was convicted of libel in connection with a series of
articles reporting high-level corruption in the Ministries of
Electricity, Agriculture, Education and Finance. The judge fined Al-
Hadhri $437 (70,000 riyals) and suspended him for 7 months. Al-Hadhri
also was ordered to pay the Minister and Deputy Minister of Education's
legal fees and $12,500 (2 million riyals) in compensation. Al-Hadhri
appealed the judgment, and the case was pending at year's end. In July
Al-Hadhri was abducted from his office for 1 day by 30 armed men, whom
he claimed were security officials.
In February 1999, the Ministry of Information closed Al-Shoura, the
newspaper of the Islamist opposition party Union of Popular Forces
(UPF), as well as a new, competing version of the same newspaper. The
second version of Al-Shoura appeared following an ideological split in
the UPF. Under the Press Law, it is illegal for more than one newspaper
to use the same name. Some journalists allege that the Government
financed the second Al-Shoura in order to create a pretext to shut down
the outspokenly critical original Al-Shoura. A court allowed the
original Al-Shoura to resume publication and upheld the suspension of
the second Al-Shoura, but an appeals court later ordered the original
newspaper to cease publication pending the Supreme Court's decision as
to which faction had the right to Al-Shoura's name. The original Al-
Shoura resumed publication in August.
In August 1999, journalist and lawyer Nabil Al-Amoudi was brought
before the Abyan preliminary court for writing an article critical of
the Government and the human rights situation in the country. The case
still was pending at year's end.
In August 1999, security officials detained Jamil Al-Samit, a
journalist for the Taiz-based official newspaper Al-Jumhurriyah, for
writing an article about the use of excessive force by the military in
putting down a civilian protest in the village of Quradah. He was
detained in prison for several weeks.
The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate defends freedom of the press and
publicizes human rights concerns. For example in September it sponsored
a symposium on the media and human rights. Critics claim that the
Syndicate is ineffective because it has too many nonjournalist members
who support government policy. In 1999 several independent and
opposition party journalists formed a rival union, the Committee for
the Defense of Journalists, under the leadership of Hisham Ba Sharahil,
the publisher of Al-Ayyam newspaper, to defend more vigorously
journalists harassed by the Government.
Customs officials confiscate foreign publications regarded as
pornographic or objectionable because of religious or political
content. In April PSO officials in Taiz detained Faysal Said Fara'a,
the director of a private cultural center, for a day of questioning
following his alleged receipt of banned books dealing with the
opposition. There were no reports during the year that the Ministry of
Information delayed the distribution of international Arabic-language
dailies in an effort to decrease their sales in the country, as had
occurred in previous years. However, authorities monitor foreign
publications, banning those that they deem harmful to national
interests. For example in April the owner of a Sana'a bookstore was
arrested by the PSO for selling banned copies of an edition of the
London-based Arabic magazine Al-Magalah, which featured a cover story
on President Saleh's son Ahmed, the Commander of the Republican Guard.
An author must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Culture to
publish a book. Most books are approved, but the process is time-
consuming for the author. The author must submit copies of the book to
the Ministry. Officials at the National Library must read and endorse
the text. It is then submitted to a special committee for final
approval. If a book is not deemed appropriate for publication, the
Ministry simply does not issue a decision. Publishers usually do not
deal with an author who has not yet obtained a permit.
An estimated 16,000 persons use the Internet, and 5,371 persons
subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on
Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the
Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service
provider. With the exception of mowj.com, the web site of the Yemeni
National Opposition Front, the Government does not block politically
oriented web sites (see Section 1.f.).
Academic freedom is restricted somewhat because of the extreme
politicization of university campuses. A majority of professors and
students align themselves with either the ruling GPC party or the
opposition Islaah party. Each group closely monitors the activities of
the other. Top administrative positions usually are awarded to
political allies of these two major parties. There were several clashes
between GPC- and Islaah-affiliated students during the year, but no
serious violence.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There are no
constitutional restrictions on the right to assemble peacefully;
however, the Government limited this right in practice. The Government
claims that it bans and disrupts some demonstrations to prevent them
from degenerating into riots and violence. The Government requires a
permit for demonstrations, but it issues them routinely. In August
police in Aden briefly detained five members of the YSP who convened a
political meeting without a permit. Government informers monitor
meetings and assemblies. In September 1998, following violent
demonstrations earlier that year, the Government sent a draft law to
Parliament that would impose significant limitations on the right to
assemble and to demonstrate. The draft law was criticized by many
lawyers, human rights activists, and members of Parliament. The
Parliament continues to withhold action on this proposed law. Draft
provisions of a new Police Law would have permitted police to open fire
on gatherings of five or more persons if police suspected imminent
violence or criminal activity; however, the provisions were removed
after a campaign by human rights organizations, opposition political
parties, and the press (see Section 1.d.).
Although it banned a similar demonstration in 1999, in April the
Government allowed the opposition to organize a rally in Mukallah in
Hadramaut governorate to commemorate the deaths of the two persons who
were killed by police during violent demonstrations there in April
1998. Five thousand persons reportedly attended the rally. Also in
April, the Government detained 19 opposition activists in Abyan
governorate for questioning for several days; the opposition claims
this was done to prevent them from holding a similar rally. In May
hundreds of persons in Al-Dalah governorate peacefully marched to
protest Government security policies and to demand an investigation
into the death of a student during a violent confrontation between
security forces and armed citizens earlier in the month (see Section
1.a.). During the year, the opposition organized mass demonstrations in
Al-Dalah and Lahaj governorates and a number of smaller marches
throughout the country. In May thousands of students at Sana'a
University organized a peaceful march to protest the university
administration's delay in investigating alleged serial killings at the
medical school (see Section 5). In September 300 women demonstrated in
Al-Ghaida in Al-Mahra governorate to protest the preface to a book of
statistics on the governorate written by the governor, which they
believed contained derogatory comments about residents of the
governorate. In November an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 citizens, mostly
women and children, peacefully demonstrated in Sana'a to protest
Israeli actions against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza
during the fall.
There are no constitutional restrictions on the freedom of
association, and the Government generally respects this right in
practice. Associations must obtain an operating license from the
Ministry of Social Affairs or the Ministry of Culture, which usually is
a routine matter.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares that Islam is
the state religion and also provides for freedom of religion, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice; however, there
were some restrictions. Followers of other religions are free to
worship according to their beliefs and to wear religiously distinctive
ornaments or dress; however, the Government forbids conversions,
requires permission for the construction of new places of worship, and
prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing. The Constitution states that
Shari'a is the source of all legislation.
Under Islam the conversion of a Muslim to another religion is
considered apostasy, a crime punishable by death. There were no reports
of cases in which the crime was charged or prosecuted by government
authorities. In January the director of the Aden office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) received a report that a Somali
refugee, Mohammed Haji, who allegedly had converted from Islam to
Christianity after his arrival in the country, had been arrested for
apostasy. The UNHCR's investigation found that the refugee had been
detained previously by police in Aden and at the UNHCR's Al-Jahin camp.
The refugee was registered with the UNHCR under a Christian name but
maintained an address in Sana'a under a Muslim name. He is married to a
Muslim woman and has an Islamic marriage certificate. The UNHCR
believed that authorities detained the refugee on criminal rather than
religious grounds. In August Haji's case was dismissed, and he was
remanded to immigration detention. Later that month, UNHCR resettled
Haji and his family to New Zealand.
Official government policy does not prohibit or provide punishment
for the possession of non-Islamic religious literature. However, there
are unconfirmed reports that foreigners, on occasion, have been
harassed by police for possessing such literature. In addition, some
members of the security forces occasionally censor the mail of
Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community, ostensibly to
prevent proselytizing.
There are unconfirmed reports that some police, without the
authorization or knowledge of their superiors, on occasion have
harassed and detained persons suspected of apostasy in order to compel
them to renounce their conversions.
The Government does not allow the building of new non-Muslim public
places of worship without permission; however, in 1998 the country
established diplomatic relations with the Vatican and agreed to the
construction and operation of a ``Christian center'' in Sana'a. The
Papal Nuncio, resident in Kuwait, presented his credentials to the
Yemeni Government in March. Yemen's ambassador to Italy was accredited
to the Vatican in July 1999. President Saleh paid an official visit to
the Vatican at the time of his state visit to Italy in April.
Public schools provide instruction in Islam but not in other
religions. However, almost all non-Muslims are foreigners who attend
private schools.
In February the Government revised its travel regulations to allow
Yemeni-origin Jews on third-country passports to travel to Yemen, as
well as Yemeni-origin Israelis with laissez-passer travel documents.
The first such visitors arrived in March.
The Government has taken steps to prevent the politicization of
mosques in an attempt to curb extremism. Private Islamic organizations
may maintain ties to pan-Islamic organizations and operate schools, but
the Government monitors their activities.
Following unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, owners of
property previously expropriated by the Communist government of the
former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, including religious
organizations, were invited to seek restitution of their property.
However, implementation of the process, including for religious
institutions, has been extremely limited, and very few properties have
been returned to any previous owner.
Nearly all of the country's once sizable Jewish population has
emigrated. There are no legal restrictions on the few hundred Jews who
remain, although there are traditional restrictions on places of
residence and choice of employment (see Section 5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Government places some limits on
freedom of movement. In general the Government does not obstruct
domestic travel, although the army and security forces maintain
checkpoints on major roads. There were a few reports during the year
that security forces at checkpoints killed or injured persons whom they
believed were engaging in criminal activity and resisting arrest (see
Section 1.a.).
In certain areas, armed tribesmen occasionally man checkpoints
alongside military or security officials, and subject travelers to
physical harassment, bribe demands, or theft.
The Government does not obstruct routinely foreign travel or the
right to emigrate and return. However, journalists must have a permit
to travel abroad. There were no reports that the restriction on
journalists was enforced during the year (see Section 2.a.). Women must
obtain permission from a male relative before applying for a passport
or departing the country.
Immigrants and refugees traveling within the country often are
required by security officials at government checkpoints to show that
they possess resident status or refugee identification cards.
The law does not include provisions for granting refugee or asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the
Government continues to grant refugee status on a group basis to
Somalis who have arrived in Yemen after 1991.
In 1999 the Government offered asylum to 9,311 Somalis, who fled
the fighting in that country. This brought the total number of
registered Somali refugees in the country to 55,186. The Government
also cooperated with the UNHCR in assisting refugees from Eritrea
(2,500 persons), Ethiopia (2,403 persons) and various other countries
(362 persons). The Government permitted the UNHCR to monitor the
situation of 2,000 Iraqis in Yemen.
Approximately 32,862 Somali refugees have been integrated into
society and are no longer receiving food or financial assistance from
the UNHCR. However, they still are eligible for medical treatment at
UNHCR facilities in Aden and Sana'a. In addition, the UNHCR provides
small loans to refugee women who wish to initiate income-generating
activities. Somali-language education is provided in urban areas of
Aden.
The UNHCR provides food and medical assistance for up to 12,408
Somalis and Ethiopians in a refugee camp at Al-Jahin in Abyan
governorate. Children receive schooling in the camp, and adults are
eligible for vocational training. The Government in 1998 approved a new
UNHCR facility to be built at a site in Lahaj governorate; the facility
still was under construction at year's end. The UNHCR, in coordination
with the Government, issues identification cards to Somali refugees and
recognized refugees of other nationalities. The Government has
developed plans to establish a national refugee commission composed of
the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, and the Immigration
Authority.
The UNHCR reports that the Government consults with it prior to
returning illegal immigrants to their countries of origin in order to
avoid the involuntary repatriation of refugees with a credible fear of
persecution. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution. The UNHCR facilitated the
voluntary repatriation of some Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees, as well
as the voluntary return of 1,856 Somali refugees to areas of Somalia
that are considered safe. Additionally, the UNHCR in Yemen, in
collaboration with several Western governments, resettles vulnerable
refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizen to Change
Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government; however, there are significant limitations in practice. The
Government by law is accountable to the Parliament; however, the
Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive
authority. Decisionmaking and real political power still rest in the
hands of the executive branch, particularly the President. In addition,
the Constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are
contrary to Islam, oppose the goals of the Yemeni revolution, or
violate the country's international commitments.
The President appoints the Prime Minister, who forms the
Government. The Cabinet consists of 24 ministers. Parliament is elected
by universal adult suffrage; the first such election was held in 1993.
International observers judged the most recent parliamentary elections
(held in 1997) as ``reasonably free and fair,'' despite some problems
associated with the voting.
Ali Abdullah Saleh, the President and leader of the GPC, was
elected to a 5-year term in the country's first nation-wide direct
presidential election in September 1999, winning 96.3 percent of the
vote. The Constitution provides that the President be elected by
popular vote from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and
the election was generally free and fair; however, there were some
problems, including the lack of a credible voter registration list. In
addition the President was not opposed by a truly competitive candidate
because the candidate selected by the leftist opposition coalition did
not receive from the GPC-dominated Parliament the minimum number of
votes required to run (the other opposition party chose not to run its
own candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The President's sole
opponent was a member of the GPC. There was no significant violence
associated with the election.
The President has the authority to introduce legislation and
promulgate laws by decree when Parliament is not in session. Decrees
must be approved by Parliament 30 days after reconvening. In theory if
a decree is not approved, it does not become law; in practice, a decree
remains in effect unless it is later affirmatively rejected by
Parliament. Although the Constitution also permits Parliament to
initiate legislation, to date it has not done so. Parliament generally
is relegated to debating policies that the Government already has
submitted, although it sometimes successfully revises or blocks draft
legislation submitted by the Government. Despite the fact that the
President's party enjoys an absolute majority, Parliament has rejected
or delayed action on major legislation introduced by the Government,
and on occasion it has forced significant modification. The Parliament
also has criticized strongly the Government for some actions, including
the lifting of subsidies that led to widespread violence in June 1998.
Ministers frequently are called to Parliament to defend actions,
policies, or proposed legislation, although they may and sometimes do
refuse to appear. Parliamentarians at times are sharply critical during
these sessions. Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff attended
foreign NGO-sponsored training workshops designed to increase their
independence and effectiveness.
The President is advised by the 59-member Consultative Council, a
board of appointed notables chaired by a former prime minister. The
Council advises the President on a range of issues but has no
constitutional powers.
Formal government authority is centralized in Sana'a; many
citizens, especially in urban areas, complain about the inability of
local and governorate entities to make policy or resource decisions.
Responding to these concerns, in January the Parliament passed the
government-submitted Local Authority Law. The new law, considered by
the Government as an important part of its ongoing democratization
program, is intended to decentralize authority by establishing locally
elected district and governorate councils. The councils would be headed
by government-appointed governors. The first elections for the councils
were scheduled for February 2001.
On November 19, Parliament approved several amendments to the
Constitution, including amendments that would extend the terms of
Members of Parliament from 4 to 6 years and the President from 5 to 7
years, allow the President to dissolve Parliament without a referendum
in rare instances, abolish the President's ability to issue
parliamentary recess decrees, and transform the Consultative Council
into a presidentially appointed Shura Council with limited legislative
and candidate approval powers. The amendments were to be approved in a
national referendum scheduled for February 2001.
In some governorates, tribal leaders exercise considerable
discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Central
government authority in these areas often is weak.
The multiparty system remains weak. The GPC dominates the
Parliament, and Islaah is the only other party of significance. All
parties must be registered in accordance with the Political Parties Law
of 1991, which stipulates that each party must have at least 75
founders and 2,500 members. Some oppositionists contend that they are
unable to organize new parties because of the prohibitively high legal
requirements on the minimum number of members and leaders. Twelve
parties participated in the 1997 elections, compared with 16 in 1993.
The YSP and several smaller parties boycotted the 1997 elections,
leading to lower voter turnout in the south. These same parties also
boycotted the country's first nationwide direct presidential election
in September 1999. There was no significant violence associated with
this election. Two new parties were established in 1999: The Yemeni
Green Party and the Union of Democratic Forces.
The Government provides financial support to political parties,
including a small stipend to publish their own newspapers. However, the
YSP claims that the Government has yet to return the assets it seized
from the party during the 1994 civil war.
Although women vote and hold office, these rights often are limited
by cultural norms and religious customs, and women are underrepresented
in Government and politics. Two women were elected to the Parliament in
1997 (the same number as in 1993), and an increasing number hold senior
leadership positions in the Government or in the GPC. Voter
registration of women is less than half that of men. Many Akhdam, a
small ethnic minority that may be descendants of African slaves, are
not permitted to participate in the political process, mainly due to
their inability to obtain citizenship. There no longer are any credible
reports that citizen members of religious minorities are not permitted
to participate in the political process.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The concept of local nongovernmental human rights organizations is
relatively new, with the first groups forming only in the years since
unification. Several groups held workshops and other activities during
the year without government interference and often with government
support.
The Government cooperates with NGO's, although NGO's complain that
there is a lack of response to their requests from government
officials. The Government's ability to be responsive is limited in part
by a lack of material and human resources. In 1998 the Government
introduced a new draft law for regulating the formation and activities
of NGO's. While more liberal than the law it is designed to replace,
the proposal still contains significant limitations on such
organizations. The Parliament again refused to take any action on the
proposed new law during the year.
The Taiz-based Human Rights Information and Training Center
(HRITC), perhaps the country's most respected domestic human rights
NGO, places particular emphasis on education and NGO training. During
the year, the HRITC sponsored numerous public lectures, training
workshops, and conferences, and participated in several meetings of the
international human rights community. The HRITC publishes the quarterly
human rights journal Our Rights and regularly prints and distributes a
brochure entitled Know Your Rights. During the year, the HRITC also
published several works, including a translation of international human
rights documents and laws, a book on violence against women, and a
study on the role of women in local NGO's. Several donors have
supported the HRITC. The HRITC, in cooperation with a foreign embassy,
coordinated the series of events conducted by Penal Reform
International from September 1998 to February 1999 (see Section 1.c.).
The HRITC did not conduct any investigations into alleged human rights
abuses during the year.
The Organization for the Defense of Human Rights, a lawyers' group
formed in 1999 by attorney and parliamentarian Mohamed Naji Alao,
discovered that several illegal private prisons were being operated at
government facilities in Sana'a. He reported them to the President, who
immediately ordered the unlawful prisons closed and offenders arrested
(see Section 1.c.).
The Yemeni Organization for the Defense of Liberties and Human
Rights is based in Aden. Although the organization continued to suffer
from a lack of funds, it actively publicized human rights abuses,
particularly in the south, and provided support to new human rights
NGO's.
The activities of Al-Nushataa, or The Activists, a group formed in
1999 by former members of the Yemeni Human Rights Organization (YHRO),
were limited to organizing a children's parliament, which familiarized
secondary school children with the country's legislature. The
activities of the National Center for Human Rights and Democratic
Development (NCHRDD) were limited to an inspection tour of several
Sana'a police stations.
In 1998 and 1999, Penal Reform International (PRI), a London-based
NGO, conducted a fact-finding mission to Yemen and, with the support of
a foreign embassy and the HRITC, organized prison management training
workshops for prison and security officials. PRI identified several
issues of concern, including the mistreatment of prisoners, lack of
education and resources for prison officials, and unsanitary and
overcrowded conditions.
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Parliament of the
European Union, and the Committee to Protect Journalists observe the
country closely. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
maintains a resident representative. The Government has given these
groups broad access to government officials, records, refugee camps,
and prisons. The Government had acknowledged some abuses that were
alleged in a 1997 Amnesty International report and rejected other
allegations. Amnesty International's follow-up report, issued in July
1999, criticized the Government for not keeping its promise to
investigate some of these abuses. The Government claims that it
responded to Amnesty International and passed the results of its
investigations to the UNCHR, but that the information the organization
provided was inadequate for effective investigation and conclusive
action.
In February the Government hosted a major symposium of the UNCHR,
chaired by U.N. High Commissioner Mary Robinson, on the human rights
aspects of international development. Robinson signed a Memorandum of
Intent for a technical assistance grant of $300,000, half of which
would be used to fund a resident UNCHR consultant who, working under
the umbrella of the UNDP, would serve as an advisor to the Supreme
National Committee on Human Rights and oversee UNCHR programs in the
country.
The YHRO is a local human rights group headquartered in Sana'a,
with branches in seven other cities. It was founded by the Government.
Oppositionists as well as some human rights experts have viewed its
findings as unobjective. The head of the YHRO, a member of the
judiciary, was transferred from his post as head of the Sana'a Court of
Appeals to the Dhamar Court of Appeals in 1998. This was seen by some
observers as a demotion or an attempt by the Government to marginalize
the judge, who was seen as too independent on human rights questions.
The Supreme National Committee for Human Rights, which was formed
in 1997 and reports to the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign
Affairs, is responsible for ensuring that the country meets its
obligations with respect to implementing international human rights
conventions and investigating specific instances of abuse. The
Committee views using education as a means to effect cultural change as
its highest priority. To this end, it continued during the year to seek
donor support for a project to incorporate human rights education into
secondary school curricula and to provide 1-day human rights workshops
for police officers, which it began in 1999. The committee has been
less active in investigating specific cases of abuse. Many persons
alleged that it has not followed up on its stated commitment to
investigate allegations of human rights violations. For example, the
committee has not investigated the alleged torture of Naji Saleh Al-
Khowlani during detention by police in Sana'a in 1999 (see Section
1.c.), and it declined to investigate the case of Wadia Al-Shaibani,
who reportedly died in late 1997 while in the custody of security
forces in Aden (see Section 1.a.). In the latter case, it accepted the
official coroner's report of death by suicide. The committee conducted
no investigations of alleged human rights violations during the year,
claiming that it had received no such reports. The committee continues
to be hampered by a lack of human and material resources.
However, the committee has been active on prison reform. In January
it led a government initiative to establish and, with the help of
private sector contributions, to finance a special ``charity fund'' to
be used to enable the release of prisoners who, in keeping with tribal
or Islamic law, were being held in prison pending payment of
restitution to their victims, despite having completed their sentences.
The committee participated in the subsequent inspections conducted to
identify prisoners whom the fund could help and to assess prison
conditions (see Section 1.c.). Working with the National Women's
Committee, the committee during the year developed a plan to establish
a shelter in Sana'a that would house and provide vocational education
for 50 abandoned women. The committee is seeking donor assistance and
hopes to establish additional shelters in other governorates. In 1999
following an inspection of Sana'a central prison, the committee
arranged for minors who were incarcerated with adults to be
incarcerated separately in two age groups: 11 to 14 years old and 15 to
18 years old. Fifty juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an
orphanage run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, where they now attend
school and participate in other activities (see Sections 1.c. and 4).
The committee also initiated a project, with the support of local
businessman, to build the country's first youth reformatory, but still
is seeking financing to purchase land on which to build the reformatory
(see Section 5).
In October the Human Rights Committee of the President's
Consultative Council, in cooperation with the NCHRDD, inspected several
police stations in Sana'a to determine whether police were following
proper procedures and to develop recommendations for the Minister of
Interior on training for police officers. The Committee has had limited
success in investigating human rights abuses and conducted no other
investigations during the year.
The Parliament's human rights committee in the past has
investigated some reports of human rights abuses, but its activities
during the year were limited to participating in various prison
inspections. The committee's chairman claims that he would like to
increase the activities of the committee, especially in the area of
press freedoms, but cites lack of official and financial support as
constraints. The committee has no authority except to issue reports.
The Committee to Combat Torture is composed of 100 senior
parliamentarians and party leaders, including some opposition members,
but apparently was inactive during the year.
The Center for Future Studies, a think tank affiliated with the
Islaah Party, issues an annual report on human rights practices,
providing a wide-ranging overview of human rights. There is little
follow-up to the report.
Two delegations from the UNHRC visited in late 1998. One delegation
looked into what progress the Government had made on cases of
``disappearances'' (see Section 1.b.). The other conducted an
assessment of the Government's need for technical assistance,
particularly for the Supreme National Committee on Human Rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal in general
rights and duties,'' and that society ``is based on social solidarity,
which is based on justice, freedom, and equality according to the
law;'' however, discrimination based on race, sex, disability, and, to
a lesser extent, religion, exists. Entrenched cultural attitudes often
prevent women from enjoying equal rights.
Women.--Although spousal abuse reportedly is common, it generally
is undocumented. Violence against women and children is considered a
family affair and usually is not reported to the police. In the
country's traditional society, an abused woman would be expected to
take her complaint to a male relative (rather than the authorities),
who should intercede on her behalf or provide her sanctuary if
required. One survey conducted by Sana'a University and the Dutch
Ministry of Justice found that nearly 50 percent of the 120 women
interviewed stated that they had been beaten; 1 in 5 claimed to have
been threatened with death. Despite the high incidence rates reported,
only 3 percent of women had ever sought help from an outsider or the
police. The laws pertaining to violence against women rarely are
enforced. The only institutionalized aid for victimized women is a
small battered-women's shelter in Aden. The press and women's rights
activists only recently have begun to investigate or report on
violations of women's rights. Violence against women was the subject of
a women's conference held in Aden in July and of two conferences held
in 1999, and the issue became a topic of heated public debate following
rumors of serial killings of female students at Sana'a University's
medical school. Rumors that 16 women were murdered now appear to be
unfounded; police believe the Sudanese morgue attendant now on trial
for the murder of two female students fabricated accounts of having
killed more. However, the press' extensive coverage highlighted
authorities' dismissive treatment of the female students' concerns and
a lack of interest in their security. In May 5,000 students marched to
protest the university administration's handling of the case (see
Section 2.b.).
The Penal Code allows for leniency for persons guilty of committing
a ``crime against honor,'' a euphemism for violent assaults or killings
committed against a female for her perceived immodest or defiant
behavior. Legal provisions regarding violence against women state that
an accused man should be put to death for murdering a woman. However, a
husband who murders his wife and her lover may be fined or imprisoned
for a term not to exceed 1 year. Despite the apparent sanctioning of
honor killings, most citizens, including women's activists, believe the
phenomenon is not widespread. Some Western NGO's claim that the
practice is more prevalent, but admit to a lack of evidence to support
such claims.
Women face significant restrictions on their role in society. The
law, social custom, and Shari'a discriminate against women. Men are
permitted to take as many as four wives, although very few do so. By
law the minimum age of marriage is 15. However, the law largely is not
enforced, and some girls marry as early as age 12. In 1998 some
conservative Members of Parliament attempted to eliminate the ``minimum
age'' requirement on the grounds that parents should decide when their
daughters are old enough to marry. Their draft law failed by a large
majority. A 1998 draft law to raise the minimum age of marriage to 18
also failed by a large majority. The law stipulates that the wife's
``consent'' to the marriage is required; ``consent'' is defined as
``silence'' for previously unwed women and ``pronouncement of consent''
for divorced women. The husband and the wife's ``guardian'' (usually
her father) sign the marriage contract; in Aden and some outlying
governorates, the wife also signs. The practice of bride-price payments
is widespread, despite efforts to limit the size of such payments.
The law provides that the wife must obey the husband. She must live
with him at the place stipulated in the contract, consummate the
marriage, and not leave the home without his consent. Husbands may
divorce wives without justifying their action in court. A woman has the
legal right to divorce; however, she must provide a justification, such
as her husband's nonsupport, impotence, or taking of a second wife
without her consent. However, the expense of hiring a lawyer is a
significant deterrent, as is the necessity for rural women to travel to
a city to present their case. A woman seeking a divorce also must repay
the mahr (a portion of her bride price), which creates an additional
hardship. As the mahr usually is in the hands of her family, the
refusal by a family to pay the mahr effectively can prevent a divorce.
The family's refusal to accept the woman back into the home also may
deter divorce, as few other options are available to women. When a
divorce occurs, the family home and older children often are awarded to
the husband. The divorced woman usually returns to her father's home or
to the home of another male relative. Her former husband must continue
to support her for another 3 months, since she may not remarry until
she proves that she is not pregnant.
Women who seek to travel abroad must obtain permission from their
husbands or fathers to receive a passport and to travel. They also are
expected to be accompanied by male relatives. However, enforcement of
this requirement is irregular.
Shari'a-based law permits a Muslim man to marry a Christian or
Jewish woman, but no Muslim woman may marry outside of Islam. Yemeni
women do not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born
spouses; however, they may confer citizenship on children born in Yemen
of foreign-born fathers.
According to a 1995 Interior Ministry regulation, any citizen who
wishes to marry a foreigner must obtain the permission of the Ministry.
A Yemeni woman wishing to marry a foreigner must present proof of her
parents' approval to the Interior Ministry. A foreign woman who wishes
to marry a Yemeni man must prove to the Ministry that she is ``of good
conduct and behavior,'' and ``is free from contagious disease.'' There
are no corresponding requirements for men to demonstrate parental
approval, good conduct, or freedom from contagious diseases. Although
the regulation does not have the force of law and is applied
irregularly, some human rights groups have raised concerns about it.
The Government consistently supports women's rights and the
expansion of the public role of women. The President frequently speaks
publicly about the importance of women's political participation and
economic development. In 1999 the Prime Minister mandated that all
ministries must promote at least one woman to the director general
level; at year's end, only the Interior Ministry had failed to do so,
although it had initiated an aggressive campaign to recruit, train, and
deploy female police officers. Several ministries have a number of
female directors general. In March the Prime Minister established the
Supreme Council for Women, an independent governmental body charged
with promoting women's issues in the Government. With the Government's
active support, bilateral and multilateral donors have initiated long-
term (1994-2004) projects worth $31 million (4.96 billion riyals) aimed
at advancing vocational education and reproductive health for women and
girls.
According to the most recent Government statistics (1998), 64.15
percent of women are illiterate, compared with approximately 31.25
percent of men. The fertility rate is 6.5 children per woman. Most
women have little access to basic health care. Only approximately 22
percent of births are attended by trained health-care personnel. In
some cases, where clinics are available, women do not use them because
they are unable to afford them or reach them from their remote
villages, have little confidence in them, or their male relatives or
they themselves refuse to allow a male doctor to examine them. Donor-
funded maternal and child health programs attempt to address these
issues through programs designed to train midwives who serve rural
populations.
In general women in the south, particularly in Aden, are better
educated and have had somewhat greater employment opportunities than
their northern counterparts. However, since the 1994 civil war, the
number of working women in the south appears to have declined, due not
only to the stagnant economy but also to increasing cultural pressure
from the north.
The National Women's Committee (NWC), a government-sponsored semi-
independent women's association, promotes female education and civic
responsibility through seminars and workshops and by coordinating
donors' programs. The committee's chairwoman sits on the Prime
Ministerial Supreme Council for Women. There are a number of recently
formed NGO's working for women's advancement, including the Social
Association for Productive Families, which promotes vocational
development for women; the Women and Children's Department of the
Center for Future Studies, which organizes seminars and publishes
studies on women and children; the Woman and Child Development
Association, which focuses on health education and illiteracy; and the
Yemeni Council for Motherhood and Childhood, which provides microcredit
and vocational training to women.
Children.--While the Government has asserted its commitment to
protect children's rights, it lacks the resources necessary to ensure
adequate health care, education, and welfare services for children. The
UNDP estimates that 30 percent of children are malnourished. The infant
mortality rate in 1999 was 75 deaths per 1,000 births, down from 105
per 1,000 in 1998. Male children receive preferential treatment over
female children; after the age of 1, male children have a 12 percent
greater chance of survival than females, a result of the comparative
neglect of female children.
The law provides for universal free education for 9 years, which is
compulsory, but this provision is not enforced. Many children,
especially girls, do not attend primary school. Education for females
is not encouraged in some tribal areas, where girls often are kept home
to help their mothers with child care, housework, and farm work.
According to UNICEF's ``Report on Children and Women in Yemen: 1998,''
an estimated 45 percent of primary-school-age children (ages 6 to 15)
do not attend school. Some rural areas have no schools for their
school-age population. In 1998 to encourage girls' attendance at
school, the Government passed a law that eliminated school fees and the
requirement of uniforms for girls. According to the UNICEF report,
enrollment of girls in school increased by 4 percent in 1998.
Enrollment of boys declined 10 percent because increasing numbers of
older boys from poor families left school to work.
In 1999 following an inspection of Sana'a central prison, the
Supreme National Committee for Human Rights arranged for minors who
previously had been incarcerated with adults to be incarcerated
separately in two age groups: 11 to 14 years old and 15 to 18 years
old. Fifty juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an orphanage
run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, where they now attend school and
participate in other activities (see Sections 1.c. and 4). The
Committee also initiated a project, with the support of local
businessmen, to build the country's first youth reformatory, but still
is seeking financing to purchase land on which to build the reformatory
(see Section 4).
Child marriage is common in rural areas. Although the law requires
that a girl be 15 to marry, the law is not enforced, and marriages of
girls as young as age 12 occur.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is practiced by some citizens. According to a
1997 demographic survey conducted by the Government, nearly one-fourth
(23 percent) of women who have ever been married have been subjected to
FGM. However, the prevalence of the practice varies substantially by
region. Citizens of African origin or those living in communities with
heavy African influence are more likely to practice FGM. For example,
according to the survey, approximately 69 percent of women living in
coastal areas were subjected to FGM, compared with 15 percent in
mountainous regions, and 5 percent in the plateau and desert regions.
The procedure is confined mainly to excision, with infibulation being
practiced only among East African immigrants and refugees. FGM rarely
is reported among Shaf'ai Sunnis, and the Zaydi Shi'a reputedly do not
practice it at all. The Government's publication of the data on FGM was
an important first step in addressing this problem; however, while some
government health workers and officials actively and publicly
discouraged the practice, the Government has not proposed legislation
to outlaw it nor have local women's groups adopted the problem as a
major concern.
In January the Prime Minister established the Higher Council of
Motherhood and Childhood (HCMC), a semi-autonomous inter-ministerial
entity responsible for formulating policy and programs to improve the
status of children. The HCMC participates in the World Bank's Child
Development Program and the Arab Council for Childhood and
Development's program for street children.
People with Disabilities.--Persons with mental and physical
disabilities face distinct social prejudices, as well as discrimination
in education and employment. In 1998 the Government mandated acceptance
of disabled students in schools, exempted them from paying tuition, and
required that schools be made more accessible to disabled students;
however, it is unclear to what extent these laws have been implemented.
There is no national law mandating the accessibility of buildings for
the disabled. Some disabled persons are reduced to begging to support
themselves. During the year, donors financed the establishment of three
new schools for the disabled in Taiz governorate. Mentally ill
patients, particularly those who commit crimes, are imprisoned and even
shackled when there is no one to care for them. Persons with mental
problems sometimes are arrested without charge and placed in prisons
alongside criminals (see Section 1.c.). The ICRC, in cooperation with
the Yemeni Red Crescent Society, built and now staffs separate
detention facilities for mentally disabled prisoners. These facilities
are located in Sana'a, Ibb, and Taiz, and collectively are able to care
for a population of 300 persons.
The Handicapped Society, the country's largest NGO involved in
assisting the disabled, was founded in 1988 and has branches in 13
governorates. Funded by international donors (primarily the Swedish
organization Radda Barnen) and a modest annual grant from the
Government, the Handicapped Society provides rehabilitation assistance
and vocational training, and sponsors cultural and sports activities
for disabled persons. The Ministry of Education has assigned three
teachers to teach students at the disabled-accessible classrooms at the
Society's Sana'a branch. Believing that the needs of disabled women
were not being addressed adequately by the Handicapped Society,
activists in 1998 established with government support the Challenge
Society. The Challenge Society provides 85 disabled females between the
ages of 6 and 30 with medical care, support services, and vocational
training. In March three disabled teenagers toured the country on
specially adapted bicycles and, supported by the Ministry of Youth and
Sports and private sector contributions, took their bike tour to
several Arab countries.
Religious Minorities.--Apart from a small but undetermined number
of Christians and Hindus of South Asian origin in Aden, Jews are the
only indigenous religious minority. Their numbers have diminished
significantly--from several tens of thousands to a few hundreddue to
voluntary emigration over the past 50 years. Although the law makes no
distinction, Jews traditionally are restricted to living in one section
of a city or village and often are confined to a limited choice of
employment, usually farming or handicrafts. Jews may, and do, own real
property.
Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community are employed
in teaching, social services, and health care. Occasionally the
security authorities harass such clergy by censoring their mail,
ostensibly to prevent proselytizing (see Section 2.c.).
In July 1998, a gunman killed three nuns belonging to the Sisters
of Charity order in Hodeidah. The Government took swift action and
immediately arrested the individual. The Government determined that he
was deranged and committed him to a psychiatric institution.
A hospital in Jibla operated by the Baptist Church has experienced
occasional harassment from local Islamic extremists who feared that the
hospital might be used to spread Christianity. There have been no
reports of threats of violence by extremists in several years.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens with a noncitizen
parent, called ``muwalladin,'' sometimes face discrimination in
employment and in other areas. Persons who seek employment at Sana'a
University or admission to the military academy by law must demonstrate
that they have two Yemeni parents. Nonetheless, many senior government
officials, including members of Parliament and ministers, have only one
Yemeni parent. In some cases, naturalization of the non-Yemeni parent
is sufficient to overcome the ``two-Yemeni-parent'' requirement.
A small group of persons claiming to be the descendants of ancient
Ethiopian occupiers of Yemen who later were enslaved, are considered
the lowest social class. Known as the ``Akhdam'' (servants), they live
in squalor and endure persistent social discrimination. Beginning in
September 1999, the Government's Social Fund for Development (SFD)
initiated a program for ``special needs groups,'' which focused
particularly on the Akhdam. During the year, the SFD conducted an
education project for Akhdam children in Hodeidah governorate, provided
support to an NGO conducting field research on Akhdam needs in Sana'a
governorate, and improved the quality of the water supply and built two
classrooms for the Akhdam community in Taiz governorate.
There have been reports by human rights groups that some immigrants
of African origin have difficulty in securing Interior Ministry
permission to marry Yemeni citizens. An Interior Ministry regulation
requires that marriages of citizens and foreigners be approved in
advance by the Ministry (see also Section 1.f.).
Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, and the
Government's ability to control tribal elements responsible for
kidnapings, shootings, and other acts of violence remained limited. In
January 22 persons were killed and 35 injured in tribal disputes in
Shabwa and Al-Baida governorates. In one incident, 10 persons were
killed and 3 injured when a fight at school between 2 children from
different tribes escalated into violence. In another incident, a member
of the Ba Haider tribe killed a fellow tribesman in retaliation for the
killing of his father 20 years ago. The Nehm and Al-Haymah tribes also
are involved in an ongoing violent feud in which several persons have
been killed. In February tribesmen from the Nehm blocked the Sana'a
Highway, opening fire on and killing three of the police officers
dispatched to dismantle the roadblock. Up to 16 persons reportedly were
killed in the ensuing fighting. The Deputy Governor of Sana'a was shot
to death in August in what police believe was a tribally related
revenge killing. Tensions, which periodically escalate into violent
confrontations, continue between the Government and the Khowlan and
other tribes in Marib governorate.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that
citizens have the right to form unions; however, this right is
restricted in practice. The Government seeks to place its own personnel
in positions of influence inside unions and trade union federations.
The 1995 Labor Law (amended in 1997) provides both for the right to
form unions and for the right to strike.
The Yemeni Confederation of Labor Unions (YCLU) remains the sole
national umbrella organization. The YCLU claims 350,000 members in 15
unions and denies any association with the Government, although it
works closely with the Government to resolve labor disputes through
negotiation. Observers suggest that the Government likely would not
tolerate the establishment of an alternative labor federation unless it
believed such an establishment to be in its best interest.
By law civil servants and public sector workers, and some
categories of farm workers, may not join unions. Only the General
Assembly of the YCLU may dissolve unions. The law provides equal labor
rights for women, and it confirms the freedom of workers to associate.
The Labor Law does not stipulate a minimum membership for unions, nor
does it limit them to a specific enterprise or firm. Thus, citizens may
associate by profession or trade.
Strikes are not permitted unless a dispute between workers and
employers is ``final'' and ``incontestable'' (a prior attempt must have
been made to settle through negotiation or arbitration). The proposal
to strike must be submitted to at least 60 percent of all concerned
workers, of whom 25 percent must vote in favor of the proposal.
Permission to strike also must be obtained from the YCLU. Strikes for
explicit ``political purposes'' are prohibited. In practice the law
tends to discourage strikes.
There were several small strikes during the year. In February a
group of school teachers in Taiz governorate struck for a day because
they had not received their January salaries. Also in February, Sana'a
municipality garbage collectors struck for a day, demanding payment of
overdue wages and a salary increase. In June the staff of Sana'a
University struck for a week to demand an increase in their salaries
and overdue bonus payments. In August the staff of Al-Thawra public
hospital in Sana'a struck for 10 days for higher wages. In September
workers at the Yemen Hunt Oil Company in Marib governorate struck for a
wage increase. There were no reports of violence in connection with
these strikes.
The YCLU is affiliated with the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions
and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1995 Labor
Law provides workers with the right to organize and bargain
collectively. The Government permits these activities; however, it
seeks to influence them by placing its own personnel inside groups and
organizations. All collective bargaining agreements must be deposited
with and reviewed by the Ministry of Labor, a practice criticized by
the International Labor Organization (ILO). Agreements may be
invalidated if they are ``likely to cause a breach of security or to
damage the economic interests of the country.'' Despite these
restrictions, several such agreements exist in fact. Unions may
negotiate wage settlements for their members and may resort to strikes
or other actions to achieve their demands. Public sector employees must
take their grievances to court.
The law protects employees from antiunion discrimination. Employers
do not have the right to dismiss an employee for union activities.
Employees may appeal any disputes, including cases of antiunion
discrimination, to the Ministry of Labor. Employees also may take a
case to the Labor Arbitration Committee, which is chaired by the
Ministry of Labor and also consists of an employer representative and a
YCLU representative. Such cases often are disposed favorably toward
workers, especially if the employer is a foreign company.
There are no export processing zones in operation; an EPZ is
planned for Aden.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of its
practice. The law does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by children
specifically, but such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor is common, especially in rural areas. Many
children are required to work in subsistence farming because of the
poverty of their families. Even in urban areas, children work in stores
and workshops, sell goods on the streets, and beg. The law does not
prohibit forced or bonded labor by children specifically, but such
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
The established minimum age for employment is 15 in the private
sector and 18 in the public sector. By special permit, children between
the ages of 12 and 15 may work. The Government rarely enforces these
provisions, especially in rural and remote areas. The Government also
does not enforce laws requiring 9 years of compulsory education for
children, and many school-aged children work instead of attending
school, particularly in areas where schools are not easily accessible.
The results of the 1994 national census showed that 231,655
children between the ages of 10 and 14 years, or 6.5 percent of all
children in that age group, were working. Experts believe that the
number has increased since 1994.
After the Government ratified the ILO's Convention 182 on the Worst
Forms of Child Labor in July, the Consultative Council adopted the
ILO's Child Labor Strategy to address persistent child labor problems.
A special council, under the leadership of the Minister of Labor, uses
the strategy as a government-wide guideline for enforcing existing
child labor laws and formulating and implementing new laws.
In June the Ministry of Labor signed a $1.3 million agreement with
the ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor
(IPEC). Under the program, the Ministry will establish a child labor
department, train teachers to make school curricula more relevant to
rural children, mobilize media to discuss child labor, establish a
microenterprise program to help families establish businesses that will
allow their children to stay in school, and seek the support of civil
society to remove children from hazardous jobs. In addition the
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs has developed a plan to
establish six centers for street children over the next 5 years.
The Ministry of Labor occasionally inspects factories in the major
population areas. Ministry officials state that they lack the resources
to enforce child labor laws more effectively. However, since a great
percentage of the country's underage work force is in the agricultural
sector in remote rural areas, it is difficult for the Government to
protect most child workers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no established minimum
wage for any type of employment. The Labor Law states that ``it shall
not be permissible that the minimal level of the wage of a worker
should be less than the minimal wages of government civil servants.''
According to the Ministry of Labor, the average minimum wage of civil
servants is approximately $37 to $56 (6,000 to 9,000 riyals) per month.
Private sector workers, especially skilled technicians, earn a far
higher wage. The average wage does not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. A combination of inflation and the loss
of government-provided subsidies continued to erode wages.
The law specifies a maximum 48-hour workweek with a maximum 8hour
workday, but many workshops and stores operate 10- to 12hour shifts
without penalty. The workweek for government employees is 35 hours: 7
hours per day Saturday through Wednesday.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for regulating workplace
health and safety conditions. The requisite legislation for regulating
occupational health is contained in the Labor Law, but enforcement is
weak to nonexistent. Many workers regularly are exposed to toxic
industrial products and develop respiratory illnesses. Some foreign-
owned companies as well as major Yemeni manufacturers implement higher
health, safety, and environmental standards than the Government
requires. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous
work situations and may challenge dismissals in court.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
from, within, or through the country.
SOUTH ASIA
----------
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan \1\ continued to experience civil war and political
instability for the 21st consecutive year. There was no functioning
central government. The Pashtun-dominated ultra-conservative Islamic
movement known as the Taliban controlled approximately 90 percent of
the country, including the capital of Kabul, and all of the largest
urban areas, except Faizabad. A Taliban edict in 1997 renamed the
country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, with Taliban leader Mullah
Omar as Head of State and Commander of the Faithful. There is a six-
member ruling council in Kabul, but ultimate authority for Taliban rule
rested in Mullah Omar, head of the inner Shura (Council), located in
the southern city of Kandahar. Former President Burhanuddin Rabbani
claimed to be the head of the Government, controlled most of the
country's embassies abroad, and retained Afghanistan's United Nations
seat after the U.N. General Assembly again deferred a decision on
Afghanistan's credentials during the September General Assembly
session. Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmed Shah Masood, both
Tajiks, also maintained control of some largely ethnic Tajik territory
in the country's northeast. Masood's forces were within rocket range of
Taliban-held Kabul until late July 1999, but since then the Taliban has
pushed them back, capturing large areas. In 1999 the Taliban summer
offensive pushed Masood's forces out of the Shomali plain, north of
Kabul. Towards the middle of June, the Taliban resumed its offensive,
and captured the northeastern city of Taloqan. Commander Masood and
commanders under the United Front for Afghanistan (UFA), also known as
the Northern Alliance, continue to hold the Panjshir valley and
Faizabad. The U.N. Secretary General's Personal Representative to
Afghanistan Fransesc Vendrell engaged in extensive discussions with
various Afghan parties and interested nations throughout the year, but
there has been little visible progress in ending the conflict. A group
of representatives from the six nations bordering Afghanistan plus the
United States and Russia met several times during the year to explore
ways to end the conflict. During the year, a process to convene a Loya
Jirga, or Grand Assembly of traditional leaders, which was focused
around former King Zahir Shah and based in Rome, slowly began to gather
support. Other initiatives, such as the Bonn process and the Cyprus
process, began to cooperate with the Rome-based initiative. A number of
provincial administrations maintained limited functions, but civil
institutions were rudimentary. There is no countrywide recognized
constitution, rule of law, or independent judiciary. In 1999 the
Taliban claimed that it was drafting a new constitution based on
Islamic law, but during the year there were no further announcements
regarding a constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ *The U.S. Embassy in Kabul has been closed for security reasons
since January 1989. Information on the human rights situation is
therefore limited. This report focuses on the over 90 percent of the
country under Taliban control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Taliban remained the country's primary military force. Taliban
and members of other warring Afghan factions committed numerous serious
human rights abuses in areas they occupied.
Agriculture, including high levels of opium poppy cultivation, was
the mainstay of the economy. For the second year in a row, the country
was the largest opium producer in the world. The agriculture sector
suffered a major setback due to the country's worst drought in 30
years. Experts estimate that the drought may affect more than half of
the population, with 3-4 million severely affected. The drought has
affected all areas of the country, causing an increase in internal
displacement, loss of livestock, and loss of livelihood. The crop loss
in some areas was estimated to be 50 percent. Approximately 80 percent
of the livestock of the Kuchi nomads reportedly has perished, and the
Argun reservoir which supplied water to 500,000 farmers and to Kandahar
has run dry, as have 8 rivers in the region. In addition to the
drought, the agricultural sector continues to languish because of a
lack of resources and the prolonged civil war, which have impeded
reconstruction of irrigation systems, repair of market roads, and
replanting of orchards in some areas. The presence of millions of
landmines and unexploded ordnance throughout the country has restricted
areas for cultivation and slowed the return of refugees who are needed
to rebuild the economy. Trade was mainly in opium, fruits, minerals,
and gems, as well as goods smuggled to Pakistan. There were rival
currencies, both very inflated. Formal economic activity remained
minimal in most of the country, especially rural areas, and was
inhibited by recurrent fighting and by local commanders' roadblocks in
non-Taliban controlled areas. The country also is dependent on
international assistance. Per capita income, based on World Bank
figures, is about $280 per year. Reconstruction was continuing in
Herat, Kandahar, and Ghazni, areas that are under firm Taliban control.
Areas outside of Taliban control suffered from brigandage.
The overall human rights situation remained extremely poor, and the
Taliban continued to commit numerous serious and systemic abuses.
Citizens were unable to change their government or choose their leaders
peacefully. The Taliban carried out summary justice in the areas they
controlled, and reportedly were responsible for political and other
extrajudicial killings, including targeted killings, summary
executions, and deaths in custody. There were allegations that Taliban
forces were responsible for disappearances. The Taliban imposed strict
and oppressive order by means of stiff punishments for crimes in the
areas that they controlled. The Taliban's Islamic courts and religious
police, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of
Vice (PVSV), enforced their ultra-conservative interpretation of
Islamic law. The PVSV has carried out punishments such as stoning to
death, flogging, public executions for adultery, murder, and homosexual
activity, and amputations of limbs for theft. For lesser infractions,
Taliban militiamen often judged accused offenders and meted out
punishments, such as beatings, on the spot. Prison conditions were
poor. The Taliban arbitrarily arrested and detained persons and
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Taliban's military offensive
and capture of Taloqan forced tens of thousands of civilians to flee
their homes. Taliban forces were responsible for indiscriminate
bombardment of civilian areas. Civil war conditions and the unfettered
actions of competing factions effectively limited the freedoms of
speech, press, assembly, and association. Freedom of religion is
restricted severely and Taliban members vigorously enforced their
interpretation of Islamic law. Freedom of movement is also limited.
Years of conflict have left approximately 258,600 citizens internally
displaced, while more than 2.8 million of the country's population of
approximately 25.8 million live outside the country as refugees.
Although the continued fighting has discouraged many refugees from
returning to their country, 133,600 refugees voluntarily returned from
Iran during the year under a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees-Iran
agreement on voluntary repatriation. An additional 50,000 are estimated
to have returned outside the framework of this agreement. All factions
have harassed domestic and international NGO's.
The human rights situation for women was extremely poor. Violence
against women remained a problem throughout the country. Women and
girls were subjected to rape, kidnaping, and forced marriage. Taliban
restrictions against women and girls remained widespread,
institutionally sanctioned, and systematic. The Taliban imposed strict
dress codes and prohibited women from working outside the home except
in limited circumstances in the health care field and in some
humanitarian assistance projects. Despite these formal restrictions,
the treatment of women and girls in Taliban-controlled areas improved
slightly for the second year in a row, mainly due to lack of
enforcement. Although girls were prohibited formally from attending
school, several organizations were able to run elementary schools and
home schools with girls in attendance despite the formal prohibition.
Nonetheless, there was widespread and widely accepted societal
discrimination against women and girls throughout the country. The
Taliban detained persons because of their ethnic origins. Worker rights
were not defined. Child labor persists.
The human rights situation in areas outside of Taliban control also
remained extremely poor, and Masood's forces and the Northern Alliance
members committed numerous, serious abuses. Masood's forces continued
sporadic rocket attacks against Kabul. Anti-Taliban forces bombarded
civilians indiscriminately. Various factions infringed on citizens'
privacy rights. Armed units of the Northern Alliance, local commanders,
and rogue individuals were responsible for political killings,
abductions, kidnapings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detention,
and looting.
During the year, a degree of ``enforcement fatigue'' seems to have
led to an informal easing of various restrictions. Reports suggest that
activities such as nonformal education for girls and women working in
self-employed sectors increasingly are tolerated if engaged in quietly.
Many households in urban areas own television sets. Significantly, the
Taliban forces did not engage in the scorched earth policy of previous
campaigns when they burned homes, killed livestock, uprooted orchards,
and destroyed irrigation systems.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Taliban forces
committed a large number of political and other extrajudicial killings,
both within the country and in the refugee community in Pakistan during
the year. In June Amnesty International (AI), reported that over the
previous 2 years more than a dozen prominent citizens advocating an end
to the war and establishment of a government representing all ethnic
groups have been arrested and killed by the Taliban.
Much of the political and extrajudicial killing in Afghanistan
during the year occurred during the renewed conflict between the
Taliban and the Northern Alliance during the summer, which was
characterized by sporadic indiscriminate shelling and bombing. On
February 14, indiscriminate bombing by the Taliban in the Panjshir
valley killed eight civilians. In mid-June, the Taliban began
offensives in the Shomali and Kunduz areas, using aircraft to support
ground troops. On July 1, the Taliban launched large-scale attacks near
the towns of Baghram and Charikar, approximately 30 miles north of
Kabul. Civilians continued to be the primary victims of the fighting.
On July 1-2, the Taliban carried out air raids on the towns of Charikar
and Jabal-as Saraf, reportedly claiming civilian lives. In mid-July,
there were reports--denied by the Taliban--of summary executions of
prisoners by the Taliban forces in the conflict areas. On July 23,
Taliban aircraft bombed several towns and villages in northern
Afghanistan, reportedly killing three and wounding seven civilians. On
July 30, the Taliban used heavy artillery and aircraft to bomb the town
of Nahreen before capturing it.
From August 9 through September 5, when the Taliban captured it,
there was intense fighting around and in the town of Taloqan. During
the offensive to capture Taloqan, Taliban aircraft bombed the city many
times. No statistics are available on civilian casualties in Taloqan,
but 60,000 to 75,000 persons left their homes in Taloqan and other
areas in the northern part of the country to flee the fighting. AI
reported in July that during the fighting in Taloqan the Taliban
bombarded a village, burned all of the houses there, and killed some of
the villagers. It was also reported that the Taliban cut the throat of
one man in front of his relatives.
In previous years, the Taliban used swift summary trials and
implemented strict punishments in accordance with Islamic law. Public
executions, which sometimes took place before crowds of up to 30,000
persons at Kabul Stadium, are not known to have occurred during the
year. Similarly, death by stoning for adultery, and by toppling walls
on offenders for homosexual transgressions are not known to have
occurred.
Political killings and harassment of moderate Afghan leaders and
Afghan intellectuals residing in Pakistan continued during the year;
many believed that these killings and harassment occured at the
direction of the Taliban. AI notes that over the last 2 years dozens of
Afghans living in Pakistan have received death threats, and several of
them have been killed. In 1999 a number of moderate activists relocated
out of Pakistan to other countries, in part as a reaction to killings
in Pakistan in 1998 and 1999. On June 1, a hooded gunman shot and
wounded Mohammad Enam Wak, an Afghan author, at his home in Peshawar.
By year's end, no action had been taken in the case. The shooting may
have been in response to a book Wak just had published examining the
idea of an Afghan federation on the basis of ethnic groups.
Many Taliban soldiers reportedly were killed and injured by
landmines laid by the Northern Alliance as they advanced in the Shomali
plains.
Opposition forces fired rockets into Kabul on a number of
occasions. In many of these attacks, civilians were killed or injured.
In other areas, combatants sought to kill rival commanders and
their sympathizers. The perpetrators of these killings and their
motives often were difficult to identify, as political motives often
are entwined with family and tribal feuds, battles over the drug trade,
and personal vendettas. A long-running feud among Northern Alliance
members led to a number of killings of prominent commanders, including
Bahadur in November 1999 and Abdul Chesik in December 1999. On December
4, United Front Commander Abdullah Jan Wahidi reportedly was killed in
an ambush.
On August 5, seven deminers working for the U.N.-funded
Organization for Mine Clearance and Rehabilitation were ambushed,
killed, and burned in Badghis Province; one of the deminers may have
been alive at the time he was burned. It is not clear who was
responsible, but the group that waylaid the deminers was reportedly
large, well-organized, and well-armed.
When the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan in 1999, there were reports
that Taliban forces carried out summary executions upon entering the
city. AI reported that hundreds of men, and in a few instances women
and children, were separated from their families, taken away, and
killed (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). There has been no investigation by
the Taliban of these widely publicized allegations.
The Taliban also has taken no action and conducted no investigation
into allegations by AI that dozens of noncombatants were systematically
killed by Taliban forces when they captured most of the Shomali valley
in late July 1999.
The Taliban has used excessive force against demonstrators. In
December 1998, two students at Nangarhar medical college reportedly
were killed by members of the Taliban when they fired upon a crowd of
students who were protesting their dean's misappropriation of hostel
funds. Taliban leader Mullah Omar ordered an investigation of the
incident, but it is not known whether an investigation took place or
what the results of any investigation may have been.
In 1998 the Taliban reportedly executed as many as 189 prisoners it
captured during fighting near Mazar-i-Sharif in order to avoid
exchanging them with the Northern Alliance. The Taliban denied these
allegations; by year's end, there had been no investigation into these
alleged killings.
In 1998 the U.N. found several mass graves connected with the
massacre of Taliban soldiers near Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, which
contained evidence consistent with mass executions. Independent
investigations of these mass and other killings, including killings by
the Taliban, were hindered by the continuing warfare and the
unwillingness of local commanders to allow investigators to visit the
areas in question. The Taliban leadership has indicated in several of
these cases that investigations were under way or that investigations
would be permitted. However, according to neutral observers, no real
progress was made by the Taliban in facilitating investigations; mass
and other killings from 1997 and 1998 have not been investigated fully.
There has been no investigation into the 1998 killing of Lieutenant
Colonel Carmine Calo, an Italian serving with the U.N. Special Mission.
b. Disappearance.--The strict security enforced by the Taliban in
areas under its control has resulted in a decrease in abductions,
kidnapings, and hostages taken for ransom. However, there have been
allegations that the Taliban maintains private prisons to settle
personal vendettas and that the Taliban was responsible for
disappearances in areas under its control. AI reported that hundreds of
persons were separated from their families in the Taloqan area during
the Taliban summer offensive, and that these persons were taken away
and believed to have been killed (see Section 1.a.). There were
unconfirmed reports that some Taliban soldiers (often reported to be
foreigners) abducted girls and women from villages in the Taloqan area
during fighting from June through October. There also were reports of
the abduction of women by the Taliban in August 1999 when the Taliban
retook the Shomali plains; women reportedly were taken in trucks from
the area of fighting and were trafficked to Pakistan and to the Arab
Gulf states. In 1998 there were credible reports that the Taliban
detained hundreds of persons, mostly ethnic Hazaras, after the takeover
of Mazar-i-Sharif; the whereabouts of many such persons remained
unknown at year's end. There were unconfirmed reports that some Taliban
soldiers abducted girls and women from Hazara neighborhoods in Mazar-i-
Sharif in 1998; the whereabouts of some of these women also were
unknown at year's end (see Section 5). Since 1998 persons who have
disappeared include: General Abdul Rahman; General Farooq; Moulvi
Shabuddin; Waliullah Dagarwal; General Syed Agha Rayees; Engineer Nabi
Shah; and Wolaswal Ismail.
There have been credible reports of some instances where Taliban
soldiers have arrested Hazara men to extract ransoms. Abductions,
kidnapings, and hostage taking for ransom or for political reasons also
occurred in non-Taliban areas, but specific information was lacking. In
northern areas, women were at risk of being raped and kidnaped,
according to the U.N. There have been unconfirmed reports that local
commanders were kidnaping young women. Some of the women reportedly
then were forced to marry their kidnapers. Others simply remained
missing. To avoid this danger, some families reportedly sent their
daughters to Pakistan or to Iran (see Section 5).
Groups in Russia listed nearly 300 Soviet soldiers formerly serving
in Afghanistan as missing in action or prisoners of war (POW's). Most
were thought to be dead or to have assimilated voluntarily into Afghan
society, though some are alleged to be held against their will. A
number of persons from the former Soviet Union missing since the period
of the Soviet occupation are presumed dead.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Taliban is believed to have used torture against
opponents and POW's. Torture does not appear to be a routine practice
in all cases. The Taliban reportedly beats some persons detained for
political reasons. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in
Afghanistan met in Iran with a former governor of Herat, General Ismail
Khan, and two of his colleagues. The three stated that they were
detained in a Kandahar prison on political grounds for 3 years prior to
their escape on March 26. They were kept in windowless cells, shackled
the entire time (see Section 1.d.). The General's colleagues reported
that they were tortured by the prison authorities, and all three
reported the torture of other prisoners; including being hung upside
down by the legs while being beaten with cables.
The Taliban ruled strictly in areas that it controlled,
establishing ad hoc and rudimentary judicial systems, based on its
understanding of Islamic justice. Taliban courts imposed their extreme
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments following swift summary
trials. Murderers were subjected to public executions, a punishment
that at times was inflicted by the victims' families. Thieves were
subjected to public amputations of either one hand, one foot, or both.
Adulterers were stoned to death or publicly given 100 lashes. On
September 26, a man convicted of adultery was publicly stoned in
Maymana in Fariab province. The woman with whom he was convicted of
engaging in adultery was sentenced to 100 lashes, but the sentence was
postponed because she was pregnant. A second woman, who was convicted
of arranging this adultery, was sentenced to 39 lashes. The punishment
for those found guilty of homosexual acts is to have walls toppled over
them. Although there were no known instances of such punishment during
the year, this punishment was carried out on at least one occasion in
1999, and seven times in 1998 (resulting in five deaths).
In the past, there have been credible reports that Taliban forces
threatened and beat women for what they considered immodest dress. They
threatened and beat men for immodest dress and for incorrect beard
length. There were no such credible reports this year.
During the year, there were credible reports that the Taliban
detained and tortured persons who they believed were being helpful to
Western journalists. In July a Western journalist observed his Afghan
associate being severely beaten. The associate was subsequently
detained and beaten routinely until he was able to escape from prison
(see Section 2.a.).
All Afghan factions are believed to have used torture against
opponents and POW's, though specific information generally is lacking.
Torture does not appear to be a routine practice in all cases. Some of
Masood's commanders in the north reportedly used torture routinely to
extract information from and break the will of prisoners and political
opponents. At least one of the alleged killers of Commander Abdullah
Jan Wahidi (see Section 1.a.) reportedly was tortured prior to being
executed.
Prison conditions are poor. Prisoners held by some factions are not
given food, as normally this is the responsibility of prisoners'
relatives, who are allowed to visit to provide them with food once or
twice a week. Those who have no relatives have to petition the local
council or rely on other inmates. Prisoners live in overcrowded,
unsanitary conditions in collective cells.
In the past, there have been credible reports that torture occurred
in prisons under the control of both the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance. Local authorities maintain prisons in territories under their
control and reportedly established torture cells in some of them. The
Taliban operates prisons in Kandahar, Herat, Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-
Sharif, Pul-i-Khumri, Shibarghan, Qala-e-Zaini, and Maimana. The
Northern Alliance maintains prisons in Panjshir and Faizabad. According
to one credible report, prison authorities routinely used rubber and
plastic bound cables in beatings in Badakhshan province. According to
AI, there have been reports that the Taliban forced prisoners to work
on the construction of a new story on the Kandahar prison and that some
Taliban prisoners held by Masood were forced to labor in life-
threatening conditions, such as digging trenches in mined areas.
There were reports that an Afghan human rights organization visited
a Taliban prison in Mazar-i-Sharif in February 1999. Intensified
fighting and poor security for foreign personnel limited the
International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) ability to monitor
prison conditions, especially in and around Mazar-i-Sharif after that
city fell to the Taliban. However, the ICRC's access improved toward
the end of 1999. The ICRC visited 5,621 detainees, including 49 women
and 414 minors in 51 different places of detention during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In the absence of formal
legal and law enforcement institutions, justice was not administered
according to formal legal codes, and persons were subject to arbitrary
detention. There are credible reports that both Taliban and Northern
Alliance militia extorted bribes from civilians in return for their
release from prison or to avoid arrest. Judicial and police procedures
varied from locality to locality. Little is known about the procedures
for taking persons into custody and bringing them to justice. In both
Taliban and non-Taliban areas, the practices varied depending on the
locality, the local commanders, and other authorities. Some areas have
a more formal judicial structure than others.
On July 9, the Taliban's PVSV jailed for several days a foreign aid
worker, who had lived and worked in Afghanistan for over 30 years, and
a number of her Afghan associates. The aid worker and her associates
promoted home-based work for women and home schools for girls. She was
expelled from the country shortly after her release on July 12. She
returned to Kabul in late September after receiving a visa in Pakistan
but within days was ordered to leave the country; she departed on
October 6. No reason was given by the Taliban for her arrest and
deportation.
On July 23, in Kabul, the Taliban arrested 40 members of a local
group advocating a peaceful settlement of the conflict on charges of
trying to destabilize the country. There were reports that another
member of this group was arrested by Pakistani authorities in Peshawar,
Pakistan.
AI reported that the Taliban has taken children hostage in an
effort to compel their fathers to surrender; the fathers of such
children generally are reported to be political opponents of the
Taliban. The families of these children have been told that the
children would be released when their fathers surrender to the Taliban.
A respected physician, Dr. Ayub, who headed the Shuhada Hospital in
Jaghoray, was taken into custody during the Bamiyan military action in
1999 and remains in Taliban custody without charges.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan met in
July in Iran with a former governor of Herat, General Ismail Khan, and
two of his colleagues. The three said that they were detained in a
Kandahar prison on political grounds for three years prior to their
escape on March 26. They were kept in windowless cells and shackled for
the entire time. The General's colleagues reported their own torture by
the prison authorities, and all three reported the torture of other
prisoners, including being hung upside down by the legs while being
beaten with cables (see Section 1.c.).
A number of persons arrested by the Taliban in 1998 for political
reasons were believed still to be in detention at year's end.
All factions probably hold political detainees, but no firm numbers
are available. Both the Taliban and Masood hold thousands of POW's.
Masood reportedly holds a number of Pakistanis, along with several
hundred Taliban soldiers, as POW's. In June the Taliban and the
Northern Alliance sent delegations to inspect each other's prisoners in
advance of an exchange of prisoners. Lists were reportedly prepared
amid allegations that the Taliban had executed as many as 189 prisoners
captured in 1998 during the fighting around Mazar-i-Sharif in order to
avoid exchanging them (see Section 1.a.). The Taliban has denied this,
and there has been no investigation. The prisoner exchange initiative
ended as fighting resumed in June.
There was no information available on forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--With no functioning nationwide
judicial system, many municipal and provincial authorities relied on
some interpretation of Islamic law and traditional tribal codes of
justice. There is no independent judiciary.
The Taliban has Islamic courts in areas under their control to
judge criminal cases and resolve disputes. According to the U.N., the
Taliban asserts that there is a lower court and a higher court in every
province, and a Supreme Court in Kabul. In 1999 Mullah Omar promulgated
a decree ordering the Supreme Court and military courts not to
interfere with one another, according to press reports. The courts
meted out punishments including execution and amputation and reportedly
heard cases in sessions that lasted only a few minutes. The courts
reportedly dealt with all complaints relying on the Taliban's extreme
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments, as well as on
traditional tribal customs (see Section 1.c.). In cases involving
murder and rape, convicted prisoners generally were ordered executed,
although relatives of the victim could instead choose to accept other
restitution. Decisions of the courts were reportedly final. According
to AI, some judges in these courts were untrained in law and at times
based their judgments on a mixture of their personal understanding of
Islamic law and a tribal code of honor prevalent in Pashtun areas.
Defendants do not have the right to an attorney.
Little is known about the administration of justice in the areas
controlled by the Northern Alliance. The administration and
implementation of justice varied from area to area and depended on the
whims of local commanders or other authorities, who summarily execute,
torture, and mete out punishments without reference to any other
authority.
All factions probably hold political prisoners, but no reliable
estimates of numbers are available.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Interfactional fighting often resulted in the homes
and businesses of civilians being invaded and looted by the opposing
forces--whether victor or loser. Some armed gunmen reportedly acted
with impunity given the absence of any legal protection or a responsive
police force. It was unclear what authority controlled the actions of
the Taliban militiamen who patrolled the streets of cities and towns. A
number of incidents were reported in which Taliban soldiers, persons
masquerading as Taliban, or foreign sympathizers fighting alongside the
Taliban, entered private homes without prior notification or informed
consent. In Kabul the soldiers allegedly searched homes for evidence of
cooperation with the former authorities or for violations of Taliban
religion-based decrees, including the ban on the possession of
depictions of living things (including photographs, stuffed animals,
dolls, etc.). At various times, the Taliban also has banned certain
traditional recreational activities, such as kite flying and playing
chess (see Section 2.c.). Members of the PVSV, the Taliban's religious
police, beat individuals on the streets for infractions of Taliban
rules concerning dress, hair length, and facial hair, as well as for
the violation of the prohibition on women being in the company of men
who were unrelated to them. The Taliban required women to wear a burqa,
a tent-like outer garment that covers a woman from head to toe, when in
public (see Section 5). Men are required to have beards of a certain
length or longer, not to trim their beards, and to wear head coverings.
Men whose beards did not conform to the guidelines on beard length set
out by the Taliban were subject to imprisonment for 10 days and
mandatory Islamic instruction. According to AI, the Taliban have taken
children hostage in an effort to compel their fathers to surrender (see
Section 1.d.). The Taliban reportedly also has required parents to give
their children ``Islamic'' names.
In 1998 the Taliban prohibited television sets, satellite dishes,
videocassette recorders, videocassettes, and audio cassettes as part of
an effort to ban music, television, and movies (see Section 2.a.). The
ban continues, although televisions reportedly are widely sold, and
their use generally is ignored unless reported by a neighbor (see
Section 2.a.).
During the late summer offensive to retake Taloqan, the Taliban
reportedly burned a village and killed several villagers (see Section
1.a.). On October 19, the Northern Alliance alleged that the Taliban
forced the residents of Humber Koh and Hazrab villages near Taloqan to
leave their homes before burning the dwellings. There were reports
during 1999 and during the year that the Taliban forcibly expelled
ethnic Hazara and Tajiks from areas controlled by the Taliban, and that
the Taliban harassed these minorities (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
There were reports that some prisoners of the Taliban, including
the sons of families that had opposed Taliban social restrictions, had
been drafted forcibly and sent to the front. There were also reports
that the Taliban forcibly conscripted or attempted to forcibly
conscript persons in 1997 and 1998; some of these reports were
unconfirmed.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The Taliban continued to pose serious obstacles to
the efforts of international aid organizations to deliver food aid and
other humanitarian assistance. U.N.-led negotiations to obtain Taliban
permission for delivery of food and nonfood aid across the front lines
into the Panjshir Valley and the Dara-i-Suf area remained at an impasse
at year's end. The Taliban permitted limited deliveries to Panjshir in
December 1999 to reach the large community of displaced persons, which
had fled the Shomali plains during the summer 1999 offensive. Limited
supplies have reached Dara-i-Suf (where the U.N. has received reports
of starvation), but only at great expense aboard donkey caravans. The
French NGO Solidarite has sent similar donkey caravans into nearby
Balkhab District.
The continuing internal conflict resulted in many instances of the
use of excessive force. When fighting resumed in June, the Taliban
bombed cities held by the Northern Alliance, such as Taloqan, Charikar,
Nahreen, and Jabal-as Saraf. The Taliban's aerial bombing of civilian
areas has resulting in the deaths of civilians, property damage, and
the displacement of residents.
The conflict leading up to the fall of Taloqan in September
displaced 60,000 to 75,000 people. Taloqan itself was evacuated, but
families quickly returned once it became clear that the Taliban was not
following the scorched earth policy it had pursued in previous years.
In May 1999, the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan. There were reports of
systematic killings and summary executions by Taliban forces, as well
as reports of hundreds of persons being taken away in Taliban trucks.
Taliban forces reportedly also took hundreds of persons after the
capture of Yakaolang the same month. In the late summer of 1999,
refugees from the Taliban offensive in the Shomali plain reported
summary executions of noncombatants. The number of those killed or
detained in fighting by the Taliban in 1999 is unknown. In August 1998,
the Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif. There were reports that as many as
5,000 persons, mostly ethnic Hazara civilians, were massacred by the
Taliban after the takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif. In September 1998, the
Taliban captured Bamiyan; during the fighting an estimated 200
civilians were killed. There were also credible reports of a massacre
of 45 civilians in a village near Bamiyan by Taliban commanders in
September 1998. AI reported that the Taliban massacred 70 Hazara
civilians, including children, in Qezelabad, near Mazar-i-Sharif in
1997. There were also reports that Taliban forces in Faryab province
killed some 600 civilians in late 1997.
In general independent investigations of alleged killings were
hindered by continuing warfare and the unwillingness of local
commanders to allow investigators to visit the areas in question (see
Section 1.a.). The Taliban denied charges that its forces massacred or
committed atrocities against civilians and claimed that civilian
deaths, if any, resulted from combat.
Prior to its summer offensive, the Taliban claimed that the
Northern Alliance bombed Shekhar Darra and Gol Darra, killing an
unspecified number of civilians.
The discovery of mass graves near Shibarghan in the northern part
of the country in 1997 was widely reported. The graves allegedly
contained 2,000 corpses, reportedly those of Taliban forces captured
near Mazar-i-Sharif in mid-1997 and executed by Northern Alliance
forces (see Section 1.a.).
There were reports in 1999 that Masood's commanders in the
northeast were ``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering Afghanistan
from Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid convoys, and
otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid (see Section 4).
There were no reports of such behavior during the year, and, on the
contrary, the Masood forces appeared welcoming to NGO's.
Continued warfare also resulted in massive forced displacement of
civilians. Over the course of the year, it is estimated that up to
75,000 persons may have fled the fighting, although a majority of them
reportedly have returned to their homes. An estimated 500,000-750,000
Afghans remain internally displaced following years of conflict. More
than 2.4 million Afghans are living as refugees in Pakistan and Iran. A
much larger number over the past 21 years has sought refuge abroad.
Women and children constituted the majority of those in need of
humanitarian assistance.
Afghanistan is the most heavily mined country in the world,
according to U.N. mine-clearing experts. The U.N. estimates that there
are 5 to 7 million landmines and over 750,000 pieces of unexploded
ordnance throughout the country, sown mainly during the Soviet
occupation. However, some NGO's estimate that there may be less than 1
million mines. There have been claims that 162 of 356 districts are
mine-affected. The most heavily mined areas are the provinces bordering
Iran and Pakistan. The landmines and unexploded ordnance cause deaths
and injuries, restrict areas available for cultivation, and slow the
return of refugees. At the end of 1999, according to the NGO Halo
Trust, mines covered more than an estimated 420 square miles, including
over 285 square miles of grazing land; over 100 square miles of
agricultural land; almost 25 square miles of roads; 7.5 square miles of
residential area; and over 2 square miles of irrigation systems and
canals. From 1995-97, new mines are believed to have been laid over 90
square miles of land, reportedly mainly by the Northern Alliance in the
western provinces of Badghis and Faryab. Additional newly mined areas
were reported but not confirmed during the year in the conflict areas
north of Kabul. The Northern Alliance reportedly laid these in response
to the Taliban's summer offensive. Taliban leader Mullah Omar
reportedly banned the use, production, trade, and stockpiling of mines
in 1998. Despite the general prohibition on the depiction of living
things, the Taliban allowed the visual depiction of persons in demining
educational materials.
An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by
landmines. Currently casualties caused by landmines and unexploded
ordnance are estimated at 10 to 12 per day. In some parts of the
country, including in Herat and Kandahar, almost 90 percent of
households are affected by the presence of landmines. An estimated 96
percent of civilian mine and unexploded ordnance casualties are male.
Approximately 53 percent of mine and unexploded ordnance casualties
occur in the 18 to 40 age group, while 34 percent of the casualties
involve children, according to the U.N. Mine Action Center. Landmines
and unexploded ordnance resulted in death in approximately 30 percent
of cases and in serious injuries and disability, including amputation
and blindness, in approximately 20 percent of cases.
With funding from international donors, the U.N. has organized and
trained mine detection and clearance teams, which operate throughout
the country. Nearly all areas that have been cleared are in productive
use, and approximately 1.5 million refugees and internally displaced
persons have returned to areas cleared of mines and unexploded
ordnance. Nevertheless the mines are expected to pose a threat for many
years. In 1997 the 4,000 mine clearers suffered from an accident rate
of 1 per week. However, clearance rates and safety have increased for
clearance teams assisted by dogs. U.N. agencies and NGO's have
instituted a number of mine awareness campaigns and educational
programs for women and children in various parts of the country, but
many were curtailed as a result of Taliban restrictions on women and
girls.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--There are no laws that effectively
provide for freedom of speech and of the press, and senior officials of
various warring factions allegedly attempted to intimidate journalists
and influence their reporting. There are fewer than 10 regular
publications in the country. All other newspapers are published only
sporadically. Newspapers for the most part are affiliated with
different factions. Various factions maintain their own communications
facilities. The Taliban selectively bans the entry of foreign
newspapers into their territory. Many foreign books are prohibited. The
Taliban radio station, the Voice of Shariat, broadcasts religious
programming and Taliban pronouncements.
The Taliban has arrested more than 25 journalists since it took
control of Kabul in September 1996. In July a Western journalist, while
being detained, observed his Afghan associate being severely beaten.
The journalist subsequently was expelled from the country, and his
associate was detained and beaten routinely, until he escaped from
prison (see Section 1.c.). On August 11, three foreign journalists were
arrested by the PVSV and accused of taking pictures of a soccer match
in Kabul. The journalists were interrogated for 2 hours, after which
their film was confiscated. The PVSV officials confirmed that it is
forbidden to take pictures of living things.
All factions have attempted to pressure foreign journalists who
report on the conflict. The Taliban initially cooperated with members
of the international press who arrived in Kabul but later imposed
restrictions upon them. Foreign journalists were forbidden to film or
photograph persons or animals, were not allowed to interview women, and
were required to be accompanied at all times by a Taliban escort to
ensure that these restrictions were enforced. In 1998 foreign
journalists were not permitted into Mazar-i-Sharif after the Taliban
took the city and reportedly massacred as many as 5,000 persons (see
Section 1.g.).
In August the Taliban introduced strict regulations governing the
work of foreign journalists in the country. A list of 21 points ``to be
respected'' is given to foreign journalists upon arrival. The list
includes an item asking journalists ``not to offend the people's
feelings.'' Journalists are required to tell the Taliban authorities
when they travel outside of Kabul and to stay out of prohibited areas
outside of Kabul. Journalists may work only with approved interpreters
and local assistants, must renew their work permits every year, and
must register all of their professional equipment. The Taliban also
require most journalists to stay at the Intercontinental Hotel in
Kabul, allegedly for security and economic reasons.
In August 1998, Iranian journalist Mahmoud Saremi was killed after
being abducted by Taliban soldiers in Mazar-i-Sharif, along with eight
Iranian diplomats. Saremi was the Afghanistan bureau chief for the
official Iranian news agency, IRNA. Taliban officials stated that those
responsible for Saremi's killing were not acting under official orders
and would be punished; however, no action was known to have been taken
regarding the case by year's end.
There have been numerous threats to Afghan journalists working in
exile in Pakistan; the UNHCR has assisted approximately 10 Afghan
journalists in relocating to Western countries from Pakistan. Many
believe these threats are directed by the Taliban authorities in
response to unfavorable columns by the journalists. On July 4, Inayat-
ul-Haq Yasinin, a journalist in Peshawar, received death threats for
publishing the results of an opinion poll on Afghan refugees living in
Peshawar. In 1998 in Peshawar, two men fired at Abdul Hafiz Hamis
Afizi, an ethnic Tajik Afghan journalist writing for two Peshawar
Afghan daily newspapers. Also in 1998, Mohammad Hashim Paktianai, a
journalist related to former president Najibullah was killed at his
home in Hayatabad.
The Taliban continue to prohibit music, movies, and television on
religious grounds. In August 1998, television sets, videocassette
recorders, videocassettes, audiocassettes, and satellite dishes were
outlawed in order to enforce the prohibition. However, televisions
reportedly are sold widely, and their use generally is ignored unless
reported by a neighbor.
The Taliban severely restricts academic freedom, particularly
education for girls (see Section 5).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Civil war,
tenuous security, and likely opposition from local authorities
seriously inhibited freedom of assembly and association.
It is unknown whether laws exist that govern the formation of
associations. Many domestic NGO's continue to operate in the country,
and many international NGO's also continue to operate (see Section 4).
There were reports that the Taliban required NGO's to go through
burdensome registration procedures in order to be allowed to operate
and attempted to exert control over NGO staffing and office locations,
especially in Kabul. All factions continue to harass and interfere with
the operations of domestic and international NGO's, including aid
organizations (see Section 4).
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted
severely. Due to the absence of a constitution and the ongoing civil
war, religious freedom is determined primarily by the unofficial,
unwritten, and evolving policies of the warring factions. In most parts
of the country, the Pashtun-dominated, ultraconservative Islamic
movement known as the Taliban vigorously enforced its extreme
interpretation of Islamic law. The Taliban claimed in mid-1999 that it
was drafting a new constitution, based upon the sources of Islamic
religious law (Shari'a): the Koran, the Sunna, and Hanafi
jurisprudence. A Taliban spokesman stated that the new constitution
would ensure the rights of all Muslims and of religious minorities.
However, custom and law require affiliation with some religion, and
atheism is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. The small
number of non-Muslim residents who remain in the country may practice
their faith but may not proselytize.
The country's official name, according to the Taliban, is the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; according to the umbrella organization
of various smaller, anti-Taliban groups, the Northern Alliance, it is
the Islamic State of Afghanistan. These names reflect the desire of
both factions to promote Islam as the state religion. Taliban leader
Mullah Omar carries the title of Commander of the Faithful.
Traditionally Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence has
been the dominant religion. The Taliban also adheres to the Hanafi
school of Sunni Islam, making it the current dominant religion in the
country.
The Taliban ruled strictly in areas that it controlled,
establishing ad hoc and rudimentary judicial systems. The Taliban
established Islamic courts in areas under its control to judge criminal
cases and resolve disputes. Taliban courts imposed their extreme
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments following swift summary
trials (see Section 1.e.).
The Taliban seeks to impose its extreme interpretation of Islamic
observance in areas that it controlled and has declared that all
Muslims in areas under Taliban control must abide by the Taliban's
interpretation of Islamic law. The Taliban announces its proclamations
and edicts through broadcasts on the Taliban's ``Radio Shariat'' and
relies on a religious police force under the control of the PVSV to
enforce rules regarding appearance, dress, employment, access to
medical care, behavior, religious practice, and freedom of expression.
Members of the PVSV, which was raised to the status of a Ministry in
May 1998, regularly check persons on the street in order to ascertain
that individuals are conforming to such Taliban edicts. Persons found
to be in violation of the edicts are subject to punishment meted out on
the spot, which may include beatings and detention. In practice the
rigid policies adopted both by the Taliban and by certain opposition
groups have a chilling effect on adherents of other forms of Islam and
on those who practice other faiths. Enforcement of Taliban social
strictures is much stricter in the cities, especially in Kabul, and
looser in rural areas, where more is left to local custom.
Reliable data on the country's population is not available.
However, informed sources estimate that 85 percent of the population
are Sunni Muslim; most of the remaining 15 percent are Shi'a. The
Hazara ethnic group is predominantly Shi'a; Shi'a are among the most
economically disadvantaged persons in the country. The Shi'a minority
want a national government that would give them equal rights as
citizens. There are also small numbers of Ismailis living in the
central and northern parts of the country. Ismailis are Shi'a but
consider the Aga Khan their spiritual leader. In the past, small
communities of Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Christians lived in the
country, but most members of these communities have left. Almost all
members of the country's small Hindu and Sikh population, which once
numbered about 50,000 persons, have emigrated or taken refuge abroad.
Licensing and registration of religious groups do not appear to be
required by the authorities in any part of the country.
According to Human Rights Watch, in September 1999, the Taliban
issued decrees that forbade non-Muslims from building places of worship
but allowed them to worship at existing holy sites, forbade non-Muslims
from criticizing Muslims, ordered non-Muslims to identify their houses
by placing a yellow cloth on their rooftops, forbade non-Muslims from
living in the same residence as Muslims, and required that non-Muslim
women wear a yellow dress with a special mark so that Muslims could
keep their distance. These decrees followed earlier reports that Hindus
were required to wear a piece of yellow cloth attached to their
clothing to identify their religious identity and that Sikhs were
required to wear some form of identification as well. This system of
identification allegedly was imposed to spare non-Muslims from the
enforcement of rules that are mandatory for Muslims and from harassment
by agents of the PVSV, but the identification system reportedly no
longer is enforced.
There also are unconfirmed reports that the Taliban has occupied
and ``cleaned'' Shi'a mosques for the use of Sunnis, including a Shi'a
mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998. The sections of the country's
educational system that have survived over 20 years of war put
considerable emphasis on religion.
In Taliban controlled areas, the Taliban has decreed that all
Muslims must take part in five daily prayers. Those who are observed
not praying at appointed times or who are late attending prayer are
subject to punishment, including severe beatings. There were reports in
1998 that PVSV members in Kabul stopped persons on the street and
quizzed them to determine if they knew how to recite various Koranic
prayers.
Publishing and distribution of literature of any kind, including
religious material, is rare.
Proselytizing by non-Muslims is prohibited. A small number of
foreign Christian groups are present in the country, but they focus on
relief work since they are forbidden to proselytize. Conversion from
Islam is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. There was no
information available about converts or about restrictions on the
training of clergy.
Since taking control of Kabul in 1996, the Taliban reportedly has
committed numerous human rights violations, particularly against the
Hazaras. In September 1997, the Taliban reportedly massacred 70 ethnic
Hazara civilians in Qezelabad. There were reports of mass arrests by
the Taliban in Hazara neighborhoods of Kabul in January 1998. There
also were credible reports of the massacre of thousands of civilians
and prisoners by the Taliban during and after the capture of Mazar-i-
Sharif in August 1998; this massacre reportedly was aimed at ethnic
Hazaras. In September 1998, approximately 500 persons were killed as
the Taliban gained control of the city of Bamiyan. The Hazaras regained
control of Bamiyan in April 1999 following prolonged guerrilla-style
warfare; however, the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan in May 1999 and
reportedly killed a number of Shi'a residents. There were reports
during 1999 and 2000 that there were forced expulsions of ethnic
Hazaras and Tajiks from areas controlled or conquered by the Taliban,
as well as harassment of these minorities throughout Taliban controlled
areas.
The Ismaili community fought for the Northern Alliance against the
Taliban and suffered when the Taliban occupied territories once held by
Ismaili forces. There were reports of mistreatment of Ismailis at the
hands of the Taliban.
The Taliban, following its extreme interpretation of Shari'a
(Islamic law), required women to don a head-to-toe garment known as the
burqa, which has only a mesh screen for vision, when in public. While
in some rural areas this was the normal garment for women, the
requirement to wear the burqa represented a significant change in
practice when imposed in urban areas. According to a decree announced
by the religious police in 1997, women found outside the home who were
not covered properly would be punished severely, along with their
family elders. In Kabul and elsewhere, women found in public who were
not wearing the burqa, or whose burqas did not cover their ankles
properly, were beaten by Taliban militiamen. According to Taliban
regulations, men's beards must protrude farther than would a fist
clamped at the base of the chin. Men also must wear head coverings and
must not have long hair. A man who has shaved or cut his beard may be
imprisoned for 10 days and be required to undergo Islamic instruction.
Several civil service employees reportedly were fired in 1997 for
cutting their beards. All students at Kabul University reportedly are
required to have beards in order to study there (no female students are
allowed). There also are credible reports that Taliban members gave
forced haircuts to males in Kabul. At various times, the Taliban has
banned certain traditional recreational activities, such as kite flying
and playing chess. Dolls, stuffed animals, and photographs are
prohibited under the Taliban's interpretation of religious injunctions
against representations of living beings; in search of these objects,
Taliban soldiers or persons masquerading as Taliban members reportedly
have entered private homes without prior notification or informed
consent. The Taliban reportedly has required parents to give their
children Islamic names (see Section 1.f.).
The Taliban continues to prohibit music, movies, and television on
religious grounds in Taliban-controlled areas. In 1998 television sets,
videocassette recorders, videocassettes, audiocassettes, and satellite
dishes were outlawed in order to enforce the prohibition. However,
subsequent reports indicate that many persons in urban areas around the
country own such electronic devices despite the ban (see Section 1.f.
and 2.a.).
In November 1998, Taliban officials accepted responsibility for the
defacing of one of two historic statues of Buddha near Bamiyan during
their takeover of that city earlier in the year. The Taliban claimed
that the vandalism was the result of an unauthorized act by one of
their soldiers and that the statutes were being protected by the
Taliban from further harm. While some Taliban leaders have claimed
tolerance of religious minorities, there reportedly have been
restrictions imposed upon Shi'a Muslims in Taliban-controlled
territory, although not necessarily on a uniform basis. However, the
Taliban allegedly has ordered Shi'a to confine their Ashura
commemorations during the month of Muharram to their mosques and to
avoid the public processions that are an integral part of Ashura in
other countries with Shi'a populations.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although in principle citizens have the
right to travel freely both inside and outside the country, their
ability to travel within the country was hampered by warfare,
brigandage, landmines, a road network in a state of disrepair, and
limited domestic air service, complicated by factional threats to air
traffic. Some Afghans reported difficulty in receiving necessary
permits to leave the country for tourism or business purposes, while
others reported no such difficulty. The Taliban's restrictions on women
further curtail freedom of movement (see Sections 2.c. and 5). Despite
these obstacles, many persons continued to travel relatively freely,
with buses plying routes in most parts of the country. However, due to
intermittent fighting in various areas, international aid agencies
often found that their ability to travel, work, and distribute
assistance was hampered severely. International travel continued to be
difficult as both the Taliban and Masood threatened to shoot down any
planes that flew without their permission over areas of the country
that they controlled.
Commercial trade was impeded in certain non-Taliban areas, as local
commanders and criminals continued to demonstrate their control over
the roads by demanding road tolls and sometimes closing roads. There
were reports in 1998 that some Taliban commanders, who previously
gained popularity by sweeping away the checkpoints that local warlords
used to shake down travelers, were setting up checkpoints themselves
and demanding tolls for passage, but there were no such reports during
the year.
There also have been instances in the past of the forcible
expulsion of individuals on ethnic grounds, but there were no known
instances of this during the year.
Afghans continued to form one of the world's largest refugee
populations. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
approximately 2.8 million Afghans remain outside the country as
registered refugees: 1.4 million in Iran, 1.4 million in Pakistan, and
some in Russia, India, and the central Asian republics. Women and
children constitute 75 percent of the refugee population. In addition
there are 500,000 to 750,000 Afghans who are internally displaced
following years of fighting. A total of 4,069,000 Afghan refugees have
been repatriated since 1988, with over 1.5 million returning to the
country in the peak year of 1992. During the year, 133,600 refugees
were voluntarily repatriated from Iran under an UNHCR-Iran program, and
another 50,00 are estimated to have returned outside the program.
Refugees in Pakistan are known to cross the border back and forth
routinely.
There was no available information on policies regarding refugees,
asylum, provision of first asylum, or the forced return of refugees.
On June 21, Pakistan deported Professor Mohammad Rahim Elham, a
prominent Afghan scholar, back to Afghanistan. Professor Rahim had
called for a stop to Pakistani interference in the internal affairs of
Afghanistan. There is concern that he may face detention, torture, or
extrajudicial execution in Afghanistan. According to an AI report,
Professor Rahim was granted asylum in another country late in the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
There was no functioning central government in the country. The
continuing struggle for political power among the major armed groups
prevented citizens from changing their government or choosing their
leaders peacefully. Most political changes came about through shifting
military fortunes. No faction held elections or respected citizens'
right to change their government peacefully.
The Taliban movement's authority emanates from its leader, Mullah
Omar, who carries the title Commander of the Faithful, and from the
Taliban's military occupation of most of the country. Governmental
functions are exercised through the key Taliban governing body, the
Inner Shura (Council) based in Kandahar, and by ministries based in
Kabul.
The Northern Alliance, headed by nominal President Rabbani, holds
power with de facto Defense Minister Masood as Rabbani's primary
military backer. Rabbani received nominal support from General Dostam
and a faction of the Shi'a Hazara Hezb-i-Wahdat. Another faction of the
Hezb-i-Wahdat nominally allied with the Taliban early in 1999. Rabbani
and Masood control the northeastern, largely Tajik, portion of the
country, including the strategic Panjshir valley north of Kabul.
Discontent with the Taliban's strictures and rural village values
was strong in large, non-Pashtun cities such as Herat, Kabul, and other
northern cities. The Taliban's military successes did not encourage the
group's leaders to engage in meaningful political dialog with
opponents. Efforts in 1998 to convene a national body of Muslim
scholars (ulema) to discuss the future of the country broke down when
both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance disagreed over the possible
membership and sequence of the talks. Peace talks convened in April
1998 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, but broke down quickly. Moderate and
neutral Afghans, mostly living outside of the country, continue their
efforts to organize a traditional Grand National Assembly (Loya Jirga)
and held meetings in Rome in July and November 1999. The former King
supports this process. Other moderate groups exist in Bonn, Cyprus, and
Teheran.
The U.N. and the international community continued their efforts to
help Afghans reach a political settlement. The U.N. Secretary General's
Personal Representative for Afghanistan Fransesc Vendrell has continued
to explore ideas for a peace process with the warring factions. A group
of six nations bordering the country, the U.S., and Russia met several
times during the year to explore ways to resolve the conflict
peacefully.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are many NGO's, both domestic and international, in the
country. Some are based in neighboring countries, mostly Pakistan, with
branches inside the country; others are based in Afghan cities and
rural areas. The focus of their activities is primarily humanitarian
assistance, rehabilitation, health, education, and agriculture.
The Afghan League of Human Rights operates both in Afghanistan and
Pakistan; it produces an annual report. The Cooperation Center for
Afghanistan (CCA) is an Afghan NGO that operates in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The CCA maintains an office in Peshawar, where it produces
a monthly newsletter on the Afghan human rights situation. It also
monitors and documents the human rights situation from several offices
in both Taliban-controlled and Northern Alliance-controlled cities. The
National Commission on Human Rights in Afghanistan began operations
during 1998 in Pakistan, conducting seminars on human rights issues,
issuing press statements criticizing specific instances of human rights
abuses, and placing articles in Pashtu and Dari newspapers. The
Afghanistan Commission for Human Rights, founded in 1997 after
discussions with Taliban authorities on Islamic aspects of human
rights, also started activities in Pakistan in 1998, focused on the
plight of Afghan prisoners in Pakistani prisons and on children's
rights. However, the civil war and lack of security continued to make
it difficult for human rights organizations to monitor adequately the
situation inside the country.
On July 6, the Taliban issued an edict banning women's employment
(except in the health care sector) by U.N. agencies and NGO's.
Implementation remains erratic, but the U.N. and NGO's kept their
female staff at home to avoid open confrontation with the Taliban. On
August 16, the Taliban issued an order closing down the World Food
Program's (WFP) 25 widows' bakeries, which provide food to the neediest
citizens, including many war widows and other female-headed households.
On August 17, the Taliban reversed the previous day's decision to close
the widows' bakeries, apparently accepting the WFP's explanation that
the female staff of the bakeries were not direct hire WFP employees and
therefore not subject to the July 6 edict. The arrest in July of a
foreign aid worker long resident in the country (see Section 1.d.) and
the sudden closure of the widows' bakeries, served as reminders to the
international relief community that their programs are at constant risk
of closure by the Taliban.
In September the Taliban refused a visa to the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan.
During the year, the Taliban continued to pose serious obstacles to
the international aid community's efforts to deliver food aid and other
humanitarian assistance to citizens (see Section 1.g.).
The Taliban continued to harass domestic and international NGO's.
The Taliban has interfered consistently with the operation of the U.N.
and NGO's. Tactics used have included threatening to impound the
vehicles of NGO's that do not work on projects preferred by the
Taliban, threatening to close projects that do not include Taliban
supervisors or workers, and, in the case of one local NGO, the
detention of its director and the impounding of all of its equipment in
an effort to increase Taliban control of the organization. The Taliban
announced in March 1998 that foreign Muslim women, including U.N.
workers, would be allowed to perform their jobs only if accompanied by
a male relative, a move that continued to hamper NGO and relief
operations. The U.N. withdrew its personnel from southern Afghanistan
in late March 1998 to protest the assault on a U.N. worker by the
Taliban governor of Kandahar Province and the interference with its
work by the Taliban. After reaching agreements with local officials,
the U.N. returned to Kandahar in May 1999. In April 1998, Taliban
authorities rejected the participation of a U.N. official on the U.N.
team selected to negotiate with the Taliban on the travel restrictions
for foreign Muslim women and other issues, because he was perceived to
be ``anti-Taliban.'' In June 1998, the Taliban required all NGO's in
Kabul to relocate to a single location in a bomb-damaged former school;
those who refused were threatened with expulsion from the country.
However, the order was not enforced. In November 1998, the U.N. World
Food Program accused the Taliban of looting 1,364 tons of food,
stealing trucks from the WFP's compound in Bamiyan, and occupying WFP
offices in Bamiyan and Yakaolang.
On June 15, 1999, staff members of an international NGO were
detained and beaten by members of the Taliban in Bamiyan Province.
After the June 1999 incident, Mullah Omar issued an edict stating that
any person causing annoyance to a foreign worker could face punishment
of up to 5 years in prison. However, in November 1999 U.N. properties
were targeted in organized demonstrations in several cities when U.N.
sanctions related to terrorism were imposed on the country. Certain key
issues, including the mobility of international female Muslim staff and
access by Afghan women and girls to programs, remain largely
unresolved.
There were reports in 1999 that Masood's commanders in the
northeast were ``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering Afghanistan
from Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid convoys, and
otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid. There were no
such reports during the year (see Section 1.g.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
There is no functioning constitution, and therefore there are no
constitutional provisions that prohibit or protect against
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, disability, language, or
social status. It is not known whether specific laws prohibit
discrimination; local custom and practices generally prevail.
Discrimination against women is prevalent throughout the country. Its
severity varies from area to area, depending on the local leadership's
attitude towards education for girls and employment for women and on
local attitudes. Historically the minority Shi'a faced discrimination
from the majority Sunni population. There has been greater acceptance
of the disabled as the number of persons maimed by landmines increased,
and the presence of the disabled became more widespread. In 1998 and
1999, the Taliban on several occasions sought to execute homosexuals by
toppling walls on them (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.); however, this is
not known to have occurred during the year.
Women.--As lawlessness and interfactional fighting continued in
some areas, violence against women occurred frequently, including
beatings, rapes, forced marriages, disappearances, kidnapings, and
killings. Such incidents generally went unreported, and most
information was anecdotal. It was difficult to document rapes, in
particular, in view of the social stigma that surrounds the problem.
Although the stability brought by the Taliban to most of the country
acted in general to reduce violence against women, particularly rapes
and kidnapings, Taliban members continued to threaten or beat women to
enforce the Taliban's dress code for women. There were unconfirmed
reports that the Taliban or foreign ``volunteers'' fighting alongside
the Taliban abducted women during the military offensive on Taloqan.
There were also unconfirmed reports that Taliban soldiers or foreign
volunteers abducted women in the offensive in the Shomali plains in
1999 and that they raped and abducted women from Hazara neighborhoods
in Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998. The whereabouts of some of these
women were unknown at year's end. The enforced seclusion of women
within the home greatly limited the information available on domestic
violence and marital rape. In a climate of secrecy and impunity, it is
likely that domestic violence against women remained a serious problem.
Women accused of adultery also are subjected to violence. Adultery
is punishable by death through stoning. At least one accused adulteress
was sentenced to 100 lashes during the year; a female accomplice was
sentenced to 30 lashes.
Overall, the situation of women and girls remained mostly
unchanged, as the Taliban generally continued the application of its
ultra-conservative interpretation of Islamic law.
In 1992 a new government was installed and the previous trend
towards increasing numbers of women working outside of the home was
reversed. Since the advent of the Taliban in 1994, the trend towards
excluding women from employment has intensified.
The treatment of women under Taliban rule has been particularly
harsh, although there was marginal improvement in some areas during the
year. In the areas where it took control, the Taliban initially
excluded women from all employment outside the home, apart from the
traditional work of women in agriculture; women were forbidden to leave
the home except in the company of a male relative. In urban areas, and
particularly after the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, the Taliban forced
almost all women to quit their jobs as professionals and clerical
workers, including teachers, doctors, nurses, bank tellers, and aid
workers. In a few cases, the Taliban relented and allowed women to work
in health care occupations under restricted circumstances. The
prohibition on women working outside of the home has been especially
difficult for the large numbers of widows left by 20 years of civil
war; there are an estimated 30,000 widows in Kabul alone. In August the
Taliban issued an order closing down the World Food Program's 25
widows' bakeries but reversed the decision on the following day (see
Section 4). Many women reportedly have been reduced to selling all of
their possessions and to begging to feed their families.
However, during 1999, restrictions on women's employment reportedly
eased somewhat. The Taliban allowed women to work in the medical sector
as doctors and nurses, treating only other women. Medicins Sans
Frontieres and other international NGO's reported that they were able
to recruit both male and female health care staff without
administrative obstacles and that the main difficulty faced in
recruitment of medical staff was the lack of qualified female
personnel. In 1999 there were reports that the Taliban reopened schools
for doctors and nurses and that women were allowed to attend women-only
institutions. A limited number of women were allowed to work for
international agencies and NGO's, but they were not allowed to work in
the offices of their employers; they were required to go directly from
their homes to the project sites on which they worked. A Taliban edict
issued in 1999 allowed needy widows with no other means of support to
seek employment; but many widows reportedly were unaware of the change,
and there was little work available. Women reportedly were allowed to
claim international assistance directly rather than through their close
male relatives, as a 1997 edict stipulated. However, male relatives
still were required to obtain the permission of the PVSV for female
home-based employment.
Girls formally were prohibited from attending school. Formal
restrictions against the education of girls remain, apart from
instruction provided in mosques, which is mainly religious in content.
However, there are a growing number of girls educated by international
NGO's in formal schools, community-based schools, and home schools.
Most citizens lack any access to adequate medical facilities, and
the provision of health care under Taliban rule remains poor. Life
expectancy rates are estimated at 44 years for women and 43 years for
men. In most regions, there is less than 1 physician per 10,000
persons. Health services reach only 29 percent of the population and
only 17 percent of the rural population. Clean water reaches only about
12 percent of the population. Health care for both men and women was
hampered by the Taliban's ban on images of humans, which caused the
destruction of public education posters and made the provision and
dissemination of health information in a society with high levels of
illiteracy more difficult. Tuberculosis rates for women and maternal
mortality rates are extremely high. The Taliban significantly reduced
women's access to health care, although it has since loosened
restrictions somewhat. In 1997 the Taliban announced a policy of
segregating men and women in hospitals; this policy reportedly
continued at year's end. In 1997 in an attempt to centralize medical
care for women, the Taliban also directed most hospitals in Kabul to
cease services to women and to discharge female staff. Services for
women were to be provided by a single hospital still partially under
construction, which resulted in a drastic reduction in access to, and
the quality of, health care for women. Later, women were permitted to
seek treatment from female medical personnel working in designated
women's wards or clinics; since June 1998 they have been permitted to
seek treatment from male doctors only if accompanied by a male
relative. In practice women were excluded from treatment by male
physicians in most hospitals. These rules, while not enforced
universally, made obtaining treatment extremely difficult for most
women, and especially for Kabul's widows, many of whom have lost all
such male family members. Further, even when a woman was allowed to be
treated by a male doctor, he was prohibited from examining her except
if she were fully clothed in Taliban-approved garb and from touching
her, thus limiting the possibility of any meaningful treatment. The
participants in a 1998 survey of 160 Afghan women reported little or no
access to health care in Kabul. Most of the participants also reported
a decline in their mental health. However, there were credible reports
that the restrictions on women's health care were not applied in
practice and that there were some improvements in access to health care
for women during the last 2 years. By the end of 1999, all Kabul
hospitals apart from the military hospital reportedly treated women.
Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital in Kabul provided a full range of health
services to women, but there was only one maternity hospital in the
country.
The Taliban decreed what women could wear in public. Women in
public spaces were required to wear a burqa, a loose, head-to-toe
garment that has a small cloth screen for vision. While in many,
particularly rural, areas of the country, the burqa was the customary
women's outer garment, the requirement for all women to wear the burqa
represented a significant change in practice for many women,
particularly in urban areas. According to a decree announced by the
religious police in 1997, women found outside the home who were not
covered properly would be punished severely along with their family
elders. In Kabul and elsewhere women found in public who were not
wearing the burqa, or whose burqas did not cover their ankles properly,
reportedly have been beaten by Taliban militiamen. Some women cannot
afford the cost of a burqa, and thus are forced to remain at home or
risk beatings if they go out without one.
During 1999 there were reports of differences in the enforcement of
the requirement for women to wear the burqa. Enforcement reportedly was
relatively lax in rural and non-Pashtun areas, and there were reports
that some women in Herat and in rural areas cover their heads with
large scarves that leave the face uncovered and have not faced
reprisals. The Taliban's dress code for women apparently is not
enforced strictly upon the nomad population of several hundred thousand
or upon the few female foreigners, who nonetheless must cover their
hair, arms, and legs. Women in their homes must not be visible from the
street; the Taliban require that homes with female occupants have their
windows painted over.
Women were expected to leave their homes only while escorted by a
male relative, further curtailing the appearance and movement of women
in public even when wearing approved clothing. Women appearing in
public without a male relative ran the risk of beatings by the Taliban.
Some observers reported seeing fewer and fewer women on the streets in
Taliban-controlled areas. Women are not allowed to drive, and taxi
drivers reportedly are beaten if they take unescorted women as
passengers. On October 19, taxi drivers were warned by the PVSV not to
pick up unaccompanied female passengers or risk a ban on their driving
privileges. Women only may ride on buses designated as women's buses;
there are reportedly not enough such buses to meet the demand, and the
wait for women's buses can be long. In December 1998, the Taliban
ordered that bus drivers who take female passengers must encase the bus
in curtains and put up a curtain so that the female passengers cannot
see or be seen by the driver. Bus drivers also were told that they must
employ boys under the age of 15 to collect fares from female passengers
and that neither the drivers nor the fare collectors were to mingle
with the passengers.
AI has reported that the Taliban have ordered the closure of
women's public baths.
Women are also forbidden to enter mosques or other places of
worship unless the mosque has separate sections for men and women. Most
women pray at home alone or with other family members. Women also
reportedly have been prohibited from appearing on the streets for
certain periods during the month of Ramadan.
The Taliban's restrictions regarding the social behavior of men and
women were communicated by edicts and enforced mainly by the PVSV. The
U.N. and numerous other interlocutors noted that the edicts are
enforced with varying degrees of rigor throughout the country. The
restrictions were enforced most strictly in urban areas, where women
had enjoyed wider access to educational and employment opportunities
before the Taliban gained control.
After her 1999 visit, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women noted some improvements in the status of women, including
the existence of home schools as well as limited primary educational
institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in Kabul;
increased access of women to health care; and the permission for widows
to work. The Special Rapporteur also noted continuing violations of the
physical security of women and the practice of lashings and public
beatings, violations of the rights to education, health, employment,
freedom of movement, and freedom of association, and of family rights,
including the existence of polygyny and forced marriage. She also noted
that minority women sometimes were subject to forced displacement and
that there were some cases of trafficking in women and children (see
Section 6.f.).
Children.--Local administrative bodies and international assistance
organizations undertook to ensure children's welfare to the extent
possible; however, the situation of children is very poor. Infant
mortality is 250 out of 1,000 births; Medicins Sans Frontieres reports
that 250,000 children per year die of malnutrition. One fourth of
children die before the age of 5. Approximately 45 percent of the
population is made up of children age 14 or under. The Taliban's
restrictions on male-female medical treatment have had a detrimental
effect on children. Physicians for Human Rights reported that children
sometimes are denied medical care when the authorities do not let male
doctors visit children's wards, which may be located within the women's
ward of a hospital, or do not allow male doctors to see children
accompanied only by their mothers. A UNICEF study also reported that
the majority of children are highly traumatized and expect to die
before reaching adulthood. According to the study, some 90 percent have
nightmares and suffer from acute anxiety, while 70 percent have seen
acts of violence, including the killing of parents or relatives.
Taliban restrictions on the movement of women and girls in areas
that they controlled hampered the ability of U.N. agencies and NGO's to
implement effectively health and education programs targeted to both
boys and girls.
The educational sector currently is characterized by limited human
and financial resources; the absence of a national educational policy
and curriculum; the unpreparedness of the authorities to rehabilitate
destroyed facilities; and discriminatory policies banning the access of
females to all levels of education, according to a report by the Gender
Advisor to the U.N. System in Afghanistan. Female literacy is
approximately 4 percent, compared with an overall literacy rate of 30
percent. There have been reports that the ban on women working outside
of the home has hampered the education of boys, since a large
percentage of the country's teachers were women prior the advent of
Taliban rule.
The Taliban have eliminated most of the formal opportunities for
girls' education that existed in areas that they have taken over;
however, some girls' schools still operate in rural areas and some
towns. Some girls also are receiving an education in informal home
schools, which are tolerated to varying degrees by the Taliban around
the country. During the year, there were reports that the number of
children that these home schools reach was increasing and that there
was an increase in the attendance of girls in various educational
settings, including formal schools. However, in June 1998, more than
100 NGO-funded girls' schools and home-based women's vocational
projects were closed by the Taliban in Kabul. In 1998 the Taliban also
stated that schools would not be allowed to teach girls over the age of
8, that schools teaching girls would be required to be licensed, and
that such schools would be required to limit their curriculums to the
Koran. However, the Taliban's implementation of educational policy is
inconsistent and varies from region to region, as well as over time.
In September 1999, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women noted the existence of home schools and also of limited primary
educational institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in
Kabul. The Taliban told the Special Rapporteur in 1999 that primary
education is available to girls between the ages of 6 and 10 and that
this was dispensed in mosque schools under the Ministry of Religious
Affairs. About three-fourths of the curricula in the Ministry of
Religious Affairs schools reportedly deals with religious and moral
subjects. Taliban-sponsored public schools, at both the elementary and
secondary levels, provide education only to boys and also emphasize
religious studies. However, schools run by NGO's and international
donors mostly are open to both boys and girls.
Despite the limitations on education and the Taliban's restrictions
on female education, approximately 25 to 30 percent of boys were
estimated to be enrolled in school and up to 10 percent of girls were
estimated to attend school, whether NGO-run, mosque schools, or home
schools, according to UNICEF. This represents a modest increase in both
boys' and girls' school enrollment over the last 5 years. Prior to the
Taliban takeover in 1996, more than 100,000 girls reportedly attended
public school in Kabul in grades kindergarten to 12, according to a
U.N. survey. During 1999 approximately 300,000 to 350,000 school-age
children attended schools run or funded by various assistance agencies
and NGO's. In 1999 the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) reported
that it served 175,000 students in 567 schools; most of these were
formal schools, but 39 were home schools. In a few areas, over 50
percent of students reportedly were girls. The SCA reported that 20
percent of the students in its formal schools, mostly located in rural
areas, were girls. Many boys also were being educated in home schools,
because of administrative problems in the Taliban-run schools,
including problems in the payment of teachers' salaries. A high
proportion of the students in Northern Alliance-controlled territory
reportedly were girls. In 1999 in areas newly captured by the Taliban,
some communities successfully petitioned Taliban representatives to
reopen the schools. In Herat, which was captured by the Taliban in
1995, girls' schools have remained closed except in the refugee camps
maintained by international NGO's. Nonetheless, approximately 5 percent
of girls were enrolled in school in Kandahar; approximately 20 percent
of girls were enrolled in Herat. Some families have sent girls abroad
for education in order to evade the Taliban's prohibitions on females
attending school.
There have been unconfirmed reports that the Taliban uses child
soldiers. In the past, there have been some cases of trafficking in
children (see Section 6.f.).
The Taliban have banned certain recreational activities, such as
kite flying and playing chess. In October the Taliban banned youths
from playing soccer in Kabul on Fridays. Dolls and stuffed animals are
prohibited due to the Taliban's interpretation of religious injunctions
against representations of living beings.
People with Disabilities.--There are no measures to protect the
rights of the mentally and physically disabled or to mandate
accessibility for them. Victims of landmines continued to be a major
focus of international humanitarian relief organizations, which devoted
resources to providing prostheses, medical treatment, and
rehabilitation therapy to amputees. It is believed that there was more
public acceptance of the disabled because of the increasing prevalence
of the disabled due to landmines or other war-related injuries. There
are reports that disabled women, who need a prosthesis or other aid to
walk, are virtually homebound because they cannot wear the burqa over
the prosthesis or other aid.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--During the year, there were
reports of harassment, extortion, and forced expulsion from their homes
of ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks by Taliban soldiers. The Taliban is
Pashtun-dominated and has show little tolerance for accommodation with
ethnic minorities.
It is estimated that the Taliban may have killed thousands of
members of the ethnic Hazara minority in 1998 (see Section 1.a.).
In the past, there were reliable reports that individuals were
detained by both the Taliban and Northern Alliance because of their
ethnic origins and suspected sympathy with opponents. Ethnic Hazara,
who are overwhelmingly Shi'a, reportedly have been targeted for
ethnically-motivated attacks, in particular by the overwhelmingly Sunni
and ethnic Pashtun Taliban forces.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Little is known about labor laws and
practices. There were no reports of labor rallies or strikes. Labor
rights are not defined, and in the context of the breakdown of
governmental authority there is no effective central authority to
enforce them. Many of Kabul's industrial workers are unemployed due to
the destruction or abandonment of the city's minuscule manufacturing
base. An insignificant fraction of the work force ever has labored in
an industrial setting. The only large employers in Kabul are the
governmental structure of minimally functioning ministries and local
and international NGO's.
Workers in government ministries reportedly have been fired because
they received part of their education abroad or because of contacts
with the previous regimes, although certain officials in previous
administrations still are employed under the Taliban. Others reportedly
have been fired for violating Taliban regulations concerning beard
length.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The country
lacks a tradition of genuine labor-management bargaining. There are no
known labor courts or other mechanisms for resolving labor disputes.
Wages are determined by market forces, or, in the case of government
workers, dictate.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Little information
is available on forced or compulsory labor, including child labor.
There have been reports that the Taliban has forced prisoners to do
construction work at Kandahar prison and that the Taliban used forced
labor after its takeover of the Shomali plains area in the summer of
1999. There have been credible reports that Masood forced Taliban
prisoners to work on road and airstrip construction projects under
life-threatening conditions (such as requiring them to dig in mined
areas). There were some cases of trafficking in women and children (see
Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no evidence that authorities in any part of the
country enforce labor laws, if they exist, relating to the employment
of children. Children from the age of 6 often work to help support
their families by herding animals in rural areas and by collecting
paper and firewood, shining shoes, begging, or collecting scrap metal
among street debris in the cities. Some of these practices expose
children to the danger of landmines.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no available
information regarding a statutory minimum wage or the enforcement of
safe labor practices. Many workers apparently are allotted time off
regularly for prayers and observance of religious holidays. Most work
in the informal sector.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no available information
regarding legislation prohibiting trafficking in persons. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women reported that there were
some cases of trafficking in women and children (see Section 5). There
were reports that some Taliban soldiers (often reported to be
foreigners) abducted girls and women from villages in the Shomali
plains during fighting in August 1999. Women taken in trucks from the
area of fighting in the Shomali plains reportedly were trafficked to
Pakistan and to the Arab Gulf states.
__________
BANGLADESH
Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy, with broad powers
exercised by the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is the
leader of the Awami League, which came to power in 1996 in national
elections deemed to be free and fair by international observers. There
is an active political opposition. Violence is a pervasive feature of
politics, including political campaigns, and elections frequently are
marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and rigging. The major
opposition political parties have abstained from Parliament since July
1999, diminishing Parliament's effectiveness. The opposition parties
accuse the Awami League Government of abusing its parliamentary
majority to prevent real debate on legislation and national issues. The
higher levels of the judiciary display a significant degree of
independence and often rule against the Government; however, lower
judicial officers fall under the executive, and are reluctant to
challenge government decisions.
The Home Affairs Ministry controls the police and paramilitary
forces, which bear primary responsibility for maintaining internal
security. The Government frequently uses the police for political
purposes. There is widespread police corruption and lack of discipline.
Police officers committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
Bangladesh is a very poor country. Annual per capita income among
the population of about 130 million is approximately $350. Slightly
more than half of all children are chronically malnourished. Seventy
percent of the work force is involved in agriculture, which accounts
for one-fourth of the gross domestic product. The economy is market-
based, but the Government still plays a significant role. The
industrial sector is growing, albeit slowly, based largely on the
manufacture of garments and textiles by privately owned companies. A
small, wealthy elite controls much of the private economy, but there is
an emerging middle class. Foreign investment has increased
significantly in the gas sector and in electrical power generation
facilities. Foreign aid still is significant, but has diminished
somewhat in relative importance vis-a-vis increased earnings from
exports and remittances from workers overseas. Efforts to improve
governance and economic growth through reform have been unsuccessful,
and were blocked by bureaucratic intransigence, vested economic
interests, endemic corruption, and political polarization. The
Government's commitment to economic reform is weak. Periodic natural
disasters, including a severe flood in 1998, also hamper development;
nevertheless, the economic growth rate during the last fiscal year was
about 5.5 percent.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in some areas; however, its record remained poor in many other
significant areas, and it continued to commit serious abuses. Police
committed a number of extrajudicial killings, and some persons died in
police custody under suspicious circumstances. Police routinely used
torture, beatings, and other forms of abuse while interrogating
suspects. Police frequently beat demonstrators. The Government rarely
convicts and punishes those persons responsible for torture or unlawful
deaths. Prison conditions are extremely poor for the majority of the
prison population. Rape of female detainees in prison or other official
custody has been a problem; however, there were no reports of this
during the year. The Government continued to arrest and detain persons
arbitrarily, and to use the Special Powers Act (SPA) and Section 54 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allow for arbitrary arrest and
preventive detention, to harass political opponents and other citizens
by detaining them without formal charges. The Government encourages
violence by urging retaliation against opposition members who attack
government supporters. The Government filed numerous criminal cases
against opposition leaders and activists; in at least some of these
cases, the charges likely were false. The newly-enacted Public Safety
Act (PSA) gives the police even greater opportunity to abuse their
powers. Much of the judiciary is subject to executive influence and
suffers from corruption. A large case backlog slowed the judicial
process, and lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. Police searched
homes without warrants, and the Government forcibly relocated slum
dwellers. Virtually all journalists practiced some self-censorship.
Attacks on journalists and efforts to intimidate them by government
officials, political party activists, and others increased. The
Government limited freedom of assembly, particularly for political
opponents, and on occasion limited freedom of movement. The Government
generally permitted a wide variety of human rights groups to conduct
their activities, but it continued to refuse to register a local
chapter of Amnesty International. Abuse of children and child
prostitution are problems. Violence and discrimination against women
remained serious problems. Discrimination against the disabled,
indigenous people, and religious minorities was a problem. There was
occasional violence against members of the Ahmadiya religious minority.
The Government continued to limit worker rights, especially in the
Export Processing Zones (EPZ's), and, in general, is ineffective in
enforcing workers' rights. Some domestic servants, including many
children, work in conditions that resemble servitude and many suffer
abuse. Child labor and abuse of child workers remained widespread and
serious problems. However, a 1995 agreement between the Bangladesh
Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF, and
the International Labor Organization (ILO) that has eliminated about 95
percent of child labor in the export garment sector, the main export
industry, was extended in June. Trafficking in women and children for
the purpose of forced prostitution and at times for forced labor
remained serious problems. Both ruling and opposition political parties
and their activists often employed violence, causing deaths and
numerous injuries; however, the number of deaths has declined, likely
due to fewer general strikes during the year. Vigilante justice
resulted in numerous killings, according to press reports.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--Police committed a
number of extrajudicial killings.
Security forces sometimes used unwarranted lethal force. On
February 9, police officers shot and killed Mohammad Ahmed Hossain
Sumon, while trying to arrest him. Police officers also shot and
wounded Sumon's brother and 12-year-old niece. Family members began to
drive the victims to the hospital in a van, at which time the police
again shot at them, breaking the van's windshield. No action was taken
against the policemen involved in the killing. On May 3, police
officers shot and killed two workers in the Savar EPZ, as police
stormed a factory that disgruntled workers had taken over; another two
persons later died from stab wounds sustained during the seizure (see
Sections 1.c. and 6.b.). On September 18, police officers brandished
weapons at persons attempting to rescue Mahbub Hasan Khan Oli, who was
drowning in a Dhaka pond into which he had jumped to evade police
capture. Oli drowned. In March 1999, police officers in Dhaka drowned
college student Mujibur Rahman, and in July 1999, three policemen in
Dhaka allegedly severely beat Mohammed Shahjada Tuku, then threw him
into a canal where he drowned; as of year's end, none of the officers
involved had been held accountable.
According to government figures, 134 persons died in prison and
police custody during the year (see Section 1.c.). According to an
independent human rights organization, 70 persons died in police,
prison, court custody, and army camps during the year.
Most police abuses go unpunished, and the resulting climate of
impunity remains a serious obstacle to ending police abuse and
extrajudicial killings. However, in some instances where there was
evidence of police culpability for extrajudicial killings, the
authorities took action. In March 1999, four police officers were
charged with manslaughter after a body was found in the rooftop water
tank of the Detective Branch in Dhaka. The case is ongoing. The case
against a police sergeant for killing a rickshaw puller in July 1999 in
Agargaon remained pending at year's end.
Court proceedings continued against 14 persons, including 13 police
officers, arrested and charged after a college student in police
custody was beaten to death in July 1998. At year's end, nine of the
accused persons were in custody, and proceedings in the case were
continuing (see Section 1.c.).
In 1995 the Government charged former President Hossain Mohammad
Ershad with ordering the 1981 murder of the alleged assassin of
President Ziaur Rahman. Ershad, leader of the Jatiya party, was granted
bail in 1997. In late 1998, immediately after Ershad took a stronger
stance against the Government, the Prime Minister made remarks implying
that the Government might accelerate the case. Subsequently Ershad
entered into an alliance with other opposition parties to pressure the
Government to step down by calling hartals and boycotting Parliament.
On August 24, in a case concerning alleged misuse of power and
corruption during Ershad's tenure as President, a High Court panel
sentenced Ershad to 5 years in prison and a fine of $1 million (about
55 million Taka) (see Section 1.e.). After Ershad's surrender to the
court and subsequent incarceration on November 20, an appellate panel
of the Supreme Court ruled that Ershad could be released from prison
after payment of the fine, or after serving 6 months if the fine is
unpaid. As of year's end, Ershad remained in jail. Ershad may be barred
from politics for 5 years.
In 1998 a judge convicted and sentenced to death 15 persons for the
1975 murder of then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of current
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina) and 21 of his family members (see Section
1.e.). On June 28, the High Court began hearing an appeal of the
verdicts and a review of the sentences. On December 14, a 2-judge High
Court panel confirmed 10 of the convictions and death sentences. On the
remaining five convictions, the two judges released split opinions, and
those cases were pending further High Court review at year's end (see
Section 1.e.).
The Government continued to imprison eight persons accused of
perpetrating the November 1975 murders of four senior Awami League
leaders who then were in jail (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). On October
12, charges were filed against these individuals and 13 others who are
not in custody. At year's end, the court was scheduled to begin hearing
testimony in the case on January 24, 2001.
Vigilante violence against criminals by private citizens occurs.
The Government reported that, by year's end, vigilantes killed 1
person, compared to 20 persons during the first 9 months of 1999.
Authorities rarely arrest and punish those responsible for vigilante
violence.
Press reports of vigilante killings by mobs are common. Tallying
these reports, a newspaper estimated that mobs had beaten to death at
least 14 persons in May and had killed at least 10 persons in June.
Press editorials and commentaries opinioned that the increasing mob
violence reflected a breakdown of law and order and a popular
perception that the criminal justice system does not function. Human
rights groups and press reports indicate that vigilante violence
against women who are accused of having committed moral offenses is
common, particularly in rural areas, and that religious leaders
sometimes lead it (see Section 5).
Mob violence also occurs. On August 18, Alfred Soren, a leader of
the Santal tribe in the northern part of the country was killed and
dozens of others were injured, in a mob attack, reportedly carried out
by Bengalis who were angry with the tribals over a land dispute (see
Section 5).
Violence, often resulting in killings, is a pervasive element in
the country's politics (see Sections 1.c. and 3). Supporters of
different political parties, and often supporters of different factions
within one party, frequently clash with each other and with police
during rallies and demonstrations. According to government figures, 15
persons were killed and 56 others were injured in politically motivated
violence during the year. Awami Leaque supporters, often with the
connivance and support of the police, violently disrupted rallies and
demonstrations of the opposition parties (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
Opposition parties also used armed violence and intimidation to enforce
general strikes. During the year, four persons died in violence related
to general strikes (hartals); five others were killed when run over by
recklessly-driven vehicles that were violating the hartal.
One person was killed in an explosion at opposition BNP
headquarters just hours before the beginning of a hartal on February 2.
The Government accused the opposition of manufacturing bombs; the
opposition alleged that the explosion was a government plot designed to
discredit the opposition. During the February 2 hartal, another person
was killed by a bomb in Dhaka. During the February 16 hartal, a
businessman was killed in the old section of Dhaka. On August 30, a BNP
youth front leader was killed during a hartal by unidentified persons
in the old section of Dhaka.
During an opposition-called hartal in 1999, eyewitnesses saw Maqbul
Hossain, an Awami League Member of Parliament (M.P.) for the Dhanmondi
area of Dhaka, order the killing of two young BNP activists who had
been seized by Hossain's armed followers. Members of Hossain's
entourage then shot at point-blank range one of the men, BNP activist
Sajal Chowdhury, who subsequently died; the other person was beaten.
About a dozen police officers who were standing nearby in riot gear
made no effort to intervene or to apprehend the gunmen, nor did the
Government later take action against those persons responsible.
However, police summoned for repeated interrogations the family of
Chowdhury, which had filed a murder complaint against M.P. Hossain and
the armed men. One Chowdhury family member was arrested on criminal
charges, then detained under the SPA after a judge granted him bail
(see Section 1.d.). In December 1999, police submitted their final
report on the case to the court, stating that the evidence did not
support the murder charge. Subsequently, the court accepted the police
report and dismissed the case against Hossain. Hossain then served
legal notice on the victim's family, demanding that they explain why
they should not be charged with criminal defamation.
Political killings continued during non-hartal periods as well. On
July 16, Shamsur Rahman, a well-respected journalist who wrote articles
on smuggling and terrorism in the southwestern region, was killed in
Jessore. The Home Minister blamed the opposition for the killings;
others blamed members of the ruling party who are connected with the
smugglers. Numerous other journalists were killed or attacked by
government or societal forces throughout the year (see Section 2.a.).
On August 11, S.M.A. Rab, a prominent Awami League leader in Khulna,
was killed. A Maoist group claimed responsibility. However, Rab's son
blamed the killing on his father's rivals inside the ruling party who
were upset by the Prime Minister's announcement that Rab would be the
party's nominee for the Khulna mayoral post. On August 16, rival
political party activists in the old section of Dhaka killed Awami
League leader Kamal Hossain. On August 20, a pro-BNP attorney, Habibur
Rahman Mandal, was shot and killed in the old section of Dhaka while on
his way to court. The same morning a pro-Awami League attorney, Kalidas
Boral, was shot and killed in Bagerhat (near Kulna), allegedly by
rivals within his own party. A mourning procession for the two slain
attorneys was fired upon, resulting in injuries (see Section 1.c.).
On July 21, a large bomb was unearthed near the site of a public
meeting at which the Prime Minister was to speak the following day. On
July 23, a second bomb was discovered near a helicopter pad that she
had used the previous day (see Section 1.c.).
In March 1999, two persons were killed while making bombs at ruling
party M.P. Mohammed Mohibur Rahman Manik's residence in the Sylhet
region. Newspaper speculations that the bombs were to have been used if
local intraparty conflicts were contested. Police arrested Manik in May
1999 for involvement in bomb making. The court charged the M.P. on
February 29; at year's end, Manik remained free on bail. On August 16,
Manik was injured, along with approximately 50 others, in a gun battle
between 2 factions of the Awami League in Sunamganj, Sylhet Division.
On March 7, 1999, 2 bombs exploded in Jessore, killing 10 persons who
were attending a performance of the leftaffiliated cultural group
Udichi Shilpa Gosthi. On July 19, 24 individuals were charged in
connection with the bombing(s), including former minister and BNP
leader Tariqul Islam. As of year's end, Islam and 2 others accused in
the case were free on bail, 18 individuals were in jail, and 3 are not
in custody. While awaiting trial, Islam and the two others on bail
appealed to have the charges dismissed, saying that they were not
involved in the case. The High Court stayed the order until February
14, 2001. On February 16, 1999, masked gunmen shot and killed Jatiya
Samajtantrik Dal leader Kazi Aref Ahmed and four others as they were
addressing a public rally in a village near Khushtia. On July 11, 29
individuals were charged in connection with the incident; 25 of them
are in custody. As of year's end, the case was continuing.
Violence also is endemic between the student political wings of the
major national parties, and between rival factions within the parties.
In an escalation of political violence, on July 12, gunmen fired
automatic guns at a van in Chittagong, killing eight persons, including
six members of the ruling party's student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra
League (BCL). The Govenment accused the student wing of the opposition
JamaateIslami Party of being responsible for the attack. The Prime
Minister challenged her supporters and the police to retaliate for the
murders of her student supporters, declaring that there should be 10
opposition bodies for each one from the ruling party. An anti-Jamaat
campaign following the July 12 killings resulted in the deaths of at
least 2 Jamaat activists, the injury of many others, and the arrests of
hundreds more (see Section 1.d.). The opposition asserts that the
attack on the van was a continuation of a shoot-out the previous day
between rival factions of the BCL that left three BCL activists dead.
Published photographs of an August 20 clash between two factions of the
BCL at Kabi Nazrul College in the old section of Dhaka showed a BCL
activist wielding a pistol in the presence of a policeman. The ruling
Awami League temporarily suspended the operations of its youth front
wing in Dhaka. On December 15, many major newspapers published a photo
of a man pointing a gun during the riot that ensued after the court
issued a split verdict in the murder case of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and
his family (see Section 1.e.). The man was identified as Hemayetuddin,
a well-known BCL leader. No police action was taken against him. The
main opposition BNP suspended activities of the central unit of its
student wing, Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal, following the killing of two
persons in a factional dispute at Dhaka University on July 2.
Extortion from businesses and individuals by persons with political
backing was common, and businessmen on several occasions went on
strikes to protest the extortion. On May 25, several young men shot and
killed Iftekhar Ahmed Shipu, owner of a cellular telephone shop in
Dhaka, after Shipu refused to give them a free telephone. A ruling
party parliamentarian's son and several others were charged with the
killing in a case filed by Shipu's relatives. According to press
accounts and a subsequent investigation by a human rights organization,
a gang led by Sumon, son of an influential local Awami League leader,
abducted two young men on September 15 and demanded a ransom of about
$1,000 (50,000 Taka), which the parents did not pay. The dismembered
bodies of the two victims were found in a drain the following day. The
human rights organization report asserts that the police did not
intervene to rescue the two young men, but rather shared drinks and
cigarettes with the gang members as they were holding the two victims.
Subsequently, the officer-in-charge of the local police station was
transferred, and the police arrested several members of the gang.
b. Disappearance.--During the night of September 18, Nurul Islam,
the BNP Organizing Secretary for Laxmipur district, was abducted from
his home. According to reports from neighbors and from BNP sources, the
General Secretary of the local chapter of the Awami League was behind
this abduction and suspected killing. Police subsequently searched the
General Secretary's residence for evidence relating to the abduction. A
case was filed against the General Secretary, 2 of his sons, and 12
others, but neither the General Secretary nor his sons were arrested.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment; however, police routinely employ physical and
psychological torture and other abuse during arrests and
interrogations. Torture may consist of threats, beatings and,
occasionally, the use of electric shock. The Government rarely convicts
or punishes those responsible for torture, and a climate of impunity
allows such police abuses to continue. After several Dhaka policemen
were arrested in 1998 for allegedly beating to death a college student
in police custody (see Section 1.a.), the deputy commissioner of the
Dhaka police detective branch publicly defended the use of physical
coercion against suspects, saying that the practice was necessary in
order to obtain information.
Nasir Uddin Pintu, a leader of the opposition student group
Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD), alleged that he was tortured in police
custody with beatings, sleep deprivation, and dousing with water. He
also reported that he was denied proper food and water while in custody
from December 1999 to January. One human rights organization reported
that, after conducting a field investigation, it had confirmed that on
June 13, police officers in Jhenidaha arrested a 12-year-old boy named
Belal, hung him nude from a tree, tied a brick to his genitals, and
beat him with sticks, allegedly for teasing a beggar. The human rights
organization reported that the family was too intimidated to file a
criminal report on this incident. Subsequently, one police officer from
the nearby Betai Police Camp was suspended temporarily; other policemen
from the Camp were transferred.
Rape of female detainees in police or other official custody has
been a problem, as the Chief Justice of the Bangladesh Supreme Court
acknowledged in a March speech when he observed that rapes and killings
in police custody frequently occurred (see Section 1.a.). Some well-
publicized reports of rape in police custody in prior years resulted in
a widespread public outcry. While there were no reports of such rapes
during the year, it is unclear whether the situation has improved after
public condemnation, or whether rapes continue and simply are not being
reported.
According to human rights groups and media reports, police engaged
in violence and looting during the July 1999 raid of the Tanbazar and
Nimtali brothel districts, allegedly attacking residents as well as
over 40 female human rights activists who were protesting the eviction
(see Section 1.f.). The evicted sex workers were detained in vagrant
centers, where guards and fellow inmates subjected them to sexual
assault and harassment. According to two human rights organizations,
fewer than a dozen prostitutes remained in the vagrant homes at year's
end.
Police sometimes rape women who are not in custody. The Government
reported that in May a police constable raped a woman who was not in
police custody. After an investigation, the constable was charged with
rape and placed under suspension. The case was pending at year's end.
During the first 9 months of the year, one human rights organization
documented nine cases of police raping women who were not in custody.
In addition after women report that they are raped (or are involved in
family disputes), they frequently are detained in ``safe custody,''
where they endure poor conditions, and sometimes are abused or, as has
been reported in prior years, are raped (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
Citing statistics from prison officials, one human rights organization
asserted that as of September, 307 females (including adults and
minors) and 114 male children were in ``safe custody.'' Government
figures showed that 353 persons, including 139 women, were in safe
custody at year's end.
The police often employ excessive, sometimes lethal, force in
dealing with opposition demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 3).
Before a scheduled rally of former Awami League M.P. Kader Siddiqui in
May, police stopped Siddiqui in front of his house, fired gunshots into
the sky to scare his followers, and beat him so severely that he
required hospitalization. Four of his party activists were detained
under the PSA. On August 6, police broke up a rally of the four-party
opposition alliance using tear gas, rubber bullets and batons. At least
25 persons were injured seriously. On October 5, security personnel
blocked a road in the southwestern part of the country to prevent
opposition leader Begum Khaleda Zia from visiting floodaffected areas
and addressing a scheduled rally. Awami League student activists,
assisted by the police, dismantled the dais that had been erected for
Zia's rally. Government leaders said Zia's scheduled rally was at the
same venue as a rally the Prime Minister was slated to address. A
formal clarification from the Government stated that this ``unfortunate
situation'' would not have occurred had the opposition scheduled its
program before or after the Prime Minister's. The opposition protested
that its rally had been announced before the Prime Minister's program,
and that it had assured the authorities that its program would be
finished well ahead of the Prime Minister's arrival. In November
approximately 100 persons were injured in Chittagong after police tried
to break up a 500-person march of Jamaat-e-Islami party members. Police
fired tear gas and blank shots to disperse the marchers, who retaliated
with homemade bombs and bricks. Police arrested more than 100
protestors; 40 still were in custody at year's end. In a separate
incident, no action was taken against police in the 1999 beating of
Shafiul Alam Prodhan, president of the Jatiya Gonotantrik Party.
On May 3, police officers injured numerous persons in the Savar
EPZ, as police stormed a garment factory that disgruntled workers had
taken over. Four persons died and more than 20 persons were injured in
the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 6.b.).
According to a May Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, Rohingya
refugees living in camps continue to suffer abuses, including beatings
and other forms of physical abuse, and in the past have been coerced by
camp administrators trying to secure their return to Burma (see Section
2.d.).
The Government sometimes punishes family members for the alleged
violations of others (see Section 1.f.).
Police corruption remains a problem and there were credible reports
that police facilitated or were involved in trafficking in women and
children (see Section 6.f.).
Both opposition and ruling parties routinely use actual or
threatened violence to achieve political ends. Violence is a common
feature during rallies, demonstrations, and general strikes. In an
incident witnessed by a member of the foreign diplomatic community, on
February 13, a joint procession of the four-party opposition alliance
came under attack in Dhaka from unknown assailants. In retaliation some
individuals from the procession damaged dozens of vehicles parked on
the street. On August 7, members of an Awami League student wing
procession fired upon a BNP torch procession in Narayanganj. The BNP
demonstrators threw their torches at the Awami League student activists
and stoned the police. As the police chased the BNP demonstrators, the
Awami League activists ransacked the local BNP office. On August 16, 2
ruling party factions fought a gun battle in Sylhet Division, injuring
some 50 persons. Also in August, a mourning procession for two slain
attorneys was fired upon by unidentified assailants, injuring four
persons, including two policemen (see Section 1.a.).
In the past, some opposition political activities, especially
hartals, allegedly were staged with the intent of provoking violent
clashes, in order to embarrass the Government and galvanize public
opinion. However, the overall incidence and severity of hartals
decreased significantly during the year.
On December 22, after the BNP announced a new central committee for
its youth wing, the Jatiyabadi Chhatra Dal, JCD activists opposed to
the new leaders attacked the houses of two BNP leaders, damaged
vehicles, and ransacked properties to protest the new committee,
alleging that the new leaders were well-known terrorists, not students
(see Section 1.a.).
Members of the Ahmadiya religious minority were attacked at several
places in the country (see Section 5).
In rural areas, human rights groups and press reports indicate that
vigilantism against women for perceived moral transgressions occurs,
and may include humiliating, painful punishments such as whipping (see
Sections 1.a. and 5). Rejected suitors, angry husbands, or those
seeking revenge sometimes throw acid in a woman's face (see Section 5).
On July 21, in Kotalipara village, Gopalganj district, a large bomb
was found near the rostrum where Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was
supposed to make an appearance the following day. On July 23, a second
bomb of similar size was found buried near the helipad prepared for the
Prime Minister's use at the same site. No one was hurt. The Government
accused the opposition of plotting to kill the Prime Minister, and
several dozen persons, including members of Jamaat-e-Islami and other
proIslamic groups, were arrested or picked up for interrogation. On
September 13, 20 persons were accused of being involved in the
assassination attempt. Of those, 11 later were charged. At year's end,
four were in custody; several others remained unapprehended (see
Section 1.a.).
Prison conditions are extremely poor for most prisoners. The
Supreme Court Chief Justice told a seminar on August 10 that prisoners
live a ``subhuman'' life. Official figures indicated that 134 persons
died in prison and police custody during the year (see Section 1.a.).
According to credible sources, poor conditions were at least a
contributing factor in many of these deaths. Most prisons are
overcrowded and lack adequate facilities. According to government
figures, the current prison population of 63,489 roughly is 265 percent
of the official prison capacity. Of those, 16,393 were convicted and
47,096 were awaiting trial or under trial. In some cases, cells are so
crowded that prisoners sleep in shifts. The Dhaka Central Jail
reportedly houses over 8,000 prisoners in a facility designed for fewer
than 3,000 persons. A 1998 judicial report noted the poor physical
condition of jails and unhygienic food preparation. Drugs are abused
widely inside the prisons. The treatment of prisoners in the jails is
not equal. There are three classes of cells: A, B, and C. Common
criminals and lowlevel political workers generally are held in C cells,
which often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor quality food.
The use of restraining devices on prisoners in these cells is common.
Conditions in A and B cells are markedly better; A cells are reserved
for prominent prisoners. The Government has begun construction of
additions to jail facilities in an effort to alleviate overcrowding.
In general the Government does not permit prison visits by
independent human rights monitors (see Section 4). Government-appointed
committees of prominent private citizens in each prison locality
monitor prisons monthly, but do not release their findings. District
judges occasionally also visit prisons, but rarely disclose their
findings.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued
to arrest and to detain persons arbitrarily, as well as to use national
security legislation (the SPA or PSA) to detain citizens without formal
charges or specific complaints being filed against them. The
Constitution states that each person arrested shall be informed of the
grounds for detention, provided access to a lawyer of his choice,
brought before a magistrate within 24 hours, and freed unless the
magistrate authorizes continued detention. However, the Constitution
specifically allows preventive detention, with specified safeguards,
outside these requirements. In practice authorities frequently violate
these constitutional provisions, even in non-preventive detention
cases. In an April 1999 ruling, a two-judge High Court panel criticized
the police force for rampant abuse of detention laws and powers.
Under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, individuals may
be detained for suspicion of criminal activity without an order from a
magistrate or a warrant. Some persons initially detained under Section
54 subsequently are charged with a crime, while others are released
without any charge. According to the Government, 10,582 persons were
arrested under Section 54 during the year. Of those, 3,915 subsequently
were charged with criminal offenses. In 1998 the Home Minister
acknowledged that police abuse Section 54. The Government sometimes
uses Section 54 to harass and to intimidate members of the political
opposition and their families. In a Government crackdown on the Jamaat-
e-Islami after the July 12 killings of Awami League student supporters
in Chittagong (see Section 1.a), the police arrested 38 Jamaat students
at Rajshahi University on July 15 under Section 54. After an August 6
clash between student activists of the ruling Awami League and the
Jamaat-e-Islami at the Islamic University in Kushtia, the police
detained 30 Jamaat-e-Islami supporters under Section 54. In addition
police commonly detain opposition activists prior to and during general
strikes without citing any legal authority, holding them until the
event is over. Newspapers sometimes report instances of police
detaining persons to extract money or for personal vengeance.
Under the SPA the Government or a district magistrate may order
anyone detained for 30 days to prevent the commission of an act likely
``to prejudice the security of the country.'' Other offenses subject to
the SPA include smuggling, black market activity, or hoarding. The
Government (or magistrate) must inform the detainee of the grounds for
detention within 15 days, and the Government must approve the grounds
for detention within 30 days or release the detainee. In practice
detainees sometimes are held for longer periods without the Government
stating the grounds for the detention or formally approving it.
Detainees may appeal their detention, and the Government may grant
early release.
An advisory board composed of two persons who have been, or are
qualified to be, high court judges and one civil servant are supposed
to examine the cases of SPA detainees after 4 months. If the Government
adequately defends its detention order, the detainee remains
imprisoned; if not, the detainee is released. Appellate courts
sometimes order authorities to release SPA detainees after finding that
the Government is unable to justify the detention. If the defendant in
an SPA case is able to present his case before the High Court in Dhaka,
the High Court generally rules in favor of the defendant. However, many
defendants are either too poor or, because of strict detention, are
unable to obtain legal counsel and thereby move the case beyond the
magistrate level. Magistrates are subject to the administrative
controls of the Establishment Ministry and are less likely to dismiss a
case (see Section 1.e.). Detainees are allowed to consult with lawyers,
although usually not until a charge is filed. They are not entitled to
be represented by a lawyer before an advisory board. Detainees may
receive visitors. While in the past the Government has held
incommunicado some prominent prisoners, there were no known cases of
incommunicado detention during the year.
According to a study carried out by a parliamentary subcommittee
and released on September 7, successive governments have detained
69,010 persons since the SPA was enacted in 1974, and have released
68,195 persons, following orders from the High Court. The study
asserted that the SPA cases generally are so weak and vague that the
court had no alternative but to grant bail.
The Government cites a significant reduction in the number of
persons held under the SPA as evidence that it is minimizing its use of
the act; some observers assert that use of the recentlyenacted Public
Safety Act (PSA) explains the reduction of persons held under the SPA.
According to the Government, 801 persons were under SPA detention at
year's end: 416 for terrorism, 301 for smuggling, and 84 for anti-
social activities. This was 180 fewer than the 981 persons under
detention as of January 1, and a substantial decrease from the
approximately 2,000 persons under SPA detention in mid-1997. According
to the Government, authorities detained 1,331 persons under the SPA and
released 1,511 SPA detainees during the year.
In response to a deteriorating law and order situation, Parliament
passed the restrictive new PSA in January; the law became effective in
February. The law established special tribunals to hear cases under the
act, and made such offenses non-bailable. Opposition leaders expressed
fears that the law would be used to arrest political opponents of the
ruling party, as the law, like the SPA, allows police to circumvent
normal procedures designed to prevent arbitrary arrest, and precludes
detainees from being released on bail, which often is the result of
arrests based on little or no concrete evidence (see Section 2.b.).
According to the Government, 1,350 persons were arrested under the PSA
during the year: 445 for interfering with tenders and 905 for damaging
vehicles or obstructing traffic. Of those, 450 persons were released,
140 within 1 month, 301 within 3 months, and 9 within 6 months of
detention. According to a human rights organization, 3,763 persons were
accused under the PSA from February through August 10. Of these
persons, 1,285 eventually were arrested. Another human rights
organization reports that from June 1 to September 15, 1,166 persons
were accused under the PSA, of whom 90 belonged to the BNP, 29 to the
Awami League, and 32 to the the Jamaat-e-Islami.
Opposition leaders claim that the Government used the new PSA to
intimidate them. There are credible reports from human rights monitors
and political activists that the Awami League Government uses both the
SPA and the new PSA as tools to harass and intimidate political
opponents and others. In November police searched the residence of
Bahauddin, editor of an opposition newspaper, to arrest him on charges
of sedition for publishing a parody of the national anthem that mocked
the Prime Minister (see Section 2.a.). When police could not find
Bahauddin, they arrested his brother, Mainuddin, instead, under the
Special Powers Act (see Section 1.f.). Mainuddin spent 16 days in jail
and then was released under court order.
On December 26, BNP Member of Parliament Morshed Khan went to a
shop to inquire about the identity of some youths who had attacked his
son over a minor traffic incident. According to Khan, a mob of several
dozen youths with weapons and sticks gathered around the shop to attack
him. He quickly left. After the incident, a PSA case was filed against
Khan and his son for allegedly stealing cash from the shop. In contrast
no PSA case was filed against any member of the Awami League student
front, the BCL, when they incited a riot on December 14 after
announcement of the split verdict in the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman murder
case (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). BCL activists had taken to the
streets, smashing and burning hundreds of vehicles, and one auto-
rickshaw driver was shot and killed. No PSA charges were filed against
BCL leader Humayetuddin, whose photo appeared in numerous newspapers,
wielding a gun during the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.), nor
against others identified as participants in this violence.
There is a system of bail for criminal offenses. Bail is granted
commonly for both violent and nonviolent crimes. However, some
provisions of the law preclude the granting of bail. The Women and
Children Repression Prevention Act provides special procedures for
persons accused of violence against women and children. Persons
arrested under this act cannot be granted bail during an initial
investigation period of up to 90 days. Some human rights groups express
concern that a large number of allegations made under the act are
false, since the non-bailable period of detention is an effective tool
for exacting personal vengeance. According to government figures, 7,565
persons were detained under this act during the year. At year's end,
there were 2,139 persons detained under this law. A total of 201
persons were convicted under this law during the year. In January
Parliament passed The Women and Children Repression Prevention Act,
which amended and superseded the old law of the same name. The new law
calls for harsher penalties, provides for compensation to victims, and
requires action against investigating officers for negligence or
willful failure in duty (see Section 5). In a radio interview on July
26, the Prime Minister called the courts ``safe havens'' for criminals,
and criticized the courts for being too liberal in granting bail, even
to known criminals. The Prime Minister's remarks led to protests from
lawyers and the filing of three contempt of court petitions against
her. If bail is not granted, the law does not specify a time limit on
pretrial detention.
Prisons often are used to provide ``safe custody'' for women who
are victims of rapes or domestic violence (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
One study conducted by the Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers
Association (BNWLA) found that nearly half of the women in Dhaka's
Central Jail were crime victims being held in safe custody, not
criminals (see Sections 1.c. and 5). While women initially may consent
to this arrangement, it often is difficult for them later to obtain
their release, or to gain access to family or lawyers. While there have
been reports in prior years of police raping women in safe custody,
there were no reports that this occurred during the year (see Section
1.c.).
A major problem with the court system is the overwhelming backlog
of cases, which produces long pretrial delays. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court on May 19 told a gathering organized by the Law Ministry
that about 1 million cases were pending in criminal, civil, and
appellate courts. More than 47,000 persons, or about 75 percent of the
country's prison population, were awaiting trial or under trial.
According to research by one human rights organization, most prison
inmates never have been convicted and are awaiting trial. The
Government explains that many convicted persons who are appealing their
cases sometimes mistakenly are counted as ``pretrial detainees.''
Government sources report that the period between detention and trial
averages 6 months, but press and human rights groups report instances
of pretrial detention lasting several years. One human rights
organization asserted that the average time in detention before either
conviction or acquittal is in the range of 4 to 7 years. Reportedly
some prisoners awaiting trail have been in prison longer than the
maximum sentence they would receive if convicted. In one case reported
by a human rights group, a suspended bank officer in Chittagong was
arrrested in 1985 on corruption charges. Bail was granted in 41 of the
45 cases filed against him. The bail petitions in the remaining four
cases have yet to be heard, and trials on the merits of any of the
charges have not begun. If convicted of the charges against him, his
maximum sentence would be no more than 10 years, yet he already has
served 15 years in pretrial detention. In another case, the BNP
government in 1993 arrested a 10-year-old boy in connection with an
Awami League demonstration. He remained in jail without a hearing until
this year, when a prominent Dhaka attorney took up his case and won his
release on bail. Trials often are characterized by lengthy
adjournments, which considerably prolong the incarceration of accused
persons who do not receive bail.
Citizens who are not political opponents sometimes also are
detained arbitrarily. Newspapers and human rights activists report
numerous cases in which a person is arrested in order to force family
members to pay for his or her release. In a 1999 judgment criticizing
the police for abuse of detention powers, the High Court commented that
the police had become a law breaking agency. Most persons detained
under the SPA ultimately are released without charges being brought to
trial (see Sections 1.f. and 2.a.).
The Government sometimes uses serial detentions to prevent the
release of political activists. A former Jamaat-e-Islami M.P. was
released on bail on October 3 and immediately redetained under the SPA.
National Socialist Party member Mahmud Hasan Shachchu, an elected
leader of a local government unit in Kushtia, was jailed in June 1999.
After the High Court declared his detention illegal in April, the local
magistrate detained Shachchu again under the SPA.
Numerous court cases have been filed against opposition M.P.'s and
activists, on charges ranging from corruption to murder. In June 1999,
the Prime Minister told Parliament that more than 70 current BNP M.P.'s
were under investigation for alleged corruption during the previous
administration. Most of these corruption cases still were under
investigation and a few had been completed by year's end. Obaidur
Rahman, a BNP M.P., remained in prison. Rahman and two other political
figures were arrested in October 1998 for alleged complicity in the
1975 ``jail killings'' of four senior Awami League leaders. The
Government continued to hold eight persons accused of perpetrating
these murders. On October 12, the court filed charges against these
persons. The deposition of witnesses in the jail killing case was
scheduled to begin on January 24, 2001.
Some opposition activists were detained or charged in questionable
cases. On July 21, a Jamaat-e-Islami leader in Chittagong was arrested
and accused in five cases; he subsequently was detained under the SPA.
On September 11, the High Court found his detention invalid and ordered
his release.
In a case that appears to be politically-motivated, a senior leader
of the opposition Islami Oikkyo Jote was detained from September 5 to
November 7 under the SPA on the basis of his alleged involvement in
undefined ``anti-State activities.''
It is difficult to estimate the total number of detentions for
political reasons. In some instances criminal charges may apply to the
actions of activists, and many criminals claim political affiliations.
Because of crowded court dockets and magistrates who are reluctant to
challenge the Government, the judicial system does not deal effectively
with criminal cases that may be political in origin. There is no
independent body with the authority and ability to monitor detentions,
or to prevent, detect, or publicize cases of political harassment. Most
such detentions appear to be for short periods, such as several days or
weeks. Defendants in most cases receive bail, but dismissal of wrongful
charges or acquittal may take years.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, under a longstanding ``temporary''
provision of the Constitution, some subordinate courts remain part of
the executive and are subject to its influence. The higher levels of
the judiciary display a significant degree of independence and often
rule against the Government in criminal, civil, and even politically
controversial cases; however, lower level courts are more susceptible
to pressure from the executive branch. There also is corruption within
the legal process, especially at lower levels.
In a case concerning alleged misuse of power and corruption during
President Hossain Mohammad Ershad 's tenure as President, a High Court
panel on August 24 sentenced Ershad to 5 years in prison and a fine
equivalent to about $1 million (approximately 55 million Taka). Ershad,
who leads the Jatiya party, was sent to prison after he surrendered to
the court on November 20. Meanwhile the appellate panel of the Supreme
Court reduced his sentence to either payment of the fine or 6 months in
jail. However, Ershad may be banned from Parliament for 5 years. In
another case in 1995, the Government charged Ershad with ordering the
1981 murder of the alleged assassin of President Ziaur Rahman (see
Section 1.a.).
There continued to be tension between the executive and the
judiciary during the year. In 1999 the Government charged that the High
Court granted bail to criminals indiscriminately, crippling efforts to
combat crime. In January Parliament hastily passed the Public Safety
Act, citing the ready availability of bail for criminal offenses as one
of its motivations (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In October the court
dismissed a case of contempt of court against Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina for her criticism of the court, but cautioned her against making
statements not based on fact.
On December 14, the High Court issued a split verdict in the murder
case of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, founder of the country and father of the
Prime Minister, along with 21 members of his family. The senior judge
in the case upheld the convictions and death sentences of 10 of the 15
previously convicted persons, while the junior judge upheld the
convictions and death sentences of all 15 of the convicted. The Prime
Minister expressed her disappointment that both judges did not uphold
the death sentences for all 15, and ruling party Chhatra League
activists rioted in the streets, smashing and burning hundreds of cars
in protest of the split verdict (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
The court system has two levels: The lower courts and the Supreme
Court. Both hear civil and criminal cases. The lower courts consist of
magistrates, who are part of the administrative branch of government,
and session and district judges, who belong to the judicial branch. The
Supreme Court is divided into two sections, the High Court and the
Appellate Court. The High Court hears original cases and reviews cases
from the lower courts. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear
appeals of judgments, decrees, orders, or sentences of the High Court.
Rulings of the Appellate Court are binding on all other courts.
Trials are public. The law provides the accused with the right to
be represented by counsel, to review accusatory material, to call
witnesses, and to appeal verdicts. State-funded defense attorneys
rarely are provided, and there are few legal aid programs to offer
financial assistance. In rural areas, individuals often do not receive
legal representation. In urban areas, legal counsel generally is
available if individuals can afford the expense. However, sometimes
detainees and suspects on police remand are denied access to legal
counsel. Trials conducted under the SPA, the PSA, and the Women and
Children Repression Prevention Act, are similar to normal trials, but
are tried without the lengthy adjournments typical in other cases.
Under the provisions of the PSA and the Women and Children Repression
Prevention Act, special tribunals hear cases and issue verdicts. Cases
under these laws must be investigated and tried within specific time
limits, although the law is unclear as to the disposition of the case
if it is not finished before the time limit elapses.
Persons may be tried in absentia, although this rarely is done. In
November 1998, 15 of the 19 defendants tried for the 1975 killing of
then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 21 of his family members were
convicted and sentenced to death, and 4 persons were acquitted.
Fourteen of the defendants were tried in absentia, and 12 of them were
convicted. In April when the High Court began its automatic review of
the death sentences, the first two judges assigned to the case recused
themselves, declaring that they were unable to hear the cases
impartially, prompting heavy criticism from the Government. After the
second recusal, government supporters marched to the High Court
Building wielding sticks and clubs, and called for the execution of the
sentences issued at the trial. Some members of the Cabinet, including
the Home Minister, participated in a rally that threatened action
against the judges for their failure to take on the case. The Prime
Minister expressed sympathy with those persons protesting against the
judiciary. Many observers believe that the High Court judges recused
themselves because government interest in and pressure regarding the
case were not conducive to a neutral judicial review of the trial;
however, the judges have not explained their decisions, and there is no
direct evidence to substantiate such allegations. The High Court is to
rule simultaneously on appeals filed by four defendants present in the
country. There is no automatic right to a retrial if a person convicted
in absentia later returns. Absent defendants may be represented by
state-appointed counsel (as was done in the Sheikh Mujib case), but may
not choose their own attorneys, and, if convicted, may not file appeals
until they return to the country.
A major problem of the court system is the overwhelming backlog of
cases, and trials under way typically are marked by extended
continuances while many accused persons remain in prison (see Section
1.d.). These conditions, and the corruption encountered in the judicial
process, effectively prevent many persons from obtaining a fair trial
or justice. According to one independent sample survey conducted by
Transparency International Bangladesh, over 60 percent of the persons
involved in court cases paid bribes to court officials. Because of the
difficulty in accessing the courts and because litigation is time
consuming, alternative dispute resolution by traditional village
leaders, which is regarded by some persons to be more transparent and
swift, is popular in rural communities. However, these mechanisms also
can be subject to abuse.
The Government states that it holds no political prisoners, but the
BNP and human rights monitors claim that many opposition activists have
been arrested and convicted under criminal charges as a pretext for
their political activities. It is not clear how many such prisoners
actually are being held (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires authorities to obtain a judicial
warrant before entering a home; however, according to human rights
monitors, police rarely obtain warrants, and officers violating the
procedure are not punished. In addition the SPA permits searches
without a warrant.
The Government sometimes forcibly resettles persons against their
will. In 1999 police forcibly removed 267 sex workers from a large
brothel district in Tanbazar and Nimtoli, Narayanganj. Authorities
claimed that the women wished to be rehabilitated, but credible
eyewitnesses said that the women refused the offer. The 267 women were
confined in a center for vagrants, where some alleged that they were
abused. By December fewer than a dozen remained in the vagrant homes
(see Section 1.c.).
In 1999 police and paramilitary troops forced more than 50,000
persons from their homes in 6 Dhaka slum areas. The Government
continued its slum clearances during the year. On April 15, the
Government demolished 700 homes in the Segunbagicha slum area. On April
30, police officials demolished the Paribagh slums, leaving 1,100
persons without shelter. After police announced the destruction of the
railway slum in Kawran Bazar, residents protested the 1-day notice.
Police used rubber bullets and batons to subdue the protesters,
injuring 30 persons. Police and hired laborers set fire to 20 huts, but
were unable to dislodge the slum dwellers (see Section 1.c.).
The Government sometimes punishes family members for the alleged
crimes of others (see Section 1.c.). According to one human rights
organization and a published account by one of the victims, on the
evening of June 17, police raided a house in the Khilgaon section of
Dhaka, and after failing to locate their intended target, arrested his
parents and beat his sisters. In November when police could not find
Bahauddin, editor of an opposition paper, to arrest him under charges
of sedition, they arrested his brother, Mainuddin, instead. Mainuddin
was not connected with the sedition charge; however, police arrested
him under the SPA (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
The Special Branch division of the police, National Security
Intelligence, and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI)
employ informers to report on citizens perceived to be political
opponents of the Government and to conduct surveillance of them.
Political leaders, human rights activists, foreign NGO's, and
journalists report occasional harassment by these security
organizations. For example, representatives from one human rights
organization report that police harassed their representatives in
Comilla and Chittagong.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, expression, and the press, subject to ``reasonable
restrictions'' in the interest of security, friendly relations with
foreign states, public order, decency and morality, or to prohibit
defamation or incitement to an offense; however, there were numerous
examples of the Government limiting these rights in practice. Some
government leaders encouraged violence against journalists by ruling
party members.
The press, numbering hundreds of daily and weekly publications, is
a forum for a wide range of views. While most publications support the
overall policies of the Government, several newspapers report
critically on government policies and activities, including those of
the Prime Minister. In addition to an official government-owned wire
service, there is one privately-owned wire service affiliated with a
major international company.
Newspaper ownership and content are not subject to direct
government restriction. However, if the Government chooses, it can
influence journalists through financial means. Government-sponsored
advertising and allocations of newsprint imported at a favorable tariff
rate are central to many newspapers' financial viability. Government-
sponsored advertising is the largest source of revenue for many
newspapers. In allocating advertising through the Department of Films
and Publications, the Government states that it considers circulation
of the newspapers, wage board implementation, objectivity in reporting,
coverage of development activities, and ``attitude towards the spirit
of Bangladesh's War of Liberation.'' Commercial organizations often are
reluctant to advertise in newspapers critical of the Government due to
fear of unspecified governmental or bureaucratic retaliation.
Attacks on journalists and newspapers, and efforts to intimidate
them by government leaders, political party activists, and others
frequently occurred. Such attacks by political activists are common
during times of political street violence, and some journalists also
were injured in police actions (see Section 1.c.).
On January 4, two unidentified persons threw a bomb at the building
that houses the Bangla-language daily Dainik Azadi, causing no major
damage; however, a few minutes later, another bomb blast damaged the
managing editor's car. On January 5, the leader of the local Jatiyabadi
Chhatra Dal (the student wing of the BNP in Munshiganj), attacked Zakir
Hossain Sumon-Srinagar, a correspondent for the ``Ajker Kagoj,''
reportedly because he published a news item criticizing the student
group. When Sumon was attacked, a senior journalist, Shafi Uddin Ahmed,
tried to rescue him and also was attacked by the student group. No one
was held accountable in either incident.
On January 15, three unidentified persons shot and killed
journalist Mir Illais Hossain in Jhenaidah. The journalist, also the
leader of a leftist party, allegedly had received death threats a few
weeks before the killing and had requested police protection. Four
persons were arrested for their suspected involvement in the murder. By
year's end, charges had not been filed. On February 27, a court in
Narayanganj issued an arrest warrant for the editor and other officers
of the opposition daily Dinkal on the basis of a complaint lodged by a
ruling party M.P., who accused the newspaper of publishing false,
malicious and inaccurate reports about him. On March 8, police officers
raided the newspaper's office, threatening journalists and damaging
furniture. The police withdrew after about 1 hour. On May 20, activists
from the ruling party student front, the BCL, assaulted two Dhaka
University correspondents and threatened to kill one of them.
On July 16, two men entered the Jessore office of the Bangla-
language daily Janakantha and shot and killed reporter Shamsur Rahman
(see Section 1.a.). Rahman had been reporting on the activities of
criminal gangs in the southwest part of the country, and the
relationship of those gangs to the national political parties. By
September 15, 12 persons had been arrested in connection with the
murder. By year's end, charges had not been filed.
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, on October 20, a
group of Jubo League activists, the youth wing of the ruling party,
threatened Sohrab Hossain, a reporter with the regional ``Loksamaj,''
after he wrote an article about problems with the Government's relief
efforts in the flood-ravaged district of Satkhira. On October 25, State
Minister for Social Welfare Mozammel Hossain (the person in charge of
overseeing relief operations in Sathkira district) reportedly actively
encouraged ruling party members to attack physically the press by
saying ``Wherever you will find journalists, break their bones.'' On
October 26, a group led by local Awami League leader Nurul Islam
ransacked the office of the local daily ``Satkhirar Chitro'' and
assaulted Anisur Rahim, the newspaper's editor, with knives and a
revolver, hospitalizing him. The attack followed the newspaper's report
on the alleged misappropriation of disaster relief funds (see Section
1.c.). One person was arrested for his involvement in the attack on the
editor following the state minister's remarks, but by year's end, no
charges had been filed.
According to the International Freedom of Expression Exchange, on
October 27, Monwar Islam, senior journalist and secretary-general of
the Dhaka Reporters Unity (an organization for reporters working in
Dhaka) narrowly escaped an abduction attempt, allegedly because of his
reporting. By year's end, no investigation had been conducted, and
Islam had fled the country.
Virtually all print journalists practice self-censorship to some
degree, and are reluctant to criticize politically influential
personalities in both the Government and the opposition; however, some
journalists do make such criticism. Many journalists cite fear of
possible harassment, retaliation, or physical harm as a reason to avoid
sensitive stories. For example, in March the Laxmipur correspondent of
a leading Bangla-language newspaper was arrested under the PSA,
following a report he published on police involvement in mass cheating
during high school examinations. The journalist was released in
November as the Government failed to prove the charge against him in
the PSA Tribunal. On May 28, Aminur Rahman Taj, a reporter from ``Ajker
Kagoj,'' a leading Bangla-language newspaper, was arrested without a
warrant and later was accused of defamation of character. Earlier his
paper had published an article asserting that the wives of a prominent
minister and a senior police official were involved in corrupt
practices. After the reporter's arrest, fellow journalists strongly
protested, and the police threatened to file PSA cases against the
journalists. The protesting journalists went to the High Court for
protection, and no PSA charges were filed against them.
In June a leading English-language newspaper ran a story about
three sons of M.P.'s who were allowed to leave the country after being
implicated in criminal cases. When the story was quoted in foreign
newspapers, an official from the Prime Minister's Office pressured the
newspaper's management to fire the author of the story. The author
resigned under pressure a few days later. On August 6, a daily
newspaper in Chittagong issued a notice retracting a story it had run
the previous day, implying that a ruling party faction was involved in
the July 12 murders of eight persons in a van (see Section 1.a.). The
reporter who authored the original story was fired. According to press
reports, the General Secretary of a local Awami League chapter declared
at a public rally in Laxmipur on October 4, that he would ``chop off
the hands and legs'' of journalists who continue to write about him
(see Section 2.a.). He threatened to ``throw opposition activists into
the river'' if they came out against him, and to take action against
the police if they tried to arrest him. An Awami League Presidium
member and government minister was ``chief guest'' at this Laxmipur
rally. Two days later, armed men in Laxmipur injured a newspaper
reporter in an attack.
Journalists and others potentially are subject to incarceration as
a result of criminal libel proceedings filed by private parties. Ruling
party M.P.'s filed separate criminal libel suits against several
newspapers after articles were published that the politicians viewed as
false and defamatory. The journalists in all cases received
anticipatory bail from the courts, and none of the cases moved to
trial. Sedition charges filed against a Bangla-language newspaper in
February 1998 remained pending, and those persons accused remained on
bail. In November a new sedition charge was filed against the same
editor, Bahauddin, for publishing a parody of the national anthem
mocking the Prime Minister. When the police arrived at Bahauddin's
residence to arrest him, he was not there, so they arrested his brother
Mainuddin instead (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.). Mainuddin was arrested
under the PSA, and therefore was not eligible for bail. Mainuddin was
not charged; after 16 days he was released. Charges against editor
Bahauddin remain pending in both sedition cases.
Feminist author Taslima Nasreen, whose writings and statements
provoked death threats from some Islamic groups in 1993 and 1994, left
the country for Europe in 1994. Nasreen returned to the country in
September 1998, and then departed again in January 1999. She remains
abroad in self-imposed exile, and both criminal and civil cases against
her for insulting religious beliefs remain pending. However, a private
citizen filed similar charges in 1994, and a judge issued an arrest
warrant in that case after Nasreen's September 1998 return. The warrant
never was executed, and Nasreen later requested and received
anticipatory bail from the High Court. In August 1999, the Government
banned the import, sale, and distribution of Nasreen's latest book,
citing the likelihood that the book would inflame passions and offend
the religious sentiments in the Muslim community (see Section 5).
On June 29, the Government banned a book written by Matiur Rahman
Rentu, a former aide to Awami League president and current Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina, on the grounds that it contained materials that
could provoke hatred and malice toward the Government. The author was
shot and injured by unidentified assailants in Dhaka after his book
first was released.
The Government owns and controls radio and television stations. The
activities of the Prime Minister occupy the bulk of prime time news
bulletins on both television and radio, followed by the activities of
members of the Cabinet. Opposition party news gets little coverage. In
its 1996 election manifesto, the Awami League called for autonomy for
the state-controlled electronic media. A government committee
subsequently recommended measures for authorizing autonomy for radio
and television broadcasts, but the Government has yet to implement this
recommendation. However, the Prime Minister on September 20 reiterated
her earlier commitment to grant autonomy whereby the responsibility for
funding still would come from the Government but the stations would be
run by independent bodies without government interference. The Ministry
of Information has authorized one private radio station and one private
television station. That private television station, named Ekushey
Television (ETV), went on the air in early March and began full
commercial broadcasts on April 14. ETV broadcasts to 70 percent of the
country via land transmission and to the entire country via satellite.
On November 6, programming duration was extended from 10 to 12 hours
per day. ETV broadcasts two Bangla-language news bulletins of its own
and rebroadcasts the state-owned and run, BTV, English-language news
bulletin. ETV news bulletins cover opposition events without any
apparent interference from the Government. Moreover, the station also
carries a feature program that addresses various social problems and
calls for government action to redress these issues. ETV's proprietor
owns the private radio station. As a condition of operation, both
private stations are required to broadcast for free some government
news programs and speeches by the Prime Minister and President.
Foreign publications are subject to review and censorship.
Censorship most often is used in cases of immodest or obscene
photographs, perceived misrepresentation or defamation of Islam, and
objectionable comments about national leaders. The September 18 issue
of the international news magazine ``Newsweek,'' published in
Singapore, was banned in the country because it featured a photograph
of Koranic verses on the sole of a human foot.
A government Film Censor Board reviews local and foreign films, and
may censor or ban them on the grounds of state security, law and order,
religious sentiment, obscenity, foreign relations, defamation, or
plagiarism. During the year, the Film Censor Board banned 14 English-
language films on the grounds of obscenity and 13 Bangla-language
films, although after 2 months the ban on the Bangla-language films was
lifted. The Government also banned the screening of any English-
language films in approximately 10 movie theaters that regularly do not
comply with the Censor Board. Cable operators generally function
without government interference, but on August 15 (the anniversary of
the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the nation's founder and
father of the current Prime Minister), the Government asked them to
suspend their operations for the day, and the operators complied. Video
rental libraries provide a wide variety of films to their borrowers,
and government efforts to enforce censorship on these rental films are
sporadic and ineffectual. The Government does not limit citizens'
access to the Internet.
The Government generally respects academic freedom. Although
teachers and students at all levels largely are free to pursue academic
assignments, research on extremely sensitive religious and political
topics is forbidden.
The situation on public university campuses remains volatile,
seriously inhibiting the ability of students to receive a university
education and of teachers to teach. Armed clashes between student
groups of different parties or of different factions within a
particular party resulted in temporary closures of colleges and
universities in Chittagong, Sylhet, and other localities. A woman on
the Dhaka University campus was partially stripped during New Year's
Eve celebrations on December 31, 1999. After a week of heavy criticism
by the press, three members of the student wing of the ruling party
were arrested but later freed on bail. A ruling party M.P. made a
statement in Parliament that demanded the punishment of the victim for
violating Muslim social values by being on the streets to celebrate New
Year's Eve (see Sections 2.c., 2.d., and 5). Campus violence has little
to do with ideological differences, and more to do with extortion
rackets run by nonstudent party activists, including those based on
physical control of dormitories. As a result of widespread violence and
campus closures, it takes nearly 6 years to earn a 4-year degree.
However, several private universities that were established during the
1990's are not affected by student political violence.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, subject to restrictions in the
interest of public order and public health; however, the Government
frequently limits this right. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure
Code allows the Government to ban assemblies of more than four persons.
According to one human rights organization, the Government imposed
Section 144 bans 33 times during the first 9 months of the year. The
Government sometimes uses Section 144 to prohibit rallies for security
reasons, but many independent observers believe that such explanations
usually are a pretext. Supporters of the ruling party frequently will
schedule their own rallies for the same venue and time as scheduled
opposition rallies and meetings, thus providing the Government a basis
for imposing Section 144 for security reasons. The Krishak Sramik
Janata League of former Awami League stalwart and present opposition
figure Kader Siddiqi had to cancel a scheduled rally at Karimganj on
May 14, because the ruling party's student wing announced a rally at
the same time and place, prompting the local administration to impose
Section 144. The BNP youth front could not hold its planned rally at
Muladi in Barisal on June 29, because the local administration imposed
Section 144 following a simultaneous rally by a ruling party
organization at the same location.
Authorities also permit ruling party activists to blockade roads
and take other steps to disrupt opposition events. During nationwide
general strikes called by the opposition, ruling party activists
routinely intimidate opposition supporters and seek to coerce
shopkeepers and drivers to ignore the strike.
Ruling party supporters, often with the connivance and support of
the police, violently disrupted rallies and demonstrations of the
opposition parties. On August 6, at least 22 persons were injured
during a gunbattle on the Islamic University Campus between activists
of the ruling party student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League, and
the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the student wing of the Jamaat-e-
Islami. According to one human rights organization that cites campus
sources, the shooting began when a procession of ruling party
supporters opened fire on an ICS procession. On August 6, police
officers attacked a joint opposition rally led by the BNP that was held
to protest the Government's failure to eradicate the mosquitoes that
carry dengue fever. Using teargas, rubber bullets, and lathis (heavy
sticks), the police broke up the rally and procession. More than 100
persons were injured during the incident (see Section 2.a.).
Thirteen full or part days of opposition-called hartals (general
strikes) took place during the year at the national or local levels. In
addition there were a number of local hartals to demand the
Government's resignation, and to protest the enactment of the PSA (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.), attacks on opposition rallies and processions,
rising fuel prices, and the killing of a pro-BNP lawyer (see Section
1.a.). Localized hartals were frequent occurrences in some parts of the
country.
Four persons died in violence during the hartals, and many were
injured, including opposition activists, police, and many ordinary
citizens (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 3).
Local ruling party groups sometimes also call local general
strikes. Party activists enforce these strikes through threatened or
actual violence against strikebreakers. Those persons who are opposed
to or neutral toward the strike are coerced into observing prohibitions
against vehicular transport and normal operation of businesses. Both
opposition and ruling party activists mount processions during general
strikes. Police rarely interfere with ruling party processions on such
occasions; police and ruling party activists often work in tandem to
disrupt and to discourage opposition processions.
The Constitution provides for the right of every citizen to form
associations, subject to ``reasonable restrictions'' in the interest of
morality or public order, and in general the Government respects this
right. Individuals are free to join private groups.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Islam as the
state religion but also stipulates the right--subject to law, public
order, and morality--to practice the religion of one's choice, and the
Government respects this provision in practice. However, although the
Government is secular, religion exerts a powerful influence on
politics, and the Government is sensitive to the Muslim consciousness
of the majority of its citizens. Approximately 88 percent of the
population is Muslim. Some members of the Hindu, Christian, and
Buddhist minorities continue to perceive and experience discrimination
toward them from the Muslim majority (see Section 5).
Religious organizations are not required to register with the
Government; however, all nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
including religious organizations, are required to register with the
NGO Affairs Bureau if they receive foreign money for social development
projects. The Government has the legal ability to cancel the
registration of an NGO or to take other action against it; such powers
rarely are used and have not affected NGO's with religious
affiliations.
Religion is taught in schools, and children have the right to be
taught their own religion.
The law permits citizens to proselytize. However, strong social
resistance to conversion from Islam means that most missionary efforts
by Christian groups are aimed at serving communities that have been
Christian for several generations or longer. The Government allows
various religions to establish places of worship, to train clergy, to
travel for religious purposes, and to maintain links with co-
religionists abroad. Foreign missionaries may work in the country, but
their right to proselytize is not protected by the Constitution. Some
missionaries face problems in obtaining visas.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally are able to move
freely within the country and to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to
repatriate; however, there were instances in which the Government
restricted these rights. In August 1999, immigration authorities seized
the passport of Jatiya Party Secretary General Naziur Rahman Monzur. A
High Court ruling ordered the passport to be returned to Monzur, and
the Supreme Court rejected government appeals against the ruling.
However, the passport had not been returned by year's end. Then-leader
of the opposition Jamaat-e-Islami, Ghulam Azam, in December 1999
submitted his passport to immigration authorities for renewal, but it
was not renewed. Azam filed a writ petition with the High Court on
March 13, challenging the Government's refusal to renew his passport.
On June 8, the Court ordered the Home Secretary to renew the passport
within 15 days and return it to Azam. The Government filed a delayed
appeal with the Supreme Court. The case was pending at year's end. In
late 1999 immigration authorities seized the passport of Jatiya Party
chairman and former president H.M. Ershad and subsequently returned it
under court orders. However, on June 5, the Government barred Ershad
from going to London for medical treatment, and immigration authorities
at the airport in Dhaka seized his passport again. A High Court bench
dismissed Ershad's writ petition, challenging the restriction on his
travel and the seizure of his passport. However, the appellate panel of
the Supreme Court on August 17 ordered the Government to return the
passport to Ershad. The Government has yet to comply with this order;
Ershad also had not yet received a certified copy of the court's order
to return the passport by year's end. Bangladeshi passports are invalid
for travel to Israel.
The law does not include provisions for granting refugee and asylum
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The
Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. The law does not provide for first asylum or resettlement of
asylum seekers. However, in practice the Government grants temporary
asylum to individual asylum seekers whom the UNHCR has interviewed and
recognized as refugees on a case-by-case basis. At the UNHCR's request,
the Government allowed about 125 refugees and asylum seekers, including
non-Rohingya Burmese, Somalis, Iranians, and Sri Lankans, to remain in
the country pending durable solutions such as voluntary repatriation
and resettlement to other countries.
Approximately 300,000 Bihari Muslims live in various camps
throughout the country; they have been in the country since 1971
awaiting settlement in Pakistan. Biharis are non-Bengali Muslims who
emigrated to what formerly was East Pakistan during the 1947 partition
of British India. Most supported Pakistan during Bangladesh's 1971 War
of Independence. They later declined to accept Bangladesh citizenship
and asked to be repatriated to Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan
historically has been reluctant to accept the Biharis.
Approximately 251,000 Rohingya refugees (Muslims from the northern
Burmese state of Arakan) crossed into southeastern Bangladesh in late
1991 and 1992, fleeing repression. Since 1992 approximately 232,000
Rohingyas have been repatriated voluntarily to Burma, nearly 22,700
have left the camps and are living among the local Bangladeshis, more
than 32,200 children have been born to the refugees, 7,700 have died,
and more than 20,800 refugees remain in 2 camps administered by the
Government in cooperation with the UNHCR. After blocking further
repatriation in August 1997, Burma allowed repatriation to resume in
November 1998, but at such a slow rate that births in the camps
outnumbered repatriations. In April 1999, the UNHCR urged the
Government to allow any refugees who could not return to Burma to be
allowed to work in the country, benefit from local medical programs,
and send their children to local schools. The Government refused these
requests, insisting that all Rohingya refugees must remain in the camps
until their return to Burma. According to HRW, there are reports of
violence by refugee camp officials against Rohingyas (see Section
1.c.). Despite senior level interaction with the Burmese Government,
the Bangladesh Government remains unable to win Burmese agreement to
accelerate the rate of repatriation.
According to media reports, several thousand more Rohingyas arrived
during the year, but recent arrivals avoided the camps and attempted to
settle in the southeastern areas of the country. HRW reports that more
than 100,000 Rohingyas who have entered the country since 1991 live in
precarious circumstances in the country outside the camps with no
formal documentation. The Government effectively denied first asylum to
the new arrivals it encountered by categorizing them as illegal
economic migrants and turned back as many persons as possible at the
border. According to UNHCR, which has interviewed some of these
migrants, at least some of them are fleeing persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Bangladesh is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy in which
elections by secret ballot are held on the basis of universal suffrage.
M.P.'s are elected at least every 5 years. The Parliament has 300
elected members, with 30 additional seats for women, who are chosen by
Parliament. Under a 1996 constitutional amendment, general
parliamentary elections are presided over by a caretaker government,
led by the most recently retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or,
if he is unfit or unwilling, another senior retired justice or other
neutral figure. Domestic and international observers deemed the last
general election, held in June 1996, to be generally free and fair. The
high voter turnout of 75 percent set a new record.
Due to continuing opposition from the opposition parties, the
Election Commission did not schedule upazila (subdistrict) elections.
In July Parliament passed the zila (district) council law, which
provides for indirect election of the district council chairman by an
electoral college of elected lower level representatives. The law
empowers the Government to appoint these chairmen until the indirect
elections can be held. The Government has not made such appointments.
The Chittagong City Corporation election was held on January 3;
however, the opposition parties boycotted it, and the Awami League
incumbent mayor was reelected unopposed. On the national level, the
opposition parties continued to demand the immediate resignation of the
Government and elections under a caretaker regime.
Elections often are marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and
vote rigging. The Government and activists of major political parties
frequently use violence and harassment against political opponents,
practices that intensify in the period prior to elections. On July 31,
Food Minister and Awami League Presidium member Amir Hossain Amu won a
by-election, which was boycotted by the opposition. International and
domestic observers as well as the media witnessed widespread
intimidation of voters and abuse of authority in support of the winning
candidate. The dispute over the November 15, 1999, byelection in
Tangail remained unresolved and the ruling party candidate, although
declared the victor, could not take his oath of office.
Political activists also reportedly engage in extortion from
businesses and individuals (see Section 1.a.).
Under constitutional amendments enacted in 1991, the country
changed from a presidential system to a parliament-led system. The
changes stipulated that an M.P. who resigns from his party or votes
against it in Parliament automatically loses his seat. BNP member Major
(retired) Akhtaruzzaman lost his seat in Parliament as he joined the
parliamentary session in violations of his party's decision to abstain.
In practice this provision solidifies the control of Parliament by the
Government and the Prime Minister. The lack of democracy within the
political parties that have formed governments since 1991 has resulted
in a concentration of political power in the office of the Prime
Minister, regardless of which party is in power. In practice the Prime
Minister usually decides on major governmental policies, with little or
no involvement by Parliament. Parliament's effectiveness as a
deliberative body is undermined further by the country's narrow,
partisan politics. Since July 1999, the major opposition parties have
abstained from parliamentary sessions. However, members of the
opposition continue to participate in parliamentary standing committees
on government ministries, which were formed in 1998. These committees
are headed by M.P.'s rather than the ministers concerned, increasing
the committees' effectiveness in overseeing government work.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Thirty
parliamentary seats are reserved for women chosen by majority vote in
Parliament; critics charge that these seats act far less to empower
women than to enhance the ruling party's majority. The constitutional
provision that provides for these 30 reserved seats expires in April
2001, unless a new parliament sits before that date. A Government-
sponsored bill to extend this provision cannot be passed unless the
opposition ends its ongoing boycott of Parliament and supports the
bill. In addition to these seats, women are free to contest any seat in
Parliament. Seven current women M.P.'s were elected in their own right.
Seats are not specifically reserved for other minority groups, such
as tribal people. Of the 300 elected M.P.'s, 3 are Tribal Buddhists
from the Chittagong Hill Tracts and 5 are Hindus. The rest are Bengali
Muslims. The Jamaat-i-Islami, the country's largest Islamic political
party, had 18 seats in Parliament after the 1991 elections, but only 3
after the 1996 elections.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally permits human rights groups to conduct
their activities. A wide variety of groups publish reports, hold press
conferences, and issue appeals to the Government with regard to
specific cases. While human rights groups often are sharply critical of
the Government, irrespective of the ruling party, they frequently
practice self-censorship, particularly on some politically sensitive
cases and subjects. In the past, the Government has consulted with
human rights groups on some draft legislation and taken their views
into account. In January after discussions between the Government and
some women's rights groups and NGO's, Parliament passed the Women and
Children Repression Prevention Act. However, the Government continues
to refuse to register the Bangladesh Section of Amnesty International,
which since 1990 has applied several times for registration under the
Societies Registration Act. Without this registration, a voluntary
organization cannot receive funding from abroad.
The Government is defensive about international criticism regarding
human rights issues. However, the Government has been open to dialog
with international organizations and foreign diplomatic missions
regarding issues such as trafficking in women and children. Legislation
to establish a National Human Rights Commission remained in abeyance
for yet another year. Earlier the Government formed a cabinet
subcommittee to review the draft legislation.
In the past, the Government has put pressure on individual human
rights advocates, including by filing charges that are known to be
false. Such pressure also has included long delays in issuing re-entry
visas for international human rights activists. Missionaries who
advocate human rights have faced similar problems.
In the past, human rights organizations have reported that the
Government has put pressure on them usually in the form of harassment
by the intelligence agencies and threats from activists of the ruling
party.
During the year, the Government acceded to the U.N. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal before the
law and are entitled to equal protection by the law.'' However, in
practice the Government does not enforce strongly laws aimed at
eliminating discrimination. In this context, women, children, minority
groups, and the disabled often confront social and economic
disadvantages.
Women.--Violence against women is difficult to quantify because of
unreliable statistics, but recent reports indicated that domestic
violence is widespread. A report released by the U.N. Population Fund
in September asserted that 47 percent of adult women report physical
abuse by their male partner. The Government, the media, and women's
rights organizations have fostered a growing awareness of the problem
of violence against women.
Much of the violence against women is related to disputes over
dowries. According to a human rights group, there were 81 dowry-related
killings during the year. Human rights groups and press reports
indicate that incidents of vigilantism against women--sometimes led by
religious leaders--at times occur, particularly in rural areas. These
include humiliating, painful punishments, such as the whipping of women
accused of moral offenses. Assailants who fling acid in their faces
disfigured numerous women. One human rights organization reported that
181 women suffered acid attacks during the year. The most common
motivation for acidthrowing attacks against women is revenge by a
rejected suitor; land disputes are another leading cause of the acid
attacks. Few perpetrators of the acid attacks are prosecuted. Often the
perpetrator flings the acid in through an open window during the night,
making cases difficult to prove. Some arrests have been made, and one
person has been given the death sentence.
The law prohibits rape and physical spousal abuse, but it makes no
specific provision for spousal rape as a crime. A total of 3,516 rapes
and 3,523 incidents of spousal abuses were officially reported during
the year. Of the spousal abuse cases, 2,814 were related to disputes
over dowry. Of the 2,130 alleged rapists that were prosecuted, 63
persons were convicted. The Government reports that other rape cases
are under trial. During the year, the Government acceded to the U.N.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. The Government also has enacted laws
specifically prohibiting certain forms of discrimination against women,
including the Anti-Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, the Cruelty to Women
Law of 1983, and the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act of
1995, which was replaced by the Women and Children Repression
Prevention Act of 2000 (see Section 1.d.). However, enforcement of
these laws is weak, especially in rural areas, and the Government
seldom prosecutes those cases that are filed. According to a human
rights organization, there are 7 government-run and 13 privately-run
large shelter homes available for use by women who are victims of
violence. Some smaller homes also are available for victims of
violence. However, these are insufficient to meet victims' shelter
needs. As a result, the Government often holds women who file rape
complaints in safe custody, usually in prison. Safe custody frequently
results in further abuses against victims, discouraging the filing of
complaints by other women, and often continues for extended periods
during which women often are unable to gain release (see Sections 1.c.
and 1.d.).
There is extensive trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
prostitution within the country and to other countries in Asia (see
Section 6.f.).
For the most part, women remain in a subordinate position in
society, and the Government has not acted effectively to protect their
basic freedoms. Literacy rates are approximately 26 percent for women,
compared with 49 percent for men. In recent years, female school
enrollment has improved. Approximately 50 percent of primary and
secondary school students are female. Women often are ignorant of their
rights because of continued high illiteracy rates and unequal
educational opportunities, and strong social stigmas and lack of
economic means to obtain legal assistance frequently keep women from
seeking redress in the courts. Many NGO's operate programs to raise
women's awareness of their rights, and to encourage and assist them in
exercising those rights.
Under the 1961 Muslim Family Ordinance, female heirs inherit less
than male relatives do, and wives have fewer divorce rights than
husbands. Men are permitted to have up to four wives, although this
right rarely is exercised. Laws provide some protection for women
against arbitrary divorce and the taking of additional wives by
husbands without the first wife's consent, but the protections
generally apply only to registered marriages. Marriages in rural areas
often are not registered because of ignorance of the law. Under the
law, a Muslim husband is required to pay his ex-wife alimony for only 3
months, but this rarely is enforced.
Employment opportunities have been stronger for women than for men
in the last decade, which largely is due to the growth of the export
garment industry in Dhaka and Chittagong. Eighty percent of the 1.4
million garment sector workers are women. Programs extending micro-
credit to large numbers of rural women also have contributed to greater
economic power for them. However, women still fill only a small
fraction of other wageearning jobs. According to a report by the Public
Administration Reforms Commission publicized in October, women hold
only 12 percent of government jobs, and only 2 percent of senior
positions. The Government's policy to include more women in government
jobs only has had limited effect. In recent years, about 15 percent of
all recruits into government service have been women.
The garment and shrimp processing industries are the highest
employers of female laborers. Forty-three percent of women work in the
agriculture, fisheries, and livestock sectors, but 70 percent of them
are unpaid family laborers. Many women work as manual laborers on
construction projects as well, and constitute nearly 25 percent of all
manufacturing workers. Women also are found in the electronics, food
processing, beverage, and handicraft industries.
Children.--The Government undertakes programs in the areas of
primary education, health, and nutrition. Many of these efforts are
supplemented by local and foreign NGO's. While much remains to be done,
these joint efforts have allowed the country to make significant
progress in improving health, nutrition, and education; however,
slightly more than half of all children are chronically malnourished.
For example, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the
country's largest NGO, provides primary education to more than 1.2
million children. In cooperation with the NonFormal Education
Directorate of the Government and some NGO partners, UNICEF is
implementing a program to provide education to 350,000 (primarily
working) children in urban slum areas around the country. In addition
the ILO has undertaken education/social welfare programs for more than
50,000 children (see Section 6.d.). The Government made universal
primary education between the ages of 6 and 10 years mandatory in 1991,
but stated that it lacked the resources to implement the law fully.
According to Education Ministry figures, approximately 81 percent of
children between the ages of 6 and 10 years are enrolled in school,
including 83 percent of girls. Attendance rates drop steadily with age;
according to the Government, about 70 percent of all children complete
grade 5. To reach the maximum number of children with limited
facilities, most schools have two shifts. As a result, most children in
grades one and two spend 2.5 hours a day in school; children in grades
3 to 5 are in school for 4 hours. The Government provides incentives
for rural female children between the ages of 12 and 16 years to remain
in school. These incentives have been effective in increasing the
number of girls in school.
Because of widespread poverty, many children are compelled to work
at a very young age. This frequently results in abuse of children,
mainly through mistreatment by employers during domestic service
(children who work in domestic service may work in conditions that
resemble servitude) and prostitution (see Section 6.c.); this labor-
related child abuse occurs commonly at all levels of society and
throughout the country (see Section 6.d.). Reports from human rights
monitors indicate that child abandonment, kidnaping, and trafficking
for prostitution continue to be serious and widespread problems. There
is extensive trafficking of children, primarily to India, Pakistan, and
destinations within the country, largely for the purpose of forced
prostitution (see Section 6.f.). UNICEF has estimated that there are
about 10,000 child prostitutes in the country. Other estimates have
been as high as 29,000. Prostitution is legal, but only for those over
18 years of age and with government certification. However, this
minimum age requirement commonly is ignored by authorities, and is
circumvented easily by false statements of age. Procurers of minors
rarely are prosecuted, and large numbers of child prostitutes work in
brothels. There were credible reports that police facilitated or were
involved in trafficking in of women and children (see Sections 1.c.,
6.c., and 6.f.). The law stipulates a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment for persons found guilty of forcing a child into
prostitution.
During the year, the Government acceded to the U.N. Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and to the U.N.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.
People with Disabilities.--The law provides for equal treatment and
freedom from discrimination for the disabled; however, in practice, the
disabled face social and economic discrimination. The Government has
not enacted specific legislation or otherwise mandated accessibility
for the disabled. Facilities for treating the mentally ill or the
retarded are inadequate. Unless a family has money to pay for private
service, a mentally ill person can find little treatment in the
country.
Indigenous People.--Tribal people have had a marginal ability to
influence decisions concerning the use of their lands. The 1997
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord has been in effect for 3
years, and has ended 25 years of insurgency in the CHT, although law
and order problems continue. Former insurgent leader Jotirindrio
Bodhipriya Larma, alias Shantu Larma, has publicly questioned whether
the Peace Accord has been implemented properly, and has urged prompt
government action to implement all provisions of the Accord. Confusion
continues over the overlapping responsibilities of the various central
and local government bodies involved in the Hill Tracts. The Land
Commission that is to deal with land disputes between tribals and
Bengali settlers does not yet function effectively in addressing
critical land disputes. Tribal leaders also have expressed
disappointment at the lack of progress in providing assistance to
tribals that left the area during the insurgency.
Until 1985 the Government regularly allotted land in the CHT to
Bengali settlers, including land that was claimed by indigenous people
under traditional concepts of land ownership. This led to the
displacement of many tribal groups, such as the Chakmas and Marmas.
Bengali inhabitants in the CHT increased from 3 percent of the region's
population in 1947 to approximately 50 percent of the area's population
of 1 million persons in 1997. The Shanti-Bahini, a tribal group, had
waged a low-level conflict in the CHT from the early 1970's until the
signing of the peace agreement with the Government in December 1997.
During the periods of violence, all those involved--indigenous tribes,
settlers, and security forces--accused each other of human rights
violations. The terms of the 1997 pact provided for a strong local
government, consisting of mostly tribal representatives, including the
chairperson; reduction of the military presence in the CHT region; and
a substantial compensation package for displaced tribal families.
Alfred Soren, a leader of the Santal tribe in the northern part of
the country, was killed and dozens of others were injured in an August
18 attack. According to one human rights organization, the perpetrators
of the attack were Bengalis who were angry with the tribals over a land
dispute. Ninety persons were charged for involvement in the attack, but
only four were arrested by year's end. Court proceedings were scheduled
to begin at the end of January 2001.
Tribal people in other areas also have reported problems of loss of
land to Bengali Muslims through questionable legal practices and other
means. The Garos of the Modhupur forest region in the north-central
part of the country continue to face problems in maintaining their
cultural traditions and livelihoods in the face of deforestation and
encroachment by surrounding Bengali communities. The pressure on the
Garo community has resulted in greater migration to urban areas and to
the Indian state of Meghalaya, threatening the existence of an already
small community estimated at only 16,000 persons. The Government had
indicated in 1995 that it would establish a national park of 400 acres
in the Mymensingh district. Part of the land would be taken from the
Garo tribals. Action still is pending on that proposal. The Government
has not ruled out moving the tribals from the land.
Religious Minorities.--Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists constitute
about 12 percent of the population.
Local thugs and gang leaders sometimes attack religious minorities,
perceiving them to be weak and vulnerable. The Government sometimes has
failed to criticize, investigate, and prosecute the perpetrators of
these attacks. The Ahmadiyas, whom many mainstream Muslims consider
heretical, have been the target of continued attacks and harassment. In
March neighboring Muslims attacked and damaged 40 houses belonging to
Ahamdiyas at Krora and Nasirabad (Brahmanbaria district); they also
captured a local Ahmadiya mosque. The mosque was returned to the
Ahmadiyas after a month-long negotiation. In 1999 in Kushtia mainstream
Muslims captured another Ahmadiya mosque, which remains under police
control, preventing Ahmadiyas from worshipping. In November 1999, Sunni
Muslims ransacked an Ahmadiya mosque in the western part of the
country. In October 1999, a bomb killed 6 Ahmadiyas and injured more
than 40 others who were attending Friday prayers at their mosque in
Khulna; the case remained unresolved at year's end.
Religious minorities are disadvantaged in practice in such areas as
access to government jobs and political office. Selection boards in the
government services often lack minority group representation.
Many Hindus have been unable to recover landholdings lost because
of discrimination in the application of the law, especially the Vested
Property Act. Property ownership, particularly among Hindus, has been a
contentious issue since partition in 1947, when many Hindus fled, and
again in 1971 when Bangladesh achieved independence, and many Hindus
lost land holdings because of anti-Hindu discrimination in the
application of the law. Prior to its 1996 election victory, the Awami
League promised to repeal the Vested Property Act, the law used to
deprive Hindus of their property. On September 4, the Cabinet decided
in principle to return vested property to its original owners and
formed a subcommittee to draft a law to this effect. At year's end, the
draft was awaiting cabinet approval. In past years, there have been
cases of violence directed against religious minority communities that
also have resulted in the loss of property. The last such major
incidents occurred in 1992, although there also were some minor
incidents of this type during the period surrounding the 1996
elections. Such intercommunal violence reportedly has caused some
religious minority members to depart the country.
Feminist author Taslima Nasreen left the country in January 1999,
due to concerns about her personal security. She lives abroad in self-
imposed exile (see Section 2.a.). The Government banned her latest book
in 1999 for fear of offending the country's Muslim community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to join unions and--with government approval--the right to form a
union. Approximately 1.8 million of the country's 5 million workers in
the formal sector belong to unions, most of which are affiliated with
the various political parties. (The total work force is approximately
58 million persons.) There is a large unreported informal sector, for
which no reliable labor statistics exist.
For a union to obtain and maintain its registration, 30 percent
workplace participation is required. Moreover, would-be unionists
technically are forbidden to engage in many activities prior to
registration, and legally are not protected from employer retaliation
during this period. Labor activists have protested that this
requirement severely restricts workers' freedom to organize, and the
ILO has requested the Government to amend the 30 percent provision on
the same grounds. The ILO also has requested the Government to amend
legislative provisions that bar registration of a union that is
composed of workers from different workplaces owned by different
employers. About 15 percent of the approximately 5,450 labor unions are
affiliated with 25 officially registered National Trade Union (NTU)
centers. There also are several unregistered NTU's.
With the exception of workers in the railway, postal, telegraph,
and telephone departments, civil servants, police, and military
personnel are forbidden to join unions in large part because of the
highly political nature of those unions. Many civil servants who are
forbidden to join unions, such as teachers and nurses, have formed
associations that perform functions similar to labor unions, that is,
providing for members' welfare, offering legal services, and airing
grievances. However, collective bargaining is prohibited. Some workers
have formed unregistered unions, particularly university employees and
workers in the construction and transport (both public and private)
industries. The Government banned trade union activity in the
Bangladesh Bank, the country's central bank, in early 1998. The ban
followed an incident in which some labor unionists affiliated with the
ruling party's trade union assaulted a senior bank official, after
which there were clashes between members of rival unions. In September
numerous associations of private school teachers went on strike,
demanding that the Government, which pays private school teachers 80
percent of their basic salary, pay 100 percent of it. The strikes ended
after several weeks when the Government agreed to raise its part of the
payment to 90 percent. In 1999 the ILO Committee of Experts stated that
the Government's rejections of several applications for registration by
trade unions in the textile, metal, and garment sectors were on
unjustified grounds. The Ministry of Labor contends that these cases
lacked the necessary documentation.
The right to strike is not recognized specifically in the law, but
strikes are a common form of workers' protest. In addition political
opposition parties use general strikes to pressure the Government to
meet political demands (see Section 2.b.). Workers at Chittagong port,
the country's major harbor, conducted several work stoppages to protest
a proposed new private container port. Some employees organized in
professional associations or unregistered unions also went on strike
during the year. Wildcat strikes are illegal but frequently occur, with
varying government responses. Wildcat strikes in the transportation
sector are particularly common.
The Essential Services Ordinance permits the Government to bar
strikes for 3 months in any sector that it declares essential. During
the year, the Government applied this ban against employees of the
Power Development Board. In the past, the Government has applied this
ban to national airline pilots, water supply workers, shipping
employees, and electricity supply workers. The ban may be renewed for
3-month-periods. The Government is empowered to prohibit a strike or
lockout at any time before or after the strike or lockout begins and to
refer the dispute to the Labor Court. Mechanisms for conciliation,
arbitration, and labor court dispute resolution were established under
the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969. Workers have the right to
strike in the event of a failure to settle. If a strike lasts 30 days
or longer, the Government may prohibit the strike and refer the dispute
to the Labor Court for adjudication. This has not happened since 1993.
The ILO has criticized the provisions of the Industrial Relations
Ordinance that require three-quarters of a worker's organization to
consent to a strike and that grant the Government authority to prohibit
a strike at any time if it is considered prejudicial to the national
interest or if it involves a public utility service.
There are no legal restrictions on political activities by labor
unions, although the calling of nationwide general strikes (hartals) or
transportation blockades by unions is considered a criminal rather than
a political act and thus is forbidden.
While unions are not part of the government structure, they are
highly politicized, and are strongest in state-owned enterprises and in
institutions like the government-run port in Chittagong. Virtually all
the NTU centers are affiliated with political parties, including the
ruling party and the major opposition parties. Some unions are militant
and engage in intimidation and vandalism. Illegal blockades of public
transportation routes by strikers frequently occurred during the year.
Pitched battles between members of rival labor unions regularly
occurred. Fighting often is over the control of rackets or extortion
payoffs and typically involves knives, guns, and homemade bombs.
Workers are eligible for membership on their union's executive
staff, the size of which is set by law in proportion to the number of
union members. The Registrar of Trade Unions may cancel registration of
a union with the concurrence of the Labor Court, but no such actions
were known to have been taken during the year.
There are provisions in the Industrial Relations Ordinance for the
immunity of registered unions or union officers from civil liability.
Enforcement of these provisions is uneven. In past illegal work
actions, such as transportation blockades, police officers have
arrested union members under the SPA or regular criminal codes.
There are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor
organizations, and unions and federations maintain a variety of such
links. Trade unionists are required to obtain government clearance to
travel to ILO meetings, but there were no reports that clearances were
denied during the year. In addition in April 1999, immigration
officials at the airport in Dhaka prevented 11 members of the
Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers Union Federation (BIGUF) from
departing the country to participate in an AFL-CIO-organized study tour
in the Philippines, citing a requirement for government clearance. In
October the Ministry of Labor issued the clearance, but it was too late
for the BIGUF representatives to participate in the study tour.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining by workers is legal on the condition that they be
represented by unions legally registered as collective bargaining
agents by the Registrar of Trade Unions. Labor unions are affiliated
with the various political parties; therefore, each industry generally
has more than one labor union (one or more for each political party).
To engage in collective bargaining, each union must nominate
representatives to a Collective Bargaining Authority (CBA) committee,
which the Registrar of Trade Unions must approve after reviewing the
selection process. Collective bargaining occurs on occasion in large
private enterprises such as pharmaceuticals, jute, or textiles but,
because of high unemployment, workers may forgo collective bargaining
due to concerns over job security. Collective bargaining in small
private enterprises generally does not occur. The International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has criticized the country
for what it views as legal impediments which hamper such bargaining.
Public sector workers' pay levels and other benefits are set by the
National Pay and Wages Commission, whose recommendations are binding
and may not be disputed except on the issue of implementation.
The Registrar of Trade Unions has wide powers to interfere in
internal union affairs. He has the authority to enter union premises
and inspect documents; however, there were no reports during the year
that the Registrar of Trade Unions had abused these powers.
Under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, there is considerable
leeway for discrimination against union members and organizers by
employers. For example, the ordinance allows the arbitrary transfer of
workers suspected of union activities or termination with payment of
mandatory severance benefits (2 weeks' salary). In practice private
sector employers usually discourage any union activity, sometimes
working in collaboration with local police. The Registrar of Trade
Unions rules on discrimination complaints. In a number of cases, the
Labor Court has ordered the reinstatement of workers fired for union
activities. However, the Labor Court's overall effectiveness is
hampered by a serious case backlog, and in the past there have been
allegations that employers have corrupted some of its deliberations.
In 1998 Zafrul Hassan, the General Secretary of the Bangladesh
Jatiyatabadi Sramik Dal (BJSD), filed a complaint that 76 persons, most
of whom were active union leaders, were discriminated against through
transfers and harassment by the Bangladesh Water Board. This case had
not been resolved by year's end.
In June 1999, the ILO received a complaint from the Bangladesh
Agricultural Farm Labor Federation that the Government had not
introduced legislation that would extend the protections of the
Industrial Relations Ordinance to a greater number of agricultural
workers. In July the ILO sponsored a seminar where this issue was
raised to create awareness about agricultural laborers. Officials from
various ministries, including the Ministry of Labor, attended. Farm
laborers, such as those employed in the aquaculture sector (shrimp
hatchery, harvesting and processing) are covered by the labor law and
can form trade unions. However, most agricultural laborers are migrant
workers, and thus are not employed by any particular individual or
group. The Government had not taken steps to extend labor laws to cover
these migrant workers.
The country's two EPZ's are exempted from the application of the
Employment of Labor (Standing Orders) Act of 1965, the Industrial
Relations Ordinance of 1969, and the Factories Act of 1965. Among other
provisions, these laws establish the freedom of association and the
right to bargain collectively, and set forth wage and hour and
occupational safety and health standards. While substitutes for some of
the provisions of these laws have been implemented through EPZ
regulations, which the Bangladesh EPZ Authority is charged with
enforcing, professional and industry-based unions are prohibited in the
zones. A small number of workers in the EPZ's have skirted prohibitions
on forming unions by setting up associations. The Government has not
implemented its 1992 commitment to end restrictions on freedom of
association and formation of unions by 1997, and to apply all sections
of labor law in the EPZ's by 2000. No collective bargaining occurs in
the EPZ's. However, on December 12, the Government agreed to allow full
freedom of association in the EPZ's by January 2004. Approximately
93,000 persons are employed in EPZ's, primarily in the textile and
apparel, electronics component, and leather industries. During the
year, the EPZ's experienced several strikes, some of which turned
violent. In one case, four workers were killed when the police stormed
a factory that had been taken over by the disgruntled workers. During
the incident, police shot and killed two persons; two others later died
from stab wounds sustained in the violence. The workers were angered by
a 15 percent cut in piece rates and the subsequent firing of 33 workers
who had joined in protests against the pay-cut (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.).
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children; however, the Government does not enforce this prohibition
effectively. The Factories Act and Shops and Establishments Act, both
passed in 1965, established inspection mechanisms to enforce laws
against forced labor; however, these laws are not enforced rigorously,
partly because resources for enforcement are scarce. There is no large-
scale bonded or forced labor; however, numerous domestic servants,
including many children, work in conditions that resemble servitude and
many suffer physical abuse, sometimes resulting in death. In the past,
the Government has brought criminal charges against employers who abuse
domestic servants. There is extensive trafficking in both women and
children, mainly for purposes of forced prostitution, although in some
instances for labor servitude outside of the country (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no law that uniformly prohibits the employment of
children, and child labor is a serious problem. Some laws prohibit
labor by children in certain sectors. The Factories Act of 1965 bars
children under the age of 14 from working in factories. This law also
stipulates that children and adolescents are allowed to work only a
maximum 5-hour day and only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The
Shops and Establishments Act of 1965 prohibits the employment of
children younger than the age of 12 in commercial workplaces. The
Employment of Children Act of 1938 prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 15 in the railways or in goods handling within ports.
Coverage and enforcement of these rules is inadequate. Because of
widespread poverty, many children begin to work at a very young age.
According to a 1996 labor force survey by the Government, the country
has 6.3 million working children between the ages of 5 and 14 years who
work for compensation and are not enrolled in school. Also, children
often work alongside other family members in small-scale and
subsistence agriculture. Previous UNICEF and ILO surveys indicate that,
of children 6 to 17 years of age, 21 percent of boys and 4 percent of
girls work in paid employment. Hours usually are long, the pay usually
is low, and the conditions sometimes are hazardous. Children drive
rickshaws, break bricks at construction sites, carry fruit, vegetables,
and dry goods for shoppers at markets, work at tea stalls, and work as
beachcombers in the shrimp industry. Many children work in the beedi
(hand-rolled cigarette) industry, and children under 18 years old
sometimes work in hazardous circumstances in the leather industry.
Children routinely perform domestic work. Cases of children being
abused physically and occasionally killed by the head of the household
where they work are reported in the press. In the past, the Government
has brought criminal charges against employers who abuse domestic
servants. Some children are trafficked domestically or overseas, often
for prostitution, and child prostitution is a serious problem (see
Sections 5 and 6.f.). Under the law, every child must attend school
through the fifth grade, or the age of 10 years. However, the
Government continues to maintain that it does not yet have the
resources to implement this law effectively.
Protracted negotiations led to the July 1995 signing of a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Bangladesh Garment
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF, and the ILO to
eliminate child labor in the garment sector. Under the MOU, the garment
sector was to become child labor free by October 1996, with former
child laborers enrolled in UNICEFsponsored schools and follow-up
inspections of factories by ILO-managed inspection teams. Under the
program, former child employees received a small monthly stipend while
attending school to help replace their lost income. On June 16, the MOU
was renewed for 1 year. Violations of the ban on child labor in the
garment export sector dropped slightly from 5 percent as the year
progressed to 4.7 percent of the factories inspected. According to ILO
inspectors, 90 percent of the factories where violations were found had
one to three child laborers, and the remaining ten percent had more.
However, a BGMEA arbitration committee, which is tasked with imposing
fines on violating factories, functions slowly. The number of children
working in nonexport, or nonfactory garment production, is unknown.
The Government did not grant the Ministry of Labor additional
resources to enforce its commitment as a member of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation to eliminate hazardous child labor
by 2000, and to eliminate all child labor by 2010; the existing small
corps of labor inspectors continues to be ineffective against all labor
problems because of inefficiency and corruption.
In cooperation with the Non-Formal Education Directorate of the
Government and some NGO partners, UNICEF is implementing a ``hard-to-
reach'' program to provide education to 350,000 (primarily working)
children in urban slum areas around the country. Working with the
Government, NGO's, and some trade unions, ILO/IPEC has 20 action
programs, targeting about 6,000 children in hazardous conditions,
designed to ensure that children receive an education, rather than
removing children from work. In addition ILO has undertaken education/
social welfare programs for more than 50,000 children.
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including
that performed by children; however, the Government does not enforce
this prohibition effectively, and some children work as domestic
servants in conditions that resemble labor servitude or are trafficked
for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
There were credible reports that police facilitated or were involved in
trafficking of women and children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage. Instead the Wage Commission, which convenes every several years,
sets wages and benefits industry by industry. In most cases, private
sector employers ignore this wage structure. For example, in the
garment industry, legal minimum wages are not paid by many factories,
and it is common for workers of smaller factories to experience delays
in receiving their pay, or to receive ``trainee'' wages well past the
maximum 3 months. The declared minimum monthly wage for a skilled
industrial worker is approximately $63 (3,400 Taka) for a worker in an
EPZ and approximately $49 (2,650 Taka) for a worker outside an EPZ, and
is sufficient to provide an individual with a minimal standard of
living, but is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family.
The law sets a standard 48-hour workweek with 1 day off mandated. A
60-hour workweek, inclusive of a maximum 12 hours of overtime, is
allowed. The law is enforced poorly in industries such as hosiery and
ready-made garments.
The Factories Act of 1965 nominally sets occupational health and
safety standards. The law is comprehensive but largely is ignored by
employers. For example, there are many fire safety violations in the
garment industry. Many factories are located in structures that were
not designed adequately for industrial use, nor for the easy evacuation
of large work forces. Twelve garment factory workers died on August 27
when they were unable to escape from a factory fire due to locked
exits. A Civil Defense Department report cited lack of adequate safety
measures as the cause of the fatalities. In addition numerous factories
have insufficient toilet facilities (for example, 1 toilet for 300
employees). Workers may resort to legal action for enforcement of the
law's provisions, but few cases actually are prosecuted. Enforcement by
the Labor Ministry's industrial inspectors is weak, due both to the low
number of labor inspectors (100 for about 300,000 covered
establishments), and to endemic corruption and inefficiency among
inspectors. Due to a high unemployment rate and inadequate enforcement
of the laws, workers demanding correction of dangerous working
conditions or refusing to participate in perceived dangerous activities
risk losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons and trafficking is a serious problem. There is extensive
trafficking in both women and children, primarily to India, Pakistan,
and destinations within the country, mainly for the purpose of forced
prostitution, although in some instances for labor servitude. Some
children also are trafficked to the Middle East to be used as camel
jockeys.
Trafficking in women for purposes of prostitution carries a 10 to
20 year sentence or the death penalty. Trafficking in children for
immoral or illegal purposes carries the death penalty or life
imprisonment. However, few perpetrators are punished. Human rights
monitors also credibly report that police and local government
officials often ignore trafficking in women and children for
prostitution, and easily are bribed to look the other way (see Sections
1.c., 5, and 6.c.). According to one antitrafficking organization,
during the year four new trafficking cases were filed, and the trials
of two cases filed earlier were concluded. In one case, a trafficker
was sentenced to death in absentia; in the second, two individuals were
sentenced to life in prison. Exact numbers of those persons arrested
for trafficking are difficult to obtain as charges against traffickers
usually are for lesser crimes, such as crossing borders without proper
documents.
The exact number of women and children trafficked for purposes of
forced prostitution is unknown; however, human rights monitors estimate
that more than 20,000 women and children are trafficked from the
country for such purposes annually. Most trafficked persons are lured
by promises of good jobs or marriage, and some are forced into
involuntary servitude outside of the country. Seeing no alternative for
breaking the cycle of poverty, parents often willingly send their
children away. Unwed mothers, orphans, and others outside of the normal
family support system also are susceptible. Traffickers living abroad
often arrive in a village and ``marry'' a woman, only to dispose of her
upon arrival in the destination country, where women are sold by their
new ``friends'' or ``husbands'' into bonded labor, menial jobs, or
prostitution. Criminal gangs conduct much of the trafficking in and
smuggling of persons. The border between Bangladesh and India is
loosely controlled, especially around Jessore and Benapole, making
illegal border crossings easy.
The number of child prostitutes is difficult to determine.
Prostitution is legal, but only for those persons over 18 years of age
with government certification; however, this minimum age requirement
commonly is ignored by authorities, and is circumvented easily by false
statements of age. Procurers of minors rarely are prosecuted, and large
numbers of child prostitutes work in brothels.
Children, usually young boys, also are trafficked into the Middle
East and the Persian Gulf States to work as camel jockeys. It is
estimated that there are anywhere from 100 to over 1,000 underage South
Asian camel jockeys currently working in the United Arab Emirates
alone; while many come from India and Pakistan, a growing number come
from Bangladesh. Criminal gangs procure most of the youths. The
majority of such children work with the knowledge of their parents, who
receive as much as $200 (10,000 Taka) for their child's labor, although
a significant minority simply are kidnaped. The gangs bringing the
jockeys earn approximately $150 (7,500 Taka) a month from the labor of
each child. The usual procedure used for bringing these children into
the Middle East is to have their names added to the passport of a
Bangladeshi or Indian woman who already has a visa for the Middle East;
the children fraudulently are claimed to be her children. During the
year, police made arrests in several incidents for trafficking in young
boys to the Middle East.
The Government has developed a set of policies and plans regarding
the trafficking issue. The Government has been involved in ongoing
efforts to engage the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) on the issue. The Government also frequently sends
representatives to conferences, seminars, and workshops on the
trafficking problem. In addition the Government has initiated a program
across a number of ministries to address the problem. However,
government capacity to address with this issue remains limited.
In June the Government signed a 3-year, $2 million (108 million
Taka) project with the Norwegian government aid organization, NORAD, to
develop an intraministerial infrastructure for addressing the
trafficking problem. This project, based in the Department of Women and
Children's Affairs, plans to be the focal point for addressing the
prosecution, protection, and prevention activities carried out by the
Government. A goal of the project is for the Government to become more
involved in arresting and prosecuting traffickers. However, because the
Government does not keep records of births and marriages at the village
level, it is very difficult for authorities to detect false claims of
marriage or family ties.
The Government has expressed concern about the problem and has
worked with NGO's, donor countries, and international organizations
against trafficking. Some of these projects include conducting
awareness campaigns, research, lobbying, and rescue and rehabilitation
programs. While the Government provides support for returning
trafficking victims, governmentrun shelters generally are inadequate
and poorly run. Increasing shelter capacity and rehabilitation programs
is one of the features of the NORAD project.
Throughout the country, a variety of NGO's and community-based
organizations are working on the trafficking problem through prevention
efforts, research, data collection, documentation, advocacy, awareness
creation and networking, cross-border collaboration, legal enforcement,
rescue, rehabilitation, reintegration, income generation and low-
interest loan programs, vocational training, and legislative reform.
Among the NGO's that have been active in addressing the problem, the
Association for Community Development conducted a study on trafficking
issues and conducted workshops and outreach programs aimed at reaching
potential victims of trafficking before they are trafficked. The
Bangladesh National Women Lawyer's Association (BNWLA) conducts
awareness programs aimed at alerting poor persons to the dangers of
trafficking through leaflets, stickers, and posters. The BNWLA also
provides legal assistance to trafficking victims, and initiates legal
action against traffickers. The BNWLA runs a shelter home for
trafficked women and children that provides health care, counseling,
and training. The Center for Women and Children (CWCS) has networks to
monitor trafficking across the country, conducts awareness meetings,
and has a pilot project to make police aware of the rights of women and
children. Awareness of trafficking is increasing, and the topic
receives frequent press coverage. Two umbrella organizations of anti-
trafficking NGO's exist, and are seeking to improve coordination and
planning of efforts against the problem.
__________
BHUTAN
Bhutan is ruled by a hereditary monarch, King Jigme Singye
Wangchuk, who governs with the support of a National Assembly and a
Council of Ministers; there is no written constitution to protect
fundamental political and human rights. Since ascending to the throne
in 1972, the King has continued efforts toward social and political
modernization begun by his father. In the last few years, Bhutan has
improved rapidly services in education, health care, sanitation, and
communications, with parallel but slower developments of the role of
representatives in governance and decision making. In recent years,
Bhutan has adopted some measures to transfer power from the King to the
National Assembly. The judiciary is not independent of the King.
Approximately two-thirds of the government-declared population of
600,000 persons is composed of Buddhists with cultural traditions akin
to those of Tibet. The Buddhist majority consists of two principal
ethnic and linguistic groups: the Ngalongs of the western part of the
country and the Sharchops of the eastern part of the country. The
remaining third of the population, ethnic Nepalis, most of whom are
Hindus, live in the country's southern districts. Bhutanese dissident
groups claim that the actual population is between 650,000 and 700,000
persons and that the Government underreports the number of ethnic
Nepalese in the country. The rapid growth of this ethnic Nepalese
segment of the population led some in the Buddhist majority to fear for
the survival of their culture. Government efforts to institute policies
designed to preserve the cultural dominance of the Ngalong ethnic
group, to change citizenship requirements, and to control illegal
immigration resulted in political protests and led to ethnic conflict
and repression of ethnic Nepalese in southern districts during the late
1980's and early 1990's. Tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese left the
country in 1991-92, many of whom were expelled forcibly. According to
U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), there were 98,269 ethnic
Nepalese in 7 refugee camps in eastern Nepal as of late June; upwards
of 15,000 reside outside of the camps in the Indian states of Assam and
West Bengal. The Government maintains that some of those in the camps
never were citizens, and therefore have no right to return. In 1998 the
Government began resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from other regions of
the country on land in southern districts vacated by the ethnic
Nepalese now living in refugee camps in Nepal, which some claim will
complicate any future return of the ethnic Nepalese. A National
Assembly resolution adopted in 1997 prohibits still-resident immediate
family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding jobs with the
Government or the armed forces. In early 1998 the Government
implemented the resolution, and already had dismissed 429 civil
servants by November 1998, when implementation of the resolution was
discontinued.
The Royal Bhutan Police (RBP), assisted by the Royal Bhutan Army,
including those assigned to the Royal Body Guard, and a national
militia, maintain internal security. Some members of these forces
committed human rights abuses against ethnic Nepalese.
The economy is based on agriculture and forestry, which provide the
main livelihood for 90 percent of the population and account for about
half of the gross domestic product (GDP). Agriculture largely consists
of subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Cardamon, citrus fruit,
and spices are the leading agricultural exports. Cement and electricity
are the other important exports. Strong trade and monetary ties link
the economy closely to that of India. Hydroelectric power production
potential and tourism are key resources, although the Government limits
foreign tourist arrivals because of inadequate tourist infrastructure
and environmental concerns. Tourist arrivals also are limited by means
of pricing policies. Bhutan is a poor country. The gross national
product per capita is estimated to be $470.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and problems
remain in several areas. The King exercises strong, active, and direct
power over the Government. Citizens do not have the right to change
their government. The Government discourages political parties, and
none operate legally. There were reports that security forces beat
ethnic Nepalese refugees who entered the country to demonstrate.
Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems, and reports of torture
and abuse of persons in detention continue. Impunity for those who
commit abuses also is a problem. Judges serve at the King's pleasure,
and the Government limits significantly the right to a fair trial.
Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated under a
legal code established in the 17 century and revised and modernized in
1958 and 1965. In late 1998 the Government formed a special committee
of jurists and government officials to review the country's basic law
and propose changes. In April the Government established a Department
of Legal Affairs, which is projected to be functioning fully by mid-
2001; it is a result of the review of the Basic Law. Programs to build
a body of written law and to train lawyers are progressing. For
example, the Government sends many lawyers to India and other countries
for legal training. The Government limits significantly citizens' right
to privacy. The Government restricts freedom of speech, the press,
assembly, and association. The Government launched the country's first
indigenous television service in June 1999, modifying a ban on private
television reception that had been in place since 1989. Citizens face
significant limitations on freedom of religion. In July 1998, the
Government initiated steps to renew negotiations with the Government of
Nepal on procedures for the screening and repatriation of ethnic
Nepalese in the refugee camps, and the two governments held a series of
meetings during the second half of that year. After a 3-year hiatus,
ministerial-level bilateral talks resumed in September 1999. The
Government restricts worker rights.
The Government claims that it has prosecuted government personnel
for unspecified abuses committed in the early 1990's; however, public
indications are that it has done little to investigate and prosecute
security force officials responsible for torture, rape, and other
abuses committed against ethnic Nepalese residents.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political or other extrajudicial killings during
the year. Human rights groups allege that in 1998 a government official
shot and killed Gomchen Karma, a Buddhist monk arrested in October 1997
during a peaceful demonstration in the eastern part of the country. The
Government stated that the shooting was accidental, that the official
responsible has been suspended from duty and charged in connection with
the incident, and that his case was being heard as of September.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and abuse; however, human rights
advocates state that in practice security forces ignore these
provisions. No one was prosecuted in connection with violating
prohibitions against torture during the year. There were reports that
security forces captured numerous ethnic Nepalese refugees attempting
to return to the country, beat them, and sent them back across the
border. Persons holding peaceful marches from India to Bhutan report
that in 1998 and 1999, the police assaulted them, injuring several
demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all of the marchers to
Nepal (see Section 5). In the past, there have been reports that ethnic
Nepalese refugees who attempted to return to the country were tortured.
Refugee newspapers published in Nepal allege that Nima Gyaltsen, a
prisoner detained since 1997 without charge or trial in Zilnon
Namgyeling jail in Thimphu, died in 1999 after being subjected to
torture during his incarceration.
Refugee groups credibly claim that persons detained as suspected
dissidents in the early 1990's were tortured by security forces, who
also committed acts of rape. During those years, the Government's
ethnic policies and the crackdown on ethnic Nepalese political
agitation created a climate of impunity in which the Government tacitly
condoned the physical abuse of ethnic Nepalese. The Government denies
that these abuses occurred but also claims that it has investigated and
prosecuted three government officials for unspecified abuses of
authority during that period. Details of these cases have not been made
public, and there is little indication that the Government has
investigated adequately or punished any security force officials
involved in the widespread abuses of 1989-92.
Prison conditions reportedly are adequate, if austere. In 1993 the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began a program of
visits to prisons in the capital, Thimphu. In 1994 a new prison in
Chemgang was opened. Together, these events contributed to a
substantial improvement in conditions of detention over those that
existed previously. However, Bhutanese human rights groups active
outside the country maintain that prison conditions outside of Thimphu
remain oppressive.
The Government and the ICRC signed a new Memorandum of
Understanding in September 1998, extending the ICRC prison visits
program for another 5 years. The ICRC conducted two prison visits
during the year, as it has done for each of the past 6 years, and
received unhindered access to prisons during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. Under the Police Act of 1979, police may not
arrest a person without a warrant and must produce an arrested person
before a court within 24 hours of arrest, exclusive of travel time from
place of arrest. However, legal protections are incomplete, due to the
lack of a fully elaborated criminal procedure code and to deficiencies
in police training and practice. Incommunicado detention is known to
occur. Incommunicado detention of suspected militants was a serious
problem in 1991 and 1992, but the initiation of ICRC prison visits and
the establishment of an ICRC mail service between detainees and family
members has helped to allay this problem. Of those detained in
connection with political dissidence and violence in southern areas in
1991-92, 1,685 persons were ultimately amnestied, 58 are serving
sentences after conviction by the High Court, 9 were acquitted by the
High Court, and 71 were released after serving prison sentences.
Human rights groups allege that in July and August 1997, the Royal
Bhutan Police in and around Samdrup Jongkar town in the east arrested
some 50 suspected supporters of a Bhutanese dissident group active
outside the country. The Government states that only 16 persons were
arrested during this period and that they have been charged with
involvement in seditious activities and are awaiting trial. Many were
said to be supporters of one-time Druk National Congress (DNC) and
United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD) leader Rongthong Kunley
Dorji, who was arrested in India in April 1997, following the issuance
of an extradition request by Bhutanese authorities. Dorji faces
extradition proceedings in India and possible return to Bhutan to face
charges of fraud, nonpayment of loans, and incitement to violence. The
original Bhutanese extradition request included a third charge,
``antinational activities,'' but this later was dropped when it became
clear that Indian law would preclude his extradition to face political
charges. Human rights groups contend that the charges brought against
Dorji are politically motivated and constitute an attempt by the
Government to suppress his prodemocracy activities. In June 1998, an
Indian court granted Dorji bail, but placed restrictions on his
movements. Dorji's extradition case still is pending in the Indian
courts. According to an Amnesty International report released in 1999,
30 persons were detained in 1998, most of them on suspicion of being
members or supporters of the DNC.
Amnesty International has reported that some of those arrested are
feared to be at risk of torture (see Section 1.c.). Bhutanese human
rights groups outside the country claim that the arrests, including
those of several Buddhist monks, are aimed at imposing Ngalong norms on
the eastern, Sharchop community, which has a distinct ethnic and
religious identity. The Government denies that it has such a policy;
many government officials, including both the former Head of
Government, Foreign Minister Jigme Thinley, and the Chief Justice of
the High Court Sonam Tobgye, are Sharchops.
Persons holding peaceful marches from India to Bhutan charge that
in 1999, the police assaulted them, injuring several demonstrators, and
then arrested and deported all of the marchers to Nepal (see Section
5). By one estimate, approximately 100 marchers were arrested and
deported in 1999. The Government acknowledged that 58 persons whom it
described as terrorists were serving sentences at the end of 1998 for
crimes including rape, murder, and robbery. It stated that a total of
134 persons were arrested in connection with the October 1997
disturbances in the east; of that number, more than one-half either had
been tried and acquitted or had been released after serving short
sentences.
Some or all of the approximately 75 prisoners serving sentences for
offenses related to political dissidence or violence, primarily by
ethnic Nepalese during 1991-92, may be political prisoners (see Section
1.e.).
Although the Government does not use formally exile as a form of
punishment, many accused political dissidents freed under Government
amnesties say that they were released on the condition that they depart
the country. Many of them subsequently registered at refugee camps in
Nepal. The Government denies this.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is no written constitution,
and the judiciary is not independent of the King.
The judicial system consists of district courts and a High Court in
Thimphu. Judges are appointed by the King on the recommendation of the
Chief Justice and may be removed by the King. Village headmen
adjudicate minor offenses and administrative matters.
The Department of Legal Affairs, which was established in April, is
projected to be fully functional by mid-2001. At a future date, the
Government expects to create a Ministry of Law and Justice and an
Attorney General's office within the Department of Legal Affairs. At
present, the Department is composed of a Legal Services Division (which
eventually is to become the Ministry of Law and Justice) with domestic,
international, and human rights sections; and a Prosecution Division
(which eventually is to become the Attorney General's office), with a
criminal section and a civil section.
Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated under
a legal code established in the 17 century and revised in 1958 and
1965. For offenses against the State, state-appointed prosecutors file
charges and prosecute cases. In other cases, the relevant organizations
and departments of government file charges and conduct the prosecution.
Defendants are supposed to be presented with written charges in
languages that they understand and given time to prepare their own
defense. However, this practice is not always followed, according to
some political dissidents. In cases where defendants cannot write their
own defense, courts assign judicial officers to assist defendants.
There were reports that defendants receive legal representation at
trial, and that they may choose from a list of 150 governmentlicensed
and employed advocates to assist with their defense; however, it is not
known how many defendants actually receive such assistance. A legal
education program gradually is building a body of persons who have
received formal training in the law abroad. Village headmen, who have
the power to arbitrate disputes, make up the bottom rung of the
judicial system. Magistrates, each with responsibility for a block of
villages, can review their decisions. Magistrates' decisions can be
appealed to district judges, of which there is 1 for each of the
country's 20 districts. The High Court in Thimphu is the country's
supreme court. Its decisions can be appealed to the King.
Defendants have the right to appeal to the High Court and may make
a final appeal to the King, who traditionally delegates the decision to
the Royal Advisory Council. Trials are to be conducted in open
hearings; however, there are allegations that this is not always the
case in practice.
Questions of family law, such as marriage, divorce, and adoption,
traditionally are resolved according to a citizen's religion: Buddhist
tradition for the majority of the population and Hindu tradition for
the ethnic Nepalese; however, the Government states that there is one
formal law that governs these matters.
Some or all of the approximately 75 prisoners serving sentences for
offenses related to political dissidence or violence, primarily by
ethnic Nepalese during 1991-92, may be political prisoners (see Section
1.d.).
On December 17, 1999, the King pardoned 200 prisoners to mark
National Day; all reportedly were released. Among them were 40 persons
convicted of ``antinational'' offenses, including prominent ethnic
Nepalese dissident and internationally recognized political prisoner
Tek Nath Rizal. Tek Nath Rizal was arrested in 1988 in Nepal and
extradited to Bhutan, where he was held in solitary confinement in
Wangdiphodrang military prison until his 1992 conviction for
antinational crimes, including writing and distributing political
pamphlets and attending political meetings. He was convicted under the
1993 National Security Act, although at the time of his conviction the
act had not yet been passed. However, a U.N. Human Rights Commission
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention that visited the country in 1994
at the Government's invitation determined that Rizal had received a
fair trial and declared his detention ``not to be arbitrary.'' During
the latter part of the year, Rizal was granted permission to leave
Bhutan to receive medical treatment in Calcutta, India. He had not left
Bhutan by year's end.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--There are no laws providing for these rights. The
Government requires all citizens, including minorities, to wear the
traditional dress of the Buddhist majority when visiting Buddhist
religious buildings, monasteries, or government offices, and in schools
and when attending official functions and public ceremonies. According
to human rights groups, police regularly conduct house-to-house
searches for suspected dissidents without explanation or legal
justification.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government restricts freedom
of speech and of the press.
The country's only regular publication is Kuensel, a governmentrun
weekly newspaper with a circulation of 10,000. Human rights groups
state that government ministries regularly review editorial material
and have the power to suppress or change content, which they regularly
do. They allege that the board of directors nominally responsible for
editorial policy is appointed by and can be removed by the Government.
Kuensel, which publishes simultaneous editions in the English,
Dzongkha, and Nepali languages, supports the Government but does
occasionally report criticism of the King and Government policies in
the National Assembly. Nepalese, Indian, and other foreign newspapers
are available, but they sometimes can be withheld from circulation if
they carry news that the Government deems critical of the country.
In 1989 the Government banned all private television reception and
ordered that television antennas and satellite dishes be dismantled.
Many homes in Paro and Thimphu nonetheless have satellite dishes and
receive signals from international broadcasters. In June 1999, the
Government introduced locally produced television service with the
inauguration of the Bhutan Broadcasting Service. The service broadcasts
4 hours of programming daily: 2 hours of locally produced programming
in Dzongkha, and 2 hours of English-language programming produced
outside of the country (such as from the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) and the Cable News Network (CNN)). In late 1999 the
Government began licensing cable operators to provide service in
Thimphu and Paro, and cable television is available. The Government
radio station broadcasts each day in the four major languages
(Dzongkha, Nepali, English, and Sharchop). The Government inaugurated
the country's first Internet service provider, Druknet, in June 1999.
English is the medium of instruction in schools and the national
language, Dzongkha, is taught as a second language. The teaching of
Nepali as a second language was discontinued in 1990.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
restricts freedom of assembly and association. Citizens may engage in
peaceful assembly and association only for purposes approved by the
Government. Although the Government allows civic and business
organizations, there are no legally recognized political parties. The
Government regards parties organized by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the
Bhutan People's Party (BPP) and the Bhutan National Democratic Party
(BNDP)--as well as the Druk National Congress--as ``terrorist and
antinational'' organizations and has declared them illegal. These
parties do not conduct activities inside the country. They seek the
repatriation of refugees and democratic reform.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government limits freedom of religion.
The Drukpa branch of the Kagyupa School of Mahayana Buddhism is the
state religion. About two-thirds of the population practice either
Drukpa Kagyupa or Ningmapa Buddhism. The Drukpa branch is practiced
predominantly in the western and central parts of the country, which
are inhabited mainly by ethnic Ngalongs (descendants of Tibetan
immigrants who predominate in government and the civil service, and
whose cultural norms have been declared to be the standard for all
citizens). The Ningmapa school is practiced predominantly in the
eastern part of the country, although there are adherents in other
areas, including the royal family. Most of those living in the east are
ethnic Sharchops--the descendants of those thought to be the country's
original inhabitants. The Government subsidizes monasteries and shrines
of the Drukpa sect and provides aid to about one-third of the Kingdom's
12,000 monks. The Government also provides financial assistance for the
construction of Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa Buddhist temples and
shrines. In the early 1990's, the Government provided funds for the
construction of new Hindu temples and centers of Sanskrit and Hindu
learning and for the renovation of existing temples and places of Hindu
learning. The Drukpa branch enjoys statutory representation in the
National Assembly (Drukpa monks occupy 10 seats in the 150 member
National Assembly) and in the Royal Advisory Council (Drukpa monks hold
2 of the 11 seats on the Council), and the Drukpa branch is an
influential voice on public policy. Citizens of other faiths, mostly
Hindus, enjoy freedom of worship but may not proselytize. Under the
law, conversions are illegal.
The King has declared major Hindu festivals to be national
holidays, and the royal family participates in them. Foreign
missionaries are not permitted to proselytize, but international
Christian relief organizations and Jesuit priests are active in
education and humanitarian activities. According to dissidents living
outside of the country, the Government restricts the import into the
country of printed religious matter; only Buddhist religious texts are
allowed to enter. These dissidents also state that Buddhist religious
teaching, of both the Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa sects, is permitted
in schools; the teaching of other religious faiths is not. The
passports of members of minority religions cite the holder's religion,
and applicants for government services sometimes are asked their
religion before services are rendered.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens traveling in border regions are
required to show their citizenship identity cards at immigration check
points, which in some cases are located at a considerable distance from
what is in effect an open border with India. By treaty, citizens may
reside and work in India.
Bhutan is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol (See Section 5 regarding
the ethnic Nepalese refugee situation).
The Government states that it recognizes the right to asylum in
accordance with international refugee law; however, it has no official
policy regarding refugees, asylum, first asylum, or the return of
refugees to countries in which they fear persecution. According to one
credible human rights source, until recent years the Government
systematically used to arrest and imprison Tibetan refugees crossing
the country's border from Tibet. This policy was followed in deference
to China's wishes. So invariable was this policy that Tibetan leaders
advise refugees not to use routes of escape through Bhutan. Tibetan
refugees have not done so for several years. This virtually is the only
refugee population seeking first asylum in Bhutan, thus, the issue of
first asylum did not arise during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Bhutan
is a monarchy with sovereign power vested in the King. In June 1998,
the King introduced term limits for his Council of Ministers and
proposed measures to increase the role of the National Assembly in the
formation of his Government. The National Assembly elected a new
Council of Ministers and Government in July 1998 to a 5-year term.
There are elected or partially elected assemblies at the local,
district, and national levels, and the Government claims to encourage
decentralization and citizen participation. These elections are
conducted in much the same way as National Assembly elections. Since
1969 the National Assembly has had the power to remove ministers who
the King appoints, but it never has done so. Political authority
ultimately resides in the King and decisionmaking involves only a small
number of officials. Officials subject to questioning by the National
Assembly routinely make major decisions, but the National Assembly is
not known to have overturned any decisions reached by the King and
government officials.
Political parties do not exist legally, and the Government
discourages their formation as unnecessarily divisive. The Government
prohibits parties established abroad by ethnic Nepalese (see Section
2.b.).
The National Assembly, established in 1953, has 150 members. Of
these, 105 are elected indirectly by heads of household, 10 are
selected by a part of the Buddhist clergy, and the remaining 35 are
appointed by the King to represent the Government. The National
Assembly, which meets irregularly, has little independent authority.
However, there are efforts underway to have the National Assembly meet
on a more regular basis, and in recent years the King and the Council
of Ministers have been more responsive to the National Assembly's
concerns.
The procedures for the nomination and election of National Assembly
members are set out in an amendment to the country's Basic Law proposed
by the King and adopted by the 73 session of the National Assembly in
1995. It provides that in order to be eligible for nomination as a
candidate for election to the National Assembly, a person must be a
citizen of Bhutan, be at least 25 years of age, not be married to a
foreign national, not have been terminated or compulsorily retired for
misconduct from government service, not have committed any act of
treason against the King, the populace, and country, have no criminal
record or any criminal case pending against him, have respect for the
nation's laws, and be able to read and write in Dzongkha (the language,
having different dialects in the eastern and western areas of the
country, spoken by Bhutanese Buddhists).
Each National Assembly constituency consists of a number of
villages. Each village is permitted to nominate one candidate but must
do so by consensus. There is no provision for selfnomination and the
law states that no person...may campaign for the candidacy or canvass
through other means. If more than one village within a constituency
puts forward a candidate, an election is conducted by the district
development committee, and the candidate obtaining a simple majority of
votes cast is declared the winner. Individuals do not have the right to
vote; every family in a village is entitled to one vote in elections.
The law does not make clear how a candidate is selected if none
achieves a simple majority. However, it does state that in case of a
tie among the candidates in the election, a selection shall be made
through the drawing of lots. The candidate whose name is drawn shall be
deemed to be elected.
Human rights activists claim that the only time individual citizens
have any involvement in choosing a National Assembly representative is
when they are asked for consensus approval of a village candidate by
the village headman. The name put to villagers for consensus approval
by the headman is suggested to him by district officials, who in turn
take their direction from the central Government. Consensus approval
takes place at a public gathering. Human rights activists state that
there is no secret ballot.
The Assembly enacts laws, approves senior government appointments,
and advises the King on matters of national importance. Voting is by
secret ballot, with a simple majority needed to pass a measure. The
King may not formally veto legislation, but may return bills for
further consideration. The Assembly occasionally rejects the King's
recommendations or delays implementing them, but in general, the King
has enough influence to persuade the Assembly to approve legislation
that he considers essential or to withdraw proposals he opposes. The
Assembly may question government officials and force them to resign by
a two-thirds vote of no confidence; however, the National Assembly
never has compelled any government official to resign. The Royal Civil
Service Commission is responsible for disciplining subministerial level
government officials and has removed several following their
convictions for crimes including embezzlement.
In June 1998, the King issued a decree setting out several measures
intended to increase the role of the National Assembly in the formation
and dissolution of his Government. The decree, later adopted by the 76
session of the National Assembly, provided that all cabinet ministers
are to be elected by the National Assembly and that the roles and
responsibilities of the cabinet ministries were to be spelled out. Each
cabinet minister is to be elected by simple majority in a secret ballot
in the National Assembly from among candidates nominated by the King.
The King is to select nominees for cabinet office from among senior
government officials holding the rank of secretary or above. The King
is to determine the portfolios of his ministers, whose terms will be
limited to 5 years, after which they must pass a vote of confidence in
the National Assembly in order to remain in office. Finally, the decree
provided that the National Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of no
confidence, can require the King to abdicate and to be replaced by the
next in the line of succession. After adopting the decree, the National
Assembly elected a new cabinet of ministers consistent with the decree.
Human rights groups maintain that since only the King may nominate
candidates for cabinet office, their election by the National Assembly
is not a significant democratic reform. The King also removed himself
as Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1998; Foreign Minister Jigme
Thinley was elected to that position by the National Assembly for 1
year, and was replaced by Minister for Health and Education Sangay
Ngedup in July 1999.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
they have made small but visible gains. Three women hold seats in the
National Assembly.
All major ethnic groups, including ethnic Nepalese, are represented
in the National Assembly. There are 16 ``southern Bhutanese'' (also
known as Lhotshampas) in the National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no legal human rights nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) in the country. The Government regards human rights groups
established by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the Human Rights Organization of
Bhutan, the People's Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan, and the
Association of Human Rights Activists--Bhutan--as political
organizations and does not permit them to operate in the country.
Amnesty International visited Bhutan in 1992 to investigate and to
report on the alleged abuse of ethnic Nepalese. In late November 1998,
Amnesty International again sent a delegation to the country and later
released a report.
ICRC representatives continue twice yearly prison visits, and the
Government has allowed them unhindered access to detention facilities,
including those in southern districts inhabited by ethnic Nepalese. The
chairman and members of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention made a second visit to the country in May 1996
as a follow-up to an October 1994 visit. In addition to meetings with
government officials, members of the working group visited prisons and
interviewed prisoners in Thimphu, Phuntsoling, and Samtse.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Ongoing government efforts to cultivate a national identity rooted
in the language, religion, and culture of the Ngalong ethnic group
restrict cultural expression by other ethnic groups. In the late 1980's
and early 1990's, the Government instituted polices designed to
preserve the cultural dominance of the Ngalong ethnic group. It also
committed many abuses against the ethnic Nepalese, which led to the
departure of tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese from the country;
many ethnic Nepalese were expelled forcibly, and almost 100,000 of them
remain in refugee camps in Nepal. At the time, the Government claimed
that it was concerned about the rapid population growth of and
political agitation by the ethnic Nepalese. The Government claims that
ethnic and gender discrimination in employment is not a problem. It
claims that ethnic Nepalese fill 22 percent of government jobs, which
is slightly less than their proportion of the total population.
Bhutanese human rights groups active outside the country claim that
ethnic Nepalese actually make up about 35 percent of the country's
population and that the Government underreports their number. Women are
accorded respect in the traditions of most ethnic groups; however,
persistence of traditional gender roles apparently accounts for the low
proportion of women in government employment. Exile groups claim that
ethnic and gender discrimination is a problem.
Women.--There is no evidence that rape or spousal abuse are
extensive problems. However, there are credible reports by refugees and
human rights groups that security forces raped large numbers of ethnic
Nepalese women in the southern area of the country in 1991 and 1992.
According to Amnesty International, some women reportedly have died as
a result. In one independent survey of 1,779 refugee families, 26
percent of the respondents cited rape, fear of rape, or threat of rape
as a prime reason for their departure from the country. The Government
has denied these reports.
Rape was made a criminal offense in 1953, but that law had weak
penalties and was enforced poorly. In 1993 the National Assembly
adopted a revised rape act with clear definitions of criminal sexual
assault and stronger penalties. In cases of rape involving minors,
sentences range from 5 to 17 years. In extreme cases, a rapist may be
imprisoned for life.
Women constitute 48 percent of the population and participate
freely in the social and economic life of the country. Approximately 43
percent of enrollment in school is female, and 16 percent of civil
service employees are women. Inheritance law provides for equal
inheritance among all sons and daughters, but traditional inheritance
practices, which vary among ethnic groups, may be observed if the heirs
choose to forego legal challenges. Dowry is not practiced, even among
ethnic Nepalese Hindus. Among some groups, inheritance practices
favoring daughters reportedly account for the large numbers of women
among owners of shops and businesses and for an accompanying tendency
of women to drop out of higher education to go into business. However,
female school enrollment has been growing in response to government
policies. Women increasingly are found among senior officials and
private sector entrepreneurs, especially in the tourism industry. Women
in unskilled jobs generally are paid slightly less than men.
Polygamy is sanctioned provided the first wife gives her
permission. Marriages may be arranged by the marriage partners
themselves as well as by their parents. Divorce is common. Recent
legislation requires that all marriages must be registered; it also
favors women in matters of alimony.
Children.--The Government has demonstrated its commitment to child
welfare by its rapid expansion of primary schools, health-care
facilities, and immunization programs. The mortality rates for both
infants and children under 5 years have dropped significantly since
1989. The Government provides free and compulsory primary school
education, and primary school enrollment has increased at 9 percent per
year since 1991, with enrollment of girls increasing at an even higher
rate. In 1995 the participation rate for children in primary schools
was estimated at 72 percent, with the rate of completion of 7 years of
schooling at 60 percent for girls and at 59 percent for boys. There is
no law barring ethnic Nepalese children from attending school. However,
most of the 75 primary schools in southern areas heavily populated by
ethnic Nepalese that were closed in 1990 remain closed today. The
closure of the schools acts as an effective barrier to the ability of
the ethnic Nepalese in southern areas to obtain a primary education.
Children enjoy a privileged position in society and benefit from
international development programs focused on maternal and child
welfare. Amnesty International reported that at least 23 students,
between 7 and 21 years of age, whose relatives had been arrested for
supporting the prodemocracy movement, were expelled from school in
eastern Bhutan in 1998. Amnesty International also reported that 19-
year-old Needup Phuntso was expelled from school in March 1998 and was
tortured by members of the Royal Bhutanese police after his arrest in
Thimphu in July 1998.
A study by UNICEF found that boys and girls receive equal treatment
regarding nutrition and health care and that there is little difference
in child mortality rates between the sexes. Government policies aimed
at increasing enrollment of girls have increased the proportion of
girls in primary schools from 39 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 1995.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence of official
discrimination toward disabled persons but the Government has not
passed legislation mandating accessibility for the disabled. Societal
discrimination against the disabled is a problem.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Nepalese have lived in
the southern part of the country for centuries, and the early phases of
economic development at the turn of the century brought a large influx
of additional ethnic Nepalese. In the late 1980's, concern over the
increase in the population of and political agitation among ethnic
Nepalese prompted aggressive government efforts to assert a national
culture, to tighten control over southern regions, to control illegal
immigration, to expel ethnic Nepalese, and to promote national
integration. Early efforts at national integration focused on
assimilation, including financial incentives for intermarriage,
education for some students in regions other than their own, and an
increase in development funds in the south.
Beginning in 1989, more discriminatory measures were introduced,
aimed at shaping a new national identity, known as Drukpa. Drukpa is
based on the customs of the non-ethnic Nepalese Ngalong ethnic group
predominant in the western part of the country. Measures included a
requirement that national dress be worn for official occasions and as a
school uniform, the teaching of Dzongkha as a second language in all
schools, and an end to instruction in Nepali as a second language
(English is the language of instruction in all schools). Also,
beginning in 1988, the Government refused to renew the contracts of
tens of thousands of Nepalese guest workers. Many of these workers had
resided in the country for years, in some cases with their families.
During the mid- and late 1980's, citizenship became a highly
contentious issue. Requirements for citizenship first were formalized
in the Citizenship Law of 1958, which granted citizenship to all adults
who owned land and had lived in the country for at least 10 years.
However, in 1985 a new citizenship law significantly tightened
requirements for citizenship and resulted in the denaturalization of
many ethnic Nepalese. While citizenship previously was conferred upon
children whose father was a citizen under the 1958 law, the 1985 law
required that both parents be citizens in order to confer citizenship
on a child, and that persons seeking to prove citizenship through their
own or their parents' residency in 1958 be able to prove residency in
the country at that time. In many cases, persons were unable to produce
the documentation necessary, such as land tax receipts from 1958, to
show residency nearly 30 years before. The law permits residents who
lost citizenship under the 1985 law to apply for naturalization if they
can prove residence during the 15 years prior to that time. The
Government declared all residents who could not meet the new
citizenship requirements to be illegal immigrants.
The 1985 Citizenship Act also provides for the revocation of the
citizenship of any naturalized citizen who ``has shown by act or speech
to be disloyal in any manner whatsoever to the King, country, and
people of Bhutan.'' The Home Ministry, in a circular notification in
1990, advised that ``any Bhutanese nationals leaving the country to
assist and help the antinationals shall no longer be considered as
Bhutanese citizens . . . such people's family members living in the
same household will also be held fully responsible and forfeit their
citizenship.'' Human rights groups allege that these provisions were
used widely to revoke the citizenship of ethnic Nepalese who
subsequently were expelled or otherwise departed from the country.
Beginning in 1988, the Government expelled large numbers of ethnic
Nepalese through enforcement of the new citizenship laws.
Outraged by what they saw as a campaign of repression, ethnic
Nepalese mounted a series of demonstrations, sometimes violent, in
September 1990. The protests were spearheaded by the newly formed
Bhutan People's Party, which demanded full citizenship rights for
ethnic Nepalese, the reintroduction of Nepali as a medium of education
in the south, and democratic reforms. Characterizing the BPP as a
``terrorist'' movement backed by Indian sympathizers, the authorities
cracked down on its activities and ordered the closure of local
Nepalese schools, clinics, and development programs after several were
raided or bombed by dissidents. Many ethnic Nepalese schools reportedly
were turned into Army barracks. There were credible reports that many
ethnic Nepalese activists were beaten and tortured while in custody,
and that security forces committed acts of rape. There also were
credible reports that militants, including BPP members, attacked and
killed census officers and other officials, and engaged in bombings.
Local officials took advantage of the climate of repression to coerce
ethnic Nepalese to sell their land below its fair value and to
emigrate.
Beginning in 1991, ethnic Nepalese began to leave southern areas of
the country in large numbers and take refuge in Nepal. Many were
expelled forcibly. According to Amnesty International, entire villages
sometimes were evicted en masse in retaliation for an attack on a local
government official. Many ethnic Nepalese were forced to sign
``voluntary migration forms'' wherein they agreed to leave the country,
after local officials threatened to fine or imprison them for failing
to comply. By August 1991, according to NGO reports, 2,500 refugees
already were camped illegally in Nepal, with a steady stream still
coming from Bhutan. The UNHCR began providing food and shelter in
September of that year, and by year's end, there were 6,000 refugees in
Nepal. The number of registered refugees grew to approximately 62,000
by August 1992, and to approximately 80,000 by June 1993, when the
UNHCR began individual screening of refugees. The flow slowed
considerably thereafter; there were no new refugee arrivals from Bhutan
to the camps during the year. According to UNHCR, there were 98,269
ethnic Nepalese refugees in 7 refugee camps in eastern Nepal, as of
June 30. Much of this increase since 1993 is the result of births to
residents of the camps. An additional 15,000 refugees, according to
UNHCR estimates, are living outside the camps in Nepal and India.
Ethnic Nepalese political groups in exile complain that the
revision of the country's citizenship laws in 1985 denaturalized tens
of thousands of former residents of Bhutan. They also complain that the
new laws have been applied selectively and make unfair demands for
documentation on a largely illiterate group in a country that only
recently has adopted basic administrative procedures. They claim that
many ethnic Nepalese whose families have been in the country for
generations were expelled in the early 1990's because they were unable
to document their claims to residence. The Government denies this and
asserts that a threemember village committee--typically ethnic Nepalese
in southern districts--certifies in writing that a resident is a
Bhutanese citizen in cases where documents cannot be produced.
The Government maintains that many of those who departed the
country in 1991-92 were Nepalese or Indian citizens who came to the
country after the enactment of the 1958 Citizenship law but were not
detected until a census in 1988. The Government also claims that many
persons registered in the camps as refugees may never have resided in
the country. A royal decree in 1991 made forcible expulsion of a
citizen a criminal offense. In a January 1992 edict, the King noted
reports that officials had been forcing Bhutanese nationals to leave
the country but stressed that this was a serious and punishable
violation of law. Nevertheless, only three officials ever were punished
for abusing their authority during this period (see Section 1.c.).
According to the UNHCR, the overwhelming majority of refugees who have
entered the camps since screening began in June 1993 have documentary
proof of Bhutanese nationality. Random checks and surveys of camp
residents--including both pre- and post-June 1993 arrivals--bear this
out. The Government contends that some ethnic Nepalese left the country
voluntarily, thus renouncing their Bhutanese citizenship. However,
human rights organizations credibly dispute this claim.
A Nepal-Bhutan ministerial committee met seven times between 1994
and 1996, and a secretarial-level committee met twice in 1997 in
efforts to resolve the Bhutanese refugee problem. In 1998 Foreign
Minister Jigme Thinley took office with a mandate to resolve the
refugee issue, and several meetings were held with representatives of
the Nepalese Government, the UNHCR, and NGO's. However, the dialog lost
momentum in 1998 and was suspended by the Bhutanese Government pending
the formation of a new government in Nepal in 1999. After a 3-year
hiatus, the foreign ministers of Nepal and Bhutan met in September 1999
in Kathmandu to resume discussions on the refugee issue. Bilateral and
multilateral discussions have continued, including a ninth round of
ministerial level talks held in May. During the year, U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata visited the country, as did at
least one high-ranking foreign official. In late December, Bhutan and
Nepal agreed upon a system to verify the nationality of Bhutanese
refugees in Nepal in preparation for their for return to Bhutan.
Refugee verifications were scheduled to begin in January 2001. At
year's end, approximately 98,000 Bhutanese refugees remained in Nepal.
The resettlement of persons onto the land once occupied by refugees
continues to represent an obstacle to a negotiated resolution of the
refugee problem.
In March 1996, refugees began a series of ``peace marches'' from
Nepal to Bhutan to assert their right to return to Bhutan. Bhutanese
police immediately detained and deported the marchers who crossed into
Bhutan in August, November, and December 1996. In the December 1996
incident, police reportedly used force against the marchers. Such
marches also were held in 1998 and 1999; the marchers charge that the
police assaulted them during each march, injuring several
demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all marchers. A
resolution adopted by the National Assembly in July 1997 prohibits the
still-resident family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding
jobs with the Government or in the armed forces. Under the resolution,
those holding such jobs were to be retired involuntarily. The
Government made clear that for the purposes of this resolution, a
family member would be defined as a parent, a child, a sibling, or a
member of the same household. The Government states that 429 civil
servants, many of them ethnic Nepalese, were retired compulsorily in
accordance with the July 1997 National Assembly resolution, and that
the program was terminated in November. The Government states that
those forced to retire were accorded retirement benefits in proportion
to their years of government service. The Government also began a
program of resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from other regions of the
country on land in the southern part of the country vacated by the
ethnic Nepalese now living in refugee camps in Nepal. Human rights
groups maintain that this action prejudices any eventual outcome of
negotiations over the return of the refugees to the country. The
Government maintains that this is not its first resettlement program
and that Bhutanese citizens who are ethnic Nepalese from the south
sometimes are resettled on more fertile land in other parts of the
country. The failure of the Government to permit the return of ethnic
Nepalese refugees has tended to reinforce societal prejudices against
this group, as has the Government's policy on forced retirement of
refugee family members in government service and the resettlement of
Buddhists on land vacated by expelled ethnic Nepalese in the south.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are not permitted, and
there are no labor unions. Workers do not have the right to strike, and
the Government is not a member of the International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no
collective bargaining in industry. Industry accounts for about 25
percent of the GDP, but employs only a minute fraction of the total
work force. The Government affects wages in the manufacturing sector
through its control over wages in state-owned industries.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
abolished its system of compulsory labor taxes in December 1995.
Laborers in rural development schemes previously paid through this
system now are paid regular wages. There is no evidence to suggest that
domestic workers are subjected to coerced or bonded labor. The law does
not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such
practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 18 years
for citizens and 20 years for noncitizens. A UNICEF study suggested
that children as young as 11 years sometimes are employed with road-
building teams. The Government provides free and compulsory primary
school education, and 72 percent of the school-aged population is
enrolled (see Section 5). Children often do agricultural work and
chores on family farms. There is no law barring ethnic Nepalese
children from attending school. However, most of the 75 primary schools
in southern areas heavily populated by ethnic Nepalese that were closed
in 1990 remain closed today. The closure of the schools acts as an
effective barrier to the ability of the ethnic Nepalese in southern
areas to obtain a primary education. In the early 1990's, children who
failed their school examinations were compelled to join the armed
forces (despite the fact that the minimum age of recruitment is age
18). This practice of conscription has ended. The law does not
specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A circular effective in February
1994 established wage rates, rules and regulations for labor recruiting
agencies, and regulations for payment of workmen's compensation. Wage
rates are revised periodically, and range upward from a minimum of
roughly $1.50 (50 ngultrums) per day for unskilled and skilled
laborers, with various allowances paid in cash or kind in addition.
This minimum wage provides a decent standard of living for a worker and
family in the local context. The workday is defined as 8 hours with a
1-hour lunch break. Work in excess of this must be paid at one and one-
half times normal rates. Workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled
to 1 day's paid leave for 6 days of work and 15 days of leave annually.
The largest salaried work force is the government service, which has an
administered wage structure last revised in 1988 but supplemented by
special allowances and increases since then, including a 25 percent
increase in July 1997. Only about 30 industrial plants employ more than
50 workers. Smaller industrial units include 69 plants of medium size,
197 small units, 692 ``mini'' units, and 651 cottage industry units.
The Government favors a family-owned farm policy; this, along with the
country's rugged geography, and land laws that prohibit a farmer from
selling his last 5 acres and that require the sale of holdings in
excess of 25 acres, result in a predominantly self-employed
agricultural work force. Workers are entitled to free medical care
within the country. They are eligible for compensation for partial or
total disability, and in the event of death, their families are
entitled to compensation. Existing labor regulations do not grant
workers the right to remove themselves from work situations that
endanger health and safety without jeopardizing their continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
from, within, or through the country.
__________
INDIA
India is a longstanding parliamentary democracy with a bicameral
parliament. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whose Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) led a 17-party coalition, took office in October 1999 and
heads the Government. President K.R. Narayanan, who was elected by an
electoral college consisting of Members of Parliament and members of
state assemblies, is Head of State and also has special emergency
powers. The judiciary is independent.
Although the 28 state governments have primary responsibility for
maintaining law and order, the central Government provides guidance and
support through the use of paramilitary forces throughout the country.
The Union Ministry for Home Affairs controls most of the paramilitary
forces, the internal intelligence bureaus, and the nationwide police
service; it provides training for senior police officers for the
stateorganized police forces. The armed forces are under civilian
control. Security forces committed numerous significant human rights
abuses, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeastern
states.
The country is in transition from a government-controlled economy
to one that largely is market oriented. The private sector is
predominant in agriculture, most nonfinancial services, consumer goods
manufacturing, and some heavy industry. Economic liberalization and
structural reforms begun in 1991 continue, although momentum has
slowed. The country's economic problems are compounded by population
growth of 1.7 percent annually with a current population of more than 1
billion. Income distribution remained very unequal, with the top 20
percent of the population receiving 39.3 percent of national income and
the bottom 20 percent receiving 9.2 percent. Twenty percent of the
urban population and 30 percent of the rural population live below the
poverty level.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in some areas; however, numerous serious problems remain, despite
extensive constitutional and statutory safeguards. Significant human
rights abuses included: Extrajudicial killings, including faked
encounter killings, deaths of suspects in police custody throughout the
country, and excessive use of force by security forces combating active
insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and several northeastern states;
torture and rape by police and other agents of the Government; poor
prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention in
Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast; continued detention throughout the
country of thousands arrested under special security legislation;
lengthy pretrial detention; prolonged detention while undergoing trial;
occasional limits on freedom of the press and freedom of movement;
harassment and arrest of human rights monitors; extensive societal
violence against women; legal and societal discrimination against
women; female bondage and forced prostitution; child prostitution and
infanticide; discrimination against the disabled; serious
discrimination and violence against indigenous people and scheduled
castes and tribes; widespread intercaste and communal violence;
societal violence against Christians and Muslims; widespread
exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child labor; and trafficking in
women and children.
Many of these abuses are generated by a traditionally hierarchical
social structure, deeply rooted tensions among the country's many
ethnic and religious communities, violent secessionist movements and
the authorities' attempts to repress them, and deficient police methods
and training. These problems are acute in Jammu and Kashmir, where
judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed counterinsurgency
tactics, the refusal of security forces to obey court orders, and
terrorist threats have disrupted the judicial system. The number of
insurgencyrelated killings in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast by
regular security forces increased from the previous year. In the
northeast there was no clear decrease in the number of killings,
despite negotiated ceasefires between the Government and some insurgent
forces, and between some tribal groups.
The concerted campaign of execution-style killings of civilians by
Kashmiri militant groups, begun in 1998, continued, and included
several killings of political leaders and party workers. Separatist
militants were responsible for numerous, serious abuses, including
killing of armed forces personnel, police, government officials, and
civilians; torture; rape; and brutality. Separatist militants also were
responsible for kidnaping and extortion in Jammu and Kashmir and the
northeastern states.
In July one of the largest Kashmiri militant groups announced a
unilateral ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir and offered to open a dialog
with the Government. The Government responded by instructing its
military forces to reciprocate the ceasefire, accepting the offer of
dialog, and beginning talks. The ceasefire and talks ended abruptly in
August when the militants demanded the start of tripartite talks
between themselves, the Government of India, and the Government of
Pakistan. During the same period, Pakistan-backed militants opposed to
the ceasefire attacked and killed more than 100 civilians, many of them
Hindu religious pilgrims, at several locations in Jammu and Kashmir. On
November 26, the Government instituted its own unilateral suspension of
offensive action for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in Jammu and
Kashmir and offered to initiate dialog with militant groups that wished
to come forward for talks. The Government extended the ceasefire on
December 20, and it remained in force at year's end. The Government
also continued to pursue a dialog with Kashmiri militant groups, but no
formal talks had begun by year's end.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--Extrajudicial
killings by government forces (including deaths in custody and faked
encounter killings) continued to occur frequently in the state of Jammu
and Kashmir and several northeastern states, where separatist
insurgencies continued. Security forces offered bounties for wanted
militants brought in dead or alive.
Official government figures indicate that security forces killed
1,520 militants in encounters in Jammu and Kashmir as of September,
compared with 1,082 militants killed by about the same time in 1999
(Kashmir has been at the center of a territorial dispute between India
and Pakistan since the two nations gained their independence in 1947;
both claim Kashmir). Kashmiri separatist groups maintain that many such
``encounters'' are faked and that suspected militants offering no
resistance are executed summarily by security forces. Statements by
senior police and army officials confirm that the security forces are
under instructions to kill foreign militants, rather than attempt to
capture them alive. Human rights groups allege that this particularly
is true in the case of security force encounters with non-Kashmiri
militants who cross into Jammu and Kashmir illegally. According to
press reports and anecdotal accounts, those persons killed typically
were detained by security forces, and their bodies, bearing multiple
bullet wounds and often marks of torture, were returned to relatives or
otherwise were discovered shortly afterwards. For example, on the night
of April 29, police took into custody Said Hafeez Mehraj, an alleged
militant, at a public telephone booth in Srinagar; the police delivered
Mehraj's body to his family the following day. Family members allege
that the police killed Mehraj while in police custody. However, the
police claim that they took Mehraj to Rajouri Kedar in downtown
Srinagar so that he could help them uncover an arms cache, and that
militants fired on the police party, killing Mehraj. On August 16,
authorities reported that security forces killed two members of the
Hizbul Mujahideen militant group during a raid on a ``safe house'' used
by the group in Walurhama-Magam, Kupwara district. Authorities claim
that the two men, Nazir Ahmad Wani and Muhammad Sadiq Mir, began
shooting at the forces and that troops killed them while firing back.
However, the Hizbul Mujahideen claims that the two men surrendered, and
alleges that the security forces later killed them while in custody.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) active in Jammu and Kashmir
claimed that in January, Mohammad Tahir Shah of Kapipora was killed
soon after being taken into custody by security forces, which earlier
had killed Shah's two sons, alleging that they were members of a
militant organization. Shah was buried in Tral town. His relatives were
not permitted to recover the body for burial in Kapipora, according to
an NGO. Another NGO reported that on March 29, security forces killed
Gulab Muhammad Chechi in an encounter in Beerwah. Authorities claim
that he was a foreign militant and that security forces killed him
during a gunfight. However, his relatives say that Chechi was a beggar
native to Beerwah. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), a
government-appointed and financed investigative body (see Section 4),
directed that all alleged encounter deaths be investigated immediately
by an independent agency; however, members of the security forces
rarely are held accountable for these killings. The NHRC itself may
inquire into alleged security force abuses in Jammu and Kashmir, but
does not have the statutory power to investigate such allegations if it
is not satisfied with the responses to its inquiries. Authorities
generally have not reported encounter deaths that occur in Jammu and
Kashmir to the NHRC. Human rights groups allege that during the year
security forces killed a number of captured non-Kashmiri militants in
Jammu and Kashmir. During conflicts with armed militants, security
forces allegedly respond indiscriminately to gunfire.
According to official figures, in Jammu and Kashmir security forces
killed 1,520 militants during the year; 762 civilians and 397 members
of the security forces were killed during the same period. According to
the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 1999 in Jammu and Kashmir security
forces killed 1,082 militants, captured 744, and 109 surrendered to
authorities. During the same period, 821 civilians and 356 security
force members were killed in insurgency-related incidents in the state,
according to the Home Ministry. Home Ministry figures state that in
1999, 584 civilians, 439 militants, and 205 security force members were
killed in insurgencies in the northeastern states. The Home Ministry
reported that in 1998, 881 civilians, 374 militants, and 182 security
force members were killed in the northeastern states.
The security forces also killed civilians during military
counterinsurgency operations. For example, on March 25, security forces
shot and killed 5 men in Pathribal village, south of Srinagar, alleging
that these men were responsible for the March 20 massacre of 35 Sikh
civilians in Chattisinghpura village (see Section 5); however, the
victims' family members claim that all of the men were innocent
civilians whom the police killed, burned, and buried. A Home Ministry
spokesman, announcing an investigation into the killings of the five
men, later admitted that Jammu and Kashmir police may have
``overreacted'' in shooting the civilians. On April 3, the Special
Operations Group (SOG) of the Kashmir police and the Central Reserve
police force fired into a group of several hundred unarmed Muslim
protesters in Brakpora, Anantnag district, killing 8 persons and
injuring at least 15 others. The demonstrators were protesting the
March 25 Pathribal village killings. On April 18, the Jammu and Kashmir
government opened a judicial inquiry, under the leadership of retired
Supreme Court Justice S.R. Pandian, to investigate the Anantnag
incident. On October 31, Jammu and Kashmir's Chief Minister reported
that the Home Ministry's Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the
SOG of the Jammu and Kashmir police force were guilty of using
excessive force during the April 3 Brakpora incident. While some
members of the police special task force were indicted in connection
with the Brakpora killings, trials had not begun by year's end.
Human rights activists in Jammu and Kashmir allege that members of
the Border Security Force shot and killed Ashraf Bazaz and his wife in
Srinagar. Security forces allegedly killed the couple, who was
traveling in a taxi through Malka Chowk in the capital of Kashmir,
after stopping them for questioning. The authorities maintain that the
couple was killed in crossfire between the Border Security Force and a
group of militants. On August 9, security forces reportedly opened fire
on a group of protesters in the town of Rajori near the Jammu border
with Pakistan, killing 1 person and injuring 15 others; allegedly, the
shooting occurred because the protesters tried to stop an army convoy.
Accountability remains a serious problem in Jammu and Kashmir.
Security forces have committed thousands of serious human rights
violations over the course of the conflict, including extrajudicial
killings, disappearances, and torture (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
Despite this record of abuse, between January 1990 and September 1998,
only 295 security force members were prosecuted and punished for any of
these crimes, and no compensation was paid to the victims or their
families, according to the Union Home Ministry. During the same period,
113 security force members were punished for human rights abuses in the
northeastern states. Punishments ranged from reduction in rank to
imprisonment for up to 10 years. According to Amnesty International,
the army stated in January that it had investigated 822 of the 955
complaints of human rights violations that it received in 1999 and
found that only 24 were of substance.
In the past, scrutiny by the NHRC and international human rights
organizations, when permitted (see Section 4), and the persistence of
individual magistrates, resulted in somewhat greater accountability for
abuses committed by security force members in Jammu and Kashmir;
however, in July 1998, the Government rejected the NHRC's
recommendations to bring the army and paramilitary forces under closer
scrutiny by allowing the NHRC to investigate complaints of their
excesses. The majority of complaints during the year involved
individual cases; while there have been complaints of individual houses
being destroyed, there were no reports of entire villages being burned
by armed forces or of mass killings, as in past years. The NHRC
continues to receive complaints alleging human rights violations by the
security forces, especially from Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern
states.
There were many allegations that military and paramilitary forces
in the northeast engage in abduction, torture, rape, arbitrary
detention, and the extrajudicial execution of militants (see Sections
1.b., 1.c., 1.d., and 1.g.). The Armed Forces Special Powers Act of
1958 and the Disturbed Areas Act of 1976 remained in effect in several
states in which active secessionist movements exist, namely, in Jammu
and Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and parts of Tripura. The
Disturbed Areas Act gives police extraordinary powers of arrest and
detention, which, according to human rights groups, allow security
forces to operate with virtual impunity in areas under the act. The
Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 provides search and arrest
powers without warrants (see Section 1.d.).
Human rights monitors allege that, as in Jammu and Kashmir,
government reports of deaths during ``encounters'' between insurgent
groups and security forces in northeastern states actually are staged,
and that those insurgents who were reported dead were killed after
being detained by security forces. More than 30 encounters occurred
between security forces and militant groups in Tripura alone during the
first 9 months of the year. In March Assam chief minister Prafulla
Kumar Mahanta told the press that 1,439 persons had been killed during
the state's conflict; of these, 430 were security force members. There
were at least 60 insurgency-related killings in Assam between January
and June, according to an informal estimate from press reports. For
example, on April 7, army personnel killed six suspected United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) militants in an encounter in the
Manasdiga Forest, Bongaigaon district. The People's Union for Civil
Liberties (PUCL) credibly reported that army troops killed 12 members
of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN(I-M))
in an encounter on July 11 along the Assam-Manipur border close to the
Jiri River at Bolapunj in Assam's northern Cachar district. There were
no army casualties in the encounter. The district administration in
Meghalaya ordered an investigation of an August 24 police shooting in
which two Khasi student union leaders were killed. The two students
allegedly were members of the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council
(HNLC) and were suspected of having killed three nontribal laborers in
Meghalaya in 1999. The South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center
(SAHRDC) credibly reported that on September 10, members of the 17th
Battalion of the Assam Rifles, led by Major Rawal, took Khundrakpam
Tomcha, Surjit Chongthamcha, Ito Tongbram, and Robin Thokchom into
custody in the home of Naorem Dwijamani at Chingamthak, Thokchom
Leikai, Imphal, Manipur; authorities detained Dwijamani later the same
day. It is believed that the Assam Rifles took the five persons to
their headquarters in Kangla. On September 12, police found a bullet-
riddled body, which subsequently was identified as that of Khundrakpam
Tomcha, on a bank of the Imphal River near Singjamei, Thokchom Leikai,
Imphal. On September 12, the Assam Rifles stated that security forces
had killed Khundrakpam Tomcha in crossfire between security forces and
insurgents during an operation against insurgents on September 11.
However, witnesses allege that the body also bore marks of torture. On
September 13, the 17th Battalion Assam Rifles released to police Naorem
Dwijamani and Robin Thokchom into police custody. According to press
reports, Thokchom had been tortured (see Section 1.c.). Dwijamani
subsequently was released on bail, but as of November, Thokchom
remained in the central Imphal jail, facing charges under the National
Security Act (NSA).
Since 1980 clashes between police members and Naxalite Maoist
Revolutionaries of the Peoples' War Group (PWG) have occurred in
northwestern Andhra Pradesh. During the late 1990's, hundreds of
policemen and suspected Naxalites were killed, according to press
reports and human rights organizations. According to police, 101 PWG
Naxalites were killed in armed ``encounters'' during the first 8 months
of the year. Twenty years of guerrilla-style conflict have led to
serious human rights abuses committed by both sides. Human rights
groups allege that ``encounters'' often are faked by the police to
cover up the torture and subsequent killing of Naxalite suspects,
sympathizers, or informers. According to police, the PWG killed 31
police officers and 80 civilians, including the former home minister of
the state, from January 1 to December 14. In PWG-dominated areas,
villagers complain of regular harassment and arbitrary detention by
police (see Section 1.d.). Police officials rarely, if ever, are held
accountable for human rights abuses.
The state government offers a financial package to surrendered PWG
militants, a program that has prompted hundreds of Naxalites to leave
the movement in recent years. According to human rights activists and
journalists, a few surrendered militants have been allowed to retain
their weapons and now are working for the police as anti-PWG hitmen,
residing in police camps and barracks. On November 23, four assailants
killed human rights lawyer and former PWG militant Purusuotham in
Hyderabad. Police arrested four suspects a few days later, two of whom
were identified as ex-PWG militants. The two persons confessed to the
killing at a press conference that was quickly organized by the police.
Police attributed the killing to feuds dating back to the victim's time
spent in the PWG.
An ``encounter'' death occurred in Tamil Nadu on January 10, when
police shot and killed a Naxalite, Ravindran, in Dharmapuri district.
Police claimed that they opened fire after Ravindran and three other
Naxalites ambushed a police patrol. A factfinding team of human rights
NGO's, citing inconsistencies in the police reports and the testimony
of another Naxalite who was taken into custody during the same
incident, alleged that Ravindran was arrested on January 7, tortured,
and later executed (see Section 1.c.). On July 20, Andhra Pradesh
police killed seven Naxalites in Karimnagar district. According to
police, the Naxalites began firing at police officers who were
surrounding a safehouse used by the extremists, and the seven were
killed in the ensuing return of fire by police. However, human rights
NGO's allege that police deliberately set fire to the house before the
outbreak of gunfire and then fired bullets into the structure for
several hours, killing the Naxalites. On October 30, police surprised
an armed group of seven female Naxalites in Gadampalli, Andhra Pradesh.
Police opened fire while the women were bathing in a stream, killing
all seven. No policemen were injured or killed in the encounter. On
November 2, police officers killed Jadhav Subash, a former Naxalite, in
Dantepalli village, Andhra Pradesh. According to human rights lawyers
who interviewed village eyewitnesses, a squad of policemen dragged
Subash from a village tea shop and then shot and killed him.
As evidence that ``encounters'' often are faked by police, human
rights groups cite the refusal of police officials to turn over the
bodies of suspects killed in ``encounters.'' The bodies often are
cremated before families can view them. The NHRC is investigating about
285 reported cases of socalled ``fake encounter deaths'' allegedly
committed by the Andhra Pradesh police in connection with anti-Naxalite
operations. In its 1996-97 report, the NHRC stated that the evidence on
record did not reveal any prior police attempt to arrest the persons
before they were killed. The report observed that in none of these
encounters did police personnel receive any injury. The Commission
further observed that ``no attempt whatsoever'' was made to ascertain
the identity of the police officers who fired the weapons, and that no
attempt was made to investigate the circumstances under which the
police opened fire. ``As this appeared to be the pattern of the
procedure followed by the police,'' the report concluded, ``the
Commission felt it necessary to conclude that the procedure followed by
them was opposed to law.'' According to the Andhra Pradesh Civil
Liberties Committee, the NHRC has evidence of police culpability in
several cases of ``encounter deaths'' involving suspected Naxalites.
However, such cases have not been adjudicated in the courts or
otherwise have not been acted on by the state government. For example,
of six cases referred by the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee
to the NHRC in 1994, evidence of police culpability was found in five.
In 1994 the NHRC directed the state government to investigate the
cases; however, the state never has taken any action. The state
government's failure to act expeditiously in these cases has
discouraged local human rights groups from filing additional
``encounter death'' cases with the NHRC.
The Disturbed Areas Act has been in force in a number of districts
in Andhra Pradesh for over 3 years. Human rights groups allege that
security forces have been able to operate with virtual impunity in
parts of Andhra Pradesh under the act. They further allege that Andhra
Pradesh police officers train and provide weapons to an armed vigilante
group known as the ``Green Tigers,'' whose mission is to combat
Naxalite groups in the state. Little is known about the size,
composition, or activities of this group.
Police also used excessive force indiscriminately against
demonstrators, killing many citizens. For example, according to Amnesty
International, on January 31, police killed two ``Dalit'' (formerly
``untouchable'') men in Jethuke village, Bhatinda district, Punjab,
when they opened fire on hundreds of persons demonstrating over high
bus fares and the detention of four leaders of the Bharatiya Kisan
Union (Indian Farmers Union), who were representing villagers in
negotiations with the district administration regarding the issue (see
Section 2.b.). On May 8, in Dibrugarh, Assam, police killed two persons
when they opened fire on the funeral procession of a businessman and
his son--who allegedly were killed by surrendered ULFA militants
working at police behest. On May 10, police fired 23 rounds of bullets
into a mob of Karbi People's Front (KPF) supporters in Jalpaiguri, West
Bengal, killing 1 person and injuring 5 others. During the year, a
government commission completed its investigation of the drowning
deaths of 17 persons in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu. The deaths occurred in
July 1999, when thousands of demonstrators ran into a river to escape
police beatings. The demonstrators were demanding government
intervention in a labor dispute at a local coffee estate and the
release of 652 estate workers imprisoned after a previous
demonstration. Human rights groups in Tamil Nadu criticized the
commission's findings, claiming that the commission exonerated senior
police officials, and implied that the demonstrators themselves were
responsible for the drownings. No charges in connection with the
drownings had been brought against any police official by year's end.
On April 4, police in Mau district, Uttar Pradesh, confronted a
group of 20 to 25 women staging a sitdown strike to demand the removal
of a liquor-vending stall from their village, according to PUCL. After
failing to persuade the women to disperse, police charged the group
with bamboo poles. When this failed to move the women, the police
opened fire on the unarmed protesters, killing one of them. On December
18, police in Keshori village, Gondia district, Maharashtra, fired on a
crowd of persons, killing 5 persons and injuring 31 others. The
villagers asserted that the police firing followed an altercation that
arose when villagers objected to some drunken policemen sexually
harrassing a village woman. Police initially claimed that they had
fired in self-defense. The entire police contingent later was
transferred to another district. On December 31, police in Rayagada
district, Orissa, fired on villagers protesting the attempt of a
multinational company to set up an aluminum plant in the predominantly
tribal area; three persons were killed.
Throughout the country, numerous accused criminals continue to be
killed in encounters with police. For example, the Institute of
Objective Study in its ``Human Rights Today'' bulletin of winter 1999-
2000 reported that on January 14, police in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, shot
and killed 20-year-old Meerut College student Smita Bhaduri. Three
police officers--Inspector A.K. Kaushik, Constables Surendra, and
Bhagwan Sahay of Daurala police station--were told that ``gangsters
were prowling'' Sewaya village on the outskirts of Meerut. After
arriving at the village, the three officers shot at an automobile,
believing it to be the gangsters' vehicle, killing Bhaduri. The
officers allegedly reported that Bhaduri was killed by ``crossfire''
during an ``encounter'' with gang members.
According to the Government, 542 civilians and 96 police officers
died in gunfire exchanges involving police in 1998.
Security forces also held persons in incommunicado detention; on
occasion, as in the 1996 case of human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi,
such missing persons later were found dead (see Sections 1.b. and 4).
As of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial death
still were pending against Border Security Force personnel in Jammu and
Kashmir (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
While extrajudicial killings continued in areas affected by
separatist insurgencies, the press and judiciary also continued to give
attention to deaths in police custody. According to the NHRC, 1,114
persons died in prisons between April 1998 and March 1999, many from
natural causes that in some cases aggravated by poor prison conditions
(see Section 1.c.). Human rights groups allege that many deaths in
prisons are due to torture. There were numerous examples of prison
deaths due to torture throughout the year (see Section 1.c.).
The NHRC has focused on torture and deaths in custody by directing
district magistrates to report all deaths in police and judicial
custody and stating that failure to do so would be interpreted as an
attempted coverup. Magistrates appear to be complying with this
directive. However, the NHRC has no authority to investigate directly
abuses by the security forces, and security forces therefore are not
required to--and do notreport custodial deaths in Jammu and Kashmir or
the northeastern states. In August the NHRC ordered an investigation
into the death in police custody of Rajan Singh in September 1995 in
Agra district jail. Police stated that Singh, who was being transported
to court for trial in a police truck, died of injuries sustained when
he jumped from the vehicle in an effort to escape. The autopsy revealed
that Singh had undergone shock and hemorrhaging prior to his death. The
NHRC found that the postmortem results were inconsistent with the
police explanation of the death and believed that the claim of Singh's
attempted escape from custody was fabricated and that a more likely
explanation was that Singh ``could have been subjected to severe
beating in the police vehicle.'' The NHRC ordered Uttar Pradesh state
to pay $10,990 (500,000 rupees) in compensation to Singh's next of kin
and recommended disciplinary action against the police officers
involved in the incident. Also in August, the NHRC directed the
Karnataka government to pay compensation of $4,395 (200,000 rupees) to
the family of Thimmaiah, who died in the Mulbagal police station, Kolar
district, Karnataka. The police maintain that Thimmaiah hanged himself
in his cell; however, the postmortem and inquest reports forwarded by
the Karnataka government do not substantiate this claim. The Commission
concluded that the death ``had been caused by police,'' and ordered the
government of Karnataka to bring charges against the police officers
involved in the incident.
According to the PUCL, on February 17, Nathan died in police
custody in Chennai. Police assert that they arrested Nathan on February
16 on suspicion of theft and that he confessed to that crime in court
the same day. They further maintain that Nathan complained of diarrhea
and vomiting the following morning; he later was taken to a nearby
hospital and declared dead. However, the PUCL alleges that Nathan
actually was arrested on February 10, 6 days before the recorded
arrest, and that police tortured him to death in an effort to recover
stolen money. The Tamil Nadu government initiated an official inquiry
into the death and suspended six police personnel, including an
inspector, after the incident. Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch (HRW) reported that on April 20, police in Gujarat beat to death
Colonel Pratap Save, an activist with the Kinara Bachao Samiti (Save
the Coast Committee), which was protesting the construction of a port
in Gujarat. Members of the State Reserve Police allegedly arrested 46
demonstrators, including Save, following the protest, and beat 6 of
them at a local police station (see Section 1.c.). Save suffered a
brain hemorrhage and died at a hospital in Mumbai. All of the other
protesters were released on bail within 48 hours. The Karnataka branch
of the PUCL alleged that police in Moodabidri town, Mangalore district,
Karnataka, were responsible for the custodial death of Sudath Kumar
Jain, a 40year-old local film projectionist. The human rights group
alleges that police took Jain from his home for questioning shortly
after midnight on May 30. Two hours later, his relatives were informed
that he had been admitted to a hospital; his relatives found Jain
unconscious and bleeding from his mouth. Jain was transferred to a
second hospital late that morning where he died 3 hours later. The PUCL
concluded that police had tortured Jain to death (see Section 1.c.).
After the investigation results, the superintendent of police, South
Kanara district, filed a criminal case against the arresting officer.
Human rights groups allege that police in Adilabad district, Andhra
Pradesh tortured and then hanged Chandraiah, an unarmed suspected
Naxalite, on June 10. Angry villagers forced one of the police
officials to confess to the hanging. Based on his confession, human
rights activists filed a formal complaint with the NHRC. The NHRC has
directed the Andhra Pradesh government to investigate. The PUCL
reported that Krishna Pada Seal, his wife, and his son were imprisoned
in Sakchi Jail, Jamshedpur, Bihar on July 25. According to the PUCL,
prison officials tortured them, allegedly because they intended to
extort money from the family (see Section 1.c.). Seal and his family
were granted bail on August 4, following the intercession of the PUCL.
On his release, Seal could not walk, and died as he was being carried
to a waiting car. According to credible reports, on August 3,
Lalrinchana, a 25-year-old Chin refugee, died from torture in the
Mizoram Aizawl central prison. Reportedly, village defense persons
first arrested and tortured Lalrinchana, and then turned him over to
the Mizoram police (see Section 2.d.). In August the Karnataka High
Court convicted eight police officers who served in Nanjangud Police
Station in Karnataka in 1996 for fabricating official records following
a custodial death. The Karnataka police oversaw the entire
investigation and presentation of evidence.
In its 2000 annual report, Amnesty International expressed concern
about the torture death of 21-year-old Devinder Singh. On September 18,
1999, police beat Devinder Singh, Sapinder Singh, and Karnail Singh
(three Sikh brothers), in a police courtyard in Punjab, apparently to
exact a confession from them that they possessed an assault rifle.
Allegedly, police pulled their legs open 180 degrees, applied gasoline
to their genitals, and beat them badly. Devinder Singh died as result
of his injuries. A police subinspector subsequently was charged with
Devinder Singh's murder.
An army major was arrested in 1998 for the 1996 killing of human
rights monitor Jalil Andrabi. The case still was being heard at year's
end, but human rights workers alleged that the central Government and
Jammu and Kashmir state both were attempting to subvert the judicial
process by withholding evidence, and that there were no court actions
during the year. There were no developments in the 1996 killing of
human rights monitor Parag Kumar Das, who allegedly was killed by a
militant who previously had surrendered and was supported by the
Government (see Section 4).
Killings and abductions of suspected militants and other persons by
progovernment countermilitants continued to be a significant problem in
Jammu and Kashmir. Countermilitants are former separatist militants who
have surrendered to government forces, but who have retained their
weapons and paramilitary organization. Government agencies fund,
exchange intelligence with, and direct operations of countermilitants
as part of the counterinsurgency effort. Countermilitants are known to
search persons at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.) and guard extensive
areas of the Kashmir Valley from attacks by militants. The Government,
through its sponsoring and condoning of extrajudicial countermilitant
activities, is responsible for killings, abductions, and other abuses
committed by these militant groups. Perhaps as many as 3,000
individuals continue to operate in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in
the countryside, outside major towns. The Hizbul Mujahideen, a Kashmiri
militant group, stated in June 1998 that progovernment countermilitants
had killed 350 of its members. According to Pakistani newspaper
accounts, Indian security forces had killed 438 Pakistani members of
insurgent groups in Jammu and Kashmir during 1999. Of this number, 200
were members of the LashkareTayyaba, 123 were members of the Al-Badr
Mujahideen, 69 were members of the Harkat-Ul-Mujahideenand, and 46 were
members of the Hizbul Mujahideen. However, these numbers have not been
confirmed, and only include the four largest militant groups in the
state. The Government stated that security forces had killed 1,520
militants in the state during the year, compared with 1,082 in 1999.
The Government recruited countermilitants into the Special Operations
Group of the Jammu and Kashmir police and into the Border Security
Force.
Militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir increasingly targeted members
of the security forces and civilians during the year. In January
militants allegedly killed two soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir; the
soldiers retaliated with arson. On February 28, militants killed five
Hindu truck drivers on the SrinagarJammu Highway (see Section 5).
According to HRW, in February militants allegedly shot and killed three
police officers in the busy market area of Lal Chowk, Srinagar;
security forces retaliated by beating nearby civilians with sticks and
rifle butts and by burning cars in Srinagar (see Section 1.c.). On
March 20, militants massacred 35 Sikh inhabitants of Chatisinghpura
town, Anantnag district, Jammu and Kashmir, in what appeared to be a
well-planned attack. The militants, dressed in military uniforms,
separated unarmed male members of the Sikh families from women and
children, gathered the men in a school complex a short distance from
their homes, and summarily executed them. It was the first known attack
on the Sikh minority in Jammu and Kashmir by militants, and it appeared
intended to drive other members of that community from the Muslim-
majority state (see Section 5).
On March 24, militants invaded a Muslim family's home and killed
five family members in Kot Budhan village, Udhampur district. The
militants stormed into the house in the early morning, beat family
members, and then shot them at point-blank range; three other family
members, including a child, were wounded in the attack. According to
HRW, on April 17, gunmen entered the homes of several Hindu families in
Kot Dara village, near Rajouri. They fired on the unarmed civilians,
killing six persons and injuring six others (see Section 5). On August
1 and 2, militants launched 8 separate and coordinated attacks in Jammu
and Kashmir, killing approximately 99 persons. In one of the attacks,
at Pahalgam, armed militants descended on a camp of Hindu religious
pilgrims making the annual pilgrimage to Amarnat, in the northern part
of the state. The militants fired automatic weapons at the pilgrims'
tents, the unarmed civilians in the camp, their local porters and
guides, and nearby army personnel, killing 32 persons, primarily
unarmed civilians. Similar attacks throughout the night of August 1 to
2 appeared to have been intended to halt the nascent effort of the
Hizbul Mujahideen militant group and the Government to observe a
ceasefire and initiate a dialog. An army-headed commission investigated
the August 1 Phalagam massacre and reported on October 31, that the
Home Ministry's Central Reserve Police Force and the SOG of the Jammu
and Kashmir police force used excessive force; however, there were no
charges brought in connection with this use of excessive force. On
August 17, militants from Harkat-ul-Jehade Islami reportedly killed six
Hindu villagers and seriously wounded seven in the Rajouri district in
Jammu (see Section 5). According to HRW, on August 18, militants killed
three elderly men and a teenage boy, and wounded two other persons when
they fired automatic weapons at civilians in Ind village, Udhampur (see
Section 5). On September 12, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen
militants wearing army uniforms entered an army camp at Beerwa, Budgam
district, and fired automatic weapons at the sleeping soldiers; 11
soldiers were killed. Two of the attackers were killed in the ensuing
gun battle. In early December, militants killed two members of a
policeman's family and wounded two others when they barged into a house
in the border district of Poonch and opened fire. Militants also
carried out attacks on security forces that killed numerous persons
(see Section 1.g.). On December 22, six militants with concealed
weapons entered Delhi's Red Fort, an historic monument that also houses
an army unit, during a regularly scheduled sound and light show for the
public. The militants opened fire on the crowd, killing a soldier and
two civilians. The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militant group later claimed
responsibility for the attack. On December 26, city police raided a
Delhi apartment and shot and killed Abu Shamal, whom they claimed to be
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militant involved in the Red Fort attack.
Killings of security force members by militants in Jammu and
Kashmir increased for the third year in a row. According to official
statistics, 397 security force personnel were killed in the state
during the year. The Ministry of Home Affairs reported that 356
security force members were killed in the state in 1999 and that 232
members died in Jammu and Kashmir in 1998.
Insurgency and increased ethnic violence took a heavy toll in the
northeastern states. Extensive, complex patterns of violence continued
in many of the seven northeastern states. The main insurgent groups in
the northeast include two factions of the National Socialist Council of
Nagaland (NSCN) in Nagaland; Meitei extremists in Manipur; the ULFA and
the Bodo security force in Assam; and the All Tripura Tiger Force
(ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in Tripura.
The proclaimed objective of many of these groups is to secede from the
country, creating new, independent nations. Their stated grievances
against the Government range from charges of neglect and indifference
to the widespread poverty of the region, to allegations of active
discrimination against the tribal and nontribal people of the region by
the central Government (see Section 5). The oldest of these conflicts,
involving the Nagas, dates back to the country's independence in 1947.
On August 1, 1997, a ceasefire between the Government and the Isak-
Muivah faction of the NSCN (NSCN-IM) entered into effect. The ceasefire
was extended in January until July 31, 2001. In April another Naga
insurgent group, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
(NSCN-K), announced a formal ceasefire. Security forces were not
operating against either of the two NSCN factions and both generally
were observing the ceasefire with security forces. However, in April
week-long fighting between the 2 NSCN factions left over 45 persons
dead, and 4,500 persons were forced to flee 15 villages in Mon district
(see Section 2.d.). Negotiations to widen the area of application of
the ceasefire were handicapped when NSCN(I-M) leader Thuingaleng Muivah
was arrested in Thailand on January 19 for travelling on a forged South
Korean passport. On August 25, a joint group of Thai and Indian
citizens appealed to the central Government to secure the release of
the NSCN(IM) leader in the interest of Naga peace talks. He was
released on bail in September.
Elsewhere in the northeast, Bodo-Santhal ethnic clashes, which
began in April 1998, continued throughout the year. More than 87,000
persons live under poor conditions in relief camps in Assam's
Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, and adjoining districts as a result of the
ongoing violence between Bodos and Santhals. The killings of ULFA
leaders' family members during the year renewed concerns about the
situation in Assam.
Militant groups in Manipur, Tripura, and Assam continued to attack
civilians.
In Tripura on January 3, the NLFT killed three persons, including
Ravi Kumar Devbarma, a Communist Party of India (Marxist)CPI(M)-leader,
in Kashichandrapara. Prior to the April 30 to May 3 elections for the
Tripura tribal autonomous district council, ultras (militants)
threatened to harm seriously persons who voted in favor of any
candidate not belonging to the Indigenous People's Front of Tripura
(IPFT). During the period before the election, more than 1,500
nontribal families from 3 villages were left homeless as tribals backed
by militants intensified their offensive to cleanse autonomous district
council areas of Bengalis. On April 14, the NLFT killed four nontribal
villagers in Ramdulapara, north Tripura. Reportedly, the NLFT was
retaliating for a United Bengali Liberation Force (UBLF) attack nearby
on March 8 in which a villager was killed and six tribals were injured
seriously. On April 15, the NLFT killed at least 12 villagers in Khas
Kalyanpur, West Tripura. On May 4, NLFT militants shot three family
members of Kishore Debbarma, an NLFT deserter. On May 15, NLFT
militants killed four persons and abducted three others in west and
south Tripura (see Section 1.b.). CPM sources allege that all of the
victims were CPM supporters and that the NLFT was punishing them for
voting for the CPM in the council polls. On May 19, NLFT insurgents
killed seven nontribals--including CPM workers' family members--and set
fire to several houses in south and west Tripura. On May 20, at least 8
persons were killed and more than 20 others were injured in Kalyanpur,
west Tripura. On May 21, 15 persons were killed in Teliamura and
Kalyanpur in attacks on tribals by non-tribals. NLFT insurgents killed
40 villagers in west Tripura on May 21, including 19 nontribals who
were massacred at a relief camp in Kalyanpur. On May 22, NLFT
insurgents killed three nontribals in Gandachhara. On May 25, NLFT
members raided the house of a CPM leader in west Tripura, and burned
alive his 8-year-old son. On May 26, ATTF rebels killed a tribal person
and kidnaped four others (see Section 1.b.). On May 28, the NLFT shot
and killed two farmers in Raiabari. On June 6, ATTF ultra's hacked a
person to death in Warengtubari. On June 13, two persons, including a
paramilitary officer, were killed in an ethnic clash in Telaimura, in
which a Bengali mob, angered at a killing by tribals, turned violent.
On June 23, NLFT militants kidnaped and killed a person in Anandapur
village. On June 26, four persons were injured in ethnic clashes
between tribals and Bengalis in Teliamura. On July 9, NLFT militants
shot and killed Dhirendra Roy, a CPM leader at Salema. On July 14,
tribals set fire to more than 150 houses, injured 3 persons, and
kidnaped another in Teliamura. On July 22, rebels of the Bru National
Liberation Front (BNLF), a group of Reang tribals, shot 12 NLFT
activists at Saikarbari. On July 25, tribal rebels killed Roman
Catholic priest Victor Crasta near Bongsul village. The same day UBLF
activists set 25 houses on fire in west Tripura. On August 17,
militants killed a villager at Panisagar and abducted three persons
from Manu (see Section 1.b.). On August 26, NLFT insurgents killed one
tribal youth in Sidhai, a fisherman at Jarulbachai, and a plantation
worker in Narendrapur Tea Estate. On August 27, Bengalis in Tripura
State Rifles uniforms hacked to death three tribal women in Durga
Charan Para village. NLFT ultra's killed a priest as he was exiting a
Kali temple in Jirania on August 27 (see Section 5). On November 19,
NLFT members killed six Bengali settlers, including two children, in
the remote Barahaldi area of Tripura; a few hours later, Bengali
settlers killed seven tribals in retaliation.
In Assam, on April 9, United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
militants lined up 11 non-Karbi laborers in the Dhansari Reserve Forest
in Karbi Anglong district, and shot at them. (The UPDS is a Karbi
radical group fighting for greater autonomy for the Karbis, and Karbis
are tribal peoples native to KarbiAnglong district.) On April 19, UPDS
militants killed 11 Nepalis at East and West Umplapher villages. On
April 24, UPDS militants killed six Bihari laborers in Akhoiputua as
part of their ethnic cleansing drive in Karbi Anglong district. In
April alone, the Karbis killed 29 persons. In an ambush near Haflong,
Dima Halam Daoga (DHD), militants killed an executive magistrate and
five others on May 18. On June 3, ULFA militants at Srijangram in
Bongaigaon killed two Assam policemen. On June 20, two CRPF personnel
and a top People's United Liberation Front (PULF) leader were killed in
an encounter at Motinagar. On June 25, surrendered ULFA leader Tarun
Phukan was found dead; it is believed that ULFA activists killed him at
Sivsagar. On July 16, UPDS activists in Karbi Anglong district shot 10
nontribals, mostly women and children. On July 18, migrant Biharis
killed six Karbi villagers in Karbi Anglong. On July 26, DHD militants
opened fire in a marketplace at Herangajao, killing two traders and
injuring six others. On August 20, suspected National Democratic Front
of Bodoland (NDFB) militants killed Bodo Sahitya Sabha President
Bineswar Brahma in Guwahati. On August 21, at Bijni, NDFB rebels killed
eight persons including a Peoples Democratic Front Legislator, Mohini
Basumatary. On August 22, Bodo militants killed a former All Assam
Students Union Leader. On August 27, a man affiliated with the People's
United Liberation Front (PULF) killed a 7yearold Muslim boy in Cachar
for unknown reasons, generating protests from Muslim organizations such
as Nadwadoot Tamir and the Cachar Koumi Madrassa Students' Association.
On December 7, in Sadiya, Assam, more than 20 ULFA militants killed 28
persons after intercepting 3 trucks carrying non-Assamese, mainly
Nepali settlers, from a nearby market.
On June 10, unidentified militants killed noted playwright and
social worker Arambam Somorendra at Khurai Salanthong. On June 28,
unknown assailants killed 10 passengers in a car on the Imphal-Jiri
stretch of National Highway 53. On July 30, unidentified militants
killed four security personnel and injured many others in an ambush
near Mao, bordering Nagaland. In mid-November suspected militants of
the People's Liberation Army of Manipur shot and killed five army
personnel in the Mutukhong area of east Imphal district.
Many members of the Hmar Revolutionary Force (HRF) in Mizoram
accepted the state government's offer of amnesty in return for
surrendering their arms. On June 6, 16 HRF members relinquished arms
before state Home Minister Tawnluia. They received $215 (10,000 rupees)
each for rehabilitation. In Assam more than 2,000 extremists
surrendered their arms during the year. A new Assam government package
for insurgents attempted to rehabilitate rural and urban ultras
separately, through various economic development and training programs.
On February 6, ``organizing secretaries'' of the ULFA Khairul Hussain
and Phukan Ali and ``medical-in-charge'' Tajuddin Ahmed surrendered to
the army in lower Assam. On March 21, 22 ULFA members surrendered
before Sonitpur district administration in Tezpur. On April 4, 532
Assam militants (436 ULFA members, 77 Karbi National Volunteers, and 19
National Democratic Front of Bodoland) surrendered at Rang Ghar. On
April 18, 48 ULFA and NDFB militants surrendered before village elders
in lower Assam's Darrang district. On May 2, 75 militants (54 ULFA, 12
Rabha National Security Force, 8 Muslim United Liberation Tigers of
Assam, and 1 Koch Rajbangshi) surrendered in Goalpara before the
district administration. On May 30, 25 ULFA militants relinquished arms
before the army at Bongaigaon.
The kidnaping of NGO environmental monitor Sanjay Ghosh in 1997 and
his death at the hands of his ULFA captors continued to attract wide
public criticism. In August 1997, ULFA confirmed that Ghosh died in
captivity after being ``arrested and tried.'' ULFA still has not
produced Ghosh's body. In June 1999, the CBI filed murder charges in
connection with the case against ULFA leader Paresh Arua and 10 other
ULFA members. During the year, surrendered ULFA militant Lohit Deuri
told the police that ULFA has kept one of the killers of development
worker Sanjoy Ghosh in ``solitary confinement'' since 1999. The alleged
killer, Khirod Gohain, is serving a ``sentence'' for indiscipline.
Naxalite Maoist revolutionaries of the PWG killed dozens of
persons, declaring them ``class enemies'' or police informers. On
September 3, three PWG members shot and killed a former Naxalite,
Krishnan, in Nizamabad district, Andhra Pradesh. Krishnan had
surrendered to police earlier. The militants left a note accusing him
of being a police informant. On May 30, PWG Naxalites shot one person
and blew up a government guesthouse in a village in Andhra Pradesh. In
areas under their control, Naxalites dispense summary justice in
``People's Courts,'' which in some cases condemn to death suspected
police informers, village headmen, and others deemed to be ``class
enemies'' or ``caste oppressors'' (landlords); the Naxalites also
extort money from these groups, as well as businesses. Naxalite
violence has plagued Andhra Pradesh since the early 1980's, and has
claimed more than 500 civilian and police victims since 1996 alone (see
Sections 1.g. and 5).
In November 1997, an independent commission of inquiry established
by Parliament in 1991 to investigate the May 21, 1991 assassination of
former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi tabled an interim report of its
findings in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament). The report
blamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as clearly
responsible for the assassination but was inconclusive on the question
of whether the LTTE had received assistance in carrying out the murder.
It criticized the then-government for its alleged failure to provide
comprehensive security for the former Prime Minister. On January 28,
1998, a designated lower court in Chennai sentenced to death all 26
persons accused in the assassination. The CBI originally charged 41
persons in the case; 12 since have died, and 3 have evaded capture
(including LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan). Many of those
sentenced, who include both Indian and Sri Lankan nationals, allegedly
were involved only peripherally in the assassination plot, but the
court upheld the CBI contention that all of them were aware that they
were conspiring in a common cause. Having heard an appeal of the
convictions, the Supreme Court in May 1999, acquitted 19 of the 26
accused persons and upheld the convictions of 7 persons (see Section
1.e.). It sustained the death sentence in the case of four of the
convicted persons and changed the sentence of three others to life
imprisonment.
Nearly 50 persons were killed in election-related violence
throughout the country in September and October (see Sections 1.g. and
4).
Religiously and ethnically motivated violence caused numerous
deaths (see Section 5).
Mob lynchings of tribal people occur in many states (see Section
5).
b. Disappearance.--According to human rights groups,
unacknowledged, incommunicado detention of suspected militants
continued in Jammu and Kashmir; however, the Government has not
released any recent figures.
The Ministry of Home Affairs reported that 744 suspected militants
were arrested in 1999 and 109 persons surrendered. In comparison,
according to the Jammu and Kashmir police, 1,228 suspected militants
were arrested in 1998 and 187 persons surrendered. Human rights
organizations allege that the decline in the number of militants
arrested from 1998 to 1999 is consistent with reports that security
forces are killing many militants captured in ``encounters'' (see
Section 1.a.); that pattern continued during the year. Of those
arrested and who surrendered in 1998, 529 persons were released after
preliminary questioning, 457 persons were charged under special
security laws, and the remaining persons were released at a later stage
of judicial review. In addition the Jammu and Kashmir police stated
that in 1998 it held 514 persons under the Public Safety Act (PSA).
According to an Amnesty International report that was released during
the year, there are between 700 and 800 unsolved disappearances in
Kashmir since 1990. The Home Ministry reported that security forces in
the northeastern states arrested 1,413 suspected militants in 1999; an
additional 1,080 militants surrendered during that year. In comparison
1,485 suspected militants were arrested and 267 persons surrendered in
1998. The Government was unable to provide complete statistics for the
number of persons held under special security laws in the northeastern
states, but acknowledged that 43 persons were in detention under the
National Security Act as of December 31, 1998. Although the Government
allowed the Terrorist and Disruptive Practices (Prevention) Act (TADA)
to lapse in 1995, human rights organization credibly reported that more
than 1,000 persons remained in detention awaiting prosecution under the
law. Several thousand others are held in short-term (1 day to 6 months
duration) confinement in transit and interrogation centers.
Human rights groups maintain that several hundred more persons are
held by the military and paramilitary forces in long-term
unacknowledged detention in interrogation centers and transit camps in
Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeastern states that nominally are
intended for only short-term confinement. Human rights groups fear that
many of these unacknowledged prisoners are subject to torture and
extrajudicial killing (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). According to one
NGO, there were 1,300 writs of habeas corpus pending in the Jammu and
Kashmir High Court in 1999. In August Amnesty International reported
that the fates of up to 1,000 persons reported missing in Jammu and
Kashmir since 1990 remain unexplained by authorities. The U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Torture reported in 1997 that more than 15,000 habeas
corpus petitions have been filed in the country since 1990, ``but that
in the vast majority of these cases the authorities had not responded
to the petitions.'' In 1999 the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR) transmitted 33 newly reported cases of disappearance to the
Government, 14 of which reportedly occurred in 1998. The Government
submitted information on eight cases of disappearance to the working
group in 1999.
HRW reported that M. Akbar Tantray, an imam of a mosque in
Rafiabad, Jammu and Kashmir, was reported missing on February 8.
Shortly after his January 30 arrest by an army unit, unit officials
told family members that Tantray was not in their custody. In February
the NHRC issued a notice to the Union Defense Secretary requiring him
to report on the whereabouts of Abdul Rasheed Wani of Bemina, Jammu and
Kashmir. According to family members, an army patrol arrested Wani near
the Srinagar fruit market on July 7, 1997 and he has not been seen
since. In August Amnesty International appealed to the Government to
investigate the growing number of disappearances in Jammu and Kashmir.
The organization estimated that as many as 1,000 persons had
``disappeared'' in the state since 1990. In September the NHRC issued a
notice to the Chief Secretary and Director General of Police in Jammu
and Kashmir and the Secretaries of the Union Home and Defense
Minisitries requiring them to report on missing persons in the state
within 8 weeks; however, there was no public information regarding the
authorities complied with the directive.
In one prominent case in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government
responded to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or
Arbitrary Executions in 1997, states that human rights monitor Jalil
Andrabi was not arrested by security forces, as alleged by human rights
groups, but was abducted by ``unidentified armed persons.'' Andrabi
last was seen alive in the presence of countermilitants and members of
the security forces on March 8, 1996, in Srinagar. Despite the
Government's statement, the army in February 1996 identified to a
Srinagar court a major with a temporary commission as the individual
primarily responsible for Andrabi's death. Security forces allegedly
dumped Andrabi's body into the Jhelum River. His case also is the
subject of an inquiry by the NHRC. In 1998 an army major was arrested
for the killing of Andrabi. There was no progress in the case by year's
end, and the accused major no longer is in detention (see Sections 1.a.
and 4). In April 1998, the Government stated that it would investigate
the fate of eight persons who reportedly disappeared in Jammu and
Kashmir during 1997: Fayaz Ahmad Beigh, Fayaz Ahmad Khan, Abdula Rashid
Wahid, Mohammed Ashraf Dar, Mohammed Afzal Shah, Nisar Ahmad Wani,
Manzoor Ahmad Dar, and Bilal Ahmad Sheikh. In September 1998, the
Government accounted for only one of the eight persons, claiming that
Fayaz Ahmad Beigh had escaped from police custody on September 9, 1997,
and was believed to have crossed the line of control into Pakistan. By
year's end, no new information was available on any of these cases. As
of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial death still
were pending against Border Security Force personnel in Jammu and
Kashmir (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
The Government maintains that screening committees administered by
the state governments provide information about detainees to their
families. However, other sources indicate that families are able to
confirm the detention of their relatives only by bribing prison guards.
For example, in May the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)
published an appeal by Sunita Majumdar, the mother of Partha Majumdar,
who was taken from his home by police in District 24 Parganas, West
Bengal, in September 1997, and has not been seen since. Police have
provided no information in the case despite a request from the State
Human Rights Commission. Partha Majumdar was a witness to an alleged
police shooting that left one person dead. In May the State Human
Rights Commission recommended that a criminal investigation be
initiated against police involved in the incident; however, it is not
known whether the requested criminal investigation was initiated. A
program of prison visits by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), which began in October 1995, is designed in part to help
assure communications between detainees and their families. During the
year, the ICRC visited approximately 1,000 detainees in about 20 places
of detention. All acknowledged detention centers in Jammu and Kashmir
and Kashmiri detainees elsewhere in the country were visited. However,
the ICRC is not authorized to visit interrogation centers or transit
centers, nor does it have access to regular detention centers in the
northeastern states (see Sections 1.c. and 4).
In Punjab the pattern of disappearances prevalent in the early
1990's appears to have ended. Hundreds of police and security officials
were not held accountable for serious human rights abuses committed
during the counterinsurgency of 1984-94. However, steps were taken
against a few such violators. The CBI claims to be pursuing actively
charges against dozens of police officials implicated in the ``mass
cremations'' case. Police in the Tarn Taran district secretly disposed
of bodies of suspected militants believed to have been abducted and
extrajudicially executed, cremating them without the knowledge or
consent of their families. The CBI in its report to the Supreme Court
in December 1996 stated that Punjab police secretly had cremated over
2,000 bodies in Tarn Taran; of these, 585 bodies had been identified
fully, 274 had been identified partially, and 1,238 were unidentified.
Most reportedly were killed by Border Security Force personnel while
they were attempting to enter the country from Pakistan, were
unidentified victims of accidents or suicide, or died in clashes
between militant factions. However, 424 persons apparently were
militants killed in the interior of the district, 291 of whom
subsequently were identified. These numbers demonstrate the extent of
the violence during those years and, given the pattern of police abuses
prevalent during the period, credibly include many persons killed in
extrajudicial executions. The NHRC is seeking to obtain compensation
for the families of those victims whose remains were identified, but
the Government has challenged the NHRC's jurisdiction in the cases. In
September 1998, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the NHRC to
investigate the cases. In August 1998, the Committee for the
Coordination on Disappearances in Punjab (CCDP) member and former
Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh presented the Chief Minister of
Punjab with a list of approximately 3,000 persons who either were
missing or had died in encounters with security forces during the
period of unrest in Punjub. Former Justice Singh also announced that
the CCDP would form a threemember commission to investigate the mass
cremations. The Commission received little cooperation from state
government authorities and made little progress during the year (see
Section 4).
Amnesty International in its April report on human rights defenders
in the country expressed concern that Punjab police officials continued
to obstruct the judicial inquiry into the death of human rights monitor
Jaswant Singh Khalra, hindering efforts to probe the Tarn Taran
cremations. Khalra was investigating the cremation of unidentified
bodies by Tarn Taran police. Several witnesses observed Punjab police
officials arrest Khalra outside his Amritsar home in September 1995.
Police officials subsequently denied that they had arrested Khalra, and
he has not been seen since. In July 1996, following its investigation,
the CBI identified nine Punjab police officials as responsible for
Khalra's abduction and recommended their prosecution. One of the
suspects subsequently died, reportedly by suicide; none of the others
were charged by year's end. One human rights organization credibly
alleged that police intimidated a witness in the case in August,
threatening to kill him if he testified against them. These events
prompted extended public debate over the accountability of Punjab
police for abuses committed while suppressing a violent insurgency.
According to human rights monitors in Punjab, approximately 100 police
officials either were facing charges, were prosecuted, or were under
investigation for human rights abuses at year's end.
There are credible reports that police throughout the country often
do not file required arrest reports. As a result, there are hundreds of
unsolved disappearances in which relatives claim that an individual was
taken into police custody and never heard from again. Police usually
deny these claims, countering that there are no records of arrest. In
Manipur 14-year-old Yumlembam Sanamacha of Thoubal district has been
missing since soldiers arrested him in February 1998. The army
reportedly detained him because of his alleged links with insurgent
groups. The All-Manipur Students' Union petitioned the Guwahati High
Court for Sanamacha's release. The Court ordered the army to produce
the boy, but it failed to do so and his whereabouts remain unknown. On
May 5, 1999, police in Siliguri, West Bengal, arrested 14-year-old
Pinter Yadav and his 9yearold cousin. According to local human rights
monitors, the boys were beaten and, when Pinter began to vomit blood,
he was taken to a local police station. He has not been seen since, and
efforts by family members to petition police for information were
unsuccessful.
Militants in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states
continued to use kidnapings to terrorize the population, seek the
release of detained comrades, and extort funds. Sometimes kidnaped
persons later were killed (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). According to
government figures, there were 634 kidnapings in the northeastern
states during 1999. There were no significant new developments in the
case of the 1995 kidnapings of American, British, German, and Norwegian
nationals, despite police cooperation with foreign diplomats.
On April 15, the BNLF abducted two officials of the Mizoram Public
Health Engineering Department. The rebels released the captives on May
16, after the intervention of three local church leaders. On April 19,
members of the Reang ethnic minority abducted a teacher in Aizawl,
Mizoram. On May 13, NLFT guerillas abducted two tea garden staff from
Kailashahar. On May 14, NLFT militants injured three persons and
abducted three others in Udaypur (see Section 1.c.). Also on May 14,
tribal guerillas abducted three persons and set a number of houses on
fire in Radhakishorpur and Kanchanpur, Tripura. On May 15, NLFT
militants killed four persons and abducted three others in west and
south Tripura (see Section 1.a.). CPM sources allege that all of the
victims were CPM supporters, and that the NLFT was punishing them for
voting for the CPM in the council elections. On May 17, the NLFT shot
two villagers whom they had kidnaped from Manu on February 28. On May
23, NSCN(K) supporters abducted seven persons in Borduria village,
Tirap district, Arunachal Pradesh. On May 26, ATTF killed a tribal
person and kidnaped four other persons (see Section 1.a.). On May 31,
an NLFT militant abducted CPM worker Ajit Debbarma from Jampuijala,
West Tripura. On June 6, in the Andaman Islands, Tamil immigrants from
Sri Lanka abducted and took hostage Manoranjan Bhakta, a former
Congress Party Member of Parliament, for more than 24 hours on Katchal
Island. On June 14, the Manipur based Hmar People's Conference (HPC)
released the two engineers and four technicians of the Northeastern
Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO) who were abducted on March 31 from
Mizoram. On June 22, NLFT rebels kidnaped a tribal family in Khowai. On
June 29, tribal militants abducted seven nontribals in Melaghar,
Gandacherra and Brahmacherra. On July 3, North Tripura tribal
guerrillas kidnaped a nontribal youth; in retaliation a mob killed an
elderly tribal woman and burned down a number of houses. Also on July
3, NLFT militants abducted the manager of Golakpur Tea estate in north
Tripura. On July 4, tribal militants in Dhalai, Tripura, kidnaped a
health department official. On July 14, tribals set fire to more than
150 houses, injured 3 persons, and kidnaped another in Teliamura. On
July 23, NLFT militants kidnaped four tribals from a Garo colony in
South Tripura. On August 16, nine Tripura villagers were kidnaped in
Brahmachhara Udaypur subdivision. On August 17, militants abducted
three persons from Manu and killed a villager at Panisagar (see Section
1.a.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and confessions extracted by
force generally are inadmissible in court; however, torture is common
throughout the country, and authorities often use torture during
interrogations. In other instances, they torture detainees to extort
money and sometimes as summary punishment.
In 1997 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture reported that the
security forces systematically torture persons in Jammu and Kashmir in
order to coerce them to confess to militant activity, to reveal
information about suspected militants, or to inflict punishment for
suspected support or sympathy with militants. Information is not made
public regarding instances of action taken against security force
personnel in Jammu and Kashmir for acts of torture.
In May the NHRC ordered the government of Jammu and Kashmir to pay
$4,395 (200,000 rupees) to the family of Ghulam Rasool, following its
investigation into Rasool's 1996 death while in police custody in
Kathua, Jammu and Kashmir. Police arrested Rasool in Kathua on October
31, 1996. He was found dead in his cell the following day. The autopsy
showed that the cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest arising
from the dislocation of the spine. It also showed that Rasool had
suffered injuries to his scalp, face, back, left eye, and both arms and
legs. The NHRC concluded that police had tortured Rasool to death. It
further directed the Jammu and Kashmir government to initiate legal
proceedings against the police officials responsible. Human rights
monitors maintain that there is a similar pattern of security force
abuses in the northeastern states. On July 28, members of the Assam
Rifles arrested Khuraijam Pranam of Bishenpur, Manipur and allegedly
tortured him for 2 days before turning him over to local police. Pranam
survived and underwent treatment in Imphal Hospital. On August 18, the
Guwahati High Court directed the Manipur government to ensure that
Pranam was not harmed in the hospital, and to allow family members to
visit him. Police abuses against indigenous people include torture (see
Section 5).
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture noted in 1997 that methods
of torture included beating, rape, crushing the leg muscles with a
wooden roller, burning with heated objects, and electric shocks.
Because many alleged torture victims die in custody, and others are
afraid to speak out, there are few firsthand accounts, although marks
of torture often have been found on the bodies of deceased detainees.
The U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial Killings
renewed their requests to visit the country during the year, but the
Government did not permit them to do so (see Section 4).
The prevalence of torture by police in detention facilities
throughout the country is supported by the number of cases of deaths in
police custody (see Section 1.a.). Delhi's Tihar jail is notorious for
the mistreatment of prisoners, with 1 of every 11 custodial deaths
occurring there. Police and jailers typically assault new prisoners for
money and personal articles. In addition police commonly torture
detainees during custodial interrogation. Although police officers are
subject to prosecution for such offenses under Section 302 of the Penal
Code, the Government often fails to hold them accountable. On April 20,
police in Gujarat allegedly beat to death Colonel Pratap Save in a
local police station (see Section 1.a.). The PUCL reported that police
tortured to death Sudath Kumar in Moodabidri police station, Karnataka,
on May 30 to 31 (see Section 1.a.). Human rights groups allege that
police in Andhra Pradesh tortured and then hanged an unarmed suspected
Naxalite, Chandraiah, on June 10 (see Section 1.a.). On August 4,
Krishna Pada Seal died, just after he and his family were released from
prison; according to the PUCL, prison officials tortured them during
detention (see Section 1.a.). The PUCL alleged that police in Mangalore
district, Karnataka, were responsible for the August 29 custodial death
of Sudath Kumar Jain, a 40yearold local film projectionist who died in
a hospital after sustaining injuries (see Section 1.a.). During the
year, Amnesty International expressed concern about the September 1999
torture death of 21-year-old Devinder Singh (see Section 1.a.).
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture stated in 1997 that, in
Jammu and Kashmir, torture victims or their relatives reportedly have
had difficulty in filing complaints because local police were issued
instructions not to open a case without permission from higher
authorities. In addition the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Act provides that unless approval is obtained from the central
Government, no ``prosecution, suit, or other legal proceeding shall be
instituted . . . against any person in respect of anything done or
purported to be done in exercise of the powers of the act.'' This
provision allows the security forces to act with virtual impunity.
There also were incidents in which police beat journalists (see
Section 2.a.), demonstrators (see Section 2.b.), and Muslim students
(see Section 2.c.). Police also committed abuses against tribal people
(see Section 5).
The rape of persons in custody is part of the broader pattern of
custodial abuse. Limits placed on the arrest, search, and police
custody of women appear effectively to limit the frequency of rape in
custody, although it does occur on occasion. According to HRW, in
February in Tamil Nadu, 12 women were detained illegally, tortured, and
repeatedly sexually assaulted in custody, because of their ties to a
suspected robber who had himself died in police custody. In addition to
the 12 women, police detained and beat the young sons of suspected
robbers, according to a local human rights organization. The same
organization reported that the victims declined to press charges
against the police. On September 3, Captain Ravinder Singh Twatir of
the 12th Battalion, Rashtriya Rifles, was sentenced to 7 years of
rigorous imprisonment and dismissed from the army for raping a girl in
Naugam village, Doda district, Jammu and Kashmir on February 14. As of
September no action had been taken against an alleged accomplice in the
rape, special police officer Bharat Bhusan. The NHRC received a report
of only one case of custodial rape between April 1997 and March 1998.
The 24-hour reporting requirement applies to custodial rape as well as
custodial death. However, the requirement does not apply to rape by
policemen outside police stations. NGO's claim that rape by police,
including custodial rape, is more common than NHRC figures indicate.
Although evidence is lacking, a higher incidence of abuse appears
credible, given other evidence of abusive behavior by police and the
likelihood that many rapes go unreported due to a sense of shame and a
fear of retribution among victims.
Human rights monitors allege that on July 19, central reserve
police force personnel raped a tribal housewife in Lamdam village,
Manipur. They allege that the rape was committed in retaliation for an
attack carried out on a CRPF patrol by People's Liberation Army
militants the previous day (see Section 1.g.).
There is a pattern of rape by paramilitary personnel in Jammu and
Kashmir and the northeast as a means of instilling fear among
noncombatants in insurgency-affected areas (see Section 1.g.), but it
is not included in NHRC statistics because it involves military forces.
From April 1998 to March 1999, the NHRC received 1,297 complaints
of custodial death (1,114 in judicial custody and 183 in police
custody), no cases of custodial rape, and 2,252 complaints of other
police abuses. By year's end, the NHRC had not released the statistics
of its actions against police during this time period. However, from
April 1997 to March 1998, the NHRC received 1,012 complaints of
custodial death (819 in judicial custody and 193 in police custody), 1
case of custodial rape, and 1,413 complaints of other police excesses.
As a result of NHRC action during this earlier period, criminal
prosecutions were brought against 43 persons; departmental action was
taken against 60 officers, 51 of whom were placed under suspension; and
monetary compensation in amounts ranging from $1,100 (50,000 rupees) to
$2,100 (100,000 rupees) were recommended for payment in 20 cases.
According to press reports, prison officials used prisoners as
domestic servants and sold female prisoners to brothels (see Sections
5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
Police corruption undermines efforts to combat trafficking in women
and children (see Section 6.f.).
Security forces killed and injured numerous militant group members,
many in so-called encounter deaths, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir
and the northeastern states (see Section 1.a.).
Militant groups sometimes used automatic weapons, hand grenades,
bombs, landmines, and other weapons in political violence in Jammu and
Kashmir and the northeastern states; numerous security forces and
civilians were killed and injured.
Religiously motivated violence led to a number of deaths and
injuries as well as damage to property (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and
5).
Some militant groups in the northeast have used rape as a tactic to
terrorize the populace; however, no cases are known to have been
reported during the year.
Prison conditions are very poor. Prisons are severely overcrowded,
and the provision of food and medical care frequently is inadequate.
Prisons operate above capacity because of thousands of prisoners
awaiting hearings (see Section 1.d.). For example, in Bihar 80 percent
of prisoners are unconvicted remand prisoners awaiting completion of
their trials. Delhi's Tihar jail, with a designed capacity of 3,300
persons, houses 9,000 prisoners. Birsa Munda jail in Ranchi, Bihar,
designed to hold 364 persons, houses more than 1,800 male and female
prisoners. In May the PUCL visited Sakchi jail, Jamshedpur, Bihar,
following complaints of abuse of prisoners. The human rights activists
found that the prison, designed to hold 200 prisoners, housed 786
persons, of whom only 55 had been convicted; the rest were at various
stages of the judicial process. Amnesty International reported that
overcrowding in Arthur jail, Mumbai, led to rioting on June 19.
Designed to hold 50 prisoners, Arthur jail has 180 inmates. Prison
guards reportedly attacked inmates with razors and wooden poles to
quell rioting that erupted following a fight between two prisoners.
Forty inmates were injured in the incident. An August 3 report from
Aizawl, Mizoram, stated that its central jail, designed to house 500
prisoners, had 846 inmates. The NHRC reported in February on its
November 1999 visits to jails in Guwahati and Shillong. In Guwahati the
commission found 780 inmates in a district jail designed to hold 507
(see Section 1.d.). In Shillong the commission found 374 inmates in the
central jail, which was designed to hold 150 persons. One of the
inmates was a 10- or 11-year-old girl awaiting trial. The Government
prepared a national prison manual during the year to facilitate reform.
It also continued to provide financial aid to the states. However, the
Prison Act of 1894 remains unamended. According to the SAHRDC, in the
poorest states, such as Bihar, where 265 police stations have no lock-
up facilities, the lack of prisons led police to shackle prisoners to
trees. An NHRC investigatory team visiting Meerut jail in Uttar Pradesh
in 1998 found about 3,000 inmates in a facility designed to hold 650
persons. As a result of this and other jail visits, the NHRC hired a
consultant to draft the prison reform bill to be submitted to the
Government. The draft bill, meant to be enacted by the national
Parliament, encountered opposition from state governments asserting
that prison management is the responsibility of the states. No new
initiatives were taken on the bill during the year. The 1,114 deaths in
judicial custody in 1998-99, occurring in a prison population of
approximately 246,000 persons, many of whom are held for years, include
a large proportion of deaths from natural causes that, in some cases
were aggravated by poor prison conditions (see Section 1.a.). A study
conducted by the NHRC in 1997-98 found that tuberculosis was the cause
of death in 76 percent of deaths in judicial custody. Deaths in police
custody, which typically occur within hours or days of initial
detention, more clearly imply violent abuse and torture. The NHRC has
no authority to investigate abuses by security forces directly, and
security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states are
not required to report custodial deaths to the Commission.
With the exception of an agreement with the ICRC for visits to
detention facilities in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government does not
allow NGO's to monitor prison conditions (see Section 4). However, 15
states and union territories have authorized the NHRC to conduct
surprise check-ups on jails. Although custodial abuse is deeply rooted
in police practices, increased press reporting and parliamentary
questioning provide evidence of growing public awareness of the
problem. The NHRC has identified torture and deaths in detention as one
of its priority concerns. In 1998 it created a ``Special Rapporteur and
Chief Coordinator of Custodial Justice'' to help implement its
directive to state prison authorities to ensure that medical check-ups
are performed on all inmates. In June the country's first women's
correctional facility was opened in the Tihar complex in New Delhi.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--During the early 1980's,
the Government implemented a variety of special security laws intended
to help law enforcement authorities fight separatist insurgencies, and
there were credible reports of widespread arbitrary arrest and
detention under these laws during the year.
Although the law that had been subject to the most extensive abuse,
the TADA, lapsed in May 1995, 1,502 persons previously arrested under
the act continued to be held as of January 1, 1997, in a number of
states, according to the NHRC's 1996-97 report. Human rights sources
estimate that about 1,000 persons remained in custody under TADA or
related charges at year's end. A small number of arrests under the TADA
continued for crimes allegedly committed before the law lapsed. In 1997
the Government asserted that every TADA case would be reviewed.
However, few persons have been released as a result of the review.
Criminal cases are proceeding against most of those persons still held
under the TADA, with more than 3,000 charged under other laws in
addition to the TADA. In 1996 the Supreme Court eased bail guidelines
for persons accused under TADA, taking into account the large backlog
of cases in special TADA courts. In March 1999, the state minister for
home affairs told the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly that 16,620
persons had been detained under the TADA in the state since 1990; of
these, 1,640 were brought to trial and 10 were convicted. TADA courts
use abridged procedures. For example, defense counsel is not permitted
to see witnesses for the prosecution, who are kept behind screens while
testifying in court. Also, confessions extracted under duress are
admissible as evidence. The special task force established by the state
police forces of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to capture a bandit hiding in
forests in the border area between the 2 states had arrested some 121
persons under the TADA prior to the law's lapse; 51 of these persons
were in custody at year's end.
During the year, the Government sent a draft Prevention of
Terrorism Bill, 2000 to the Law Commission of India for review and
possible introduction in Parliament. The bill is similar to the TADA,
in that it would permit summary trials and the hearing of testimony
exacted under duress. It also would allow witnesses to testify in
camera, without having to disclose their identities to the defense at
any stage of the proceedings. In addition it would compel journalists
to disclose to authorities any information regarding terrorist groups
or actions, or face charges of terrorism against them. Finally, the
bill would require the law to be reviewed every 5 years, instead of
every 2, which was the case with TADA. In August the NHRC issued an
opinion stating that the new Prevention of Terrorism Bill was not
necessary. Commenting on these and other provisions of the bill, the
NHRC wrote: ``These provisions would seriously affect human rights
guaranteed under the Constitution and violate basic principles of
criminal jurisprudence as internationally understood.'' Similar bills
are pending in the Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh state assemblies.
If enacted they would provide for special courts to try offenses, place
the burden of proof at the bail stage on the accused, make confessions
to a police officer of the rank of superintendent of police admissible
as evidence, extend the period of remand from 15 to 60 days, and set
mandatory sentences for terrorism-related offenses. The Maharashtra
state assembly enacted TADA-like legislation in November 1999. On
September 6, the Mumbai Sessions Court issued the first conviction
under the act, the Organized Crime (Control) Act. The court sentenced
three alleged gang members to death on charges of conspiracy to murder
former Mumbai mayor Milind Vaidya. The three persons have appealed
their convictions to the Mumbai High Court. As of year's end, their
case had not been heard.
The Constitution permits preventive detention laws in the event of
threats to public order and national security. Under Article 22 of the
Constitution, an individual may be detained--without charge or trial--
for up to 3 months, and detainees are denied their rights or
compensation for unlawful arrest or detention. In addition to providing
for limits on the length of detention, the preventive detention laws
provide for judicial review. Several laws of this type remain in
effect.
The National Security Act (NSA) of 1980 permits the detention of
persons considered to be security risks; police anywhere in the country
(except Jammu and Kashmir) may detain suspects under NSA provisions.
Under these provisions the authorities may detain a suspect without
charge or trial for as long as a year on loosely defined security
grounds. The state government must confirm the detention order, which
is reviewed by an advisory board of three High Court judges within 7
weeks of the arrest. NSA detainees are permitted visits by family
members and lawyers, and must be informed of the grounds for their
detention within 5 days (10 to 15 days in exceptional circumstances).
According to the Government, 1,163 persons were being held under the
NSA at the end of 1997. The NSA does not define ``security risk.''
Human rights groups allege that preventive detention may be ordered and
extended under the act purely on the opinion of the detaining authority
and after advisory board review. Any court may not overturn such a
decision.
The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) of 1978 covers
corresponding procedures for that state. Over half of the detainees in
Jammu and Kashmir are held under the PSA. Jammu and Kashmir police
reported that 514 persons were being held under the PSA as of December
1998. In September and November 1999 alone, the Jammu and Kashmir
police arrested 25 members of the Kashmiri separatist All Parties
Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The arrests followed a series of terrorist
attacks in the state for which members of this group allegedly were
responsible (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and 4). On April 4, the
Government released 3 of the 25 persons; in May it released 11 more of
the APHC detainees and attempted to initiate a dialog with the APHC. By
year's end, all of the remaining APHC detainees were released; no
charges were brought against any of them. In December 1999, Shabir
Shah, president of the Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party, was
released. At the time of Shah's release, Amnesty International
expressed concern about the 25 arrested leaders of the APHC and
explicitly suggested that the charges were politically motivated.
The Constitution provides that detainees have the right to be
informed of the grounds for their arrest, to be represented by counsel,
and, unless held under a preventive detention law, to appear before a
magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. At this initial appearance, the
accused either must be remanded for further investigation or released.
The Supreme Court has upheld these provisions. The accused must be
informed of their right to bail at the time of arrest and may, unless
held on a nonbailable offense, apply for bail at any time. The police
must file charges within 60 to 90 days of arrest; if they fail to do
so, court approval of a bail application becomes mandatory.
In November 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958. In a
representation made to the NHRC, the SAHRDC asserted that the act's
powers were ``too vast and sweeping and pose a grave threat to the
fundamental rights and liberties of the citizenry of the (disturbed)
areas covered by the act.'' The SAHRDC asserted that the powers granted
to authorities under Section 3 of the act to declare any area to be a
``disturbed area,'' and thus subject to the other provisions of the
act, were too broad. Moreover, the SAHRDC noted that Section 4(a) of
the act empowers any commissioned officer, warrant officer,
noncommissioned officer, or any other person of equivalent rank in the
armed forces to fire upon and otherwise use force, even to the point of
death, if he believes that it is necessary for the maintenance of law
and order. Further, Section 6 of the act states that ``no prosecution,
suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted, except with the
previous sanction of the central Government against any person in
respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of
powers'' conferred by the act.
The court system is extremely overloaded, resulting in the
detention of numerous persons awaiting trial for periods longer than
they would receive if convicted. Prisoners may be held for months or
even years before obtaining a trial date. According to a reply to a
parliamentary question in July 1994, more than 111,000 criminal cases
were pending in the Allahabad High Court, the most serious case backlog
in the country, of which nearly 29,000 cases had been pending for 5 to
8 years. A statement to Parliament in July 1996 indicated that criminal
and civil cases pending before the country's high courts numbered
nearly 2.9 million in 1995, roughly the same as in 1994, but an
increase from 2.65 million in 1993. According to the Union Home
Ministry, the total number of civil and criminal cases pending for 3 or
more years in all courts throughout the country was 5,116,895 on
December 31, 1998. In its most recent report, the NHRC reported that
nearly 80 percent of all prisoners held between April 1996 and March
1997, were so-called ``undertrials,'' i.e., unconvicted remand
prisoners awaiting the start or conclusion of their trials. In its
1997-98 report, the NHRC stated that it ``remains deeply disturbed by
the presence of a large number of under trial prisoners in different
jails in the country.'' In March 1999, the chairman of the NHRC said
that 60 percent of all police arrests were ``unnecessary and
unjustifiable,'' and that the incarceration of those wrongly arrested
accounted for 43 percent of the total annual expenditure on prisons.
The NHRC reported in February on its November 1999 visits to jails in
Guwahati (see Section 1.c.). The Commission found that 90 percent of
the 780 inmates were unconvicted prisoners awaiting completion of
trial. On February 27, the NHRC directed the Orissa government to pay
$1,000 (50,000 rupees) as interim relief to a 16-year-old boy who was
victim of illegal detention and torture by police at Kandhamal. Accused
of theft, the boy was sent to a regular prison to await trial, rather
than a juvenile home. In March the NHRC reported that it had directed
the West Bengal government to pay $1,000 (50,000 rupees) in
compensation to the court guardian of a 12year-old girl who was in the
custody of the West Bengal police for nearly a decade because she was
the sole witness to her parents' murder. On July 9, Bihar police
registered a case against then-Bihar Minister of State for Cooperatives
Lalit Yadav, his cousin, and four others for alleged illegal detention
and torture of a truck driver and cleaner at the minister's residence.
The complaint alleges that Yadav kept the two men in wrongful
confinement for a month, beat them, and tortured them. The two men's
toenails allegedly were pulled out and they were forced to drink urine.
Yadav was dismissed from his state government post and from his
political party membership.
On November 28, the Government announced that it was allocating
$108.15 million (5.03 billion rupees) to state governments for the
creation of 1,734 additional courts during 2000-2005, in order to hear
more cases and reduce the number of remand prisoners.
In June 1997, Rongthong Kunley Dorji, a Bhutanese dissident, was
placed in judicial custody pending review of an extradition request
from the Government of Bhutan on charges that included political
offenses as well as financial malfeasance. On June 12, 1998, Dorji was
released on bail following the New Delhi High Court's decision to deny
a government appeal and let stand a lower court's order to grant bail
in the case. Dorji still awaits conclusion of his extradition hearing.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is an independent judiciary
with strong constitutional safeguards. Under a Supreme Court ruling,
the Chief Justice, in consultation with his colleagues, has a decisive
voice in selecting judicial candidates. The President appoints judges,
and they may serve up to the age of 62 on the state high courts and up
to the age of 65 on the Supreme Court.
Courts of first resort exist at the subdistrict and district
levels. More serious cases and appeals are heard in state-level high
courts and by the national-level Supreme Court, which also rules on
constitutional questions. State governments appoint subdistrict and
district judicial magistrates. High court judges are appointed on the
recommendation of the federal law ministry, with the advice of the
Supreme Court, the High Court Chief Justice, and the chief minister of
the State, usually from among district judges or lawyers practicing
before the same courts. Supreme Court judges are appointed similarly
from among High Court judges. The Chief Justice is selected on the
basis of seniority.
When legal procedures function normally, they generally assure a
fair trial, but the process often is drawn out and inaccessible to poor
persons. Defendants have the right to choose counsel from attorneys who
are fully independent of the Government. There are effective channels
for appeal at most levels of the judicial system, and the State
provides free legal counsel to the indigent.
The Criminal Procedure Code provides for an open trial in most
cases, but it allows exceptions in proceedings involving official
secrets, trials in which statements prejudicial to the safety of the
state might be made, or under provisions of special security
legislation. Sentences must be announced in public.
Muslim personal status law governs many noncriminal matters
involving Muslims, including family law, inheritance, and divorce. The
Government does not interfere in the personal status laws of the
minority communities, with the result that personal status laws that
discriminate against women are upheld.
In Jammu and Kashmir, the judicial system barely functions due to
threats by militants against judges, witnesses, and their family
members; because of judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed
antimilitant actions; and because of the frequent refusal by security
forces to obey court orders. Courts in Jammu and Kashmir are reluctant
to hear cases involving terrorist crimes, and fail to act expeditiously
on habeas corpus cases, if they act at all. There were a few
convictions of alleged terrorists in the Jammu High Court during the
year. Many more accused militants have been in pretrial detention for
years. On April 1, the Jammu and Kashmir Home Minister submitted a
written statement to the state assembly acknowledging that 115 foreign
militants (primarily from Pakistan, but reportedly also from
Afghanistan and Tajikistan) jailed in the state and elsewhere had not
been tried, despite the fact that many of them had been imprisoned for
10 years (see Section 1.d.).
Criminal gangs in all four southern states have been known to
attack rivals and scare off complainants and witnesses from court
premises, denying free access to justice. In some cases, accused
persons have been attacked while being escorted by police to the
courts.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary
requested to visit the country during the year, but the Government did
not grant the Rapporteur permission to do so.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The police must obtain warrants for searches and
seizures. In a criminal investigation, the police may conduct searches
without warrants to avoid undue delay, but they must justify the
searches in writing to the nearest magistrate with jurisdiction over
the offense. The authorities in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam
have special powers to search and arrest without a warrant.
The government Enforcement Directorate (ED), which is mandated to
investigate foreign exchange and currency violations, searches,
interrogates, and arrests thousands of business and management
professionals annually, often without search warrants. However, the ED
ultimately convicts very few persons. In 1997 only 28 persons out of
thousands arrested were convicted, according to the Times of India.
The Indian Telegraph Act authorizes the surveillance of
communications, including monitoring telephone conversations and
intercepting personal mail, in case of public emergency or ``in the
interest of the public safety or tranquillity.'' Every state government
has used these powers, as has the central Government.
In early January, soldiers set fire to 47 shops in an open market
in Pattan Town, northern Kashmir Valley, in retaliation for a nearby
ambush in which militants killed 2 soldiers. The army used gasoline to
spread the blaze and shot at fire trucks that arrived on the scene.
Human rights activists were unaware of any effort to hold security
force members accountable for the rampage in Pattan Town; government
information on action against suspects was unavailable.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Government forces continue to commit numerous
serious violations of humanitarian law in the disputed state of Jammu
and Kashmir. Between 350,000 and 450,000 army and paramilitary forces
are deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. The Muslim majority population in
the Kashmir valley suffers from the repressive tactics of the security
forces. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, and the Armed
Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, both passed in July
1990, security force personnel have extraordinary powers, including
authority to shoot suspected lawbreakers and those persons disturbing
the peace, and to destroy structures suspected of harboring militants
or arms.
The Union Home Ministry was unable to estimate how many civilians
were killed in crossfire by security forces in Jammu and Kashmir during
the year. It reported that 84 such deaths occurred in Jammu and Kashmir
in 1996-1997. The security forces continue to abduct and kill suspected
militants; the security forces have not accepted accountability for
these abuses. Many commanders' inclination to distance their units from
such practices has led to reduced participation in them and a transfer
of some of these abuses to government-supported countermilitants.
According to credible reports, in addition to harassment during
searches and arbitrary arrests (see Section 1.d.) security forces
abduct and sometimes use civilians as human shields in night patrolling
and searching for landmines; the abuses so far have occurred mostly in
the Kupwara and Doda districts. Because of Doda's inaccessibility, the
abuses there allegedly have been underreported greatly.
The spring and summer 1999 incursion of Pakistan-backed armed
forces into territory on the Indian side of the line of control new
Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir resulted in an increased
counterinsurgency campaign, accompanied by repressive offensive
measures. According to a credible government source, as of early
December 1999 over 450 militants had been killed since the Kargil
conflict began. That trend continued, with official sources reporting
that security forces had killed 1,062 militants during the first 9
months of the year. In September 1999, then-chief of army staff Gen.
Ved Malik said that security forces were killing 150 to 160 militants
every month in Jammu and Kashmir.
Kashmiri militant groups also committed serious abuses.
Militants carried out several execution-style mass murders of Hindu
(Pandit), Sikh, and Buddhist villagers in Jammu and Kashmir (see
Sections 1.a. and 5). On March 20, suspected militants killed 35 Sikhs
in Chatisinghpura village, Anantnag district (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
On April 26, militants invaded a home in Golgam village and killed four
members of a Hindu family. On July 30, militants hurled a hand grenade
into a jeep carrying Hindu religious pilgrims near Gulmarg, killing one
person and injuring five others (see Section 5).
In addition to political killings, kidnapings, and rapes of
politicians and civilians (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.),
insurgents engaged in extortion and carried out acts of random terror
that killed hundreds of Kashmiris. Many of the militants are not
citizens but Afghani, Pakistani, and other nationals. Since the 1990's,
the militants have made liberal use of timedelayed explosives,
landmines, hand grenades, and snipers. Militants previously had
restricted landmine use to army convoys traveling outside of major
cities, but during the year they began using command detonated
landmines in Srinagar city. There was a significant upsurge in militant
violence against security forces, and a tendency to use heavy weapons
such as hand grenades and rockets. Militants killed and injured
numerous security personnel and destroyed a great deal of security
force property; many civilians also were killed. On January 3, a bomb
explosion in a Srinagar market killed 16 persons, including 3 security
force members. On February 10, militants planted a bomb on a Calcutta-
bound train. The bomb exploded near Vijaypur, Jammu district, killing
two persons and injuring four others. On March 27, militants hurled
hand grenades at a police patrol in Bandipora town, killing 3 civilians
and injuring 11 others. On April 12, militants exploded a powerful car
bomb in Rawalpora on the outskirts of Srinagar as an army convoy was
passing by; one civilian was injured in the blast. On April 19, a 15-
year-old boy recruited by militants died in an explosion when he
attempted to drive an explosivesladen car into army headquarters,
Badamibagh Cantonment, Srinagar; four soldiers and three civilians were
injured in the attack. Also on April 19, in Baramulla, 2 students, aged
17 and 11, were killed and 20 passersby were injured when militants
hurled a hand grenade at a security force vehicle convoy and missed;
the hand grenade exploded in a market in Sopore town. On April 22, a
group of militants attacked an army post in Punch district, killing two
soldiers. On April 26, militants detonated a homemade bomb in
Gharanarial, Jammu, killing five Border Security Force members. On
April 29, an 18-year-old student was killed and four police personnel
were injured when militants detonated an explosive device in Sher Bagh,
Anantnag district. On May 10, four soldiers were killed when their
vehicle hit a landmine planted by militants at Nihalpura village,
Baramula district. On May 15, Ghulam Hasan Bhatt, Minister of Power,
Jammu and Kashmir state, his driver, two body guards and radioman were
killed when militants detonated a landmine under their passing vehicle.
On May 16, one soldier was killed and two others were injured when
militants fired rockets at an army camp in Sudru village, Banihal.
Sixteen persons were killed, including 11 militants, 3 civilians, and a
soldier, when militants armed with rockets and hand grenades attacked
an army camp at Khundroo, Anantnag on June 1. On August 10, in
Srinagar, a car bomb explosion set by militants killed 10 persons and
injured approximately 30 others. The car bomb explosion occurred just
minutes after police and journalists had rushed to, and civilians had
vacated, the site of a hand grenade attack. On August 21, a landmine
blast in Kupwara district killed three security force personnel,
including a senior-level brigadier. On August 24, a landmine injured
five security force personnel when a vehicle drove over it in Puthkhai,
northern Kashmir. On September 23, two bomb explosions killed seven
civilians in Sangalsan village, Udhampur. On October 8, three Border
Security Force members were injured when their bus struck a landmine
planted by militants near Khooni Nala village. On October 20, two
soldiers were killed in Udhampur district when militants detonated an
improvised explosive device that they had strapped to a mule and sent
into the army camp. On November 28, shortly after the beginning of the
Government's unilateral ceasefire for the holy month of Ramadan, a
landmine blew up an army truck, killing 3 soldiers and wounding 12
others; Hizbul Mujaheddin claimed responsibility. On December 5, a
landmine explosion in the Adipora area of Baramulla district injured
three soldiers.
Extremist and terrorist activities in the northeast claimed many
lives. In addition to ambushes, terrorists increasingly resorted to
destroying bridges, and the laying time bombs on roads, on railway
tracks, and in trains. On February 27, Assam Minister for Public Works
and Forests Nagen Sharma and four others were killed when suspected
ULFA militants detonated an explosive device as the minister's vehicle
passed a near NijBahjani, Nalbari district. On March 5, suspected ULFA
militants attempted to kill a second Assam minister, Hiranya Konwar.
They detonated an improvised explosive device as the minister's car
neared Rongali Doegarh, Sivasagar district; no persons were injured in
the attack. On May 20, 5 persons were killed and 11 others were injured
when militants threw a hand grenade into a passing jeep at
Manikerbasti, west Tripura. Also on May 20, UBLF militants lobbed bombs
at a passenger jeep from north Maharanipur in Khowai, killing 5 tribals
and injuring 11 others. On May 21, 15 persons were killed when
suspected NLFT militants threw hand grenades at Bengali villagers in
Baghber village, Tripura. The militants then attacked villagers with
machetes and set fire to 60 homes in the village. On October 23,
suspected ULFA militants killed 15 persons and wounded 8 others in 2
separate attacks. The first occurred in the Kakogam Market, Tinsukia
district, where militants fired automatic guns at civilians, killing 11
persons. The second attack occured at Naoholia, Dibrugarh district
where militants indiscriminately fired at civilians, killing four
persons and injured five others.
On February 12, a Naxalite mine blast killed 21 persons in Bihar
(see Section 5). On March 7, Naxalites killed Andhra Pradesh minister
for local government A. Madhava Reddy in a landmine explosion near
Hyderabad. Reddy was returning from a political rally. As home minister
in the state from 1994-95, Reddy had overseen anti-Naxalite operations.
In a letter to the PUCL, G.N. Saibaba, general secretary of the All
India People's Resistance Forum; Varavara Rao, executive member of the
Revolutionary Writers Association; and Gadar, general secretary of the
All India League for Revolutionary Culture alleged that police had
summarily executed three unarmed members of CPI(M) on February 1. The
three writers alleged that police detained the three victims--Kumar,
Sujanta and Venkanna--in the Musmi village, Warangal district. The PUCL
alleges that police killed five women in an April 27 encounter in the
Chandragiri Hills, Warangal district, Andhra Pradesh. According to the
human rights organization, police surrounded the women and lobbed hand
grenades at them, killing them.
During the year, police arrested numerous persons suspected of
involvement in previous terrorist attacks and brought charges against
some suspects. Charges also were brought against persons accused of
involvement with human suicide bomb attacks to advance Sikh separatism,
as well as against dozens of captured separatist insurgents in Jammu
and Kashmir for bombings, killings, and acts of sabotage.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice; however, there are some limitations.
A vigorous and growing press reflects a wide variety of political,
social, and economic beliefs. Newspapers and magazines regularly
publish investigative reports and allegations of government wrongdoing,
and the press generally promotes human rights and criticizes perceived
government lapses.
Under the Official Secrets Act, the Government may restrict
publication of sensitive stories; however, while the Government at
times interprets this power broadly to suppress criticism of its
policies, the Government nonetheless introduced a right to information
bill in the 2000 Monsoon Session of Parliament. However, during the
year the bill lapsed; it must be reintroduced if Parliament is to take
any further action on it.
The 1971 Newspapers Incitements to Offenses Act remains in effect
in Jammu and Kashmir. Under the act, a district magistrate may prohibit
the press from publishing material resulting in incitement to murder or
any act of violence. As punishment the act stipulates that the
authorities may seize newspapers and printing presses. Despite these
restrictions, newspapers in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir,
report in detail on alleged human rights abuses by the Government, and
regularly publish press releases of militant Kashmiri groups. The
authorities generally allowed foreign journalists to travel freely in
Jammu and Kashmir, where they regularly spoke with militant leaders and
filed reports on government abuses.
In Assam the state government has attempted to impede criticism by
filing a number of criminal defamation charges against journalists.
In October 1998, the Manipur government announced curbs on the
publication of insurgency-related news. The publication of insurgents'
press releases, public invitations to slain militants' funerals, and
calls to boycott Republic Day and Independence Day functions were
prohibited. Penalties for violating the prohibition included arrest and
criminal prosecution of newspaper owners and editors, and cancellation
of newspapers' registration. These restrictions continued during the
year.
The Press Council of India is a statutory body of journalists,
publishers, academics, and politicians, with a chairman appointed by
the Government. Designed to be a self-regulating mechanism for the
press, it investigates complaints of irresponsible journalism and sets
a code of conduct for publishers. This code includes a commitment not
to publish articles or details that might incite caste or communal
violence. The Council publicly criticizes newspapers or journalists it
believes have broken the code of conduct, but its findings, while noted
by the press community, carry no legal weight.
At the state level, regional political parties have the ability to
control regional media. In some instances, allegations of violence
against journalists have been made against state governments. According
to Reporters Without Borders, on July 6, a magistrate in Sibsagar town,
Assam, beat Parag Saikia, a journalist of the daily newspaper Aji. The
magistrate reportedly had summoned the journalist for publishing a July
1 article about the local authorities' alleged involvement in
corruption. The journalist later was admitted to the hospital with
various injuries. Between July and August, in the state of Andhra
Pradesh, state police obstructed or attacked journalists and
photographers in at least 10 different cities as they attempted to
report on civil disturbances resulting from protests over power tariff
hikes. The Andhra Pradesh Journalists' Union claims that the state
chief minister of Andhra Pradesh played a role in the dismissal of the
editor of the Telugu daily newspaper Andhra Prabha. The editor
reportedly was fired for publishing stories critical of the state
government's power policy.
Nonviolent pressure on journalists comes from official sources as
well: the editor of the vernacular daily newspaper Naharolgi Thoudang
was arrested on charges of indulging in anti-national activities. He
was released after a court ruled that the allegation was baseless. In
Assam a similar incident occured as police intercepted the editor of
the largest circulating Assamese daily in April, accusing him of having
participated in a function organized by a militant organization. In
April the Assam Human Rights Commission requested the police to report
on the detention of Asomiya Pratidin editor Haider Hussain for visiting
an ULFA camp in Bhutan; police detained Hussain in the first week of
March. The Commission cited the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression; Hussain was released several days later. Some newspapers
receive more than $1.29 million (60 million rupees) annually in
advertising revenue from the state government. The threat of losing
this revenue contributes to self-censorship by smaller media outlets,
which heavily rely on government advertising.
In Calcutta the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) often
threatens journalists; however, as the power of the party diminishes,
journalists find it easier to criticize the government. At least nine
journalists were injured while attempting to give a deputation to the
director of information. The alleged assailants were state information
officers, government employees owing allegiance to the Marxist
government. In July alleged members of the CPI(M) severely beat a team
of three reporters and a cameraman of ETV, a new vernacular cable
television channel. Another reporter was injured severely in state
finance minister Asim Dasgupta's constituency during municipal
elections (see Section 3). On numerous occasions, CPI(M) supporters
beat reporters of another Bengali cable channel, Khas Khobor. Earlier
in the year, CPI(M) officially requested its supporters to boycott the
channel. The matter was resolved when a former CPI(M) activist replaced
the editor.
In the northeast part of the country, violence against journalists
has become a problem and results in significant self-censorship. On
August 20, two unknown assailants shot and killed Thounaojam Brajamani
Singh, the editor of the Manipur News, a daily newspaper published in
Manipur. According to Reporters Without Borders, two men on a
motorcycle followed Singh after he left the newspaper office. They
overtook Singh and shot him in the head at point-blank range; Singh was
the only employee whom they targeted. Singh had received anonymous
death threats on August 15. No one had claimed responsibility for the
murder, and police investigations were ongoing by year's end. On August
26, militants bombed a newspaper office owned by an NGO at Konung
Lampak, Manipur. Altogether, at least seven journalists have been
killed in Assam over the past decade. There was no further information
on the 1996 killing of journalist and human rights activist Parag Das
in Assam (see Sections 1.a. and 4).
On July 31, V. Selvaraj, a journalist with the biweekly Nakkeeran,
was shot and killed in Perambalur, Tamil Nadu. Thirteen persons were
charged in connection with Selvaraj's killing. A motive for the killing
has not been established; however, local police maintain that there was
personal enmity between Selvaraj and his 13 assailants. The trial had
not begun by year's end.
Intimidation by militant groups also causes significant
selfcensorship. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in
January English-language newspapers throughout Gujarat received written
notice from the Bajrang Dal, a radical Hindu nationalist group,
threatening them with dire consequences if they continued to publish
exaggerated reports of antiChristian violence (see Sections 2.c. and
5). In 1999 Kashmiri militant groups threatened journalists and editors
and even imposed temporary bans on some publications that were critical
of their activities.
The Government maintains a list of banned books that may not be
imported or sold in the country; some--like Salman Rushdie's ``Satanic
Verses'' because they contain material government censors have deemed
inflammatory.
On February 16, customs agents at the Calcutta airport blocked the
distribution of 3,000 issues of Time magazine because they contained a
1-page interview with the brother of Mohandas Gandhi's assassin, which
they deemed would be defamatory and derogatory to national prestige.
Television no longer is a government monopoly, but this is due more
to technological changes than to government policy. Private satellite
television is distributed widely by cable or dish in middle-class
neighborhoods throughout the country. These channels have been
providing substantial competition for Doordarshan (DDTV), the national
broadcaster, in both presentation and credibility because DDTV
frequently is accused of manipulating the news for the benefit of the
Government; however, cable operators are not free of criticism. In some
parts of the country, to varying degrees, satellite channel owners use
their medium to promote the platforms of the political parties that
they support.
In late summer the Government proposed measures to control
objectionable content on satellite channels--specifically, tobacco and
alcohol advertisements--that would hold cable distributors liable under
civil law. As a result, cable operators in New Delhi and some other
areas held a 3-day blackout during the Olympic Games to demonstrate the
gravity of their concern. The Government since has clarified its
position, stating that the (often foreign) satellite broadcasters,
rather than the domestic cable operators, fall within the scope of the
regulation.
AM radio broadcasting remains a government monopoly. Private FM
radio station ownership was legalized during the year, but licenses
only authorize entertainment and educational content. Licenses do not
permit independent news broadcasting.
A government censorship board reviews films before licensing them
for distribution. The board censors material deemed offensive to public
morals or communal sentiment. During the year, Hindu fundamentalist
groups resorted to violence and disrupted the shooting of ``Water,'' a
film involving the exploitation of widows, as they claimed it offended
Hindu sentiments. A 1999 film by the same producer/director and cast,
``Fire,'' which dealt with lesbianism and which had been cleared by the
censor board, was not allowed to be screened in most states; only
Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal took proactive steps to allow the film
to be shown. At times offended Hindu mobs, led by members of the Shiv
Sena, a Hindu fundamentalist political party, provoked violence at
movie theaters that were able to show the film. The fact that the lead
actress of both films was a Muslim exacerbated tensions. Producers of
video newsmagazines that appear on national television are required to
submit their programs to Doordarshan, the government television
channel, which occasionally has censored stories that portrayed the
Government in an unfavorable light. This has led to self-censorship
among producers so that DDTV rarely has to exercise its power of
censorship.
The Government does not limit access to the Internet.
Arundhati Roy's book ``The Greater Common Good,'' which discusses
the socio-environmental costs of the Sardar Sarovar dam, was serialized
in magazines in the country during the year. In 1999 political parties
in favor of the Narmada project burned copies of the book and
successfully threatened bookstores in Gujarat to remove it from their
shelves.
Citizens enjoy academic freedom, and students and faculty espouse a
wide range of views. In addition to about 10 national universities and
256 state universities, states are empowered to accredit locally run
private institutions.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities sometimes
require permits and notification prior to holding parades or
demonstrations, but local governments ordinarily respect the right to
protest peacefully, except in Jammu and Kashmir, where separatist
parties routinely are denied permits for public gatherings. During
periods of civil tension, the authorities may ban public assemblies or
impose a curfew under the Criminal Procedure Code.
Srinagar and other parts of Jammu and Kashmir occasionally came
under curfew, but more often were affected by strikes called by
militants.
On March 27, Calcutta police beat primary school teachers
participating in a peaceful procession to the legislative assembly,
after holding a meeting on demands they had made of the state
government. On August 13 and 14, police killed 2 persons and injured 3
others after they fired on a crowd of 1,500 Muslims in Agra. The crowd
had gathered to protest efforts by majority Hindus to prevent them from
using a plot of land close to a Hindu temple. The minority community
wanted to use the land, which was under the supervision of Muslim
religious authorities, as a graveyard. Police allege that the
protesters turned violent, throwing bombs and bottles filled with acid
at police. The police maintain that they fired at the crowd with live
ammunition only after efforts to quell the disturbance with tear gas
and rubber bullets had failed. Some of the protesters told reporters
that the police actions were unprovoked (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
According to Amnesty International, in August the Gujarat
government detained approximately 600 persons who were planning to
attend a hearing on the Narmada dam (see Section 2.d.). The police
charged the protestors with disturbing the peace and released them
shortly after their arrests.
The Constitution provides for the right to form associations, and
the Government generally respected this right in practice.
In 1999 the Government introduced and enforced a new requirement
that NGO's secure the prior approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs
before organizing international conferences. Human rights groups
contend that the new requirement provides the Government with
substantial political control of the work of NGO's, abridging of their
freedom of assembly and association.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice; however,
it sometimes does not act effectively to counter societal attacks
against religious minorities and attempts by state and local
governments to limit that freedom. India is a secular state in which
all faiths generally enjoy freedom of worship; government policy does
not favor any religious group. However, tension between Muslims and
Hindus, and to an increasing extent between Hindus and Christians,
continues to pose a challenge to the secular foundation of the State
(see Section 5). In addition governments at state and local levels only
partially respect religious freedom.
Although the law provides for religious freedom, enforcement of the
law has been poor, particularly at the state and local levels, where
the failure to deal adequately with intragroup and intergroup conflict
and with local disturbances has abridged the right to religious
freedom. In particular, some Hindu extremist groups continued to attack
Christians during the year. In many cases, the Government response was
inadequate, consisting largely of statements criticizing the violence
against Christians, with few efforts to hold accountable those persons
responsible or to prevent such incidents from occurring (see Section
5). Throughout the year, the Government generally described the
violence and attacks as a series of isolated local phenomena, in some
states calling for a national debate on conversions, which Hindus had
advocated being banned.
The Government is led by a coalition called the National Democratic
Alliance, which has pledged to respect India's traditions of secular
government and religious tolerance. However, the leading party in the
coalition is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist
political party with links to Hindu extremist groups that have been
implicated in violent acts against Christians and Muslims. The BJP also
leads state governments in Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar
Pradesh. Many BJP leaders and party workers are members of the
Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) and share some of its ideology.
However, the BJP is an independent political party and the degree of
RSS influence over its policy making is not clear. The RSS espouses a
return to Hindu values and cultural norms. Members of the BJP, the RSS,
and other affiliated organizations were implicated in incidents of
violence and discrimination against Christians and Muslims. The BJP and
RSS officially express respect and tolerance for other religions;
however, the RSS in particular opposes conversions from Hinduism and
believes that all citizens should adhere to Hindu cultural values. The
BJP officially agrees that the caste system should be eliminated, but
many of its members are ambivalent about this. Most BJP leaders also
are RSS members. The BJP's traditional cultural agenda includes calls
for construction of a new Hindu temple to replace an ancient Hindu
temple that was believed to have stood on the site of a mosque in
Ayodhya that a Hindu mob destroyed in 1992; for the repeal of Article
370 of the Constitution, which grants special rights to the state of
Jammu and Kashmir, the country's only Muslim majority state; and for
the enactment of a uniform civil code that would apply to members of
all religions. In mid-October, the RSS held a 3-day rally in Agra,
which more than 75,000 Hindus reportedly attended. Speaking at the
rally, RSS chief K.S. Sudarshan sparked controversy when he called for
banning foreign churches and creating a national Christian Church based
on the Chinese model. Sudarshan reportedly also encouraged Christian
citizens to free themselves from the strong influence of foreign
countries by setting up Indian nationalistic churches. Of particular
concern for minority groups was Home Minister L.K. Advani's highly
publicized participation at the Agra rally and vocal support of the RSS
on his return to New Delhi. All of these proposals are opposed strongly
by some minority religious groups. The BJP-led national Government took
no steps to implement these controversial measures and has promised
that it would not do so during its tenure.
Human rights groups and others have suggested that the response by
authorities in these states to acts of violence against religious
minorities by Hindu extremist groups has been ineffective, at least in
part because of the links between these groups and the BJP, and have
noted that the ineffective investigation and prosecution of such
incidents may encourage violent actions by extremist groups. Some
Chrisian groups also claim that BJP officials at state and local levels
have become increasingly uncooperative. The Government also has been
criticized for not attempting to restrain the country's radical Hindu
groups.
The degree to which the BJP's nationalist Hindu agenda is felt
throughout the country with respect to religious minorities varies
depending on the region. In some states, governments took pains to
reaffirm their commitment to secularism. In others, mainly in the
south, religious groups allege that since the BJP's rise to power in
the national Government, some government bureaucrats have begun to
enforce laws selectively to the detriment of religious minorities. The
situation in the east varied. For example, the Orissa government in
November 1999 notified churches that religious conversions could not
occur without notification of the local police and district magistrate.
The Orissa Freedom of Religion Act of 1967 contains a provision
requiring a monthly government report on the number of conversions, but
this provision previously had not been enforced. After a conversion has
been reported to the District Magistrate, the report is forwarded to
the authorities and a local police officer conducts an inquiry. The
police officer may recommend in favor of or against such intended
conversion, often as the sole arbitrator on the individual's right to
freedom of religion; if conversion is judged to have occurred without
permission or with coercion, the authorities may take penal action. In
Tripura there were reports of attacks on non-Christians by Christians.
No registration is required for religions. Legally mandated
benefits are assigned to certain groups, including some groups defined
by their religion.
There are many religions and a large variety of denominations,
groups, and subgroups in the country, but Hinduism is the dominant
religion. According to 1999 statistics (based on the 1991 census),
Hindus constitute 82.4 percent of the population, Muslims 12.7 percent,
Christians 2.3 percent, Sikhs 2.0 percent, Buddhists 0.7 percent, Jains
0.4 percent, and others, including Parsis, Jews, and Baha'is, 0.4
percent.
The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act makes it a
criminal offense to use any religious site for political purposes or to
use temples for harboring persons accused or convicted of crimes. While
specifically designed to deal with Sikh places of worship in Punjab,
the law applies to all religious sites. The state of Uttar Pradesh
passed the Religious Buildings and Places Act during the state assembly
budget session of March-May. The act requires a state government-
endorsed permit before construction of any religious building may
commence in the state. During the year, West Bengal's government
implemented 15year-old legislation that requires any person desiring to
construct a place of worship to seek permission from the district
magistrate; any person intending to convert a personal place of worship
to one for the community must obtain the district magistrate's
permission.
The current legal system accommodates minority religions' personal
status laws; there are different personal laws for different religious
communities. Religion-specific laws pertain in matters of marriage,
divorce, adoption, and inheritance. For example, Muslim personal status
law governs many noncriminal matters involving Muslims, including
family law, inheritance, and divorce. The personal status laws of the
religious communities sometimes discriminate against women. Under
Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and
unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also
allows a man to have up to four wives but prohibits polyandry. Under
the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman may demand divorce
only in cases of spousal abuse and certain categories of adultery; for
a Christian man, adultery alone is sufficient. In May 1997, the Mumbai
High Court recognized abuse alone as sufficient grounds for a Christian
woman to obtain a divorce.
The Government was reviewing the legislation on marriage and
drafted the ``Christian Marriage Bill'' during the year. The bill would
replace the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, which is widely criticized as
biased against women. If enacted it would place limitations on
interfaith marriages and specify penalties, such as 10 years'
imprisonment, for clergymen who contravene its provisions. The current
form of the bill states that no marriage in which one party is a non-
Christian may be celebrated in a church. The bill was not introduced
during the most recent Parliament session in March-May due to the
strong objections and reservations of the Christian community.
There is no national law that bars proselytizing by Christian
citizens. Foreign missionaries generally may renew their visas, but
since the mid-1960's the Government has refused to admit new resident
foreign missionaries. New arrivals currently enter as tourists on
short-term visas. During the year, as in the past, state officials
refused to issue permits for foreign Christian missionaries, as well as
other persons, to enter some northeastern states, on the grounds of
political instability in the region. This restriction is not levied
specifically against Christians. Many foreigners, including diplomats,
are refused permits to the country's northeastern states on the grounds
of political instability in the region. Missionaries and religious
organizations must comply with the Foreign Contribution (Regulation)
Act (FCRA), which restricts funding from abroad and, therefore, the
ability of certain groups to finance their activities. The Government
is empowered to ban a religious organization if it has violated the
FCRA, has provoked intercommunity friction, or has been involved in
terrorism or sedition. There is no ban on professing or proselytizing
religious beliefs; however, speaking publicly against other beliefs is
considered dangerous to public order, and is prohibited.
A January decision by the Gujarat state government to revoke the
ban on the participation of government employees in Rashtriya
Swayamsewak Sangh activities was criticized widely by those who felt
that this would lead to the spread of RSS influence within the
government services, as was the well-publicized participation of the
state's chief minister at an RSS rally that month. In March the
government of Gujarat convinced a BJP legislator to withdraw a bill
that sought to regulate Christian missionary activity within the state;
the bill was written to prohibit ``forced'' or ``induced'' conversionsa
crime that would have been punishable by a fine and up to 3 years in
prison. In May the Gujarat government withdrew permission for state
government workers to engage in RSS activities. Despite these steps by
the state and national governments to address communal concerns, many
in the minority communities continued to express unease about BJP rule.
In August 1999, a bill was introduced in Gujarat that would allow
harsh punishment for anyone in the state found guilty of converting
someone to another religion through the use of force, provision of
material benefits, or fraud. Human rights groups feared that if passed
the bill--called the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Bill, 1999--could be
used to restrict the fundamental right to choose one's religion.
However, the Gujarat state assembly took no action on the Freedom of
Religion Bill, allowing it to lapse. It must be reintroduced to be
further considered.
Violent attacks against Christians by Hindus, which began in late
1998, continued during the year. Attacks on religious minorities no
longer appear to be confined to Gujarat and Orissa. There were several
attacks by Hindu groups against Christian institutions in Uttar Pradesh
in April (see Section 5). These incidents were the first signs of
Hindu-Christian violence in Uttar Pradesh in over 6 years. The
Government dispatched the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) to
investigate the attacks in the north, but the NCM's findings that the
attacks were not ``communal in nature'' sparked widespread criticism in
the minority community (see Section 5). There is strong evidence that
the NCM report misrepresented the victims in its claim that the victims
themselves are satisfied entirely that there was no religious
motivation behind the violence. Victims of the incidents claim that the
local police were not responsive either before or during the attacks.
The BJP government in Uttar Pradesh initiated an investigation by
intelligence agencies into the June 21 custodial killing of a witness,
Vijay Ekka (see Sections 1.a. and 5); the government also announced
plans to set up a judicial inquiry by a sitting judge from the state
High Court. The Mathura superintendent of police was transferred
because of the Ekka killing; however, no further information was
uncovered and no other persons were held accountable by year's end.
On June 26, the National Human Rights Commission ordered states
affected by Hindu-Christian violence to provide written reports
detailing the violence against Christians and the actions taken by
state governments. No reports were made public by year's end, and
according to human rights activists, states had not submitted them.
On occasion, Hindu-Muslim violence led to killings and a cycle of
retaliation. In some instances, local police and government officials
abetted the violence, and at times security forces were responsible for
abuses. Police sometimes assisted the Hindu fundamentalists in
perpetrating violent acts (see Section 5). Following riots in
Ahmedabad, Gujarat from August 5 to 7, some police officers allegedly
forced some Muslim residents to sing the Sanskrit anthem to prove that
they were not ``anti-national'' (see Section 5). Government officials
allegedly also subjected Christian-affiliated foreign relief
organizations to arbitrary roadblocks; many of these organizations are
not engaged in religious activities (see Section 4). In a few
instances, state governments investigated and sometimes arrested
suspects in cases of anti-Christian violence. For example, after an
Australian missionary was murdered in Orissa (see Section 5), several
suspects were arrested. In another instance, the governments of
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh investigated a series of 6 church bombings
in June and July (see Section 5); the investigations led to the arrest
of 45 persons and concluded that members of the Deendar Anjuman, a
Muslim group, carried out the bombings. In general government response
has been poor with respect to such incidents.
On July 14, the Maharashtra government announced its intention to
prosecute Bal Thackeray, leader of the rightwing Hindu organization
Shiv Sena, for his role in inciting the Mumbai 1992-1993 riots in which
over 700 persons, the vast majority of whom were Muslim, were killed
(see Section 5). On July 25, amid rioting by Shiv Sena supporters,
Thackeray was arrested; a few hours later a judge ruled that the
statute of limitations relating to the incitement charges had expired,
and Thackeray was released.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement
within the country except in certain border areas where, for security
reasons, special permits are required. Under the Passports Act of 1967,
the Government may deny a passport to any applicant who ``may or is
likely to engage outside India in activities prejudicial to the
sovereignty and integrity of India.'' The Government uses this
provision to prohibit the foreign travel of some government critics,
especially those advocating Sikh independence and members of the
violent separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. On April 9, the
Government prevented four members of a Kashmir human rights
organization from traveling to the 56th U.N. Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR) meeting in Geneva (see Section 4). Abdul Majid Banday, Mohammad
Tufail, Mohannad Amin Bhat and Abdul Rashid Lone, had valid passports
and letters of accreditation as members of a U.N.-recognized NGO, but
authorities prevented them from boarding their flight.
Vehicle checkpoints, at which Border Security Forces routinely
search and question occupants, are a common feature throughout most of
Jammu and Kashmir. It also is common for police to block entry and exit
points in preparation for gathering young males for police lineups.
These searches tend to focus on troubled areas, as opposed to the mass
searches that were common in the past. According to a credible source,
such search operations seldom yield any results.
In September the PUCL reported that Bangalore police arrested 30
persons peacefully demanding access to public information on
construction of the Bangalore-Mysore information corridor. The
Karnataka government has proposed acquiring more than 20,000 acres of
land in 168 villages. Those arrested were concerned about the status of
farmland and homes in the village resutling form the continued planned
government construction of an expressway between the two cities.
On October 18, the Supreme Court ruled that construction of the
Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River in Gujarat could begin
immediately, reaching a height of 90 meters, and could proceed in
stages thereafter up to a finished height of 138 meters. The ruling
stipulated that those displaced by the dam would be compensated.
However, many human rights advocates and NGO's continued to allege that
the construction of the dam would displace 40,000 families without
adequately compensating those who are resettled (see Section 2.b.).
(Opposition to the Narmada project was greatest during the early
1990's, resulting in prolonged financial and legal delays.)
Citizens may emigrate without restriction.
Since 1990 more than 235,000 Bangladeshis have been deported, many
from Maharashtra and West Bengal. The occasional deportation of
Bangladeshis judged to have entered the country illegally continued
during the year, but there was no repetition of the systematic roundup
of Bangladeshis for mass deportation that was conducted by the
Maharashtra government in 1998. The Government estimates that there are
10 million Bangladeshis living illegally in the country. On August 28,
the Supreme Court gave the central Government until January 2001 to
repeal the Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal (IMDT) Act of
1985. The court ruled that the law, which is largely aimed at illegal
Bangladeshi immigrants, is being applied only in Assam, and therefore
is discriminatory. Bodo-Santhal ethnic clashes, which began in April
1998, continued throughout the year. More than 87,000 persons live
under poor conditions in relief camps in Assam's Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon,
and adjoining districts as a result of the ongoing violence between
Bodos and Santhals.
The spring and summer 1999 incursion of Pakistan-backed armed
forces into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around
Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military
campaign to repel the intrusion forced as many 50,000 residents of
Jammu and Kashmir from their homes, a number of whom took refuge on the
Paskistani side of the line of control. Many had their homes destroyed.
Since that conflict, artillery shelling of the region by Pakistan has
kept many of the internally displaced persons from returning and driven
others from their homes. On October 12, Jammu and Kashmir home minister
Mustaq Ahmad Lone told the State Assembly that 43,510 persons remained
displaced (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.).
In a number of northern states, most notably Orissa, Bihar, and
West Bengal, hundreds of thousands of persons were displaced
temporarily due to severe flooding and cyclonic storms during the
monsoon season.
The law does not contain provisions for processing refugees or
asylum seekers in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, nor is there a clear
national policy for the treatment of refugees. The Office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has no formal status, but the
Government permits the UNHCR to assist certain groups of refugees
(notably Afghans, Iranians, Somalis, Burmese, and Sudanese). The U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, visited the country in
May (see Section 4).
The Government has not permitted the UNHCR to assist other refugee
groups, including Sri Lankan Tamils, to whose camps in Tamil Nadu the
Government continued to bar access by the UNHCR and NGO's (see Section
4). The Government provides first asylum to some refugees, most notably
in recent years to Tibetan and Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. However, this
policy is applied inconsistently. For example, the insistence of some
border authorities on the presentation of passport and visas by those
claiming refugee status occasionally has resulted in individuals or
groups being refused admittance. This has occurred in recent years in
cases involving Chin and Rakhine refugees from Burma, and Afghans who
entered the country through Pakistan. Refugees are not required to make
claims in other countries. Cramped and unhygienic conditions reportedly
exist in some of the camps for Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu.
The Government recognizes certain groups, including Chakmas from
Bangladesh, Tamils from Sri Lanka, and Tibetans as refugees and
provides them with assistance in refugee camps or in resettlement
areas. According to UNHCR and government statistics, there were
approximately 98,000 Tibetans, approximately 64,989 Sri Lankan Tamils
in 131 camps, and perhaps as many as 80,000 Sri Lankan Tamils outside
of the camps living in the country at year's end. The refugees in the
camps are permitted to work, and the state and central governments pay
to educate refugee children and provide limited welfare benefits. Many
Chakmas from Bangladesh have been repatriated voluntarily, including
all of the estimated 56,000 persons who had been residing in Tripura.
Some 80,000 Chakma permanent residents remain in Arunachal Pradesh and
Mizoram; the Supreme Court has upheld their right to citizenship.
However, the Supreme Court's order to extend citizenship to this group
still had not been enforced by year's end. The UNHCR reported that
13,390 Afghans, 747 Burmese, 139 Iranians, 105 Somalis, 50 Sudanese,
and 56 others, including Iraqis and Ethiopians, were receiving
assistance from the UNHCR in the country as of August 31. Although the
Government formally does not recognize these persons as refugees, it
does not deport them. Instead, they received renewable residence
permits or their status was ignored. Increasingly during the year, some
of these groupsAfghans, Iraqis, and Iranians in particular--were not
granted renewal of their residence permits by the authorities on the
grounds that they were not in possession of valid national passports.
Due to financial and other reasons, many refugees were unable or
unwilling to obtain or renew their national passports, and therefore
were unable to regularize their status in the country.
The Tamil Nadu government provides educational facilities to Sri
Lankan Tamil refugee children, and the central Government provides some
assistance and channels assistance from NGO and church groups. The
central Government generally has denied NGO's and the UNHCR direct
access to the camps. NGO's report refugee complaints about deteriorated
housing, poor sanitation, delayed dole payments, and inadequate medical
care in the Tamil refugee camps. The NHRC has intervened to uphold the
right of several Sri Lankan Tamils detained in so-called ``special
camps'' to remain in the country. The Government uses these camps to
hold suspected members of the LTTE terrorist organization. Human rights
groups allege that inmates of the special camps sometimes are subjected
to physical abuse and that their confinement to the camps amounts to
imprisonment without trial. They allege that several of those acquitted
by the Supreme Court in May 1999 of involvement in the assassination of
former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (see Section 1.a.) remain confined
in these special camps. Some 1,399 new refugees arrived from Sri Lanka
during the first 9 months of the year. Human rights groups allege that
the Government did not permit 30 to 40 families, whom alien smugglers
left stranded on sand bars in the shallow Palk Strait, to enter the
country; however, during the year some 180 persons similarly marooned
were permitted to enter.
Ethnic Chins are among the nonrecognized refugees in the
northeastern states, particularly Mizoram. Chins and Chakma refugees
have been targeted by student-led demonstrations protesting their
presence in Mizoram. During the year, tensions between security forces
and Chin National Force (CNF) insurgents operating in Burma allegedly
resulted in the detention, interrogation, and expulsion of some persons
associated with the CNF to Burma, where they credibly feared
persecution. Human rights monitors allege that about 1,000 Chin
refugees had been arrested in Mizoram and some 200 had been repatriated
forcibly to Burma between July and September. According to one NGO, on
August 3, a 25-year-old Chin refugee died in the Aizawl central police
station, Mizoram (see Section 1.a.). An estimated 40,000 to 50,000
Chins live and work illegally in Mizoram.
Mizoram human rights groups estimate that some 41,000 Reangs, a
tribal group from Mizoram that has been displaced due to a sectarian
conflict, presently are being sheltered in 6 camps in North Tripura;
conditions in such camps are poor and the Tripura government has asked
the central Government to allot funds for their care. Reang leaders in
the camps say that their community would return to Mizoram if they were
granted an autonomous district council, allotted a set number of seats
in the Mizoram Assembly, and granted financial assistance for
resettlement. The Mizoram government rejected these demands and
maintained that only 16,000 of the refugees had a valid claim to reside
in the state. On August 7, following his meeting with Tripura chief
minister Manik Sarkar, Union Home Minister L.K. Advani announced that
an initial group of Reang refugees would be resettled in Tripura by
October 31, and that repatriation of the entire group would be
completed by year's end. However, while an NHRC staff member also
visited Tripura to inquire into the situation of the Reangs, by year's
end nothing had been done to repatriate them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right Of Citizens To
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The country has a democratic, parliamentary system
of government with representatives elected in multiparty elections. A
Parliament sits for 5 years unless dissolved earlier for new elections,
except under constitutionally defined emergency situations. State
governments are elected at regular intervals except in states under
President's Rule.
On the advice of the Prime Minister, the President may proclaim a
state of emergency in any part of the national territory in the event
of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Similarly, President's
Rule may be declared in the event of a collapse of a state's
constitutional machinery. The Supreme Court in May 1995 upheld the
Government's authority to suspend fundamental rights during an
emergency.
Some 50 persons were killed in election-related violence in state
assembly polling in Gujarat, Bihar, and Manipur (see Section 1.a.), and
there were localized allegations of voter fraud.
During the February 12 Bihar State Assembly election, extremists of
the Maoist Coordination Center (MCC) and the PWG killed 21 persons,
including 12 members of the security forces and 2 election officials.
The extremist groups had warned voters to remain at home during the
polls, or face attack. Seventeen more persons were killed in the second
phase of voting in the state on February 22. On September 17 in
Ahmedabad, Gujarat, police killed 6 persons and injured 15 others when
they fired on a crowd of about 2,000 persons (see Section 1.a.). The
crowd had rampaged through a Muslim-minority section of the city after
reports that ballot boxes had been tampered with in the city's
municipal corporation elections. In West Bengal, clashes between
supporters of the Trinamul Congress Party and the CPI(M) left 71
persons dead in the first 9 months of the year (see Section 1.g.).
Voting irregularities in the West Bengal election--such as fraud,
delaying tactics, and intimidation--were reported widely.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although no
legal impediments hinder their participation in the political process.
A large proportion of women participates in voting throughout the
country (with turnout rates slightly lower than those of men), and
numerous women are represented in all major parties in the national and
state legislatures. There are 66 women among the 790 Members of
Parliament, including the Deputy Speaker of the upper house, and there
are 8 women in the 74-member Cabinet. The 1993 passage of the
``Panchayati Raj'' constitutional amendments reserved 30 percent of
seats in elected village councils (Panchayats) for women, which has
brought more than 1 million women into the political life at the
grassroots level. In September debate over the Women's Reservation
Bill, which was designed to reserve one-third of parliamentary seats
for women, subsided when the Government failed to introduce the bill
during the monsoon session of Parliament. The bill was introduced but
not debated in the winter session of Parliament. The Women's
Reservation Bill first was introduced in late 1998.
The Constitution reserves seats in Parliament and state
legislatures for ``scheduled tribes'' and ``scheduled castes'' in
proportion to their population (see Section 5). Indigenous people
actively participate in national and local politics, but their impact
depends on their numerical strength. In the northeastern states,
indigenous people are a large proportion of the population and
consequently exercise a dominant influence in the political process. In
comparison, in Maharashtra and Gujarat, tribal people are a small
minority and have been unsuccessful in blocking projects that they
oppose.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Independent human rights organizations operate throughout most of
the country, investigating abuses and publishing their findings;
however, in some states and in a few circumstances, human rights groups
face some restrictions. Human rights monitors in Jammu and Kashmir have
been unable to move around the state to document human rights
violations due to fear of retribution by security forces and
countermilitants. Since 1992 several individuals closely involved in
the documentation of violations in Jammu and Kashmir, including lawyers
and journalists, have been attacked and in some cases killed.
International human rights monitors have had difficulty in obtaining
visas to visit the country for investigation purposes. For example,
during the year the authorities continued to deny HRW and Amnesty
International permission to visit Jammu and Kashmir; however, some
foreign diplomats gained improved access to some prisons in Jammu and
Kashmir. The Government also continued to deny the U.N. Special
Rapporteurs on Torture and Extrajudicial Killings permission to visit
the country, despite their repeated requests. Moreover, the police and
security forces have arrested and harassed human rights monitors. In
May U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata was allowed to
visit the country (see Section 2.d.).
In September 1999, the Ministry of Home Affairs sent a notice to
several prominent NGO's asking them to justify their status as
nonpolitical organizations under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation)
Act. According to HRW, the notice effectively was a threat to cut off
foreign funding. The NGO's, many of which worked on women's rights,
communal violence, and Dalit and tribal issues, publicly had criticized
the policies of the BJP-led government and the antisecular activities
of the Sangh Parivar, a collective of rightwing Hindu organizations of
which the BJP is a member.
On May 24, an agent of the intelligence bureau visited and
questioned the director of the South Asia Human Rights Documentation
Center (SAHRDC) about his travel earlier in the month to Geneva to
participate in the meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. In 1998
the Andhra Pradesh government issued a directive to faculty members of
state universities not to associate with the Andhra Pradesh Civil
Liberties Union (APCLC), a well-respected human rights organization.
Following protests by faculty organizations, the directive was
rescinded.
On April 9, the Government prevented four members of a Kashmir
human rights organization from traveling to the 56th annual meeting of
the UNCHR in Geneva (see Section 2.d.).
According to HRW, on April 20, a mob of local residents and
politicians raided the Almora and Jageswar offices of an NGO working
primarily on women's health and empowerment in Uttar Pradesh. The
attack allegedly was in response to a pamphlet that the NGO had
published in 1999 on HIV transmission, which contained purportedly
sexually offensive material. Police and protestors assaulted staff and
trainees, and a number of persons were detained for a short period.
According to Amnesty, the chief judicial magistrate in Srinagar
released on bail Ghulam Mohiuddin Najar, a political activist and
teacher; however, immediately upon release, members of the Special
Operations Group, a unit of the state police, shot and killed him at
the court gate. According to Amnesty International, in February
security forces in Jammu and Kashmir pointed guns at journalists who
were attempting to investigate the killing of Najar.
Amnesty International reported the November killing of human rights
defender T. Puroshottam in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. A group of
unidentified men wielding knives attacked Puroshottam, the Joint
Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, in a local
shop. Puroshottam was involved in numerous investigations of alleged
human rights violations by the police including torture and
extrajudicial executions, had been attacked previously, and had
received persistent threatening telephone calls. There has been no
independent investigation into Puroshottam's killing.
There was no definitive resolution in the case of abducted and
murdered Kashmir human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi. Human rights
workers allege that the state is attempting to subvert the judicial
process by withholding evidence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). In Assam
the investigation into the 1996 murder of human rights monitor and
journalist Parag Das has yielded no definitive information on the
identity of his killer. The assailant allegedly was a militant who
previously had surrendered and was supported by the Government (see
Sections 1.a. and 2.a.).
Several Christian-affiliated (in many cases, non-evangelical)
international relief agencies stated that, during the year, their work
in delivering services to the poor became considerably more difficult
due to threats, increased bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases,
physical attacks on their field workers by Hindu extremists (see
Sections 2.c. and 5).
The Government appointed a National Human Rights Commission in 1993
with powers to investigate and recommend policy changes, punishment,
and compensation in cases of police abuse. In addition the NHRC is
directed to contribute to the establishment, growth, and functioning of
human rights NGO's. The Government appoints the members and finances
the operations of the NHRC. The NHRC is seriously understaffed and
prohibited by statute from directly investigating allegations of abuse
involving army and paramilitary forces.
From April 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999 (the most recent reporting
year), the NHRC received 40,724 new complaints of human rights
violations. The Commission had 13,512 cases awaiting consideration at
the beginning of the reporting period. Of the 54,236 cases before it in
the 1998-99 year, the Commission reviewed 53,711, leaving 525 awaiting
review at the end of the year. Of the 53,711 cases considered during
the year, 32,172 were dismissed; 10,718 were transmitted to other
governmental authorities for disposition; 3,395 were concluded, and
7,426 were pending. In the previous 12-month period (April 1997 to
March 1998), the Commission received 36,791 complaints. The increased
number of complaints in the most recent reporting year is believed to
be the result of the Commission's increased visibility.
The NHRC has sought to encourage a culture respective of human
rights by fostering human rights education in schools and universities,
by offering assistance and encouragement to human rights NGO's, by
supporting training programs for the police, military forces, and
paramilitary forces, and by making recommendations to the central and
state governments. During the year, the NHRC carried out, with the
assistance of NGO's, a human rights training program for state police
that included stress counseling. The NHRC also has influenced the
legislative process, particularly by issuing a formal opinion that a
new Prevention of Terrorism Act is not needed, and by proposing Prison
Reform Legislation. State Human Rights Commissions exist in Assam,
Manipur, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu,
Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, and Rajasthan; Uttar Pradesh took
legal steps to establish a commission but has yet to appoint members.
In addition special courts to hear human rights cases have been
established in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. The
courts in Uttar Pradesh are not functioning, despite a September 1999
court order that they be reactivated. The NHRC also encouraged the
establishment of human rights cells in police headquarters in the
states.
The NHRC also was involved in programs to eliminate child labor
(see Section 6.c.).
The state human rights commission established in Jammu and Kashmir
by an act of the state legislature, in 1997, has no power to
investigate independently alleged human rights violations committed by
security force members. Credible human rights monitors say that the
Jammu and Kashmir Commission has not yet demonstrated effective,
independent protection of human rights in the state.
A People's Commission that was established in 1998 by retired
Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh to highlight the fate of more than
2,000 persons who ``disappeared'' during the period of political unrest
in Punjab (see Section 1.b.) continued to receive little cooperation
from state government authorities.
The prison visits program in Jammu and Kashmir by the ICRC,
initiated in October 1995, continued during the year (see Section
1.c.). ICRC representatives also continued training police and Border
Security Force personnel in international humanitarian law.
The Government continued to refuse repeated UNHCR requests for
access to the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee camps in Tamil Nadu (see Section
2.d.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social status
The traditional caste system as well as differences of ethnicity,
religion, and language deeply divide society. Despite laws designed to
prevent discrimination, other legislation as well as social and
cultural practices have a profound discriminatory impact. According to
the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
caste clashes are frequent in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu.
Women.--Domestic violence is common and a serious problem.
According to a 1996 survey in Uttar Pradesh, 30 percent of married men
acknowledged physically abusing their wives. In a survey of 10,000
women released during the year, more than half of the women said that
violence was a normal part of married life. The Health Ministry
released a different survey during the year that indicated that, of
90,000 women surveyed, more than half acknowledge being battered. Dowry
disputes also are a serious problem. In the typical dowry dispute, a
groom's family members harass a new wife whom they believe has not
provided a sufficient dowry. This harassment sometimes ends in the
woman's death, which family members often try to portray as a suicide
or kitchen accident; recent research suggests that a significant
percentage of kerosene attacks also are due to domestic violence.
Although most ``dowry deaths'' involve lower and middle-class families,
the phenomenon crosses both caste and religious lines. According to
National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics, 6,917 dowry deaths
occurred in the country in 1998, including 2,229 dowry deaths in Uttar
Pradesh, 1,039 in Bihar, 598 in Madhya Pradesh, 500 in Andhra Pradesh,
420 in Maharashtra, 200 in Karnataka, 176 in Tamil Nadu, and 21 in
Kerala.
Under a 1986 amendment to the Penal Code, the court must presume
that the husband or the wife's in-laws are responsible for every
unnatural death of a woman in the first 7 years of marriage--provided
that harassment is proven. In such cases, police procedures require
that an officer of deputy superintendent rank or above conduct the
investigation and that a team of two or more doctors perform the
postmortem procedures. According to human rights monitors, in practice
police do not follow these procedures consistently.
The issue of rape has received greater political and social
attention than in earlier years. In July the NHRC directed the Andhra
Pradesh government to pay $1,100 (50,000 rupees) in compensation to
each of four Dalit women who were raped in Godavari district. The NHRC
overturned a state ruling that had denied the women monetary
compensation because the victims and their attackers were members of
low caste and tribal communities. The press consistently reports that
such violence against women is increasing, although local women's
organizations claim that there simply has been increased reporting.
Only 10 percent of rape cases are fully adjudicated by the courts, and
police typically fail to arrest rapists, thus fostering a climate of
impunity. In May the Central Bureau of Investigation initiated an
inquiry into the alleged gang rape of three women by police officials
in Pilibhit district, Uttar Pradesh in August 1998. According to a
complaint filed by a witness, three officers of the Madho Tanda police
station in Pilibhit district entered the victims' home late on the
night of August 16-17 and raped the three women. On May 30, a court in
Jalpaiguri, West Bengal sentenced Kashinath Tripathy and Bhuson Barua
to life imprisonment for the 1982 rape of a girl in Jalpaiguri.
In September in Kulkul village, Orissa, a group of villagers hacked
to death a 60-year-old tribal woman, Namsi Ho, allegedly for practicing
witchraft. Police arrested four persons in connection with the killing.
On October 16 and November 19, in Ganjam district, Orissa, villagers
accused Kumari Behera, of sorcery, and tortured and branded her with
hot iron rods. Five persons were arrested in connection with the
assaults.
According to NCRB statistics, in 1998 there were 15,031 reported
rapes, 16,381 abductions of women, 6,917 dowry deaths, 41,318 reported
cases of torture of women, 31,046 cases of molestation, and 8,123 cases
of sexual harassment. The NCRB recorded 131,338 crimes against women in
1998, compared with 121,265 in 1997. In 1997, 678 cases of gang rape
were recorded. Gang rapes often are committed as punishment for alleged
adultery or as a means of coercion or revenge in rural property
disputes and feuds. On February 1, the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights (UNCHR) expressed concern that ``there is a high incidence of
gender-based violence against women, which takes even more extreme
forms because of customary practices such as dowry, sati (the burning
alive of widows on their husbands' funeral pyre) and the Devadasi
system (the practice of dedicating or marrying young, prepubescent
girls to a Hindu deity or temple as servants of God. Devadasis, who
generally are Dalits, may not marry. They are taken from their families
and are required to provide sexual services to priests and high caste
Hindus. Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban brothels'' (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The committee further stated that
``discrimination against women who belong to particular castes or
ethnic or religious groups also is manifest in extreme forms of
physical and sexual violence and harassment.''
Higher female mortality at all age levels, including female
infanticide and sex selective termination of pregnancies, accounts for
an increase in the ratio of males to females to 107.9 males per 100
females in 1991, from 104.7 males per 100 females in 1981, and from
102.9 males per 100 females at the turn of the century. In some
districts of Tamil Nadu, female infanticide occurs despite government
and NGO programs intended to counter the practice. In July the district
collector of Dharmapuri, Tamil Nadu, formed a team to investigate the
murder of a girl in Pararrapatti village. The team exhumed the buried
body and arrested the girl's father and another accomplice. In August
the maimed body of a newborn girl was found under a bridge in
Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu. Police believe that the child's mother
abandoned her in the public place hoping that someone would take her
in. On February 1, CEDAW expressed concern that ``India has not yet
established a comprehensive and compulsory system of registration of
births and marriages. The Committee notes that inability to prove those
important events by documentation prevents effective implementation of
laws that protect girls from sexual exploitation and trafficking, child
labor and forced or early marriage.''
Numerous laws exist to protect women's rights, including the Equal
Remuneration Act, the Prevention of Immoral Traffic Act, the Sati
(Widow Burning) Prevention Act, and the Dowry Prohibition Act. However,
the Government often is unable to enforce these laws, especially in
rural areas in which traditions are deeply rooted. According to press
reports, the rate of acquittal in dowry death cases is high, and
because of court backlogs it takes 6 to 7 years on average to rule on
such cases. On February 1, CEDAW noted that ``there is an urgent need
to introduce comprehensive [legislative] reform to promote equality and
the human rights of women.''
Prostitution is widespread, with an estimated 2.3 million
prostitutes in the country, some 575,000 of whom are children. Many
indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation (see
Section 6.c.). In Assam's Chars River islands, some women work as
prostitutes in exchange for as little as $0.23 (10 rupees). In 1998
prostitutes began to demand legal rights, licenses, and reemployment
training, especially in Mumbai and New Delhi.
In 1997 Karnataka's government made sexual harassment a criminal
offense.
The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination
for many thousands of trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
Literacy rates for women are significantly lower than rates for
men; the 2000 U.N. Development Program (UNDP) Report for India found
that 38 percent of women were literate, compared with 66 percent of
men.
The law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but enforcement
is inadequate. In both rural and urban areas, women get lower wages
than men for doing the same job. Women experience economic
discrimination in access to employment and credit. This acts as an
impediment to women owning a business, and the promotion of women to
managerial positions within businesses often is slower than that of
males. State governments have supported micro-credit programs for women
that have begun to have an impact in many rural districts.
The personal status laws of the religious communities discriminate
against women. Under the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman
may demand divorce only in the case of spousal abuse and in the case of
certain categories of adultery; for a Christian man, adultery alone is
sufficient. In 1997 the Mumbai High Court recognized abuse alone as
sufficient grounds for a Christian woman to obtain a divorce. Under
Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and
unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also
allows polygyny (under which a man may have up to four wives) but
prohibits polyandry (under which a woman may have muliple husbands). On
February 1, CEDAW noted that ``steps have not been taken to reform the
personal laws of different religious and ethnic groups, in consultation
with them, so as to conform with the Convention. The Committee is
concerned that the Government's policy of non-intervention perpetuates
sexual stereotypes, son preference and discrimination against women.''
The Hindu Succession Act provides equal inheritance rights for
Hindu women, but married daughters seldom are given a share in parental
property. Islamic law recognizes a woman's right of inheritance but
specifies that a daughter's share only should be one-half that of a
son.
Under many tribal land systems, notably in Bihar, tribal women do
not have the right to own land. Other laws relating to the ownership of
assets and land accord women little control over land use, retention,
or sale. However, several exceptions exist, as in Ladakh and Meghalaya,
where women may have several husbands and control the family
inheritance.
Thousands of grassroots organizations work for social justice and
the economic advancement of women, in addition to the National
Commission for Women. The Government usually supports these efforts,
despite strong resistance from traditionally privileged groups.
Children.--The Government does not provide compulsory, free, and
universal primary education, and only approximately 59 percent of
children between the ages of 5 and 14 attend school. Of a primary
school-age population of approximately 203 million, about 120 million
children attend school. No significant sectors or groups actively are
excluded, but the economic reality is that children of wealthier
families are more likely to attend school than those of poor families.
According to a UNDP study conducted in 1993, the dropout rate from
primary school was 34 percent. A significant gender gap exists in
school attendance, particularly at the secondary level. According to
UNICEF, 59 percent of boys and 38 percent of girls were enrolled in
secondary school.
The central Government spends approximately 5.9 percent of its
overall budget on education. The state governments also spend part of
their budgets on education, but no comprehensive figure of combined
federalstate expenditure is available. A 1993 study commissioned by the
UNDP estimated that about 3.7 percent of the country's gross national
product is devoted to education. On February 23, the Committee on the
Rights of the Child of the UNHRC expressed concern ``at the prevailing
poor situation in the state party with respect to education, which is
characterized by a general lack of infrastructure, facilities and
equipment, insufficient numbers of qualified teachers and a drastic
shortage of text books and other relevant learning materials. There is
serious concern regarding the striking disparities in terms of access
to education, attendance at primary and secondary levels and drop-out
rates between: different states, rural and urban areas, boys and girls,
the affluent and the poor, and children belonging to scheduled castes
and tribes.''
Child welfare organizations estimate that there are 500,000 street
children nationwide living in abject poverty.
A coalition of about 50 NGO's conducted a detailed survey in the
Calcutta municipal area and identified 145,000 children who were not
attending school. Not all of them were street children. The NGO's
received UNICEF assistance in training teachers to conduct transitional
education for a target group of 45,000 5 to 9year-old children. The
course work is intended to allow these children to enter mainstream
schooling. UNICEF has contributed $94,000 (4.4 million rupees) for this
activity; the West Bengal government has provided technical advice; the
central Government contributed nothing to the project. By year's end,
300 teachers had received training and 235 centers are functioning.
About 5,875 children are attending transitional education sessions at
these centers.
Child prostitution occurs in the cities, and there are an estimated
575,00 child prostitutes nationwide. Trafficking in children for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.). On February 23, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child of
the UNCHR expressed concern ``about the sexual abuse and exploitation
of children, especially those belonging to the lower castes and from
poor urban and rural areas, in the contexts of: Religious and
traditional culture; child domestic workers; children living and/or
working on the streets; communal violence and ethnic conflict; abuse by
security forces in areas of conflict, such as Jammu and Kashmir and the
northeastern states; and trafficking and commercial exploitation,
especially girls form neighboring countries, particularly Nepal. It is
also concerned about the lack of adequate measures to combat this
phenomenon and the lack of adequate rehabilitation measures.''
According to an International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate, 15
percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes are
children.
A working group on child prostitution set up by the NHRC includes
representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department
of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet
throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal
prohibitions.
Runaway children, especially in larger cities, are at high risk for
sexually transmitted diseases and HIV. They often work 18- to 20-hour
days, frequently in hazardous conditions (see Section 6.c.), and suffer
sexual and mental abuse. In addition schoolteachers often beat
children.
The Union Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment has set up a
24-hour ``child help line'' phone-in service for children in distress
in nine cities. Run by NGO's with government funding, the child help
line assists street children, orphans, destitutes, runaway children,
and children suffering abuse and exploitation. During one 6-month
period, the help lines received 25,000 calls, including 2,190 seeking
medical assistance for children, 1,056 seeking shelter, 138 reporting
missing children, and 125 reporting physical or sexual abuse of
children.
As part of its ongoing effort, the NHRC seeks to examine conditions
in juvenile homes and recommend improvements. In 1999 the Commission
issued directions to all state governments to report within 24 hours
any instance of death or rape in such institutions. The Commission
reported that it had undertaken this initiative following receipt of
reports of a young boy's death in such a home in Delhi in 1996. In
March 1999, NHRC member Justice V.S. Malimath said that cases of abuse
and torture of children confined to juvenile homes had been reported.
In some cases, the Commission had acted to transfer oversight of homes
to private voluntary organizations ``after the (state) government
failed to provide a healthy environment to children in these homes.''
In its February 23 concluding observations regarding the country, the
U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child of the UNCHR expressed
concern about ``numerous reports of routine ill-treatment, corporal
punishment, torture and sexual abuse of children in detention
facilities, and alleged instances of killings of children living and/or
working on the streets by law enforcement officials.'' The Committee
also expressed concern ``at the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions
of detention of children, including detention with adults; lack of
application and enforcement of existing juvenile justice legislation;
lack of training for professionals, including the judiciary, lawyers
and law enforcement officers, in relation to the Convention (On the
Rights of the Child), other existing international standards and the
1986 Juvenile Justice Act; and the lack of measures and enforcement
thereof to prosecute officials who violate these provisions.''
The Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act of 1929, as amended in
1978, prohibits child marriage, a traditional practice in the northern
part of the country. The act raised the age requirement for marriage
for girls to 15 from 18 years, but the Government does not enforce it.
According to one report, 50 percent of girls in Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar
Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh are married by age 16. NCRB statistics show
that only 56 cases were registered under the Child Marriage Restraint
(Amendment) Act during 1998. The NHRC, in consultation with the
National Commission for Women and the Department of Women and Child
Development, recommended in 1997 that a new draft ``Marriage Bill'' be
enacted to strengthen the prohibitions of the 1929 act; however, the
bill had not yet been introduced in Parliament by year's end. The NHRC
in its 1996-1997 report, criticized the Government for rejecting this
suggestion, a response that the Commission concluded amounted,
``essentially, to a total disinclination to strengthen or alter the
law, in any respect, or indeed to see to its better implementation in
any manner.''
The traditional preference for male children continues. Although a
law passed in 1994 prohibits the use of amniocentesis and sonogram
tests for sex determination, the Government does not enforce the law.
The tests are misused widely for sex determination, and termination of
a disproportionate number of pregnancies with female fetuses occurs. In
the 12 years since the southern state of Maharashtra passed a law
banning the use of such tests for sex determination, the state
government only filed charges against one doctor, who he was acquitted.
Human rights groups estimate that at least 10,000 cases of female
infanticide occur yearly, primarily in poor rural areas. Parts of Tamil
Nadu (Dharmapuri, Salem, and Madurai districts) still have high rates
of female infanticide. According to statistics compiled by the
Dharmapuri office of the Directorate of Health Services, 1,260 female
infants were killed in the district in 1997. Police have not
investigated these cases. In 1998 the Tamil Nadu Human Rights
Commission suggested that a separate mandatory police investigation
into the death of every female infant become mandatory, but there is no
legislation that requires such action and none has been taken. In
addition parents often give priority in health care and nutrition to
male infants. Women's rights groups point out that the burden of
providing girls with an adequate dowry is one factor that makes
daughters less desirable. Although abetting or taking dowry
theoretically is illegal under the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, it
still is practiced widely.
Bonded and unbonded child labor continues to be a serious problem
throughout the country (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
People with Disabilities.--According to regional NGO's, there are
over 90 million disabled persons in the country. Neither law or
regulations require accessibility for the disabled. With the adoption
of the Persons with Disability (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act in 1995, a nascent disabled rights
movement slowly is raising public awareness of the rights of the
disabled. Although the act provides equal rights to all persons with
disabilities, most disabled-related organizations admit that its
practical effects so far have been minimal, in part due to a clause
that makes the implementation of programs dependent on the ``economic
capacity'' of the Government. To a large degree, physical impediments
still limit mobility, legislation prevents equality, and societal
discrimination maintains the status quo of the disabled.
The Disabled Division of the Ministry of Welfare had a budget
provision of more than $38 million (1.65 billion rupees) for the 1998-
99 fiscal year for a number of organizations and committees at the
national, regional, and local levels. The Ministry delivers
rehabilitation services to the rural population through 16 district
centers. A national rehabilitation plan commits the Government to
putting a rehabilitation center in each of more than 400 districts, but
services still are concentrated in urban areas. Moreover, the impact of
government programs has been limited. Significant funding is provided
to a few government organizations such as the Artificial Limbs
Manufacturing Corporation of India, the National Handicapped Finance
and Development Corporation, and the Rehabilitation Council of India.
Each entity provides specific services or training, including producing
aids and prosthetics, promoting disabled-oriented economic development
activities, offering training to health-care professionals and
vocational instructors concerning disabled-related issues, and
providing comprehensive rehabilitation services to the rural disabled.
Additional mini-grants are offered to NGO's that coordinate
programs for the disabled to facilitate their physical, social, and
psychological rehabilitation and integration into mainstream society.
During 1998-99, $3 million (130.5 million rupees) was available.
However, only half of this amount was allocated due to funding
restrictions placed on each providing organization and the small number
of them that exist.
Two significant programs to benefit the disabled are the National
Project to Integrate Mentally Retarded in Family and Community and the
National Institute for the Multiple Disabilities. The first project,
launched in six states in 1998, primarily focuses on children from the
economically weaker sectors and promotes awareness concerning the
mentally disabled, their problems, and their rights. The second is the
Ministry of Welfare, which provides rehabilitation services to the
disabled and is fostering greater awareness among communities
throughout the country. As a result of the passage of the Persons with
Disabilities Act, there now is a Disabilities Commissioner who oversees
implementation of the act and its protections for the disabled.
According to the Persons with Disability Act, 3 percent of
positions in official offices and state-owned enterprises must be
reserved for persons with visual, hearing, or orthopedic disabilities.
The Government provides special railway fares, education allowances,
scholarships, customs exemptions, budgetary funds from the Ministry of
Rural Development, and rehabilitation training to assist the disabled.
However, implementation of these entitlements is not comprehensive.
Although the Government has taken significant steps toward improving
the plight of the disabled, its involvement has been insufficient. The
majority of responsibility for caring for disabled persons still lies
with family members and voluntary groups.
The NHRC continues to receive complaints relating to harassment,
intolerance, and discrimination against the disabled. It currently is
gathering information on these cases and forwarding assessments to
concerned NGO's and government entities. However, this process is slow,
and its effects so far have been minimal.
The NHRC continued its efforts to improve conditions in mental
hospitals and enhance awareness of the rights of those with mental
disabilities during the year. In 1997 it commissioned an assessment of
conditions at mental hospitals throughout the country, to be conducted
by the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuroscience. The
assessment, whose results the NHRC released in July 1999, found that
conditions in mental institutions were unsatisfactory and in need of
reform. The rights of the mentally ill and mentally disabled are
provided for in the Constitution and the Mental Health Act of 1987.
However, the NHRC noted that despite these protections, conditions in
many mental hospitals are unsatisfactory. They continue to embody old
concepts of mental health care and essentially function as custodial
rather than therapeutic institutions. Overcrowded and serving as
``dumping grounds'' for desperate relatives, some mental hospitals lack
even basic amenities and have poor medical facilities. In August 1999,
the NHRC reported that it had assumed the management of mental
hospitals in Ranchi, Bihar, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, and Gwalior, Madhya
Pradesh, at the direction of the Supreme Court. In February NHRC
Chairman Justice J.S. Verma asked chief ministers of all the states and
administrators of all the union territories ``to issue clear directions
to the inspector generals of prisons to ensure that mentally ill
persons are not kept in jail under any circumstances.'' However, there
was little follow-up to the NHRC direction.
Indigenous People.--The Innerline Regulations enacted by the
British in 1873 still provide the basis for safeguarding tribal rights
in most of the northeastern border states. They are in effect in
Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram, but not in Tripura,
in which the tribal population has been reduced to 30 percent of the
total population due to increased Bengali migration since partition.
These regulations prohibit any person, including citizens from other
states, from going beyond an inner boundary without a valid permit. No
rubber, wax, ivory, or other forest products may be removed from the
protected areas without prior authorization. No outsiders are allowed
to own land in the tribal areas without approval from tribal
authorities.
The 1991 census, the last conducted, showed that 8.08 percent of
citizens belonged to scheduled tribes. According to the Indian
Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal People (ICITP), 80 percent of
the tribal population live below the poverty level. In May 1998, the
NHRC established a panel to investigate the condition of the country's
20 million denotified tribal people, who in 1871 the British colonial
government labeled as belonging to ``criminal tribes''). During the
year, the panel prepared a report for the NHRC on their condition and
advised the NHRC in other ways. Denotifed tribal peoples are tribal
people The colonial act listing these tribes was repealed in 1951, but
the stigma remains and many of these tribal people still are
discriminated against actively. On February 15, the NHRC recommended
that the ``Habitual Offenders Act,'' aimed at the denotified and
nomadic tribes, be repealed. According to the ICITP, more than 40,000
tribal women, mainly from Orissa and Bihar, have been forced into
situations of economic and sexual exploitation (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.); many come from tribes that were driven off the land by national
park schemes. Special courts to hear complaints of atrocities committed
against tribal people were to have been established under the
protection of Civil Rights Act of 1976, but this never was
accomplished.
Despite constitutional safeguards, the rights of indigenous groups
in the eastern parts of the country often are ignored. Indigenous
people suffer discrimination and harassment, have been deprived wrongly
of their land, and have been subject to torture and to arbitrary
arrest. There has been encroachment on tribal land in almost every
eastern state, including by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, and by
businesses that illegally have removed forest and mineral products.
Moreover, persons from other backgrounds often usurp places reserved
for members of tribes and lower castes in national education
institutions. Mob lynchings, arson, and police atrocities against
tribal people occur in many states (see Section 1.c.). For example, on
January 31, local landowners attacked the tribal village of Ghutewadi,
Ahmednagar district, Maharashtra, killing a 60-year-old tribal woman
and injuring 10 other women and a child. On July 4, a mob killed a 90-
year-old tribal woman and set 16 houses on fire following the abduction
of a nontribal youth from Futotip village in North Tripura. On August
17, a mob attacked Jatindra Kumr Jamatya, a tribal activist and member
of the ruling CPI(M)in Nagrai, South Tripura.
In the Andaman Islands in 1999, the local government implemented a
policy of permitting development of the Jawara tribal area, which
threatens the indigenous group's way of life. The construction of a
road through the forest that is inhabited by this group and the
encroachment of Indian settlers have impacted negatively this
indigenous group's cultural vitality, economic self-sufficiency, and
physical and mental health. These integrative policies have been
motivated partly by humanitarian concerns, although interest in
commercial exploitation of virgin forests that we inhabited by tribal
people is another strong factor behind these policies. A manifestation
of this negative trend was a destructive outbreak of measles that
affected about 30 persons among the Jawara tribal people, which was
reported in the press in September 1999.
Such violations led to numerous tribal movements demanding the
protection of land and property rights. The Jharkhand Movement in Bihar
and Orissa, and the Bodo Movement in Assam, reflect deep economic and
social grievances among indigenous people. In the Jharkhand area,
tribal people complain that they have been relegated to unskilled
mining jobs, have lost their forests to industrial construction, and
have been displaced by development projects. During the year, the
Government introduced and Parliament passed legislation creating new,
largely tribal-populated states from the Jharkand area of Bihar and the
Chhatisgarh region of Madhya Pradesh. The Chhatisgarh State came into
existence on November 1 and the Jharkhand State came into existence on
November 15.
There also is some local autonomy in the northeast. In Meghalaya
tribal chiefs still wield influence in certain villages. The Nagaland
government controls the rights to certain mineral resources, and
autonomous district councils in Tripura, Assam, and Meghalaya control
matters such as education, rural development, and forestry in
cooperation with the state governors.
Religious Minorities.--The potential for renewed Hindu-Muslim
violence remains considerable and both sides committed human rights
abuses during the year. Hindus and Muslims continue to feud over the
construction of mosques several centuries ago on three sites where
Hindus believe that temples stood previously. In 1998 the Sri Krishna
Commission, established by the Government to inquire into the cause of
Hindu-Muslim riots in Mumbai in December 1992 and January 1993,
released its report (see Section 2.c.). The riots, which followed the
destruction of an historic mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992, left
more than 1,000 persons, mostly Muslims, dead. Maharashtra's BJP-Shiv
Sena ruling coalition rejected the report, which laid responsibility
for much of the violence on leaders from both parties. That government
fell and was replaced by a Congress Partyled government, which
submitted an affidavit to the Supreme Court in August promising to
implement the Commission's recommendations. The same government
established a special task force to implement the recommendations of
the Sri Krishna Commission report. The recommendations included
prosecuting the 31 police officials and several Shiv Sena, BJP, and
Congress Party politicians found to have abetted the anti-Muslim
rioting in Mumbai in 1993.
On January 30, Muslim and Hindu crowds in Bangalore clashed and
threw stones at each other after an idol was desecrated in a Hindu
temple. Two persons were injured in Hindu-Muslim clashes in Ahmedabad,
Gujarat, from August 5 to 7. Human rights groups allege that following
the riots, the state reserve police officers forced some Muslim
residents of the city to sing the Sanskrit anthem ``Vande Mataram'' to
prove that they were not ``anti-national'' (see Section 2.c.). On
August 31, several hundred angry Hindus pelted Muslim houses with
stones and tried to set fire to several homes after a Muslim eloped
with a Hindu in a town in Vadodara district, Gujarat. On September 12,
Muslim-Hindu violence in Nanded, a city 300 miles southeast of Mumbai,
left approximately 60 persons injured. The attacks occured during the
annual Ganesh festival when a procession of Hindus passed by a mosque.
According to some reports, Muslims in the mosque threw stones at Hindu
worshippers whom they claim offended the mosque by making too much
noise. The Maharasthra government ordered a judicial inquiry. On
October 16, a gang entered Tahira village, Siwan district, Bihar, and
murdered five members of a Muslim family. Police suspect unknown
persons in nearby Mohajirpur village committed the killings in
retaliation for the killings of Hindu villagers a few days earlier. On
December 3, a group of men in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, attacked and
killed a Muslim preacher with crude bombs and sickles. No one was
convicted in connection with the August 26, 1999 mob mutilation and
burning to death of a Muslim cattle trader in Padiabeda village,
Orissa; about 400 persons witnessed the killing.
Attacks by Muslim militants seeking to end Indian rule in Jammu and
Kashmir, and contining political violence, has driven almost 95 percent
of Hindus in the Kashmir valley (Pandits) to seek refuge in camps in
Jammu, with relatives in New Delhi, or elsewhere, during the last few
years. Throughout the year, militants carried out several execution-
style mass killings of Hindu villagers and violently targeted Pandits,
and in one instance the Sikh minority, in Jammu and Kashmir (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). On February 28, militants killed five truck
drivers on the Srinagar-Jammu highway. The militants systematically
halted commercial trucks traveling along the route and questioned the
unarmed drivers and cleaners on board. Those persons identified as
Hindus were taken out of the trucks and shot. On March 20, 17
unidentified gunmen in army uniforms killed 35 Sikh men in Chati
Singhpura (near Anantang in south Kashmir). The incident was the
largest single massacre of civilians during the past 11 years of
militancy, and at year's end, the only mass killing in Kashmir to have
involved the Sikh community. According to various reports, militants
separated unarmed male members of the Sikh families from women and
children, gathered the men a short distance from their homes, and
killed them with automatic weapon fire. It was the first known attack
on the Sikh minority in Jammu and Kashmir (see Section 1.a.). On March
25, security forces shot and killed five men, alleging that they had
been responsible for the March 20 massacre. According to HRW, on April
17, gunmen entered the homes of several Hindu families in Kot Dara
village, near Rajouri. They fired on unarmed civilians, killing six
persons and injuring six others. On July 13, militants killed three
Buddhist monks in Rangdum, Kargil district. On July 30, militants
hurled a grenade into a jeep carrying Hindu religious pilgrims near
Gulmarg, killing one person and injuring five others. On August 1 to 2,
militants entered a camp of Hindus making the annual pilgrimage to
Amarnath in the northern part of the state and fired automatic weapons
at tents, the unarmed civilians in the camp, the pilgrims' local
porters and guides, and army personnel nearby. A total of 32 persons
were killed in the attack, all of them unarmed civilians. Similar
attacks occurred throughout the night of August 1 to 2, killing some
100 persons in various places in Jammu and Kashmir (see Section 1.a.).
On August 17, militants reportedly killed six Hindu villagers and
seriously wounded seven others in Jammu (see Section 1.a.). On August
18, militants entered a Hindu village in the Koteswara area near
Rajauri and indiscriminately fired at villagers, killing four persons
and injuring six others. On August 18, militants killed three elderly
men and a teenage boy, and wounded two other persons when they fired
automatic guns at civilians in Ind village, Udhampur. On August 20, a
person shot and injured a Hindu telephone kiosk operator in Qazi Gund,
near Anantnag. Also on August 20, militants entered the Hindu village
of Indeh, Udampur district and killed four members of a Hindu family
(see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, about 51,000 Pandit
families fled their homes in Jammu and Kashmir due to the violence. Of
these, 4,674 families are living in refugee camps in Jammu, 235
families are in camps in Delhi, and 18 families are in Chandigarh. The
rest still are displaced, but are living on the economy in Jammu and
Delhi. The Pandit community criticizes bleak physical, educational, and
economic conditions in the camps and fears that a negotiated solution
giving greater autonomy to the Muslim majority might threaten its own
survival in Jammu and Kashmir as a culturally and historically
distinctive group. On August 18, the Jammu and Kashmir government
adopted a proposal designed to facilitate the return of Pandits to the
Kashmir valley and rehabilitation of the Pandits. However, various
Pandit groups criticized the proposal for failing to address the
political aspirations of Pandits, failing to provide economic
guarantees, failing to provide adequate security for returning Pandits,
and creating special economic zones that would aggravate communal
tensions. The proposal abandoned during the year. The NHRC released a
39-page report in June 1999, in response to a petition from Hindu
Pandits alleging that genocide had been committed against them. The
NHRC found that the crimes against the Pandits ``fall short of the
ultimate crime: Genocide,'' but stated that compensation to the
community had been inadequate. As a result, the Government's monthly
subsistence payment to Pandit families was increased.
There were numerous attacks against Christian communities and
Christian missionaries during the year. In August the SAHRDC stated
that there had been 57 such attacks during the first 7 months of the
year. The SAHRDC stated the attacks had taken three forms: Attacks on
priests and nuns; attacks on evangelists and disruption of prayer
meetings; and attacks on churches, hospitals, and other charitable
institutions. Attacks occurred in Tamil Nadu, Goa, Punjab, Karnataka,
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar,
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. There were a series of
incidents in Uttar Pradesh in April. On April 6, an angry mob,
demanding a decrease in school fees and an increase in the number of
passing students, harassed the principal of Sacred Heart school in
Mathura. The principal disputed an allegation that the harassment was
because of school fees, saying that she was harassed and chased by a
group of young men (not parents of students) who also asked her
questions about the religious texts read at the school. On April 10,
Father Joseph Dabre, principal of St. Dominic's school in Mathura, was
beaten by six young men who went to the school on the pretext of
inquiring about admissions. On April 11, in Kosi Kalan near Mathura, 8
to 10 assailants attacked Father K.K. Thomas at St. Theresa's school
when he rushed to the assistance of a servant girl and 3 nuns whom the
assailants were attacking. Thomas was injured seriously; his attackers
had not been found by year's end.
Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee asked Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Ram
Prakash Gupta for a detailed report on the incidents in the Mathura
area. State officials also ordered police to monitor closely churches,
missionary centers, and other places of worship after the attacks near
Mathura. On April 26, the NCM visited the sites of the attacks at
Sacred Heart school, St. Dominic's school, and St. Theresa's school,
and issued a report on April 27. The report, which claimed that the
Sacred Heart case had ``no communal tinge,'' and that the Kosi Kalan
case was a ``case of robbery and nothing else,'' was criticized widely
by the minority community. Several members of the Lok Sabha openly
questioned the report's validity, and there is strong evidence that the
NCM report misrepresented the victims in its claims that they
themselves are entirely satisfied that there was no religious
motivation behind the violence. Victims of the incidents claim that the
local police were not responsive either before or during the attacks.
These attacks on Christians in Uttar Pradesh were the first in the
state in 6 years.
Following the violence in April in the vicinity of Mathura, on May
5, six missionaries who were distributing Bibles and other literature
in Vivekanandnagar, Ahmedabad, were injured severely. Some evangelists
and some Bajrang Dal activists attacked each other in this
Vivekanandnagar when the Bajrang Dal activists forbade distribution of
Christian literature. Both groups filed police complaints alleging that
the other group attacked them. A Hindu bystander who attempted to
intervene had his finger cut off, according to newspaper reports. On
May 22, 30 persons were injured when a powerful bomb exploded during a
Christian meeting at Machlipatnam in the southern state of Andhra
Pradesh. The central Government and the state governments of Andhra
Pradesh and Karnataka maintain that the bombing were carried out by a
Muslim extremist organization, Deendar Anjuman. Following investigation
by the Central Bureau of Investigation, on October 21, police in
Karnataka arrested 31 persons in connection with the bombings in that
state, including 4 persons who reportedly were Pakistani nationals (see
Section 2.a.). The governments later made more arrests, and by year's
end, they had filed charges of conspiracy, violating the Explosives
Act, and fomenting religious hatred against approxiamately 45 suspects
in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. On June 7, a Catholic priest, Brother
George Kuzhikandum, was killed on the campus of Brother Polus Memorial
School near Mathura. On June 21, Vijay Ekka, the prime witness to the
June 17 killing of Brother George, died in police custody (see Sections
1.a. and 2.c.). In June in northern Punjab state, the Rev. Ashish
Prabash Masih, age 23, reportedly was murdered and his body burned.
Although police ruled out any communal undertones, the Punjab Christian
Association stated that the murder was part of a concerted campaign
against its community by Hindu nationalists. In April three nuns said
that they were run down deliberately by a motor scooter in the northern
state of Haryana on their way to a midnight Easter Mass. One of the
nuns was injured seriously. The Christian Forum stated that the attack
was the fifth on nuns and priests in Haryana in the year, but both the
NCM and the Catholic Bishop's conference stated that the incident could
have been an accident. On May 9 in Maharashtra, approximately 150
suspected activists of the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(World Hindu Council, or VHP) attacked the 45th Annual Convention of
the Evangelical Alliance Christian Church and the Nashik District
Church Council, set fire to three vehicles, and ransacked a bus
carrying religious literature. Four persons were hospitalized. Rural
police said that they arrested 33 persons, all of whom belonged to
Bajrang Dal or VHP. Although political leaders from Maharashtra's
ruling party criticized the attack, the Minister of State for Dairy
Development joined a group of BJP, RSS, and VHP activists who traveled
to meet and congratulate the accused when they were released from
prison on bail. On May 12, in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, assailants threw
stones and attempted to set fire to one church, while vandalizing two
other churches.
On January 23, 1999, Australian missionary Graham Staines and his
two young sons were killed. The three were asleep in their car in
Manoharpur, Keonjhar district, Orissa, when a mob shouting Hindu
slogans set fire to their car. Police arrested 51 suspects in
connection with the crime and sought others. Dara Singh was arrested on
January 31 and charged with the murders of Staines and his two young
sons (see Section 2.c.); he also was charged with the murders of
another Christian and a Muslim. Singh remained in custody and the
charges against him and 14 others still were pending at year's end. On
September 30, a special court in Bhubaneswar, Orissa, convicted a 13-
year-old boy of complicity in the killing of Staines and his two sons.
He was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. The Wadhwa Commission
established to investigate the Staines murder presented its findings in
August 1999. The report concluded that Dara Singh masterminded the
killing and effectively exonerated the Hindu organizations and
political parties that had been accused of complicity. The National
Commission for Minorities, other human rights groups, and some
Christian groups criticized the Commission's findings as a coverup. The
National Commission for Minorities, separate inquiry found evidence
suggesting that the Bajrang Dal was involved in the Staines murders. On
June 2, a Hindu priest reportedly ``reconverted'' 72 tribal Christians
in the same village in which Graham Staines and his sons were killed.
The burning of churches continued during the year. For example, on
May 12, a hut used as a prayer cottage by Christians in Katiguda
village was burned by what the local police referred to as ``anti-
socials.'' Also on May 12, in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, assailants threw
stones, attempted to set fire to one church, and vandalized two other
churches. On May 16, a cottage in Dharakote village that was used as a
place of congregation for local Christians was set on fire. Armed
police officers were deployed to the area, but by year's end no arrests
had been made. On June 8, bombs exploded in four churches in Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, and Goa. The blasts occurred in a Baptist Church in
Ongole, Andhra Pradesh; a Catholic church in Tadepalligudem, Andhra
Pradesh; a Catholic church in Wadi, Karnataka; and a church in Vasco,
Goa. The bombs reportedly blew out windows and damaged pews; three
persons in Ongole and two in Wadi received minor injuries. During the
last week of June, a mosque in Gunter, Andhra Pradesh was bombed. None
of the localities had a history of serious communal tensions before the
blasts. In Karnataka police patrols reportedly were increased at all
places of worship, and a special investigative unit was formed to
investigate the bombings. By June 20, nine persons reportedly were
arrested in connection with the blasts in Andhra Pradesh, including a
leading member of a Shi'a Muslim organization (see Section 2.c.). A
bomb exploded in the early hours of July 7 at a Lutheran church in
Hubli, northern Karnataka, causing minor damage. On the evening of July
8, across town, a bomb exploded at Saint Peter and Paul Church,
breaking windows; there were no injuries.
Since 1998 there has been increased harassment of Christian aid
workers. Many report having been hampered in their work through
threats, bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases, physical attacks
on their workers. Several Christian relief organizations have reported
difficulty in obtaining visa renewal for foreign relief workers (see
Sections 2.d. and 4).
The NHRC expressed its concern at the upsurge of violence against
Christians in the first 6 months of the year, demanding that the
Government announce the steps that it was taking to protect the
Christian community. Speaking in Parliament August 18 on the series of
church bombings, Home Minister L.K. Advani said that ``the Center, in
consultation with the affected states, will take stern action against
those found guilty of instigating attacks against Christians.''
Members of militant Hindu organizations (including members of the
Hindu Jagran Manch, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the Bajrang Dal)
reportedly are concerned about Christian efforts to convert Hindus.
They claim that missionaries are forcing or inducing Hindus to convert
to Christianity, including economically disadvantaged Dalits and
tribals. In some cases, Hindus allegedly have reconverted, at times by
force, tribals and Dalits belonging to other religions. However, many
tribals follow traditional religious practices, and many Christian
tribals were not Hindu prior to becoming Christian, although they often
are considered Hindu by the Government and others. In September 1999,
Vishw a Hindu Parishad working president Ashok Singhal called for
enactment of a law banning forced conversions. Missionaries have been
operating schools and medical clinics for many years in tribal areas,
including the Dangs district in Gujarat. Tribals, such as those
attacked in the Dangs district in 1998, and Dalits are outside of the
caste system and occupy the very lowest position in the social
hierarchy. However, they have made socioeconomic gains as a result of
the missionary schools and other institutions, which have increased
literacy among the lowest castes, among other achievements.
Other incidents affecting religious minorities during the year
occurred in Tripura, at which Christian militants imposed bans on Hindu
and Muslim festivals, and in Assam, in which Hindu concern over the
continued influx of illegal Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh has grown
over the past year (see Section 2.d.). On April 17, the secretary of
the Noapara Baptist Church in Tripura was arrested with explosives in
his possession. He allegedly was intending to take them to the NLFT.
The practice of dedicating or marrying young, prepubescent girls to
a Hindu deity or temple as ``servants of God'' (also known as
Devadasis), is reported by HRW to continue in several southern states,
including Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. Devadasis, who generally are
Dalits, may not marry. They are taken from their families and are
required to provide sexual services to priests and high caste Hindus
(see Section 6.c.). Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban
brothels. In 1992 the Karnataka state passed the Karnataka Devadasi
(Prohibition) Act and called for the rehabilitation of Devadasis, but
this law suffers from a lack of enforcement and criminalizes the
actions of Devadasis. Since Devadasis are by custom required to be
sexually available to higher caste men, it reportedly is difficult for
them to obtain justice from the legal system if they are raped.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's caste system has
strong historic ties to Hinduism. It delineates clear social strata,
assigning highly structured religious, cultural, and social roles to
each caste and subcaste. Members of each caste--and frequently each
subcasteare expected to fulfill a specific set of duties (known as
dharma) in order to secure elevation to a higher caste through rebirth.
Dalits (formerly called untouchables) are viewed by many Hindus as
separate from or ``below'' the caste system; nonetheless, they too are
expected to follow their dharma if they hope to achieve caste in a
future life. Despite longstanding efforts to eliminate the
discriminatory aspects of caste, the practice remains widespread.
The practice of untouchability (``untouchables''--now called
Dalits--along with tribals occupy the lowest strata of the caste
system) was outlawed in theory by the Constitution and the 1955 Civil
Rights Act, but it remains an important aspect of life.
``Untouchability'' refers to the social restrictions imposed on persons
because of their birth into certain Hindu castes. Dalits are considered
unclean by higher caste Hindus and thus traditionally are relegated to
separate villages or neighborhoods and to low paying and often
undesirable occupations (such as scavenging, street sweeping, and
removing human waste and dead animals). Many rural Dalits work as
agricultural laborers for higher caste landowners. By custom Dalits may
be required to perform tasks for upper caste Hindus without
remuneration. The majority of bonded laborers are Dalits (see Section
6.c.). Dalits are among the poorest of citizens, generally do not own
land, and often are illiterate. They face significant discrimination
despite the laws that exist to protect them, and often are prohibited
from using the same wells and from attending the same temples as higher
caste Hindus, and from marrying persons from higher castes. In addition
they face segregation in housing, in land ownership, on roads, and on
buses. Dalits tend to be malnourished, lack access to health care, work
in poor conditions (see Section 6.e.), and face continuing and severe
social ostracism. In contrast the highest caste, the Brahmin, with 3.5
percent of the population, holds 78 percent of the judicial positions
and about 50 percent of parliamentary seats. NGO's report that crimes
committed by higher caste Hindus against Dalits often go unpunished,
either because the authorities do not prosecute vigorously such cases
or because the crimes are unreported by the victims, who fear
retaliation. In recent years, groupsincluding some that use violence--
have organized to protect Dalit rights.
The Constitution gives the President the authority to identify
historically disadvantaged castes, Dalits, and ``tribals'' (members of
indigenous groups historically outside the caste system). These
``scheduled'' castes, Dalits, and tribes are entitled to affirmative
action and hiring quotas in employment, benefits from special
development funds, and special training programs. The impact of
reservations and quotas on society and on the groups they are designed
to benefit is a subject of active debate. According to the 1991 census,
scheduled castes, including Dalits, made up 16 percent and scheduled
tribes 8 percent of the country's 1991 population of 846 million.
Christians historically have rejected the concept of caste. However,
because many Christians descended from low caste Hindu families, many
continue to suffer the same social and economic limitations that low
caste Hindus do, particularly in rural areas. Low caste Hindus who
convert to Christianity lose their eligibility for affirmative action
programs. Those who become Buddhists or Sikhs do not. In some states,
government jobs are reserved for Muslims of low caste descent.
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act of 1989 lists new offenses against disadvantaged
persons and provides stiffer penalties for offenders. However, this act
has had only a modest effect in curbing abuse. The NCRB reported that
25,638 crimes against scheduled castes and 4,276 crimes against
scheduled tribes were recorded in 1998. This compares with 27,944
crimes against scheduled castes and 4,644 crimes against scheduled
tribes recorded by the NCRB in 1997. However, human rights NGO's allege
that caste violence actually is on the increase.
Intercaste violence claims hundreds of lives annually; it was
especially pronounced in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh. According to HRW, on April 25,
upper caste Rajputs shot and killed four Dalits and seriously injured
three others in Rohtas district, Bihar. Subsequently, Rajputs burned
down the entire Dalit village, leaving all 25 families homeless,
reportedly in retaliation for an earlier attack. On March 12, a mob of
upper caste men entered Kambalapalli village, Karnataka, where they
reportedly believed that the killer of an upper caste person had taken
refuge. The mob surrounded and set fire to one of the homes in the
predominantly Dalit village; seven members of a Dalit family were
killed in the blaze. On May 12, a group of men entered Lakhisarai
village, Bihar, and indiscriminately shot at villagers, killing 11
persons, including 10 low-caste laborers. Police suspected that a
criminal gang was responsible for the killings. On May 17, upper caste
youths stripped two lower caste women and paraded them naked through
their village of Rasoolabad, Kanpur district, Uttar Pradesh. The
women's allged crime was to have allowed an upper caste woman to spend
one night in their home. On June 3, approximately 50 armed men
suspected of belonging to an upper caste private army, the Ranvir Sena,
killed 5 low-caste persons, including a woman and a child, in Rajebigha
village, Bihar. The killings reportedly were perpetrated because the
assailants suspected that the villagers had voted against a candidate
favored by the upper caste community in February state assembly
elections in Bihar (see Section 3). Police occasionally have arrested
Ranvir Sena members after similar incidents in Bihar. However,
generally members of the Ranvir Sena who are arrested were released on
bail shortly thereafter, and none were convicted during the year in
connection with attacks on low-caste villagers. According to HRW,
police make little effort to prevent such killings, despite the fact
that the Ranvir Sena often publicly announces its intentions days
before each attack; allegedly, police also fail to provide protection
for villagers in the aftermath of such attacks. On October 22, the NHRC
directed the Tamil Nadu government to pay about $10,990 (500,000
rupees) to 36 Dalit women and children. The Commission found police
wrongly attacked and beat the women and children after entering their
Ogalur village, Perambalur district, on November 30, 1998. The NHRC
further found that police illegally detained the victims for 18 days.
In issuing the order, NHRC chairman justice J.S. Verma wrote, ``the
present case is an instance of lawlessness on the part of the police
even in discharging their duties.''
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of association. Workers may establish and join unions of their
own choosing without prior authorization. More than 400 million persons
make up the country's active work force. Some 30 million of these
workers are employed in the formal sector. The rest are overwhelmingly
are agricultural workers and, to a lesser extent, urban nonindustrial
laborers. While some trade unions represent agricultural workers and
informal sector workers, most of the country's estimated 13 to 15
million union members are part of the 30 million member formal sector.
Of these 13 to 15 million unionized workers, some 80 percent are
members of unions affiliated with one of the 5 major trade union
centrals. All major trade union centrals are affiliated to a greater or
lesser extent with particular political parties. Central unions have
stressed their independence and in some cases are attempting to sever
previously tight party control.
Trade unions often exercise the right to strike, but public sector
unions are required to give at least 14 days notice prior to striking.
Some states have laws requiring workers in certain nonpublic sector
industries to give notice of a planned strike.
The Essential Services Maintenance Act allows the Government to ban
strikes and requires conciliation or arbitration in specified
``essential'' industries. Legal mechanisms exist for challenging the
assertion that a given dispute falls within the scope of this act.
However, the essential services never have been defined in law. The act
thus is subject to varying interpretations from state to state. The
Maharashtra government passed a law in February 1999 banning strikes in
essential services, including transport services, milk supply services,
the electricity department, and hospitals. The Industrial Disputes Act
prohibits retribution by employers against employees involved in legal
strike actions. This prohibition is observed in practice.
The Kerala High Court declared in July 1997 that all general
strikes (bandhs) were illegal and all organizers of protests would be
liable for losses caused by shutdowns. Later in the year, the Supreme
Court upheld the verdict drawing attention to the difference between a
complete closedown of all activities (bandh), and a general strike
(hartal). While it is likely that the ruling was introduced in relation
to political strikes, unions stated that it remained a potential threat
to their activities. Other court rulings during 1997 also declared
strikes illegal and made striking workers pay damages because consumers
and the public suffered during strikes.
According to Ministry of Labor statistics, as of June there had
been 127 strikes and lockouts throughout the country during the year,
involving 39,265 workers. In all, 63,000 ``person-days'' were lost due
to strikes and 900,000 ``person-days'' were lost due to lockouts during
this period. For example, in February over 100,000 workers of a
colliery in Andhra Pradesh went on a 13-day strike demanding better
wages and other benefits. The company later agreed to some of the
workers' demands. In addition, during the year approximately 80,000
workers went on strike for about 2 weeks in Uttar Pradesh to protest
the government's plans to reorganize the state electricity board along
corporate lines. The government succeeded in reorganizing the
electicity board along corporate lines despite the workers' protest.
When abuses, such as intimidation or suppression of legitimate
trade union activities, are perpetrated against nationally organized or
other large-scale unions or unionized workers, the authorities
generally respond by prosecuting and punishing those persons
responsible. Unaffiliated unions are not able, in all instances, to
secure for themselves the protections and rights provided by law.
In June the Government announced its intention to modify the Trade
Union Act. The Government convened the Indian Labor Conference, which
brought together government and trade union representatives to discuss
modification of the Trade Union Act, but the conference took no
substantive action on the act and it remained unchanged at year's end.
Unions are free to affiliate with international trade union
organizations. The Indian National Trade Union Congress and the Hind
Mazdoor Sabha are affiliated with the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), while the All India Trade Union Congress is
affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
bargain collectively has existed for decades. The Trade Union Act
prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers, and
employers are penalized if they discriminate against employees engaged
in union activities.
Collective bargaining is the normal means of setting wages and
settling disputes in unionized plants in the organized industrial
sector. Trade unions vigorously defend worker interests in this
process. Although a system of specialized labor courts adjudicates
labor disputes, there are long delays and a backlog of unresolved
cases. When the parties are unable to agree on equitable wages, the
Government may establish boards of union, management, and government
representatives to determine them.
In practice legal protections of worker rights are effective only
for the 30 million workers in the organized industrial sector, out of a
total work force of more than 400 million persons. Outside the modern
industrial sector, laws are difficult to enforce. Union membership is
rare in the informal sector, and collective bargaining does not exist.
There are seven Export Processing Zones (EPZ's). Entry into the
EPZ's ordinarily is limited to employees. Such entry restrictions apply
to union organizers. All companies bus their workers directly to and
from the factory. While workers in the EPZ's have the right to organize
and to bargain collectively, union activity is rare. In addition unions
have not pursued vigorously efforts to organize private-sector
employees anywhere in the years since EPZ's were established. There
have been efforts to organize workers in the EPZ's and unions have
complained that such attempts were suppressed in Kerala and Gujarat.
The fact that organizers are barred from EPZ's and workers are bused to
EPZ's helps prevent unions from forming. Women constitute the majority
of the work force in the EPZ's. The ICFTU reports that overtime is
compulsory in the EPZ's, that workers often are employed on temporary
contracts with fictitious contractors rather than directly by the
company, and that workers fear that complaints about substandard
working conditions would result in their being fired. In March 1999,
the Union Ministry of Commerce announced its intention to convert all
EPZ's into free trade zones and eliminate government interference in
their functioning. Because of trade unions' and the Union Ministry of
Labor's opposition to this change, the Government did not implement the
plan. In June the Government announced its intention to establish
special economic zones patterned on the Chinese model, and on November
1, four out of seven existing EPZ's were converted without significant
oppostion. These zones are not exempt from labor legislation.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the
Constitution and specific statutes prohibit forced or compulsory labor,
and bonded labor, as a form of compulsory labor, also is prohibited by
statute; however, such practices are widespread. The Bonded Labor
System (Abolition) Act of 1976 prohibits all bonded labor, by adults
and children. Offenders may be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison,
but prosecutions are rare. Enforcement of this statute, which is the
responsibility of state and local governments, varies from state to
state and generally has not been effective, due to inadequate resources
and to societal acceptance of bonded or forced labor. Labor inspectors
at the state and local level have overwhelming case loads, and in many
cases, do not receive adequate support or protection to challenge
employers, who often have direct access to government officials. On the
occasions when inspectors refer violations for prosecution, long court
backlogs and inadequate funding for legal counsel frequently result in
acquittals. NGO's estimate that there are 5 to 40 million bonded
laborers in the country, including a large number of children (see
Section 6.d.). According to HRW, the majority of bonded laborers are
Dalits (see Section 5), and bondage is passed from one generation to
the next.
A Supreme Court decision defined forced labor as work at less than
the minimum wage, which usually is set by the state governments. Under
this definition, which differs from that of the ILO, forced labor is
widespread, especially in rural areas.
Bonded labor, the result of a private contractual relationship
whereby a worker incurs or inherits debts to a contractor and then must
work off the debt plus interest, is illegal but widespread. The
Government estimates that between enactment of the Bonded Labor
(Abolition) Act in 1976 and March 1999, 280,340 bonded workers were
released from their obligations. Other sources maintain that those
released constituted only one-twentieth of the total number of bonded
laborers. State governments provide a sum of money to workers freed
from bondage for their rehabilitation. In response to the 1997 Supreme
Court decision requesting the NHRC to oversee implementation of the
Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act, the NHRC formed a high-level
``Central Action Group,'' which reviews compliance routinely. The NHRC
also appointed a special rapporteur to work in Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu and report on compliance. In addition
the NHRC briefed state governments on their responsibilities and
instituted a system for receiving regular reports from the states. The
NHRC also assessed the bonded labor problem, identifying districts in
which it especially is acute. It identified and evaluated NGO's working
in these areas, and conducted training in bonded labor law enforcement
for district officials in the acutely affected areas. In November 1996,
the Supreme Court directed each state to undertake a survey of bonded
laborers. The surveys were carried out and identified 28,916 bonded
laborers throughout the country. In Feburary 1997, the Supreme Court
required state governments to file detailed affidavits on the status of
bonded laborers. Some press reports indicate that Tamil Nadu alone has
an estimated 25,800 bonded laborers, in response to which the state
government began implementing and continues to work on rehabilitation
plans. In 1999 alone, it allocated $1.25 million (54.4 million rupees)
for these plans. According to Union Ministry of Labor Statistics, from
1976 to March 31, the Tamil Nadu government identified and released
63,894 bonded laborers. Government officials worked to release other
bonded laborers in many of the country's states. In West Bengal,
organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi immigrants is a source of
bonded labor (see Section 6.f.).
The working conditions of domestic servants and children in the
workplace often amount to bonded labor. Children sent from their homes
to work because their parents cannot afford to feed them, or in order
to pay off a debt incurred by a parent or relative, have no choice in
the matter. There are no universally accepted figures for the number of
bonded child laborers. However, in the carpet industry alone, human
rights organizations estimate that there may be as many as 300,000
children working, many of them under conditions that amount to bonded
labor. Officials claim that they are unable to stop this practice
because the children are working with their parents' consent. In
addition there is a reasonable basis to believe that products were
produced using forced or indentured child labor in the following
industries: Brassware; hand-knotted wool carpets; explosive fireworks;
footwear; hand-blown glass bangles; hand-made locks; hand-dipped
matches; hand-broken quarried stones; hand-spun silk thread and hand-
loomed silk cloth; hand-made bricks; and beedis (hand-rolled
cigarettes). A number of these industries expose children to
particularly hazardous work conditions (see Section 6.d.). In its first
attempt to address the issue of domestic child labor, during the year
the Government issued a notification prohibiting government employees
from hiring children as domestic help. Those employers who failed to
abide by the law would be subject to penalities provided by the Bonded
Labor System (Abolition) Act (such as fines and imprisonment), but also
to disciplinary action at the place of work.
In 1998 an HRW team headed by the Karnataka state labor
commissioner conducted surprise inspections on silk twining factories
in and around the town of Magadi. The team found 53 child workers under
the age of 14 years working in the plants, forbidden to talk to each
other, and beaten for slow work. The labor commissioner estimated that
there were 3,000 bonded child laborers in the Magadi silk twining
factories. In response UNICEF has started a non-formal education
program for the estimated 3,000 bonded child laborers working in the
industry. By year's end, about 260 children had been enrolled. In
addition UNICEF began a micro-credit program for the parents of these
children to create income-generating opportunities as an alternative to
child labor.
Female bondage, forced prostitution, and trafficking in women and
children for the purpose of forced prostitution are widespread problems
(see Section 6.f.). According to press reports, prison officials have
used prisoners as domestic servants and sold female prisoners to
brothels (see Section 1.c.). Devadasis, prepubescent girls given to a
Hindu deity or temple as ``servants of God,'' are taken from their
families and required to provide sexual services to priests and high
caste Hindus. Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban brothels
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
In Punjab persons routinely are sold in an organized trade in
weekend bazaars for the purposes of forced domestic labor and forced
sexual service. In 1998 one person was arrested in connection with this
human trade. He later was released on bail.
In December 1999, domestic media reported that child laborers were
being sold in an organized ring at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in
Bihar. According to these reports, children of impoverished families in
surrounding districts are brought to the fair and sold. One reporter
talked to a buyer, a shopkeeper, who paid $21 (900 rupees) for a 12-
year-old child. Persons sometimes are sold into virtual slavery (see
Sections 5 and 6.f.).
NGO's such as the Bonded Labor Liberation Front worked to release
bonded laborers throughout the year.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Article 24 of the Constitution and the Child Labor
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986 are the principal protections
against the exploitation of children in the workplace. Provisions for
the protection of children in the workplace also are made in the Beedi
and Cigar Workers (Condition of Employment) Act of 1966, the Factories
Act of 1948, the Mines Act of 1952, the Motor Transport Workers Act of
1961, the Plantations Labor Act of 1951, and the Minimum Wages Act of
1948. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but
does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
The enforcement of child labor laws is the responsibility of the
state governments. Enforcement is inadequate, especially in the
informal sector in which most children who work are employed. The
continuing prevalence of child labor is attributed to social acceptance
of the practice, to the failure of the state and federal governments to
make primary school education compulsory, and ineffective state and
federal government enforcement of existing laws.
Work by children under 14 years of age is barred completely in
``hazardous industries,'' which include passenger, goods, and mail
transport by railway; carpet weaving; cinder picking; cleaning of ash
pits; cement manufacturing; building and construction; cloth printing;
dyeing and weaving; manufacturing of matches, explosives, and
fireworks; catering within railway premises or port limits; beedi
(cigarette) making; mica cutting and splitting; abattoirs; wool
cleaning; printing; cashew and cashew nut descaling and processing; and
soldering processes in electronics industries. In January 1999, the
Government added 6 occupations and 33 processes to the list of
occupations and processes in which children are barred from working by
the 1986 Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act. The additions
brought the totals to 13 occupations and 51 processes in which children
are prohibited from working under the act.
In addition to industries that utilize forced or indentured child
labor (see Section 6.c.), there is evidence that child labor is used in
the following industries: Hand-knotted carpets; gemstone polishing;
leather goods; and sporting goods.
In occupations and processes in which child labor is permitted,
work by children is permissible only for 6 hours between 8 a.m. and 7
p.m., with 1 day's rest weekly.
The BJP-led coalition Government continued its predecessors' plan
to eliminate child labor from hazardous industries and eventually from
all industries, but it did not repeat the previous government's pledge
to accomplish the former by 2000 and the second by 2010. This program,
for which approximately $56.69 million (2.64 billion rupees) has been
budgeted since 1992, includes the enhanced enforcement of child labor
laws, income supplements for families, subsidized school lunches in
areas which child labor is concentrated, and a public awareness
campaign. The Government continued efforts initiated in 1987 to enhance
enforcement of the Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986
and other laws prohibiting and regulating child labor. In 1988 the
Government started the National Child Labor Project (NCLP) to release
children from hazardous work places and provide them with transitional
schooling leading to mainstreaming in regular schools, and other forms
of assistance. In addition government programs assist working children
in rural development, women and child development, health, and adult
job-creation programs. The NCLP targeted 12 districts in which child
labor was prevalent at its inception in 1988. The NCLP has grown to
cover 91 districts in 10 states. From April 1999 To January 31, 145,725
children participated in the NCLP. Since its inception, the program is
estimated to have helped more than 500,000 children leave work and
start school. During their participation in the NCLP, the children's
families are given a small stipend--usually $2.15 to $4.30 (100 to 200
rupees) per month. Nevertheless, government efforts to eliminate child
labor have affected only a small fraction of children in the workplace.
A 1996 Supreme Court decision raised penalties for employers of
children in hazardous industries to $430 (20,000 rupees) and
established a welfare fund for formerly employed children. According to
the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS), authorities are
pursuing some 6,000 cases against employers. The Supreme Court ruling
also has helped make local government officials more aware of the
prohibitions against child labor in hazardous industries. This in some
cases, has helped improve cooperation between local offcials and NGO's
like SACCS that are removing children from hazardous workplaces. One
recent example of such cooperation occurred on December 29, in Bhadohi
district, Uttar Pradesh, in which SACCS and local law enforcement
officials released 11 child laborers from work on looms for the
production of hand-knotted carpets and initiated legal proceedings
against the employer. During the year, SACCS helped release about 135
child laborers in Bhadohi district alone. According to the Tamil Nadu
Labor Department, 155 child laborers were freed from illegal workplaces
between April and October 1999, out of the 10,118 child laborers
identified in 2 surveys carried out in the state in 1997. State labor
officials acknowledged that many more child laborers exist in the
state.
Estimates of the number of child laborers range widely. The
Government census of 1991 puts the number of child workers at 11.28
million. The ILO estimates the number at 44 million, while NGO's state
that the figure is 55 million. Interpolation of census figures by the
National Labor Institute indicates that of a total of 203 million
children between the ages of 5 and 14, 116 million are in school, 12.6
million are in full-time employment, and the status of 74 million is
unknown. Most, if not all, of the 87 million children not in school do
housework, work on family farms, work alongside their parents as paid
agricultural laborers, work as domestic servants, or otherwise are
employed. A Supreme Court-ordered survey of child labor throughout the
country was completed during 1997 and documented the existence of some
126,665 wage-earning child laborers. When this figure was challenged as
patently low, the states conducted a second survey, in which an
additional 428,305 child laborers in hazardous industries were found.
However, even the combined total of the two surveys understates the
true dimension of the problem.
According to the ILO, labor inspectors conducted 13,257 inspections
in 1997-98, finding 958 violations of the Child Labor Prohibition Act,
prosecuting 676 of these cases, and obtaining 29 convictions. Those
convicted of violating the Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act
are fined $460 (20,000 rupees) for each child employed. The Government
is required to find employment for an adult member of the child's
family or pay $108 (5,000 rupees) to the family instead. According to
the Government, in 1996-97, labor inspectors conducted 35,886
inspections, over twice as many as the following year. Between 1993 and
the end of 1997, the Government released about 8,000 children from
illegal workplaces and brought charges against approximately 4,000
employers. In the hand-knotted carpet producing area of Uttar Pradesh,
the NHRC and NGO's have worked with the state government to establish a
task force for the elimination of child labor. SACCS reported freeing
some 135 child laborers in the hand-knotted carpet industry during the
year from Bhadohi district in Uttar Pradesh alone.
Employers in some industries also have taken steps to combat child
labor. The Carpet Export Promotion Council (CEPC), a quasi-governmental
organization that receives funding from the Ministry of Textiles, has a
membership of 2,500 exporters who have subscribed to a code of conduct
barring them from purchasing hand-knotted carpets known to have been
produced with child labor. The CEPC conducts inspections to insure
compliance, and allows members to use voluntarily a government-
originated label to signify adherence to the code of conduct. Rugmark,
which is a private initiative, operates a similar voluntary label
scheme. Rugmark has 228 exporter members who buy carpets from the
28,118 looms registered with Rugmark. However, the CEPC states that
even with the program it is impossible to ensure that a carpet has been
produced without child labor, given the difficulties of monitoring a
decentralized and geographically dispersed industry. A privatesector
research and consulting firm conducts the inspections, which cover only
10 percent of registered looms. The inspectors have difficulty locating
unregistered looms. The Government also cooperates with UNICEF, UNESCO,
the UNDP, and the ILO in its efforts to eliminate child labor. Since
1992 it has participated in the ILO's International Program on the
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC). Approximately 90,000 children were
removed from work and received education and stipends through IPEC
programs since the start of its program in 1992.
NGO's also have helped to free children from the work force. For
example, since 1999 SACCS has freed over 34,000 children from the work
force; it also operates an education and training center for children
in New Delhi. From 1999 through year's end, SACCS freed 541 child
laborers throughout the country through raids with law enforcement
authorities on illegal workplaces. SACCS's intervention with parents
resulted in the release of an additional 2,758 children, and its
referral of cases to law enforcement agencies resulted in the release
of 3,994 more child laborers over the same period. In many cases,
charges were brought against the employers under the 1986 Child Labor
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act.
The NHRC, continuing its own child labor agenda, organized NGO
programs to provide special schooling, rehabilitation, and family
income supplements for children in the glass industry in Firozabad. The
NHRC also intervened in individual cases.
Primary school education is not compulsory, free, and universal
(see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The directive principles of the
Constitution declare that ``the State shall endeavor to secure . . . to
all workers . . . a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent
standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural
opportunities.'' Laws set minimum wages, hours of work, and safety and
health standards. Laws governing minimum wages and hours of work
generally are observed in industries subject to the Factories Act but
largely are unenforced elsewhere and do not ensure acceptable
conditions of work for the 90 percent of the work force not subject to
the Factories Act.
Minimum wages vary according to the state and to the sector of
industry. Such wages provide only a minimal standard of living for a
worker and are inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Most workers employed in units subject to the
Factories Act receive much more than the minimum wage, including
mandated bonuses and other benefits. The state governments set a
separate minimum wage for agricultural workers but do not enforce it
effectively. Some industries, such as the apparel and footwear
industries, do not have a prescribed minimum wage in any of the states
in which such industries operate.
The Factories Act establishes an 8-hour workday, a 48-hour
workweek, and various standards for working conditions. These standards
generally are enforced and accepted in the modern industrial sector,
but tend not to be observed in older and less economically robust
industries. State governments are responsible for enforcement of the
Factories Act. However, the large number of industries covered by a
small number of factory inspectors and the inspectors' limited training
and susceptibility to bribery result in lax enforcement.
The enforcement of safety and health standards also is poor.
Although occupational safety and health measures vary widely, in
general state and central government resources for inspection and
enforcement of standards are adequate. However, as awareness grows, the
courts have begun to take work-related illnesses more seriously.
Industrial accidents continued to occur frequently due to improper
enforcement. Chemical industries are the most prone to accidents.
According to the Director General of Mines' safety rules, mining
companies must seal the entrances to abandoned underground mines and
opencast mines are to be bulldozed and reforested. These rules are
obeyed seldom, if ever. According to the Coal Ministry, between 1995 to
1999, 1,201 persons were killed in registered mines and oil fields, 822
(68 percent) of whom died in coal mines, mostly underground;
approximately 3,000 persons were injured in mining accidents. Illegal
mining is rampant. For example, Oswal Fertilizer Ltd.'s (OFL) new
Diamonium Phosphate fertilizer plant at Paradip, Orissa, began
operations in May. Eleven workers died during the plant's construction;
an additional 6 persons were killed and 51 others were injured in a
series of accidents at the plant from May to September. None of the
workers was using safety equipment. Seven criminal cases have been
brought against OFL in connection with the accidents.
Safety conditions tend to be better in the EPZ's.
The law does not provide workers with the right to remove
themselves from work situations that endanger health and safety without
jeopardizing their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a significant source,
transit point, and destination for numerous trafficked persons,
primarily for the purpose of forced prostitution and forced labor.
The country's legal code generally is technically adequate for
dealing with the problems of trafficking, violence against women, and
prostitution. The Prevention of Immoral Trafficking Act (PITA) of 1986
superseded and strengthened the All-India Suppression of Immoral
Traffic Act (SITA). The PITA sought to toughen penalties for
trafficking in children, particularly by focusing on traffickers,
pimps, landlords, and brothel operators, while protecting underage
girls as victims. The PITA requires police to use only female police
officers to interrogate girls rescued from brothels. The PITA also
requires the State to provide protection and rehabilitation for these
rescued girls. In addition the PITA grants a form of quasi-toleration
of prostitution, as prostitution, per se, is not a crime under the
PITA, which criminalizes only solicitation or practice in or near a
public place. Some NGO's note that this ambiguity, which is intended to
protect trafficking victims, has been exploited to protect the sex
industry. Due to the selective implementation of the PITA, the
``rescue'' of sex workers from brothels often leads to their
revictimization. On June 25, 14 underage rescued sex workers fled the
government shelter in Mumbai, citing poor conditions and ``inhuman
treatment.'' On August 31, the Mumbai High Court instructed the
Maharashtra government to improve conditions in its rescue homes.
The country's prostitution and trafficking laws fail to impose on
the clients and organizers of the sex trade the same penalties imposed
on prostitutes found soliciting or practicing their trade in or near
(200 meters) public places. Using the PITA's provisions against
soliciting or practicing, police regularly may arrest sex workers,
extort money from them, evict them, and take their children from them.
The client by comparison largely is immune from any law enforcement
threat, as he has committed a crime only if he is engaged in sex with a
sex worker in a public place or is having sex with a girl under the age
of 16 years (statutory rape). Similarly, although the intention of the
1986 PITA was to focus enforcement efforts against the traffickers,
pimps, and border operators, the opposite currently is the reality; a
Calcutta NGO reports that an average of about 80 to 90 percent of the
arrests made under the PITA in West Bengal state in the 1990's are of
female sex workers. Police implementation of the PITA similarly is
inadequate throughout the country; only a small fraction of arrests
made under the PITA involve the trafficker. Implementation of the
PITA's provisions for protection and rehabilitation of women and
children who are rescued from the sex trade is extremely poor. NGO's
familiar with the legal history of prostitution and trafficking laws
regard the failure of the judiciary to recognize this inequity in the
law's practice as a continuing ``blind spot.'' Over the last several
years, arrests and prosecutions under the PITA have remained relatively
static, while all indicators suggest a growing level of trafficking
into and within the country.
NGO's allege that ignorance of trafficking, a lack of political
resolve to tackle it, and corruption at the enforcement level
perpetuate the problem. Although the police are charged with enforcing
the country's laws on prostitution and trafficking in women and
children, NGO's, observers, and sex workers uniformly view police
actions as part of the problem. Sex workers in Mumbai and Calcutta
claim that harassment, extortion, and occasional arrests on soliciting
charges usually characterize police intervention. The police seldom are
seen as a positive force that addresses the violence of pimps and
traffickers while protecting underage girls from bonded sex labor. A
commonly held view among sex workers and NGO's is that local police and
politicians responsible for the red light areas receive bribes from
organized crime networks to protect the lucrative sex trade.
Over 1 million girls and women are believed to be forced into the
sex industry within the country at any given time. Women's rights
organizations and NGO's estimate that more than 12,000 and perhaps as
many as 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the country
annually from neighboring states for the sex trade. According to an ILO
estimate, 15 percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes
are children. The traffic is controlled largely by organized crime.
There is a growing pattern of trafficking in child prostitutes from
Nepal. According to one estimate, 5,000 to 7,000 children, mostly
between the ages of 10 and 18, are drawn or forced into this traffic
annually. Girls as young as 7 years of age are trafficked from
economically depressed neighborhoods in Nepal, Bangladesh, and rural
areas of India to the major prostitution centers of Mumbai, Calcutta,
and Delhi. Currently there are about 100,000 to 200,000 women and girls
working in brothels in Mumbai and 40,000 to 100,000 in Calcutta. In
Mumbai an estimated 90 percent of sex workers began when they were
under 18 years of age; half are from Nepal. A similar profile is
believed to exist among female sex workers in Calcutta, although the
vast majority of women who are trafficked there come from Bangladesh,
as opposed to Nepal. NGO's in the region estimate that about 6,000 to
10,000 girls are trafficked annually from Nepal to Indian brothels, and
that a similar number are trafficked from Bangladesh.
Within the country, women from economically depressed areas often
move into the cities seeking greater economic opportunities, and once
there are victimized by traffickers who force or coerce them into the
sex trade. However, in some cases family members sell young girls into
the sex trade. For example, according to a local NGO researcher, in one
village in Uttar Pradesh, girls 1 to 2 years of age are purchased from
their parents and adopted by persons who train them for the sex trade
through the use of pornographic materials, and sell them into the sex
trade when they are 7 to 12 years old.
Many indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation.
According to the Indian Center for Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
(ICITP), more than 40,000 tribal women, mainly from Orissa and Bihar,
were forced into economic and sexual exploitation; many come from
tribes that were driven off their land by national park schemes. In
Punjab persons of both sexes are sold in an organized trade in weekend
bazaars, ostensibly as farm labor; many instead are purchased for the
purposes of forced sexual service. In 1998 one person was arrested in
connection with the trade. He was released later on bail.
The number of women being trafficked out of the country to other
countries is comparatively low. In July authorities cooperated with
U.S. investigators seeking evidence in the prosecution of Lakreddy Bali
Reddy, a U.S. citizen of Indian birth, who was indicted for trafficking
minor girls for sexual exploitation from a rural area of Andhra Pradesh
to the U.S. Reddy allegedly paid the airfares and expenses of 350 to
400 young men and women aged approximately 13 to 18 years, mostly from
low castes, and obtained their passports and visas--ostensibly to work
as specialty cooks or laborers in his restaurants or apartment
business. However, upon arrival in the U.S., the girls reportedly were
put to work in a prostitution ring. Some of the girls claimed that
Reddy had sex with them in India after their parents sold them; at
least one victim was 12 years old.
In a study published in 1996, the National Commission for Women
reported that organized crime plays a significant role in the country's
sex trafficking trade, and that women and children who are trafficked
frequently are subjected to extortion, beatings, and rape. How women
are trafficked varies widely: some are abducted forcibly or drugged,
while others are made false offers of marriage, employment, or shelter.
Poverty, illiteracy, and lack of employment opportunities contribute to
the trafficking problem, although organized crime is a common element
in all trafficking incidents, as is police corruption and collusion.
Trafficking of persons within and into the country for forced labor
also is a significant problem. In December 1999, the media reported
that an organized ring was selling children from surrounding areas for
labor at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in Bihar. There was a report
that a 12-year-old child was purchased for $21 (900 rupees). In July a
Mangalore, Karnatakabased NGO reported that tribal children were being
auctioned in the Dakshina-Kanara district of the state primarily for
use as domestic servants. The Karnataka Department of Social Welfare
initiated an investigation, which it completed during the year (see
Sections 5 and 6.c.). It found that the children were not being
auctioned, but that better-off families in the district were employing
many of them as domestic servants. The Department of Social Welfare
suggested that more efficient implementation of ongoing development
programs for tribal people in the district offered the best remedy for
the child labor problem.
In West Bengal, the organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi
immigrants is a source of bonded labor. In June police in Krishnagar,
West Bengal detained 8 Bangladeshi women and 14 children transiting the
distict by bus. Agents allegedly smuggled the group from Jessore,
Bangladesh across the border at Bongaon by offering them employment in
Mumbai. Calcutta is a convenient transit point for traffickers who send
Bangladeshis to New Delhi, Mumbai, Uttar Pradesh, and West Asia.
Persons sometimes are sold into virtual slavery.
Many boys, some of whom are as young as age 4, are trafficked to
West Asia or the Persian Gulf States (especially the United Arab
Emirates), and end up as riders in camel races. Some such boys end up
as beggars in Saudi Arabia during the hajj. It is estimated that there
are anywhere from 100 to over 1,000 underage South Asian camel jockeys
(from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) currently working in the United
Arab Emirates alone. Criminal gangs procure most of the youths. The
majority of such children work with the knowledge of their parents, who
receive as much as $200 (9,300 rupees) for their child's labor,
although a significant minority simply are kidnaped. The gangs bringing
the jockeys earn approximately $150 (6,975 rupees) per month from the
labor of each child. The usual procedure used for bringing the children
to the Gulf States is to have their names added to the passport of a
Bangladeshi or Indian woman who already has a visa for the Gulf; the
children fraudulently are claimed to be her children. Girls and women
trafficked to the Persian Gulf States end up either as domestic workers
or sex workers.
NGO's and others allege that when police take action against
brothels suspected of enslaving minors, the resulting police raids
often are planned poorly and seldom are coordinated with NGO's or
government social agencies. Therefore, the police action often worsens
the situation of the girls and women indebted to traffickers and
brothel owners. Girls rescued from brothels are treated as criminals
and often are abused sexually by their police rescuers or by the staff
of government remand centers, where they are housed temporarily before
being brought back to the brothels as a result of the bribes paid by
brothel operators, or legally released into the custody of traffickers
and madams posing as relatives. In these cases, the debt owned by the
girls to the brothel operators and traffickers further increases as the
costs of bribing or legally obtaining release of the girls is added to
their labor debt. NGO's invariably indicate the 1996 police roundup of
476 sex workers in Mumbai as an illustration of the consequences of
forced sweep rescues. Police in Mumbai carried out no such sweeps
during the year.
As was the case in the 1996 raids, NGO's claim that they seldom are
given advance notice of police raids on brothels and therefore are not
able to lend valuable assistance in identifying and interviewing
underage victims. Moreover police do not seek advice or assistance from
NGO's in planning law enforcement action to protect the victims during
raids. Although over 400 girls and women were arrested in the 1996
raids, few pimps or brothel managers were arrested, and none were
prosecuted to conviction. The NGO's found themselves caught off guard
by the large-scale police action and were illprepared to cope with a
sudden huge demand for shelter for the rescued sex workers. As a
result, many of the girls were sent to government centers known for
their harsh conditions and considered by many to be in a worse state
than the brothels. Ultimately, some of the girls died in state
detention and many returned to the sex trade voluntarily, given their
lack of options. Success stories from the 1996 raids were rare.
Some NGO's know about trafficking conditions in the brothel areas
such as Kamathipura, including identification of traffickers and
locations of girls being held captive by brothel owners. However,
because of the lingering effects of the 1996 raids, most of these NGO's
are reluctant to trust the police with this information. Cooperation
among NGO's in sharing information and assessing out the magnitude and
scope of the trafficking problem in Mumbai has not been significant to
date, although it continues to improve. Some Mumbai NGO's have worked
aggressively to sensitize, train, and create awareness of trafficking
among local authorities. The case of the NGO Prerana, which has been
working closely with government officials, is a good example. During
the year, a Prerana pilot program trained employees of a large
Maharashtra government enterprise to identify and assist trafficking
victims during their daily bus commute; Prerana also has enlisted the
assistance of state police, who help train the workers. Conversely,
other NGO's working to rescue women and girls from forced sexual work
report that complaint-based police rescues are quite effective. Unlike
the sweep type rescues such as the one carried out in Kamathipura in
1996, these are focused attempts to rescue a small number of women and
girls using specific information about the victim's location, names and
appearance, often supplied by NGO's; police responses in such cases
frequently have resulted in the rescue of the women and girls involved.
Similar efforts to improve NGO coordination are being made in
Calcutta, where some 10 NGO's meet monthly as part of the ``Action
Against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children'' forum. Every
3 months the group attempts to meet withits Bangladeshi and Nepalese
counterparts. Calcutta NGO's such as Sanlaap also are seeking to build
stronger working relationships with local police. As a result of this
coordination, Sanlaap has built stronger working relationships with
police and other law enforcement officials in Calcutta. It has
organized and sponsored meetings between representatives of the sex
workers and police to discuss such issues as violence against women and
trafficking. The seminars have helped sensitize police to the fact that
many of the sex workers are the victims of organized traffickers.
Sanlaap invariably is the first organization Calcutta police turn to
when they have rescued a trafficked sex worker. The NGO has been
allowed to place a counselor at the West Bengal Remand Home for Women,
where rescued trafficking victims are housed. It also has been
permitted to place counselors in police stations within Calcutta's red
light district and has convinced the courts to release young
trafficking victims into its custody, instead of sending them to the
remand home.
There are roughly 80 NGO's in 10 states around the country working
for the emancipation and rehabilitation of women and children
trafficked into the sex trade.
A group on child prostitution established by the NHRC includes
representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department
of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet
throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal
prohibitions.
__________
MALDIVES
The Republic of Maldives, which comprises 1,190 islands (less than
200 of which are inhabited), with a population of approximately
270,000, has a parliamentary form of government with a very strong
executive. The President appoints the Cabinet, members of the
judiciary, and one-sixth of the Parliament. The President derives
additional influence from his constitutional role as the ``supreme
authority to propagate the tenets'' of Islam. Political parties are
officially discouraged, and candidates for the unicameral legislature,
the People's Majlis, run as individuals. The Majlis selects a single
presidential nominee who is approved or rejected in a national
referendum. President Gayoom was approved for a fifth 5-year term in
October 1998. The Majlis must approve all legislation and is empowered
to enact legislation without presidential approval. Civil law is
subordinate to Islamic law, but civil law generally is applied in
criminal and civil cases. The judiciary is subject to executive
influence.
The National Security Service (NSS) performs its duties under
effective civilian control. The NSS includes the armed forces and
police, and its members serve in both police and military capacities
during their careers. The police division investigates crimes, collects
intelligence, makes arrests, and enforces house arrest.
Fishing, small-scale agriculture, and tourism provide employment
for over one-half of the work force. Tourism accounts for over one-
quarter of government revenues and roughly 40 percent of foreign
exchange receipts. Manufacturing accounts for 6 percent of gross
domestic product.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in a number of areas; however, its record was poor in some other areas,
particularly with regard to political and religious freedoms. The
President's power to appoint a significant portion of the Parliament
constrains citizens' ability to change their government. The Government
limits freedom of assembly and association. There are significant
restrictions on the freedom of religion; in the past, the Government
has detained arbitrarily and expelled foreigners for proselytizing and
detained citizens who converted. Although the Government has undertaken
a number of programs addressing women's issues, women face a variety of
legal and social disadvantages. Some of these disadvantages are linked
to the Government's observance of Shari'a (Islamic law) and other
Islamic customs. The Government also restricts worker rights.
Nonetheless, in recent years there has been some progress in certain
areas. The Majlis has assumed a more active political role in recent
years, and its members routinely differ with government policy on many
issues. The courts were reorganized in 1997, and a new Constitution,
which provides for the protection of certain fundamental rights, went
into effect at the beginning of 1998. In addition procedural rules
limiting indefinite police detention were instituted in 1998, and the
presidential nominating process involved competition among candidates
for the first time in 1998. A continued easing of government
restrictions and the Press Council's balanced handling of issues
related to journalistic standards allowed a greater diversity of views
in the media, although most media outlets are controlled by persons
friendly to the Government or by the Government itself.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There were no reports of beatings or other mistreatment of
persons in police custody during the year; however, convicted criminals
may be flogged under judicial supervision when this punishment is
prescribed by Islamic law as interpreted in the country (i.e., only
when the criminal confesses to the crime and only for the offenses of
marital infidelity and alcohol abuse). There were no public floggings
during the year. In 1998 there were two private floggings (carried out
without public spectators) due to the confession of an extramarital
affair. The man was subsequently banished, and the woman was placed
under house arrest for 12 months. Punishments usually are confined to
fines, compensatory payment, house arrest, imprisonment, or banishment
to a remote atoll. The Government generally permits those who are
banished to receive visits by family members.
The country's prison was destroyed by fire in 1999. Following the
fire, the Government transferred prisoners to a temporary facility on
Maafushi, which houses a fluctuating population of approximately 300
inmates (including 20 women who are housed in a separate compound).
Children also are housed in separate center for juveniles. Prison
conditions at the current facility, including food and housing,
generally are adequate. Prisoners are allowed to work in prison and
given the opportunity for regular exercise and recreation. Spouses are
allowed privacy during visits with incarcerated partners. However,
Amnesty International (AI) reported that in 1998, in the since-
destroyed prison, prisoners were mistreated. The Government is
surveying prison facilities in other countries to incorporate
international standards and improvements in the reconstruction of the
prison, and it has requested training for prison guards.
The Government has permitted prison visits by foreign diplomats.
The issue of visits by human rights groups is not known to have arisen.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The 1997 Constitution
states that no person shall be arrested or detained for more than 24
hours without being informed of the grounds for arrest or detention;
however, in 1998 authorities arbitrarily detained foreign Christians
for allegedly proselytizing and detained citizens who supposedly
converted (see Section 2.c.). Police initiate investigations based on
suspicion of criminal activity or in response to written complaints
from citizens, police officers, or government officials. They are not
required to obtain warrants for arrests. Based on the results of police
investigations, the Attorney General refers cases to the appropriate
court. The authorities generally keep the details of a case
confidential until they are confident that the charges are likely to be
upheld. In the past, persons have been held for long periods without
charge.
Depending upon the charges, a suspect may remain free, be detained
in prison, or placed under house arrest for 15 days during
investigations. The President may extend pretrial detention for an
additional 30 days, but in most cases the suspect is released if not
brought to trial within 15 days. Those who are released pending trial
may not leave a specific atoll. The law providing for the indefinite
detention of individuals under investigation was revised substantially
in 1998. Within 24 hours of an arrest, an individual must be told of
the grounds for the arrest. An individual can then be held for 7 days.
If no legal proceedings have been initiated within 7 days, the case is
referred to an anonymous three-member civilian commission appointed by
the President that can authorize an additional 15 days' detention.
After that time, if legal proceedings still have not been initiated, a
judge must sanction the continued detention on a monthly basis. There
is no right to legal counsel during police interrogation. There is no
provision for bail.
The Government may prohibit access to a telephone and nonfamily
visits to those under house arrest. While there have been no reported
cases of incommunicado detention in recent years, the law does not
provide safeguards against this abuse.
There were no reports of the external exile of citizens, although
24 foreigners suspected of proselytization were banished for life in
1998 (see Section 2.c.). The Government sometimes banishes convicted
criminals to inhabited atolls away from their home communities; a man
who confessed to an extramarital affair in April 1998 was banished for
1 year. AI reported that in 1999, 10 persons from Faafu Magoodhoo were
banished, reportedly without trial, for trying to organize a
demonstration against the local atoll chief.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1997 Constitution does not
provide for an independent judiciary, and the judiciary is subject to
executive influence. In addition to his authority to review High Court
decisions, the President influences the judiciary through his power to
appoint and dismiss judges, all of whom serve at his pleasure and are
not subject to confirmation by the Majlis. The President nevertheless
has removed only two judges since 1987. Both dismissals followed the
recommendation of the Justice Ministry that found the judges'
professional qualifications to be below standard. The President may
also grant pardons and amnesties.
In September 1997, the court system, under the Ministry of Justice,
was reorganized and court administration has improved. There are three
courts: One for civil matters; one for criminal cases; and one for
family and juvenile issues. On the recommendation of the Ministry of
Justice, the President appoints a principal judge for each court. There
is also a High Court on Male, which is independent of the Justice
Ministry and which handles a wide range of cases, including politically
sensitive ones. The High Court also acts as court of appeals. Under a
1995 presidential decree, High Court rulings can be reviewed by a five-
member advisory council appointed by the President. The President also
has authority to affirm judgments of the High Court, to order a second
hearing, or to overturn the Court's decision. In addition to the Male
courts, there are 204 general courts on the islands.
There are no jury trials. Most trials are public and are conducted
by judges and magistrates trained in Islamic, civil, and criminal law.
Magistrates usually adjudicate cases on outer islands, but when more
complex legal questions are involved, the Justice Ministry will send
more experienced judges to handle the case.
The Constitution provides that an accused person be presumed
innocent until proven guilty, and that an accused person has the right
to defend himself ``in accordance with Shari'a'' (Islamic law). During
a trial, the accused also may call witnesses, and be assisted by a
lawyer. Courts do not provide lawyers to indigent defendants. Judges
question the concerned parties and attempt to establish the facts of a
case.
Civil law is subordinate to Shari'a, which is applied in situations
not covered by civil law as well as in certain acts such as divorce and
adultery. Courts adjudicating matrimonial and criminal cases generally
do not allow legal counsel in court because, according to a local
interpretation of Shari'a, all answers and submissions should come
directly from the parties involved. However, the High Court allows
legal counsel in all cases, including those in which the right to
counsel was denied in the lower court. Under the country's Islamic
practice, the testimony of two women is required to equal that of one
man in matters involving Shari'a, such as adultery, finance, and
inheritance. In other cases, the testimony of men and women are equal.
There were no confirmed reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The 1997 Constitution prohibits security officials
from opening or reading letters, telegrams, and wireless messages or
monitoring telephone conversations, ``except as expressly provided by
law.'' The NSS may open the mail of private citizens and monitor
telephone conversations if authorized in the course of a criminal
investigation.
Although the 1997 Constitution provides residential premises and
dwellings should be inviolable, there is no legal requirement for
search or arrest warrants. The Attorney General or a commanding officer
of the police must approve the search of private residences.
The Government is attempting to concentrate the population on the
larger islands by providing government services and concentrating job
creation efforts there. The smaller islands are to be provided with
only ``basic services.'' However, no one is being coerced to move to
the larger islands under this program.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law prohibits public
statements that are contrary to Islam, threaten the public order, or
are libelous.
The Penal Code prohibits inciting citizens against the Government.
However, a 1990 amendment to the Penal Code decriminalized ``any true
account of any act of commission or omission past or present by the
Government in a lawfully registered newspaper or magazine, so as to
reveal dissatisfaction or to effect its reform.''
Regulations that make publishers responsible for the content of the
material they published remain in effect but did not result in any
legal actions during the year.
Most major media outlets are owned either by the Government or its
sympathizers. Nonetheless these sympathetic outlets do on occasion
strongly criticize the Government.
The Press Council is composed of lawyers, private and government
media representatives, and other government officials. The Council
reviews charges of journalist misconduct (advising the Ministry of
Information, Arts, and Culture on measures to be taken against
reporters, when appropriate) and promotes professional standards within
the media (recommending reforms and making suggestions for
improvement). Private journalists have said that they are satisfied
with the Council's objectivity and performance. The Government agreed
that private journalists, rather than the Government, should take
responsibility for preparation of a journalistic code of ethics.
Individual newspapers and journals established their own ethical
guidelines in many cases.
There were no reports of government censorship of the electronic
media, nor were there closures of any publications or reports of
intimidation of journalists. Television news and public affairs
programming routinely discussed topics of current concern and freely
criticized government performance. Regular press conferences with
government ministers instituted in 1995 continued. Journalists are more
self-confident than in the past; self-censorship appears to have
diminished, although it remains a problem. Since it is not clear when
criticism violates the law prohibiting public statements that are
contrary to Islam, threaten the public order, or are libelous,
journalists and publishers continue to watch what they say,
particularly on political topics, to avoid entanglement with the
Government.
Pornography and material otherwise deemed objectionable to Islamic
values may be banned. In 1999 the Government banned the animated movie
``The Prince of Egypt,'' on the grounds that it was offensive to Islam
(see Section 2.c.).
In 1997 the Government banned a book written by an elderly close
relative of the President for its derogatory comments about a deceased
previous president, after the relatives of the latter complained.
Although 88 newspapers and periodicals are registered with the
Government, only about 60 regularly publish. Aafathis, a morning daily,
is often critical of government policy. Another daily, Miadhu, began
publishing in 1996, and Haveeru is the evening daily. Both Miadhu's and
Haveeru's publishers are progovernment.
The Government owns and operates the only television and radio
station. It does not interfere with foreign broadcasts or with the sale
of satellite receivers. Reports drawn from foreign newscasts are aired
on the Government television station.
Cable News Network (CNN) is shown, uncensored, daily on local
television. In 1996 a company began providing Internet service. The
Government enacted no regulations governing Internet access but blocks
distribution of pornographic material via the Internet.
There are no legal prohibitions on the import of foreign
publications except for those containing pornography or material
otherwise deemed objectionable to Islamic values. No seizures of
foreign publications were reported during the year.
There are no reported restrictions on academic freedom. Some
teachers reportedly are vocal in their criticism of the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1997
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly ``peaceably and in a
manner that does not contravene the law;'' however, the Government
imposes limits on this right in practice. The Home Ministry permits
public political meetings during electoral campaigns but limits them to
small gatherings on private premises.
The Government registers clubs and other private associations if
they do not contravene Islamic or civil law; however, the Government
imposes some limits on freedom of association. While not forbidden by
law, the President officially discourages political parties on the
grounds that they are inappropriate to the homogeneous nature of
society. However, many Majlis members were active and outspoken critics
of the Government and have stimulated closer parliamentary examination
of government policy.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted
significantly. The 1997 Constitution designates Islam as the official
state religion, and the Government interprets this provision to impose
a requirement that citizens be Muslims. The practice of any religion
other than Islam is prohibited by law. However, foreign residents are
allowed to practice their religion if they do so privately. On July 4,
the commemoration of the day the country embraced Islam, President
Gayoom stated that no other religion should be allowed in the country,
and the Home Affairs Ministry announced special programs to safeguard
and strengthen religious unity. The President, the members of the
People's Majlis, and cabinet members must be Muslims.
There are no places of worship for adherents of other religions.
The Government prohibits the importation of icons and religious
statues, but it generally permits the importation of individual
religious literature, such as Bibles, for personal use. It also
prohibits non-Muslim clergy and missionaries from proselytizing and
conducting public worship services. Conversion of a Muslim to another
faith is a violation of Shari'a and may result in a loss of the
convert's citizenship.
Islamic instruction is a mandatory part of the school curriculum,
and the Government funds the salaries of religious instructors. The
Government has established a Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs to
provide guidance on religious matters. The Government also has set
standards for individuals who conduct Friday services at mosques to
ensure adequate theological qualifications.
In January 1999, the Government banned the animated movie ``The
Prince of Egypt'' on the ground that ``its portrayal of the Prophet
Moses was offensive to Islam, because all prophets and messengers of
God are not to be animated or portrayed in any way'' (see Section
2.a.). During June 1998, the authorities detained 24 foreigners
(including children) for alleged Christian proselytization without
explaining the charges against them and then expelled them from the
country for life. Following the expulsion of the foreigners, police
took two female citizens into custody for allegedly converting to
Christianity. As many as a dozen other citizens were questioned. The
women were detained from mid-June to late September 1998, during which
time they received extensive counseling. No formal charges were ever
brought against them, and they were released to their families. In
April 1998, the Government asked the Seychelles Government to stop the
radio broadcast of Christian programming in the local language,
Dhivehi, to the country. However, the broadcasts continued throughout
the year.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel at home and
abroad, to emigrate, and to return. Because of overcrowding, the
Government discourages migration into the capital island of Male or its
surrounding atoll. Foreign workers are often kept at their worksites.
Their ability to travel freely is restricted, and they are not allowed
to mingle with the local population on the islands. The Government has
not formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the
year. There were no reports of forced expulsion of those having a valid
claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens' ability to change their government is constrained, and
the strong executive exerts significant influence over both the
legislature and the judiciary. Under the 1997 Constitution, the Majlis
chooses a single presidential nominee, who must be a Sunni Muslim male,
from a list of self-announced candidates for the nomination. Would-be
nominees for President are not permitted to campaign for the
nomination. The nominee is then confirmed or rejected by secret ballot
in a nationwide referendum. From a field of five candidates, President
Gayoom was nominated by the Majlis and was confirmed for a fifth 5-year
term in October 1998. Observers from the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation found the referendum to be free and fair.
The elected members of the Majlis, who must be Muslims, serve 5-
year terms. All citizens over 21 years of age may vote. Of the body's
50 members, 42 are elected--2 from each of the 20 inhabited atolls and
2 from Male--and the President appoints 8 members. Individuals or
groups are free to approach members of the Majlis with grievances or
opinions on proposed legislation, and any member may introduce
legislation. There are no political parties, which are officially
discouraged.
The Office of the President is the most powerful political
institution. The 1997 Constitution gives Islamic law preeminence over
civil law and designates the President as the ``supreme authority to
propagate the tenets'' of Islam. The President's authority to appoint
one-sixth of the Majlis members, which is one-third of the total needed
for nominating the President, provides the President with a power base
and strong political leverage. The President currently also is
commander in chief of the armed forces, the Minister of Defense and
National Security, the Minister of Finance and Treasury, and the
Governor of the Maldivian Monetary Authority.
Relations between the Government and the Majlis have been
constructive. The Government may introduce legislation but may not
enact a bill into law without the Majlis' approval. However, the Majlis
may enact legislation into law without presidential assent if the
President fails to act on the proposal within 30 days or if a bill is
repassed with a two-thirds majority. In recent years, the Majlis has
become increasingly independent, challenging government policies and
rejecting government-proposed legislation.
In 1993 the Majlis introduced a question period during which
members may question government ministers about public policy. Debate
on the floor has since become increasingly sharp and more open.
Elections to the People's Majlis were held in November 1999. According
to observers from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), the elections were generally free and fair. Several losing
candidates entered court challenges, but the courts upheld the election
results.
Women are not eligible to become president but may hold other
government posts. For reasons of tradition and culture, few women seek
or are selected for public office, and women are underrepresented in
government and politics. In order to increase participation by women in
the political process, the Government continued a political awareness
campaign in the atolls. In the November 1999 elections, six women ran
for seats and two were elected. During the 1999 elections, observers
from the SAARC noted that women participated equally in the electoral
process. Following the elections, President Gayoom appointed an
additional three women to the Majlis.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Although not prohibited, there are no active local human rights
groups. The Government has been responsive to at least one foreign
government's interest in examining human rights issues. The Government
also facilitated visits of teams of SAARC election observers in 1994,
1998, and 1999.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The 1997 Constitution declares all citizens equal before the law,
but there is no specific provision to prohibit discrimination based on
these factors. Women have traditionally been disadvantaged,
particularly in terms of education and the application of Islamic law
to matters such as divorce, inheritance, and testimony in legal
proceedings.
Women.--Women's rights advocates agree that wife beating and other
forms of violence are not widespread. There are no firm data on the
extent of violence against women because of the value attached to
privacy in this conservative society. In 1997 the Government
commissioned a study by a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) on
domestic violence, but it was never completed. Police officials report
that they receive few complaints of assaults against women. Rape and
other violent crimes against women are extremely rare. None were
reported or prosecuted during the year. Under Shari'a the penalty would
be flogging, banishment, or imprisonment for up to 5 years.
Women traditionally have played a subordinate role in society,
although they now participate in public life in growing numbers and
gradually are participating at higher levels. Women constitute 38
percent of government employees, and about 10 percent of uniformed NSS
personnel. Well-educated women maintain that cultural norms, not the
law, inhibit women's education and career choices. In many instances,
education for girls is curtailed after the seventh grade, largely
because parents do not allow girls to leave their home island for an
island having a secondary school. Nonetheless, women enjoy a higher
literacy rate (98 percent) than men (96 percent). Due largely to
orthodox Islamic training, there is a strong strain of conservative
sentiment--especially among small businessmen and residents of the
outer islands--that opposes an active role for women outside the home.
However, the Government continued legal literacy programs to make women
aware of their legal rights and workshops on gender and political
awareness in the outer atolls. The Government also has built 10 of 15
planned women's centers in the atolls, which are facilities where
family health workers can provide medical services. The centers also
provide libraries and space for meetings and other activities with a
focus of the development of women.
Under Islamic practice, husbands may divorce their wives more
easily than vice versa, absent any mutual agreement to divorce. Islamic
law also governs intestate inheritance, granting male heirs twice the
share of female heirs. A woman's testimony is equal to only one-half of
that of a man in matters involving adultery, finance, and inheritance
(see Section 1.e.). Women who work for wages receive pay equal to that
of men in the same positions.
In October the Cabinet replaced the National Women's Council with a
Gender Equality Council to serve as an advisory body to the Government
to help strengthen the role of women in society and to help ensure
equal participation by women in the country's development. Also during
the year, the Government, with the assistance of the European Union and
the U.N. Population Fund, expanded a program of small loans to women
for development projects to additional islands.
Children.--The Government does not have a program of compulsory
education, but it provides universal access to free primary education.
The percentage of school-age children actually in school was as
follows: (grades 1 to 5) 99.26 percent, (grades 6 to 7) 96.2 percent,
and grades (8 to 10) 51.09 percent. Of the students enrolled, 49
percent are female and 51 percent are male. The Government is committed
to the protection of children's rights and welfare. The Government is
working with UNICEF to implement the rights provided for in the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Government established a
National Council for the Protection of the Rights of the Child in 1992.
Government policy provides for equal access to educational and health
programs for both male and female children. Laws protecting children's
rights apply with equal force to children of either sex.
Children's rights are incorporated into law, which specifically
protects them from both physical and psychological abuse, including
abuse at the hands of teachers or parents. The Ministry of Women's
Affairs and Social Welfare has the authority to enforce this law, takes
its responsibility seriously, and has received strong popular support
for its efforts. The Ministry noted an increase in reports of child
abuse during the first part of the year with 138 reports involving 317
children, including 10 reports of sexual abuse. Penalties could be
banishment or imprisonment for up to 3 years. It is not known if there
were any prosecutions during the year. The Government is reviewing the
law to see if improvements and additional protections are necessary.
There is no reported societal pattern of abuse directed against
children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no law that specifically
addresses the rights of the physically or mentally disabled. In 1999
the Government initiated a survey and identified 30,000 persons in the
country as disabled (primarily hearing and sight impaired). The
Government has established programs and provided services for the
disabled.
Persons with disabilities usually are cared for by their families.
When such care is unavailable, persons with disabilities are kept in
the Institute for Needy People, which also assists elderly persons. The
Government provides free medication for all mentally ill persons in the
islands, and mobile teams regularly visit mentally ill patients. In
1999 the Government enacted a new building code, which mandated that
all new government buildings and jetties must be accessible to disabled
persons. The CARE Society, an NGO that assists the disabled, with
funding from UNICEF and the Australian Government, began programs to
train disabled persons in life and work skills.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--While the Government does not
expressly prohibit unions, it recognizes neither the right to form them
nor the right to strike. There were no reports of efforts to form
unions or of strikes during the year. However, small groups of
similarly employed workers with mutual interests have formed
associations, which include employers as well as employees. These
associations may address a variety of issues, including workers'
rights.
The work force consists of between 70,000 and 75,000 persons,
including expatriate labor and seasonal and part-time workers. About 20
percent of the workforce are employed in fishing. The approximately
27,000 foreigners who work in the country makeup almost half of the
workers in the formal sector; most are employed in tourist hotels, the
retail and wholesale trade, factories, or on construction projects. The
Government employs approximately 22,000 persons, both permanent and
temporary. It estimates that the manufacturing sector employs about 15
percent of the labor force and tourism another 10 percent.
Although workers can affiliate with international labor
federations, this generally has not been the case. However, it is
believed some seamen have joined such federations.
In 1995 the U.S. Government suspended Maldives' eligibility for
tariff preferences under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
because the Government failed to take steps to afford internationally
recognized worker rights to Maldivian workers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law neither
prohibits nor protects workers' rights to organize and bargain
collectively. Wages in the private sector are set by contract between
employers and employees and are usually based on the rates for similar
work in the public sector. There are no laws specifically prohibiting
antiunion discrimination by employers against union members or
organizers. The Government has exerted pressure in the past to
discourage seamen from joining foreign seamen's unions as a means to
secure higher wages. There have been no reported complaints alleging
such discrimination or claiming government interference with workers'
attempts to join unions in the past 5 years.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is not prohibited by law. However, there were no reports that it
occurred. The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no compulsory education law, but more than 98
percent of school-age children to grade 7 are enrolled in school. A
1992 law bars children under 14 years of age from ``places of waged
work and from work that is not suitable for that child's age, health,
or physical ability or that might obstruct the education or adversely
affect the mentality or behavior of the child.'' An earlier law
prohibits government employment of children under the age of 16. There
are no reports of children being employed in the small industrial
sector, although children work in family fishing, agricultural, and
commercial activities. The hours of work of young workers are not
limited specifically by statute. The Government does not prohibit
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices
are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.). A Unit for Children's Rights
in the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare is responsible
for monitoring compliance with the child labor regulations. It relies
upon complaints filed with it rather than initiating its own
inspections to ensure compliance. As a result, oversight is incomplete.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1994 the Government
promulgated its first set of regulations for employer-employee
relations. The regulations specify the terms that must be incorporated
into employment contracts and address such issues as training, work
hours, safety, remuneration, leave, fines, termination, etc. There is
no national minimum wage for the private sector, although the
Government has established wage floors for certain kinds of work. Given
the severe shortage of labor, employers must offer competitive pay and
conditions to attract skilled workers.
There are no statutory provisions for hours of work, but the
regulations require that a work contract specify the normal work and
overtime hours on a weekly or monthly basis. In the public sector, a 7-
hour day and a 5-day work-week have been established through
administrative circulars from the President's office. Overtime pay in
the public sector was instituted in 1990. Employees are authorized 20
days of annual leave, 30 days of medical leave, maternity leave of 60
days, and special annual leave of 10 days for extraordinary
circumstances. There are no laws governing health and safety
conditions. However, there are regulatory requirements that employers
provide a safe working environment and ensure the observance of safety
measures. It is unclear whether workers can remove themselves from
unsafe working conditions without risking the loss of their jobs. The
Ministry of Trade, Industries, and Labour set up a Labour Dispute
Settlement Unit in 1998 to resolve wage and labor disputes and to visit
worksites and enforce labor regulations.
In 1997 the Government for the first time worked closely with the
International Labor Organization to address a number of labor issues.
Although two draft labor laws were prepared in 1998: One to address
issues such as the right of association, the right to organize, and
acceptable work conditions related to health, environment, employer-
employee relations, leave, and termination, and the other to deal with
social security, pensions, and provident funds, these laws have not
been enabled.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not address the problem of
trafficking in persons; however, the Attorney General's Office believes
that should a case arise it could be addressed under Shari'a. There
were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, within, or
through the country.
__________
NEPAL
Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of
government. In 1990 the King, formerly an absolute monarch, legalized
political parties, after which an interim government promulgated a new
Constitution. The King retains important residual powers, but has
dissociated himself from direct day-to-day government activities. The
democratically elected Parliament consists of the House of
Representatives (lower house) and the National Council (upper house).
In May 1999, the country's third national parliamentary elections were
held, which international observers considered to be generally free and
fair. In February 1996, the leaders of the Maoist United People's Front
(``Maoists'') launched a ``People's War'' that has led to violence in
more than 50 of the country's 75 districts. The insurrection has been
waged through torture, killings, and bombings involving civilians and
public officials. The Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary; however, the courts generally are inefficient and
susceptible to political pressure and corruption.
The National Police Force maintains internal security and is
subject to civilian control, but local officials have wide discretion
in maintaining law and order. Police reaction to the ``People's War''
insurgency led to incidents of unwarranted force against prisoners and
noncombatants. The army, which traditionally is loyal to the King, has
sought to limit its domestic-security role in responding to the Maoist
insurgency. The police committed numerous human rights abuses.
The country is extremely poor, with an annual per capita gross
domestic product of approximately $242. Over 80 percent of its 23
million persons support themselves through subsistence agriculture.
Principal crops include rice, wheat, maize, jute, and potatoes. Tourism
and the export of carpets and garments are the major sources of foreign
exchange. Foreign aid accounts for more than half of the development
budget. The economy is mixed, with approximately 50 public sector
firms. Many former government firms have been privatized since 1992.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. The police at
times used unwarranted lethal force and continue to abuse detainees,
using torture as punishment or to extract confessions. The Government
rarely investigates allegations of police brutality or punishes police
officers who commit abuses. The disappearance of persons in custody is
a problem. Prison conditions remain poor. The authorities use arbitrary
arrest and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention, judicial
susceptibility to political pressure and corruption, and long delays
before trial remain problems. The Government generally respects freedom
of expression; however, at times it imposes some restrictions. The
Government generally allows for freedom of assembly; some restrictions
occur but are rare. The Government generally respects freedom of
religion, although the Constitution imposes restrictions on
proselytizing to spread religion. Women, the disabled, and lower castes
suffer from widespread discrimination. Violence against women,
trafficking in women and girls for prostitution, forced labor, and
child labor also remain serious problems. There have been instances of
forced child labor in the past, and there was one reported instance
during the year.
The Government established a national human rights commission in
May. In July the Government outlawed the feudal ``Kamaiya'' system,
releasing some 200,000 bonded laborers and family members from their
debts to their landlords.
During the year, the Maoists increased the scope of their campaign,
frequently committing torture, killings, bombings, and other abuses.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--The police
continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Most extrajudicial killings
by police involved the Maoist insurgents, but police at times used
unjustifiable lethal force in other situations as well.
On October 27 in Dolakha district, police clashed with a group of
24 Tibetans who had crossed into the country. After the Tibetans began
throwing stones, police opened fire, killing one person and injuring
five others. Police officers shot and killed six Nepalese citizens
during countrywide civil unrest from December 26 to 31. Scores of
police and hundreds of civilians were injured during the protests
sparked by alleged anti-Nepali remarks from an Indian film star. On
December 26 in Kathmandu, police who reportedly were protecting a
crowded movie theater were surrounded by a group of persons who were
throwing rocks and threatening to burn down the theater. After overhead
shots failed to disperse the group, the police fired shots into the
crowd, killing two persons. Another death occurred as police attempted
to control rioters in Thamel, another area of Kathmandu. On December 27
in Kathmandu, police gunfire against disruptive civilians killed two
more persons including an uninvolved adolescent in a neighboring
building. On December 31 in Rajbiraj, police shot and killed a 40-year-
old male while attempting to control a mob of persons. The Government
announced that it would financially compensate the families of those
killed and make arrangements for medical treatment for those injured in
the December clashes. At year's end, a government commission was
investigating the incidents.
On June 18, Ravi Upreti died of injuries reportedly sustained from
beatings while in police custody in Jhapa in the eastern part of the
country. On July 26, Sudish Rimal died shortly after being taken into
police custody in the Sarlahi district. Family members alleged that he
was tortured but declined to allow an autopsy, making confirmation of
these charges impossible.
Both police and insurgents continued to be killed in the
increasingly violent ``People's War.'' Launched in February 1996 by
leaders Baburam Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the ``People's War''
is a self-declared Maoist insurgency. The Government continued to
commit human rights abuses in its efforts to combat the insurgency. The
police have killed nearly 1,000 Maoists since 1996. Some of the deaths
are believed to have been extrajudicial killings. On January 14, police
opened fire on a Maoist ``cultural program'' at a school in Accham
district, killing nine persons and wounding numerous others (see
Section 1.c.). Police later admitted that seven of the persons killed
were innocent bystanders. Police killed at least 18 Maoists during a
``search operation'' in Rukum in February. An ensuing fire destroyed
hundreds of homes in the area, though there are conflicting claims as
to who started the blaze. On December 9, police fired on a meeting of
the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal Women's Association in Bharatpur,
killing one woman and injuring nine others, according to local media
reports. Police claim that they fired on the crowd only after persons
threw stones at and charged the police. At year's end, the 20 to 30
police officers charged with abuses against the public in connection
with police sweeps in 1998 had not been brought to trial.
The Maoists were responsible for numerous abuses, and clashes
between Maoist rebels and police led to a number of deaths during the
year. On January 3, Maoists killed nine police officers during a 3-hour
gun battle in Jumla. Six police officers were killed and five others
were injured seriously in a Maoist ambush in Jajarkot on January 22. On
February 19, Maoists killed 15 police officers and injured 20 others in
an attack on a police post in Rolpa. A constable died instantly on May
25 when he stepped on a landmine planted by Maoists in Tanahu district.
Three other police officers were wounded. A total of 25 persons were
killed, including 12 police officers, in a June 8 Maoist attack on a
police checkpoint in Jajarkot. On June 14, a group of more than 50
rebels attacked the police post at Junbesi. Three police officers died
in the ensuing 2hour firefight, after which the rebels bombed the post
and seized weapons stored there. On July 15, a group of some 300
Maoists ambushed a police post in Thokarpa, killing 4 police officers
and injuring 9 others. On September 25, Maoist insurgents attacked the
district police headquarters of Dolpa, killing at least 14 persons and
wounding 40 others (see Section 1.c.). On November 30, Maoists attacked
a police post in Kalikot district, killing 11 police officers.
Reportedly, some of the police deaths were executions based on a list
that the Maoists consulted at the time.
Although their activities are focused on the police, the Maoists
continued to kill, injure, and kidnap civilians as well. On February
14, Maoists pulled two men out of a political procession in Rukum and
beheaded them in front of hundreds of onlookers. It is believed that
the victims were targeted because they were carrying Nepali Congress
Party flags. A bomb planted by Maoists behind a police post in Dolpa
killed an 11-year-old boy on February 15. Two other persons were
injured in the blast. On February 24 in Sindhupalchowk, a group of
rebels attacked a local official, tied him to a tree and hacked him to
death with khukuri, large machete-like knives. On February 26, in
Okhaldhunga in the eastern part of the country, a group of
approximately 15 Maoists hacked to death another local official. On May
3, Maoists kidnaped Chitra Bahadur Thapa, a rival political worker,
from his home in Bhotechaur. He was found dead 7 days later. On the
night of July 13, Maoists severed the hands and legs of a resident of
Gulmi. He died immediately. According to local press reports, on
November 5, Maoists killed a policeman and injured seven other persons
in an attack on a police post at a village in Ramechap district.
According to mid-November government figures, since 1996, the
insurgency has resulted in the deaths of 1,483 persons, including 234
police officers, 258 civilians, and 991 insurgents. These figures
indicate that 98 police, 69 civilians, and 128 insurgents were killed
through mid-November. The press has reported higher figures, and
reports have claimed that more police than Maoists were killed during
the year, pointing to a marked increase in the firepower and
aggressiveness of the insurgency.
b. Disappearance.--The disappearance of persons in police custody
is a problem. According to the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC),
a local human rights organization, 10 persons disappeared from police
custody during the first 9 months of the year; 218 persons have
disappeared since 1996. Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, a secondary school
teacher, lawyer, and member of a human rights organization, who
disappeared after an arrest in Kathmandu in September 1999, was
released on July 6 without ever having been charged. There are reports
that Shrestha was held incommunicado and tortured during his
incarceration (see Sections 1.c. and 4). According to Amnesty
International (AI), on September 6, police detained opposition
politician Ishwari Dahal; at year's end, he remained missing.
In December 1999, Suresh Ale Magar and Pawan Shrestha were released
from jail in Kathmandu under a Supreme Court order, but immediately
were re-arrested. At the time, police denied having them in custody,
but Magar and Shrestha were released again in February (see Section
2.a.). On November 3, authorities released Maoist leaders Dinesh Sharma
and Diananath Gautam, whom police had held in custody for more than 11
months. At a police-arranged press conference, Sharma initially said
that he had been treated well; however, after his release he
disappeared again. A statement later issued in his name alleges that
police tortured him during his captivity.
AI reported that on January 8, 1999, lawyer and human rights
defender Rajendra Dhakal disappeared after his arrest in Jamdi in
Tanahun district. He reportedly was arrested because of his alleged
involvement in Maoist violence. Dhakal, along with two teachers
arrested at the same time, was taken to the Bel Chantan police post.
The teachers later were released. Dhakal remains missing, and police
now deny ever having arrested him (see Section 1.e.). On January 21,
1999, police arrested freelance journalist Milan Nepali. Nepali, who
was associated with the left-leaning publication ``Janadesh'', later
disappeared from police custody; as of year's end, Nepali's whereabouts
were unknown (see Section 2.a.).
According to AI, Maoists abducted as least 30 children in Jajarkot
district in July and August.
AI also expressed concern about other individuals currently held
captive. According to AI, Dirgha Bahadur Dashoudi and Narayan Sharma,
two teachers and members of the Tarun Dal from Dailekh district were
abducted in early May, and the Chief Education Officer of Rolpa
district, Rajendra Prasad Yadav was taken from a bus on which he was
travelling on June 10. Yadav was released on September 16; the others
remain missing.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law prohibit torture;
however, the police at times use torture and beatings to punish
suspects or to extract confessions. According to AI, torture methods
include boxing of the ears, beating of the feet, and the rolling of
weights over the thighs. AI noted that torture apparently was used to
intimidate or punish detainees and to extract information and/or
confessions, and that torture often occurred while detainees were held
incommunicado and unable to contact family members, doctors, or lawyers
(see Section 1.d.). The Government has failed to conduct thorough and
independent investigations of reports of police brutality and has
refused to take significant disciplinary action against officers
involved. Police often are unwilling to investigate and to discipline
fellow officers, and persons are afraid to bring cases against police
for fear of reprisals. The Constitution and the Torture Compensation
Act, which was passed by Parliament in 1996, provide for compensation
for victims of torture. According to the Center for Victims of Torture
(CVICT), 10 persons claimed compensation under the act during the year,
all of the cases that were in the courts as of year's end. Another 20
persons made claims during 1999. According to the CVICT, during the
year one of the claims made in 1999 resulted in a payment of $70 (5,000
rupees) to the claimant; none of the cases filed during the year were
resolved by year's end. The Government has begun human rights education
for the police force. According to an August 1999 government newspaper
report, the Government suspended seven police personnel and appointed a
high-level commission to probe the death of trucker Ale Tamang
following alleged police torture while in police custody (see Section
1.a.).
Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, who disappeared after an arrest in Kathmandu
in September 1999, was released on July 6 without ever having been
charged (see Sections 1.b. and 4). Shrestha reportedly was tortured
early in his incarceration and allegedly was held in solitary
confinement throughout most of his stay.
On January 14, police opened fire on a Maoist ``cultural program''
at a school in Accham district; according to INSEC, police killed nine
persons and wounded seven others during the incident (see Section
1.a.). In February police officers allegedly set fire to ``Maoist
sympathizing'' villages in Rukum in retaliation for the killing of 14
police officers in a single Maoist attack (see Section 1.a.).
Human rights groups have reported instances of torture in areas
affected by the ``People's War.'' Dozens of male detainees reported
having torture inflicted on them by the police; women in these areas
have reported instances of rape and sexual abuse by the police. AI,
which visited the country in 1998, reported that it found evidence of
``the systematic use of severe torture'' by the police, and raised
concerns over the relative impunity of the police for such actions;
however, in contrast to previous years, there only were two reports of
torture during the year. AI did not find systematic use of severe
torture when it visited the country during the year.
On March 10, in Kathmandu, police charged a group of Tibetans with
clubs and sticks, reportedly injuring several persons, including a 12-
year-old monk. The Tibetans were chanting antiChinese slogans after a
ceremony to mark the anniversary of the 1959 antiChinese uprising in
Tibet. In 1999 in Pokhara police used tear gas and batons to break up a
similar demonstration (see Section 2.b.).
Local and international human rights groups also have documented
Maoist violence in areas affected by the ``People's War,'' including
the severing of limbs. The Maoists most often have targeted political
leaders, local elites, and suspected informers. These targets included
not only members of the majority Nepali Congress Party (NCP), but also
members of the opposition Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist/
Leninist (CPN-UML). Throughout the year, Maoists looted banks and
bombed or set fire to government offices and homes of local political
leaders. International nongovernmental organization (NGO) offices also
were attacked on several occasions, as were foreign companies. There
also were cases of intimidation, torture, or other degrading treatment.
On February 17, Maoists set fire to the home of Rukum resident Bal
Bahadur K.C., a district executive member of the CPN-UML party. The
house was destroyed completely. On April 23, Maoists assaulted two
teachers of a primary school in Rukum, beating them and smearing black
paint on their faces. On April 26, 12 Maoists set fire to the Surhket
home of NCP regional chairman Yagya Bahadur B.C. On May 6, Maoists
kidnaped school headmaster Dharma Chandra Sharma from his home in
Jumla. Sharma was released 2 days later after his captors shaved his
head and paraded him around his village with shoes tied around his
neck. Maoists were responsible for at least 17 violent incidents
involving bombings, arson, and looting, on August 23. On September 25,
Maoist insurgents attacked the district police headquarters of Dolpa,
in the town of Dunai, killing at least 14 persons and wounding 40
others (see Section 1.a.). On October 23, approximately 30 members of
the student wing of the Maoists attacked the Padma Kanya School's
principle.
Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding is common in prisons, and
authorities sometimes handcuff or fetter detainees. Women normally are
incarcerated separately from men, but in similar conditions. The
Government still has not implemented a provision in the 1992 Children's
Act calling for the establishment of a juvenile home and juvenile
court. Consequently children sometimes are incarcerated with
adultseither with an incarcerated parent, or, as one local NGO reports,
as criminal offenders. The Department of Prisons states that there are
approximately 10 children in jail or custody for offenses that they
have committed and approximately 100 noncriminal dependent children
housed along with their parents (see Section 5). In April the
Government established separate juvenile benches in district courts
where youth are tried. As a result, trials of persons under the age of
18 now occur in a separate room in the courthouse, though there are no
separate juvenile courts as such. Likewise, there is no provision for
separate juvenile detention facilities.
The authorities are more likely to transfer sick prisoners to
hospitals than they were in the past. However, due to the inadequacy of
appropriate facilities, the authorities sometimes place the mentally
ill in jails under inhumane conditions.
The Government permits local human rights groups and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
stipulates that the authorities must arraign or release a suspect
within 24 hours of arrest, but the police at times violate this
provision. Under the Public Offenses Act of 1970, the police must
obtain warrants for an arrest unless a person is caught in the act of
committing a crime. For many offenses, the case must be filed in court
within 7 days of arrest. If the court upholds the detention, the law
authorizes the police to hold the suspect for 25 days to complete their
investigation, with a possible extension of 7 days. However, the police
occasionally hold prisoners longer, though the Supreme Court has, in
some cases, ordered the release of detainees held longer than 24 hours
without a court appearance.
Detainees do have the legal right to receive visits by family
members, and they are permitted access to lawyers only after
authorities file charges. In practice the police grant access to
prisoners on a basis that varies from prison to prison. There is a
system of bail, but bonds are too expensive for most citizens.
According to the Department of Prisons, about half of the 6,000 persons
imprisoned are awaiting trial. Due to court backlogs, a slow appeals
process, and poor access to legal representation, pretrial detention
often exceeds the period to which persons subsequently are sentenced
after a trial and conviction.
Under the Public Security Act, the authorities may detain persons
who allegedly threaten domestic security and tranquillity, amicable
relations with other states, and relations between citizens of
different classes or religions. Persons whom the Government detains
under the act are considered to be in preventive detention and can be
held for up to 6 months without being charged with a crime. Human
rights groups allege that the police have used arbitrary arrest and
detention during the ``People's War'' to intimidate communities
considered sympathetic to the Maoists (see Section 1.b.). Since the
insurgents began their terrorist campaigns, police have arrested 5,866
suspected Maoists. Of those persons arrested, 1,654 had been tried and
4,182 had been released.
The 1991 amendments to the Public Security Act allow the
authorities to extend periods of detention after submitting written
notices to the Home Ministry. The police must notify the district court
of the detention within 24 hours, and it may order an additional 6
months of detention before authorities file official charges.
Other laws, including the Public Offenses Act, permit arbitrary
detention. This act and its many amendments cover crimes such as
disturbing the peace, vandalism, rioting, and fighting. Human rights
monitors express concern that the act vests too much discretionary
power in the Chief District Officer (CDO), the highest-ranking civil
servant in each of the country's 75 districts. The act authorizes the
CDO to order detentions, to issue search warrants, and to specify fines
and other punishments for misdemeanors without judicial review. Few
recent instances of the use of the Public Offenses Act have come to
light, since it has become more common, particularly with the Maoists,
to arrest persons under the Public Security Act. In January local
authorities in Biratnagar arrested Laxmi Mudbari, the central member of
the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary),
under the act; Mudbari remained incarcerated at year's end. Human
rights commission officials reported several other cases of arrests or
detentions under the act, but were unable to provide details of the
cases.
Authorities detained journalists and their advocates on occasion,
on suspicion of having ties to or sympathy for the Maoists (see Section
2.a.).
The police have arrested or illegally detained some suspected
Maoist insurgents and held them incommunicado. There are no other
political detainees.
The Constitution prohibits exile; it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary and the Supreme Court has demonstrated
independence; however, lower level courts remain vulnerable to
political pressure and bribery of judges and court staff is endemic.
The Supreme Court has the right to review the constitutionality of
legislation passed by Parliament. In the past it has ruled that
provisions in the 1992 Labor Act and in the 1991 Nepal Citizenship Act
are unconstitutional. In 1995 the Court also decided that the
dissolution of the Parliament at the request of a former Prime Minister
was unconstitutional, and ordered the body restored.
Appellate and district courts have become increasingly independent,
although sometimes they bend to political pressure as well. In Rolpa,
one of the districts most affected by the ``People's War,'' human
rights groups have accused the district courts of acting in complicity
with CDO's in violating detainees' rights. These groups allege that
arrest without a warrant, prolonged detention without trial, and police
torture occurs in these areas.
The judicial system consists of three levels: District courts,
appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The King appoints judges on
the recommendation of the Judicial Council, a constitutional body
chaired by the Chief Justice. The Council also is responsible for the
assignment of judges, disciplinary action, and other administrative
matters. Judges decide cases; there is no jury system.
Delays in the administration of justice are a severe problem.
According to the latest statistics, approximately 150,000 cases are
active throughout the country. The Supreme Court has a backlog of
approximately 15,000 cases. At the Court's current rate, it never will
clear this backlog.
The Constitution provides for the right to counsel, equal
protection under the law, protection from double jeopardy, protection
from retroactive application of the law, and for public trials, except
in some security and customs cases. All lower court decisions,
including acquittals, are subject to appeal. The Supreme Court is the
court of last appeal, but the King may grant pardons. The King also can
suspend, commute, or remit any sentence. On the recommendation of the
Government, the King often pardons up to 12 prisoners--if they have
served 75 percent of their sentence and shown good behavior--on
national holidays.
Although prisoners have a constitutional right to legal
representation and a court appointed lawyer, government lawyers or
access to private attorneys is provided only on request. Consequently,
those persons unaware of their rights may be deprived of legal
representation.
There have been reports of cases in previous years in which
authorities allegedly penalized attorneys involved in the defense of
human rights. In January 1999, lawyer and human rights defender
Rajendra Dhakal was arrested reportedly because of his alleged
involvement in Maoist violence. He has not been seen since (see Section
1.b). Kathmandu newspapers reported that in July 1999, four lawyers
pleading for a group of three detained journalists were ordered
detained themselves by a district judge as they tried to express their
views on the judicial order to detain the journalists. After other
attorneys came to protest the arrests, the attorneys were released (see
Section 2.a.).
Military courts adjudicate cases concerning military personnel, who
are immune from prosecution in civilian courts. In 1992 the Supreme
Court ruled that military courts could no longer try civilians for
crimes involving the military services.
The authorities may prosecute terrorism or treason cases under the
Treason Act. Specially constituted tribunals hear these trials in
closed sessions. No such trials have occurred during the past 5 years.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, Or
Correspondence.--The Government generally respected the privacy of the
home and family. Search warrants are required before searches and
seizures may be carried out, except in cases involving suspected
security and narcotics violations. As amended, the Police Act of 1955
empowers the police to issue warrants for searches and seizures in
criminal cases upon receipt of information about criminal activities.
Within 24 hours of their issuance, warrants in misdemeanor cases must
be approved by the CDO. Court judges must approve them in felony cases.
Government provisions permit discrimination in employment on the
basis of political opinion; however, such discrimination is not known
to occur.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution specifies that
all citizens shall have freedom of thought and expression and that the
Government may not censor any news item or other reading material;
however, the Government imposes some restrictions on these rights. The
Constitution prohibits speech and writing that would threaten the
sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom; disturb the harmonious
relations among persons of different castes or communities; promote
sedition, defamation, contempt of court, or crime; or contradict decent
public behavior or morality.
The Press and Publications Act provides for the licensing of
publications and the granting of credentials to journalists. The Act
also includes penalties for violating these requirements. In addition
the Act prohibits publication of material that, among other things,
promotes disrespect toward the King or the royal family; that
undermines security, peace, order, the dignity of the King, or the
integrity or sovereignty of the Kingdom; that creates animosity among
persons of different castes and religions; or that adversely affects
the good conduct or morality of the public. However, throughout August
and September, the press and several private FM radio stations produced
a number of stories calling for the prosecution of a nephew of the
monarch who allegedly killed a popular local singer in a hit-and-run
incident. This is the first time the local media has confronted a
member of the royal family. The Press and Publications Act also
provides a basis for banning foreign publications. However, foreign
publications are widely available.
There are hundreds of independent vernacular and Englishlanguage
newspapers available, representing various political points of view.
The Government owns ``Gorkhapatra,'' the second-largest circulating
Nepali daily, and ``The Rising Nepal,'' the second-largest English
daily. Editors and writers at the government newspapers practice self-
censorship and generally reflect government policy. Ruling political
parties have influenced the editorial policy of the government
newspapers to their advantage. However, despite the sensitivity of the
Government to the ``People's War,'' the press has not faced overt
pressure to report on it in a particular way. Views of human rights
groups, the statements of the police, and the press releases of Maoist
leaders all have been reported in the local press.
Nevertheless, journalists and their advocates have suffered human
rights abuses. Shambhu Prasad Patel, vice president of the Rautahat
Branch of the Nepal Press Union (NPU), was shot and killed by two
unidentified gunmen on January 23 at his residence; as of year's end,
no one had been held accountable. On February 13, police arrested and
briefly detained Dev Kumar Yadav, a Maoist-leaning newspaper reporter
for Janadesh and council member of the Federation of Nepalese
Journalists, Siraha (FNJS), and Nagendra Kumar Paswan, a reporter for
Mahima and vice chairman of the FNJS. No charges were filed. The 1999
case against Krishna Sen, the editor of Janadesh who was arrested in
connection with the publication of an interview with a Maoist leader,
continued during the year. On February 18, Sen was charged under the
Illegal Weapons Act and subsequently was sent to Rajbiraj jail in
Saptari. Also in February police released Suresh Ale Magar, another
columnist with Janadesh who had been held without a detention order
(see Section 1.b.). On March 12, Jagdish Bhattarai, editor of the local
weekly Nava Chetana and correspondent for Kantipur Daily in Palpa, was
sentenced to 7 days in jail and fined approximately $7.20 (500 rupees)
for contempt of court. Bhattarai was accused of writing a 1998
editorial that denounced corruption and threatened to publish names of
corrupt government officials. On May 8, the publication Gorkhapatra
suspended associate editor Ram Prasad Acharya for publishing a Maoist
press release. Freelance journalist Milan Nepali remains missing (see
Section 1.b). In contrast to prior years, there were no reported
incidents of seizure of either publications or equipment.
In February the censor board of the Ministry of Information and
Communications banned public screening of the film ``Aago'' (Fire),
claiming that the film undermined public safety. The film contained
references to the Maoist insurgency. In July the board allowed the film
to be shown after the references had been deleted.
The Broadcast Act of 1993 allows private television and FM radio
broadcasts, but implementation of the Act has been slow. The Government
owns the only television station, and controls one radio station that
broadcasts both AM and FM signals. Radio, primarily short and medium
waves, reaches the greatest number of persons and has the largest
influence. Government-owned Radio Nepal broadcasts throughout the
country through a series of repeater stations. With privatization of a
number of radio bands, there was a marked increase in the range of
programming options available. However, only government-owned Radio
Nepal may originate its own local news broadcasts, and all stations
must rebroadcast its news programs. The Government does not restrict
access to foreign radio broadcasts, private cable networks, or to the
purchase of television satellite dishes. Indian and Pakistani broadcast
television also is readily available in many parts of the country.
Since 1996 two private cable television networks have been
operating in the Kathmandu valley. They mainly provide entertainment
programming, but commentary critical of government policies
occasionally occurs during publicly broadcast discussion programs.
Throughout the country, local entrepreneurs also are receiving
international stations via satellite for viewing in local bars, and are
reselling the signal to local residents. Television time on the
government-owned television station also is leased to private
producers.
There are four private radio stations and three community-owned
radio stations that have their own transmitters, an increase of two and
one, respectively, over 1999. During the year, a private company
acquired a license to establish a 1,000-watt FM transmitter in the
eastern part of the country, which will cover much of the eastern
region and portions of India. Five private radio stations so far have
been licensed to operate outside of the capital city, although none
have begun their broadcasts. Although nongovernment radio stations are
precluded legally from broadcasting locally developed news, private
stations select which newspaper stories to read, permitting editorial
perspective. Private stations also must broadcast the Government
station's news program but are permitted to rebroadcast news from
abroad. Private radio stations, like print media, practice self-
censorship. In August 1999, one private radio station reported that a
government official asked the station to stop a live call-in advice
show dealing with the topics of HIV/AIDS and teenage problems. Other
talk shows on sensitive topics continued without government comment.
There have been many debates about liberalizing the media and
privatizing government-owned media. This debate has put pressure, which
successive governments so far have resisted, to open the airwaves and
divest government-controlled printing operations. However, private FM
radio and cable and satellite television have overtaken the
Government's ability to regulate them.
No government efforts to curtail academic freedom were reported
during the year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, although it may be restricted by law
on vague grounds such as undermining the sovereignty and integrity of
the State or disturbing law and order. These restrictions rarely were
used during the year. Large public demonstrations are common, and
police intervention is rare except in cases where crowds become violent
or violate the terms of their parade permit. On March 10, the Tibetan
community in Kathmandu held its annual ceremony to commemorate the
anniversary of the 1959 anti-Chinese uprising in Tibet. Following the
conclusion of the official ceremony, a large group of young persons
left the event location and went onto a public street chanting anti-
Chinese slogans. After attempting to restore order, police charged the
crowd, reportedly injuring several persons in the process (see Section
1.c.). In March 1999, police arrested 27 Tibetan demonstrators
commemorating the same event in Pokhara; the police used tear gas and
batons to break up the demonstration. All of the protesters were
released soon after the incident.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and permits the practice of all religions; however, although
the Government generally has not interfered with the practice of
religions, conversion and proselytizing are prohibited and punishable
with fines or imprisonment, and members of minority religions
occasionally complain of police harassment. Some Christian groups are
concerned that the ban on proselytizing limits the expression of non-
Hindu religious belief. The Constitution describes the country as a
``Hindu Kingdom,'' although it does not establish Hinduism as the state
religion.
The large majority of citizens are Hindu. There are smaller numbers
of Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian citizens, as well.
April public observances of Easter in a Kathmandu park and a
Passover Seder in a major hotel in Kathmandu were uneventful. However,
in 1999, Christian groups in Kathmandu were prevented from observing
Good Friday in a public park when they failed to obtain the proper
permit; 3 members of a group of 400 persons reportedly were injured
when police attempted to disperse the group's subsequent protest at a
local government office. Easter services that year, which did have the
proper permit, took place in a public park without incident.
A conviction for conversion or proselytizing can result in fines or
imprisonment or, in the case of foreigners, expulsion from the country.
Although arrests or detentions for proselytizing are rare, there have
been few incidents of punishment or investigation in connection with
conversion or proselytization during the last few years. However, the
Government on occasion investigates reports of proselytizing. It
investigated a 1997 accusation against the Adventist Development and
Relief Agency (ADRA), and cleared ADRA in 1997. Nongovernmental groups
or individuals are free to file charges of proselytizing against
individuals or organizations. Such a case was filed with the Supreme
Court against ADRA and the United Missions to Nepal, an umbrella
Protestant group, on December 31, 1999. The case still was pending at
year's end.
For decades dozens of Christian missionary hospitals, welfare
organizations, and schools have operated in the country. These
organizations have not proselytized and have operated freely.
Missionary schools are among the most respected institutions of
secondary education in the country; most of the country's governing and
business elite graduated from Jesuit high schools. Many foreign
Christian organizations have direct ties to Nepali churches and sponsor
Nepali priests for religious training abroad.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of caste,
except for traditional religious practices at Hindu temples, where, for
example, members of the lowest caste are not permitted.
The Press and Publications Act prohibits the publication of
materials that create animosity among persons of different castes or
religions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement and residence, and the Government generally does not restrict
travel abroad. However, for security reasons, the Government restricts
travel by foreigners, including Tibetan residents in Nepal, to some
areas near the Chinese border. The Government also has imposed
restrictions on women's travel to the Gulf states to work as domestic
servants, in response to cases of abuse of such women in the past.
These restrictions do not apply to women who are traveling to the Gulf
states for other reasons, nor do they apply for travel to other areas.
Women's rights groups have protested the ban as discriminatory. The
Government allows citizens abroad to return, and is not known to revoke
citizenship for political reasons.
The Government has no official refugee policy. However, it does
provide asylum for refugees and has cooperated with the office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and with other
humanitarian organizations, in assisting refugees from Bhutan and Tibet
(China). The UNHCR has maintained an office in Kathmandu since 1989.
Since 1959 the Government has accepted as residents approximately
20,000 Tibetan refugees, many of whom still reside in the country.
Since 1991 it also has provided asylum to some 97,000 Bhutanese
refugees, the great majority of whom are living in UNHCR administered
camps in the eastern part of the country.
China and the Government of Nepal tightened control of movement
across their border in 1986, but both sides have enforced these
restrictions haphazardly. Police and customs officials occasionally
harass Tibetan asylum seekers who cross the border from China.
According to the UNHCR, police conduct in this regard has improved in
the last 2 years, although border police sometimes extort money from
Tibetans in exchange for passage. There were no reports of forced
expulsion of Tibetan asylum seekers during the year.
There are approximately 98,000 ethnic Nepali refugees from Bhutan
in UNHCR-administered camps in the southeastern region of the country.
An additional 15,000 refugees reside outside the camps in either Nepal
or India. The total represents approximately one-sixth of Bhutan's
estimated pre-1991 population.
The UNHCR monitors the condition of the Bhutanese refugees and
provides for their basic needs. The Government accepts the refugee
presence as temporary, on humanitarian grounds, but offers little more
than a place to stay. The Government officially restricts refugee
freedom of movement and work, but does not strictly enforce its
policies. Visitors to the camps universally describe conditions as
excellent. Violence sometimes has broken out between camp residents and
the surrounding local population. The UNHCR and other donors and relief
organizations have defused tensions through a refugee-affected areas
assistance plan aimed at improving conditions in communities adjacent
to the camps.
In 1993 the Governments of Nepal and Bhutan formed a joint
committee and began bilateral talks to resolve the refugee problem. No
significant breakthroughs were made for several years. However, during
the tenth round of bilateral talks December 24-27, Nepal and Bhutan
agreed to prepare for verification at the camps in January 2001.
Earlier lack of progress in the talks had left refugees frustrated, and
both government leaders and international organization officials were
concerned that the frustration could lead to unrest. Refugees continued
to hold ``peace marches'' to protest their plight.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right Of Citizens To
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully.
Citizens, through their elected representatives, also have the right to
amend the Constitution with the exception of certain basic principles
that they may not change--sovereignty vested in the people, the
multiparty system, fundamental rights, and the constitutional monarchy.
Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of
government. Parliamentary elections are scheduled at least every 5
years. Midterm elections may be called if the ruling party loses its
majority, loses a vote of no confidence, or calls for elections. Under
the Constitution all citizens aged 18 and over may vote.
The House of Representatives, or lower house, may send legislation
directly to the King by majority vote. The National Council, or upper
house, may amend or reject lower house legislation, but the lower house
can overrule its objections. The upper house also may introduce
legislation and send it to the lower house for consideration.
The King exercises certain powers with the advice and consent of
the Council of Ministers. These include exclusive authority to enact,
amend, and repeal laws relating to succession to the throne. The King's
income and property are tax-exempt and inviolable, and no question may
be raised in any court about any act performed by the King. The
Constitution also permits the King to exercise emergency powers in the
event of war, external aggression, armed revolt, or extreme economic
depression. In such an emergency, the King may suspend without judicial
review many basic freedoms, including the freedoms of expression and
assembly, freedom from censorship, and freedom from preventive
detention. However, he may not suspend habeas corpus or the right to
form associations. The King's declaration of a state of emergency must
be approved by a two-thirds majority of the lower house of the
Parliament. If the lower house is not in session, the upper house
exercises this power. A state of emergency may be maintained for up to
3 months without legislative approval and for up to 6 months, renewable
only once for an additional 6 months, if the legislature grants
approval.
The Constitution bars the registration and participation in
elections of any political party that is based on ``religion,
community, caste, tribe, or region,'' or that does not operate openly
and democratically. During the most recent national elections in May
1999, there were sporadic incidents of violence that mainly occurred
between supporters of rival political parties. Maoist efforts to
disrupt the elections by intimidating voters and candidates had little
effect. The elections generally were held throughout the country
according to schedule. International observers considered the elections
to be generally free and fair.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no
specific laws that restrict women, indigenous peoples, or minorities
from participating in the Government or in political parties. Tradition
limits the roles of women and some castes in the political process.
However, the Constitution requires that women constitute 5 percent of
each party's candidates for the House of Representatives. A 1999 royal
ordinance, which Parliament has ratified, also requires that 20 percent
of all village and municipal level seats be reserved for female
candidates. The 1999 elections resulted in an increase from 7 to 12 in
the number of women in the 205-seat lower house and from 5 to 9 in the
60-seat upper house.
No specific laws prevent minorities from voting or restrict them
from participating in the Government and political parties on the same
basis as other citizens. Hindus and members of certain castes
traditionally have wielded more power than others, but members of other
religious and social groups have in recent years gained increasing
influence in government, including senior leadership positions. There
are no special provisions to allocate a set number or percentage of
political party positions or parliamentary seats for any minority
group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are approximately 10 human rights NGO's. These include the
Human Rights Organization of Nepal (HURON), the Informal Sector
Services Center (INSEC), the International Institute for Human Rights,
Environment, and Development (INHURED), and the Forum for the
Protection of Human Rights (FOPHUR). The Nepal Law Society also
monitors human rights abuses and a number of NGO's focus on specific
areas such as torture, child labor, women's rights, or ethnic
minorities. Groups are free to publish reports on human rights abuses.
The Government also has allowed groups to visit prisons and prisoners.
The Government rarely arrests or detains persons reporting on human
rights problems, but in June 1998, the police arrested Gopal Siwakoti
Chintan, a human rights activist, for alleged collaboration with Maoist
rebels. The police also confiscated audiotapes and videotapes of
interviews with victims of human rights violations from Chintan's
office. The police later released Chintan due to insufficient evidence
that he had collaborated with the Maoists. There were reports that the
Government and Maoists limited the activities of human rights
activists.
On July 6, police officers released Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, a
secondary school teacher, lawyer, and member of a human rights
organization; Shrestha never was charged (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
The insurgency has caused a number of NGO's in the midwestern
districts to reduce their activities substantially. Agricultural
development projects and community health offices have been frequent
targets. Maoists also have targeted aircraft attempting to make
humanitarian deliveries of foodstuffs to midwestern districts.
In May the Government formed the Human Rights Commission (HRC), a
government-appointed commission with a mandate to investigate human
rights violations. Since then the commission has received nearly 400
complaints of human rights violations. Although some cases involve
disappearance of detainees, illegal detention, and arrest of acquitted
persons, many other cases are relatively trivial. The HRC notes that
none of its cases have moved forward. Many do not merit prosecution;
for those that do, the HRC lacks the legal resources to pursue them in
the courts.
The Government does not refuse visas to international NGO human
rights monitors, or otherwise restrict their access when they are in
the country. However, some areas along the country's border with China
are restricted. An organization monitoring Tibetan refugee flows has
been denied access to these border areas.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution specifies that the State shall not discriminate
against citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, or ideology.
However, there still is a caste system. Discrimination against lower
castes, women, and the disabled remains common, especially in rural
areas.
Women.--Violence against women is a serious problem, but it
receives limited public attention. In a 1996 study, 50 percent of the
respondents said that they know someone who was the victim of domestic
violence. In another 1996 survey, respondents listed the perpetrators
of violence in 77 percent of incidents as family members, and 58
percent reported that it is a daily occurrence. There currently is no
law against domestic violence.
Rape and incest also are problems, particularly in rural areas.
Laws against rape provide for prison sentences of 6 to 10 years for the
rape of a woman under 14 years of age and 3 to 5 years for the rape of
a woman over the age of 14. The law prescribes imprisonment for 1 year
or a fine for the rape of a prostitute. The law does not forbid spousal
rape.
The dowry tradition is strong, with greater prevalence in the Terai
region. The killing of brides because of defaults on dowry payments is
rare, but does occur. More common is the physical abuse of wives by the
husband and the husband's family to obtain additional dowry or to force
the woman to leave to enable the son to remarry.
There is a general unwillingness among citizens, and particularly
among government figures, to recognize violence against women as a
problem. In a survey conducted by Saathi, a local NGO, 42 percent of
the respondents said that in their experience medical practitioners
were uncooperative or negligent in cases of violence against women and
girls. This unwillingness to recognize violence against women and girls
as unacceptable in daily life is seen not just in the medical
profession, but among the police and politicians as well.
The police department has a ``women's cell'' in five cities,
including Kathmandu. These cells include female officers who receive
special training in handling victims of domestic violence. The police
also have sent out directives instructing all officers to treat
domestic violence as a criminal offense that should be prosecuted.
However, according to a police official, this type of directive is
difficult to enforce because of entrenched discriminatory attitudes.
Even though the police may make an arrest, further prosecution seldom
is pursued by the victim or by the Government.
At least six NGO's in Kathmandu work on the problem of violence
against women and on women's issues in general. Saathi's assistance
program includes a women's shelter and a suicide intervention center.
The shelter provides housing, medical attention, counseling, and legal
advocacy for the victims of violence.
Trafficking in women remains a serious social problem in several of
the country's poorest areas, and large numbers of women still are
forced to work against their will as prostitutes in other countries
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Although the Constitution provides protections for women, including
equal pay for equal work, the Government has not taken significant
action to implement its provisions, even in many of its own industries.
Women face systematic discrimination, particularly in rural areas,
where religious and cultural tradition, lack of education, and
ignorance of the law remain severe impediments to their exercise of
basic rights such as the right to vote or to hold property in their own
names.
Women have benefited from some changes in marriage and inheritance
laws. In 1994 the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the
Citizenship Law that discriminated against foreign spouses of Nepalese
women. However, many other discriminatory laws still remain. According
to legal experts, there are over 20 laws that discriminate against
women. For example, the law grants women the right to divorce, but on
narrower grounds than those applicable to men. The law on property
rights also favors men in its provisions for inheritance, land tenancy,
and the division of family property. In 1995 the Supreme Court also
ordered the Council of Ministers to enact legislation within 1 year
giving women property rights in regard to inheritance and land tenancy
that were equal to those of men. Alhough legislation to comply with
this order has been introduced, it remains stalled in Parliament.
According to the 1991 census, the female literacy rate is 26
percent, compared with 57 percent for men. Human rights groups report
that girls attend secondary schools at a rate half that of boys. There
are many NGO's focused on integrating women into society and the
economy. These NGO's work in the areas of literacy, small business,
skills transfer, and prevention of trafficking in women and girls.
There also are a growing number of women's advocacy groups.
Most political parties have women's groups. Members of Parliament
have begun working for the passage of tougher laws for crimes of sexual
assault, but have had little success so far.
Children.--Education is not compulsory. Government policy is to
provide free primary education for all children between the ages of 6
and 12 years, but the quality of education is sorely inadequate, many
families cannot afford school supplies and clothing, and schools do not
exist in all areas. Schools charge fees for higher education. Roughly
60 percent of the children who work also attend school. However,
approximately 70 to 75 percent of boys who work go to school, compared
to only 50 to 60 percent of the girls who work. Free health care is
provided through government clinics, but they are poorly equipped and
too few in number to meet the demand. Community-based health programs
assist in the prevention of childhood diseases and provide primary
health care services. Due to poor or nonexistent sanitation in rural
areas, many children are at risk from severe and fatal illnesses.
Forced prostitution and trafficking in young girls remain serious
problems (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Societal attitudes view a female child as a commodity, to be
bartered off in marriage, or as a burden. Some persons, in fact,
consider marrying a girl before menarche an honorable, sacred act that
increases one's chances of a better afterlife. As a result, child
brides are common. According to UNICEF's Regional Office for South
Asia, 40 percent of all marriages involve a girl under 14 years of age.
The age difference in marriage often is cited as one cause of domestic
violence.
A local NGO reports that approximately 100 children considered
delinquents or accused of public offenses are incarcerated with adults
because the Government has not established juvenile homes. Some of
these delinquent children allegedly are as young as 9 years old, even
though, under the law, children under 18 cannot be charged with crimes;
the Government reports that about 10 persons under the age of 18 are
incarcerated for crimes they have committed. The UNHCR believes that
police sometimes have falsified the ages of young detainees in order to
avoid challenge on this point. However, according to the press, almost
100 children are in jails as noncriminal dependents of incarcerated
adults (see Section 1.c.).
People with Disabilities.--The disabled face widespread
discrimination. Families often are stigmatized by and ashamed of
disabled family members, who may be hidden away or neglected. Economic
integration is further hampered by the general view that the disabled
are unproductive. The mentally retarded are associated with the
mentally ill. Sometimes, mentally ill and retarded persons are placed
in prisons due to the lack of facilities or support.
The Government has long been involved in providing for the
disabled, but the level of government assistance has not met the needs
of the disabled. The 1982 Disabled Persons Protection and Welfare Act
and additional 1994 rules mandate accessibility to buildings, to
transportation, to employment, to education, and to other state
services. However, despite government funding for special education
programs, the Government does not implement or enforce laws regarding
the disabled. A number of NGO's working with the disabled receive
significant funding from the Government, but persons who are physically
or mentally disabled rely almost exclusively on family members to
assist them.
Religious Minorities.--The adherents of the country's many
religions generally coexist peacefully and respect all places of
worship. Most Hindus respect the many Buddhist shrines located
throughout the country; Buddhists accord Hindu shrines the same
respect. Buddha's birthplace is an important pilgrimage site, and
Buddha's birthday is a national holiday. The country's Muslim minority
is not well integrated with the Hindu and Buddhist communities.
Some Christian groups report that Hindu extremism has increased in
recent years. In January 1999, the India-based Hindu political party
Shiv Sena, locally known as Pashupati Sena, opened an office in
Kathmandu; a few Shiv Sena candidates unsuccessfully ran for office in
the 1999 general elections. Government policy does not support Hindu
extremism, although some political figures have made public statements
critical of Christian missionary activities. Some citizens are wary of
proselytizing and conversion by Christians and, therefore, view the
growth of Christianity with alarm.
Those who choose to convert to other religions--in particular Hindu
citizens who convert to Islam or Christianity--sometimes are ostracized
socially. Some reportedly have been forced to leave their villages.
While this prejudice is not systematic, it can be vehement and
occasionally violent. Hindus who convert to another religion may face
isolated incidents of hostility or discrimination from Hindu extremist
groups. Nevertheless, converts generally do not fear to admit in public
their new religious affiliations.
The caste system strongly influences society, even though it is
prohibited by the Constitution. However, the Government allows caste
discrimination at Hindu temples where, for example, members of the
lowest caste are not permitted to enter. Otherwise, the Government
makes an effort to protect the rights of the disadvantaged castes. In
1998 the Government formed the ``Committee for the Upliftment of
Depressed Communities,'' which runs income generation, public
education, and scholarship programs for the disadvantaged castes.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country has over 75 ethnic
groups that speak 50 different languages. The Constitution provides
that each community ``shall have the right to preserve and promote its
language, script, and culture.'' The Constitution further specifies
that each community has the right to operate schools up to the primary
level in its mother tongue.
Discrimination against lower castes especially is common in the
rural areas in the western part of the country. Although the Government
has outlawed the public shunning of ``untouchables,'' an exception was
retained for traditional practices at Hindu religious sites. Economic,
social, and educational advancement tend to be a function of historical
patterns, geographic location, and caste. Better education and higher
levels of prosperity, especially in the Kathmandu valley, slowly are
reducing caste distinctions and increasing opportunities for lower
socioeconomic groups. Better educated urban-oriented castes (Brahmin,
Chhetri, and certain elements of the Newar community traditionally
dominant in the Kathmandu valley) continue to dominate politics and
senior administrative and military positions, and to control a
disproportionate share of natural resources in their territories.
In remote areas, school lessons and national radio broadcasts often
are conducted in the local language. However, in areas with nearby
municipalities, education at the primary, secondary, and university
levels is conducted almost exclusively in Nepali, which is
constitutionally mandated as the official language of the State. Human
rights groups report that the languages of the small Kusunda, Dura, and
Meche communities nearly are extinct.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
freedom to establish and to join unions and associations. It permits
restriction of unions only in cases of subversion, sedition, or similar
conditions. Despite the political transformation in 1990, trade unions
still are developing their administrative structures to organize
workers, to bargain collectively, and to conduct worker education
programs.
Union participation in the formal sector accounts for approximately
10 to 12 percent of the formal work force. In 1992 Parliament passed
the Labor Act and the Trade Union Act, and formulated enabling
regulations. However, the Government has not yet fully implemented the
laws. The Trade Union Act defines procedures for establishing trade
unions, associations, and federations. It also protects unions and
officials from lawsuits arising from actions taken in the discharge of
union duties, including collective bargaining, and prohibits employers
from discriminating against trade union members or organizers. There
have been few reports of discrimination against union members.
The law permits strikes, except by employees in essential services
such as water supply, electricity, and telecommunications. The law
empowers the Government to halt a strike or to suspend a union's
activities if the union disturbs the peace or if it adversely affects
the nation's economic interests. Under the Labor Act, 60 percent of a
union's membership must vote in favor of a strike in a secret ballot
for the strike to be legal. Workers at a jute mill in Biratnagar struck
from June 29 to July 4 to demand tenure, medical benefits, and annual
leave. Workers returned to their jobs after management acceded to most
of their demands. In August thousands of employees of various
government-owned corporations went on strike to protest perceived
inequities in their pay scales. The employees later returned to work
voluntarily after the Government appointed a committee tasked with
reaching an agreement on the issue. Several days later, the Government
issued notices in local media stating that in the future, it would
enforce the Essential Services Act of 1957 which prohibits strikes by
employees of government-owned enterprises.
The Government does not restrict unions from joining international
labor bodies. Several trade federations and union organizations
maintain a variety of international affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Act
provides for collective bargaining, although the organizational
structures to implement the Act's provisions have not been established.
Collective bargaining agreements cover an estimated 20 percent of wage
earners in the organized sector. However, labor remains widely unable
to use collective bargaining effectively due to inexperience and
employer reluctance to bargain.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits slavery, serfdom, forced labor, or trafficking in human
beings in any form; however, forced labor and trafficking in persons
remain problems (see Section 6.f.). The Department of Labor enforces
laws against forced labor in the small formal sector, but remains
unable to enforce the law outside that sector.
Large numbers of women still are forced to work against their will
as prostitutes (see Section 6.f.). Bonded labor, especially in
agricultural work, was a perennial problem. Bonded laborers usually
were members of lower castes. Bonded labor reportedly occurred among
certain ethnic groups in the western Terai region. However, the
Government in July outlawed bonded labor and released the ``Kamaiya''
bonded agricultural workers, from their debts. By year's end, the
Government had not yet provided land to the Kamaiyas for resettlement
nor had it begun programs to prepare the Kamaiyas for economic
independence; however, it had announced plans to do so. The Government
has set up temporary camps for the Kamaiyas and begun arrangements for
distribution of food under a food-for-work program.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution stipulates that children shall not be
employed in factories, mines, or similar hazardous work and limits
children between the ages of 14 and 16 years to a 36-hour work-week.
The law also mandates acceptable working conditions for children. The
law establishes a minimum age for employment of minors at 16 years in
industry and 14 years in agriculture and mandates acceptable working
conditions for children.
On July 21, the country passed its first comprehensive child labor
law. The law, drafted with the assistance of the International Labor
Organization (ILO), tightened earlier laws. It is the first national
legislation to establish specific penalties for those who unlawfully
employ children. It repeats the existing prohibition of the employment
of children under the age of 14 years and renews the constitutional
provision that children between the ages of 14 and 16 years may work,
but no more than 6 hours a day and 6 days a week. The law prohibits
child labor in tourism, cigarette or carpet factories, mines, or
laboratories. Employers must maintain records of all 14- to 16-year-old
laborers.
These legal protections notwithstanding, resources devoted to their
enforcement are limited, and children work in many sectors of the
economy. According to a 1996 ILO study, up to 40 percent of all
children work, mostly in agriculture. Others work in the carpet
weaving, pottery, basket weaving, sewing, and ironsmithing industries.
NGO's estimate that 2.6 million children are economically active, 1.7
million of which work fulltime. According to a 1996 ILO study, most
working children in the country are girls. Roughly 60 percent of the
children who work also attend school. However, approximately 70 to 75
percent of boys who work go to school, compared with 50 to 60 percent
of girls who work. There also are reports that the Maoists use
children, including girls, as soldiers, shields, runners, and
messengers.
The Ministry of Labor's enforcement record is improving. In
February police rescued five children from a garment factory in
Kathmandu. The children claimed that they were forced to work more than
12 hours a day and that some were abused sexually. According to a
February 1999 press report, police found 14 boys aged 15 to 17 years
who were employed forcibly in a wool factory in Jorpati. The Government
introduced a number of programs beginning in 1998 that are designed to
reduce child labor. For example, the Ministry of Labor has set up three
centers for children of carpet weavers, who might otherwise join their
parents at the loom. The centers provide day care or education for the
children, depending upon their ages. The Government also conducts
public awareness programs to raise public sensitivity to the problem of
child labor.
The private sector has made its own efforts to eradicate child
labor, especially in the carpet industry. Since 1996, the Rugmark
Foundation has certified carpets made without child labor. Over half of
all carpet factories now participate in this or a similar certification
system. Partially as a result of this initiative, and of consumer
pressure, children reportedly now constitute only 5 percent of the work
force in the exportoriented carpet industry, and the carpet
manufacturers association in August 1999 pledged publicly to end child
labor in the industry by 2005. However, children's rights activists
still say that, in the smaller factories, children remain a part of the
work force. Rugmark, in its self-policing function, reports that it
found 20 children working in carpet factories in Kathmandu in April and
May.
Trafficking in girls continues to be a serious problem (see Section
6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In April the Government passed
legislation that raised the minimum monthly wage for unskilled labor to
$20 (1,450 rupees). The law also defined monthly minimum wages for
semi-skilled labor at about $21 (1,500 rupees), skilled labor at $22
(1,610 rupees), and highly skilled labor at $25 (1,800 rupees). The
minimum wage for children ages 14 to 16 was set at $16 (1,144 rupees).
Wages in the unorganized service sector and in agriculture often are as
much as 50 percent lower. The Labor Act calls for a 48-hour work-week,
with 1 day off per week, and limits overtime to 20 hours per week.
Health and safety standards and other benefits such as a provident fund
and maternity benefits also are established in the Act. Implementation
of the new Labor Act has been slow, as the Government has not created
the necessary regulatory or administrative structures to enforce its
provisions. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations. Although the law authorizes labor officers
to order employers to rectify unsafe conditions, enforcement of safety
standards remains minimal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking and
prescribes imprisonment of up to 20 years for infractions; however,
trafficking in women and girls remains a serious social problem in
several of the country's poorest areas. Young women are by far the most
common targets; trafficking of men and boys is not known to occur.
While the vast majority of trafficking is of women and girls for the
commercial sex industry, women and girls sometimes are trafficked for
domestic service, manual or semi-skilled labor, or other purposes.
Nepal is a primary sending country for the South Asia region; most
women and girls trafficked from the country go to India. Local NGO's
working against trafficking estimate that 5,000 to 7,000 Nepali girls
between the ages of 10 and 18 are lured or abducted annually into India
and subsequently forced into prostitution. In some cases, parents or
relatives sell women and young girls into sexual slavery. Hundreds of
girls and women return to the country annually after having worked as
prostitutes in India. Most are destitute and, according to some
estimates, 65 percent are HIV-positive when they return. There is
legislation to protect women from coercive trafficking, including a ban
on female domestic labor leaving the country to work in Saudi Arabia
and other countries in the Gulf (see Section 2.d.); women's rights
groups have protested the ban as discriminatory.
Prostitution also is a problem in the Kathmandu valley. A
children's human rights group states that 20 percent of prostitutes in
the country are younger than 16 years old.
Since 1996 active special police units have dealt with crimes
against women and children.
Despite recent attempts to increase the imposition of penalties on
traffickers, enforcement of antitrafficking statutes remains sporadic.
The fear of the spread of AIDS by returning prostitutes has discouraged
the Government from promoting efforts to rehabilitate prostitutes.
Government efforts focus more on preventing prostitution and
trafficking in women. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare sponsors
job and skill training programs in several poor districts known for
sending prostitutes to India. In May 1999, the Ministry of Women and
Social Welfare opened the Women's Self-Reliance and Rehabilitation
Center (WOREC), a rehabilitation and skills training center for women
returned from being trafficked and for women and girls at risk of being
trafficked. With the Government's endorsement, many NGO's have public
information and outreach campaigns in rural areas. These groups
commonly use leaflets, comic books, films, speaker programs, and skits
to convey antitrafficking messages and education.
There are over 15 NGO's working against trafficking, several of
which have rehabilitation and skills training programs for trafficking
victims. WOREC and other organizations involved in the rehabilitation
of trafficking victims state that their members have been threatened
and that their offices have been vandalized because of their
activities. According to press reports, on August 18, 1999, five
convicted traffickers who had been given 20-year sentences but were
released within 3 years attacked a 17-year-old living at a WOREC
facility. The director of another prominent anti-trafficking group
reported in July that traffickers regularly make threats against her
organization.
In October NGO's, the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and
the Home Ministry together hosted a regional workshop with senior
police officers to enhance cross border antitrafficking collaboration.
NGO's and law enforcement officials discussed ways of improving
bilateral and regional cooperation on investigating and prosecuting
traffickers and ensuring better protection of victims.
In June 1999, the police hosted a workshop in Kathmandu to provide
recommendations for new legislation regarding trafficking and the
sexual exploitation of children. A followup workshop was held in July
1999. To date no new legislation has been passed on the subject. There
are many social and legal obstacles to successful prosecution, and
convictions are rare.
__________
PAKISTAN
On October 12, 1999, the elected civilian Government of former
Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a bloodless coup led
by Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf. In consultation with
senior military commanders, General Musharraf designated himself Chief
Executive, and suspended the Constitution, the Parliament, and the
provincial assemblies. The office of the President, which is mainly
ceremonial, was retained. General Musharraf appointed an advisory
National Security Council, which included both military and civilian
advisers, and a civilian cabinet. The government bureaucracy continued
to function; however, at all levels, the functioning of the Government
after the coup was ``monitored'' by military commanders. In May the
Supreme Court ruled that the Musharraf Government was constitutional
and imposed a 3-year deadline--starting from October 12, 1999--to
complete a transition to democratic, civilian rule. On December 31,
local elections were held in 18 districts on a non-party basis; however
the Government has not set a timetable for national elections.
Corruption and inefficiency remained acute in all branches of
government. The suspended Constitution provided for an independent
judiciary; however, the judiciary was subject to executive branch and
other outside influences, and suffers from inadequate resources,
inefficiency, and corruption. The Supreme Court demonstrated a limited
degree of independence; however, the overall credibility of the
judiciary remained low, and General Musharraf took steps to control the
judiciary and to remove his regime from judicial oversight.
The police have primary internal security responsibilities,
although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and the Frontier
Constabulary, provide support in areas where law and order problems are
acute, like Karachi and the frontier areas. Provincial governments
control the police and the paramilitary forces when they are assisting
in law and order operations. In August the Government announced a
devolution plan that included some increase in local political control
of the police; however, the Government had not implemented this plan by
year's end. During some religious holidays, the regular army is
deployed in sensitive areas to help maintain public order. After the
coup, the army played a role in enforcing exit control restrictions at
airports and border crossings, reportedly as part of the Musharraf
regime's anticorruption accountability campaign. Members of the
security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
Pakistan is a poor country with great extremes in the distribution
of wealth. Education, especially for females is poor and only 33
percent of the population are judged literate by a very low standard.
Cotton, textiles and apparel, rice, and leather products are the
principal exports. The economy includes both state-run and private
industries and financial institutions. The suspended Constitution
provided for the right of private businesses to operate freely in most
sectors of the economy and there continued to be a strong private
sector. The per capita annual income is $490 (PRs 29,400).
The Government's human rights record was poor, and the Government
committed numerous serious abuses; however, there were improvements in
some areas, particularly with respect to freedom of the press. Citizens
continued to be denied the right to choose or change their government
peacefully. Police committed numerous extrajudicial killings; however,
there were fewer such killings than in 1999. In Karachi there were
fewer killings between rival political factions during the year;
however, many of these killings reportedly were committed by or with
the participation of the security forces. Police abused and raped
citizens. While the officers responsible for such abuses sometimes were
transferred or suspended for their actions, no officer has been
convicted and very few have been arrested. In Karachi there were signs
of progress in redressing police excesses; however, in general police
continued to commit serious abuses with impunity. Prison conditions
remained extremely poor, and police arbitrarily arrested and detained
citizens. The Government used arbitrary and sometimes incommunicado
detention against leaders of the Sharif Government and their families;
several major political leaders remained in jail or in self-imposed
exile abroad at year's end. Case backlogs led to long delays in trials,
and lengthy pretrial detention is common. The judiciary is subject to
executive and other outside influences, and corruption, inefficiency,
and lack of resources remained problems. The Government took steps to
control the judiciary and to remove itself from judicial oversight. On
January 25, General Musharraf ordered all Supreme Court, Shariat court,
and provincial High Court justices to swear to uphold the post-coup
Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), which suspended the
Constitution and legislative bodies and prohibited the superior courts
from making any decision against the Chief Executive ``or any person
exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority.'' Six Supreme
Court justices, including the Chief Justice, and nine other provincial
court justices resigned in protest. The Government's anticorruption
campaign violated due process. In October 1998, the National Assembly
(NA) voted for a 15th constitutional amendment, which would have
required the Government to enforce Shari'a (Islamic law) throughout the
country. However, General Musharraf abandoned his predecessor's attempt
to enact the amendment. In April the Sindh Court found Nawaz Sharif
guilty of treason and other charges; however, the court imposed a life
sentence instead of the death penalty sought by the Musharraf
Government. The court acquitted Sharif's six codefendants. In October
the Sindh High Court upheld Nawaz Sharif's conviction. However, on
December 9, the Government commuted former Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif's prison sentence and exiled him and 18 of his family members to
Saudi Arabia for 10 years. The Government infringed on citizens'
privacy rights. The press was able to publish relatively freely;
however, several journalists practiced self-censorship, especially on
sensitive issues related to the military. There was not a systematic
harassment campaign against newspapers or commentators critical of the
Government during the year; however, the broadcast media remain a
closely controlled government monopoly. The Government restricted
freedom of assembly. During the year, the Government sporadically
permitted several large antigovernment demonstrations; however, it
prevented other protests and arrested organizers, reportedly for
security reasons. In March the Government instituted a country-wide ban
on strikes, processions, and outdoor political demonstrations. The
Government maintained some limits on freedom of association. The
Government imposed some limits on freedom of religion, particularly for
Ahmadis. The Government also imposed limits on freedom of movement.
General Musharraf spoke out against some of the human rights abuses of
the previous regime and held a conference on human rights in April;
however, the Government made minimal progress toward achieving the
goals set at the conference.
Significant numbers of women were subjected to violence, abuse,
rape, and other forms of degradation by spouses and members of society.
The Government publicly criticized the practice of ``honor killings''
but failed to take corrective steps, and such killings continued
throughout the country. There was considerable discrimination against
women, and traditional social and legal constraints kept women in a
subordinate position in society. Violence against children, as well as
child abuse, and prostitution, remained serious problems. Female
children still lag far behind boys in education, health care, and other
social indices. Governmental and societal discrimination against
religious minorities, particularly Ahmadis and Christians remains a
problem, and the Government failed to take effective measures to
counter prevalent public prejudices against religious minorities.
Religious and ethnic-based rivalries resulted in numerous killings and
civil disturbances. The Government and employers continued to restrict
worker rights significantly. Debt slavery persists, and bonded labor by
both adults and children remained a problem. The use of child labor
remained widespread, although it generally is recognized as a serious
problem, and industrial exporters have adopted a number of measures to
eliminate child labor from specific sectors. Trafficking in women and
children for the purpose of forced prostitution was a serious problem.
Mob violence and terrorist attacks remained problems; however, the
number of incidents declined slightly during the year.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed
extrajudicial killings. The extrajudicial killing of criminal suspects,
often in the form of deaths in police custody or of staged encounters
in which police shoot and kill the suspects, is common. Police
officials generally insist that these deaths occur during attempts to
escape or to resist arrest; family members and the press insist that
many of these deaths are staged. Police personnel have been known to
kill suspected criminals to prevent them from implicating police in
crimes during court proceedings. After an attempt was made on then
Prime Minister Sharif's life in January 1999, as many as 40 Sunni
Muslims associated with the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the putative instigator,
may have been killed in police encounters. The Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that there were fewer reports of
extrajudicial killings during the year than there were in the previous
year. In September a journalist reported that 19 persons died in police
encounters or as victims of torture in the first 9 months of the year.
Amnesty International (AI) estimates that at least 100 persons die from
police torture each year (see Section 1.c.). The HRCP estimated that 23
persons were killed in police custody or police encounters during the
year. Police officials insist that these deaths occurred during
attempts to escape or resist arrest. For example, in October police
killed a suspect who reportedly attempted to resist arrest; there were
no investigations of the incident during the year. In addition to
killing suspects to prevent them from implicating the police in court,
police reportedly killed suspected criminals to circumvent or overcome
insufficient evidence, witness intimidation, judicial corruption, and
sometimes political pressure. Police professionalism is low. The police
view the killings of criminal suspects as appropriate given the lack of
effective action by the judiciary against criminals. The judiciary on
the other hand, faults the police for presenting weak cases that do not
stand up in court.
According to a press report, Shaheen Akhtar, a 15-year-old rape
victim charged with adultery was kept fettered in a hospital despite
being diagnosed with advanced tuberculosis; Akhtar died in May (see
Section 1.c.).
Police officers occasionally are transferred or briefly suspended
for involvement in extrajudicial killings. However, court-ordered
inquiries into these killings have resulted in few trials and no
convictions. In February two police inspectors who were charged with
killing a member of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in custody were
denied bail after the Sindh High Court determined that they had
falsified precinct records and appeared to have committed the crime.
Punjabi police killed Tahir Prince in February 1999; after his mother
filed a writ, the Lahore High Court ordered a case registered against
two police officers, one of whom was dismissed mid-year on charges of
corruption. Tahir Prince's family then accepted financial compensation
and dropped the case against the two officers. In general police
continued to commit such killings with impunity.
The police and security forces were responsible for the deaths of a
number of individuals associated with political or terrorist groups. A
committee of inquiry was established to look into the death of Pakistan
Muslim League youth wing leader Qasim Khan, who died while in the
custody of the Peshawar police in July 1999. However, despite requests
from human rights activists, the committee did not publish its
findings, and the officer who allegedly was involved in the killing
retained his position.
The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an urban Sindh-based political
party that in the past demonstrated a willingness to use violence to
further its aims, claimed that the police specifically targeted its
adherents for extrajudicial killings. Altaf Hussain established the MQM
in 1984 to promote the rights of Mohajirs, the descendants of Urdu-
speaking Muslims who migrated from India to Pakistan following
partition in 1947. Elements of the group became involved in extortion
and other forms of racketeering, and the party split into the
MQM-Altaf--the original group headed by Altaf Hussain, a large
breakaway group (MQM-Haqiqi), and a few smaller factions. The MQM-
Altaf, in part because of its efficient organization and willingness to
use violence, became the dominant political party in Karachi and
Hyderabad, and sent several moderate and nonviolent leaders to the now
suspended Parliament and the Sindh provincial assembly. Because of its
past links, the MQM-Altaf has antagonized followers, suffered violent
breakaways, and continually been at odds with successive governments.
In a 1999 report, the MQM listed 10 persons, mostly MQM activists, that
it alleged were killed extrajudicially by Karachi police between
October 1998 and March 1999. Since the coup, reports of extrajudicial
killings of MQM activists have dropped sharply. However, on September
13, two MQM activists were killed, probably by government forces.
Politically motivated and sectarian violence continued. After the
coup, there was relative quiet until the traditionally tense Shi'a
holiday of Muharram in April, when a number of violent incidents
occurred between rival Sunni and Shi'a groups. One newspaper reported
that an estimated 300 persons had died in sectarian attacks between
late 1997 and 1999 (see Sections 2.c. and 5). Shi'a activists reported
in April that approximately 40 Shi'as have been killed since the coup.
According to government figures, 915 persons, 64 percent of them
Shi'as, have died as a result of sectarian violence since 1994. On
April 7, unknown gunmen in Karachi killed a Shi'a lawyer and the
Secretary General of Tehrek-i-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP), his son, and his
driver; the assailants may have been members of the extremist Sipah-e-
Sahaba Pakistan (SSP--see Section 5). On April 12, in the worst
incident of sectarian violence since the coup, unknown assailants
attacked a Shi'a religious congregation in Rawalpindi with grenades and
bullets, killing 19 persons and injuring 37 others. Police arrested
several Sunni Muslims following the attack. In April an unknown gunman
killed 15 Shi'a Muslims in the village of Mallow Wali. On May 11,
unknown assailants killed a leader of the SSP, which marked the first
killing of a known Sunni leader since 1998 (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
Women were killed by family members in so-called ``honor
killings.'' In March women's rights activists told a local newspaper
that the frequency of honor killings is on the rise. For example, on
June 1, a man from Yar Hussain in the northwest frontier province
(NWFP) allegedly killed his 20-year-old daughter, Mumlikat Bibi, while
she was sleeping. The father reportedly opposed his daughter's efforts
to choose a spouse without parental consent (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
There were at least two high profile killings during the year. In
January unknown assailants killed the chief justice designate of the
Baluchistan High Court; it is likely that Marri was killed as a result
of a personal vendetta. On March 10, unknown assailants killed Iqbal
Raad, one of the defense lawyers for former Prime Minister Sharif.
However, many observers believe that Raad's involvement in the Sharif
trial was not a factor in his death.
There were numerous bomb attacks during the year. On January 17, a
bomb in Karachi killed 12 persons and injured 22 persons. On January
28, two separate explosions killed 6 persons and injured 40 persons. On
February 5, a bomb exploded killing 7 persons and injuring 60 others.
No one claimed responsibility for these attacks. In March during a high
profile visit to the country by a foreign head of state, five
explosions occurred in Hyderabad, Quetta, and Karachi; two persons were
killed and four persons were injured in these explosions. On March 28,
an explosion in Torkham along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border killed at
least 7 persons and injured 27 others. In May a spate of bombings
targeting Karachi police stations killed one person. On July 7, two
explosions in the Punjab killed 3 persons and injured 11 others. On
July 16, a bomb exploded on a train to Hyderabad, killing 10 persons
and injuring 32 others. On September 3, a bomb exploded in Lahore's
central bus station, killing 2 and injuring 12 others. On September 7,
7 persons were killed and 35 injured in an explosion at the Dharampura
Bazaar in Lahore. In late September, a large explosion at an Islamabad
market killed at least 16 persons and injured 100 others. A local
magazine reported that between January and October, there were more
than 17 bomb explosions that killed dozens of persons in Quetta. No one
claimed responsibility for these attacks (see Section 1.c.).
Local newspapers reported that more than ten politically prominent
Afghans were killed during the year (see Section 2.d.). For example, in
April unknown assailants killed Arif Khan, the Taliban governor of
Konduz province. Afghans attributed some of these killings to personal
rather than political disputes. Police personnel did not arrest anyone
in connection with these killings.
There were reports that four prisoners died in a riot in a Peshawar
jail in October; however, prison authorities denied these reports (see
Section 1.c.).
Tension along the line of control between Pakistan and Indian-held
Kashmir was high during the year, and there was shelling in several
sectors. A senior army official in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir
estimated that approximately 143 civilians were killed on the Pakistani
side of the line of control.
b. Disappearance.--There were credible reports of politically
motivated disappearances. For example, retired Major General Anwar Sher
and an Afghan aide, Abdul Qaher Shariati, disappeared in July; they
were active in organizing Afghans to pursue a peace process. There has
been no police investigation into the disappearances. In the intra-
Mohajir violence in Karachi, victims sometimes first are held and
tortured by opposing groups (or, as the MQM-Altaf alleges, by security
forces). Bodies of these victims, often mutilated, generally are dumped
in the street soon after the victims are abducted; however, the
incidence of such crimes decreased greatly during the year.
In July a woman in Baluchistan was abducted by members of her tribe
after a tribal jirga (council) forced the woman to annul her marriage
(see Section 5).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The suspended Constitution and the Penal Code expressly
forbid torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment;
however, police regularly torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons.
Police routinely use force to elicit confessions; however, there were
fewer such reports and greater police cooperation in investigating such
reports during the year. Human rights observers suggest that, because
of widespread torture by the police, suspects usually confess to crimes
regardless of their actual culpability; the courts subsequently throw
out many such confessions. AI estimates that at least 100 persons die
from police torture each year (see Section 1.a.). According to a 1999
Human Rights Watch report, children in detention also are subjected to
torture and mistreatment (see Section 5).
Common torture methods include: beating; burning with cigarettes;
whipping the soles of the feet; sexual assault; prolonged isolation;
electric shock; denial of food or sleep; hanging upside down; forced
spreading of the legs with bar fetters; and public humiliation. Some
magistrates help cover up the abuse by issuing investigation reports
stating that the victims died of natural causes.
Police personnel continued to torture persons in custody throughout
the country. In June a local newspaper reported that prisoners waiting
to appear in court routinely are held in fetters in police vans, even
on extremely hot days. In 1999 70 prisoners awaiting or undergoing
trial at Karachi prison, all MQM members, charged that they had been
arrested illegally and tortured to induce confessions. According to MQM
officials, police arrested over 700 MQM members during the past 2 years
(see Section 1.d.); many of these persons reportedly were tortured in
custody. In November 1999, Rana Sanaullah Khan, a PML member of the
suspended Punjab provincial assembly, was arrested for criticizing the
Musharraf Government; he reportedly was tortured in custody.
In March a judge sentenced two prisoners convicted of murdering
almost 100 children to be executed by having their bodies cut into 100
and 98 pieces, respectively, and then having the pieces dissolved in
acid. Legal experts criticized the judgment, and the case was under
appeal at year's end.
Despite some cases during the year in which police officers were
investigated or charged in connection with abuse of detainees, the
failure of successive governments to prosecute and to punish abusers
effectively is the single greatest obstacle to ending or reducing the
incidence of abuse by the police. The authorities sometimes
transferred, suspended, or arrested offending officers, but seldom
prosecuted or punished them. Investigating officers generally shield
their colleagues. However, in February Deputy Inspector General Fayyaz
Ahmed Leghari stated that in 1999 Sindh police penalized 28,000
officers for malfeasance, and discharged or compulsorily retired 1,100
out of a total provincial force of 85,000. In February two police
inspectors charged with killing an MQM activist in custody in 1998 were
denied bail after the Sindh High Court determined that they falsified
precinct records and appeared to have committed the crime (see Section
1.a.).
The 1997 Anti-terrorist Act allowed confessions obtained in police
custody to be used in new ``special courts.'' Human rights
organizations and the press criticized this provision of the law
because police torture of suspects is common. Police generally did not
attempt to use confessions to secure convictions under this law and the
Government agreed to amend the law after the Supreme Court in 1998
invalidated this and other sections of the Anti-terrorist Act. Due to
greater scrutiny by NGO's and the media, including prison inspections
in the Punjab and Sindh, the incidence of torture and abuse in prisons
may be decreasing. In Karachi the Citizens Police Liaison Committee
(CPLC) brought cases against police who make false arrests, practice
torture, or take bribes. Cooperation between the CPLC and the police
human rights complaint cell resulted in the dismissal of 216 policemen
and the demotion or fines for 1,226 others between November 1998 and
July 1999.
Police corruption is widespread. Police and prison officials
frequently use the threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and
their families. Police accept money for registering cases on false
charges and may torture innocent citizens. Persons pay police to
humiliate their opponents and to avenge their personal grievances.
During the year, the Government took some steps to reduce police
corruption and transferred several senior police officers to other
provinces to circumvent their local ties. The Government also deployed
army officers to police stations.
In the past, successive governments recruited police officers in
violation of considerations of merit and the department's regulations.
In some instances, recruits had criminal records Police corruption is
most serious at the level of the Station House Officer (SHO), the
official who runs each precinct. In 1998 300 new SHO's recruited on
merit began a long-delayed special training course; the new SHO's have
been hired and observers believe that they might improve police
performance greatly. Some SHO's widely are believed to operate arrest-
for-ransom operations, and establish unsanctioned police stations to
collect illicit revenue. An August news report listed seven such
stations in Karachi. SHO's are powerful; some are believed to have
killed superior officers who tried to inhibit their corruption. Senior
government officials have confirmed that police stations, and
assignments therein, are sold to interested parties who then proceed to
recoup their investment though illicit activities.
Actions taken to redress police abuses often have mixed results. In
urban Sindh, the CPLC committees helped to curb some excesses, but
complaints of large-scale police abuse persist.
Special women's police stations were established in 1994 in
response to growing numbers of complaints of custodial abuse of women,
including rape. These stations are staffed by female personnel, but
receive even fewer material and human resources than regular police
stations. For example, at the beginning of the year, the Karachi
women's police station was housed in an unsafe building that had no
bathing facilities and only one toilet for staff and inmates to share.
Alerted to these conditions, Sindh Inspector General of Police Aftab
Nabi moved the station to improved quarters and began a fundraising
drive for a permanent facility. According to the government's own
Commission of Inquiry for Women, the stations do not function
independently or fulfill their purpose. Despite court orders and
regulations that only female officers may interrogate female suspects,
women continued to be detained overnight at regular police stations and
abused by male officers. Based on Lahore newspaper reports from January
to May 1999, the HRCP found 11 cases of violence, rape, or torture of
women in police custody. In 1998 ``Nasreen'' accused the SHO of
Lahore's Mozang police station of raping her after she visited the
station to register a complaint against her in-laws. At the end of
1998, the case was under internal investigation by Lahore police;
however, during the year, ``Nasreen'' and her family withdrew the case
without stating a reason. Instances of abuse of women in prisons are
less frequent than in police stations. Sexual abuse of child detainees
by police or guards reportedly also is a problem.
The Hudood Ordinances, promulgated by the central martial law
government in 1979, aimed to make the Penal Code more Islamic. These
ordinances provide for harsh punishments for violations of Shari'a
(Islamic law), including death by stoning for unlawful sexual relations
and amputation for other crimes (see Section 1.c.). These so-called
Hadd punishments require a high standard of evidence. In effect, four
adult Muslim men of good character must witness an act for a Hadd
punishment to apply. In 20 years, not a single Hadd punishment has been
carried out. However, on the basis of lesser evidence, ordinary
punishments such as jail terms or fines are imposed. From 1979 to 1995,
over 1 million Hudood cases were filed, and 300,000 were heard by the
courts. More recent statistics are unavailable. The laws are applied to
Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Women frequently are charged under the Hudood laws for sexual
misconduct, such as adultery. In 1998 about one-third of the women in
jails in Lahore, Peshawar, and Mardan were awaiting trial for adultery;
that percentage likely remains accurate. Most women tried under the
ordinance are acquitted, but the stigma of an adultery charge alone is
severe. A Hudood law meant to deter false accusations is enforced
weakly, and one human rights monitor claimed that 80 percent of
adultery-related Hudood cases are filed without supporting evidence.
Men accused of rape sometimes are acquitted and released while their
victims are held for adultery or fornication. The Commission of Inquiry
for Women recommended that the Hudood laws be repealed as they are
based on an erroneous interpretation of Shari'a (see Section 5).
The Federal Crimes Regulation (FCR), which applies in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), permits the punishment of relatives,
friends, and neighbors of suspects. Authorities are empowered to
blockade villages or to detain tribal kinsmen to obtain the surrender
of a fugitive (see Sections 1.e. and 1.f.).
Police routinely use excessive force against demonstrators or
strikers. On June 3, in Rawalpindi police that were armed with batons
attacked 200 small business owners during a demonstration, injuring a
number of persons. On June 9, police personnel used force to disperse a
group of protesters, injuring 4 persons. Police accused the protesters
of throwing stones and bricks at them, but some eyewitnesses alleged
that the police fired without provocation. On June 29, police used
batons and deployed tear gas during a rally of small and medium
businessmen. In all three incidents, the protesters were challenging
government plans to collect sales taxes (see Section 2.b.).
Police at times also beat journalists (see Section 2.a.). For
example, in August government agents allegedly beat journalist Mazhar
Tufail.
Police failed in some instances to protect members of religious
minorities--particularly Ahmadis and Christians--from societal attacks
(see Section 5).
A number of bomb attacks killed and injured many persons during the
year (see Section 1.a.). No one claimed responsibility for these
attacks.
Prison conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding is widespread.
According to the HRCP, there are 80,000 prisoners in jails that were
built to hold a maximum of 35,833 persons. In 1999 a journalist for the
Nation newspaper visited Adiala jail in Rawalpindi and reported that
the prison holds 4,277 prisoners but was built for 2,000. According to
a February press report, Sindh provincial officials claimed that the 16
jails of Sindh province, with a total capacity of 7,759 prisoners,
actually housed over 14,000. Karachi central prison is the most
overcrowded, with a population of 4,087 prisoners in a space designed
for only 991; only 2 toilets are available per every 100 prisoners and
the daily food budget in the lowest class of cells equals about $.020
per prisoner. The HRCP claimed that the Lahore district jail, built to
house 1,045 prisoners, contains 3,200. In July 1999, the Punjab Home
Department admitted before the Lahore High Court that over 50,000
prisoners were held in Punjabi jails meant for 17,271. In the NWFP 21
prisons with a total capacity of 7,397 prisoners house 10,194 persons,
including 485 children. Some 80 percent of prisoners are awaiting
trial, mostly for petty offenses.
Prisoners routinely are shackled. The principal of the institute
for jail staff training in Lahore stated in a July 1999 press interview
that fettering is the most convenient way to administer an overcrowded
jail. While the Pakistan Prison Act of 1894 permits fettering for a
variety of offenses, the punishment usually is given for administrative
convenience, or to extract bribes from prisoners. The shackles used are
tight, heavy, and painful, and reportedly have led to gangrene and
amputation in several cases. According to a press report, Shaheen
Akhtar, a 15-year-old rape victim charged with adultery under the
Hudood Ordinances, was kept fettered in a hospital despite being
diagnosed with advanced tuberculosis; Akhtar died in May (see Section
1.c.). Although the Sindh High Court ruled fettering illegal in 1993,
the practice continues, and visitors to Sindhi jails regularly see
fettered prisoners. On April 21, General Musharraf condemned fettering
as a ``tool of indignity.'' Following a Lahore High Court ruling in
June, prison wardens in Lahore were ordered to remove fetters; however
police personnel and prison administrators have resisted (see Section
4).
There are three classes (A, B, and C) of prison facilities. Class
``C'' cells generally hold common criminals and those in pretrial
detention. Such cells often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor
food. Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer the most abuse,
including beatings and forced kneeling for long periods of time. In
1998 the Senate's Committee on Human Rights reported that at one
facility in Hyderabad, 60 prisoners were confined to a space 100 feet
by 30 feet with only 1 latrine. Such unsanitary conditions are common
in small, poorly ventilated, and decrepit colonial-era prisons.
Inadequate food, often consisting of only a few pieces of bread, led to
chronic malnutrition for those unable to supplement their diet with
help from family or friends. Access to medical care is a problem.
Mentally ill prisoners normally lack adequate care and are not
segregated from the general prison population (see Section 5). Foreign
prisoners, mostly citizens of African countries with minimal diplomatic
representation, often remain in prison long after their sentences are
completed because there is no one to pay for their deportation to their
home country. Conditions in ``A'' and ``B'' cells are markedly better;
prisoners in these cells are permitted to have servants, special food,
and televisions. Authorities reserve ``A'' cells for prominent persons,
including political leaders. Especially prominent individuals--
including some political figures--sometimes are held under house arrest
and permitted to receive visitors.
In September prisoners in Hyderabad prison rioted to protest poor
prison conditions. On September 25, police used force to quell a large
prison riot; no casualty figures were reported. Prisoners also held
riots over prison conditions in Peshawar in October and in Dera Islami
Khan in December. There were reports that four prisoners died in the
Peshawar jail riot; however, prison authorities denied the reports.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors (see
Section 1.d.). Landlords in Sindh and political factions in Karachi
operated private jails (see Section 1.d.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law regulates arrest
and detention procedures; however, the authorities do not always comply
with the law and police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The
law permits the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local district to order
detention without charge for 30 days of persons suspected of
threatening public order and safety. The DC may renew detention in 30-
day increments, up to a total of 90 days. Human rights monitors report
instances in which prisoners jailed under the Maintenance of Public
Order Act have been imprisoned for up to 6 months without charge. For
other criminal offenses, police may hold a suspect for 24 hours without
charge. After the prisoner appears before a magistrate, the court can
grant permission for continued detention for a maximum period of 14
days if the police provide material proof that this is necessary for an
investigation. The Musharraf regime created the National Accountability
Bureau (NAB) and special accountability courts to try corruption cases;
the National Accountability Ordinance allows those suspected of corrupt
practices to be detained for 90 days without charge (see Section 1.e.).
Police may arrest individuals on the basis of a First Incident
Report (FIR) filed by a complainant, and have been known to file FIR's
without supporting evidence. FIR's frequently are used to harass or
intimidate individuals. Charges against an individual also may be based
on a ``blind'' FIR, which lists the perpetrators as ``person or persons
unknown.'' If the case is not solved, the FIR is placed in the inactive
file. When needed, a FIR is reactivated and taken to a magistrate by
the police; the police then name a suspect and ask that the suspect be
remanded for 14 days while they investigate further. After 14 days, the
case is dropped for lack of evidence, but then another FIR is activated
and brought against the accused. In this manner, rolling charges can be
used to hold a suspect in custody continuously.
If the police can provide material proof that detention (physical
remand or police custody for the purpose of interrogation) is necessary
for an investigation, a court may extend detention for a total of 14
days. However, such proof may be little more than unsubstantiated
assertions by the police. In practice the authorities do not fully
observe the limits on detention. Police are not required to notify
anyone when an arrest is made and often hold detainees without charge
until a court challenges them. The police sometimes detain individuals
arbitrarily without charge or on false charges to extort payment for
their release. In Karachi small squads of police stopped taxis and
delivery trucks for bribes. Human rights monitors report that a number
of police stations have secret detention cells in which individuals are
kept while police bargain for their release. There also are reports
that the police move prisoners from one police station to another if
they suspect a surprise visit by higher authorities. Some women
continued to be detained arbitrarily and sexually abused (see Sections
1.c. and 5). Police also detained relatives of wanted criminals in
order to compel suspects to surrender (see Section 1.f.). Police
personnel also have been known to detain persons as a result of
personal vendettas. Following an August house robbery in a Christian
neighborhood in Islamabad, police reportedly arrested residents of the
neighborhood and extorted bribes from them in exchange for their
release.
The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within
30 days of their arrest. However, in many cases, trials do not start
until 6 months after the filing of charges. In 1998 the HRCP estimated
that there were almost as many individuals awaiting trial in jails as
there were prisoners. According to the chief justice of the Lahore High
Court, there were over 500,000 civil and criminal cases backlogged in
the province's subordinate court system as of April 1999. In 1999 in 62
Lahore city courts, 7,000 prisoners were awaiting trial in 6,000 cases;
in 3,500 of these cases, the police have not even brought a
``challan,'' or indictment, to the court. Sindh Government officials
reported in February that 11,945 of the 14,219 prisoners in Sindh jails
are awaiting trial. In 1997 the Government justified the creation of
Anti-terrorist courts by citing the large number of murder and other
cases that are clogging the regular court system (see Section 1.e.).
The anti-terrorist courts reportedly sentenced 32 persons to death and
15 persons to life imprisonment during the year. Double jeopardy
applies to those convicted of possessing narcotics because of a 1990
federal Shariat court ruling that customs and narcotics cases be
initiated separately. A February ruling by the Lahore High Court
forbidding a second trial was ignored by an April sessions court
decision in Lahore, which sent the accused back to prison for the
second time on the same narcotics conviction.
Asif Zardari, husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, has
waited for over 3 years for the start of his trial on charges of
killing his brother-in-law, Murtaza Bhutto. Charges were first filed
against Zardari in 1997 and transferred successively to two courts,
where several judges refused to preside. By year's end, only 2 of 223
witnesses have been heard. In April 1999, Zardari was tried and
convicted separately on corruption charges.
The Government permits visits by human rights monitors, family
members, and lawyers (see Section 1.c.). However, in some cases,
authorities refuse family visits and, in some police stations, persons
are expected to pay bribes to see a prisoner. The Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have a separate legal system, the
Frontier Crimes Regulation, which recognizes the doctrine of collective
responsibility. Authorities are empowered to detain fellow members of a
fugitive's tribe, or to blockade the fugitive's village, pending his
surrender or punishment by his own tribe in accordance with local
tradition. The Government continued to exercise such authority during
the year. In March two persons from Mullah Said village were arrested
under the Frontier Crimes Regulation following a shooting incident in
which some persons from this village fired on residents of the
neighboring Badan village (see Section 1.f.).
The Government sometimes uses mass arrests to quell protests or
civil unrest. In 1999 police personnel arrested hundreds of persons,
including two prominent members of the SSP, Maulana Muhammad Azam Tariq
and Maulana Mohammad Ahmad Ludhianvi, following a wave of sectarian
violence in Punjab and Sindh. Tariq and Ludhianvi were released during
the year; however, Ludhianvi was killed in May by unknown assailants
and Azam Tariq has taken refuge in Afghanistan (see Sections 1.a. and
5). Police arrested small businessmen during strikes in May and June;
however, all of the demonstrators were released shortly after their
arrests. On May 11, police arrested about 300 Muslim clerics and
students in Lahore during protests against Musharraf's proposed changes
to the blasphemy laws (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.). In September Lahore
police arrested more than 500 activists of the Pakistan People's Party
(PPP) for shouting slogans against the Musharraf regime and the army.
During the year, police arrested hundreds of opposition party members
in order to prevent planned demonstrations from occurring (see Section
2.b.).
The Government detained several high-profile businessmen in
connection with General Musharraf's anticorruption campaign. In March
police detained a leading Afghan rug merchant; the merchant was
released after 2 months. On May 8, armed gunmen seized Amin Lakhani, a
leading Karachi businessman. Several days later, the NAB admitted that
it authorized Lakhani's seizure. Lakhani was held without charge for
several weeks and questioned about his financial affairs. His brother,
Sultan Lakhani, also was seized on May 8 and remained in detention
without charge at year's end.
On a number of occasions, police arrested persons prior to
demonstrations under the Criminal Procedures Code ban (see Section
2.b.).
Police personnel arrested about 150 journalists during a peaceful
protest in April. In August police personnel arrested four journalists
who reportedly criticized the police; the journalists were released
after 4 days (see Section 2.a.).
In past years, persons occasionally were detained arbitrarily
because of disputes with powerful or well-connected persons; however,
there were no reports that this occurred during the year.
The Musharraf Government detained without warrants and without
charges several dozen political figures, military officers, government
administrators, and Sharif family members following the 1999 coup.
Nawaz Sharif and members of his family, including Punjab chief minister
Shahbaz Sharif; most of the Cabinet; several senior advisors to the
Prime Minister or to the Government; and a number of military and
police officials were arrested or placed under house arrest immediately
following the coup. On several occasions during the year, police
officials prevented Nawaz Sharif's wife, Kulsoom Nawaz, from speaking
at public meetings. Many of the officials who were arrested following
the coup were held incommunicado. Nawaz Sharif was held incommunicado
from the time of his arrest until he was brought to court more than 1
month later. Most others were released within a few days. In December
the Government released from detention former Minister of Information
Mushahid Hussain who had been held under house arrest since the October
coup. As of year's end, approximately 30 politicians and their
relatives remained in custody.
Several key figures among those initially arrested without charge,
including Nawaz Sharif, were held in connection with the ``hijacking''
on October 12, 1999 of the civilian airliner carrying General Musharraf
back from a conference in Sri Lanka; former Prime Minister Sharif
reportedly denied permission for the plane to land in Karachi. Along
with Sharif's summary replacement of General Musharraf with the
Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, this
event led to the 1999 coup. In the weeks following Sharif's arrest, he
was detained without charge and denied access to counsel and family
members (see Section 1.e.). A First Incident Report was filed on
November 10, 1999, which charged Sharif with attempted murder,
hijacking, and criminal conspiracy. Former Sharif advisor Ghous Ali
Shah, former Pakistan International Airlines chairman Shahid Khaqan
Abbasi, former Director of Civil Aviation Aminullah Chaudhary, and
former Inspector General of Police Rana Maqbool were charged along with
Sharif. The accused were to be tried before an Anti-terrorist court. On
November 26, 1999, three other individuals--former Punjab chief
minister Shahbaz Sharif, former senator Saifur Rehman, and former
secretary to the Prime Minister Saeed Mehdi--were named codefendants in
the case. Following changes in the Anti-terrorist Act, the formal
filing of charges against Nawaz Sharif occurred on December 8, 1999.
Sharif was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in April. His
six codefendants were acquitted; however, they were still in custody at
year's end on a maintenance of public order charge'' (see Section
1.e.).
Private jails exist in tribal and feudal areas.
Hundreds of MQM activists and legislators (including former Sindh
Minister of Labor Shoaib Bokhari) were arrested in 1998 and remained in
custody at year's end; some of these activists are being held without
charge. According to MQM officials, police arrested over 700 MQM
officials during the past 2 years (see Section 1.c.).
Many persons apprehended by the National Accountability Bureau (see
Section 1.e.) remained in detention past the ordinance's stipulated 90
days detention without charge (see Section 1.d.). Siddiq ul-Farooq, a
former press secretary to Nawaz Sharif, was arrested under the NAB in
October 1999 and held without charge until May; at year's end, he was
in detention pending commencement of the proceedings in his case. On
April 4, Mian Manzoor Watoo, the former Punjab Chief Minister and head
of his own PML faction, became the first senior politician to receive a
jail term in a corruption case. In late 1999, MQM leader and former
mayor of Karachi Dr. Farooq Sattar was arrested by order of the NAB,
removed from his domicile, and held in a cell without a bed, chair, or
desk. On July 14, Sattar was convicted on a widely disputed corruption
charge. In July Nawaz Sharif was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment
and banned from holding political office for 21 years on the basis of a
corruption conviction. Most observers reported that Sharif's trial was
fair; however, they believe the Government's decision to pursue the
corruption case was politically motivated.
During the year, authorities released from prison thousands of
persons convicted of petty crimes who were being held despite the fact
that their prison terms had expired. For example, in January
authorities released 12,000 prisoners who were convicted of petty
crimes. In an October news report, a senior official in the Ministry of
Interior stated that 47,000 persons who were jailed for minor offenses
were released during the year. The Punjab Department of Jails
reportedly released 15,000 prisoners who were convicted of petty crimes
during the year.
Human rights groups alleged that as many as 50 private jails,
housing some 4,500 bonded laborers were being maintained by landlords
in lower Sindh (see Section 6.c.). Some prisoners reportedly have been
held for many years. In the five districts of upper Sindh, landlords
have defied the courts and police by holding tribal jirgas, which
settle feuds, award fines, and even sentence persons to the death
penalty in defiance of provincial laws. In January a newspaper reported
that 56 landless agricultural workers escaped from a private jail in
Sanghar district, Sindh. The landlord reportedly had forced them to
work without wages for several years. In February 42 bonded laborers
escaped from a private jail in Umerkot district, Sindh. Under pressure
from the landowner, seven of the laborers signed affidavits that they
had not been confined against their will. On March 8, the Lahore High
Court ordered the release of 24 brick kiln workers, including 10 women
or children. According to press accounts, the laborers were kept in
chains, not compensated for their work, and were beaten frequently.
On December 9, the Government commuted former Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif's prison sentence and exiled him and 18 of his family members to
Saudi Arabia for 10 years. The Sharif family was forced to surrender a
number of assets to the Government and had to agree to withdraw from
politics while in exile. Some observers stated that the Government
exiled Sharif in order to remove him from politics and to reduce the
power and influence of the opposition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The suspended Constitution
provided for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, the
judiciary remains subject to executive branch influence, and despite
the Musharraf regime's pledge to respect the independence of the
judicial system, it took steps to control the judiciary and to remove
the regime from judicial oversight. Provisional Constitution Order
Number 1, issued on October 14, 1999, provided that all courts
functioning at the time of the change in government would continue to
operate, but that no court would have the power to issue orders against
General Musharraf or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction under
his authority. The decree effectively removed the actions of the
Musharraf regime from judicial oversight. General Musharraf further
undermined the independence of the judiciary when he ordered that all
Supreme Court, Shar'ia Court, and Provincial High Court justices take
an oath to uphold the PCO that brought the military into power. Low
salaries, inadequate resources, heavy workloads, and corruption
contributed to judicial inefficiency, particularly in the lower courts.
On January 25, 4 days before the Supreme Court was due to begin
hearings on the legitimacy of the coup, General Musharraf ordered all
Supreme Court, Shariat court, and provincial High Court justices to
take an oath committing themselves to uphold the PCO, which suspended
the Constitution and legislative bodies and prohibited the superior
courts from making any decision against the Chief Executive ``or any
person exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority.'' Six
Supreme Court justices, including the Chief Justice, and nine
provincial High Court justices resigned in protest; however, 85 percent
of the affected justices agreed to swear allegiance to the PCO. As a
result of this decree, government directives and ordinances under the
PCO are no longer subject to judicial review. Some government officials
claimed that General Musharraf issued this decree due to concerns that
judges were being bribed to rule against the Government in the court
challenges to the military takeover. Many persons criticized this
requirement, stating that it effectively ended the role of the
judiciary as an independent body.
The Supreme Court at times demonstrated a limited degree of
independence. For example, on May 12, in a unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court upheld the legality of the coup on the grounds of state
necessity; however, the court ordered the current Government to hold
national elections no later than 90 days after October 12, 2002. The
decision also affirmed the Supreme Court's continued right of judicial
rule, ruled that it was legal for the Musharraf Government to amend the
Constitution as long as the amendments do not change the basic
character of the Constitution, and reserved the right to review the
military's performance and the continued necessity of the Emergency
Proclamation and the PCO. Many observers criticized the Supreme Court
decision as vague and contradictory.
The judicial system involves several court systems with overlapping
and sometimes competing jurisdictions. There are civil and criminal
systems with special courts for banking, antinarcotics, and anti-
terrorist cases, as well as the federal Shariat court for certain
Hudood offenses. The appeals process in the civil system is: Civil
court, district court, High Court, and the Supreme Court. In the
criminal system, the progression is magistrate, sessions court, High
Court, and the Supreme Court.
The judiciary has argued that it has failed to try and convict
terrorist suspects in a timely manner because of poor police casework,
prosecutorial negligence, and the resulting lack of evidence. In
response to this problem, the Sharif Government passed the Anti-
terrorist Act in 1997; special anti-terrorist courts began operation in
August 1997. The anti-terrorist courts, designed for the speedy
punishment of terrorist suspects, have special streamlined procedures;
however, due to the continued intimidation of witnesses, police, and
judges, the courts produced only a handful of convictions in 1998.
Under the act, terrorist killings are punishable by death and any act,
including speech, intended to stir up religious hatred, is punishable
by up to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. Cases are to be decided within
7 working days, but judges are free to extend the period of time as
required. Trials in absentia were permitted, but then subsequently
prohibited in October 1998. Appeals to an appellate tribunal also were
required to take no more than 7 days, but appellate authority since has
been restored to the High and Supreme Courts, under which these time
limits do not apply. Under the Anti-terrorist Act, bail is not to be
granted if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
is guilty.
Leading members of the judiciary, human rights groups, the press,
and politicians from a number of parties expressed strong reservations
about the anti-terrorist courts, charging that they constitute a
parallel judicial system and could be used as tools of political
repression. Government officials and police believed that the deterrent
effect of the act's death penalty provisions contributed to the
reduction in sectarian violence after its passage. The anti-terrorist
courts also are empowered to try persons accused of particularly
``heinous'' crimes, such as gang rape and child killings, and several
persons have been tried, convicted, and executed under these
provisions. In 1997 cases filed under Section 295 (a) of the Penal Code
(one of the so-called blasphemy laws--see Section 2.c.) were
transferred to the anti-terrorist courts. Human rights advocates feared
that if blasphemy cases were tried in the anti-terrorist courts,
alleged blasphemers, who in the past normally were granted bail or
released for lack of evidence were likely to be convicted, given the
less stringent rules of evidence required under the Anti-terrorist Act.
In November 1998, Nawaz Sharif announced the establishment of
military courts in Karachi, which had been under Governor's Rule since
October 1998. These courts were to try cases involving heinous acts and
terrorism, which the Government stated were a serious challenge to
public authority that the existing court system was inadequate to
address. They were intended to bring swifter justice to the city, which
had been plagued by terrorism, violence, and a general breakdown in law
and order. Military courts began operation in December 1998. In January
1999, the Supreme Court ruled in an interim decision that military
trial courts could not impose the death penalty. On February 17, 1999,
the Supreme Court ruled that the military courts were unconstitutional
and ordered the establishment of additional anti-terrorist courts;
however, it allowed sentences already handed down by the military
courts to stand. The anti-terrorist courts were to operate under the
supervision of two Supreme Court justices, and courts of first instance
and appellate courts were to render decisions within 7 days; in
practice, this did not occur. Consequently in April 1999, the Sharif
Government promulgated an ordinance transferring cases from military
trial courts to anti-terrorist courts and expanded the jurisdiction to
cover the same types of offenses as the military courts, including
murder, gang rape, and child molestation. An April 1999 ordinance made
strikes and go-slows illegal as ``civil commotion'' offenses; both are
punishable by incarceration and fines (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). In
December 1999, the Musharraf Government again modified the Anti-
terrorist Act by adding a number of additional offenses, including acts
to outrage religious feelings; efforts to ``wage war against the
state''; conspiracy; acts committed in abetting an offense; and
kidnaping or abduction to confine a person. By ordinance the Musharraf
regime created a special anti-terrorist court in Sindh presided over by
a High Court justice rather than a lower level judge, as is usually the
case. The amended provision permits the High Court justice to
``transfer . . . any case pending before any other special court . . .
and try the case'' in his court. Supporters of Nawaz Sharif maintained
that these changes were designed to help the Musharraf regime prosecute
Sharif.
The trial of Nawaz Sharif and six codefendants on charges of
hijacking was the most widely publicized case tried by an Anti-
terrorist court during the year. On April 6, Sharif was found guilty of
hijacking and terrorism and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment
(to be served consecutively), an unspecified fine, 5 years' rigorous
imprisonment in lieu of non-payment of the fine, forfeiture of all
property, and a fine to compensate the 198 passengers and crew of the
flight. Judge Jaffrey ruled that there was insufficient evidence to
arraign Sharif on four offenses related to ``waging war against the
state'' and criminal conspiracy; the charges were dropped. The six
codefendants were found not guilty; however, they were still in custody
at year's end on a ``maintenance of public order charge.''
Diplomatic observers who attended the Sharif trial concluded that
the trial generally was fair, open, and transparent. The defendants
were given free choice of and ready access to counsel. Diplomats and
the media were granted free daily trial access and newspapers
frequently reported on defense attorneys' criticism of General
Musharraf and the army. In February the prosecution asked the judge to
restrict media coverage of court statements by the accused. Judge
Jaffrey rejected the prosecution's petition; however, the court
reserved the right to prevent publication of sensitive national
security data. Nawaz Sharif and his defense counsel expressed ``full
confidence'' in the court. The prosecution appealed the codefendants'
acquittals and Sharif's life sentences, arguing for the death penalty,
and the defense appealed Sharif's conviction in the Sindh High Court in
a trial that courtroom observers considered free and fair. On October
30, the appeals court upheld Nawaz Sharif's convictions for hijacking
and terrorism but combined them into one offense. The court also denied
the prosecution appeal to upgrade Nawaz's sentence to the death
penalty, reduced the amount of property forfeiture, and affirmed the
antiterrorism court's acquittals of the six codefendants.
By ordinance, the Musharraf regime created the National
Accountability Bureau and special accountability courts to try
corruption cases. The NAB was created in part to deal with as much as
$4 billion (approximately PRs 208 billion) that is estimated to be owed
to the country's banks (all of which are state-owned) by debtors,
mainly from among the wealthy elite. The Musharraf Government stated
that it would not target genuine business failures or small defaulters
and does not appear to have done so. The NAB was given broad powers to
prosecute such cases, and the accountability courts were expected to
try cases within 30 days. The ordinance prohibits courts from granting
bail and gives the NAB chairman sole power to decide if and when to
release detainees. The ordinance also allows those suspected by the
State Bank of Pakistan of defaulting on government loans or of corrupt
practices to be detained for 90 days without charge and, prior to being
charged, does not allow access to counsel. During the year, many
persons that were apprehended under the NAB ordinance remained in
detention without charge for longer than 90 days (see Section 1.d.). In
accountability cases, there is a presumption of guilt, and conviction
under the ordinance can result in 14 years' imprisonment; fines; and
confiscation of property. Those convicted also are disqualified from
running for office or holding office for 21 years. On August 11, the
Government announced that persons with a court conviction would be
barred from holding party office.
The Musharraf regime denied press reports that it had decided not
to pursue accountability cases against active members of the military
or the judiciary; however, no serving members of the military or the
judiciary have been charged by the NAB. In June the Government
announced that NAB had arrested 132 persons to date; 82 persons were in
detention, 53 were held in judicial lockups, and 29 were in the
bureau's custody. A published list of persons charged with corruption
by the NAB included former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir
Bhutto. On November 19, 1999, MQM leader and former mayor of Karachi
Dr. Farooq Sattar was arrested on a corruption charge by the NAB. He
was held for more than three months in prison without access to counsel
and was transferred from Karachi to Attock Fort, a high-security army
facility in NWFP in February. Sattar was convicted on July 14 and
sentenced to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment, a $1 million (PRs 50
million) fine, and 21 years of political disqualification. Sattar's
lawyers complained about violations of due process and the remote venue
of the trial.
The civil judicial system provides for an open trial, the
presumption of innocence, cross-examination by an attorney, and appeal
of sentences. Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in capital
cases. There are no jury trials. Due to the limited number of judges,
the heavy backlog of cases, and lengthy court procedures, cases
routinely take years, and defendants must make frequent court
appearances. Cases start over when an attorney changes. Under both the
Hudood and standard criminal codes, there are bailable and nonbailable
offenses. According to the Criminal Procedures Code, the accused in
bailable offenses must be granted bail, and those charged with
nonbailable offenses should be granted bail if the alleged crime
carries a sentence of less than 10 years. Many accused, especially
well-connected persons who are made aware of impending warrants against
them, are able to obtain pre-arrest bail, and are thus spared arrest
and incarceration.
The federal Shariat court and the Shari'a bench of the Supreme
Court serve as appellate courts for certain convictions in criminal
court under the Hudood ordinances. The federal Shariat court also may
overturn any legislation judged to be inconsistent with the tenets of
Islam. However, these cases may be appealed to the Shari'a bench of the
Supreme Court. In two areas of the NWFP--Malakand and Kohistan--Shari'a
law was instituted in 1999 by regulation and by ordinance,
respectively. On September 20, 1999, the NWFP assembly passed a bill
that incorporated the Kohistan ordinance into law (see Section 2.c.).
In May the governor of the NWFP reportedly affirmed to the media his
plan to implement Shari'a law in Malakand division.
The judicial process continued to be impeded by bureaucratic
infighting, inactivity, and the overlapping jurisdictions of the
different court systems. Heavy backlogs that severely delayed the
application of justice remained, due to scores of unfilled judgeships
and to archaic and inefficient court procedures. The politicized
appointment process holds up the promotion of many lower court judges
to the High Courts. Although the higher level judiciary is considered
competent and generally honest, there are widespread reports of
corruption among lower level magistrates and minor court functionaries.
Persons in jail awaiting trial sometimes are held for periods
longer than the sentence that they would receive if convicted. Court
officials report that each judge reviews between 70 and 80 cases per
day, but that action is taken on only 3 or 4 each week. At the end of
1997, 80,000 criminal cases were reportedly pending in Sindh, 67,800 of
which were in Karachi. The Law Ministry, in reply to a question in the
National Assembly in 1997, reported that there were over 150,000 cases
pending with the superior judiciary, which includes the Supreme Court
and the four provincial High Courts. During the year, there were
approximately 125,000 cases pending. Clogged lower courts exacerbate
the situation; the majority of cases in the High Courts consist of
appeals of lower court rulings. Once an appeal reaches the High Court,
there are further opportunities for delay because decisions of
individual judges frequently are referred to panels composed of two or
three judges. There continued to be charges that magistrates and
police, under pressure to achieve high conviction rates, persuade
detainees to plead guilty without informing them of the consequences.
Politically powerful persons also attempt to influence magistrates in
their decision-making, sometimes threatening to transfer magistrates to
other assignments.
In July 1999, press reports noted that hundreds of prisoners
remained in the Karachi central prison after the completion of their
sentences. The Sindh Home Department stated that at least 10 percent of
prisoners awaiting trial in Karachi central prison had no access to
free legal aid or the possibility of bail, even if qualified. Reporters
interviewing male prisoners in one block discovered that 16 percent of
them were not represented by attorneys. As of March 1999, 6,000 cases
awaited trial in 62 Lahore courts, with 7,000 prisoners awaiting a
court date. In 3,500 of these cases, the police have not yet submitted
a ``challan,'' or indictment.
The Penal Code incorporates the doctrines of Qisas (roughly, an eye
for an eye) and Diyat (blood money). Qisas is not known to have been
invoked; however, Diyat occasionally is applied, particularly in the
NWFP, in place of judicial punishment of the wrongdoer. Only the family
of the victim, not the State, may pardon the defendant. The Hudood,
Qisas, and Diyat ordinances apply to ordinary criminal courts and
Shariat courts. According to Christian activists, if a Muslim kills a
non-Muslim, he can redress the crime by paying Diyat to the victim's
family; however, a non-Muslim who kills a Muslim does not have the
option of paying and must serve a jail sentence or face the death
penalty for his crime. Failure to pay Diyat in non-capital cases can
result in indefinitely extended incarceration, under Section 331 of the
Diyat ordinance. In 1998 the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan noted
that there were 58 persons in prison after the completion of their jail
terms because they could not pay the Diyat.
Appeals of certain Hudood convictions involving penalties in excess
of 2 years' imprisonment are referred exclusively to the Shariat courts
and are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and High Court judges using
ordinary criminal procedures. Judges and attorneys must be Muslim and
must be familiar with Islamic law. Within these limits, defendants in a
Shariat court are entitled to the lawyer of their choice. There is a
system of bail.
The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape, extramarital sex
(including adultery and fornication), and various gambling, alcohol,
and property offenses. Offenses are distinguished according to
punishment, with some offenses liable to Hadd, or Koranic, punishment
(see Section 1.c.), and others to Tazir, or secular punishment.
Although both types of cases are tried in ordinary criminal courts,
special, more stringent rules of evidence apply in Hadd cases; Hadd
punishments are mandatory if there is enough evidence to support them.
Hadd punishments regarding sexual offences are most severe for married
Muslims; for example, if a married Muslim man confesses to rape or
there are four adult male Muslim witnesses to the act, the accused must
be stoned to death; if the accused rapist is not Muslim or married, if
he confesses, or if the act is witnessed by four adult males (not all
Muslim), the accused must be sentenced to 100 lashes with a whip, and
such other punishment, including death, as the court may deem fit. The
testimony of four female witnesses, or that of the victim alone, is
insufficient to impose Hadd punishments. If the evidence falls short of
Hadd criteria, then the accused may be sentenced to a lesser class of
penalties (Tazir). Since it is difficult to obtain sufficient evidence
to support the Hadd punishments, most rape cases are tried at the Tazir
level, under which sentences may be imposed up to 25 years in prison
and 30 lashes. No Hadd punishment has ever been applied in the more
than 20 years that the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir
punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim
offenders. Under Tazir the evidentiary requirement for financial or
future obligations is for two male witnesses or one male and two female
witnesses; in all other matters, the court may accept the testimony of
one man or one woman (see Section 5).
Administration of justice in the FATA is normally the
responsibility of tribal elders and maliks, or leaders. They may
conduct hearings according to Islamic law and tribal custom. In such
proceedings, the accused have no right to legal representation, bail,
or appeal. The usual penalties consist of fines, even for murder.
However, the Government's political agents, who are federal civil
servants assigned to tribal agencies, oversee such proceedings and may
impose prison terms of up to 14 years. Paramilitary forces under the
direction of the political agents frequently conduct punitive actions
during enforcement operations. For example, in raids on criminal
activities, the authorities have damaged surrounding homes as
extrajudicial punishment of residents for having tolerated nearby
criminal activity (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.).
In remote areas outside the jurisdiction of federal political
agents, tribal councils occasionally levy harsher, unsanctioned
punishments, including flogging or death by shooting or stoning.
Another related form of rough justice operating in the NWFP,
particularly in the tribal areas, is the concept of Pakhtunwali, or the
Pakhtun Tribal Code, in which revenge is an important element. Under
this code, a man, his family, and his tribe are obligated to take
revenge for wrongs--either real or perceived--to redeem their honor.
More often than not, these disputes arise over women and land, and
frequently result in violence (see Section 5).
There are limited numbers of political prisoners. Sections of the
Penal Code directly target members of the Ahmadi faith; according to
Ahmadi sources, approximately 200 Ahmadis have been incarcerated under
these provisions since their inception. Several minority religious
groups argue that other sections of the Penal Code--particularly the
related blasphemy laws--are used in a discriminatory fashion by local
officials or private individuals to punish religious minorities. While
precise numbers are unavailable, the Ahmadis estimate that 80 of their
coreligionists were charged in criminal cases ``on a religious basis''
in 1999 (see Sections 2.c. and 5). On April 12, the Government
announced its intention to require that deputy commissioners review all
blasphemy cases prior to the filing of a FIR; however, the Government
reversed this decision on May 16 due to intense pressure from some
Islamic groups (see Section 2.c.).
Some political groups also argue that they are marked for arrest
based on their political affiliation (see Section 1.d.). The Muttahida
Quami Movement, in particular, has argued that the Government used
Anti-terrorist court convictions in Sindh to silence its activists.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights.
The Anti-terrorist Act allowed police or military personnel acting as
police to enter and to search homes and offices without search
warrants, and to confiscate property or arms likely to be used in an
alleged terrorist act (which is defined very broadly). This provision
was never tested in the courts. While the Anti-terrorist Act was
partially suspended in 1998, the Government promulgated new Anti-
terrorist Ordinances in October 1998 and in April 1999. Under these new
ordinances, many blasphemy cases are now tried by anti-terrorist
courts. By law the police need a warrant to search a house, but not to
search a person. Despite this law, police have entered homes without a
warrant and sometimes stole valuables during searches. In the absence
of a warrant, a policeman is subject to charges of criminal trespass.
However, police seldom are punished for illegal entry.
The Government maintains several domestic intelligence services
that monitor politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists,
and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Credible reports indicate
that the authorities routinely use wiretaps and intercept and open
mail. In 1997 the Supreme Court directed the Government to seek its
permission before carrying out wiretapping or eavesdropping operations.
The judiciary's directive has been widely ignored. A case in which it
was alleged that 12 government agencies tapped and monitored citizens'
telephone calls still was pending in the Supreme Court at year's end.
Police sometimes arrest and detain relatives of wanted persons to
compel them to surrender. In some cases, the authorities have detained
entire families in order to force a relative who was the recipient of
an arrest warrant to surrender (see Section 1.d.). While the Government
generally does not interfere with the right to marry, the Government on
occasion assists influential families to prevent marriages they oppose.
For example, in July 1999, police in Mirpurkas District, Sindh raided
the home of Javed Dal, who had eloped with his cousin, and arrested his
family members as hostages. His wife's father, Somar Dal, used his
influence as a member of the Sindh National Front Executive Committee
to instigate the arrests, which were carried out without warrants (see
Section 5). The authorities also fail to prosecute vigorously cases in
which families punish members (generally women) for marrying or seeking
a divorce against the wishes of other family members. In June Mumlikat
Bibi was killed in her parents' home in the village of Yar Hussain in
the NWFP. Her father, who reportedly opposed Bibi's efforts to choose a
spouse without parental consent, was accused of being the culprit (see
Section 5).
Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved (see
Section 2.c.).
The Frontier Crimes Regulation, the separate legal system in the
FATA, permits collective responsibility, and empowers the authorities
to detain innocent members of the suspect's tribe, or blockade an
entire village (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The Government demolished
the houses of several alleged criminals, as well as the homes of those
who reportedly tolerated nearby criminal activity.
On December 13, 1999, a Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-
Tulaba, an extremist group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged
accomplices to a killing, and burned down their homes as punishment. On
December 29, 1999, there were riots in Karachi in response to the
demolition by security forces of up to 300 homes in the low-income
Gharibabad neighborhood, which is widely considered to be an MQM-Altaf
stronghold. Authorities claimed that the homes were built without
permits and that they sheltered terrorists and criminals. In March
police personnel arrested two persons from Mullah Said village
following an incident in which several persons from the village shot at
residents of the neighboring Badan village (see Section 1.d.).
Provincial governments sometimes forcibly moved landless laborers
from their temporary camps. For example, in October local government
officials forcibly moved 900 persons who recently had been freed from
bonded labor from their temporary camps in Sikandarabad in Kotri
district (see Section 6.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The suspended Constitution
provided for freedom of speech and of the press, and citizens generally
are free to discuss public issues; however, some journalists practice a
degree of self-censorship. In contrast to the Sharif Government, the
Musharraf Government did not attempt to exercise direct control over
views expressed in the print media. Newspaper editorials and
commentators are increasingly critical of the Government; however,
direct criticism of the military is rare. Investigative journalism is
rare; instead the press acts freely to publish charges and
countercharges by named and unnamed parties and individuals
representing competing political and social interests. Both
governmental and nongovernmental entities sometimes pay for favorable
media coverage.
Prior to the 1999 coup, any person deemed to have damaged the
Constitution, including the publication of statements against the
spirit of the Constitution, could be prosecuted for treason. However,
prosecutions under this provision were rare. The suspended Constitution
also prohibited the ridicule of Islam, the armed forces, or the
judiciary.
The Penal Code mandates the death sentence for anyone defiling the
name of the Prophet Mohammad, life imprisonment for desecrating the
Koran, and up to 10 years in prison for insulting another's religious
beliefs with the intent to outrage religious feelings (see Section
2.c.). The Anti-terrorist Act stipulates imprisonment with rigorous
labor for up to 7 years for using abusive or insulting words, or
possessing or distributing written or recorded material, with the
intent to stir up sectarian hatred. No warrant is required to seize
such material. While the Anti-terrorist Act was partially suspended in
1998, the Sharif Government promulgated new Anti-terrorist Ordinances
in October 1998 and in April 1999.
In March police in Hyderabad registered criminal cases against
Kulsoom Nawaz and 15 other PML leaders for making ``provocative''
speeches at a party convention held the previous day.
The competitive nature of politics helps to ensure press freedom
since the media often serve as a forum for political parties,
commercial, religious, and various other interests to compete with and
criticize each other publicly. Although the press does not criticize
Islam as such, leaders of religious parties and movements are not
exempt from public scrutiny and criticism. The press traditionally has
avoided negative coverage of the armed forces, and the Office of Inter-
Services Public Relations (ISPR) has served to hold press coverage of
military matters under close restraint. Officially the ISPR closely
controls and coordinates the release of military news and access to
military sources. After the 1999 coup, journalists reported no attempts
by the ISPR agencies to influence editorial content.
Detailed public discussion of the military as an institution is
hampered severely since any published discussion, let alone criticism,
of the defense budget is proscribed by law. However, in 1997 this code
of silence was undermined when a National Assembly committee discussed
defense appropriations and corruption in defense contracts in open
session, thereby making possible (and legal) newspaper coverage of the
same issues. Discussion of the defense budget continued during the
year, especially in the English-language press. Personnel changes among
senior army officers in September were widely discussed in the press
and newspapers published calls for extending the accountability process
to include former military officers.
Government leaks are not uncommon, but are managed carefully, and
often are made to underpaid journalists who are on the unofficial
payrolls of competing interests. Reports of intimidation, heavy-handed
surveillance, and legal action to quiet the unduly curious or
nondeferential reporter were common in the past; however, these reports
have declined significantly since the coup. The Government has had
considerable leverage over the press through its substantial budget for
advertising and public interest campaigns and its control over the
supply of newsprint and its ability to enforce regulations. Human
rights groups, journalists, and opposition figures accused the
Government of attempting to silence journalists and public figures;
however, there were fewer such complaints during the year. On July 1,
the Government ended its monopoly of newsprint supply and did not
initiate new efforts to collect back taxes from selected newspapers. On
August 28, the Government announced a draft ordinance for freedom of
information, which would require every government office to designate a
freedom of information officer who would be responsible for providing
replies to written applications within 21 days. However, the act
excludes all classified documents and does not define what constitutes
classified information. By year's end, this ordinance has not been
enacted. On December 30, the Government declassified the Hamoodur
Rahman Commission Report, which criticizes the conduct of political and
military leaders during the 1971 war with India.
On April 29, a newspaper reported that police attacked and arrested
150 journalists from Islamabad and Rawalpindi during a peaceful protest
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In May journalists in Abbotabad accused
the local army monitoring cell of harassing Shuja Ahmad, president of a
local organization of journalists. On August 22, several unknown
assailants attacked Mazhar Tufail, a journalist from the Awam newspaper
(see Section 1.c.). The journalist claimed that his assailants were
government agents who wanted information on his activities. On August
30, police in Dadu, Sindh arrested and charged with theft four
journalists who reportedly criticized the police; authorities released
the journalists after 4 days (see Section 1.d.). On July 10, police
personnel entered the Lahore Press Club during a press conference and
arrested the leader of the All Pakistan Traders Alliance, Umer Sailya.
During the press conference, Sailya had criticized Musharraf and the
military. In October a team of army monitors demanded immediate access
to the premises of the Dawn newspaper and threatened to cut off power
if refused; this occurred after the editors of Dawn received an
unsigned letter threatening retaliatory action for recent articles
criticizing the Government. However, many reputable journalists stated
that this incident was an electrical inspection and not a violation of
freedom of press. On October 3, police officials prohibited more than a
dozen journalists from covering a speech that General Musharraf
delivered to a group of businessmen. On December 10, army personnel
detained for several hours a journalist and four photographers who
attempted to photograph the departure of Nawaz Sharif following his
exile. The officers confiscated the film and subsequently released the
journalist and photographers.
The State no longer publishes daily newspapers; however, the
Ministry of Information controls and manages the country's primary wire
service, the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP). The APP is both the
Government's own news agency and the official carrier of international
news to the local media. The few small privately owned wire services
usually are circumspect in their coverage of sensitive domestic news
and tend to follow a government line.
The Print, Press, and Publications Ordinance requiring the
registration of printing presses and newspapers was allowed to lapse in
1997 after several years of waning application. In practice,
registering a new publication is a simple administrative act, and is
not subject to political or government scrutiny.
Foreign books must pass government censors before being reprinted.
Books and magazines may be imported freely, but are likewise subject to
censorship for objectionable sexual or religious content. English
language publications were not affected by the direct proscription of
books and magazines promulgated by the Chief Commissioner in Islamabad,
who banned five Sindhi-language publications in 1997 for
``objectionable material against Pakistan,'' i.e., expressions of
Sindhi nationalism.
Privately owned newspapers freely discuss public policy and
criticize the Government. They report remarks made by opposition
politicians, and their editorials reflect a wide spectrum of views. The
effort to ensure that newspapers carry their statements or press
releases sometimes leads to undue pressure by local police, political
parties, ethnic, sectarian, and religious groups, militant student
organizations, and occasionally commercial interests. Such pressure is
a common feature of journalism, and, when a group is extreme in its
views, can include physical violence, the sacking of offices, the
intimidation or beating of journalists, and interference with the
distribution of newspapers. At times landlords and their agents, who
have become accustomed to terrorizing the powerless on their lands in
an atmosphere of impunity, retaliate against journalists who report on
their crimes. Journalists working in remote areas can expect more
difficulties from local authorities and influential individuals than
their big city counterparts. However, violence against and intimidation
of journalists is a nationwide problem.
The broadcast media are mainly government monopolies directed by
the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and Pakistan Television (PTV).
Domestic news coverage and public affairs programming on these media
are controlled closely by the Government and traditionally reflect its
views. One private radio station, one television broadcaster, and a
semi-private cable television station are licensed under special
contractual arrangements with the Government. The semi-private
television station, Shalimar Television Network (STN), occasionally has
been closed due to disputes with the Ministry of Information and to
financial difficulties. None of these stations is permitted to produce
news and public affairs programming; the private television station
rebroadcasts or simulcasts the regular PTV evening news. The Shalimar
Television Network also rebroadcasts PTV news, in addition to current
affairs programming from foreign broadcasters, such as the British
Broadcasting Corporation. While the STN routinely censors those
segments considered to be socially or sexually offensive, rarely, if
ever, are foreign news stories censored for content. In 1999 after STN
aired news stories critical of the Sharif Government's handling of the
Kargil crisis with India, PTV announced plans to turn the STN into an
``all-news'' channel, scheduled to start in October 1999; as of year's
end, these plans have not been implemented. The Ministry of Information
monitors advertising on all broadcast media, editing, or removing
advertisements deemed morally objectionable.
In 1999 the Secretary for Information was quoted in the press as
stating that additional, private television and radio channels would
soon be licensed, echoing a pledge made by General Musharraf. However,
by year's end, no such licenses were granted. Satellite dishes are
readily available on the local market and are priced within reach of
almost everyone with a television set--well into the lower-middle
classes. South Asian satellite channels (usually India-based) have
become important sources of news and popular entertainment.
Literary and creative works remain generally free of censorship.
Dance performances, even classical performances, are subject to protest
by certain religious groups. Obscene literature, a category broadly
defined by the Government, is subject to seizure. Dramas and
documentaries on previously taboo subjects, including corruption,
social privilege, narcotics, violence against women, and female
inequality, are broadcast on television; however, some sensitive series
have been canceled before broadcast.
The Government and universities generally respect academic freedom.
The atmosphere of violence and intolerance fostered by student
organizations, typically tied to political parties, continued to
threaten academic freedom, despite the fact that a 1992 Supreme Court
ruling prohibits student political organizations on campuses. On some
campuses, well-armed groups of students, primarily from radical
religious organizations, clash with and intimidate other students,
instructors, and administrators on matters of language, syllabus,
examination policies, grades, doctrine, and dress. These groups
facilitate cheating on examinations, interfere in the hiring of staff
at the campuses, control new admissions, and sometimes control the
funds of their institutions. At Punjab University, the largest
university in the province, Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT--the student
wing of the religious political party Jamaat-i-Islami) imposes its
self-defined code of conduct on teachers and other students.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The suspended
Constitution provided for freedom ``to assemble peacefully and without
arms subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the
interest of public order;'' however, while the Government until March
generally permitted peaceful assembly, it later imposed significant
restrictions on this right. Since 1984 Ahmadis have been prohibited
from holding any conferences or gatherings (see Section 2.c.).
Throughout the year, the Government occasionally interfered with large
rallies, which were held by all political parties. On March 15, the
Musharraf regime enacted an ordinance banning all public political
gatherings, processions, and strikes. Government officials claimed that
the ban was enacted as a safety measure for the visit of an official
head of state; however, the ban remained in place at year's end,
although it has been enforced unevenly. Some groups circumvented the
ban by meeting in private homes while using loudspeakers to carry the
proceedings to supporters outdoors. The Government approved some public
political gatherings, including a meeting of the Grand Democratic
Alliance in September where parties debated which steps to take to
return the country to democracy.
District magistrates occasionally exercised their power under the
Criminal Procedures Code to ban meetings of more than four persons
where demonstrations seemed likely to result in violence. During the
year, police made preventive arrests of political party organizers
prior to announced demonstrations. For example, in July police arrested
a group of Sharif supporters on their way from Lahore to Peshawar for a
demonstration. On August 11, police arrested 40 PML supporters ahead of
a planned public meeting on the country's independence day. In
September police in Lahore arrested more than 500 members of the PPP
for shouting anti-Musharraf and anti-army slogans. In October police
arrested approximately 300 opposition leaders prior to a planned
demonstration commemorating the year anniversary of the coup.
The MQM has been harassed in its regular political activities,
especially by the Sindh police. On February 19, police arrested 35 MQM
and Jiye Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM, a national Sindhi political party)
members during a public protest against layoffs of Urdu and Sindhi
speaking workers from Pakistan Steel (see Section 1.d.). On February
19, police personnel arrested 40 members of JSQM who planned to
participate in a strike (see Section 1.d.). Police frequently arrested
PML leaders and supporters in order to prevent planned demonstrations
during the year; the HRCP noted that all public PML demonstrations in
Karachi were prevented, except for meetings at the party's headquarters
(see Section 1.d.).
In August 1999, the Sharif Government issued an ordinance related
to the anti-terrorist courts (see Section 1.e.). One section of the
ordinance made ``illegal strikes, go-slows, (or) lock outs'' punishable
by up to 7 years' imprisonment and a fine. A wide spectrum of
opposition groups opposed this measure, fearing that it would be used
to silence legitimate dissent. The anti-terrorist courts did not invoke
this ordinance during the year.
Police also arrested about 300 Muslim clerics and students in
Lahore in May and students in Lahore during protests against General
Musharraf's proposed changes to the blasphemy laws (see Sections 1.c.
and 2.c.).
Police sometimes used excessive force against demonstrators. On
April 29, a local newspaper reported that police attacked with batons
and then arrested more than 150 journalists from Islamabad and
Rawalpindi during a peaceful rally (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.). On
June 3, police attacked with batons a procession of 200 small business
owners who were protesting a government campaign to collect sales
taxes; police also arrested three demonstrators (see Section 1.c.). On
June 9, police opened fire to disperse a protest in Peshawar; four
persons were injured (see Section 1.c.). Police accused the protesters
of throwing stones and bricks; however, eyewitnesses alleged that the
police opened fire without provocation.
The authorities sometimes prevented leaders of politico-religious
parties from traveling to certain areas if they believed their presence
would increase sectarian tensions or cause public violence (see Section
2.d.).
The suspended Constitution provided for freedom of association
subject to restriction by government ordinance and law; however, the
Government maintained some limits on this right. While these ordinances
and laws apparently have not been used since the martial law period,
the Sharif Government revoked the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in
Punjab. After the coup, the government of Punjab lifted the ban on the
registration of new NGO's, but the old NGO's remained without licenses
at year's end. Overall, NGO's reported improved relations with the
Government during the year (see Section 4). There are no banned groups
or parties.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The suspended Constitution provided for
freedom of religion, and stated that adequate provisions shall be made
for minorities to profess and practice their religions freely; however,
the Government imposes a range of limits on freedom of religion.
Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which approximately 95 percent of
the population is Muslim. The majority of the population is Sunni
Muslim, but an estimated 15 percent of the population is Shi'a. The
suspended Constitution required that laws be consistent with Islam and
imposed some elements of Koranic law on both Muslims and religious
minorities. In July General Musharraf amended the PCO in order to
incorporate the Islamic provisions of the suspended Constitution, which
include the definition of ``Muslim'' and ``non-Muslim'' and procedures
regarding Shariat courts. While there is no law establishing the
Koranic death penalty for apostates (those who convert from Islam),
social pressure against apostasy is so powerful that most such
conversions take place in secret. Reprisals and threats of reprisals
against suspected converts are common. Members of religious minorities
are subject to violence and harassment, and police at times refuse to
prevent such actions or charge persons who commit them.
In the Malakand division and the Kohistan district of the NWFP,
ordinances require that ``all cases, suits, inquiries, matters, and
proceedings in the courts shall be decided in accordance with
Shari'a.'' These ordinances define Shari'a as the injunctions found in
both the Koran and the Sunna. Islamic law judges with the assistance of
the Ulema (Islamic scholars), under the general supervision of the
Peshawar High Court, try all court cases in the Malakand Division and
the Kohistan District. Elsewhere in the country, partial provisions of
Shari'a apply. For example, police are authorized to arrest or fine
Muslims who eat or smoke in public places during Ramadan. In 1998 then-
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, proposed an amendment to the Constitution
(the 15th Amendment) that would have imposed Shari'a throughout the
country; minority religious groups feared that the implementation of
this amendment would have restricted further the freedom to practice
religions other than Islam. However, the Musharraf Government did not
enact the proposed 15th Amendment and reportedly has no plans to do so.
Discriminatory religious legislation has added to an atmosphere of
religious intolerance, which has led to acts of violence directed
against minority Muslim sects, as well as against Christians, Hindus,
and members of Muslim offshoot sects, such as Ahmadis and Zikris (see
Section 5).
The Ahmadis are subject to specific restrictions under law. A 1974
constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority
because, according to the Government, they do not accept Mohammed as
the last prophet of Islam. However, Ahmadis regard themselves as
Muslims and observe Islamic practices. In 1984 the Government inserted
Section 298(c) into the Penal Code, prohibiting Ahmadis from calling
themselves Muslim and banning them from using Islamic words, phrases,
and greetings. The constitutionality of Section 298(c) was upheld in a
split-decision Supreme Court case in 1996. The punishment for violation
of this section is imprisonment for up to 3 years and a fine. The
Government and anti-Ahmadi religious groups have used this provision
extensively to harass Ahmadis. Ahmadis suffer from various restrictions
of religious freedom and widespread societal discrimination, including
violation of their places of worship, being barred from burial in
Muslim graveyards, denial of freedom of faith, speech, and assembly,
and restrictions on their press. Several Ahmadi mosques remained
closed. Since 1984 Ahmadis have been prohibited from holding
conferences or gatherings (see Section 2.b.). Ahmadis are prohibited
from taking part in the Hajj (the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca).
Some popular newspapers publish anti-Ahmadi ``conspiracy'' stories,
which contribute to anti-Ahmadi sentiments in society.
Section 295(a), the blasphemy provision of the Penal Code,
originally stipulated a maximum 2-year sentence for insulting the
religion of any class of citizens. This sentence was increased to 10
years in 1991. In 1982 Section 295(b) was added, which stipulated a
sentence of life imprisonment for ``whoever willfully defiles, damages,
or desecrates a copy of the holy Koran.'' In 1986 another amendment,
Section 295(c), established the death penalty or life imprisonment for
directly or indirectly defiling ``the sacred name of the holy Prophet
Mohammed.'' In 1991 a court struck down the option of life
imprisonment. These laws, especially Section 295(c), have been used by
rivals and local authorities to threaten, punish, or intimidate
Ahmadis, Christians, and even orthodox Muslims. No one has been
executed by the State under any of these provisions, although religious
extremists have killed some persons accused under them. Since 1996
magistrates have been required to investigate allegations of blasphemy
to see whether they are credible before filing formal charges. On April
21, the Government announced its intention to require that deputy
commissioners review all blasphemy cases prior to the filing of a FIR
(see Section 1.c.); however, General Musharraf later reversed this
decision due to strong pressure from some Muslim groups. On May 11,
police arrested approximately 300 Muslim clerics and students in Lahore
during protests against Musharraf's proposed changes to the blasphemy
laws (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). According to Ahmadi sources,
approximately 3 dozen Ahmadis have been charged under the blasphemy
laws since the October 1999 coup. For example, in October police
arrested Nasir Ahmad of Rajanpur district under Section 295(b) for
allegedly defiling a copy of the Koran. Mushtaq Ahmad Saggon and Nasir
Ahmad, were convicted in Muzaffargarh in July 1999 under Sections
295(a) and 295(c) for preaching and distributing religious literature.
Their case was transferred to an anti-terrorist court at Dera Ghazi
Khan, and the Lahore High Court denied their request for bail.
In May a lower court in Sialkot district, Punjab, sentenced two
Christian brothers to 35 years' imprisonment each and fined them each
$1,500 (PRs 75,000). The brothers were convicted of desecrating the
Koran and blaspheming the Prophet Mohammed; both cases were registered
by an ice cream vendor who allegedly fought with the brothers after he
asked them to use their own dishes, stating that his were reserved for
Muslim customers. Lawyers for the brothers filed an appeal in the
Lahore High Court. On May 2, Augustine Ashiq Masih was charged with
blaspheming the Prophet in Faisalabad. According to press reports,
Masih converted to Islam, married a Muslim woman, and then converted
back to Christianity, which angered local Muslims who brought the
charges against him. Ayub Masih (detained since 1996) was convicted of
blasphemy for making favorable comments about Salman Rushdie, the
author of the controversial book, ``The Satanic Verses,'' and was
sentenced to death in April 1998. Ayub's family and 13 other landless
Christian families were forced from their village in 1996 following the
charges, and he survived an attempt on his life in 1997, when he was
shot at outside of the courtroom while in trial. The case was pending
appeal before the Lahore High Court at year's end.
Police also arrest Muslims under the blasphemy laws; government
officials maintain that about two-thirds of the total blasphemy cases
that have been brought to trial have affected Muslims. In February
Muhammad Younis was sentenced to 13 months in jail in Multan for
uttering derogatory remarks about the companions of the Prophet
Mohammad. In March an anti-terrorist court in Sindh convicted Muslim
author Gohar Shahi in absentia under the blasphemy laws. On August 5,
Abdul Hasnain Muhammad Yusuf Aliwas was given a death sentence and 35
years' imprisonment by a Lahore court after being convicted under
Sections 295(a), 295(c), and 298 for defiling the name of the Prophet
Muhammad. Some of Ali's supporters claim that he was being persecuted
for his allegedly unorthodox Islamic beliefs. In August Abdul Hasnain
Muhammad Yusuf Ali, a Sufi Muslim was convicted of blasphemy under
Sections 295(a) and 295(c) for defiling the name of the Prophet
Muhammad. A Lahore court sentenced Ali to death. On October 4, police
arrested Yunis Shaikh on blasphemy charges after he allegedly made
remarks offensive to Islam and to the Prophet Mohammad during a
lecture. Police denied bail and he was awaiting trial at year's end. In
1998 a Shi'a Muslim, Ghulam Akbar, was convicted of blasphemy for
allegedly making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed in 1995.
He was sentenced to death, the first time a Muslim had been sentenced
to death for a violation of the blasphemy law. The case remained under
appeal at year's end.
When blasphemy and other religious cases are brought to court,
extremists often pack the courtroom and make public threats about the
consequences of an acquittal. As a result, judges and magistrates often
continue trials indefinitely, and the accused is burdened with further
legal costs and court appearances. Many judges also try to pass such
cases to other jurists.
The Government distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims with
regard to political rights. In national and local elections, Muslims
vote for Muslim candidates by geographic locality while non-Muslims
must vote for at-large non-Muslim candidates. Legal provisions for
minority reserved seats do not include the Senate and the Federal
Cabinet.
Furthermore according to the suspended Constitution, the President
and the Prime Minister must be Muslim. The Prime Minister, federal
ministers, and ministers of state, as well as elected members of the
Senate and National Assembly (including non-Muslims) must take an oath
to ``strive to preserve the Islamic ideology, which is the basis for
the creation of Pakistan'' (see Section 3).
In June a prominent Christian-affiliated NGO that is active in
defending those accused of violating the blasphemy laws received a
series of death threats.
``Islamiyyat'' (Islamic studies) is compulsory for all Muslim
students in state-run schools. Students of other faiths are not
required to study Islam but are not provided with parallel studies in
their own religions. In practice many non-Muslim students are compelled
by teachers to complete the Islamiyyat. An education policy announced
by the Government in 1998 included provisions for increased mandatory
Islamic instruction in public schools.
Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved.
The Government designates religion on passports, and to get a
passport citizens must declare whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim.
Muslims must also affirm that they accept the unqualified finality of
the prophethood of Mohammed and declare that Ahmadis are non-Muslims.
In September 1999, the Sharif Government removed colonial-era
entries for ``sect'' from government job application forms to prevent
discrimination in hiring. However, the faith of some, particularly
Christians, often can be ascertained from their names. General
Musharraf and members of his staff apparently consulted with religious
minorities on some of his initial cabinet appointments.
In December 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that interest is un-
Islamic and directed the Government to implement an interest-free
system by June 2001.
Following the coup, the Musharraf Government affirmed its
commitment to protectthe rights of religious minorities. According to
minority community members, the Government made efforts to seek
minority input into decision-making and offered some religious
minorities cabinet positions.
The predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center of Chenab Nagar
(formerly known as Rabway) in Punjab often has been a site of violence
against Ahmadis (see Section 5).
In December 1999, several hundred persons looted and burned
property in Haveli Lakha, Okara district, Punjab, which belonged to
Mohammad Nawaz, a local Ahmadi leader accused of planning to build an
Ahmadi house of worship (see Section 5). A neighbor reportedly incited
the incident by accusing Nawaz of building the house of worship after
the two were involved in a property dispute. Nawaz, a doctor,
reportedly intended to build a free clinic next to his home. The mob
destroyed the clinic and looted and burned Nawaz's home. According to
Ahmadi sources, police personnel arrived at the scene, but did nothing
to stop the crowd. At year's end, neither the neighbor nor anyone in
the crowd had been arrested or questioned in connection with the
incident, and police took no steps to find or return any of Nawaz's
property. However, Nawaz and his two sons were arrested and charged
with blasphemy. Several days later, they were released on bail;
however, the blasphemy case against them was pending as of year's end.
Three other Ahmadis in Haveli Lakha also were charged with blasphemy in
connection with the incident, even though they were not in town at the
time; however, the case against them was dismissed for lack of
evidence.
Sectarian violence and tensions continued to be a serious problem
throughout the country (see Section 5). More than 300 persons have died
in incidents of sectarian violence in Punjab in the last 3 years,
according to one credible newspaper report. Another newspaper reported
that over 2,000 persons have died in sectarian violence since 1981 (see
Section 1.a.). However, sectarian violence markedly decreased after the
October 1999 coup.
Anti-terrorist courts also handed down convictions against several
individuals accused of sectarian violence. On April 22, an anti-
terrorist court in Rawalpindi sentenced 23 persons to life imprisonment
for their role in leading a procession of persons that burned a Shi'a
mosque in 1996. On July 3, an anti-terrorist court in Gujranwala
convicted 2 men for reportedly killing a Shi'a senior police officer;
however, the men later were released.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Most citizens enjoy freedom of movement
within the country and the freedom to travel abroad; however, the
Government limits these rights. The authorities at times prevent
political party leaders and religious leaders from traveling to certain
parts of the country (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.). Travel to Israel is
prohibited by law. Government employees and students must obtain ``no
objection'' certificates before travelling abroad, although this
requirement is rarely enforced against students.
Citizens regularly exercise the right to emigrate. However, an Exit
Control List (ECL), which is made public but is constantly revised, is
used to prevent the departure of wanted criminals and individuals under
investigation for defaulting on loans, corruption, or other offenses.
At the end of 1999, the HRCP estimated that there were more than 5,000
entries on the ECL, including 400 PML leaders, all 45 MQM legislators
and their family members, 20 journalists, and as many as 3,000 alleged
bank defaulters. The Musharraf Government increased the use of the ECL
reportedly to prevent those suspected of loan defaults or corruption
from leaving the country. The focus apparently was on potential loan
defaulters as part of the Musharraf Government's emphasis on
accountability. According to a press report, the Musharraf Government
added approximately 3,000 names to the ECL. No judicial action is
required to add a name to the ECL; however, those named have the right
to appeal to the Secretary of Interior and, if refused, to the Advocate
General of the senior judiciary. In practice courts have directed the
Government to lift restrictions on some politicians on the ECL. For
example, Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister and leader of the PPP,
was placed on the ECL and was prevented from leaving the country in
December 1998. Bhutto was allowed to leave later that month following a
court order to lift the travel restrictions against her.
Pakistan has not signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol and has not adopted domestic
legislation concerning the treatment of refugees. In December 1999, the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted a
change from the practice of granting ``prima facie'' status to all
Afghans in the country; under the new policy, all refugee
determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis. However, means
for screening Afghan refugees have not been established, and Pakistani
law makes no provisions for asylum. The absence of legalized asylum,
coupled with sharp economic competition, led to a more restrictive
admissions policy and a deteriorating quality of life for some
refugees.
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum has been provided to
refugees from Afghanistan since 1979, when several million Afghans
fleeing Soviet occupation poured across the border. There remain an
estimated 1.2 million Afghan refugees in the country who have been
granted first asylum. There also are an estimated 2 to 3 million
unregistered Afghans in urban areas throughout the country.
The Government has not granted permanent legal resettlement to
Afghan refugees but allows them to live and work in the country. Many
are self-supporting and live outside refugee camps, which has resulted
in some hostility among local communities whose residents resent the
economic competition and believe that the refugees contribute to high
crime rates. The Government occasionally harasses refugees and
threatens them with deportation. For example, authorities in Quetta
detained a number of newly arrived Afghans, mostly non-Pashtun
minorities, with plans to deport them. In December 1999, the UNHCR
proposed that the Government establish a formal joint screening
mechanism to determine whether or not the intended deportees are
refugees according to internationally accepted standards. No such
formal mechanism was established during the year, and the Government
deported some persons without notifying UNHCR officials. However, the
Government sometimes allowed the UNHCR to attempt to find solutions
other than deportation for refugees, such as arranging for resettlement
in a third country.
Most refugee camps are well established, and living conditions
resemble those in neighboring villages, even though most direct
assistance to the camps ended in the early 1990's. Most recent arrivals
have gone to urban areas like Peshawar or Quetta, but some have settled
in the new Akora Khattak camp (since 1996) and the Shamshatoo camp
(since 1999). Conditions for newly arrived Afghans generally are worse
than conditions in the well-established camps. For example, sanitation,
health care, shelter, and fresh water are ongoing problems in the new
camps. Some of the most recent arrivals still reside in makeshift
tents. In 1999 874 Afghan refugees from Nasir Bagh camp were relocated
to make room for construction of a new highway and housing development.
Some were taken to Akora Khattak camp; however, many reportedly
returned to Afghanistan or moved to other locations in Pakistan.
Relocations declined in late 1999 and did not occur during the year.
According to Amnesty International, there was one report of the
forced return of a person to a country where he feared persecution
during the year. Professor Mohammad Rahim Elhan, a prominent Afghan
scholar who had accused the Government of interfering in the internal
affairs of Afghanistan, was deported against his will to Afghanistan on
June 21. However, he was subsequently permitted to reenter Pakistan.
The Government cooperated with the UNHCR to support voluntary
repatriations to rural areas of Afghanistan considered to be safe. In
1999 approximately 92,000 Afghans returned to their home country.
Afghan refugees have limited access to legal protection and depend on
the UNHCR and group leaders to resolve disputes among themselves and
with Pakistanis. In the past, police sometimes attempted to prevent
Afghan nationals from entering cities and there were reports that some
have been forced back into refugee camps. During the year, there were
reports that the Government closed some Afghan schools and cracked down
on unlicensed medical practitioners that treat mostly Afghans.
Most able-bodied male refugees have found at least intermittent
employment; however, they are not covered by local labor laws. NGO's
and private entities provided women and girls with better education and
health care than is available in Afghanistan. However, Afghan women
working for NGO's were targets for occasional harassment and violence
by conservatives and Taliban sympathizers.
Several prominent Afghans also reportedly have been the targets of
harassment and violence from Taliban supporters and conservatives in
the refugee community. According to newspaper reports, at least 10
Afghans were killed during the year, reportedly for their political
views (see Section 1.a.). On June 1, unknown gunmen injured Mohammad
Enam Wak at his home in Peshawar (see Section 1.c.). Wak wrote a book
calling for a federal system of government in Afghanistan. In July an
Afghan leader, Haji Jan Mohammad, whose name reportedly appeared on a
Taliban hit list, was killed by unknown assailants (see Section 1.a.).
Police investigations of these Afghan killings were perfunctory at
best; there were no arrests or convictions in any case.
The resettlement of Biharis continued to be a contentious issue.
The Biharis are Urdu speakers from the Indian state of Bihar who went
to East Pakistan--now Bangladesh--at the time of partition in 1947.
When Bangladesh became independent in 1971, the Biharis sought
resettlement in Pakistan. However, approximately 250,000 Biharis remain
in refugee camps in Bangladesh. While the Mohajir community--
descendants of Muslims who immigrated to Pakistan from India after
partition--supports their resettlement, the Sindhi community opposes
it. In 1993 the Government flew 342 Biharis to the country and placed
them in temporary housing in central Punjab. No further resettlement
has occurred.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens continued to be denied their right to choose or change
their government peacefully. After the imposition of a military
government in October 1999, the Constitution and representative bodies,
including the National Assembly, the Senate, and the provincial
assemblies, were suspended indefinitely. General Musharraf appointed
new members to the Cabinet, as well as new governors to all four
provinces.
The Musharraf Government pledged to return the country to a
democracy; however, General Musharraf stressed his priority to build
first a strong economic and political foundation to avert another bout
of ``sham'' democracy. General Musharraf pledged to abide by a May 12
Supreme Court ruling that mandates that national elections be held no
later than 90 days after October 12, 2002. The Government established
the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) to develop political reforms
and a framework for elections. It is unclear whether or not the NRB has
the institutional capacity to meet its mandate within the established
deadline.
Citizens' right to change their government also was restricted by
the executive's strong influence on the judiciary. On January 25,
General Musharraf ordered all of the justices in the country to swear
to uphold his PCO (see Section 1.e.).
The Musharraf regime did not ban political parties, and the parties
active prior to the coup, including the Pakistan Muslim League (which
was led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) continued their
activities. However, the Government arrested hundreds of persons in
opposition political parties during the year (see Sections 1.d. and
2.b.). On March 15, General Musharraf issued an ordinance banning all
political gatherings held outdoors (see Section 2.b.). The National
Accountability Ordinance prohibits those convicted of corruption under
the NAB from holding political office for 21 years (see Section 1.d.).
On August 11, the Government amended the Political Parties Act to
automatically disqualify anyone with a court conviction from holding
party office. Legal observers expressed concern over the concentration
of power in the NAB, the fact that NAB chairmen have all been members
of the military, and the presumption of guilt in accountability cases.
National elections for national and provincial assemblies last were
held in February 1997. Election observers concluded that the elections
generally were free and fair. Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League won
a majority of seats and formed a government.
Elections for local government bodies were held in Punjab in May
1998. Elections were held in Baluchistan in March 1999 and a chairman
was named in August. Elections have not been held in the two other
provinces, NWFP and Sindh, since 1993, when these bodies were dissolved
by a caretaker government because of corruption charges. Local
government elections were postponed indefinitely in the NWFP and Sindh.
Sindh was under Governor's rule from November 1998 until the October
1999 coup. In October 1999, Musharraf suspended the local and
provincial governments; the provinces are ruled by governors appointed
by General Musharraf. During the year, Musharraf focused on the
perceived need to devolve power to the local level in order to reduce
the power of the central Government. In March General Musharraf
presented his plan for devolution and political restructuring at the
local level. According to this plan, non-party based local elections
were scheduled to be held from December through August 2001. On
December 31, there were elections in 18 districts of the country.
According to local and international election observers, the elections
generally were free and fair. Religious minorities boycotted the polls.
Directly elected union councilors are to select a chief mayor and
members of district council. Critics of the plan claim that it is
merely an attempt to dissipate pressure for a return to democracy at
the national level. On June 7, the Government announced a number of
measures designed to make the electoral commission independent of
government control, including granting the commission full financial
autonomy.
Because of a longstanding territorial dispute with India, the
political status of the northern areas--Hunza, Gilgit, and Baltistan--
is not resolved. As a result, more than 1 million inhabitants of the
northern areas were not covered under the suspended Constitution and
have had no representation in the federal legislature. An appointed
civil servant administers these areas; an elected Northern Areas
Council serves only in an advisory capacity and has no authority to
change laws or to raise and spend revenue. In May 1999, the Supreme
Court directed the Government to act within 6 months to give the
northern areas an elected government with an independent judiciary. In
November 1999, the Musharraf regime permitted previously scheduled
elections to take place in the northern areas; independents and
candidates from the PML, the PPP, and the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan won
seats.
The right of citizens to change their government also has been
hampered at the provincial level by the Government's failure to release
the 1998 census figures and by the likely underestimation of the
population of Sindh. Held after a delay of 7 years, the national census
was postponed repeatedly due to pressure from ethnic groups and
provincial officials who feared diminished representation and access to
federal funds. The 9.26 million census figure for Karachi, revised to
9.8 million in a February report, is estimated to be 3 to 5 million
short of the actual figure.
Although women participate in Government, and former prime minister
Benazir Bhutto is a prominent opposition figure, women are
underrepresented in political life at all levels. Six women held seats
in the 217-member National Assembly, up from 4 seats in the previous
Parliament. Thirty-five women, more than ever before, campaigned for
seats in the 1997 national elections. The Parliamentary Commission on
the Status of Women in Pakistan recommended reserving one-third of
seats in all elected bodies for women. The Musharraf Government
announced in August that one-third of the seats in the upcoming local
council elections would be reserved for female candidates; some
political activists doubt that there would be enough female candidates
in certain remote areas of the country to fulfill this requirement.
Women participate in large numbers in elections, although some are
dissuaded from voting by family, religious, and social customs. In 1997
only 37 out of 6,600 female registered voters actually cast ballots in
Jamrud in the Khyber Agency due to pronouncements that voting by women
was un-Islamic. General Musharraf appointed a woman to his National
Security Council and three women to his Cabinet. Provincial governors
appointed by General Musharraf also have named women to serve in
provincial cabinets.
Minorities are underrepresented in Government and politics. Under
the electoral system, minorities vote for reserved at-large seats, not
for nonminority candidates who represent actual constituencies. The
Musharraf regime abandoned a plan to abolish the separate electorate
system due to pressure by some Muslim political groups. With separate
electorates, representatives have little incentive to promote their
minority constituents' interests. Many Christian activists state that
separate electorates are the greatest obstacle to the attainment of
Christian religious and civil liberties. Ahmadi leaders encourage their
followers not to register as ``non-Muslims,'' so most Ahmadis are
completely unrepresented. In the National Assembly, Christians hold
four reserved seats; Hindus and members of scheduled castes another
four; Ahmadis one; and Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis, and other non-Muslims
one (see Section 2.c.). Each of the four categories is maintained on a
separate electorate roll, and minorities cannot cast votes for the
Muslim constituency seats. Under Article 106 of the suspended
Constitution, minorities also had reserved seats in the provincial
assemblies. The 1997 general election report states that each Christian
National Assembly member represents 327,606 persons; each Hindu and
scheduled castes member, 319,029; the Sikh, Buddhist, Parsi, and other
non-Muslim member, 112,801; and the Ahmadi member 104,244. These
figures significantly understate the population of most of the minority
groups because they are based on 1981 census figures. By year's end,
the 1998 census figures for religious minorities had not been
published. According to a local magazine, there are approximately 3
million Christians, 2.7 million Hindus, and several hundred thousand
Ahmadis in the country.
Tribal people are underrepresented in government and politics. The
1997 elections for the eight National Assembly members from the FATA
were, for the first time, conducted on the basis of universal adult
franchise. Prior to 1997, in keeping with local traditions, tribal
leaders, or maliks, appointed in the governor's name by the central
Government's political agents in each agency, elected the FATA National
Assembly members. In accordance with the Government's general ban on
political party activities in the FATA, candidates were not allowed to
register by political party and political party rallies were not
allowed. However, several political parties did campaign covertly.
Tribal people, including large numbers of women in some areas,
registered to vote despite campaigns by some tribes against their
participation. However, on election day, far fewer registered women
than registered men actually voted.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are several domestic human rights organizations, and new
human rights and legal aid groups continue to form. These groups
generally are free to operate without government restriction; however,
they are required to be licensed. Human rights groups report that they
generally have good access to police stations and prisons. The
Government has provided protection to human rights lawyers defending
accused blasphemers following threats and attacks on the lawyers by
religious extremists. These threats became more explicit and public in
1998, with signed graffiti calling for the killing of well-known human
rights activist Asma Jahangir.
The Musharraf Government made some attempts to ease some of the
previous government's restrictions on NGO's; the Sharif Government
revoked the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in 1999. General Musharraf
appointed several persons with prominent NGO backgrounds to his Cabinet
and many NGO workers reported a smoother working relationship with the
Government during the period covered by this report. The new government
in Punjab under General Musharraf lifted the previous ban on NGO
registration (see Section 2.b.).
International human rights observers are permitted to visit the
country and travel freely. Several international organizations, many
focused on refugee relief, maintain permanent offices in the country,
although some report difficulty in securing visas for their foreign
staff.
The Ministry of Human Rights, established in 1995, is now a
department within the Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights, and
Parliamentary Affairs. Some 125 employees staff the department, which
is headquartered in Islamabad and has four regional offices. The
department has set up a ``fund for women in distress and detention''
and a ``relief and revolving fund'' for victims of human rights
violations. Because of its limited budget, the department operates
primarily on a case-by-case basis but seeks help from donor agencies
for projects to build institutional capacity and human rights
awareness. The department finalized and began limited implementation of
a reform program for jails. However, the department is not viewed as
effective by human rights observers. The Government has failed to take
follow-up action on the 1997 report of the Commission of Inquiry for
Women.
In April the Government organized a conference on human rights and
pledged to take ``small but meaningful steps'' including: an 8-month
public relations campaign on human rights themes; requiring deputy
commissioners to move female burn victims to hospitals (see Section 5);
banning the use of fetters in prisons and jails (see Section 1.c.);
ordering deputy commissioners to review all blasphemy cases prior to
the filing of a FIR (see Section 1.d.); creating a commission for
police reforms; releasing 20,000 prisoners from jail; calling for a
Commission on the Status of Women; and changing the law so that women
married to foreign husbands can claim citizenship for their children.
The Government subsequently took no apparent steps to organize the
public relations campaign and backtracked on having deputy
commissioners review blasphemy cases (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.). The
Government made limited progress in the following areas: the Lahore
High Court ordered local jail authorities to remove all fetters (see
Section 1.d.); the Government reportedly released 47,000 prisoners who
were convicted of petty crimes and that already had served their prison
terms; the Government inaugurated a National Commission on the Status
of Women on September 1; and in late April President Tarar issued an
amendment ordinance to the citizenship law to enable women married to
foreigners to claim citizenship for their children (see Section 5).
On July 23, several clergy in the NWFP shot at a female NGO
worker's home and ransacked her NGO-sponsored medical camp.
Section 5. Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status
The suspended Constitution provided for equality before the law for
all citizens and broadly prohibited discrimination based on race,
religion, caste, residence, or place of birth; however, in practice
there is significant discrimination based on these factors.
Women.--Domestic violence is a widespread and serious problem.
Human rights groups estimate that anywhere from 70 to 90 percent of
women are victims of domestic violence at the hands of their husbands,
in-laws, or other relatives. The Progressive Women's Organization
reported in 1999 that every one of two women is the victim of mental or
physical violence. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for Women
reported that violence against women ``has been described as the most
pervasive violation of human rights'' in the country, and it called for
legislation clearly stating that domestic violence against women is a
criminal offense. Husbands are known to kill their wives even for
trivial offenses. In 1999 the Pakistan Peace Coalition surveyed 1,000
women in 10 communities in rural Punjab; 82 percent of the respondents
reported that they feared violence from their husbands over trivial
matters. While abusers may be charged with assault, cases rarely are
filed. Police usually return battered women to their abusive family
members. Women are reluctant to file charges because of societal mores
that stigmatize divorce and make women economically and psychologically
dependent on their relatives. Relatives also are reluctant to report
abuse to protect the reputation of the family. There are no specific
laws pertaining to domestic violence, except for the Qisas and Diyat
ordinances, which are rarely invoked and may privatize the crime.
However, Qisas and Diyat cannot be invoked where the victim is a direct
lineal descendant of the perpetrator. Police and judges tend to see
domestic violence as a family problem, and are reluctant to take action
in such cases. Thus, it is difficult for women to obtain relief from
the justice system in cases of domestic violence.
The Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Center in Karachi published a
report in 1999 that summarized reports in the English language press
about violence against women between 1993 and 1998. Even though it
limited itself to reports of violence by close male relatives, Shirkat
Gah documented 535 women who were killed or who committed suicide
during the period; 95 of these women were killed or committed suicide
after they expressed interest in marrying a man of their own choice.
During the year, the press reported on hundreds of incidents of
violence against women, and drew attention to the killings of married
women by relatives over dowry or other family-related disputes. Most of
the victims were burned to death, allegedly in kitchen stove accidents;
some women reportedly were burned with acid. During the year, 593 burn
cases were recorded in Lahore newspapers; cases were registered in 74
percent but suspects were arrested in only 10 percent. Human rights
monitors assert that many cases are not reported by hospitals and that,
even when they are, the police are reluctant to investigate or file
charges. Furthermore, human rights monitors agree that most ``stove
deaths'' are in fact killings based upon a suspicion of illicit sexual
relationship or upon dowry demands. Increased media coverage of cases
of wife burnings, spousal abuse, spousal killing, and rape has helped
to raise awareness about violence against women. The Government has
failed to take action in honor killing cases, particularly when
influential families are involved. By year's end, there was no progress
in the 1998 case of Shahnaz, who died after her husband poured gasoline
on her and set her on fire. The police registered a case against her
husband and three in-laws. The case remained pending.
A crisis center for women in distress was opened in 1997 in
Islamabad. The center, the first of its kind in the country, is an
initiative of the Ministry of Women's Development with the assistance
of local NGO's. The center offers legal and medical referrals from
volunteer doctors and lawyers, counseling from trained psychologists,
and a hotline for women in distress. During the year, the crisis center
served 75 women. A second crisis center in Vehari, in southern Punjab,
opened during the year.
Rape is an extensive problem. The HRCP estimates that at least
eight women, five of them minors, are raped every day, and more than
two-thirds of those are gang-raped. In 1997 the National Assembly
passed a law that provided for the death penalty for persons convicted
of gang rape. No executions have been carried out under this law and
conviction rates remain low because rape, and gang rape in particular,
is commonly used by landlords and criminal bosses to humiliate and
terrorize local residents. It is estimated that less than one-third of
all rapes are reported to the police. Police rarely respond to and
sometimes are implicated in these attacks (see Section 1.c.). According
to a police official, in most rape cases the victims are pressured to
drop charges because of the threat of Hudood adultery or fornication
charges against them if they cannot prove the absence of consent. All
consensual extramarital sexual relations are considered violations of
the Hudood Ordinances, and carry Hadd (Koranic) or Tazir (secular)
punishments (see Section 1.e.). Accordingly, if a woman cannot prove
the absence of consent, there is a risk that she may be charged with a
violation of the Hudood ordinances for fornication or adultery. The
Hadd--or maximum punishment for this offense--is public flogging or
stoning; however, for Hadd punishments to apply, especially stringent
rules of evidence are followed. Hadd punishments are mandatory if
evidentiary requirements are met; for sexual offenses, four adult male
Muslims must witness the act or the alleged perpetrator must confess.
For non-Muslims or in cases where all of the 4 male witnesses are not
Muslim, the punishment is less severe. The testimony of four female
witnesses, or that of the victim alone, is insufficient to impose Hadd
punishments, therefore, even if a man rapes a woman in the presence of
several women, he cannot be subjected to the Hadd punishment. If Hadd
punishment requirements are not met, the accused may be sentenced to a
lesser class of penalties (Tazir); in practice most rape cases are
tried at this level. Under Tazir, a rapist may be sentenced to up to 25
years in prison and 30 lashes. No Hadd punishment has been applied in
the 20 years the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir
punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim
offenders.
According to an HRCP lawyer, the Musharraf Government has brought
fewer charges against women under the Hudood Ordinance than in the
past, and the courts have shown greater leniency toward women in their
sentences and in the granting of bail. However, even in cases where a
woman wishes to bring rape charges, she may have trouble bringing her
attacker to justice. According to Amnesty International, men accused of
rape sometimes are acquitted and released, while their victims are held
on adultery charges.
According to Human Rights Watch, women face difficulty at every
level of the judicial system in bringing rape cases. Police are
reluctant to take the complaint and sometimes are abusive toward the
victim; the courts do not have consistent standards of proof as to what
constitutes rape and to what corroboration is required; and judges,
police, and prosecutors are biased against female rape victims, tending
towards a presumption of female consent and the belief that women lie
about such things. Judges on the whole reportedly are reluctant to
convict; however, if there is some evidence, judges have been known to
convict the accused of the lesser offense of adultery or fornication
(consensual sex). Human Rights Watch also reported that women face
problems in the collection of evidence; that the doctors tasked to
examine rape victims often believe that the victims are lying; that
they are trained insufficiently and have inadequate facilities for the
collection of forensic evidence pertaining to rape; that they do not
testify very effectively in court; and that they tend to focus on the
virginity status of the victim, and, due either to an inadequate
understanding of the need for prompt medical evaluations or to
inadequate resources, often delay the medical examinations for many
days or even weeks, making any evidence that they collect of dubious
utility. Medical examiners and police personnel sometimes are
physically or verbally abusive during these exams, especially in cases
where a woman is charged with adultery or fornication (for which an
exam may be requested) and does not wish to be examined (such women,
despite the fact that by law they should not be examined without their
consent, have been examined, and even have been beaten for their
refusal to be examined). Police and doctors often do not know that a
woman must consent to this type of exam before it can be performed, and
judges may not inform women of their right to decline. If they report
rape to the police, women's cases often are delayed or mishandled, and
women frequently are harassed by police or the alleged perpetrators to
drop the case. Police sometimes accept bribes to get the complainant to
drop a case, and sometimes request bribes to carry it forward. Police
tend to investigate the cases poorly, and may not inform women of the
need for a medical exam or may stall or block women's attempts to
obtain one. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for Women
criticized Hudood Ordinances relating to extramarital sex and
recommended that they be repealed asserting that they are based on an
erroneous interpretation of Shari'a (see Section 1.c.). The Commission
charged that the laws on adultery and rape have been subject to
widespread misuse, with 95 percent of the women accused of adultery
being found innocent either in the court of first instance or on
appeal. However, the Commission pointed out that, by that time, the
woman may have spent months in jail, suffered sexual abuse at the hands
of the police, and seen her reputation destroyed. The Commission found
that the main victims of the Hudood Ordinances are poor women who are
unable to defend themselves against slanderous charges. These
ordinances also have been used by husbands and other male family
members to punish their wives and female relatives for reasons having
nothing to do with sexual propriety, according to the Commission. At
year's end, 511 women were awaiting trial for adultery under the Hudood
Ordinance in Lahore; 400 in Peshawar; and 300 in Mardan (see Section
1.e.).
Marital rape is not a crime. The 1979 Hudood Ordinances abolished
punishment for raping one's wife. However, the Commission of Inquiry
for women has recommended reinstating penalties for marital rape.
Marriage registration (nikah) sometimes occurs years before a marriage
is consummated (rukh sati). The nikah (unconsummated) marriage is
regarded as a formal marital relationship, and thus a woman or girl
cannot be raped by a man to whom her marriage is registered, even if
the marriage has not yet been entered into formally.
There are numerous reports of women killed or mutilated by male
relatives who suspect them of adultery. Few such cases are investigated
seriously and those who are arrested often are acquitted on the grounds
that they were ``provoked,'' or for a lack of witnesses. While the
tradition of killing those suspected of illicit sexual relations in so-
called ``honor killings'', in order to restore tribal or family honor,
applies equally to offending men and women, women are far more likely
to be killed than men. The Progressive Women's Organization, a human
rights NGO, estimated that as many as 300 women are killed each year by
their husbands or family, mostly as a result of ``honor killings,''
known as ``karo/kari'' in Sindh. The problem is believed to be even
more extensive in rural Sindh. ``Karo/kari'' (or adulterer/adulteress)
killings are common in rural Sindh and Baluchistan. The HRCP reported
an average of 30 killings per month for the first half of the year.
Tribal custom among the Baluch and the Pathans also sanctions such
killings. The Commission of Inquiry for Women has rejected the concept
of ``honor'' as a mitigating circumstance in a murder case and
recommended that such killings be treated as simple murder. Women who
are the victims of rape may become the victims of their families'
vengeance against the victims' ``defilement.'' On June 1, Nazir Ahmad
killed his wife, Yasmin, and a family friend, Nasir Farooq, on
suspicion that the two were conducting an extramarital relationship. On
December 12, Khalida was killed by her uncle and other relatives who
accused her of having illicit relations with Momin Gorchani. Khalida's
relatives also injured Momin's father and another one of his relatives.
Police arrested one person in connection with the murder. AI also
reported that if an accused adulteress is killed, and the adulterer
manages to escape this fate, he may be required under the karo/kari
tradition to compensate the family of the accused adulteress;
sometimes, a woman from the adulterer's family is given compensation to
repair the honor of the adulteress' family.
Trafficking in women also is a significant problem (see Section
6.f.).
There are significant barriers to the advancement of women
beginning at birth. In general female children are less valued and
cared for than are male children. According to a UN study, girls
receive less nourishment, health care, and education than do boys. In
February Dr. Sher Shah Syed, of the Pakistan National Forum on Women's
Health in Karachi, reported that the maternal mortality rate is 600 per
100,000 pregnancies; this figure contradicts the Government's figure of
300 per 100,000 pregnancies. At Karachi's civil hospital, the maternal
mortality rate was 2,257 per 100,000 in 1999. According to a 1996
report by the Islamabad-based human development center, only 16 women
are economically active for every 100 men.
Discrimination against women is particularly acute in rural areas.
In some areas of rural Sindh and Baluchistan, female literacy rates are
2 percent or less. A survey of rural females by the National Institute
of Psychology found that 42 percent of parents cited ``no financial
benefit'' as the reason they kept their daughters from attending
school, and sent their sons instead. Similarly a study by the NWFP
directorate of primary education concluded that most girls in rural
areas do not go to school because they have to look after the household
while their mothers help in the fields. In Karachi only 28 percent of
girls completing matriculation (10th grade) exams in science during the
year would be able to find places in government-run colleges, as
opposed to 83 percent of boys passing the same tests. In Baluchistan
conditions are much worse, with only 2 percent of the province's women
having received any formal education. Education activists have noted
that many parents would like to educate their daughters; however, many
parents reportedly choose not to send their daughters to school due to
the poor quality of instruction and the lack of facilities.
Human rights monitors and women's groups believe that a narrow
interpretation of Shari'a has had a harmful effect on the rights of
women and minorities, as it reinforces popular attitudes and
perceptions and contributes to an atmosphere in which discriminatory
treatment of women and non-Muslims is more readily accepted.
Both civil and religious laws theoretically protect women's rights
in cases of divorce, but many women are unaware of them, and often the
laws are not observed. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for
Women has recommended that marriage registration (nikahnama) be
obligatory and that women, as well as men, have the right to initiate
divorce proceedings. It also has called for the punishment of those who
coerce women or girls into forced marriages. A husband legally is bound
to maintain his wife until 3 months after the divorce. A father is
bound to maintain his children until they reach the age of 14 for
males, or the age of 16 for females. However, the legal system is so
complicated and lengthy that it can take years for the children to get
maintenance.
In inheritance cases women generally do not receive--or are pressed
to surrender--the share of the inheritance they legally are due. In
rural areas, the practice of a woman ``marrying the Koran'' still is
widely accepted if the family cannot arrange a suitable marriage or
wants to keep the family wealth intact. A woman ``married to the
Koran'' is forbidden to have any contact with males over 14 years of
age, including her immediate family members. Press reports indicate
that the practice of buying and selling brides still occurs in parts of
the NWFP and the Punjab.
A special three-member bench of the Lahore High Court upheld in
1997 the federal Shariat Court's ruling that a Muslim woman can marry
without the consent of her wali (guardian--usually her father).
However, in practice social custom dictates that couples are to marry
at the direction of family elders. When this custom is violated,
especially across ethnic lines, violence against the couple may result,
and the authorities generally fail to prosecute such cases vigorously.
Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved (see
Section 2.c.).
The value of women's testimony is not equal to that of a man's in
certain court cases (see Section 1.e.).
In December speakers at a seminar stated that large numbers of
working women face discrimination and sexual harassment. Women
routinely are denied equal opportunities for promotion, pay, and
benefits. Additionally women in some sectors are denied days off and
overtime benefits.
Although a small number of women study and teach in universities,
postgraduate employment opportunities for women largely remain limited
to teaching, medical services, and the law. Nevertheless, an increasing
number of women are entering the commercial and public sectors.
Women's organizations operate primarily in urban centers. Many
concentrate on educating women about existing legal rights. Other
groups concentrate on providing legal aid to poor women in prison who
may not be able to afford an attorney.
The Government took several positive steps to improve the status of
women during the year. For example, in April President Tarar issued an
amendment ordinance to the citizenship law, which enables women who are
married to foreign husbands to claim citizenship for their children. In
September the Government inaugurated a National Commission on the
Status of Women (see Section 4). The Commission was established in
order to advise the Government on policies directly affecting women;
however, the Commission lacks the authority to ensure that its
recommendations are implemented.
Children.--The Government, through its laws and programs, does not
demonstrate a strong commitment to children's rights and welfare. There
is no federal law on compulsory education, and neither the federal nor
provincial governments provide sufficient resources to assure universal
education. The education system is in disarray, with studies showing
that only 65 to 70 percent of children under the age of 12 are enrolled
in school, less than half of whom actually complete primary school. In
Sindh province, the number of students enrolled in primary education
rose from 2.1 million to 2.6 million between 1992 and 1998, an increase
of approximately 6 percent. During this period, an average population
growth rate of 3 percent would have added 20 percent to the number of
primary school age children. Even in relatively prosperous Karachi,
enrollment figures are low. M.I. Memon, the late head of the Board of
Intermediate and Secondary Education in Karachi, estimated in 1998 that
only 1.1 million of Karachi's school-age children actually were
attending school: 500,000 in the public schools; 500,000 in private
schools; and 100,000 in madrassahs (Islamic religious schools). Since
the lowest estimate of school-age children in Karachi--the wealthiest
and most developed city in the country--is 4 million, it would appear
that no more than 27.5 percent of school age children are attending
school. Even those children who go to school are not assured of being
able to read and write. According to UNICEF figures, a nationwide
sample of children in grade five revealed that only 33 percent could
read with comprehension, while a mere 17 percent were able to write a
simple letter. Development experts point to a number of factors for the
poor state of public education, including the low percentage of gross
national product devoted to education and inefficient and corrupt
federal and provincial bureaucracies. Those fortunate enough to pursue
higher education often face inordinate delays in receiving the results
of final exams. On March 30, candidates for civil engineering degrees
received results of the 1996 annual examinations. In 1999 one member of
the Prime Minister's education task force estimated that up to 50
percent of the education budget is ``pilfered.''
Information about progress in educating girls is contradictory. A
recent survey found that the enrollment rate for girls under age 12 was
65 percent, which was less than that of boys (75 percent), but was
considerably higher than the 1990 figure of 50 percent. Since official
government figures count at most 1.5 million school-age children in
public and private schools and madrassahs in Karachi (of an estimated 4
million or more between the ages of 5 and 14), enrollment figures of 65
and 75 percent are difficult to account for. In all of Sindh province,
a 14 percent jump in the number of girls in Sindh's primary schools in
the 1992-1998 period placed female enrollment in 1998 at only 35
percent. Similarly the female literacy rate has doubled during the past
two decades, although, at roughly 27 percent, it is just over half that
of males. However, an Oxfam report released in March 1999 stated that
the proportion of girls enrolled in school fell by 10 percent in the
first half of the 1990's and one doctor claimed in a February press
report that the average time girls spend in school nationwide is 0.7
years.
The Government announced a new education policy in March 1998,
which dealt mostly with the construction of new schools but that also
included provisions for increased Islamic instruction in public
schools. Education is a provincial responsibility. In 1998 the
government of Punjab, the country's most populous province, began an
ambitious program to improve the quality of its educational system. A
comprehensive survey was performed to identify school buildings that
were being misused as well as the large numbers of teachers and
administrators who were not performing their duties or even showing up
for work. Administrative action against these ``ghost schools'' began,
and the Government was better placed to ensure that its education
budget was not misused. The Punjab government also worked closely with
both international and local NGO's to improve primary and secondary
education. However, no legal action was taken against those found
responsible for the misuse of government property.
Health care services, like education, remained seriously inadequate
for the nation's children. Children suffer a high rate of preventable
childhood diseases. According to the National Institute of Child Health
Care, over 70 percent of deaths between birth and the age of five are
caused by easily preventable ailments such as diarrhea and
malnutrition. Public health administration suffers from poor
management, avoidance of responsibility, false data, and lack of
cooperation among agencies. The problems associated with polio are
illustrative. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 1997
91 percent of confirmed polio cases in the eastern Mediterranean region
were in Pakistan (1,147). The WHO and the Center for Disease Control
reported in 1999 that the full (three-dose) course of oral polio
vaccine has been given to only 57 percent of children in Punjab, 50
percent in the NWFP, 42 percent in Sindh, and 22 percent in
Baluchistan. However, even the high number of reported polio cases may
be too low, and the reported protection rate may be too high. Public
health professors at a Karachi medical school report that vaccines
frequently are degraded by poor storage, and that vaccination rates are
inflated. In 1999 the English-language newspaper Dawn reported that
doctors in Sindh had persuaded the Sindh health department to order a
halt to the reporting of polio cases. Doctors are required by law to
vaccinate all children under 5 years old within a 1.2 mile range (3
miles in rural areas); however, they reportedly have taken steps to
avoid the responsibility. Although the Government has undertaken six
national immunization days since 1994, a Center for Disease Control
official who observed a 1999 polio immunization campaign in Quetta, the
capital of Baluchistan, reported that vaccination teams had no maps,
census data, or plans. The International Labor Organization (ILO)
reports that 8 percent of children suffer from iron deficiency and 30
to 40 percent of children in the country suffer from stunted growth.
According to a family-planning NGO, up to 50 percent of children are
born iodine-deficient, resulting in high rates of mental retardation.
During the year, the Government conducted a well-publicized campaign to
encourage polio vaccinations; however, there were no statistics
available on the number of children who were vaccinated.
Many children begin working at a very early age (see Section 6.d.).
At the age of 5 or 6, many female children assume responsibility for
younger siblings.
Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Children sometimes are kidnaped to be used as forced labor, for
ransom, or to seek revenge against an enemy (see Sections 6.c. and
6.d.). On September 11, an anti-terrorist court in Karachi convicted
five men for kidnaping the 15-year-old son of a businessman in January;
three of the five defendants were sentenced to death. In rural areas,
it is a traditional practice for poor parents to give children to rich
landlords in exchange for money or land, according to human rights
advocates. These children frequently are abused by these landlords and
held as bonded laborers for life. Landlords also have been known to pay
impoverished parents for the ``virginity'' of their daughters, whom the
landlords then rape. Incidents of rape and the s are common. A 1996
survey conducted in Punjab showed that 40 percent of reported rape
victims were minors, with the youngest victim in the study only 8 years
old. A UNICEF-sponsored study of Punjab found that 15 percent of girls
reported having been abused sexually. Sexual abuse of boys is more
common in segments of society where women and girls traditionally
remain within the home. An HRCP study in the NWFP found 723 cases of
sexual abuse of boys and 635 of girls during the first half of 1998. A
newspaper reported that there were 1,025 incidents of sexual abuse of
children between January and September; in the majority of cases,
children were abused by acquaintances. There were credible reports of
boys being sexually abused in a jail located in Punjab province during
the year. At a May conference in Karachi on trafficking in women,
speakers claimed that over 15,000 child sex workers were operating in
Lahore and other cities. Child prostitution involving boys and girls is
widely known to exist but rarely is discussed. All forms of
prostitution are illegal and a person who abducts a child under the age
of 10 and commits sexual assault may be sentenced to the death penalty.
The Shabab-i-Milli, the youth wing of the Jamaat Islami party, launched
a campaign in May to combat child prostitution by raising public
awareness of the problem. The Commission of Inquiry for Women has
observed that child sexual abuse is a subject that ``has been virtually
ignored,'' and called for a public education campaign on the subject,
including introducing it into school curriculums and training nurses
and doctors in how to handle such cases.
In the aftermath of a September prison riot in Hyderabad (see
Section 1.c.), military personnel discovered that adult prisoners
abused sexually about 50 imprisoned minors. The Government did not take
action against prison officials for permitting the abuse by year's end.
Children's rights theoretically are protected by numerous laws that
incorporate elements of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
However, the Government frequently fails to enforce these laws. There
are two facilities--one in Karachi and one in Bahawalpur--that serve as
reform schools for juvenile offenders. There is only one jail in each
province for convicted prisoners under 21 years of age, and children
frequently are incarcerated along with the general prison population,
sharing prison conditions that are extremely poor (see Section 1.c.).
Many children in prison were born to female inmates who were sexually
abused by prison guards. Although Punjab and Sindh provinces have laws
mandating special judicial procedures for child offenders, in practice,
children and adults essentially are treated equally. According to a
local NGO, an estimated 4,200 children were held in the nation's
prisons at year's end, some as young as 8 years old, compared with
4,000 in 1999. Imprisoned children often spend long periods of time in
prison awaiting trial or a hearing before a magistrate, often in
violation of the law. One child spent 3 years and 4 months awaiting
trial. Children are subject to the same delays and inefficiencies in
the justice system as adults are (see Section 1.e.). Peshawar's jail in
1998 contained 183 children, 40 percent of whom were Afghan refugees.
These prisoners were separated from the adult prisoners. According to
some estimates, there are 900 children in Karachi's central jail, in a
space meant to house 300; these children are 18 and under. Human Rights
Watch reports that children frequently are beaten and even tortured
while in detention; usually this is done to extract confessions, but it
is done also to punish or intimidate child detainees or to extort
payment from their families for their release (see Section 1.c.).
Sexual abuse of child detainees by police or guards is reportedly a
problem as well (see Section 1.c.).
Courts also may order that children be sent to reform schools or
various types of residential facilities, many designed to provide
vocational or other training. Juvenile offenders and, in some cases,
homeless and destitute children, may be sent to these residential
facilities, for terms not to exceed the amount of time until they reach
majority. Conditions in these institutions reportedly are poor, similar
to those found in jails. Abuse and torture of the children in such
institutions is a problem; one study found that 17.4 percent of the
inmates of the Youthful Offenders Industrial School in Karachi had been
tortured or otherwise mistreated. Educational facilities in these
institutions often are inadequate; however, during the year, an NGO in
Karachi started a school for the approximately 1 dozen children forced
to live in a Karachi women's prison. Extortion on the part of the staff
at such institutions is reportedly widespread; parents of inmates often
are required to pay lower level staff members to visit their children
or bring them food. Drug trafficking by guards and other staff also is
a problem; some children reportedly have developed drug habits while in
these institutions, and are supplied by their guards.
On July 1, the Government passed the Juvenile Justice System
Ordinance. The ordinance abolished the death penalty for minors under
18 years of age, guarantees that the Government will provide children
with legal assistance, prohibits children from being tried for crimes
with adults, and prohibits the proceedings of juvenile courts from
being published.
According to press reports, there are several madrassahs where
children are confined illegally and kept in unhealthy conditions, and
there were reports of the abuse of children studying at madrassahs
during the year. Sexual abuse of boys is widely believed to occur at
some madrassahs.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is practiced by the Bohra Muslims. There are an
estimated 100,000 Bohra Muslims in the country; the Bohra observe a
form of Shi'a Islam that was practiced in medieval Cairo. There were no
available statistics on the extent to which the Bohra practice FGM;
however, the practice of FGM in the Bohra community reportedly has
declined in the last few years.
People with Disabilities.--There are no laws requiring equal
accessibility to public buildings for disabled persons. The vast
majority of physically and mentally disabled persons are cared for by
their families. However, in some cases these individuals are forced
into begging, while organized criminal ``beggarmasters'' skim off much
of the proceeds. Parents reportedly have given children as offering to
Baba Shah Dola, a shrine in Punjab where the children reportedly
intentionally are deformed by clamping a metal form on the head that
induces microcephalitis. Some human rights organizations asked local
authorities to investigate this practice; however, there have been no
investigations. There is a legal provision requiring public and private
organizations to reserve at least 2 percent of their jobs for qualified
disabled persons. Organizations that do not wish to hire disabled
persons can instead give a certain amount of money to the government
treasury, which goes into a fund for the disabled. This obligation
rarely is enforced. The National Council for the Rehabilitation of the
Disabled provides some job placement and loan facilities.
Mentally ill prisoners normally lack adequate care and are not
segregated from the general prison population (see Section 1.c.).
Religious Minorities.--Government authorities afford religious
minorities fewer protections than are afforded to Sunni Muslim
citizens. Members of religious minorities are subject to violence and
harassment, and police at times refuse to prevent such actions or to
charge persons who commit them.
Sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims continued to be
a serious problem throughout the country (see Section 2.c.). In Punjab
in particular, a deadly pattern of Sunni-Shi'a violence in which
extremists killed persons because of their membership in rival
sectarian organizations, or simply for their religious identification,
continued; however, there were fewer deaths during the year as compared
to previous years. Anti-terrorist courts handed down convictions
against several individuals accused of sectarian violence during the
year; however, government authorities did not detain suspects in many
other cases of sectarian violence. Several incidents of sectarian
violence between rival Sunni and Shi'a groups occurred during Muharram
in April, during which Shi'a Muslims mourn the deaths of the Prophet
Mohammed's nephew Ali and his son Hussain. On April 7, a Shi'a lawyer
and the secretary general of TJP, Syed Waqar Hussain, his son, and his
driver were killed by unknown gunmen in Karachi; the assailants may
have been members of the extremist SSP (see Section 1.a.). On April 12,
in the worst incident of sectarian violence since the coup, unknown
assailants attacked a Shi'a religious congregation in Mullowali,
Rawalpindi, with grenades and bullets, killing 19 persons and injuring
37 others (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Police personnel arrested
several Sunni Muslims following the attack. On April 19, unknown gunmen
killed TJP activist, Iqubal Hussain in Multan. On April 26, unknown
assailants killed TJP activist, Syed Farrukh Birjis Haider and his
personal aide in Khanewal. On April 28, unknown gunmen killed local
Shi'a leader Hakeem Syed Shahbaz Hussain Sherazi in Chishtian. On May
2, unidentified assailants killed a Shi'a doctor, his pharmaceutical
dispenser, and a patient in the doctor's Karachi office. The next day,
unknown assailants killed Shi'a lawyer, Malik Ibrar Hussain in Toba Tek
Singh, Punjab. On May 15, unknown assailants killed Shi'a lawyer Syed
Sardar Hussain Jafri. Unknown assailants also killed Qudratullah
Cheema, the chief of the Ahmadi community of Khanpur. On May 19,
unknown assailants killed eminent Sunni cleric Maulana Yousuf Ludhianvi
and Abdur Rehman, a teacher at the Sunni Banuri town religious school
in Karachi; following these murders, hundreds of Sunni Muslims rioted
in Karachi and torched a newspaper office, a movie theater, and a bank
(see Section 2.c.).
Ahmadis often are targets of religious intolerance, much of which
is instigated by organized religious extremists. Ahmadi leaders charge
that militant Sunni mullahs and their followers sometimes stage marches
through the streets of Rabwah, a predominantly Ahmadi town and
spiritual center in central Punjab. Backed by crowds of 100 to 200
persons, the mullahs purportedly denounce Ahmadis and their founder, a
situation that sometimes leads to violence. The Ahmadis claim that
police generally are present during these marches but do not intervene
to prevent trouble (see Section 2.c.).
On October 30, 2 assailants opened fire on an Ahmadi mosque in
Ghatialian in Sialkot district, killing 4 Ahmadis and 1 Sunni Muslim.
Three suspects were arrested; however, no formal charges were filed by
year's end. On November 10, a mob composed of the cleric's followers
killed five Ahmadis in Takht Hazara, Sarghoda district following a
scuffle between a group of Ahmadis and a Sunni Muslim cleric. Police
detained 25 persons for questioning and imprisoned 13 others in
connection with the killings; however, no charges were filed against
any of the suspects by year's end (see Section 2.c.).
On July 15, in response to pressure from some Muslim groups, the
Government incorporated the Islamic provisions of the suspended
Constitution into the Provisional Constitutional Order, including the
clause declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. Ahmadis suffer from
harassment and discrimination and have limited chances for advancement
into management levels in government service (see Section 2.c.). Even
the rumor that someone may be an Ahmadi or have Ahmadi relatives can
stifle opportunities for employment or promotion. Ahmadi students in
public schools are subject to abuse by their non-Ahmadi classmates, and
the quality of teachers assigned to predominantly Ahmadi schools by the
Government generally is poor. However, most Ahmadis are home-schooled
or go to private Ahmadi-run schools. Young Ahmadis complain of their
difficulty in gaining admittance to good colleges and consequently
having to go abroad for higher education. Certain sections of the Penal
Code discriminate against Ahmadis (see Section 2.c.), particularly the
provision that forbids Ahmadis from ``directly or indirectly'' posing
as Muslims. Armed with this vague wording, mullahs have brought charges
against Ahmadis for using standard Muslim salutations and for naming
their children Mohammed.
Other religious minority groups also experience considerable
discrimination in employment and education. In the country's early
years, minorities were able to rise to the senior ranks of the military
and civil service. Today many are unable to rise above mid-level ranks.
Discrimination in employment reportedly is common. Christians in
particular have difficulty finding jobs other than menial labor,
although Christian activists say the employment situation has improved
somewhat in the private sector. Christians are overrepresented in
Pakistan's most oppressed social group--that of bonded laborers. Like
Ahmadis many Christians complain about the difficulty that their
children face in gaining admission to government schools and colleges,
a problem they attribute to discrimination. Many Christians continue to
express fear of forced marriages between Muslim males and Christian
women, although the practice is relatively rare. Reprisals against
suspected converts to Christianity occur, and a general atmosphere of
religious intolerance has led to acts of violence against religious
minorities (see Section 2.c.). According to the HRCP, in January
intruders broke into a church in Sialkot and desecrated religious
literature. On March 12, men broke into the Lourdes Convent and
attacked Sister Christine, a 78-year-old nun; she died in a nearby
hospital a few days later. According to the Christian Liberation Front
(CLF), an NGO, the perpetrators of the attack were Muslims who
previously had accused Sister Christine of proselytizing. Police
officials did not arrest anyone in connection with this attack. In May
five masked men stopped a factory bus in Ferozwala on which female
factory employees were traveling and raped six to eight Christian girls
who were passengers; the assailants reportedly spared the two Muslim
passengers on the bus. Initially police officials urged the girls to
report that they were robbed, not raped; however, when the CLF
complained to government officials, the officials immediately
registered the cases as rape cases, arrested three suspects, and
promised to investigate police behavior. The suspects were charged
under the Hudood Ordinances and were scheduled to stand trial in
September. One of the suspects was released for lack of evidence;
however the other two cases had not been tried by year's end.
There are restrictions on certain testimony in court by non-Muslims
(see Section 1.e.).
Although there are few Jewish citizens, anti-Semitic sentiments
appear to be widespread, and anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist press
articles are common.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Industrial Relations Ordinance of
1969 (IRO) permits industrial workers to form trade unions subject to
major restrictions in some employment areas. The Essential Services
Maintenance Act of 1952 (ESMA) covers the state administration,
government services, and state enterprises like oil and gas production,
electricity generation and transmission, the state-owned airline, and
ports. Workers in these sectors are allowed to form unions. However,
the ESMA sharply restricts normal union activities, usually
prohibiting, for example, the right to strike in affected
organizations. A worker's right to quit also may be curtailed under the
ESMA. For each industry subject to the ESMA, the Government must make a
finding, renewable every six months, on the limits of union activity.
There is no provision allowing agricultural workers or teachers to
unionize as they are not defined as ``an industry.'' A presidential
ordinance in 1998 banned all union activity in the water and power
development authority (employing 130,000 workers) for 2 years.
Following a 3-day conference on employment protection, human resource
development, and industrial relations sponsored by the Musharraf
Government and the ILO in May, the Government on July 17 passed an
ordinance permitting water and power workers to engage in ``responsible
trade unionism.''
Other restrictions on union activities include the Anti-terrorist
Ordinance of 1999 (ATO). The ATO codified the crime of a ``terrorist
act,'' which includes ``an act of civil commotion.'' Such acts are
punishable by imprisonment of 7 years to life, as well as fines.
``Civil commotion'' includes illegal strikes, go-slows, and lockouts.
Under the original ordinance, those distributing, publishing, or
pasting a handbill or making graffiti or wall-chalking ``intended to
create unrest'' were subject to arrest. According to the ILO, this
ordinance prevented leafleting, posters, or even word-of-mouth notices
of public meetings. In late 1999, the ATO was amended to eliminate
references to handbills, graffiti, or the intent to create civil
commotion (see Sections 1.e and 2.b.). According to government
estimates, union members make up about 10 percent of the industrial
labor force and 3 percent of the total estimated work force. Unions
claim that the number of union members is underestimated. Contract
labor continues to flourish, undercutting the power of the unions and
exploiting workers who are willing to work on temporary contracts with
fewer benefits and no job security.
Legally required conciliation proceedings and cooling-off periods
constrain the right to strike, as does the Government's authority to
ban any strike that may cause ``serious hardship to the community'' or
prejudice the national interest. The Government also may ban a strike
that has continued for 30 days. Strikes are rare. When they occur, they
usually are illegal and short. The Government regards as illegal any
strike conducted by workers who are not members of a legally registered
union. Police do not hesitate to crack down on worker demonstrations.
The law prohibits employers from seeking retribution against leaders of
a legal strike and stipulates criminal penalties for offenders. The
courts may imprison employers for violating this prohibition, but they
are more likely to fine them. The law does not protect leaders of
illegal strikes. In May and June, there were strikes by small and large
businessmen throughout the country to protest the Government's efforts
to collect taxes. In May there was a 3-day strike by religious leaders
against General Musharraf's proposed modification of the blasphemy law
(see Section 2.b.).
Unions may belong to federations, and there are eight major
federations. The Government permits trade unions across the political
spectrum. While many unions remain aloof from politics, some are
associated with political parties. Unions associated with opposition
parties are allowed to carry on their activities freely.
In 1997 the Cabinet passed an amendment to the IRO which states
that: 1) only employees of the represented industry can hold office in
a trade union; and 2) if trade unions form a federation, the federation
cannot bargain with individual employers; each component union has to
bargain for itself. The first provision disadvantages smaller unions,
which may not have enough officers capable of bargaining. The second
provision is an attempt to weaken the power of the federations. This
amendment has been challenged by the trade unions and, as a result, has
not yet come into force. Late in 1997, the Prime Minister announced the
Government's new investment policy, under which, in order to improve
working relations among employees and employers, trade union activity
would be industry-based and not factory-based. The new policy also
decrees that, in order to check the growth of trade unions, unions
receiving less than 20 percent of the votes in a referendum are to be
dissolved automatically and their registrations canceled. No action has
been taken to implement these elements of the investment policy.
The ILO has stated repeatedly that current law and practice violate
the Government's commitments under ILO Convention 87. The ILO has urged
the Government to lift prohibitions against union activity with respect
to teachers, radio, television, railway, forestry, hospital, banking,
and other Government employees, as well as to rescind the existing ban
on strikes. The ILO also expressed concern about the practice of
artificial promotions that exclude workers from the purview of
Convention 111. In response to a Government request, the ILO has
provided technical assistance to help bring the country's labor laws
into conformity with the ILO's conventions. However, no legislative
remedies have been applied.
In 1994 a government task force on labor recommended improvements
on worker rights problems, which formed the basis for the development
of a new government labor policy. The Government has not approved the
new policy; however, it has implemented two components of the proposed
policy: 1) improvements in the workers' welfare fund; and 2) increases
in social security benefits for workers. Federations are free to
affiliate with international federations and confederations. Pakistani
trade unions belong to the ICFTU and to secretariats affiliated with
the ICFTU.
The United States revoked generalized system of preferences (GSP)
trade benefits in 1996 for failure to make progress on worker rights
issues.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of
industrial workers to organize and freely elect representatives to act
as collective bargaining agents is established in law. The IRO
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Under the law, private
employers are required to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
However, in practice, such redress has not been available to workers,
because workers usually do not pursue redress through the courts due to
the fact that the legal system is normally slow, prohibitively
expensive, and sometimes corrupt. In general, legal unions have the
right to bargain collectively. However, the many restrictions on
forming unions (see Section 6.a.) preclude collective bargaining by
large sections of the labor force like agricultural workers who are not
provided with the right to strike, bargain collectively, or make
demands on employers. The National Bank of Pakistan Employees Union
filed suit against the Government for implementing a banking companies
ordinance that prohibited union activities in banks during working
hours and allowed only current bank employees to serve as bank trade
union officials. Labor unions report that workers are given artificial
promotions (such as a new title with no salary increase) to make them
ineligible for union membership. This practice is prevalent in the
financial sector, particularly among foreign banks.
The ESMA also restricts collective bargaining. For each industry
subject to the ESMA (see Section 6.a.), the Government must make a
finding, renewable every 6 months, on the limits of union activity. In
cases in which the Government prohibits collective bargaining, special
wage boards decide wage levels.
The boards are established at the provincial level and are composed
of representatives from industry, labor, and the provincial labor
ministry, which provides the chairman. Despite the presence of labor
representatives, unions generally are dissatisfied with the boards'
findings. Disputes are adjudicated before the National Industrial
Relations Commission. A worker's right to quit also may be curtailed
under the ESMA. Dismissed workers have no recourse to the labor courts.
The ESMA exempts export promotion zones (EPZ's) from the IRO's
granting of workers the right to form trade unions. There is only one
EPZ, in Karachi, with nearly 6,000 employees, according to government
sources. In 1996 the Cabinet decided to withdraw these exemptions
beginning in January 2000. However, the Government has stated that it
will honor agreements with investors regarding the exemptions, making
it unlikely that the EPZ's exemption will be lifted before 2001.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The suspended
Constitution and the law prohibited forced labor, including forced
labor by children; however, the Government does not enforce these
prohibitions effectively. Critics argue that the ESMA's limitation on
worker rights, especially the right to quit, constitutes a form of
compulsory labor. The ILO has objected to this violation of Convention
29. The Government has responded that the maintenance of essential
services is required for the defense and security of the country, and
that continued reviews have limited these services to a few core areas
like electricity generation and distribution, and air and sea ports.
There is a reasonable basis to believe that handmade bricks and
hand-woven wool carpets are produced with forced or indentured child
labor. Illegal bonded labor is widespread. It is common in the brick,
glass, and fishing industries and is found among agricultural and
construction workers in rural areas. A 1998 study by a trade federation
reported that over 200,000 families work in debt slavery in the brick
kiln industry and there are reports that this figure has grown with the
arrival of Afghan refugees to the country. The Bonded Labor Liberation
Front (BLLF) is an NGO that advocates for the rights of bonded laborers
and provides a safe haven and educational and vocational training for
those who have escaped their bondage. The BLLF states that it freed 820
bonded brick kiln workers (including 351 children) in 1999. There is no
evidence that bonded labor is used in the production of export items
like sporting goods and surgical equipment. However, bonded labor
reportedly is used in the production of carpets for export under the
peshgi system, by which a worker is advanced money and raw materials
for a carpet he promises to complete. Many workers do not realize the
extent of their exploitation. The lack of education among bonded
laborers deprives them of the ability to perform the necessary
calculations to know when they have paid their debts to bondholders.
Bonded laborers who escape often face retaliation from former
employers. Although police do arrest violators of the law against
bonded labor, many of these individuals bribe the police to release
them. Conservative estimates put the number of bonded workers at
several million. The Government disputes that peshgi workers are
``bonded'' or ``forced'' laborers and argues that they are ``contract
laborers'' who negotiate a salary advance in a free and open market.
Human rights groups report that as many as 50 private jails housing
some 4,500 bonded laborers were maintained by landlords in rural Sindh
(see Section 1.d.).
The suspended Constitution and the law prohibited slavery. However,
in remote areas of rural Sindh, bonded agricultural labor and debt
slavery have a long history. Landlords have kept entire families in
private prisons and sold families to other landlords.
The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act of 1992 outlawed bonded
labor, canceled all existing bonded debts, and forbade lawsuits for the
recovery of existing debts. The act makes bonded labor by children
punishable by up to 5 years in prison and up to $900 (PRs 50,000) in
fines. However, the provincial governments, which are responsible for
enforcing the law, have failed to establish enforcement mechanisms.
Furthermore the law is written in English and is frequently
incomprehensible to persons it is intended to protect. Hence the law is
ineffective. Lacking employment alternatives, many workers who have
been freed end up returning to bonded labor. In April General Musharraf
announced that approximately $1,700,000 (PRs 100,000,000) have been
designated to fight bonded labor. However, these funds were not
allocated by year's end.
There are reports that children in juvenile detention facilities
are required to work. Children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either
are imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their
parents, or were born in jail reportedly are involved in woodcrafts and
television repairs (see Section 6.d.). Verifying these reports is
difficult because of limited outside access to the jail.
Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Children sometimes are kidnaped to be used for forced labor.
According to 1996 ILO estimates, 3.3 million children between the ages
of 5 and 14 years (about 8 percent of this population group) are
``economically active.'' Of these, about two-thirds work in
agriculture. Seventy percent of the working children have the status of
``unpaid family helpers.'' Many observers believe that the ILO
estimates understate the true dimensions of the problem. Observers also
believe that the incidence of bonded labor among such children is
significant, but there are no reliable figures available on this. Some
boys, usually between the ages of 6 and 9, are taken to countries in
the Persian Gulf to serve as camel jockeys (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor is common and results from a combination of
severe poverty, employer greed, and inadequate enforcement of laws
intended to control it. The suspended Constitution prohibited the
employment of children aged 14 years and under in factories, mines, and
other hazardous occupations. The Employment of Children Act of 1991,
whose provisions were extended by the President in 1998 to the FATA,
prohibits the employment of children under age 14 in certain
occupations and regulates their conditions of work. Under this law, no
child is allowed to work overtime or at night. Penalties for the
violation of the act include fines of up to $335 (PRs 20,000) or 1 year
in prison. The Government acknowledges that child labor is a problem.
The Constitution prohibits forced labor, including forced labor
performed by children; however, forced and bonded labor by children is
common (see Section 6.c.).
Children in juvenile detention facilities reportedly are required
to work; children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either are
imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their
parents, or were born in jail, reportedly are involved in woodcrafts
and television repairs (see Section 6.c.).
In 1996 the Government announced the results of its first
comprehensive child labor survey conducted with the assistance of the
ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-
IPEC). According to the survey, 8.3 percent (or between 3.3 and 3.6
million) of children between the ages of 5 and 14 worked. The child
labor force was predominately male (73 percent) and rural (71 percent).
About 60 percent of child labor in the country occurred in Punjab. Some
45.8 percent of child laborers worked 35 hours or more per week and
12.6 percent worked 56 hours or more. The majority (67 percent) of
child laborers worked in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing
industries; 11 percent in the manufacturing sector, 9 percent in
wholesale and retail, and 8 percent in social and personal services. In
occupational terms, craft and related trade work accounted for about 19
percent of child laborers, while 71 percent worked in unskilled jobs.
Only the Government and exporters regard the ILO survey as an accurate
measurement of the incidence of child labor. Many observers believe
that it understates the problem, and give higher estimates of as many
as 20 million child laborers. A 1997 survey by the Pakistan Institute
of Labor Education and Research indicated that in one-fourth of 187
Karachi households, the eldest child worker (below the age of 14)
provided more than 40 percent of household income. A recent ILO survey
indicated that agriculture is the largest child labor industry;
followed by the informal sector, which includes domestic work, street
vending, illegal work, and family businesses; hazardous work, such as
the leather, surgical instruments, and brick kiln industries rank
third. The report also noted that when programs are developed to
eliminate child labor in one industry, parents often shift their
children to work in other industries. A survey conducted by the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan published in June 1999 noted that there
are approximately 4,000 children working in auto workshops in the
Mardan district of the NWFP. The report stated that most of the
children were between the ages of 3 and 8. In a press conference in
February, the president of the Punjab Laborers Front stated that
100,000 children between the ages of 5 and 12 years were working in
more than 4,500 brick kilns in Punjab. The ILO, the Ministry of Labor,
and the Federal Bureau of Statistics was scheduled to conduct a new
survey in 2001 in over 30,000 households; this survey will include the
agricultural sector and rural areas where the worst forms of child
labor often occur.
Child labor, mostly female, is common in the carpet industry, much
of which is family-run. Carpet manufacturers are working with ILO-IPEC
to establish a program to eliminate child labor from the industry
through monitoring and rehabilitation. Although surgical instrument
manufacturers have acted to remove child laborers from their factories,
child labor still occurs at rudimentary offsite filing and polishing
centers run by subcontractors for low-end items. Almost all children
working in the surgical instrument industry are male. According to the
ILO and the Punjab Welfare Department, children constitute about 15
percent of the work force in the surgical instrument industry in
Sialkot; 7,500 of these children are estimated to be under age 14.
According to a June 1999 report issued by Public Services
International, the average age of children in the surgical instrument
industry is 12. Children in the surgical instrument industry are prone
to injuries from machinery and burns from hot metal, as well as
respiratory illnesses from inhaling poisonous metal dust. The
successful efforts to eliminate child labor in other industries have
not been mirrored in the surgical instrument industry. Child labor is
not regarded as a particular problem in the textile and apparel
industries, but no specific studies of this sector have been performed.
In October Fayyaz Ahmad, a child worker in a textile mill died as a
result of injuries he sustained when his clothing became entangled in
machinery.
In 1997 soccer ball manufacturers, importers, the ILO, and UNICEF
implemented an 18-month action plan (the Atlanta Agreement) to
eliminate child labor from the soccer ball industry. This project,
based in Sialkot, monitored the production of soccer balls at newly
established stitching centers, and set up as many as 185 rehabilitation
centers to educate former child laborers and their younger siblings. At
year's end, there were 153 rehabilitation centers; however, an
additional 70 centers are projected for the next 2 years. The project
also sought to identify unemployed adults, particularly women, from the
families of former child stitchers to take up stitching work and
replace lost income. Women initially were reluctant to move from their
homes to stitching centers, so the project began to establish small,
home-based stitching centers in individual villages; by year's end,
there were 358 home-based centers and 146 larger centers for female
stitchers. The ILO currently monitors over 1,200 stitching centers.
Saga Sports, which also manufactures soccer balls, has built modern
community-based facilities in 10 villages with a high percentage of
family stitching operations. The facilities contain work space for
stitchers as well as dining areas, child care centers, recreation
areas, and medical clinics. Each facility also has its own water
system, waste disposal system, generator for electricity, and
transportation system. Meals, child care, medical services, and use of
the facilities are provided gratis to workers and their families; use
of non-production areas is allowed to all community members. These
centers reportedly have created approximately 6,000 jobs, 400 to 500 of
which are held by women. During the year, Saga Sports became the first
industry in Sialkot to permit freedom of association. By year's end,
over 6,000 children have been removed from employment in the soccer
ball industry.
Under a memorandum of understanding with the Government, the
International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO/IPEC)
program in Pakistan is involved with other child labor projects.
Projects in Sialkot include one in the surgical instruments industry
and one in the non-formal (non-exporting) sectors. The ILO works with
the Government, employers, workers, and NGO's to pursue the
Government's policy and plan of action for child labor. The Government
established 30 rehabilitation centers (50 are planned) for former child
laborers through the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal, the Government's social
welfare fund. Each center educates 120 children. The ILO created a
similar program in conjunction with the European Union, specifically
targeting child bonded laborers. In 1998 the ILO and the Swiss Agency
for Development and Cooperation (SDC) launched a large project to
combat child labor and child abuse in the NWFP. This program, which
targets children in the automobile repair sector, aims to provide
children with vocational training and informal education. In May the
Government, in conjunction with the ILO, issued a national policy and
action plan to combat child labor. Its three principal goals are: To
immediately eradicate the worst forms of child labor, to progressively
eliminate all remaining forms of child labor, and to ensure at least a
primary education and vocational training for the targeted children.
According to the plan, funding will be provided by the federal and
provincial governments and ``international donors;'' however, no funds
were allocated to implement this plan by year's end.
In response to international criticism, the Government has begun to
push provincial authorities to enforce child labor laws. However,
enforcement of these laws remains a problem. There are few child labor
inspectors in most districts, and the inspectors often have little
training and insufficient resources. They reportedly also are subject
to corruption. By law inspectors also may not inspect facilities that
employ less than 10 persons; most child labor occurs in facilities
smaller than this. Hundreds of convictions are obtained each year for
violations of child labor laws, but low fines levied by the courts--
ranging from an average of $7 (PRs 364) in the NWFP to an average of
$140 (PRs 7,280) in Baluchistan--are not a significant deterrent. The
1991 Employment of Children Act allows for fines of up to $350 (PRs
18,200). Penalties often are not imposed on those found to be violating
child labor laws.
The Child Care Foundation of Pakistan, a national NGO, was
established in 1996 with support from the Ministry of Commerce. Other
NGO's, such as the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal, conduct programs to end child
labor. Bait-ul-Mal, with funding from the Government and international
organizations, operates 33 education centers for children known
collectively as the National Center for the Rehabilitation of Child
Labor. Parents of working children are offered compensation of $6 per
month (PRs 300), plus a small daily stipend of about $0.10 (PRs 5) in
exchange for sending their children to school. Children in the centers
receive free schooling, uniforms, books, and meals. However, many
children apparently do not remain there for more than 1 year; the
schools often are in areas far from their clients, and some children
reportedly are sent to the schools in order to qualify for the stipend.
The Bunyad Literacy Community Council also runs schools focusing on
children who work in the soccer ball and carpet industries; its
programs aim to transition children out of working and into mainstream
schooling. Other local NGO's, such as the Society for the Protection of
the Rights of the Child, are working to eliminate child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Federal statutes applicable
throughout the country govern labor regulations. The minimum wage for
unskilled workers is $35 (Prs 1,976) per month, with only slightly
higher minimum rates for skilled workers. It applies only to industrial
and commercial establishments employing 50 or more workers and not to
agricultural or other workers in the informal sectors. The minimum wage
usually is inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family, since families tend to be large, including members
of the extended family.
Federal law provides for a maximum work-week of 48 hours (54 hours
for seasonal factories) with rest periods during the workday and paid
annual holidays. These regulations do not apply to agricultural
workers, workers in factories with fewer than 10 employees, and
contractors. Many workers are unaware of their rights because of their
lack of education.
Additional benefits required by the Federal Labor Code include
official government holidays, overtime pay, annual and sick leave,
health and safety standards in the workplace, health care, education
for workers' children, social security, old age benefits, and a workers
welfare fund. Employees earning more than $52 (PRs 3,120) per month are
not considered workers for the purpose of these benefits.
The provinces have been ineffective in enforcing labor regulations
because of limited resources, corruption, and inadequate regulatory
structures. In general health and safety standards are poor. Although
organized labor presses for improvements, the Government has done
little and its efforts to enforce existing legal protection are weak.
Workers cannot remove themselves from dangerous working conditions
without risking loss of employment. There is a serious lack of
adherence to mine safety and health protocols. For example, mines often
have only one opening for entry, egress, and ventilation.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the trafficking of
women under age 21 into the country for sexual purposes, as well as
kidnaping and slavery; however, trafficking in persons, especially in
women, is a significant problem. Trafficking in women is protected by
powerful criminal interests and operates relatively openly. The
Government has done little to stem the flow of women trafficked into
the country or to help victims of trafficking. For example, despite the
large numbers involved, only 88 cases have been registered in Sindh
between 1990 and 1999. Of the 260 men and 110 women arrested, only 87
were charged and only 7 were sentenced.
Pakistan is a receiving country for thousands of trafficked women
every year, mainly from Bangladesh. Smaller numbers of Burmese, Sri
Lankan, Indian, and Afghan women also are trafficked into the country
and some Pakistani women were trafficked overseas. The Commission of
Inquiry for Women drew attention to the problem of ``enforced
prostitution and trafficking in women,'' noting that women are the
victims of exploitation by police and pimps, and should be treated with
compassion. Trafficking in women has occurred for decades; there are
likely several hundred thousand trafficked women in the country. A
Karachi-based NGO estimates that 100 to 150 women who are trafficked
into the country each day from Bangladesh are sold for domestic labor
throughout the country and for forced prostitution in Karachi. Press
reports indicate that the buying and selling of brides persists in
parts of the NWFP and Punjab. Trafficking victims usually are deceived
with false prospects of marriage or offers of legitimate jobs in
Pakistan. They generally do not have legal residency, and, if arrested,
end up in jail for violation of immigration laws or the Hudood
ordinance. Without money to pay for bail, they often are bailed out by
their pimps, who force them to return to prostitution. Small numbers of
escaped victims of trafficking end up in shelters, but most do not
because there are few such shelters available. Many women who are not
bailed out are not repatriated; since they arrive without
documentation, the Bangladesh High Commission will not take
responsibility for them, and they remain confined to women's shelters.
Some have been repatriated at the expense of individuals who discover
them and pay for their return home.
Prices for trafficked women start at approximately $550 (PRs
30,000) but can go as high as approximately $5,000 (PRs 260,000).
Physical beauty and educational level are major factors in determining
prices. Some women sold in shops in Karachi reportedly are sent to
Persian Gulf countries, where they are slaves; women sent to rural
Pakistan reportedly are de facto slaves. Buyers in such shops
reportedly purchase women for purposes of labor or sex; some are
married to their buyers.
There are reports that Afghan and Bangladeshi girls are trafficked
into the country for sexual purposes.
Young boys are trafficked from Pakistan to the Persian Gulf to work
as camel jockeys; reports estimate that there are between several
hundred and a few thousand boys between the ages of 4 and 10 working as
camel jockeys, mostly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The majority
of these boys are sent to the Gulf countries by their parents, landless
agricultural workers who receive a monthly sum of money for their
child's labor. Parents occasionally also accompany their children to
the Persian Gulf. However, a significant minority of these children are
abducted by traffickers in the country and sent abroad without the
knowledge of their parents. The conditions such children live under
often are poor, and many children reportedly are injured or maimed
while racing camels. The children reportedly do not receive proper
medical care or schooling, and when they become too old to race, they
are sent back to the country and left to fend for themselves. In
February the district administration in Multan approached the Pakistan
Ambassador to the UAE for the return of two children reportedly sold to
a UAE citizen for approximately $400 (PRs 20,000) each, and the federal
investigation agency filed charges against four residents of Multan who
were involved in the deal. To date, there has been no report on the
return of the boys. Within the country, children sometimes are kidnaped
to be used as forced labor, for ransom, or to seek revenge against an
enemy (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). In rural areas, it is a traditional
practice for poor parents to give children to rich landlords in
exchange for money or land, according to human rights advocates. These
children frequently are abused by these landlords and held as bonded
laborers for life.
__________
SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka is a longstanding democratic republic with an active
multiparty system. Constitutional power is shared between the popularly
elected President and the 225-member Parliament. Chandrika Kumaratunga,
head of the governing People's Alliance (PA) coalition, won reelection
in 1999 for a second 6-year presidential term in a process marked by
voting irregularities and at least six election-related deaths.
Violence and fraud marked the October parliamentary elections as well;
at least seven persons were killed in campaign-related violence in the
period prior to the October election, which resulted in a reduced
majority for the PA for the next 6-year period. The Government respects
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary. Through its
rulings, the judiciary continued to exhibit its independence and to
uphold individual civil rights, although the Supreme Court Chief
Justice, in an attempt to reduce the court's workload, limited the
fundamental rights cases that the court examined, preventing some
torture victims from obtaining redress.
For the past 17 years, the Government has fought the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an insurgent organization fighting for a
separate ethnic Tamil state in the north and east of the country. The
conflict has claimed over 62,000 lives. In 1999 government forces took
LTTE-controlled areas north and west of Vavuniya, but counterattacks
starting in November 1999 erased most government gains. In January the
LTTE began a buildup on the Jaffna peninsula and in April captured the
important Elephant Pass military base. The clashes left large numbers
of civilians dead or wounded and displaced more than 150,000 persons.
Although the military halted the LTTE advance toward Jaffna in June,
continuing clashes between the security forces and the LTTE killed
several hundred more persons on both sides.
The Ministry of Defense controls all security forces (armed forces
and police). The 60,000-member police force is responsible for internal
security in most areas of the country, and it also has been used in
military operations against the LTTE. The 120,000-member army (which
includes the Army Volunteer Force), the 17,000-member navy, and the
18,500-member air force bear principal responsibility for conducting
operations against the LTTE insurgents. The police paramilitary Special
Task Force (STF) also battles the LTTE. The more than 15,000-member
Home Guards, an armed force drawn from local communities and
responsible to the police, provides security for Muslim and Sinhalese
village communities in or near the war zone. The Government also arms
and appears to direct various anti-LTTE Tamil militias, although at
times these groups seemed to act independently of government authority.
During the year, some members of the security forces committed serious
human rights abuses.
Sri Lanka is a low-income country with a market economy based on
the export of textiles, tea, rubber, coconuts, and gems. It also earns
substantial foreign exchange from tourism and the repatriated earnings
of citizens employed abroad. The gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita is approximately $850. Real GDP growth was 4.3 percent in 1999;
because of increased exports and a surge in remittances from citizens
abroad, growth by year's end reached 6.1 percent. In 1997 the
Government intensified efforts to promote economic reform and
liberalization, including privatizing public sector enterprises and
promoting foreign investment and trade. These steps continued during
the year, although privatization slowed due to the unsettled situation
in the country.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in areas not affected by the insurgency, but there are serious problems
in some areas, and the ongoing war with the LTTE continued to be
accompanied by serious human rights abuses by both sides of the
conflict. Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. In
the past, security forces almost certainly killed prisoners captured on
the battlefield; however, there were no reports of this abuse during
the year. The military and police reportedly tortured detainees, and
one person died in police custody. In addition nine individuals
reportedly disappeared from security force custody in Vavuniya and in
the east. In the past, persons also have disappeared or have been
killed after last being seen near the army's forward defense lines in
the north, areas that civilians are ordered by the military to avoid.
The circumstances of such disappearances and killings were unclear, and
with the many military offensives and forward defense line changes
throughout the years, the risk to civilians remained high. The military
took some measures to limit civilian casualties during operations,
although more than 100 civilians died, with hundreds more injured, as a
result of military-LTTE clashes. Torture remained a serious problem,
and prison conditions remained poor. Arbitrary arrests (including
short-term mass arrests and detentions) continued, often accompanied by
failure of the security forces to comply with legal protections. New
Emergency Regulations (ER) published in May further eroded due process
protections. Impunity for those responsible for human rights abuses
also remained a serious problem. Little progress was made in resolving
many cases of extrajudicial killing or disappearance. In most cases,
there was no investigation or prosecution, giving the appearance of
impunity for those responsible for human rights violations. The
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and restricted freedom
of the press. The Government continued to engage in censorship of
domestic newspaper reporting and some foreign television broadcasts on
military and security operations during the year, implementing
stringent censorship regulations and shutting down newspapers critical
of the Government. On occasion in previous years, security forces
harassed journalists; however, there were no reports of such harassment
during the year. Serious restrictions remained on freedom of movement,
especially from Vavuniya to Colombo and the southern part of the
country generally. Violence and discrimination against women, child
prostitution, child labor, and discrimination against the disabled
continued to be problems. There is some discrimination and occasional
violence against religious minorities, and there is institutionalized
ethnic discrimination against Tamils. Trafficking in women and children
for the purpose of forced labor occurs, and a significant number of
male children are trafficked into prostitution for foreign pedophiles.
In March the Government named five commissioners including a new
chairman for the National Human Rights Commission (HRC), which has 11
offices around the country; however, human rights observers believed
the HRC was not pursuing its mandate aggressively due to poor
leadership. Rights activists expressed some satisfaction with the new
leadership. The Committee to Inquire into Undue Arrest and Harassment
(CIUAH) continued to assist those alleging abuse at the hands of the
military and police. Human rights groups state that the committee is
somewhat effective; however, critics believe that the committee's
services have not been advertised widely, and they question its
continued viability. In November the Government established an
Interministerial Permanent Standing Committee and an Interministerial
Working Group on Human Rights Issues, chaired by senior officials, to
investigate human rights abuses referred by the Supreme Court, U.N.
organs, or international human rights organizations. The Government in
November also established the Prosecution of Torture Perpetrators Unit,
under the direct supervision of the Attorney General, to prosecute
torture cases. In March authorities arrested five suspects and issued
an arrest warrant for another, in connection with the mass graves in
Chemmani exhumed in 1999. Several of those arrested received bail. The
case has not yet come to trial, and it was still pending at year's end.
The Government did not attempt, as in the past, to use the ER to
cover up security force misdeeds; however, the Government arrested one
person under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to stifle
competition with the state telecommunications monopoly. The Government
captured or accepted the surrender of at least two LTTE cadres
throughout the year (it is widely believed that many LTTE cadres
committed suicide to avoid capture). The Government also continued to
provide relief to those displaced by the conflict although many were
still in areas under LTTE control such as the Vanni. However,
government restrictions on medical supplies and a significant reduction
in food rations contributed to poor health conditions for civilians in
the Vanni. The Attorney General's office continued to indict security
force personnel (including paramilitary organizations) and
antigovernment elements, primarily the leftist Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP), who were implicated in the 1997 reports of three
regional commissions that documented the disappearance of more than
16,000 persons from 1988 to 1994. These persons disappeared after being
removed forcibly by security force personnel and others. The Attorney
General referred 348 files for action by the courts, involving 583
security force personnel and resulting in 4 convictions of 88 members
of the police and military. A fourth commission, which was established
in May 1998 to investigate the 10,000 cases of disappearance that the
first 3 commissions could not investigate before their mandates
expired, sent a report to the President on August 31 to assist in
further investigations and possible indictments.
There are several former Tamil insurgent organizations currently
aligned with the Government. These progovernment Tamil militants, who
are armed and at times appear to be directed by the security forces,
sometimes committed extrajudicial killings and were responsible for
disappearances, torture, detentions, extortion, and forced conscription
in Vavuniya and the east. The military wing of the People's Liberation
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) committed many such abuses. Both
PLOTE and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) supposedly
were disarmed by the Government in Vavuniya after a May 1999 exchange
of gunfire between the groups in Colombo.
The LTTE continued to attack civilians. The LTTE continued to
commit serious human rights abuses in the ongoing war with the
Government. The LTTE regularly committed extrajudicial killings,
including killing prisoners taken on the battlefield, and also was
responsible for disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, detentions,
and extortion. At least 170 noncombatants were killed from January
through September in LTTE suicide bombings and other attacks outside of
the northern conflict zone. Through a campaign of killing and
intimidation, the LTTE continued to undermine the work of the local
government bodies in Jaffna whose members were elected in free and fair
elections in January 1998. In addition the LTTE warned Tamil
politicians in the east to discontinue their political activities
during part of the year; however, they later lifted their ban on such
activity for some politicians.
Although it released four prisoners in February and another in
June, the LTTE refused to free remaining military personnel and
civilians in its custody. The LTTE continued to control large sections
of the north and east of the country through authoritarian military
rule. It denied those under its authority the right to change their
government, infringed on privacy rights, routinely violated civil
liberties, operated an unfair court system, restricted freedom of
movement, used child soldiers, and severely discriminated against
ethnic and religious minorities.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police, Home Guards,
and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings, including the
killing of civilians in connection with the conflict with the LTTE. One
person died in police custody at Kantale after being arrested for
suspected terrorist activity in June (see Section 1.c.). The STF shot
and killed two young Tamil civilians in March. Seven persons died in
elections-related violence on September 29. On July 13, army soldiers
allegedly killed a Tamil student in Jaffna, which led to more than a
week of protest and boycotts by students. The exact number of
extrajudicial killings was impossible to ascertain due to frequent
censorship of news relating to military or police operations and to
lack of regular access to the north and east where the war between the
Government and the LTTE insurgents is being waged.
On April 30, gunmen in police uniforms killed the chief suspect in
the 1993 killing of prominent politician Lalith Athulathmudali.
On October 27, while police allegedly looked on, 27 Tamil males
between 14 and 23 years of age were hacked to death by local villagers
armed with machetes and clubs; 15 others were injured. Police allegedly
took part in the killings and did nothing to prevent the villagers from
entering the detention camp. The victims were former child soldiers
being detained at a government-run ``rehabilitation'' camp at
Bindunuwewa near Bandarawela. President Kumaratunga sent two police
teams to investigate. The HRC said the police were guilty of ``grave
dereliction of duty,'' and it did not believe that the mobs could have
overpowered the police present. By year's end, police had arrested 3
employees of a local teacher's technical training college and detained
13 policemen in connection with the incident. Violence after the
killings at Bindunuwewa continued for almost a week in the country's
central hill area, and at least 14 people died during the week before
police could restore order.
On December 19, nine Tamil civilians were reported missing in
Mirusuvil after being arrested by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA). One person
escaped, and after checking himself into the local hospital for torture
wounds, reported the incident to police and the local magistrate. The
magistrate, accompanied by police, took the person to the site where he
and the other eight had been arrested and tortured. The escapee
identified two SLA soldiers as the perpetrators, and the soldiers
admitted to torturing nine civilians and murdering eight. The soldiers
identified the place of burial, and the bodies were exhumed. On
December 25, an additional SLA commissioned officer and six additional
SLA soldiers were arrested for the torture and murders. The army
commander is monitoring the matter and has ordered a separate inquiry
into the incident (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
In some cases, extrajudicial killings were reprisals against
civilians for LTTE attacks in which members of the security forces or
civilians were killed or injured. In most cases, the security forces
claimed that the victims were members of the LTTE, but human rights
monitors believe otherwise. In Thampalakamam, near Trincomalee, in
February 1998, police and home guards allegedly massacred eight Tamil
civilians, including three children, possibly in reprisal for the LTTE
bombing of the Temple of the Tooth a week earlier. The Government
arrested 31 police officers and 10 home guards, and charged 4 with
murder and 17 with unlawful assembly. The other 20 were released after
the Attorney General determined that there was insufficient evidence
against them. The case remained active during the year.
Impunity remains a serious problem. Since April 1995 at least
several hundred persons have been killed extrajudicially by the
security forces or have disappeared after being taken into security
force custody; they are presumed dead. With the exception of the 6
security force personnel convicted in the 1996 killing of Krishanthi
Kumaraswamy and the 4 convictions for abduction involving 88 security
force personnel, no member of the security forces has been convicted
for any of these crimes. In the vast majority of cases where military
personnel may have committed human rights violations, the Government
has not identified those responsible and brought them to justice. In
August 1998, the Government reimposed a state of emergency nationwide.
There was no evidence that the Government was using the ER, as in
previous years, to conceal extrajudicial killings or disappearances.
Nevertheless, crucial safeguards built into the ER and the legislation
establishing the HRC often were ignored by the security forces--
especially those provisions requiring receipts to be issued for arrests
and ordering the security forces to notify the HRC of any arrest within
48 hours. Although security force personnel can be fined or jailed for
failure to comply with the ER, none were known to have been punished
for this during the year.
In 1998 the court sentenced 6 persons to death and acquitted 2
others in the case of 16 police and army personnel prosecuted for the
rape and murder of Tamil schoolgirl Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, the murder
of 2 members of her family, and the rape and murder of another
individual. At his sentencing, 1 of the convicted, former Lance
Corporal Somaratne Rajapakse, claimed knowledge of mass graves at
Chemmani in Jaffna containing the bodies of up to 400 persons killed by
security forces in 1996. Five others convicted in the Kumaraswamy
killings later also claimed knowledge of mass graves in the Chemmani
area where they allegedly had buried between 120 and 140 bodies on the
orders of their superiors. In 1998 the Ministry of Defense (MOD) stated
that the police Criminal Investigation Department had been directed to
examine the allegation, and forensic experts and detectives were to
visit the site. Exhumations in 1999 in the presence of international
observers and forensic experts yielded 15 skeletons. Two of the victims
provisionally were identified as young men who had disappeared in 1996.
In December 1999, the Government submitted its forensic report to a
magistrate in Jaffna; the report stated that 10 of the remains,
including a skeleton that was bound and blindfolded, showed signs of
physical assault which led to their deaths. The cause of death was not
determined for the remaining bodies; however, the report stated that
physical assault leading to death could not be ruled out. By year's
end, 13 of the bodies had not been identified. Family members
provisionally identified the bodies. Rajapakse and others named a total
of 20 security personnel, including former policemen, as responsible
for the killings. On March 14, authorities arrested five suspects and
issued an arrest order for another who fled. In June one suspect not
charged with murder was released on bail. The case was pending at
year's end, but fighting near Jaffna displaced key witnesses and
delayed proceedings.
Although in June the courts ordered five soldiers arrested for the
July 1999 gang rape and murder of Ida Carmelita, a young Tamil girl
(two additional suspects were already in remand), the case remained
pending at year's end. During the year, investigations conducted into
the case found that the weapons used in the killing belonged to army
personnel. Various witnesses testified at hearings held during the
year. The case is to continue in 2001.
The 1997 death of Reverend Arulpalan was not investigated during
the year.
In December 1997, three Tamil prisoners were hacked to death in
prison by Sinhalese prisoners at Kalutara prison. Prison staff and army
personnel at the prison allegedly failed to take measures to protect
the detainees even as the attack occurred. At year's end, no charges
had been filed in connection with the case. On January 6 and 7, 2 Tamil
detainees in Kalutara prison died and more than 40 suffered injuries in
clashes with other prisoners and prison guards. Authorities
subsequently moved many detainees to another facility, but by year's
end, they had taken no action against those responsible for the
killings.
The case against 8 soldiers and 1 reserve police constable arrested
in February 1996 in the massacre of 24 Tamil villagers in Kumarapuram
came to trial in September 1997. In November 1998, six of the soldiers
were charged with murder, and the case was scheduled for trial during
that year; however, the case had not gone to trial by year's end. The
other two accused security force agents were released due to lack of
evidence.
The case of the 22 STF members arrested on suspicion of murdering
23 Tamil youths at Bolgoda Lake in 1995 went to trial in June. Since
key witnesses did not appear, the prosecution asked for the case to be
rescheduled to October, when another hearing was held. The next hearing
was scheduled for March 8, 2001.
The PA Government came to power in 1994 and promised to bring to
justice the perpetrators of extrajudicial killings from previous years.
In 1994 it began prosecutions in several extrajudicial killings
allegedly committed by members of the security forces. The trial of 21
soldiers accused of massacring 35 Tamil civilians in 1992 in the
village of Mailanthani in Batticaloa district was transferred to the
Colombo High Court in 1996. The court held hearings in June and
October, but the case was postponed until January 2001. Many witnesses
for the case live in refugee camps, and they cannot come to court to
give evidence; observers believe that the case likely will be
protracted.
Former insurgent Tamil militant groups armed by and aligned with
the Government committed extrajudicial killings in the eastern province
and in the Vavuniya area in the north. The military wing of PLOTE and
the Razeek group were responsible for killing a number of persons. The
security forces arm and use these militias and a number of other Tamil
militant organizations to provide information, to help identify LTTE
insurgents, and, in some cases, to fight in military operations against
the insurgents. The exact size of these militias is impossible to
ascertain, but they probably total fewer than 2,000 persons. Although
the army in some instances took steps to convert Tamil militia groups
into regular army units, military oversight of these groups remained
inadequate, and complaints about them continued, especially in Vavuniya
and Batticaloa. These groups frequently operated beyond government
control. Complaints about their activities continued, especially in
transit camps for internally displaced persons (IDP's) in Vavuniya. The
militias gain access to these camps through a variety of means,
including bribery and threats. It was impossible to determine the
number of victims because of the secrecy with which these groups
operated. Persons killed by these militants probably included both LTTE
operatives and civilians who failed to comply with extortion demands.
Unknown assailants killed Jaffna media correspondent Mayilvaganam
Nimalarajan in the early morning of October 20. Nimalarajan's outspoken
criticism of paramilitary groups in Jaffna led many to believe that one
of these groups killed him. In February two members of the Razeek group
were killed in separate incidents; in March a member of PLOTE was
killed in Batticaloa; in April two TELO members were killed. These
deaths likely resulted from rivalry among the groups. In May 1999, the
Government forbade these groups from carrying arms and from stockpiling
weapons, but these prohibitions have generally not been effective.
Violence marred the period prior to parliamentary elections in
October. By September 29, at least seven persons had died in election-
related violence, and local monitoring organizations reported over 500
violent acts.
On January 5, assailants shot and killed pro-LTTE Tamil politician
Kumar Ponnambalam. Police detained four persons, two of whom alleged
that a local businessman had hired them to commit the murder. The
investigation continued at year's end.
During the year, the Government ordered payment of compensation to
victims of a 1999 air force bombing that killed 22 civilians at
Puthukkudiyiruppu.
The LTTE committed many extrajudicial killings, including many
bombings (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). On January 23, the LTTE killed
14 civilians in Kokkadicholai for alleged links to the security forces.
On March 1, the LTTE killed a Jaffna municipal council member from the
Eelam People's Democratic party (EPDP). On March 10, in an attack meant
for government ministers scheduled to travel along a certain route near
Parliament, the LTTE killed 30 civilians and injured 60 more with
claymore mines, rocket propelled grenades, and automatic weapons during
rush hour in a Colombo suburb. Other civilians died or suffered
injuries in a fight between security forces and the LTTE that evening.
On March 11, LTTE cadres who survived the first battle committed
suicide or died at the hands of the security forces. In Batticola on
November 7, two suspected gunmen killed newly-elected Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF) Member of Parliament Nimalan Saundranayagam and
wounded his security guard.
On January 27, an LTTE bomb exploded at the post office in Vavuniya
where military personnel were collecting paychecks, killing 11 persons
and injuring more than 70 others, mainly civilians. Several bombings in
commuter buses in January and February attributed to the LTTE killed 4
persons and injured more than 100 others. On May 17, an LTTE bombing
near a temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival in Batticaloa killed 23
persons, including children, and wounded dozens of others. Credible
witnesses reported gunfire 10 minutes after the explosion; they
described it as a retaliatory attack by police that allegedly killed 4
persons (see Section 1.g.), but police and hospital records do not
confirm this account. On May 30, an LTTE bomb in Nelunkulan near
Vavuniya killed 2 persons and injured 40 others. On June 14, an LTTE
bomb hit a bus transporting members of the air force, injuring more
than a dozen soldiers and killing two civilians. On December 14, a bomb
explosion linked to the LTTE killed two civilians and two police
officers.
On January 5, a suicide bomb blast in front of the Prime Minister's
office killed 14 persons and injured dozens of others. On June 7, an
LTTE suicide bomber killed 23 persons, including the Minister of
Industrial Development C.V. Gooneratne and his wife, at a parade in a
Colombo suburb. On June 26, an LTTE suicide boat rammed the M.V. Mercs
Uhana, a civilian transport ship carrying food and other supplies to
Jaffna. Five of the ship's crew remain missing, and they may have died
in the attack or fallen prisoner to the LTTE. On September 15, an LTTE
suicide bomber killed himself, 5 others, and wounded more than 20
persons, in front of the National Eye Hospital in central Colombo. In a
similar incident, on October 5, an LTTE suicide bomb killed 10 persons
and injured 40 persons at a PA political rally at the north-central
town of Medawachchiya.
The LTTE also has targeted progovernment Tamil groups in the past.
The LTTE also has committed a number of ``lamp post'' killings,
although there were no reported lamp post killings during the year. At
least 14 persons found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-described
courts were killed in 1999 by the LTTE in public executions; their
bodies were tied to lamp posts or otherwise left for public display.
The LTTE has attacked government installations, killing and wounding
civilians, and the LTTE reportedly sometimes also kills its own injured
troops to avoid their capture (see Section 1.g.).
On October 2, at least 20 civilians were killed when a suicide
bomber killed Mohammed Lathif Baithullah, a candidate for the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress, and his bodyguards, during campaigning for the October
10 parliamentary elections. All of the civilians were reportedly
members of the Muslim community.
On October 19, a suicide bomb attack near the town hall in central
Colombo left 3 dead and injured 24 others, including 3 foreigners.
No further investigation has been made into the November 1999
killing by unknown assailants of Ramesh Nadarajah, a Tamil Member of
Parliament for the EPDP and editor of a weekly Tamil-language
newspaper.
During the year, no investigation or arrests were made in
connection with a grenade explosion in November 1999 that killed a
person and injured 35 others at a political rally held by UNP.
In March 1999, municipal workers uncovered a pit near the Durraipa
Stadium in Jaffna that contained the skeletal remains of several
persons. Forensic evidence suggested that these remains were about 10
years old. This discovery potentially implicated the Indian
Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), which occupied Jaffna at the time. Critics
contrasted the prompt investigation of the Durraipa stadium graves with
the slow investigation of the Chemmani mass graves.
b. Disappearance.--Disappearances at the hands of the security
forces continued in the north and east. During the year, there were no
reports of disappearances in Colombo, or Jaffna. The army, navy,
police, and paramilitary groups caused as many as 11 disappearances in
Vavuniya and Trincomalee through September 29. In January, bodies of
three Tamils allegedly taken by the Home Guards near Trincomalee were
found; two of them had been decapitated. In December eight Tamil
civilians were reported missing in Mirusuvil after being arrested and
tortured by the SLA. Two SLA soldiers were identified as perpetrators
and admitted to murdering seven of the civilians. The bodies were
exhumed. One SLA commissioned officer and six additional SLA soldiers
were arrested later. At year's end, the army commander had ordered an
inquiry into the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), including Amnesty International
(AI), reported an increase in disappearances in Vavuniya during the
second half of the year. As with extrajudicial killings, the exact
number of disappearances was impossible to ascertain due to censorship
of news about security force operations and infrequent access to the
north and east. However, the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances lists Sri Lanka as a country with an
extremely large number of nonclarified disappearances. Those who
disappeared during the year and in previous years are presumed dead.
The commander of the army and the Inspector General of police both have
criticized the disappearances and stated that the perpetrators would be
called to account. Nonetheless there have been very few security force
personnel prosecutions to date.
Three regional commissions were set up in November 1994 to inquire
into disappearances that occurred from 1988-94, most during the 1988-89
period of the JVP uprising. The commissions found that 16,742 persons
disappeared after having been removed involuntarily from their homes,
in most cases by security forces. In other cases, antigovernment
elements--in particular the leftist JVP--were determined to be
responsible for the disappearances. After the reports were presented to
the President in September 1997, the police created a Disappearances
Investigations Unit (DIU) in November 1998 to examine 1,681 cases in
which the commissions had evidence against specific individuals. In
July 1999, the Attorney General created a Missing Persons Commissions
Unit to consider institution of criminal proceedings based on results
of DIU investigations. The Attorney General's office has opened over
1,175 files and referred 262 indictments to the high courts and 86
complaints to magistrates involving 583 members of the security forces
on abduction and murder charges. Hearings and trials in at least 250 of
these cases had begun by year's end. Of these the Attorney General's
office successfully prosecuted 4 cases of abduction, involving 88
security force personnel.
In May 1998, a fourth commission was established to look into
approximately 10,000 cases of disappearance that the initial 3
commissions had been unable to investigate before their mandates
expired. The commission is not to investigate cases of disappearance
that occurred after 1994, but is to focus only on cases that were not
completed by the first three commissions. Human rights observers have
criticized the Government for not extending the mandate of this
commission to include cases of disappearance that occurred since the
Kumaratunga government took office in 1994. The commission is charged
with facilitating payment of monetary compensation to the families of
persons who disappeared, as well as forwarding cases to the Attorney
General for possible prosecution. The commission submitted an interim
report to President Kumaratunga in December 1999 and a final report on
August 31 (which by year's end still had not been made public) to
assist in further investigations and prosecutions.
During the year, there were no developments in the Vantharamulle
case, in which army troops allegedly abducted 158 Tamils from a refugee
camp in the Batticaloa district in 1990. Observers maintain that there
is credible evidence identifying the alleged perpetrators. Proceedings
began in 1999 against an army major (who died before the court case
began) and a former subinspector of police in the case of 31 youths who
allegedly disappeared following their arrests in Divulapitiya in 1989.
The case continued during the year.
In October 1999, the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances made its third visit to the country. Its report,
released in December 1999, cited the PTA and ER as important factors
contributing to disappearances and recommended the abolition or
modification of these laws to bring them into conformity with
internationally accepted human rights standards. The working group
criticized the country's slow progress in resolving disappearances and
noted the lack of implementation of its recommendations from visits in
1991 and 1992, including the creation of a central register of
detainees. The report encouraged the establishment of an independent
body to investigate disappearances that occurred after the Kumaratunga
Government took office in 1994.
Progovernment Tamil militias also were responsible for
disappearances. These militias detained persons at various locations
that serve, in effect, as undeclared detention centers. Human rights
observers believed that the PLOTE was a major offender in the case of
disappearances. However, the HRC has no mandate or authority to enforce
respect for human rights among these militia groups. When the HRC
office director for Vavuniya complained about PLOTE activity, he
received death threats. He eventually departed the country in 1999. It
was impossible to determine the exact number of victims because of the
secrecy with which these groups operated. The Government has taken no
clear steps to stop these militants' actions, although tighter
restrictions on these groups' right to bear arms were implemented
following a May 1999 shootout between PLOTE and TELO supporters near a
popular shopping center in downtown Colombo.
The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined number of civilian
disappearances in the north and east during the year. Although the LTTE
has denied taking any prisoners from its battles, at year's end it was
known to be holding 11 civilian crew members of vessels that it has
hijacked since 1995, along with 11 security force personnel. In
February the LTTE released four security force members after a hunger
strike; in April the LTTE released one civilian prisoner. The LTTE has
not notified the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of any
new security forces prisoners since 1994.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Despite legal prohibitions, the security forces and police
continue to torture and mistreat persons in police custody and prisons,
particularly Tamils suspected of supporting the LTTE. Suspected
criminals also apparently were tortured. Several children reportedly
have been tortured in detention during the last few years. The 1994
Convention Against Torture Act (CATA) made torture a punishable
offense. Under the CATA, torture is defined as a specific crime, the
High Court has jurisdiction over violations, and criminal conviction
carries a 7-year minimum sentence. However, according to a 1999 AI
report, the CATA does not implement several provisions of the U.N.
Convention; this results in torture being prohibited under specific
circumstances and allowed under others. Consequently torture continues
with relative impunity. In addition, the PTA makes confessions obtained
under any circumstance, including by torture, admissible in court. The
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and other human
rights organizations cited the PTA as a major factor contributing to
torture of prisoners.
The Government is developing regulations to prosecute and punish
military and police personnel responsible for torture. The
Interparliamentary Permanent Standing Committee and its
Interministerial Working Group on Human Rights Issues have begun
tracking criminal investigations of torture. By year's end, there were
146 cases under investigation. In addition the Government also ceased
paying fines incurred by security force personnel found guilty in
proceedings of the offense. Security force personnel have been fined
under civil statutes for engaging in torture. According to the Attorney
General's office, by year's end, 8 members of the security forces and
police had been prosecuted under criminal statutes, but none of the
cases had come to conclusion. Members of the security forces continued
to torture and mistreat detainees and other prisoners, particularly
during interrogation.
Methods of torture included electric shock, beatings (especially on
the soles of the feet), suspension by the wrists or feet in contorted
positions, burning, slamming testicles in desk drawers, and near
drownings. In other cases, victims must remain in unnatural positions
for extended periods, or they have bags laced with insecticide, chili
powder, or gasoline placed over their heads. Detainees have reported
broken bones and other serious injuries as a result of their
mistreatment. There were no reports of rape in detention during the
year.
Medical examination determined that officers of the Counter-
Subversive Unit of the Vavuniya police beat and burned with cigarettes
a Tamil man arrested in March. Police at Kantale, near Trincomalee,
arrested and tortured five young Tamils in June; one died as a result
(see Section 1.a.). In December the bodies of seven Tamils who had been
tortured and killed by the army in Mirusuvil were exhumed after one
person escaped and notified authorities. A commissioned officer and
eight soldiers were arrested, and at year's end, an inquiry continued
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). Torture appeared more prevalent in rural
areas than in Colombo.
Under fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution, torture
victims may file civil suit for compensation in the High Courts or
Supreme Court. Courts have granted awards ranging from approximately
$175 (14,200 rupees) to $2,280 (182,500 rupees). In February the
Colombo high court ordered compensation of $625 (50,000 rupees) to a
young man beaten in police custody in Vavuniya and Colombo in 1999. In
August the Supreme Court ordered $1,250 (100,000 rupees) in
compensation for a Tamil man tortured in December 1999 at an army camp
near Batticaloa. However, most cases take 2 years or more to move
through the courts, and NGO's who represent torture victims complained
that the new Supreme Court Chief Justice appointed in September 1999
grants hearings in only the most egregious cases.
At the invitation of the Government, the United Nations Committee
on Torture sent a five-person mission to Colombo in late August to
determine whether a systematic pattern of torture exists in the country
and, if so, to make recommendations for eliminating the practice. By
year's end, the mission had not submitted its confidential report to
President Kumaratunga.
Progovernment Tamil militants, directly responsible to the security
forces, also engaged in torture. The PLOTE in Vavuniya has drawn the
most criticism for routinely torturing its opponents, and during the
year, its members reportedly burned with cigarettes those who refused
to pay protection money. Security forces have done little to stop this
practice.
The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Security force
prisoners released by the LTTE stated that they had been subjected to
torture, including being hung upside down and beaten, having pins
inserted under their fingernails, and being burned by hot rods.
The LTTE was responsible for a number of bomb attacks during the
year, which killed and injured dozens of civilians (see Sections 1.a.
and 1.g.).
Prison conditions generally are poor and do not meet minimum
international standards because of overcrowding and lack of sanitary
facilities. An increase in detentions associated with the war with the
LTTE caused a significant deterioration in already poor conditions in
short-term detention centers and in undeclared detention centers run by
progovernment Tamil groups (see Section 1.d.).
The Government permitted representatives from the ICRC to visit
approximately 160 places of detention. The HRC also visited over 2,000
police stations and over 500 detention facilities by year's end (see
Section 1.d.).
Conditions also are poor in LTTE-run detention facilities. Some
former prisoners reported being handcuffed and shackled during much of
their captivity.
The LTTE permits the ICRC to visit detainees in the Vanni regularly
(see Section 1.d.). The ICRC provided medical attention and helped
negotiate the release of four servicemen held in Mallavi following a
hunger strike in February (see Section 1.b.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. Under the law, authorities must inform an
arrested person of the reason for arrest and bring that person before a
magistrate within 24 hours. In practice persons detained generally
appear before a magistrate within a few days of arrest. The magistrate
may authorize bail or order continued pretrial detention for up to 3
months or longer. However, under the ER and the PTA, security forces
may detain suspects for extended periods of time without court
approval. The ER, in force periodically since 1979 and in force island-
wide since August 1998, allows pretrial detention for a maximum of four
consecutive 3-month periods. The ER gives security forces broad powers
for arrest and detention without charge or the right to judicial
review. New ER provisions published in May lengthen to a year the
period for which authorities may order individuals to remain at home or
otherwise have their freedom of association and movement limited. The
new ER provisions also permit police to hold individuals for up to 90
days to investigate suspected offenses, although the police must
present detainees to a court within 30 days to record the detention.
The court can order a further 6 months detention. The ER states that
detention orders ``shall not be called in question in any court on any
ground whatsoever,'' which may contradict an individual's
constitutional right to petition the Supreme Court to redress
fundamental rights violations.
As required under the ER, the army generally turned over those that
it arrested to the police within 24 hours, although the police and the
army did not always issue arrest receipts or notify the HRC within 48
hours. The HRC has a legal mandate to visit those arrested, and police
generally respected this in areas outside of the conflict. Due to
censorship and infrequent access, observers could not determine the
state of affairs in the north and the east.
Despite Government announcements that it would close all secret
detention centers, there were continued credible reports that the
military held persons for short amounts of time in smaller camps for
interrogation before transferring them to declared places of detention.
This procedure, which allegedly occurred on the Jaffna peninsula, in
Vavuniya, and in the east (see Section 1.c.), did not comply with
requirements to notify the HRC of arrests and to issue arrest receipts.
The military maintained the detainees were ``in transit,'' and claimed
they did not violate the detainees' rights.
Large-scale arrests of Tamils continued during the year; these
arrests were particularly prevalent after LTTE bombings, when many
young Tamils were detained or arrested on suspicion of being LTTE
cadres or sympathizers. The Government detained more than 2,819 persons
under the ER and PTA from January to August 31, a higher number than
that for all of 1999. Many detentions occurred during operations
against the LTTE. Most detentions lasted several days to several
months. The number of prisoners held at any given moment under the ER
and the PTA consistently remained close to 2,000. Hundreds of Tamils
indicted under the PTA remained without bail awaiting trial, some for
more than 2 years. The high courts held hearings on 1,000 cases under
the PTA or ER during the year. Many such cases drag on for years. On
January 7 and 15, security forces detained several thousand Tamils in
Colombo and the surrounding suburbs in ``cordon and search'' operations
meant to find LTTE cadres after suicide bomb attacks (see Section
1.a.). Although authorities eventually arrested fewer than 100 persons,
many of those rounded up for questioning spent hours in detention,
often without access to sanitary facilities. On March 18, police at a
Colombo checkpoint detained and publicly strip-searched one woman, who
turned out to be Sinhalese, on suspicion of being an LTTE suicide
bomber. On May 30, police detained hundreds of Tamils in downtown
Colombo for almost 5 hours of questioning. Approximately 50 of the
detainees were taken for photographing and further questioning. In
addition those arrested, most of whom were innocent of any wrongdoing,
sometimes were detained in prisons with convicted criminals. Many
lesser incidents of this sort occurred during the year. Tamils
complained that they were abused verbally and held for extended periods
at the security checkpoints that have been set up throughout Colombo
(see Section 1.d.). The Government justified the detentions and arrests
on security grounds, but many Tamils claimed that the detentions and
arrests were a form of harrassment. Tamils often suffered arbitrary
searches in their homes.
In February the Government ordered the arrest of an engineer
employed by a local Internet provider under the provisions of the PTA
as part of its attempt to stifle competition with the state-owned
telecommunications monopoly. The Government alleged that the company
involved in a fundraising scheme to benefit the LTTE. Under
international pressure, the Government dropped the charges against the
engineer and released him in August; however, investigations of the
company continued at year's end.
In July 1998, the President established the Committee to Inquire
into Undue Arrest and Harassment (CIUAH). The committee, which includes
senior opposition party and Tamil representatives, examines complaints
of arrest and harassment by security forces and takes remedial action
as needed. The committee received more than 200 complaints between
January and August 31. Opinions on the effectiveness of the CIUAH are
mixed. Some human rights observers believe that the work of the
committee acted as a deterrent to random arrests and helped to
alleviate some of the problems encountered by detainees and their
families. However, some critics claim that, following initial
publicity, the committee's services have not been advertised widely.
For example, the fax number for the committee is not in the Colombo
telephone directory. Those wishing to contact the CIUAH usually are
referred through human rights lawyers or find it by word of mouth. Many
Tamils believe that the CIUAH does little to deter police agents from
stopping them more frequently at security force checkpoints in the
capital.
The HRC continued to investigate the legality of detention in cases
referred to it by the Supreme Court and private citizens. Although the
HRC legally is mandated to exercise oversight over arrests and
detentions by the security forces and to undertake visits to prisons,
members of the security forces sometimes violated the regulations and
failed to cooperate with the HRC.
The Government continued to give the ICRC unhindered access to
approximately 160 detention centers, police stations, and army camps
throughout the country that were recognized officially as places of
detention. Such visits played an important role in enabling the ICRC to
monitor the human rights practices of the security forces. The HRC,
through its 11 offices, also visited places of detention; however,
human rights observers believed that due to inadequate leadership and a
failure of the HRC to give long term contracts to many of its workers,
the organization was not pursuing its mandate (see Section 4).
The PLOTE continued to run places of illegal detention in Vavuniya.
The EPDP also detained members for short periods in Jaffna as
punishment for breaking party discipline.
The LTTE continued to detain civilians, often holding them for
ransom. For example, in September 1999 the LTTE held three businessmen
for a ransom of $550,000 (40 million rupees). The businessmen were
freed after making partial payment and promising to pay the balance.
Unconfirmed reports indicated the LTTE was holding in custody more than
2,000 civilians in the northern part of the island. Those held included
11 civilian crew members of 3 vessels hijacked by the LTTE since 1995.
In February the LTTE released 4 of the 15 servicemen that it held. In
June it also released 1 of its 12 declared civilians prisoners. The
LTTE did not permit the ICRC or any other humanitarian organization to
visit its detainees, aside from these crew members and security force
personnel.
The Government does not practice forced exile. There are no legal
provisions allowing or prohibiting its use.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects these provisions in
practice.
The President appoints judges to the Supreme Court, the courts of
appeal, and the high courts. A judicial service commission, composed of
the Chief Justice and two Supreme Court judges, appoints, transfers,
and dismisses lower court judges. Judges serve until the mandatory
retirement age of 65 for the Supreme Court and 62 for other courts.
Judges can be removed for reasons of misbehavior or physical or mental
incapacity, but only after a legal investigation and followed by joint
action of the President and the Parliament.
In criminal cases, defendants are tried in public by juries. They
are informed of the charges and evidence against them, may be
represented by the counsel of their choice, and have the right to
appeal. The Government provides counsel for indigent persons tried on
criminal charges in the high courts and the courts of appeal, but it
does not provide counsel in other cases. Private legal aid
organizations assist some defendants. In addition the Ministry of
Justice operates 11 community legal aid centers to assist those who
cannot afford representation and to serve as educational resources for
local communities. There are no jury trials in cases brought under the
PTA. Confessions, obtained by various means, including torture, are
inadmissible in criminal proceedings, but are allowed in PTA cases;
most convictions under the PTA rely heavily on them. Defendants bear
the burden of proof to demonstrate that their confessions were obtained
by coercion. Defendants in PTA cases have the right to appeal. Subject
to judicial review in certain cases, defendants can spend up to 18
months being held in prison on adminstrative order waiting for their
case to be heard. Once their case comes to trial, decisions are made
relatively quickly. Courts held hearings on some 1,000 PTA and ER cases
during the year.
Most court proceedings in Colombo and the south are conducted in
English or Sinhala, which, due to a shortage of court-appointed
interpreters, has restricted the ability of Tamil-speaking defendants
to get a fair hearing. Trials and hearings in the north and east are in
Tamil and English, but many serious cases, including those having to do
with terrorism, are tried in Colombo. While Tamil-speaking judges exist
at the magistrate level, only four high court judges, an appeals court
judge, and a Supreme Court justice speak fluent Tamil. Few legal
textbooks and no law reports exist in Tamil, and the Government has
complied only slowly with legislation requiring publishing all laws in
English, Sinhala, and Tamil.
In Jaffna LTTE threats against court officials disrupted normal
court operations. Although magistrate and district level courts
functioned during the year, the high court suspended activities due to
security concerns.
The LTTE has its own self-described court system, composed of
judges with little or no legal training. The courts operate without
codified or defined legal authority and essentially operate as agents
of the LTTE rather than as an independent judiciary. The courts
reportedly impose severe punishments, including execution.
The Government claims that all persons held under the ER and the
PTA are suspected members of the LTTE and, therefore, legitimate
security threats. Insufficient information exists to verify this claim
and to determine whether these detainees or members of the now legal
JVP, detained in similar fashion in past years, are political
prisoners. Between 200 and 300 of those previously detained--mostly JVP
members--were convicted under criminal law; some remain incarcerated.
In many cases, human rights monitors question the legitimacy of the
criminal charges brought against these persons.
The LTTE also holds a number of political prisoners. The number is
impossible to determine because of the secretive nature of the
organization. The LTTE refuses to allow the ICRC access to these
prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy,
and the Government generally respects these provisions in practice;
however, it infringes on citizen's privacy rights in some areas. The
police obtain proper warrants for arrests and searches conducted under
ordinary law; however, the security forces are not required to obtain
warrants for searches conducted under either the ER or the PTA. The
Secretary of the Ministry of Defense is responsible for providing
oversight for such searches. No judicial review or other means of
redress exist for alleged illegal searches under the ER. Some Tamils
complained that their homes were searched as a means of general
harassment by the security forces (see Section 1.d.). The Government is
believed to monitor telephone conversations and correspondence on a
selective basis. The security forces routinely open mail destined for
the LTTE-controlled areas and seize contraband. The Government censors
news reports that cover military operations. Television stations
practice self-censorship and some international news broadcasts which
deal with the country specifically are blurred over. This censorship
tightened after the publication of the new ER on May 3 (see Section
2.a.), although some restrictions had eased by year's end. For example,
although blocks marked ``censored'' were inserted over missing text in
newspapers in past years, there was no occurrence of this action in the
last 6 months of the year.
Progovernment Tamil militant groups, nominally operating under
government control, used forced conscription in the past, although it
appears this practice abated after a 1999 order from the Government. In
previous years, there have been credible reports that Tamil youth (in
the east in particular) have been forced to join these groups under
threats to themselves and their families; however, there were no
reports that this practice occured during the year.
The LTTE routinely invades the privacy of citizens, maintaining an
effective network of informants. There are credible reports the LTTE
has warned 66,000 displaced Muslims living in the Puttalam area not to
return to their homes in Mannar and Jaffna until the conflict is over.
The LTTE also recruits children (see Section 6.c.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Hostilities between the Government and the LTTE
continued throughout the year. After establishing positions on the
Jaffna peninsula in January, the LTTE in March began a sustained
campaign to recapture Jaffna. On April 22, the LTTE captured a large
base at Elephant Pass, and in the following weeks, forced the armed
forces to retreat to Jaffna. By late May, the front lines had
stabilized just east of Jaffna in the Chavacachcheri area. From June
through August, there were minor skirmishes, with the armed forces
carrying out counterattacks from September through year's end that
resulted in high casualties on both sides. More than 2,000 combatants
and more than 100 civilians died during the year in incidents related
to the conflict.
At year's end, approximately 490,000 persons were displaced by the
conflict. Over 340,000 persons, principally in the Vanni region, remain
displaced by the past several years of fighting; during the year the
battles near Jaffna displaced an additional 150,000.
The Government in the past often publicized aspects of its planned
operations to allow civilians time to vacate the probable areas to be
affected. However, the armed forces were more secretive during the
year, and it did not give public warnings before the commencement of
its advances. Despite the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to assess
targets before attacks, bombings and artillery fire against LTTE
installations have killed civilians working at those installations or
living nearby. More than 100 civilians were killed in the LTTE's
advance on Jaffna in April and May, including 6 who died at Pallaikudu
in May when the armed forces conducted an aerial bombing of an LTTE
boat dock. More than a dozen persons were killed by the air force in
bombings against Mullaitivu during the year. On April 19, artillery
shells killed 15 and wounded 24 at a home for the elderly in Kaithady
during a clash between the LTTE and the army. It was not clear which
side was responsible. On November 23, 2 shells thought to be fired by
the LTTE landed near a school in Muttur, near Trincomalee, killing 2
students and wounding 10 more. During the year, dozens of civilians
were wounded in contested areas of the north and east in clashes
between the armed forces and the LTTE.
On May 17, 23 people were killed and dozens were injured when a
bomb exploded at a Buddhist temple in Batticaloa in the east, where
people were gathered to celebrate the Buddhist festival of Vesak (see
Section 1.a.). The bomb, concealed in a freezer box on a bicycle,
exploded after the cyclist was stopped by two policemen and a soldier;
the cyclist ran away. After the bomb exploded, security forces opened
fire, killing four children and injuring eight more. Although the
Government has blamed the LTTE publicly for this bombing, no one
officially claimed responsibility, and at year's end, no investigation
had been conducted. Furthermore the Government has not commented on the
additional deaths and injuries caused by the security forces opening
fire.
The security forces use aerial observation for selecting targets
for shelling and bombing. They also attempt to locate the source of
incoming mortar fire before responding; however, inaccurate mortar and
artillery fire killed civilians. In September 1999, the air force
dropped 3 bombs on a village near Puthukudiyiruppu in the Vanni,
killing 22 persons (see Section 1.a.). Human rights observers,
including the ICRC and AI, alleged that those killed were civilians.
Government officials acknowledged that 22 men, women, and children were
killed by the air force bomb; however, they alleged that the air force
targeted an LTTE training camp, and at first they did not admit the
possibility that civilians were killed in error. The Government later
acknowledged quietly that the attack was an accident. During the year,
the Government held an investigation and authorized compensation for
the victim's families, admitting that the site had been bombed ``in
error.'' However, the Government did not admit formally to having
killed civilians.
The security forces continued to receive instruction in
international humanitarian law as part of their training courses (see
Section 4). According to the military, the army also established human
rights cells in each division, and it established a human rights office
in each brigade and battalion. The armed forces operate under written
rules of engagement that severely restrict the shelling, bombardment,
or other use of firepower against civilian-occupied areas such as
villages.
The Government continued to provide food relief, through the
Commissioner General for Essential Services (CGES) and the Multi-
Purpose Cooperative Societies (MCPS), to displaced and other needy
citizens, including those in areas controlled by the LTTE. Food rations
were delivered by the Government to the Vanni area through a checkpoint
that is controlled on one side by the security forces and on the other
by the LTTE. The border into the territory controlled by the LTTE (an
``uncleared area'' in Government parlance) was not closed during the
year.
The Government maintained a long list of prohibited ``war-related''
medical items, such as sutures, plaster of paris, intravenous liquid
supplies, bandages, and some drugs. NGO's and other groups that sought
to take these items to LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni region needed
permission from local officials as well as from the Ministry of
Defense. Delays were common and approval sometimes was denied, due to
fear that supplies would fall into the hands of the LTTE. As a result,
many medical items in the Vanni region were in short supply. This
shortfall contributed to an already serious deterioration in the
quality and quantity of medical care furnished to the civilian
population. During the first half of the year, the Government proved
particularly reluctant to allow medical supplies into LTTE-controlled
areas. During this period, civilians injured in the conflict relied
heavily on aid provided by international NGO's who faced severe
restrictions on moving medical supplies into the area. Government
restrictions on the transport of items such as cement, batteries, and
currency into the LTTE-controlled areas also had a negative impact on
the relief work of NGO's in those areas.
The Ministry of Defense reported capturing several LTTE insurgents
on the battlefield during the year. It sent these, and other cadres who
surrendered or whom security forces arrested to rehabilitation centers.
The ICRC continued to visit approximately 100 former LTTE members now
in government rehabilitation camps, although the October massacre of
more than 20 such detainees at a government-run detention facility at
Bindunuwewa, near Bandarawella, led observers to question the continued
security of residents of these facilities (see Section 1.a.).
In view of the scale of hostilities and the large number of LTTE
casualties, some observers found the number of prisoners taken under
battlefield conditions to be low and concluded that many LTTE fighters
apparently were killed rather than taken prisoner. Some observers
believed that, on the government side, an unwritten ``take-no-
prisoners'' policy generally remained in effect. The military denied
this claim, stating that other factors limited the number of prisoners
taken, such as the LTTE's efforts to remove wounded fighters from the
battlefield, the proclivity of its fighters to choose suicide over
capture, and the LTTE's occasional practice of killing its own badly
wounded fighters (see Section 1.a.). There were no reported instances
of security forces personnel executing LTTE cadres this year, and no
army or other security forces personnel were prosecuted or disciplined
for allegedly executing prisoners from previous years.
The Government refused to permit relief organizations to provide
medical attention to wounded LTTE fighters, although it has offered to
treat any LTTE wounded entrusted to government care. Credible reports
told of wounded LTTE cadres surrendering to the Government and
receiving appropriate medical care.
The LTTE admits that it kills security forces personnel rather than
take them prisoner. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the LTTE has
executed wounded soldiers on the battlefield. At the end of September,
the LTTE admitted to holding only 11 security forces prisoners, all
captured in 1993 and 1994. The LTTE is believed to have killed most of
the police officers and security force personnel that it has captured
in recent years. However, the LTTE released two army deserters who
surrendered to it in 1998, and in November 1999, it transferred over 11
SLA members who were captured during the year to the ICRC. In February
the LTTE released four servicemen, and in June it released one
civilian.
The LTTE uses excessive force in the war. During the course of the
year, the LTTE killed a government minister (see Section 1.a.) and more
than 200 other noncombatants. The LTTE has engaged in hostage taking,
hijackings, and bombing of civilian targets.
In the past, the LTTE has used church and temple compounds, where
civilians are instructed by the Government to congregate in the event
of hostilities, as shields for the storage of munitions; however, there
were no reports that this occurred during the year.
The LTTE uses child soldiers. The armed forces captured a 14-year-
old female LTTE cadre in fighting in September, and during the year
credible sources reported LTTE efforts to recruit children to replenish
battlefield losses. According to some reports the LTTE shows war movies
and gives political speeches to children in schools. In September 1998,
25 young LTTE fighters surrendered as a group; at least one of those
who surrendered was 13 years old. Most of the others were aged between
15 and 17 years. In 1998 the LTTE promised the U.N. Secretary General's
Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict that it would not
recruit children under 17 and would not use children under 18 in
battle. It disregarded those promises.
The LTTE expropriates food, fuel, and other items meant for IDP's,
thus exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE-controlled areas.
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE-controlled and other parts of
the Vanni region, with nutrition levels falling below the national
average. Experts have reported an increase in anemia and a lower birth
rate, both of which indicate lower levels of nutrition. There were
confirmed cases of malnutrition, including hundreds of cases of
malnourished children. Malnutrition resulted from several factors,
including food shortages, poverty, and conflict-related dislocations.
However, a survey completed by Medecins Sans Frontieres in 1999 found
malnutrition levels in the war-affected areas at about the same level
as in the war-free south of the country. Medical sources distinguish
between ``undernourished'' children (of which there are many throughout
the country) and ``malnourished'' children.
Landmines were a problem in Jaffna and the Vanni and to some extent
in the east. Landmines, booby traps, and unexploded ordnance pose a
problem to resettlement of displaced persons and rebuilding. A U.N.
landmine team tasked with locating and mapping LTTE and army mines in
the Jaffna peninsula suspended its mission in April, stating that it
was impossible to continue as long as hostilities continued. According
to the Landmine Monitor Report for 2000, both the LTTE and the military
abandoned promises given in 1999 not to place new mines in areas
designated for civilian resettlement. Sources reported 16 civilians
were killed or wounded from January to give end of August in incidents
involving mines or unexploded ordnance. On November 28, a landmine
blast attributed to the LTTE killed 7 persons and injured 24 passengers
on a bus in Anuradhapura district. In contrast 20 such accidents
occurred in 1999. Sources have confirmed that the SLA is making great
efforts to clear all explosives from areas that it has recaptured.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and expression; however, the Government restricts
these rights in practice, often using national security grounds
permitted by law. During the year, the Government limited the access of
domestic and foreign media to information and continued to censor news
relating to the military and security situation. In June 1998, the
Government imposed direct censorship on all domestic and foreign media
reports relating to ongoing or possible future military and other
security operations. The Government reissued its censorship order in
November 1999 after the military suffered setbacks in the field. Even
when no specific government censorship is exercised, private television
stations impose their own, informal censorship on international
television news rebroadcast in the country. In May the Government
passed new ER to tighten censorship rules, to give the Government power
to impound printing presses, and to close newspapers or broadcast
stations it perceived as threats to national security. Subsequently a
local NGO filed a fundamental rights case in the Supreme Court opposing
censorship as a human rights violation. The court refused to consider
the case. On November 1, International Press Institute (IPI) placed the
country on its ``watch list'' of countries which ``appear to be moving
towards suppressing or restricting press freedom.'' IPI cited the new
Emergency Regulations as an impediment to free media expression.
Despite earlier campaign promises to divest itself of its media
holdings, the Government controls the country's largest newspaper
chain, two major television stations, and the Sri Lanka Broadcasting
Corporation (SLBC, a radio station). There are a variety of
independent, privately owned newspapers, journals and radio and
television stations, most of which freely criticize the Government and
its policies. However, some journalists practiced self-censorship due
to fear of intimidation. There is also a privately owned newspaper
published in Jaffna. The Government imposes no political restrictions
on the establishment of new media enterprises.
The Government has failed to reform the press law and privatize
government-owned media as promised during the 1994 election campaign.
In 1997 there was an attempt to pass a broadcast reform bill that was
ultimately unsuccessful and further revisions subsequently proposed by
a blue-ribbon panel have yet to be implemented.
In a January speech, the President attacked the press and singled
out individuals and media organizations for criticism by name. After
passing the new ER in May, the Government created a special media
information center to approve print and broadcast material produced in
the country, including that of foreign journalists. Later that month,
the SLBC defied an order by the censor and continued to broadcast the
BBC's Sinhala-language news program. After a period of controversy, the
Media Minister allowed the broadcasts to continue. The President
officially eased censorship restrictions on foreign journalists in a
circular published on June 5, although material for publication or
broadcast within the country, regardless of author, remained subject to
government approval. As a result of the Government's actions,
journalists practiced self-censorship.
In late May, the Government used its power under the new ER to
close two publications in Colombo and the independent newspaper in
Jaffna, citing security concerns. The Supreme Court in late June
declared the censorship regulations to be invalid, and it ordered the
Government to allow the newspapers to reopen. The Government complied
with the ruling, but it reissued the regulations in a manner consistent
with the Supreme Court ruling.
On September 19, police arrested a young man for criticizing the
President on a radio call-in show. Police traced the call to discover
the caller's address. The young man's parents alleged that he had a
mental illness and could not be held responsible for his comments.
Regardless at year's end, the young man remained in prison pending a
hearing of the case.
On January 2, unknown attackers set fire to the home of an actress
who supported the opposition party candidate during the 1999
presidential election campaign. On January 26, presumed government
supporters attacked a husband and wife singing duo, who also had
supported the opposition presidential candidate. On April 6, the local
BBC correspondent was assaulted while covering a rally that protested
Norway's involvement in the country's peace process. Other journalists
reported threats for expressing opinions critical of the Government.
Several fled the country.
During the year, police detained two persons for questioning in
connection with the 1999 murder of Rohana Kumara, editor of a Sinhala-
language newspaper which had been critical of leading figures in the
ruling coalition. By year's end, no one had been charged in connection
with the case. Similarly authorities made no progress in the 1999
murder of Ramesh Nadarajah, a Tamil Member of Parliament and the editor
of a Tamil-language weekly.
In March 1999, an army brigadier allegedly abducted and assaulted a
journalist working for an independent Sinhala-language newspaper.
Police arrested the brigadier, after which courts granted him bail. The
case did not come to trial during the year.
In February 1998, armed men attacked a journalist who regularly
reported on defense matters, including corruption in military
procurements. The Government criticized the attack; it subsequently
arrested and indicted two air force personnel in the case, including
the bodyguard of a former commander of the air force. A formal
indictment was handed down in 1999. Courts postponed the hearings
several times during the year; the case was scheduled to reconvene in
February 2001.
The editor of a leading national newspaper who was found guilty of
defaming the President in 1997 appealed the verdict that year. On
December 5, an appellate court upheld the lower court's ruling. The
editor appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Another defamation
case filed by the President in 1995 led to the September 5 conviction
of an editor of another important English-language weekly. The editor
received a 2-year jail sentence, later suspended; he appealed. Other
defamation cases filed by the President against editors of major
newspapers critical of the Government or supportive of the opposition
remained pending. Journalists viewed these cases as frivolous and
intended only to intimidate and harass the media.
The Sri Lanka Tamil Media Alliance was formed in 1999 to protect
the interests of Tamil journalists, who allege that they are subject to
harassment and intimidation by Tamil paramilitary groups and Sri Lankan
security forces. Regional Tamil correspondents working in the war zones
have complained of arbitrary arrest and detention and difficulty in
obtaining press accreditation. In August 1999, the Sri Lanka Tamil
Media Alliance filed the first-ever fundamental rights case on behalf
of an ethnic Tamil reporter on the staff of the government-owned and-
controlled Tamil language daily. Security forces arrested the reporter
on August 21, 1999, on suspicion of affiliation with the LTTE and later
released him. The court ruled that the security forces had acted within
their rights in detaining the reporter and refused to award
compensation.
Travel by foreign and national journalists to the conflict areas
was restricted, but in September the Government began approving some
requests for journalists (both local and foreign) to travel north and
they organized transport for selected journalists to visit Jaffna;
however, the Government did not announce a formal policy change. Both
local and foreign journalists still were required to obtain advance
permission from the Ministry of Defense for travel to conflict areas.
The Foreign Ministry also had to approve visits to conflict areas by
foreign journalists. Bureaucratic delays in processing requests have
been reduced, but they still prevail. The Government occasionally
arranges for groups of journalists to visit Jaffna and the vicinity of
the front lines on tightly organized briefing tours. The Government
remains the only source of most news about security and defense matters
that can be disseminated to the public legally.
The LTTE does not tolerate freedom of expression. It tightly
restricts the print and broadcast media in areas under its control. The
LTTE has killed those reporting and publishing on human rights.
The Government generally respects academic freedom.
The LTTE does not respect academic freedom, and it has repressed
and killed intellectuals who criticize it, most notably the moderate
and widely-respected Tamil politician and academic, Dr. Neelan
Tiruchelvam, who was killed by a suicide bomber in July 1999. The LTTE
severely repressed members of a human rights organization, the
University Teachers for Human Rights, which formerly was based on the
Jaffna peninsula; most former members of this group have been killed.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects this
right in practice. Although the PTA may restrict this freedom, the
Government did not use the act for that purpose during the year. The
right of assembly is also restricted under the emergency regulations,
and the Government ordered the cancellation of two political rallies
under the new emergency regulations in May. However, the Government
generally granted permits for demonstrations, including those by
opposition parties and minority groups. Nonetheless, both the main
opposition UNP and the PA Government continued to accuse each other of
political thuggery and hooliganism, complaining that supporters of the
opposing party disrupted rallies and other political events.
New ER enacted in May restricted the right to organize rallies,
including political demonstrations and discouraged public celebrations.
Under the new emergency regulations, police ordered the cancellation of
a JVP protest organized for May 9 and cancelled the UNP's first pre-
election rally, scheduled for May 12. Nonetheless many political
parties and factions continued to hold impromptu, short demonstrations
without reprisals from the Government. A June presidential order lifted
the restrictions on rallies.
Violence at political rallies sometimes occurs. A JVP supporter
died on September 27 from injuries sustained when the police broke up a
JVP rally held in Matale on September 25, which the Government claimed
was illegal because participants had not applied for permits or
requested permission to use loudspeakers.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
respects this right in practice. Although the PTA may restrict this
right, the Government did not use the act for that purpose during the
year.
The LTTE does not allow freedom of association in the areas that it
controls. On the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE occasionally has posted in
public places the names of Tamil civilians accused of associating with
security forces and other Government entities. The LTTE has killed
Tamil civilians who have cooperated with the security forces in
establishing a civil administration in Jaffna under a political
leadership elected freely and fairly in January 1998.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution gives Buddhism a foremost
position, but it also provides for the right of members of other faiths
to practice their religions freely, and the Government respects this
right in practice. Despite the special status afforded by the
Constitution to Buddhism, major religious festivals of all faiths are
celebrated as public holidays.
Foreign clergy may work in the country, but for the last 30 years,
the Government has sought to limit the number of foreign religious
workers given temporary work permits. Permission usually is restricted
to denominations registered with the Government. The Government has
prohibited the entry of new foreign clergy. It permitted those already
in the country to remain; however, as foreign clergy have retired, Sri
Lankans would replace them. For example, in 1962 the Government reached
an agreement with the Catholic Church that new Jesuit clergy would not
be permitted to enter the country on a permanent basis. However, the
Jesuits want their clergy to be replaced by foreign members of their
order as they retire. The local Catholic Church hierarchy does not
support the Jesuits in the dispute, and it is not lobbying the
Government to change the agreement. Most religious workers in the
country, including most Christian clergy, are Sri Lankan in origin.
Some evangelical Christians, who constitute less than 1 percent of
the population, have expressed concern that their efforts at
proselytizing often meet with hostility and harassment from the local
Buddhist clergy and others opposed to their work (see Section 5). They
sometimes complain that the Government tacitly condones such
harassment; however, there is no evidence to support this claim. In
1997 the Assemblies of God Church filed a fundamental rights case with
the Supreme Court after the local village council in Gampaha had tried
to block the construction of a church on the grounds that it would
interfere with Buddhism. The Supreme Court ruled that the construction
of the church could proceed. However, in May 1999 two bombs exploded in
the hall of the church; no one was injured, but the structure was
damaged slightly. The denomination complained that it continues to face
opposition at the local level in many places but stated that legal
action or the threat of legal action generally has resulted in the
Church being allowed to construct facilities for its congregations and
conduct worship services.
The LTTE has discriminated against Muslims. In 1990 it evicted some
46,000 Muslims from areas under its control in the north. The LTTE also
has expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and businesses, and threatened
Muslims with death if they attempted to return to their homes before
the conflict ends (see Section 5).
The LTTE attacked Buddhist sites, most notably the historic Dalada
Maligawa or ``Temple of the Tooth,'' the holiest Buddhist shrine in the
country, in the town of Kandy in January 1998. In May an LTTE bombing
near a temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival in Batticaloa killed 23
persons and wounded dozens of others (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants every citizen
``freedom of movement and of choosing his residence'' and ``freedom to
return to Sri Lanka,'' and the Government generally respects the right
to domestic and foreign travel; however, the war with the LTTE prompted
the Government to impose more stringent checks on travelers from the
north and the east and on movement in Colombo, particularly after dark.
Tamils must obtain police passes in order to move freely in the north
and east, and frequently they are harassed at checkpoints around the
country (see Section 1.c.). These security measures have the effect of
restricting the movement of Tamils.
The movement of persons in Jaffna is regulated strictly by military
checkpoints throughout the city. For Tamils travel from Jaffna to other
parts of the country remained extremely difficult, due to security
restrictions imposed by the security forces and the limited
availability of transportation. The ICRC in September replaced its
relief and supply ship with a new vessel capable of carrying up to 75
persons. The ship evacuated civilians from Jaffna who needed medical
treatment, but it also carried civilian passengers between Trincomalee
and Jaffna on an as-needed basis. In addition the Government hired a
passenger vessel with room for 400 persons that operated between
Trincomalee and Jaffna and transported medical supplies; in July the
ICRC began providing escort for the ship under the ICRC flag, at the
request of the Government and with the agreement of the LTTE.
The armed forces initially prevented more than 1,000 civilians from
vacating conflict areas on the Jaffna peninsula during fighting in
April and May and imposed a curfew, prompting accusations that the
security forces were using the population as ``human shields.'' The
military quickly decided to permit civilians to evacuate the area after
intense pressure by human rights groups. During the April and May
campaign, almost the entire population of the Thenmarachchi district,
east of Jaffna, was trapped between the military and the LTTE. By early
June, the situation had calmed sufficiently that many persons were able
to leave. The LTTE and the military did not allow international NGO's
to have access to the area until mid-June. Observers believe that many
persons, including the elderly and invalids, may not have been able to
leave the area during the heaviest fighting in May, and may have died
as a result. The area still was contested at year's end. The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and ICRC were unable to gain access
to the region until fighting abated in June.
In November 1999, most residents of Vavuniya fled when the LTTE
threatened to shell the town as part of its counterattack. Security
forces kept nearly 5,000 residents of nearby welfare centers or transit
camps where they were. Human rights groups accused security forces of
endangering the lives of camp residents. One week later the LTTE
withdrew its threat, and most residents returned.
Fighting between Government and LTTE has displaced hundreds of
thousands of persons, with many displaced multiple times as front lines
shift. Fighting in Jaffna from April to June this year displaced an
estimated 150,000 more, most of whom sought shelter with friends or
relatives. Another 340,000 displaced reportedly live in the Vanni.
Since September 172,000 internally displaced persons (IDP's) have been
living in welfare centers ranging from camps, where conditions vary
considerably, to settlements with government social services and food
aid. By year's end, 500,000 displaced persons, including those in the
Vanni, had registered for government food aid and were receiving
medicine and other essential supplies from the Government.
The Government has sought to resettle the displaced where possible
and has arranged for a number of those from Jaffna to return to their
homes. Some attempts at resettlement proved successful. Over the years,
the Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR, built permanent housing
for 18,000 Muslims in the Puttalam area. However, many of the resettled
were displaced again by further fighting, including those who in 1999
returned to their homes north and east of Vavuniya, but they were
forced to flee again when the LTTE retook the area starting in November
1999.
From October 1996 until the end of 1999, over 150,000 persons are
estimated to have moved out of LTTE-controlled regions through Vavuniya
and other transit points in government-controlled regions. Of these
over 100,000 persons reached Jaffna and other Tamil-majority areas.
Many had left the Vanni region with the intention of proceeding south;
they opted for other destinations only after learning that they would
have to remain in transit camps until security clearances for southward
travel were obtained. Obtaining a clearance can take between 2 and 4
months in some cases, and some human rights groups alleged that the
procedures were arbitrary and unreasonably strict. Clearance procedures
were applied to everyone, including the elderly and the very young.
Those wishing to travel must be sponsored by a registered Vavuniya
resident, and only one person may be sponsored at a time. This has
created a lucrative black market in sponsorships. During the year,
persons crossed illegally from LTTE-controlled to government-controlled
areas. These individuals encountered strenuous security checks in
Vavuniya that often took months, further contributing to crowding in
the transit camps. While the Government had a legitimate interest in
identifying LTTE infiltrators, it also appeared reluctant to allow
displaced Tamils to travel to Colombo where they might contribute to
unemployment and other social problems. At year's end, about 42,000
displaced persons continued to live in substandard conditions with
relatives or in camps in Vavuniya and Mannar. Some displaced persons
wish to return to their homes.
Prior to 1996, the LTTE severely restricted the movement of Tamils
under its control, often levying a large ``exit tax'' on persons who
sought to travel to areas under government control and requiring
travelers to leave all their property in escrow. In addition it usually
would allow only one family member to travel at a time. Following the
Government's capture of Jaffna, the LTTE began to allow persons to move
more freely into, government-controlled areas, although it still
extracts a small fee for ``travel passes'' to leave the Vanni, and it
rarely allows entire families to leave at once. The LTTE occasionally
disrupts the flow of persons exiting the Vanni region through the one
established and legal checkpoint. The LTTE also disrupted the movement
of IDP's from Trincomalee to Jaffna by hijacking or attacking civilian
shipping. On June 26, an LTTE suicide boat rammed the M.V. Mercs Uhana,
a civilian transport ship carrying food and other supplies to Jaffna
(see Section 1.a.). On November 2, the LTTE temporarily hijacked the
Russian vessel M.V. Utyous after the Sri Lankan navy destroyed three
LTTE craft in a sea battle. After successfully evading the navy and
escaping to shore, the LTTE released the Russian ship and its crew. In
addition the LTTE also disrupted civilian air traffic to Jaffna; in
August 1998, it began warning civilians and humanitarian workers not to
use civilian flights serving the peninsula.
Humanitarian groups estimate that there are more than 200,000 IDP's
in LTTE-controlled areas (see Section 1.g.).
Several thousand Tamils fled LTTE-controlled areas to Tamil Nadu in
southern India in 1998. An estimated 65,000 Tamil refugees lived in
camps there, having left the country at various times throughout the
period of the conflict. Indian authorities reported 1,400 new refugees
from between January and August 31; about 100,000 refugees may have
integrated into Tamil society in India over the years.
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of
first asylum did not arise during the year. The Government does not
permit the entry of refugees into the country or grant first asylum,
nor does it aid those who manage to enter to seek permanent residence
elsewhere. Howver, the UNHCR granted refugee status to four persons
during the year who asked for that status after arriving in the
country. The law does not include provisions for granting refugee or
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no instances
of forcible repatriation of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government
through periodic multiparty elections based on universal adult
suffrage. The country is a longstanding democratic republic with an
active multiparty system. Power is shared between the popularly elected
President and the 225-member Parliament. The right to change the
government was exercised in December 1999 when Chandrika Kumaratunga
was elected to a second 6-year term as President and again during
parliamentary elections in October. Both elections were marked by
violence. As of September 29, the Center for Monitoring Election
Violence (CMEV) recorded more than 500 acts of violence, including 7
killings, in the period leading up to parliamentary elections. Another
local monitoring organization counted 2,036 acts of violence during the
campaign period from close of nominations in September to election day
on October 10; it noted violence ranging from defacement of campaign
posters to assault and 73 killings. Violence also plagued the 1999
presidential elections; several persons died and many more were
injured, including the President and the Justice Minister, in an LTTE
suicide bomb attack.
By year's end, local observers had not issued reports on the
elections; however, they expressed concern about whether the vote was
free and fair. A European Union monitoring mission, in its final
report, expressed concern about violence and irregularities in the
voting, but it concluded that the election ``did to a reasonable degree
reflect the will of the electorate.''
The incidence of electoral fraud has increased in recent elections.
Elections Commission officers reported misuse of postal votes in the
1999 Northwest (``Wayamba'') Province elections. In response to sharp
criticism about the way that the vote was conducted, the President
appointed a commission staffed by two retired judges to evaluate
allegations of electoral fraud. Although they agreed that the poll was
flawed, no new election was called. In February 1999, the President
also created a bipartisan monitoring committee (which she chaired) to
ensure that the remaining provincial council elections were ``free and
fair.'' Two local election monitoring organizations found that the 1999
presidential vote was flawed in more than 10 percent of polling
stations. A group of 26 international observers invited by the
Government to observe the elections stated that they saw no evidence of
fraud in the 1999 presidential elections, but they admitted the
possibility of irregularities and suggested ways for improving the
voting system to prevent cheating. The EU sent a delegation of more
than 70 monitors to observe the parliamentary elections in October. The
Elections Commissioner granted the EU representatives access to polling
and counting stations. Local monitoring groups also observed the polls.
The Commissioner of Elections recognized 46 parties at the time of
general elections in October; however, only 13 parties actually held
seats in the 225-member Parliament elected during the year. The two
most influential parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (the principal
component party of the governing PA coalition) and the UNP, generally
draw their support from the majority Sinhalese community. Historically,
these two parties have alternated in power.
Although there are no legal impediments to the participation of
women in politics or government, the social mores in some communities
limit women's activities outside the home, and they are
underrepresented in government and politics. Nonetheless, in August
1994, voters elected a Parliament that chose a female Prime Minister
for the third time in the country's history. In November 1994, a woman
was elected President for the first time; she was reelected in December
1999 for a second term. Eleven women held seats in the Parliament that
completed its term in August. In addition to the Prime Minister, the
Minister for Women's Affairs, and the Minister of Social Services, a
number of women held posts as deputy ministers in the last parliament.
Of the 5,000 candidates for the October parliamentary elections, 116
were women and 7 of them won seats in the October elections. The
President appointed three of these women, including the wife of the
deceased leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, to ministerial
posts.
The Parliament elected in October has 23 Tamil and 22 Muslim
members.
The LTTE refuses to allow elections in areas under its control,
although it did not oppose campaigning in the east during the October
parliamentary elections. Through a campaign of killing and
intimidation, it effectively undermined the functioning of local
government bodies in Jaffna, whose members were elected in January
1998. This campaign included the killing of 2 of Jaffna's mayors and
death threats against members of the 17 local councils. Throughout the
period of the conflict, the LTTE has killed popularly elected
politicians, including those elected by Tamils in areas the LTTE claims
as part of a Tamil homeland.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are several domestic NGO human rights groups, including the
Movement for Interracial Justice and Equality (MIRJE), the University
Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna (UTHR-J), the Civil Rights Movement
(CRM), and the Law and Society Trust (LST), that monitor civil and
political liberties. There are no adverse regulations governing the
activities of local and foreign NGO's, although in February 1999, the
Government began requiring NGO's to include action plans and detailed
descriptions of funding sources as part of its official registration
process. Some NGO workers saw this as an attempt by the Government to
exert greater control over the NGO sector after human rights groups
criticized the Government's handling of the Wayamba elections in
January 1999 (see Section 3). However, few NGO's complied with these
new reporting requirements. The Government generally cooperated with
NGO's, with members of Parliament, and with other officials frequently
participating in seminars and other events concerning human rights and
humanitarian affairs.
The Government continued to allow the ICRC unrestricted access to
detention facilities (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In the past, the
ICRC provided international humanitarian law training materials and
training to the security forces on an ad hoc basis. The UNHCR, the
ICRC, and a variety of international NGO's assisted in the delivery of
medical and other essential supplies to the Vanni area, even with the
many restrictions on such supplies (see Section 1.g).
By year's end, the HRC conducted more than 2,000 visits to police
stations and 500 visits to detention facilities. The HRC has over 4,000
cases of alleged human rights abuse pending. The Commission's
investigation into the allegations by former Lance Corporal Rajapakse
about mass graves at Chemmani in Jaffna resulted in exhumations in 1999
that provided the basis for the ongoing case (see Section l.a.).
Nonetheless, human rights observers believed that the work of the HRC
was hampered severely by a lack of strong leadership within the
organization. For example, after almost 4 years of operation, the HRC
had failed to hire permanent staff. The organization also responded
inadequately to requests from its field officers for protection when
inquiries placed them in danger. The HRC also has been criticized for
micromanaging the activities of the field offices, which are equipped
poorly. The establishment of the CIUAH in 1998 strengthened claims of
the HRC's ineffectiveness, since the responsibilities of the CIUAH
clearly fell within the HRC's mandate (see Section l.d.). New
commissioners were appointed in March after the tenure of the previous
commissioners expired. Activists have expressed some satisfaction with
the new leadership, especially for its prompt investigation into the
Bindunuwewu massacre.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights under the law for all
citizens, and the Government generally respects these rights. The
Supreme Court regularly upholds court rulings in cases in which
individuals file suit over the abridgment of their fundamental civil
rights. The HRC and the CIUAH are other mechanisms that the Government
has established to ensure enforcement of constitutional provisions in
addition to access to the courts (see Section l.d.).
Women.--Sexual assault, rape, and spousal abuse (often associated
with alcohol abuse) continue to be serious and pervasive problems.
Amendments to the Penal Code introduced in 1995 specifically addressed
sexual abuse and exploitation and modified rape laws to create a more
equitable burden of proof and to make punishments more stringent.
Marital rape is considered an offense in cases of spouses living under
judicial separation, and laws govern sexual molestation and sexual
harassment in the workplace. While the Penal Code may ease some of the
problems faced by victims of sexual assault, many women's organizations
believe that greater sensitization of police and judicial officials is
required. The Government set up the Bureau for the Protection of
Children and Women within the police in 1994 to respond to calls for
greater awareness and attention. Police statistics indicated that there
were 26,660 crimes against women during the period from January to July
1999, compared with 26,565 crimes between January and June of 1998.
Although laws against procuring and trafficking were strengthened in
1995, facilitating the prosecution of brothel owners, trafficking in
women for the purpose of forced labor occurs (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.).
The Constitution provides for equal employment opportunities in the
public sector. However, women have no legal protection against
discrimination in the private sector, where they sometimes are paid
less than men for equal work, often experience difficulty in rising to
supervisory positions, and face sexual harassment. Women constitute
approximately one-half of the formal work force.
Women have equal rights under national, civil, and criminal law.
However, issues related to family law, including divorce, child
custody, and inheritance, are adjudicated by the customary law of each
ethnic or religious group. The minimum age of marriage for women is 18
years, except in the case of Muslims, who continue to follow their
customary marriage practices. The application of different legal
practices based on membership in a religious or ethnic group often
results in discrimination against women.
Children.--The Government is committed to protecting the welfare
and rights of children, but is constrained by a lack of resources. The
Government demonstrates a strong commitment to children's rights and
welfare through its extensive systems of public education and medical
care. The 1997 Compulsory Attendance at Schools Act, implemented in
January 1998, requires children between the ages of 5 and 14 to attend
school (see Section 6.d.). Approximately 85 percent of children under
the age of 16 attend school. Education is free through the university
level. Health care, including immunization, also is free.
In the period January 1 to August 31, the police recorded 767 cases
of crimes against children, compared with 1,491 in 1999. Many NGO's
attribute the problem of exploitation of children to the lack of law
enforcement rather than adequate legislation. Many law enforcement
resources are diverted to the conflict with the LTTE, although the
Bureau for the Protection of Children and Women of the police conducts
investigations into crimes against these two groups.
There is a serious problem of child prostitution in certain coastal
resort areas. The Government estimates that there are more than 2,000
active child prostitutes in the country, but private groups claim that
the number is much higher (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). A 1998 U.N.
International Labor Office study placed the total at 30,000, a number
which has not been confirmed and has been criticized by activists in
the field as highly speculative. The bulk of child sexual abuse in the
form of child prostitution is committed by citizens; however, some
child prostitutes are boys who cater to foreign tourists. Some of these
children are forced into prostitution (see Section 6.c.). The
Government has pushed for greater international cooperation to bring
those guilty of pedophilia to justice. Several foreign pedophiles were
brought before courts during the year. The penalty for conviction is
usually a fine and deportation. Four cases of pedophilia were brought
to court this year, one involving a foreigner.
In 1995 the Ministry of Media, Tourism, and Aviation created a task
force specifically to study the problem of sex tourism and related
offenses. It was abolished at the end of 1997 and superseded by a
presidential task force on child protection. Following the
recommendation of the task force, the Government created the National
Child Protection Authority (NCPA) in 1998. The law establishing the
NCPA consolidated existing legislation and defined a child as anyone
under age 18. Under the law, the definition of child abuse includes all
acts of sexual violence against, trafficking in, and cruelty to
children. The law also prohibits the use of children in exploitative
labor or illegal activities or in any act contrary to compulsory
education regulations. The legislation further widened the definition
of child abuse to include the involvement of children in war. The NCPA
is composed of senior law enforcement officers as well as
representatives from the education, medical, and legal professions; it
reports directly to the President. By year's end, the NCPA had
recruited permanent staff and moved into an office space that it shares
with the Bureau for the Protection of Women and Children of the police
force.
The LTTE uses child soldiers and recruits children for use in
battlefield support functions and in combat. In September the military
captured a 14-year-old girl who fought near Jaffna. Other LTTE
recruits, some as young as 13, have surrendered to the military, and
credible reports indicate the LTTE has stepped up recruiting efforts
(see Section 1.g.). In May 1998, the LTTE gave assurances to the
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Children in
Armed Combat that it would not recruit children under the age of 17;
however, the LTTE has not honored this pledge.
People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility
to buildings or government services for the disabled. The World Health
Organization estimates that 7 percent of the population is disabled.
Most disabled persons who are unable to work are cared for by their
families. The Department of Social Services operates eight vocational
training schools for the physically and mentally disabled and sponsors
a program of job training and placement for graduates. Some private
companies, at the urging of the Government, have provided training and
jobs to disabled veterans. The Government also provides some financial
support to NGO's that assist the disabled, subsidizes prosthetic
devices and other medical aids for the disabled, makes some purchases
from disabled suppliers, and has registered 74 schools and training
institutions for the disabled run by NGO's. The Social Services
Ministry has selected job placement officers to help the estimated
200,000 work-eligible disabled persons to find jobs. In spite of these
efforts, the disabled still face difficulties because of negative
attitudes and discrimination. In 1996 Parliament passed legislation
forbidding discrimination against any person on the grounds of
disability. No cases are known to have been filed under this law.
Indigenous People.--The country's indigenous people, known as
Veddas, number fewer than l,000. Some prefer to maintain their isolated
traditional way of life, and they are protected by the Constitution.
There are no legal restrictions on their participation in the political
or economic life of the nation. In August 1998, the Government
fulfilled a long-standing Vedda demand when the President issued an
order granting Veddas the right to hunt and gather in specific
protected forest areas. The executive order granted the Veddas the
freedom to protect their culture and to carry on their traditional way
of life without hindrance. Under a pilot program, Veddas received
special identity cards to enable their use of these forest areas.
However, some Veddas still complain that they are being pushed off of
their land. Although many Veddas continue to pursue a traditional way
of life, visits by tourists have become an important source of income
for the community.
Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religious
differences seems much less common than discrimination based on ethnic
group or caste. In general the members of the various faiths tend to be
tolerant of each other's religious beliefs. However, on occasion
evangelical Christians have been harassed by Buddhist monks for their
attempts to convert Buddhists to Christianity (see Section 2.c.). In
1988 the leader of an Assemblies of God congregation in the southern
town of Tissamaharama was killed by unknown assailants. In April 1999,
two bombs exploded in the church hall of this congregation, now run by
the pastor's widow. No one was injured; however, the building sustained
some structural damage (see Section 2.c.).
In the northern part of the island, LTTE insurgents expelled some
46,000 Muslim inhabitants from their homes in 1990--virtually the
entire Muslim population. Most of these persons remain displaced. In
the past, the LTTE expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and businesses and
threatened Muslim families with death if they attempt to return (see
Section 2.c.).
The LTTE also has attacked notable Buddhist sites. In May 23
persons were killed and dozens wounded when an LTTE bomb exploded near
a temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are approximately 1
million Tamils of comparatively recent Indian origin, the so-called
``hill'' Tamils or ``Indian'' Tamils, whose ancestors originally were
brought to the country in the 19th century to work on plantations.
Approximately 75,000 of these persons do not qualify for either Indian
or Sri Lankan citizenship and face discrimination, especially in the
allocation of government funds for education. Without national identity
cards, they also are vulnerable to arrest by the security forces.
However, the Government has stated that none of these persons would be
forced to depart the country. During 1999 the Government introduced a
program to begin registering these individuals; 4,500 ``Indian'' Tamils
received identity cards between January and September 22. Critics
charged that the program did not progress fast enough.
Both Sri Lankan and ``Indian'' Tamils maintain that they have long
suffered systematic discrimination in university education, government
employment and in other matters controlled by the Government. In 1996
the Government established a parliamentary select committee to consider
a package of constitutional reforms designed to devolve wide-ranging
powers to local governments, thereby providing ethnic minorities
greater autonomy in governing their local affairs. While the two main
political groupings, the PA and UNP, reached consensus on many aspects
of the devolution proposals, when the Government introduced the draft
Constitution to Parliament in August in hopes of passing the measures,
it had to suspend debate on the new Constitution due to political
opposition. The LTTE rejected the devolution proposals.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Government respects the
constitutional right of workers to establish unions. Any seven workers
may form a union, adopt a charter, elect leaders, and publicize their
views. Over 70 percent of the plantation work force, which is
overwhelmingly ``hill'' Tamil, is unionized. In total there are over
800,000 union members, 650,000 of whom are women. Approximately 20
percent of the nonagricultural work force in the private sector is
unionized. Unions represent most workers in large private firms, but
those in small scale agriculture and small businesses usually do not
belong to unions. Public sector employees are unionized at very high
rates.
Most large unions are affiliated with political parties and play a
prominent role in the political process, though major unions in the
public sector are politically independent. More than 30 labor unions
have political affiliations, but there are also a small number of
unaffiliated unions, some of which have active leaders and a relatively
large membership. In 1999, the most recent year for which data are
available, the Department of Labor registered 69 new unions and
canceled the registration of 71 others, bringing the total number of
functioning unions to 1,676. The Department of Labor is authorized by
law to cancel the registration of any union that does not submit an
annual report. This requirement is the only legal grounds for
cancellation of registration.
All workers, other than civil servants and workers in ``essential''
services, have the right to strike. By law workers also may lodge
complaints with the Commissioner of Labor, a labor tribunal or the
Supreme Court to protect their rights. However, in May the Government
issued new emergency regulations in response to military events in the
north, which prohibited strikes as part of placing the country on a
``war footing.'' Nonetheless, plantation workers and railway workers
participated in strikes. The Government has periodically controlled
strikes by declaring some industries essential under the ER. Despite
this restriction, the Government in 1998 permitted a 5-week postal
strike and a strike by plantation workers. The President retains the
power to designate any industry as an essential service. The President
attempted to break a doctors' strike in June 1999 by declaring their
services essential. The doctors defied the order, and after a standoff
which lasted a week, the Government agreed to consider their
grievances. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has pointed out
to the Government that essential services should be limited to services
where an interruption would endanger the life, personal safety, or
health of the population.
Civil servants collectively may submit labor grievances to the
Public Service Commission but have no legal grounds to strike.
Nonetheless, government workers in the transportation, medical,
educational, power generation, financial, and port sectors have staged
brief strikes and other work actions in recent years. There were over
100 public sector strikes during the year.
The law prohibits retribution against strikers in nonessential
sectors. Employers may dismiss workers only for disciplinary reasons,
mainly misconduct. Incompetence or low productivity are not grounds for
dismissal. Dismissed employees have a right to appeal their termination
before a labor tribunal.
Unions may affiliate with international bodies, and some have done
so. The Ceylon Workers Congress, composed exclusively of Tamil
plantation workers, is the only trade union affiliated with the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), although a
new trade union in the Biyagama export processing zone is affiliated
with the Youth Forum of the ICFTU. No national trade union center
exists to centralize or facilitate contact with international groups.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to collective bargaining, and it is practiced
widely. Large firms may have employees in as many as 60 different
unions. In enterprises without unions, including those in the export
processing zones (EPZ's), worker councils--composed of employees,
employers and often a public sector representative--generally provide
the forums for labor and management negotiation. The councils do not
have the power to negotiate binding contracts, and they have been
criticized as ineffective by labor advocates.
In December 1999, Parliament passed an amendment to the Industrial
Disputes Act to require employers to recognize trade unions and the
right to collective bargaining. The law prohibits antiunion
discrimination. Employers found guilty of such discrimination must
reinstate workers fired for union activities but may transfer them to
different locations.
There are approximately 110,000 workers employed in the export
processing zones (EPZ's), a large percentage of them women. Under the
law, workers in the EPZ's have the same rights to join unions as other
workers. However, few unions have formed in the EPZ's, largely because
of severe restrictions on access by union organizers to the zones.
While the unionization rate in the rest of the country is approximately
25 percent, the rate within the EPZ's is only 10 percent. Labor
representatives allege that the Government's Board of Investment (BOI),
which manages the EPZ's, including setting wages and working conditions
in the EPZ's, has discouraged union activity. Work councils in the
EPZ's are chaired by the BOI and only have the power to make
recommendations. Labor representatives also allege that the Labor
Commissioner, under BOI pressure, has failed to prosecute employers who
refuse to recognize or enter into collective bargaining with trade
unions. While employers in the EPZ's offer higher wages and better
working conditions generally than employers elsewhere, workers face
other concerns, such as security, expensive but low quality boarding
houses, and sexual harassment. In most instances, wage boards establish
minimum wages and conditions of employment, except in the EPZ's, where
wages and work conditions are set by the BOI.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by provisions of the 1844 Abolition of Slavery Act;
however, there were reports of its use. There are reports of women
being trafficked to the country for the purpose of prostitution (see
Section 6.f.). The act does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children specifically, but government officials interpret it as
applying to persons of all ages. In the past there were credible
reports that some rural children were employed in debt bondage as
domestic servants in urban households; some of these children
reportedly had been abused (see Section 5); however, no cases were
reported during the year. Some children were trafficked and forced into
prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
There are credible reports that some soldiers attached to an army
camp north of Batticaloa forced local villagers to build a wall around
the camp during the year, and they beat individuals who refused to
comply. The military apparently transferred the officer responsible for
the forced labor when notified of the abuse. Some members of the STF in
the Batticaloa area forced villagers to work without compensation,
clearing jungle areas and in other manual labor in and near STF camps
during 1999; the villagers were threatened directly or indirectly with
physical abuse if they did not perform the work.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--In 1998 Parliament passed the National Child Protection
Authority Act (NCPA) to combat the problem of child abuse, including
unlawful child labor. The act consolidated existing legislation that
clearly established what types of employment are restricted for
children, which age groups are affected, and what the minimum age for
child labor is for particular jobs. The minimum age for employment is
14, although the law to permits the employment of younger children by
their parents or guardians in limited agricultural work. In January
Parliament repealed a regulation that permitted domestic employment for
children as young as age 12. About 85 percent of children under the age
of 16 attend school, and the law permits the employment of such persons
for not more than 1 hour on any day before school. The 1997 Compulsory
Attendance at Schools Act, which requires children between the ages of
5 and 14 to attend school, has been in effect since January 1998,
although it still is being implemented. The ultimate effect that this
act may have on the child labor problem remains unclear.
Persons under age 16 may not be employed in any public enterprise
in which life or limb is endangered. There are no reports that children
are employed in the EPZ's, the garment industry, or any other export
industry, although children sometimes are employed during harvest
periods in the plantation sectors and in nonplantation agriculture. A
1995 labor survey of the plantations indicated that half of all
children in plantations drop out of school after the fourth grade,
leaving a large pool of children between the ages of 10 and 15
available to pursue employment.
Despite legislation child labor still exists. A child activity
survey carried out in 1998-1999 by the Department of Census and
Statistics found almost 11,000 children working full time and another
15,000 engaged in both economic activity and housekeeping. The survey
found 450,000 children employed by their families in seasonal
agricultural work.
A recent study reported that child domestic servants are employed
in 8.6 percent of homes in the Southern Province. The same study
reported that child laborers in the domestic service sector often are
deprived of an education. The law also permits employment in any school
or institution for training purposes.
Regular employment of children also occurs mainly in the informal
sector and in family enterprises such as family farms, crafts, small
trade establishments, eating houses, and repair shops. Children also
are involved in the manufacture of coconut fiber products, bricks,
fishing, wrapping tobacco, street trading, and farming. Government
inspections have been unable to eliminate these forms of child labor
(see Section 5), although an awareness campaign coupled with the
establishment of hot lines for reporting child labor led to nearly 500
complaints from January through August. According to the Ministry of
Labor, there were 10 prosecutions for child labor (below the age of 14)
during the year. Under legislation dating from 1956, the maximum
penalty for employing minors is about $12 (1,000 rupees), with a
maximum jail term of 6 months.
Additional thousands of children are believed to be employed in
domestic service, although this situation is not regulated or
documented. Many child domestics are subjected to physical, sexual, and
emotional abuse.
Children work as prostitutes as well; internal trafficking in male
children is a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). Estimates of the
number of child prostitutes range from 2,000 to 30,000; however, there
are no reliable statistics. Although forced or bonded labor by persons
of any age is prohibited by law, some rural children reportedly have
served in debt bondage, although there were no reports of this during
the year (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
The LTTE continued to use high-school-age children for work as
cooks, messengers, and clerks. In some cases, the children reportedly
help build fortifications. In the past, children as young as age 10
were said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special
schools that provided them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal
education. The LTTE uses children as young as 13 years of age in
battle, and children sometimes are recruited forcibly into the LTTE
(see Section 5). In May 1999, the LTTE began a program of compulsory
physical training, including mock military drills, for most of the
population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and
the aged. According to LTTE spokesmen, this work is meant to keep the
population fit; however, it is believed widely that the training was
established in order to gain tighter control over the population and to
provide a base for recruiting fighters.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Department of Labor
effectively enforces the minimum wage law for large companies through
routine inspections; however, staffing shortages prevent the department
from effectively monitoring the informal sector. While there is no
universal national minimum wage, approximately 40 wage boards set
minimum wages and working conditions by sector and industry. According
to the statistics division of the Department of Labor, the Government
in September mandated a $5 (400 rupees) increase in the minimum wage
for private sector workers, and government workers received an increase
equal to 10 percent of their salary, with a minimum raise of $12.50
(1000 rupees) per month. Minimum wage rates average approximately
$33.52 (2,682 rupees) per month in industry, commerce, and the service
sector; and approximately $1.42 (114 rupees) per day in agriculture.
The minimum wage in the garment industry is $39 (3,225 rupees) per
month. These minimum wages are insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and the standard family of five, but
the vast majority of families have more than one breadwinner. Most
permanent full-time workers are covered by laws that prohibit them from
working regularly more than 45 hours per week (a 5-1/2 day work-week).
Such workers also receive 14 days of annual leave, 14 to 21 days of
medical leave, and approximately 20 local holidays each year.
Maternity leave is available for permanent and casual female
workers. Employers must contribute 12 percent of a worker's wage to an
employee's provident fund and 3 percent to an employee's trust fund.
Employers who fail to comply may be fined, although the effectiveness
of government enforcement of this provision is unknown.
Several laws protect the safety and health of industrial workers.
However, the Ministry of Labor's small staff of inspectors is
inadequate to enforce compliance with the laws. Workers have the
statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger
their health, but many workers are unaware of, or indifferent to,
health risks, and fear that they would lose their jobs if they removed
themselves. Health and safety regulations do not meet international
standards.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Penal Code amendments enacted in 1995
made trafficking in persons illegal; however, there are credible
reports that trafficking in women and children occurs. Penalties for
trafficking in women include imprisonment for between 2 and 20 years,
plus a fine. For trafficking in children, the law allows imprisonment
of between 5 and 20 years, plus a fine. According to police reports,
there is a floating pool of approximately 200 foreign female sex
workers in the country who were trafficked from the former Soviet
Union, Thailand, and China.
Internal trafficking in male children also is a problem, especially
from areas bordering the northern and eastern provinces. Protecting
Environment and Children Everywhere (PEACE), a domestic NGO, estimates
that there are at least 5,000 male children between the ages of 8 and
15 who are engaged as sex workers both at beach and mountain resorts.
Some of these children are forced into prostitution by their parents or
by organized crime (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). PEACE also reports an
additional 7,000 young men aged 15 to 18 who are self-employed
prostitutes. The country reportedly has a growing reputation as a
destination for foreign pedophiles; however, officials believe that
approximately 30 percent of the clients are tourists and 70 percent are
locals. The Government occasionally prosecuted foreign pedophiles. As
of September, a case against one foreign pedophile was pending in
magistrate court. In 1999 a foreign pedophile was sentenced to 14 years
in prison (the defendant has filed an appeal); another convicted
pedophile was deported.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
----------
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Antigua and Barbuda is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a
member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime minister, a cabinet, and
a bicameral legislative assembly compose the Government. A Governor
General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of
state, with largely ceremonial powers. Prime Minister Lester B. Bird's
Antigua Labour Party (ALP) has controlled the Government and Parliament
since 1976. In the March 1999 elections, the ALP retained power by
winning 12 of 17 parliamentary seats, 2 more than it won in the
previous elections in 1994. The Governor General appoints the 15
senators in proportion to the parties' representation in Parliament and
with the advice of the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition.
The judiciary is independent.
Security forces consist of a police force and the small Antigua and
Barbuda Defence Force. The police are organized, trained, and
supervised according to British law enforcement practices. There were
reports of occasional instances of excessive use of force by the police
and prison guards.
The country has a mixed economy with a strong private sector.
Tourism is the most important source of foreign exchange earnings. The
country is burdened by a large and growing external debt, which remains
a serious economic problem. Per capita gross domestic product was about
$7,500 in 1998.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remained in several areas. Prison
conditions are poor, and there were allegations of abuse of prison
inmates. Opposition parties complained that they received limited
coverage or opportunity to express their views on the government-
controlled electronic media. Societal discrimination and violence
against women also continued to be problems.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
authorities generally respected these prohibitions; however, there were
allegations of abuse by prison guards.
There have been occasional reports of police brutality and
threatening behavior. In August the families of two young men arrested
by the police charged that police beat the young men leaving them with
bruises and cuts on their arms, cursed them, and waved guns at family
members in a threatening manner. Police authorities acknowledged the
arrest but denied the alleged behavior by the policemen named by the
families.
Prison conditions are poor. Conditions at the lone, 18th-century
prison considerably worsened when a fire destroyed most of the facility
in January 1999. Prisoners allegedly started the fire to protest random
searches by prison guards. Following earlier prison riots and serious
security breaches in 1997, the Government had decided to privatize the
prison and hired a foreign security company, which replaced all prison
officials, with the exception of a small administrative staff and
women's prison officials, with its own employees.
Conditions at the prison have remained unsettled since the fire.
All prisoners are back in the compound, but repairs and renovations
were not yet completed at year's end. In August the private firm's
contract ended and was not renewed. A local management team was hired,
with an acting superintendent on temporary duty from a neighboring
island, and was charged with restoring order in keeping with the June
1999 recommendations of a Royal Commission of Inquiry that investigated
charges of abuse and other problems. A resident superintendent was
trained to take over from the acting official, and the new team
continued to train new hires and returning guards who had been
discharged when the private firm ran the facility. The Commission
recommended hiring more guards and using a rehabilitative approach. A
psychologist was hired to oversee a newly established Rehabilitation
Center, while some 30 new guard officer positions were filled to bring
the staff to 94, including 16 female officers.
The prison remained overcrowded, with over 170 prisoners. In
September inmates sent letters of complaint to the media, asking that
the letters be forwarded to regional human rights organizations. They
claimed that prisoners were chained naked to the floor in the maximum
security section of the yet-to-be renovated prison. The authorities
established a local review board to hear prisoner complaints and to
monitor progress at the prison, but government officials and concerned
private individuals agreed that problems are likely to continue until
funds can be found to build a new prison outside the city precincts.
The women's prison facility is separate and has not experienced the
problems encountered in the men's prison. There is no separate facility
for juveniles, who are housed with adult inmates.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects
these provisions in practice. Criminal defendants have the right to a
judicial determination of the legality of their detention. The police
must bring detainees before a court within 48 hours of arrest or
detention.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The judicial system is part of the Eastern Caribbean legal system
and reflects historical ties to the United Kingdom. The Constitution
designates the Privy Council in London as the final court of appeal,
which always is employed in the case of death sentences. There are no
military or political courts.
The Constitution provides that criminal defendants should receive a
fair, open, and public trial. In capital cases only, the Government
provides legal assistance at public expense to persons without the
means to retain a private attorney. Courts can reach verdicts quickly,
with some cases coming to conclusion in a matter of days.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, of the press, and other forms of communication.
Although the authorities generally respect these provisions in
practice, the Government has restricted opposition parties' access to
electronic media, effectively denying them equal coverage. The
Government owns one of the two general interest radio stations and the
single television station. A religious station broadcasts without
impediment. One of the Prime Minister's brothers owns the second radio
station, and another brother is the principal owner of the sole cable
television company. The government-controlled media report regularly on
the activities of the Government and the ruling party but limit their
coverage of and access by opposition parties.
These restrictions led opposition leader Baldwin Spencer to
initiate a constitutional challenge in 1993. In 1997 the High Court
determined that the Government had denied Spencer his constitutional
right to freedom of expression and called on the Government to provide
the opposition with greater media access in the future. However, this
ruling has had limited impact in practice. The Government continues to
restrict opposition access to the media, and there continue to be
allegations of censorship as the result of subtle coercive pressure by
influential persons. The March 1999 report of the Commonwealth observer
group that monitored the general elections noted that the governing ALP
party received the greatest share of political coverage by the
government-controlled electronic media. The report also indicated that
fair and equal access to publicly owned electronic media did not appear
to be available to opposition party figures.
However, print media, including daily and weekly newspapers, are
active and offer a range of opinion, often publishing vigorous
criticism of the Government. Nevertheless, efforts by print media to
expand into electronic media have been restricted. In 1996 a daily
newspaper attempted to start a radio station but has been unable to
secure a license to operate. The authorities charged the owners with
operating a radio station without a license. The case went to trial,
and the judge found in favor of the Government, charging the newspaper
owners with criminal conduct and finding them liable for damages. The
owners sued the State in December 1996 for illegal search and seizure
and claimed that their constitutional right to broadcast had been
violated. In December 1997, the judge ruled that constitutional rights
had not been violated, even though the owners could rightly claim
significant delay; the judge found that the Government had not been
inconsistent in this case, since it had not granted other licenses. In
1998 the owners appealed the case to the Privy Council in London,
pointing out that a progovernment station had been granted a license.
On November 14, the Privy Council ruled in favor of the appellants,
after finding that the Government had submitted fraudulent licenses and
deceptive evidence to the court. (The Government had presented licenses
supposedly issued to the Bird family for 25 years, but the signature on
the licenses was that of an official who had retired prior to the date
of issuance, and the law permitted licenses to have a validity of 1
year only.) The Privy Council ordered the Government to assign the
appellants a broadcast frequency within 14 days. On November 15, the
Government said that it would take steps to introduce new regulations
to govern broadcasting, and on November 27, the police returned the
impounded radio station equipment to the owners, who planned to begin
broadcasting as soon as possible.
The police still have not issued an official report of their
investigations in three possible arson attacks in November 1998. An
arsonist destroyed an opposition newspaper; a fire of suspicious origin
badly damaged the Ministry of Information; and the opposition United
Progressive Party's outdoor convention site mysteriously was set on
fire.
In March 1999, a newspaper dismissed two journalists due to a
controversy surrounding a news story critical of the Government. The
foreign-born newspaper publisher dismissed the reporters for making
public their opposition to the publisher's decision not to publish the
article critical of the Government just prior to the general elections.
The Caribbean Association of Media Workers criticized the dismissals as
undermining the newspaper's editorial independence and as a threat to
press freedoms.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly. The police normally issue
the required permits for public meetings but sometimes deny them in
order to avert violent confrontations. While the authorities placed
some restrictions on demonstrations in the past, the opposition held
numerous rallies and public meetings to promote its platform without
any interference.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law
enforcement officials unfairly target them. However, it is not clear
whether such complaints reflect discrimination on the basis of
religious belief by the authorities or simply enforcement of the laws
against marijuana, which is used as part of Rastafarian religious
practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The Government assesses all claims by refugees under the provisions
of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for a multiparty political system
accommodating a wide spectrum of political viewpoints. All citizens 18
years of age and older may register and vote by secret ballot. The
Constitution requires general elections at least every 5 years; the
last general elections were held in March 1999. The law obligates the
Government to hold voter registration during a fixed period (of only 5
days) each year, and parties conduct their own registration drives free
of government interference.
Except for a period in opposition from 1971 to 1976, the Antigua
Labour Party has held power continuously since 1951. The opposition has
charged that the ALP's longstanding monopoly on patronage and its
influence over access to economic opportunities make it extremely
difficult for opposition parties to attract membership and financial
support. In 1992 public concern over corruption in government led to
the merger of three opposition political parties into the United
Progressive Party.
The Commonwealth observer group that monitored the 1999 elections
issued a report that noted irregularities in the electoral process and
assessed the elections as free but not fair. The report indicated that
the voters' register stood at 52,348 voters, of a total population of
approximately 69,000 persons. Since 40 percent of the population were
estimated to be below voting age, the voting rolls appeared to be
inflated. According to the observer group, the voter registration
period, which is limited to only a week every July, appeared too
restrictive and potentially disfranchises citizens, such as persons who
would reach the voting age of 18 after July but before the elections.
The observer group recommended the establishment of an independent
electoral commission to improve the voter registration process. By
year's end, the Government had not acted on these recommendations.
There are no impediments to participation by women in government
and politics, but they are underrepresented. No women have been elected
or currently serve in the House of Representatives. Two women are
senators, which are appointed positions. Eight of the 14 permanent
secretaries (the top civil servant position in ministries) are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human rights
groups have been formed. There were no requests, other than the letters
from prisoners (see Section 1.c.), for human rights investigations or
inquiries from individuals or international human rights groups during
the year. In 1995 the Government created the post of Ombudsman. In 1999
the Ombudsman reviewed 220 cases, twice that of the previous year. The
office of the Ombudsman generally is well regarded. The Ombudsman makes
recommendations to the Government based on investigations into
citizens' complaints; however, his recommendations often are not
implemented to the satisfaction of alleged victims of government abuse
and injustice.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, creed,
language, or social status, and the Government generally observed its
provisions.
Women.--Violence against women is a recognized social problem. It
is treated as a matter of public conscience, and there are
nongovernmental social welfare groups focused on the problem. Women in
many cases are reluctant to testify against their abusers. However,
Parliament approved domestic violence legislation in January 1999,
which supplements the 1995 Sexual Offenses Act. The latter provides
penalties for rape and other sexual offenses. Organizations such as the
Government's Directorate of Women's Affairs seek to increase women's
awareness of their rights under the law. Police generally refrain from
intervening in cases of domestic violence, and some women have charged
credibly that the courts are lenient in such cases.
While the role of women in society is not restricted legally,
economic conditions tend to limit women to home and family,
particularly in rural areas, although some women work as domestics, in
agriculture, or in the large tourism sector. Although the Government
pledged to provide better family planning services, educational
opportunities, and job training, it has been slow to implement new
programs. The Directorate of Women's Affairs exists to help women
advance in government and the professions, but there has been little
progress.
Children.--The Government provides education for children through
the age of 16; it is free, universal, and compulsory. Children have
access to health care and other public services.
Child abuse remains a problem. While the Government has repeatedly
expressed its commitment to children's rights, it has done little to
protect those rights in practice. The Government still plans to
establish a committee on children's rights and indicated it intends to
strengthen monitoring and implementation of the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child. UNICEF helped support a study of the needs of
children and families, and its recommendations are being used to
develop a National Plan of Action on Child Survival, Development, and
Protection.
People with Disabilities.--No specific laws mandate accessibility
for the disabled, but constitutional provisions prohibit discrimination
against the physically disabled in employment and education. There is
no evidence of widespread discrimination against physically disabled
individuals, although the Government does not enforce the
constitutional antidiscrimination provisions.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to associate
freely and to form labor unions, and the authorities generally respect
these rights in practice. Approximately 75 percent of workers belong to
a union, and the hotel industry is heavily unionized. There are two
major trade unions: The Antigua Trades and Labour Union (ATLU) and the
Antigua Workers' Union (AWU). The ATLU is associated with the ruling
ALP, while the larger and more active AWU is allied rather loosely with
the opposition.
The Labor Code recognizes the right to strike, but the Industrial
Relations Court may limit this right in a given dispute. Workers who
provide essential services (including bus, telephone, port, and
petroleum workers, in addition to health and safety workers) must give
21 days' notice of intent to strike. Once either party to a dispute
requests that the court mediate, there can be no strike. Because of the
delays associated with this process, unions often resolve labor
disputes before a strike is called.
Unions are free to affiliate with international labor organizations
and do so in practice.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor
organizations are free to organize and bargain collectively. The law
prohibits antiunion discrimination, and there were no reports that it
occurred. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are not
required to rehire employees fired for union activities but must pay
full severance pay and full wages lost by the employee from the time of
firing until the determination of employer fault. There are no areas of
the country where union organization or collective bargaining is
discouraged or impeded.
There are no export processing zones, but there are free trade
zones which facilitate services such as international banking and
gambling. The Labor Code applies fully to workers in these zones as
elsewhere in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids slavery and forced labor, including that by children, and they
do not exist in practice.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law stipulates a minimum working age of 16 years,
which corresponds with the provisions of the Education Act. The
Ministry of Labor, which is required by law to conduct periodic
inspections of workplaces, effectively enforces this law. There have
been no reports of minimum age employment violations. The law prohibits
forced or bonded child labor, and it is enforced effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage rates, which were
established by law for various work categories in 1981, have never been
revised and generally are viewed as irrelevant to current economic
conditions. The Ministry of Labor periodically surveys average wages
paid in various sectors and issues these as guidelines to prevailing
market wages. The guidelines are not compulsory. The Ministry provides
them to reflect increasing wage expectations, and to offset not having
yet updated the 1981 minimum wage rates. In 1999 the guidelines
indicated that employers pay an average salary of $92.60 (EC$250) per
week, although the range of actual salaries varies widely, depending on
skill level and experience. The existing published minimum wages for a
variety of jobs would not provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family, and in practice the great majority of workers earn
substantially more than the minimum wage.
The law provides that workers are not required to work more than a
48-hour, 6-day workweek, but in practice the standard workweek is 40
hours in 5 days. The law stipulates that workers receive a minimum of
12 days of annual leave. The law requires employers to provide
maternity leave with 40 percent of wages for 6 weeks of leave, while
social service programs provide the remaining 60 percent of wages. The
employer's obligation ends after the first 6 weeks, but social services
will continue to pay 60 percent of wages for an additional 7 weeks,
covering a total of 13 weeks.
The Government has not yet developed occupational health and safety
laws or regulations, but a section of the Labor Code includes some
provisions regarding occupational safety and health. Plans to
incorporate comprehensive legislation on safety, health, and the
welfare of workers into the existing Labor Code have not been
implemented. Although not specifically provided for by law, workers may
leave a dangerous workplace situation without jeopardy to continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. There were no recent reports that
persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
ARGENTINA
Argentina is a federal constitutional democracy with an executive
branch headed by an elected president, a bicameral legislature, and a
separate judiciary. In October 1999, voters elected President Fernando
de la Rua; in December 1999, he replaced Carlos Menem of the
Justicialist Party. The elections were considered free and fair. The
judiciary is generally independent but is inefficient and subject at
times to political influence.
The President is the constitutional commander-in-chief, and a
civilian Defense Minister oversees the armed forces. Several agencies
share responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Federal Police
(PFA) report to the Interior Minister, as do the Border Police
(``gendarmeria'') and Coast Guard. The PFA also has jurisdiction in the
federal capital. Provincial police are subordinate to the respective
governor. Members of the federal and provincial police forces and the
federal prison guards continued to commit human rights abuses.
Argentina has a mixed agricultural, industrial, and service
economy. Following several years of economic growth during an economic
reform and structural adjustment program, which included privatization
and trade and financial sector liberalization, the economy slowed in
1998 and in 1999 entered a recession. There was no real economic growth
during the year. Unemployment rose to 13.8 percent in 1999 and in
October it had reached 14.7 percent. Income disparities remain a
serious problem; the wealthiest 10 percent of the population received
36 percent of total personal income, while the poorest 10 percent
received 1.5 percent of total personal income during the year.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Police officers
continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Police torture and
brutality are serious problems. In some cases the authorities
investigated and sanctioned officers responsible for abuses. Prison
conditions are poor. Police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens,
and lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. The judicial system is
inefficient and is subject at times to political influence and to
inordinate delays in trials. There were many reports of harassment,
threats, and criticisms of the press by public officials. Police used
violence against demonstrators on a number of occasions during the
year, with one person killed as a result. Violence and discrimination
against women also are problems. Child abuse and child prostitution
continued to be serious problems. AntiSemitism is a problem; however
the Government took steps to combat it. Discrimination against
indigenous people persist. Child labor is a problem. There were reports
that women, and unconfirmed reports that children, were trafficked into
the country.
The legacy of the human rights abuses of the 1976-83 military
regime continued to be a subject of intense national debate,
particularly the arrest of former junta leaders on charges of taking or
seizing babies born to dissidents in detention and giving them to
supporters for adoption. Efforts by judges in Cordoba and Bahia Blanca
to institute ``truth trials'' in an effort to force the military to
provide information on the fate of those who disappeared during the
military regime met with resistance on the part of those called to
testify.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings; however, police officers
were responsible for a number of extrajudicial killings. The
authorities investigated and in some cases detained, tried, and
convicted the officers involved.
According to reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
the police committed between 20 and 30 extrajudicial killings during
the year. In July Amnesty International (AI) reported that 59 persons
had died under suspicious circumstances in police stations throughout
the country in the last 5 years. According to the report, of the 81
police officers implicated in the deaths, 36 were sentenced, 43 have
been indicted, and 2 were cleared of charges.
On March 2, police in Buenos Aires killed two men who had taken
hostages during an attempted robbery. After government negotiators
failed to get the men to surrender, they entered a family home where
they took three persons hostage and threatened to kill them. Government
snipers then shot and killed both the hostage-takers.
AI reported that on February 16, transvestite Vanesa Lorena
Ledesma, also known as Miguel Angel Ledesma, died while in police
custody; the body showed signs of torture (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
However, later the court denied police involvement and claimed that the
victim died of a drug overdose.
On March 25, 28-year-old Jose Segundo Zambrano and 25-year-old
Pablo Marcelo Rodriguez disappeared in Mendoza province. Their
bloodstained car was found several days later, but their bodies were
not discovered until July 3. The two men reportedly were police
informants who had provided information about police officers who were
involved in illegal activities. The victims' relatives and human rights
organizations claimed that the killings were related to a police
``mafia.'' By the end of July, the authorities had detained 21
officers, 4 of whom faced trial at year's end. Three were active-duty
police and one was a former police officer.
In April police detained Juan Marcelo Carunchio, a 19-year-old man
living in Cordoba province, on his way to a concert. A witness reported
that she saw the police beat Carunchio and take him away. Following his
detention, he was hospitalized in a coma and died a few days later. The
authorities suspended five police officers suspected of involvement in
the incident. On April 20, the authorities detained Francisco Eladio
Bravo, head of the special forces unit, but further information was not
available by year's end.
On July 2, two armed police intercepted a truck in Jujuy province,
forced Manuel Fernandez to get out, and shot him from behind in the
head. They allegedly planted cocaine and a weapon on the man and
claimed that an armed encounter had taken place. On July 4, a judge
ordered 10 police detained on suspicion of involvement in this case. As
of November, they were still being detained, but no one had yet been
charged.
In July in Corrientes province, police arrested 26-year-old Jorge
Marcelo Gonzalez, whom they mistook for a car theft suspect and took
him to police headquarters. They then tortured him and fatally shot him
in the back of the neck. The police then attempted to convince the
owner of the car to report it as stolen. On July 4, the authorities
detained four police officers in connection with Marcelo's death. In
July the authorities accused personnel of the Federal Penitentiary
Service of ordering the murder of Gaston Maximiliano Noguera, an inmate
at the Caseros prison. Noguera was one of a group of prisoners allowed
to leave prison to commit crimes, apparently with the consent of the
Federal Penitentiary Service officials in this prison. According to the
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, on the night of January 3, when
he was supposed to have been in the Caseros prison, Noguera robbed a
restaurant and killed a police officer. On January 4, he was found
hanged in his cell. Carlos Sandez Tejada, a fellow inmate, claims to
have killed Noguera as part of a deal made with prison officials.
Noguera's prior cellmate, Miguel Angel Arribas, was going to provide
testimony to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights about the system
of release for robbery but penitentiary guards shot him in December
1999 while transferring him to another prison. At year's end, the judge
investigating the case was under 24-hour protection after having
received threatening phone calls and a small wooden coffin sent to his
home.
On November 10, in Salta province, provincial police efforts to
breakup roadblocks mounted by unemployed workers resulted in the death
of one protester. Incited by the violence, demonstrators later burned
several buildings and looted stores in the towns of General Mosconi and
Tartagal. Ultimate responsibility for the protester's death is still
unresolved, with both other picketers and the provincial police
potentially suspected.
The authorities have charged 10 persons, including 3 police
officers, for the killing of 2 hostages trapped in a car during a bank
robbery on September 17, 1999, in Villa Ramallo. One police officer,
Aldo Cabral, provided the transmitter the robbers used during the bank
robbery; the two others, Ramon Leiva and Oscar Parodi, reportedly were
the officers who fired the shots that killed the hostages. Trial is
scheduled for April 2001.
An investigation continued in the December 1999 deaths of two
persons several blocks from a protest in which police fired tear gas
and rubber bullets into a crowd of persons protesting the Federal
Government takeover of the provincial government in Corrientes
province; at least 40 persons were injured.
In April 1999, a court convicted a former chief of police of Rio
Negro province and sentenced him to 26 months in prison for obstructing
justice in the investigation of the November 1997 deaths of three young
women in the town of Cipolletti. The authorities also charged two army
officers, Claudio Kielmasz and Guillermo Gonzalez, with killing the
women; their trial is scheduled for March 2001. The victims' families
remain disappointed as they suspect that more than two persons were
involved in the crime, and that details were covered up during the
investigation.
In February in Buenos Aires province, a court convicted eight
defendants, including a former police officer, of killing news
photographer Jose Luis Cabezas in 1997 (see Section 2.a.).
In August in Mendoza the trial began of seven policemen and two
civilians under indictment in the 1997 death of 18-year-old Sebastian
Bordon. Several of these officers were among the 134 officials
dismissed by Mendoza authorities on charges of misconduct in January
1999. In December a court found the officers guilty; however, it set
them free because they had already served sufficient time in prison to
be released. The court awarded the Bordon family compensation of
$70,000 (70,000 pesos); half to be paid by the provincial government
and the other half by the four officers.
Several army officers were among 11 suspects in the investigation
of an alleged coverup of the March 1994 death of army recruit Omar
Carrasco. In 1996 the Federal Court of Neuquen sentenced Ignacio
Canevaro to 15 years in prison, and Cristian Suarez and Victor Salazar
to 10 years each, for the killing. They appealed the verdicts, and in
1996, the Supreme Court decided to uphold the lower court's decision.
In April lawyers appealed the case again, this time claiming that there
was substantial new evidence; however, in October, the Federal Court of
Neuquen upheld its original sentence. On November 23, the authorities
released both Suarez and Salazar based on a law that allows 1 year of
good behavior in prison to count for 2 years of a sentence. They both
served over 6 years of their 10-year sentence; Canevaro remained in
prison at year's end.
Investigations continued into the 1994 bombing of the Buenos Aires
Jewish community center (AMIA), in which 86 persons were killed, and
the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. Fifteen former
police officers have been linked to a stolen vehicle ring, which
furnished the van used in the AMIA bombing, and face various criminal
charges (see Section 5). The defendants' trial is scheduled for April
2001.
No new information was available in the following cases from
previous years: the investigation of police officers Nestor Trotta and
Roberto Martini for the killing of a youth in 1999; the investigation
into the death of Carlos Andres Sutara in 1998, in which 14 police
officers were implicated; the investigation of a police officer in
connection with the killing of Walter Repetto in 1998; and the
investigation of four police officers in the death of Juan Carlos
Cardozo in 1999.
On February 9, 1998, the authorities detained five police officers
from Rio Negro, including two chiefs of police, for the December 1989
murders of Sergio Sorbellini and Raquel Laguna. A court reportedly
indicted the officers later that year, but all five police were later
released without charges. At year's end, the investigation was still
pending.
In October 1999, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon charged 186 persons
with various crimes committed during the ``dirty war'' that the 1976-83
military regime conducted against alleged extremists. In November 1999,
Garzon indicted the leaders of the military junta, including former
military leaders General Leopoldo Galtieri, General Jorge Videla,
Admiral Emilio Massera, and 95 other officers, including 1 active
federal judge, on charges of torture, terrorism, and genocide. The
courts had sentenced Videla, Massera, and Galtieri to life in prison in
1985, but former President Menem pardoned them in 1990. The 1986-87
``full stop'' and ``due obedience'' laws put an end to further trials
stemming from dirty war offenses. Judge Garzon continued efforts to
extradite a number of Argentine citizens during the year, but the
Government did not act on the requests on the basis that those charged
already had been tried, convicted, and pardoned under Argentine law.
Two retired military officers were arrested overseas on the basis
of international arrest warrants for abuses allegedly committed during
the military regime. On August 7, on the basis of a warrant issued by
France, Italian authorities arrested retired Major Jorge Olivera in
Rome, charged with participation in the kidnaping of a French citizen
in San Juan province in 1976. Following an extradition request
presented by France in early September, the Penal Court of Appeals of
Italy released him on September 19 after ruling that under Italian law,
the statute of limitations for the crimes of kidnaping and torture had
lapsed. Olivera returned to Argentina, but later in the month, the
authorities confirmed accusations made by human rights groups that the
document that had allowed his release was a false death certificate.
The Italian Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the General
Prosecutor started to investigate the proceedings of the case, and at
the same time French judicial authorities requested that Olivera be
arrested if he should try to leave the country.
On August 24, on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Judge
Garzon in 1998 related to charges of genocide, terrorism, and torture
during the military regime, Mexican officials arrested retired
Lieutenant Commander Miguel Angel Cavallo in Cancun. Cavallo had been
working for several years as a businessman in Mexico. At year's end,
Cavallo's extradition to Spain was pending in the Mexican Justice
Ministry, a decision that must be finally approved by the Mexican
Foreign Minister. Argentine judicial authorities rejected Cavallo's
request for extradition to Argentina.
These incidents demonstrated that while many of those accused of
dirty war offenses are safe from prosecution in Argentina due to
immunity laws, they run the risk of arrest if they travel abroad. In
October Judge Juan Galeano filed a request with the Chilean Government
for the arrest and extradition of General Pinochet for his involvement
in the killing of Chilean General Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires in a
car-bomb attack in 1974. The Prats killing has been under pretrial
investigation for several years. At year's end, a Chilean response to
the extradition request was pending and had been the subject of
judicial proceedings in that country.
In March a federal court gave former naval officer Alfredo Astiz a
3-month suspended jail due to statements he made during a January 1998
interview with a news magazine in which he claimed that he was a
trained killer of political and media targets. The navy stripped Astiz
of his rank and retirement pay following the interview. Astiz is
subject to an Interpol arrest warrant for human rights violations
committed during the 1976-83 dirty war period. This warrant is based on
his 1990 sentence to life imprisonment in France (where he was tried in
absentia) for his role in the disappearance of the French nuns Alice
Domon and Leonie Duquet. He has also been linked to the disappearance
of a Swedish teenager, Dagmar Hagelin.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The provincial police in Mendoza province compensated the families
of Adolfo Garrido and Raul Bigorria, who disappeared in 1990 and are
believed to have died in police custody, with a total of $220,000
(220,000 pesos) as recommended in 1998 by the Inter-American Court for
Human Rights.
Most reliable estimates place the number of those who disappeared
during the dirty war at between 10,000 and 15,000 persons. In 1984 the
National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP) issued a report
listing 8,961 names of such persons, based on public testimony from
friends, relatives, and witnesses. Since then the Ministry of Justice
and Human Rights' Under Secretariat for Human Rights, which inherited
the CONADEP files, has added over 700 new names, also based on
voluntary reporting. At the same time, other names have been removed
from the original list, either through confirmation of the death or
survival of the person who disappeared, or through the identification
of duplicate entries. The absence of documentary records of those who
disappeared means that the Government must rely on public testimony,
either voluntary or court-ordered. As CONADEP noted in its report, ``It
has been possible to determine that an important quantity of
documentation existed which has been destroyed or which is being
concealed by those responsible for the repression.''
The Under Secretariat for Human Rights accepted claims for
financial compensation from families of persons who died or disappeared
during the dictatorship under a law that permitted filing of
applications until May. It had received nearly 9,000 claims by the
deadline; at year's end the Senate had approved a bill extending the
deadline for 3 more years. A law granting former prisoners of the
military regime the right to apply for compensation from the Government
expired in September 1998. The Under Secretariat, which administered
the law, received over 12,000 applications, and by year's end had
approved over 7,000 of them. While some human rights groups routinely
claim that the number of disappeared was as many as 30,000, the fact
that less than half that number of applications for compensation has
been received suggests the lower figure of between 10,000 and 15,000
may be more accurate.
Despite military immunity laws and pardons, investigators continued
efforts to hold members of the former military regime responsible for
the kidnaping and illegal adoptions of children born to detained
dissidents during the dirty war. At the urging of the human rights
organization Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, judicial authorities
continued to investigate such kidnaping and illegal adoption cases,
thought to number approximately 250-300.
In December 1999, the authorities arrested retired General
Guillermo Saurez Mason in connection with a child kidnaping case. In
March they put 73-year-old retired General Juan Bautista Sasiain under
house arrest, charged with participating in the kidnaping and
concealment of 11 children of women prisoners during the military
regime. Retired General Santiago Omar Riveros was arrested in August,
bringing to at least nine the number of former general officers
arrested in connection with baby kidnaping cases. As in the case of
most of the other retired general officers, Riveros was released to
house arrest due to his age. Former Army General Jorge Rafael Videla,
the de facto president from 1979 to 1981, remains under house arrest,
following his initial arrest in June 1998. The kidnaping cases are
being investigated by three federal judges, Judges Bagnasco, Servini de
Cubria, and Marquevich. By year's end, Judge Bagnasco was concluding
his investigations and was prepared to turn his investigator reports
over to an oral court for trials. Investigations by the two other
judges continued at year's end.
In November Federal Judge Gabriel Cavallo ordered the preventive
arrest of former police agents Julio Simon, known as ``Julian, the
Turkey'', and Juan Antonio del Cerro, known as ``Colors'', and charged
them with kidnaping 8-month-old Claudia Poblete in 1978. Poblete was
the daughter of Gertrudis Hlaczik and Jose Poblete, who were detained
in 1978 and are among those persons who disappeared.
In December 1999, Congress voted to block former General Antonio
Bussi, who is charged with human rights abuses including torture and
deprivation of liberty during the period of the dirty war, from taking
his seat in the legislature. In May the lower house of Congress in an
all-but-unanimous vote confirmed the earlier denial of Bussi's right to
occupy a seat in that body.
In August the Supreme Court ruled against the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces, which had attempted to assert jurisdiction over the
baby theft case. The Supreme Court decided that the case should
continue under the jurisdiction of the civilian courts.
AI reported in May that Judge Maria Romilda Servini de Cubria and
her judicial secretary Ricardo Parodi received death threats,
apparently related to the investigations that the two were involved in
regarding the kidnaping of children during the dirty war and other
human rights abuses carried out during that period (see Section 1.e.).
In 1999 the Government created a reparation fund to be used by the
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo in carrying out activities to find
and return children stolen from their parents during the 1976-83
military regime. The fund authorized $600,000 (600,000 pesos) over 2
years, starting in January 1999, with the money coming directly from
the national congressional budget. While full disbursement of this
money has been delayed because of funding shortfalls, the fund has
allowed the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo to carry out a nationwide
advertising campaign that resulted in more than 70 individuals coming
forward to ask the organization's assistance in confirming their true
identities.
In September a 23-year-old woman who had been ordered by a court to
provide a blood sample for DNA analysis to determine whether she was
one of the kidnaped babies was arrested and held overnight for refusing
to comply. Her attorney succeeded in obtaining her release after citing
her threat to commit suicide if the authorities proceeded with the
forcible blood extraction.
In the disappearance case involving survivors of the Tarnopolsky
family, Admiral Massera, who was ordered by the Supreme Court in
September 1999 to pay $120,000 (120,000 pesos) to a Tarnopolsky family
member, refused to follow the court's directive. In November a lower
court ordered Massera's ``forced bankruptcy'' in a further effort to
oblige the former admiral to obey the earlier court order.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Criminal Code
provides penalties for torture that are similar to those for homicide;
however, police torture and brutality remain serious problems. Human
rights organizations described widespread police brutality, the use of
torture on suspects, and corruption within the police forces. In June
1997, the U.N. Committee against Torture criticized the Government for
tolerating continued brutality and the use of torture in police
stations and prisons. In December 1998, the Government responded to the
U.N. Committee's criticism but did not make its reply public.
The body of a transvestite who died in police custody on February
16 reportedly showed signs of torture (see Sections 1.a. and 5.).
In March a group of police officers who were looking for the
killers of a colleague in Carlos Paz (Cordoba province) fired between
15 and 20 shots at a van and beat up the 2 men in the van, a dentist,
Humberto Gorritti, and businessman Raul Calvo. The police admitted
later that they had made a mistake. This case remains under
investigation.
In April relatives of 23-year-old Cristian Omar Lopez accused
police officers of Diamante district (Entre Rios province) of beating
him seriously after he and a group of friends were forced by the police
for no apparent reason to leave a dancing place. At year's end, Judge
Hugo Perotti was carrying out an investigation.
In July in Corrientes province, police tortured a man before
killing him (see Section 1.a.).
In July Mason Aldo Bravo accused a group of officials from the
Investigation Bureau of the Provincial Police of Santiago del Estero of
kidnaping him for 3 days and torturing him. According to his report,
the policemen broke into his house at night and attacked him. Judge
Mario Castillo Sola was investigating the case.
In September police arrested 25-year-old Ariel Simonini in Tres de
Febrero (Buenos Aires province) and charged him with stealing a weapon.
According to Simonini, no evidence was found but before releasing him,
a policewoman allowed three former police officers and a former
intelligence official, who themselves were under arrest, to torture
Simonini. Simonini reported that they kicked and beat him in the
stomach, head, legs and ribs. The authorities charged the policewoman
as the instigator of the torture and the four men involved as
participants.
Police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse protesters on
numerous occasions, resulting in injuries (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
In one incident in Salta province, one protester was killed under
circumstances that could have been the result of excessive use of force
(see Section 1.a.).
During congressional debate over a labor reform law in April,
federal police used force to suppress a group of protesters and injured
over 30 demonstrators with blows and by firing rubber bullets. One
demonstrator received a bullet wound from unknown sources. The
Government disciplined 12 police officers for excessive use of force
(see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
Prison conditions are poor. Many prisons and jails are overcrowded,
and some facilities are old and dilapidated. According to the Federal
Penitentiary Service and by the different provincial jurisdictions, in
1999 the prison system held 43,126 inmates in facilities designed to
hold 23,523 persons, indicating a serious overcrowding problem.
Reliable information on medical care and food available to
prisoners is unavailable, but the general impression is that such
services are minimal and of low quality. The Buenos Aires provincial
government has considered various solutions, including renting
temporary warehouse quarters, and was considering building 18 new
prisons in various police districts, but had taken no action to do so
by year's end.
Pretrial prisoners cannot be held together with convicted
prisoners, but reliable reports indicate that this form of prisoner
separation often is not respected. Separate facilities for men and
women and for adults and minors are provided for under the law and are
available in practice. Facilities for women and for minors are not
subject to the same serious overcrowding as prison facilities for men.
Security is a problem at some prisons and detention facilities, at
times resulting in jailbreaks. In 1999 there were 60 reported cases of
prison riots in facilities around the country.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Penal Code limits
the arrest and investigatory power of the police and the judiciary;
however, provincial police sometimes ignored these restrictions and
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. Human rights groups find it
difficult to document such incidents and state that victims are
reluctant to file complaints because they fear police retaliation or do
not believe that their complaints would result in any action.
Police may detain suspects for up to 10 hours without an arrest
warrant if the authorities have a well-founded belief that suspects
have committed, or are about to commit, a crime, or if they are unable
to determine the identity of a suspect. However, human rights groups
argue that this provision of law is abused widely, that police often
ignore the requirement that suspects must be unable to identify
themselves, and often detain suspects who in fact do have
identification.
Police occasionally detain teenagers and young adults, sometimes
overnight, sometimes for an entire weekend, without formal charges.
They do not always provide such detainees with the opportunity to call
their families or an attorney. These detainees are released only upon a
complaint from relatives or legal counsel.
In March 1999, the Federal Government promulgated Decree 150, which
instructs police to prevent conduct that ``without constituting
misdemeanors nor infractions in the code of misdemeanors, should be
avoided.'' This decree is interpreted to allow the police to detain
persons for carrying suspicious objects or potential weapons. Critics
complained that the decree revived the old police edicts that had been
in effect until the Buenos Aires City Council passed its Code of
Misdemeanors in March 1998. Human rights groups long had argued that
these edicts were used as an excuse for arbitrary detentions,
particularly of young persons, immigrants, prostitutes, and
transvestites.
The law allows pretrial detention for up to 2 years, and the slow
pace of the justice system often results in lengthy pretrial
detentions. If convicted, a prisoner usually receives credit for time
already served. Three-fourths of the inmates in the federal prisons of
the greater Buenos Aires area were reportedly in pretrial detention. In
the prison system of the province of Buenos Aires, this figure was
reported to be as high as 90 percent. The law provides for the right to
bail, and it is utilized in practice.
The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary is nominally
independent and impartial, its processes are inefficient, and at times
subject to political influence. The system is hampered by inordinate
delays, procedural logjams, changes of judges, inadequate
administrative support, and incompetence. Allegations of corruption are
reported widely, especially in civil cases.
The judicial system is divided into federal and provincial courts,
each headed by a Supreme Court with chambers of appeal and section
courts below it.
The Council of Magistrates has responsibility for submitting to the
President for his decision a slate of three qualified candidates for
each federal judicial vacancy. The council is also responsible for
conducting impeachment hearings on judges implicated in wrongdoings and
for general administration of the federal court system. It began the
process of selecting candidates for judicial vacancies in several parts
of the country in September 1999. Nonetheless, it still does not
function fully; the number of judicial vacancies has increased
significantly, and a number of impeachment cases against judges remain
to be resolved. The council made its first recommendations to the
executive on the appointments of new judges in July. Of the candidate
lists advanced to him by the Council of Magistrates, President de la
Rua nominated two judges during the year. However, the Senate confirmed
neither judge, as is required by law. At year's end, there were federal
judicial vacancies for more than 113 positions nationwide. A number of
prominent cases to discipline judges were initiated during the year,
but were moving extremely slowly through the investigation process.
Trials are public, and defendants have the right to legal counsel
and to call defense witnesses. A panel of judges decides guilt or
innocence. The law does not mandate a trial by jury. Federal and
provincial courts continued the transition to oral trials in criminal
cases, instead of the old system of written submissions. However,
substantial elements of the old system remain. For example, before the
oral part of a trial begins, judges receive written documentation
regarding the case, which, according to prominent legal experts, can
bias a judge before oral testimony is heard. Lengthy delays in trials
are a problem.
AI reported in May that Judge Maria Romilda Servini de Cubria and
her judicial secretary Ricardo Parodi received death threats,
apparently related to the investigations that the two were involved in
regarding the kidnaping of children during the dirty war and other
human rights abuses carried out during that period (see Section 1.b.).
AI called on the Government to protect the work of Judge Servini and
Parodi.
In June 1998, the Government allowed Father Juan Antonio Puigjane
to leave prison and serve the remainder of his term under house arrest.
Puigjane, a Capuchin monk, was a leader of the leftist ``All for the
Fatherland'' movement, which in 1989 assaulted the La Tablada army
barracks. Although he did not take part in the assault and denied any
foreknowledge of it, the court sentenced him to 20 years in prison.
Members of the movement who were involved in the 1989 attack are
recognized by some international human rights groups as having been
jailed for political reasons, but the Government maintains that those
involved were tried and convicted properly of involvement in a violent
rebellion against a democratically elected government.
The release of Puigjane followed the publication of a 1997 report
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) on La Tablada,
in which the IACHR absolved the Government of the use of excessive
force in repelling the assault but concluded that the Government
committed human rights violations after the attackers had surrendered.
The IACHR also found that the Defense of Democracy Act, under which the
La Tablada defendants were tried and convicted, effectively denied them
the right of appeal.
In September the La Tablada prisoners launched a hunger strike to
bring further pressure on the Government to act on their demand for an
appeal. Efforts since 1998 to pass legislation that would have allowed
the defendants a chance to appeal their earlier convictions ended in
December when the legislation failed to gain the necessary support in
both chambers of Congress. Following that, the Supreme Court rejected
by a vote of 5-4 a request by the defendants for an appeal. With the
legislative and judicial routes thereby closed, on December 29, the
President, still under strong international pressure from the IACHR and
a wide range of human rights groups, signed a decree commuting the
sentences of 11 of the 13 defendants. With these commutations, 9 of the
13 defendants will be eligible for a parole hearing in 2002, one in
2003, and one in 2005. The two leaders of the assault, Enrique
Gorriaran and his wife, Ana Maria Sivori, were convicted for their
roles at La Tablada only in 1997. Since they were not tried under the
Defense of Democracy Act, they were allowed an appeal, which confirmed
their earlier life sentences. For this reason, they were not included
in the December 29 presidential decree. As a result of the presidential
decree, the La Tablada defendants ended their hunger strike after 116
days.
There were no other reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
Government generally respects these prohibitions. Violations are
subject to legal sanction. In practice, local police stop and search
individuals without probable cause.
Several highly publicized cases of unauthorized telephone wiretaps
in recent years raised public concern, and the Government introduced a
bill in Congress in 1998 to prevent such activities, including the
unauthorized recording of telephone conversations, the unauthorized
photographing or filming of private acts, and the dissemination of such
unauthorized records. Various draft laws have been proposed on the
control of wiretapping, but none became law during the year. The use of
wiretaps approved by a federal judge continued to be governed by a
decree issued by then-President Menem in the early 1990's.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice; however, there were several reports
that public officials harassed, threatened, and criticized the press.
A number of independent newspapers and magazines publish freely,
and all print media are owned privately. Privately owned radio and
television stations broadcast freely. The Federal Government owns the
Telam wire service, a television station, and a radio network. A few
provincial governments also own broadcast media.
During the year there were several reports of harassment and
threats against journalists, and criticisms of the press by public
officials. In its annual report released in September, the Argentine
Association of Journalistic Entities (ADEPA), a media observer
organization, reviewed several incidents and noted that they occurred
principally in the provinces.
In July ADEPA expressed its concern to the provincial government in
Santiago del Estero with respect to an incident in which the telephones
of El Liberal, a local daily newspaper, were wiretapped. The incident
occurred after El Liberal published a story on an alleged intelligence
gathering network sponsored by the provincial government. The Inter-
American Press Association (IAPA) criticized anonymous threats against
three of El Liberal's journalists and the distribution of pamphlets
with defamatory information about El Liberal. IAPA representatives met
with Interior Minister Storani and expressed their concern over the
situation in Santiago del Estero. In November the IAPA sent a
delegation to Santiago del Estero to investigate the charges.
In July the Cordoba daily newspaper La Voz del Interior reported
the harassment of one of its distributors. An attacker ambushed and
threatened the driver of a distribution van with a revolver. The IAPA
reported that the attackers informed the driver that the governor was
uncomfortable with the content of paper. This incident occurred after
La Voz published a series of articles on the questionable practices of
provincial government officials of Santiago del Estero, which included
accusations of wiretapping and having blueprints of reporters' homes.
In February an appeals court ordered television talk show host
Bernardo Neustadt and Zidanelia Pacheco de Maroneses, whom Neustadt
interviewed on his program New Times, to pay punitive damages to Judge
Elisa Diaz de Vivar in the amount of $80,000 (80,000 pesos) for
allegedly defamatory comments de Maroneses made in 1993 about the judge
during the program. The IAPA stated that the award was a setback for
the freedom of the press because it would force journalists to censor
those they interview, and because it provides special privileges to
public officials, who should be open to public scrutiny.
In view of these incidents, many key media sources criticized the
apparent lack of commitment on the part of some legislators to
implement measures that would protect the role of the media as a
``bridge'' between politics and civil society, and cited the failure of
some public officials to recognize openly the role of an independent
media in a democratic society. ADEPA stated that these incidents
violated freedom of the press and have recurred in recent years in a
systematic fashion.
In February the District Court of Dolores (Buenos Aires province)
sentenced to jail terms the eight persons charged with and found guilty
of the highly publicized 1997 murder of photo-journalist Jose Luis
Cabezas of the weekly magazine Noticias. The court sentenced some to
life sentences without parole, and gave the others life sentences with
parole. Although never confirmed, many believe Cabezas was murdered by
operatives of the late businessman Alfredo Yabran for photos and
stories that he produced regarding Yabran's alleged illicit activities.
ADEPA expressed satisfaction with the sentencing of those charged with
Cabezas' murder. The IAPA stated that the verdict was a step in the
fight against impunity for those who violate freedom of the press.
Cabezas' family, however, believes that the intellectual authors of
Cabezas' murder remain free, and that the incarceration of the eight
persons who were found guilty does not put an end to the case.
No new information was available regarding the death of newspaper
editor Ricardo Gangeme, who was killed in May 1999 in Chubut province.
In November the Supreme Court upheld Eduardo Kimel's 1999 sentence
to 1 year in prison (suspended) and a fine of $20,000 (20,000 pesos)
for comments made in a book he wrote. In December the IACHR announced
that the case will be investigated as a possible violation of the right
to free speech.
The law provides for academic freedom, and the Government respects
this in practice.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
and the law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government
respects this right in practice. However, provincial police clashed
with public sector protesters on a number of occasions during the year,
using rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse protests that turned
violent. In some incidents the police used deadly force against
demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
During congressional debate over a labor reform law in April, labor
groups led a march on the Congress. Clashes between protesters and the
federal police resulted in injuries to over 30 demonstrators, including
injuries from rubber bullets fired by police (see Sections 1.c. and
6.a.). In May several protesters and police officers were injured after
the authorities used rubber bullets and tear gas to break up the
protest (see Section 6.a.).
An investigation continued into the December 1999 deaths of 2
persons near an area in which the police injured over 40 protesters who
were demonstrating against the Federal Government's takeover of the
provincial government of Corrientes (see Section 1.a.).
The Constitution and the law provide for freedom of association,
and the Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that the Federal
Government ``sustains the apostolic Roman Catholic faith;'' however,
other religious faiths are practiced freely. The Government provides
the Catholic Church with a variety of subsidies totaling $8 million (8
million pesos), administered through the Secretariat of Worship in the
Ministry of Foreign Relations, International Trade, and Worship. The
Secretariat was transferred from the office of the presidency following
the inauguration of President Fernando de la Rua in December 1999. The
Secretariat is responsible for conducting the Government's relations
with the Catholic Church, non-Catholic Christian churches, and other
religious organizations in the country. Religious organizations that
wish to hold public worship services and to obtain tax exempt status
must register with the Secretariat, and must report periodically to the
Secretariat in order to maintain their status.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
A committee composed of representatives of the Ministries of
Justice, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior determines grants of refugee
status, using the criteria of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A representative of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees may participate in committee hearings,
but may not vote. The Government has granted refugee status to numerous
persons and accepted refugees for resettlement. The issue of the
provision of first asylum did not arise during the year.
In March 1999, the Government granted asylum to former Paraguayan
General and coup plotter Lino Oviedo, who fled that country after the
assassination of Paraguayan Vice President Luis Maria Argana, in which
Oviedo allegedly was implicated. Oviedo was granted asylum under the
condition that he would not participate in political activities. In
September 1999, the authorities determined that he had been politically
active from his base in Buenos Aires and ordered him moved to Tierra
del Fuego province in Patagonia. Oviedo remained there until he fled
the country in December 1999; in June he was captured in Brazil.
In September two Paraguayans, Luis Alberto Rojas and Fidencio Vega
Barrios, wanted for extradition to Paraguay for their alleged
involvement in the 1999 assassination of the Paraguayan Vice President,
escaped from the National Police Headquarters in Buenos Aires where
they were being held. The authorities had detained them since February;
police collusion in the escapes was suspected. At year's end, the two
men had not been found and were thought to have fled the country.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic free and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. In October 1999, voters elected Fernando de la Rua, leader of
an alliance of opposition parties, as president; he succeeded President
Carlos Saul Menem of the Justicialist party on December 10, 1999.
In December 1999, President de la Rua requested and received
congressional permission to suspend all three branches of the
Corrientes provincial government and take direct federal control of the
province. Public workers, including teachers, court workers, and public
hospitals had been on strike or limiting services for much of the year,
due to the provincial government's inability to pay salaries. The
situation remained tense in the province during the year; in December,
Congress passed legislation that extended the suspension of the
Corrientes provisional government for 1 additional year.
There are no legal impediments to participation by women and
minorities in politics and government; however, they remain
underrepresented. The Constitution stipulates that the internal
regulations of political parties and party nominations for elections be
subject to requirements to increase women's representation in elective
offices. A 1991 law mandates the use of gender quotas by all political
parties in national elections. A 1993 decree requires that a minimum of
30 percent of all political party lists of candidates be female. As a
result, the presence of women in Congress increased. About one-fourth
of the 257 members of the lower house are women. Gender quotas have not
applied in the Senate, where there are only 2 female members in the 72-
person body. However, a December presidential decree mandates that for
future elections in the Senate (with the full chamber being competed in
2001 in first-ever direct elections), at least one-third of all
Senators elected must be women. There are two female cabinet-level
officials, the Minister of Social Development and Environment and the
Minister of Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Training. There are
no women justices on the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases. The Government is generally
cooperative, although not always responsive to their views.
Some of the best-known human rights organizations include the
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, the Center of Legal and Social Studies, the
Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, Service for Peace and Justice, and
New Rights of Man. Within the federal government, the Ministry of
Justice and Human Rights' Secretariat for Human Rights addresses human
rights concerns at a domestic level. Human rights issues at the
international level are handled by the Office of the Special
Representative for International Human Rights of the Ministry of
Foreign Relations, International Trade, and Worship.
In July the new chief of the army appointed by President de la Rua
proposed to establish a dialog among the Government, military, and
human rights groups that would attempt to shed light on past abuses
committed during the military regime. The proposal largely was rebuffed
by human rights organizations, many of which oppose any contact with
those officials whom they believe to be guilty of human rights abuses
committed by the security forces during the dirty war period.
In November Congress passed a law calling for the human rights
commissions of both chambers to write an annual report on human rights
in the country, commencing in 2001.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and law provide for equal treatment for all
citizens, and the law provides for prison terms of up to 3 years for
discrimination based on race, religion, nationality, ideology,
political opinion, sex, economic position, social class, or physical
characteristics.
The National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and
Racism (INADI), an agency of the Ministry of Interior, has as its
mandate identifying and combating all forms of intolerance in the
country. INADI investigates violations of the antidiscrimination law
and carries out educational programs to promote social and cultural
pluralism and combat discriminatory attitudes. However, early in the
year, INADI began a process of reorganization and leadership change,
during which its effectiveness was impaired seriously. With new
leadership, the institute was active again by year's end.
In April an AI report expressed concern over reports that police
targeted, tortured, and harassed gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. The
report included information regarding the February death in police
custody of a transvestite whose body showed signs of torture (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.c). AI noted that police bylaws and provincial
codes of misdemeanors allow police to detain or sanction members of
sexual minorities for actions that do not constitute a criminal
offence. The Association Against Homosexual Discrimination filed a
complaint to the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Cordoba
regarding such treatment.
Women.--Domestic violence and sexual harassment against women are
widely recognized as serious social problems. However, few official
statistics on these crimes are available, so any accurate measure of
the problems is difficult. The Government, through the National Council
of Women, recently implemented a new database system, with the help of
UNICEF, to standardize statistics on domestic violence, permit a more
accurate evaluation of the scope of the problem, and promote better
public policy. During the year, as part of a pilot project, two
workshops provided training on the use of the software for this
purpose.
Any person suffering physical or psychological domestic violence by
a family member can file a formal complaint before a judge, with the
level of injury inflicted determining the punishment under the civil
and criminal codes. In addition, the Law on Protection Against Family
Violence gives a judge the right to prevent the perpetrator of a
violent act from entering the home or place of work of the victim, and
temporarily to decide issues of family support, child custody, and
arrangements for communication with children.
No statistics on domestic violence were available on a national
level. However, as an indicator of the magnitude of the problem, in
1999 the city of Buenos Aires received 25,630 telephone calls regarding
family violence. Courts in the city of Buenos Aires received 1,289
formal complaints through August, compared with 2,160 in all of 1999.
Rape is a problem, but reliable statistics as to its extent were
not available. The crime of rape falls under the Law of Crimes Against
Sexual Integrity, the name of which was changed in 1999 from the former
Law of Crimes Against Honesty. This name change, sought by various
women's rights groups, recognized that the nature of the crime is not a
violation of female purity and chastity, but of the personal integrity
of the victim. Marital rape and acquaintance rape are recognized by
law, if force is involved, but the need for proof, either in the form
of clear physical injury or the testimony of a witness, often presents
a problem. The 1999 law expanded the definition of punishable sexual
violations beyond forcible intercourse and increased the severity of
punishments; in addition, it is no longer possible for an accused
rapist to be excused from prosecution by offering to marry the victim.
The penalties for rape vary from 6 months to 20 years and depend on the
nature of the relationship between the rapist and victim and the
physical and mental harm inflicted.
Public and private institutions offer prevention programs and
provide support and treatment for women who have been abused, but
transitory housing is almost nonexistent. The Buenos Aires municipal
government operates a small shelter for battered women and a 24-hour
hot line offering support and guidance to victims of violence, but few
other shelters exist. NGO's working in the area of women's rights
stress that women too often do not have a full understanding of their
rights. Women lack information about what constitutes sexual
harassment, what can be considered rape, or when physical and emotional
abuse is considered a punishable crime.
During the year, Paraguayan authorities uncovered a trafficking
ring that sent women and young girls to Buenos Aires, under the guise
of working as domestic servants, and then forced them into prostitution
(see Sections 6.c and 6.f.).
Despite legal prohibitions, women encounter economic discrimination
and occupy a disproportionate number of lower paying jobs. Often they
are paid less than men for equivalent work, even though this is
prohibited explicitly by law. Working women also are represented
disproportionately in the informal sector, where effectively they are
denied work-related economic and social benefits enjoyed by registered
workers. According to government statistics, in 1999 the
underemployment rate for women was twice as high as that of men, and
women in general earned 30 percent less than men. The wage differences
were more pronounced at higher levels of education; for example, women
with a college degree earned 46 percent less than men.
In 1992 the Government created the National Council of Women, an
interagency organization under the authority of the President's Cabinet
Chief, that carries out programs to promote opportunity for women in
the social, political, and economic arenas. The new administration
named Dr. Carmen Storani as the Council's President. The Council
operates a web site that provides information on the organization and
on issues relevant to the organization's goals.
Children.--While the Government voices strong commitment to issues
of children's rights and welfare, including education and health,
increasingly tight federal and provincial budgets mean that programs
relevant to these areas continue to receive insufficient funding. The
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights' Under Secretariat for Human and
Social Rights works with UNICEF and other international agencies to
promote children's rights. Education is compulsory, free, and universal
for children up to the age of 15; however, adequate schooling is
unavailable in some rural areas. There are numerous health care
programs for children, although not all children have access to them.
NGO's and church sources indicate that child abuse and prostitution
are increasing, although no statistics were available. The National
Council for Minors and Family, a government organization reporting to
the Ministry of Social Development and Environment, has developed an
Action Plan, together with the Attorney General, the Ministry of
Justice and Human Rights, the National Council of Women, and UNICEF, on
the elimination of child prostitution. The most recent census (in 1991)
noted that 4.5 million children under age 14 lived in impoverished
conditions. There are street children in some large cities, although
there are no reliable statistics on their numbers. There were
unconfirmed press reports that Bolivian children sometimes were sold to
sweatshops in Argentina (see Section 6.f.).
A May UNICEF report stated that sexual exploitation of children is
widespread due to police inefficiency and lack of judicial
intervention. The report indicated that the problem is substantial, but
statistics on this crime were not available. The children involved
usually work in the same institutions as adults. There were reports of
children being trafficked from rural areas to urban areas of the
country, and vice versa. Women and girls also are trafficked from other
countries, although this reportedly involves very few underage girls
(see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--A 1994 law intended to eliminate
barriers for disabled persons mandates standards regarding access to
public buildings, parks, plazas, stairs, and pedestrian areas. Street
curbs, commuter train stations, and some buildings in Buenos Aires have
been modified to accommodate wheelchairs, but many public buildings and
lavatories are still inaccessible to the disabled. The Buenos Aires
subway system installed a small number of elevators and escalators to
facilitate use of the subway system by the disabled, and the subway
administration pledged to increase the overall number of escalators in
the system.
The law prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in
employment, education, and the provision of other state services, and
mandates access to buildings for the disabled. There has been some
progress in these areas. The National Advisory Commission on the
Integration of People with Disabilities--a governmental office--and
numerous nongovernmental groups actively defend the rights of the
disabled and help them to find employment.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution recognizes the ethnic and
cultural identities of indigenous people and states that Congress shall
protect their right to bilingual education, recognize their communities
and the communal ownership of their ancestral lands, and allow for
their participation in the management of their natural resources.
However, in practice, indigenous people do not participate in the
management of their lands or natural resources. The National Institute
of Indigenous Affairs (INAI) is the government agency responsible for
implementing these provisions.
The principal indigenous groups--the Kollas in Salta and Jujuy, the
Mapuches in the Patagonian provinces, and the Wichis and Tobas in the
northern provinces--represent less than 5 percent of the national
population. The INAI estimates that there are approximately 700,000
indigenous people, most of whom reside in rural areas. However, the
nongovernmental Indigenous Association of the Argentine Republic
estimates the indigenous population at 1.5 million persons. Other
demographers in recent years have provided estimates of at most 450,000
persons. To clarify the discrepancy, the national census scheduled to
take place during the year was to have collected information about
indigenous identity for the first time; however, at mid-year, funding
shortfalls required the Federal Government to postpone the census until
the year 2001.
Existing census data show that poverty rates are higher than
average in areas with large indigenous populations. Indigenous persons
have higher rates of illiteracy, chronic disease, and unemployment.
Government efforts to offer bilingual education opportunities to
indigenous people continued to be hampered by a lack of trained
teachers.
Since 1994 the Government restored approximately 2.5 million acres
of land to indigenous communities. Nonetheless, some communities were
involved in land disputes with provincial governments and private
companies.
Religious Minorities.--Anti-Semitism is a problem; however the
Government took significant steps to initiate a public dialog intended
to highlight past discrimination, and to improve religious tolerance.
Combating this and other forms of intolerance is a priority for the
INADI. There were a number of reports of anti-Semitic acts, of anti-
Semitic violence, and of threats against Jewish organizations and
individuals during the year. During the year, however, no one was
convicted for any anti-Semitic acts.
In February a Jewish country club in San Miguel received bomb
threats. Following an evacuation of the building, it was established
that the threats were spurious. Since it reopened in 1999, there have
been several telephoned bomb threats made against the new AMIA Jewish
community center building (which replaced the one destroyed by the
bombing in 1994). No one has taken responsibility for the bomb threats,
nothing was found in the building on these occasions, and no formal
investigations were undertaken into the bomb threats.
In April several adolescents allegedly vandalized several tombs in
the Jewish cemetery at Posadas, in Misiones province. Local police
subsequently arrested seven adolescents between the ages of 12 and 17
in connection with the crime, but the police maintained that the acts
of vandalism had no religious connotations.
Most published reports of antireligious acts were anti-Semitic in
nature. However, in June statues of Jesus Christ and Saint Augustine
were vandalized at a Catholic Church in Buenos Aires. No arrests were
reported at year's end.
In January President de la Rua committed the Government to
implementing a Holocaust Education Project to be carried out under the
auspices of the International Holocaust Education Task Force. During
the year, the Government appointed a special representative to the task
force, began a number of projects including a Holocaust monument in
Buenos Aires, and donated a building for a Museum of the Shoah. The
Ministry of Education is working to include Holocaust education in
primary and secondary schools, and the schools now commemorate a
national day of tolerance on April 19. In June the Government renewed
the charter of the National Commission for Clarification of Nazi
Activities (CEANA), in order to enable CEANA to continue its
investigations into past pro-Nazi actions on the part of Argentina. In
June President de la Rua made a formal apology for Argentina's
acceptance of Nazi war criminals as immigrants after World War II.
The authorities continued to investigate the 1992 bombing of the
Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish
community center, in which 86 persons died.
In May 1999, the Supreme Court (which is responsible for leading
the investigation into the embassy bombing) released a report that
concluded that the embassy bombing was the result of a car bomb. The
court also formally determined that Islamic Jihad was responsible for
the bombing, based on claims made by the group following the attack and
on similarities with other bombings claimed by the group. In September
1999, the court issued an international arrest warrant for Islamic
Jihad leader Imad Mughniyhah. In December 1999, the court released a
more extensive finding on the bombing, which encompassed the May
report.
In late 1999, the Government sought the arrest and extradition of
Mohammad Abbas Malik for questioning about the bombing. When he was
arrested overseas on other charges, the authorities interviewed him in
September, and he denied any connection with the Israeli Embassy
bombing. Following the interview, the Government indicated that it had
no further interest in Malik with in connection to the 1992 bombing.
In the AMIA case, the investigating judge determined in February
1999 that there was insufficient evidence to charge Iranian Nasrim
Mokhtari, long suspected of complicity in the bombing. In July 1999,
the Supreme Court ruled that she could leave the country. Wilson dos
Santos, who reportedly had linked Mokhtari to the bombing, recanted his
testimony in 1999 from earlier that year; the press reported in July
1999 that he had offered to return and testify in exchange for money.
An investigator interviewed him in Brazil in 1999, evaluated the
proposed testimony, and rejected his offer. However, subsequently the
authorities decided to issue charges against Wilson dos Santos, and he
was arrested in Switzerland and extradited to Argentina in December. He
was charged with having given false testimony in the AMIA case, and the
authorities still hope that he will be able to shed light on the events
leading up to the 1994 attack.
In July 1999, the authorities brought formal charges against all
the suspects being held in connection with the attack, including a
number of former Buenos Aires provincial police officers. Fifteen
former police officers have been linked to a stolen vehicle ring, which
furnished the van used in the bombing, and face various criminal
charges (see Section 1.a.). The provincial police officers and others
held in the AMIA case are suspected accessories to the crime and not
those who are thought to have planned or executed the actual attack. In
late February, the investigating judge formally presented for trial the
report on his investigation regarding these suspected accessories. The
defendants face charges of various acts of police corruption related to
the vehicle used in the bombing. At year's end, Judge Galeano's
investigation aimed at finding the actual perpetrators of the bombing
continued.
In April President de la Rua created a new task force of four
independent prosecutors to investigate certain areas relating to the
AMIA case. On the sixth anniversary of the AMIA bombing, President de
la Rua and much of his Cabinet attended a solemn ceremony commemorating
the victims at the now-rebuilt cultural center.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form ``free and democratic labor unions, recognized by simple
inscription in a special register,'' and this right is observed in
practice. With the exception of military personnel, all workers are
free to form unions. An estimated 35 percent of the work force is
organized. Trade unions are independent of the Government and political
parties, although many union leaders traditionally have supported the
Justicialist Party. Most unions are affiliated with the General
Confederation of Labor (CGT). A smaller federation, the Argentine
Workers' Central, also is recognized legally. In the early part of the
year, the CGT split into two factions, an ``official'' faction and a
``dissident'' faction, the latter of which conducted numerous marches
and demonstrations--some of which became violent--in an effort to
pressure the Government to take a more prolabor stance.
The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts
has criticized the law, which allows only one union per industrial
sector to negotiate salary, collect dues, and call a strike. The law
makes it virtually impossible for new unions to challenge existing
unions, thus giving the established unions a monopoly on these
fundamental powers of representation. On November 21, the Labor
Minister formed a tripartite commission to analyze the ILO
observations, including this issue.
During congressional debate over a labor reform law in April, labor
groups led a march on the Congress that was suppressed by the federal
police, who injured over 30 demonstrators with blows and by firing
rubber bullets. Ten police officers were injured in the altercation.
One demonstrator received a bullet wound from unknown sources. The
Government disciplined 12 police officers for excessive use of force
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and this right
is observed in practice. Two national general strikes took place during
the year. The first in June effectively shut down most public
transportation, government offices, and schools throughout the country
as millions of workers representing the three major labor federations
protested the May reduction in government salaries, tax hikes, and
other expenditure reductions as part of the Government's austerity
plan. The second national general strike took place November 23-24,
again with the support of all three major labor federations. This
strike, in protest of labor reforms and further economic austerity
measures, was more successful than the June strike in shutting down not
only most public transportation, government offices and schools, but
also many stores and businesses. While the November strike was
generally peaceful, some prestrike acts of intimidation allegedly by
union activists against bus and taxi companies left a number of busses
and taxis damaged or burned in Buenos Aires and in other cities around
the country. The police arrested no strikers or activists as a result
of any of these incidents. In Cordoba, police made 10 arrests and there
were at least 9 injuries in an effort to break up a demonstration by
municipal workers. During the year, there also were scattered local
work stoppage, and several unions, including transport workers,
farmers, and teachers initiated numerous local and nationwide strikes
to protest various issues including government labor policies, as well
as nonpayment and late payment of wages by private companies.
Groups of unemployed and underemployed workers around the country
frequently used roadblocks as acts of protest. Hundreds of small
incidents took place, with groups of activists blocking roads and
highways. Some of these roadblocks were spontaneous actions by groups
demanding continuation of federal and provincial unemployment payments
and job subsidy programs that were expiring. Others were organized by
radical labor and social groups such as the Classicist Combative
Movement. While most roadblocks were resolved by negotiated
settlements, usually including promises of extended unemployment
programs, a number ended in confrontations between the police and
strikers. In May the provincial and border police in Salta province
used force to disperse truckers at roadblocks, who were protesting the
withdrawal of government funds from a job subsidy program. Several
protesters and police officers were injured after the authorities used
rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the protesters. Protesters
allegedly looted shops and set a townhall on fire. On November 10,
again in Salta province, provincial police efforts to break up
roadblocks resulted in the death of one protester (see Section 2.b.).
Incited by the violence, demonstrators burned several buildings and
looted stores in the cities of General Mosconi and Tartagal. The
Federal Government criticized the provincial government's use of force
but resisted calls for federal intervention.
Unions are free to join international confederations without
government restrictions; many unions also are active in international
trade secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides unions with the right to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements and to have recourse to conciliation and
arbitration, and these rights are observed in practice. The Ministry of
Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Formation ratifies collective
bargaining agreements, which cover roughly three-fourths of the work
force. According to the ILO, the ratification process impedes free
collective bargaining as the Ministry not only considers whether a
collective labor agreement contains clauses violating public order
standards, but also considers whether the agreement complies with
productivity, investment, technology and vocational training criteria.
In recent practice, however, the Government has not refused to approve
any collective agreements under the above criteria.
The Labor Reform Law, which went into effect in May, allows
collective bargaining on a regional, provincial, or company basis
depending on what the local union and company decide. Prior law only
permitted negotiations by the heads of the national union on behalf of
all the unions in the sector.
The new law also established a mediation service, which was being
organized at year's end. Foreign experts, as part of an Organization of
America States project, conducted a 1-week training in mediation for
labor professionals, particularly government officials.
The new Labor Reform Law lengthened the probationary period for new
workers from 30 days to between 90 and 120 days for large companies and
to between 6 months and 1 year for small businesses. The new law also
ended the practice known as ``ultra-activity,'' which allows existing
labor contracts to be renewed if the parties cannot come to terms on a
new agreement.
Some labor unions strongly opposed the reform legislation. In
August their opposition was strengthened when a bribery scandal emerged
over alleged payments to key Senators to encourage votes in favor of
the legislation. Most significantly, implementing regulations for the
new labor reform law were still in the process of being developed at
year's end, with no clear indication of when they would be approved.
This fact, and an inconclusive closing in December of the judicial
investigation into the alleged bribes, left the final impact of the new
legislation unclear.
The law prohibits antiunion practices, and the Government enforces
this prohibition.
There are three functioning export processing zones (EPZ's) with
many others legally registered but not active. The primary commercial
advantages of these zones are related to customs and duty exemptions.
The same labor laws apply within these zones as in all other parts of
the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports that it was used;
however, there were reports that women were trafficked to the country
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The law also prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children; however, there were unconfirmed reports that
children were trafficked to the country to work in sweatshops (see
Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits employment of children under 15 years of
age, except in rare cases where the Ministry of Education may authorize
a child to work as part of a family unit; however, child labor does
occur in practice and may be increasing. Children between the ages of
15 and 16 may work in a limited number of job categories, but not more
than 6 hours a day or 35 hours a week. The penalty for employing
underage workers ranges from $1,000 to $5,000 (1,000 to 5,000 pesos)
for each child employed. On August 25, the President decreed the formal
establishment of a National Commission for the Eradication of Child
Labor, which is to work with the Government, organized labor, the
business community, religious groups, UNICEF, and NGO's. Labor Minister
Patricia Bullrich appointed Leandro Haleprin to head the commission.
A 1993 law requires that all children receive a minimum of 9 years
of schooling, beginning at age 6. Government census figures indicate
that about 5 percent of children between the ages of 6 and 14 are
employed, most with older family members. Local NGO's note that the
figure is imprecise and could be as high as 10 percent. In 1999 in the
greater Buenos Aires area, 12,500 children age 14 and below were in the
work force. In a 1997 report, UNICEF stated that 252,000 children
between the ages of 6 and 14 were employed--183,500 in urban areas and
68,500 in the country--principally harvesting tea and tobacco. An
August UNICEF report on adolescents found that, for children between
ages 13 and 17, 3 percent were in school and also economically active;
7 percent were not in school but were economically active; 84 percent
were only in school; and 6 percent were neither in school nor working.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and there
were no confirmed reports of its use; however, there were unconfirmed
press reports that children were trafficked to the country to work in
sweat shops (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum
wage is $200 (200 pesos), which is not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. It is determined by a
tripartite committee and has not been changed for at least 5 years.
Federal labor law sets standards in the areas of health, safety,
and hours. The maximum workday is 8 hours, and the maximum workweek is
48 hours. Overtime payment is required for hours worked in excess of
these limits. The law also sets minimums for periods of rest and paid
vacation. However, enforcement of laws governing acceptable conditions
of work is not carried out universally, particularly for workers in the
informal sector who constitute about 40 percent of the work force.
Employers are required by law to insure their employees against
accidents at the workplace, and when traveling to and from work. In
December a presidential decree increased the maximum cash payments and
maximum total payments for workers' compensation in an effort to
strengthen worker protections. Workers have the right to remove
themselves from dangerous or unhealthful work situations, after having
gone through a claim procedure, without jeopardy to continued
employment. Nonetheless, workers who leave the workplace before it has
been proven unsafe risk being fired; in such cases, the worker has the
right to judicial appeal, but the process can be very lengthy.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons, laws against child abuse provide
penalties for trafficking children for purposes of prostitution, and
other laws prohibit alien smuggling, indentured servitude, and similar
abuses. During the year, Paraguayan authorities uncovered a trafficking
ring that sent women and young girls to Buenos Aires, under the guise
of working as domestic servants, and then forced them into
prostitution. In one prominent case, two girls escaped from an
Argentine brothel in April and returned to their homes. The Paraguayan
authorities charged a number of Paraguayans with involvement in the
case; however, at year's end, none had been convicted. An Argentine
television station also conducted an investigation of prostitutes
working in greater Buenos Aires and reported a number of undocumented
Paraguayan women and girls working in slave-like conditions, offering
their services as prostitutes in exchange for their clothing, room, and
board.
In 1999 police in Spain apprehended two Argentine citizens whom
they charged with trafficking in women for purposes of prostitution.
There were unconfirmed press reports that Bolivian children
sometimes were sold to sweatshops in Argentina.
__________
BAHAMAS
The Commonwealth of the Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary
democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Queen Elizabeth
II, the nominal head of state, is represented by an appointed Governor
General. Prime Minister Hubert A. Ingraham's Free National Movement
(FNM) has controlled the Government and Parliament since August 1992.
The judiciary is independent.
The national police force maintains internal security, and the
small Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF) is responsible for external security
and some minor domestic security functions such as guarding foreign
embassies and ambassadors; both answer to civilian authority. There
continue to be reports that the police occasionally committed human
rights abuses.
The economy depends primarily on tourism, which accounts for nearly
two-thirds of the gross domestic product. Financial services,
particularly offshore banking and trust management, are also major
sources of revenue. While some citizens enjoy relatively high income
levels, there is considerable underemployment and poverty. The
unemployment rate remained at 7 percent during the year.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, problems remain in several areas. There were reports that
police occasionally beat and abused detainees, and prison conditions
remain harsh. The police occasionally use arbitrary arrest and
detention. Lengthy pretrial detention and delays in trials are
problems. Violence and discrimination against women and violence
against children also are problems. Discrimination against the disabled
and persons of Haitian descent persists.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings. Three prisoners
died while in custody at the prison (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel and
degrading treatment or punishment; however, the police occasionally
beat and otherwise abused suspects. Many of the charges of abuse
involved beatings to extract confessions. Human rights monitors and
members of the public continued to express concern over such instances
of police abuse against criminal suspects. Police officials continued
to deny that there have been violations of defendants' rights.
According to officials, these rights are protected by the trial judge,
who determines the admissibility of the defendant's statement as
evidence at trial.
The Police Complaints and Discipline Unit, which reports directly
to senior police officials, is responsible for investigating
allegations of police brutality. This unit determines if enough
evidence of abuse or misconduct exists in a particular case to warrant
discipline within the police system or, in some instances, criminal
prosecution by the Attorney General. Local human rights observers doubt
the police force's ability to investigate itself impartially in cases
of alleged abuse and misconduct and believe that many incidents of
improper police behavior go unreported. Police officials insist that
their investigations are fair and thorough. There were 197 complaints
against the police during the year. In 14 cases, the complainant
dropped the charges. A total of 26 complaints were dropped because the
police were found to be not at fault. The authorities sent 31 cases to
the Police Tribunal, and 126 cases were under investigation at year's
end. Police officials believe that a continuing turnover in personnel
is a contributing factor in disciplinary cases. There are approximately
2,200 officers to police a total population (excluding tourists) of
293,000.
Corporal punishment is permitted by law with some restrictions. For
example, caning is permitted at police stations but only if performed
by a sergeant or higher ranking official. Cat-o-nine-tails are allowed
at prisons but used rarely.
Conditions at Fox Hill, the only prison, continued to improve but
remain harsh and overcrowded. The men's maximum-security block,
originally built in 1953 to house 400 to 600 inmates, holds nearly 800
of the prison's total of over 1,400 inmates. The remaining prisoners
are housed in medium- and minimum-security units which are currently
at, or above, maximum capacity. The prison's female population is
around 40 inmates, considerably less than the female unit's full
capacity of 200. Male prisoners are crowded into poorly ventilated
cells that generally lack regular running water. There are no separate
facilities for inmates being held on ``remand'' (detention pending
trial or further court action), although some eventually are segregated
in a medium security wing after processing through maximum security.
All inmates are screened for infectious diseases, and prison officials
estimate that about 7 percent of the incoming prison population is
infected with the HIV virus. Most prisoners lack beds. Many of them
sleep on concrete floors and are locked in their cells 23 hours per
day. Facilities for women are less severe and do have running water.
Organizations providing aid, counseling services, and religious
instruction have regular access to inmates. In August and September,
three prisoners died while in custody at the prison. Prison officials
were investigating the cases at year's end.
The Government has provided funds for improvements in prison
facilities and prisoner rehabilitation programs. Prison officials have
instituted some technical and vocational programs, and correctional
officers are undergoing instruction to become certified trainers.
Modern training facilities are equipped with new computers, and the
prison also offers some educational and literacy programs for
prisoners. In December an 80-cell minimum security cellblock opened,
and the prison is constructing a new 80-cell maximum-security building,
scheduled to open in 2001. This building, which is to have larger cells
and more extensive plumbing, should relieve some of the overcrowding in
the existing block. Prison officials plan to renovate the current
maximum-security unit once the new building is in service.
Domestic and international human rights groups were able to visit
the prison during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, police occasionally
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. In general the authorities
conduct arrests openly and, when required, obtain judicially issued
warrants. The Government respects the right to a judicial determination
of the legality of arrests.
Serious cases, including those of suspected narcotics or firearms
offenses, do not require warrants where probable cause exists. Arrested
persons appear before a magistrate within 48 hours (or by the next
business day for cases arising on weekends and holidays) to hear the
charges against them. They may hire an attorney of their choice, but
the Government does not provide legal representation except to
destitute suspects charged with capital crimes. Some local legal
professionals and human rights observers believe that this lack of
representation risks hasty convictions on the basis of unchallenged
evidence, particularly in the case of poor or illiterate defendants.
However, there is no statistical evidence to indicate that this is more
than an occasional problem.
The Bail Act prohibits bail for repeat offenders and those accused
of certain violent crimes. Judges tend not to grant bail to foreign
suspects, particularly on more serious offenses, since the authorities
consider foreign offenders more likely to flee if released on bail.
Judges sometimes authorize cash bail for foreigners arrested on minor
charges, but in practice, foreign suspects generally prefer to plead
guilty and pay a fine rather than pursue their right to defend
themselves, given possible delays in court cases and harsh conditions
in the prison. Attorneys and other prisoner advocates continue to
complain of excessive pretrial detention.
The authorities detain illegal immigrants, primarily Haitians and
Cubans, at the detention center located off Carmichael Road until
arrangements can be made for them to leave the country, or they obtain
legal status. The detention center, which had been closed for repairs
since suffering extensive damage from Hurricane Floyd in September
1999, reopened in December. Detainees had been housed in the women's
prison at Fox Hill where conditions are austere. Female and child
detainees were housed together with the general population and were
afforded little privacy. Incidents of antagonism between detainees and
guards were frequent. Most of these incidents involved the Cuban
detainees, a few of whom had been in custody for over a year. There
were numerous escapes from Fox Hill prison, particularly by Cuban
detainees. In the newly reopened detention center, which can hold up to
600 detainees, women and men are housed separately. Haitians usually
are repatriated within 2 weeks. Many detainees are provided with food
and other items by relatives and friends on a regular basis, and those
who can arrange and finance their repatriation generally are deported
much more quickly. Illegal immigrants convicted of crimes other than
immigration violations are held at Fox Hill prison where they may
remain for weeks or months after serving their sentences, pending
deportation.
Exile is illegal and is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
Magistrate's courts are the lowest level courts and only handle
crimes with a maximum sentence of 5 years. Trial by jury is available
only in the Supreme Court, which is the trial court that handles most
major cases. Its decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal; the
Privy Council in London is the final court of appeal. The Governor
General appoints judges on the advice, in most cases, of the
independent Judicial and Legal Services Commission.
The justice system derives from English common law. Trials are fair
and public. Defendants enjoy the presumption of innocence and the right
to appeal. Defendants can confront and question witnesses against them
and present evidence on their own behalf. However, the judicial system
is plagued by a large backlog of cases, and delays reportedly can last
as long as 2 years. To reduce the backlog, the Government continued the
process of streamlining appeals, computerizing court records, and
hiring new judges, magistrates, and court reporters. The Supreme Court
established a task force to recommend further reforms in the court
system and published a report in October 1999 proposing modifications
in the system to facilitate case flow management including the
disposition of cases within 16 months of initial filing.
Despite these measures to improve efficiency, complaints persist of
excessive pretrial detention, outdated record keeping, delayed justice
for victims, and a failure to update new laws in the books. Some judges
have been brought in from abroad; while familiar with English common
law, they lack experience regarding Bahamian law and procedures. There
were isolated complaints of deviations from normal, fair court
proceedings--particularly in civil matters--but there were no
indications that this was a widespread problem.
The final appeals court recently ruled that death-row inmates
appealing their sentences must be given the chance to be heard by
bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, or
seizure, and the Government generally respects these prohibitions in
practice. The law usually requires a court order for entry into or
search of a private residence, but a police inspector or more senior
police official may authorize a search without a court order where
probable cause to suspect a weapons violation exists. Such an official
also may authorize the search of a person (that extends to the vehicle
in which the person is traveling) without a court order, should
probable cause exist to suspect drug possession.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government respects the
constitutional provision for the right of free expression, and the
political opposition criticizes the Government freely and frequently.
Three daily and several weekly newspapers, all privately owned,
express a variety of views on issues of public interest, including
varying degrees of criticism of the Government and its policies.
Foreign newspapers and magazines are readily available.
There is a government-run radio station and four privately owned
radio broadcasters. The country's sole television station, the state-
owned Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas, presents a variety of
views, although opposition politicians claim, with some justification,
that their views do not receive as extensive coverage as those of the
Government.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice. Groups must obtain permits to hold public
demonstrations, and the authorities generally grant such permits.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. The law permits private
associations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees.
There is no legislation governing the processing of asylum seekers,
and applications for political asylum are supposed to be adjudicated on
a case-by-case basis at the cabinet level. Trained immigration
officials screen asylum applicants, and the UNHCR reviews the interview
records and offers advice on certain cases. Local and international
human rights observers have criticized the Government for failing to
screen potential asylum applicants adequately. These organizations have
claimed that some Cubans and Haitians with a legitimate fear of
persecution were repatriated without first having the opportunity to
make a claim for asylum. Although the repatriation agreement between
the Bahamas and Haiti expired at the end of 1995, the Government
continued to repatriate illegal Haitian immigrants based on the terms
of that agreement. The Government signed a repatriation agreement with
Cuba in 1998.
At year's end, a total of 5,801 persons, including 4,897 Haitians,
374 Jamaicans, and 284 Cubans had been repatriated. Two Nigerian
nationals requested asylum during the year. The Government granted one
request and denied the other. A total of 39 Cubans requested asylum.
All were denied.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
The Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary democracy with two
major political parties and general elections at least every 5 years.
An elected Prime Minister and Parliament govern. The political process
is open to all elements of society, and citizens 18 years of age and
older are eligible to register and vote. Voting is by secret ballot.
The two principal political parties are the ruling Free National
Movement and the opposition Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). The PLP
led the country for 6 years of internal self-government from 1967 to
1973 and held power from independence in 1973 until 1992. The FNM won
general elections in 1992 and 1997. It holds 35 of 40 seats in the
House of Assembly, and the PLP holds 4. The Coalition for Democratic
Reform (a splinter party from the PLP) holds one seat. Both the ruling
party and the opposition name members to the upper house, the Senate,
in compliance with constitutional guidelines. Although it does pass
legislation, the Senate is primarily a deliberative body that serves as
a public forum to discuss national problems and policies.
There are no legal impediments to participation by women in
government and politics; however, women are underrepresented. The 40-
seat House of Assembly has 6 elected female members, including the
Speaker of the House, and 6 appointed female Senators, including the
government leader in the Senate. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janet
Bostwick, also directs the Bahamian Bureau of Women's Affairs. Women
also head the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce,
Agriculture, and Industry. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is a
woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Individual human rights monitors and several local human rights
groups, as well as representatives of international human rights
organizations, operate freely, expressing their opinions and reporting
their findings on alleged human rights violations without government
restriction. The Government allows them broad access to institutions
and individuals.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Government generally respects in practice the constitutional
provisions for individual rights and freedoms regardless of race, place
of origin, political opinion, creed, or sex. However, the Constitution
and the law contain certain provisions that discriminate against women.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a serious,
widespread problem. Government crime statistics do not separate
domestic violence from other incidents of violence. The Government
operates a nationwide toll-free hot line, with two trained volunteers
on each of the inhabited islands who are on call to respond in the
event of a crisis. Government and private women's organizations conduct
public awareness campaigns highlighting the problems of abuse and
domestic violence. On November 16, the Department of Social Services in
partnership with a private company established, for the first time, two
safe houses to assist battered women. The Domestic Court, which deals
exclusively with family issues such as spousal abuse, maintenance
payments, and legal separation, continued to receive a high volume of
cases. The court can and does impose various legal constraints to
protect women from abusive spouses or companions. However, advocates
for women's rights see a need to improve the effectiveness of
enforcement of the court's orders. They cite a general reluctance on
the part of law enforcement authorities to intervene in domestic
disputes and a lack of police training and sensitivity in dealing with
domestic violence. While police training includes some presentations on
domestic violence, law enforcement authorities admit that the problem
has not been a top priority in training or resource allocation.
The Constitution discriminates against women by not providing them
with the same right as men to transmit citizenship to their foreign-
born spouses. Additionally the law makes it easier for men with foreign
spouses to confer citizenship on their children than for women with
foreign spouses. Some inheritance laws also favor men over women. For
example, when a person dies without a will, the estate passes to the
oldest legitimate son, or in cases where there is no son, the closest
legitimate male relative. Prominent women of all political persuasions
continue to push for an amendment to the Constitution and related laws
to redress this situation.
Women participate fully in society and are well represented in the
business and professional sectors.
Children.--The Government places a priority on maintaining adequate
expenditures for child welfare and education. Public education is
compulsory for children through the age of 16.
Awareness of parenting and responsibility for children has
increased. However, child abuse and neglect remain serious problems.
There were a total of 147 cases of child abuse during the year: 33
cases of physical abuse, 94 cases of sexual abuse, 9 cases of neglect,
4 cases of emotional abuse, and 7 cases of abandonment.
The law requires that all persons who have contact with a child
they believe to be abused sexually report their suspicions to the
police. However, the same reporting requirement does not apply to cases
of physical abuse, which health care professionals believe occurs quite
frequently. The police refer reported cases of sexual and physical
abuse to the Department of Social Services, which investigates them and
can bring criminal charges against perpetrators. The Department may
remove children from abusive situations if the court deems it
necessary.
People with Disabilities.--The Government has constructed
additional housing units in Nassau designed specifically for the
disabled, but very few buildings and public facilities are accessible
to the disabled. Although the 1973 National Building Code mandates
certain accommodations for the physically disabled in new public
buildings, the authorities rarely enforce this requirement. The code
also fails to mandate accommodations in new private buildings, which
often lack accessibility as well. Advocates for the disabled complain
of widespread job discrimination and general apathy on the part of
private employers and political leaders toward their need for training
and equal opportunity. They note that there is no overarching
legislation to implement and enforce equal opportunity policies in the
workplace, educational institutions, or elsewhere.
The Disability Affairs Unit of the Ministry of Social Development
and National Insurance works with the Bahamas Council for Disability,
an umbrella organization of nongovernmental organizations that offer
services for the disabled, to provide a coordinated public and private
sector approach to the needs of the disabled. A mix of government and
private residential and nonresidential institutions provides a range of
education, training, counseling, and job placement services for both
physically and mentally disabled adults and children. There is still no
disability act; a governmentsponsored task force drafted proposed
legislation; however, it had not been introduced in Parliament at
year's end.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Unofficial estimates suggest
that between 20 and 25 percent of the country's roughly 290,000
inhabitants are Haitians or citizens of Haitian descent, making them
the largest and most visible ethnic minority in the islands. While
30,000 to 40,000 Haitian citizens reside in the Bahamas legally, some
observers believe that similarly large numbers are in the country
illegally.
Although Haitians and Bahamians of Haitian descent generally are
well integrated into society, interethnic tensions and inequities
persist. Recent crime statistics show Haitians as targets for petty
theft crimes. Some members of the Haitian community complain of
discrimination in the job market, and resentment of continued Haitian
immigration is widespread. However, reports of ethnic violence or
blatant discrimination against legally resident Haitians are scarce.
Leaders of the Haitian community approve of the Government's humane
approach to the repatriation of illegal migrants and point to the high
number of ethnic Haitians in the public service.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides labor
unions with the right of free assembly and association. Private sector
and most public sector workers may form or join unions without prior
approval. Members of the police force, defense force, fire brigade, and
prison guards may not organize or join unions. Workers exercise the
right of association extensively, with almost one-quarter of the work
force (and one-half of the workers in the important hotel industry)
belonging to unions.
Three major umbrella labor organizations--the National Workers
Council of Trade Unions and Associations, the Trade Union Congress
(TUC), and the National Congress of Trade Unions--along with individual
labor unions, all function independently of government or political
party control.
The Industrial Relations Act requires that, before a strike begins,
a simple majority of a union's membership must vote in favor of a
motion to strike. The Department of Labor must supervise the vote.
Unions threatened several work stoppages against both public and
private employers during the year. In order to resolve trade disputes
more quickly, in 1996 Parliament amended the Industrial Relations Act
to establish an industrial tribunal. According to the act, labor
disputes first are filed with the Ministry of Labor and then, if not
resolved, are turned over to the tribunal. The tribunal follows normal
court procedures for the admission of evidence, direct examination, and
crossexamination. The tribunal's decision is final and can only be
appealed in court on a strict question of law. Some employers complain
that the industrial tribunal is biased unfairly in favor of employees.
All labor unions have the right to maintain affiliations with
international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers freely
exercise their right to organize and participate in collective
bargaining, which the law protects. Unions and employers negotiate wage
rates without government interference.
The Constitution and the Industrial Relations Act prohibit anti-
union discrimination by employers. The act requires employers to
recognize trade unions, and it requires the reinstatement of workers
fired for union activities. Employers may dismiss workers in accordance
with applicable contracts, which generally require some severance pay.
The Government enforces labor laws and regulations uniformly throughout
the country.
Freeport is a specially designated free trade zone. Labor law and
practice in this zone do not differ from those in the rest of the
country. However, human rights advocates assert that the Port Authority
has allowed the Hong Kong-based company Hutchinson-Whampoa, which now
owns the harbor, airport, and many major hotels in Freeport, to
discourage unions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by all persons, including
children, and such labor does not exist in practice.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
of 14 for industrial work or work during school hours. Children under
the age of 16 may not work at night. There is no legal minimum age for
employment in other sectors, and some children work part time in light
industry and service jobs. The constitutional prohibition of forced and
compulsory labor, including that by children, is respected in practice
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Fair Labor Standards Act
permits the creation of a Wages Council to recommend the setting of a
minimum wage, but the Government never has established such a council
or a general minimum wage. However, in July the Government established
a specific minimum wage of $4.66 (B$4.66) per hour for all hourly and
temporary workers throughout the public sector. In view of the high
cost of living, this wage alone would not provide more than a
subsistence living for a worker and family. The act limits the regular
workweek to 48 hours, provides for one 24-hour rest period, and
requires overtime payment (time and a half) for hours beyond the
standard.
The Ministry of Labor, responsible for enforcing labor laws, has a
team of inspectors who conduct on-site visits to enforce occupational
health and safety standards and investigate employee concerns and
complaints, but inspections occur infrequently. The Ministry normally
announces inspection visits in advance, and employers generally
cooperate with inspectors to implement safety standards.
The national insurance program compensates workers for work-related
injuries. The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to find
suitable alternative employment for employees injured on the job but
still able to work. The law does not provide a right for workers to
absent themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons; however, the Penal code bans
prostitution and prohibits the detention of persons against their will
and for immoral purposes. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked to, from, within or through the country.
__________
BARBADOS
Barbados is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty,
parliamentary form of government and is a member of the Commonwealth of
Nations. The Queen is head of state and is represented by an appointed
Governor General. Prime Minister Owen Arthur is the head of government
and governs with an appointed cabinet. The judiciary is independent.
The Royal Barbados Police Force is charged with maintaining public
order. The small volunteer Barbados Defence Force (BDF) is responsible
for national security and can be employed to maintain public order in
times of crisis, emergency, or other specific need. Police committed
some human rights abuses.
The economy is based on tourism, services, light manufacturing, and
agriculture, which makes it vulnerable to external economic
developments. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was about $9,323
in 1999. The country has registered 7 successive years of sustained
economic growth. For the first quarter of the year, GDP grew at 4.6
percent.
The Government generally respects constitutional provisions
regarding human rights; however, there were problems in a few areas.
There were three extrajudicial killings by police. Other principal
human rights problems continued to be occasional instances of excessive
use of force by police and societal violence against women and
children. There was an upsurge in spousal abuse during the year.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings. However, police committed three
extrajudicial killings. In all cases, the police conducted
investigations that found no wrongdoing on the part of the police
officers.
On February 6, police shot and killed a suspect, Curtis Maynard,
who they said was armed and attempted to flee. However, local residents
mounted a demonstration and asserted that Maynard was never known to
carry weapons and that, since he was surrounded by police, they should
have captured him without gunfire.
On February 21, police shot and killed Kerwin Wilkinson when they
responded to a report of a domestic dispute. The police said he
resisted and brandished a machete; his girlfriend claimed that he was
not holding the machete when police shot him.
On March 3, police shot and killed Tony Greenidge, an emotionally
disturbed worker, who had slashed to death an elderly person. Greenidge
then attacked a responding police officer, and another police officer
shot and killed him.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, credible
reports continued that law enforcement officials sometimes used force
during detention to extract confessions from detainees.
In February a defendant accused and later convicted of child
molestation alleged that the police slapped him, choked him, and denied
him access to legal representation, and that due to this treatment, he
signed a written confession. Also in February, another defendant
alleged that his statement made in a deposition had been altered after
the fact by police.
In September the Police Commissioner promised to investigate the
alleged beating of a prisoner being held by police on a marijuana
charge after his mother stated on a radio program that the police had
mistreated her son brutally.
In December 1998, the police took two foreign citizens into custody
for questioning in connection with a bank burglary. According to
eyewitnesses, both individuals were in good health when the police
apprehended them. However, 2 days later, the police took both men to
the local hospital following complaints of abdominal pain. One man had
to undergo extensive emergency surgery for life-threatening internal
bleeding; doctors treated the second man for injuries to the abdomen
and groin. Both men asserted that they were restrained physically and
beaten by five or six men while in police custody. The police force's
Criminal Investigation Department conducted an investigation and
presented a report to the Director of Public Prosecutions in February
1999. The authorities filed charges against five police officers and
started trial proceedings; however, at year's end, the case was
unresolved and remained before the courts.
The majority of complaints against the police fall into the
categories of unprofessional conduct and beating or assault. While the
police force has a complaints and discipline department headed by a
superintendent to deal with matters of inappropriate police conduct,
there is no independent body to review complaints against the police.
However, in December 1998, the Attorney General instituted a working
group to make recommendations regarding the establishment of an
independent complaints authority. In February the group presented its
report to the Cabinet, and its recommendations were expected to be
submitted to Parliament for further consideration.
Police procedures provide that the police may question suspects,
and other persons they hold, only at a police station, except when
expressly permitted by a senior divisional officer. An officer must
visit detainees at least once every 3 hours to inquire about the
detainees' condition. After 24 hours, the detaining authority must
submit a written report to the Deputy Commissioner. The authorities
must approve and record all movements of detainees between stations.
The authorities generally adhere to these basic principles, although
officials occasionally used excessive force.
The authorities issued firearms to special foot patrols in
highcrime areas in response to public concern over violent incidents
that had led to recent public concern. Aside from this exception, the
police force mainly still is unarmed, in keeping with its British
traditions. In February the police established a special task force
unit to address illegal weapons and crimes involving firearms. They
also announced creation of a joint unit with the BDF to target high-
profile crimes.
The only prison is antiquated and overcrowded, with over 625
inmates in a structure built for 350 inmates. The Caribbean Human
Rights Network has called for reform of the penal system and advocates
the development of alternatives to imprisonment such as community
service to alleviate the problem of severe overcrowding. During the
year, government officials took steps to introduce alternative,
noncustodial sentencing.
The Government allows private groups to visit prisons to ascertain
conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and requires detainees to
be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time, and the
Government generally respects these provisions in practice. Criminal
defendants have the right to counsel, and attorneys have ready access
to their clients.
The authorities do not use forced exile as a punishment or means of
political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is free of intervention by other branches
of government.
The judiciary includes the Supreme Court, which consists of the
high court and court of appeal. The Governor General, on recommendation
of the Prime Minister and after consultation with the leader of the
opposition, appoints the Chief Justice and other judges. Judges serve
until the age of 65.
The Constitution provides that persons charged with criminal
offenses be given a fair public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial court, and the Government respects this right
in practice. The judicial system provides for the right of due process
at each level. The law presumes defendants innocent until proven
guilty.
In February Parliament approved a package of new legislation
intended to strengthen the powers of law enforcement officials. One of
the new laws allows the Director of Public Prosecutions to appeal
sentences in criminal cases that he considers too lenient.
The Government provides free legal aid to the indigent with the
exception of a limit of about $2,150 (1,300 pounds sterling) on
expenses incurred for appeals by death row prisoners to the Privy
Council in London. Two inmates have challenged this limit and are suing
the Government on the grounds that it effectively deprives them of
their right to due process.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, or
seizure, and the law requires warrants to be issued before privately
owned property may be entered and searched.
The Government does not interfere routinely in the private lives of
its citizens; however, the police sometimes resorted to searches of
homes without warrants. The Government does not censor mail. However,
the Government restricts the receipt of foreign publications deemed to
be pornographic. Other foreign publications of a nonprurient nature are
allowed without restriction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities respect these
rights in practice. There are two independent daily newspapers, both of
which present opposition political views. The Government regularly
comes under criticism in the newspapers and on daily call-in radio
programs. There are six radio stations, two of which are owned by the
Government. The Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) television
service (the only television source, excluding direct satellite
reception) is government owned. Although CBC is a state enterprise, it
regularly reported views opposing government policies. Critics allege
that the Government sometimes uses its influence to discourage media
reporting on sensitive issues, but the press remained vigorously
critical of the Government on a broad span of issues. The Government
prohibits the production of pornographic materials.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
respects this right in practice. Political parties, trade unions, and
private organizations function and hold meetings and rallies generally
without hindrance. The Public Order Act of 1970 requires police
approval for public assemblies, and previously it had been enforced
rarely. However, in February the authorities dispersed a protest march
about the Maynard killing by police (see Section 1.c.) because no
permit had been obtained. Permission later was granted for a
demonstration held a few days afterwards.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and legal residents move freely
within the country and leave and enter it without restriction.
The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
did not arise. There were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone
having a valid claim to refugee status. However, government practice
remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have this right in law and exercise it in practice.
Political parties compete in free and fair elections by secret ballot
at least every 5 years. In the 1999 elections, the Barbados Labour
Party won a decisive victory, gaining a 26-to-2 majority over the
Democratic Labour Party. There are no impediments to participation in
the political process, and all citizens over age 18 may vote. The Prime
Minister exercises executive power along with the Cabinet of Ministers
that he appoints, balanced by the bicameral Parliament and the judicial
system.
Although underrepresented overall, women participate in all levels
of government and politics. There are three female members of
Parliament; the Deputy Prime Minister, who also serves concurrently as
Foreign Minister, is a woman, as is the Minister of Education.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Local groups involved with human rights operate freely and without
government hindrance. The Caribbean Human Rights Network, a Caribbean-
wide human rights organization which has its headquarters and a small
staff in Barbados, investigates and reports on allegations of human
rights violations throughout the region.
The Ombudsman's office, established in 1987, hears complaints
against government offices for alleged injuries or injustices resulting
from administrative conduct. The office is prohibited from involvement
in issues involving foreign affairs, immigration questions, and certain
other matters. Because it focuses only on administrative conduct, it
does not deal with complaints of police abuse; a separate department
within the police force deals with matters of inappropriate police
conduct.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law,
regardless of race, religion, or sex. The Government respects these
rights in practice.
Women.--Violence and abuse against women continued to be
significant social problems. Women's rights groups reported that
victims of sexual assaults, domestic violence, incest, and rape are
often reluctant to report such incidents. There are public and private
counseling services for victims of domestic violence, rape, and child
abuse. There was an upsurge in spousal abuse during the year.
The 1992 Domestic Violence Law specifies the appropriate police
response to domestic violence, which is intended to protect all members
of the family, including men and children. It applies equally to
marriages and to common law relationships. Criminal penalties for
violent crimes are the same, regardless of the sex of the offender or
the victim. The courts heard a number of cases of domestic violence
against women involving assault or wounding. Victims may request
restraining orders, which the courts often issue. The courts can
sentence an offender to jail for breaching such an order. Human rights
monitors criticized an inconsistency in sentencing for rape, incest,
and statutory rape. They noted that the lack of sentencing guidelines
resulted in longer sentences for persons convicted of petty theft than
for incest; and lesser sentences for incest than for rape or sexual
assault of nonfamily members.
Women actively participate in all aspects of national life and are
well-represented at all levels of both the public and private sectors.
They form a large percentage of heads of household and are not
discriminated against in public housing or other social welfare
programs.
The National Organization of Women (NOW) is an affiliate of a
regional women's organization called the Caribbean Women's Association.
The Business and Professional Women's club, an affiliate of the NOW,
runs a crisis center staffed by 30 trained counselors and provides
legal and medical referral services. The center also has a hot line for
clients who wish to maintain their anonymity. The Government
established a battered women's shelter, which opened in September 1999.
In August Minister of Labor Greenidge told a labor meeting that he
supported strong legislation aimed at preventing sexual harassment in
the workplace.
Children born overseas and out of wedlock to Barbadian men are
considered citizens. However, Barbadian women married to nonBarbadian
men were unable to confer citizenship on the child, until an act of
Parliament took effect on August 16. Now a child born to a male or a
female citizen has immediate citizenship.
Children.--The Government provides for compulsory education to the
age of 16. The national health insurance program provides children with
free medical and dental services for most medical conditions. The
Government is committed to children's human rights and welfare,
although violence and abuse against children remain serious problems.
The Child Care Board is responsible for monitoring and responding to
the critical welfare needs, interests, and rights of children.
Statistics from the Child Care Board show that approximately 1,000
children suffered abuse in 1998-99.
People with Disabilities.--The law does not prohibit discrimination
against the physically disabled in employment, education, or the
provision of other state services. However, in 1997 the Ministry of
Labor established the Disabilities Unit to address the concerns of the
disabled, and in early 1998 it created an advisory committee on
disabilities. The Labor Department, a unit within the Ministry that
finds jobs for the disabled, long has advocated the introduction of
legislation prohibiting discrimination. In May the Government, labor
leaders, and the private sector jointly announced an agreement to
promote a code of practice on the employment of persons with
disabilities, as part of these groups' continuing social partnership.
They also agreed to establish targets and time frames for the
employment of disabled persons in the private and public sectors.
While there is no legislation mandating provision of accessibility
to public thoroughfares or public or private buildings, the Town and
Country Planning Department sets provisions for all public buildings to
include accessibility to persons with disabilities. As a result, the
majority of new buildings have ramps, reserved parking, and special
sanitary facilities for the disabled.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers freely exercise their right
to form and belong to trade unions and to strike. Approximately 30
percent of the labor force belongs to trade unions. Overall union
membership appears to have declined slightly in recent years as some
workers moved to better-paying positions in higher-technology sectors.
There are two major unions and several smaller ones, representing
various sectors. The public service union, the National Union of Public
Workers, is independent of any political party or the Government. Some
officers of the largest union, the Barbados Workers' Union, are
associated personally with the Democratic Labour Party. Most unions
belong to the Congress of Trade Unions and Staff Associations, which
was founded in 1995.
The law accords full protection to trade unionists' personal and
property rights. All private and public sector employees are permitted
to strike, but essential workers may strike only under certain
circumstances and after following prescribed procedures.
In July the nonunion Barbados Police Association supported the
police in a labor action over unfulfilled promises of increased wages
and increased allowances. This action followed an October 1999 ``sick-
out'' over the same issues. The police took action because they did not
receive promised wage increases and increased allowances. For several
years, the Government has been reviewing wage and pay scales of all
public service employees, including the police. Police said that they
are entitled to special consideration since they are not allowed to be
represented by a trade union because of their domestic security
function. The police labor action took place in July during the height
of the local Carnival period. As the action proceeded, members of the
BDF were called in to supplement those police who reported for work. As
of year's end, the issues had not been resolved and were still under
consideration.
Trade unions are free to form federations and are affiliated with a
variety of regional and international labor organizations. The
Caribbean Congress of Labor has its headquarters in Barbados.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the
authorities respect it in practice. Normally, wages and working
conditions are negotiated through the collective bargaining process,
but a 1993 tripartite prices and incomes policy accord established a 2-
year wage freeze. A revised (second) protocol contained provisions for
negotiated increases in basic wages and increases based on
productivity, which covered 1995-97. In May 1998, the tripartite
partners signed a third protocol covering 1998-2000, broadened to
address the needs of disabled workers and to express support for
international efforts against child labor.
Employers have no legal obligation to recognize unions under the
Trade Union Act of 1964, but most do so when a significant percentage
of their employees express a desire to be represented by a registered
union. Several foreign-owned international data-processing companies
challenged union claims in 1997-98 to represent their workforces,
highlighting the country's need for legislation outlining the union
recognition process. While there is no specific law that prohibits
discrimination against union activity, the courts provide a method of
redress for employees who allege wrongful dismissal. The courts
commonly award monetary compensation but rarely order reemployment. New
legislation that would address the union recognition process had been
pending for about 2 years at year's end.
There are no manufacturing or special areas where collective
bargaining rights are legally or administratively impaired. There are
no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced, compulsory, or bonded labor, including that by
children, and there were no reports of its use.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum working age of 16 is observed broadly.
Compulsory primary and secondary education policies, which require
school attendance until age 16, reinforce minimum age requirements. The
Labor Department has a small cadre of labor inspectors who conduct spot
investigations of enterprises and check records to verify compliance
with the law. These inspectors may take legal action against an
employer who is found to have underage workers. The law prohibits
forced or bonded labor by children, and the authorities effectively
enforce it (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets and the authorities
establish minimum wages for specified categories of workers. Only two
categories of workers have a formally regulated minimum wage--household
domestics and shop assistants (entry level commercial workers).
Household domestics are entitled to a minimum wage of about $0.75
(bds$1.50) per hour, although in actual labor market conditions, the
prevailing wage is triple that amount. There are two agerelated minimum
wage categories for shop assistants. The adult minimum wage for shop
assistants was raised by 13 percent in June 1997, to $2.13 (bds$4.25)
per hour; the juvenile minimum wage for shop assistants became $1.62
(bds$3.25) per hour. The minimum wage for shop assistants is marginally
sufficient to enable a worker and family to meet minimum living
standards; most employees earn more.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days, and the law
requires overtime payment for hours worked in excess. The Government
accepts International Labor Organization conventions, standards, and
other sectoral conventions regarding maximum hours of work. However,
there is no general legislation that covers all occupations. Employers
must provide workers a minimum of 3 weeks' annual leave. Unemployment
benefits and national insurance (social security) cover all workers. A
comprehensive, government-sponsored health program offers subsidized
treatment and medication.
The Factories Act of 1983 sets out the officially recognized
occupational safety and health standards. The Labor Department enforces
health and safety standards and follows up to ensure that problems
cited are corrected by management. The Factories Act also requires that
in certain sectors firms employing more than 50 workers create a safety
committee. This committee can challenge the decisions of management
concerning the occupational safety and health environment. Trade union
monitors identify safety problems for government factory inspectors to
ensure the enforcement of safety and health regulations and effective
correction by management. Government-operated corporations in
particular were accused of doing a ``poor job'' in health and safety.
The Government has promised to undertake inspections of government-
operated corporations and manufacturing plants as a priority. Workers
have a limited right to remove themselves from dangerous or hazardous
job situations without jeopardizing their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
BELIZE
Belize is a parliamentary democracy with a constitution enacted in
1981 upon independence from the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister, a
cabinet of ministers, and a legislative assembly govern the country.
The Governor General represents Queen Elizabeth II in the largely
ceremonial role of head of state. Prime Minister Said Musa's People's
United Party (PUP) holds 26 of the 29 seats in the House of
Representatives. The Government generally respects the constitutional
provisions for an independent judiciary; however, at times the
judiciary is subject to political influence.
The Police Department has primary responsibility for law
enforcement and maintenance of order. The Belize Defense Force (BDF) is
responsible for external security but, when deemed appropriate by
civilian authorities, may be tasked to assist the police department.
Both the police and the BDF report to the Minister of National Security
and are responsible to and controlled by civilian authorities. There
were reports of abuse by the police.
The economy is primarily agricultural, although tourism has become
the principal source of foreign exchange earnings. The agricultural
sector is heavily dependent upon preferential access to export markets
for sugar and for bananas. The Government favors free enterprise and
generally encourages investment, although domestic investors are given
preferential treatment over foreign investors in a number of key
economic sectors. Preliminary estimates of annual gross domestic
product growth placed it at 6.2 percent in real terms. Annual per
capita income was $2,771.
The Government generally respected many of its citizens' human
rights; however, there were problems in several areas. Principal human
rights abuses include several extrajudicial killings, occasional
brutality and use of excessive force by the police when making arrests,
poor prison conditions, allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention,
lengthy pretrial detention, political influence on the judiciary, and
judicial limits on freedom of the press. Violence and discrimination
against women, abuse of children, and employer mistreatment of
undocumented foreign workers also were problems. There were instances
of trafficking in persons.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
political killings by the security forces; however, there were three
instances of extrajudicial killing.
On January 24, six BDF soldiers shot and killed Samuel Ramirez, a
Guatemalan farmer, near the border between the two countries. A public
Commission of Inquiry ruled that Ramirez had attacked the soldiers and
that the killing was justifiable.
On February 24, an off-duty police officer with a machete chased
Kelvin ``Brambles'' Barrow into the sea, where Barrow drowned. The
Ombudsman presented a report to the National Assembly, and the case was
before the Department of the Public Prosecutor (DPP) at year's end.
On March 17, Hattieville prison inmates rioted. During the riot, a
guard shot and killed one inmate. The Ombudsman's investigation
revealed that the officer was delinquent, and the matter was before the
DPP at year's end.
In September 1999, 38-year-old Daniel Tillett died while in police
custody, after being arrested for fighting in public. On February 14,
the Director of Public Prosecutions issued instructions to the Police
Commission to proceed to indictment of the officer-in-charge, Jesus
Cantun. At year's end, he was in jail awaiting trial.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or other inhuman
punishment; however, the police occasionally used excessive force when
making arrests. The Government's Ombudsman stated that the second and
third most common complaints that his office receives involve police
misconduct and brutality and misconduct on the part of Department of
Corrections personnel. The Ombudsman estimated that at year's end, his
office would have approximately 10 pending cases of this type.
The Police Department's internal affairs and discipline section,
the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Ombudsman's office, and on
occasion, special independent commissions appointed by the Prime
Minister, investigate allegations of abuse by officials. When the
Internal Affairs Division was established in 1995, it received 50
complaints against police officers; in 1999, the number had increased
to 299. The increase may reflect an increase in abuse by officials as
well as an increase in the public's willingness to report such abuses.
On February 14, a police officer shot and wounded a BDF soldier in
Orange Walk Town. Witnesses claimed that the two men were involved in a
verbal altercation. When the soldier pulled his machete, the police
officer drew his firearm and shot the soldier in the abdomen. The
exiting bullet struck an innocent bystander. Both victims recovered
from their wounds. The officer was arrested and suspended from the
force; at year's end, the Ombudsman was investigating the incident.
On April 4, police shot escaped prisoner Darrel ``Bagga'' Jones.
All investigations determined this to be a justified use of force.
On May 20, while on duty at the national agriculture and trade
show, a police officer shot and wounded a man. Immediately prior to the
shooting, the sergeant in charge ordered the officer not to shoot. The
victim had been brandishing a piece of cardboard that had a dead snake
glued to it. The authorities suspended the officer from duty, and the
Ombudsman was conducting an investigation at year's end.
On August 27, two national team soccer players claimed that police
beat them while they were handcuffed in Orange Walk Town. Police
Commissioner Hughington Williams suspended the chief inspector for the
district, James Magdaleno, and assistant inspector Eli Salazar, pending
the outcome of the investigation. Williams also took disciplinary
action against constables Roger Briceno, Mateo Carrillo, and A. Coc.
The matter still was before the police internal affairs division at
year's end.
In April 1999, two Guatemalan men, Hector Balcarcel and Ricardo
Guzman, were detained at the Guatemala-Belize border. They were taken
into police custody, allegedly detained for 5 days, and Balcarcel
allegedly was tortured. Balcarcel's report to the Human Rights
Commission and the Guatemalan embassy claimed that he was stripped,
handcuffed, burned with a lighter and habanero peppers on his genitals,
beaten with a stick, and forced to drink his own urine. After an
internal investigation, the police determined that these allegations
were false. An internal review of this investigation still was underway
at year's end.
In June 1999, the authorities arrested a police constable and
charged him with extortion and corruptly soliciting a reward. They
relieved him of duty and put him on trial in the Supreme Court; the
court found him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine.
On March 16, two inmates at the Hattieville prison, Nehru Smith and
Bert Elijios, were sentenced to receive corporal punishment in
accordance with prison rules for assaulting and nearly killing another
inmate. Smith and Elijios received 12 and 6 tamarind lashes
respectively. The Minister of Prisons gave official support and
approval for the floggings. On March 31, the newly reappointed prison
governor stated that the floggings were necessary, but that while he
was in charge, no other prisoners would be punished in that fashion.
On March 17, between 300 and 400 prisoners at Hattieville reacted
to the floggings by rioting. During the riot, one prisoner was killed,
and three were hospitalized with gunshot wounds (see Section 1.a.). The
matter still was before the DPP at year's end.
On August 28, an inmate at the Hattieville correctional facility
was given 12 lashes for stabbing a fellow inmate in the neck during an
altercation over $2 (bz$4). A visiting judge sentenced the prisoner to
the lashings following a hearing. The punishment was administered in
accordance with prison rules, despite the new prison governor's earlier
vow that floggings would not occur.
Prison conditions are poor. Conditions at the Hattieville
Department of Corrections--the country's only prison--have deteriorated
continually since it opened in 1993. Although designed to house 500
inmates, it houses 745 male inmates and 20 female inmates, resulting in
approximately 6 inmates in each 6-by-9 foot cell. The majority of
prison accommodations do not have showers or toilets. Instead, inmates
are provided with 5-gallon buckets. The prison psychiatrist provides
mental health services for inmates. There is no separate facility for
inmates with mental illnesses. First-time offenders are housed in the
same building as those who commit capital crimes. Noncitizens
constitute approximately 15 to 20 percent of the prison population.
There are rare reports of human rights abuses in the form of physical
brutality by prison wardens. Incidents of gang- and drug-related
violence in the prison are on the rise. Frequent prison breaks,
confiscation of weapons, and reports of beatings have occurred
throughout the prison's history. Prison authorities estimated that they
confiscated more than 1,500 deadly weapons by year's end. The
authorities reported that there were 53 prison escapes during the year;
all but 3 escapees were captured by year's end.
The prison includes a separate facility for women.
The Government took steps to curb recidivism and focus on
rehabilitation. The Youth Enhancement Agency (YEA) houses over 60
youths between the ages of 13 and 25, who participate in rehabilitation
and job training programs. Prison authorities provided training for
inmates in basic skilled trades such as carpentry. Increasingly,
youthful offenders are transferred from the main prison to the YEA
facilities. A job-training program at a citrus farm employs 44 inmates.
There is a timeoff program for good behavior.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government observes
these provisions to a degree; however, there were occasional
accusations of arbitrary arrest and detention.
The law requires the police to inform a detainee of the cause of
detention within 48 hours of arrest and to bring the person before a
court to be charged formally within 72 hours. In practice the
authorities normally inform detainees immediately of the charges
against them. Bail is granted in all but the most serious cases. In
cases involving narcotics, the police cannot grant bail, but a
magistrate's court may do so after a full hearing. There are persistent
allegations that security forces hold detainees for 72 hours and
release them, but upon release, arrest them again. In May the newly
appointed Supreme Court Chief Justice published and promulgated ``The
Judges' Rules,'' which outline a code of conduct to which police
officers must adhere when dealing with arrested persons. Many detainees
cannot afford bail, and backlogs in the docket often cause considerable
delays and postponement of hearings, resulting in an overcrowded
prison, and at times prolonged incarceration before trial.
The Constitution forbids exile, and it does not occur in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
provision in practice; however, at times the judiciary is subject to
political influence. The appearance of judicial independence from the
executive branch is compromised because some foreign judges and the
Director of Public Prosecutions must negotiate renewal of their
contracts with the Government and thus may be vulnerable to political
interference. In February the Government appointed a new Supreme Court
Chief Justice, Abdullai Conteh, a jurist from Sierra Leone.
The judiciary consists of the magistrate's courts, the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, and a family court that handles cases of
child abuse, domestic violence, and child support. Those convicted by
either a magistrate's court or the Supreme Court may appeal to the
Court of Appeals. In exceptional cases, including those resulting in a
capital sentence, the convicted party may make a final appeal to the
Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
Persons accused of civil or criminal offenses have constitutional
rights to presumption of innocence, protection against self-
incrimination, defense by counsel, a public trial, and appeal. Legal
counsel for indigent defendants is provided by the State only for
capital crimes. In April 1999, the Government appointed an attorney to
the Legal Aid Center to improve and strengthen legal aid services to
the public. The judicial system is constrained by a severe lack of
trained personnel, and police officers often act as prosecutors in the
magistrate's courts.
Trial by jury is mandatory in capital cases.
A Political Reform Commission recommended that the family court be
placed at the same level as the magistrate's courts, a recommendation
that the Government adopted. However, trials in cases that come before
the family court generally are private. The convicted party in family
court may appeal to the Supreme Court. Defendants have the right to be
present at their trial unless the opposing party fears for his or her
safety. In such a case, the court grants interim provisions under which
both parties are addressed individually during a 5day period.
There are lengthy trial backlogs in the judicial system. One factor
commonly cited is the low pay offered to judges, resulting in high
turnover rates. In addition an inordinate number of significant
narcotics-related cases are taking years to resolve. In these cases,
defendants often are released on minimal bail payments. In April 1999,
two retired judges were named to the Supreme Court in a temporary
capacity to help reduce backlogs. At year's end, only three justices
served on the Supreme Court, instead of the full complement of five.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violators are
subject to legal action. However, there were several cases in which the
previous government exercised its power under the right of eminent
domain in an arbitrary manner. Such cases take years to resolve in the
courts.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press but also permits the authorities to
make ``reasonable provisions'' in the interests of defense, public
safety, public order, public morality, or public health. These
provisions include forbidding any citizen to question the validity of
the financial disclosure statements submitted by public officials.
Anyone who questions these statements orally or in writing outside a
rigidly prescribed procedure is subject to a fine of up to $2,500
(bz$5,000), or imprisonment of up to 3 years, or both.
A wide range of viewpoints is presented publicly, usually without
government interference, in seven privately owned weekly newspapers,
three of which are affiliated directly with major political parties.
There is no daily press. All newspapers are subject to the constraints
of libel laws.
There are a range of privately owned commercial radio stations. In
addition to these local stations, there are two British military
stations that broadcast news directly from London. Popular radio call-
in programs are lively and feature open criticism of and comments on
government and political matters.
There are eight privately owned television broadcasting stations,
including several cable networks in Belize City and the major towns.
The Government's Belize Information Service issues press releases and
maintains an Internet web site. Two independent television stations
produce local news and feature programs. The Belize Broadcasting
Authority regulates broadcasting and asserts its right to preview
certain broadcasts, such as those with political content, and to delete
any defamatory or personally libelous material from political
broadcasts.
The law provides for academic freedom, and the Government respects
it in practice.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects it in
practice. Political parties and other groups with political objectives
freely hold rallies and mass meetings. The organizers of public
meetings must obtain a permit 36 hours in advance of the meetings; such
permits are not denied for political reasons and are granted routinely
in practice.
The Constitution permits citizens to form and join associations of
their choosing, both political and nonpolitical, and the Government
respects these provisions in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for granting of asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations. The Government's Refugee Department officially closed on
December 31, 1999. Since then, the UNHCR has relied upon a local
nongovernmental organization (NGO) to monitor the status of asylees and
to represent its interests. There were 12 refugees receiving UNHCR
assistance and awaiting the opportunity to apply for asylum in the
country. Most are African, originating from Nigeria or Sierra Leone.
The previous administration appointed members to an eligibility
committee to review applications for asylum. The committee, which
included a UNHCR representative, met on a weekly basis. In 1998 the
Government turned down 30 requests for asylum. The Government has not
established an eligibility committee since the change of administration
in 1998. The Government has not accepted applications and no mechanism
exists to adjudicate asylum requests. There is no legislation that
formalizes the asylum process. The Government last honored the
principle of first asylum in the case of four persons in 1995.
In the wake of the civil conflicts in Central America in the
1980's, over 40,000 predominantly Hispanic migrants came to Belize,
many of them entering illegally and living without documentation. In
May 1999, the Government instituted a 6-week amnesty initiative whereby
undocumented migrants were eligible to obtain legal residency,
provided: They had lived in Belize continuously for 4 years, married a
Belizean citizen or had a stable common-law association, had Belizean
children, or, if female, were at least 4 months pregnant. The amnesty
is expected to benefit about 5,000 UNHCR-registered asylees, as well as
13,000 others. Officials continued processing amnesty applications
during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Belize is a democracy governed by a national assembly with
executive direction from a cabinet of ministers headed by Prime
Minister Said Musa. The law requires national elections every 5 years.
The Government changed hands in August 1998 when the PUP won 26 of 29
seats in the House of Representatives in free and fair elections.
All elections are held by secret ballot, and suffrage is universal
for citizens 18 years of age and older. National political parties
include the People's United Party, the United Democratic Party (UDP),
and the National Alliance for Belizean Rights (NABR). The country's
ethnic diversity is reflected in each party's membership.
No laws impede participation of women in politics; however, they
are somewhat underrepresented in electoral politics due to both
tradition and socioeconomic factors. Voters elected 2 women to the 29-
seat House of Representatives, and the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate, both appointed, are women. Women also hold a
number of other appointive offices, including four of nine senate
seats, one cabinet position, and three are permanent secretaries in
ministries. The Chief Elections Officer is also a woman.
There are no laws impeding participation by indigenous people or
minority groups in politics. There are Mestizo, Creole, Maya, and
Garifuna representatives in Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Human Rights Commission of Belize (HRCB), an NGO affiliated
with regional human rights organizations and partly funded by the
UNHCR, operates without government restriction on a wide range of
issues, including migrant and agricultural workers' rights and cases of
alleged police abuse. The HRCB publishes human rights complaints and
urges police and other governmental bodies to act upon them. The HRCB
gained prominence through media reports about its workshops and
seminars that educate citizens about human rights.
International human rights groups operate freely as well.
Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
activities.
The Government's Ombudsman, a position created in 1999, stated that
his office receives an average of two to three complaints of human
rights violations per week. The second and third most common complaints
his office receives involve police misconduct and brutality and
misconduct on the part of Department of Corrections' personnel. The
Ombudsman estimated that at year's end, his office would have
approximately 10 pending cases of this type.
In his first annual report, the Ombudsman highlighted three primary
concerns: unprofessional police behavior; lack of response by public
officials to the Ombudsman's formal inquiries; and public officials'
lack of knowledge regarding provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The report
stated that the office had received 213 formal complaints (about all
types of perceived abuse by government agencies) in its first 7 months
of existence; of which the 3-person office had resolved 134 cases.
On May 9, the Office of the Ombudsman and the HRCB signed a
memorandum of understanding coordinating efforts to curb human rights
abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The country is multiracial and multiethnic, and the Government
actively promotes tolerance and cross-cultural understanding.
Discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds is illegal and rare,
although ethnic tension, particularly resentment of recently arrived
Central American and Asian immigrants, continued to be a problem. The
Government continues to reserve certain professions for citizens,
granting permits and licenses to noncitizens only in specific cases.
These occupations include fishing, souvenir manufacturing, sightseeing
tours, accounting, insurance, real estate, and legal services.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Based on reported
cases, the Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society
estimated that there were about 1,000 domestic violence cases during
the year. A shelter for battered women offers short-term housing. The
Belize Organization for Women and Development, an NGO, advises women on
their rights and provides counseling. Laws prohibit rape and sexual
harassment, but few offenders are charged and convicted. In October
1999, an expanded criminal code outlawed marital rape. Shortly
thereafter, the Police Department created a police family violence unit
in order to combat spousal abuse.
Despite constitutional provisions for equality, women face social
and economic prejudice. Women find it more difficult than men to obtain
business and agricultural financing and other resources. Most employed
women are concentrated in female-dominated occupations with
traditionally low status and wages. The Women's Bureau in the Ministry
of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society is charged with
developing programs to improve the status of women. That Ministry
estimated that women would receive 35 percent of all small business
loans during the year. A number of officially registered women's groups
work closely with various government ministries in promoting social
awareness programs. Women have access to education and are active in
all spheres of national life, but relatively few hold top managerial
positions. However, women head the Belize Business Bureau, Belize
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Belize Citrus Growers Association,
several prominent environmental NGO's, and the Belize Rotary Club. The
law mandates equal pay for equal work, but female workers often earn
less than men in similar jobs. There are no legal impediments to women
owning or managing land or other real property.
There were reports that women have been trafficked for purposes of
prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Children.--Education is compulsory for children between the ages of
5 and 15. After children finish their primary education, they may enter
a secondary school, the government-run apprenticeship program, or a
vocational institution. However, these programs have room for only
about one-half of the children finishing primary school; competition
for spaces in secondary school is intense. Education is nominally free,
but various school, book, and uniform fees place education out of reach
for many poor children.
The Family Services Division in the Ministry of Human Development,
Women, and Civil Society is devoted primarily to children's issues. The
division coordinates programs for children who are victims of domestic
violence, advocates remedies in specific cases before the family court,
conducts public education campaigns, investigates cases of trafficking
in children (see Section 6.f.), and works with NGO's and UNICEF to
promote children's welfare. The National Committee for Families and
Children includes a representative from the Ministry of Human
Development, Women, and Civil Society.
Child abuse is not considered to be widespread or a societal
problem. In 1998 Parliament passed the Families and Children Act, and
in 1999 the National Organization for the Prevention of Child Abuse
(NOPCA) published a handbook for the public that outlined in plain
language provisions of the law. The law allows authorities to remove a
child legally from an abusive home environment, removes the limit
placed on child support that a parent must pay, and allows men to file
for support, as well as women. It requires parents to maintain and
support a child until he or she reaches the age of 18, compared with
the previous law's mandate of support up to the age of 16. The law also
accepts DNA testing as legal proof of paternity and maternity. It
requires that all adoptions be reported to the Human Development
Department of the Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil
Society, and that prospective parents be screened before they may adopt
a child. The NOPCA instituted a nationwide telephone help line to
encourage discourse and reduce abuse.
There were some reports that children were trafficked for the
purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The law does not provide specifically
for accessibility for disabled persons or prohibit job discrimination
against them. The Government's Disability Services Unit, as well as a
number of NGO's, such as the Belize Association of and for Persons with
Disabilities and the Belize Center for the Visually Impaired, provide
assistance to physically disabled persons. Disabled children have
access to government special education facilities, although the
requirements to enter such programs are strict.
Indigenous People.--Among the country's indigenous people, the
Mopan and Ke'kchi are grouped under the general term Maya, although
their leaders say that they should be identified as the Masenal,
meaning ``common people.'' The Maya have sought official recognition of
their communal claims to land, but the Government has been reluctant to
single out one ethnic group for special consideration. The Government
has designated 77,000 acres as 9 separate Mayan reserves; however,
Mayan leaders claim that the Maya have an ancestral claim to a total of
500,000 acres. The Maya have formed cultural councils and other groups
to advance their interests, sometimes with the collaboration of NGO's
concerned with environmental and indigenous issues. Several Mayan
organizations have filed suit to force the Government to recognize the
Maya's ancestral land rights and to prevent further granting of logging
concessions on the disputed land.
On October 12, the Government and the Mayan People of Southern
Belize signed a collective agreement to address the grievances set
forth in a petition by Mayan community leaders in the summer of 1998.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--By law and in practice, workers
generally are free to establish and join trade unions. Eleven
independent unions, whose members constitute approximately 11 percent
of the labor force, represent a cross-section of white-collar, blue-
collar, and professional workers, including most civil service
employees. However, several of these unions are inactive. The Ministry
of Industry, Commerce, Public Services, and Labor recognizes unions
after they file with the Registrar's Office. The law empowers members
to draft the bylaws and the constitutions of their unions, and they are
free to elect officers from among the membership at large. Unions that
choose not to hold elections may act as representatives for their
membership, but the national Trade Union Congress permits only unions
that hold free and annual elections of officers to join its ranks. Both
law and precedent effectively protect unions against dissolution or
suspension by administrative authority.
The law permits unions to strike and does not require them to give
notice before going on strike.
Although no unions are affiliated officially with political
parties, several are sympathetic to one or the other of the two main
parties (the PUP and the UDP).
Unions freely exercise the right to form federations and
confederations and affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining and unions practice it freely
throughout the country. Employers and unions set wages in free
negotiations, or, more commonly, employers simply establish them. The
Labor Commissioner or his representative acts as a mediator in
deadlocked collective bargaining negotiations between labor and
management, offering nonbinding counsel to both sides. Historically the
Commissioner's guidance has been accepted voluntarily. However, should
either union or management choose not to accept the Commissioner's
decision, both are entitled to a legal hearing of the case, provided
that it is linked to some provision of civil or criminal law.
The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination both before and
after a union is registered. Unions may organize freely, but the law
does not require employers to recognize a union as a bargaining agent.
For example, although the registered Banana Workers Union actively
advocated worker rights, it was not recognized by the banana industry's
growers association due to low membership. Some employers have been
known to block union organization by terminating the employment of key
union sympathizers, usually on grounds purportedly unrelated to union
activities. Effective redress is extremely difficult to obtain in such
situations. Technically, a worker can file a complaint with the Labor
Department, but in practice it is virtually impossible to prove that a
termination was due to union activity.
The Labor Code applies in the country's export processing zones
(EPZ's). There are no unions in the EPZ's, reflecting the general
weakness of organized labor in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
laws forbid forced, compulsory or bonded labor, including that
performed by children, and generally it is not known to occur; however,
there were reports that women were trafficked and infrequent reports
that children also were trafficked for the purpose of forced
prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Act prohibits all employment of children under
age 12, and prohibits employment of children between the ages of 12 and
14, before the end of school hours on official school days. The minimum
age for employment is 17 years for work near hazardous machinery.
Inspectors from the Departments of Labor and Education enforce this
regulation. During the year, truancy officers, who historically have
borne the brunt of the enforcement burden, were more active. The law
requires children between the ages of 5 and 15 to attend school, but
there are many truants and dropouts. According to the Central
Statistics Office, in the 1990's, 46 percent of children did not
complete primary school, and 10 percent of those children never
enrolled in school at all. On March 21, the Government ratified
International Labor Organization Convention No. 182 on the worst forms
of child labor.
Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, and in general
the Government effectively enforces this prohibition; however, there
were infrequent reports of trafficking in children for purposes of
prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is $1.12
(bz$2.25), except in export industries, where it is $1.00 (bz$2.00) per
hour. For domestic workers in private households and shop assistants in
stores where liquor is not consumed, the rate is $0.87 (bz$1.75) per
hour. The minimum wage law does not cover workers paid on a piecework
basis. The Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Public Services, and Labor
is charged with enforcing the legal minimum wage, which generally is
respected in practice. The minimum wage as sole source of income does
not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
salaried workers receive more than the minimum wage.
The law sets the normal workweek at no more than 6 days or 45
hours. It requires payment for overtime work, 13 public holidays, an
annual vacation of 2 weeks, and sick leave for up to 16 days. An
employee is eligible for severance pay provided that he was employed
continuously for at least 5 years.
The exploitation of undocumented Guatemalan, Honduran, and
Salvadoran workers, particularly young service workers and possibly
some agricultural workers, continued to be a problem. Banana farm
owners slowly are moving the housing they provide for their workers
away from the fields where poisonous pesticides are sprayed. Health
clinics in the region report that the most frequently treated ailments
are pesticide-related skin conditions. Company-provided housing often
lacks electricity and water. The Government, the HRCB, and other
concerned citizens all focus on this problem; however, since turnover
rates of banana workers are so high, organizing this segment of the
work force is difficult.
A patchwork of health and safety regulations covers numerous
industries, and the Labor Department in the Ministry of Industry,
Commerce, Public Services, and Labor enforces these regulations to
varying degrees. Enforcement is not universal, and the ministries
commit their limited inspection and investigative resources principally
to urban and more accessible rural areas where labor, health, and
safety complaints have been registered. Workers have the legal right to
remove themselves from a dangerous workplace situation without jeopardy
to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, it does proscribe procurement for the
purpose of prostitution. Nonetheless, one dance hall owner reportedly
recruited women from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to work as
prostitutes by promising them jobs as dancers, waitresses, or
domestics. Upon arrival, the employer allegedly takes their passports,
forces them to engage in prostitution, and holds their wages. The
police have investigated, but had not made any arrests by year's end,
nor had the Government taken any other steps to address this practice.
The Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society, the
police department, and--in cases involving migrant children--the
Ministry of National Security and Immigration investigate and attempt
to remedy cases that involve trafficking in children (see Section 5).
According to a spokesperson from the Human Development Department,
there were infrequent reports of trafficking in children for the
purpose of prostitution; most involved migrant children.
__________
BOLIVIA
A constitutional, multiparty democracy with an elected president
and bicameral legislature, Bolivia has separate executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government, with an attorney general
independent of all three. President Hugo Banzer Suarez of the
Nationalist Democratic Action party took office in August 1997. The
government coalition controls the Senate but only has a plurality of 57
out of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the coalition
holds the leadership positions in both chambers. The executive and
legislative branches suffer from corruption and inefficiency to some
extent. The judiciary, while independent, also is corrupt and
inefficient.
The National Police have primary responsibility for internal
security, but military forces can be called upon for help in critical
situations, and this occurred during the year. The police provided
security for coca eradication work crews in the Chapare region. A
special counternarcotics force (FELCN), including the Mobile Rural
Patrol Unit (UMOPAR), is dedicated to antinarcotics enforcement.
Civilian authorities generally maintain effective control over the
security forces; however, some members of these forces committed human
rights abuses.
Bolivia has extensive poverty, and many citizens lack access to
such basic services as potable water, sewage, electricity, and primary
health care. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is about $1,087.
According to the World Bank, between 1993 and 1999, approximately 67
percent of the population lived below the national poverty line. The
country is rich in minerals and hydrocarbons, and extensive investments
in petroleum deposits in the eastern and southern parts of the country
are expected to form a basis for strong GDP growth in the future.
However, most workers engage in traditional agriculture, and many
citizens remain barely linked to the cash economy.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remain in certain areas. Legal and
institutional deficiencies prevented the full protection of citizens'
rights. In April violent demonstrations and road blockages broke out in
Cochabamba over a controversial municipal water project, and unrelated
protests occurred across the country, leading to the deaths of
protesters as well as members of the security forces; commerce was
brought to a virtual halt. On April 8, President Banzer declared a
state of siege, which Congress approved on April 13. The stage of siege
ended on April 20. Nongovernmental human rights organizations
criticized the state of siege and the killings, injuries, and
preventive detentions that took place during it. Violent demonstrations
and other confrontations due to an unrelated list of grievances against
the Government also took place in September and October, and resulted
in the deaths of up to 10 civilians, 4 security officials, and the
spouse of 1 of the security officials. There were a number of
allegations of torture. There were credible reports of abuses by
police, including use of excessive force, petty theft, extortion, and
improper arrests. Investigations of alleged official abuses were slow.
Prison conditions are harsh and at times police arbitrarily arrested
and detained persons. The most pervasive human rights abuse continued
to be prolonged incarceration of detainees due to antiquated procedures
and inefficiency and corruption in the judicial system. Other problems
include infringements on citizens' privacy rights, government attempts
to intimidate some news media, violence and discrimination against
women, abuse of children, discrimination against and abuse of
indigenous people, discrimination against Afro-Bolivians, child labor,
inhuman working conditions in the mining industry, and trafficking in
women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings. However, security forces
killed some protesters during violent demonstrations in April and
September.
In April violent demonstrations and road blockages broke out in
Cochabamba over a controversial municipal water project. These
demonstrations, combined with unrelated protests across the country,
brought commerce to a virtual halt. On April 8, President Banzer
declared a state of siege. Under a state of siege, the President has
the authority to forbid demonstrations that threaten the public order
and detain persons who are suspected of plotting against the public
order (see Section 1.d.). In the days that followed, there were violent
clashes between security forces and demonstrators. It appears likely
that at least three out of the four civilians killed during the April
demonstration were killed by security forces. In addition, 1 army
officer was killed, and over 50 persons were injured. The state of
siege ended on April 20.
On October 10, the civilian justice system ordered 17 military
officers and soldiers to testify or face arrest on charges in the death
of a protester on April 8 in Cochabamba. The military officials did not
testify and sought to have the case transferred to the military justice
system at year's end. The Government agreed to pay all medical costs,
as well as compensation up to $1,575 (10,000 bolivianos), to those
injured in the violent disturbances in April, September, and October,
depending on the severity of the injury. In addition, the Government
awarded up to $2,362 (15,000 bolivianos) in compensation to the
families of those killed in April and up to $3,937 (25,000 bolivianos)
to the families of those killed in September. At year's end, the
Government was paying the medical costs and had compensated the
families of those persons killed in April but had not yet compensated
those injured in April, September, and October, nor paid compensation
to the families of those killed in September.
The military justice case against alleged sharpshooter Captain
Robinson Iriarte Lafuente, who was videotaped by television news
organizations in civilian clothes kneeling alongside troops and firing
a rifle during the disturbances in Cochabamba, was pending at year's
end. On April 27, Captain Iriarte testified before the congressional
Human Rights Committee that he fired shots in three different locations
at walls and buildings to intimidate civilians who were rioting nearby.
Iriarte claimed that each time he received permission from a superior
officer at the scene. Armed Forces Commander Admiral Jorge Zabala
earlier told the Congressional Human Rights Committee that, during the
state of siege, soldiers only were authorized to fire live ammunition
by order of their commander, and the 7th Division Commander, Brigadier
General Jose Antonio Gil, testified that he gave no such order.
The Constitution provides for declaration of a state of siege,
which the Congress must approve, and many administrations have utilized
it. In August the Constitutional Tribunal affirmed the
constitutionality of the state of siege. However, human rights
organizations criticized the state of siege and the resulting deaths,
injuries, and detentions (see Section 1.d.).
Violent demonstrations and other confrontations, due to an
unrelated list of grievances against the Government, also took place in
September and October. Protesting groups ranged from illegal coca
growers in the Chapare, indigenous farmers in the highlands, to urban
and rural teachers' unions, to groups protesting a controversial
municipal water project in Cochabamba. These demonstrations resulted in
the deaths of up to 10 civilians, and approximately 180 civilians were
injured. At least three of these deaths were not plausibly attributable
to the security forces. The Government enjoined the security forces to
act with restraint and to avoid head-to-head conflict with
demonstrators, and their performances generally were in keeping with
these orders, despite violent provocations (see Section 2.b.). In
addition, four security officials and the spouse of one of them
disappeared in the Chapare during the disturbances and later were found
tortured and murdered. Another security official was missing and
presumed dead at year's end.
The case of the November 1999 death of Miguel Angel continued to
move slowly through the judicial system. Rivero Siles, a 17-year-old
prisoner accused of murder, died due to severe burns suffered while he
was held in a solitary confinement cell at San Sebastian prison in
Cochabamba. Investigations into actions by police at the prison
continued during the year. The authorities removed the prison governor,
closed the solitary confinement cells, and replaced them with a regular
jail cell that is used to punish prisoners for poor behavior by
isolating them from the rest of the prison (see Section 1.c.).
The case of 18-year-old Marcelo Botelho, who police arrested in
October 1999 in Santa Cruz and who died the next day in a hospital, was
closed. Although there were allegations that the police had beaten
Botelho, there were no eyewitness reports, and the Government did not
pursue a case against the police.
On May 20, 1999, police arrested Peruvian businessman Carlos Freddy
Cano Lopez, after he refused to pay a disputed taxi fare. Cano suffered
third degree burns over 50 percent of his body when his cell
mysteriously caught fire. The authorities transferred Cano to a
hospital in Lima, Peru, where he died in June 1999. The authorities
suspended the policemen in question and their judicial case was pending
at year's end.
On January 13, the Government completed investigations and issued
reports concerning the five unresolved cases of civilian deaths during
the fatal confrontations between security forces and illegal coca
growers in the Chapare in the spring of 1998. The reports were
forwarded to the Cochabamba district attorney who recommended on
February 1 that all five cases (plus two others) be closed. However, a
judge in Villa Tunari decided to continue proceedings on three cases
and following his decision allegedly received threats, which later
apparently ceased. The three cases in question subsequently were
transferred to a Superior Court in Cochabamba, which ruled that two of
the cases should be closed and that one case, the death of Alberto Coca
Cayo, should be sent back to the judge in Villa Tunari to continue
proceedings. Military officers charged in the case petitioned for the
case to be transferred to the military justice system. The case was
transferred back to the superior court in Cochabamba, where the
decision as to which jurisdiction would consider the case was pending
at year's end.
After 2-1years, the Government completed its investigations into
the December 1996 events at Amayapampa and Capasirca that left nine
civilians and one policeman dead in clashes between miners and security
forces. The findings held five military officers responsible but
absolved then-President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and his ministers of
any responsibility. The cases against the accused officers were pending
in the military justice system at year's end; five officers were
reassigned to nonoperational units pending the outcome of their legal
cases. An attempt in Congress to censure Sanchez de Lozada and his
ministers also was pending at year's end. The Government's delay in
completing effective investigations and identifying and punishing those
responsible for either civilian or security force deaths results in an
atmosphere of impunity.
There was violence during the year against government security
forces and coca eradication crews. On January 20, an unknown assailant
shot and killed Joint Eradication Task Force (JTF) conscript Raul
Almendras; police later arrested a coca grower as a suspect in the
murder. On May 14, a government helicopter flying in support of
eradication efforts was fired upon; one JTF soldier was wounded. The
JTF in the Chapare was fired upon on August 2, and the Ecological
Police, who provide security for the JTF, returned fire and wounded one
of the assailants, who subsequently was arrested along with a
companion. On August 18, there were two serious explosive incidents
that injured a policeman and another government employee. One suspect
subsequently was arrested. In separate booby trap blasts on October 11,
a coca eradication soldier and a civilian were injured. On October 21,
as the JTF near Puerto Zudanez was returning to base camp, it was fired
upon. Two members of the JTF were killed and four were wounded. On
November 13, the JTF column was ambushed while proceeding to eradicate
coca in the Ismael Montes sector. One policeman, Abad Espinoza, was
killed.
There were several reported cases of alleged criminals lynched or
burned by civilians, sometimes resulting in death, for their alleged
crimes.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The case of Jose Carlos Trujillo Oroza drew renewed attention as
the most prominent of the cases of those who disappeared during the
1971-78 de facto regime of President Hugo Banzer Suarez. Trujillo's
mother presented the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
in June 1999. The security forces had detained Trujillo, a 21-year-old
university student, in December 1971, and he never was seen again after
February 2, 1972. Trujillo's mother first presented his case to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in September 1992. In 1996
President Sanchez de Lozada's Government accepted responsibility for
Trujillo's arrest and disappearance and named those responsible, but
did not hold them accountable. On January 25, the Banzer Government
accepted responsibility for Trujillo's arrest and disappearance before
the Court. The Government offered to begin negotiations with Trujillo's
mother, who is seeking the return of her son's remains and punishment
for those responsible, with the goal of an amicable settlement. These
negotiations still were unsuccessful at year's end. The Government was
pursuing cases against some persons accused of torture and deprivation
of freedom, but not murder, in the Trujillo case. At year's end, the
family was appealing the decision of the judicial system not to pursue
murder charges.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Government
generally respects this provision; however, there were a number of
significant allegations of torture, beatings, and abuse by members of
the security forces. There were no independently confirmed reports of
abuse or beatings by security forces of civilians during the year.
During the April state of siege (see Section 1.a.), there were
allegations that the military took residents of Achacachi into custody
in the middle of the night and beat them in an attempt to learn the
names of those responsible for the death of an army captain. The army
captain was an officer in a unit thought by demonstrators to be
responsible for the earlier death of a civilian in Achacachi. A mob
beat the captain, and after he was taken to a hospital, dragged him
from the hospital and beat him to death. There also were allegations
that arrestees from Patacamaya during the state of siege were beaten by
the military prior to being transferred to the custody of the PTJ.
There were allegations that security officials beat protesters who
they detained in the Chapare during the September-October disturbances,
as well as allegations that they beat civilians to try to learn the
location of missing security officials and the names of those
responsible for their deaths.
There also were credible allegations that military officers and
sergeants beat and otherwise mistreated military conscripts. The
military justice case against superiors accused of allegedly beating
conscript Roger Candia Vallejos in September and November 1999
continued at year's end.
Several police officers were fired and charged for off-duty crimes,
and a number were dismissed for corruption. However, in general the
police were not disposed to investigate their own colleagues, and
prosecutors were reluctant to prosecute security officials for alleged
offenses committed while on duty.
Neither the technical and judicial police nor prosecutors normally
receive human rights training. Over 6,000 FELCN members, PTJ members,
lawyers, prosecutors, and judges received training on bail provisions
of the new Code of Criminal Procedures. In July foreign consultants
conducted a 1-week human rights course for 33 FELCN investigators. The
basic FELCN and UMOPAR training includes a human rights module.
In September 1999, the military signed a cooperation agreement with
the Ombudsman's office and, in November 1999, the military concluded an
agreement for cooperation and coordination for human rights training
with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, which took place during
the year.
Indigenous communities in areas with little or no central
government presence impose punishment reliably reported to include the
death penalty on members who violate traditional laws or rules,
although the Constitution prohibits such punishment.
Prison conditions are harsh. Prisons are overcrowded, and
conditions can be life threatening for inmates without money. According
to the Director General of the Penal System in the Ministry of
Government, as of July there were approximately 8,500 prisoners in
facilities designed to hold 4,400 prisoners. The majority of all
prisoners were held for narcotics crimes. The Pardon and Extraordinary
Freedom Jubilee 2000 Law, an amended version of which took effect on
December 8, is expected to reduce this overcrowding. The law pardons
prisoners under the age of 21 or over the age of 60; reduces felony
sentences by onethird for all prisoners sentenced prior to August 30;
and pardons prisoners who are parents of minor children and have
completed at least 50 percent of their sentences. (Reductions in felony
sentences are not extended to prisoners convicted of murder, parricide,
or treason, nor to most prisoners convicted of terrorism, rape, or
narcotics trafficking. In addition, prisoners who were convicted for
murder, rape, kidnaping, terrorism, or narcotics crimes and sentenced
to more than 10 years in jail are not eligible for the benefits given
to prisoners under age 21 or over age 60, or to parents of minor
children.) The one-third reduction in sentences is expected to be that
many prisoners would then have served over 50 percent of their
sentences and thus be eligible for parole much sooner than expected.
The law is expected to lead to the release of between 1,500 and 2,000
prisoners over the course of 2001.
Ability to pay can determine a prisoner's cell size, visiting
privileges, day-pass eligibility, and place or even length of
confinement. Cell prices range from $20 to $5,000 (125 to 30,000
bolivianos), paid to prior occupants or to prisoners who control cell
blocks. For example, in the poorest parts of San Pedro prison in La
Paz, inmates occupy tiny cells (3 by 4 by 6 feet) with no ventilation,
lighting, or beds. Crowding in some ``low-rent'' sections obliges
inmates to sleep sitting up. Although only children up to 6 years old
are supposed to live with an incarcerated parent, children as old as
age 12 live with their fathers in San Pedro prison. According to the
Director General, as of July there were 900 children living with a
parent in prison. If such children have nowhere else to go, the
Government considers it more humane to support them in prison than to
leave them homeless in the streets. The standard prison diet, according
to a 1995 study, can cause anemia; the diet has not been improved since
then. The Government budgets only $0.32 (2 bolivianos) per prisoner per
day for food. Prisoners who can afford to use their own money to
supplement the standard prison diet by buying food do so. There is no
adequate health care within the prisons, and it is very difficult for
prisoners to get permission for outside medical treatment. However,
affluent prisoners can obtain transfers to preferred prisons or even to
outside private institutional care for ``medical'' reasons. Drugs and
alcohol are readily available for those inmates who can pay.
There are separate prisons for women; conditions for female inmates
are similar to those for men.
Convicted juvenile prisoners are not segregated from adult
prisoners in jails. Rehabilitation programs for juveniles or other
prisoners are scarce to nonexistent. The Government has acknowledged
these problems but does not have sufficient resources to correct them
quickly.
On June 28, Brazilian prisoner Mustafa Samir was found hanged and
on June 29, Peruvians Omar Casis and Renaldo Montesinos were shot and
killed at the maximum security San Pedro de Chonchocoro prison located
near La Paz. Investigations into these deaths were pending at year's
end. The prison houses the country's most violent prisoners and
terrorists.
Unlike 1999 there were no instances of prisoners dying from fires
in their cells during the year. In November 1999, prisoner Miguel Angel
Rivero Siles died as the result of a fire in his prison cell; in May
1999 Carlos Freddy Cano Lopez was arrested and suffered severe burns
after his cell mysteriously caught fire. He died in a hospital that
June (see Section 1.a.). These were the second and third times since
1998 that prisoners had been burned in their cells. In 1999 the
authorities discharged the two policemen arrested for attempting to
burn a drunken man in September 1998, but their judicial case still was
pending at year's end. On November 29, 1999, the Ombudsman and the
Ministry of Government signed an agreement that led to the closing of
several prisons determined to have inhuman conditions, including the
detention cell in La Paz where Cano Lopez was burned. The agreement
also called for repair of other substandard prisons, including San
Sebastian prison in Cochabamba where Rivero Siles was burned. The San
Sebastian solitary confinement cells subsequently were removed and
replaced by a regular jail cell (see Section 1.a.).
In October 1999, Marcelo Botelho died in a Santa Cruz hospital and
human rights organizations alleged that police had beaten the victim.
However, there were no eyewitness reports, and the Government did not
pursue a case against the police (see Section 1.a.).
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and
news media representatives.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were some
instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrests are carried out
openly. The law requires a valid warrant, which a court must confirm
within 48 hours. However, there were credible reports that these legal
safeguards were violated in some cases.
On April 8, President Banzer declared a state of siege (see Section
1.a.), which under the Constitution provides for the detention of
persons who are suspected of plotting against the public order. Those
detained must be brought before a judge within 48 hours. The
authorities detained 22 persons seen as instigators of the protests.
Those detained included Felipe Quispe Huanca, executive secretary of
the Sole Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia
(CSUTCB), and several other trade unionists, peasant leaders, and
university students. Quispe, the leader of indigenous farmers who
manned roadblocks outside La Paz, is a former terrorist in the Tupaj
Katari Guerrilla Army who was imprisoned during 1992-97 and then
granted conditional release. Another approximately 50 persons were
arrested for violating the state of siege and later released. The
Ombudsman and human rights organizations challenged the detentions as
illegal, since the authorities detained the 22 persons on April 7,
prior to the April 8 supreme decree that enacted the state of siege.
All 22 detainees were released by April 14, and the state of siege
ended on April 20. The La Paz superior court and the Constitutional
Tribunal both ruled in favor of the habeas corpus petitions after the
detainees already had been released. The Ombudsman's office noted that
this state of siege was the first in which habeas corpus was used as a
legal tactic to attempt to force the Government to release detainees.
There were allegations that the military beat residents of Achacachi
and arrestees from Patacamaya during the state of siege (see Section
1.c.).
Denial of justice through prolonged detention remains the most
pervasive human rights problem. Judicial corruption, a shortage of
public defenders, inadequate case-tracking mechanisms, and complex
criminal justice procedures keep persons incarcerated for months, or
even years, before trial. The Constitution provides for judicial
determination of the legality of detention. Prisoners are released if a
judge rules detention illegal, but the process can take months.
Prisoners may see a lawyer, but approximately 70 percent cannot afford
legal counsel, and public defenders are overburdened (see Section
1.e.).
According to a 1998 study, approximately 60 percent of those jailed
still were waiting for the processing of their cases to be finished,
and of those, 30 percent already had served what would have been the
maximum sentence for the crime they were accused of committing.
The Government continued to address the problem of delay of justice
by implementing the 1994 constitutional reforms to streamline the
judicial system and by taking measures to correct other deficiencies as
they come to light. In May provisions of the new Code of Criminal
Procedures replaced the release provisions of the Personal Recognizance
Law, promulgated in 1996, which were never utilized effectively. Most
prisoners still await either trial or sentencing, but under the new
Code of Criminal Procedures the courts are beginning to provide release
on bail for some prisoners. Judges still have the authority to order
preventive detention for suspects under arrest deemed to be a flight
risk or for obstruction of justice. If a suspect is not detained, a
judge still can order significant restrictions on a suspect's travel.
The expanding public defender program provides concise information
about human rights to citizens and seeks to involve public defenders in
arrest cases at the earliest possible juncture to ensure that human
rights and due process are honored. A program of mobile public
defenders who can reach the more remote parts of the country has proven
effective.
Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in
children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their
protection, simply on the orders of a social worker. There is no
judicial review.
The 1997 abduction case of Waldo Albarracin, President of the
Bolivian Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), continued to move
slowly through the judicial system. The authorities had yet to take any
action regarding the four police officials accused of abducting
Albarracin, although legal cases against two policemen were pending at
year's end.
The Government does not use forced exile as a punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent;
however, corruption and intimidation in the judicial system remain
major problems. Poor pay and working conditions help make judges and
prosecutors susceptible to bribes.
The judicial system has four levels of trial: Investigative, trial,
superior court, and Supreme Court or Constitutional Court appellate
review. Since the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 1998,
the Supreme Court hears only appeals of substantive laws, not
constitutional issues. The system is essentially a closed, written
system. With rare exceptions, a judge does not interview witnesses, nor
does an opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses before the
judge exist. The highly formal and corrupt judicial system makes it
difficult for poor, illiterate persons to have effective access to
courts and legal redress.
In cases not involving the narcotics law, a judge of instruction is
in charge of the first stage. The judge instructs the police about what
witness statements he wishes to take. A prosecutor, who is an overseer
of correct procedure, may intervene, if the judge deems it necessary,
to give an advisory opinion. Often this opinion is provided in advance
and contains the statements of all witnesses interviewed by the police
or the prosecutor. If the judge finds that the evidence is conclusive
of guilt, the judge submits the case to a sentencing judge for review.
This second stage of trial involves an analysis of this evidence by the
trial judge, who allows the defense to present additional evidence. The
trial judge is not required to seek additional evidence, although the
judge may add additional witnesses to be interviewed if deemed
necessary.
In narcotics (Law 1008) cases, the FELCN handles the investigative
stage, and there is no judicial review of cases to determine whether a
case should move to the trial stage. This is expected to change when
the new Code of Criminal Procedures takes full effect in 2001, and
narcotics cases are expected to be handled the same as non-narcotics
cases in the first two stages. The third stage of Superior Court review
is essentially a review of all evidence, and the court may reopen the
case for additional witnesses. The Supreme Court review, which is
virtually automatic if sought in non-narcotics cases and is required in
all narcotics cases, is a fourth iteration of that process. During the
superior court and Supreme Court reviews, the courts may confirm,
lower, raise, or annul sentences, or provide alternatives not
contemplated in lower courts. The repetitive nature of this four-stage
procedure requires a great deal of time before a final result is
reached in an individual case.
Defendants have constitutional rights to a presumption of
innocence, to remain silent, to an attorney, to confront witnesses, to
present evidence on their own behalf, to essential due process, and to
appeal judicial decisions. However, in practice almost none of these
rights systematically exist. The full implementation of the new Code of
Criminal Procedures on May 31, 2001, is expected to alleviate some of
these problems. The new code is expected to facilitate more efficient
investigations, transparent oral trials, and credible verdicts.
Although the law provides for a defense attorney at public expense if
needed, one is not always promptly available. The Government has hired
49 additional staff members to bolster rural public defense, achieving
a total of 167 public defenders, legal assistants, and social workers.
In October 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Judicial
Council, established in 1998 to oversee the judicial process and to
provide an impartial body to review the actions of judges, did not have
the power to dismiss a Superior Court or higher level judge due to an
administrative finding of malfeasance alone. The Court ruled that the
removal of such a judge from office requires a final judgment and
sentence of conviction in a criminal case tried before the Supreme
Court. The Council retains its power to suspend without pay, for up to
13 months, judges against whom a criminal charge has been filed or
against whom a disciplinary process has been initiated.
In early 1999, the Council had investigated numerous reports of
judicial corruption, which led to the resignation or dismissal of more
than 20 judges in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and La Paz. One of the
dismissed judges, who allegedly accepted bribes from narcotics
traffickers, protested his dismissal to the Constitutional Court, which
ruled that only a court finding of malfeasance, rather than a finding
by an administrative body such as the Council, was cause for dismissal.
The Court's decision dealt a serious blow to the Judicial Council and
weakened its role as a disciplinary body. At year's end, legislation
was pending that would increase the Council's suspension powers to 3
years or would reinstate the Council's power to dismiss judges found
guilty of malfeasance by the Council.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity of the home
and the privacy of citizens; however, while the authorities generally
respect these provisions, there were credible allegations of UMOPAR
abuses involving thefts of property. Residents in the cocagrowing areas
generally are reluctant to file and pursue formal complaints. On May
17, the Government reopened a human rights office of the Ministry of
Justice and Human Rights in Chimore in the Chapare region (see Section
4).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
fundamental right to express ideas and opinions freely by any means of
dissemination; however, there are some limitations on freedom of
speech, and the Government attempted to intimidate some news media. The
Penal Code provides that persons found guilty of insulting, defaming,
or slandering public officials for carrying out their duties may be
jailed from 1 month to 2 years. If the insults are directed against the
President, Vice President, or a minister, the sentence may be increased
by one-half.
Press organizations alleged that the Government intentionally cut
off electricity for 2 hours on April 8 in Cochabamba during the state
of siege in order to silence radio and television stations (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). There has been no investigation of these
allegations, by either press organizations or the Government.
The 40-person La Paz Press Tribunal is authorized to evaluate
journalists' practices that are alleged to violate either the
Constitution or citizens' rights.
Newspapers are privately owned, and most adopt antigovernment
positions. State-owned and private radio and television stations
operate freely. There were credible reports of government attempts to
intimidate some news media to provide more favorable coverage.
The Government prohibits the importation of pornographic books,
magazines, and artwork.
The Government respects academic freedom, and the law grants public
universities autonomous status.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities generally
respect this right in practice; however, under the state of siege the
Government imposed some limits on this right. The Government routinely
grants permits for marches and rallies. There were numerous
demonstrations throughout the year; in some cases protesters blocked
roads. The Governor of La Paz temporarily instituted a ban on public
gatherings of more than three persons during the state of siege.
As a rule, the authorities try to avoid confronting demonstrators.
However, security forces clashed with union and other demonstrators on
many occasions during the year, resulting in some deaths and hundreds
of injuries (see Section 1.a.). The authorities intervened only when
rallies became dangerously violent or interfered substantially with
normal civic activity. The authorities regularly use tear gas and other
forms of crowd control. In early February, violent protests over
increases in municipal water prices left 130 persons injured (including
30 police) and led to the arrest of 180 persons.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the authorities
generally respect this right in practice. The Government requires
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to register with the appropriate
departmental government. There were complaints in 1999 against the
departmental government of La Paz for the revocation of civil
registrations for three NGO's established by the Unification Church
(see Section 2.c.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Roman
Catholicism predominates, and the Constitution recognizes it as the
official religion. Non-Catholic religious organizations, including
missionary groups, must register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Worship and receive authorization for legal religious
representation. There were 268 registered religious groups, which were
mostly Protestant; at year's end, approximately 130 applications were
pending. The only minority religions in the country that have
encountered problems are Hari Krishna and the Unification Church. Hari
Krishna had registered as an educational organization instead of as a
religious organization. The Government sought to expel Hari Krishna
from the country in the mid-1980's; however, the attempt failed when
the Supreme Court declared it illegal. According to the Government, in
1999 it denied for lack of documentation a Hari Krishna application for
registration as a religious organization. In August 1999, the
Unification Church complained of ongoing harassment by the Government,
specifically citing the August 1998 revocation by the La Paz
departmental government of three civil registrations for church-
affiliated NGO's. However, the Unification Church still is registered
legally with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship as a religious
organization.
On July 21, President Banzer signed a Supreme Decree governing the
relationships between religious organizations and the Government. The
decree updates a similar decree dating from 1985, which had been the
subject of criticism by Catholic and non-Catholic religious groups. The
new decree reflects input from religious groups and, according to the
Government, is designed to increase transparency and dialog in church-
state relations.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on travel.
However, on numerous occasions during the year protestors blocked roads
and highways. The law permits emigration and provides for the right to
return. The Government does not revoke citizenship for political
reasons.
The law provides for the grant of asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government has accepted persons for
resettlement; it received 2 refugees during the year, over 40 refugees
in 1999, and 5 refugees in 1998. The issue of the provision of first
asylum did not arise. After the 1996 takeover of the Japanese
Ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru by Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (MRTA) terrorists, the authorities found that some MRTA
activists had used Bolivia as a safehaven and announced a more
restrictive policy on accepting Peruvian political asylees.
Nonetheless, members of the MRTA and other terrorists continued to use
the country as a safehaven and a place to plan activities.
There were no reports of persons forced to return to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Political parties ranging from far left to moderate
right function openly. Implementing regulations for the 1994
constitutional revisions provide for half of the congressional deputies
to be elected individually and directly, rather than from party lists.
The first national election under these regulations was held in June
1997, with attendance by international observers. Only one instance of
tampering with ballots was detected. Elections for national offices are
held every 5 years; the next national election is scheduled for 2002.
In August 1997, President Hugo Banzer Suarez of the Nationalist
Democratic Action Party took office. His coalition controls the Senate
but has a plurality of only 57 out of 130 seats in the Chamber of
Deputies. However, the government coalition holds leadership positions
in both chambers.
There are no legal impediments to women or indigenous people
voting, holding political office, or rising to political leadership;
however, women and indigenous people are underrepresented in government
and politics. Political parties acceded to demands from women that they
be allocated a fair share of the candidacies in the 1997 national
elections, approving a law that every third candidate on party lists
must be female. In addition every other candidate on municipal election
ballots, beginning with the second candidate, must be a woman--a
development that has significantly augmented female representation to
approximately 30 percent of municipal council positions. However, there
have been reports that in some municipalities party leaders have
pressured councilwomen to resign in favor of their male substitute, and
women in three separate municipalities have allegedly been threatened
with death if they do not resign their positions. There are 20 women
among the 157 deputies and senators; there are no female ministers in
the Cabinet and only 4 women among the 45 vice ministers.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
responsive to their views. However, NGO's and the Ombudsman have
complained that government security forces and government ministries
have refused to cooperate when NGO's or the Ombudsman are conducting
investigations. The Government criticizes human rights advocates for
paying attention exclusively to the negative aspects of the
Government's performance.
APDH President Albarracin and his family have received anonymous
threats in relation to the legal case against his alleged police
abductors (see Section 1.d.). The APDH's branch office in Santa Cruz
also received anonymous threats related to its investigations involving
the security forces; in 1999 unknown parties broke into its office and
destroyed its computer.
The Human Rights Ombudsman conducted numerous investigations and in
August presented a comprehensive report to Congress that was critical
of the Government, and particularly cited the fact that the greatest
number of alleged violations were attributed to the police. The Chamber
of Deputies Human Rights Committee, led by an opposition party
congressman, also presented its annual report in August, which
criticized the Government.
On May 17, the Government reopened a human rights office of the
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights in Chimore in the Chapare region
with assistance from an international donor. All of the human rights
offices in the Chapare region had closed in June 1999. These offices
accept and pursue complaints of human rights abuses committed by
anyone, including police, narcotics traffickers, and illegal coca
growers.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, origin, or economic or
social condition; however, there was significant discrimination against
women, indigenous people, and the small Afro-Bolivian minority.
Women.--Violence against women is pervasive, but no system exists
to register such incidents systematically. According to the National
Police's Department of Statistics and Planning, in 1998 approximately
57 percent of reported assaults were perpetrated against women.
According to a 1997-98 study conducted by the Pan American Health
Organization and the Ministry of Health among women in three
municipalities representative of the country's three major cultural and
geographic zones, 62 percent of women reported experiencing some kind
of domestic violence or abuse at least once in their lifetime.
Approximately 21 percent had suffered psychological abuse, 28 percent
had suffered non-life-threatening physical violence, and 13 percent had
suffered life-threatening violence. Rape is also a serious problem that
is highly underreported. It is estimated that only one out of every
five incidents of violence against women is reported.
The 1995 Law on Domestic and Family Violence makes the rape of an
adult victim a public crime; however, the victim must press charges.
The law also broadens the definition of family member abuse. The 1999
Law against Sexual Violation created the new crime of statutory rape of
a person from 14 to 18 years of age and established new penalties of 10
to 20 years' imprisonment for the rape of a child under the age of 14,
2 to 6 years' imprisonment for statutory rape, and 5 to 20 year's
imprisonment for the rape of an adult. The new Code of Criminal
Procedures provides that crimes against adults included in previous
laws on sex crimes can be made public crimes; however, the victim must
press charges. Sexual crimes against minors automatically are
considered public crimes. Public agencies state that reported incidents
of abuse have increased markedly as a result of the recent laws, as
citizens become more aware of the problem and of the availability of
help. There was no further action on proposed legislation to provide
benefits and protection for domestic workers, including specific
protection from physical, psychological, and sexual aggression.
In October 1999, President Banzer signed the Law to Protect Victims
of Crimes Against Sexual Freedom, first proposed in 1997 as a draft law
against sexual harassment. The new Code of Criminal Procedures (see
Section 1.e.) for the first time considers sexual harassment a civil
crime, also resulting in greater protection under the law. There are no
statistics on the incidence of sexual harassment, but the problem
generally is acknowledged to exist widely in the male-oriented society.
Prostitution is legal for adults age 18 and older, and there were
reports of trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution (see
Section 6.f.).
Legal services offices devoted to family and women's rights operate
throughout the country. Family protection police units, staffed by
specially trained officers, including women, also are active.
The Maternal and Infant Health Insurance Program, which began in
1996 and was expanded to the Basic Health Insurance Program in 1999,
provides 75 types of health services, focused on maternal and infant
health, to women of reproductive age and to children under the age of
5.
Women generally do not enjoy a social status equal to that of men.
Many women do not know their legal rights. Traditional prejudices and
social conditions remain obstacles to advancement. Women generally earn
less than men for equal work; however, the minimum wage law treats men
and women equally.
Most women in urban areas work in the informal economy and the
services and trade sectors, including domestic service and micro-
business, whereas in rural areas the vast majority of economically
active women work in agriculture. Young girls often leave school early
to work at home or in the economy. According to a 1997 study by the
Ministry of Education, four out of five illiterate citizens are female.
Girls have lower rates of school participation and higher dropout rates
than boys. Although not effectively enforced, the national labor law
limits women to a workday 1 hour shorter than that of men and prohibits
them from working at night.
Children.--The Government is aware of the precarious situation of
children and the need to provide legal and institutional infrastructure
for their protection. Seven Defender of Children and Adolescents
offices were opened in 1997 in La Paz to help protect children's rights
and interests. However, the Government has not given the poor situation
of children sufficient political priority to ensure that it can be
improved quickly and effectively. In December the Government's Inter-
Institutional Commission for the Progressive Elimination of Child Labor
released a new national plan to address the problem of child labor,
which includes programs to address financial, health, education, and
other needs of children (see Section 6.d.).
In October 1999, President Banzer signed into law a new Code for
Boys, Girls, and Adolescents, which codifies many obligations the
country assumed by ratifying the U.N. Convention on Rights of the
Child. It also regulates adoptions and tightens protection against
exploitative child labor and violence against children. However,
resource constraints are expected to impede full implementation of this
law.
Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in
children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their own
protection, simply on the orders of a social worker (see Section 1.d.).
Corporal punishment and verbal abuse are common in school, and physical
and psychological abuse in the home also are serious problems.
Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5 years
of primary school, this requirement is enforced poorly, particularly in
rural areas. The Ministry of Education and the World Bank calculated in
1997 that 26 percent of children graduated from high school. Prolonged
teachers' strikes often result in lengthy school closures, limiting
children's access to education.
The National Institute of Statistics calculated in 1998 that
approximately 24 percent of children under 3 years old were chronically
undernourished. A December 1999 UNICEF report on infant mortality
indicated that 85 of every 1,000 children die before they reach 5 years
of age.
Many children, particularly from rural areas, lack the birth
certificates and identity documents they need to secure social benefits
and protection.
Although laws provide safeguards against children working, they are
not enforced effectively. According to a May 1999 study commissioned by
the International Labor Organization (ILO), approximately 369,385
children between the ages of 7 and 14 work (23 percent of that age
group), usually to help provide for family subsistence, in uncontrolled
and sometimes unhealthy conditions (see Section 6.d.).
Child prostitution is a problem, particularly in urban areas and in
the Chapare region. At least two NGO's, Fundacion La Paz and Q'Haruru,
have active programs to fight child prostitution. The Government's plan
to combat child labor includes a campaign against child prostitution
(see Section 6.d.).
The old practice of ``criadito'' service still persists in some
parts of the country. Criaditos are indigenous children of both sexes,
usually 10 to 12 years old, whom their parents indenture to middle- and
upper-class families to perform household work in exchange for
education, clothing, room, and board. There are no controls over the
benefits to, or treatment of, such children, who may become virtual
slaves for the years of their indenture.
There were unconfirmed reports that children sometimes were sold to
work in sweatshops in Argentina (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--In 1997 the Government promulgated
regulations to implement the 1995 Law on Disabilities. The regulations
require wheelchair access to all public and private buildings; duty
free import of orthopedic devices; a 50 percent reduction in public
transportation fares; and expanded teaching of sign language and
Braille. A National Committee for Incapacitated Persons was established
to oversee the law's enforcement, conduct studies, and channel and
supervise programs and donations for the disabled. The electoral law
makes arrangements for blind voters. However, in general there are no
special services or infrastructure to accommodate disabled persons. A
lack of adequate resources impedes full implementation of the law.
Social attitudes keep many disabled persons at home from an early age,
limiting their integration into society.
Indigenous People.--Discrimination against, and abuse of,
indigenous people continued. The indigenous majority generally remains
at the low end of the socioeconomic scale, facing severe disadvantages
in health, life expectancy, education, income, literacy, and
employment. More than one-half of all citizens speak indigenous
dialects as their first language, and many speak no Spanish at all,
which essentially excludes them from most of the formal economy. Lack
of education, inefficient farming and mining methods, indigenous
cultural practices, and societal biases keep the indigenous people
poor. They continued to be exploited in the workplace. Some rural
indigenous workers are kept in a state of virtual slavery by employers
who charge them more for room and board than they earn. Although the
1996 Agrarian Reform Law extended the protection of the national labor
law to all paid agricultural workers, including indigenous workers, the
problem persists due to lack of effective enforcement.
The Agrarian Reform Law provides for indigenous communities to have
legal title to their communal lands and for individual farmers to have
title to the land they work. The Government and indigenous leaders
jointly developed provisions of this law. However, the issue of land,
specifically the Agrarian Reform Law, has been a constant source of
complaints and protests by indigenous people.
Indigenous people complain that their territories are not legally
defined and protected, and that outsiders exploit their resources.
Specific offenders allegedly are illegal coca growers and timber
pirates. Indigenous groups have taken advantage of the Popular
Participation Law to form municipalities that offer them greater
opportunities for selfdetermination.
Clashes between Laime and Qaqachaca indigenous groups in the border
of the Oruro and Potosi departments left dozens dead and injured over
the course of the year. These groups have a decades-long history of
tension over disputed land.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is ongoing societal
discrimination against the small Afro-Bolivian minority.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers may form and join
organizations of their choosing; however, labor leaders consistently
state that a section of the 1985 Economic Liberalization Decree, which
addresses the free contracting of labor, undermines any protections
against dismissal without cause. Labor leaders allege that employers
use or threaten to use this article to limit unionization. The Labor
Code requires prior government authorization to establish a union,
permits only one union per enterprise, and allows the Government to
dissolve unions by administrative fiat; however, the Government has not
enforced these provisions in recent years. The law requires the
Government to confirm the legitimately elected officers of unions, a
difficult role that it is not known to abuse. While the code denies
civil servants the right to organize and bans strikes in public
services, including banks and public markets, nearly all civilian
government workers are unionized. Workers generally are not penalized
for union activities; during the April state of siege some union
leaders and activists were detained, not for union activities, but for
their alleged roles in fomenting disturbances (see Section 1.d.). In
theory the Bolivian Labor Federation (COB) represents virtually the
entire work force; however, only about one-half of workers in the
formal economy actually belong to labor unions. Some members of the
informal economy also participate in labor or trade organizations. The
CSUTCB, led by Felipe Quispe, is not a trade union in the traditional
sense, since there is no counterpart employer with which to bargain.
The CSUTCB is designed to maximize the power of indigenous farmers with
respect to the Government and traditional trade unions.
On December 6, the Government announced that for the remainder of
the President's term of office, it would not introduce legislation to
modernize the antiquated Labor Code and patchwork of labor laws and to
make them conform with ILO conventions that the country already has
ratified.
Workers in the public sector frequently exercise the right to
strike. Solidarity strikes are illegal, but the Government has neither
prosecuted those responsible nor imposed penalties. Significant strikes
centered around annual negotiations over salaries and benefits for
public employees. However, their real targets were the Government's
economic and social reform programs. During the April disturbances (see
Section 1.a.), riot police struck for more pay. Most strikes were
conducted and led by the self-described Trotskyite element of the Urban
Teachers Union, which protested the Government's education reform plan,
including reform of teacher training institutions, a merit-based salary
system, and decentralization designed to give municipalities greater
control over education. Teachers' strikes shut down public schools for
several weeks in late September.
Unions are not free from influence by political parties. The COB
itself is a political organization directed by Marxist ideologues. Its
stated aim is to end the Government's neoliberal economic program, and
it gives little attention to serious collective bargaining. Most
parties have labor committees that attempt to influence union activity
and also have party activists inside the unions.
The law allows unions to join international labor organizations.
The COB became an affiliate of the Communist, formerly Sovietdominated,
World Federation of Trade Unions in 1988.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers may
organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining, or voluntary
direct negotiations between employers and workers without the
participation of the Government, is limited but growing. The Labor Code
was written in a period in which the COB, which purports to represent
all worker groups and interests, had quasi-governmental status and the
exclusive authority to negotiate with state-owned enterprises. The
practice was for the COB and the Government to negotiate a global
agreement on salaries, minimum wages, and other work conditions each
year. With the privatization of most of these enterprises, the COB's
relevancy has diminished markedly, and the practice of direct employee-
management negotiations in individual enterprises is expanding.
The law prohibits discrimination against union members and
organizers. Complaints go to the National Labor Court, which can take a
year or more to rule due to a massive backlog of cases. The court has
ruled in favor of discharged workers in some cases and successfully
required their reinstatement. However, union leaders say that problems
are often moot by the time the court rules.
Labor law and practice in the seven special duty-free zones are the
same as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by
children; however, the practices of child apprenticeship and
agricultural servitude by indigenous workers (see Section 5) constitute
violations, as do some individual cases of household workers
effectively held captive by their employers. In addition, women were
trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits all work for payment by children under
the age of 14; however, this prohibition generally is not enforced.
Child labor is a serious and increasing problem. The Labor Code is
ambiguous on conditions of employment for minors from 14 to 17 years of
age and permits apprenticeship for those 12 to 14 years old. The ILO
has criticized this practice, which is sometimes tantamount to bondage
(see Section 6.c). The law also prohibits the employment of persons
under 18 years of age in dangerous, unhealthy, or immoral work.
Approximately one in every four children between the ages of 7 and
14 is employed in some way. A May 1999 study by the ILO estimated that
approximately 70,000 children between the ages of 7 and 14 were working
in cities, and that approximately 300,000 children in the same age
group were working in rural areas. The extreme poverty of many families
dictates the involuntary employment of their children for motives of
survival. After an ILO-sponsored conference in May 1999 on the
country's child labor problems, an Inter-Institutional Commission for
the Progressive Elimination of Child Labor was formed. The Government
also signed a memorandum of understanding with the ILO, pledging more
attention to child labor, a 5-year plan to combat it, and adoption of
policies against its most dangerous forms. In November President Banzer
announced a plan to give small annual payments to families with
children between the ages of 6 and 14 who were attending school. In
December the Government's Inter-Institutional Commission released its
new national plan to address the problem of child labor. The plan,
which has not yet been funded, includes programs to give families
alternatives to having children work, and to address financial, health,
education, and other needs.
The Labor Ministry is responsible for enforcing child labor
provisions but generally does not enforce them throughout the country.
Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5 years of
primary school, this requirement is enforced poorly, particularly in
rural areas. Urban children sell goods, shine shoes, and assist
transport operators. Rural children often work with parents from an
early age, generally in subsistence agriculture. Children generally are
not employed in factories or formal businesses but, when employed,
often work the same hours as adults. Children also work in the mines
and other dangerous occupations in the informal sector. Child
prostitution is a growing problem, particularly among girls between the
ages of 14 and 18. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children; however, the practices of child apprenticeship (criadito) and
agricultural servitude by indigenous workers constitute violations, as
do some individual cases of household workers effectively held captive
by their employers (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In conformity with the law, the
minimum wage is subject to annual renegotiation and was increased in
January by 7 percent to approximately $56 (355 bolivianos) per month,
plus bonuses and fringe benefits. The minimum wage does not provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family, and most workers
earn more. Although the minimum wage falls below prevailing wages in
most jobs, certain benefit calculations are pegged to it. The minimum
wage does not cover members of the informal sector, who constitute the
majority of the urban work force, nor does it cover farmers, who
account for some 30 percent of the working population.
Only one-half of the urban labor force enjoys an 8-hour workday and
a workweek of 5 or 5-1/2 days, because the maximum workweek of 44 hours
is not enforced. The Labor Ministry's Bureau of Occupational Safety has
responsibility for protection of workers' health and safety, but
relevant standards are enforced poorly. Many workers have died due to
unsafe conditions. However, the Government has requested technical
assistance in the occupational safety area from an international donor.
The Labor Ministry maintains a hot line for worker inquiries,
complaints, and reports of unfair labor practices and unsafe working
conditions.
Working conditions in the mining sector are particularly bad.
Although the State Mining Corporation has an office responsible for
safety, many mines, often old and using antiquated equipment, are
dangerous and unhealthy. In some mines operated as cooperatives, miners
earn approximately $3 (20 bolivianos) per 12-hour day. They work
without respirators in mines where toxic gases and cancer-causing dusts
abound; they buy their own supplies, including dynamite, have no
scheduled rest periods, and many work underground for up to 24 hours
continuously. There are no special provisions in the law defining when
workers may remove themselves from dangerous situations. Unless the
work contract covers this area, any worker who refuses to work based on
the individual's judgment of excessively dangerous conditions may face
dismissal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons, although aspects of the problem are
covered in other laws and in the Constitution. There were reports of
domestic trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution. A union
leader asserted that employment agencies lure rural indigenous women to
cities with promises of employment as domestic servants but then force
them to work without salaries to repay transport and other fees and
sometimes turn them over to houses of prostitution. There were also
unconfirmed press reports that children sometimes were sold to
sweatshops in Argentina.
__________
BRAZIL
Brazil is a constitutional federal republic composed of 26 states
and the Federal District. The federal legislative branch exercises
authority independent of the executive branch. In 1998 voters elected
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, of the Brazilian Social Democratic
Party (PSDB), to a second 4-year term. The 1998 elections marked the
third time since the end of military rule in 1985 that citizens freely
chose their president and elected the legislative bodies in accordance
with the 1988 Constitution. All parties are able to compete on the
basis of fair and equal procedures. The judiciary generally is
independent; however, it is inefficient and subject to political and
economic influence.
The military forces handled national defense and are subject to
effective civilian control, both in law and in practice. Police forces
fall primarily under the control of the states. State police are
divided into two forces. The civil police have an investigative role,
and the uniformed police, known officially as the ``military police,''
are responsible for maintaining public order. Although the individual
state governments control the uniformed police, the Constitution
provides that they can be called into active military service in the
event of an emergency, and they maintain some military characteristics
and privileges, including a separate judicial system. The federal
police force is very small and primarily investigative. It plays little
role in routine law enforcement. The state police forces committed
numerous serious human rights abuses.
Brazil has a market-based, diversified economy. The Government,
which traditionally played a dominant role in shaping economic
development, is encouraging greater private sector participation in the
economy through privatization of state enterprises, deregulation, and
removal of some impediments to competition, trade, and investment.
Industrial production, including mining operations and a large and
diversified capital goods sector, accounts for approximately 35 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP); agriculture contributes about 8
percent. Exports consist of both manufactured and primary goods. Among
the principal exports are iron ore, coffee, airplanes, soybeans, and
footwear. Per capita GDP was about $3,400, and the economy grew by 4
percent. Income distribution remained highly skewed: the poorest half
of the population received only 10 percent of national income while the
richest tenth received 48 percent.
The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its
citizens; however, there continued to be numerous serious abuses. State
police forces (both civil and uniformed) committed many extrajudicial
killings, tortured and beat suspects under interrogation, and
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Police also were implicated
in criminal activity of all kinds, including killings for hire, death
squad executions, and kidnapings for ransom. Prison officials often
tortured and beat inmates. The state governments concerned did not
punish most perpetrators of these abuses effectively. Police tribunals
(special courts for the uniformed police) remained overloaded, rarely
investigated cases thoroughly, and seldom convicted abusers. The
separate system of uniformed police tribunals contributes to a climate
of impunity for police officers involved in extrajudicial killings or
abuse of prisoners. Prison conditions range from poor to extremely
harsh. The judiciary has a large case backlog and often is unable to
ensure the right to a fair and speedy trial. Justice is slow and often
unreliable, especially in areas where powerful economic interests
influence the local judiciary. Human rights monitors on occasion face
threats and harassment. Violence and discrimination against women are
problems. Child prostitution and abuse are problems. Despite
constitutional provisions safeguarding the rights of indigenous people,
government authorities often fail to protect them adequately from
outsiders who encroach on their lands, and fail to provide them with
adequate health care and other basic services in many areas.
Discrimination against Afro-Brazilians is a problem. Violence against
homosexuals is a problem. Forced labor continued to be a serious
problem. Child labor is a serious problem. There continued to be
occasional reports of forced child labor. The Government continued its
interministerial campaign against child labor. Trafficking in women and
children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a serious problem.
The National Secretariat of Human Rights oversees the
implementation of the Government's action plan to address human rights
abuses. A new secretary was installed in May. In May U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited, and U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Torture Nigel Rodley visited in August and September.
Robinson commented on the Government's recognition of its human rights
problems and stated that President Cardoso was on the right track in
trying to reduce and eliminate abuses. Rodley noted the poor conditions
in prisons and said that in many cases law enforcement authorities who
torture prisoners and suspects do so with impunity. The Government
undertook several programs to promote the protection of human rights.
In 1996 a nongovernmental organization (NGO) established a witness
protection program; the Government adopted it in 1999 in an attempt to
combat widespread impunity. The Government's inter-ministerial
Committee for the Defense of the Human Being (CDDPH), chaired by the
National Human Rights Secretary, continued to be an effective
instrument to highlight human rights abuses and allocate federal
resources to bolster the efforts of the states. However, because of
jurisdictional and resource limitations, the efforts of the Federal
Government had an uneven and limited impact in many of the states where
human rights violations are most common.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed
numerous extrajudicial killings, which continued to be a serious
problem throughout the country. The uniformed police summarily executed
suspected criminals rather than apprehend them, and then filed false
reports that the suspects were resisting arrest. Preliminary estimates
from the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo alone indicated that
the police killed at least 1,000 persons during the year while
operating in their ``official'' capacity. In addition many other
killings occurred as the result of death squads and other criminal
groups, many of which included police as members. The failure to
investigate, prosecute, and punish police who commit such acts creates
a climate of impunity that continues to encourage human rights abuses.
Harsh conditions in prisons and rioting led to the death of inmates
(see Section 1.c.).
The lack of accountability and the inefficient criminal justice
system allow impunity to continue. All crimes less serious than murder
committed by uniformed police officers against civilians remain in the
military justice system. In 1999 an investigation into Sao Paulo's
special courts for uniformed police uncovered 1,107 ``missing'' and
``delayed'' cases against uniformed police charged with crimes against
civilians that include murder and torture. In 1999 a newspaper that had
access to 300 cases under investigation found 100 murder charges among
them, some delayed for up to 12 years. Equally long delays allowed many
cases of torture and lesser charges to expire due to statutes of
limitations. This probe was the closest scrutiny ever of the special
police courts and resulted in the authorities bringing criminal charges
against two court officials.
Human rights activists believe that the 1996 ``Bicudo'' law, which
gives civil courts jurisdiction over intentional homicide committed by
uniformed police officers, has had limited success. In 1995--the last
year before the implementation of the new law--police courts convicted
23 percent (48 of 205) of officers tried for homicide. In 1998 civilian
courts convicted 48 percent (31 of 64) of officers charged with
homicide. The comparable rate for civilians tried for murder in Sao
Paulo was 50 percent. The law allows for civil prosecutors to review
the most egregious cases, while less prominent cases are reviewed by
the police force itself. Almost without exception, the police
investigators conclude that suspects were resisting arrest.
Police often were members of vigilante groups and death squads
responsible for killings. In addition uniformed and civil police
involvement in criminal activity is widespread. Throughout the country,
police were implicated in crimes ranging from killing for hire and
kidnaping to drug trafficking and extortion.
Reputable NGO's reported hundreds of extrajudicial killings and
other abuses of force by police throughout the country during the year.
A Sao Paulo press report indicated that on November 8, a local
police officer was arrested near Boa Vista, Roraima, on the accusation
that he had participated in the killing of seven adolescents whose
noisy party had bothered him.
Two Sao Paulo police officers were arrested on or about December 11
and accused of having killed four persons in a bakery in Sao Bernardo
do Campo 5 days earlier. Three other persons were injured in the
attack.
In May police shot and killed a member of the Landless Movement
(MST) during a confrontation between protesters and uniformed police in
the state of Parana (see Section 2.b.). The authorities did not charge
or arrest any officer by year's end.
The use of torture by police sometimes led to the death of the
victims (see Section 1.c.). The authorities opened an investigation
into the death of Nilson Saldinia, who died in February in the 50th
district jail in Sao Paulo's Itaim Paulista neighborhood. At year's
end, the investigation continued, but no one had been accused.
Police killings of street children continued (see Section 5).
Harsh or dangerous prison conditions, official negligence, poor
sanitary conditions, abuse by guards, and a lack of medical care led to
a number of deaths in prisons. Inmates in prisons and at juvenile
detention facilities rioted repeatedly during the year (see Section
1.c.). Many riots resulted in a number of deaths, but no estimates were
available for the number of prisoners killed nationwide during prison
riots.
The office of the police ombudswoman in Rio de Janeiro state
received 2,894 complaints from April 1999 through December 15, during
its first 20 months of operation. Complaints against the uniformed
police accounted for 60 percent of that total. There were 312
officially reported police homicides in the first 9 months of the year,
compared to 289 in all of 1999. These statistics seriously understate
the number of killings by police, as they do not include the deaths of
perpetrators allegedly caught in the act of committing a crime.
Previous research by the Institute for Religious Studies (ISER)
suggests that, to estimate the true number of police homicides, the
official figures should be doubled. The ISER report also stated that
Rio de Janeiro police killed half of their victims with 4 or more
bullets and shot the majority of victims in either the shoulder or the
head; 40 cases clearly demonstrated execution-style deaths, where
police first immobilized the victims and then shot them at point-blank
range. In 64 percent of the cases examined, the victims were shot in
the back.
According to the Sao Paulo state government, the uniformed and
civil police killed 635 civilians in the first 9 months of the year, an
increase of 30 percent over the same period in 1999. A Sao Paulo police
ombudsman's report released in July showed that of the 664 persons
killed by police officers in 1999, 31 percent were committing crimes at
the time they were shot, 56 percent had no previous criminal record,
and 51 percent of the victims were shot in the back. Many human rights
observers believe that the report reflects excessive use of force by
the Sao Paulo police.
In a nationally televised bus hijacking in Rio de Janeiro in June,
police wounded a hostage while attempting to shoot the hijacker. The
hijacker then killed the hostage. The hijacker was apprehended unhurt,
but arrived dead at the hospital after police riding in the ambulance
allegedly strangled him. At year's end, one police officer had been
acquitted and four awaited trial.
Four uniformed police officers were sent to prison to await trial
in a civil court for the highly publicized killing of three persons,
including two juveniles (aged 14, 17, and 21) in Sao Paulo in February
1999. The officers arrested the victims for fighting, beat them, then
were seen leading them into a forested area near where the bodies were
found 2 weeks later. Each victim was shot once in the head. The police
officers initially denied having any contact with the victims. They
later confessed to the killings after 19 witnesses came forward to
testify against them and a DNA test identified blood inside the police
car as that of one of the victims. The perpetrators were charged with
aggravated triple homicide, abuse of power, and hiding bodies.
The five uniformed police officers arrested in the March 1999
shooting deaths of two persons, one of whom was mentally disabled, in
Sao Paulo's Jardin Elba slum, were jailed in September, pending trial.
The officers, who allegedly shot the two outside of their police car,
dragged the bodies inside, and then simulated an exchange of gunfire,
were charged with homicide. At year's end, no trial date had been set.
Police sources reported that the investigation continues into the
April 1999 death of 20-year-old Ricardo Galvao, who was shot, stabbed,
and beaten. Galvao was last seen in a police vehicle after being caught
trying to steal a car. On August 11, the police involved in the
apprehension were expelled from the police force. The authorities
charged two civilians with Galvao's death.
Four uniformed policemen are still in custody awaiting trial in the
August 1999 double homicide that took place in Sao Bernardo do Campo,
Sao Paulo. The accused suspected the victims of stealing a police
motorcycle, questioned them, and returned to the neighborhood the
following day, when they allegedly killed the two youths by shooting
them in the head and leaving another youth for dead. The third victim
survived by feigning death and was placed in the witness protection
program.
In December 1999, police in the Federal District shot and killed
one person and blinded another during a peaceful demonstration. The
governor removed certain officials as a result. At year's end, the case
against the police officers awaited trial.
There was no information available about an investigation into the
February 1999 killing of Antonio Lopes in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte,
or in the October 1999 killing of Robelio dos Santos, in Salvador,
Bahia.
Amnesty International reported that police death squads still were
active in Mato Grosso do Sul. There was no information available about
the status of the cases against various police officers accused of
participating in death squads in the states of Alagoas and Mato Grosso
do Sul in 1997 and 1998.
In April a court retried and convicted former military policeman
Otavio Lourenco Gambra, also known as ``Rambo,'' for the murder of
Mario Jose Josino in a highly publicized March 1997 extortion and
killing incident in Sao Paulo's Favela Naval neighborhood. Gambra's
1998 conviction had been overturned due to lack of evidence. Eight
other police officers were convicted of bodily harm and professional
negligence. All were serving time in Sao Paulo prisons at year's end.
In April the State Court of Para annulled an August 1999 trial in
the city of Belem that acquitted 3 uniformed police officers in command
of the unit responsible for the 1996 massacre of 19 landless workers at
Eldorado de Carajas in the Amazonian state of Para. Human rights
activists considered this decision a major blow against police
impunity. A new trial was scheduled for March 2001.
In September the State Court of Rondonia convicted 3 of 12
uniformed policemen and 2 squatters of homicide in the August 1995
killings of 11 squatters and 2 policemen in Corumbiara. The three
officers received sentences of 16, 18, and 19 years. The two squatters
who were tried were not convicted of murder but of inciting the
killings and received 6 and 8 years respectively. Activists criticized
the fact that the courts had acquitted 9 of the 12 police officers
involved and that the court had not indicted the landowner who was
involved directly in the conflict, despite the fact that there was a
videotape of the landowner in which he told the police to attack the
squatters, whom he called enemy guerrillas.
Of 31 police officers charged with participation in the 1993
massacre of 21 residents of the Vigario Geral neighborhood in Rio de
Janeiro, the courts acquitted 19 and convicted 6 officers. At year's
end, four officers awaited trial; two died before going to trial.
The trial of retired police Colonel Ubiratan Guimaraes again was
delayed. Guimaraes is accused of homicide in the deaths of 111 inmates
during an October 1992 riot in Sao Paulo's Carandiru prison. The
charges he faces carry a penalty of 1,350 years of imprisonment,
although his jail term would be limited to 30 years by the
Constitution. Guimaraes would be the first policeman of the rank of
colonel to face a civilian jury under the Bicudo law. The other 85
officers who are accused of involvement also await trial. The statute
of limitations expired for the charges of torture and beatings, but the
officers can be tried for murder. All of the officers, including
Guimaraes, were released to await trial.
Death squads in which the police are involved contribute
significantly to the level of violence and lawlessness, according to
public security officials. Human rights groups reported the existence
of organized death squads linked to the police forces that target
suspected criminals and persons considered ``undesirable'' (such as
street children) in almost every state. A report on death squads issued
by the committee for human rights of the Federal Chamber of Deputies in
1999 highlighted death squad activity with police involvement in the
states of Bahia, Rio Grande do Norte, Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso,
Amazonas, Para, Paraiba, Ceara, Espirito Santo, and Acre. The report
stated that death squads ``arise because of the loss of credibility in
the justice and public security institutions and the certainty of
impunity as the result of the incapacity of the institutions that have
jurisdiction in resolving the problem.'' The report indicated that
death squad activity appeared to be declining except in Bahia.
In August 1999, the Governor of Espirito Santo (the state with the
highest rate of homicide), stated that death squad activity involving
the police contributed significantly to the level of violence in the
state. A state police investigation and a state parliamentary committee
of inquiry reported that an informal organization, the ``Squad le
Cocq'' involving police, judicial, and elected authorities including
Jose Carlos Gratz, president of the state assembly, was responsible for
the vast majority of organized crime in the state.
An investigation instigated by the former president of the supreme
court of Acre state and carried out under the auspices of the CDDPH
amassed evidence that former Acre military police chief and former
state and federal deputy Hildebrando Pascoal headed a crime ring and
death squad in that Amazonian state linked to at least 30 murder and
torture cases previously suspended by state authorities for lack of
evidence. Charges against Pascoal include the kidnaping--with the
collusion of military police officers from Piaui--and murder of the
suspected killer of Pascoal's brother, and the kidnaping of the
victim's wife and children in an attempt to locate the victim. A
congressional committee of inquiry also established Pascoal's control
of narcotics trafficking within the state. A witness who testified
before that committee identified the site of a mass grave in Acre that
federal authorities believe Pascoal's organization used to dispose of
at least eight murder victims. Pascoal's election to the federal
Chamber of Deputies in October 1998 conferred on him parliamentary
immunity from all prosecution. However, in October 1999, the Chamber
voted to remove Pascoal's immunity and the police subsequently arrested
him. In June a federal judge ruled that Pascoal would face a jury trial
on account of the capital offense, but no trial date was set. At year's
end, he was in prison and awaited trial on charges of murder;
additional charges of narcotics trafficking and electoral violations
were pending.
The authorities also failed to conclude the investigation of the
May 1996 death squad killings in the Franco da Rocha neighborhood of
Sao Paulo, and no charges have been filed in connection with the case.
Witnesses identified five uniformed police officers as having arrested
four men who were found dead a few hours later. Franco da Rocha is one
of Sao Paulo state's poorest communities and the location of a
clandestine dumping site for the victims of death squads. Since 1993 at
least 212 bodies have been found there, including 50 victims shot in
the head. Progress in the investigation has been hampered by difficulty
in identifying bodies whose heads or hands were amputated.
Several persons were killed in conflicts involving the settlement
of disputes of land ownership and usage. The MST increased its campaign
of legal occupation of lands identified as unproductive, and illegal
occupation of land not yet so designated. In addition as a new policy,
the MST began occupying public buildings in an effort to embarrass the
Government and gain publicity for its cause. MST activists destroyed
private property during some occupations. The Catholic Church's
Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), the country's foremost entity
monitoring human rights in rural areas, released in October its report
covering rural violence in 1998. The report presents a mixed picture of
the overall human rights climate relating to the country's land
conflicts. Killings of landless activists increased to 47 in 1998,
compared with 30 in 1997, while attempted murders rose from 37 to 46.
Cases of torture rose from 5 to 35, but less serious indicators of
aggression fell sharply. The report notes that increased actions by the
Government to remove activists from illegal settlements resulted in
increased confrontations and destruction of property and homes but also
noted that the pace of agrarian reform outstripped new MST occupations,
contributing to a less violent climate overall.
In the investigation into the March 1999 killing of the brother of
an MST leader in Parana, the police arrested a suspected gunman but
later released him. There was no information available about the
investigation into the April 1998 death of MST leader Sadi Padillo in
Santa Catarina.
The CPT's report concludes that the climate of impunity enjoyed by
landed interests as a result of the ``fragile'' justice system and the
collusion of local political interests continues to encourage serious
human rights abuses of landless activists, including murder and
torture. However, the report also notes that the tactics of the land
reform movement have led to a self- perpetuating cycle in recent years,
whereby increased confrontation and tension have led to increased
government attention, encouraging in turn more land occupations. In
1999 statistics showed a decrease in violence.
Manuel Souza Neto, a leader of the MST, was killed in October and
his body was found in his home. He had been shot, and reports indicate
that his neck was slit. Members of the MST reported that landowners had
sent death threats to the victim, and suspect one landlord in his
death. However, others note that the victim also was active in politics
and that his killer could have been motivated by political goals.
On July 25, a wave of MST actions throughout the country left three
dead. In Recife, a police officer shot and killed one protestor. The
protester was part of a group of about 300 activists attempting to
occupy a regional bank headquarters. Near Fortaleza ranchers killed
another MST member during an occupation attempt. In Para state, an
unknown gunman killed an MST activist; six other persons had died in
land-related violence in that area since May.
On November 21, MST leader Sebastiao da Maia, also known as
Tiaozinho, was killed during the occupation of a ranch in Parana. The
authorities claimed that Maia was killed in a shootout during the
occupation, but the MST claimed that he died in an ambush by hired
gunmen. The authorities did not charge anyone with murder in the case
but arrested five security guards on firearms charges. According to the
Catholic Church's Pastoral Land Commission, Maia's killing was the
tenth killing of a rural activist during the year.
Also on November 21, a gunman killed Jose Dutra da Costa, a rural
activist in the state of Para. Police arrested the gunman the same day
and suggested that Costa may have been killed on the orders of large
landowners in the region. According to one source, for 2 years Costa
had been on a death list of 18 activists.
On December 19, federal police seized a large cache of arms at a
ranch in Pontal do Paranapanema, east of Sao Paulo, in the home of a
member of a landowner's group. In 1997 the ranch had been the scene of
an armed conflict between the landowner and the MST, in which eight MST
members were shot. The landowner was acquitted of charges of homicide
in that case, but faced arms charges after the arms seizure.
In June in the state of Para, Jeronimo Alves de Amorim was
convicted of ordering the 1991 murder of the head of a local workers'
union, Expedito Ribiero de Souza. Human rights activists noted that
this conviction is the first time that a landowner has been held liable
for such a crime. The court sentenced Alves de Amorim to 19 years in a
maximum security prison (see Section 6.a.).
In an April retrial, a jury acquitted MST leader Jose Rainha for
the 1989 killings of landowner Jose Machado Neto and police officer
Sergio Narciso da Silva. In 1997 a jury in the small, rural town of
Pedro Canario, Espirito Santo, sentenced Rainha to 26 years for the
killing. The jury convicted Rainha even though the prosecution
presented no material evidence and witnesses testified to Rainha's
presence 1,500 miles away from the scene of the crime. Since Rainha's
sentence exceeded 20 years, he automatically was entitled to a retrial.
Police investigator Celso Jose da Cruz, who appealed his 1997
conviction (and sentence of 516 years' imprisonment) for involvement in
these killings, was convicted in a retrial. There was no information
available regarding the trials of the 29 policemen charged as
codefendants in the killings.
According to human rights activists monitoring the case,
proceedings remain stalled against the former mayor of Rio Maria, in
the state of Para, who was charged with the 1985 murder of Joao Canuto,
the first president of the rural workers' union in Rio Maria. Canuto's
daughter, Luzia Canuto, received death threats as a result of the case.
In 1998 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
criticized the Federal Government for failing to prosecute the crime.
The four suspects charged with manslaughter in the burning death of
Pataxo indigenous leader Galdino Jesus dos Santos in Brasilia still
awaited trial at year's end. In 1998 an appellate court upheld a 1997
court decision to prosecute for manslaughter rather than murder. In
1999 a superior court ruled that a jury would try the defendants, and
the defense appealed the decision. The appeal was denied in April, but
a new appeal was filed, delaying the trial again. The accused remain in
prison. Dos Santos died in April 1997 after the suspects set him on
fire while he was asleep on a public bench.
Vigilante groups and death squads, which often included police
officials, also were responsible for killings.
The National Secretariat for Human Rights sponsors training
programs in human rights, carried out in cooperation with federal and
state entities and national and international organizations, in most
states. The Secretariat administers a human rights training program for
policemen in cooperation with Amnesty International (AI) in 10 states.
Human rights groups maintain that the effect of these programs has been
limited, at best. However, human rights activists in many states
reported willingness of police authorities to address their concerns
and to deal with problems brought to their attention.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In 1995 Congress passed legislation that recognized and assigned
government responsibility for the deaths of political activists who
``disappeared'' during the military regime while in the custody of
public officials, and obligated the Government to pay indemnities of
between $100,000 and $150,000 (200,000 to 300,000 reais) to each of the
families. In 1997 President Cardoso signed a decree awarding
reparations to the families of 43 such persons. As of March 1999, 265
persons had received indemnities out of 366 requests. A commission
created by the law continued to evaluate requests for, and authorize
payment of, indemnities.
No further progress was made during the year in investigating the
mass grave found in the Perus Cemetery in Sao Paulo on September 4,
1990. Over the last 10 years, the authorities were able to identify the
bodies of 6 persons from the 1,500 bones found. Human rights groups
state that these persons were opponents of the military regime.
However, attempts to identify additional bodies have stopped, and no
efforts were made to find those responsible for the deaths.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and a 1997 law prohibit torture and
provide severe legal penalties for its use; however, there are frequent
credible reports that police torture and beat criminal suspects to
extract information, confessions, or money. Victims generally are poor,
uneducated about their rights, and afraid to come forward due to fear
of reprisals. Prison officials often tortured and beat inmates.
As in the cases of extrajudicial killings, the police benefit from
a high level of impunity. A 1999 investigation by prosecutors into Sao
Paulo's special courts for uniformed police uncovered 1,107 ``missing''
and ``delayed'' cases against uniformed police charged with crimes
against civilians that include murder and torture. A newspaper that had
access to 300 cases under investigation found 100 murder charges among
them, some dating back up to 12 years. Equally long delays have allowed
many cases of torture and lesser charges to expire due to statutes of
limitations. Although some policemen are expected face criminal charges
as a result of this investigation, human rights officials called the
findings ``horrifying.''
The Sao Paulo state police ombudsman received 481 complaints
through the first 9 months of the year alleging torture, abuse,
mistreatment, or neglect (negligence accounts for 132 of these
complaints). This represented a slight increase from the same period in
1999, when the ombudsman received 467 such complaints. The ombudsman's
office believes that many cases are not reported.
U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture Rodley visited the country for
23 days in August and September. While his final report had not been
issued before year's end, Rodley described conditions in some prisons
as grotesque and stated that the Congress promotes impunity of police
agents by failing to provide proper oversight and by giving them
excessive powers. Rodley told the Federal Chamber of Deputies
Commission on Human Rights that the authorities routinely subject
suspects and prisoners to illegal detention, subhuman conditions and
torture, and rarely are punished for the abuses. He described instances
during his visit in which prisoners were beaten after talking with him,
where torture implements were discovered in a prison, and where he had
to take one prisoner to the hospital to recover from a beating. He also
told the Commission that officials in one prison promised to discipline
one corrections officer, but did not do so. He called the situation
worse than he had imagined and presumed that his experience represented
only a fraction of the problem.
In 1999 the Globo newspaper in Rio de Janeiro published the results
of an investigation into the allegations of torture by state police.
The police opened a total of 53 investigations regarding complaints of
torture against police authorities between 1997, when the torture law
came into effect, and 1999. Only one of the inquiries, which had been
suspended, officially had been concluded. The report identified several
patterns, including the use of electric shock, beatings with iron bars,
and sexual abuse including sodomy with foreign objects. The report
noted that police classified such incidents as abuse of authority and
physical assault, offenses that are far less serious than torture. As a
result of the report, the state government ordered an independent
review of the 53 cases, and the Federal Government established a task
force to review Rio de Janeiro state police practices.
In 1999 Sao Paulo officials investigated allegations that
investigative police of the 26th state police district humiliated and
beat prisoners after inmates secretly audiotaped 20 police officers
beating them and threatening to kill them. The authorities responded by
creating a special service to receive complaints of torture committed
by investigative and uniformed police. Persons wishing to make a
grievance about police activity or offer suggestions contacted the
police ombudsman over 8,000 times during the first 9 months of the
year.
On October 18, Amnesty International released a special report on
torture that included five cases in the country. One was that of
``Jose'' (not his real name), a juvenile in the state of Para who was
beaten so severely by police that he has needed psychiatric treatment
ever since. Jose's mother complained about the beating to the local
public prosecutor, who referred the case to the police chief at the
same station where the beating occurred. Other cases were cited in
Paraiba, Sao Paulo, and Pernambuco.
On October 19, the authorities arrested two civil guards in Sao
Paulo and accused them of the sexually assault of three teenage girls
caught trespassing in a cemetery. Police authorities began an internal
investigation into the matter.
On October 24, Federal Highway Police arrested a Rio state
policeman and accused him of having been a member of a gang that
specialized in robbing trucks at gunpoint along the highways. Police
were investigating the possible involvement of other officials in the
activities of the gang.
In late November, several former prisoners who had been held in an
Air Force prison in Rio de Janeiro made public their allegations of
having been tortured during their time in prison. The allegations
included accusations of beatings and electric shocks. The Federal
Police announced that it would begin an investigation into the reports.
The allegations were also investigated in early December by the Human
Rights Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.
On December 14, two policemen severely beat a shoe shiner, Rangel
Bezerra de Lima, in Ceilandia, Federal District. The reason given by
the police during the attack was that they had experienced a ``bad
day.'' The case got the attention of the Human Rights Division of the
Ministry of Foreign Relations, which assisted Rangel in filing a
complaint against the perpetrators, accusing the police of torture.
The case of Otavio dos Santos Filho, who allegedly died as a result
of torture at Sao Paulo's Depatri jail in 1999, was archived without
any resolution. No explanation for closing the case was been made
public by year's end.
Police authorities took no action regarding 107 cases of torture
and beating that took place in the Depatri jail in February 1998 and
were confirmed by the Police Medical Institute. Prosecutors and human
rights groups continued to push for a trial of the guards who are
accused in the case.
In 1997 civil policemen in Belem, Para state, under the command of
Captain Clovis Martins de Miranda Filho, accosted Hildebrando Silva de
Freitas, who apparently had failed to pay a bribe for a liquor license
for his bar. At Captain de Miranda's direction, as many as 10 police
officers severely beat and sexually abused de Freitas. In 1998 an
internal police investigation concluded that de Freitas had suffered
severe physical injury and did not contest the testimony of the
witnesses who corroborated his account, but declared there was no
connection between his injuries and the officers who had confronted
him. At year's end, the case was under review by the Para state
prosecutors' office. De Miranda has brought a defamation suit against
the state ombudsman for public security in Para for statements that she
allegedly made to the press regarding the case. The state has declined
to bear the costs of the ombudsman's defense.
Police violence against homosexuals continued (see Section 5).
There continue to be numerous credible reports of state police
officials' involvement in crime, including revenge killings and
intimidation and killing of witnesses involved in testifying against
police officials.
The Sao Paulo state police ombudsman received 218 complaints in the
first 9 months of the year alleging corruption, illicit enrichment,
swindling, embezzlement, or participation in drug trafficking on the
part of policemen.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued its
human rights training courses for high-ranking state military police
officers at the Federal Police Academy in Brasilia. A total of 860
military police have been trained in basic techniques, including the
apprehension and interrogation of criminal suspects without recourse to
excessive or unnecessary force. The program was funded through
December, and the ICRC office expected authorization to proceed for 2
to 3 more years. The Center for the Study of Violence at the University
of Sao Paulo is expected to review the results. The military police in
the states of Amapa, Paraiba, Rondonia, and Sao Paulo already have
incorporated the ICRC program into their general police training
program.
Over one-fifth of Sao Paulo's uniformed police officers have
received some kind of community police training under the state's
community policing initiative. Begun in December 1997, the program is
expected to take 10 years to implement fully. Under the program, high-
ranking police officials meet with citizens' consultative groups
weekly. The uniformed police also instituted a policy of ``recycling''
policemen involved in shootings, removing them from patrols for 6
months and offering them counseling.
Prison conditions range from poor to extremely harsh. Severe
overcrowding was prevalent, especially in larger cities. According to
Ministry of Justice figures for 1998, about 85 percent of the prison
population was kept in substandard conditions. The situation was most
critical in the states with the largest prison populations, including
Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul, and Pernambuco.
Most penal authorities in these states do not have the resources to
separate minor offenders from adults and petty offenders from violent
criminals. Prison riots were frequent occurrences. Discipline is
difficult to maintain under such conditions, and prison officials often
resort to inhuman treatment, including torture.
AI stated that the prison system was ``in crisis'' in a
comprehensive report on prisons released in June 1999. The report was
based on 33 visits to prisons in 10 states. In December 1998, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) also issued a comprehensive report entitled ``Behind
Bars in Brazil,'' based on an intensive review of prison conditions in
eight states. Both reports meticulously detail inhuman conditions and
systematic and wide ranging abuses of human rights throughout the
prison system. Among the most serious charges are the commonplace
undocumented and uninvestigated deaths of inmates at the hands of
authorities or other prisoners, and the routine use of torture against
inmates by both guards and police officers.
Poor working conditions for prison guards aggravate substandard
prison conditions and encourage corruption. The director of Sao Paulo's
Carandiru prison (the largest in the country) told representatives from
AI that many cases of torture and use of excessive force result in part
from employees' working conditions. An investigation of the more than
1,100 employees of Sao Paulo's prison at the end of 1998 showed that
241 had criminal records themselves. The majority of the charges
against them were for crimes committed while working at the prison and
ranged from drug trafficking and threats to assisting in escapes. The
state secretary of penitentiary administration was aware of the guards'
criminal pasts and allowed them to continue working. At year's end,
prison officials stated that investigations were continuing and that
they had discharged some employees.
In September the director of the maximum security prison Bangu 1 in
Rio de Janeiro, who had attempted to clean up corruption and violence
at the institution, was murdered--probably on orders from incarcerated
drug traffickers, corrupt prison guards, or police officers, according
to state security officials.
Prisons do not provide adequate protection against violence
inflicted by inmates on each other.
On October 10, news media reported a riot in a Parana state prison
in Piraquara, where prisoners armed with pistols and a grenade took
seven guards hostage. According to news sources, this was the second
riot there in 4 months. Another riot occurred on October 10 in
Contagem, a district of Belo Horizonte, in which one policeman and one
prisoner were injured. Press reports stated that it was the third riot
there during the year, and that the cause was overcrowding.
On October 22, prisoners took 66 persons hostage during a riot in
Penitenciaria Nelson Hungria, near Belo Horizonte. The prisoners were
armed with pistols and knives. The riot ended with a promise by the
authorities to transfer some of the inmates to other facilities.
On October 23, a riot broke out in Penitenciaria 2 de Itapetininga,
in Sao Paulo State. At least 500 prisoners were involved; they took 14
guards as hostages. The riot lasted only 9 hours, but three prisoners
died from fires set during the incident. On October 24, a gang fight
inside Carandiru Prison in Sao Paulo killed two prisoners and injured
another five. According to the authorities, the gangs were fighting
over control of the prison. Prison authorities responded by
transferring prisoners identified as most dangerous gang members to
other facilities.
On or about November 5, a riot broke out in the Casa de Detencao
Jose Mario Alves da Silva, in Porto Velho, Rondonia. Three prisoners
were killed (apparently by other prisoners) and another 17 were
injured. A guard also was injured. The revolt lasted 79 hours.
Armed with knives, razor blades, and pistols, prisoners in Sao
Paulo's high-security Taubate penitentiary rioted December 17 and 18,
resulting in the deaths of nine inmates. The riot was sparked by
prisoner demands for transfer to lower-security facilities and was
followed by an unsuccessful escape attempt. After the riot was quelled,
the authorities transferred 25 prisoners to other facilities.
Prisoners also are subject to extremely poor health conditions.
Scabies and tuberculosis, diseases not common in the general
population, are widespread in Sao Paulo prisons. The Ministry of
Justice estimates that 10 to 20 percent of the national prison
population is HIV positive. Denial of first aid and other medical care
sometimes is used as a form of punishment. According to the Sao Paulo
state secretary of prison administration, 1,923 prisoners in Sao
Paulo's prisons are infected with tuberculosis, 178 have leprosy, 122
are infected with hepatitis, 457 are infected with HIV, and over 3,800
suffer from full-blown AIDS. AI reports that, while underused, the Sao
Paulo state hospital for prisoners with AIDS is cleaner and better
organized than most prison hospitals.
Overcrowding in Sao Paulo's prisons and police detention centers,
which hold about 43 percent of the country's prison population, is a
critical human rights problem. Although state prison capacity has risen
by 50 percent with the opening of 21 new prisons since 1998, rising
crime and inflexible sentencing has meant that facilities remain
overcrowded. The prison population increased by 7,000 persons in the
first 8 months of the year.
The state of Sao Paulo has approximately 92,000 prisoners. Only
about 59,000 these prisoners are in the state penitentiary system. Due
to lack of space, more than 32,000 prisoners, most of whom already have
been convicted and should be in state penitentiaries, remain in
temporary holding facilities in police stations. The state penitentiary
system has an over-capacity rate of about 18 percent.
Sao Paulo prison authorities openly admit that overcrowding has led
to abysmal conditions and violent riots in Sao Paulo prisons. There
were 25 riots during the year in Sao Paulo prisons, which resulted in
the deaths of 23 prisoners. A riot in Parana state on June 3-6 left one
prisoner dead and three injured. Another riot occurred on July 12,
although no one was hurt in that incident. Among the prisoners'
complaints were overcrowding, the slow parole process, and lack of
conjugal visits.
Overcrowding and lack of adequate security also lead to a number of
escapes and carefully planned jail and prison breaks. On September 19,
in Sao Paulo state, armed men broke into 2 prisons and 1 jail and freed
206 prisoners. At another break at Sumare prison, also in Sao Paulo
state, 7 men stormed the complex and freed 92 of the 100 prisoners.
Numerous breaks such as these occurred throughout the year, and very
few prisoners were recaptured. In at least one case seven guards were
held hostage during the escape.
Torture and mistreatment of prisoners by prison officials is also a
serious concern. Investigations began in the torture and beatings of 20
prisoners in Sao Paulo's Sorocaba prison. The prisoners and their
relatives charge that on July 28, the prisoners were forced to walk
through two rows of police officers (armed with truncheons and sticks)
who beat the prisoners as they walked. The prisoners were then divided
into groups of five and each group locked into a solitary confinement
cell designed to hold one person. In October a public prosecutor
charged 20 policemen and 5 penitentiary guards with participating in
the torture of inmates.
The authorities opened an investigation in the death of Nilson
Saldinia, who died in February in the 50th district jail in Sao Paulo's
Itaim Paulista neighborhood. Human rights groups claim that he died as
a result of torture after police beat him and other prisoners with bars
and metal rods and applied electric shocks to them (see Section 1.a.).
An investigation also has been opened into the allegation of a June
3 torture incident involving over 100 prisoners in Sao Paulo state's
prison facility in the city of Americana. According to Justica Global,
a local human rights group, prisoners were forced to pass through a
``corridor'' formed by military policemen from the Special Operations
Unit while the policemen beat the prisoners with iron bars, truncheons,
and whips. According to the organization, one prisoner's left arm was
broken and another prisoner, Wilson Pereira da Silva, was beaten
severely and then police threw a mixture of vinegar, water, and salt on
his wounds. The director of the facility was fired shortly after the
accusations surfaced.
Sao Paulo prison officials have taken steps to improve the quality
of the prison guard force. Since 1998 new hires are required to have a
high school diploma and to take human rights courses. Sao Paulo prison
authorities also are attempting to improve conditions by building more
prisons (six small ones were built during the year), by improving
training of prison personnel, and by creating committees of community
leaders to monitor prison conditions. However, they emphasize that the
most serious problem--overcrowding--can not be resolved in the short
term as it is simply impossible to build as fast as the prison
population is growing.
The states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo provide separate prison
facilities for women, but generally only in houses of detention or
actual prisons, where female inmates are separated from men. However,
in Rio de Janeiro state there are only two police districts in which
women in lockup are held in exclusive short-term jail facilities.
Women's facilities in Sao Paulo's penitentiary system are even more
overcrowded than those for men. Facilities built to accommodate 600
female inmates hold 1,055. The state's prison expansion program did not
include provisions for additional space for women. There are no
facilities that are exclusively female--including inmates, guards, and
warden. With male officers in women's prisons, opportunities for abuse
and extortion of sexual favors are abundant.
Sao Paulo's juvenile detention centers (FEBEM) continue to be
plagued by overcrowding, poor conditions, riots, and accusations of
torture. The authorities completed an investigation into the 1999 riots
at the FEBEM facility at Franco da Rocha and fired the director as a
result. Human rights NGO's expressed regret that this was the only
management-level employee discharged by year's end.
Since the extremely violent Tatuape complex riot in October 1999,
human rights groups estimate that FEBEM employees have tortured or
beaten at least 700 FEBEM inmates. The two most common forms of torture
cited by these groups are ``repique'' and ``recepcao.'' Repique is used
after attempted escapes or rebellions, when the employees gather the
inmates and beat them with iron bars and sticks. Recepcao occurs when
adolescents are transferred to different facilities and are greeted by
two rows of FEBEM guards who kick, beat, and scream at the prisoners as
they pass between them to teach them the rules of discipline.
The Public Ministry was investigating 87 cases of torture and
mistreatment in FEBEM facilities. Officials were considering for
investigation another 52 complaints of mistreatment. The majority of
the investigations and complaints involve the Tatuape complex.
Three cases of torture occurred in FEBEM facilities in June and
July, involving the so-called ninjas, a group of FEBEM guards who roam
FEBEM complexes at night, beating inmates at random. Actions by this
group were registered at the Cadeiao de Pinheiros, Tatuape, and Franco
da Rocha facilities.
Human rights organizations also accuse the Sao Paulo state
government of holding 900 of the 4000 FEBEM inmates in an ``irregular''
state (in violation of a federal statute) by putting them in adult
prison facilities, in violation of the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child, to which the Government is a signatory. The
transfer of youth to adult prison facilities began in August 1999 and
intensified after the riots in November of that year. Injunctions that
would force FEBEM officials to move the youth to juvenile facilities
consistently have been reversed by the Sao Paulo supreme court, citing
the fact that there is no other place to put the inmates.
Government action has proved ineffective in improving the
conditions in FEBEM. After the November 1999 riots, Sao Paulo Governor
Mario Covas promised to build 20 new facilities and fire all FEBEM
employees responsible for torture. To date 4 of the 20 facilities have
been built, but they have failed to resolve overcrowding. Moreover, two
of these new facilities were sites of later riots, leading employees to
complain that the inmates had been transferred before the facilities
were ready and able to provide basic care or recreational or
educational activities. Some employees accused of mistreatment have
been fired, but human rights groups claim that only a small portion of
those responsible have been dismissed.
There is no evidence that conditions have improved in the 14 months
since riots began. A report put together by several human rights groups
also notes that FEBEM officials demand 5 days' notice for visits by
human rights groups, inhibiting the independent analysis of conditions
within the FEBEM complexes.
In August local human rights NGO's delivered a report to Nigel
Rodley, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture about the situation in
FEBEM. Rodley toured the facilities and reported finding instruments of
torture.
In November 1998, President Cardoso approved a law authorizing
alternative sentencing for nonviolent offenders aimed, in part, at
easing prison overcrowding. In its 1999 prison report, AI noted that
the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Mato Grosso do Sul have imposed
noncustodial sentences effectively, but points out that in states such
as Rio de Janeiro alternative sentencing has not been implemented
effectively. There was minimal improvement during the year on the issue
of alternative sentencing. In May the Government approved legislation
that provided new funds for prisons and options for alternative
sentencing. In September Justice Minister Jose Gregori inaugurated a
National Center of Support and Accompaniment for Alternative Sentences
to educate the judiciary to apply alternatives such as community
service to convicts sentenced to less than 4 years' incarceration to
reduce prison overcrowding.
It is government policy to permit prison visits by independent
human rights monitors, and state prison authorities generally observe
this policy in practice. Federal officials in the Ministry of Justice
responsible for penal matters offered full cooperation to AI, which
reported no significant problems in gaining access to state-run prison
facilities. U.N. Special Rapporteur Rodley was given full access during
his 3-week fact-finding mission in August and September. By contrast,
HRW noted in preparing its prison report in 1998 that gaining access to
prisons was ``surprisingly difficult,'' and that barriers ranged from
outright denial of access to the use of procedural delays. Only three
states of the eight investigated--Amazonas, the Federal District, and
Rio Grande do Norte--had made their prisons completely accessible to
Human Rights Watch.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally observes
this prohibition; however, police continued at times to arrest and
detain persons arbitrarily. The Constitution limits arrests to those
caught in the act of committing a crime or those arrested by order of a
judicial authority. The authorities generally respect the
constitutional provision for a judicial determination of the legality
of detention, although many convicted inmates are detained beyond their
sentences due to poor record keeping. The law permits provisional
detention for up to 5 days under specified conditions during a police
investigation, but a judge may extend this period. However, groups that
work with street children claim that the police sometimes detain street
youths illegally without a judicial order or hold them incommunicado.
Human rights monitors allege that civil and uniformed police
regularly detain persons illegally to extort money or other favors,
citing the Favela Naval incident of 1997 as the most notorious example
(see Section 1.a.).
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture made an inquiry into the
death of Anderson Carlos Crispiniano, who alleged himself to be the
victim of police torture in Rio de Janeiro. In June Crispiniano was
asleep at his home when a group of armed men identifying themselves as
policemen forced their way in and arrested him without a warrant. They
removed Crispiniano from his home and later telephoned to say that he
was being held hostage for ransom. He later was released, badly beaten
and partly paralyzed, and died after 15 days in the hospital.
HRW noted that police in the state of Parana arrested 173 persons,
mostly without probable cause, during forced evictions carried out
during the year.
According to an AI press release, police detained 141 persons in an
attempt to prevent protesters from disrupting the 500th anniversary
celebration in Porto Seguro on April 22. Human rights activists
protested the police action, calling the detentions unjustified and out
of proportion to any perceived threat (see Sections 2.b. and 5). The
authorities later released the temporarily detained demonstrators
without filing charges.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is an independent
branch of government; however, it is inefficient, subject to political
and economic influence, and plagued by problems relating to lack of
resources and training of officials. In many instances, lower-income,
less educated citizens make limited use of the appeals process that
otherwise might ensure the right to fair trial.
The judicial system, with the Federal Supreme Court at its apex,
includes courts of first instance and appeals courts. States organize
their own judicial systems but must adhere to the basic principles in
the Constitution. Specialized courts deal with police, labor,
elections, juveniles, and family matters.
Defendants in criminal cases arrested in the act of committing a
crime must be charged within 30 days of their arrest, depending on the
crime. Other defendants must be charged within 45 days, although this
period can be extended. Defendants for all but the most serious crimes
have the right to a bail hearing. Based on the police investigation
leading to the formal charges, prosecutors prepare an indictment for
the review of a judge, who determines if the indictment meets the legal
requirements to bring the accused to trial. A judge and jury try
persons accused of capital crimes, attempted homicide, or more serious
charges. A judge tries lesser crimes. Defendants have the right to
appeal all convictions to state superior courts. They further have the
right to appeal state court decisions to both the Federal Supreme Court
on constitutional grounds and to the Federal superior court to contest
whether a decision was inconsistent with the decision of a court in
another state or infringes on federal law. All defendants sentenced to
20 years in prison or more have the automatic right to a retrial in the
same court.
Special police courts have jurisdiction over state uniformed police
(except when charged with intentional homicide); the record of these
courts shows that conviction is the exception rather than the rule.
These courts (which are separate from the courts-martial of the armed
forces, except for the final appeals court) are composed of four
ranking state uniformed police officials and one civilian judge. With
too few judges for the caseload, there are backlogs, and human rights
groups note a lack of willingness by police to investigate fellow
officers.
A 1996 law gives ordinary courts jurisdiction over cases in which
uniformed police officers are accused of intentional homicide against
civilians. However, except for the most egregious cases, the internal
police investigation determines if the homicide was intentional, and
the police tribunal decides whether to forward a case to a civil court
for trial. As a result, few cases are referred to the civil courts. It
takes 8 years to reach a definitive decision in the average case. At
the appellate court level, a large backlog of cases hinders the court's
ability to ensure fair and expeditious trials.
Defendants are entitled to counsel and must be made aware fully of
the charges against them. According to the Ministry of Justice,
approximately 85 percent of prisoners cannot afford an attorney. In
such cases, the court must provide one at public expense; courts are
supposed to appoint private attorneys to represent poor defendants when
public defenders are unavailable, but often no effective defense is
provided. Juries decide only cases of willful crimes against life,
including crimes by police; judges try all others.
The right to a fair public trial as provided by law generally is
respected in practice, although in some areas, particularly rural
areas, the judiciary generally is less capable and more subject to
influence. Similarly local police often are less dutiful in
investigating, prosecutors are reluctant to initiate proceedings, and
judges find reasons to delay when cases involve gunmen contracted by
landowners to eliminate squatters or rural union activists.
Low pay, combined with exacting competitive examinations that in
some years eliminate 90 percent of the applicants, make it difficult to
fill vacancies on the bench. The system requires that a trial be held
within a set period of time from the date of the crime. However, due to
the backlog, old cases frequently are dismissed. According to a former
judge, this practice encourages corrupt judges to delay certain cases
purposely, so that they can be dismissed. Lawyers often drag out cases
as long as possible in the hope that an appeals court might render a
favorable opinion and because they are paid according to the amount of
time that they spend on a case.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for freedom from arbitrary
intrusion into the home. Wiretaps authorized by judicial authority are
permitted. The law regulating the conditions under which wiretaps may
be used appears to strike a fair balance between giving the police an
effective law enforcement tool and protecting the civil liberties of
citizens. The inviolability of private correspondence is respected.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution prohibits all
forms of censorship and provides for freedom of speech and a free
press, and the authorities respect these rights in practice.
Newspaper, magazines, and a growing number of on-line electronic
publications, which are privately owned, vigorously report and comment
on government performance. Both the print and broadcast media routinely
discuss controversial social and political issues and engage in
investigative reporting. Most radio and television stations are
privately owned; however, the Government has licensing authority, and
politicians frequently obtain licenses. Current or former congressional
representatives, some of whom are or were members of the committee that
oversees communications, own many television and radio stations, as
well as local newspapers. It is difficult to determine how many media
outlets are controlled indirectly by politicians, since concessions
often are registered in the names of family members or friends linked
to them. In addition the Government regularly approves transfers of
concessions already granted to other individuals with little oversight.
The penalty for libel under the 1967 Press Law is a prison term. It
is considered extreme by judges and rarely is imposed. The National
Newspaper Association (ANJ) continued to press for an updated press
law, noting that the current law dates from time of the military
regime. Newspaper owners throughout the country have complained about
judges who have imposed huge fines and jail terms against newspapers
for ``moral damage'' that appear aimed at crippling news organizations.
According to the ANJ annual report issued in September, if the new law
does not establish criteria for calculating maximum fines for libel,
there is a risk of restrictions to freedom of the press.
In December 1999, the Lower House of the Congress approved a press
gag law (Lei Mordaca) that would penalize prosecutors, judges and
government attorneys for revealing information about ongoing cases to
the press. The ANJ, together with the Inter-American Press Association,
mounted a public campaign against the law and Congress effectively
stalled the legislation. The journalists argued that such a gag law
would represent a prior restraint on freedom of speech, in violation of
the Constitution.
Complex electoral campaign laws regulate the broadcast media and
prescribe complicated arrangements to apportion the free use of
commercial radio and television broadcast time granted to political
parties during an election campaign. The short periods for rulings and
non-appeal provisions of the regulations are designed to enforce
discipline and ensure that remedies are applied in a timely manner.
Media and free speech advocates generally accept the manner in which
the campaign laws are enforced.
Foreign publications are distributed widely; prior review of films,
plays, and radio and television programming is used only to determine a
suitable viewing age.
The National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ) and the ANJ have
documented a number of violent attacks, including killings and threats
against journalists. The September ANJ report, which covered the period
August 1999 through July, listed 8 cases of physical aggression against
12 journalists, including a murder attempt upon a newspaper reporter in
Bauru, Sao Paulo. It also described five death threats against
journalists. Although no new murder cases were reported during the
year, the ANJ report noted that seven journalists have been murdered
since 1995 and none of the crimes have been solved. The police said
that charges have been brought in four of the cases, and that they
could not gather sufficient evidence in the other three. The ANJ
further stated that impunity for crimes committed against journalists
and inappropriate and inconsistent application of the Press Law are
impediments to the functioning of the free press.
The ANJ alleged that on February 17, two uniformed police officers
attacked Juarez Rodrigues, from the newspaper Estado de Minas. The
officers also confiscated Rodrigues' working equipment, his cellular
phone, and demanded the roll of film in which Rodrigues had recorded a
police action. Police Commander Augusto Severo later visited the
newspaper's director to apologize for the actions against the reporter
and to promise to pay for any material damage to the equipment. Severo
also stated that a military inquiry had been initiated to punish the
officers responsible.
The ANJ also alleged that, on February 22, two journalists and a
driver from the newspaper O Povo de Fortaleza were beaten and tortured
on the orders of the mayor of a small town, Hidrolandia, in which they
were investigating a story. Although criticized and forced to leave his
political party, the mayor remained in office.
According to the Inter-American Press Association (SIP), on March
3, journalist Ricardo Noblat, managing editor of the newspaper Correio
Braziliense of Bras!lia, alleged that two of his sons had been attacked
and that he had been receiving anonymous telephone threats since 1998.
He stated that these actions were political persecution because of his
professional activity. On June 27, the CDDPH gave the Justice Minister
a preliminary report about the attacks on Noblat's sons. Although it
was only preliminary, the report by the Justice Ministry concluded that
the attacks were political.
Also according to the SIP, on March 8, a group of masked, armed men
kidnaped journalist Klester Cavalcanti, correspondent of the magazine
Veja in Belem, capital of Para state. The men pushed the journalist
into a car, drove him to a forest with his head inside a black plastic
bag, tied him to a tree in an isolated spot, pointed a revolver at him,
and threatened him with death if he published a report on an illegal
land sale.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble peacefully, and the Government
respects this right in practice. Permits are not required for outdoor
political or labor meetings, and such meetings occur frequently.
Police used force to disperse demonstrators on several occasions
during the year, resulting in serious injuries and at least one death
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In May MST protesters heading to Parana
state's capital of Curitiba were stopped by police 20 kilometers
outside the city. They said that they were planning to protest
peacefully in front of government buildings. However, the same week,
MST groups had invaded government buildings in several other capital
cities. Parana state police say that they acted to prevent the same
occurrence in their state. The confrontation between police and
protesters which took place when the bus was stopped resulted in one
death (see Section 1.a.). Human Rights Watch reported that police
killed another demonstrator--Jose Marlucio da Silva--in Recife on July
25 during a similar protest, but no further information was available
about this case.
Between May and October, MST protests increased, culminating in
promises of about $2 billion (4 billion reais) in federal government
money for agrarian reform. Protests in the capital, Brasilia, united
large numbers of protesters. In August joint protests by the MST and
Contag (Confederacao Nacional de Trabalhadores na Agricultura) drew
over 12,000 participants. Demonstrations in Brasilia were usually
concurrent with smaller, local protests and invasions, of anywhere
between 200 and 5,000 landless activists. Many protests occurred
without incident, with notable exceptions. The MST's new method of
forcibly invading public buildings is an example of increasing
aggressiveness on the part of the movement. The movement also invaded
President Cardoso's family farm.
However, the number of land invasions decreased sharply during the
year. According to INCRA (the government agency charged with
implementing land reform), there were only 226 invasions by landless
militants through November, compared with 438 in 1999 and 427 in 1998,
indicating that the large amount of land that has been distributed by
the Federal Government may have had some effect in decreasing landless
movement activity. The CPT noted that the number of conflicts between
landless movement members, landowners, and police increased over the
last 3 years, but that the number of resulting deaths declined from 47
in 1998 to 24 in 1999. The total number of MST activists killed during
the year was not yet available.
In April a group of indigenous leaders organized a march in protest
of the ceremonies to mark the 500-year anniversary of Portuguese
arrival; however, police using riot gear prevented the protesters from
entering the main square, and fired rubber bullets into the crowd.
Human rights observers criticized the police for injuring over 30
persons, arresting over 100 others, and limiting free assembly and
lawful protests. The then-president of FUNAI, Carlos Frederico Mares,
resigned in protest over this incident.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
no favored or state religion. All faiths are free to establish places
of worship, train clergy, and proselytize, although the Government
controls entry into indigenous lands.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on movement,
except entry into protected indigenous areas, nor are there any
restrictions on emigration or return. However, a parent is not allowed
to leave the country with children under the age of 18 without the
permission of the other parent, whether or not the marriage still is in
effect.
In 1997 the Government passed legislation with provisions for
asylum and refugee status intended to conform to the principles of the
1951 U. N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. The Government provides first asylum and cooperates with the
U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. There were 2,632 refugees in the
country, mostly from Angola and other African countries, but also
including persons from Iran, Bosnia, and Kosovo. During the year, a
total of 445 persons were granted refugee status, out of a total of 590
requests.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Voting is secret and mandatory for all literate
citizens aged 18 to 70, except for military conscripts who may not
vote. It is voluntary for minors from 16 to 18 years of age, for the
illiterate, and for those age 70 and over.
Women have full political rights under the Constitution and are
increasingly active in politics and government; however, they are
underrepresented in both fields. Cultural, institutional, and financial
barriers continue to limit women's participation in political life. The
number of female candidates for office in the 1998 national elections
roughly doubled, compared with the number in 1994, according to
statistics released by the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE). Women
constituted approximately 12 percent of the total candidates. However,
their representation in the national Congress decreased from 7.6
percent to 6.1 percent after the 1998 elections; 29 women were elected
to the 513-seat Chamber of Deputies, and 5 to the 81seat Senate. In
August the TSE reported that for the first time, a majority of
registered voters were female (50.45 percent). The TSE also reported
that there were over 70,000 female candidates for the nationwide
municipal elections. At 18.3 percent of the total number of candidates,
this was a 40 percent increase from the last municipal elections in
1996. There were no female members of Cabinet. In December the first
woman assumed her seat on the country's highest court, the Supreme
Federal Tribunal.
Diverse ethnic and racial groups, including indigenous persons,
while free to participate politically, are not represented in
government and politics in proportion to their numbers in the general
population.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of local and national human rights groups operate without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases. Federal officials generally are cooperative and
responsive to their views. Federal and state officials, due to
insufficient resources, in many instances actively solicit the aid and
cooperation of NGO's in addressing human rights problems. However, on
occasion human rights monitors are threatened and harassed due to their
efforts to identify and take action against human rights abusers,
especially members of the state police forces (see Section 1.a.).
AI reported in February that its office in Sao Paulo received a
bomb threat from an extreme right group (see Section 5). The police
investigated the threats and no bomb was found. AI noted that gay
rights groups had received similar threats, that a member of their
staff was attacked during the year, and that police had not acted to
protect their staff or other human rights activists from violent
attacks. The head of the AI office continued to receive threats by mail
and phone. As a result, AI closed their Sao Paulo office and moved to
Porto Alegre. At year's end, the Sao Paulo State Civil police still
were investigating. The AI office in Porto Alegre also continued to
receive threats, which the Rio Grande do Sul police were investigating.
Henri des Roziers, a Dominican monk, attorney, and human rights
activist in Xinguara, Para, received several death threats during the
year for his assistance to victims of violence in the region and his
direct involvement in criticizing cases of torture, police abuse, and
forced labor. Des Roziers, along with the Ministry of Labor's Office to
Combat Forced Labor, was instrumental in freeing 462 rural workers from
forced labor in 1999. In May Pastoral Land Commission President Dom
Tomas Balduino announced that des Roziers' name appeared on a ``hit
list'' of 10 names of activists who were to be murdered, drawn up by
large landowners. In July Des Roziers and the CPT criticized the use of
torture in the Xinguara city police station. Para state civil police
chief Joao Moraes responded with a personal attack on des Roziers and
accused him of involvement in the murder of a landowner.
Established in April 1997, the Justice Ministry's National
Secretariat of Human Rights oversees implementation of a 1996 action
plan to address human rights abuses. The Secretariat also administers
or sponsors programs to reduce violence among the poor, to train police
officials in human rights practices, and to combat discrimination
against blacks, women, children, indigenous people, the elderly, and
the disabled. In May the Government appointed Gilbert Saboia, former
ambassador to Sweden, as the new Secretary for Human Rights.
In May U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson
visited the country and met with a full range of NGO's as well
government officials. Robinson commended the Government for allowing
her to investigate and for its recognition of its human rights problems
and commitment to seek a solution. Robinson declared that impunity from
prosecution is the greatest human rights problem, linking it to
killings, torture, racial and sexual discrimination, and the
exploitation of children. She also stated that the U.N. might open an
investigation into the repression of indigenous rights during an April
commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the European arrival to the
country (see Sections 2.b and 5).
In December the Government released the second National Report on
Human Rights, independently prepared by the Center for the Study of
Violence at the University of Sao Paulo. The National Secretariat for
Human Rights, the University of Sao Paulo, and the U.N. Development
Program co-sponsored the preparation of the report. A comprehensive
account of the human rights situation in each state, it provides
information on health, education, public security, and labor conditions
and a list of human rights monitors and advocates in each state.
In 1999 two attorneys working for a human rights group in
Aracatuba, Sao Paulo state, received death threats after successfully
prosecuting three police officers who were convicted of torture and
homicide. The attorneys asked for police protection and refused to
leave the city. Police investigations into the threats produced no
results; the attorneys continued their work but without police
protection.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race,
religion, or nationality; however, discrimination against women,
blacks, and indigenous people continued to be a problem. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) notes that important differences
in wages affect women and blacks, particularly in rural areas. A 1997
law provides prison penalties and fines for racist acts, including
promulgation of pejorative terms for ethnic or racial groups, use of
the swastika, or acts of discrimination based on sex, religion, age, or
ethnic origin. Several persons have been charged with racism since the
law's enactment, mostly for the use of racial slurs.
There continued to be reports of violence against homosexuals,
although it was not always clear that the victim's sexual orientation
was the reason for the attack. The Gay Group of Bahia (GGB), the
country's best known homosexual rights organization, and AI have in the
past 7 years documented the existence of skinhead, neo-Nazi, and
``machista'' gangs that attacked suspected homosexuals in cities
including Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, and
Brasilia. In some cases, these gangs included police officers.
In September Jose Eduardo do Bernardes da Silva, a member of AI,
and Roberto de Jesus, president of the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Pride
Association, both received bombs in the mail with swastikas and the
word revenge printed on the package (see Section 4).
Homosexual activist groups reported that 130 gay, lesbian, and
transgender persons were murdered during the year, compared to 169 in
1999 and 116 in 1998. However, data compiled by activist organizations
and claims that violence against homosexuals is increasing cannot be
confirmed, because the motives for the crimes are not always clear.
Information from the GGB and other homosexual rights groups clearly
indicates that transvestite prostitutes, the most visible homosexual
group, are at a greater risk of violence than other homosexuals. Police
routinely extort money from transvestites and often beat or kill those
who fail to cooperate. Gay rights activists in the city of Recife
compiled substantial evidence of extortion and the unlawful use of
violence against transvestite prostitutes. In past years, flagrant
abuses by the police in the states of Alagoas and Bahia have been
reported.
The Secretariat of State Security of Rio de Janeiro state, in
partnership with NGO's, continued to operate a hot line to receive
complaints of violence or other crimes against homosexuals. The
Secretariat also continued to operate a hot line for complaints of
prejudice, discrimination, or other crimes based on race, ethnicity,
color, religion, or national origin. The offices in police headquarters
where both hot lines are located also offered professional counseling
to victims of such offenses. Respect for human rights and sensitivity
to the problems of minorities and the poor are included in police
training in Rio de Janeiro. In April a new Institute for Public
Security was created to reform police organization, recruitment, and
training; it also aims to improve police performance on human rights.
Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved
sexual and domestic violence, which are both widespread and vastly
underreported. There is a high incidence of physical abuse of women.
Most major cities and towns have established special police offices to
deal with crimes of domestic or sexual violence against women; there
are over 250 such offices. However, reporting crimes and receiving help
continue to be a problem for women living in remote areas who must
sometimes travel great distances to the nearest special precinct. For
example, the large but sparsely populated states of Acre and Roraima
each have only one such precinct. Though the numbers of reported cases
of the most common crimes rose through much of the 1990's, they
generally have leveled since 1998. For example, in the state of Sao
Paulo, there were 1,731 reported cases of rape in the first 11 months
of the year, compared with 1,833 for all of 1999. In the Federal
District, the number of reported cases of rape declined slightly to 371
during the year, compared with 416 cases in 1999. The annual number of
cases of harmful physical assault against women reported to the police
in the state of Rio de Janeiro nearly doubled from 1991 to 1999, to
34,831, and the number of rapes reported increased from 952 to 1,455.
Both state authorities and women's rights activists agree that a large
number of rapes go unreported. According to a 1998 study of two middle-
class neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro, only 10 percent of women who had
suffered violent attacks reported them to the police. The Sao Paulo
Center for Assistance to Female Victims of Sexual Violence reported
that 400 women sought the center's intervention in rape cases after
receiving no help from the police in 1998. In Bahia there were 7,751
complaints about violence to women filed with the police Delegate for
the Protection of Women during the first 7 months of the year, an
increase of 40 percent over the same period in 1999.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is also
a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
Each state Secretariat for Public Security runs ``women's
stations'' (delegacia da mulher). However, the quality and availability
of services provided varies widely, especially in isolated areas. These
offices are intended to provide the following services for victims of
domestic violence: psychological counseling; a ``shelter home'' for
victims of extremely serious abuses who have no place to go; hospital
treatment for rape victims, including abortion (up to 12 weeks of
pregnancy) and treatment for HIV and other sexually transmitted
diseases; and initiation of criminal cases by investigating and
forwarding evidence to the courts.
The penalties for rape vary from 8 to 10 years in prison.
A domestic violence offender in a case that does not involve a
serious offense and carries penalties of less than 1 year's
imprisonment may receive alternative sentencing with no jail term,
according to the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense
of Women's Rights.
Men who commit crimes against women, including sexual assault and
murder, are unlikely to be brought to trial and courts still are
reluctant to prosecute and convict men who claim that they attacked
their wives for infidelity. A 1999 study by an academic at the Catholic
Pontifical University of Sao Paulo indicates that 70 percent of
criminal complaints regarding domestic violence against women are
suspended without a conclusion. Only 2 percent of criminal complaints
of violence against women lead to convictions. In 1998 the National
Movement for Human Rights reported that female murder victims were 30
times more likely to be killed by current or former husbands or lovers
than by others.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex in
employment or pay and provides for 120 days of paid maternity leave.
However, the provision against wage discrimination rarely is enforced.
According to statistics released in 1998 by the International
Confederation of Independent Unions, women are paid, on average, 44
percent less than men. According to government statistics released in
1998, women with a high-school education or less earn, on average, 63
percent of the salaries earned by men with the same level of education.
Black women earned on average 26 percent of a white male's salary. A
1998 study by a sociologist showed that women who started working in
positions in which they earned twice the minimum wage advanced in pay
after 10 years to a wage of seven times the minimum wage. Men starting
in the same positions earned 2.6 times the minimum wage and advanced to
a wage of 10.9 times the minimum wage after 10 years. A Ministry of
Labor survey reported that the average starting salary for high-school-
educated women in Sao Paulo was one-third less than the average
starting salary for high school educated men. According to the Ministry
of Labor and Employment (MLE), Centers for the Prevention of Workplace
Discrimination have been established in 16 states. These centers, which
are housed in regional bureaus of the Ministry, promote programs to end
discrimination in the workplace and cultivate partnerships with other
organizations that combat discrimination. The centers also serve as
clearinghouses for allegations of discrimination.
In response to the Maternity Leave Law, some employers seek
sterilization certificates from female job applicants or try to avoid
hiring women of childbearing age. A 1995 law prohibits employers from
requiring applicants or employees to take pregnancy tests or present
sterilization certificates. Employers who violate the law are subject
to a jail term ranging from 1 to 2 years, while the company must pay a
fine equal to 10 times the salary of its highest-paid employee.
Children.--Millions of children continue to suffer from the poverty
afflicting their families, must work to survive, and fail to get an
education. Schooling is free and compulsory until the age of 14 and is
available in all parts of the country. The education system does not
exclude any groups; however, 1.1 million children between 7 and 14
years of age did not attend school in 1999.
In September UNICEF reported that nearly 100,000 children die each
year before their first birthday, almost half during the peri-natal
period. While the national infant mortality rate declined from 50.8 in
1989 to 36.1 per 1,000 live births in 1998, in some states, such as
Alagoas, it reached 72 per 1,000. Some municipalities have a rate of
110 per 1,000.
According to a UNICEF report, over 20 million children and
adolescents, or almost 35 percent, live in poverty. About 2.9 million
children under the age of 15, including over 375,000 between 5 and 9
years old, continue to work (see Section 6.c.). Many work together with
their parents, most often in agriculture. Many other children beg on
city streets. According to the most recent government figures released
in November 1999 and confirmed by UNICEF, the number of children
working has decreased steadily since 1993, while the number of children
attending school has increased. However, the overall level of child
labor remained roughly the same between 1998 and 1999, because progress
in reducing it was hampered by a rise in agricultural production that
year. The Federal Government administers a total of 33 programs under 5
separate ministries aimed at combating child labor. The Ministry of
Social Security and Assistance's program for the eradication of child
labor provided supplemental income or ``school scholarships'' to the
families of 390,000 children in rural and urban areas who, in return,
must attend school. The federal scholarship program is supplemented by
a number of similar programs administered by municipalities and NGO's.
Some of the largest such programs are in Campinas (Sao Paulo state),
Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais), and Olinda (Pernambuco).
There are no reliable figures on the number of street children.
Some are homeless, but the majority return home at night. Disparities
in the numbers of children living on the street reported by children's
rights activists indicate the difficulty of arriving at accurate
estimates. The Center for the Defense of Children and Adolescents
(CEDECA) in Belem, in the state of Para, reported that in 1998 a total
of 2,328 youths under the age of 18, or 0.5 percent of the youth
population, spent their days in the streets. CEDECA estimated that 97
of those youths lived permanently in the streets.
NGO's in Rio de Janeiro have made 28 shelters available for
homeless children, but some children prefer the freedom and drugs that
street life offers. Drug use, particularly glue sniffing and crack, is
increasingly prevalent among street children. NGO's report that extreme
poverty at home or sexual abuse by fathers and stepfathers are the
principal reasons that many children choose to live in the streets. A
national study of rape cases carried out by a group of Sao Paulo
academics indicated that family members committed roughly 70 percent of
rapes within their own homes. A study by the Brazilian Geography and
Statistics Institute (IBGE) reported that 47 percent of Sao Paulo
street children come from families that earn less than $200 (350 reais)
per month. Nationwide, the Inter-American Development Bank estimates
that some 30 million children live below the poverty line and
increasingly come from households headed by women.
In the October 1999 case of a child prostitution ring in Maranhao
that involved police, judicial authorities, and elected officials,
charges were brought against the owner of a bar, a local judge, a high-
ranking police official, and two attorneys. At year's end, trials had
not yet taken place.
Youth are both victims and perpetrators of violence. Of all deaths
of 15- to 19-year-olds, 72 percent are due to causes such as homicide,
suicide, and traffic accidents, which reduces by at least 3 years the
average life expectancy of men. During the first half of the year, 50
young people died as a result of manslaughter in the state of Sao Paulo
alone. Approximately 85 percent were victims of commercial sexual
exploitation and ranged from 12 to 17 years of age. Homicide is the
leading cause of death for children aged 10 to 14, and only 1.9 percent
of murderers are serving prison sentences.
A 1999 study by the Information Network for Violence, Exploitation,
and Sexual Abuse of Children and Adolescents (CECRIA), an entity within
the National Human Rights Secretariat, states that government efforts
to combat sexual exploitation of children need to be better tailored
and coordinated. It cites 40 separate programs operated by national and
international NGO's, some in partnership with Government entities, but
notes that most of the programs face shortfalls in resources and
personnel. In association with the Ministry of Justice, the NGO ABRAPIA
has since 1997 operated a telephone hot line to register complaints of
sexual abuse against children and adolescents. ABRAPIA also administers
the ``SOS-child'' program in Rio de Janeiro state that registers
complaints of domestic abuse against children and provides medical and
social assistance.
Sexual exploitation of children and child prostitution remained a
significant problem throughout the country. The CECRIA report indicated
that patterns of sexual exploitation of children correspond to the
distinct economic and social profile of the country's region. In the
northern Amazonian region, sexual exploitation of children centers
around brothels that cater to mining settlements. In the large urban
centers, children, principally girls, who leave home because of abuse
or sexual exploitation often prostitute themselves on the streets in
order to survive. In the cities along the northeast coast, sexual
tourism exploiting children is prevalent, and involves networks of
travel agents, hotel workers, taxi drivers, and others who actively
recruit children and even traffic them outside the country. Child
prostitution also is developed in the areas served by the country's
navigable rivers, particularly in ports and at international borders.
In port cities, crews from cargo vessels are a primary clientele. The
report notes that although trafficking develops in part to meet the
demands of foreigners, and that the local population sustains it.
Trafficking in children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution contains several
provisions for the disabled, stipulating a minimum wage, educational
opportunities, and access to public buildings and public
transportation. However, groups that work with the disabled report that
state governments failed to meet the legally mandated targets for
educational opportunities and work placement. A 1991 law stipulates
that all businesses with over 200 employees must reserve 2 percent of
their vacancies for the disabled. In 1999 labor officials in the
Federal District launched an information campaign to encourage firms to
comply with the law and warned that noncomplying firms could be fined.
The National Human Rights Secretariat sponsored a ``City for
Everyone'' program in cooperation with municipal governments and
national and international NGO's that focused on providing better
access for the disabled to public areas and public transport. However,
little progress in the elimination of architectural barriers to the
disabled has been made. In 1999 Rio de Janeiro state mandated that bus
companies must make a specific number of buses on certain routes
accessible to wheelchair users within 3 months. By September only 14
public buses--of thousands in the city--had been adapted for wheelchair
use. No intercity or interstate buses had been modified. The city of
Niteroi put in service 10 vans specifically for the use of disabled
persons, but the supply of this service lagged behind the rising
demand.
In June the Chamber of Deputies' Human Rights Commission released
the report of its investigation into the conditions of mental hospitals
and asylums. The report cited many examples of understaffed and poorly
administered hospitals, substandard living conditions for many
patients, and severely overcrowded and unclean facilities.
According to the Federal Ministry of Education, in 1997 only 5
percent of the estimated 6 million school-age children with
disabilities had access to specialized instruction. Throughout the
country, 43 percent of school districts offer special instruction for
disabled children. In the nine states in the northeast part of the
country, only 24 percent of school districts offer special instruction.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution grants the indigenous
population of approximately 330,000 broad rights, including the
protection of their cultural patrimony and the exclusive use of their
traditional lands; however, the Government has fallen short of securing
these rights for indigenous people in practice. The Government
estimates that over half live in poverty in communities whose
traditional ways of life are threatened on a variety of fronts. The
number of indigenous citizens receiving food assistance in the southern
states of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul exceeded the total indigenous
population at the time of the 1995 census in those states. The greatest
number of beneficiaries reside in Mato Grosso do Sul state, where
42,000 persons of a total indigenous population of 45,300 receive food
assistance.
Indigenous leaders and activists complain that indigenous people
have only limited participation in decisions taken by the Government
affecting their land, cultures, traditions, and allocation of national
resources. They also criticized the Government for devoting
insufficient resources to health care, other basic services, and
protection of indigenous reserves from outsiders. Illegal mining,
logging, and ranching are serious problems on indigenous land.
The National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) is responsible for the
coordination and implementation of indigenous policies. The President
appoints the head of FUNAI; it is organized into 52 regions with
directors appointed directly by the FUNAI president.
The 1988 Constitution charged the Federal Government with
demarcating indigenous areas within 5 years. By January the Government
had completed demarcation of roughly 79 percent of the total area of
identified indigenous territory. During the year, the Government
demarcated 4 more areas totaling about 360 square miles. Of the 563
identified indigenous areas, 313 have reached the final registration
stage, and 250 remain to be demarcated legally. Identified indigenous
territory comprises 11 percent of the national territory.
In December 1998, the Federal Government issued a decree
recognizing the original boundaries of the Raposa Serra do Sol
indigenous area in the Amazonian state of Roraima, overturning a
controversial decision made in 1996 by the Justice Minister to limit
and alter the shape of the reserve. In 1999 a state court suspended the
demarcation process after local landowners and economic interests filed
a suit requesting that action. In 1999 Roraima Senator Mozarildo
Cavalcanti presented a bill canceling the 1998 decree. In September the
bill was given an unfavorable report in committee. Indigenous activists
claim that the Government's failure to allocate resources and complete
the demarcation was a political concession to local economic and
political interests who then were able to influence the state court.
The demarcation of Raposa Serra do Sol has been pending since 1992.
The Constitution provides indigenous people with the exclusive use
of the soil, waters, and minerals on indigenous lands, subject to
congressional authorization. In granting such authorization, the
Constitution stipulates that the views of the affected communities must
be considered and that the communities also must ``participate'' in the
benefits gained from such use. However, legislation regulating mining
on indigenous lands has been pending before the Congress since 1995.
The Catholic Church-affiliated Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI)
criticized the regulations within the legislation that would provide
for indigenous groups' approval of mining concessions and their
participation in the profits from mining, on the grounds that they do
not address sufficiently the constitutional rights of indigenous
people.
In 1999 landowners brought a civil action to the Supreme Court
against a lower court ruling in Bahia that restored demarcated land of
the Caramuru-Catarina Paraguacu reserve to the Pataxo Ha-Ha-Hae tribe.
At year's end, no trial date had been set. Other attempts were made to
negotiate between the tribe and landowners.
The Government estimates that 208 of the 563 identified indigenous
lands are used illegally by nonindigenous persons for mining, logging,
and agriculture. Nonindigenous invaders destroy the environment and
wildlife, spread disease, and provoke violent confrontations. FUNAI
admits that it does not have the necessary resources to protect
indigenous lands from encroachment.
Due partly to the Government's failure to provide adequate medical
care as required by law, indigenous people have suffered epidemics of
malaria, measles, and tuberculosis. According to the chief of FUNAI's
medical department, 60 percent of the indigenous population suffer from
a chronic disease such as tuberculosis, malaria, or hepatitis. In
certain areas of the Amazon region, up to 80 percent of the population
are affected. Illegal mining in the Amazon has led to the doubling of
the incidence of malaria in the 1994-98 period. FUNAI estimates that 75
percent of the affected population is indigenous. The infant mortality
rate among the Yanomami in 1997 was 13 percent, while infant mortality
among nonindigenous residents in the area was only 1.5 percent.
According to health workers' unions, poor working conditions and lack
of resources from the Government make it very difficult for health
workers to travel into indigenous areas to provide sufficient medical
care.
FUNAI also has been unable to provide mandated health care and
other basic services. Hoping to improve the level of health care
provided to indigenous people, in 1999 the Government transferred that
responsibility from FUNAI to the Ministry of Health.
According to the Pro-Yanomami Committee, in 1999 FUNASA, the
Government's health agency, issued a report showing that in 1998, 279
indigenous persons died in Roraima, 180 of them Yanomami. Most of the
deaths were caused by acute respiratory infection, malaria, and
diarrhea. Almost half died without having received medical assistance.
In September after Federal prosecutors complained about the
slowness of the police investigation, the National Council for Human
Rights formed a committee to oversee the investigation of the May 1998
killing of Xucuru Chief Francisco ``Xicao'' de Assis Araujo. Araujo
defended the land claims of his tribe, whose lands are being encroached
upon by ranchers in his home state of Pernambuco.
No progress was made in the case of mass sterilizations promoted
among women of the Pataxo tribe of Bahia by Federal Deputy Dr. Roland
Lavigne in exchange for votes during his 1994 electoral campaign. Women
were reluctant to have children due to the general level of poverty in
the community, and campaign workers allegedly convinced them that
sterilization was the only effective form of birth control. Pataxo
leaders claim that the sterilizations were a deliberate program of
genocide intended to eliminate their tribe and free their land for
farmers who illegally occupy the Pataxo reserve.
In April during the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the
arrival of the Portuguese in Porto Seguro (Bahia), police used rubber
bullets and tear gas, in violently blocking 2,000 indigenous marchers
from entering the city. Indigenous leaders were seeking damages in
civil court at year's end. In May U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights Mary Robinson raised the police's actions with President
Cardoso. The President denied any use of excessive force, and in July a
Federal Police investigation reached the same conclusion. However, the
Federal Public Prosecutor has challenged these findings. FUNAI
president Mares resigned in protest over the treatment of indigenous
people during the event.
In May an Acre state judge sentenced former Acre governor Orleir
Cameli, his family's firm, and his partner Abraao Candido da Silva, to
pay about $5 million (10 million reais) to the Ashaninka-Kampa
indigenous group for material and moral damage caused by the extraction
of mahogany and cedar from 1981 to 1987. The firm extracted 2,478 cubic
meters of wood from the area. Cameli announced he would appeal the
decision.
In September CIMI reported that FUNAI was going to press charges
against Jordao, Acre city councilman Auton Farias, and two others for
the murder of an indigenous person in Tarauaca, Acre.
Religious Minorities.--Leaders in the Jewish community expressed
concern over the continued appearance of anti-Semitic material on
Internet websites compiled by neo-Nazi groups.
Amnesty International reported that Eduardo Bernardes da Silva, a
worker with the NGO's office in Sao Paulo, received a suspicious
package at his home on September 5. He opened it partially and found a
device covered in swastikas, thought to have been sent by a neo-Nazi
group. Police confirmed that it was a bomb and destroyed it in a
controlled explosion.
The next day a similar bomb was sent to the offices of the
Associacao da Parada GLBT, an association which organizes an annual Gay
Pride March, reportedly by the same group.
In September a neo-Nazi group sent letters to two prominent Sao
Paulo human rights commission members, Renato Simoes and Italo Cardoso,
threatening to ``exterminate'' gays, Jews, black people and nordestinos
(people from the impoverished northeast of the country), as well as
those seeking to protect their rights. The letter said that the group
intended to target a number of human rights organizations on or around
the country's September 7 Independence Day, including Tortura Nunca
Mais (No More Torture), Action by Christians against Torture, AI, and
gay and lesbian groups.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination
has been illegal since 1951, darker-skinned citizens say that they
frequently encounter discrimination. Legislation in force since 1989
specifically prohibits, among other practices, denial of public or
private facilities, employment, or housing to anyone based on race. A
1997 amendment to this law added prohibitions against, and jail terms
for, the incitement of racial discrimination or prejudice and the
dissemination of racially offensive symbols and epithets. The media
reported arrests of several persons charged with using racial slurs
during the year. Several examples of such cases include that of a
seamstress pressing charges against her employer, a stagehand bringing
charges against a theatrical director, and a customer pressing charges
against an employee of a video rental store. All instances involved use
of racial slurs when insults were uttered; at year's end, none had
completed the trial process.
In Sao Paulo human rights activists continued to express concern
because of discrimination against blacks and poor persons from the
northeast by neo-Nazi groups in the south. Many of these groups
maintain Web sites that espouse violence. The Sao Paulo State Assembly
Human Rights Committee criticized several hate groups who maintain such
Web sites and asked the Public Ministry for an investigation. One man,
who maintained a Web site that called for the eviction from Sao Paulo
of all emigrants from northeastern part of the country, was accused of
crimes under the Racism Law. Instead of going to trial, he chose to
accept guilt for the crime and did community service as punishment. At
year's end, other similar cases still were being investigated.
ISER research noted a disproportionately higher rate of police
killings of Afro-Brazilians. Persons of color are five times more
likely to be shot or killed in the course of a law enforcement action
than are persons who are perceived to be white.
In September two members of the Sao Paulo State Assembly's Human
Rights Committee received threatening letters stating that the group
which identifies itself as ``raca pura'' (pure race) is ``fighting for
an end to homosexuals, blacks, and northeasterners.'' Sao Paulo's State
Secretary of Security ordered an investigation into both incidents. The
investigations were ongoing at year's end.
In addition to these violent threats against minorities, research
conducted this year at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
reconfirmed that Afro-Brazilians experience lower standards of living
than whites. Cross-checking data from the IBGE, the national statistics
office, and the U.N. Human Development Index showed that Afro-
Brazilians have lower salaries, life expectancies (62 years instead of
69 years), and educational standards (79 percent literacy rates,
compared with 92 percent) than whites. Afro-Brazilians and mulattos
still are clearly disadvantaged economically and socially throughout
the country. In Sao Paulo, for example, the rate of unemployment among
blacks is 22.7 percent, while the rate among nonblacks is 16.1 percent.
Nonblacks in Sao Paulo have an average monthly income of about $523
(1,005 reais), while blacks average only $267 (512 reais) a month.
According to research carried out by the Inter-Union Department of
Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies in 1998, Afro-Brazilians had
higher rates of unemployment, earned less, and enjoyed less job
stability than white Brazilians in each of the five largest
metropolitan regions where data were gathered. In and around Salvador,
Bahia, which has the highest percentage of Afro-Brazilians of any
metropolitan region, unemployment among Afro-Brazilians was 45 percent
higher than among whites (the difference among heads of household was
75 percent). In Sao Paulo, Afro-Brazilian unemployment was 41 percent
higher than among whites and 64 percent higher among heads of
households. Afro-Brazilian men earned on average between 62 percent and
70 percent of the average salary earned by white men in the five
regions surveyed. Afro-Brazilian women earned on average between 33.5
and 47 percent of the average salary of a white man. Illiteracy also is
a problem: 32 percent of blacks are illiterate, compared with 14
percent of whites. Blacks are less likely than whites to be enrolled in
institutes of higher education.
A much higher percentage of blacks are convicted by courts than
whites, according to professor Sergio Adorno of the University of Sao
Paulo's Nucleus for the Study of Violence. Adorno analyzed 500 criminal
cases judged in Sao Paulo courts in 1990 and found that 60 percent of
whites able to afford their own lawyers were acquitted, while only 27
percent of blacks who hired lawyers were found not guilty. Ignacio
Cano, a researcher at the Sociological Institute of Religious Studies
in Rio de Janeiro, found strong evidence of racial bias by the police
in the use of lethal force against residents of color in Rio de Janiero
from 1993 to 1996 and in Sao Paulo from 1996 to 1999. According to
Cano, Afro-Brazilians were three times as likely as whites to suffer
death or injury from police gunfire.
In 1997 the Federal Government's Interministerial Working Group for
the Valorization of the Black Population issued 29 recommendations,
including the creation of affirmative action programs for university
admissions and government hiring. The group is charged with proposing
public policies to increase the participation and access of Afro-
Brazilians in society. The National Secretariat for Human Rights
adopted some of the group's recommendations in the national human
rights program, which now contains, as a specific goal, the development
of affirmative actions programs to increase access for Afro-Brazilians
to professional schools and universities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provides for representation of all workers (except members of the
military, the uniformed police, and firemen) but imposes a
hierarchical, unitary system funded by a mandatory union tax on workers
and employers. New unions must register with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MLE), which accepts the registration if no objections are
filed. Registration can be contested with the MLE by other unions which
represent workers in the same geographical area and professional
category. In the case of such an objection, the MLE's Secretariat for
Labor Relations has 15 days to consider the validity of the objection.
If the objection is found to be valid, the MLE will not register the
union and it remains for union organizers to challenge the decision in
the labor courts.
The 1988 Constitution freed workers to organize new unions out of
old ones without prior authorization of the Government; however, it
retained many other provisions of the old labor code. One such
provision is a restriction known as ``unicidade'' (``one-per-city''),
which limits freedom of association by prohibiting multiple, competing
unions of the same professional category in a given geographical area.
Most elements of the labor movement, as well as the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), criticize the retention of
unicidade. The Cardoso administration submitted a constitutional
amendment to Congress that would end unicidade, but at year's end, it
still had not come to a vote due to disagreement over the proposal.
In practice a number of competing unions have been allowed to exist
among the thousands of local unions. However, these do not represent
the norm, and the MLE and the courts actively enforce the principle of
unicidade in decisions regarding the registration of new unions.
Approximately 16 percent of the work force voluntarily pays union
dues, but nearly twice that percentage is charged a mandatory union tax
and also is represented in collective bargaining. The Ministry of Labor
estimates that there are over 16,000 unions. Local unions are able to
associate with state federations and national confederations in their
professional category. Unions are obliged by law to represent all
workers in a professional category and geographical area, regardless of
membership status.
Although the law makes no provision for central labor organizations
that include multiple categories of workers, four major groups have
emerged: the Workers' Unitary Central (CUT), the Forca Sindical (FS),
the Workers' General Confederation (CGT), and the Social Democratic
Union (SDS). Labor centrals are not provided for in the Labor Code, and
centrals do not have legal standing to represent professional
categories of workers in collective bargaining.
Unions and their leadership are independent of the Government and
of the political parties. The leadership of major unions is distinct
and independent from that of the political parties. The major union
centrals tend to share links to various left-of-center political
parties. In some instances, unions and centrals form alliances with
political parties and social movements to advocate or carry out protest
acts regarding specific issues. One of the largest such acts in recent
years was the ``March of 100,000,'' which brought 75,000
representatives of the CUT, the National Confederation of Agricultural
Workers, the MST, and 30 other organizations to Brasilia in 1999 to
protest government policies.
The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike (except
for the military, police, and firemen). Enabling legislation passed in
1989 stipulates that essential services must remain in operation during
a strike and that workers must notify employers at least 48 hours
before beginning a walkout. Congress has yet to pass the complementary
legislation establishing legal protection for strikes in the public
sector; however, in practice the Government has not interfered with the
right of public workers to strike. The Constitution prohibits
government interference in labor unions, but provides that ``abuse'' of
the right to strike (such as not maintaining essential services, or
failure to end a strike after a labor court decision) is punishable by
law. Employers are prohibited from firing workers or hiring substitute
workers during a strike, with certain exceptions, provided that the
strike is not ruled abusive. If a union follows the laws regarding
strikes, which were eased in the 1988 Constitution, the labor courts
generally do not rule that the strikes are abusive.
The number of strikes has diminished in recent years. According to
the Inter-union Department of Socioeconomic Studies and Statistics
(DIEESE), there were approximately 550 strikes in 1999, compared with
1,250 strikes recorded in 1996. In the city of Sao Paulo and the
surrounding region, which covers the country's industrial center, data
from the regional labor court showed that there were 84 strikes during
the year, the lowest number in a decade. Public sector strikes received
the most attention in the media during the year. Public sector unions
that struck during the year include municipal transit workers, customs
agents, public teachers, state university workers, and various
categories of federal employees. In addition major strikes in the
private sector included the metalworkers of Sao Paulo, bank workers,
truck drivers, and longshoremen in the port of Santos.
On May 18 in Sao Paulo, military police fired tear gas and rubber
bullets into a crowd of striking workers from a coalition of 25 unions
linked to the CUT. More than 20 strikers were injured. Strikers reacted
by throwing rocks and cans at police, injuring five policemen (see
Section 1.c.). The ICFTU reported that police fired on striking workers
at a government-run company in Brasilia in December 1999, killing
public sector worker Jose Ferreira da Silva and injuring 20 others.
Although police said that they used only tear gas and rubber bullets,
live ammunition was found in Ferreira's body.
According to leaders of the National Confederation of Agricultural
Workers, an organized campaign exists in the state of Para to
assassinate rural labor leaders. In November labor organizer Jose Dutra
da Costa was shot and killed in Rondon do Para. Costa served as
director for land reform policy of the local union, which was involved
in taking over disputed land for the settlement of rural workers. In
June in the state of Para, Jeronimo Alves de Amorim was convicted of
ordering the 1991 murder of the head of a local workers' union,
Expedito Ribiero de Souza (see Section 1.a.).
Unions and centrals freely affiliate with international trade union
organizations; the CUT, FS, and CGT are affiliated with the ICFTU.
The ICFTU reports that intimidation and killings of rural labor
union organizers and their agents also continues to be a problem.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right to organize. Businesses and unions
are working to expand and improve mechanisms of collective bargaining.
However, due to the highly detailed labor code, the scope of issues
legally subject to collective bargaining is narrow. The labor court
system exercises normative power with regard to the settlement of labor
disputes, discouraging direct negotiation. The Cardoso administration
made expansion of collective bargaining one of its major objectives in
the labor sector. However, the Labor Ministry has yet to introduce
legislation on the issue due to fierce resistance by labor unions,
which view such government efforts as an attempt to make negotiable
collective bargaining rights provided for by the Constitution.
Collective bargaining is widespread in the formal sector. More than
16,700 negotiated contracts were registered with the Labor Ministry in
1999, a significant increase from the 10,000 contracts registered 2
years earlier. To be binding, all collective bargaining agreements must
be reported to the Labor Ministry within 8 days of their conclusion. In
spite of the prevalence of collective bargaining, unicidade and the
inability of new unions to compete with existing unions limit the
effectiveness of negotiations and the bargaining power of unions. As a
result, DIEESE reports that only half of the collective bargaining
agreements it tracked in 1999 contained wage increases that kept pace
with inflation.
In 1995 the Cardoso administration promulgated a provisional
measure that simultaneously ended inflation indexing of wages, allowed
for mediation of wage settlements if the parties involved so desired,
and provided greater latitude for collective bargaining. Previously the
labor court and the Labor Ministry had responsibility for mediation in
the preliminary stages of dispute settlement. Although labor court
decisions still set wages in many disputes, parties now may choose
mediation as an alternative. Free mediation services are provided by
the Ministry of Labor and the Public Ministry of Labor, and unions and
employers also may choose a private mediator from a registry kept by
the Labor Ministry.
The Constitution incorporates a provision from the old labor code
that prohibits the dismissal of employees who are candidates for or
holders of union leadership positions. Nonetheless, dismissals take
place, with those dismissed required to resort to a usually lengthy
court process for relief. In general the authorities do not effectively
enforce laws protecting union members from discrimination. Labor courts
charged with resolving these and other disputes involving unfair
dismissal, working conditions, salary disputes, and other grievances
are slow and cumbersome. At year's end, over 2.5 million complaints
were languishing in the labor court system, where they may remain
unresolved for 5 to 10 years. According to the Supreme Labor Court,
over 2 million complaints have been registered in labor courts each
year during the past 5 years.
The Government is attempting to reduce this backlog and increase
the efficiency of the courts. Legislation approved in January enables
cases with relatively low monetary claims to be adjudicated in one
meeting with a judge within 30 days of the filing. Another recent law
promotes the formation of employee/employer conciliation commissions
designed to resolve grievances before they reach the labor courts. In
the past, according to union officials, as many as 95 percent of cases
in courts took between 5 to 10 years to resolve.
Labor law applies equally in the free trade zones. The unions in
the Manaus free trade zone, like rural unions and many unions in
smaller cities, are weaker vis-a-vis employers than unions in the major
industrial centers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor; however, there continue to be credible reports
of compulsory labor in many parts of the country. The 2000 ICFTU report
states that forced laborers number in the hundreds of thousands, but
there are no government sources to confirm such estimates. Forced labor
is most common in agricultural activities in the rural north and
center-west of the country, in logging, charcoal production, herding,
and agriculture. The majority of cases occur when employers recruit
laborers from population centers and transport them long distances to
remote areas where escape is difficult. Laborers often are forced to
work in inhuman conditions, many times under the watch of armed guards,
to pay off debt that they incurred on the trip or at the worksite. In
many cases, overseers or owners of farms withhold pay from migrant
laborers and use force to retain and intimidate them.
According to the Penal Code, violators of forced or compulsory
labor laws may be sentenced up to 8 years in prison. Legislation passed
in December 1988 better defined penalties for those who recruit workers
under fraudulent claims, withhold documents or salaries, or force
workers to labor against their will to repay debt.
Government officials and labor activists say that widespread
poverty, low levels of education, and lack of awareness of workers'
rights greatly complicate efforts to combat forced labor. Enforcement
also has been hampered by the remoteness of the areas in which forced
labor is practiced and the difficulty of arriving in these areas
without alerting those using illegal labor. Additionally, freed workers
often are afraid to testify against those who recruited and supervised
them and are unable to remain in the region in order to testify. Thus
the authorities often have found it difficult to identify and prosecute
the owners of farms or businesses that exploit forced labor. In its
March report, the ILO Committee of Experts noted that when convictions
do occur, usually only the third party recruiters are punished and the
owners of the large estates who employ illegal labor are not
sanctioned. Beginning in 1996, the Government may expropriate and use
in land reform programs land on which slave labor is found. However,
land owners must be compensated for these lands. In one case, the
Government paid the owner of the Flor da Mata ranch in the Para state
for lands expropriated for use in land reform in 1998. The Pastoral
Land Commission objected to the amount paid to the ranch owner, stating
that it was well above what the owner paid for the land, thereby
contributing to a sense of impunity and rewarding those who allow their
lands to be used for forced labor. There is proposed legislation in
Congress that would allow land to be confiscated with no payment to
land owners.
Federal Government efforts to eliminate forced labor are
coordinated by the Executive Group to Combat Forced Labor (GERTRAF),
which was established in 1995. The Ministry of Labor coordinates
GERTRAF, which includes representatives from seven different
ministries. The enforcement arm of GERTRAF is the Special Group for
Mobile Inspection (SETIF), which works in conjunction with Federal
Police. During 1995-98, the teams carried out more than 500 raids. They
reached over 140,000 persons working under varying conditions
approximating forced labor. Over this period, SETIF freed nearly 800
workers from slave-like conditions and helped in the prosecution and
incarceration of 13 persons. SETIF conducted 123 raids and freed 639
workers from forced labor in 1999--more than in any previous year.
Through the first 6 months of the year, the group freed 418 workers
from 45 ranches and levied over $200,000 (370,000 reais) in fines.
Although 33 minors under 16 years of age were found working on ranches
during raids by SETIF during the year, none of them were laboring in
conditions of forced or compulsory labor.
In its largest single operation to date, SETIF and the Federal
Police freed 135 workers from slave-like conditions on a cotton ranch
in the state of Mato Grosso in April. The team responded to a complaint
made by 15 workers who had escaped from the ranch in February and
reported working 7 days a week among rats and snakes, sleeping on the
ground, and paying high prices for spoiled food. Workers had been
recruited from cities in the region with promises of good housing,
food, and salaries; instead, they were forced to work at gunpoint in
inhuman conditions. The authorities are investigating at least eight
other ranches in the region for suspected use of forced labor.
GERTRAF receives allegations of forced labor from labor unions and
other organizations. The CUT initiated a 24-hour hot line with a toll-
free number for reporting instances of forced labor in 1997. However,
the most important supplier of information to GERTRAF is the Catholic
Church's Pastoral Land Commission, which tracks instances of forced
labor and carries out campaigns to educate workers about the risks of
forced labor. The CPT reported 16 instances of forced labor involving
1,099 workers in 10 states in 1999. Over one-half of these forced
laborers were found in the state of Para. The 1999 figures represented
a reversal of a 3-year trend of declining instances of forced labor.
The CPT reported that, due to the hidden and complex nature of forced
labor, these figures significantly understate the actual number of
workers trapped in conditions of forced and compulsory labor in the
country.
The law also bars forced and bonded labor by children. Although the
MLE found no children working as forced laborers during the year, in
1999 the Pastoral Land Commission reported 25 children under the age of
16 found working in conditions of forced labor. In March the ILO
reported that observers have cited over 3,000 girls who were subject to
debt servitude and forced into prostitution in the state of Rondonia.
Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
prostitution also is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law restricts work that may be performed by children;
however, child labor is a serious problem. The Government amended the
Constitution in December 1998 to raise the minimum working age from 14
to 16 years and the age at which apprenticeships may begin from 12 to
14 years. The law bars all minors under age 18 from work that
constitutes a physical strain or from employment in nocturnal,
unhealthful, dangerous, or morally harmful conditions. However, the
authorities rarely enforce additional legal restrictions intended to
protect working minors under age 18, and the problem is widespread.
The law requires permission of the parents for minors to work as
apprentices, and working minors must attend school through the primary
grades. Schooling is universal, free, and compulsory until the age of
15.
The rate of school enrollment of children aged 7 to 14 increased
from 89.1 percent in 1994 to 95.5 percent in 1999. Rates of repetition
have dropped from 30.2 percent in 1995 to 23.4 percent in 1997. Despite
these promising numbers, repetition rates and the poor quality of
public schools continued to be problems. Fully 40 percent of first-
graders repeat the year, and in a number of states first-graders are
more likely to fail than to pass. Even with increased enrollment, there
still were 1.1 million children between the ages of 7 and 14 who are
not attending school.
Although still a serious problem, the incidence of child labor has
dropped significantly in recent years. According to government figures,
the number of working children fell by nearly 24 percent between 1995
and 1999. Over the same period, the rate of participation in the work
force of children from the ages of 5 to 14 dropped from 11 to 9
percent. Nevertheless, more than 2.9 million children under the age of
15 continued to work in 1999. Frequent accidents, unhealthy working
conditions, and squalor are common.
A 1999 Labor Ministry report indicates that children work in about
100 rural and urban activities. Common rural activities include
fishing, mining, producing charcoal, and harvesting sugarcane, sisal,
tobacco, cotton, citrus fruits, and a variety of other crops. In urban
areas, children are found in shoe shining, trash picking, street
peddling, prostitution, and drug trafficking. According to the
Government's Institute for Applied Economic Research, there are around
400,000 children between the ages of 10 to 16 working as domestic
servants.
The Ministry of Labor and Employment is responsible for inspecting
worksites to enforce child labor laws. These efforts are guided
regionally by special Nuclei for the Eradication of Child Labor, which
gather data and develop plans for child labor inspection. Nearly all
inspections of children in the workplace are driven by allegations and
tips from workers, teachers, unions, NGO's, and the media.
Approximately 3,200 inspectors investigated 52,000 establishments in
1999. Inspectors lack authority to investigate allegations of child
labor in informal sector establishments, where most child labor is
found. In all cases but the worst forms, inspectors attempt to reach an
alternative solution before applying fines of around $225 (400 reais)
per violation. Inspectors also may refer cases to prosecutors from the
Public Ministry of Labor, who are able to levy fines upwards of $1,670
(3,000 reais) and investigate cases in the informal sector.
Fighting child labor is a priority of the Cardoso administration.
The Ministry of Social Security and Assistance's Program for the
Eradication of Child Labor (PETI) provides cash stipends to low-income
families who keep their children in school and out of work activities.
Because the public school day lasts only 4 hours, PETI also offers
complementary cultural and instructional activities to children during
nonschool hours to keep them from situations in which they could be put
to work. PETI has grown from assisting about 3,700 children in 2 states
in 1996 to over 390,000 in nearly all 26 states by the end of the year.
The program started with children involved in hazardous activities in
rural areas, such as charcoal production and sisal, sugar cane, and
citrus harvesting. Other rural activities recently included in the
program are work in cotton and tobacco fields, flour mills, salt mines,
horticulture, weaving, fishing, wood mills, brick production, ceramics,
and mining. The PETI program also is growing rapidly in urban
activities such as trash picking, shoe shining, and street peddling.
Social programs to end child labor have been matched by investments
in programs to support greater access to education. The Ministry of
Education's (MEC) Program for the Guarantee of a Minimum Income (PGRM)
provides low-income families with modest monthly stipends--typically
ranging from $6-8 (10-15 reais) per child--provided that all children
aged 7-14 in the household are attending school. The poorest 20 percent
of municipalities in each state are eligible to enroll in the program
and receive funds from the Federal Government. MEC estimates that the
PGRM has benefited 1 million children in more than 500,000 families.
The Government supplements this program with a decentralized school
lunch program that serves 37 million children across the country.
In December 1999, the Government ratified ILO Convention 138
dealing with the minimum age for work and Convention 182 on the
eradication of the worst forms of child labor. At year's end,
Convention 138 had not taken effect due to technical issues concerning
the minimum working age that the Government submitted to the ILO. In
March the Ministry of Labor established a tripartite commission to
produce a list of worst forms of child labor to be eradicated in the
country. At year's end, the commission produced a list of over 80 such
activities, which includes 27 new activities that are to be banned for
all workers under 18 years of age. These new activities include cutting
sugar cane, applying pesticides, and driving tractors.
Civil organizations have played a fundamental role in reducing the
number of children working. One of the organizations coordinating the
diverse efforts has been the National Forum for the Prevention and
Eradication of Child Labor. The Forum was established in 1994 with
funding from the ILO and UNICEF, and has chapters in every state and
over 40 institutional members from government, unions, employers, and
NGO's. The ILO's Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC)
sponsors programs in footwear, charcoal, citrus, sisal, and domestic
service. IPEC programs have focused on capacity building, awareness
raising, research promotion, and the incorporation of income generating
schemes and monitoring systems into child labor prevention programs.
UNICEF supports various NGO's, and began a campaign in to remove child
laborers from working in trash dumps.
The ABRINQ Foundation for Children's Rights has negotiated
agreements and garnered commitments from producers in footwear, citrus,
automobile production, charcoal, and other industries to investigate
and eradicate instances of child labor. ABRINQ also awards mayors who
invest in prochild policies with its Child-Friendly Mayor award.
Through a labeling program and awareness-raising activities, the
footwear industry's Pro-Child Institute has helped to reduce
significantly instances of child labor in footwear production in the
state of Sao Paulo. Other important NGO's include Projeto POMMAR, which
works most closely with children at risk of becoming prostitutes in the
Northeast, and Missao Crianca (Mission Child), a new NGO that seeks to
disseminate its methodology for minimum income programs to end child
labor. All major union centrals have made firm commitments to eradicate
child labor by reporting violations and implementing programs to
educate union members about the hazards of child labor. The News Agency
for Children's Rights closely tracks stories in the media, publishes
studies, and gives awards to media outlets that effectively cover
children's rights.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is
approximately $77 (151 reais) a month, which is not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for workers and their families. A
1999 study by DIEESE concluded that the minimum wage was only about
one-seventh of the salary necessary to support a family of four in the
Sao Paulo metropolitan area. Many workers outside the regulated
economy, particularly in the rural northeast, earn less than the
minimum wage. At year's end, Congress was considering legislation that
would increase the minimum wage.
The Constitution limits the workweek to 44 hours and specifies a
weekly rest period of 24 consecutive hours, preferably on Sundays. The
Constitution provides for pay and fringe benefits and establishes
protections for agricultural and domestic workers, although not all
provisions are enforced. All workers in the formal sector receive
overtime pay for work beyond 44 hours, and there are prohibitions
against excessive use of overtime.
Unsafe working conditions are prevalent throughout the country.
Fundacentro, part of the Ministry of Labor, sets occupational, health,
and safety standards, which are consistent with internationally
recognized norms. However, the Ministry has insufficient resources for
adequate inspection and enforcement of these standards. If a worker has
a problem in the workplace and has trouble getting relief directly from
an employer, the worker or union can file a claim with the regional
labor court, although in practice this frequently is a cumbersome,
protracted process.
The law requires employers to establish internal committees for
accident prevention in workplaces. It also protects employee members of
these committees from being fired for their committee activities.
However, such firings do occur, and legal recourse usually requires
years for resolution. Individual workers do not have the legal right to
remove themselves from the workplace when faced with hazardous working
conditions; however, workers may express such concerns to the internal
committee, which would conduct an immediate investigation.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the transport of
persons for illicit reasons within and outside the country; however,
trafficking in persons, including women and children, in, to, and from
the country is a problem. Penalties for trafficking in persons include
fines and prison sentences ranging from 1 to 12 years, depending on the
severity of the abuse and whether violence, threats, or fraud were
employed.
Trafficking within the country often takes the form of rural
workers being transported long distances to work on remote ranches in
slave-like conditions (see Section 6.c.).
Trafficking of women and children for purposes of prostitution,
both within the country and to other countries is also a problem.
Laws on trafficking are enforced by the Federal Police. Officials
reported that it is very difficult to capture and incarcerate
traffickers because they must be caught in the act of traveling with
the victims. Further, most women who leave the country with traffickers
do so willingly, and only upon arrival do they realize the severe
conditions under which they are forced to work and live. Officials also
report that fear of reprisals keeps a number of victims from seeking
police intervention or from testifying against those who persecuted
them.
The U.N. reported that over 75,000 Brazilian women work as
prostitutes in Europe. According to the report, most of the women come
from the states of Goias, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. During the
year, the Federal Police arrested several suspects in the capital of
Brasilia, Goias, Rio de Janeiro, and Ceara involved in recruiting women
to work as prostitutes abroad, mainly in Spain, but also in Portugal,
Japan, and Israel. Police officials stated that in most cases women who
are recruited by trafficking organizations understand that they are to
work as prostitutes, but that they are lied to about working conditions
and their prospective earnings. In other cases women were told that
they would work as nannies or as household servants. Upon arrival
victims of trafficking often have their passports confiscated and are
forced to prostitute themselves and live in virtual confinement. As in
other types of trafficking, perpetrators use debt and isolation to
control the victims.
In March the federal police arrested one person who was connected
to a trafficking ring that brought women from the state of Goias to
Spain. The person allegedly received $130 (234 reais) in return for
each woman transported from the bus station to the airport. Four women
were with the suspect at the time of arrest.
In June the Federal Police uncovered a travel agency in Goias which
had recruited and sent at least 20 women to work as prostitutes in
Spain. At year's end, the two agency owners were in prison awaiting
trial; the recruiters were still at large.
The Government took a number of steps over the year to combat child
prostitution. To call attention to the problem and foster initiatives
to fight it, May 18 was declared the first National Day against the
Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents. Legislation enacted in
June lengthened the maximum sentence to 10 years in prison for those
who manage brothels that exploit child prostitutes. In July the
Government announced the first national pilot program to combat child
prostitution. The program has a budget of a $556,000 (1 million reais)
but was geared to begin its outreach operations at the end of the year.
__________
CANADA
Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a federal parliamentary
form of government. Citizens periodically choose their representatives
in free and fair multiparty elections. On November 27, voters elected a
majority of 172 Liberal Party members to the 301-seat Parliament, and
Jean Chretien began his third term as prime minister. The judiciary is
independent.
Elected civilian officials control the federal, provincial, and
municipal police forces. The armed forces have no role in domestic law
enforcement except in national emergencies. Laws requiring the security
forces to respect human rights are observed strictly, and the courts
punish violators.
Canada has a highly developed, market-based economy. Laws
extensively protect the well-being of workers and provide for workers'
freedom of association.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means for dealing
with individual instances of abuse; however, there were problems in
some areas. Problems include discrimination against aboriginals, the
disabled, and women. There was an increase in anti-Semitic harassment.
The Government continued to take serious steps to address private acts
of violence against women. Trafficking of persons into the country,
including trafficking for purposes of prostitution is a growing
problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
Four Toronto policemen were charged with manslaughter for the death
of a suspect whom they beat while taking him into custody outside a
convenience store in August. Accounts of the incident vary as to what
actually transpired at the time.
The Government made concerted efforts to resolve issues stemming
from two controversial shooting deaths in previous years. In May an
Alberta provincial court judge issued a fatality inquiry report on the
causes of a 1998 incident in which a Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) officer shot a woman and her child on the Tsuu T'ina
reservation. The report's 18 key recommendations focused on the needs
of indigenous people and improvements in police and family services
procedures, and other measures to prevent similar situations from
occurring. A court upheld the 1999 conviction for criminal negligence
of a police officer in the 1995 shooting death of an aboriginal
activist at Ipperwash, Ontario.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the Government
observes these prohibitions in practice; however, there were isolated
incidents of police mistreating suspects. In February the RCMP began an
inquiry into the deaths of four native men, two of whom were found
frozen on the outskirts of Saskatoon and two of whom were found dead in
or near their homes. Another native man filed charges against two
Saskatoon police officers who allegedly picked him up in a police
cruiser, drove him to the same spot outside the city where the two
other men were found dead, and left him in sub-zero temperatures. At
year's end, the two officers were awaiting trial in this case. In
October Saskatchewan's Justice Minister ordered a public inquest into
the events that led to the death of one of the men who had been found
dead in his home, due to a drug overdose, shortly after being released
from police custody. The provincial public prosecutions office already
had decided that there was no basis for pressing criminal charges in
relation to this case.
The military continued to receive complaints from women serving in
the armed forces who charge that they are subject to sexual abuse,
harassment, and discrimination. A new armed forces grievance board that
is independent of the military chain of command began operations in
June. In addition, other mechanisms established by the Government to
address such complaints, including the Advisory Board on Canadian
Forces Gender Integration and Employment Equity and an Ombudsman in the
Department of National Defense, continue to operate. During the year,
the Ombudsman received 14 discrimination complaints, 128 harassment
complaints, and 2 sexual assault complaints.
In 1999 Toronto police continued a review of procedures following
public complaints about the use of strip searches and body cavity
searches in several routine arrests. The review determined that there
were isolated incidents of unnecessary searches. Toronto police
authorities determined that the policy still was appropriate and during
the year provided further guidance to officers about when such searches
are appropriate.
In June the RCMP Public Complaints Commission completed its
hearings on the controversy surrounding the use of pepper spray to
break up demonstrations at the November 1997 Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) conference in Vancouver (see Section 2.b.). The
Commission had not issued a report by year's end.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors. However, the
Ombudsman Ontario remains concerned about ``recurring evidence''
presented in three separate investigations concluded during the year
that there is a ``systemic problem in the lack of consistent
application of official policy and standing order across correctional
facilities in the province's prison system.'' The Ombudsman
investigated a variety of problems during the year, including
segregation procedures, use of force, and lost property. The Ombudsman
also made recommendations concerning standards of hygiene, health care,
and fair and reasonable treatment to the Ministry of Correctional
Services; the Ombudsman reports that the Ministry has begun to make
improvements in these areas.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process and vigorously enforces the right to a fair trial.
The court system is divided into federal and provincial courts,
which handle both civil and criminal matters. The highest federal court
is the Supreme Court, which exercises general appellate jurisdiction
and advises on constitutional matters.
The judicial system is based on English common law at the federal
level as well as in most provinces; in the province of Quebec, it is
derived from the Napoleonic Code. Throughout the country, judges are
appointed. In criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of
innocence and the right to a public trial, to counsel (which is free
for indigents), and to appeal. The prosecution also can appeal in
certain limited circumstances.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law generally prohibits such practices, government
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice; however, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Government may
limit free speech in the name of goals such as ending discrimination,
ensuring social harmony, or promoting gender equality. The Court ruled
that the benefits of limiting hate speech and promoting equality are
sufficient to outweigh the freedom of speech clause in the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.
Journalists occasionally are banned from reporting some specific
details of court cases until a trial is concluded, and these
restrictions, adopted to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial,
enjoy wide popular support. Some restrictions on the media are imposed
by provincial-level film censorship, broadcasters' voluntary codes
curbing graphic violence, and laws against hate literature and
pornography. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for free
speech and free press, but both the Criminal Code and human rights
legislation have established limits. Inciting hatred (in certain cases)
or genocide is a criminal offense. The Supreme Court has set a high
threshold for such cases by specifying that these acts must be proven
willful and public. The Broadcasting Act, which prohibits programming
containing any abusive comment that would expose individuals or groups
to hatred or contempt, has not yet been challenged in the courts.
The Human Rights Act also prohibits repeated communications by
telephone that expose a person or group to hatred or contempt. Human
rights groups are exploring the possibility of extending this
prohibition to the Internet, arguing that the Internet should be
considered ``telephonic communications'' and therefore covered under
the Human Rights Act. Between October and December, the Human Rights
Tribunal heard two complaints that the Ernst Zundel web site, known for
its Holocaust-denial material, incites hatred against Jews. The case
was ongoing at year's end.
On September 13, an unidentified gunman shot and wounded Michel
Auger, the organized crime reporter for Le Journal de Montreal. The
previous day, Auger had published an article regarding activities of
motorcycle gangs. Police linked the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang to
the shooting and their investigation continued at year's end. They
arrested two men in connection with the attack, including one man for
making and supplying the gun. The Auger shooting led to a debate
between those who advocated additional powers for law enforcement to go
after gangs (up to and including suspension of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms) and those who argued that preserving civil liberties
outweighed the risk of isolated incidents of gang violence. The
question divided the journalistic community, which relies heavily upon
civil liberty provisions. After the Auger shooting, approximately
20,000 persons (mostly journalists) demonstrated on the streets of
Montreal, to urge police to do a better job in combating gang violence.
Following Auger's recovery and return to work, the numbers of those
calling for additional police powers dwindled.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government generally respects them
in practice.
In June the RCMP Complaints Commission completed hearings begun in
1998 investigating the use of pepper spray by RCMP officers to break up
small crowds of protesters at the APEC leaders meeting in Vancouver in
November 1997. The issues covered by the Commission included whether
actions taken by police were justified by the security risk and whether
political considerations such as direct influence from senior political
leaders played a role in determining the level of RCMP response to
protesters' actions. The Commission had not issued a report at year's
end.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
The province of Saskatchewan permits prayer and bible readings in
school as provided for in the Saskatchewan Act, which forms part of the
provincial constitution. However, in July 1999, a one-person Board of
Inquiry ruled that it was discriminatory to require recitation of the
Lord's Prayer in Saskatoon public schools. As a result of the ruling,
the Lord's Prayer is not recited in Saskatoon public schools. At year's
end, the Saskatoon School Board and complainants continued to search
for a compromise.
Public funding for Roman Catholic schools--or separate schoolsis
constitutionally protected in the country's original four provinces,
but the policy has been challenged in recent years. In 1999 the U.N.
Human Rights Committee found that the province of Ontario had failed to
provide equal and effective protection against discrimination.
In March 1999, the government-mandated Proulx task force submitted
a report on religion in schools to the Quebec National Assembly. Its 14
recommendations included abolishing Catholic and Protestant status for
public schools and creating secular public schools within which
religion would be studied from a cultural perspective. Publicly funded
support services would be provided for students of all faiths. School
boards' responses are due to the Quebec government by July 1, 2001.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in
accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees and extends first asylum. Canada is
a resettlement country, and the Government projected approving between
36,600 and 40,800 claims for refugee status during the year.
During the summer of 1999, 599 Chinese arrived illegally by boat
off the coast of British Columbia and sought refugee status. Because
the majority of the early refugee claimants who were released failed to
appear for their hearings, a much larger percentage of refugee
claimants from subsequent boats were remanded into custody pending
their refugee hearings. A total of 586 persons made refugee claims. The
Government has granted refugee status to 25 migrants and has denied 458
claims. Of these, 330 have been returned to China. Other claims were
abandoned or withdrawn. A total of 43 adults remained in custody at
year's end. A total of 115 children were placed in the care of the
Ministry of Children and Families.
There was no information publicly available on the results of a
formal inquiry into a Chinese refugee's claims that prison officers had
beaten him in December 1999.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
On November 27, national parliamentary elections were held, in
which the Liberal Party won a majority with 172 of 301 seats. The
Canadian Alliance (conservative) won 66 seats, the Bloc Quebecois
(separatist) won 38 seats, the New Democratic Party (liberal) won 13
seats, and the Progressive Conservative Party (conservative) won 12
seats. Jean Chretien of the Liberal Party entered his third term as
Prime Minister.
A significant body of opinion in the Province of Quebec
(represented by the party that currently governs the province)
continues to maintain that Quebec has the right to withdraw from the
Confederation if that decision proves to be the democratically
expressed will of the people of Quebec. However, in June the Federal
Government enacted legislation to clarify its role in a possible
secession attempt by a province. The new law is in response to a 1998
Supreme Court reference (an answer to a question referred to the Court
by the federal government), which stipulated that the Federal
Government would be obliged to negotiate Quebec's separation in good
faith if a clear majority of Quebeckers voted to separate on the basis
of a clearly phrased question. The new legislation stipulates that the
House of Commons must determine whether any future secession referendum
question proposed by a province is clear, and whether any subsequent
majority vote is large enough to obligate the Government to negotiate
secession. The legislation was controversial with Quebec's provincial
government, which then drafted and, on May 30, passed Bill 99 to
underline the right of the Quebecois to self-determination and to
decide the political regime and legal status of Quebec.
There are no laws limiting the participation of women in political
life; however, they are underrepresented in government and politics.
Following the November elections, in the Parliament, 62 of 301 members
in the House of Commons are women, and 33 of 105 senators are women.
Women hold 10 seats in the 36person Cabinet. In November 1999, a woman
was appointed for the first time as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for equal benefits and
protection of the law regardless of race, national or ethnic origin,
color, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. These
rights generally are respected in practice; however, there were some
complaints of discrimination in this multicultural society.
Women.--The law prohibits violence against women, including spousal
abuse; however, it remained a problem. The number of sexual assault
crimes have declined over the past 5 years; however, in 1999 a total of
23,872 cases of sexual assault were reported. The courts consider such
cases seriously and those convicted of sexual assault face up to 10
years in prison. Cases involving weapons, threats, wounding, or
endangerment of life carry longer sentences, up to life imprisonment.
The Government's publication on family violence statistics
indicates that an estimated 8 percent of women (and 7 percent of men)
who were married or living in a common-law relationship during the
previous 5-year period experienced some type of violence committed by
their partner on at least one occasion. The economic costs of violence
against women are estimated to be $2.7 billion (Can $4.2 billion).
Services available to abused women have increased significantly over
the past 2 decades. For example, the number of shelters for abused
women across the country increased from 75 in 1979 to 470 in 1998.
The Criminal Code prohibits criminal harassment (stalking) and
makes it punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years. The law
prohibits sexual harassment, and the Government enforces this
provision. Women continued to complain of harassment in the armed
forces, and the Government has set up mechanisms to try to resolve
complaints (see Section 1.c.).
Women are well represented in the labor force, including business
and the professions. Employment equity laws and regulations cover
federal employees in all but the security and defense services. In
October 1999, the Federal Government agreed to a settlement following
an unsuccessful appeal of a 1998 Human Rights Tribunal ruling that the
Government must pay back wages to workers in underpaid positions
(predominantly female) under the concept of equal pay for work of equal
value. Payment was made and finalized this year.
Women have marriage and property rights equal to those of men.
Women head over 85 percent of single-parent households.
Prostitution is legal, but pimping and operating, being found in,
or working in a brothel are not. Living (wholly or partially) on the
earnings of prostitution is illegal. Communicating in public for the
purpose of prostitution (solicitation) is also illegal, but is
considered a lesser offense than the other offenses related to
prostitution.
Women were trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual
exploitation (see Section 6.f.).
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. Education is free through grade
13 and is compulsory nationwide through age 15 or 16, depending on
the province. Federal and provincial regulations protect children from
abuse, overwork, and discrimination and penalize perpetrators of such
offenses.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Changes to the
law in 1997 strengthened tools to combat child prostitution and
prohibited female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health.
A group of 1,500 citizens, who as orphans were diagnosed falsely as
retarded and psychotic, and illegally interned in mental institutions
during the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, continued to seek compensation
from the provincial and Federal governments. They charge that the
Government is responsible for the abuse that they received in the
Catholic Church-run institutions, including beatings, electric shock
treatment, and sexual abuse. In 1999 they formed a committee to seek
restitution for the abuse suffered. In May the Catholic Church
announced that it would participate in a ``compassion fund,'' but would
not issue a formal apology or admit fault in the cases. Quebec Premier
Bouchard reiterated his government's compensation offer of
approximately $650 (C$1,000) each to the victims, but the committee
representing the orphans rejected the offer as insufficient.
Children were trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual
exploitation (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. Nevertheless, the Government continued to receive
numerous complaints regarding societal discrimination against disabled
persons and has instituted programs to discourage such discrimination.
Disabled persons are underrepresented in the work force; they make up
2.7 percent of the federally regulated private sector work force, while
those capable of working total 6.5 percent of the population. The law
mandates access to buildings for persons with disabilities, and for the
most part the Government enforces these provisions.
In 1999 the province of Alberta announced that it would compensate
the nearly 500 surviving persons who were sterilized without their
consent under a policy aimed at residents of mental institutions. More
than 2,000 Albertans were sterilized between 1928 and 1972 under the
Alberta Sterilization Act, which was repealed in June 1972. By the end
of the year, the Alberta Government had settled all outstanding
sterilization claims.
The law provides a variety of protections and rights for the
disabled and specifically prohibits discrimination against disabled
persons in employment, education, or in the provision of public
services. Sexual exploitation of persons with disabilities in
situations of dependency is a criminal offense. The law requires
employers and service providers to accommodate special needs of
disabled persons, unless it constitutes an undue hardship, and mandates
access to buildings for the disabled. The Government has instituted
programs to help the disabled join the work force, but they continued
to experience more difficulties in getting and retaining employment
than those without disabilities.
Indigenous People.--The treatment of aboriginal people continued to
be one of the most important human rights problems facing the country.
Disputes over land claims, self-government, treaty rights, taxation,
duty-free imports, fishing and hunting rights, and alleged harassment
by police continued to be sources of tension on reserves. Aboriginal
people remain underrepresented in the work force, overrepresented on
welfare rolls and in prison populations, and more susceptible to
suicide and poverty than other population groups.
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically protects aboriginal
rights, including those established by historical land claims
settlements; aboriginal rights also are recognized in the Constitution
and by the courts. Historical treaties with native groups in eastern
Canada form the basis for the Federal Government's policies there, but
the antiquated language and uncertain intent have resulted in extensive
legal challenges to the Government's interpretation of treaty rights.
Native groups in the west that never signed historical treaties
continue to claim land and resources, and many continue to seek legal
resolution of outstanding issues. As a result, the evolution of the
Federal Government's policy toward aboriginal rights, particularly land
claims, has been linked closely to legal challenges, including 45
Supreme Court decisions.
In 1998 the Government established the Aboriginal Action Plan, a
``long-term, broad-based'' policy approach to promote the quality of
life of aboriginal people and promote self-sufficiency. According to
the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, the Government spent
$4.7 billion (Can $7 billion) on aboriginal programs during the year,
which included the Aboriginal Action Plan and spending from 12
different departments. Since 1999
16 specific claims have been settled, and 70 comprehensive land
claims have been negotiated across the country. After years of
negotiations, the Federal and provincial governments concluded a modern
day treaty with the Nisga'a people of British Columbia, who received
claim to tribal lands, fishing and timber rights, limited self-
government, and other economic benefits. The Federal Government
continued to be involved in self-government negotiations with over 350
First Nations, and 6 agreements were in final or advanced stages of
negotiations at year's end. Professional development and fiscal
accountability projects further support aboriginal self-governance.
In response to court decisions over the past few years, the
Government continues to work at resolving a variety of issues,
including fishing rights in Atlantic Canada. Disputes over native
fishing rights in Atlantic Canada continued after a 1999 Supreme Court
ruling on the Marshall case which interpreted centuries-old treaties to
allow First Nations to earn a moderate livelihood from natural
resources, in compliance with government regulations that promote
conservation and protect others who depend on the same resource. The
Federal Government negotiated interim fishing agreements with 29 of the
34 native communities in Atlantic Canada, but the Burnt Church First
Nation in New Brunswick and 4 other native communities in Nova Scotia
have refused to sign the interim agreements and have been accused of
contravening federal regulations by fishing for lobster out-of-season.
Other test cases that involve aboriginals being tried on charges of
illegally harvesting timber on Crown land continued in the court
systems in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Court cases also continue in
Quebec over timber resources.
During the year, the Federal and British Columbia governments
concluded a treaty with the Nisga'a people who live in northwestern
British Columbia. The treaty gave the Nisga'a control over 765 square
miles of tribal lands, a cash settlement, fishing and timber-cutting
rights, and certain rights of self-government. The treaty ended a range
of special tax breaks and other benefits available under previous
arrangements. The treaty was ratified by the Nisga'a people in November
1998 and by the provincial legislature in the spring of 1999. It was
debated and passed by Parliament in December 1999. Although the British
Columbia legislature ratified the treaty, two groups expressed their
intention to challenge the treaty in court. These legal challenges
include one from a political party that contends that the treaty should
have been submitted to a referendum and one from the Gitanyow, an
aboriginal band located near the Nisga'a, who contend that the treaty
awarded more than 85 percent of their traditional tribal lands to the
Nisga'a. At year's end, neither case had made legal progress.
The Stoney reserve west of Calgary gave up control of its finances
to federal Indian Affairs officials in 1997, following widespread
allegations of political corruption, financial mismanagement, sexual
assaults, and abuses connected with social service agencies. After a 2-
year probe, the RCMP concluded that no criminal charges would be made,
and that instead, the problem with reserve finances was managerial in
nature. Stoney Reserve corrected the situation and put its finances
back in order. Of the 611 First Nations, 25 have their finances managed
by a private accounting firm.
Quebec's Indian people remain overwhelmingly opposed to separation
from Canada and deeply distrust the separatist government of the
province. Despite the Quebec Prime Minister's recent overtures to the
leaders of the Cree and Inuit nations, surveys indicate that most of
Quebec's 60,000 Indians would favor partition of the province in the
event of Quebec's separation from Canada. Indian leaders maintain that
a sovereign Quebec would treat Indians as another ethnic minority
instead of as sovereign nations within the territory of the province.
To address these sentiments and respond to a pending lawsuit, in 1998
the Quebec government agreed with the Cree and Mohawk tribes to
initiate negotiations regarding longstanding grievances over timber
resources, public rights of way on tribal lands, and management of
development in the James Bay region. In March 1999, Quebec gave the
Mohawks increased fiscal rights and powers. In June 1999, the first
summit in 11 years between Quebec's First Nations and the provincial
government was held to establish a permanent policy forum to resolve
ongoing issues. During 1999 the Government focused on negotiations over
a commission to set up a political entity (Nunavik) for Quebec's Inuit.
The commission, in accordance with an agreement signed in November
1999, has Inuit, Quebec, and federal representatives. In September the
James Bay Crees challenged the authority of the Nunavik Commission on
the basis of overlapping land claims. In December the Commission
postponed delivering its final report to the federal and provincial
governments, stating that it needed more time and formally requested an
extension of its mandate to the end of March 2001.
In May 1999, representatives of the Government of Newfoundland and
Labrador, the Federal Government, and the Labrador Inuit Association
initialed a land claims agreement for the Inuit. The plan provides for
land, water rights, self-government, and an economic development plan
that includes sharing revenues from subsurface developments. The
Federal Government negotiated interim fishing agreements with 29 of the
34 native communities in Atlantic Canada, but the Burnt Church First
Nation in New Brunswick and 4 other native communities in Nova Scotia
have refused to sign. As a result, they have been accused of
contravening federal regulations by fishing for lobster out-of-season.
In September 1999, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of
Nova Scotia aboriginal Donald Marshall for catching and selling fish
eels out of season and without a license. In doing so, the court ruled
that the 18th century treaties between the aboriginals and the British
Crown gave the First Nations rights not accommodated by modern fishery
regulations. The Court ruled that the Federal Government must give
treaty beneficiaries access to the fisheries sufficient to enable them
to earn a moderate livelihood. The Court also found that this right is
subject to regulation and subsequently reemphasized this point in a
separate explanation of its decision. There was some violence against
aboriginals by nonaboriginals, following aboriginal efforts to exercise
their new rights by trapping lobsters in October prior to the normal
season. The Supreme Court's decision to interpret the 18th century
treaties liberally has encouraged aboriginals involved in a number of
court cases seeking access to economic benefits from natural resources
such as logging, mining, and energy.
The Supreme Court's clarification of the Marshall case ruled out
the possibility of aboriginals using the case to gain commercial rights
in the forestry sector. However, test cases now are progressing through
the court systems in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia that involve
aboriginals being tried on charges of illegally harvesting timber on
Crown land.
Religious Minorities.--The League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith
in Canada reported that there were 267 incidents of anti-Semitism in
1999--an 11 percent increase from 1998. An increase in acts of
vandalism contributed to the rise in incidents, in contrast to a steady
decrease in previous years. The League continues to express concern
over the growth of anti-Semitic activity on the Internet. In October
the Human Rights Tribunal examined the activities of one such web site
(see Section 2.a.).
In October and November, Jews were subjected to a wave of attacks
that community leaders said was unprecedented. During a 6 week period
beginning on October 1, about 45 anti-Jewish incidents--arson,
assaults, verbal abuse and death threats--were recorded. Many Jewish
leaders complained about what they described as a lukewarm response
from government officials at all levels.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The narrow defeat of the 1995
Quebec sovereignty referendum left unresolved the concerns of French-
speaking Quebeckers about their minority status in Canada, while
sharpening the concerns of English-speaking Quebeckers about their
minority status. The separatist Parti Quebecois provincial government
of Quebec stated that it would hold another sovereignty referendum only
under winning conditions. The Supreme Court ruled in August 1998 that a
unilateral declaration of independence would be illegal, but that the
Federal Government and other provinces would be obligated to negotiate
Quebec's separation if a clear majority of Quebeckers voted to change
their relationship with Canada on the basis of a clearly phrased
referendum question (see Section 3).
Some English-speaking and native groups in Quebec assert the right
to keep parts of Quebec in Canada in the event that Quebec declares
independence. Despite personal meetings and other overtures by Quebec's
Prime Minister to aboriginals and the English-speaking community, both
groups remain distrustful of the separatist government of Quebec. Many
members of these communities fear that their rights would be infringed
by a sovereign Quebec.
The Constitution protects the linguistic and cultural rights of
minorities. Despite Canada's federal policy of bilingualism, English
speakers in Quebec and French speakers in other parts of Canada
generally must live and work in the language of the majority.
In January the Supreme Court upheld an appeal by francophones who
had been denied a French-language school in their community and forced
to bus their children 57 minutes to another school. The Court ruled
that the percentage of French language students in the community who
potentially could attend a French language school (rather than the
actual number of students who desired to attend one) met the
requirements to establish such a school, and therefore the community
was obligated constitutionally to provide one. In making its ruling,
the Supreme Court stated that the Appeals Court erred (among other
reasons) by not considering which services would best encourage the
flourishing and preservation of the French language minority.
Quebec's language law restricts access to publicly funded, English
language schools through grade 11 to children whose parents were
educated in English in Canada and to short-term residents. The Quebec
courts heard two cases challenging this law. In June the Montreal
Superior Court heard a suit brought against the Quebec government by 10
francophone families for the right to send their children to anglophone
schools. Another case was brought by a group whose native tongue is
neither French nor English, who alleged that the law restricting
English-language schools to children whose parents were educated in
English in Canada is discriminatory. At year's end, both cases were
pending.
In October three coffeehouses with English names were firebombed,
allegedly in an attempt to force them to change their names to French.
A man associated with a group that aims to eliminate the use of English
in Quebec was arrested for the bombings and was denied bail prior to
his trial.
The English-speaking minority of Quebec, representing 9 percent of
the population of the province and 16 percent of the population of the
city of Montreal, continues to protest restrictions placed on English-
language use. In 1997 the Quebec provincial government reestablished a
French-language inspection office that had been abolished in 1993.
Quebec's language law also stipulates that French is the working
language of most businesses and must predominate in bilingual
commercial signage. However, in October 1999, a Quebec court judge
struck down a key section of the province's language law that requires
French lettering to be twice as large as English lettering on
commercial signs, stating that French is no longer in jeopardy in
Quebec. In April the Quebec Superior Court overturned the lower court
decision, ruling that the lower court erred by finding that the Quebec
government had the burden of proving that French is still in jeopardy
in Quebec. The Superior Court stated that the lower court should have
found that the defendant had the burden of proving that French is no
longer in jeopardy in Quebec. The defendant has appealed the Superior
Court ruling. English speakers also expressed concern over the
increasing scarceness of health services and public schooling in their
language.
Provinces other than Quebec often lack adequate French-language
schooling and health services, which is of concern to local
francophones, although French-language schools and French immersion
programs are reported to be thriving in all three prairie provinces.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Except for members of the armed
forces, workers in both the public and private sectors have the right
to associate freely. The Labor Code protects these rights for all
employees under federal jurisdiction, while provincial legislation
protects all other organized workers.
Trade unions are independent of the Government. Of the civilian
labor force, approximately 29.5 percent is unionized.
All workers have the right to strike, except for those in the
public sector who provide essential services. The law prohibits
employer retribution against strikers and union leaders, and the
Government enforces this provision.
Labor action, including strikes, occurred throughout the country
during the year. Notable strikes included: Inside Workers strike by
clerical staff, social-work staff, tax collectors, health inspectors,
and public nurses in the city of Toronto, nurse and federal prison
guard strikes in Alberta, and forestry and hotel worker strikes in
British Columbia.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers in both
the public (except for some police) and the private sectors have the
right to organize and bargain collectively. While the law protects
collective bargaining, there are limitations, which vary from province
to province, for some public sector workers providing essential
services.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and requires employers
to reinstate workers fired for union activities. There are effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints and obtaining redress.
All labor unions have full access to mediation, arbitration, and
the judicial system.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including that performed by children, is illegal, and it generally does
not occur; however, women and children were trafficked for the purposes
of commercial sexual exploitation (see Sections 5, 6.d, and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor legislation varies from province to province.
The Federal Government does not employ youths under 17 years of age
while school is in session. Most provinces prohibit children under age
15 or 16 from working without parental consent, at night, or in any
hazardous employment. These prohibitions are enforced effectively
through inspections conducted by the federal and provincial labor
ministries. Education is compulsory nationwide through age 15 or 16,
depending upon the province.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and
generally enforces this prohibition effectively; however, children were
trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual exploitation (see Sections
5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Standard work hours vary from
province to province, but in all provinces the limit is 40 or 48 a
week, with at least 24 hours of rest.
Minimum wage rates are set in each province and territory, and
range from $3.65 to $4.77 (Can $5.50 to Can $7.20) per hour. Ontario
and Alberta have a minimum wage rate for youths lower than their
respective minimums for adult workers. The minimum wage does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. A family
whose only employed member earns the minimum wage would be considered
below the poverty line.
Federal law provides safety and health standards for employees
under federal jurisdiction, while provincial and territorial
legislation provides for all other employees. Federal and provincial
labor departments monitor and enforce these standards. Federal,
provincial, and territorial laws protect the right of workers with
``reasonable cause'' to refuse dangerous work and to remove themselves
from hazardous work conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, the Government prosecutes such offenses as
violations of immigration policies. The Government is conducting a
legislative review of the Immigration Act and introduced legislation
that specifically makes trafficking an offense punishable by fine or
imprisonment, but the Senate had not passed it by year's end. The
country is primarily a transit and destination point for trafficking in
persons. There have been several widely reported cases of smuggling and
trafficking, including hundreds of Chinese who arrived illegally by
ship in British Columbia during the summer of 1999 (see Section 2.d.).
Press reports indicate that over the past 10 years almost 15,000
Chinese have entered Canada illegally. Many of these illegal immigrants
have paid large sums to be smuggled to Canada and are indentured to
their traffickers upon arrival. Almost all work at lower than minimum
wage and use most of their salaries to pay down their debt at usurious
interest rates. The traffickers (snakeheads) use violence to ensure
that their clients pay and that they do not inform the police.
Asian women and girls who are smuggled into Canada often are forced
into the sex trade. Traffickers use intimidation and violence, as well
as the illegal immigrants' inability to speak English, to keep these
victims from running away or informing the police.
Vancouver and Toronto serve as hubs for organized crime groups that
deal in trafficking in persons, including trafficking for prostitution.
East Asian crime groups have targeted Canada, and Vancouver in
particular, because of lax immigration laws, benefits available to
immigrants, and the proximity to the U.S. border.
Canadian and Honduran officials are investigating the ongoing
problem of Honduran youths being smuggled into Canada who are being
used by Honduran drug traffickers to sell drugs. In January Canadian
authorities arrested dozens of small-time Central American drug dealers
including many Honduran minors. In February the press reported that
Honduran authorities were working to repatriate those minors.
__________
CHILE
Chile is a multiparty democracy with a constitution that provides
for a strong executive, a bicameral legislature, and a separate
judiciary. Approved by referendum in 1980 and amended in 1989, the
Constitution was written under the former military government and
establishes institutional limits on popular rule. President Ricardo
Lagos, of the Socialist Party, won a close runoff election on January
16 against center-right candidate Joaquin Lavin of the Alliance for
Chile coalition. Lagos took office on March 11, succeeding Christian
Democrat Eduardo Frei. International and domestic observers found both
the 1999 election and the subsequent runoff to be free and fair. Both
the current and former presidents are members of the ``Concertacion''
coalition of political parties. The National Congress consists of 120
deputies and 49 senators; this includes nine designated senators plus
two former presidents who are senators-for-life. The government
coalition of four major parties controls the lower house and, following
the suspension of two conservative senators including former president
Augusto Pinochet, counts a slim majority in the Senate. Continued
turnover in the court system has reduced the number and influence of
military-era appointees over the constitutionally independent judicial
branch to the point that there was very little influence in the
administration of justice.
The armed forces are constitutionally subordinate to the President
through an appointed civilian Minister of Defense but enjoy a large
degree of legal autonomy. Most notably, the President must have the
concurrence of the National Security Council, which comprises military
and civilian officials, to remove service chiefs. The Carabineros (the
uniformed national police) have primary responsibility for public
order, safety and border security. The civilian Investigations Police
are responsible for criminal investigations and immigration control.
Both organizations--although formally under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Defense, which prepares their budgets--are under
operational control of the Ministry of Interior. Some members of the
police committed human rights abuses.
The export-led free-market economy experienced its first recession
after 15 consecutive years of expansion in 1999, when the economy
experienced a decline of 1.1 percent in real terms with inflation at
2.3 percent. Economic growth for the year was 5.4 percent with
inflation of 4.75 percent. Copper remained the most important export;
salmon, forest products, fresh fruit, fishmeal, other minerals, and
manufactured goods also were significant sources of foreign exchange.
Unemployment stood at 8.3 percent at the end of the year. From 1987 to
1998, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line
decreased from 45 to 21.7 percent. Annual per capita gross domestic
product was approximately $4,700.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights;
however, problems remained in some areas. The most serious involved a
death in police custody, police mistreatment, use of excessive force,
and physical abuse in jails and prisons. The due process rights of
detainees were not always respected. Discrimination and violence
against women and children continue to be problems. Indigenous people
remain marginalized. Despite ongoing attempts to change the labor code,
limitations on fundamental worker rights persisted. Child labor is a
problem in the informal economy.
During the year, the Government, primarily the judiciary, took
significant steps to allow for the investigation of human rights abuses
committed during the former military government, and to bring those
accountable in certain cases to justice. The bulk of the human rights
abuses under the military regime occurred between 1973 and 1978,
although a number took place after this period. In its August 1999
ruling to uphold the removal of former President Augusto Pinochet's
congressional immunity, the Supreme Court ruled that Chile's Amnesty
Law could only be applied after a crime had been investigated and
prosecuted. At year's end, the Defense Ministry-sponsored Human Rights
Roundtable Dialog, comprising members of the armed services, religious
groups, human rights groups, and NGO's, was preparing to make public
information on the fate of some of the persons who were killed or who
disappeared while in official custody during the Pinochet regime;
however, military authorities continued during the year to resist a
full accounting of the fate of those who were killed and disappeared.
Unlike in previous years, the judiciary appeared not to interfere in or
stifle cases against alleged human rights abusers.
In October 1998, the United Kingdom detained Pinochet pending
resolution of a Spanish extradition request on charges of genocide and
murder. On March 2, after considerable legal action and a series of
court rulings, Home Secretary Jack Straw denied Spain's request on the
basis of medical exams indicating that Pinochet was unfit mentally and
physically to defend himself against the charges. On March 3, the
British authorities freed Pinochet and he returned to Chile. He faces
charges in over 200 cases, including charges of aggravated homicide, in
Chilean courts. The investigation of the most prominent of these cases,
known as the ``Caravan of Death'' case, led to the petition to remove
Pinochet's immunity and the subsequent effort to indict him.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings or other extrajudicial killings during
the year; however, one person died under yet to be explained
circumstances while in police custody.
On January 5, Carlos Antonio Millaman Munoz was detained on charges
of aggravated robbery. According to the Corporation for the Promotion
and Defense of Human Rights (CODEPU), on January 6, the authorities
permitted family members and a friend a visit at the headquarters of
the Investigative Police in the Santiago suburb of La Florida. Millaman
was reportedly in bad physical condition and feared for his life. The
same day he was transferred to the El Salvador hospital where he died
later in the day. At the end of the year, the case was still being
investigated.
A number of cases from previous years in which the police were
accused of extrajudicial killings due to excessive use of force or
mistreatment of prisoners while in custody remained under investigation
or pending resolution of appeals. These include the case of University
of Tarapaca student Daniel Menco Prieto, who police shot and killed
during a May 1999 student demonstration.
No information was available regarding the case of Jonathan Moya
Jara, whose partially clothed body was found with its head buried in
the sand in August 1999. In September 1999 the authorities arrested two
Carabineros who had allegedly detained the victim.
No information was available in the case of Raul Palma Salgado, who
died in police custody in 1998 after police allegedly tortured him. In
1999 a court sentenced four police officers to 10 years in prison for
his death, and their appeal was pending at the end of 1999.
The case of Claudia Alejandra Lopez, who was shot under unclear
circumstances during a 1998 demonstration in Santiago, also was
inactive. No new information was available on the case of the September
1989 murder of leftist leader Jecar Nehgme, which was reopened in
November 1998 when new evidence was discovered.
While former President Pinochet was in the United Kingdom, family
members of victims filed numerous charges in Chile against him for
deaths and disappearances during the period of military rule. Of these,
one concerned the 1973 disappearance of 19 persons in a case known as
the Caravan of Death. On August 8, the Supreme Court confirmed a Court
of Appeals ruling lifting Pinochet's parliamentary immunity in this
case. The Supreme Court's decision stated that ``the true purpose of an
immunity proceeding is to decide whether there is probable cause
against a congressman charged with a crime'' and, according to the Code
of Criminal Procedure ``there is probable cause when evidence is
discovered against a congressman that would warrant his arrest.''
Subsequently, the prosecuting judge ordered psychiatric exams as
required by law for defendants over age 70. Pinochet's lawyers appealed
the decision, arguing that general physical exams also should be
required. At year's end, the prosecuting judge had ordered psychiatric
and neurological exams and set a date to take Pinochet's deposition,
both steps required by law, which would ultimately pave the way for an
indictment and arrest order. At year's end, over 200 cases concerning
human rights violations had been filed in the courts against Pinochet.
The Supreme Court decision on Pinochet also contained guidelines
calling for full investigation of cases of deaths and disappearances
that are likely to fall under provisions of the Amnesty Law or that
potentially are subject to the statute of limitations. The Court stated
that amnesty is not applied to crimes in the abstract, but rather to
individuals found guilty of a crime. Likewise, the statute of
limitations should be applied only after the guilty party has been
identified and the courts determine that no impeding factors, such as
subsequent crimes by the accused are relevant. Previously,
investigations into human rights abuses during the 1973-78 period had
been impeded because the cases were thought to fall automatically under
the Amnesty Law and the statute of limitations. By 1989 this
interpretation already had begun to erode in the courts. The new
guidelines make it possible to open investigations into all types of
crimes committed during the 1973-78 period. Following these guidelines,
the judge investigating the Caravan of Death case expanded the charges
against Pinochet to include aggravated homicide.
In January a military tribunal changed the charges in the case of
Operation Albania--the June 1987 killings of 12 Manuel Rodriguez
Patriotic Front (FPMR) members--against former National Intelligence
Center (CNI) Director Hugo Salas Wenzel from being an author of the
crime to concealing it. The military court dropped indictments against
former CNI Sub-directors retired General Humberto Leiva Gutierrez and
Brigadier Marcos Derpich Miranda, Air Force Captain Hernan Miguel
Carmona, and Inspector Jose Morales Morales of the Investigations
Police and changed the charges against the 15 other individuals accused
in the case from kidnaping to illegal detention. The court ratified the
thesis of the investigating judge that the crime under investigation is
homicide, thereby affirming that there was never an armed confrontation
as the CNI had alleged. At year's end, the investigation and legal
proceedings continued.
Acting on a petition by the Council for the Defense of the State
(the official entity charged with the defense of the State's legal
interests), the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court on June 1
transferred the Operation Albania case from the military tribunal to
the Court of Appeals. Investigating Judge Milton Juica, who had been
handling the case under the military tribunal, was reappointed as
investigating judge.
No new information was available regarding the trial of eight CNI
agents who authorities charged in November 1999 in the case of
journalist Jose Carrasco, who died in 1986. Several of the officers
charged in 1999 were also under investigation regarding Operation
Albania.
There was little progress in the investigation of Operation Condor,
an undercover operation in which several military governments in Latin
America cooperated to kill leftist opponents. In 1999 Spanish Judge
Baltazar Garzon and a colleague collected evidence and took testimony
regarding human rights violations in Chile and Argentina during the
military dictatorships. The Social Aid Foundation of Christian Churches
(FASIC) reported that on July 2, Argentine judge Maria Servini de
Cubria (the same judge in charge of the Prats case) handed over
``extrajudicially'' numerous antecedents regarding Operation Condor to
Chilean Judge Juan Guzman in connection with the 126 (at that time)
cases against Pinochet pending before Guzman's court.
In 1999 an appeals court reopened the case of the 1982 killing of
labor leader Tucapel Jimenez. In 1998 investigating judge Sergio
Valenzuela Pinto had closed the case, ruling that there was
insufficient evidence to bring anyone to trial. Acting on a petition by
the Council for the Defense of the State, in April 1999 the Supreme
Court replaced Valenzuela Pinto, who had been criticized for his
handling of the case, with judge Sergio Munoz Gajardo.
Judge Munoz led the Appeals Court to order the detention of 12
persons for the crimes, including retired army general and former head
of Army Intelligence (DINE) Ramses Arturo Alvarez Scoglia. Munoz
subsequently charged several others, including retired army general and
former DINE director Hernan Ramirez Rurange, who is accused of helping
one of the suspects flee the country. He also indicted former Auditor
General of the Army, retired General Genera Gernando Torres Silva.
Another prominent official among the accused, former CNI director and
retired general Humberto Gordon died of a heart attack in June. Munoz
dropped charges against several other suspects. In November an
investigative judge indicted active duty Brigadier General Hernan
Ramirez Hald in the Tucapel Jimenez case; the indictment was the first
ever of an active duty general. At year's end, of the 17 persons
charged, the authorities had released 2 on bail, detained 14, and were
still seeking 1 person.
The family of Carmelo Soria, a Spanish citizen working for the
United Nations killed in Santiago on July 14, 1976, continues to seek
compensation from the Government in the amount of approximately $50
million (2.7 billion pesos) and has asked the Audencia Nacional de
Madrid to issue an arrest warrant for Pinochet, retired General Manuel
Contreras, and others.
In November an Argentine court found Chilean intelligence agent
Enrique Arancibia Clavel guilty and sentenced him to life in prison for
his role in the 1974 car bombing in Buenos Aires that killed former
Chilean army chief Carlos Prats and his wife Sofia Cuthbert. Arancibia
Clavel had filed an appeal, which was pending at year's end. The case
had been reopened in 1992 as a result of a petition filed by the Prats
family. An Argentine appeals court had ruled in October that the Prats
killing was a ``crime against humanity'' and, as such, was not subject
to the statute of limitations. The judge also requested the extradition
of Pinochet and other former military officers and one civilian in
connection with the Prats case. At year's end, the Chilean Supreme
Court was considering the extradition request.
On December 7, the family of Charles Horman, whom security forces
killed in Santiago in 1973, filed a criminal complaint requesting that
Judge Juan Guzman open a criminal investigation into his death. The
family also filed a petition requesting that the Supreme Court appoint
a special prosecutor to hear the case. At year's end, the Supreme Court
had not ruled on the petition and the case remained before Judge
Guzman.
On July 20, the Seventh Chamber of the Court of Appeals of Santiago
sentence two former CNI officials and a DINE official to life
imprisonment in the related Juan Alegria Mundaca case. The Supreme
Court upheld that decision on appeal.
Families of persons who suffered, died, or disappeared while in
government custody continue to file new claims for compensation. In
June the Group of Former Political Prisoners of the Region of
Valparaiso filed a claim with the regional appeals court seeking
damages for illegal detention and deprivation of liberty. In April a
Santiago court decreed that the Government should pay about $222,000
(125 million pesos) to two children of Doctor Enrique Paris for damages
resulting from the 1973 death and disappearance of their father.
Another Santiago court ordered the Government to pay approximately
$180,000 (100 million pesos) to the family of Arsenio Poupin Ossiel. A
court also ordered a payment of approximately $430,000 (240 million
pesos) to the family of Eduardo Paredes. All three disappeared after
being taken into custody by the military following the September 11,
1973, assault on the presidential palace. In August the courts awarded
approximately $500,000 (300 million pesos) to the widow and three
children of Luis Anibal Manriquez, detained and killed in November of
1973. In October the courts awarded $400 million (225 million pesos) to
Carmen Gloria Quintana, who received burns on her body after being
detained by a military patrol in 1986. The Council for the Defense of
the State was considering whether to appeal some of these awards at
year's end.
In October 1999, Italy requested the extradition of retired General
Manuel Contreras and another DINA (the army intelligence branch during
the military regime) official to serve prison sentences for their role
in the attempted murder of Christian Democrat Party leader Bernardo
Leighton, which occurred in Italy in 1975. Chile has no extradition
treaty with Italy. In October Supreme Court President Hernan Alvarez
rejected the recommendation of the investigating judge that the
Government either extradite the two former officials or try them in
country for the crime. At the end of the year, the Supreme Court denied
the extradition request principally on the grounds of insufficient
evidence and lack of due process because the two persons had been tried
and convicted in Italy in absentia.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
On June 13, a ``Dialog Table'' of military officers and human
rights attorneys signed an agreement that established a mechanism for
gathering new information on persons who had disappeared during the
military regime. Under a law approved in June, specific military
officers and community leaders were designated to receive information
on the whereabouts of those who ``disappeared'' during the military
regime. Information was received in the strictest confidence during a
6-month period. At year's end the armed forces and the Carabineros were
preparing to turn over information on the fate of 200 persons executed
during the Pinochet regime. The courts have taken steps to try to
locate bodies identified by the Dialog Table process and are deciding
what legal actions should be taken next. The FASIC, the CODEPU, and
other human rights organizations have several denial-of-justice cases
pending before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
regarding previously closed disappearance and execution cases (see
Section 1.a.). Denial of justice cases based on application of the
amnesty law also have been filed with the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights (UNCHR).
Investigations of military-era detentions and disappearances of
persons at Colonia Dignidad (now called ``Villa Bavaria''), a secretive
German-speaking settlement 240 miles south of Santiago, intensified
during the year. Paul Schaefer, who immigrated from Germany in 1961
with 300 followers, founded the 34,000-acre enclave. In April 1999,
investigating judge Juan Guzman issued a detention order against the
79-year-old Schaefer for the kidnaping and disappearance in 1974 of
Alvaro Vallejos in the vicinity of Colonia Dignidad. Schaefer, also
wanted by the authorities on other charges, remained a fugitive at
year's end. During the year the enclave was searched several times. In
October the authorities confiscated files and arrested Schaefer's
deputy Gerhard Muecke in connection with Vallejos' disappearance. The
Government issued an order to expel Muecke and two other German
citizens whose residency permits expired. Muecke would stand trial
before being expelled.
In January 1985, Boris Weisfeiler disappeared near the Colonia
Dignidad under circumstances that have yet to be fully clarified. The
case was reopened at the beginning of the year and is among those being
investigated by Judge Guzman.
On August 16, the Penal Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled that the
Fourth Criminal Court of Santiago had jurisdiction over the case of the
disappearance of Jose Manual Ramirez Rosales, arrested by agents of the
DINA in 1974. In May 1999, the authorities indicted former Army Sargent
Major and DINA agent Basclay Humberto Zapata Reyes (``El Troglo'') in
this case.
Of the 1,156 persons who disappeared under the military regime, the
remains of 985 have yet to be found. The government agency in charge of
the compensation program for the families of those executed or
disappeared under the military regime recognizes 3,197 victims of the
Pinochet era. These include 2,095 victims in which circumstances of
death have been established and 1,102 cases in which the persons
disappeared. During the year, monthly pension benefits, distributed to
an average 3,441 eligible survivors (spouse, mother or father, and
children), were approximately $11.3 million (6.3 billion pesos). Since
1992, the program has distributed well over $100 million (57.8 billion
pesos). Survivors receive pensions, educational benefits and other
assistance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of illegal pressure on
detainees; however, the CODEPU has received reports of abuse and
mistreatment by both the National Police and the Investigations Police.
When requested by other human rights organizations or family members,
CODEPU lawyers visit detainees during the interrogation (see Section
1.d.) and represent some suspected terrorists in court. The CODEPU
continues to investigate alleged use of excessive force against
detainees. The Minister of Interior asks the courts to conduct
independent investigations of credible complaints of police abuse, but
such investigations often do not result in arrests, due in part to the
reluctance of judges to pursue the issue vigorously.
The Human Rights Office of the Metropolitan Legal Aid Office, an
arm of the Justice Ministry, released a report in March 1999 noting it
had assisted 815 persons in 1998, twice the number as in the previous
year. The report further stated the Legal Aid Office presented 70 cases
to civilian or military courts in 1998; 42 cases were filed in 1997. Of
the more recent cases, 48 were lodged against national police officers,
while 7 cases involved the Investigations Police and 6, military
personnel; the remainder involved various civilian government
authorities and private security guards.
In 1998 a law entered into effect that clarified the illegality of
any use of force against persons detained by the police. The law
provides that if a member of the police force uses ``torture or
unlawful coercion,'' either physical or mental, or orders them to be
applied, or commits them against a person under arrest or detention,
the officer would be sentenced to imprisonment. Officers who know about
the abuse and have the ``necessary power and authority'' to prevent or
stop it also would be considered accessories to the crime if they fail
to do so. The CODEPU has found that this law had an important impact on
the conduct of the Judicial Police, but little impact so far on
Carabineros. Beginning in 2001, courses in human rights are expected to
be part of the core curriculum in the Carabinero police academies for
both rank and file as well as officers.
Human rights groups continue to claim that military recruits
sometimes are mistreated. The Commission on Juvenile Rights (CODEJU), a
nongovernmental organization (NGO), claimed in November 1999 that it
had received 380 complaints of recruit mistreatment in the previous 5
years. This statement followed claims of mistreatment by recruits,
lawsuits, and an investigation by the army that affirmed recruits'
claims of mistreatment. There were three suicides among recent recruits
in 1999 and one in 1998.
No new information is available regarding the case of 14 military
conscripts who military officers reportedly beat during a military
exercise in 1998. As of 1999, one corporal was awaiting trial in the
case.
At year's end, the court of appeals had not yet ruled on the August
1997 filing by attorneys for Carmen Gloria Quintana that appealed
efforts by the Government to set aside an award of approximately
$600,000 in compensation that the IACHR had recommended for Quintana in
1988. Army Captain Pedro Fernandez Dittus set fire to Quintana and her
companion Rodrigo Rojas Denegri while they participated in a protest
against the military regime in 1986. Rojas died 4 days later, while
Quintana survived with severe and disfiguring injuries.
During the year, there were instances of violent confrontations
between radical Mapuche groups and local landowners and representatives
of logging companies in the southern part of the country (see Section
5). Most of the protests involved rockthrowing.
A Marxist-Leninist group claimed responsibility for a bomb that
exploded on November 26 in front of the Colombian embassy in Santiago.
The bombing resulted in damage to property, but no injuries.
Prisons are often overcrowded and antiquated. A fight among prison
gangs that led to a fire and the death of seven prisoners caused a
national debate on the overcrowding of prisons, which are unable to
cope with a rapidly growing inmate population. At year's end, the
number of prisoners averaged 163 percent of designed capacity.
According to press reports, there were over 30,000 prisoners housed in
104 locations. Food meets minimal nutritional needs, and prisoners may
supplement the diet by buying food. Those with sufficient funds often
can rent space in a better wing of the prison. Although most reports
state that the guards generally behave responsibly and do not mistreat
prisoners, prisoners have complained to CODEPU about beatings.
Pretrial detainees are not generally held with convicted prisoners.
In 1999 a Santiago appeals court ruled that prison guards had used
excessive force when moving maximum security prisoners in February of
that year. Prison authorities appealed the finding, and the courts
absolved the guards, ruling that the force used was not excessive.
Prison guards have been accused of using excessive force to stop
attempted prison breaks. Although most reports state that the guards
generally behave responsibly and do not mistreat prisoners, the CODEPU
reported several instances of alleged mistreatment of prisoners and
believes that many others go unreported. CODEPU is particularly
concerned about the treatment of prisoners in maximum security prisons
and prisoners with HIV/AIDS and mental deficiencies who often do not
receive adequate medical attention. The Government announced plans to
build 5 new prisons in 2001 capable of housing 8,000 prisoners.
Women are generally housed in separate facilities, which tend to be
less crowded and with somewhat better conditions than men's prisons.
By law, juvenile offenders (those under the age of 18) are
segregated from adult prisoners. According to the latest available
figures, there were 6,630 minors in adult prisons in 1992 and 346 by
the end of 1997 although this number increased to 422 by the end of
1998. The Government announced plans to build three juvenile detention
centers in 2001.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The authorities
generally respect constitutional provisions for arrest and detention;
however, detainees are not always advised promptly of charges against
them nor granted a timely hearing before a judge. The Constitution
allows civilian and military courts to order detention for up to 5 days
without arraignment and to extend the detention of alleged terrorists
for up to 10 days. The law affords detainees 30 minutes of immediate
and subsequent daily access to a lawyer (in the presence of a prison
guard) and to a doctor to verify their physical condition. The law does
not permit a judge to deny such access; police authorities generally
observe these requirements.
In practice, many detainees are not promptly advised of charges
against them, and they are not granted a timely hearing before a judge.
At the end of 1999, 8 percent of the general prison population of
24,791 was under investigation but not charged with a crime; 45 percent
were charged with an offense and were awaiting trial or had been
convicted and were awaiting sentencing; and 48 percent were serving
sentences.
A 1998 law requires police to inform those detained of their
rights, to expedite notification of the detention to family members,
and eliminated the ability of police to demand identification from or
stop persons bases solely on suspicion. The law also deals with
physical abuse by police against detained persons.
The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel, but this
is a reality only for those who can afford to pay. The Constitution
allows judges to set bail.
There were no cases of forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a
judicial system independent of the other branches of government;
continued turnover in the court system has reduced the number of
military-era appointees over the constitutionally independent judicial
branch to the point that there they had very little influence over the
administration of justice.
Cases decided in the lower courts can be referred to appeals courts
and ultimately to the Supreme Court. Criminal court judges are
appointed for life. In 1997 constitutional reforms set 75 as the age
limit for Supreme Court justices, gave the Senate the right to approve
or disapprove presidential nominations to the Court, and increased
court membership from 17 to 21. Of the 21 justices on the Supreme
Court, 3 were appointed under the military regime. The Supreme Court
prepares lists of nominees for the Supreme Court and appeals courts,
from which the President makes nominations. The Supreme Court continues
to work with the other branches of government on broad judicial reform.
If formal charges are filed in civilian courts against a member of
the military, including the National Police, the military prosecutor
asks for jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court has sometimes granted,
although less often than in previous years. This is of particular
consequence in the human rights cases from the period covered by the
1978 Amnesty Law. In addition, military courts have the authority to
charge and try civilians for terrorist acts, defamation of military
personnel, and sedition. Rulings by military tribunals can be appealed
to the Supreme Court. Persons accused of terrorist acts and students
arrested during demonstrations for damaging property or assaulting a
police officer, are brought before military tribunals. On July 19 the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights received a submission on behalf of
32 civilians convicted in military tribunals for violations of the Law
on Terrorist Actions, Arms Control, and State Security. The plaintiffs
argued that applying military criminal law to civilians violates the
American Convention on Human Rights.
A 1997 judicial reform law created the post of Attorney General,
with a 10-year term, and a related office that is expected to be in
full operation by 2002. Congress passed enabling legislation for the
Ministry in September 1999. The judicial reform law, which applies to
criminal cases, provides that national and regional prosecutors
investigate crimes and formulate charges, leaving judges and
magistrates the narrower function of judging the merits of evidence
presented to them. Training and administrative setup began in 1999, and
implementation began in December with oral trials in 2 of the 13
political regions.
Based on the Napoleonic Code, the criminal justice system does not
provide for trial by jury, nor does it presume innocence until proven
otherwise. However, recent changes to the trial system, including the
gradual adoption of oral trials, have moved the system away from its
Napoleonic roots. Criminal proceedings are inquisitorial rather than
adversarial. The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel,
but indigent defendants do not always receive effective legal
representation. Indigent defendants, who account for the majority of
cases, may be represented by law students doing practical training, on
occasion by a court-appointed lawyer, or by a lawyer from the
Government's legal assistance corporation.
There were no reports of political prisoners, although inmates in
Santiago's maximum-security prison who have been convicted of terrorist
acts routinely claim to be political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanctions. A 1995 privacy law bars obtaining
information by undisclosed taping, telephone intercepts, and other
surreptitious means, as well as the dissemination of such information,
except by judicial order in narcotics-related cases.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respect these rights in practice. However, human rights groups have
criticized the existence and application of laws that allow government
officials to prosecute journalists who insult or criticize them.
The press maintains its independence, criticizes the Government,
and covers issues sensitive to the military, including human rights
cases. Investigative journalism is infrequently practiced for both
financial and political reasons, but recently on-line dailies are
including such stories more frequently.
Two major media groups control most of the print media, which are
largely independent of the Government. The State is majority owner of
La Nacion newspaper, but it is not under direct government control.
Electronic newspapers are emerging with distribution over the Internet.
The broadcast media also are largely independent of government
control. The Television Nacional network is state-owned but not under
direct government control. It receives no government subsidy and is
self-financing through commercial advertising. It is editorially
independent and is governed by a board of directors appointed by the
President and approved by the Senate. Members reflect various political
viewpoints, and the board encourages the expression of varied opinions
over the network.
Under the State Security Law of 1958, it is a criminal offense to
besmirch the honor of state institutions and their members and symbols,
such as the Congress, the Supreme Court, the military services, the
flag, and the President. Military courts have the authority to charge
and try civilians for defamation of military personnel and for
sedition, but their rulings can be appealed to the Supreme Court. Human
Rights Watch (HRW) and the Inter-American Press Association have
criticized these restrictions on freedom of expression and information,
as has the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression, who visited the country in June 1999 and called
for changes in the law.
Several cases have been brought against journalists under
provisions of the State Security Law. In February the Supreme Court
sentenced Jose Ale Aravena to a suspended prison sentence under the law
for insulting former Chief Justice Servando Jordan in an article in La
Tercera newspaper. HRW noted that the judge who issued the sentence
also insulted and threatened Ale in public before releasing the
verdict. In July President Lagos pardoned Ale.
In April 1999, ``The Black Book of Chilean Justice'' by journalist
Alejandra Matus, went on sale in Santiago. Former Supreme Court
President Jordan, who was mentioned negatively in the book, immediately
filed charges against Matus under the State Security Law, and an
appeals court judge ordered all copies of the book seized from the
publisher and book stores. The newspaper La Tercera and the Editorial
Planeta publishing house subsequently placed the prohibited text on the
Internet, using foreign servers, and the book was published in
Argentina. It remains banned.
After becoming aware of the Jordan lawsuit, Matus left the country
and sought and obtained political asylum abroad. The charges against
her and seizure of the book were widely repudiated, including by the
President and members of Congress. The IACHR adopted a resolution in
October declaring that, if the alleged facts of the case are certain,
they would constitute a violation of the freedom of expression.
Nevertheless, the State Security Law has yet to be modified and,
without a conviction, the President is unable to grant Matus a pardon,
as he did in the case involving the journalist Jose Ale.
HRW reported that authorities charged journalist Paula Afani Saud
with breaching the secrecy of a criminal investigation when she wrote
articles in 1998 about an investigation by authorities into narcotics
trafficking and money laundering. HRW noted that Afani refused to
identify her sources for information contained in the articles and
claimed that the subsequent charges brought against her violated the
public's right of access to information and counteracted a Government
initiative to protect the confidentiality of journalist's sources.
A 1996 privacy law set penalties for those who infringe on the
private and public life of individuals and their families. At the time
of the law's passage, journalists argued vigorously that applying it to
media reporting would have a chilling effect on freedom of the press.
To date, this privacy law has not been applied to the media.
The 1980 Constitution established a Film Classification Council
(CCC) with the power of prior censorship. The Council has banned over
50 films and approximately 700 videos, mostly for violence and
pornography. Local and foreign film distributors regard the CCC's
screening process as insufficiently transparent. The Constitution
permits the State to censure films. The Lawyers Association for Public
Liberties petitioned the IACHR to object to the Supreme Court's banning
of the film ``The Last Temptation of Christ;'' the case was before the
InterAmerican Court at year's end.
The National Television Council (CNT), created by legislation in
1989 and supported with government funding, is charged with assuring
that television programming ``respects the moral and cultural values of
the nation.'' The CNT's principal role is to regulate violence and
sexual explicitness in both broadcast and cable television programming
content. Films and other programs judged by the CNT to be excessively
violent or to have obscene language or sexually explicit scenes can be
shown only after 10 p.m. when ``family viewing hours'' end. In
practice, the ever-increasing volume of programming makes the CNT's job
all but impossible. The CNT issues occasional warnings to networks and
cable providers and sometimes obliges them to postpone the showing of
certain films until after 10 p.m. It also occasionally levies fines.
Debate continues over the CNT's role.
The courts can prohibit media coverage of legal cases in progress
but do so rarely. The press has begun using foreign Internet web sites
to publish articles when gag orders are issued.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble peacefully, and the Government
respects this right in practice. However, early in the year an
international group of neo-Nazis were prohibited from holding a
meeting. The Government enacted legislation to prevent the meeting from
being held and specifically used immigration laws to prohibit foreign
citizens from entering the country to attend the meeting.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Church
and state are officially separate; however, the Roman Catholic Church
continues to receive some preferential treatment. All denominations
practice their faiths without restriction.
A 1999 law on religion, designed to bring other religious entities
closer to the legal status enjoyed by the Catholic Church, went into
effect in March. The new law bestows the same legal status that the
Catholic Church previously enjoyed upon all other faiths. However,
their status still can be challenged in court. Reflecting its
historical position, the legal status of the Catholic Church cannot be
challenged at all. The new religion law removed the ability of the
State to dissolve religious entities by decree. Instead, this only can
occur after a judicial review begun by a complaint filed by the
semiautonomous council for the Defense of the State.
Many of the approximately two million Protestants, who represent
about 12 percent of the population, assert the Government has
discriminated against them. They cite the absence of Protestant armed
forces chaplains, difficulties for pastors to visit military hospitals,
and the predominantly Catholic religious education in public schools.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. For
minor children to leave the country, either alone or with only one of
their parents, they must have notarized permission from nonaccompanying
parent(s).
The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The issue
of the provision of first asylum has not arisen.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government through periodic elections. There is universal suffrage for
citizens 18 years of age and over. Free and fair presidential elections
were held in December 1999, with a runoff in January. In the second
round of elections, Ricardo Lagos narrowly defeated Joaquin Lavin with
52 percent of the vote to Lavin's 48 percent. Lagos led the center-left
Concertacion coalition that included his Socialist Party, the Christian
Democratic Party, the Party for Democracy, and the Radical Social
Democrat Party. Lavin was supported by the center-right Alliance for
Chile coalition consisting of the Independent Democratic Union and the
National Renewal party. The legislative branch, with the exception of
11 nonelected senators among its 49 members, is elected freely and is
independent from the executive branch.
The Government still operates under some political restraints that
the military regime imposed. Under the 1980 Constitution, various
national institutions--including the President, the Supreme Court, and
the National Security Council (the latter acting on nominations by the
armed forces)--appoint an additional nine Senators (beyond those
elected) to 8-year terms. In addition, former presidents Pinochet and
Frei exercised their option to become senators-for-life.
The former military government wrote the 1980 Constitution, and
amended it slightly in 1989 after losing a referendum on whether
General Pinochet should stay in office as president. The Constitution
provides for a strong presidency and a legislative branch with limited
powers. It includes provisions designed to protect the interests of the
military and the minority political opposition (currently the center-
right coalition). These provisions include limitations on the
President's right to remove the commanders in chief of the three armed
services and the national police; an electoral system that gives the
second-place party (or coalition) in each district disproportionate
representation in Congress; and the provision for non-elected senators.
In January the IACHR issued a resolution criticizing the existence of
designated senators and senators-for-life and urged the Government to
end the practice. In October a Senate Commission (including two
designated Senators) unanimously approved a proposal that would abolish
these positions starting in 2006, but at year's end Congress had not
passed legislation codifying this proposal.
Women have the right to vote and are active in all levels of
political life, including grassroots movements. Women are a majority of
registered voters and of those who actually cast ballots; however, they
are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 13 women
among the 120 deputies, 2 women in the 49-seat Senate, and 5 women
among the 16 cabinet ministers. No women currently serve as Supreme
Court justices.
The approximately 1.2 million indigenous people have the legal
right to participate freely in the political process, although
relatively few are active politically. One member of Congress is of
indigenous descent.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several human rights NGO's are active. The Chilean Human Rights
Commission, an NGO, is affiliated with the International League of
Human Rights. The FASIC is active on the full range of human rights
issues. The CODEPU provides legal counsel to those accused of
politically related crimes and to victims of human rights abuses. The
Government cooperates with domestic NGO's efforts to investigate
current accusations of human rights violations. Many international
NGO's also follow human rights issues closely.
There were no confirmed reports of threats made against human
rights activists during the year. An investigation into the burglary of
the CODEPU offices in 1999 was inconclusive. No information was
available regarding unconfirmed threats reportedly made against Rafael
Castillo, who had been involved in investigations of human rights
abuses associated with Operation Albania and other killings.
In May 1998, then-President Frei advocated the creation of a
``national defender of citizens,'' a state body that would receive
complaints about abuse of authority by government officials and
agencies. The Lagos administration forwarded legislation to Congress in
October to create this entity, but Congress had not passed the
legislation by year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law and the
Government generally respects these provisions. In 1999 Congress
amended the Constitution to emphasize the principle of equality between
men and women and now states that ``persons are born free and equal in
their dignity and rights.'' There are no laws that specifically
prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or social status.
Women.--The most serious violations of women's rights involved
sexual and domestic violence. The public is becoming increasingly aware
of the extent of physical abuse of women. The National Women's Service
(SERNAM), created in 1991 to combat discrimination against women,
conducted courses on the legal, medical, and psychological aspects of
domestic violence for police officers and judicial and municipal
authorities. In a 1996 study conducted by SERNAM, the most recent that
it has conducted, results showed that of 12,000 reports of domestic
violence since the Law of Intrafamily Violence went into effect, only 1
in 5 accusations resulted in judicial action. The study also found that
in nearly three-quarters of those cases, the accusation led to a
positive change in the domestic situation regardless of the judicial
outcome.
The courts may order counseling for those involved in intrafamily
violence. In 1997 there were approximately 61,000 reports of domestic
violence. The Citizens' Peace Foundation indicated that there were
1,052 cases of rape reported to the police in 1998, and 993 in 1997.
Experts believe that a majority of rape cases go unreported. In July
1999, a new law took effect increasing the penalties for sexual abuse.
The legislation includes clauses to facilitate proof of the crime and
to protect the privacy and safety of the person making the charge. The
new law also overturned 100-year-old legislation that permitted a man
charged with rape to be released if he asked the victim to marry him
and she accepted.
Legal distinctions between the sexes still exist. The law permits
legal separation but not divorce, so those who wish to remarry must
seek annulments. Since annulment implies that a marriage never existed
under the law, former spouses are left with little recourse for
financial support. A 1994 law created conjugal property as an option in
a marriage, but some women saw this as a disadvantage, since the law on
separate property (which still exists) gives women the right to one-
half their husbands' assets but gives husbands no rights to assets of
the wife. In the face of heavy opposition from the Catholic Church, the
Chamber of Deputies approved a divorce bill in September 1997; the bill
faces Senate opposition but was still on the legislative agenda at
year's end.
A SERNAM study in 1997 found that the average earnings of female
heads of household are 71 percent of those of male heads of household.
Women with no schooling averaged a salary that was 87 percent of their
male counterparts. The minimum wage for domestic helpers (who are
thought to number 300,000 in what is probably the largest single
category of working women) is only 75 percent of the standard minimum
wage. Female heads of household with university training averaged 57
percent as much as their male counterparts. The Labor Code provides
specific benefits for pregnant workers and recent mothers. Employers do
not have the right to ask women to take pregnancy tests prior to hiring
them. Legislation extending these benefits to domestic employees took
effect in November 1998.
Children.--The Government provides free education through high
school; education is compulsory from first through eighth grade.
Violence against children is a problem, albeit a declining one. A
survey of eighth grade students by UNICEF comparing the incidence of
mistreatment in the years 1994 and 2000 showed that in 1994, 34 percent
of children had been subject to some form of serious physical violence.
That number had declined to 25 percent this year. During the same
period, those having suffered some sort of serious physical violence
from their parents had fallen from 21.3 percent to 11.9 percent.
Violence by the mother (21.3 percent) was almost twice as frequent as
violence by the father (11.9 percent), and violence in low-income
households (31 percent) almost double that in high-income households
(16.3 percent).
A 1999 report by the National Minors Service (SENAME) noted that it
had handled the cases of 5,453 maltreated children for the first 6
months of that year; 583 of these cases were judged severe enough to be
presented to legal authorities. The SENAME reported that cases of abuse
brought to its attention totaled 9,723 in 1998 and 7,676 in 1997. From
the middle of 1998 to December of 1999, the SENAME brought to the
courts 713 cases for child abuse, 314 for rape, 292 for sexual abuse,
79 for grave harm done to children, and 28 cases of homicide. Of the
cases, 70 percent came to trial, of which 80 percent resulted in
convictions. Beginning in 1997, the SENAME lawyers began receiving
specialized training in child abuse cases, leading to a higher
conviction rate of offenders according to the Director of the
organization. A report from the La Morada Corporation for Women
released in May 1999 estimated that there are 20,000 cases of sexual
abuse of children every year.
A 1996 UNICEF report stated that 34 percent of children under 12
years of age experience serious physical violence, although only 3.2
percent of the victims of intrafamily violence reported to the National
Police family affairs unit were below the age of 18. A 1994 law on
intrafamily violence was designed in part to deal with this problem.
According to UNICEF, some form of corporal punishment is used by one or
both parents in 62 percent of households. UNICEF estimated that
approximately 107,000 children between the ages of 12 and 19 are in the
work force. A study by the Catholic Church estimated that some 50,000
children under age 15 are working (see Section 6.d.).
UNICEF estimated in June 1999 that there were roughly 10,000 child
prostitutes between the ages of 6 and 18, up from 4,200 in 1995.
People with Disabilities.--A 1994 law promotes the integration of
the disabled into society; the Government's National Fund for the
Handicapped has a small budget to encourage such integration. The 1992
census found that 288,000 citizens said that they had some form of
disability. The disabled still suffer some forms of legal
discrimination; for example, blind persons cannot become teachers or
tutors. Although a 1994 law requires that new public buildings provide
access for the disabled, the public transportation system does not make
provision for wheelchair access, and subway lines in the Santiago
metropolitan area provide facilitated access for the disabled only in
some areas.
Indigenous People.--Approximately 1.2 million persons identify
themselves as indigenous. The Mapuches, from the south, constitute
about two-thirds of the indigenous population, but there are small
Aymara, Atacameno, Huilliche, Rapa Nui, and Kawaskhar populations in
other parts of the country. A committee composed of representatives of
indigenous groups participated in drafting the 1993 law that recognizes
the ethnic diversity of the indigenous population and gives indigenous
people a voice in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, and
traditions. It provides for eventual bilingual education in schools
with indigenous populations, replacing a statute that emphasized
assimilation of indigenous people. Of the population that identifies
itself as indigenous, about one-half remain separated from the rest of
society, largely because of historical, cultural, educational, and
geographical factors. In practice, the ability of indigenous people to
participate in governmental decisions affecting their lands, cultures,
traditions, and the allocation of natural resources is marginal.
Indigenous people also experience some societal discrimination.
The National Corporation for Indigenous Development (CONADI) was
created in 1994, and indigenous people directly elected representatives
to this body in 1995 and 1999. It advises and directs government
programs that assist the economic development of indigenous people. In
May a commission appointed by the Lagos administration proposed a 16-
point program aimed at addressing indigenous concerns. As part of the
program, a permanent national commission was created to facilitate the
participation of Mapuche and other indigenous populations in the
formulation of national policies affecting them.
In October the Chamber of Deputies allowed to lapse a proposed
constitutional reform, pending since 1991, that would have recognized
explicitly the existence of indigenous persons and the state's
responsibility for encouraging development of indigenous culture. Also
in October, a group of 200 Mapuches marched from Santiago to the
National Congress in Valparaiso demanding land, more political rights,
and ratification of International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention
No. 169. That convention supports ``the aspirations of indigenous
people to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life
and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities,
languages and religions, with the framework of the States in which they
live.'' The marchers declared themselves satisfied with the response
they received from the legislators.
In the first decision of its kind, a Temuco appeals court ruled in
September 1999 that an indigenous employee fired from a municipal job
had been discriminated against by her immediate superior. The court
based its ruling on the Indigenous Law, which outlaws discrimination on
the basis of ``origin and culture.''
Several Mapuche families continued to object to exchanging
traditional lands for other property as part of the Ralco hydroelectric
project. The eight families involved continued to object to ENDESA's
effort to have them resettled. Land occupations and other violence by
isolated Mapuche Indian groups against private forestry companies
occurred through much of the year (see Section 1.c.).
The Government had not responded to suggestion from the U.N.
Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination made in August
1999. The Committee suggested that the Government apologize to and
compensate indigenous people for their historical treatment, and
explicitly outlaw racial and ethnic discrimination.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Country assimilated a major
European migration in the 19th century and major Middle Eastern and
Croatian migrations in the early part of the 20th century. Smaller
racial and ethnic minority groups such as those of Asian descent and
African-Chileans also can be found and experience some societal
intolerance.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form unions
without prior authorization and to join existing unions. The work force
is estimated at 5.7 million persons, of whom 3.7 million are salaried.
Union membership is approximately 655,000, or roughly 12 percent of the
work force. Government-employee associations are provided with the same
rights as trade unions; however, the law denies government employees
the possibility of uniting with other workers or to benefit from joint
actions, thus constituting an interference to their freedom of
association. Police and military personnel and employees of state-owned
companies attached to the Ministry of Defense may not organize
collectively. Members of unions are free to withdraw from union
membership.
The 1992 Labor Code permits nationwide labor centrals, and the
Unified Workers Central (CUT), the largest and most representative of
these, legalized its status in April 1992. Labor unions are effectively
independent of the Government, but union leaders usually are elected
from lists based on party affiliation and sometimes receive direction
from party headquarters. Political activities or affiliations of unions
or union officials are not restricted. Registering a union is a simple
process.
Employees in the private sector have the right to strike; however,
the Government regulates this right, and there are some restrictions on
the right to strike. Public employees do not enjoy the right to strike,
although government teachers, municipal, and health workers have struck
in the past. The law proscribes employees of some 30 companies--largely
providers of essential services (e.g., water and electricity)--from
striking; it stipulates compulsory arbitration to resolve disputes in
these companies. There is no provision for compulsory arbitration in
the public sector. Striker replacements are permitted under certain
circumstances.
Employers must pay severance benefits to striking workers and must
show cause to dismiss workers. Employees who believe they have been
dismissed unfairly or dismissed because of their trade union activities
file complaints with the Ministry of Labor. However, even if such a
claim is found to have merit, the employee does not enjoy the right to
reinstatement. In such cases the employer is only required to make
additional compensatory payments. The burden of proof rests with the
employer in cases in which employees allege illegal antiunion activity.
In October protesting truck owners disrupted movement along parts
of the highway system for over two days. The truckers asked for lower
diesel fuel prices and a limit on the number of truckers allowed to
work in the country. Labor unions did not support the truck owners.
The CUT and many other labor confederations and federations
maintain ties to international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Despite legal
provisions for collective bargaining, the Labor Code includes
provisions that make it difficult for trade unions to organize in many
sectors. As a result, the majority of workers work under individual
contracts. Employers say that this is due to the workers' preference,
distrust of union leaders, and loyalty to companies. Union leaders
counter that the Labor Code--which does not allow union shops--prevents
successful organization in many sectors. Unions cite the widespread
practices of subcontracting and temporary employment as a ways that
employers resist unionization.
The Ministry of Labor arbitrates about half of the complaints it
receives. Workers may take cases to the courts if they have not been
arbitrated. If complainants succeed in proving that they were fired
unjustly, the employer must pay discharged employees twice their normal
severance payment. There are no statistics available concerning the
disposition of complaints of antiunion behavior. There were allegations
that employers dismiss workers for union activity and attempt to avoid
a complaint by immediately paying them some multiple of the normal
severance pay.
Temporary workers--defined in the Labor Code as those in
agriculture and construction, as well as port workers and
entertainers--may form unions, but their right to collective bargaining
is limited, as it is dependent on employers agreeing to negotiate with
unions of temporary workers. Likewise, intercompany unions are
permitted to bargain collectively only if the employer agrees to
negotiate with such a union. Labor Code sanctions against unfair
bargaining practices protect workers from dismissal only during the
bargaining process. Labor leaders complain that companies invoke the
law's needs-of-the-company clause to fire workers after a union has
signed a new contract, particularly when negotiations result in a
prolonged strike.
Labor laws apply in the duty free zones; there are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the Labor Code prohibit forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known
to occur. While the Labor Code does not specifically prohibit forced
and bonded labor by children, there were no reports of such practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law allows children between the ages of 16 and 18 to
work with the express permission of their parents or guardians. The law
allows 15-year-olds to work under certain conditions; their parents
must consent they must have finished compulsory schooling, and they may
only perform light work not requiring hard physical labor, or
constituting a threat to health and childhood development. In July
Congress passed a law that raised the minimum legal age for some types
of work from 14 to 15 years of age. Additional provisions in the law
protect workers under 18 years of age by restricting the types of work
open to them (for example, they may not work in nightclubs), and by
establishing special conditions of work (they may not work more than 8
hours in 1 day). Labor inspectors enforce these regulations, and
compliance is good in the formal economy; however, many children are
employed in the informal economy. In August 1999, Congress passed a law
that raised the minimum age to work in an underground mine from 18 to
21 years; special regulations govern the ability of 18- to 21-year-olds
to work at such sites.
UNICEF estimated that approximately 107,000 children between the
ages of 12 and 19 work. A government study in 1996 estimated that
15,000 children between the ages of 6 and 11 and 35,000 children
between the ages of 12 and 14 are in the work force. A 1998 Catholic
Church study estimated that 50,000 children under the age of 15 worked.
The majority of these were males from single-parent households headed
by women; among these were children who worked more than 40 hours per
week and did not attend school. The Ministry of Labor convenes regular
meetings of a tripartite group (business-labor-government) to monitor
progress in eradicating child labor. The Labor Code does not
specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such
practices were not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages, and
the minimum wage is adjusted annually. This wage is designed to serve
as the starting wage for an unskilled single worker entering the labor
force and does not provide a worker and family with a decent standard
of living. Approximately 400,000 workers (about 11 percent of the work
force) earn the minimum wage. According to the Government, of the
workers who earn the minimum wage, approximately 43 percent are between
the ages of 15 and 19. A tripartite committee comprising government,
employer, and labor representatives normally suggests a minimum wage
based on projected inflation and increases in productivity. In May
1998, Congress approved the Government's proposal setting an escalating
minimum monthly wage through the year 2000; the minimum wage as of
December 31 was approximately $175 (100,000 pesos).
The law sets hours of work and occupational safety and health
standards. The legal workweek is 48 hours, which can be worked in
either 5 or 6 days. The maximum workday length is 10 hours, but
positions such as caretakers and domestic servants are exempted. All
workers enjoy at least one 24-hour rest period during the workweek,
except for workers at high altitudes who voluntarily exchange a work-
free day each week for several consecutive work-free days every 2
weeks.
Occupational health and safety are protected under the law and
administered by both the Ministries of Health and of Labor. The
Government has increased resources for inspections by over 60 percent
since 1990 and targeted industries guilty of the worst abuses. As a
result, enforcement is improving, and voluntary compliance is fairly
good. A 1996 law increased the number of annual occupational health and
safety inspections and provided that they be carried out by an expanded
labor inspection service in the Ministry of Labor. Insurance mutual
funds provide workers' compensation and occupational safety training
for the private and public sectors. There was a 24-percent decline in
reported occupational injuries in 1997, the last available figures,
compared with the previous 5 years, although 11 percent of the work
force still submitted claims. Workers who remove themselves from
situations that endanger their health and safety have their employment
protected if a real danger to their health or safety exists.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, although it may be prosecuted under
other laws.
There were occasional reports that persons were trafficked through
the country.
If cases of trafficking in persons were to arise, the police,
Justice and Interior Ministries, SERNAM (if the cases involved women),
or SENAME (if the cases involved children) would respond.
__________
COLOMBIA
Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy in which the
Liberal and Conservative parties have long dominated politics. Citizens
elected President Andres Pastrana of the Conservative Party and a
bicameral legislature controlled by the Liberal Party in generally
free, fair, and transparent elections in 1998, despite attempts at
intimidation and fraud by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and
narcotics traffickers. Similar attempts at intimidation by illegal
armed actors, including killings and kidnapings, threatened to impair
local elections scheduled for October; however, the elections were
generally peaceful. The civilian judiciary is largely independent of
government influence; however, the suborning or intimidation of judges,
witnesses, and prosecutors is common.
The Government continued to face serious challenges to its control
over the national territory, as longstanding and widespread internal
armed conflict and rampant violence--both political and criminal--
persisted. The principal participants in the conflict were government
security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotics
traffickers. The number of victims of paramilitary attacks during the
year increased. In some areas government forces were engaged in combat
with guerrillas or narcotics traffickers, while in others paramilitary
groups fought guerrillas, and in still others guerrillas attacked
demobilized members of rival guerrilla factions. The 2 major guerrilla
groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (ELN), consist of an estimated 11,000 to
17,000 full-time combatants organized into more than 100 semiautonomous
groups. The FARC and the ELN, along with other smaller groups,
exercised a significant degree of territorial influence and initiated
armed action in nearly 1,000 of the country's 1,085 municipalities
during the year, which was approximately the same level as in 1999.
Their popular support nationwide remained low, according to polls and
numerous other reports. The major guerrilla organizations received a
significant part of their revenues (in the hundreds of millions of
dollars) from fees levied on narcotics production and trafficking, as
well as kidnaping and extortion. Guerrillas and paramilitary groups
supplanted absent state institutions in many sparsely populated areas.
Peace talks initiated in 1999 between the Government and the FARC
continued in a demilitarized zone (``despeje'') consisting of 5
southern municipalities, with a total population of approximately
100,000 persons. In the absence of both a state presence and
international verification, FARC human rights abuses inside the zone,
as well as outside of it, continued. Peace talks were complicated by
the September 8 hijacking of a commercial plane by a FARC guerrilla who
obtained refuge in the demilitarized zone. On November 14, the FARC
unilaterally suspended negotiations and demanded concrete government
action against the paramilitary groups. On December 6, President
Pastrana extended the term of the demilitarized zone until January 31,
2001, as intense public debate continued over the value of the existing
peace process. The killing of congressional peace commission chairman
Diego Turbay Cote on December 29 cast further doubt on the future of
peace negotiations, although government and FARC negotiators remained
in contact.
In April the Government and the ELN agreed in principle on
verification within a proposed ``encounter zone'' in southern Bolivar
and northeastern Antioquia departments, in which the ELN's national
convention could take place. However, progress stalled when local
residents of the proposed zone protested its creation. Two groups--
Asocipaz and the ``No to the Despeje'' Committee--demanded active
consultation with the Government on the creation of an encounter zone
and on occasion blocked access to the area. Paramilitary groups have
attempted to influence these organizations. The Governments of Spain,
France, Switzerland, Norway, and Cuba took a progressively more active
role in the peace process during the year and committed to provide
development assistance when the zone is implemented. However, the
September 17 mass kidnaping of over 50 Cali residents by the ELN again
slowed the peace process. After negotiation coupled with military
pressure, the last of the hostages were released on November 3. ELN
leaders participated in a mid-October conference in San Jose, Costa
Rica, jointly sponsored by the Government and a group of
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), to explore solutions to the
conflict. (The FARC, although invited, did not participate in the
conference.) On December 15, five hired killers wounded public
employees' union president Wilson Borja, a key member of the civil
society facilitating commission in the Government-ELN peace process.
Carlos Castano, the head of the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia
(AUC) paramilitary umbrella organization, admitted a role in the
attack. The Christmas release of 42 police and military hostages by the
ELN paved the way for continued negotiations on the encounter zone at
year's end.
In open opposition to the Government, in November the AUC
paramilitary group kidnaped seven members of Congress and demanded that
the Government grant the AUC a role in the peace negotiations with the
FARC. Interior Minister Humberto de la Calle negotiated the hostages'
release with Castano, an action that angered the FARC. The Government
refused to accord illegal self-defense (paramilitary) groups any
political status.
The civilian-led Ministry of Defense is responsible for internal
security and oversees both the armed forces (including the army, air
force, navy, marines, and coast guard) and the National Police. In the
past, civilian management of the armed forces has been limited;
however, over the past few years, the professionalism of the armed
forces has improved, and respect for civilian authority on the part of
the military has increased. In addition to the armed forces and the
National Police, the public security forces include armed state law
enforcement and investigative authorities, including the Administrative
Department of Security (DAS) and the Prosecutor General's Technical
Corps of Investigators (CTI). The DAS, which has broad intelligence
gathering, law enforcement, and investigative authority, reports
directly to the President but is directed by a law enforcement
professional. The police are charged formally with maintaining internal
order and security, but in practice law enforcement responsibilities
often were shared with the army in both rural and urban areas. Many
observers maintain that government action to combat paramilitarism has
been inadequate, and in the past security forces regularly failed to
confront paramilitary groups; however, the security forces improved
their efforts to confront and detain members of paramilitary groups
during the year. Nevertheless, members of the security forces sometimes
illegally collaborated with paramilitary forces. The armed forces and
the police committed serious violations of human rights throughout the
year.
Despite years of drug- and politically related violence, the
economy is diverse and relatively advanced. Crude oil, coal, coffee,
and cut flowers are the principal legal exports. In 1999 the country
suffered its first recession in over 60 years, with a decrease in gross
domestic product (GDP) of 4.5 percent and record unemployment of over
20 percent. Although the economy recovered with 3 percent growth during
the year, the level of unemployment remained unchanged and was at 19.7
percent by year's end. The inflation rate at year's end was 8.75
percent. Since September 1999, the Government has adopted fiscally
austere budgets and floated the peso. High levels of violence greatly
inhibit business confidence. Narcotics traffickers continued to control
large tracts of land and other assets and exerted influence throughout
society, the economy, and political life. Income distribution is highly
skewed; much of the population lives in poverty. Per capita GDP was
approximately $2,100.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; there were some
improvements in the legal framework and in institutional mechanisms,
but implementation lagged, and serious problems remain in many areas.
Government security forces continued to commit serious abuses,
including extrajudicial killings. Despite some prosecutions and
convictions, the authorities rarely brought higher-ranking officers of
the security forces and the police charged with human rights offenses
to justice, and impunity remains a problem. Members of the security
forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed abuses, in
some instances allowing such groups to pass through roadblocks, sharing
information, or providing them with supplies or ammunition. Despite
increased government efforts to combat and capture members of
paramilitary groups, often security forces failed to take action to
prevent paramilitary attacks. Paramilitary forces find a ready support
base within the military and police, as well as among local civilian
elites in many areas.
On August 12, the revised Military Penal Code went into effect,
which provides for an independent military judicial corps and for legal
protection for troops if they refuse to carry out illegal orders to
commit human rights abuses; the code also precludes unit commanders
from judging subordinates. A series of military reform decrees signed
by the President on September 14 provided greater facility for the
military to remove human rights abusers or paramilitary collaborators
from its ranks and provided for the further professionalization of the
public security forces. The military judiciary continued to demonstrate
an increased willingness to turn cases involving security force
officers accused of serious human rights violations over to the
civilian judiciary, as required by a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling
and the new Military Penal Code; in August a presidential directive
reinforced these legal norms.
Police, prison guards, and military forces tortured and mistreated
detainees. Conditions in the overcrowded and underfunded prisons are
harsh; however, some inmates use bribes or intimidation to obtain more
favorable treatment. Arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as
prolonged pretrial detention, are fundamental problems. The civilian
judiciary is inefficient, severely overburdened by a large case
backlog, and undermined by intimidation and the prevailing climate of
impunity. This situation remains at the core of the country's human
rights problems. The Superior Judicial Council (CSJ) estimated, based
on a 1997 survey, that 63 percent of crimes go unreported, and that 40
percent of all reported crimes go unpunished. On April 6, the
Constitutional Court overturned much of the 1999 law that had created
the specialized jurisdiction (which had replaced the anonymous regional
courts system on July 1, 1999).
The authorities sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
Journalists typically work in an atmosphere of threats and
intimidation, primarily from paramilitary groups and guerrillas, which
appeared to worsen during the year; journalists practice selfcensorship
to avoid reprisals. There were some restrictions on freedom of
movement, generally because of security concerns. Violence and
instability in rural areas displaced between 125,000 and 317,000
civilians from their homes during the year. Almost one-fourth of these
movements occurred in massive displacements. (Exact numbers of
displaced persons are difficult to obtain because some persons were
displaced more than once, and many displaced persons do not register
with the Government or other entities.) The total number of internally
displaced citizens during the last 5 years may exceed 1 million. There
were reports that security force members harassed or threatened human
rights groups. Violence and extensive societal discrimination against
women, abuse of children, and child prostitution are serious problems.
Extensive societal discrimination against the indigenous and minorities
continued. Child labor is a widespread problem. Trafficking in women
and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem. ``Social
cleansing'' killings of street children, prostitutes, homosexuals, and
others deemed socially undesirable by paramilitary groups, guerrillas,
and vigilante groups continued to be serious problems.
Paramilitary groups and guerrillas were responsible for the vast
majority of political and other killings during the year. Throughout
the country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, and threatened
civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an orchestrated
campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their homes, thereby depriving
guerrillas of civilian support and allowing paramilitary forces to
challenge the FARC and the ELN for control of narcotics cultivations
and strategically important territories. Paramilitary forces were
responsible for an increasing number of massacres and other politically
motivated killings. They also fought guerrillas for control of some
lucrative coca-growing regions and engaged directly in narcotics
production and trafficking. The AUC paramilitary umbrella organization,
whose membership totaled approximately 8,150 armed combatants,
exercised increasing influence during the year and fought to extend its
presence through violence and intimidation into areas previously under
guerrilla control while conducting selective killings of civilians it
alleged collaborated with guerrillas. The AUC increasingly tried to
depict itself as an autonomous organization with a political agenda,
although in practice it remained a mercenary vigilante force, financed
by criminal activities and sectors of society that are targeted by
guerrillas. Although some paramilitary groups reflect rural residents'
desire to organize solely for selfdefense, most are vigilante
organizations, and still others are actually the paid private armies of
narcotics traffickers or large landowners. Popular support for these
organizations grew as guerrilla violence increased in the face of a
slowly evolving peace process. The Government continued to insist that
paramilitary groups, like guerrillas, were an illegal force and
increased efforts to apprehend paramilitary members; however, the
public security forces' record in dealing with paramilitary groups
remained mixed. In some locations the public security forces
increasingly attacked and captured members of such groups; in others
elements of these entities tolerated or even collaborated with
paramilitary groups.
The FARC and the ELN regularly attacked civilian populations,
committed massacres and summary executions, and killed medical and
religious personnel. The FARC continued its practice of using gas
canisters as mortars to destroy small towns, indiscriminately wounding
government officials and civilians in the process. Guerrillas were
responsible for the majority of cases of forcible recruitment of
indigenous people and of hundreds of children; they also were
responsible for the majority of kidnapings. Guerrillas held more than
1,000 kidnaped civilians, with ransom payments serving as an important
source of revenue. Other kidnap victims were killed. At year's end, the
FARC and ELN reportedly held 527 soldiers and police. In many places,
guerrillas collected ``war taxes,'' forced members of the citizenry
into their ranks, forced small farmers to grow illicit crops, and
regulated travel, commerce, and other activities. In March the FARC
announced ``Law 002,'' which demanded that anyone with assets of $1
million pay taxes to the FARC or risk kidnaping. The FARC routinely
committed abuses against citizens who resided in the despeje zone.
Numerous credible sources reported cases of murder, rape, extortion,
kidnaping, robbery, threats, detention, and the forced recruitment of
adults and children, as well as impediments to free speech and fair
trial and interference with religious practices.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political and
extrajudicial killings continued to be a serious problem. An estimated
4,000 citizens died in such acts, committed principally by nonstate
agents. Members of the security forces continued to commit
extrajudicial killings.
An analysis of data from the Center for Investigations and Popular
Research (CINEP), published by the Colombian Commission of Jurists (an
NGO), indicated that there were 20 reports of extrajudicial killings
attributable to state forces in the period from October 1999 to March,
including deaths that resulted from police abuse of authority. However,
the military claimed that six of the deaths resulted from
confrontations with guerrillas; four alleged deaths (of which only one
was confirmed) resulted from a panic when the army tear-gassed an
indigenous protest (see Sections 2.b. and 5); and five were attributed
by other groups to paramilitary forces. CINEP calculated 37 similar
cases in 1999, which also included deaths that resulted from police
abuse of authority. Most of the incidents cited by the Commission were
under investigation by military and civilian authorities at year's end.
The number of cases of military personnel accused of human rights
violations who were tried in civilian courts increased. There were some
reports that police and former security force members committed social
cleansing killings.
According to the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, there were 235
massacres (defined as the simultaneous or nearly simultaneous killing
of 3 or more persons outside of combat at a single location or at
several nearby locations) during the first 6 months of the year. An
estimated 1,073 persons were killed in these massacres; the Ministry of
Defense attributed none of these deaths during this period to public
security forces. The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police
reported 1,286 persons killed in 216 massacres (defined as 4 or more
persons killed in the same incident) during the year and attributed
none of these massacres to security forces. The Ombudsman's office
recorded 509 massacres in 1999, in which 2,262 persons were killed, and
attributed 20 killings to public security forces.
On August 15, an army unit mistakenly killed 6 children; the
Prosecutor General's office determined that the act was unintentional
harm caused in the course of duty and referred the case to the military
justice system (see Section 1.g.).
The human rights delegate of the Attorney General's office, which
oversees the performance of all public sector employees, received 201
complaints and cases during the first 6 months of the year and
concluded 26 disciplinary investigations. Among the complaints were 20
complaints of massacres. The Attorney General's office received 78
complaints related to massacres and forced disappearances during the
year. Approximately 75 percent of these complaints involved the army
(particularly in Putumayo, Antioquia, and southern Bolivar
departments); the other 25 percent implicated police or DAS officials.
During the year, the Attorney General's office concluded 13
investigations of massacres and forced disappearances attributed to
state agents and sanctioned 50 members of the security forces
(including 10 members of the National Police, 35 members of the army,
and 5 members of the DAS). The office exonerated 20 accused persons.
Contrary to previous years, the office referred all cases involving
human rights violations to the Prosecutor General for criminal
investigation. Five generals were under investigation by the Attorney
General during the year for failure to prevent paramilitary massacres
in 1998 and 1999.
At year's end, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's
office reported that it had approximately 918 open investigations of
human rights violations, in which 1,379 individuals are under
investigation. This number includes 286 members of the military and
police, 573 presumed members of paramilitary groups, 353 presumed
guerrillas, and 187 other civilians. The unit arrested 302 persons
during the first 6 months of the year, and other state entities
arrested a further 70 persons against whom the unit had cases. As of
November, another 676 arrest warrants for persons against whom the unit
had cases remained outstanding, of which 37 are for military personnel,
20 are for police, and 3 are for members of the DAS. The authorities
detained 38 members of the army, 41 police, 5 members of the DAS, and 5
members of the CTI during the year.
The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police announced that
25,660 murders occurred during the year, compared with 24,358 murders
in 1999. The press reported that on average one person was killed every
20 minutes. The police and the Prosecutor General's office have
insufficient resources to investigate most killings adequately. The
Superior Judicial Council estimated based on a 1997 survey that 63
percent of crimes go unreported and that 40 percent of all reported
crimes go unpunished.
According to a March report by the Ministry of Defense, during the
first half of the year, the military judiciary convicted and sentenced
206 members of the National Police, army, and navy for serious offenses
that the Ministry identified as violations of human rights: homicide,
bodily injuries, rape, attempted murder, illegal detention, and abuse
of authority. Of the total of 206 convictions, 66 were for homicide and
113 were for bodily injuries. The average sentences issued in 1998 were
58 months' imprisonment for homicide and 15 months' imprisonment for
bodily injuries, although sentences ranged from 2 years to 64 years for
homicide, and 2 months to 2 years for bodily injuries. The military
judiciary convicted and sentenced 206 persons for serious crimes in
1999. The civilian Criminal Procedure Code authorizes restriction to a
military base as an acceptable substitute for imprisonment when
military jails or prisons are unavailable.
In August 1997, the Constitutional Court more narrowly defined the
constitutional provision that crimes by state agents unrelated to
``acts of service'' must be tried in civilian courts (see Section
1.e.). Since then the military judiciary has turned 1,307 cases, of
which an estimated 41 percent are for possible human rights violations,
over to the civilian judiciary for investigation and possible
prosecution, including cases involving high-ranking officers. During
the year, the military judiciary turned 496 cases over to the civilian
judiciary, compared with 79 cases in 1999 and 266 cases in 1998. The
new Military Penal Code reiterates that the crimes of forced
disappearance, torture, and genocide must be tried in civilian courts.
President Pastrana reaffirmed these new legal norms in an August
directive sent to the military high command and the commander of the
National Police (see Section 1.e.).
Prosecution continued in civilian courts against army Major David
Hernandez, Captain Diego Fino Rodriguez, Sergeant Edgardo Varon, and
Privates Carlos Escudero, Ferney Cardona, and Raul Gallego, members of
the Fourth counter-guerrilla battalion (Fourth Brigade), for the March
1999 murder of Antioquia peace commissioner (and former Vice Minister
for Youth) Alex Lopera and two other persons. However, in March Captain
Fino escaped military detention; four soldiers are under investigation
for complicity in his escape. Major Hernandez had escaped in June 1999
and was still at large at year's end. Following Fino's escape, the
military announced that all military detainees would be transferred to
the military stockade at Tolemaida to prevent further escapes; however,
it was not clear that this was implemented in all cases.
On April 1, the Attorney General's office publicly stated that it
had found insufficient evidence to bring charges against retired army
Colonel Jorge Plazas Acevedo, former chief of intelligence of the
army's 13th Brigade, for the October 1998 kidnaping and later murder of
Jewish business leader Benjamin Khoudari. The Attorney General's office
announced that it was dropping its administrative investigation and
publicly asked the Prosecutor General's office to drop its criminal
investigation. However, the Prosecutor General's office continued its
prosecution of Colonel Plazas and civilians Jhon Alexis Olarte Briceno
and Guillermo Lozano Guerrero, who were on trial at year's end. The
Prosecutor General's office has 11 other arrest warrants pending in the
case; 1 lieutenant was ruled out as a suspect.
During the year, the Attorney General sanctioned eight service
members in connection with the May 1998 Barrancabermeja massacre, of
which three--army Captain Oswaldo Prada Escobar, Lieutenant Enrique
Daza and Second Lieutenant Hector Guzman Santos--were discharged. A
police lieutenant colonel, captain, and lieutenant, as well as two DAS
agents were suspended. On July 12, Elizabeth Canas Cano, a key
eyewitness to the massacre, was killed by two unidentified gunmen. In
May the Prosecutor General's office ordered the preventive detention of
four paramilitary suspects in the case; the investigation was still in
progress at year's end. The Attorney General's office also was
conducting an inquiry into the death of Canas.
In December the Attorney General's office charged 17 police and 9
army officials with collusion with paramilitary groups in approximately
160 social cleansing murders by members of paramilitary groups in
northeastern Antioquia (near the communities of La Ceja, Guarne, and El
Penon) during 199598. The Attorney General also charged two municipal
officials with omission. The Prosecutor General's office pressed
criminal charges against 3 of the 26 officials charged by the Attorney
General; police Captain Luis Alfredo Castillo Suarez Juan Carlos
Valencia Arbalaez and Carlos Mario Tejada Gallego were on trial in
Medellin at year's end. Army Lieutenant Colonel Jesus Maria Clavijo
Clavijo, Staff Sergeant Javier Gomez Herran, and soldier Carlos Mario
Escudero are under investigation in the killings. Clavijo was arrested,
suspended from duty, and placed in military detention on March 17.
Although the army challenged jurisdiction, arguing Clavijo's actions
were related to acts of service, the CSJ ruled that the case should be
tried in civilian court.
On March 3, the ongoing civilian prosecution of retired Colonel
Bernardo Ruiz Silva, former commander of the army's now disbanded 20th
Brigade (military intelligence), for allegedly organizing the November
1995 Bogota killing of Conservative Party opposition leader Alvaro
Gomez Hurtado suffered a major setback when key witness Luis Eduardo
Rodriguez Cuadrado retracted his previous testimony before a Bogota
judge. However, the testimony of another key witness helped the
prosecution. The trial continued at year's end. Also on trial are army
intelligence agents Henry Berrio Loaiza and Carlos Gaona Ovalle,
retired army warrant officers Omar Berrio Loaiza and Franklin Gaona
Ovalle, and civilian accused killers Hector Paul Florez Martinez,
Manuel Mariano Montero Perez, Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo Giraldo, and
Hermes Ortiz Duran.
In 1999 the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office
formally indicted marine Colonel Jose Ancizar Molano Padilla, then-
commander of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion, as well as marine
Corporals Javier Fernando Guerra, Eduardo Aristides Alvarez, and Jose
Milton Caicedo for the 1995 social cleansing killings of alleged
thieves Sifredy and Fredy Arboleda. On May 25, the Prosecutor General
ordered the detention of marine Sergeant Francisco Duarte Zuniga, who
was still at large at year's end. A disciplinary investigation by the
Attorney General was still underway at year's end.
In October 1998, the Attorney General's office severely reprimanded
marine Lieutenant Colonel Rodrigo Alfonso Quinones, along with 4
others, for colluding with paramilitary groups in the murders of at
least 50 persons in Barrancabermeja, Santander department, in 1992-94,
although he was exonerated by a military tribunal in 1994. Quinones
appealed the reprimand, but Attorney General Jaime Bernal recused
himself from the case, and Congress never appointed anyone else to
adjudicate the matter. The statute of limitations on the case expired
during the year, leaving the reprimand standing. During the year,
Quinones was promoted to brigadier general.
In July 1999, the Prosecutor General's office indicted paramilitary
Nicolas Antonio Gomez Zapata for participation in the January 1994 ``La
Chinita'' massacre, which resulted in the deaths of 35 persons. Among
the 50 service members sanctioned by the Attorney General during the
year were persons accused of involvement in this massacre. No progress
has been reported in the Prosecutor General's case.
At year's end, three army noncommissioned officers sought in
connection with the April 1991 massacre of bus passengers at Los Uvos
remained at large.
In August a civilian court absolved retired army Colonel Hernando
Navas of involvement in the November 1988 Nuevo Segovia massacre in
which over 100 persons were killed or wounded. The authorities have
charged 8 military officials, 1 police officer, and 10 civilians in the
case. Among these, Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Londono Tamayo and
Lieutenant Colonel Marco Baez Garzon continued to appeal civilian court
convictions related to the massacre. Londono remained in detention, but
was still on active duty, although he has been deprived of command
responsibilities. Baez Garzon also was deprived of command
responsibility and remained in military custody in Bogota.
On June 29, the Constitutional Court instructed the CSJ to
reconsider its 1996 decision referring the case of the 1987 forced
disappearance, torture, and death of a member of the M-19 guerrilla
group, Nydia Bautista, by accused retired General Alvaro Velandia
Hurtado to military courts. Upon the stipulated review, the CSJ
reversed itself and assigned jurisdiction to the civilian courts at the
end of July, pointing out that the acts were not related directly to
military service. The Prosecutor General's office continued its
investigation.
There was no information available regarding the pending trial of
Lieutenant Colonel Jose Vincente Perez Berrocal for the 1987 killing of
a Liberal mayor.
No motives or suspects have been identified in the September 1998
killing of Congressman Jorge Humberto Gonzalez. The investigation
remained open at year's end.
Credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups,
including instances of both silent support and direct collaboration by
members of the public security forces, in particular the army,
continued. Evidence suggests that there were tacit arrangements between
local military commanders and paramilitary groups in some regions, and
paramilitary forces operated freely in some areas that were under
military control or despite a significant military presence. Individual
members of the security forces actively collaborated with members of
paramilitary groups--passing them through roadblocks, sharing
intelligence, providing them with ammunition, and allegedly even
joining their ranks while off-duty.
The military high command, under the leadership of Defense Minister
Luis Fernando Ramirez and General Fernando Tapias, stated repeatedly
that it would not tolerate collaboration between military personnel and
paramilitary groups and that the army would combat paramilitary groups;
however, security force actions in the field were not always consistent
with the leadership's positions. Credible reports persisted of
paramilitary installations and roadblocks near military bases; of
contacts between paramilitary and military members; of paramilitary
roadblocks unchallenged by military forces; and of military failure to
respond to warnings of impending paramilitary massacres or selective
killings. Military entities often cited lack of information or
resources to explain this situation. Impunity for military personnel
who collaborated with members of paramilitary groups remained common.
In September the President signed military decrees that allowed for
the dismissal of members of the public security forces who were
complicit in paramilitary or other illegal activities; government
agencies actively investigated allegations of collaboration or
complicity with paramilitary groups by members of the security forces.
A total of 388 members of the military were dismissed in October;
however, it was not known how many of these were dismissed for
collaborating with paramilitary groups in such abuses (see Section
1.e.).
Both the Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU),
the largest of the seven major paramilitary organizations of the AUC
umbrella group, and the army's Fourth Brigade claimed responsibility,
but in different circumstances, for the January 23 killings of two
long-demobilized guerrillas. The ACCU claimed that it killed Uberney
Giraldo and Jose Evelio Gallo, both leaders of the Socialist Renewal
Current (CRS), and two others after abducting them from the village of
San Antonio, Antioquia department. On January 24, the army's Fourth
Brigade announced that it had killed two ``ELN guerrillas'' in combat,
but civilian autopsies identified them as the two missing CRS leaders.
On January 26, gunmen stole the bodies from the morgue but left the
autopsy reports behind. At year's end, investigations by the Attorney
General's office and the Prosecutor General's office were underway.
On February 19-20, a large group of AUC paramilitary attackers
killed an estimated 37 persons whom they suspected of being guerrillas
or guerrilla sympathizers at El Salado, Bolivar department. The navy
reportedly set up a roadblock shortly after the killings began, which
prevented human rights and relief groups from entering; some groups
accepted the navy's explanation that access was not possible due to
fighting in the area. The Ministry of Defense denied charges that the
navy blocked NGO's from entering or colluded with paramilitary forces,
and an investigation by the Prosecutor General was underway at year's
end. A military investigation did not find any substantiation for these
charges.
The paramilitary group reportedly had been in the town since
February 16, and had a list of names of persons they suspected of being
guerrilla supporters. The victims included a 6-year-old girl and an
elderly woman, and some victims were tortured or raped. The attackers
also burned several homes. On February 19, the paramilitary group flew
in a helicopter to rescue an injured member. According to Human Rights
Watch, 30 minutes after the paramilitary forces withdrew, government
forces entered the town.
On February 22, members of the 3rd Marine Infantry Battalion
captured 11 members of the paramilitary group suspected of
participating in the El Salado massacre, killed 2 of them, and downed a
paramilitary helicopter. According to NGO's and press reports, the
massacre at El Salado and a February 15-16 paramilitary massacre at
nearby Las Ovejas, Sucre department, displaced approximately 3,000
persons. By year's end, 16 paramilitary suspects were under arrest, and
the Prosecutor General's investigation into the paramilitary group's
responsibility for the massacre was concluded.
Members of the San Jose de Apartado ``peace community'' in Uraba
region, Antioquia department, as well as NGO's, accused the 17th
Brigade of involvement in 2 paramilitary massacres in February and July
in which 11 persons were killed. On February 19, unidentified
perpetrators widely believed to be members of the ACCU paramilitary
group attacked San Jose de Apartado. They selectively killed five
persons, and wounded three others. There were reports that the men wore
the insignia of the 17th Brigade on their uniforms and that army troops
were seen on the outskirts of the city several hours before the
massacre. On July 8, approximately 20 paramilitary assailants murdered
6 peasants in La Union, part of San Jose de Apartado. The attackers
reportedly gave the citizens 20 days to leave the town. NGO's alleged
that the 17th Brigade was complicit in both attacks and that army
members were near La Union prior to the July 8 attack. There were
allegations that a military helicopter hovered over La Union during the
massacre; however, these allegations were never confirmed. The military
investigation rebutted the charges. The Prosecutor General was
investigating both incidents at year's end. There were at least two
visits during the year by joint commissions of inquiry including
representatives from the Prosecutor General's office, the Human Rights
Ombudsman's office, and international NGO's. Human rights NGO's and
members of the peace community of San Jose de Apartado reported 11
additional deaths in separate incidents during the year, half of which
they attributed to paramilitary forces. They also reported frequent
paramilitary roadblocks, intimidation, theft, and the restriction of
incoming food supplies.
In February Human Rights Watch issued a report that stated that the
army maintains close operational ties to paramilitary groups. The
report highlighted incidents of collaboration by officers of the army's
Third, Fourth, and 13th Brigades. It stated that according to evidence
from government investigators, the army's Third Brigade based in Cali
provided weapons and intelligence to the paramilitary ``Calima Front.''
The report also detailed ties between the army's Fourth Brigade and
paramilitary groups and ties between the 13th Brigade (intelligence)
and paramilitary groups. The report also detailed threats received by
various government agents while they investigated these ties.
Vice President Gustavo Bell responded to the Human Rights Watch
report and said that while the Government has never denied residual
ties between individual members of the public security forces and
paramilitary groups, it has moved to break those ties and punish those
responsible. Bell said that the suggestion that there was a
``deliberate, institutional will to help and support'' paramilitary
groups was untrue. Bell noted that much of the information in the
report came from the Prosecutor General's office, demonstrating that
the Government was investigating military crimes.
In March the Attorney General's office ordered that Vice First
Sergeant Jose Maria Cifuentes Tovar, of the 45th Battalion, be removed
from the army for having failed to obey orders to install a roadblock
to prevent the escape of members of paramilitary groups from
Barrancabermeja following a February 1999 massacre that left nine
persons dead. On March 18, 1999, police arrested paramilitary leader
Mario James Mejia (``el Panadero'') for killing a taxi driver; he then
was charged in Bogota with leading the February 1999 Barrancabermeja
massacre and was still under investigation at year's end. Pedro Mateo
Hurtado Moreno and three other paramilitary suspects in the massacre
remained at large at year's end. Politically motivated killings and
related unrest continued in Barrancabermeja at a very high rate
throughout the year.
In March the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office
ordered the detention of army Captain Luis Fernando Campusano Vasquez
and sought the capture of 15 other civilians, including Carlos Castano,
who remained at large. They are suspected of being affiliated with area
units that collaborated with a 300person paramilitary group based at
Vetas, Norte de Santander department, which committed 15 massacres in
and around the towns of La Gabarra and Tibu between May 29 and
September 1, 1999. More than 145 persons whom the attackers claimed
were guerrillas or guerrilla supporters were killed. Nearby elements of
the army's 46th counterguerrilla battalion (Tibu) and Fifth mechanized
group (Cucuta), as well as police, did not intervene.
In July the Attorney General announced an investigation into
retired army Brigadier General Alberto Bravo Silva, Colonel Roque
Sanchez, and three other army officers for failing to prevent a
paramilitary massacre of 27 persons in August 1999 in La Gabarra. The
investigation was still in progress at year's end. Bravo retired in
August 1999 on the orders of President Pastrana. Two of the three army
officers are still members of the public security forces. Colonel
Sanchez, the regional police commander at the time of the killings, was
on trial at year's end. In October the Attorney General's office also
charged Colonel Sanchez. On May 3, the Prosecutor General's office
formally charged AUC paramilitary chief Carlos Castano with
masterminding the May 29 and August 21 La Gabarra massacres in 1999.
In March the Prosecutor General issued formal indictments against
eight security force members, including Tibu military base Commander
Mauricio Llorente Chavez, for complicity in a paramilitary massacre
that took place in Tibu in July 1999. Five members of the police were
charged in May and subsequently were arrested. On June 20, the
Prosecutor General's office arrested six members of the National
Police--Arturo Velandia, Luis Toloza, Miguel Hernandez, Alfonso Ortiz,
Gustavo Lobo, and Jose Ordonez.
In April 1999, President Pastrana formally retired from service
Brigadier Generals Fernando Millan Perez and Rito Alejo del Rio; both
had links to paramilitary groups. The Government stated only that it
``was no longer convenient'' for them to continue their military
service. The military judiciary announced no new developments during
the year in its ongoing investigation of General Millan regarding
allegations that he armed and equipped a paramilitary group in Lebrija,
Santander department, in 1997. The group was believed responsible for
at least 11 killings. In October 1998, the Superior Judicial Council
had determined that Millan's alleged actions constituted an act of
service and turned the case over to the military judiciary for
prosecution, effectively cutting off the prosecutor's investigation.
Millan had denied the charges. In June 1999, the Attorney General's
office opened a disciplinary investigation of Millan, which still was
in progress at year's end.
At year's end, General del Rio, former commander of the 13th
Brigade, remained under preliminary investigation by the human rights
unit of the Prosecutor General's office for allegedly establishing
illegal paramilitary groups in Medellin in 1987, and in Uraba in 1996.
General Del Rio is also under preliminary investigation by the Attorney
General's office.
On July 27, the Attorney General's office formally charged five
army officers, including four generals, for failing to protect the
residents of Puerto Alvira, Meta department, when paramilitary forces
killed 19 persons in May 1998, despite repeated requests by the Human
Rights Ombudsman. The five charged are former commanders of the army's
Fourth Division, retired General Augustin Ardila Uribe and General
Jaime Humberto Cortes Parada (the army's Inspector General); former
commander of the 7th Brigade, retired Brigadier General Jaime Humberto
Uscategui; commander of the 2nd Brigade, General Fredy Padilla de Leon
(former head of the Seventh Brigade); and commander of the ``Joaquin
Paris'' battalion, Colonel Gustavo Sanchez Gutierrez. Those involved
denied the charges. The Attorney General's investigation was still in
progress at year's end. In June a first instance military court
recommended closing the investigation of the case; the Superior
Military Tribunal was considering this recommendation at year's end. At
year's end, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office
had detained three members of paramilitary groups and had outstanding
arrest warrants for five more, including brothers Carlos and Fidel
Castano.
In August air force Commander Hector Fabio Velasco called for the
renewed detention and a first instance hearing of Brigadier General
Jaime Uscategui and Lieutenant Colonel Hernan Orozco in connection with
the July 1997 AUC paramilitary massacre of dozens of persons at
Mapiripan, Meta department. Army Commander General Jorge Mora had
recused himself from Uscategui's case due to personal ties and was
replaced by Velasco. A military tribunal was still considering the
issue at year's end. In May 1999, Uscategui was arrested on civilian
charges connected with the case, but in August 1999, the CSJ had ruled
that the case should be tried in the military courts. Uscategui was
released after 180 days when the military investigation produced no
action, although the investigation continued. Early in 1999, Uscategui
sought to retire from the military effective in January; however, his
effort was thwarted by the Attorney General, who ordered Uscategui
dismissed from the military in November 1999 for dereliction of duty in
the October 1997 judicial convoy massacre in San Juan de Arama, Meta
department. A military trial of Brigadier General Uscategui and
Lieutenant Colonel Orozco still was in progress at year's end.
In August 1999, the CSJ had sent the cases of all other defendants
in the Mapiripan case to the civilian courts for action, including
charges against Lieutenant Colonel Lino Hernando Sanchez Prada for
facilitating the massacre, which was determined not to be an act of
service. As of February 29, the Prosecutor General's human rights unit
had completed its investigations of Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez and the
five other defendants (two noncommissioned officers and three
commercial pilots) in the civilian judiciary. In November the
Prosecutor General indicted in a separate process Lieutenant Colonel
Sanchez, two army sergeants, and eight members of paramilitary groups
(including two civilian pilots). All the cases were on trial by year's
end. In addition to Sanchez, and the five other defendants, two more
presumed paramilitary group members (who also were still in detention)
were indicted in December.
In May the Attorney General's office, which in 1999 formally had
accused five officers, three noncommissioned officers, and five
civilian officials of possible complicity or participation in the July
1997 Mapiripan massacre, dropped the charges against and closed the
investigation of Lieutenant Colonel Lino Sanchez Prada. The other cases
remained under investigation at mid-year.
The case of retired army Colonel Jose Ancizar Hincapie Betancurt
for collaboration in 1993-94 with a paramilitary group that killed 10
persons remained pending before civilian courts at year's end.
In July Ivan Cepeda, the son of murdered Senator Manuel Cepeda
Vargas, was forced to flee the country due to death threats that he
suspected were a reaction to his activism in pursuing justice for his
father's 1994 death. In testimony before the Senate, the Attorney
General had stated that the Senator had been killed as the result of a
joint operation between some senior army officers and members of
paramilitary groups. In 1999 the Attorney General's office severely
reprimanded army First Sergeant Justo Gil Zuniga Labrador and Vice
First Sergeant Hernando Medina Camacho, then members of the army's 20th
Brigade, for the killing of Senator Cepeda, who was the leader of the
Patriotic Union (UP) party. The army discharged both men from service,
and in December 1999 they each were sentenced to 43 years' imprisonment
for their roles in Cepeda's murder.
Paramilitary groups committed numerous extrajudicial killings,
primarily in areas where they competed with guerrilla forces for
control, and often in the absence of a strong government security force
presence. The frequency of paramilitary massacres continued to increase
significantly. Several major paramilitary campaigns during the year
involved a series of orchestrated massacres in Uraba, Norte de
Santander, and Barrancabermeja. At mid-year the Human Rights Ombudsman
attributed 93 massacres, which claimed 512 victims, to paramilitary
groups. In 1999 the office received 1,467 complaints against members of
paramilitary groups. The Ministry of Defense attributed 52 percent of
the estimated 1,073 deaths that occurred in the 235 massacres reported
by the Human Rights Ombudsman's office during the first 6 months of the
year. In December the Ministry of Defense reported that paramilitary
forces killed 983 civilians in massacres during the year. The Colombian
Commission of Jurists attributed 657 killings and 118 social cleansing
killings to paramilitary groups in the period from October 1999 through
March. Paramilitary activities also included kidnaping, intimidation,
and the forced displacement of persons not directly involved in
hostilities (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). Paramilitary groups targeted
teachers (see Section 2.a.), human rights activists (see Section 4),
labor leaders (see Section 6.a.), community activists, national and
local politicians (including President Pastrana), peasants, and other
persons whom they accused of supporting or failing to confront
guerrillas. Paramilitary forces killed members of indigenous groups
(see Section 5).
AUC paramilitary groups were suspected of hundreds of selective
killings throughout the country, especially in Choco, Santander, Valle
del Cauca, and Antioquia departments. The FARC, the ELN, or both, had a
strong presence in these areas as paramilitary forces vied with them
for control of territory or resources, including coca cultivation.
Paramilitary groups continued to kill political leaders and peace
activists, including peace community leader Freddy Gallego, former
Aguachica mayor and peace activist Luis Fernando Rincon, and former
Cucuta mayor (and current mayoral candidate at the time of his death)
Pauselino Camarga. Fourteen members of the CTI were killed during the
year in various parts of the country. Both paramilitary forces and
guerrillas were suspected of responsibility in these killings.
Paramilitary massacres at Las Ovejas, Sucre department, and El
Salado, Bolivar department, were part of an ongoing paramilitary effort
to wrest control of the Montes de Maria region from guerrillas. On
February 15-16, approximately 150 ACCU members staged attacks in 5
neighborhoods of Las Ovejas. They killed at least 20 persons whom they
suspected of being guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers, burned dozens
of homes, and displaced a large number of persons.
On April 6, approximately 50 paramilitary attackers massacred 21
men whom they suspected of being guerrillas or guerrilla collaborators
at Tibu, Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander department, in a
continuation of a series of 15 massacres in the region in 1999.
On May 11, a paramilitary group that identified itself as the
``Calima Front'' claimed responsibility for the killings of 12
civilians in the village of Sabaletas, just outside Buenaventura, Valle
del Cauca department. The group also claimed to have killed 14 other
persons it suspected of being guerrillas in the same area. According to
Human Rights Watch, the army's Third Brigade created and supports the
Calima Front, which Human Rights Watch believes is responsible for at
least 200 killings between July 1999 and July 2000, as well as the
displacement of over 10,000 persons.
In August the AUC paramilitary movement claimed that it had killed
the leader and six members of the ``la Terraza'' gang of hired killers
based in Medellin. The AUC was known to have contracted the gang to
conduct killings.
In a series of attacks on the night of November 22, paramilitary
forces killed 15 fishermen in Nueva Venecia, in the region of La
Cienaga de Santa Marta, Magdalena department, and kidnaped another 22
persons whose bodies later were discovered. Human Rights Ombudsman
Eduardo Cifuentes issued a December 14 resolution that reported that 45
persons were killed and that 25 had disappeared, criticized slow
government action to assist those displaced as a result of the
incident, and called for immediate investigation of reports of a
paramilitary base in the area. The Prosecutor General's office was
investigating the 37 confirmed deaths at year's end.
Other examples of paramilitary massacres included the killing of 7
persons in Estados Unidos in January, the November killings of 15
persons in Granada in the western part of the country, and the killing
in November of 7 persons in Barrancabermeja.
Investigations of past killings and massacres proceeded slowly. In
many cases there was no progress in ongoing investigations. Progress
during the year included the issuance of warrants of arrest for five
suspects involved in murder and extortion as members of the El Corral
Convivir (self-defense group) in 1991 in Arauca department. Other
members of paramilitary groups investigated and indicted included Luis
Arnulfo Tuberquias, who was linked to kidnaping and theft on behalf of
such groups; among those captured were Jose Luis Hernandez and Ruben
Isaza, nephew and son respectively of paramilitary leader Ramon Isaza,
and Dario Zapata Hernandez, allegedly the second in command of the AUC
in the Puerto Boyaca area, Caldas department.
On May 3, the Prosecutor General's office formally charged AUC
paramilitary leader Carlos Castano with the August 1999 killing of
renowned journalist, political comedian, and peace and human rights
activist Jaime Garzon Forero in Bogota. On January 13, members of the
CTI captured La Terraza gang member Juan Pablo Ortiz Agudelo in
Medellin on suspicion of having been the gunman in the attack against
Garzon. Ortiz remained in detention in Bogota at year's end. In
December a group of men claiming to represent the ``La Terraza''
criminal organization said publicly that they were hired by Castano to
kill Jaime Garzon and human rights activists Elsa Alvarado, Mario
Calderon, Jesus Maria Valle, and Eduardo Umana Mendoza. They offered to
turn themselves in and provide proof of Castano's involvement in return
for security guarantees from the Government. There was no public
response from the authorities by year's end.
In December 1999, Spain complied with a government request and
extradited paramilitary Lubin de Jesus Morales Orozco, who was arrested
in Madrid in June 1999 on unrelated charges, for the April 1998 killing
of Eduardo Umana Mendoza, perhaps the country's best-known and most
controversial human rights lawyer. Five persons, including Morales,
remained in detention and were on trial in a civilian court at year's
end.
On June 14, the trial of 10 persons suspected of the February 1998
killing of human rights activist Jesus Maria Valle began in Medellin.
Valle was the president of the Antioquia Permanent Committee for the
Defense of Human Rights. Charges were brought against suspected killers
Jorge Eliecer Rodriguez Guzman, Alvaro Goez Meza, Gilma Patricia
Gaviria Palacios, Elkin Dario Granada Lopez, Alexander Vallejo
Echeverry, and Carlos Alberto Bedoya Marulanda for direct participation
in the crime. In August 1999, the Prosecutor General's office issued
arrest warrants for AUC paramilitary leader Carlos Castano and Juan
Carlos Gonzalez Jaramillo for planning the crime. Castano was indicted
in September 1998 for the killing. According to press reports, the
first police agent on the case was killed soon afterward; the
prosecutor fled the country; and another investigator was killed in
September 1999.
On November 22, a Bogota judge convicted paramilitary Juan Carlos
Gonzalez Jaramillo (alias ``El Colorado'') and Walter Jose Alvarez
Rivera in the May 1997 murders of two CINEP workers, Mario Calderon and
Elsa Alvarado, as well as Alvarado's father, Carlos Alvarado. Jaramillo
was sentenced to 60 years in prison, and Alvarez Rivera was sentenced
to 45 years. The judge determined that soccer magnate Gustavo Adolfo
Upegui Lopez was not implicated in the murders but ordered a review of
evidence presented during the CINEP trial that connected Upegui with
paramilitary groups. Upegui remained under arrest in Medellin on
separate charges at year's end. The judge also convicted two other men
connected to the case for the illegal use of telecommunications
equipment and exonerated two other men accused of organizing the
murders. An arrest warrant for paramilitary leader Carlos Castano in
connection with this case remains outstanding.
Accused paramilitary Ivan Urdinola Grajales remained detained in
connection with the 1989-90 ``Trujillo I'' massacres in Valle
department, and also is implicated in the 1994 ``Trujillo II''
massacre. Prosecutors also have an outstanding warrant for the
detention of one other paramilitary member in the Trujillo I case. In
May a court upheld charges against paramilitary Norberto Morales
Ledesma for involvement in the Trujillo II massacre. Paramilitary
member Reynel Gomez Correa, detained in 1999 in connection with
Trujillo II, was murdered in prison in December, before he could be
brought to trial. Two other members of paramilitary groups implicated
in both Trujillo I and Trujillo II remain at large. One such person has
been detained, and another is being sought in the Trujillo I massacre.
One paramilitary member has been convicted and another detained for the
1994 Trujillo II massacre. Investigations continue in both cases.
In July the superior court of Cundinamarca department exonerated
Jose Tellez and his wife Nancy Lozano, who were accused of
participating in the 1989 killing of Liberal presidential candidate
Luis Carlos Galan. Another suspect, Alberto Hubiz Hazbun, who was
accused of planning the crime, was absolved in 1993. The only person to
have been convicted of the crime is John Jairo Velazquez Vasquez, who
was sentenced to 20 years in prison in 1997.
No suspects have been identified in the September 1999 killing of
academic and peace activist Jesus Bejarano.
There was no information available on the investigation into the
May 1998 killing of former Defense Minister General Fernando Landazabal
Reyes.
While an estimated 507 members of paramilitary groups were believed
to be in jail at year's end, known paramilitary leaders largely
remained beyond the reach of the law. Government figures indicated that
from 1997 through October 2000, 934 members of paramilitary groups have
been captured, and 150 members have been killed. The Ministry of
Defense reported that during the year the security forces killed 89
members of paramilitary groups and captured 315 members. In 1999 the
army reported that it killed 26 members of paramilitary groups and
captured 102 during that year.
Paramilitary forces killed members of indigenous groups (see
Section 5) and members of trade unions (see Section 6.a.).
The guerrillas of the FARC, the ELN, and the People's Liberation
Army (EPL) continued to commit killings, often targeting noncombatants
in a manner similar to that of paramilitary groups. The Colombian
Commission of Jurists reported that guerrillas were responsible for 236
political killings in the period of October 1999 through March. The
Ministry of Defense attributed 880 civilian deaths in massacres to
guerrillas during the year. The Human Rights Ombudsman attributed 22
massacres to the FARC during the first 6 months of the year and 9
massacres to the ELN. The Ombudsman also attributed 89 killings to the
FARC and 31 killings to the ELN during the first 6 months of the year.
Local elected officials and candidates for public office, teachers,
civic leaders, business owners, and peasants opposed to their political
or military activities were common targets. The Federation of Colombian
Municipalities reported that 17 mayors were killed during the year;
guerrillas were the principal suspects (see Section 3). For example, in
November unknown gunmen killed Carlos Julio Rosas, mayor of Orito,
Putumayo department. In addition, in the run-up to the October
municipal elections, 19 mayoral candidates were killed. Police and
military personnel were targeted for selective and combat killings (see
Section 1.g.). Guerrilla groups also killed religious leaders (see
Section 2.c.), members of indigenous groups (see Section 5), and labor
leaders (see Section 6.a.). Some communities controlled by guerrillas
also experienced social cleansing killings of criminal or other
``undesirable'' elements. Guerrilla campaigns around the demilitarized
area, in the Norte de Santander, Antioquia, and southern departments
often involved significant civilian casualties and prompted significant
displacements (see Section 1.g.).
According to military statistics, FARC and ELN guerrillas killed as
many as 200 children during the year (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office reported
in November that it is conducting ongoing investigations into the
detention, disappearance, and deaths of 92 off-duty army personnel.
Police suspected 22nd FARC front commander ``Geovanni'' of ordering the
February 27 killing of retired army General Crispiniano Quinones (a
former commander of the 13th Brigade) by unidentified gunmen at La
Vega, Cundinamarca department. According to the press, Geovanni and two
other FARC members were killed shortly thereafter in a confrontation
with police.
On March 25 and 26, at least 21 police officers and 8 civilians
(including the mayor of Vigia del Fuerte and 2 children) were killed
when the FARC overran the twin towns of Vigia del Fuerte, Antioquia
department, and Bellavista, Choco department. The FARC held captive at
least seven more police officers. The FARC tortured many of the
policemen before killing them outside of combat. In April the
authorities issued an arrest warrant for FARC member Luis Fernando
Zapata Hinestroza.
In May six men who participated in roadblocks protesting a possible
demilitarized zone for the ELN in southern Bolivar and Antioquia
departments were killed in the Magdalena Medio region. The ELN was
suspected of the killings.
On May 7, FARC guerrillas attacked a public bus in Gigante, Huila
department, with an explosive device; the driver lost control and hit a
tree. FARC members shot at the occupants of the bus and burned the
vehicle; four occupants were still inside when the bus was set on fire
and are presumed dead.
In June the FARC massacred at least 11 civilians at Nutibara,
Antioquia department, and injured 15 other persons. The army's 14th
Brigade responded to this and other FARC attacks, reportedly killing 14
guerrillas.
On July 10, in Huila department, two unidentified gunmen killed
General Saulo Gil Ramirez, former Director of the National Police from
1958-65. The press speculated that guerrillas were responsible for the
killing.
On July 1, 1 person was killed and approximately 40 were wounded
when several explosive devices exploded at the El Valle police command
in Cali. Authorities attributed the explosion to subversive groups. On
the same day, ELN guerrillas attacked the police's Simon Bolivar
Carabineer Academy in southwestern Cali.
On July 14, the FARC entered the town of Roncesvalles in Tolima
department and killed 13 policemen (see Section 1.g.).
An August offensive by the FARC resulted in the deaths of more than
20 civilians and military personnel.
In August FARC guerrillas killed secretary general of Rio Blanco
Milciades Luis Garabito after accusing him of paramilitary ties.
According to press reports, also in August an ELN guerrilla squad
tortured and killed eight residents of Sardinita, including one child
and one teacher.
In early October, the FARC attacked the remote village of Ortega
and killed eight persons, including two women and two children. The
guerrillas also burned 20 homes, a school, and a church.
On October 18, guerrillas attacked Bagado and Dabeiba in the Choco
department, killing 1 police officer; 17 were missing. Much of Bagado
was destroyed.
On November 23, suspected guerrillas killed 12 persons in Santander
de Quilichao, Cauca department. At least some of the victims reportedly
were linked to paramilitary groups. Two women were injured. Also on
November 23, FARC guerrillas killed nine peasants suspected of
collaborating with paramilitary groups in Antioquia department.
Investigations into reported killings by FARC members within and on
the periphery of the demilitarized zone continued. On December 29,
congressional peace commission chairman Diego Turbay Cote, his mother
councilwoman Ines Cote, and five other persons were killed in Caqueta
department (near the FARC demilitarized zone). The killings placed the
future of the peace process in doubt as the Prosecutor General, army,
and police alleged that the FARC were responsible. There was no
reported progress in the Prosecutor General's investigation into the
May 1999 killings in Vereda Perlas Altas, Puerto Rico, Caqueta
department. According to press reports, the FARC have executed
approximately 20 residents in the despeje zone.
Guerrillas killed citizens using bombs and artillery and continued
their practice of using gas canisters to attack small towns, thereby
killing civilians indiscriminately (see Section 1.g.).
On May 1, FARC spokesman Raul Reyes said that a FARC
``revolutionary tribunal'' exonerated FARC eastern bloc commander
German Briceno Suarez (``Grannobles'') of involvement in the March 1999
killings of kidnaped American citizen indigenous activists Terence
Freitas, Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok near Saravena, Arauca
department. In July 1999, the Prosecutor General's office ordered the
arrest of Briceno; army efforts to apprehend him and other FARC members
accused of the crime had not been successful at year's end. Reyes said
that investigations of other FARC members suspected of the killings
would continue. In September the Prosecutor General's office sought to
question Nelson Vargas Ruedas, a FARC guerrilla imprisoned in Bogota,
for information about the crime. U'wa tribe member Gustavo Bocota
Aguablanca, who also was indicted for the crime in December 1999, was
still at large at year's end. The investigation of the case continued
at year's end.
In December a Medellin court ruled that Wilson Eusebio Garcia
Ramirez, commander of the ELN's ``Carlos Alirio Buitrago'' front,
should be tried in absentia for the September 1998 killings of CTI
members Edilbrando Roa Lopez and John Morales Patino at Mesopotamia,
Antioquia. The two had been investigating a 1998 massacre of nine
persons at the nearby town of Sonson.
At year's end, the authorities had not yet captured two members of
the FARC's 32nd Front, including Arley Leal and Milton de Jesus Tonal
Redondo (``Joaquin Gomez'' or ``Usurriaga''), head of the FARC's
southern bloc, in connection with the September 1998 murder of Father
Alcides Jimenez in Putumayo.
The Ministry of Defense reported that security forces killed 970
guerrillas and captured 1,556 guerrillas during the year. The
Prosecutor General's office reported that at year's end, it had open
investigations of 353 guerrillas, had 53 guerrillas in custody, and had
252 warrants for the arrest of guerrilla leaders.
Approximately 80 cases regarding Colombia were before the
InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) at year's end. The
great majority involved violations of the right to life. At year's end,
the IACHR was expected to make a decision about whether to move a case
involving paramilitary and military involvement in the 1996 killing of
19 merchants to the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.
The IACHR continued the process of trying to reach an amicable
settlement of the Patriotic Union's 1996 complaint charging the
Government with ``action or omission'' in what the UP termed
``political genocide'' of the UP and the Communist Party. As part of
the process, since June the Government has provided protection through
the Interior Ministry to surviving UP and Communist Party members.
Despite these efforts, at least two UP members reportedly were killed
during the year.
There continued to be incidents of social cleansing--including
attacks and killings--directed against individuals deemed socially
undesirable, such as drug addicts, prostitutes, transvestites,
homosexuals, beggars, and street children. The Colombian Commission of
Jurists did not attribute any social cleansing killings to security
forces during the period from October 1999 through March; it attributed
118 social cleansing killings to paramilitary groups and 2 such
killings during this period to the guerrillas.
b. Disappearance.--The 1991 Constitution and the law explicitly
prohibit ``forced disappearance;'' however, it continued to be a
problem. On May 30, Congress codified forced disappearance, genocide,
torture, and forced displacement as crimes, permitting such cases to be
tried in the civilian judiciary. On July 6, President Pastrana signed
the law, and it entered into effect immediately. Human rights activists
noted that the final law did not include a draft article stipulating
that the four crimes, as serious human rights violations, must be tried
in the civilian, rather than the military judiciary, when military
defendants are involved, according to a 1997 Constitutional Court
decision. However, advocates of the bill noted that the reformed
Military Penal Code, which entered into effect August 12, did include
such a stipulation. More than 3,000 cases of forced disappearance have
been reported formally to the authorities since 1977; very few have
ever been resolved. Many of the victims disappeared in the course of
various confrontations between armed groups or with the State. The
great majority of victims of forced disappearance were never seen or
heard from again.
The Attorney General's office, which oversees the performance of
all public sector employees, received 78 complaints related to
massacres and forced disappearances during the year; approximately 75
percent of these complaints involved the army (particularly in
Putumayo, Antioquia and southern Bolivar departments); the other 25
percent implicated police or DAS officials. A report of three persons
who allegedly disappeared due to actions by the army has not been
confirmed.
There were no reported results from the trial in a civilian court
of police Major Manuel de Jesus Lozada Plazas, the former deputy
commander of the Government's elite antikidnaping squads known as the
GAULA, at year's end. The authorities had suspended him from duty and
placed him on half-pay following his arrest in March 1997. There also
have been no results reported in the investigation into cooperation
between these squads and illegal paramilitary groups.
In May the Prosecutor General indicted retired Colonel Gonzalo Gil
Rojas, former commander of the 20th Brigade, for responsibility in the
1989 kidnaping of Amparo Tordecillo Trujillo, a former EPL member; in
December the charges were dismissed. The Prosecutor General also
indicted in absentia former 20th Brigade members retired Captain Mario
Raul Rodriguez Reynoso and three noncommissioned officers; they
remained at large at year's end.
The law prohibits kidnaping; however, it remained an extremely
serious problem. Reforms to the Penal Code enacted in June increased
the minimum sentence for simple kidnaping from 6 to 8 years; the
maximum is 20 years. Police figures for the year, corroborated by Free
Country Foundation (Fundacion Pais Libre), registered 3,706 kidnapings
during the year, compared with 3,201 in 1999. Paramilitary groups
kidnaped 280 persons, while criminals kidnaped 371 persons and another
944 persons were kidnaped by unknown persons or groups. Guerrilla
groups were responsible for 2,104 cases. An estimated 164 minors were
in captivity at year's end. GAULA members and other units of the
security forces freed 507 persons during the year (including at least
48 children); 285 of the rescued victims were held by the ELN, 82 by
the FARC, 44 by the EPL (Popular Liberation Army), and the remaining 96
by either paramilitary groups or common criminals. The GAULA reported
that 173 people died in captivity during the year, a 33 percent
increase over 1999. Arrests or prosecutions in any kidnaping cases were
rare.
The Colombian Commission of Jurists attributed 145 forced
disappearances to paramilitaries in the period from October 1999
through March. In many instances persons kidnaped by paramilitary
groups later were found dead.
On March 9, a paramilitary group led by Jhon Jairo Esquivel
Cuadrado kidnaped seven members of the CTI at Minguillo, Cesar
department. Esquivel was captured in July and remained detained pending
formal charges at year's end. There were no indications that the
abducted investigators were still alive.
In May paramilitary forces kidnaped and raped journalist Jineth
Bedoya (see Section 2.a.).
On June 19, Carlos Castano's AUC paramilitary group kidnaped
Antioquia Deputy Guillermo Leon Valencia Cossio, brother of the
Government's negotiator in the peace process with the FARC, Fabio
Valencia Cossio, but released him on June 23.
In October the AUC paramilitary group kidnaped seven members of
Congress, including former Senate President Miguel Pineda and Zulema
Jattin, a member of a congressional peace commission, and demanded that
the AUC be consulted in the peace process. The Government refused to
open discussions with the AUC, but Interior Minister Humberto de la
Calle negotiated the hostages' release with Castano.
Kidnaping continued to be an unambiguous, standing policy and major
source of revenue for both the FARC and ELN. In April the FARC
announced ``Law 002,'' which required persons with more than $1 million
in assets to volunteer payment to the FARC or risk detention. According
to Pais Libre, politicians, cattlemen, children, and businessmen were
guerrillas' preferred victims. The FARC often purchased victims
kidnaped by common criminals; the FARC then negotiated ransom payments
with the family.
On March 22, the FARC kidnaped 9-year-old Clara Oliva Pantoja and
did not release her until December 19. On April 7, the FARC kidnaped 3-
year-old Andres Felipe Navas; he had not been released by year's end.
Both children reportedly were held in the FARC demilitarized zone.
Several released kidnaped victims claim that the FARC is holding more
than 200 persons in the despeje zone.
In March the ELN kidnaped 25 electrical company workers at Guatape,
Antioquia. The kidnapings were part of the ELN's campaign against the
country's civilian electrical infrastructure.
On September 17, the ELN kidnaped over 50 patrons of Cali
restaurants. Roughly a dozen were released within a few days. After
combined negotiation and military pressure, the remaining survivors
were released by November, although three had died while in captivity
due to illness after lengthy forced marches while the kidnapers
attempted to evade the army. Over the objections of the army commander
in charge of rescue, the Government allowed the captors to remain free
in return for release of the remaining hostages. Brigadier General
Jaime Canal Alban, commander of the 3rd Brigade, resigned to express
his disagreement with the Government's decision.
On November 28, unknown assailants kidnaped 18-year-old Juliana
Villegas, daughter of the head of the National Association of
Industrialists, a strong supporter of the peace process; guerrillas
were suspected.
Guerrillas continued to kidnap political leaders. For example, in
October the FARC kidnaped a gubernatorial candidate in northern Choco
department, Senator Juan Mesa, and Antioquia assemblyman Alvaro
Velasquez. The Federation of Colombian Municipalities reported that at
least 20 mayors were kidnaped during the year, nearly all by guerrilla
groups. Many more unreported kidnapings of short duration may have been
carried out. In response to this situation, some rural mayors fled to
major cities, where they continued to conduct municipal business via
telephone and facsimile. Guerrillas also kidnaped journalists (see
Section 2.a.).
The FARC, the ELN, and other guerrilla groups regularly kidnaped
foreign citizens throughout the year; some were released after weeks or
months of captivity. For example, in July a representative of Doctors
without Borders was kidnaped by a fringe guerrilla group and had not
been heard from at year's end. In August the ELN captured and held 26
university professors and students, including several foreigners, for
several days before releasing the group.
On April 8, the DAS captured ELN leader Ovidio Antonio Parra
Cortes, who had been sought for his role in directing the May 1999
kidnaping of 174 persons from Cali's La Maria Catholic Church. The
army's Third Brigade also arrested seven men believed to have helped
carry out the La Maria hostage-taking.
By year's end, all of the 41 occupants of an airplane hijacked by
the ELN in April 1999 had been released; 1 died in captivity in 1999
due to a lack of needed medications.
Despite government search efforts and continued pressure by the
Government on the FARC to account for three American missionaries
kidnaped by FARC guerrillas in January 1993, their whereabouts and
condition remained unknown.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law explicitly prohibit
torture, as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; however, police and military torture and mistreatment of
detainees continued. On May 30, Congress codified torture as a crime
(see Section 1.b.), and the reformed Military Penal Code directed that
cases of torture involving military and police defendants be tried in
the civilian, rather than the military, courts. The Attorney General's
office, which only can sanction administratively or refer to the
Prosecutor General's office those it finds guilty, did not sanction any
security force members for torture during the year. Contrary to
previous years, the Attorney General's office, which received 119
complaints of torture in 1998, did not receive any complaints of
torture by state agents during the year. The Colombian Commission of
Jurists reported one case in the period from October 1999 to March.
During the first 9 months of the year, CINEP reported that 79 persons
were injured by state forces. During the year, the Military High Court
convicted 52 service members for causing injuries.
The Colombian Commission of Jurists reported that from October 1999
through March, 136 corpses of persons presumed killed by paramilitary
forces showed signs of torture; there were 14 similar cases attributed
to guerrillas; one case attributed to an unidentified unarmed group;
and none by the State. Of victims who survived torture, the Commission
attributed one case to public security forces and four cases to
paramilitary groups. In March the Ministry of Defense reported that the
Superior Military Tribunal convicted 53 service members for inflicting
bodily injuries.
On March 10, a Bogota prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for four
policemen for allegedly beating detainees Jorge Amilkar Murcia, Juan
Antonio Rodriguez Ochoa, and a third unnamed victim, taking them to a
bridge, and forcing them to jump. Rodriguez survived and reported the
crime to the authorities; Murcia's body was never found.
According to Human Rights Watch, on June 18, troops from the Rebeiz
Pizarro Battalion fired upon a car carrying six adults and two
children; all occupants were wounded.
In December the Prosecutor General's human rights office indicted
Colonel Jose Ancizar Molano Padilla (then-commander of the 2nd Marine
infantry battalion), Captain Alvaro Hernando Moreno, Captain Rafael
Garcia, Lieutenant Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo, and four noncommissioned
officers for torturing 12 marines with asphyxiation and electric shocks
in December 1995. The victims were tortured to determine the
whereabouts of two lost assault rifles. Colonel Molano and his accused
subordinates remained in detention and are expected to be tried in a
civilian court. In December the Attorney General's office concluded its
investigation of the same incident and ordered a 3-month suspension
from duty for Colonel Molano. It also suspended Captain Moreno,
Lieutenant Jaramillo, seven noncommissioned officers, and one private.
Four Venezuelans arrested in May 1999 in the course of a military
antiguerrilla operation who subsequently claimed that the 3rd army
Special Forces Battalion tortured and inflicted other cruel, inhuman,
and degrading punishment against them were remanded to the custody of
the Venezuelan Embassy and finally allowed to return to Venezuela. The
Venezuelan Government also asked for an investigation in relation to
five other persons who were with these four men at the time of their
capture. The bodies of two of these five persons subsequently were
found in a river; the other three allegedly disappeared following the
operation.
Paramilitary groups increasingly used threats both to intimidate
opponents and to raise money. Letters demanding payment of a war tax
and a threat to mark victims as a military target if they failed to pay
were typical. In 1999 CINEP reported that nearly half of those
threatened were public school teachers and that approximately half of
all threat recipients were residents of Antioquia department.
Guerrilla groups also tortured and abused persons. The bodies of
many persons detained and subsequently killed by guerrillas showed
signs of torture and disfigurement. For example, one soldier captured
by the FARC was subjected to several machete blows to the head until
the entire left side of his head was destroyed. While he was still
alive, his genitalia were cut off and acid was poured on his face. The
military reported that another soldier and his brother were captured by
the FARC while on a bus, subsequently were tortured and decapitated,
and their heads were sent to their father inside a box. The Colombian
Commission of Jurists reported 17 cases of torture by guerrillas during
the period from October 1999 to March.
Guerrillas also routinely used threats, both to intimidate
opponents and to raise money, and--like the paramilitary groups--sent
letters demanding payments of a war tax, along with threats to make
persons military targets. Guerrillas also killed, kidnaped, and
threatened mayoral candidates (see Section 3).
According to press reports, in July explosive devices damaged three
businesses in downtown Barrancabermeja, Santander department. The
authorities stated that the ELN demanded that local businessmen attend
a mandatory meeting and that the bombs were punishment against those
who failed to attend. In April the FARC announced ``Law 002,'' which
required persons with more than $1 million in assets to volunteer
payment to the FARC or risk detention. In August the FARC bombed as
many as 13 businesses in Medellin in retaliation for nonpayment of a
FARC-imposed ``war tax.''
Prison conditions are harsh, especially for those prisoners without
significant outside support. Severe overcrowding and dangerous sanitary
and health conditions remained serious problems. In December 1997, a
visiting IACHR mission declared that the living conditions in Bogota's
La Picota prison constituted ``cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
of the inmates,'' and these problems continue. Prison guards from the
INPEC report to the Ministry of Justice. There are approximately 7,000
prison guards. Guards and prison staff frequently are untrained or
corrupt. In response to what was called a ``disciplinary emergency,''
INPEC's disciplinary office reported in September that it had removed
159 prison guards and was investigating 651 INPEC officials for
irregularities in performing their duties. Prisoners are suspected of
killing or ordering the killing of 22 guards in 1999.
According to the Committee for Solidarity with Political Prisoners,
a majority of prisoners' food was provided by outside, private sources.
In 1999 INPEC reported that the daily food allowance for each prisoner
was $1.44 (2,700 pesos). According to INPEC, the country's prisons and
jails held approximately 50,702 inmates at year's end, significantly
more than their capacity of 31,000 persons. The addition of a new
prison in Valledupar, Cesar department, and the renovation of other
facilities added 3,000 spaces over the past 3 years but was offset by
an increase of approximately 10,000 prisoners over the same period.
According to the Ministry of Defense, 20 percent of the country's
inmates are in the 10 most crowded prisons, which have an average
occupancy rate of 200 percent. In a number of the largest prisons,
overcrowding was severe. Medellin's Bellavista prison, the country's
largest, was built to house 1,800 inmates; at year's end, it housed
6,575 inmates. Bogota's La Modelo prison had a 169 percent occupancy
rate, and the Palmira prison outside Cali held 192 percent above its
planned capacity.
In February the Justice Ministry announced a plan to renovate
prisons and build 11 other new prisons over the next 3 years, expanding
prison capacity by 18,000 persons. In July Congress approved the
financing of the remaining announced facilities. Only 8,000 prisoner
accommodations met international standards. A total of 17.8 percent of
the country's prisons were between 40 and 80 years old, 3.5 percent
were between 80 and 201 years old, and 2.4 percent were more than 201
years old.
In November approximately 12,000 women and children, who were
visitors to the prisons, protested prison conditions by spending 72
hours inside 7 prisons, including Bogota's La Modelo. The Government
negotiated with inmate representatives and human rights NGO's to ensure
the peaceful exit of the protesters by agreeing to convoke the National
Roundtable on Penitentiary Work, an intersectoral commission that
includes inmate representatives, in December.
An estimated 42 percent of all prison inmates are pretrial
detainees. The remaining 58 percent are split roughly between those
appealing their convictions and those who have exhausted their appeals
and are serving out their terms. There are no separate facilities for
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. According to the Ministry
of Defense, 4,145 persons (8 percent of inmates) are in pretrial
detention in police stations. Despite an August 1999 Constitutional
Court ruling which obligated the transfer of detainees from overcrowded
police station holding cells to prisons, Bogota's 21 police stations
still hold 1,657 prisoners awaiting transfer to prisons.
Local or regional military and jail commanders did not always
prepare mandatory detention registers or follow notification
procedures; as a result, precise accounting for every detainee was not
always possible.
There are separate prison facilities for women, and in some parts
of the country, separate women's prisons exist. Conditions at women's
prisons are similar to those at men's prisons but are far less violent.
According to the Criminal Procedures Code, no one under the age of 18
may be held in a prison. Juveniles are held in separate facilities
operated by the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF).
The reformed Penal Code requires sentences of 3 to 6 years for
prison escapes. Escapes from prison continued to be a problem. There
were six major riots in prisons. On February 3, six prisoners were
killed and two were wounded during a confrontation between members of
paramilitary groups and guerrillas at Bogota's La Picota Prison.
In April members of paramilitary groups and guerrillas engaged in a
12-hour battle inside Bogota's La Modelo prison, ending a 2-month
truce, and employed a wide variety of firearms and other weapons.
Thirty-two inmates were killed, and 35 were wounded. In response, 1,200
members of the National Police entered La Modelo prison to retake
control. Among prohibited items found were cellular telephones,
handguns, shotguns, assault rifles, hand grenades, explosives, dogs
trained to attack, illicit drugs, and alcohol. Police found a sauna and
gym in a FARC commander's cell and also discovered a working brothel.
Authorities brought a variety of charges, including homicide and rape,
against 20 prisoners. In July Jorge Ospina Trujillo, reportedly a
member of a paramilitary group, escaped from the Bellavista prison in
Medellin, Antioquia department. According to the authorities, Ospina
was one of the prisoners responsible for the April massacre in La
Modelo prison in Bogota.
Guerrillas launched several attacks against prisons holding
guerrilla prisoners, facilitating numerous escapes. For example, during
its April 2-3 offensive, the ELN attacked a prison at Cucuta, Norte de
Santander department, initiating the attack with a car bomb. Some 75
prisoners, including approximately 50 ELN and FARC guerrillas, escaped.
Four prisoners were killed and four prisoners were wounded in the
fighting.
Key narcotics traffickers and some guerrilla leaders obtain cells
with many comforts, some of which--such as access to twoway radios,
cellular telephones, and computers--allowed them to continue their
illegal activities from inside jail. In July the authorities dismantled
a sophisticated telecommunications center in the district and Picalena
prisons in Ibague, Tolima, department. Fortysix prisoners between the 2
prisons used cellular telephones to extort money or negotiate ransom.
To prevent this type of activity, on July 27, President Pastrana
announced that he would issue a resolution making it mandatory for
telephone companies to provide caller identification service to all
customers.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to
have routine access to most prisons and police and military detention
centers.
The ICRC continues to have ad hoc access to civilians held by
paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces. However, it has not been
granted access to members of the police or military who are held by
guerrilla groups.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
includes several provisions designed to prevent illegal detention;
however, there continued to be instances in which the authorities
arrested or detained citizens arbitrarily.
The law prohibits incommunicado detention. Anyone held in
preventive detention must be brought before a prosecutor within 36
hours to determine the legality of the detention. The prosecutor must
then act upon that petition within 36 hours of its submission. Despite
these legal protections, instances of arbitrary detention continued.
Conditional pretrial release is available under certain
circumstances, for example, in connection with minor offenses or after
unduly lengthy amounts of time in preventive detention. It is not
available in cases of serious crimes, such as homicide or terrorism.
Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, pressed the Government and
Congress to adopt a permanent prisoner exchange law. Initiating regular
prisoner exchanges remained a top guerrilla priority and featured
prominently in the FARC's negotiating points at the peace talks.
Neither the Congress nor the Government attempted to pass such
legislation, and there was minimal popular support for it during much
of the year. On September 27, the Attorney General proposed the
implementation of an existing law that allows for the exchange of
prisoners during armed conflict. In October the public debate on
prisoner exchange revived when photographs emerged of 261 police and
military hostages being held in outdoor fenced enclosures. The U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) expressed deep concern for
the well-being of the hostages and called on the FARC to permit ICRC
access. At year's end, 527 soldiers and police are presumed held by the
FARC and ELN, and the ICRC had not been permitted access to them.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and forced exile is not practiced
by the State. However, there were repeated instances of individuals
pressured into self-exile for their personal safety. Such cases
included persons from all walks of life, including politicians, human
rights workers, slum-dwellers, business executives, farmers, and
others. The threats came from various quarters: some individual members
of the security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrilla groups,
narcotics traffickers, other criminal elements, or combinations of the
above.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The civilian judicial system,
reorganized under the 1991 Constitution, is independent of the
executive and legislative branches both in theory and in practice;
however, the suborning or intimidation of judges, witnesses, and
prosecutors by those indicted or involved is common. The Human Rights
Ombudsman's office reported receipt of 773 complaints of denial of the
right to due legal process during 1999, the most recent year for which
statistics were available. The office received 1,353 complaints in
1998.
The judiciary includes the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of
Justice, and the Council of State, the Superior Judicial Council, and
lower courts. The Prosecutor General's office is an independent
prosecutorial body that brings criminal cases before the courts.
Article 234 of the new Military Penal Code states that the Supreme
Court (not the Superior Military Tribunal) has first instance
jurisdiction in cases involving criminal acts by generals, admirals,
major generals, vice-admirals, brigadier generals, rear admirals, and
magistrates and prosecutors of the Superior Military Tribunal. Cases
that already were in their trial phase by August 12, 1999, must
continue under the old military penal code; however, this article
applies to all cases brought to trial after that date, regardless of
when the crime was committed. Article 234 also states the Supreme Court
is the court of second instance review of rulings by the Superior
Military Tribunal, effectively asserting the authority of the Supreme
Court--a body composed entirely of civilian magistratesover the
military judiciary. The Council of State is the appellate court for
civil cases. The Constitutional Court adjudicates cases of
constitutionality, reviews all decisions regarding writs of protection
of fundamental rights (``tutelas''), and reviews all decisions
regarding motions for cessation of judicial proceedings. Jurisdictional
clashes among the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Justice, the
Council of State, and the Superior Judicial Council were common, due to
the lack of a single supreme judicial authority capable of deciding
issues of jurisdiction or constitutional interpretation.
The CSJ, which oversees the administration of the judiciary, also
has the responsibility of determining whether individual cases
involving members of the security forces are to be tried in civilian or
military courts. On August 17, President Pastrana issued a directive to
the armed forces and the police that stated that the new Military Penal
Code ``excludes from military criminal jurisdiction the crimes of
genocide, torture, and forced disappearance'' and that ``acts against
humanity do not fall under the jurisdiction of the military courts.''
The directive also ``raises to the category of law'' a 1997
Constitutional Court decision that serious human rights violations and
other crimes not directly related to acts of service must be tried by
civilian courts.
On April 6, the Constitutional Court overturned much of the 1999
law that had created the specialized jurisdiction (which had replaced
the anonymous (``faceless'') regional courts system on July 1, 1999).
The Constitutional Court found that defendants have the right to know
the identity of their accusers and that elements of the law that
permitted some prosecutors and witnesses to remain anonymous under
exceptionally dangerous circumstances were unconstitutional. The Court
ruled that specialized jurisdiction judges and prosecutors no longer
could transfer cases to other colleagues when they believed their own
security to be at risk. The Court also ruled that persons detained for
any of the crimes designated in the legislation may request to be
confined in their homes and may request special permission to go to
work, as is the case in the regular civilian judiciary. The Court
permanently closed the appeals court for the specialized jurisdiction.
The remaining first instance specialized jurisdiction courts continued
to have responsibility for trying certain crimes, including crimes of
kidnaping, hijacking, paramilitarism, narcotics trafficking, money
laundering, and human rights abuses. Specialized jurisdiction
prosecutors still are permitted 12 months to investigate and develop
cases, rather than the 6 months afforded to regular civilian judiciary
prosecutors.
As part of the Ministry of Defense, the military judiciary falls
under the executive branch, rather than under the judicial branch. The
armed forces commander is also the president of the military judiciary.
The workings of the military judiciary lack transparency and
accountability, contributing to a generalized lack of confidence in the
system's ability to bring human rights abusers to justice. On August
12, a new Military Penal Code replaced the outdated one, which predated
the 1991 Constitution and did not contemplate some contemporary crimes.
(President Pastrana signed it into law in August 1999.) The
Constitutional Court ruled that no implementing legislation was needed
and instructed the Ministry of Defense to implement the new Military
Penal Code. Provisions of the new code include the following: unit
commanders no longer may judge their subordinates; an independent
military judicial corps is to be created; and service members are to be
protected legally if they refuse to carry out illegal orders to commit
human rights abuses. The reformed code states that torture, genocide,
and forced disappearance could never be related to ``acts of service,''
which is the constitutional standard for trying crimes in the military
judiciary, and stipulates that these crimes therefore always must be
tried in the civilian judiciary (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). The
reformed Military Penal Code also gives representatives of the civilian
judiciary the right to be present at military trials of military
personnel.
The new military justice system is composed of magistrates of the
Military Court of Appeals, lower military court judges, investigating
judges, prosecutors, and judge advocates (auditor de guerra) at the
General Inspector, division, and brigade levels. Brigadier General
Jairo Pineda was appointed to head the Executive Directorate of the
military penal justice system and is to report directly to the Minister
of Defense, a civilian. Military prosecutors report to Brigadier
General Pineda, not to unit commanders as under the previous system.
According to press reports, on August 16, the Military Penal
Tribunal appointed its first three prosecutors as part of the new
Military Penal Code. New prosecutors also were appointed for the
military forces as a whole and one for each branch of the military and
the police. On August 17, the prosecutors began to analyze and rule in
military proceedings.
A 1997 Constitutional Court decision directed the military judicial
system to relinquish to the civilian judiciary the investigation and
prosecution of serious human rights violations and other alleged crimes
not directly related to acts of service-the 1991 constitutional
standard for determining whether a case should be tried by the military
or civilian judiciary. The CSJ assigned most cases involving high-level
military personnel to the military courts, where convictions in human
rights-related cases were the rare exception. According to the 1991
Constitution, general-rank officers are to be tried by the Supreme
Court; however, that provision was ignored in practice. No definitive
court ruling has resolved various judicial interpretations of the
provision; however, a majority of decisions appear to suggest that this
provision applies only to full generals. The Court ruled that military
justice was the exception to the general rule and that, in the case of
doubt, jurisdiction should be assigned to the civilian system. In
determining which alleged crimes were to be tried by military
tribunals, the CSJ sometimes employed a broad definition of acts of
service, thus ensuring that uniformed defendants of high rank,
particularly the most senior, were tried in military tribunals. During
the year, the CSJ assigned two key cases to civilian jurisdiction: the
case against Major Clavijo and the Nydia Bautista case (see Section
1.a.). In addition, CSJ figures quoted by the Ministry of Defense
indicated that, where conflicts of jurisdiction arose, the total number
of cases assigned to military courts dropped from 50 percent in 1992 to
approximately 15 percent in 2000, while cases assigned to civilian
jurisdiction rose from 40 percent in 1992 to 60 percent over the same
period.
According to figures released by the Ministry of Defense in
December, since the 1997 Constitutional Court decision, the military
judiciary has transferred 1,136 cases to the civilian judicial system;
there was no information available as to how many of these cases dealt
specifically with human rights abuses or violations of international
humanitarian law, nor how many cases remained in the military judicial
system. However, a March report by the Ministry of Defense reports that
41 percent of the cases transferred involved serious crimes such as
homicide, torture, illegal detentions, and infliction of bodily
injuries; the rest were common crimes. Out of the total of 1,307 police
and military cases transferred, 496 cases were transferred during the
year, 79 in 1999, 266 in 1998, 295 in 1997, and 171 cases were
transferred on an unknown date. According to year-end report of the
Ministry of Defense, the military judiciary during the year found 122
members guilty of violating ``human or fundamental rights.'' The
average prison sentence was 58 months for homicide and 15 months for
inflicting bodily injury.
The military judiciary demonstrated an increased willingness during
the year to turn cases of military officers who were accused of human
rights violations or criminal activities over to the civilian
judiciary; however, such officers generally were of lower rank. A July
CSJ ruling suggested that it considered itself bound by the
Constitutional Court's 1997 decision that certain human rights
violations could not be considered acts of service and therefore must
be tried in civilian courts. Between January and November, 80 cases
were transferred.
In October 1998, the CSJ had determined that Brigadier General
Fernando Millan Perez's alleged organization of a paramilitary group
constituted an act of service and therefore had turned General Millan's
case over to the military judiciary for prosecution (see Section 1.a.).
In reaching its decision, the CSJ had determined that it was not bound
by the Constitutional Court's narrow 1997 interpretation of the 1991
constitutional standard of relation to acts of service. The CSJ's
decision effectively ended the Prosecutor General's investigation into
whether General Millan had provided weapons and intelligence to
paramilitary groups in Santander department.
On September 14, President Pastrana signed 12 decrees to reform and
strengthen the military. One decree provides for the separation from
service of all uniformed members of the military regardless of their
time in service, at the discretion of the top military commanders.
Previously, the Minister of Defense could at his discretion separate
from service only those who had served at least 15 years in the
military. Other decrees establish three levels of misconduct and the
crimes classified at each level. A total of 27 crimes are punishable
with immediate dismissal; these include: Torture, forced disappearance,
genocide, facilitating by any means the knowledge of protected
information or access to classified documents without authorization,
failure to enter into combat or to pursue the enemy having the capacity
to do so, and retreating before the enemy or abandoning post without
having used elements of defense that might be available. A higher-
ranking officer such as a unit commander is granted initial authority
to issue disciplinary sanctions. Those under investigation may be
suspended for up to 90 days with half pay; those suspended may perform
administrative duties. The decrees also state that in the event that
another authority should be informed of crimes, the military must
inform that authority and provide all relevant information to it.
Another decree states that, with limited exceptions, any officer
sentenced to prison by the military or the civilian justice system is
to be separated from service.
On October 16, the military dismissed 388 members of the armed
forces, including 89 officers. According to press reports, these
included 2 lieutenant colonels and 15 majors. No information was
available from the Ministry of Defense regarding the specific reasons
for any of the dismissals, nor were their names announced; it was not
known how many were dismissed due to allegations that they were
responsible for human rights abuses or for collaborating with
paramilitary groups in such abuses.
In cases in which military officers were tried, convicted, and
sentenced for human rights violations, they generally did not serve
prison terms but were confined to their bases or military police
detention centers, as permitted by law. Military prisoners remain on
active duty (and reduced pay) while in detention but are relieved from
command responsibilities. In other cases members of the military can be
suspended pending investigation, as occurred in the August Pueblo Rico
killings (see Section 1.g.). Some perform administrative functions
while in detention. Armed Forces Commander General Tapias cited a lack
of adequate military prison facilities as a primary cause for escapes
from military detention areas. For example, on March 14, suspected
Casanare department paramilitary leader Humberto Caicedo Grosso escaped
from military confinement at the 14th Brigade's headquarters. The
authorities detained five brigade members for failing to stop Caicedo's
escape.
The Constitution provides for a special criminal and civil
jurisdiction within Indian territories based upon traditional community
laws (see Section 5).
Judges have long been subject to threats and intimidation,
particularly when dealing with cases involving members of the public
security forces or of paramilitary, narcotics, and guerrilla
organizations. Violent attacks against prosecutors and judges
continued, and prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys continued to
be subjected to threats and acts of violence. On April 3, specialized
jurisdiction prosecutor Margarita Maria Pulgarin Trujillo was killed in
Medellin; AUC members were the prime suspects in her killing.
Prosecutors reported that potential witnesses in major cases often
lacked faith in the Government's ability to protect their anonymity and
were thus unwilling to testify, ruining chances for successful
prosecutions. In June Congress approved Penal Code and Penal Procedural
Code reforms that created a number of new crimes such as genocide (see
Section 1.b.), but reduced the sentences for a number of serious
crimes, including kidnaping and extortion, and the amount of time
served necessary for parole. The new Penal Code and Procedural Code are
scheduled to go into effect in 2001. It still was difficult for defense
attorneys to impeach or cross-examine anonymous witnesses, and often
the defense attorneys did not have unimpeded access to the State's
evidence.
The Attorney General's office investigates misconduct by public
officials, including members of the military and police. The Attorney
General's office can draw upon a nationwide network of hundreds of
government human rights investigators covering the country's 1,085
municipalities. The office received 78 complaints related to massacres
and forced disappearances during the year. Approximately 75 percent of
these complaints involved the army (particularly in Putumayo, Antioquia
and southern Bolivar departments); the other 25 percent implicated
police or DAS officials. Its constitutional mandate only provides for
the imposition of administrative sanctions; it has no authority to
bring criminal prosecutions or impose criminal sanctions but can refer
all cases to the Prosecutor General's office for investigation.
Contrary to previous years, the Attorney General's office referred all
cases of human rights violations received during the year to the
Prosecutor General for investigation. The Attorney General's office
reported that the majority of these cases are investigated by the
Prosecutor General's office.
In August a judge convicted of ``corrupt practice'' for her 1999
exoneration of billionaire emerald magnate Victor Carranza on charges
of paramilitarism was released after serving less than half of her 46-
month term. Carranza remained in prison due to his prior convictions
for homicide and kidnaping.
The Supreme Court elects the Prosecutor General for a 4-year term,
which does not coincide with that of the president, from a list of
three candidates chosen by the President. The Prosecutor General is
tasked with investigating criminal offenses and presenting evidence
against the accused before the various judges and tribunals. However,
this office retains significant judicial functions and, like other
elements of the civilian judiciary, it is struggling to make the
transition from a Napoleonic legal system to a mixed one that
incorporates an adversarial aspect.
In an attempt to deal with impunity, the Prosecutor General in 1995
created a special human rights unit as part of the regional courts
system. The unit has achieved significant results; as of November, its
group of 30 anonymous prosecutors had handled 918 cases involving
massacres, extrajudicial killings, kidnapings, and terrorism during the
year. These prosecutors have issued arrest warrants against members of
the security forces and of paramilitary, guerrilla, and drug
trafficking organizations. The unit arrested 192 suspects during the
year.
During the year, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's
office investigated, indicted, or prosecuted 286 security force
members, including at least 11 officers, on a variety of charges
including homicide, torture, kidnaping, and sponsorship of paramilitary
groups. The Attorney General's office and the security forces
demonstrated a greater willingness to follow up with instructions that
those ordered arrested be removed from their duties, denied the right
to wear a uniform, or turned over to civilian judicial authorities.
However, impunity continued to be very widespread.
The Constitution specifically provides for the right to due
process. Judges determine the outcome of all trials; there are no jury
trials. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and has
the right to representation by counsel, although representation for the
indigenous and the indigent historically has been inadequate. In mid-
1999, the CSJ's administrative chamber reported that the civilian
judiciary suffered from a backlog of approximately 3,069,000 cases
(including approximately 604,000 penal cases) and that there were
approximately 338,000 outstanding arrest warrants. Approximately
223,000 writs for protection of fundamental rights (``tutelas'') were
before the Constitutional Court for its legally mandated review.
Defendants in trials conducted by the regular courts have the right
to be present and the right to timely consultation with an attorney.
Regular court defendants and their attorneys have the right to
question, contradict, and confront witnesses against them, to present
witnesses on their own behalf, and to have access to government
evidence relevant to the case. The country's judiciaries, including
regular civilian, specialized jurisdiction, and military, continue to
be overwhelmingly Napoleonic in character; everything is processed in
writing. Public trials are still rare, and there are no juries;
however, cross-examination of witnesses does occur. Defendants also
have the right to appeal a conviction to a higher court.
In addition to providing public defense attorneys in criminal
cases, the Human Rights Ombudsman's 34 departmental and regional
offices throughout the country provide a legal channel for thousands of
complaints and allegations of human rights violations. However, in
practice, the Ombudsman's operations are underfunded and understaffed,
slowing its development of a credible public defender system.
Within the FARC-controlled despeje zone, local FARC leaders
effectively supplanted judicial authorities and declared the
establishment of an alternative, FARC-run ``justice system.'' Residents
of the zone regularly were denied the right to a fair trial. In the
face of FARC intimidation, all elements of the civilian judiciary fled
the zone. In 1999 Prosecutor General Alfonso Gomez Mendez publicly said
that they would return only ``when accompanied by the security
forces.'' In September the FARC gave haven to a FARC guerrilla who had
hijacked an airplane and refused to release him to government
authorities. Continuing concern about arbitrary FARC justice in the
zone led the authorities to stress that governmental justice must be
present.
The Government states that it does not hold political prisoners.
The ICRC reported that it monitored approximately 3,900 cases of
imprisoned citizens accused of terrorism, rebellion, or aiding and
abetting the insurgency, which are crimes punishable under law.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides for the protection of these rights;
however, at times the authorities infringed upon them. The law
generally requires a judicial order signed by a prosecutor for the
authorities to enter a private home, except in cases of hot pursuit.
The Ministry of Defense continued training public security forces in
legal search procedures that comply with constitutional and human
rights. Due to intimidation, corruption, or the absence of evidentiary
proof collected directly by prosecutors, guerrilla suspects captured by
the security forces in or out of combat and turned over to the judicial
authorities routinely were set free.
A judicial order or the approval of a prosecuting attorney is
required to authorize the interception of mail or the monitoring of
either landline or cellular telephones. This protection extends to
prisoners held in jails. However, various state authorities sometimes
monitored telephones without obtaining prior authorization. There were
unconfirmed reports by some human rights groups that members of the
security forces subjected them to surveillance, harassment, or threats.
A preliminary investigation begun by the Prosecutor General's
anticorruption unit in December 1999 determined that elements of the
Administrative Department of Security had engaged in illegal
wiretapping in Bogota over the course of several years. As of April,
eight DAS officers were in custody, and another officer was sought.
Having found sufficient evidence, on June 20, the Prosecutor General
opened a formal investigation. This was the first instance in which the
Prosecutor General pressed charges against a state entity for
interference with privacy. The investigation continued at year's end.
Guerrillas also used wiretaps and accessed bank accounts of
citizens at roadblocks in order to select kidnap victims.
There are some child soldiers among the paramilitary groups, who
were recruited forcibly (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
Guerrillas regularly forcibly recruited children and indigenous
people to serve as soldiers (see Sections 1.g and 5).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The internal armed conflict and narcotics
trafficking are the central causes of violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. Government security forces at times
violated international humanitarian law and continued to commit serious
human rights abuses, although the great majority of serious abuses were
committed by paramilitary groups and guerrillas.
In October the ICRC suspended evacuations of wounded combatants
after the murder of a wounded guerrilla by paramilitary forces near
Apartado, Uraba region, Antioquia department, and of a wounded member
of a paramilitary group by guerrillas in Putumayo. In both cases the
victims forcibly were taken from ICRC vehicles. The ICRC resumed
medical evacuations of combatants in December.
On February 24, the Government announced the creation of an
interagency intelligence committee, chaired by the Minister of Defense
and including members of the police, the Prosecutor General's office,
the Attorney General's office, and the DAS, to improve the State's
ability to track down and engage or capture members of paramilitary
groups. However, at year's end there was little tangible evidence that
the committee was functioning.
The ICRC reported that the Government, including military
authorities, followed an open-door policy toward the ICRC and readily
incorporated Red Cross curriculums on international humanitarian law in
standard military training. However, impunity remains a problem.
According to military sources, local commanders typically preferred to
transfer or discharge soldiers accused of serious human rights
violations, rather than initiate legal proceedings. On May 30, Congress
passed legislation that codified forced displacement as a crime and
provided for sentences of between 15 and 40 years' imprisonment; the
legislation also codified genocide and forced disappearance as crimes
(see Section 1.b). Departing from the historical, internationally
accepted definition of genocide, and in response to the killings of
thousands of members of the Patriotic Union leftist coalition (see
Section 1.a.), the law codified ``political genocide'' as a crime.
However, it stipulated that political genocide could be committed only
against members of legally constituted (i.e., nonguerrilla) groups.
On August 15, an army unit of 30 soldiers operating near Pueblo
Rico, Antioquia, mistook a party of schoolchildren for a guerrilla unit
and opened fire, killing 6 children between the ages of 6 and 10, and
wounding 6 others. According to press interviews, the soldiers did not
realize at the time that the persons that they were shooting were
children. On September 28, a military justice panel provisionally
disassociated 14 of the soldiers and allowed them to return to duty.
The remaining 16 soldiers, including patrol commander Sergeant Jorge
Enrique Mina Gonzalez, remained under investigation at year's end. On
December 22, the Attorney General charged Sergeant Mina, and corporals
Avilio Pena Tovar and Ancizar Lopez, stating that the three confused a
15-year-old girl in the group with a guerrilla but that they willfully
used indiscriminate force. The Attorney General's office exonerated the
other 27 soldiers involved in the incident. The Prosecutor General's
office determined that the act was unintentional harm caused in the
course of duty and referred the case to the military justice system,
where it remained at year's end.
In May the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office
recommended that the air force reopen its investigation into the
December 1998 Santo Domingo, Arauca department, incident in which an
air force helicopter was accused of bombing civilians in the course of
combat with the FARC. A total of 19 civilians were killed, and 25
others were wounded. The Prosecutor General's office based its
recommendation on new evidence after the office subpoenaed three
helicopter crew members and obtained an analysis of metal shards. An
air force commander reportedly charged the FARC with planting shards at
the scene. In December the air force revisited the zone prior to making
a decision on whether to open formally an investigation. In November
the Attorney General's office charged air force lieutenants Johan
Jimenez Valencia and Cesar Romero Pradilla (the pilot and copilot of
the helicopter) and flight technician Hector Mario Hernandez Acosta
with indiscriminate use of force.
According to the Independent Advisory Committee for Human Rights
and Displacements (CODHES), 317,340 displacements of civilians from
their homes occurred during the year; government sources estimate that
125,000 persons were displaced. (Exact numbers of displaced persons are
difficult to obtain because some persons were displaced more than once,
and many displaced persons do not register with the Government or other
entities.) According to CODHES, approximately 288,000 displacements
occurred during 1999. As many as 1 million citizens may have been
displaced since 1996. The ICRC provided emergency assistance to 135,000
displaced persons during the year. An alliance of human rights,
religious, and aid organizations stated that an estimated 2 million
persons had been displaced by political violence since 1985. CODHES
states that some persons have been displaced for as long as 10 years,
but it is unable to identify a typical timeframe for displacement. Some
persons return to their homes within days or weeks, others within
months, and some never return. Some displaced persons move several
times after fleeing their original home, making tracking difficult. The
Government does not consider persons to be displaced after 2 years.
CODHES estimated that perhaps 65 percent of displacements became
permanent. In an attempt to determine the true scope of the problem,
the Government, in cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), developed a computerized system for collecting data
on the displaced and estimating total numbers.
The vast majority of displaced persons are peasants who have been
displaced to cities, which have had difficulty integrating large
numbers of persons into their infrastructure. According to CODHES, in
1999 approximately 53 percent of displaced persons were women and
girls, 32 percent of displaced households were headed by women, and 70
percent of the displaced population were children. The Human Rights
Ombudsman's office reported that only 15 percent of displaced children
have access to schools. Many displaced persons settle on the outskirts
of Bogota, Medellin, and Cartagena, where conditions are overcrowded
and unsanitary, and smaller municipalities have been overwhelmed by the
need for services. Malnutrition among displaced children is a problem.
Many displaced persons lost access to health care, employment, and
education (see Section 5). CODHES estimates that only 34 percent of
displaced households have access to health services. According to the
UNHCR, approximately one-third of displaced persons are indigenous
people or blacks; these groups represent only 11 percent of the
population. In 1999 the office of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
received reports of threats and attacks against displaced communities
and their leaders; threats against individuals and groups working with
the displaced increased in 1999, especially in the regions of Magdalena
Medio and Uraba.
Both paramilitary groups and guerrillas used forced displacements
to gain control over disputed territories and to weaken their
opponents' base of support. In some cases, entire towns were abandoned
after paramilitary or guerrilla attacks. The authorities sometimes
encouraged civilian populations to move back to their homes before
security situations had normalized.
The Government's response to the needs of the displaced population
continued to be inadequate. The Government has no systematic program or
budget to make adequate provisions for humanitarian assistance to the
displaced, although it is required by law and court decisions to do so.
Conditions at the Government's two camps for displaced persons in
Uraba, at Pavarando and Turbo, were poor and unhygienic; health care
remained poor, and there were few educational or employment
opportunities. However, conditions at a temporary government shelter
for displaced persons at the stadium at Cucuta, Norte de Santander
department, were much better. The Government provides assistance
through the Solidarity Network, the ICBF, the Health Ministry, and
other state entities. The Solidarity Network was neither designed nor
prepared for emergency humanitarian assistance work, and it usually
provided such assistance only to refugees returning to the country. In
March 1999, the Government estimated that the ICRC provided 70 percent
of humanitarian assistance received by displaced persons. Private
estimates were higher. Most displaced citizens receiving ICRC emergency
humanitarian assistance received it for only 90 days. The Government
also tries to limit assistance to 90 days; however, some displaced
persons in the camps at Turbo and Pavarando, and in a stadium in
Cucuta, received aid for a longer period. During the year, ICRC
provided emergency assistance to 130,000 internally displaced persons.
Hundreds of displaced persons also fled to Panama, Ecuador, and
Venezuela, where they often were denied refugee status, treated as
illegal immigrants, and denied protection or assistance, and often were
returned to Colombia. The UNHCR has an office in Bogota to address the
problem and opened field offices in Barrancabermeja in 1999 and in San
Jose de Apartado, Uraba and in Puerto Asis, Putumayo during the year.
On January 4, a group of internally displaced persons violently
took over the ICRC's Bogota offices; they injured 3 local ICRC
employees and detained 37 ICRC workers for 13 hours, then allowed most
staff to leave the building. On February 22, such a group again
forcibly detained members of the ICRC staff, a representative from the
Attorney General's office, and two journalists for 9 hours. Also on
that day, members of the same group tried to occupy the Bogota
headquarters of the Social Solidarity Network; the police arrested
them. In April the ICRC abandoned offices in Bogota that had been
occupied by approximately 60 internally displaced persons since
December 1999. Despite a December Constitutional Court ruling that the
Government should assist the group, at year's end, the group still
occupied the old ICRC premises.
According to the Vice President's office, there are more than
70,000 antipersonnel landmines in the country, located throughout 135
municipalities in 23 departments. Some 20,000 mines are maintained by
the military to defend static positions. According to the International
Campaign Against Mines, 63 persons were killed by mines in 1999. The
Ministry of Defense reported that 10 military personnel were killed or
wounded by antipersonnel mines during the first 7 months of the year.
There is no generalized mine clearance program. However, in January the
army deactivated 20 guerrilla landmines in southern Bolivar. Four
civilians had been injured recently by landmines in the area. In August
the military cleared two mine fields in Cundinamarca department. From
1998 to mid-2000, the Ministry of Defense reported that the military
had cleared 120 FARC minefields and 39 ELN minefields.
The Human Rights Ombudsman's office reported continued violence
against women, especially in war zones. It noted that most female
victims in zones of conflict chose not to report the abuses they had
suffered, in part due to a lack of confidence in the efficacy of
governmental institutions to address their problems. The Ombudsman
noted that female leaders of political and peasant organizations in the
Uraba-Antioquia region were increasingly the targets of persecution,
threats, torture, and executions. According to the Ombudsman's 1999-
2000 report, intrafamilial violence, sexual assault, and murder of
women remained serious problems throughout the country (see Section 5).
More than 30 percent of FARC members are female.
Contrary to previous years, there were no reports during the year
that the Government militarized public hospitals in conflict areas,
which increased the risk that the hospitals would become targets of
guerrilla attack. In March the Constitutional Court ruled that state
security forces could not maintain installations (such as police
stations) next to schools, so as to not endanger the lives of students
in case of guerrilla attack. The Ministry of Defense later announced a
proposal to relocate police stations outside of city centers; however,
this had not been implemented by year's end. In contrast to the
previous year, there were no reports that the State refused medical
treatment to guerrillas.
The many paramilitary groups are diverse in their motivations,
structure, leadership, and ideology. The 1997 establishment of the
United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia as a national umbrella
organization was designed both to provide a national structure and to
develop a more coherent political culture for the country's local and
regional paramilitary groups. The AUC paramilitary umbrella group
comprises an estimated 8,000 combatants, who are members of 7 major
organizations. The largest of these organizations is the ACCU, which is
based in Cordoba department and the Uraba region of Antioquia
department. The AUC also has as many as 4,000 of its own combatants.
Carlos Castano heads both the AUC and the ACCU. Although illegal, some
paramilitary groups reflected rural citizens' legitimate desire to
defend themselves from the guerrilla threat. Other groups were actually
the paid, private armies of drug traffickers or large landowners. Many
members of paramilitary groups are former security force members or
former guerrillas. Some local army and police commanders tacitly
tolerated--and sometimes aided and abetted--the activities of
paramilitary groups, despite the public pronouncements of the
Government and the public security forces high command that they
intended to combat paramilitary violence. Elements of political and
economic elites in these areas also supported paramilitary groups. The
President, other government officials, the UNHCHR, and various NGO's
noted increased popular support for paramilitary groups during the
year. AUC leader Carlos Castano admitted publicly that his group
receives funding from both legitimate businesses and from narcotics
trafficking, and that the group is financed by ``dominant businesses''
in the regions in which it operates.
Paramilitary groups used selective killings and systemic massacres
to force displacements and punish civilians for perceived ties to the
guerrillas (see Section 1.a.). Paramilitary groups also launched
several offensive campaigns characterized by a series of massacres
linked by time or location.
The Fifth Brigade reported that in March troops of its 13th and
56th Battalions captured 25 suspected AUC members at San Rafael de
Lebrija, Santander department. During the operation, the troops
captured a significant amount of war material. Also in March, elements
of the army's 46th Battalion, based at Tibu, Norte de Santander
department, captured another three suspected members of paramilitary
groups and killed one. One soldier was killed in the action. In
February the National Police and the DAS captured north coast
paramilitary chief Adan Rojas Ospino in Barranquilla, Atlantico
department. Rojas, a key aid to AUC paramilitary chief Carlos Castano,
was sought in connection with a series of massacres dating back to the
1980's, as well as to the 1994 killing of a congressman. On February
24, the DAS also announced the capture of Arnoldo Segundo Meza de la
Rosa, the alleged chief of intelligence and finance operations for the
paramilitary fronts operating in Sucre and Bolivar departments.
Additionally, the DAS announced the capture in Monteria, Cordoba
department, of an ACCU paramilitary leader.
Paramilitary groups on occasion used landmines and sometimes forced
underage combatants into their ranks. Paramilitary forces failed to
respect the injured and medical personnel. For example, in November
members of a paramilitary group reportedly killed a patient on an
ambulance driving from Tibu to Cucuta, Norte de Santander department,
and declared the Tibu hospital a ``military objective,'' causing
several support staff to flee. In late October, presumed members of a
paramilitary group kidnaped the same hospital's director, who later was
found dead. In late September, paramilitary forces in the Uraba region
dragged a wounded FARC member from a Red Cross ambulance and shot and
killed her. In early October, the FARC stopped a Red Cross ambulance
carrying a wounded paramilitary member and killed him. In response, on
October 4, the ICRC suspended all assistance to wounded combatants. The
ICRC resumed evacuation of wounded combatants in late December.
Guerrilla organizations continued to pursue strategies that
routinely led them to commit abuses against citizens. Their tactics
consistently included killings, kidnaping, torture, targeting of
civilian populations and installations, including medical facilities,
and the forced recruitment of children as young as 10 years old. In
response to President Pastrana's August 1999 call to all armed groups
to obey international humanitarian law (the rules of war), the FARC
responded that it would not abide by, and was not bound by,
international humanitarian law.
Two main guerrilla armies, the FARC and the ELN, as well as the
much smaller EPL and other groups, commanded an estimated total of
between 11,000 and 17,000 full-time guerrillas operating in more than
100 semiautonomous groups throughout the country. These groups
undertook armed actions in nearly 1,000 of the 1,085 municipalities.
Both the FARC and the ELN systematically attacked noncombatants and
violated citizens' rights through the use of tactics such as killings,
forced disappearances, the mutilation of bodies, attacks on churches,
attacks on hospitals, attacks on ambulances, and executions of patients
in hospitals. Guerrilla groups also were responsible for multiple
abuses of religious and medical personnel with protected status and of
the wounded. Indiscriminate attacks on police stations resulted in high
numbers of civilian casualties. Guerrillas also killed religious
leaders (see Section 2.c.) and indigenous people (see Section 5).
Guerrillas used landmines both to defend static positions (such as
base camps, cocaine laboratories, and sites at which kidnap victims
were held) and as indiscriminate weapons of terror. According to the
Vice President's office, the FARC and ELN have laid indiscriminately
50,000 mines in rural areas. Landmines planted by guerrillas or
disguised as everyday items such as soccer balls or paint cans often
resulted in the killing or maiming of civilian noncombatants; thousands
of displaced persons were unable to return to their homes due to the
presence of antipersonnel mines. According to press reports, guerrilla
bases in the despeje zone are surrounded by landmines. The FARC used
sulfuric acid in the gas canisters that it employed as artillery, and
continued its practice of using these canisters to attack small towns.
Scores of soldiers, police, and civilians were burned indiscriminately
as a result. For example, on August 19, two girls aged 13 and 14 years
old, were killed when FARC guerrillas threw an explosive device into a
hardware store in El Carmen de Bolivar, Bolivar department. In mid-
December, a 9-year-old girl died buried in rubble when a gas canister
destroyed her home in San Alfonso, Huila department, during a FARC
attack. A 15-year-old female guerrilla also was killed in combat during
the same attack.
Although the ELN agreed to halt recruitment of children under the
terms of the June 1998 Mainz ``Heaven's Gate'' agreement, both it and
the larger FARC regularly forced children into their ranks (see Section
5). Once recruited, child guerrillas are virtual prisoners of their
commanders and subject to various forms of abuse. Sexual abuse of girls
is a particular problem, and former child guerrillas have testified to
this in the press. According to one press report, the Roman Catholic
Church documented one case of a 13-year-old girl who was recruited by
the guerrillas and used for sex before a nun persuaded them to release
her. Child soldiers, including girls, were seen in guerrilla ranks in
the despeje, and reports from various sources indicate that the
guerrillas recruited at least 120 minors in the despeje. In addition,
many families reportedly left the despeje (or have been displaced from
other regions) to escape forcible recruitment of their children.
According to press reports, in April FARC military commander Jorge
Briceno Suarez (``Mono Jojoy'') admitted that the FARC often had
committed serious abuses against civilians and that the FARC made
regular use of child combatants.
Guerrilla-paramilitary violence left a string of civilian
casualties in the wake of ongoing targeted or massive killings by both
sides. For example, in Barrancabermeja paramilitary and guerrilla
elements killed 160 persons during the first 6 months of the year, the
highest total in 5 years for this area. On December 11, the army's
Human Rights Office posted on placards in Bogota's central square the
names of 3,289 civilians, of whom 11,596 persons were killed by
paramilitary groups, and 693 persons by guerrillas. The names of more
than 200 children were listed.
The FARC staged many attacks against municipalities outside of the
despeje, possibly in a de facto effort to expand the demilitarized
zone. According to the Ministry of Defense, between January and
October, 74 guerrilla attacks on towns left 3,515 civilians dead. On
July 12, the FARC attacked four towns in Huila and Tolima departments,
destroying police stations, churches, schools, businesses, and homes.
Four FARC groups attacked Alpujarra in southern Tolima department, and
Colombia, Timana, and Vegalarga in Huila department. The attacks left 4
civilians dead and more than 15 persons wounded. The FARC attacked
Vegalarga again 8 days later. As a result, more than 2,000 persons from
Vegalarga, Colombia, Algeciras, and other towns fled to Neiva, capital
of Huila department. On July 14, the FARC entered the town of
Roncesvalles, Tolima department, and killed 13 policemen. According to
press reports, the FARC attacked the mayor's office, various commercial
buildings, a dozen homes, and the police station. After the police ran
out of ammunition defending the station, they were killed upon
surrendering.
Ending its unilaterally declared Christmas truce, on January 12,
the FARC attacked four towns in Narino department. The attackers
destroyed police stations, town halls, and a water plant. The FARC
killed three policemen and one civilian and kidnaped three other
civilians. During the course of the attacks, FARC members also stole an
ambulance and bombed the Trans-Andean oil pipeline near Ipiales,
causing an oil spill. On January 15, approximately 500 guerrillas
attacked four different points along the Bogota-Villavicencio highway.
In confrontations among the army, the National Police, and the FARC, at
least five civilians and five security force members were killed. The
army reported that it killed 44 FARC combatants in action. Also on
January 15, four National Police stations in southern Bogota were
destroyed; one 11-year-old girl was killed by a grenade, and seven
other civilians were reported wounded. The National Police suspected
that the FARC was responsible for the attacks. According to press
reports, in January the ELN kidnaped 15 persons southwest of Cartagena
and then reportedly used 8 of its victims as human shields in
confrontations with the police and the marines. One 19-year-old woman
was killed in the crossfire.
During a January attack on the town of El Castillo, Meta
department, indiscriminate FARC use of homemade artillery resulted in
the destruction of the town church, hospital, school, town hall, and at
least 20 homes. Eight FARC guerrillas, all estimated to be between the
ages of 13 and 15, were killed during the attack. Nine civilians were
killed, and four civilians were wounded.
On February 4, a car bomb in Puerto Asis, Putumayo department,
killed 2 persons and wounded 10 other persons. On March 3, the FARC
detonated a car bomb in the town square at Cachipay, Cundinamarca
department; 3 civilians were killed and 19 were wounded. On March 30,
the FARC detonated another bomb in front of the mayor's office in
Cachipay, which killed 3 persons and wounded 20 others. On March 26,
the FARC detonated another car bomb in the town square at Girardot,
Cundinamarca department, killing 1 policeman and wounding 10 civilians.
Many believed that the Girardot bombing was a FARC admonishment to
local merchants who were late in making extortion payments. Other FARC
car bombings in Cundinamarca department at Soacha (a southern
neighborhood of Bogota) on February 24 and at Anapoima on January 16
caused property damage but did not result in any deaths.
During a March FARC artillery attack on the Medellin base of the
army's Fourth Brigade, 2 civilians were killed and 18 injured when the
FARC's gas cylinder-bombs exploded prematurely in a civilian
neighborhood. A total of 45 homes and 2 civilian buildings were
destroyed.
On July 29, approximately 400 members of the FARC guerrilla group
attacked the town of Arboleda, Caldas department, killing 12 policemen
and 4 civilians. The attack lasted for 2 days. Guerrillas detonated
explosives in front of town buildings, including the police station and
a church. Most of the village was damaged or destroyed.
On August 2, the FARC 14th front killed five hostages with shots to
the head and left a sixth person for dead. The survivor, a farmer named
Fernando Jimenez Hurtado, had been kidnaped in June in Caqueta
department, south of the FARC demilitarized zone, and had been chained
for 2 months to another hostage. He was forced to drag the victim's
body almost 1 kilometer to the nearest police station. Jimenez Hurtado
reported being held with 50 other kidnaped persons under poor
conditions.
Antioquia police reported that, on November 18, the FARC killed 6
farmers who were former EPL guerrillas, burned 20 houses, and displaced
30 persons in a rural area of Frontino, west of Medellin. Unconfirmed
reports indicated that another five persons may have disappeared.
From late September to early December, the FARC banned all road
traffic in the southern department of Putumayo, following an offensive
by paramilitary forces in the area of La Hormuga. The guerrillas' ban
on road traffic, which was criticized by NGO's and local officials, led
to severe shortages in food and medicine despite government efforts to
fly in supplies and to secure key roads. The FARC also reportedly
restricted the movement of ambulances.
According to the Federation of Colombian Municipalities,
paramilitary and guerrilla attacks damaged or destroyed the
installations of 64 municipal governments during the year, and
paramilitary groups and guerrillas kidnaped 20 mayors and 18 mayoral
candidates (see Sections 1.b. and 3).
The FARC committed numerous abuses against civilians in the despeje
zone. The FARC was responsible for killings, alleged cases of forced
disappearance, rape, arbitrary detention, infringement of the rights to
free speech, freedom of religion (see Section 2.c.), and fair trial
(see Section 1.e.), forced political indoctrination, and the forced
recruitment of hundreds of children. According to press reports, the
FARC has stated publicly that all persons between the ages of 13 and 60
in the despeje zone are liable for military service with the
guerrillas; families fleeing the zone reported that they were asked to
surrender children to the FARC as of their 14th birthday.
Guerrillas, usually the ELN, destroyed 434 electrical pylons in the
period from January 1999 to September 2000, causing massive damage to
the country's power industry and increases in electricity rates for
consumers. Guerrilla attacks on oil pipelines caused considerable
environmental damage.
According to press reports in September, the ELN had held an
internal trial of participants in the 1998 Machuca fireball incident in
which over 80 persons were killed and 17 were injured as a result of an
ELN pipeline bombing. According to the reports, the ELN claimed to have
expelled guerrillas from its ranks for involvement in the crime.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press; and the Government generally respected this right
in practice; however, journalists regularly practiced selfcensorship to
avoid retaliation and harassment by various groups. The privately owned
print media published a wide spectrum of political viewpoints and often
voiced harsh antigovernment opinions without fear of reprisals. A ban
on the publication of evidence pertaining to criminal investigations,
based on the secrecy provisions of the Penal Code and an anticorruption
statute, remained in effect. Journalists typically work in an
atmosphere of threats and intimidation, primarily from paramilitary
groups and guerrillas, which appeared to worsen during the year.
Fearing for their safety, journalists often refrain from publishing or
broadcasting stories counter to the interest of paramilitary groups,
guerrillas, or narcotics traffickers.
In October 1999, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression stated that the ``press freedom
situation in Colombia is a serious source of concern'' and that, in
addition to the killings of journalists, ``Colombian journalists endure
constant threats and intimidation.''
The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office reported
in November that it had 32 open cases involving murders, kidnapings,
and threats against journalists. Twelve journalists were killed during
the year, although not all of the killings could be attributed directly
to the journalists' work.
On September 9, members of a paramilitary group murdered Carlos
Jose Restrepo Rocha, the publisher of TanGente newspaper in Tolima, a
municipal council candidate, and a former member of the now-inactive M-
19 terrorist group. Ten men who identified themselves as members of a
paramilitary group seized Restrepo during a community meeting in San
Luis de Ibague, Tolima department, and Restrepo was found dead hours
later, with paramilitary pamphlets placed on his body.
On November 15, unidentified assailants shot and killed local radio
reporter Gustavo Rafael Ruiz Cantillo in the Pivijay municipality
marketplace, Magdalena department. Many observers believe that he was
killed by paramilitary forces, who reportedly have a strong presence in
Pivijay; however, the FARC also are known to operate in the region. An
investigation continued at year's end.
On November 30, unidentified assailants killed reporter Guillermo
Leon Agudelo in his home in Florencia, Caqueta department. On December
13, two persons on a motorcycle shot and killed Alfredo Abad Lopez,
director of the Voice of the Jungle radio station, a Caracol affiliate,
as he left his home in Florencia, Caqueta department. The authorities
formed a special investigative unit to establish whether the two
murders are connected, and the Florencia mayor's office offered a
$10,000 reward for information leading to arrests in these cases.
In May 1999, the Prosecutor General's office created a new
subdivision to handle investigations of crimes that targeted
journalists. On May 3, investigations also produced arrest warrants
against AUC leader Carlos Castano and three other persons who allegedly
killed journalists Alberto Sanchez and Luis Alberto Rincon.
In July the Prosecutor General's Human Rights Unit indicted Rodolfo
Nelson Rosado Hernandez (alias ``El Pichi'') and Jorge Eliecer Espinal
Velasquez (``El Parce'') in the September 1999 murder of newspaper
editor Guzman Quintero Torres in Valledupar, Cesar department. The two
have been in police custody since September 1999 and are thought to be
members of a group of killers working for area paramilitary forces.
Quintero's editorials had criticized state forces in the area, and he
reportedly had been threatened before his death.
There was also progress in the investigation of murdered journalist
Jaime Garzon (see Section 1.a.).
Guerrillas, primarily the ELN, were responsible for the kidnaping
of 15 journalists during the year. Guerrillas abducted many of them to
bear witness to crimes committed by paramilitary forces or to deliver
messages to local authorities. Eleven journalists reported death
threats during the year.
In January the FARC kidnaped journalist Guillermo ``la Chiva''
Cortes; in August security forces rescued him, along with six other
hostages.
On May 25, Jineth Bedoya Lima, a reporter for the El Espectador
newspaper, was kidnaped and raped over a period of 10 hours while on
her way to interview a convicted paramilitary leader at the Modelo
prison in Bogota. Two days prior to her kidnaping, El Espectador
received threatening letters against her and other journalists. Carlos
Castano, leader of the AUC paramilitary organization, denied that the
AUC was involved in the kidnaping.
On December 16, the ELN reportedly kidnaped Caracol television
journalist Winston Viracacha in Tumaco, Narino department. Viracacha
had traveled with his cameraman and an assistant to meet members of the
ELN's ``Comuneros del Sur'' front, who retained Viracacha but released
his companions.
Thirteen journalists left the country during the year. In March
Francisco ``Pancho'' Santos, editor of the family-run El Tiempo, the
country's largest newspaper, and founder of the Pais Libre
antikidnaping organization and the national ``No More'' antiviolence
civic campaign, fled the country after announcing that he was the
target of a FARC guerrilla group plot to kill him. Santos remained in
exile at year's end. Also in March, television personality Fernando
Gonzalez Pacheco fled the country after receiving threats from the
FARC. In June Ignacio Gomez Gomez, a journalist for El Espectador, fled
the country after receiving threats against his life.
The InterAmerican Press Society opened a rapid action unit office
in Bogota to help the Prosecutor General's office investigate crimes
against journalists. On August 18, President Pastrana issued a decree
establishing a program for the protection of journalists. In October
the Minister of Interior announced the inauguration of the program,
which is to provide armor for cars, escorts, and transportation. The
Government consulted with journalism organizations to identify
journalists at special risk but has not had the resources to provide
protection. The Ministry of the Interior supported an alerts network
organized for journalists by providing a small number of radios and an
emergency telephone hot line.
On December 20, a specialized court judge in Neiva, Huila
department, absolved contractor Fernando Bermudez Ardila and two other
defendants accused of the April 1998 murder of journalist Nelson
Carvajal Carvajal; the judge cited weak evidence in the case. Bermudez
had been accused of hiring the two other men to kill Carvajal, because
Carvajal would not agree to stop negative reporting about a development
project built by Bermudez's firm. Prosecutors appealed the decision,
and the Supreme Court is expected to rule on the case.
Media ownership remains highly concentrated. Wealthy families or
groups associated with one of the two dominant political parties have
consolidated their holdings of news media, and regional firms continued
to purchase local news media outlets. As a result of the general
economic downturn, large press conglomerates closed radio stations and
newspaper offices in certain provinces and reduced staff. Although the
press remained generally free, economic problems and the concentration
of media ownership limited the media's resources, causing the media to
rely heavily on a smaller pool of advertisers, including the
Government, which the media often chose not to criticize.
The National Television Commission continued to oversee television
programming throughout the year.
The FARC restricted the movement of journalists in the despeje
through blockades and random identity checks and on at least three
occasions stopped El Tiempo trucks and burned all of the newspapers
that they carried.
The Government generally respected academic freedom, and there was
a wide spectrum of political activity throughout the country's
universities. However, paramilitary groups and guerrillas maintain a
presence on many university campuses, aimed at generating political
support for their respective campaigns. They use both violent and
nonviolent means towards political ends. Both paramilitary groups and
guerrillas also regularly targeted public school teachers at the
elementary and secondary levels for politically motivated killings.
In August the National University was closed, and its premises were
searched after a policeman was killed during a protest. Students held a
referendum against violent groups operating on the university campus.
In April schools in Chalan and Ovejas, in Sucre department, were
suspended due to death threats against 50 teachers. More than 3,000
students were affected. Threats also were made against teachers in
Coloso, Morroa, Toluviejo, San Onofre, Los Palmitos, and San Antonio de
Palmito in Sucre department. All of the major guerrilla organizations
and the paramilitary groups maintain a presence in the region.
On October 5, Universidad del Atlantico professors Luis Meza
Almanza Alfredo Martin Castro Hayder were killed in Barranquilla on
October 5 and August 26, respectively. Both were known for leftist
views and had been under consideration for rector positions at the
University. Castro was reportedly on a death threat list.
Investigations continued into four 1999 attacks against prominent
academics. Jesus Antonio Bejarano, a former government peace
commissioner; Doctor Dario Betancur, head of the social sciences
faculty of Bogota's Universidad Pedagogica; and Doctor Hernando Henao,
an anthropologist who published on the subject of displaced persons,
all were killed in 1999. In December 1999, Professor Eduardo Pizarro
Leongomez, director of the political studies and international affairs
institute at the National University, was shot twice by unknown
attackers; he survived but fled the country. As a result of these
incidents, academic leaders have chosen to assume a lower profile; many
have taken up residence outside the country.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respects
this right in practice. The authorities normally do not interfere with
public meetings and demonstrations and usually grant the required
permission except when they determine that there is imminent danger to
public order.
There were large demonstrations on several occasions by citizens
throughout the country; the authorities generally did not interfere.
In February police sought to remove an U'wa road block by using
tear gas to disperse the crowd; the U'wa claimed that four children
were killed in the ensuing panic (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Press
reports indicated that only one body was recovered. In April numerous
indigenous groups blocked routes, freeways, and city streets throughout
the country to demand respect for their life and territory and to
support the Embera-Katio and U'wa tribes in their disputes against the
Urra hydroelectric project and Occidental Petroleum respectively (see
Section 5). On September 10, thousands of persons across the country,
including business leaders, union activists, and ordinary citizens,
marched in support of peace and respect for human rights.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Any legal organization is
free to associate with international groups in its field. Membership in
proscribed organizations, such as the FARC, the ELN, the EPL, and the
AUC, is a crime.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
Roman Catholic religious instruction is no longer mandatory in public
schools, and a 1994 Constitutional Court decision declared
unconstitutional any official government reference to religious
characterizations of the country. Although the Catholic Church was
separated from the State by the 1991 Constitution, it retains a de
facto privileged status. The law on the freedom of religion provides a
mechanism for religions to obtain the status of recognized legal
entities. Accession to the 1997 public law agreement between the State
and non-Roman Catholic religious entities currently is required for any
religion that wishes to minister to its adherents via any public
institution. Local governments may exempt from taxes religiously
affiliated organizations such as schools and libraries; however, in
practice, local governments often exempt only organizations that are
affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. The Government permits
proselytizing among the indigenous population, provided that it is
welcome and does not induce members of indigenous communities to adopt
changes that endanger their survival on traditional lands.
Paramilitary groups sometimes target representatives and members of
the Roman Catholic Church and evangelical Christian churches, generally
for political reasons.
The FARC has placed religious restrictions on persons within the
despeje zone. The FARC also levied ``war taxes'' on Roman Catholic and
evangelical churches and schools in the despeje and elsewhere.
The FARC and ELN guerrilla movements regularly target
representatives and members of the Roman Catholic Church and
evangelical Christian churches, generally for political reasons, and
committed acts of murder, kidnaping, and extortion, as well as
inhibited the right to free religious expression. For example,
according to one evangelical movement, guerrillas regularly attacked
rural evangelical Christians and their churches.
According to the Christian Union Movement, the FARC murdered 46 of
the movement's affiliated preachers between January 1999 and June 2000.
As of June, the FARC had forced the closure of over 300 evangelical
churches in Meta, Guajira, Tolima, Vaupes, Guainia, Guaviare, Vichada,
Casanare, and Arauca departments. Additionally, the movement claimed
that the FARC extorted and, in many cases, forced the closure of rural
evangelical schools. Faced with threats by guerrillas or paramilitary
forces, many evangelical preachers were forced to refrain from publicly
addressing the country's internal conflict.
Guerrillas were suspected of the April massacre of 2 evangelical
preachers and 12 church members at Hato Nuevo, Carmen de Bolivar,
Bolivar department.
On March 27, unidentified perpetrators killed Roman Catholic priest
Hugo Duque Hernandez at Supia, Caldas department.
There were no new developments in the November 1999 killings of
Roman Catholic priest Jorge Luis Maza and Spanish aid worker Inigu
Egiluz in Choco department; security forces had arrested nine members
of a paramilitary group in conjunction with the crime.
The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's Office reported
in November that it had 34 open cases of killings of members of
evangelical groups.
The Bishops' Conference of the Roman Catholic Church reported that
paramilitary forces, the ELN, and the FARC sometimes threatened rural
priests with death for speaking out against them. It also reported that
Roman Catholic churches in Huila, Tolima, Cauca, and Antioquia
departments were destroyed during guerrilla attacks on towns and police
stations.
On April 11, at least three Mormon temples in Cali were bombed. No
one was injured in the attacks, which damaged buildings. No one claimed
responsibility for the attacks.
Jewish community leaders estimated that as many as 20 percent of
the country's Jewish community had fled the country as of July 1999.
Among the principal causes was a string of kidnapings, assaults, and
murders affecting Jewish business leaders.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
the right to travel domestically and abroad, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice, with some exceptions.
Outsiders who wish to enter Indian tribes' reserves must be invited. In
areas where counterinsurgency operations were underway, police or
military officials occasionally required civilians to obtain safe-
conduct passes; paramilitary forces and guerrillas often used similar
means to restrict travel in areas under their control. At times the
Government implemented curfews. Military counterinsurgency operations,
forced conscription by paramilitary and guerrilla organizations, and
guerrilla incursions often forced peasants to flee their homes and
farms, and there was a very large population of internally displaced
persons. According to CODHES, approximately 317,000 displacements of
persons occurred during the year; the vast majority of displaced
persons are peasants who have been displaced to cities (see Section
1.g.).
Throughout the year, frequent road blockades erected by
paramilitary groups, the FARC, ELN, and peasant farmers inhibited
transportation, communication, and commerce throughout the country.
Social organizations also resorted to road blockages, some of them
prolonged, to protest government actions or policies. Almost every
major artery in the country was closed at some point during the year.
From late September to early December, the FARC banned all road traffic
in the southern state of Putumayo, following an offensive by
paramilitary forces in the area of La Hormiga (see Section 1.g.).
Press reports indicate that more than 300,000 citizens emigrated
during the last 2 years, due principally to the deteriorating security
situation and economic recession.
The Constitution provides for the right to asylum, under terms
established by law in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The country has had a
tradition of providing asylum since the 1920's. At year's end, 239
refugees had legal asylum status, and 12 applications for asylum were
pending.
The Government cooperates with the offices of the UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and internally
displaced persons. The Government reserves the right to determine
eligibility for asylum, based upon its own assessment of the nature of
the applicant's suffering. The issue of the provision of first asylum
did not arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government, and citizens exercise this right in regularly scheduled
elections by secret ballot. In 1998 voters elected Conservative Party
candidate Andres Pastrana President in elections that were free, fair,
and transparent, despite some threats to the electoral process by
paramilitary groups, narcotics traffickers, and guerrillas. The Liberal
Party controls the legislature.
Presidential elections are held every 4 years, with the incumbent
barred for life from reelection. The Liberal and Conservative parties
long have dominated the formal political process with one or the other
winning the presidency. Public employees are not permitted to
participate in partisan campaigns. Officially, all political parties
operate freely without government interference. Those that fail to
garner 50,000 votes in a general election lose the right to present
candidates and may not receive funds from the Government. However, they
may reincorporate at any time by presenting 50,000 signatures to the
National Electoral Board. Voting is voluntary and universal for
citizens age 18 and older, except for activeduty members of the police
and armed forces, who may not vote.
Prior to local elections in October, both paramilitary and
guerrilla organizations sought to dissuade some potential candidates
from running for office or restrict their ability to campaign. The
Colombian Federation of Municipalities reported to the press that armed
groups threatened candidates in more than half of the country's 1,085
municipalities. By year's end, the Federation reported that 19 mayoral
candidates were killed, 20 were kidnaped, 12 reported threats, and as
many as 53 candidates for mayoral and municipal council posts withdrew
their candidacies. For example, on September 23, guerrillas kidnaped
the mayor of Samaniego, a Liberal Party candidate for that office, and
six other mayoral candidates from this southern town in Narino. On
September 9, members of a paramilitary group forced Carlos Restrepo, a
leftist activist and publisher who was planning to run for a local
office, from a community meeting; his body later was found outside San
Luis. However, the October 29 elections were generally peaceful.
In April the FARC announced the formation of a political party--the
Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia--before a gathering of thousands
of persons. FARC leader Manuel Marulanda announced that the party would
operate secretly.
There are no legal restrictions, and few practical ones, on the
participation of women or minorities in the political process; however,
both are underrepresented in official and party positions. In March a
quota law to increase the number of women in high-level public
positions went into effect. The quota law requires that a minimum goal
of 30 percent of nominated positions, including seats on the high
courts and ministerial positions, be allotted to women. The quota law
does not apply to publicly elected positions, such as seats in
Congress. Before the end of each year, the Government must report to
Congress the percentage of women in high-level governmental positions.
Voters elected 14 women to the 102-seat Senate and 19 women to the
161seat House of Representatives in March 1998. At year's end, there
were 4 women in the 16-member cabinet--they serve as the Ministers of
Health, Culture, Communications, and Foreign Trade. There were no women
among the 23 Supreme Court justices, 1 woman among 9 Constitutional
Court magistrates, and 3 women out of 13 magistrates of the Superior
Judicial Council.
Indigenous people are underrepresented in government and politics.
Two Senate seats are reserved for indigenous representatives. In
October voters in Cauca elected Floro Tunubala, the country's first
indigenous governor. Blacks also are underrepresented in government and
politics. In 1996 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a
1993 law that set aside two house seats for citizens of African
heritage, although the ruling nonetheless allowed the incumbents to
complete their terms in office. There is one black senator, but there
are no black members of the Chamber of Representatives.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A large and varied nongovernmental human rights community is
active, and provides a wide range of views. Among the many groups are:
The Colombian Catholic Bishops Conference; the Colombian Commission of
Jurists; the Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace; the
Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights; the Center for
Investigations and Popular Research; the Advisory Committee for Human
Rights and Displacements; the Latin American Institute for Alternative
Legal Services; the Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners
(dedicated to defending accused guerrillas); the Association of
Families of Detained and Disappeared Persons; the Reinsertion
Foundation (focused on demobilized guerrillas); the Pais Libre
Foundation (focused on the rights of kidnap victims); and the Vida
Foundation (focused on the rights of victims of guerrilla violence).
Other international humanitarian and human rights organizations in the
country that were active include the ICRC (with 16 offices across the
country) and Peace Brigades International.
Although the Government generally did not interfere directly with
the work of human rights NGO's, many prominent human rights monitors
worked under constant fear for their physical safety. There were
unconfirmed reports that security forces harassed or threatened human
rights groups. In August the Prosecutor General's office opened an
investigation against retired Brigadier Generals Millan and Del Rio for
bribing witnesses to testify falsely against a leading NGO organizer
and a labor leader. Human rights groups were subjected to surveillance,
harassing phone calls, graffiti campaigns, and threats by paramilitary,
guerrilla, and other unidentified groups. At least four human rights
activists had been killed as of October; there were three forced
disappearances of human rights activists.
In October Angel Quintero and Claudia Patricia Monsalve, members of
ASFADDES (an association for relatives of the disappeared) were
kidnaped in Medellin by persons claiming political motives. There has
been no news of the victims since October, and no arrests have been
made. The authorities continued their investigation at year's end.
In August the Government launched an effort to improve its dialog
with NGO's on human rights, the peace process, the Government's
comprehensive strategy known as ``Plan Colombia,'' and other issues. In
October the Government jointly hosted with an NGO umbrella group an
international gathering on these issues which included the
participation of the ELN.
NGO's investigated and reported on human rights abuses committed by
government forces, various paramilitary groups, and the guerrillas.
Many NGO's expressed serious concern over the growing paramilitary and
guerrilla violence and the Government's apparent inability to stop
either group. In particular, a number of NGO's, as well as governmental
human rights officials, were alarmed by the rapid growth of popular
support for paramilitary groups, and their increasing political and
military power.
The human rights community remained under intense pressure during
the year. Human rights monitors were subjected to a systematic campaign
of intimidation, harassment, and violence. According to the Colombian
Commission of Jurists, five human rights advocates were killed during
the year; three human rights workers disappeared. A total of 49 human
rights workers have been killed or have disappeared in the past 5
years. On numerous occasions during the year, paramilitary groups in
several municipalities circulated lists of the names of persons they
considered ``military targets,'' which included the names of local
human rights activists, labor organizers, and politicians.
In addition, approximately 35 human rights workers left the
country, either temporarily or permanently, for their own safety. For
example, in July human rights activists Ivan Cepeda and his wife
Claudia Giron left the country after receiving threats against their
lives.
The Government, through the Ministry of the Interior and the DAS,
allocated approximately $4.3 million (8 billion pesos) to its 2-year-
old program to protect human rights advocates and labor activists
associated with 88 different human rights NGO's and unions. The funds
were designated for security measures for individuals as well as for
the headquarters of the NGO's, an emergency radio network, and funding
for travel abroad for individuals who faced a particular threat;
however, human rights groups stated that the protection programs are
inadequate to address the crisis, and called for increased efforts to
combat impunity.
The new forced disappearance law provides for a maximum penalty of
60 years for cases involving human rights activists (see Section 1.b.).
Armed groups targeted regional ombudsmen. Fourteen regional
ombudsmen have been killed since 1998. In July Jose Manuel Bello, the
municipal human rights ombudsman in Vigia del Fuerte, Atrato, Antioquia
department, reportedly was kidnaped, killed, and dragged into the
Atrato River by members of the FARC guerrilla group. In July
unidentified, armed men killed Yemil Fernando Hurtado Castano, the
human rights ombudsman in Narino municipality, southeastern Antioquia
department. The regional ombudsman of Lourdes municipality, Norte de
Santander department, was kidnaped and held for 3 days by paramilitary
forces. Garcia and two other municipal human rights officials were
forced to leave Norte de Santander department due to continued
paramilitary threats.
The criminal organization La Terraza publicly admitted to killing
at least five human rights advocates and stated that the killings had
been ordered by Carlos Castano (see Section 1.a.).
There was no reported progress in the investigation of the
September 1999 killing of the Human Rights Ombudsman's representative
for San Juan Nepomuceno, Carlos Arturo Pareja, and his assistant.
A preliminary investigation by the Prosecutor's national human
rights unit indicated common criminals were responsible for the January
1999 killings of Everardo de Jesus Puerta and Julio Ernesto Gonzalez,
both members of the Committee for Solidarity with Political Prisoners
(CSPP). The case was referred to the Medellin prosecutor's office for
further investigation.
Prosecutors continued to investigate the November 1999 AUC killings
of southern Bolivar department peasant leaders Edgar Quiroga and
Gildardo Fuentes.
On November 22, a Bogota judge convicted two members of a
paramilitary group for the 1997 murders of two CINEP workers and one
other person. Arrest warrants remained outstanding for Carlos Castano
and four other members of paramilitary groups (see Section 1.a.).
Suspected paramilitary leader Libardo Humberto Prada was linked by
NGO's to the August 15 murder of peace activist and former mayor Luis
Fernando Rincon Lopez in Aguachica, Cesar department. The case remained
under investigation at year's end. In April 1999, the human rights unit
of the Prosecutor General's office formally indicted Prada and
paramilitary Cielo Lobo Ascano in the August 1998 killing in Valledupar
of local Redepaz coordinator Amparo Leonor Jiminez.
In February a lower civilian court convicted four Colombian human
rights activists arrested by the army in 1997 for allegedly funneling
international human rights assistance intended for displaced persons to
the ELN guerrilla movement. The court sentenced them each to 5 years'
imprisonment.
The Ministry of Defense reported that in the past 5 years, 97,894
security force members received human rights training during the year,
including 1,994 human rights trainers. Such training is provided by the
ICRC, the Colombian Red Cross, the Roman Catholic Church, elements of
the Government and security forces, and foreign governments. Many
observers credited these programs with having done much to foster a
climate of increased respect for human rights and international
humanitarian law within the military forces in recent years.
The Government has an extensive human rights apparatus, which
includes the office of the President's Adviser for Human Rights, headed
by Vice President Gustavo Bell. Human rights expert Reinaldo Botero was
named Director of the presidential program for human rights and
international humanitarian law in September. The executive branch's
efforts on human rights are supported by the Ministry of Interior, the
human rights office of the Ministry of Defense, and dependent offices
for each of the public security forces. The office of the national
Human Rights Ombudsman, its regional representatives and corps of
public defenders, the Attorney General's office and its delegate for
human rights and regional representatives, and the Prosecutor General's
office and its human rights unit are all independent institutions, not
subject to executive branch direction.
The House of Representatives elects the Public Ministry's National
Ombudsman for Human Rights for a 4-year term, which does not coincide
with that of the President. The office has the constitutional duty to
ensure the promotion and exercise of human rights. The Ombudsman
provides public defense attorneys and a channel for complaints of human
rights violations (see Section 1.e.). However, the Ombudsman lacks
sufficient funding and staff. In August the House of Representatives
named former Constitutional Court Judge Eduardo Cifuentes Munoz as
Human Rights Ombudsman.
The Human Rights Ombudsman's office processed 13,951 complaints in
1999 (the latest year for which figures were available); 8,562 cases
(61 percent) were against government entities. Of the 7,272 cases
concluded in 1999, the Ombudsman's office obtained favorable or
partially favorable conclusions in 2,867, or forty percent. Another
1,436 were referred to the competent authority. The office also
provided 40,656 free legal consultations through its corps of more than
1,000 public defenders, many of whom work only part-time.
Early in the year, the Government established a high-level
commission to coordinate policy on human rights and international
humanitarian law, which is headed by Vice President Gustavo Bell.
In August 1999, the Vice President enunciated the Government's
human rights policy; however, some aspects of implementation have been
slow to materialize. The Government's national human rights plan called
for the respect, promotion, and assurance of human rights. It promised
increased government attention to the consequences of human rights
abuses and called on all armed factions to respect international
humanitarian law. The plan asserted that security forces would combat
both guerrilla and paramilitary forces. One of the plan's most
important provisions permitted the armed forces commander to remove
from service summarily any military member whose performance in
combating paramilitary forces he deemed ``unsatisfactory or
insufficient.'' In September President Pastrana signed 12 decrees to
reform and strengthen the military; one decree provides for the
separation from service of all uniformed members of the military
regardless of their time in service, at the discretion of the top
military commanders (see Section 1.e.).
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UNHCR have
offices in Bogota. In 1997 the UNHCHR opened a field office in Bogota
to observe human rights practices and advise the Government; its
mandate was extended through April 2002. The office is tasked with
monitoring and analyzing the human rights situation throughout the
country and with the provision of assistance to the Government, civil
society, and NGO's in the field of human rights protection. It
submitted reports to the Government and to the U.N. In March the UNHCR
report, which covered 1999, noted that ``the continued existence of
direct links between some members of the security forces and
paramilitary groups, revealed by disciplinary and judicial
investigations, is a cause of great concern.'' The report also noted
that in 1999 ``in some regions of the country, these links were
strengthened and the authorities responsible for penalizing them failed
to take decisive action.'' In April UNHCHR Mary Robinson noted
``reports indicating that members of the military forces participate
directly in organizing new paramilitary groups and in disseminating
threats. The President, other government officials, the UNHCHR, and
various NGO's noted increased popular support for paramilitary groups
and a polarization of political opinion with concern.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination based on
race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status; however,
in practice, many of these provisions are not enforced. The killing of
homosexuals as part of the practice of social cleansing continued.
Women.--Rape and other acts of violence against women are pervasive
in society, and like other crimes, seldom are prosecuted successfully.
According to the Ombudsman's 1999-2000 report, intrafamilial violence,
sexual assault, and murder of women were increasing problems. The
governmental Institute for Family Welfare and the Presidential
Adviser's Office for Youth, Women, and Family Affairs continued to
report high-levels of spouse and partner abuse throughout the country.
In 1999 the Institute for Forensic Medicine reported 62,123 cases of
domestic violence, of which 41,528 were conjugal violence, 9,896 were
child abuse, and 10,699 were cases of abuse by other family members.
The ICBF conducted programs and provided refuge and counseling for
victims of spousal abuse; however, the level and amount of these
services were dwarfed by the magnitude of the problem. For example,
ICBF's 530 family ombudsmen handle approximately 1,160 cases per year.
The Institute estimated that 95 percent of all abuse cases are
never reported to the authorities and reported 13,703 cases of probable
rape during the year.
The 1996 Law on Family Violence criminalizes violent acts committed
within families, including spousal rape. The law also provides legal
recourse for victims of family violence, immediate protection from
physical or psychological abuse, and judicial authority to remove the
abuser from the household. It allows a judge to oblige an abuser to
seek therapy or reeducation. For acts of spousal sexual violence, the
law mandates sentences of 6 months to 2 years and denies probation or
bail to offenders who disobey restraining orders issued by the courts.
A 1997 law also made additional, substantial modifications to the Penal
Code and introduced sentences of between 4 and 40 years for crimes
against sexual freedom or human dignity, including rape, sex with a
minor, sexual abuse, induction into prostitution, and child
pornography. The law also repealed an old law that fully exonerated a
rapist if he subsequently offered to marry the victim and she accepted.
However, there was little evidence that this legislation was enforced
systematically. The reforms to the Penal Code approved in June reduced
the maximum sentence for violent sexual assault from 20 to 15 years;
the minimum sentence is 8 years. The National Institute for Forensic
Medicine reported 19,859 cases of spousal abuse during the first half
of 1999. The overwhelming majority of victims were women. First Lady
Nohra Pullana de Pastrana is on the board of directors of the ICBF and
works with the ``Make Peace'' program, which provides support to women
and children who were victims of domestic violence.
Sexual harassment is a problem.
Women also faced an increased threat of torture and sexual assault
due to the internal conflict (see Section 1.g.).
The forced disappearance law provides for a maximum penalty of 60
years for cases involving pregnant women (see Section 1.b.).
Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
The Constitution prohibits any form of discrimination against women
and specifically requires the authorities to ensure ``adequate and
effective participation by women at decisionmaking levels of public
administration.'' Even prior to implementation of the 1991
Constitution, the law had provided women with extensive civil rights.
However, despite these constitutional provisions, discrimination
against women persists. A study by the University of Rosario released
during the year concluded that women faced hiring discrimination and
that women's salaries were generally incompatible with their education
and experience. The salary gap between men and women widened in the
last decade, reaching a high point in 1999 as the country's economy
declined. The study also noted that women were affected
disproportionately by unemployment. Government unemployment statistics
for the year indicated that the unemployment rate for men was 16.9
percent, while the rate for women was 24.5 percent. According to the
March report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, women earn
28 percent less than men. The National Statistics Institute reported
that a higher percentage of women were employed in minimum wage jobs.
According to U.N. statistics, women's earnings for formal sector,
nonagricultural work correspond to approximately 85 percent of men's
earnings for comparable work, and women must demonstrate higher
qualifications than men when applying for jobs. Moreover, women
constitute a disproportionately high percentage of the subsistence
labor work force, especially in rural areas. Female rural workers are
affected most by wage discrimination and unemployment.
Despite an explicit constitutional provision promising additional
resources for single mothers and government efforts to provide them
with training in parenting skills, women's groups reported that the
social and economic problems of single mothers remained great. In
September 1997, the Constitutional Court ruled that pregnant women and
mothers of newborn children under 3 months of age could not be fired
from their jobs without ``just cause.'' The court ruled that bearing
children was not just cause.
On October 25, the Constitutional Court struck down a law that had
prohibited pregnant women who are divorced or separated from their
partners from remarrying before giving birth. The law also had imposed
a 270-day ``waiting period'' for women who wanted to remarry.
Children.--The Constitution formally provides for free public
education, which is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 15. An
estimated 25 percent of children in this age group do not attend
school, due to lax enforcement of truancy laws, inadequate classroom
space, and economic pressures to provide income for the family. The
Government provides for the cost of primary education, but many
families face additional expenses related to education, such as
matriculation fees, books, school items and transportation costs (which
are significant in rural areas where children may live far from
school). These costs can be prohibitive, especially for the rural poor.
Despite significant constitutional and legislative commitments for
the protection of children's rights, these were implemented only to a
minimal degree. The Constitution imposes the obligation on family,
society, and the State to assist and protect children, to foster their
development, and to assure the full exercise of these rights. The
Children's Code sets forth many of these rights and establishes
services and programs designed to enforce the protection of minors.
Children's advocates reported the need to educate citizens with regard
to the code as well as the 1996 and 1997 laws on family violence, which
had been drafted particularly to increase legal protection for women
and children.
Abuse of children is a problem. The National Institute for Forensic
Medicine reported 9,896 cases of child abuse during the year; there
were 9,713 reported cases in 1999. According to the March report of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, sexual abuse is prevalent,
particularly of children between the ages of 5 and 14 years of age. In
70 to 80 percent of cases, children know their abusers.
An estimated 25,000 boys and girls under age 18 work in the sex
trade. In 1996 legislators passed a law prohibiting sex with minors or
the employment of minors for prostitution, and they amended that law in
1997 to provide that conviction for nonviolent sexual abuse of a child
under age 14 carries a prison sentence of 4 to 10 years. Conviction for
rape of anyone under the age of 12 carries a mandatory sentence of 20
to 40 years in prison. Enforcement of such laws is lax. The ICBF
oversees all government child protection and welfare programs and funds
nongovernmental and church programs for children.
Trafficking in girls is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Child labor is a significant problem (see Section 6.d.).
In conflict zones, children often were caught in the crossfire
between the public security forces, paramilitary groups, and guerrilla
organizations. For example, on August 15, six children were killed and
several others injured by members of the army's Fourth Brigade who
mistook the children for a guerrilla unit (see Section 1.g.). Ministry
of Defense figures indicated that approximately 200 children were
killed due to the conflict during the year. At mid-year, UNICEF
reported that 460 children had been killed over the past 4 years by
various armed groups and that 789 had been kidnaped. Children suffered
disproportionately from the internal conflict, often forfeiting
opportunities to study as they were displaced by conflict and suffered
psychological traumas. According to UNICEF, over 1 million children
have been displaced from their homes over the past decade. The Human
Rights Ombudsman's office estimated that only 15 percent of displaced
children attend school. In July 1999, the Government announced that no
one under the age of 18 could enter military service, even with the
consent of a parent; previously, individuals over 16 years of age but
below age 18 could volunteer to join the military with parental
permission but were barred from serving in combat.
Paramilitary groups sometimes impressed children into their ranks,
and the use of child soldiers by guerrillas was common. According to
press reports, in August members of the FARC killed a school rector in
Meta department for criticizing the recruitment of his students. The
Government estimates that approximately 6,000 children are engaged as
combatants by both paramilitary groups and guerrillas. In May 1999, the
FARC promised visiting Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary
General on Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu that it would stop
forcing children into its ranks; however, it continued the practice.
The Roman Catholic Church reported that the FARC lured or forced
hundreds of children from the despeje zone into its ranks. It engaged
in similar practices in other areas under its control. For example,
according to press reports, in June the FARC recruited at least 37
youths, including minors, in the municipality of Puerto Rico in
southern Meta department. According to one NGO, in Putumayo the FARC
instigated compulsory service of males between the ages of 13 and 15
and was recruiting in high schools. Once recruited, child guerrillas
are virtual prisoners of their commanders and subject to various forms
of abuse. Sexual abuse of girls is a particular problem. Although the
ELN agreed to halt recruitment of children under the terms of the June
1998 Mainz ``Heaven's Gate'' agreement, it also regularly impressed
children into its ranks. Some 57 child guerrillas were captured or
deserted during the year, and 27 children were killed during FARC-
military clashes.
According to press reports, families from the demilitarized zone,
as well as from Arauca, Valle del Cauca, and Antioquia departments have
fled their homes because guerrilla groups have tried to recruit their
children forcibly. On May 4, a woman from Norte de Santander
department, with the help of the Colombian military, delivered her 12-
year-old son to the ICBF to protect him from the FARC, which was trying
to recruit him forcibly.
Children were also among the preferred kidnaping targets of
guerrillas (see Section 1.b.). Pais Libre reports that the number of
children kidnaped annually has increased in recent years, from 131 in
1998 to 206 in 1999, and as of November 12, 265 children had been
kidnaped in 2000. According to one press report, more than 200 children
were kidnaped during the year. For example, the FARC kidnaped 9-year-
old Clara Oliva Pantoja on March 22 and 3-year-old Andres Felipe Navas
on April 7 and held both in the despeje zone. Clara Olivia Pantoja was
released in December (see Section 1.b.). In April three armed men
kidnaped 9-year-old Dagberto Ospina Ospina from his school bus in
southern Cali. No group has been identified or claimed responsibility.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution enumerates the
fundamental social, economic, and cultural rights of the physically
disabled; however, serious practical impediments exist that prevent the
full participation of disabled persons in society. There is no
legislation that specifically mandates access for the disabled.
According to the Constitutional Court, physically disabled individuals
must have access to, or if they so request, receive assistance at,
voting stations. The Court also has ruled that the social security fund
for public employees cannot refuse to provide services for the disabled
children of its members, regardless of the cost involved.
Indigenous People.--There are approximately 80 distinct ethnic
groups among the country's more than 800,000 indigenous inhabitants.
These groups are concentrated in the Andes mountains, Pacific Coast
lowlands, the Guajira peninsula, and Amazonas department. According to
the National Organization of Colombia's Indigenous (ONIC), 93 percent
of indigenous people live in rural areas; 25 percent are on
reservations, and approximately 115,000 indigenous people are without
land.
The Constitution gives special recognition to the fundamental
rights of indigenous people. The Ministry of Interior, through the
office of indigenous affairs, is responsible for protecting the
territorial, cultural, and self-determination rights of Indians.
Ministry representatives are located in all regions of the country with
indigenous populations and work with other governmental human rights
organizations, as well as with NGO human rights groups and civil rights
organizations, to promote Indian interests and investigate violations
of indigenous rights. Nonetheless, members of indigenous groups suffer
discrimination in the sense that they traditionally have been relegated
to the margins of society. Few opportunities exist for those who might
wish to participate more fully in modern life. The March report of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights noted that an estimated 80 percent of
the indigenous population live in conditions of extreme poverty, that
74 percent receive wages below the legal minimum, and that their
municipalities have the highest rates of poverty. In addition,
indigenous communities suffer disproportionately from the internal
armed conflict (see Section 1.g.). Members of indigenous communities
often flee together in mass displacements, relocating to another
indigenous community.
According to the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA),
68,245 indigenous families live on designated Indian reserves.
Indigenous groups' rights to their ancestral lands are by law
permanent. INCORA reports that approximately 80 percent of these lands
have been demarcated. However, armed groups often violently contested
indigenous land ownership. According to ONIC, roughly 95 percent of the
country's resources are found on indigenous reservations and claimed
territories. Traditional Indian authority boards operate some 519
reserves; the boards handle national or local funds and are subject to
fiscal oversight by the national Comptroller General. These boards
administer their territories as municipal entities, with officials
elected or otherwise chosen according to Indian tradition.
Indigenous communities are free to educate their children in
traditional dialects and in the observance of cultural and religious
customs. Indigenous men are not subject to the national military draft.
INCORA estimated that some 200 indigenous communities had no legal
title to land that they claimed as their own. INCORA reported that at
mid-year some 488 requests by indigenous communities to establish new
reserves remained outstanding. According to INCORA, more than 75
million acres have been recognized legally as Indian lands. It is
buying back much of this land, which has been settled by mestizo
peasants, and returning it to indigenous groups.
The Constitution provides for a special criminal and civil
jurisdiction within Indian territories based upon traditional community
laws. However, some observers asserted that these special jurisdictions
were subject to manipulation, and that punishments rendered by such
community courts were often much more lenient than those imposed by
regular civilian courts.
Members of indigenous communities continued to be victims of all
sides in the internal conflict, and a number of them were killed. The
national Human Rights Ombudsman stated in its 1999-2000 annual report
that among the indigenous communities most affected by extrajudicial
killings, threats, and regional combat were the Corebaju in Caqueta,
the Puinave in Guaviare, the Embera-Katio of Alto Sinu, the Embera-
dobida of Choco, the Paez in Cauca, the Emaer-katio in Antioquia, the
Guayabero on the Guaviare-Meta border, the Tule in Choco, and the U'wa
in Boyaca and Casanare. The Human Rights Ombudsman's office reported 33
killings in indigenous communities in 1999; 22 of these victims were
community leaders.
According to press reports, in June members of a paramilitary
organization killed Joselito Bailarin, EmberaKatio governor of the
community of Canaverales in Murri de Frontino in Antioquia department.
On December 25, Embera leader Armando Achito reportedly was killed by
paramilitary forces in Jurado municipality, Choco department.
There were no new developments in the 1996 murder of Indians
Dagoberto Santero Bacilio, Carlos Arturo Solano Bernal, and Sergio
(Manue) in San Antonio de Palmito in Sucre department, allegedly by
paramilitary groups.
According to press reports, in early May, the FARC announced that
it would execute seven Embera-Katio indigenous leaders in the town
square at Frontino in Murri, Antioquia department, as retribution for
the May 26 deaths of two indigenous brothers at the hands of
paramilitary forces. The FARC believed that the indigenous leaders had
laid a trap for the brothers by identifying them as guerrilla
collaborators. The FARC stated that the indigenous leaders took too
long (8 days) to report the crime. The Indigenous Organization of
Antioquia (OIA) attributed the delay to difficulties in communicating
from a rural zone to Medellin. The OIA called for a humanitarian
commission to protect the leaders; however, on May 24, the FARC killed
one of the leaders, a 30-year-old teacher named Hernando de Jesus
Bailarin.
Paramilitary and guerrilla groups have been known to force
indigenous people, including children, into their ranks. Some guerrilla
groups reportedly favored indigenous people as guides and
communicators, due to their knowledge of the geography of their
historical lands and knowledge of generally unfamiliar languages.
On May 10, approximately 3,000 Kankuama tribe members from the
Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta region in Magdalena department were
pressured to leave their community by the AUC paramilitary
organization. The AUC was fighting the FARC, ELN, and EPL guerrilla
organizations in the region. On March 2, indigenous leader Jairo Bedoya
Hoyos disappeared. The OIA held the AUC responsible. In an open letter,
the AUC stated that it did not have Bedoya in its custody.
U'wa protests against initial drilling by Occidental Petroleum in
an area near but not on their reserve continued. The U'wa filed several
court challenges to drilling, and succeeded in winning brief delays
before appeal courts ruled in favor of the Government's arrangement
with Occidental. U'wa repeatedly sought to block road access to the
drilling site; in one instance in February, police sought to remove an
U'wa road block by using tear gas to disperse the crowd; in an ensuing
panic the U'wa claimed that four children were killed (see Sections
1.a. and 2.b.). Press reports indicated that only one body was
recovered. Indigenous Senator Jesus Pinacue announced a hunger strike
to pressure Occidental Petroleum to leave U'wa land. Indigenous Senator
Francisco Rojas Birri and Representatives Leonardo Caicedo and Jhonny
Aparicio supported the hunger strike. A 1997 OAS joint study with a
university recommended the immediate and unconditional suspension of
oil exploration or exploitation activities; clarification of the status
of U'wa territories and protected reserves; and the development of a
formal process of consultation under the auspices of the Government.
The U'wa also had threatened to commit collective suicide if their
wishes were not respected. In August 1999, the Government increased the
U'wa reserve, from 100,000 acres to 1.25 million acres. The area has
estimated oil reserves of up to 1 billion barrels. In August a
technical working group including the Ministries of Interior and
Environment, as well as an advisor to the U'wa, reported that the
Government and Occidental Petroleum are complying with all applicable
regulations. The U'wa broke off talks in September, in response to a
ruling by the Government's agrarian reform agency authorizing the state
oil company to purchase lands to create a buffer zone around the
drilling area. Talks remained suspended at the end of the year.
Beginning in early January, 167 indigenous members of the
EmberaKatio tribe occupied the grounds of the Ministry of the
Environment in Bogota for 4 months to protest the flooding of their
lands by the Urra hydroelectric project. In 1998 the Constitutional
Court ruled that the human rights of the Embera had been violated by
Urra because it had not consulted the Embera on the project.
Religious Minorities.--There is little religious discrimination.
The Roman Catholic Church and some evangelical churches reported that
some indigenous leaders were intolerant of nontraditional forms of
worship.
Three Mormon temples were bombed in April, and members of the
Jewish community were victims of abuse (see Section 2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the Ministry of
the Interior, citizens of African heritage live primarily in the
Pacific departments of Choco (370,000), Valle del Cauca (1,720,257),
Cauca (462,638), and Narino (261,180), as well as along the Caribbean
coast. Although estimates vary widely, blacks represent approximately
10 percent of the total population.
Blacks are entitled to all constitutional rights and protections;
however, they traditionally have suffered from discrimination. Blacks
are underrepresented in the executive branch, judicial branch, and
civil service positions, and in military hierarchies. Despite the
passage of the African-Colombian law in 1993, little concrete progress
was made in expanding public services and private investment in Choco
department or other predominantly black regions. The same law also
authorized black communities to receive collective titles to some
Pacific coast lands. However, black leaders complained that the
Government was slow to issue titles, and that their access to such
lands often was inhibited by the presence of armed groups or
individuals. Unemployment among African-Colombians ran as high as 76
percent in some communities. The March report of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights noted that an estimated 80 percent of African-Colombians
live in conditions of extreme poverty, that 74 percent receive wages
below the legal minimum, and that their municipalities have the highest
rates of poverty. Choco remains the department with the lowest per
capita level of social investment and is last in terms of education,
health, and infrastructure. It also has been the scene of some of the
country's most enduring political violence, as paramilitary forces and
guerrillas struggled for control of the Uraba region.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes the
rights of workers to organize unions and to strike, except for members
of the armed forces, police, and those ``essential public services'' as
defined by law. However, legislation that prohibits all public
employees from striking is still in effect, although it often is
overlooked. In practice violence towards trade unionists and antiunion
discrimination are obstacles to joining and engaging in trade union
activities. Labor leaders throughout the country continued to be
targets of attacks by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, narcotics
traffickers, and their own union rivals. Union leaders contend that
perpetrators of violence against workers, particularly members of
paramilitary groups, operate with virtual impunity.
The 1948 Labor Code (which has been amended repeatedly) provides
for automatic recognition of unions that obtain at least 25 signatures
from potential members and comply with a simple registration process at
the Labor Ministry; however, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
has received reports that this process was slow and sometimes took
years. The law penalizes interference with freedom of association. It
allows unions to determine internal rules freely, elect officials and
manage activities, and forbids the dissolution of trade unions by
administrative fiat. In 1999 President Pastrana approved Law 584, which
limits government interference in a union's right to free association.
The law reflects recommendations made by the ILO Direct Contacts
Mission and corresponds to international labor legislation. Previous
requirements that were repealed under this law include the requirement
that in order for a trade union to be registered, the labor inspector
must certify that there is no other union. The law also amends the
requirement that labor authorities must be present at general
assemblies convened to vote on calling a strike (the trade unions now
have the choice of having labor authorities present or not). However,
the law added the requirement that when there is a request for
information from an interested party, Ministry of Labor officials can
require trade union leaders or members to provide relevant information
on their work, including books, registers, plans, and other documents.
The ILO Committee of Experts considers that this amendment is not in
conformity with the freedom of association convention since control by
an administrative authority should be used only for carrying out
investigations when there are reasonable grounds that an offense has
been committed.
According to estimates by the Ministry of Labor and various unions,
6 to 7 percent of the work force is organized. According to the
Colombian Commission of Jurists, 89 percent of those organized are
public sector workers. There are approximately 2,500 registered unions,
87 to 95 percent of which are organized in one of three confederations:
The center-left United Workers' Central, with which 45 to 50 percent of
unions are affiliated; the Maoist/Social Christian Colombian Democratic
Workers' Confederation, with which approximately 30 percent of unions
are affiliated; and the Liberal Party-affiliated Confederation of
Colombian Workers (CTC), with which 12 to 15 percent of unions are
affiliated. Unions and Ministry of Labor officials report that union
membership has declined in recent years.
Before staging a legal strike, unions must negotiate directly with
management and, if no agreement results, accept mediation. By law,
public employees must accept binding arbitration if mediation fails; in
practice, public service unions decide by membership vote whether or
not to seek arbitration. In early August leaders of some unions called
for a 24-hour strike by an estimated 700,000 state workers, including
the Sindicated Union of Workers (USO) oil workers, the main public
sector employees' union, telecommunications workers, teachers, and
health workers, to protest government austerity workers and high
unemployment.
Unions, indigenous groups, debtors, students, and others continued
to both protest and negotiate with the Government over the latter's
inability to confront the country's economic downturn, soaring
unemployment, and a Labor Code reform bill which may eliminate several
popular worker benefits. On August 3, a general strike organized by
various unions, including the United Workers' Central (CUT) and the
General Confederation of Democratic Workers (CGTD), protested economic
policies, privatizations, unemployment, new taxes, and social security
reforms in Bogota and other cities throughout the country. Union
strikers were joined by bank employees and state workers, such as
teachers and health employees.
Labor leaders throughout the country continued to be targets of
attacks by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, narcotics traffickers, and
their own union rivals. Labor leaders and NGO's reported that 105 union
members were killed during the year; U.N. officials reported 54 murders
of labor leaders during the first 10 months of the year. According to
the National Labor School (ENS), approximately 1,500 union members have
been murdered since 1991, and unions face widespread societal hostility
because they are seen by some observers as ``subversive.'' Trade union
leaders allege that 90 percent of victims were killed by paramilitary
groups. Other victims were targeted by the FARC for their membership
in, or sympathy with, the National Syndicate of Agricultural Industry
Workers (Sintrainagro), a union largely composed of demobilized EPL
members. Many of the murdered Sintrainagro members had worked in the
banana industry in the Uraba region. The ILO Direct Contact Mission
preliminary report in March noted that ``cases where the instigators
and perpetrators of the murders of trade union leaders are identified
are practically nonexistent, as is the handing down of guilty
verdicts.'' The ENS also reported that in the last 5 years, 47
unionists have been the victims of forced disappearances, 60 unionists
were kidnaped, and 1,573 unionists received death threats. The USO
reported that at least 600 trade union leaders were displaced during
the first 10 months of the year.
In May 1998, the ILO expressed serious concern over allegations of
murders, forced disappearances, death threats, and other acts of
violence against trade union officials and members. The ILO documented
more than 300 murders of trade union members during 1995-98. The ILO
criticized the Government for failing, since November 1996, to provide
it with information on a single case of detention, trial, and
conviction of anyone responsible for the murder of union officials and
members.
In February an ILO Direct Contacts Mission, which had been approved
by the ILO Governing Body and accepted by the Government in November
1999, visited the country to examine alleged abuses of workers' rights
to life, free association, and collective bargaining. In March the
Direct Contacts Mission presented a preliminary report to the Governing
Body's committee on freedom of association, which noted that the
Government was ``making sincere efforts'' to address these problems.
The report expressed concern over the number of killings, kidnapings,
death threats, and other violent assaults on trade union leaders and
unionized workers and stated that killings of trade union leaders and
unionized workers were a ``regular'' occurrence.
Government efforts to overcome impunity include the establishment
of 25 special human rights investigative subunits, one of which is
responsible for cases of human rights violations of trade unionists,
and a 49 percent increase in the legal budget for judicial employees.
To protect trade unionists from violence, in 1999 the Government
developed the Program for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and
Trade Union Leaders. As of November, the program provided protection
for 41 trade union premises and protection for 116 leaders and
activists. These individuals are provided with bulletproof vests,
bodyguards, and in some cases vehicles. Trade unionists complain that
these measures are insufficient to protect adequately the large number
of trade unionists who are threatened, and continue to press for more
efforts to break the impunity with which most of these acts are
committed.
The ILO's recommendations included an urgent and global inquiry
into the participation of public officials in the creation of self-
defense or paramilitary groups; an increase in government budgetary
allocations to protect trade union officials; and an increase in
efforts to combat impunity. After a contentious debate at the June
International Labor Conference, the Government and worker delegations
agreed to a compromise offered by the ILO Director General Juan
Somovia: the establishment of an ILO office in Bogota to be headed by
his personal representative. Rafael Alburquerque was appointed ILO
Special Representative to Colombia and began work in October. In
November Alburquerque reported to the ILO Governing Body that the
situation continues to be grave; the Special Representative's next
report is expected in March 2001.
On May 4, Javier Suarez, the leader of a truck drivers' union, was
shot and killed near his home in Buenaventura. Union leaders suspected
that paramilitary groups were responsible.
In early August, Carmen Emilio Sanchez Coronel, a trade unionist
with the teacher's union in Norte de Santander department, was killed
along with seven other trade unionists at a paramilitary roadblock. The
CUT also blamed paramilitary forces for the August 2 death of Antioquia
union worker Luis Rodrigo Restrepo. The CUT alleged that paramilitary
groups were targeting its rank and file members as well as union
leaders.
On December 15, five men seriously wounded Wilson Borja, president
of public employees' union FENALTRASE, when they fired on his car at a
stoplight in an apparent attempt to kill him. The attackers killed a
30-year-old female street vendor and wounded one of Borja's two
bodyguards. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano publicly admitted
ordering the attack and claimed that he meant to ``detain'' Borja. Most
observers connected the attempt, which followed press reports of
progress toward establishing an ELN ``encounter zone,'' with Borja's
role in facilitating the ELN peace process. Police detained one
suspected gunman and a possible paramilitary accomplice within days of
the attack.
Prosecutors have outstanding warrants for the arrest of
paramilitary members Temilda Rosa Martinez and Eduardo Manrique Morales
in the February 1999 killing of 72-year-old Julio Alfonso Poveda, a CUT
founder.
In December the Prosecutor General's office arraigned three hired
killers alleged to have murdered CUT vice president Jorge Ortega in
1998.
There were no leads in the August 1999 bomb incidents at both the
Sincelejo, Sucre department offices of the Association of Rural Land
Users (which was destroyed by a bomb) and at the Medellin office of the
USO, where a bomb was defused. According to the ENS, there have been 14
bombing attempts against union offices in the last 3 years.
The Government still has not addressed a number of ILO criticisms
of the Labor Code. In 1993 the ILO had complained about the following
provisions of the law: The requirement that government officials be
present at assemblies convened to vote on a strike call; the legality
of firing union organizers from jobs in their trades once 6 months have
passed following a strike or dispute; the requirement that contenders
for trade union office must belong to the occupation their union
represents; the prohibition of strikes in a wide range of public
services that are not necessarily essential; various restrictions on
the right to strike; the power of the Minister of Labor and the
President to intervene in disputes through compulsory arbitration when
a strike is declared illegal; and the power to dismiss trade union
officers involved in an unlawful strike.
The expired 1995 collective work convention between Ecopetrol and
the USO was replaced by a new agreement in May 1999. USO leadership
remained in open conflict with the Government on many issues. USO
leaders reported that its members in the oilproducing Magdalena Medio
region continued to receive death threats from presumed paramilitary
groups, who have accused USO officials of working with the ELN
guerrillas waging a sabotage campaign against the country's oil
pipelines.
Unions are free to join international confederations without
government restrictions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution protects the right of workers to organize and engage in
collective bargaining. Workers in larger firms and public services have
been most successful in organizing, but these unionized workers
represent only a small portion of the economically active population.
High unemployment, traditional antiunion attitudes, a large informal
economic sector, and weak union organization and leadership limit
workers' bargaining power in all sectors. The requirement that trade
unions must cover the majority of workers in each company as a
condition for representing them in sectoral agreements further weakens
workers' bargaining power.
The law forbids antiunion discrimination and the obstruction of
free association; however, according to union leaders, both
discrimination and obstruction of free association occurred frequently.
Government labor inspectors theoretically enforce these provisions, but
because there are 271 labor inspectors to cover 1,085 municipalities
and more than 300,000 companies, the inspection apparatus is weak.
Furthermore, labor inspectors often lacked basic equipment, such as
vehicles. Guerrillas sometimes deterred labor inspectors from
performing their duties by declaring them military targets.
The Labor Code calls for fines to be levied for restricting freedom
of association and prohibits the use of strike breakers.
Collective pacts--agreements between individual workers and their
employers--are not subject to collective bargaining and typically are
used by employers to obstruct labor organization. Although employers
must register collective pacts with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry
does not exercise any oversight or control over them.
The Labor Code also eliminates mandatory mediation in private
labor-management disputes and extends the grace period before the
Government can intervene in a conflict. Federations and confederations
may assist affiliate unions in collective bargaining.
Labor law applies to the country's 15 free trade zones (FTZ's), but
its standards often were not enforced in the zones. Public employee
unions have won collective bargaining agreements in the FTZ's of
Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cartagena, and Santa Marta, but the garment
manufacturing enterprises in Medellin and Risaralda, which have the
largest number of employees, are not organized. Labor unions do not
exist in any of the zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids slavery and any form of forced or compulsory labor, and this
prohibition generally is respected in practice in the formal sector;
however, women were trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution
(see Section 6.f.).
Paramilitary forces and guerrilla groups forcibly conscripted
indigenous people (see Section 5). There were some reports that the
guerrillas used forced labor to build clandestine roads.
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children; however, the
Government does not have the resources to enforce this prohibition
effectively (see Section 6.d.). Although there were no known instances
of forced child labor in the formal economy, several thousand children
were forced to serve as paramilitary or guerrilla combatants (see
Section 1.g.), to work as prostitutes (see Section 5), or in some
instances as coca pickers.
Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 14 in most jobs, and the Labor Code prohibits the
granting of work permits to youths under the age of 18; however, child
labor is a significant problem, particularly in the informal sector. A
1989 decree established the Minors' Code and prohibited the employment
of children under age 12. It also stipulated exceptional conditions and
the express authorization of Labor Ministry inspectors for the
employment of children between the ages of 12 and 17 years. Children
under age 14 are prohibited from working, with the exception that those
between the ages of 12 and 14 may perform very light work with the
permission of their parents and appropriate labor authorities. All
child workers (anyone under the age of 18) must receive the national
minimum wage for the hours they work. Children between the ages of 12
and 14 can work a maximum of 4 hours a day; children between the ages
of 14 and 16 can work a maximum of 6 hours a day; and children between
the ages of 16 and 18 can work a maximum of 8 hours a day. All child
workers are prohibited from working at night, or performing work in
which there is a risk of bodily harm or exposure to excessive heat,
cold, or noise. A number of specific occupations are prohibited for
children as well, such as mining and construction. However, these
requirements largely are ignored in practice, and only 5 percent of
those children who work have filed for the required work permits. By
allowing children between the ages of 12 and 13 to work, even under
restricted conditions, the law contravenes international standards on
child labor, which set the minimum legal age for employment in
developing countries at 14 years.
In the formal sector, child labor laws are enforced through
periodic review by the Ministry of Labor and by the military, which
ensures compliance with mandatory service requirements. However, in the
informal labor sector and in rural areas, child labor continues to be a
problem, particularly in agriculture and mining. Children as young as
11 years of age work full-time in almost every aspect of the cut flower
industry as a way to supplement family income. Even children enrolled
in school or, in some cases, those too young for school, accompany
their parents to work at flower plantations at night and on weekends.
In the mining sector, coal mining presents the most difficult child
labor problem. Many marginal, usually family-run, mining operations
employ their young children as a way to boost production and income; it
is estimated that between 1,200 and 2,000 children are involved. The
work is dangerous and the hours are long. Younger children carry water
and package coal, while those age 14 and up engage in more physically
demanding labor such as carrying bags of coal. These informal mining
operations are illegal. The Ministry of Labor reported that, by the end
of 1999 an interagency governmental committee had removed approximately
80 percent of child laborers from the informal mines and returned them
to school. The law prohibits the employment of minors for prostitution;
however, child prostitution is a problem. In August the Prosecutor
General's Specialized Sex Crimes and Human Dignity Unit reported that
from August 1999 to August 2000 it opened 41 cases in which a child
under age 14 was induced or lured into prostitution.
A Catholic Church study conducted in May 1999 reported that
approximately 2.7 million children work, including approximately
700,000 who worked as coca pickers. This represented a sharp increase
from 1992, when according to a 1997 study by Los Andes University,
approximately 1.6 million children (between the ages of 12 and 17)
worked. One observer noted that the recent economic downturn might
increase the number of children working, especially in rural areas.
Child participation in agricultural work soared at harvest times.
According to the Ministry of Labor, working children between the ages
of 7 and 15 earned on average between 13 and 47 percent of the minimum
wage. An estimated 26 percent of working children had regular access to
health care; approximately 25 percent were employed in potentially
dangerous activities. The ICBF estimated that paramilitary and
guerrilla groups employed 6,000 children as combatants (see Section 5).
School attendance by working children was significantly lower than for
nonworking children, especially in rural areas. The health services of
the social security system cover only 10 percent of child laborers. A
1996 study by the national Human Rights Ombudsman of child labor in
Putumayo department found that 22 percent of the children between the
ages of 5 and 18 were full-time coca pickers. In the municipality of
Orito, the figure reached 70 percent.
The Labor Ministry has an inspector in each of the 33 departments
responsible for certifying and conducting repeat inspections of
workplaces that employ children; however, this system has few resources
and covered only the 20 percent of the child work force employed in the
formal sector of the economy. In 1995 the Government established a
National Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor, made up of
representatives from the Ministries of Labor, Health, Education, and
Communications, as well as officials from various other government
offices, unions, employer associations, and NGO's. Under the Action
Plan, the Government distributed funds during the year to member
organizations of the committee for child labor eradication projects.
The Government also obtained commitments from the country's leading
trade associations and unions to implement child labor eradication
programs with the jointly ILO's IPEC program, these programs were in
the preparatory stages at year's end. During the year, the Government
formulated a 2000-02 Action Plan which gives priority to direct
intervention on behalf of domestic child workers, child miners,
sexually exploited children, children in trade activities and children
in the agricultural sector. It has also designed a project, for which
it is seeking funding, to collect more reliable national data on child
labor.
The Government is taking steps to incorporate into national law,
ILO Convention 182 concerning the prohibition of and immediate action
for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
however, it is unable to enforce this prohibition effectively, and
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution and the
forced recruitment of child soldiers are problems (see Sections 1.f.,
1.g., 6.c., and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a uniform
minimum wage for workers every January to serve as a benchmark for wage
bargaining. The monthly minimum wage, set by tripartite negotiations
among representatives of business, organized labor, and the Government
was about $150 (322,500 pesos) throughout the year. The minimum wage
does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
Because the minimum wage is based on the Government's target inflation
rate, the minimum wage has not kept up with real inflation in recent
years. A total of 70 percent of all workers earn wages that are
insufficient to cover the costs of the Government's estimated low-
income family shopping basket. However, 77 percent of all workers earn
no more than, and often much less than, twice the minimum wage.
The law provides for a standard workday of 8 hours and a 48-hour
workweek, but it does not require specifically a weekly rest period of
at least 24 hours, a failing criticized by the ILO.
Legislation provides comprehensive protection for workers'
occupational safety and health; however, these standards are difficult
to enforce, in part due to the small number of Labor Ministry
inspectors. In general, a lack of public safety awareness, inadequate
attention by unions, and lax enforcement by the Labor Ministry result
in a high-level of industrial accidents and unhealthy working
conditions. Over 80 percent of industrial companies lack safety plans.
The Social Security Institute reported 53,408 work-related accidents
during the year, which resulted in 417 deaths. There were 243 cases of
work-related illness. The industries most prone to worker accidents
were mining, construction, and transportation.
According to the Labor Code, workers have the right to withdraw
from a hazardous work situation without jeopardizing continued
employment. However, unorganized workers in the informal sector fear
the loss of their jobs if they exercise their right to criticize
abuses, particularly in the agricultural sector.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons, and the country is a source for
trafficking in women and girls to Europe, the United States, and Asia.
In June Congress approved a new Criminal Code, which provides for a
prison term of 6 to 8 years and a fine up to the equivalent of 100
times the minimum legal monthly salary for any person who ``promotes,
induces, compels, facilitates, collaborates, or in any other way
participates in the entry or exit of people into or from the country
without complying with all legal requisites.'' While intended to combat
alien smuggling in general, the law could be used to prosecute
traffickers as well. The law is scheduled to enter into effect in
January 2001.
A government committee composed of representatives of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Interpol, the DAS, the Ministry of Justice, the
Attorney General's office, the Prosecutor General's office, and the
presidency meets once every 2 months to discuss trafficking in persons.
In November the Ministry of Justice, the Organization for International
Migration, and NGO Hope Foundation held the first national conference
on trafficking in persons.
The DAS reported at that conference that Colombia is the third most
common country of origin of trafficking victims, and that the majority
of Colombian women trafficked for prostitution go to the Netherlands,
Spain, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe issued a report on trafficking in persons in
September 1999, which stated that women and girls from Colombia also
are trafficked to North America. According to press reports, more than
50 percent of women from Colombia who enter Japan are trafficking
victims forced to work as prostitutes. According to the DAS, 126
Colombian trafficking victims have been rescued abroad by Interpol
during 1998-2000, and 115 victims were rescued by the National Police
during 19992000. According to police, the majority of international
trafficking operations are managed by Colombians and have ties to
narcotics trafficking.
First Lady Nohra Pastrana, in conjunction with the Foreign Affairs
Ministry and Interpol, participated in a public relations campaign to
alert citizens, in particular women, to the risks of immigrating
illegally to other countries.
On June 23, a Colombian woman trafficked to Denmark was granted
asylum in Denmark after testifying against Colombian and Danish
traffickers. In August police in Andalucia, Spain, detained 51 persons
and broke up a ring that trafficked women from Brazil, Colombia, and
Ecuador for purposes of prostitution.
__________
COSTA RICA
Costa Rica is a longstanding, stable, constitutional democracy with
a unicameral Legislative Assembly directly elected in free multiparty
elections every 4 years. Miguel Angel Rodriguez of the Social Christian
Unity Party (PUSC) won the presidency in the February 1998 elections,
in which approximately 70 percent of eligible voters cast ballots. The
judiciary is independent.
The 1949 Constitution abolished the military forces. The Ministry
of Public Security--which includes specialized units such as the
antidrug police--and the Ministry of the Presidency share
responsibility for law enforcement and national security. In 1996 the
Government combined several police units within the Ministry of Public
Security, including the Border Guard, the Rural Guard, and the Civil
Guard, into a single ``public force.'' Public security forces generally
observe procedural safeguards established by law and the Constitution;
however, members of these forces occasionally committed human rights
abuses.
The market economy is based primarily on light industry, tourism,
and agriculture. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth was estimated
at 1.4 percent, compared with 8 percent in 1999. The government deficit
is estimated to have narrowed to 2.1 percent of GDP, compared with 2.3
percent in 1999; however, the public sector deficit remained at 3.3
percent of GDP, the same as in 1999. The Constitution protects the
right to private property; however, domestic and foreign property
owners encounter considerable difficulty gaining adequate, timely
compensation for lands expropriated for national parks and other
purposes. The law grants considerable rights to squatters who invade
uncultivated land, regardless of who may hold title to the property.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse; however, there were problems in a
few areas. There were some instances of physical abuse by police and
prison guards, and reports of police abuse of authority or misconduct
increased during the year. The judicial system processes criminal cases
very slowly, resulting in lengthy pretrial detention for some persons
charged with crimes. Domestic violence is a serious problem, and abuse
of children also remains a problem. Traditional patterns of unequal
opportunity for women remain, in spite of continuing government and
media efforts to advocate change. Child labor persists, and child
prostitution is a growing problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
The third judicial police officer accused of the 1994 murder of
farmer Ciro Monge did not appear for his trial in April, and his
whereabouts were unknown at year's end. The two officers convicted in
1997 appealed the rulings and lost; one fled the country in 1998 but
was captured and returned to serve his sentence in February.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits cruel or degrading treatment
and holds invalid any statement obtained through violence, and the
authorities generally abide by these prohibitions; however, members of
the public forces were responsible for some physical abuse, and reports
of police abuse of authority or misconduct increased during the year.
An effective mechanism for lodging and recording complaints of police
misconduct exists. The Ombudsman's office serves as a recourse to
citizens that have complaints about violations of their civil and human
rights and about deficiencies in public and private infrastructure. It
investigates complaints and, where appropriate, initiates suits against
officials.
The Ombudsman's office received 52 reports of police abuse of
authority or misconduct during the year, compared with 14 in 1999 and 4
in 1998. The majority of the reports involved complaints about
negligence or corruption, but part of the large increase was due to
complaints of alleged police brutality during the Costa Rican
Electricity Institute strike (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). Police
intervention during strike-related protests in downtown San Jose
included the use of tear gas and riot gear.
A large percentage of police personnel owe their appointments to
political patronage. The Rodriguez administration continued
implementation of the 1994 Police Code designed to depoliticize and
professionalize the police force. The Government's longterm plan is to
establish permanent, professional cadres, eventually resulting in a
nonpolitically appointed career force. The basic course for new police
recruits includes training using a human rights manual developed by the
Ministry of Public Security.
Prisoners generally receive humane treatment. Prisoners are
separated by sex and by level of security (minimum, medium, and
maximum). There are separate juvenile detention centers. Illegal
narcotics are readily available in the prisons, and drug use is common.
As of August, the Ombudsman's office had received two complaints of
physical abuse of prisoners by guards, and four complaints of
psychological abuse; compared with six complaints of physical abuse and
six complaints of psychological abuse in all of 1999. The Ombudsman's
office investigates complaints and refers serious cases of abuse to the
public prosecutor.
Penitentiary overcrowding remains a problem, with the prison
population estimated at 67 percent above planned capacity in 1999. A
study by a U.N. agency found that the prison population grew by 155
percent from 1992-99. The Government is expanding six prisons to
address this problem. In March 1996, the Supreme Court's Constitutional
Chamber issued an order to the San Sebastian prison in San Jose, giving
the institution 1 year to achieve minimally acceptable conditions for
the prisoners. As of September, occupancy in that prison was 139
percent above intended capacity, an increase from 108 percent in 1999.
In August the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber declared that no
additional prisoners would be admitted to the San Sebastian prison
until it met the U.N. minimum standards for the treatment of the
imprisoned. The Ministry of Justice responded by calling on the
Rodriguez administration to allocate more funds for prison enhancement.
Five additional facilities have been opened and three have been
undergoing renovation since 1999 as part of this plan. The Government
also approved the budget for a series of detention facilities in
outlying provinces, which are expected both to reduce overcrowding and
to locate prisoners closer to their families.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and law
prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
respects these prohibitions.
The law requires issuance of judicial warrants before making
arrests. The Constitution entitles a detainee to a judicial
determination of the legality of the detention during arraignment
before a court officer within 24 hours of arrest. The authorities
generally respect these rights.
The law provides for the right to bail, and the authorities observe
it in practice. Generally, the authorities do not hold detainees
incommunicado. With judicial authorization, the authorities may hold
suspects for 48 hours after arrest or, under special circumstances, for
up to 10 days.
The Constitution bars exile as punishment, and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide
for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this
provision in practice. The Constitution provides for the right to a
fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces this
right.
The Supreme Court supervises the work of the lower courts, known as
tribunals. The Legislative Assembly elects the 22 Supreme Court
magistrates to 8-year terms, subject to automatic renewal unless the
Assembly decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority. Accused persons
may select attorneys to represent them, and the law provides for access
to counsel at state expense for the indigent.
Persons accused of serious offenses and held without bail sometimes
remain in pretrial custody for long periods. Lengthy legal procedures,
numerous appeals, and large numbers of detainees cause delays and case
backlogs. As of February, there were 1,967 accused persons jailed while
awaiting trial, representing 21 percent of the prison population.
There were no reports of political prisoners. However, one
individual was jailed for committing crimes against the State
(politically motivated acts of violence) in the 1980's. The human
rights group Families for the Defense of Political Prisoners and Human
Rights considers this person to be a political prisoner.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions; and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction. The law requires judicial warrants
to search private homes. Judges may approve the use of wiretaps in
limited circumstances, primarily to combat narcotics trafficking.
The law grants considerable rights to squatters who invade
uncultivated land, regardless of who may hold title to the property.
Landowners throughout the country have suffered frequent squatter
invasions for years. President Rodriguez said he would give priority to
reducing these conflicts, increasing public security, and regularizing
land tenure. The Legislative Assembly is reexamining laws that allow
occupants of land to gain title through adverse possession. The
incidence of squatter invasions had increased in 1999 in anticipation
of the land tenure regularization. However, during the year there was
only one instance when squatter families were removed. In that case,
the Government removed 230 families without reports of protests or
violence.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, a generally effective
judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system together
ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
There are 6 major privately owned newspapers, several periodicals,
20 privately owned television stations, and over 80 privately owned
radio stations, all of which pursue independent editorial policies.
While the media generally criticized the Government freely, there were
unconfirmed allegations that the Government withheld advertising from
some publications in order to influence or limit reporting.
A 1996 ``right of response'' law provides persons criticized in the
media with an opportunity to reply with equal attention and at equal
length. Print and electronic media continued to criticize public
figures; however, media managers have found it difficult to comply with
provisions of this law.
The Penal Code outlines a series of ``insult laws'' that establish
criminal penalties of up to 3 years in prison for those convicted of
``insulting the honor or decorum of a public official.'' The law also
identifies defamation, libel, slander, and calumny as offenses against
a person's honor that can carry criminal penalties. The Inter-American
Press Association and the World Press Freedom Committee assert that
such laws have the effect of restricting reporting by the media, and
that they wrongly provide public officials with a shield from public
scrutiny by citizens and the press.
The Office of Control of Public Spectacles rates films and has the
authority to restrict or prohibit their showing; it has similar powers
over television programs and stage plays. Nonetheless, a wide range of
foreign films are available to the public. A tribunal reviews appeals
of the office's actions.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
In March police intervention to disband strike-related protests in
San Jose resulted in complaints to the Ombudsman's office that such
actions were abusive and constituted evidence of police brutality (see
Sections 1.c. and 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. While the
Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion,
members of all denominations freely practice their religion without
government interference. Religious education teachers, including those
in public schools, must be certified by the Roman Catholic Episcopal
Conference. Foreign missionaries and clergy of all denominations work
and proselytize freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There are no
restrictions on travel within the country, on emigration, or on the
right of return.
There is a long tradition of providing refuge to persons from other
Latin American countries.
The law provides for granting asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government has
admitted approximately 5,000 persons as refugees under terms of the
convention. The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government makes a distinction between
political asylum and refugee status. The issue of the provision of
first asylum did not arise. The Constitution specifically prohibits
repatriation of anyone subject to potential persecution, and there were
no reports of the forced expulsion of persons to a country where they
feared persecution.
The authorities regularly repatriated undocumented Nicaraguans,
most of whom entered the country primarily for economic reasons.
However, following Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the Government announced a
program of general amnesty for all Nicaraguans, Hondurans, and
Salvadorans in the country prior to November 9, 1998. By June 156,000
Central Americans, 95 percent of whom are Nicaraguans, qualified for
and received legal resident status under this government amnesty
program.
Immigration officials reported that 4,000 Colombians were expected
to emigrate to Costa Rica during the year; 2,831 emigrated in 1999. The
majority immigrate legally. However, others seek temporary refugee
status, and under the law, are expected to return to their country of
origin once the period of conflict ends in their country.
The Government has been reluctant in many cases to state publicly
under what status it would grant legal residence. However, according to
press reports, the authorities granted 16 Cuban athletes asylum in the
period between January 1999 and June, under the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
Allegations of abuse by the Border Guard periodically arise.
Although instances of physical abuse appear to have declined, there
were credible reports of extortion of migrants by border officials.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through free and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage
and by secret ballot every 4 years. The independent Supreme Electoral
Tribunal ensures the integrity of elections, and the authorities and
citizens respect election results. The Constitution bars the President
from seeking reelection, and Assembly members may seek reelection only
after at least one term out of office. In September the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this
provision in response to a petition filed by private citizens. The case
is expected to be appealed to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
for a determination of whether the ban on presidential reelection
constitutes an infringement of citizens' rights to vote and run for
office.
In the 1998 elections, President Rodriguez's Social Christian Unity
Party won a plurality in the Legislative Assembly, winning 27 of 57
seats. The National Liberation Party (PLN) won 23 seats, the Democratic
Force won 3 seats, and 4 minor parties--the Labor Action, National
Integration, Costa Rican Renovation, and Libertarian Movement parties--
each won 1 seat.
Women encounter no legal impediments to their participation in
politics; however, while they are underrepresented overall, women are
represented increasingly in leadership positions in the Government and
political parties. Both vice presidents (who are also cabinet members),
the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Women's Affairs, and 11
legislative assembly deputies are women. Sonia Picado, leader of the
PLN, the principal opposition party, is also a woman. Former Assembly
Deputy Sandra Piszk continues as Ombudsman, a key autonomous post
created in 1993 to protect the rights and interests of citizens in
their dealings with the Government, and Linette Saborio remained the
Director General of the judicial investigative organization. The PUSC
mandated that a minimum of 40 percent of posts in party councils be
occupied by women and created the Ministry of Women's Affairs, headed
by Dr. Gloria Valerin. In 1998 female legislators formed the Foundation
of Women Parliamentarians of Costa Rica to commemorate the 45th
anniversary of the first female members of the Assembly. The group's
principal focus is to promote women's involvement in politics through
informational meetings and public awareness campaigns, but it also
works for a number of social objectives, including the decentralization
of government.
Indigenous people may participate freely in politics and
government; however, in practice, they have not played significant
roles in these areas, except on issues directly affecting their
welfare, largely because of their relatively small numbers and physical
isolation. They account for about 1 percent of the population, and
their approximately 20,000 votes constitute an important swing vote in
national elections. None of the 57 members of the National Assembly
identifies himself as indigenous. There are two black members in the
Assembly. The country's 100,000 blacks, who mostly reside on the
Caribbean coast, enjoy full rights of citizenship, including the
protection of laws against racial discrimination.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Various human rights groups operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views. The
Costa Rican Commission for Human Rights, the Commission for the Defense
of Human Rights in Central America, and the Family and Friends of
Political Prisoners of Costa Rica monitor and report on human rights,
as does the Ombudsman's office.
The Legislative Assembly elects the Ombudsman for a 4-year,
renewable term. The Ombudsman's office is part of the legislative
branch, ensuring a high degree of independence from the executive
branch. The law provides for the functional, administrative, and
judgmental independence of the Ombudsman's office.
Several international organizations concerned with human rights,
including the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, are located in San Jose.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that all persons are equal before the
law, and the Government generally respects these provisions.
Women.--The Government has identified domestic violence against
women and children as a serious societal problem. The Costa Rican
Women's Defense Office handled 5,188 cases of domestic violence in
1999. The Law Against Domestic Violence classifies certain acts of
domestic violence as crimes and mandates their prosecution. An old law
permitted a judge to pardon a man accused of statutory rape if the
perpetrator intends to marry the victim, she and her family acquiesce,
and the National Institute for Children does not object; however, an
August 1999 reform to the Penal Code rendered this article void. The
authorities have incorporated training on handling domestic violence
cases into the basic training course for new police personnel. The
domestic violence law requires public hospitals to report cases of
female victims of domestic violence. It also denies the perpetrator
possession of the family home in favor of the victim. Television
coverage of this issue has increased in news reporting, public service
announcements, and feature programs. Reports of violence against women
have increased, possibly reflecting a greater willingness of victims to
report abuses rather than an actual increase in instances of violence
against women. The public prosecutor, police, and the Ombudsman all
have offices dedicated to this problem. The law against sexual
harassment in the work place and educational institutions seeks to
prevent and punish sexual harassment in those environments.
Prostitution and sex tourism are both legal for persons over the
age of 18. The prohibition against trafficking in women for the purpose
of prostitution was strengthened by a statute that went into effect in
August 1999, although there have been only infrequent and isolated
cases reported in the past (see Section 6.f.).
Women constitute 50.1 percent of the population. In 1998 President
Rodriguez created the Ministry of Women's Affairs. The 1990 Law for the
Promotion of the Social Equality of Women prohibits discrimination
against women and obligates the Government to promote political,
economic, social, and cultural equality. In March 1996, the
Government's National Center for the Development of Women and the
Family presented its 3-year National Plan for Equality of Opportunity
between Women and Men. The plan is based on the Platform for Action
adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. As
part of the plan, the Government established an office for gender
issues in the Ministry of Labor; similar offices are planned in two
other ministries.
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1999
Human Development Report, women represent 31 percent of the labor
force. Most women work in the services sector, with others working in
industry and agriculture. While laws require that women and men receive
equal pay for equal work, average salaries for women remain somewhat
below those of their male counterparts. According to 1997 UNDP data,
women occupy 45 percent of executive, management, and technical
positions.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare through well-funded systems of public education and medical
care. The Government spends over 5 percent of GDP on medical care. In
June 1998, the Legislative Assembly passed a constitutional amendment
increasing spending on education from 4 percent to 6 percent of GDP.
The country has a high rate of literacy (95 percent) and a low rate of
infant mortality (14 persons per 1,000). The law requires 6 years of
primary and 3 years of secondary education for all children. There is
no difference in the treatment of girls and boys in education or in
health care services. The autonomous National Institute for Children
(PANI) oversees implementation of the Government's programs for
children. In December 1996, the Assembly passed a law strengthening the
PANI's role in protecting and promoting the rights of children, in
accordance with the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child.
In recent years, the PANI has increased public awareness of abuse
of children, which remains a problem. From January to June, the
Institute intervened in 3,704 cases of abandonment, 1,013 cases of
physical abuse, 536 cases of sexual abuse, and 885 cases of
psychological abuse of children. The PANI attributed the increase in
cases reported to better reporting capabilities and an increase in
patterns of child abuse. There was also a continued increase in
reported psychological abuse cases because the 1997 Code of Childhood
and Adolescence redefined such abuse and increased awareness of it.
Abuses appear to be more prevalent among poor, less-educated families.
Traditional attitudes and the inclination to treat such crimes as
misdemeanors sometimes hamper legal proceedings against those who
commit crimes against children.
In February 1996, the PANI announced a comprehensive plan to
improve the conditions of the poorest children. According to Institute
estimates, 19 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 17 are
employed in domestic tasks, while 15 percent work outside the home. The
Government, police sources, and UNICEF representatives acknowledge that
child prostitution is a growing problem. Although no official
statistics exist, the PANI has identified street children in the urban
areas of San Jose, Limon, and Puntarenas as being at the greatest risk.
Estimates of the number of children involved in prostitution vary
widely. An International Labor Organization (ILO) study of four San
Jose neighborhoods in 1998-99 identified at least 212 minor girls
working as prostitutes, but other countrywide estimates are higher. A
PANI study estimated that some 40 families in August supported
themselves by ``renting'' their children to sex tourists. In July 1999,
the Legislative Assembly passed the Law Against the Sexual Exploitation
of Minors, which specifically penalizes persons who use children and
adolescents for erotic purposes and made it a crime to engage in
prostitution with minors. An adult who pays for sex with a minor can be
sentenced to 2 to 10 years in prison. The Government took steps to
enforce this law and has raided brothels and arrested clients. The law
provides for prison sentences from 4 to 10 years for those managing or
promoting child prostitution. The authorities brought charges against
30 persons for violating the law and had convicted 4 persons by year's
end.
Casa Alianza operates a 24-hour telephone help line that received
240 accusations of exploitation of minors. In March the organization
made a presentation to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) about what it termed the growing commercial sexual exploitation
of children in the country. Casa Alianza criticized the Government for
not providing the PANI with 7 percent of national tax revenue, as
stipulated by the law creating the Institute, and also criticized the
Government for the relatively low number of persons actually charged,
found guilty, and sentenced for child exploitation.
People with Disabilities.--The 1996 Equal Opportunity for Persons
with Disabilities Law prohibits discrimination, provides for health
care services, and mandates provision of access to buildings for
persons with disabilities. This law is not enforced widely, and many
buildings remain inaccessible to persons with disabilities. In July a
government study concluded that only 35 percent of the law's stated
goals had been implemented. Nonetheless, a number of public and private
institutions have made individual efforts to improve access. In 1999
the PANI and the Ministry of Education published specific classroom
guidelines for assisting children with hearing loss, motor
difficulties, attention deficit disorder, and mental retardation. In
October the Ministry reported that since 1998 there had been a 20
percent increase in special education services offered throughout the
country, and that 116 special education centers had been created.
Indigenous People.--The population of about 3.5 million includes
nearly 40,000 indigenous people among 8 ethnic groups. Most live in
traditional communities on 22 reserves which, because of their remote
location, often lack access to schools, health care, electricity, and
potable water. The Government, through the National Indigenous
Commission, completed distribution of identification cards to
facilitate access to public medical facilities in 1999. The Government
also built a medical clinic and several community health centers in
indigenous areas. The Ombudsman has established an office to
investigate violations of the rights of indigenous people. In January
1999, a group of indigenous people from Puntarenas challenged the
constitutionality of the 1978 Indigenous Law because of their inability
to possess private property on the reservation. The Supreme Court's
Constitutional Chamber rejected this challenge in January.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law specifies the right of
workers to join unions of their choosing without prior authorization,
although barriers exist in practice. About 15 percent of the work force
is unionized, almost entirely in the public sector. Unions operate
independently of government control.
Some trade union leaders contend that ``solidarity'' associations,
in which employers provide access to credit unions and savings
plans in return for agreement to avoid strikes and other types of
confrontation, infringe upon the right of association. After the ILO
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) ruled that solidarity
associations and their involvement in trade union activities violated
freedom of association, the Government amended the Labor Code in 1993.
The following year, the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) ruled that these
and other planned changes fostered greater freedom of association. In
1995 the COE encouraged the Government to approve legislation to allow
unions to administer compensation funds for dismissed workers and to
repeal labor code provisions restricting the right to strike in certain
nonessential public, agricultural, and forestry sectors. The
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reported that
the Labor Ministry provided information about newly formed unions to
employers who then encouraged formation of solidarity associations and
blacklisted union members. The Labor Ministry denied the reports but
acknowledged that solidarity association culture is deeply embedded.
During 1999 and 2000, the Labor Ministry received 13 complaints
(representing 7 incidents) charging explicit antiunion discrimination.
In June 1998, the Rerum Novarum Workers Confederation complained
about government noncompliance with commitments to protect worker
rights but withdrew the complaint after the Rodriguez administration
asked for a reasonable period to demonstrate its commitment to worker
rights. Some labor unions did not support the complaint because they
believed that it interfered with the administration's national
reconciliation process. In August the Rerum Novarum confederation
resubmitted the complaint against the Government; they had not received
a response at year's end.
The Constitution and Labor Code restrict the right of public sector
workers to strike. However, in February 1998, the Supreme Court
formally ruled that public sector workers, except those in essential
positions, have the right to strike. Even before this ruling, the
Government had removed penalties for union leaders participating in
such strikes.
In March the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber clarified the
law forbidding public sector strikes. It ruled that public sector
strikes may be allowed only if a judges approves them beforehand and
finds that ``services necessary to the well-being of the public'' are
not jeopardized. Public sector workers who decide to strike can no
longer be penalized by a prison sentence but can face charges of breach
of contract.
In March Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) workers, employees
from public hospitals, teachers, students, taxi drivers, and public
transportation workers called a general strike that lasted several days
to protest the passage of legislation which would partially open the
ICE to private participation (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
There are no legal restrictions on the right of private sector
workers to strike, but very few workers in this sector belong to
unions. Private sector strikes rarely occur; however, their frequency
increased during the year.
Unions may form federations and confederations and affiliate
internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution protects the right to organize. Specific provisions of the
1993 Labor Code reforms provide protection from dismissal for union
organizers and members during union formation. The revised provisions
require employers who are found guilty of discrimination to reinstate
workers fired for union activities. However, the ILO's CFA reported
that harassment is still used to force workers to leave unions, and
that other violations of labor legislation continue to occur. In one
incident, a company in the banana industry refused to negotiate with a
legitimate union for 3 years. The company eventually fired the union
leader and established a solidarity association.
Trade unions claim that the 1993 reforms have not led to
significant improvements because the Government has not enforced the
law effectively. However, the Labor Ministry hired an additional 10
labor inspectors who are able to expedite such cases. The
Constitutional Chamber ruled that the labor inspectorate must comply
with the 2-month time limit for investigations. Most cases take up to 2
months to resolve, but some may take longer if the judge decides that
an unusual situation merits further investigation and requires
witnesses. Delays in processing court rulings are common throughout the
judicial branch.
Public sector workers cannot engage in collective bargaining
because the Public Administration Act of 1978 makes labor law
inapplicable in relations between the Government and its employees.
However, the Supreme Court has affirmed their right to strike (see
Section 6.a.). In August 1999, the Government negotiated a wage
increase following a 7-day strike by public sector workers. Private
sector unions have the legal right to engage in collective bargaining.
All labor regulations apply fully to the country's nine export
processing zones (EPZ's). The Labor Ministry oversees labor regulations
within the EPZ's. It reported that after an effort to hire additional
inspectors, it now has 1 inspector for every 9,000 workers, compared
with 1 for every 30,000 in 1999.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no known instances
of such practices. Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children,
and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution and the Labor Code provide special
employment protection for women and children and establish a minimum
working age of 15 years. The Legislative Assembly adopted the Code on
Childhood and Adolescence in December 1997, which includes provisions
designed to implement the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Adolescents between the ages of 15 and 18 can work for a maximum of 6
hours daily and 36 hours weekly, while children under age 15 cannot
work legally. The PANI, in cooperation with the Labor Ministry,
generally enforces these regulations in the formal sector. Due to
limited government resources for enforcement, some children work on the
fringes of the formal economy in violation of these limits. Youths
under the age of 18 may not work in the banana industry. A 1999 study
by the Census Bureau and Ministry of Labor estimated that 8.9 percent
of the population between the ages of 5 and 14 are involved in the
country's formal and informal workforce, and found that 70 percent of
these children are boys. However, the study also indicated that the
number of minor children in the workforce has dropped steadily over the
past 10 years.
With help from the ILO, the Labor Ministry is working to phase out
child labor and has asked employers of children to notify the Ministry
of such employment. The Government formed the National Directive
Committee for the Progressive Eradication of Child Labor and Protection
of Adolescent Laborers in 1990. Representatives from the PANI, the
Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public
Security, the Ombudsman's Office, UNICEF, the ILO, and area
universities are part of the committee. In April 1999, the Committee
conducted an aggressive public awareness campaign as part of its
national plan. The campaign addressed child labor and explained
existing legislation to audiences of different age groups. The Ministry
of Labor maintains an Office for the Eradication of Child Labor, which
cooperates with projects sponsored by the ILO, U.N. Development
Program, and other entities. Nonetheless, child labor remains an
integral part of the informal economy, particularly in small-scale
agriculture and family-run microenterprises selling various items,
which employ a significant proportion of the labor force. Child
prostitution is a growing problem (see Section 5). The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
In October the International Relations Commission of the
Legislative Assembly approved ILO Convention 182 on the eradication of
the worst forms of child labor for debate on the Assembly floor, which
was scheduled for the session beginning in December.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for a
minimum wage. A National Wage Council, composed of three members each
from government, business, and labor, sets minimum wage and salary
levels for all sectors. Monthly minimum wages, last adjusted in July
for the private sector, range from $137 (42,373 colones) for domestic
employees to $662 (205,365 colones) for some professionals. Public
sector negotiations, based on private sector minimum wages, normally
follow the settlement of private sector negotiations. The Ministry of
Labor effectively enforces minimum wages in the San Jose area, but does
so less effectively in rural areas. Especially at the lower end of the
wage scale, the minimum wage is insufficient to provide a worker and
family with a decent standard of living.
The Constitution sets workday hours, overtime remuneration, days of
rest, and annual vacation rights. Although often circumvented in
practice, it also requires compensation for discharge without due
cause. Generally, workers may work a maximum of 8 hours during the day
and 6 at night, up to weekly totals of 48 and 36 hours, respectively.
Nonagricultural workers receive an overtime premium of 50 percent of
regular wages for work in excess of the daily work shift. However,
agricultural workers do not receive overtime pay if they voluntarily
work beyond their normal hours. Little evidence exists that employers
coerce employees to perform such overtime.
A 1967 law on health and safety in the workplace requires
industrial, agricultural, and commercial firms with 10 or more workers
to establish a joint management-labor committee on workplace conditions
and allows the Government to inspect workplaces and to fine employers
for violations. Most firms subject to the law establish such committees
but either do not use the committees or do not turn them into effective
instruments for improving workplace conditions. Due partly to budgetary
constraints, the Ministry has not fielded enough labor inspectors to
ensure consistent maintenance of minimum conditions of safety and
sanitation, especially outside San Jose. However, ministry programs to
hire additional inspections and enhance inspector training programs
have resulted in some progress. While workers have the right to leave
work if conditions become dangerous, workers who do so may jeopardize
their jobs unless they file written complaints with the Labor Ministry.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in women
for the purpose of prostitution, and in August 1999, a statute went
into effect that strengthens this prohibition. There have been only
infrequent and isolated cases of trafficking in women in the past (see
Section 5). However, in its March submission to the IACHR, Casa Alianza
asserted that there was trafficking in women from Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, and the Philippines to the country. Local
authorities lack the resources necessary to address this problem; there
is little in the way of government protection, aid, or educational
campaigns for persons who have been trafficked to or from the country.
The Ministry of Women's Issues began an awareness campaign in 1999 to
educate women about the dangers of trafficking.
__________
CUBA
Cuba is a totalitarian state controlled by President Fidel Castro,
who is Chief of State, Head of Government, First Secretary of the
Communist Party, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. President
Castro exercises control over all aspects of life through the Communist
Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government
bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. The Communist Party is
the only legal political entity, and President Castro personally
chooses the membership of the Politburo, the select group that heads
the party. There are no contested elections for the 601-member National
Assembly of People's Power (ANPP), which meets twice a year for a few
days to rubber stamp decisions and policies already decided by the
Government. The Party controls all government positions, including
judicial offices. The judiciary is completely subordinate to the
Government and to the Communist Party.
The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security
and totalitarian control. Officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
(FAR), which are led by President Castro's brother, Raul, have been
assigned to the majority of key positions in the Ministry of Interior
in recent years. In addition to the routine law enforcement functions
of regulating migration and controlling the Border Guard and the
regular police forces, the Interior Ministry's Department of State
Security investigates and actively suppresses opposition and dissent.
It maintains a pervasive system of vigilance through undercover agents,
informers, the rapid response brigades, and the Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution (CDR's). The Government traditionally uses
the CDR's to mobilize citizens against dissenters, impose ideological
conformity, and root out ``counterrevolutionary'' behavior. During the
early 1990's, economic problems reduced the Government's ability to
reward participation in the CDR's and hence the willingness of citizens
to participate in them, thereby lessening the CDR's effectiveness.
Other mass organizations also inject government and Communist Party
control into citizens' daily activities at home, work, and school.
Members of the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
The Government continued to control all significant means of
production and remained the predominant employer, despite permitting
some carefully controlled foreign investment in joint ventures with it.
Foreign companies are required to contract workers only through Cuban
state agencies, which receive hard currency payments for the workers'
labor but in turn pay the workers a fraction of this (usually 5
percent) in local currency. In 1998 the Government retracted some of
the changes that had led to the rise of legal nongovernmental business
activity when it further tightened restrictions on the self-employed
sector by reducing the number of categories allowed and by imposing
relatively high taxes on self-employed persons. In September the
Minister of Labor and Social Security publicly stated that more
stringent laws should be promulgated to govern self-employment. He
suggested that the Ministry of Interior, the National Tax Office, and
the Ministry of Finance act in a coordinated fashion in order to reduce
``the illegal activities'' of the many self-employed. According to
government officials, the number of self-employed persons as of
September was 156,000, a decrease from the 166,000 reported in 1999.
According to official figures, the economy grew 5.6 percent during
the year. Despite this, overall economic output remains below the
levels prior to the drop of at least 35 percent in gross domestic
product that occurred in the early 1990's due to the inefficiencies of
the centrally controlled economic system; the loss of billions of
dollars of annual Soviet bloc trade and Soviet subsidies; the ongoing
deterioration of plants, equipment, and the transportation system; and
the continued poor performance of the important sugar sector. The 1999-
2000 sugar harvest (just over 4 million tons) was marginally better
than the 1998-99 harvest. The 1997-98 harvest was considered the worst
in more than 50 years. For the tenth straight year, the Government
continued its austerity measures known as the ``special period in
peacetime.'' Agricultural markets, legalized in 1994, provide consumers
wider access to meat and produce, although at prices beyond the reach
of most citizens living on peso-only incomes or pensions. Given these
conditions, the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars in remittances
from the exile community significantly helps those who receive dollars
to survive. Tourism remained a key source of revenue for the
Government. The system of so-called tourist apartheid continued, with
foreign visitors who pay in hard currency receiving preference over
citizens for food, consumer products, and medical services. Most
citizens remain barred from tourist hotels, beaches, and resorts.
The Government's human rights record remained poor. It continued to
violate systematically the fundamental civil and political rights of
its citizens. Citizens do not have the right to change their government
peacefully. There were unconfirmed reports of extrajudicial killings by
the police, and reports that prisoners died in jail due to lack of
medical care. Members of the security forces and prison officials
continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners. The
Government failed to prosecute or sanction adequately members of the
security forces and prison guards who committed abuses. Prison
conditions remained harsh. The authorities continued routinely to
harass, threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and defame
human rights advocates and members of independent professional
associations, including journalists, economists, doctors, and lawyers,
often with the goal of coercing them into leaving the country. The
Government used internal and external exile against such persons, and
it offered political prisoners the choice of exile or continued
imprisonment. The Government denied political dissidents and human
rights advocates due process and subjected them to unfair trials. The
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government denied
citizens the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. It
limited the distribution of foreign publications and news, reserving
them for selected party faithful, and maintained strict censorship of
news and information to the public. The Government restricts some
religious activities but permits others. Before and after the January
1998 visit of Pope John Paul II, the Government permitted some public
processions on feast days, and reinstated Christmas as an official
holiday; however, it has not responded to the papal appeal that the
Church be allowed to play a greater role in society. During the year,
the Government allowed two new priests to enter the country (as
professors in a seminary) and another two to replace two priests whose
visas were not renewed. However, the applications of many priests and
religious workers remained pending, and some visas were issued for
periods of only 3 to 6 months. The Government kept tight restrictions
on freedom of movement, including foreign travel. The Government was
sharply and publicly antagonistic to all criticism of its human rights
practices and discouraged foreign contacts with human rights activists.
Violence against women, especially domestic violence, and child
prostitution are problems. Racial discrimination occurs. The Government
severely restricted worker rights, including the right to form
independent unions. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children; however, it requires children to do farm work without
compensation during their summer vacation.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings. There were unconfirmed
reports of deaths due to the excessive use of force by the national
police.
On October 6, according to a report by the Agencia de Prensa Libre
Oriental (APLO--an independent news agency), a policeman shot 41-year-
old Leovigildo Oliva, from El Poblado, Dos Caminos de San Luis,
Santiago province, as he was returning home in the early morning on
horseback carrying a bag of animal feed. Oliva was taken to the
hospital and died a few hours later. No explanation was given for the
shooting.
On December 28, 27-year-old Leonardo Horta Camacho was shot and
killed. According to some reports, Horta apparently was shot while
trying to steal a pig; a policeman reportedly told Horta's girlfriend
that he was accidentally shot while struggling with a policeman.
Another version was that police thought Horta was one of two escaped
prisoners that they were searching for.
Government sanctions against perpetrators were light or nonexistent
in the cases of deaths due to excessive use of force that occurred in
1998. There was no information available about the results of any
investigations into the 1998 deaths of Wilfredo Martinez Perez, Yuset
Ochoterena, and Reinery Marrera Toldedo.
During the year, there were reports that prisoners died in jail due
to lack of medical care (see Section 1.c.).
In 1996 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
issued its final report on the Government's July 1994 sinking of the
13th of March tugboat, which killed 41 persons. The IACHR ordered the
Government to indemnify the survivors and the relatives of the victims
for the damages caused. At year's end, the Government still had not
done so. The Government detained a number of human rights activists to
prevent them from participating in a Mass in memory of the victims on
the anniversary of the deaths (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits abusive treatment of detainees
and prisoners; however, there were instances in which members of the
security forces beat and otherwise abused human rights advocates,
detainees, and prisoners. There were numerous reports of
disproportionate police harassment of black youths (see Section 5).
On January 22, Communist Party members attacked members of the
Sigler Amaya family in their home in Pedro Betancourt, in the province
of Matanzas, in the presence of police officers. The family was
concluding a fast for the release of two of their family members, Guido
Sigler Amaya and Ariel Sigler Amaya, who were detained on December 15,
1999. After destroying a number of placards, the 10 party members
attacked several persons in the family with sticks. Juan Francisco
Sigler Amaya was knocked unconscious; Miguel Sigler Amaya suffered a
broken rib; Gulliver and Ulises Sigler Gonzalez, the sons of Juan
Francisco, received lesser injuries. Party members also beat Gloria
Amaya Gonzalez, the grandmother. After the attack, police officers
entered the house and arrested all the men in the house. The police did
not arrest the attackers. On January 23, the authorities released Juan
Rogelio ``Yeyo'' Gonzalez, Juan Francisco Martinez, and Miguel Sigler
Amaya but fined them for disturbing the peace and causing public
disorder. At year's end, the Government had not sanctioned any of the
Communist Party members for this attack. Police released Guido Sigler
Amaya on July 9, and Airel Sigler Amaya on August 5.
On July 13, Ernesto La O Ramos of the ``Maximo Gomez National Civic
Movement,'' reportedly planned to place flowers in a nearby river in
commemoration of the death of 41 persons, who died in the sinking of
the 13th of March tugboat in 1994. A policeman warned La O Ramos not to
go to the river. When he refused, the policeman brought him to the
police station. On the way to the police station, La O Ramos greeted a
friend, and the policeman reportedly interpreted this as an indication
that La O Ramos intended to run away. The officer hit La O Ramos in the
face, fracturing his nose and breaking his eye glasses. La O Ramos was
cited for disrespect and his trial on August 3 was postponed until
further notice. However, on September 29, the judge dismissed the
charges against La O Ramos.
The Government continued to subject persons who disagree with it to
acts of repudiation. At government instigation, members of state-
controlled mass organizations, fellow workers, or neighbors of intended
victims are obliged to stage public protests against those who dissent
with the Government's policies, shouting obscenities and often causing
damage to the homes and property of those targeted; physical attacks on
the victims sometimes occur. Police and state security agents are often
present but take no action to prevent or end the attacks. Those who
refuse to participate in these actions face disciplinary action,
including loss of employment.
During the year, there were no massive acts of repudiation directed
against the homes of individual human rights activists; however, there
were smaller-scale acts of repudiation, known as ``reuniones
relampagos,'' or rapid repudiations. These acts are conducted by a
small number of persons, usually not from the person's neighborhood,
and can last up to 30 minutes. These individuals shout epithets and
throw stones or other objects at the target's house. For example, in
the early morning on June 21, a small group of persons threw stones,
tomatoes, and eggs for about 10 minutes at the home of Yvette Rodriguez
Manzanares in Santiago de Cuba. Rodriguez is a member of Followers of
Chibas Movement (MSC).
On the night of August 12, unknown persons threw stones at the
house of Nelson Parra Polanco, a member of the Democratic Solidarity
Party in Manzanillo in the province of Granma. On September 27, just
before midnight, an unknown number of persons entered the yard of the
house of Isabel del Pino, president of the Association of Humanitarian
Followers of Christ the King, and knocked loudly on her door. The crowd
also shouted abusive language, such as ``Down with the Worm'' (``Abajo
la gusanera''), ``Let the worms leave'' (``Que se vayan los gusanos''),
etc.
Prison conditions continued to be harsh and life threatening, and
conditions in detention facilities also are harsh. The Government
claims that prisoners have rights, such as family visitation, adequate
nutrition, pay for work, the right to request parole, and the right to
petition the prison director. However, police and prison officials
often denied these rights in practice, and beat, neglected, isolated,
and denied medical treatment to detainees and prisoners, including
those convicted of political crimes or those who persisted in
expressing their views. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in
February 1999, the Government revised the Penal Code to provide that
prisoners cannot be subjected to corporal punishment, nor is it
permitted to employ any means against them to humiliate them or to
lessen their dignity. However, the revised code failed to establish
penalties for committing such acts.
The Government regularly violated prisoners' rights by failing to
provide adequate nutrition and medical attention. On June 1, APLO
reported that Marcelo Diosdado Amelo Rodriguez, imprisoned in Boniato,
was not receiving medicine for hypertension and circulatory problems.
In June the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) called on the
Government to provide medical treatment to two journalists serving
prison sentences. The two journalists suffered from hepatitis and
serious influenza, and the IAPA feared that one might contract
tuberculosis. On July 27, an independent press agency reported the
death of common prisoner Lucia Castelua Padron because prison
authorities did not transfer her to a hospital to receive treatment for
hepatitis. In 1997 the IACHR described the nutritional and hygienic
situation in the prisons, together with the deficiencies in medical
care, as ``alarming.'' Both the IACHR and the former U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Cuba, as well as other human rights monitoring
organizations, reported the widespread incidence in prisons of
tuberculosis, scabies, hepatitis, parasitic infections, and
malnutrition.
On April 10, over 100 prisoners in Prison 1580, located in the
Havana City municipality of San Miguel del Padron, protested the lack
of medical attention and requested better prison conditions. On May 3,
a number of prisoners reportedly rioted in Kilo 7, a prison in
Camaguey, and requested better medical treatment, better food, and
personal respect. Special police forces apparently attacked the
prisoners and terminated the strike, an action that resulted in 20
prisoners being hospitalized.
Prison guards and state security officials also subjected human
rights and prodemocracy activists to threats of physical violence; to
systematic psychological intimidation; and to detention or imprisonment
in cells with common and violent criminals, sexually aggressive
inmates, or state security agents posing as prisoners.
There are separate prison facilities for women and for minors.
Prison officials regularly denied prisoners other rights, such as
the right to correspondence, and continued to confiscate medications
and food brought by family members for political prisoners. Prison
authorities also routinely denied religious workers access to detainees
and prisoners.
Political prisoners are required to comply with the rules for
common criminals and often are punished severely if they refuse. They
often are placed in punishment cells and held in isolation. Detainees
and prisoners often are subjected to repeated vigorous interrogations
designed to coerce them into signing incriminating statements, to force
collaboration with authorities, or to intimidate victims.
Vladimiro Roca Antunez, a member of the Internal Dissidents Working
Group, remains in prison, and was moved from solitary confinement in
early July to a section of the prison for common prisoners. Prison
officials denied Roca prison furloughs over weekends, which were
granted to the three other members of the group before their release in
May (see Section 1.e.).
The authorities took Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet to a prison in Holguin,
located about 450 miles from Havana where his family lives, immediately
following his 1-day trial in February. On June 7, Biscet was placed in
a ``punishment cell'' and could not receive visitors nor receive food,
clothes, or publications. He was not allowed to take any reading
materials to the punishment cell, not even the Bible. The authorities
allegedly placed Biscet in a punishment cell because he started a 6-
hour fast to commemorate the 40 days of fasting that he started on June
7, 1999, in an apartment on Tamarindo 34 in the 10th of October
municipality in Havana. On July 1, Biscet left the punishment cell;
however, authorities sent him back to the punishment cell again when he
announced his intention to fast on July 13 in honor of the Cubans who
died when the 13th of March tugboat sank in 1994. Prison authorities
reportedly told Biscet that such actions were disruptive of prison life
and could lead to violence. Biscet served 42 days in solitary
confinement. In November prison authorities punished Biscet again, this
time for protesting inadequate medical attention for 10 common
prisoners suffering from diarrhea. Guards allegedly denied him food
that his family brought and refused to allow a scheduled family visit.
Biscet still was imprisoned at year's end.
From May 24 to June 1, political prisoners Jorge Garcia Perez
(Antunez) conducted a hunger strike to protest the lack of medical
attention, the arbitrary removal of books and literature, including the
Bible, and suspension of family visits. He reportedly received improved
treatment from prison officials following the hunger strike.
On August 22, the parents of Jesus Joel Diaz Hernandez reported
that he was placed in a punishment cell in the provincial prison of
Canaleta in Ciego de Avila. Prison officials did not allow him to have
any literature, including the Bible.
Although no longer in solitary confinement in a punishment cell,
Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez, who was president of the National Council
for Civil Rights in Cuba and who has been imprisoned since 1994 on
charges of espionage and disrespect, refuses to see family members
until prison officials guarantee that he can receive visits from his
family members once a month, in accordance with prison regulations.
Presently Chaviano and his wife exchange letters.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions by international or national human rights monitoring groups.
The Government has refused to allow prison visits by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) since 1989 and continues to refuse
requests to renew such visits.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention continued to be problems, and they remained the Government's
most effective weapons for harassing opponents. The Law of Penal
Procedures requires police to file formal charges and either release a
detainee or bring the case before a prosecutor within 96 hours of
arrest. It also requires the authorities to provide suspects with
access to a lawyer within 7 days of arrest. However, the Constitution
states that all legally recognized civil liberties can be denied to
anyone who actively opposes the decision of the Cuban people to build
socialism. The authorities routinely invoke this sweeping authority to
deny due process to those detained on purported state security grounds.
The authorities routinely engage in arbitrary arrest and detention
of human rights advocates, subjecting them to interrogations, threats,
and degrading treatment and unsanitary conditions for hours or days at
a time. A survey by the illegal nongovernmental organization (NGO) the
Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation reported
that the Government sanctioned or processed 368 persons for political
motives in 1999. Amnesty International (AI) further recognized the
increase of arrests and harassment of dissidents at year's end,
particularly around the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, when the authorities arrested approximately 200 persons
to prevent them from participating in a celebration of that
anniversary. Human rights activists characterized this escalation as
the worst in a decade. Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, president of the
Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation, said that
he especially was disturbed about the new and unlawful methods that the
security forces used to harass dissidents, including the use of force
when arresting activists.
For example, the police arrested Victor Rolando Arroyo Carmona, an
independent journalist, and Pedro Pablo Hernandez Mijares during a
birthday party celebration for Noel Ascanio Montero in Guines. The
police beat Rolando Arroyo, confiscated his cassette recorder (he is an
independent journalist) and $15. Police subsequently left the two men
on the side of a road, far from Guines. The men returned to Guines and
went to the local police station to lodge a formal complaint against
the police, but instead were again driven away and left on the road
more than 20 miles away. On returning to Guines in the early morning,
Rolando Arroyo again went to the police station, but police intercepted
him and took him to the next municipality of Guanajay.
In December 1999, police detained Jose Aguilar Hernandez and Carlos
Oquendo Rodriguez of the July 13 Movement, Diosdado Gonzalez Marrero of
the Peace, Love, and Liberty Party, and Marcel Valenzuela Salt of the
Brotherly Civic Organization when they attempted to demonstrate during
the religious festivities in honor of St. Lazarus, near the small town
of El Rincon, near Havana. On June 13, the authorities released the
four men.
In December 1999, the authorities arrested Maritza Lugo Fernandez,
the vice president of the Democratic November 30 Party and released her
only on June 2. Maritza Lugo had been released from jail in August
1999, then was detained various times before her subsequent arrest in
December 1999. When Maritza Lugo was released, state security officials
told her to prepare the papers for the departure of her family,
including her husband, Rafael Ibarra Roque, who still was in jail.
However, in December the authorities again arrested Maritza Lugo and
detained her until year's end without filing charges against her.
The authorities continued to detain human rights activists and
independent journalists for short periods, often to prevent them from
attending or participating in events related to human rights issues.
The authorities also placed such activists under house arrest for short
periods for similar reasons.
On January 13, security personnel impeded a number of human rights
activists and independent journalists from attending the trial of
independent journalist Victor Rolando Arroyo Carmona. Victor Rolando
received a 6-month jail sentence for allegedly hoarding toys. He bought
toys to distribute to poor children on January 6. The Government
confined Juan Carlos Perez Arencibia, Feliciano Alvarez, and Cecilio
Gonzalez to their homes so that they could not attend Arroyo's trial in
Pinar del Rio. In 1996 Arroyo Carmona served a 1-year and 9 months'
prison term for showing disrespect to authorities.
On January 25, police detained Oswaldo Paya Sardinas, president of
the Christian Liberation Movement and Hector Palacios Ruiz, director of
the Center for Social Studies. According to Elizardo Sanchez Santa
Cruz, the two were detained to prevent a meeting from taking place at
Palacios' house regarding ``All United,'' a document that was issued
just before the Ninth Ibero-American Summit in November 1999 in Havana.
The police also detained a number of other dissidents, including Jose
Orlando Gonzalez Bridon, Secretary General of the Confederation of the
Democratic Workers Union of Cuba, and an independent journalist; all
were released the same afternoon. Police had detained Bridon on January
20 and questioned him about his journalistic activities.
State Security officers detained human rights activists and
independent journalists, including Alejandro Chang of the Movement of
Fraternal Brothers for Dignity; Nelson Aquiar Ramirez of the Orthodox
Party, Maria A. Garcia Delgado of the Movement of 24 February, Carlos
Alberto Dominguez of the November 30 Democratic Party, Carlos Rios of
Change 2000, Clara Morales Martinez of the July 13 Movement, Angel
Polanco, Rafael Peraza, Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez Amaro, and Jose
Antonio Fornaris Ramos to make sure they did not attend the 1-day
public trial of Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Eduardo Diaz Fleitas, and
Fermin Scull Zulueta, which took place on February 25 in Havana. In
addition, the authorities told many dissidents and independent
journalists not to attend. The authorities ordered prominent dissident
Jesus Yanez Pelletier not to leave his house, and placed guards outside
to ensure compliance. Others who were ordered to stay in their homes
were Maria Esther Suarez Valdes of the Confederation of Democratic
Workers Union of Cuba; Ileana Gonzalez of the Democratic Party November
30; Ruben Camalleri of the Movement of February 24; Carlos Raul Jimenez
Carrero of Nationalist Agenda; and Odilia Collazo Valdes of the Pro-
Human Rights Party of Cuba. The authorities placed independent
journalists Omar Rodriguez Saludes and Jorge Olivera Castillo under 1-
day house arrest.
On May 24, security police detained four human rights activists who
were on their way to deliver a letter requesting better prison
conditions for political prisoners to prison authorities in Vedado,
Havana. The letter also protested Dr. Biscet's incarceration 450 miles
away from his family. Police detained Armando Dominguez and Iosvani
Aquilar Camejo of the Movement of Fraternal Brothers for Dignity, and
Alejandro Chang Cantillo and Marlon Cabrera of the Brotherly Civic
Movement. On October 23, the police released Marlon Cabrera Rivero and
Alejandro Chang Cantillo; they released Armando Dominguez Gonzalez on
October 20 and Iosvani Aquilar Camejo on October 30. The authorities
also fined Aguilar Camejo about $30 (600 pesos) for disturbing the
peace in the prison.
On June 29, the police arrested Rafael Iturralde Bello, president
of the Libertad independent agricultural cooperative in Santiago de
Cuba, outside a bus station in Pinar del Rio. They arrested Iturralde
before he could meet with other members of the National Association of
Independent Farmers of Cuba in Pinar del Rio. They released Iturralde
24 hours later and placed him on a bus to Santiago de Cuba.
As in previous years, on July 13, police prevented activists from
commemorating in any way the 1994 incident in which 41 persons drowned
when the Border Guard sank the 13th of March tugboat (see Section
1.a.). Beginning on July 12, police detained activists in a number of
provinces, and ordered others to remain in their homes on July 13. The
authorities told dissidents that if they did not obey they would be
prosecuted for illegal assembly and distribution of enemy propaganda,
or for incitement to rebellion. In Santiago de Cuba, more than 80 state
security agents reportedly attacked about 30 dissidents who had thrown
bouquets of flowers into the ocean in honor of those who died in 1994.
State Security agents allegedly also beat women in the group. Security
agents accused the dissidents of being thieves and delinquents (see
Section 2.b.).
On July 21, the authorities also prevented activists in Santiago de
Cuba, including independent journalist Luis Alberto Rivera and Fidel
Soria Torres and Ivette Rodriguez Manzanares of the MSC, from attending
the trial of Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina and Eddy Alfredo Mena Gonzalez of
the Movement of Cuban Youth for Democracy. The two men were charged
with disrespect, causing damages, and causing public disorder. On
August 15, the court gave Rodriguez a 6-year prison sentence and
sentenced Mena to 5 years in prison (see Section 1.e.).
On September 8, security police ordered a number of human rights
activists not to attend the annual procession in honor of the Virgin of
Charity (see Section 2.c.).
The Penal Code includes the concept of ``dangerousness,'' defined
as the ``special proclivity of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated
by his conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist norms.'' If the
police decide that a person exhibits signs of dangerousness, they may
bring the offender before a court or subject him to therapy or
political reeducation. Government authorities regularly threaten
prosecution under this article. Both the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights (UNCHR) and the IACHR have criticized this concept for its
subjectivity, the summary nature of the judicial proceedings employed,
the lack of legal safeguards, and the political considerations behind
its application. According to the IACHR, the so-called special
inclination to commit crimes referred to in the Criminal Code amounts
to a subjective criterion used by the Government to justify violations
of the rights to individual freedom and due process of persons whose
sole crime has been an inclination to hold a view different from the
official view.
On August 8, police summoned Manuel Lantigua Dominguez, a member of
the dissident Council of Cuban Workers (CUTC) in the province of
Guantanamo, to the local police office. After taking his photograph and
fingerprints, the police told Lantigua that a case on charges of
dangerousness would be opened against him.
The Government also used exile as a tool for controlling and
eliminating the internal opposition. AI has noted that the Government
detains human rights activists repeatedly for short periods and
threatens them with imprisonment unless they gave up their activities
or left the country. The Government used these incremental aggressive
tactics to compel Ruben Ruiz Armenteros, vice president of the Human
Rights Party of Cuba, to leave the country on September 28. On October
26, Orestes Rodriguez Horruitiner, president of the MSC, also left the
country. Rodriguez had been imprisoned from July 1997 to April 7.
The Government also has pressured imprisoned human rights activists
and political prisoners to apply for emigration and regularly
conditioned their release on acceptance of exile. HRW observed that the
Government routinely invokes forced exile as a condition for prisoner
releases and also pressures activists to leave the country to escape
future prosecution.
AI has expressed particular concern about the Government's practice
of threatening to charge, try, and imprison human rights advocates and
independent journalists prior to arrest or sentencing if they did not
leave the country. According to AI, this practice ``effectively
prevents those concerned from being able to act in public life in their
own country.''
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
independent courts; however, it explicitly subordinates the courts to
the ANPP and the Council of State, which is headed by Fidel Castro. The
ANPP and its lower level counterparts choose all judges. The
subordination of the courts to the Communist Party, which the
Constitution designates as the superior directive force of the society
and the State further compromises the judiciary's independence. The
courts undermine the right to a fair trial by restricting the right to
a defense and often failed to observe the few due process rights
available to defendants.
Civil courts exist at municipal, provincial, and supreme court
levels. Panels composed of a mix of professionally certified and lay
judges preside over them. Military tribunals assume jurisdiction for
certain counterrevolutionary cases.
The law and trial practices do not meet international standards for
fair public trials. Almost all cases are tried in less than a day;
there are no jury trials. While most trials are public, trials are
closed when there are alleged violations of state security. Prosecutors
may introduce testimony from a CDR member about the revolutionary
background of a defendant, which may contribute to either a longer or
shorter sentence. The law recognizes the right of appeal in municipal
courts but limits it in provincial courts to cases such as those
involving maximum prison terms or the death penalty. Appeals in death
penalty cases are automatic. The death penalty ultimately must be
affirmed by the Council of State.
Criteria for presenting evidence, especially in cases of human
rights advocates, are arbitrary and discriminatory. Often the sole
evidence provided, particularly in political cases, is the defendant's
confession, usually obtained under duress and without the legal advice
or knowledge of a defense lawyer. The authorities regularly deny
defendants access to their lawyers until the day of the trial. Several
dissidents who have served prison terms reported that they were tried
and sentenced without counsel and were not allowed to speak on their
own behalf. AI concluded in 1996 that ``trials in all cases fall far
short of international standards for a fair trial.''
The law provides the accused with the right to an attorney, but the
control that the Government exerts over the livelihood of members of
the state-controlled lawyers' collectives--especially when they defend
persons accused of state security crimes--compromises their ability to
represent clients. Attorneys have reported reluctance to defend those
charged in political cases due to fear of jeopardizing their own
careers.
In January a Havana court reaffirmed the 4-year prison term for
dangerousness imposed in 1998 on Lazaro Constantin Duran, leader of the
Friends Club of an independent teachers' organization. On January 18, a
court sentenced independent journalist Jesus Joel Diaz Hernandez to 4
years imprisonment for dangerousness (see Section 2.a.).
On February 25, diplomats and members of the international press
attended the 1-day trial of Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, president of the
Lawton Foundation for Human Rights. Biscet was convicted of disrespect,
creating a public disturbance by hanging a Cuban flag upside down
during a press conference in his home, and encouraging others to
violate the law. In his opening statement, Biscet denied all charges
against him, and insisted that he was a nonviolent activist for human
rights. The three judge panel heard six witnesses and listened to the
opening and closing arguments of both the prosecutor and defense
attorney. The court sentenced Biscet to 3 years in prison (less than
the 7 years the prosecution sought). The same court sentenced Fermin
Scull Zulueta to 1 year in prison, and released Eduardo Diaz Fleitas.
The latter two men were charged with insulting national symbols,
creating a public disturbance, and instigating a crime. The authorities
transferred Biscet to the Cuba Si prison in Holguin (see Section 1.c.).
The authorities detained and prevented human rights activists and
independent journalists from attending the trial (see Section 1.d.).
On July 13, prison authorities accused Egberto Angel Escobedo
Morales, serving a 24-year sentence for the crimes of espionage,
propagating enemy propaganda, and theft of the additional crimes of
disrespect and causing disturbances in a penitentiary. The prosecution
requested an additional 20-year sentence.
On July 21, in Santiago de Cuba, Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina and Eddy
Alfredo Mena Gonzalez of the Movement of Cuban Youth for Democracy went
on trial for disrespect, causing damages, and causing public disorder.
On August 15, Rodriguez received a 6-year prison sentence, while Mena
was sentenced to 5 years in prison.
During the year, three of the four members of the Internal
Dissident Working Group received conditional release from prison--Felix
Antonio Bonne Carcasses, on May 12; Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello, on
May 15; and Rene de Jesus Gomez Manzano, on May 23. Police arrested the
four persons in July 1997 for expressing peacefully their disagreement
with the Government. In September 1998, they were charged with acts
against the security of the state in relation to the crime of sedition.
Despite the prosecution's demand for sentences from 5 to 6 years, Felix
Bonne and Rene Gomez received a 4-year jail sentence while Martha
received a 3-1/2 year sentence. The fourth member of the group,
Vladimiro Roca Antunez, received a 5-year sentence. In early July, Roca
was moved from solitary confinement to a section of the prison for
common prisoners; he remained in prison at year's end.
Human rights monitoring groups inside the country estimate the
number of political prisoners at between 300 and 400 persons. On July
16, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation
reported that 314 persons were in prison for political reasons. The
authorities have imprisoned persons on charges such as disseminating
enemy propaganda, illicit association, contempt for the authorities
(usually for criticizing Fidel Castro), clandestine printing, or the
broad charge of rebellion, which is often brought against advocates of
peaceful democratic change.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Although the Constitution provides for the
inviolability of a citizen's home and correspondence, official
surveillance of private and family affairs by government-controlled
mass organizations, such as the CDR's, remains one of the most
pervasive and repressive features of daily life. The State has assumed
the right to interfere in the lives of citizens, even those who do not
actively oppose the Government and its practices. The mass
organizations' ostensible purpose is to improve the citizenry, but in
fact their goal is to discover and discourage nonconformity. Citizen
participation in these mass organizations has declined; the economic
crisis both has reduced the Government's ability to provide material
incentives for their participation and has forced many persons to
engage in black market activities, which the mass organizations are
supposed to report to the authorities.
The authorities utilize a wide range of social controls.
The Interior Ministry employs an intricate system of informants and
block committees (the CDR's) to monitor and control public opinion.
While less capable than in the past, CDR's continue to report on
suspicious activity, including conspicuous consumption; unauthorized
meetings, including those with foreigners; and defiant attitudes toward
the Government and the revolution.
The Government controls all access to the Internet, and all
electronic mail messages are subject to censorship. The Department of
State Security often reads international correspondence and monitors
overseas telephone calls and conversations with foreigners. The
Government also monitors domestic phone calls and correspondence.
In January the authorities dismissed Teidy Betancourt Gonzalez from
her job as an assistant teacher in a kindergarten because her husband,
Ruben Perez Pons, a member of the Democratic Action group in Sancti
Spiritus, is a dissident. On April 29, the authorities expelled from
his workplace Jose Carlos Malina Gonzalez, conditionally released from
jail, because he refused to participate in a government-sponsored
public event for the return of Elian Gonzalez Brotons. The
administrator of Molina's workplace threatened to inform the police so
that he could be returned to prison.
In August Romilio de Jesus Garcia Mauri, member of the Club of
Prisoners and Former Political Prisoners, was convoked three times to
appear at the local police station in Santiago de Cuba for possible
drug trafficking. Every time Mauri arrived at the police station, he
was asked to submit a writing test for examination. On August 10,
police detained Yuri Tier Pineiro on the La Victoria beach in the
province of Sancti Spiritus and interrogated him for 3 days about the
political activities of his father, Marcelo Tier Perez, and his older
brother Marcelo Tier Pineiro, members of the Democratic Solidarity
Party. He himself is not a political activist.
There were numerous credible reports of forced evictions of
squatters and residents who lacked official permission to reside in
Havana (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government does not allow
criticism of the revolution or its leaders. Laws against antigovernment
propaganda, graffiti, and disrespect of officials carry penalties of
between 3 months and 1 year in prison. If President Castro or members
of the National Assembly or Council of State are the objects of
criticism, the sentence can be extended to 3 years. Charges of
disseminating enemy propaganda (which includes merely expressing
opinions at odds with those of the Government) can bring sentences of
up to 14 years. In the Government's view, such materials as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international reports of human
rights violations, and mainstream foreign newspapers and magazines
constitute enemy propaganda. Local CDR's inhibit freedom of speech by
monitoring and reporting dissent or criticism. Police and state
security officials regularly harassed, threatened, and otherwise abused
human rights advocates in public and private as a means of intimidation
and control.
The Constitution states that print and electronic media are state
property and cannot become in any case private property. The Communist
Party controls all media--except a few small church-run publications.
Even the church-run publications, denied access to mass printing
equipment, are subject to governmental pressure. In particular, the
Government publicly criticized the publisher of the magazine Vitral, a
publication of the diocese of Pinar del Rio, twice during the year;
President Castro had criticized publicly an article that the magazine
printed in 1999. The Government reported extensively on Vitral articles
and on the publisher's activities and contacts, which it labeled as
counterrevolutionary. As of October, Vitral had not been shut down, but
as of year's end, the Church was still being subjected to considerable
pressure to avoid political topics.
The Government controls all access to the Internet, and all
electronic mail messages are subject to censorship. Citizens do not
have the right to receive publications from abroad, although newsstands
in hotels for foreigners and certain hard currency stores sell foreign
newspapers and magazines. The Government continued to jam the
transmission of Radio Marti and Television Marti. Radio Marti
broadcasts generally overcame the jamming attempts on short-wave bands,
but its medium-wave transmissions are blocked completely in Havana.
Security agents subjected dissidents, foreign diplomats, and
journalists to harassment and surveillance, including electronic
surveillance.
All media must operate under party guidelines and reflect
government views. The Government attempts to shape media coverage to
such a degree that it not only continued to exert pressure on domestic
journalists but also kept up a steady barrage of pressure on groups
normally outside the official realm of control, such as visiting
international correspondents. Fidel Castro continued to criticize
publicly the international press, often by name.
Resident foreign correspondents reported that the very high-level
of government pressure experienced in 1999, including official and
informal complaints about articles, threatening phone calls, and lack
of access to officials, continued throughout the year. The Government
strengthened its ability to control the foreign press by ceasing to
issue multiple entry visas to journalists from foreign press
organizations who reside in Havana. Such journalists are now required
to apply for a new visa each time they leave the country.
In August Radio Moron, a small government-run radio station in the
central part of the country, dismissed the host of one of its programs
after he read on the air a poem by Raul Rivero (founder and director of
the Cuba Press news agency).
The 1999 Law to Protect National Independence and the Economy
outlaws a broad range of activities as undermining state security, and
toughens penalties for criminal activity. Under the law, anyone caught
possessing or disseminating literature deemed subversive, or supplying
information that could be used by U.S. authorities in the application
of U.S. legislation, is subject to fines and to prison terms of 7 to 20
years. While many activities between Cuban nationals and foreigners
possibly could fall within the purview of this new law, it appears to
be aimed primarily at independent journalists.
This law increased the penalties and broadened the definitions of
activities covered by the 1996 Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty Act, which
already proscribed citizens from providing information to any
representatives of the U.S. Government, or seeking any information from
them, that might be used directly or indirectly in the application of
U.S. legislation against the Government. This includes accepting or
distributing Publications, documents or other material from any origin,
which the authorities might interpret as facilitating implementation of
such legislation.
The Government continued to threaten independent journalists,
either anonymously or openly, with arrest and conviction based on the
new law. Some journalists have been threatened repeatedly since the law
took effect. Independent journalists noted that the law's very
existence had some effect on their activities and increased self
censorship, and some noted that it is the Government's most effective
tool to harass members of the independent press.
In February 1999, National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon told
foreign correspondents that under the new law, even reporters working
for accredited foreign media could be sentenced to up to 20 years in
prison if the information they publish is deemed to serve U.S.
interests.
The Government continues to subject independent journalists to
internal travel bans, arbitrary and periodic detentions (overnight or
longer), harassment of family and friends, seizures of computers,
office and photographic equipment, and repeated threats of prolonged
imprisonment (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.). Independent
journalists in Havana reported that threatening phone calls and
harassment of family members continued during the year. More than 20
independent journalists experienced varying degrees of harassment, and
certain individuals appear to have been singled out. Since January
dozens of reporters were repeatedly detained, some for several days.
Authorities also placed journalists under house arrest to prevent them
from reporting on conferences sponsored by human rights activists,
human rights events, and court cases against activists.
Family members have lost their jobs because they refuse to condemn
or inform on these so-called counterrevolutionaries (see Section 1.f.).
Acts of intimidation have been reported less frequently since 1999.
However, police have tried more often to prevent independent
journalists from covering so-called sensitive events.
In January an unidentified assailant attacked Mary Miranda, of Cuba
Press, and beat her unconscious.
In February police briefly detained Edel Garcia, Director of the
Centro Norte del Pais agency, as he left church after attending a
memorial Mass for the Brothers to the Rescue pilots who were aboard
planes that the air force shot down in 1996. Police frequently stop
Garcia on fabricated traffic violations. Garcia's wife receives weekly
death threats and his teenage daughters are harassed with increasing
frequency. Garcia has a criminal trial pending, but the date and the
charges are as yet not known. Charges that have been mentioned include:
insulting the President, illicit association, collaboration with the
enemy, spreading false news, and espionage.
In February security officials ordered several journalists to
remain home and not to attend the trial of a member of the opposition.
Jose Antonio Fornaris, of Agencia Cuba Verdad, refused to stay home;
the police detained him at the local jail for the entire day.
In March the University of Havana expelled the daughter of Maria de
los Angeles Gonzalez Amaro, Director of the Union de Periodistas y
Escritores Cubanos Independientes, after a university dean warned her
not to follow in her mother's footsteps. In September on two occasions,
security officials intimidated Mrs. Gonzalez in her home.
In April the Government's Juventud Rebelde newspaper accused Raul
Rivero, Tania Quintero, Manuel David Orrio, Lucas Garve, and Vicente
Escobal of being counterrevolutionary leaders.
In May the authorities went to the home of Manuel Vasquez Portal,
Director of Agencia Decoro, who was scheduled to speak that day on
``Globalization and Culture'' at the Centro de Estudios Sociales. Two
officials from State Security threatened Vazquez with detention if he
give his speech. State Security officials also visited 17 other persons
and told them not to attend the speech.
In July the authorities confiscated equipment (video cameras,
camera, and cassette recorders) and all office supplies from the
Agencia Yara in Bayamo.
In August police detained Ricardo Arabi Jimenez, director of
Agencia Yara, for attending a meeting about organizing the first
congress of independent trade unions by the CUTC, scheduled to be held
in October (see Section 6.a.).
In September Dorca Cespedes, Havana Press reporter, was told by the
director of her daughter's day care center, that the toddler could no
longer attend. The authorities had instructed the director not to care
for the child due to the mother's counterrevolutionary activities.
In September the security police took octogenarian Nestor Baguer,
independent journalist and founder of the original Independent Press
Agency of Cuba, to a private home in Havana where he was questioned
about his activities. The authorities also made calls to contacts of
Baguer to invite them to a meeting at his home. The authorities then
went to Baguer's home to inform him that they knew about the alleged
meeting.
In September individuals posing as vandals, but thought to be
security officials, threw rocks at the home of Juan Tellez, Agencia
Libertad.
In September the authorities jailed Joaquin Cabeza de Leon in
Camaguey because he helped to organize a literary award ceremony.
In September police arrested brothers Jesus and Jadir Hernandez
Hernandez, of Havana-Press, in Guines, and charged them with illegal
trafficking in persons and collaboration with a foreign diplomatic
mission. For several weeks, both men had been disseminating information
about the unification of several dissident groups in Havana Province.
In October authorities again threatened the brothers and their family
members.
In October a security official showed a photograph to Dr. Jose Luis
Garcia, Agencia Libertad, in which Garcia was conversing with a man
that he had just casually met. Garcia was told that the man was a
member of state security and that the photograph would be shown to
other members of the opposition to make it look like Garcia was
actually collaborating with state security.
In October the police detained Jesus Alvarez Castillo and Pedro
Duque, Cuba Press correspondents from Ciego de Avila, in front of the
office of Cuba Press and accused them of involvement in a murder. The
authorities later dismissed the accusation as a case of mistaken
identity.
The authorities often confiscate equipment when arresting
journalists, especially photographic and recording equipment. It is now
possible to buy a fax machine or computer, payable in dollars; if a
receipt can be produced, this equipment is usually not confiscated.
Photocopiers and printers are impossible to find on the local market,
which makes them a particularly valuable commodity for journalists. A
fax machine that a friend brought from overseas for journalist Reinaldo
Cosano Alen, arrived damaged and was not usable after 10 days in
Customs. Equipment lost due to burglary also has been reported. In
January unidentified persons entered the home of journalist Juan
Gonzalez Febles and stole his tape recorder, recorded tapes, and
several articles. In August a couple posing as employees of Cuba Press
stole all the documents, books, and office materials collected by the
agency after the owner of the premises had asked the agency to move due
to pressure from the police.
Outside the capital of Havana, independent journalists reported
that detentions, threats, and harassment are more severe than in the
capital.
AI, HRW, the IAPA, Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), and the
Committee to Protect Journalists repeatedly called international
attention to the Government's continued practice of detaining
independent journalists and others simply for exercising their right to
free speech (see Section 1.d.).
In June the IAPA called on the Government to provide medical
treatment to two independent journalists serving prison sentences. Joel
de Jesus Diaz, in prison in Ciego de Avila, was suffering from
hepatitis and Manuel Antonio Gonzalez Castellanos in Holguin was
suffering from severe influenza and possibly tuberculosis. The IAPA
also called for the release of independent journalists Victor Rolando
Arroyo and Bernardo Arevalo Pardon, both of whom are serving prison
sentences (see Section 1.c.).
In July police detained Ricardo Gonzalez, RSF correspondent, for 6
hours as they tried to coerce him to collaborate with them. In August
French journalist Martine Jacot, sent by RSF to the country, was in
contact with a dozen independent journalists in Havana and Ciego de
Avila. She also met with the families of two of the three journalists
currently in prison. On August 17, just before she was to leave the
country, security police arrested her, questioned her at the Havana
airport, and seized a video camera, two videotapes, and documents. The
police never returned this equipment to RSF.
In August the authorities detained three Swedish journalists and
later expelled them from the country. The journalists had met with
independent journalists and had organized a seminar for two groups of
independent journalists. The authorities said that the journalists,
including Martine Jacot, violated immigration laws by traveling on
tourist visas, instead of traveling on visas issued to journalists.
Distribution of information continues to be controlled tightly.
Importation of foreign literature is controlled, and the public has no
access to foreign magazines or newspapers. Leading members of the
Government have indicated that citizens do not read foreign newspapers
and magazines to obtain news because they do not speak English and they
have access to the daily televised round tables on issues with which
they need to concern themselves. Access to computers is limited. E-mail
use is growing slowly as the Government incrementally allows access to
more users; however, the Government generally controls its use, and
only very few persons or groups have access. The Government opened a
national gateway to some journalists, artists, and municipal-level
youth community centers, but the authorities still restrict the types
and numbers of international sites that can be accessed.
Independent journalist Reinaldo Cosano Alen received a letter from
Customs informing him that two magazines were confiscated for being
counterrevolutionary. Customs also confiscated several editions of the
Cartas de Cuba magazine that were addressed to independent journalist
Tania Quintero Antunez.
The Government officially prohibits all diplomatic missions in
Havana from printing or distributing publications, particularly
newspapers and newspaper clippings, unless these publications deal
exclusively with conditions in a mission's home country and prior
Government approval is received. Many missions do not accept this
requirement and send materials out liberally; however, the Government's
threats to expel embassy officers who provide published materials had a
chilling effect on some missions.
The Government restricts literary and academic freedoms and
continued to emphasize the importance of reinforcing revolutionary
ideology and discipline over any freedom of expression. The educational
system teaches that the State's interests have precedence over all
other commitments. Academics and other government officials are
prohibited from meeting with some diplomats without prior approval from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Education requires
teachers to evaluate students' and their parents' ideological
character, and note such evaluations in school record that students
carry throughout their schooling. These reports directly affect the
students' educational and career prospects. As a matter of policy, the
Government demands that teaching materials for courses such as
mathematics or literature have an ideological content. Government
efforts to undermine dissidents include denying them advanced education
and professional opportunities. Fidel Castro has stated publicly that
the universities are available only to those who share his
revolutionary beliefs.
Artistic expression is less restricted. The Government encourages
the cultural community to attain the highest international standards in
order to sell its work overseas for hard currency. However, the
Government began implementing a program in the fall called ``Broadening
of Culture'' that ties art, socialism, and modern ``revolutionary''
ideology and legends into its own vision of culture. The Government
uses the government media and the schools to impose this vision on the
public, particularly the youth.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the
Constitution grants limited rights of assembly and association, these
rights are subject to the requirement that they may not be ``exercised
against the existence and objectives of the Socialist State.'' The law
punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons,
including those for private religious services in a private home, by up
to 3 months in prison and a fine. The authorities selectively enforce
this prohibition and often use it as a legal pretext to harass and
imprison human rights advocates.
The Government's policy of selectively authorizing the Catholic
Church to hold outdoor processions at specific locations on important
feast days continued during the year. For the third consecutive year,
it permitted a procession in connection with Masses in celebration of
the feast day of Our Lady of Charity in Havana on September 8. The
Government also authorized other denominations to hold a few public
events in late November. However, the Government continued routinely
and arbitrarily to deny requests for other processions and events. Just
before Holy Week, the Government informed Catholic Church officials
that no processions would be allowed. When the Church made this
information public, state officials changed their position and decided
that churches that had requested permission for a procession could
proceed.
The authorities have never approved a public meeting by a human
rights group. On February 22, state security officers detained
prodemocracy activists in different parts of the country to prevent
them from staging activities commemorating the February 24, 1996,
shootdown of two civilian aircraft over international airspace by the
air force. Security agents also warned many more activists against
staging any public demonstrations on February 24, and warned
independent journalists not to cover such incidents.
In early August, security agents detained in Havana leaders of the
Council of Cuban Workers from various provinces to ensure that members
could not hold a preparatory meeting for the CUTC's first congress.
Although scheduled to take place in October, it never was held. On
October 13, state security arrested Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, the
Secretary General of the CUTC, as he was about to conduct a press
conference. At year's end, he remained in jail without being charged.
On August 15, state security informed a number of activists not to
gather in the cemetery in Havana in honor of Eduardo Chibas, a well-
known politician of the 1940's and early 1950's.
A march from the Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus to the Church
of La Merced and which was organized by dissidents for the release of
political prisoners on September 17 did not take place because of
police intimidation and detentions.
On September 25, police again prevented a number of activists from
marching from the Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus to the Church of
Mercedes. Police took the activists to a police station to review their
identification documents.
On November 2, the Day of the Dead, state security personnel
prevented activists from entering the chapel in Havana's Colon Cemetery
where a number of human rights activists are buried.
On November 10, police in Santiago de Cuba prevented activists from
marching from the Plaza de Marte in honor of the first anniversary of
the attempt to demonstrate in Dolores Park in Havana.
During the year the Government organized a number of marches and
rallies in front of diplomatic missions. The Government mobilizes
thousand of persons in these marches, including school children and
workers. Anyone who does not attend the event can be easily identified
since persons congregate at certain points from factories or schools.
Sometimes small identification papers are given to participants; they
must present these papers to their immediate supervisor or school
officials the next day to demonstrate that they attended the rally.
The Government generally denies citizens freedom of association.
The Penal Code specifically outlaws illegal or unrecognized groups. The
Minister of Justice, in consultation with the Interior Ministry,
decides whether to give organizations legal recognition. The
authorities have never approved the existence of a human rights group.
However, there are a number of professional associations that operate
as NGO's but without legal recognition. For example, some scientists
formed the Zoological Society, and some teachers established an
Association of Independent Teachers.
Along with recognized churches, the Roman Catholic humanitarian
organization Caritas, the Masonic Lodge, small human rights groups, and
a number of nascent fraternal or professional organizations are the
only associations outside the control or influence of the State, the
Communist Party, and their mass organizations. With the exception of
the Masons, who have been established in the country for more than a
century, the authorities continue to ignore those groups' applications
for legal recognition, thereby subjecting members to potential charges
of illegal association. All other legally recognized nongovernmental
groups are at least nominally affiliated with, or controlled by the
Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution recognizes the right of
citizens to profess and practice any religious belief, within the
framework of respect for the law; however, in law and in practice, the
Government continues to restrict freedom of religion.
In 1991 the Government allowed religious adherents to join the
Communist Party. In 1992 it amended the Constitution to prohibit
religious discrimination and removed references to ``scientific
materialism,'' i.e., atheism, as the basis for the State. Members of
the armed forces do not attend religious services in their uniform,
probably to avoid possible reprimand by superiors.
The Government requires churches and other religious groups to
register with the provincial registry of associations within the
Ministry of the Interior to obtain official recognition. In practice,
the Government refuses to recognize new denominations. The Government
prohibits, with occasional exceptions, the construction of new
churches, forcing many growing congregations to violate the law and
meet in private homes. Government harassment of private houses of
worship continued, with evangelical denominations reporting evictions
from houses used for these purposes. According to the Cuban Council of
Churches (CCC) officials, most of the private houses of worship that
the Government closed were unregistered, making them technically
illegal. In addition CCC Pentecostal members have complained about the
preaching activities of foreign missionaries that led some of their
members to establish new denominations without obtaining the required
permits. Because of these complaints by the Pentecostals, the CCC has
formally requested overseas member church organizations to assist them
in dissuading foreign missionaries from establishing Pentecostal
churches.
The Government's main interaction with religious denominations is
through the Office of Religious Affairs of the Communist Party. The
Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor
the country's religious institutions, including surveillance,
infiltration, and harassment of religious professionals and laypersons.
In 1998 following Pope John Paul II's January visit, the country's
Roman Catholic bishops called on the Government to recognize the
Church's role in civil society and the family, as well as in the
temporal areas of work, the economy, the arts, and the scientific and
technical worlds. The Government continued to limit the Church's access
to the media and refused to allow the Church to have a legal
independent printing capability. It maintained a prohibition against
the establishment of religious-affiliated schools. Nonetheless, in
September local government authorities, for the third time since 1961,
allowed the Catholic Church to hold an outdoor procession to mark the
feast day of Our Lady of Charity in Havana. Although visibly present,
state security personnel did not harass any participants or observers,
as they did in 1998. However, prior to the event, security police
ordered a number of human rights activists not to attend the
procession. On December 25, 1999, the Government permitted the Catholic
Church to hold a Christmas procession in Havana. Catholic Church
authorities received permission to conduct the closing ceremonies for
the jubilee year celebration and the Cuba Eucharistic Congress (the
last one took place in 1959) on December 9 and 10. On December 9, 1,500
children from all over the country received their first communion in
the square outside the San Carlos Seminary. On December 10 Cardinal
Jaime Lucas Ortega Alamino, carrying the eucharist, led a procession of
bishops, priests, and believers from the Church of Christ (Iglesia del
Cristo del Buen Viaje) to the San Carlos Seminary. Unlike 1999, there
was no broadcast of the Pope's annual Christmas Day message from the
Vatican, but it was mentioned in the evening television news.
In 1998 the Government announced in a Politburo declaration that
henceforth citizens would be allowed to celebrate Christmas as an
official holiday. (The holiday had been cancelled, ostensibly to spur
the sugar harvest, in 1969, and restored in 1997 as part of the
preparations for the Pope's 1998 visit.) However, despite the
Government's decision to allow citizens to celebrate Christmas as a
national holiday, it also maintained a December 1995 decree prohibiting
nativity scenes in public buildings.
The Government allowed two new foreign priests to enter the country
during the year and two to replace two priests whose visas were not
renewed during the year. Some visas were issued only for periods from 3
to 6 months, and the applications of many other priests and religious
workers remain pending.
The Government continued to enforce a resolution that prevented any
national or joint enterprise (except those with specific authorization)
from selling computers, fax machines, photocopiers, or other equipment
to any church at other than official--and exorbitant--retail prices.
On July 9, dissidents attended the Jubilee Mass for prisoners
celebrated by Cardinal Jaime Ortega Alamino at the Church of Our Lady
of Charity. The Church distributed leaflets that invited worshippers to
attend the Mass and to pray for prisoners and requested former
prisoners and prisoners on conditional release to attend. Recently
released members of the Internal Dissident Working Group, Martha
Beatriz Roque Cabello, Rene de Jesus Gomez Manzano, and Felix Antonio
Bonne Carcasses also attended. During the ceremony a white dove was
released from its cage, and the congregation spontaneously started to
clap and some persons shouted ``liberty, liberty.'' State security
officials outside the church did not intervene. The Church normally
uses lay members to provide security at events like these. Apart from
ensuring that people remain in their places or in the procession line
during the service, these church guards also prevent any activities
from taking place that could lead to a response from state security
officials such as occurred at the July 9 Mass.
On August 30, the independent press agency Grupo Decoro reported
that evangelical pastor Pablo Rodriguez Oropeza and his wife Enma
Cabrera Cabrera were evicted from the house where they had lived for 6
years. The press agency did not report the reason for the eviction.
Santos Osmany Dominguez Borjas, a bishop of the United Pentecostal
Church of Cuba (Apostolic), returned to Havana after he was expelled to
Holguin on October 8, 1999. In recent years, the Government has relaxed
restrictions on some religious denominations, including Seventh-Day
Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses. The CCC continues to broadcast a
monthly 15-minute program on a national classical music radio station,
under the condition that the program not include material of a
political character.
State security officials visited some priests and pastors, prior to
significant religious events, ostensibly to warn them about dissidents;
however, some critics claim that these visits are done in an effort to
foster mistrust between the churches and human rights or prodemocracy
activists. State security officers also regularly harassed, including
inside churches and during religious ceremonies, human rights advocates
who sought to attend religious services commemorating special feast
days or before significant national days.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government tightly restricted
freedom of movement. The Government generally has not imposed legal
restrictions on domestic travel, except for persons found to be HIV-
positive, whom it initially restricts to sanatoriums for treatment and
therapy before conditionally releasing them into the community.
However, in recent years state security officials have forbidden human
rights advocates and independent journalists from traveling outside
their home provinces, and the Government also has sentenced others to
internal exile. On December 12, a court sentenced Angel Moya Acosta to
1 year in prison and banned him from traveling to Havana from his home
province of Matanzas for 10 years after serving his prison term.
In 1997 the Council of Ministers approved Decree 217, aimed at
stemming the flow of migration from the provinces to the capital.
Persons from other provinces may travel and visit Havana; however, they
cannot move into the city, on the grounds that if internal migration is
left unchecked, the city's problems regarding housing, public
transport, water and electrical supplies will become worse. The
Government recently noted that since the decree went into effect,
17,000 fewer people have migrated to Havana. Police frequently check
the identification of persons on the streets, and if someone is found
from another province living in Havana illegally, they are fined $15
(300 pesos) and sent back home. Fines are higher$50 (1,000 pesos) for
those who are residing illegally in the neighborhoods of Old Havana and
Cerro. Human rights observers noted that while the decree affected
migration countrywide, it was targeted at individuals and families, who
are predominantly of African descent, from the more impoverished
eastern provinces.
The Government imposed some restrictions on both emigration and
temporary foreign travel. In June the Government denied an exit permit
to Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, secretary-general of the CUTC to attend a
labor conference in the United States organized by the AFL-CIO. No
explanation was given. Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, president of the
Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation also was
not allowed to leave the country. Mexico's Partido Accion Nacional
(PAN) had invited Sanchez to witness the Mexican presidential election
on July 2. The PAN also invited members of the Moderate Reflection
Group, but Osvaldo Alfonso Valdes, president of the Democratic Liberal
Party and a member of the Moderate Reflection Group, said that the
group decided not to apply for an exit permit because of lack of funds
to pay for the application fees for exit permits. PAN also issued an
invitation to Elizardo Sanchez to attend the inauguration of the new
President on December 1. According to Sanchez, even though PAN
officials requested an exit visa for him directly from the Government,
he never received it. Similarly, the authorities denied an exit visa to
Osvaldo Alfonso Valdes, president of the Liberal Party, who was invited
to attend the International Liberal Party's convention that took place
in Canada in October.
The Government did issue an exit permit to Manuel Costa Morua of
the Socialist Movement to travel to Europe in April; Costa Morua also
is a member of the Moderate Reflection Group.
The Government allows the majority of persons who qualify for
immigrant or refugee status in other countries to depart; however, in
certain cases the authorities delay or deny exit permits, usually
without explanation. Some denials involve professionals who have tried
to emigrate and whom the Government subsequently banned from working in
their occupational field. The Government refused permission to others
because it considers their cases sensitive for political or state
security reasons. In July 1999, the Ministry of Health issued an
internal regulation, known as Resolution 54, that provides for the
denial of exit permits to medical professionals, until they have
performed 3 to 5 years of service in their profession after requesting
permission to travel abroad. This regulation normally applied to recent
graduates. This regulation was not published as part of the legal
provisions, and may apply to other professionals as well.
The Government also routinely denies exit permits to young men
approaching the age of military service, and until they reach the age
of 27, even when it has authorized the rest of the family to leave.
However, in most of those cases approved for migration to the United
States under the September 1, 1994, U.S.-Cuban migration agreement, the
applicants eventually receive exemption from obligatory service and are
granted exit permits.
In September two independent journalists, Jesus Labrador, Cuba
Press reporter, and Gustavo Cardero, (NotiCuba reporter) planned to
leave the country as refugees until the authorities confiscated their
exit permit.
The Government has a policy of denying exit permission for several
years to relatives of individuals who successfully migrated illegally
(e.g., merchant seamen who have defected while overseas, and sports
figures who have defected while on tour abroad).
Migrants who travel to the United States must pay the Government a
total of about $500 per adult and $400 per child, plus airfare. These
government fees for medical exam, passport, and exit visa--which must
be paid in dollars--are equivalent to about 5 years of a professional
person's accumulated peso salary and represent a significant hardship,
particularly for political refugees who usually are marginalized and
have no income. In 1996 the Government agreed to allow 1,000 needy
refugees to leave each year with reduced exit fees. However, after the
first group of 1,000 in 1996, no further refugees have been accorded
reduced fees. At year's end, 85 approved refugees remained in the
country because they were unable to pay government exit fees for
themselves and their families.
The Penal Code provides for imprisonment from 1 to 3 years or a
fine of $15 to $50 dollars (300 to 1,000 pesos) for unauthorized
departures by boat or raft. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) has stated that it regards any sentence of over 1
year for simple illegal exit as harsh and excessive. Under the terms of
the May 2, 1995, U.S.-Cuba Migration Accord, the Government agreed not
to prosecute or retaliate against migrants returned from international
or U.S. waters, or from the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, after
attempting to emigrate illegally.
In 1994 the Government eased restrictions on visits by, and
repatriation of, Cuban emigrants. Citizens who establish residency
abroad and who are in possession of government-issued permits to reside
abroad may travel to the country without visas. The Government reduced
the age of persons eligible to travel abroad from 20 to 18 years and
extended the period for a temporary stay abroad from 6 to 11 months. In
1995 the Government announced that emigrants who are considered not to
have engaged in so-called hostile actions against the Government and
who are not subject to criminal proceedings in their country of
residence may apply at Cuban consulates for renewable, 2-year multiple-
entry travel authorizations. However, in 1999 the Government announced
that it would deny entry permits for emigrants who had left the country
illegally after September 1994. It remains unclear whether the
Government actually was implementing such a policy.
The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum to individuals
persecuted ``for their ideals or struggles for democratic rights
against imperialism, fascism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; against
discrimination and racism; for national liberation; for the rights of
workers, peasants, and students; for their progressive political,
scientific, artistic, and literary activities; and for socialism and
peace.'' However, the Government has no formal mechanism to process
asylum for foreign nationals. Nonetheless, the Government honors the
principle of first asylum and has provided it to a small number of
persons. There was no information available on its use during the year.
According to the UNHCR, since January the authorities received 75
applications for refugee status within the country. Of the 75
applicants, 24 persons were recognized as refugees. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens do not have the legal right to change their Government or
to advocate change, and the Government retaliates systematically
against those who seek peaceful political change. The Constitution
proscribes any political organization other than the Communist Party.
While the Constitution provides for direct election of provincial,
municipal, and National Assembly members, the candidates must be
approved in advance by mass organizations controlled by the Government.
In practice, a small group of leaders, under the direction of President
Castro, selects the members of the highest policy-making bodies of the
Communist Party--the Politburo and the Central Committee.
The authorities tightly control the selection of candidates and all
elections for government and party positions. The candidacy committees
are composed of members of government-controlled mass organizations
such as the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) and the CDR's and are
responsible for selecting candidates, whose names are then sent to
municipal assemblies that select a single candidate for each regional
seat in the ANPP. An opposition or independent candidate has never been
allowed to run for national office.
In January 1998, the Government held national elections in which
601 candidates were approved to compete for the 601 seats in the
National Assembly. According to the official state media, the
candidates were voted in by over 93 percent of the electorate. No
candidates with views independent from or in opposition to the
Government were allowed to run, and no views contrary to the Government
or the Communist Party were expressed in the government-controlled
national media. The Government saturated the media and used government
ministries, Communist Party organs, and mass organizations to urge
voters to cast a ``unified vote'' where marking one box automatically
selected all candidates on the ballot form. In practice, the Communist
Party approved candidates for all offices. A small minority of
candidates did not belong formally to the Communist Party. The
Communist Party was the only political party allowed to participate in
the elections.
On April 23, elections for local representatives to the municipal
assembly were held. Government newspapers reported that 98 percent of
voters participated in the election. Slightly more than 50 percent of
those elected were the incumbents, 20 percent were women, and about 9
percent of all candidates were between the ages of 16 and 30. The
reports also claim that nationwide the number of blank ballots
decreased from 3.2 percent to 2.8 percent, while the number of annulled
votes also decreased to 3 percent from nearly 4 percent, compared with
the last election. Municipal elections are held every 2-1/2 years to
elect 14,686 local representatives to the municipal assemblies.
Deputies to the National Assembly, delegates to the provincial
assemblies, and members of the council of state are elected during
general elections held every 5 years. The municipal assemblies
constitute the lowest level of the Government's structure.
Although not a formal requirement, Communist Party membership is in
fact a prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional
advancement.
The Government rejects any change to the political system judged
incompatible with the revolution and ignored and actively suppressed
calls for democratic reform. Although President Castro signed the
Declaration of Vina del Mar at the Sixth Ibero-American Summit in 1996,
in which government leaders reaffirmed their commitment to democracy
and political pluralism, the Government continued to oppose independent
political activity on the ground that the national system provides a
``perfected'' form of democracy and that pluralism exists within the
one-party structure.
Government leadership positions continue to be dominated by men,
and women remain underrepresented. There are very few women or
minorities in policymaking positions in the Government or the Party.
There are 2 women in the 24-member Politburo, 18 in the 150-member
Central Committee, and 166 in the 601-seat ANPP. Although blacks and
persons of African descent make up over half the population, they hold
only six seats in the Politburo.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not recognize any domestic human rights groups,
or permit them to function legally. The Government subjects domestic
human rights advocates to intense intimidation, harassment, and
repression. In violation of its own statutes, the Government refuses to
consider applications for legal recognition submitted by human rights
monitoring groups (see Section 2.b.).
Dissidents generally believe that most human rights organizations
have been infiltrated and are subjected to constant surveillance.
Activists believe that some, perhaps many, of the dissidents are either
state security or are persons attempting to qualify for refugee status
to leave the country.
In its 1997 report, the IACHR examined measures taken by the
Government and found that they did not ``comprise the bedrock of a
substantive reform in the present political system that would permit
the ideological and partisan pluralism implicit in the wellspring from
which a democratic system of government develops.'' The IACHR
recommended that the Government provide reasonable safeguards to
prevent violations of human rights, unconditionally release political
prisoners and those jailed for trying to leave the country, abolish the
concept of dangerousness in the Penal Code, eliminate other legal
restriction on basic freedoms, cease harassing human rights groups, and
establish a separation of powers so that the judiciary would no longer
be subordinate to political power.
The Government steadfastly has rejected international human rights
monitoring. In 1992 the country's U.N. representative stated that Cuba
would not recognize the mandate of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR) on Cuba and would not cooperate with the Special Rapporteur on
Cuba, despite being a UNCHR member. This policy remained unchanged and
the Government refused even to acknowledge requests by the Special
Rapporteur to visit the country. In April 1998, the UNCHR did not renew
the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, following as yet unfulfilled
assertions by the Government that it would improve human rights
practices if it was not under formal sanction from the UNCHR. As in
1999, the UNCHR again passed a resolution on April 18, introduced by
the Czech Republic and Poland, which expressed concern about the human
rights situation in the country. The Government responded by organizing
a march of an estimated 200,000 persons past the Czech Embassy in
Havana. On April 19, national television featured a round-table
discussion on the UNCHR vote in which the Foreign Minister strongly
criticized the UNCHR resolution and accused it of discriminating
against third world countries.
During this same UNCHR session, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women released her report, which was critical of the
Government on issues of women's rights and on other human rights
problems.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Cuba is a multiracial society with a black and mixed-race majority.
The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, sex, or national
origin, although evidence suggests that racial discrimination occurs
frequently.
Women.--Violent crime rarely is reported in the press, and there
are no publicly available data regarding the incidence of domestic
violence and rape; however, human rights advocates report that violence
against women is a problem. The law establishes strict penalties for
rape, and the Government appears to enforce the rape law; however,
according to human rights advocates, the police do not act on cases of
domestic violence.
Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on violence
against women, visited the country in 1999 and issued a report on her
findings in February. The report states that she was surprised to find
that most government officials did not see violence against women as a
prevalent problem. However, she noted that activists at the grassroots
level are very attuned to problems of violence affecting women.
Coomaraswamy urged the Government to take comprehensive steps to
enhance the legal protection against violence against women and
specifically urged the adoption of legislation to address domestic
violence and sexual harassment.
Prostitution is legal (except for prostitution by children under 17
years of age); however, pandering or otherwise benefiting from
prostitution is a felony. Prostitution has increased greatly in the
last few years; press reports indicate that tourists from various
countries visit specifically to patronize inexpensive prostitutes. A
government crackdown on prostitution that began in late 1998 initially
had some effect, but prostitutes (known as ``jineteras'') were still
visible in Havana and other major cities during the year. The early
success was obtained by stationing police on nearly every major street
corner where tourists are present. Some street police officers are
suspected of providing protection to the jineteras. Most observers
believe that the Government clamped down on prostitution to combat the
perception that the Government promotes sex tourism. The Government set
up centers to take prostitutes off the streets and reeducate them; the
newest center reportedly opened in September in Valle Grande near
Havana. In her February report, U.N. Special Rapporteur Coomaraswamy
recommended that the Government dismantle the centers and find ``other
mechanisms that do not violate the rights of the prostitutes.''
The Family Code states that women and men have equal rights and
responsibilities regarding marriage, divorce, raising children,
maintaining the home, and pursuing a career. Women are subject to the
same restrictions on property ownership as men. The maternity law
provides 18 weeks of maternity leave and grants working mothers
preferential access to goods and services. About 40 percent of all
women work, and they are well represented in many professions.
According to the Cuban Women's Federation (FMC), women hold 33 percent
of managerial positions. The FMC also asserted that 11,200 women have
received land parcels to cultivate; that more than 561,000 women have
begun working as agricultural workers, and that women devote 34 hours a
week to domestic work, about the same number of hours they spend
working outside the home.
Children.--The Constitution provides that the Government protect
family, maternity, and matrimony. It also states that children,
legitimate or not, have the same rights under the law and notes the
duties of parents to protect them. Education is free and compulsory to
the ninth grade, but it is grounded in Marxist ideology. State
organizations and schools are charged with the integral formation of
children and youth. The national health care system covers all
citizens. There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. However,
child prostitution is a problem, with young girls engaging in
prostitution to help support themselves and their families. It is
illegal for a child under 17 years of age to engage in prostitution.
The police began to enforce this law more actively in late 1998 and
continued to do so during the year, as part of their crackdown on
prostitution in general. However, the phenomenon continues as more
cabarets and discos open for the growing tourist industry which make it
easier for tourists to come into contact with child prostitutes.
Police officers who find children loitering in the streets or
begging from tourists frequently will intervene and try to find the
parents. If the child is found bothering tourists a second time, police
frequently fine the child's parents.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based
on disability, and there have been few complaints of such
discrimination. However, a young married blind couple, members of the
Fraternity of Independent Blind People of Cuba were told to leave a
cafe in Moron where they sang for tips. There are no laws that mandate
accessibility to buildings for the disabled. In practice buildings and
transportation are rarely accessible to disabled people.
On November 8, a special police operation dislodged a number of
persons with disabilities from selling their products in Central
Havana. Police arrested two persons; a court sentenced one of them to 1
year in jail for selling stolen goods.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Many persons of African descent
have benefited from access to basic education and medical care since
the 1959 revolution, and much of the police force and army enlisted
personnel is black. Nevertheless, racial discrimination often occurs,
and is acknowledged publicly by high governmental officials, including
Castro. There have been numerous reports of disproportionate police
harassment of black youths. In 1997 there were numerous credible
reports of forced evictions of squatters and residents lacking official
permission to reside in Havana. The evictions, exacerbated by Decree
217 (see Section 2.d.), primarily targeted individuals and families
from the eastern provinces, which are traditionally areas of black or
mixed-race populations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution gives priority to
state or collective needs over individual choices regarding free
association or provision of employment. The demands of the economy and
society take precedence over individual workers' preferences. The law
prohibits strikes; none are known to have occurred. Established
official labor organizations have a mobilization function and do not
act as trade unions, promote worker rights, or protect the right to
strike. Such organizations are under the control of the State and the
Communist Party, which also manage the enterprises for which the
laborers work.
The Communist Party selects the leaders of the sole legal labor
confederation, the Confederation of Cuban Workers, whose principal
responsibility is to ensure that government production goals are met.
Despite disclaimers in international forums, the Government explicitly
prohibits independent unions and none are recognized. There has been no
change in conditions since the 1992 International Labor Organization
(ILO) finding that the Government violated ILO norms on freedom of
association and the right to organize. Those who attempt to engage in
unofficial union activities face government persecution.
Workers can and have lost their jobs for their political beliefs,
including their refusal to join the official union. Several small
independent labor organizations have been created, but function without
legal recognition and are unable to represent workers effectively or
work on their behalf. The Government actively harasses these
organizations. Police detained independent labor activist Jose Orlando
Gonzalez Bridon of the CUTC for brief periods in January. Most
political dissidents lose their jobs and remain unemployed; the only
work they are offered is cleaning streets.
The CTC is a member of the Communist, formerly Soviet-dominated
World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining does not exist. The State Committee for Work and Social
Security (CETSS) sets wages and salaries for the state sector, which is
almost the only employer in the country. Since all legal unions are
government entities, antiunion discrimination by definition does not
exist.
The 1995 Foreign Investment Law (Law 77) continued to deny workers
the right to contract directly with foreign companies investing in the
country without special government permission. Although a few firms
have managed to negotiate exceptions, the Government requires foreign
investors to contract workers through state employment agencies, which
are paid in foreign currency and, in turn, pay workers very low wages
in pesos. Workers subcontracted by state employment agencies must meet
certain political qualifications. According to Minister of Basic
Industry Marcos Portal, the state employment agencies consult with the
Party, the CTC, and the Union of Communist Youth to ensure that the
workers chosen deserve to work in a joint enterprise.
There are no functioning export processing zones, although the law
authorizes the establishment of free trade zones and industrial parks.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Neither the
Constitution nor the Labor Code prohibits forced labor. The Government
maintains correctional centers where it sends persons for crimes such
as dangerousness. Prisoners held there are forced to work on farms or
building sites. The authorities often imprison internees who do not
cooperate.
The Government employs special groups of workers, known as
microbrigades, that are temporarily reassigned from their usual jobs,
to work on special building projects. These microbrigades become
increasingly important in the Government's efforts to complete tourist
and other priority projects. Workers who refuse to volunteer for these
jobs often risk discrimination or job loss. Microbrigade workers
reportedly receive priority consideration for housing assignments. The
military assigns some conscripts to the Youth Labor Army, where they
serve their 2-year military service requirement working on farms that
supply both the armed forces and the civilian population.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
however, the Government requires children to work without compensation.
All students over age 11 are expected to devote 30 to 45 days of their
summer vacation to farm work, laboring up to 8 hours per day. The
Ministry of Agriculture uses ``voluntary labor'' by student work
brigades extensively in the farming sector.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum working age is 17 years. However, the
Labor Code permits the employment of 15- and 16-year-old children to
obtain training or fill labor shortages. The law requires school
attendance until the ninth grade, and this law generally is respected.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, it
strongly encourages children to work without compensation (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage varies by
occupation and is set by the CETSS. For example, the minimum monthly
wage for a maid is $8.25 (165 pesos); for a bilingual office clerk,
$9.50 (190 pesos); and for a gardener $10.75 (216 pesos). The
Government supplements the minimum wage with free education and
subsidized medical care (but reduces daily pay by 40 percent after the
third day of being admitted to a hospital), housing, and some food
(this subsidized food is enough for about 1 week per month). However,
even with these subsidies, the minimum wage does not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. Corruption and black market
activities are pervasive. The Government rations most basic necessities
such as food, medicine, clothing, and cooking gas, which are in very
short supply.
The Government requires foreign companies in joint ventures with
state entities to hire and pay workers through the State. HRW noted
that the required reliance on state-controlled employment agencies
effectively leaves workers without any capacity directly to negotiate
wages, benefits, the basis of promotions, and the length of the
workers' trial period at the job with the employer. Reportedly these
exploitative labor practices force foreign companies to pay the
Government as much as $500 to $600 per month for workers, while the
workers in turn receive only a small peso wage from the Government.
The standard workweek is 44 hours, with shorter workdays in
hazardous occupations, such as mining. The Government reduced the
workday in some government offices and state enterprises to save
energy.
Workplace environmental and safety controls are usually inadequate,
and the Government lacks effective enforcement mechanisms. Industrial
accidents apparently are frequent, but the Government suppresses such
reports. The Labor Code establishes that a worker who considers his
life in danger because of hazardous conditions has the right not to
work in his position or not to engage in specific activities until such
risks are eliminated. According to the Labor Code, the worker remains
obligated to work temporarily in whatever other position may be
assigned him at a salary provided for under the law.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--In February 1999, the National Assembly
revised the Penal Code to prohibit trafficking in persons through or
from the country and provided the following penalties for violations: a
term of 7 to 15 years' imprisonment for organizing or cooperating in
alien smuggling through the country; 10 to 20 years' imprisonment for
entering the country to smuggle persons out of the country; and 20
years to life in prison for using violence, causing harm or death, or
putting lives in danger, in engaging in such smuggling. These
provisions are directed primarily at persons engaging in organized
smuggling of would-be emigrants. In addition, the revised code made it
illegal to promote or organize the entrance of persons into or the exit
of persons from the country for the purpose of prostitution; violators
are subject to 20 to 30 years' imprisonment.
There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from,
within, or through the country for the purpose of providing forced
labor or services.
__________
DOMINICA
Dominica is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member of
the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime minister, a cabinet, and a
unicameral legislative assembly compose the Government. A president,
nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of the
opposition party, and elected for a 5-year term by the Parliament, is
head of state. The Dominica Labour Party (DLP) prevailed in free and
fair elections held on January 31, and Roosevelt P. Douglas became
Prime Minister. Douglas died in office on October 1, and former
Minister of Communication and Works Pierre Charles replaced him. The
judiciary is independent.
The Dominica Police is the only security force. It is controlled by
and responsive to the democratically elected Government. There were
occasional allegations of abuse by the police.
The country's primarily agrarian economy depends on earnings from
banana exports, which declined some 20 percent during the year. The
Government's efforts to develop the tourist industry had mixed results,
with a decline in tourist arrivals but an increase in cruise ship
visitors during the year. The Government also is diversifying
agricultural production and promoting the export of fresh fruits,
vegetables, and coconut products, both within and outside the region.
Per capita gross domestic product was about $3,426 in 1999.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in several areas. The principal
human rights problems are occasional instances of use of excessive
force by police, poor prison conditions, societal violence against
women and children, instances of discrimination against indigenous
Carib Indians, and societal discrimination against female Caribs in
mixed marriages.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
were some allegations of occasional use of excessive force by the
police. During the first half of the year, the authorities reportedly
received 13 complaints regarding excessive use of force by the police.
In November 1997, the authorities forced the Commissioner and
Deputy Commissioner of police to retire as a result of recommendations
by a Commission of Inquiry that investigated allegations of
mismanagement, corruption, and police brutality. Under new leadership,
the police created an Internal Affairs Department in December 1997 to
investigate public complaints against the police and to provide
counseling to police. In July 1998, a consultant from the United
Kingdom conducted a 3-month study to update antiquated police
regulations and to establish new operational guidelines for the police.
This report was submitted to the Government in 1998, but the
recommendations have not yet been implemented.
Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions
continue to be problems in the sole prison facility. There are over 200
prisoners. The prison provides work therapy, sports programs,
educational opportunities, and counseling for inmates. There continued
to be complaints by prisoners about the poor quality of prison food.
Female prisoners are segregated from male prisoners; however, juveniles
are housed with adult inmates.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
requires that the authorities charge persons with a crime within 24
hours after arrest. If charges are brought, the police must bring the
detainee to court within 72 hours. This requirement generally is
honored in practice, although those arrested on Fridays often must
remain in jail over the weekend and are not charged until the following
Monday.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
The judicial system is composed of a high court judge, 5
magistrates, and 10 magistrate courts located in police stations around
the country. Appeals can be made to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court
and to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
The law provides for public trial before an independent, impartial
court. Criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty,
are allowed legal counsel, and have the right to appeal. Courts provide
free legal counsel to the indigent only in capital cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
right of free expression, and the Government respects this in practice.
The political opposition openly criticizes the Government.
The print media consist of two private newspapers and political
party journals; all publish without censorship or government
interference. The principal radio station is state-owned and has a
government-appointed board. There is also an independent radio station
owned by the Catholic Church. Citizens also have access to independent
news sources through cable television and radio reception from
neighboring islands.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law
enforcement officials unfairly target them. However, it is not clear
whether such complaints reflect discrimination on the basis of
religious belief by the authorities or simply enforcement of laws
against marijuana, which is used as part of Rastafarian religious
practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice. The Government may revoke
passports if subversion is suspected but has not done so in recent
times.
The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The Constitution calls for elections at least every
5 years.
On January 31, the Dominica Labour Party won 10 seats in free and
fair elections, defeating the United Workers' Party (UWP) which had
held power since 1995. DLP leader Roosevelt P. ``Rosie'' Douglas forged
a majority coalition of 13 seats in the 21-member Parliament, with the
Dominican Freedom Party, holder of 2 seats, and 1 former UWP
parliamentarian who changed party affiliation to join the DLP
Government. Douglas died in office on October 1, and the former
Minister of Communication and Works, Pierre Charles, became the Prime
Minister. Ian Douglas, nephew of Rosie Douglas and representing the
DLP, won the December 11 by-election for the deceased Prime Minister's
seat.
There are no impediments in law or in practice to the participation
of women in leadership roles in government or political parties;
however, they are underrepresented in practice. Voters elected two
women to Parliament in the January elections.
Carib Indians participate in national political life.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no government restrictions on the formation of local
human rights organizations, although no such groups exist. Several
advocacy groups, such as the Association of Disabled People and a
women's and children's self-help organization, operate freely and
without government interference. There were no requests for
investigations of human rights abuses from international or regional
human rights groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution includes provisions against racial, sexual, and
religious discrimination, which the authorities respect in practice.
Women.--Sexual harassment and domestic violence cases are common,
and there is no family court to deal specifically with domestic
violence issues. Women can bring charges against husbands for battery,
and both the police and the courts prosecute cases of rape and sexual
assault, but there are no specific spousal abuse laws. However, in
April 1998, a new Sexual Offences Act went into effect to replace the
previous act, which required medical evidence or witness corroboration
for indictment. As a matter of policy, all rape cases are handled
solely by female police officers. The Department of Labor recruited a
permanent counselor and established a crisis response mechanism to
assist women who are victims of domestic violence. The Welfare
Department assists victims of abuse by finding temporary shelter,
providing counseling to both parties, or recommending police action.
The Welfare Department reports all cases of abuse to the police. The
courts may issue protective orders, but the police do not enforce them
consistently.
Beyond the general protection of the Constitution, women do not
benefit from any specific civil rights legislation. While there is
little open discrimination against women, property ownership continues
to be deeded to ``heads of households,'' who are usually males. When
the male head of household dies without a will, the wife cannot inherit
the property or sell it, although she can live in it and pass it to her
children. In the civil service, the law establishes fixed pay rates for
specific jobs, whatever the gender of the incumbent.
The Dominica National Council of Women, a nongovernmental
organization, has developed local adult education and small business
training programs for women. According to the Labor Department, many
women in rural areas find it difficult to meet basic needs, at least in
part owing to the decline in the banana export industry.
Children.--The law stipulates that the Government should protect
the rights of children to education and health care. Education is
compulsory through the age of 16, and primary health care is available
throughout the island.
Various laws enumerate children's rights, but their enforcement is
hampered by lack of staffing in government agencies. According to the
Welfare Department, reported cases of child abuse, including sexual
abuse, have increased in the past few years. In 1999 there were 303
reported cases of child abuse, which affected 71 boys and 232 girls. Of
these cases, 124 involved sexual abuse. At year's end, there were nine
staff members in the social welfare office that handles all welfare
problems, including complaints of child abuse.
Although the maximum sentence for sexual molestation (rape, incest)
is life imprisonment, the normal sentence given is 15 years except in
the case of murder. The age of consent for sexual relations is 16
years.
People with Disabilities.--Beyond the general protection of the
Constitution, there is no specific legislation dealing with the
disabled. However, the labor laws permit authorization of employment of
a disabled person for less than the minimum wage, in order to increase
opportunities for employment of the disabled (see Section 6.e.). There
is no requirement mandating access for those with disabilities.
Indigenous People.--There is a significant Carib Indian population,
estimated at 3,400 persons, of a total population of 76,000. Most live
on a 3,783-acre reservation created in 1903 and expanded in 1997.
School, water, and health facilities available on the Carib reservation
are rudimentary but similar to those available to other rural
Dominicans. Most Carib Indians engage in farming, fishing, and
handicraft. Unemployment is believed to be higher than in rest of the
country, while the average income is below the national average. About
65 percent of the Carib population is between the ages of 18 and 35.
The reservation is governed by the 1978 Carib Constitution. Carib
Indians over the age of 18 who reside there are eligible to vote for
the Chief and eight members of the Council of Advisors. Elections are
held every 5 years, and the latest election was held in July 1999.
According to the Carib Constitution, the Council must meet once a
month, determine the chief's itinerary, and publish council meeting
agendas in the government Gazette.
There are credible reports of discrimination against Carib women
who are married to, or who live with, non-Carib men, making it
difficult for such couples to obtain permits to build homes within the
reservation. Building permits are obtained from the Carib Council.
Until 1979 the Carib Constitution allowed Carib men married to non-
Carib women to continue living on the Carib reserve but dictated that
Carib women married to non-Carib men had to move off the reservation.
Although the law has changed, practice is not yet in keeping with the
law. In one case, a Carib woman in a common-law relationship with a
non-Carib man who tried to build a house on land reserved for her
family received threats that her house would be burned down. An
estimated 25 percent of the Carib Indian population is believed to be
in mixed marriages or relationships.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers have the legal right to
organize, to choose their representatives, and to strike, but unions
represent less than 10 percent of the work force. All unions are
independent of the Government. While there are no direct ties, members
of certain political parties dominate some unions. There is no
restriction on forming labor federations, but there is no Trades Union
Congress. Unions may affiliate with various international labor bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have
legally defined rights to organize workers and to bargain with
employers. Collective bargaining is widespread in the nonagricultural
sectors of the economy, including in government service, and there is
also recourse to mediation and arbitration by the Government. The law
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and judicial
authorities enforce union rights. In addition, employers must reinstate
workers fired for union activities. The law requires that employers
recognize unions as bargaining agents once both parties have followed
appropriate procedures. Department of Labor inspectors under the
supervision of the Labor Commissioner enforce labor legislation, but
the small Labor Inspection Office lacks sufficient personnel to carry
out its duties.
Labor regulations and practices governing the country's industrial
areas and export firms do not differ from those prevailing in the rest
of the economy. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that by children, and such labor
is not known to exist.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum legal age for employment is 15 years.
Employers generally observe this law without government enforcement.
The law prohibits forced or bonded child labor, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages for
various categories of workers, but these were last revised in 1989. The
minimum wage rate for some categories of workers (e.g., household
employees) is as low as $0.37 (EC$1.00) per hour if meals are included.
However, minimum wages for most workers fall in a range between $0.74
(EC$2.00) per hour for tourist industry workers to $1.11 (EC$3.00) per
hour for occupations such as shopclerks. Minimum wages are not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. However, most workers (including domestic employees) earn more
than the legislated minimum wage for their category. The Minimum Wage
Advisory Board met in 1998 and recommended increases in these wage
levels, but the Government had not yet acted upon these recommendations
at year's end.
The labor standards laws state that no employer shall establish or
maintain differences in wages between men and women performing the same
or similar work with parallel responsibilities under similar
conditions. The law further states that no employer may reduce the
wages of an employee to comply with equal wage standards. The labor
laws also provide that the Labor Commissioner may authorize the
employment of a disabled person at a wage lower than the minimum rate
in order to enable that person to be employed gainfully.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. The law provides
for a minimum of 2 weeks' paid vacation per year. The Employment Safety
Act provides occupational health and safety regulations that are
consistent with international standards. The Advisory Committee on
Safety and Health is an established body but has never met. The rarely
used enforcement mechanism consists of inspections by the Department of
Labor, which can and does prescribe specific compliance measures,
impose fines, and prosecute offenders. Workers have the right to remove
themselves from unsafe work environments without jeopardy to continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons.
The country has an economic citizenship program that allows foreign
investors to purchase passports through loosely monitored procedures
requiring cash inflows ranging from $15,000 (EC$40,000) to $50,000
(EC$135,000). This process reportedly has facilitated the illegal
immigration of persons from China and other countries to North America
where, in some instances, they may be forced by the criminal
organizations that provided the funds to work under conditions similar
to bonded labor to repay their debt.
__________
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The Constitution provides for a popularly elected president and a
bicameral Congress. President Hipolito Mejia of the Dominican Reform
Party (PRD) took office on August 16 after a free and fair election,
replacing President Leonel Fernandez of the Dominican Liberation Party
(PLD). The PRD also has control of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however,
interference from outside forces remains a problem. The Government took
some steps to improve the ability of the judiciary to resist such
outside interference.
The National Police (PN), the National Department of Investigations
(DNI), the National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD), and the military
(army, air force, and navy) form the security forces. The PN is under
the Secretary of the Interior and Police; the military is under the
Secretary of the Armed Forces; and the DNI and the DNCD, which have
personnel from both the police and the military, report directly to the
President. Although the security forces generally are responsive to
civilian authority, there were instances in which members of the
security forces, principally the National Police, acted independently
of government authority or control. Members of the National Police, and
to a more limited extent the military, continued to commit serious
human rights abuses.
The economy, once heavily dependent on sugar and other agricultural
exports, continues to diversify; tourism, telecommunications, and free
trade zones (FTZ's) are major sources of income and employment.
Remittances from abroad, estimated to exceed $1.5 billion, are
equivalent to approximately 9 percent of the $2,100 per capita gross
domestic product. The country's agricultural and tourism sectors and
electrical power network largely have recovered from the effects of
Hurricane Georges, which hit the island in 1998, while housing
reconstruction and transportation infrastructure lag behind. The 1999
transfer of sugar mills to private control contributed to increasing
poverty and joblessness in the bateyes (sugar cane shantytowns). Income
distribution in the country is highly skewed, and according to the U.N.
Development Program, the richest 10 percent of the population receives
over 37 percent of the income, over 18 times that received by the most
impoverished 10 percent of the population.
The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems
remain. Police committed extrajudicial killings. The police, and to a
lesser degree the military, tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
detainees and prisoners. Police on several occasions used force to
disperse demonstrators. There was a significant increase in allegations
of physical abuse and torture of minors in police and military
detention. Prison conditions ranged from poor to extremely harsh.
Police arbitrarily arrested and detained suspects and suspects'
relatives. The ability of prosecutors to limit police detentions and
practices has eroded, as compared with 1999. While there have been some
improvements in the efficiency of the judiciary, lengthy pretrial
detention and long delays in trials remained problems. Police committed
break-ins of private homes without judicial orders. The authorities
rarely prosecute abusers, and at times members of the security forces
commit abuses with the tacit acquiescence of the civil authorities,
leading to a climate of impunity. Numerous allegations of corruption by
government officials were raised following the change of
administration. The authorities infringe on citizens' privacy rights.
Members of the police harassed journalists. The Government at times
pressured editors not to publish unfavorable items, and journalists
practice self-censorship. The Government at times restricted freedom of
assembly. The Government restricts the movement of and forcibly expels
Haitian and Dominican-Haitian migrants. Violence and discrimination
against women; prostitution, including child prostitution; abuse of
children; discrimination against the disabled, discrimination against
and abuse of Haitian migrants and their descendants, and child labor
are serious problems. There continued to be reports of forced labor.
Workers on the sugar plantations and mills continued to work in unsafe
conditions. Trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials; however, police
committed at least 250 extrajudicial killings. It is difficult for any
outside observer to quantify the exact number of victims of
extrajudicial killings each year; included in this number are civilians
who were killed in alleged ``exchanges of gunfire'' with police. The
police fail to cooperate with civilian authorities in many ways, which
made quantifying the problem very difficult. For example, the police do
not provide Public Ministry officials with reports on investigations of
citizens killed in confrontations with police; police rarely documented
citizen killings in accordance with minimum investigations or crime
scene standards; police denied civilian authorities, including
prosecutors requesting information, transcripts of police tribunal
hearings that process these cases in secret; and the police have been
known to publicly fire officials involved in these incidents, only to
reinstate them quietly later.
The Dominican Human Rights Committee and other observers state that
the police may employ unwarranted deadly force against criminal
suspects in a kind of uniformed vigilantism. In addition, some victims
are involved in private disputes with police agents, while other
victims later were found to be honest citizens erroneously caught up in
the wave of antigang violence carried out by the police. The
circumstances of the vast majority of these killings are questionable,
but witnesses other than the police usually are lacking.
Extrajudicial killings stem from the lack of basic education, poor
training, and weak discipline of the members of the police force. These
problems are aggravated by low pay and the fact that the Government's
budgetary allocation for the police is too low to support the higher
recruiting standards needed and to provide adequate training for
police. For example, new recruits fire only one round of ammunition
during training, and there is no coherent policy on the use of deadly
force or rules of engagement by the police. Additionally, the lack of
professional, transparent, and credible investigation of the
circumstances in which police kill citizens in ``exchanges of gunfire''
lead to the perception of impunity in these killings. Finally, there is
a lack of specific training in human rights as applied to police work.
In the majority of the 250 deaths at the hands of police, the
police characterized the victims as delinquents. The rest were wives,
girlfriends, or associates of the officers, other civilians, or fellow
officers. In most cases, the police claimed that the deaths resulted
from the exchange of gunfire in the course of an arrest. Amnesty
International's August report noted the large number of deaths at the
hands of police and the lack of transparency in the investigative
process. In October 1999, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) issued a report that criticized the police for committing
extrajudicial killings and neglecting to investigate and punish
officers responsible for such abuses. Police assert that the deaths of
so-called delinquents resulted from shoot-outs requiring the police to
act in self-defense. However, a number of cases demonstrate that this
often is not the case.
For example, on April 18, police shot and killed Antonio Lora
Fernandez allegedly during questioning at the Isabela police substation
of Puerto Plata.
In July in Manoguayabo, a suburb of Santo Domingo, police shot and
killed Juan Expedito Garcia, a 49-year-old businessman who was
traveling with his daughter-in-law, Katy Jimenez de Garcia. Garcia and
Jimenez were victims of an attempted carjacking by a group of
delinquents. The delinquents ultimately kidnaped the two and sped away,
followed closely by the police. After being stopped by police, Garcia
and Jimenez threw themselves to the ground, raised their hands, and
told the police not to shoot because they themselves were victims.
Jimenez, the only surviving witness, reported that the police shot
Garcia four times in the head and three times in the body before
shooting and killing one of the kidnapers. She overheard one officer
giving the order to kill her as well, but was spared when she was able
to explain the circumstances of their kidnaping. The police commission
investigating the incident recommended that those responsible be tried
in a military tribunal. At year's end, there was no public information
about the investigation into this case.
In July witnesses, including the victim's sister, reported that
police shot and killed 20-year-old Juan Jose Urena in Santo Domingo.
The police said that Urena was wanted by the Secret Service and the
Department of Homicide and Crimes against Property. They reported that
when they tried to detain Urena, he threatened them with a machete, and
they were forced to shoot him. The victim's sister, who saw the
incident, said that he did not resist arrest, but that he already was
wounded and handcuffed when the agents fired the shots that killed him.
Urena's death at the hands of police led to public protests, tire
burnings, and the throwing of Molotov cocktails. Police responded with
tear gas and guns. The police shot a bystander in the leg as they tried
to calm the protests (see Section 2.b.). The police officers who
participated in the shooting of Urena were arrested pending a police
investigation.
On July 18, in Guayabin, on the northern border with Haiti,
military agents shot and killed 6 Haitians and 1 Dominican citizen and
wounded 13 others after they crossed the border illegally in a truck
(see Section 2.d.).
On August 13, a 30-year-old Haitian died after soldiers took him
into custody in La Canada, near Hondo Valle (see Section 2.d.).
On September 25, police killed two persons in separate incidents,
20-year-old Emilio Jose Matias Moronta and 23-year-old Lauri Mendez
Sena, in Santo Domingo neighborhoods Villa Maria and Los Alcarrizos,
respectively. The local press reported that the police said that
Moronta resisted arrest and threatened officers with a gun; however, an
unidentified businessman claimed the police version was false and that
the victim did not carry a firearm and was first wounded by the police
in the leg. In the same press report, the police claimed Sena resisted
arrest with a machete. At year's end, there was no public information
about an investigation.
On November 15, police shot and killed Johnny Perdomo Santo, in the
Santo Domingo neighborhood of Ozama. Police reported to the press that
they followed Santo in a car, whose plates linked it to a history of
crimes, and that Santo attempted to shoot at them. Santo reportedly
died on the way to the hospital. Witnesses told the press there were a
total of three victims, including a woman. They said two corpses were
taken away in the police vehicle, and a third one was taken away in the
victims' car. At year's end, there was no public information about an
investigation into the facts of the case.
Military personnel killed a number of Haitian migrants who were
attempting to enter the country (see Section 2.d.).
The administration of President Hipolito Mejia acknowledged the
problems with the police apparatus and early in his administration
agreed to the creation of a Police Reform Commission to be made up of
the Chief of Police, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Armed
Forces, the Legal Advisor to the President, representatives of human
rights organizations, and legislators. However, President Mejia
retained the services of Chief of Police Pedro de Jesus Candelier,
under whose tenure the number of deaths at the hands of the police rose
significantly over previous years. At year's end, the Commission had
not made public any recommendations, but the Secretary of Interior and
Police indicated in early December that he would make public and open
to public debate any contemplated reforms. In October the Attorney
General publicly agreed to more aggressive independent investigation of
extrajudicial killings. On December 7, the Supreme Court president
urged judges to apply the full weight of the law in cases of violations
of human rights.
Police courts may try police officers or may remand them to
civilian court jurisdiction. Military courts try military personnel
charged with extrajudicial killings or other crimes. Police Chief
Candelier announced that every time an officer is involved in a
questionable incident, the case goes to a commission of superior
officers for investigation. He said that if it is determined that the
police officer exceeded his authority, the case is sent to the police
courts or to the civilian courts, depending on the severity of the
offense. However, the police send very few--if any--cases to civilian
courts, despite requests from the former Attorney General, District
Attorney, and Justice Reform Commissioner. On September 4, six civil
society groups submitted an ``Act of Unconstitutionality'' to the
Supreme Court on the issue of the legality of Law 285, which
encompasses the Code of Police Justice. Civil society groups argue that
police courts violate the Constitution, and that they weaken the
separation and independence of governmental functions, as well as the
exclusivity of the judicial function in the administration of justice.
The lawsuit asks the Court to rule on the constitutionality of these
police tribunals; a decision was still pending at year's end.
State agents in prisons also committed extrajudicial killings. In
the Najayo Prison in San Cristobal, police custodians shot and killed
inmates Francisco Alberto Jaquez Brito, Manuel Sanchez Fermin, and
Rafael Taversal Alberto in August during an escape attempt. A
commission that included the Attorney General, the Chief of Police, and
the Director of Prisons concluded that police agents acted negligently
and in excess of their duties, and that the escapees could have been
subdued by other means. The prisoners had not yet breached the exterior
gates of the prison campus when they were shot and killed. The
commission recommended that the three police cadets be tried in a
police tribunal, and that three police supervisors be sanctioned with
days in prison and ``arrest without salary'' for failing to control
their subordinates and for failing to take an adequate count of
prisoners. Human rights groups called for civilian trials for those
responsible for the deaths of the prisoners.
There also were a number of deaths in prisons due to harsh
conditions and official negligence (see Section 1.c.).
In July 1999, the authorities arrested a general, a colonel, a
legal consultant, and various police officers in connection with the
deaths of three alleged delinquents in Moca. In a civilian video, the
police were shown handcuffing the three young men and placing them,
alive, in the back of a police pickup truck. When the truck arrived at
police headquarters, the three men were dead. A lower police tribunal
reportedly tried, convicted, and sentenced officers Cesar Ovando
Michell and Virgilio Severo Rodriguez to 2 years in prison, but a
Police Appeals Tribunal later absolved the officers. The first-instance
police tribunal discharged three other officers. In early November, the
Attorney General asked Police Chief Candelier for a detailed report on
the tribunal's proceedings, and said that he would investigate the
possibility of reopening the case on a procedural appeal to the Supreme
Court. Candelier said that he would not prevent such action; however,
as of year's end, the case had not yet been presented to the Supreme
Court.
In August a court sentenced Rafael Paredes de la Cruz, a former
cadet in the National Police to 15 years in prison for the 1998 killing
of Father Jose Antonio Tineo Nunez. The court found the other
defendant, Juan Bautista Caminero Mendoza, not guilty.
There was no progress reported in trials of police officers
detained for killing law student Franklin Bortolo Fabian Mejia in July
1998; for killing a suspected robber of a Santiago pharmacy, also in
July 1998; or for the triple homicide in November 1998 of three young
male victims who might have been killed because of their refusal to
share the proceeds of a recent robbery with the police.
In August a court in Santo Domingo released the verdict in the case
of the 1975 murder of journalist Orlando Martinez Howley, a critic of
the Balaguer administration. Retired General Joaquin Pou Castro, former
air force officer Mariano Cabrera Duran, and Luis Emilio de la Rosa
Beras admitted to the killing and a court sentenced each of them to the
maximum penalty of 30 years in prison. The court also awarded an
indemnity of $314,000 (5 million pesos) to Martinez's surviving
brothers. Lawyers for the sentenced defendants say that they plan to
appeal. Although several witnesses testified to the knowledge and
complicity of former President Balaguer in the murder, he was not
called to testify for health reasons.
In April violence at political rallies during the election campaign
resulted in two deaths and several injuries when PRD bodyguards fired
into the crowd at a political rally in Moca (see Section 3.)
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
There was little progress in the investigation into the case of
Narciso Gonzalez, a university professor and critic of the Balaguer
government who disappeared in May 1994. According to the former
District Attorney, there is not enough evidence to go to trial, and
existing evidence is contradictory. There was no action during the year
on the family's complaint to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and other
forms of physical abuse; however, security force personnel continue to
torture, beat, and otherwise physically abuse detainees and prisoners.
Lack of supervision, training, and accountability throughout the law
enforcement and corrections systems exacerbate the problem of physical
abuse. Human rights groups, the local press, and the President's
Commission to Support the Reform and Modernization of Justice (Justice
Reform Commission) reported regular and repeated occurrences of
physical abuse of detainees while in custody. There was a significant
increase in allegations of physical abuse and torture of minors in
police and military detention.
In June the Justice Reform Commission reported cases of torture and
abuse of at least nine minors in the police stations in Villas
Agricolas, Los Farallones, Villa Francisca, and Plan Piloto in the
national district. It cited numerous instances of beatings, sexual
abuse, asphyxiation with plastic bags to elicit confessions, and a
torture method called ``roasting the chicken'' in which the victim is
placed over hot coals and turned until confessing. After completing an
internal investigation, the National Police claimed that there were no
instances of torture or abuse, and that if force was used, it was
necessary to obtain the ``obedience'' of the minor. The Justice Reform
Commission criticized the police for failing to conduct an objective
investigation and for covering up serious abuses. As of September, the
district attorney for Santo Domingo had made two requests to the Chief
of Police that three officers be turned over for interrogation. Both of
these requests were denied. An investigative judge was appointed to the
cases, which were still pending in the Eighth Penal Court in Santo
Domingo at year's end.
In August judges of the Appeals Court for Children and Adolescents
in San Pedro de Macoris made public a set of allegations of similar
abuses committed against 19 minors in police stations in Juan Dolio and
Boca Chica, as well as in the General Pedro Santana public jail, which
is controlled by the army. One of the adolescent victims reported that
the police beat him to force him to say ``yes'' to their questions; in
the interrogation sessions, they hit him with the butts of their guns;
they made him kneel and two officers at once hit him in the ears and
kicked him; they hit him with a baton, and put him in a dark room where
they applied an electric current to his body. The child reported that
due to the marks these incidents left on his body, the police held him
for 8 days before transferring him to the judge. The law requires that
minor detainees be transferred to a judge within 24 hours. There is no
information available regarding any investigation into these alleged
abuses by the police or the military.
Homosexual and transvestite detainees report to gay rights
advocates that during detention the police have held them in a darkened
room and have given them the alternative of performing fellatio on
guards or being placed in a locked cell with the most dangerous
prisoners, where the detainees presumed that they would be raped,
beaten, or both. Other informants confirmed that the police use the
prospect of being locked in with the most dangerous prisoners as a
threat.
The National Coordinator for Human Rights cited the Department of
Homicide and Robbery Investigations and the DNCD for the persistent use
of torture to extract confessions from detainees. According to human
rights organizations, the method most often used is beating. After
several former detainees went to the press in 1999 with credible
reports that police interrogators had beaten them repeatedly, the Chief
of Police and Attorney General designated a commission to investigate.
The beatings allegedly took place during periods of detention of up to
15 days without arraignment before a judge (the Constitution permits
only 48 hours). The informants reported that the police repeatedly
awoke them during the night for questioning. Human rights advocates
have described another form of abuse that guards reportedly use against
prisoners in the Mexico section of San Pedro de Macoris Prison. Prison
officials use a punishment called ``the toaster'', where prisoners are
laid, shackled hand and foot, on a bed of hot asphalt for the entire
day and are beaten with a club if they scream. The army administers San
Pedro de Macoris prison.
The National District Prosecutor's office continued to place
lawyers in high-volume police stations and in several DNCD offices to
monitor the investigative process and to assure that detainees' rights
are respected (see Section 1.d.). Most of the affected PN and DNCD
investigators responded positively to this oversight, although some
DNCD personnel reportedly complained that their hands were being tied.
This initiative remains largely limited to the Santo Domingo
metropolitan area, with a lesser presence in Santiago. There is some
evidence that these assistant prosecutors at times acquiesce in
traditional police practices, rather than attempt to raise these
practices to constitutional standards. Less qualified prosecutors
assigned to the rest of the country have not assumed strong roles in
managing criminal investigations and ensuring the rights of suspects.
Human rights courses are offered in the training curriculums for
military and DNCD enlisted personnel and officers; however, the courses
are optional. In October the Armed Forces Secretary inaugurated the
Military Institute of Human Rights, located in Santiago.
Civilian prosecutors sometimes file charges against police and
military officials alleging torture, physical abuse, and related
crimes. A 1997 law provides penalties for torture and physical abuse,
including sentences of from 10 to 15 years in prison. However, until
recently these provisions were not known fully or applied by
prosecutors and judges. There have been repeated calls by human rights
groups as well as by the Justice Reform Commission for civilian trials
of officials charged with abuse and torture; however, most cases, if
tried at all, are sent to military or police tribunals.
Out of a police force of about 23,000 members, Police Chief
Candelier fired 84, disarmed 200, and sent 100 officers for retraining
during the first 6 months of the year as part of an effort to increase
respect for human rights and discipline within the police force. He
reported that many of the 84 were fired for drug use, including cocaine
and marijuana. However, some discharged officers later were rehired.
Significant problems also remain because serious efforts have not been
made to vet police recruits. Many persons with prior criminal records
reportedly have been incorporated into police ranks, either using false
names or identification or with recommendations from other state
institutions, such as the army.
The police at times forcibly dispersed demonstrators, using tear
gas and weapons (see Sections 2.b. and 6.b.).
Prison conditions range from poor to extremely harsh. Reports of
torture and mistreatment in prisons are common. The prisons are
seriously overcrowded, health and sanitary conditions are poor, and
some prisons are out of the control of the authorities. The General
Directorate of Prisons falls under the authority of the Public Ministry
and is seriously underfunded. Budget allocations for necessities such
as food, medicines, and transportation were lacking. Medical care in
all prisons suffers from a lack of supplies and available physicians.
Prisoners immobilized by and dying of AIDS are not transferred to a
hospital, but some terminal-stage inmates were released early to spend
their last days at home.
In 32 prisons around the country with a total capacity of 9,000
persons, the police and the military hold more than 15,000 prisoners
and detainees. The military controls 22 prisons with a total of 6,000
prisoners, and the National Police controls 10 prisons, with a total of
9,000 inmates. A warden is responsible for running each prison and
reports to the Attorney General through the Directorate of Prisons. A
police or military colonel (or lieutenant colonel), who is appointed
for 3 to 6 months only, reports to the warden and is responsible for
providing security. However, in practice the colonel is in charge of
the prison, and neither the Directorate of Prisons nor the individual
wardens have much power. According to credible reports, some prisons
are totally out of the control of the authorities. They are, in effect,
operated by armed inmates, who decide whether an individual gets food,
space to sleep, or medical care. Individual inmates only can secure a
tolerable level of existence by paying for it. Only those with
considerable personal or family resources can do so.
Conditions at La Victoria prison, which is run by the National
Police, pose a serious threat to life and health. In June this prison
held over 3,500 prisoners in a facility built for 1,000. In March there
was a serious fire at La Victoria in which 13 persons died, 44 suffered
burns, and 20 others were injured. Inmates alleged that guards refused
to open cell doors so that they could escape. At year's end, the
Director of Prisons reported that an investigation had been conducted,
and that those responsible were arrested and sent before a police
tribunal. However, there was no public information on the trial's
outcome.
The Barahona Commission for the Defense of Human Rights has
criticized the conditions in the Barahona prison, which has 22 beds,
but currently holds 586 inmates. In one cellblock, which has space for
32 persons, there are 145 inmates. The commission issued a report at
mid-year, in which it described 52 Haitians imprisoned there as
``practically kidnaped,'' and said that they have not been taken to
their hearings. The Commission reported that the bathroom facilities
amount to cesspools and that the authorities are indifferent to the
lack of hygiene; prisoners do not receive medicine or medical
attention, and many have tuberculosis and other diseases. They
allegedly receive only one meal on Saturdays and no meals on Sundays.
A government food program for the general public is used to provide
lunches at some prisons. The former Director of Prisons reported that
his office had the budget to spend $0.50 (8 pesos) per inmate to
provide three meals per day. Inmates surveyed said that the food
provided was unacceptable, and most chose to eat whatever they could
beg for or purchase from persons in the vicinity of the prison or from
family members. Due to inefficiency and corruption within the prison
system, visitors often have to bribe prison guards in order to visit
prisoners.
Female prisoners are separated from male inmates. In general,
conditions in the female prison wings are superior to those found in
male prison wings. There have been some reports of guards physically
and sexually abusing female inmates. Female inmates, unlike their male
counterparts, are prohibited from receiving conjugal visits. Those who
deliver while incarcerated are permitted to keep their babies with them
in prison until they reach 1 year of age.
In May in Rafey Prison in Santiago, guards beat six inmates with
aluminum and wooden bats as they bathed in the rain in a courtyard of
the prison. Two officials allegedly responsible for the beatings were
said to have been tried in a police tribunal; however, there was no
public information available about any investigation or trial.
The law requires that juveniles be detained separately from adults.
However, recent press reports found a high incidence of juveniles who
were detained with adult prisoners being forced into sexual servitude
in return for protection at prisons around the country. Najayo prison
has a new wing for juvenile offenders that holds 250 persons. Inmates
are not separated by crime within the prison population; however, they
may be put into solitary confinement for disturbances while
incarcerated.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors and by the press.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Constitution provides for the security of
the individual against imprisonment without legal process, bars
detention beyond 48 hours without the detainee being presented before
judicial authorities, and prohibits custodial authorities from not
presenting detainees when requested. It also provides for recourse to
habeas corpus proceedings to request the release of those unlawfully
held. However, the security forces continued to violate constitutional
provisions by detaining suspects for investigation or interrogation
beyond the prescribed 48-hour limit. The police traditionally detain
all suspects and witnesses in a crime and use the investigative process
to determine who are innocent and merit release, and who they should
continue to hold. After the prosecutor's office placed its lawyers in
several police stations in 1997, the police began to curtail the
practice of arbitrary detention in those precincts. However, progress
has been slow (see Section 1.c.), and this program has been limited for
the most part to the Santo Domingo metropolitan area. During the year,
no new prosecutors were placed in police stations, and the
effectiveness against human rights abuses of those working in police
stations cannot be discerned accurately.
The prosecutor for the Court of Appeals in Santiago reported that
the Department of Investigation of Homicide and Robbery of the National
Police, Northern Command, routinely detained persons beyond the 48-hour
limit. Detainees at police headquarters in Santo Domingo, known as
``the palace,'' reported that they were held for 15 to 21 days.
Juveniles held at the Department for Minors at the Villa Juana Police
Station commonly are held for 8 to 14 days, well beyond the 24-hour
limit for minors. The official in charge of the Department for Minors
attributes this to lack of swift action by the Juvenile Defender, the
Public Ministry official in charge of interrogating minors and sending
them before a Juvenile Court judge. By law juveniles may not be
interrogated by the police or in the presence of police.
The police continued the practice of making frequent sweeps or
roundups in low-income, high-crime communities in which they arrest and
detain individuals arbitrarily. The alleged objective of the roundups
is to fight delinquency. Following the indiscriminate arrests, the
police regularly detain individuals for up to 20 days or more, while
they look for a reason to charge them with a crime. For example, on
September 23-24, police arrested 900 persons around the country in 1
weekend with the objective of ``preventing the commission of crimes''
and ``maintaining order and peace.'' They also took possession of
property including motorcycles, other vehicles, and weapons. Human
rights organizations report that individuals detained in these roundups
frequently are beaten. The police say that they rely upon unlawful
detention without presentation to a court because some cases involve
more complicated investigations. However, there is a clear pattern of
the police arresting individuals before investigating a crime
thoroughly, and relying on confessions to make their case. Without the
education, training, or equipment to conduct modern forensic
investigations, police rely instead on holding suspects incommunicado
(see Section 1.e.), repeatedly questioning them, and sometimes beating
them, until they confess. Prosecutors who are assigned to monitor the
criminal investigation phase at police stations appear to be unable to
control the practice (see Section 1.c.).
A related problem is the police practice of arresting and detaining
individuals solely because of their familial or marital relationship to
a suspect. A suspect's parents, siblings, or spouse are all vulnerable
to this practice, the goal of which is to compel an at-large suspect to
give himself up or to coerce a confession from one already arrested. In
1999 the PN chief had ordered that this practice be ended immediately;
however, it continued. According to the Dominican Human Rights
Committee, there were several reports of detentions of suspects'
relatives during the year.
Local human rights organizations have reported on and criticized
police roundups of Haitian and Dominican-Haitian construction workers.
Officials allegedly take groups of dark-skinned or ``Haitian-looking''
individuals to empty buildings soon after they are paid, in order to
extort money from them. One worker reported that he was beaten
frequently, and that many of his paychecks were taken during these
roundups. He said that the license plates are removed from the official
police vehicles so that the perpetrators cannot be identified easily.
Many suspects suffer long pretrial detention. In November over 83
percent of the national prison population was awaiting trial, 11
percent higher than in 1999; of these, about three-quarters were
``prisoners without sentences,'' and the remainder had convictions
under appeal. However, while suspects nationwide still suffer long
pretrial detention, judicial statistics show reduced delays for the
last 3 years in the Santo Domingo National District (an area that
accounts for approximately 45 percent of all criminal cases in the
country). The average pretrial detention throughout the country is more
than 6 months.
Due to the historical inefficiency of the courts (see Section
1.e.), the granting of bail serves as the de facto criminal justice
system. As a rule, defendants awarded bail rarely face an actual trial.
(Time already served counts toward a sentence.) This situation improved
somewhat as a result of the steps taken by the former Santo Domingo
District Attorney and the judiciary, in cooperation with the Director
of Prisons, to introduce a prisoner registry system that focuses on
providing timely trials for prisoners. The failure of prison
authorities to produce the accused caused a significant percentage of
trial postponements. Authorities held some prisoners even though there
were no formal charges against them, and kept some prisoners jailed
even after a court ordered their release. One prisoner held in Najayo
Prison was charged with swindling over 4 years ago. The maximum penalty
for this crime is 3 years; however, the prisoner was never tried or
convicted. His case finally was dismissed in August. In October the
Attorney General proposed a program to reduce prison crowding by
releasing inmates who only were held pending payment of a fine. Large
numbers of prisoners are generally pardoned at the end of the year. In
early December, prison authorities paroled 80 elderly (75 years or
older) persons, 90 terminally ill prisoners, and 150 inmates who have
finished sentences, but cannot pay their fines.
Notable advances also were made by the new Mejia administration to
increase the availability of free legal services to the poor. Most
detainees and prisoners cannot afford adequate defense services. There
were 12 new public defenders added, bringing the total to 31 throughout
the country. A bill to create a national public defender program was
pending in Congress at year's end.
Hoguisten Canji, a 33-year-old Haitian, spent 9 years in prison
without an official charge and without ever being presented to a
judicial officer. His case finally came to the attention of the Public
Defender Program, which ultimately obtained his release on January 14
on a writ of habeas corpus. His attorney noted that there was no
official file on the case, no name of the person that he allegedly
murdered in 1991, and no order for preventive detention. A Public
Defender Program attorney also defended Hector Manuel Reyes, who spent
17 years behind bars for a murder for which he had never been
convicted. The authorities had lost his case file. Reyes was released
on March 20. Officials acknowledge that there may be hundreds of such
cases in the prison system.
The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its
use. However, persons who credibly asserted that they were citizens
sometimes were expelled to Haiti (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, attempts by public and private
entities, including the executive branch, to undermine judicial
independence still remain. The judiciary appears better equipped to
resist such outside interference, due in part to training funded by
foreign technical assistance. Court officials also began to implement
new selection criteria for judges. The National Judiciary Council
chooses members of the Supreme Court, with the goal of ensuring
independence from the executive and legislative branches, and some
progess has been made.
The judiciary, based primarily on the Napoleonic Code, includes a
16-member Supreme Court, appeals courts, courts of first instance, and
justices of the peace. There are also specialized courts that handle
administrative, labor, land, and juvenile matters.
Military or police courts have jurisdiction over members of the
security forces. However, civil society groups challenged this system
in a Supreme Court case filed in August (see Section 1.a.). Public
pressure exists for military or police boards to remand cases involving
serious crimes to civilian courts for review; however, there is no
information that any such cases were remanded during the year. In other
cases, civil authorities have requested that the PN turn over their
files so that cases of suspected extrajudicial killings might be
evaluated independently for possible prosecution. There was little
cooperation from the National Police or military in requested
investigations during the year (see Section 1.c.).
Judges, rather than juries, render all verdicts. Under the 1994
constitutional amendments, which entered into force in August 1998, the
Supreme Court is responsible for naming all lower-court judges in
accordance with a judicial career law. The National Judiciary Council
selects new justices of the Supreme Court. The Council consists of the
President, the President of the Senate, the President of the Chamber of
Deputies, two at-large members designated by them (one Senator and one
Deputy, from parties different than those of the presidents of the
Senate and Chamber), the President of the Supreme Court, and one other
justice designated by the Supreme Court.
Following the commission of a crime, the criminal process begins
with the arrest of possible suspects. During the investigative phase,
suspects are questioned repeatedly and urged to confess. The
Constitution provides for the right not to be arrested without judicial
warrant except in cases where the suspect is caught in the act; the
right not to be deprived of liberty without trial or legal formalities,
or for reasons other than those provided by law; the right to be
presented to a competent judicial authority within 48 hours of one's
detention; the right not to be a witness against oneself; and the right
to a defense in an impartial and public trial. These rights commonly
are disregarded.
The most serious and common violation of these rights occurs when
police detain suspects, sometimes for many days, without giving them
access to a telephone call to family while subjecting them to frequent
questioning. Although accused persons are entitled to have an attorney
present, they often are not permitted to call one or, if one arrives,
the attorney is not permitted to be present during the questioning.
(The police complain that the presence of attorneys interferes with
their investigations.) Torture frequently is used as a method to
extract a confession during questioning (see Section 1.c.). Under these
circumstances, suspects may confess to acts that they did not commit
merely to get relief from the intense questioning and the detention.
The results of these interrogations frequently form the only evidence
presented at the trial.
The law provides for the remedy of ``Amparo,'' an action any
citizen may bring for violation of a constitutional right, in
accordance with the terms of the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights. This action includes violations by judicial officials. The
process of dispute resolution, including reconciliation, mediation, and
arbitration, continues to be used as an alternative to trial and
incarceration.
There remains a large backlog of criminal cases in the National
District and throughout the country. The Supreme Court's plan to unclog
the court dockets has been frustrated by the Government's failure to
allocate sufficient funds. Dockets are crowded with traffic infractions
that should be heard in the traffic courts provided for by statute; due
to a lack of funds, the traffic courts have not been set up. Other
complications in clearing the backlog arise from the exhaustion of
funds for transporting prisoners to court; many cases must be sent back
when the accused does not appear. The Government has not yet
established 25 additional courts provided for by law.
Throughout the year, there were improvements in the administration
of justice that resulted from cooperation between the judiciary and the
Santo Domingo district attorney's office. New cases unnecessarily
congesting the criminal system were reduced by more than 50 percent
through use of community conciliation centers, and investigative judge
rulings increased by 65 percent in the last 2 years. The courts'
efforts to improve productivity of judges was notable: the number of
definitive (final) sentences quadrupled over the past 3 years and time
to trial was reduced from an average of 11.8 to 6.5 months. It is not
yet clear how the change of 90 percent of Public Ministry officials in
August will affect the changes introduced by the previous
administration.
The judicial training school trained 530 judges (out of a total of
585) on drafting and structuring sentences in its first cycle. The
school prepared a computer seminar on fundamental constitutional
protections with four modules for judges on human rights. In October it
held a seminar on domestic violence and a seminar on judicial ethics
for 200 judges. A dialog among 500 judicial and civil society
representatives created a judicial code of ethics.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution contains provisions against arbitrary
entrance of one's home; however, police sometimes break into private
quarters without cause to search for suspects, and the authorities
infringe on citizens' privacy rights in other ways as well. Although
the Government denies arbitrary use of wiretapping or other
surreptitious methods to interfere with the private lives of persons or
families, it has not taken necessary steps to dismantle an active
private wiretapping industry.
The law permits the arrest of a suspect caught in the act of
committing a crime, and police may enter a residence or business in
pursuit of such suspects. Otherwise judges must authorize arrests and
issue search warrants. However, the PN and occasionally the DNCD
continued to violate these requirements. Some prosecutors confessed
that out of ``tactical necessity to combat criminality'' and ``with
great reluctance,'' they tolerated the illegal search practices. They
justified their actions by arguing that the Government has not provided
sufficient resources or attention to criminal investigation and that,
given the cumbersome and antiquated criminal procedures, adhering to
the letter of the law would make law enforcement nearly impossible.
The Dominican Human Rights Committee reported that police carried
out raids on private homes in the Santo Domingo neighborhoods of
Caputillo, Villa Agricola, Los Alcarrizos, and Guachupita; police
allegedly went into homes without search warrants to look for
delinquents.
The police continued to detain relatives and friends of suspects to
try to compel suspects to surrender or to confess (see Section 1.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these
freedoms, and the Government generally respected them in practice;
however, there were some isolated exceptions. For example, there were
isolated instances of government pressure on editors not to publish
certain unfavorable items, such as negative poll results.
Citizens of all political persuasions exercise freedom of speech.
Newspapers and magazines freely present a diversity of opinion and
criticism; there are eight daily and seven weekly newspapers, and three
weekly magazines. However, journalists and editors practice self-
censorship, particularly when coverage could adversely affect the
economic or political interests of media owners.
The National Press Union criticized police treatment of journalist
and union secretary Paul Meguis Jose in April. Jose was following a
story in Batey Central in Barahona when a police officer shoved him,
threw his camera on the ground, and then confiscated it. A police
tribunal found the official guilty of an infraction, and ordered that
he serve 10 days in prison. In San Francisco de Macoris, police smashed
the camera of La Nacion newspaper reporter Julio Benzant. DNI agents
arrested and mistreated Jose Rivas, a reporter for the daily newspaper
Hoy, during his coverage of the return of Mario Duran Cabrera, one of
the defendants in the Orlando Martinez case (see Section 1.a.). The
Dominican Human Rights Committee criticized the detention of journalist
Robert Vargas, of the Spanish news agency (EFE), and the unlawful
search of his residence carried out by police as an attempt to
intimidate him for his reporting on human rights issues.
Numerous privately owned radio and television stations broadcast
all political points of view. The Government controls one television
station.
In September the National Press Union criticized the violation of
freedom of expression by the director of the government-owned Dominican
Radio and Television for canceling an FM radio program. The director of
the station arrived with a group of military officers to interrupt the
broadcast and said that the program served as a forum to criticize the
Government of President Mejia. The union complained that this
cancellation occurred only days after installation of the new
Government and asserted that the station director should have discussed
the program with its producers if he disagreed with its content.
In November the National Press Union reported that PRD leaders,
including one from the Secretariat of Youth and another from the
National Lottery, beat a journalist in Hato Mayo, who broadcast a radio
program critical of the PRD. In the same month, in Moca, a provincial
official of the Secretariat of Education punched a correspondent of the
daily newspaper El Nacional when he asked the official about problems
with the national school lunch program. Also in November, a
correspondent from the El Siglo newspaper was sued for slander and
detained for 2 days after he denounced the cutting of trees ordered by
the vice mayor of Constanza. The charges later were dropped.
Public and private universities enjoy broad academic freedom. The
main public university, the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo,
with approximately 100,000 mostly part-time students, has few
restrictions on enrollment and maintains a policy of nonintervention
(other than on curriculum development) in classroom affairs. The
Government exerts no control over private universities, except for the
preservation of standards, and teachers are free to espouse their own
theories without government oversight.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and the Government generally respects
this right in practice; however, there were some exceptions, and the
Government at times restricted this right. Outdoor public marches and
meetings require permits, which the Government usually grants; however,
the police used force to break up demonstrations on several occasions
throughout the year. The Government responded with force to disperse
demonstrators calling for completion of public works projects, opposing
evictions, or supporting a strike. During transportation strikes in the
first 4 months of the year, police used force to disperse union
members; others were arrested and detained without charges for several
days.
The police used force to disperse demonstrators. News reports and
human rights organizations criticized the manner in which police used
force to disperse demonstrators in Batey 5 in Barahona in mid-year.
Protesters gathered to call for compliance with a promise to finish
installation of electricity made 4 years ago by the governor of the
province. There were reports that police indiscriminately launched tear
gas into homes; several children had to be taken to hospitals due to
the effects of the gas. According to the Dominican Human Rights
Committee, the police on several other occasions used force to remove
squatters from Punta Villa Mella, Valiente, La Toronja, and Vallo
Lindo, state-owned lands near the national district (Santo Domingo and
environs).
In a December interview with the newspaper Hoy, the Secretary of
Interior and Police admitted that the police committed abuses when
responding to several public marches and demonstrations in late
November. These protests were largely in response to the Government's
package of economic proposals. On November 16, a police lieutenant and
four others were wounded by bullets and rocks in the confrontation
between high school students and police in the town of Licey. National
news media reported that the police repelled the students with tear
gas. Student leaders told reporters that the police came into the
school and arrested and beat several students. The police have promised
an investigation into the protests.
On November 24, former President Leonel Fernandez and numerous
other PLD leaders were involved in confrontations with the police when
the PLD officials marched to the offices of the Public Ministry to
protest the arrest of four high-level PLD members on corruption
charges. The police used tear gas against the marchers and prevented
Fernandez from entering the building. He and several others were
overcome by the gas and taken to nearby hospitals.
On November 29, the ``black helmet'' unit of the police interrupted
a march to the National Palace by groups of student, chauffeur, and
social organizations who were also protesting the economic reform
package. Police repelled demonstrators with tear gas and rubber bullets
and detained more than 170 demonstrators. Organizers of the
demonstration, including Human Rights Committee president Virgilio
Almanzar, claimed that the police denied their right to freedom of
assembly.
There were no reports of the use of the criminal charge
``association with criminal elements'' to stifle political dissent this
year. Under former President Balaguer, the authorities traditionally
used this charge against dissidents and those involved in street
demonstrations against the Government.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. Political parties
frequently affiliate with their foreign counterpart organizations.
Professional organizations of lawyers, doctors, teachers, and others
function freely and can maintain relationships with counterpart
organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination
on religious grounds, and many religions and denominations are active.
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice.
The Catholic Church, which signed a concordat with the Government
in 1954, enjoys special privileges not extended to other religions.
These include the use of public funds to underwrite some church
expenses, such as rehabilitation of church facilities, and a complete
waiver of customs duties when importing goods into the country. The
attendance at Catholic Mass for members of the National Police is
compulsory.
In July then-President Fernandez signed a law making Bible reading
in public schools obligatory. This new law added Bible reading to the
weekly flag raising and singing of the national anthem in public
schools. Private schools are not obliged to include Bible reading as
part of their weekly activities.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
travel, except for limitations imposed under judicial sentence, or
police regulations for immigration and health reasons, and the
Government generally respects these provisions in practice; however,
there were some exceptions. Citizens face no unusual legal restrictions
on travel within or outside the country. Local and international human
rights groups cited discrimination against Haitian migrants, whom they
said were subject to arbitrary and unilateral action by the
authorities.
Haitians continue to migrate in great numbers to the Dominican
Republic, some legally but most without legal documents, in search of
economic opportunity. Some illegal migration is assisted or sanctioned
indirectly by the authorities, especially by police and military in the
border areas, who profit from the illegal traffic. Throughout the year,
the security forces, particularly the army, repatriated undocumented
Haitian nationals believed to be in the country illegally. In December
the Directorate of Migration reported that 12,500 Haitians were
repatriated during the year; however, a later report issued by the
armed forces stated that they had deported 36,362 Haitians between
August 16 and the end of the year.
In many cases, the Government denied those deported the opportunity
to demonstrate that they were legal residents in the country or to make
arrangements for their families or property. Haitian Government
officials complained that Haitians often were detained with little or
no food and then deported without timely notice to the Haitian
authorities. Human rights organizations and the media continued to
report many instances of violent treatment of Haitian migrants by the
authorities.
On July 18, in Guayabin, on the northern border with Haiti,
military agents shot and killed 6 Haitians and 1 Dominican citizen and
wounded 13 others after they crossed the border illegally in a truck.
The truck had sped through several military checkpoints, and members of
the military pursued it until it crashed. Controversy exists as to
whether the military personnel knew that the truck was filled with
immigrants when they fired at it. A Commission with members from Haiti
and the Dominican Republic was established to investigate the incident.
The officers reportedly were tried in a military court, given letters
of reprimand, and returned to military service.
On August 13, a 30-year-old Haitian died after he was taken into
custody by soldiers in La Canada, near Hondo Valle, a border town.
According to newspaper reports, he entered the country illegally and
was detained along with two other illegal migrants; soldiers allegedly
beat him to death. The Commander of the Third Brigade of the army
arrested the soldiers involved in the homicide and promised a quick
investigation.
On November 7, soldiers in the Department of Border Investigation
Operations shot and killed a Haitian under questionable circumstances
at the Elias Pina border crossing point. Investigations of killings of
civilians at the hands of military, similar to killings at the hands of
police, lack transparency. At year's end, there was no information
about an investigation into this case.
On March 6, the IACHR held a hearing in two 1997 cases of two
Dominican-born children who have been denied birth registrations. The
mothers of both children are Dominican citizens of Haitian descent. The
law in question is Law 6-59 on Civil Records, and the legal issue in
the case is the denial of the right to register a late declaration of
birth. The cases were still pending at year's end.
On August 8, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights heard a case
presented by the Dominican Center for Justice and International Law
(CEJIL), Dominicans 2000, Human Rights Watch, the International Human
Rights Law Clinic, and other international human rights organizations,
alleging that massive expulsions, repatriations, and deportations of
Haitians and Dominican-Haitians by the Government violated
international human rights law. The Inter-American Court considered
general concerns about ``mass expulsions'' and ``forced repatriations''
carried out by the Ministry of Interior and Police, as well as nine
individual cases of persons who allegedly were expelled forcibly
without opportunity for due process. The Court did not address the case
of the six Haitians killed in Guayabin.
On August 18, the Court rendered its decision, laying out
``provisional measures'' for the future treatment of Haitians, and
specific relief and protection of the nine individuals. It did not
require immediate broad-based accountability of the migration
authorities for enforcement of border agreements reached with Haiti in
December 1999. These agreements set out a systematized deportation
procedure in which Haitian authorities would be advised of potential
deportations, deportees would be given opportunities for legal hearings
(to present proof of legal status in the country), as well as
opportunities to advise family members and collect belongings. Rather,
the Court requested that the Government provide more detailed
information about the condition of individuals in the border
``bateyes'' (shantytowns) who potentially are subject to forced
expulsions. It also asked for a government report every 2 months on
provisional measures that are expected be adopted to comply with the
Court's decision.
The ongoing process of repatriating Haitian citizens did not
diminish after the Court's decision in August. NGO representatives
working in rural areas reported that decisions to deport often were
made by lower ranking members of the security forces, sometimes based
upon the racial characteristics of the deportees. The Director of
Migration stated that the process of rounding up illegal Haitians is
performed by the rank and file of the armed forces and migration
officers. They approach persons who look like Haitians, including
persons who have very dark complexions and fairly poor clothing. They
engage them in conversation about their work and residence, mainly to
check their use of Spanish and any accent they may have. If such
persons speak Spanish poorly or with a noticeable accent, they
generally are detained and deported.
The Haitian Government protested the failure to give detainees an
opportunity for a hearing on their claim of citizenship or right to
residence, although it acknowledges the Government's right to deport
those individuals who are illegal aliens. NGO's and Catholic priests
familiar with the process also have protested that children born of one
or two Haitian parents in the Dominican Republic, heretofore denied
registration as Dominican citizens, frequently are among those deported
as illegal Haitians.
While the Government has a policy of strictly enforcing documentary
requirements and repatriation for those found lacking, it appears to
have an unofficial policy that is more tolerant, which is fueled by the
reality of dependence on Haitian labor for certain agricultural and
construction work. Thus, after being stopped as a suspected illegal
Haitian migrant, an individual may be allowed to remain in the country
despite his lack of documents if his story about work satisfies the
official who stopped him. NGO's have reported corruption among the
military and migration border officials, and noted that these officials
sometimes cooperate with the transit of Haitian workers into the
country. However, in December the Director of Migration reported that
the need for Haitian labor is generally filled by Haitian migrants
already in the country.
According to a 1984 presidential decree, an applicant for refugee
status must be referred to the Technical Subcommittee of the National
Commission for Refugees by the National Office of Refugee Affairs. The
Subcommittee, which makes a recommendation to the Commission, is made
up of members from the Foreign Ministry, the DNI, and the Immigration
Directorate. The Commission, which makes a final decision on the
application, consists of the three members of the Subcommittee; the
legal advisor to the President; and members of the PN, the Ministry of
Labor, and the Attorney General's office. There is no functioning
National Office of Refugee Affairs, and the National Commission for
Refugees, an office of the Foreign Ministry, has not met since 1993.
However, the Subcommittee makes recommendations, and the Immigration
Directorate issues documentation to refugees certified as such by the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While these documents are
accepted routinely by the police and immigration officials, the process
by which they are issued does not comply with the decree. During the
year, 43 refugee applications (30 of which were from Haitians) were
submitted. Of those, the UNHCR recognized 14 and refused 5; 17 were
pending and 5 were abandoned. There were no reports of repatriation or
refoulement of persons claiming refugee status.
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first
asylum and resettlement. There were several cases in which the
Government offered political asylum to refugees and their families
fleeing war-torn countries.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully through periodic elections. Citizens exercised
this right in free and fair presidential elections in May. Voters gave
the PRD 49.87 percent of the vote, while the DLP received 24.94
percent, and the Social Christian Reform Party (PRSC) received 24.6
percent of the vote. The Constitution requires 50 percent plus one vote
for a candidate to be elected to the presidency; however, if the
second-place candidate concedes, as happened in May, the Central
Electoral Board (JCE) may declare the first-place candidate the winner
without a second round of elections.
The President and all 179 members of the Senate and the Chamber of
Deputies are elected freely every 4 years by secret ballot. There is
universal adult suffrage; however, active duty police and military
personnel may not vote. In practice, voting is limited to those persons
who can show a national identity document, which requires that their
births were registered properly by their parents.
There was a significant controversy about the ability of the JCE to
issue new national identity cards to the voting population prior to the
May elections, and there were serious allegations by the PRD that the
PLD intentionally was sabotaging its supporters' ability to vote.
Ultimately, the Board was able to issue cards to most voters who
applied for them. However, there were numerous reports, including
allegations by supporters of the PRD, that identity cards were being
taken or ``bought'' from dark-skinned individuals so that they would
not exercise their right to vote.
Election campaigning was relatively peaceful, although there were
isolated instances of violence. On April 29, two PLD activists were
killed in Moca during a PRD campaign rally. PLD members claimed that
PRD supporters shot into a group of PLD flag wavers. In contrast, PRD
supporters argued that PLD opposition members were trying to ``ambush''
their presidential candidate's motorcade. There was also political
violence in San Pedro de Macoris at the end of April in which a vice
mayor and secretary general of the PRD were wounded by gunfire when
their party was carrying out a medical mission in one of the
neighborhoods. During the August 16 election, an argument between
political rivals reportedly led to the fatal shooting of an
unidentified man in San Juan de la Maguana.
The nation has a functioning multiparty system. Opposition groups
of the left, right, and center operate openly. The President often
dominates public policy formulation and implementation. He can exercise
his authority through the use of the veto, discretion to act by decree,
and influence as the leader of his party. Traditionally, the President
has predominant power in the Government, effectively making many
important decisions by decree. Former President Fernandez reduced the
reliance on rule by decree during his administration. The President
appoints the governors of the 29 provinces.
Congress provides an open forum for the free exchange of views and
debate. The main opposition party is the PLD, which holds 4 of 30 seats
in the upper house and 49 of 149 seats in the lower house. A third
major party, the PRSC of former President Balaguer, contests all
elections; various smaller parties are certified to contest provincial
and national elections.
The JCE conducts all elections. In April 1999, the leading
political parties agreed that the Congress should approve legislation
expanding the JCE from five to seven members until after the May
presidential elections. The PLD and the PRSC each nominated one new
member to join the board.
There were no reports of disturbances surrounding the Dominican
Municipal League (LMD). It functioned normally, albeit with diminished
legitimacy, due to the exclusion of PRD candidates from the 1999
election for LMD president.
Women and minorities confront no serious legal impediments to
political participation; however, they are underrepresented in
government and politics. By law parties must reserve 33 percent of
positions on voting lists for women; a proportion that is to increase
to 40 percent in 2002. However, the parties often place women so low on
the lists as to make their election difficult or impossible. With the
election of former Senator Milagros Ortiz-Bosch to the vice-presidency,
there is only 1 woman in the 30-member Senate; women hold 24 seats in
the 149-member Chamber of Deputies. Women continue to be represented in
appointed positions, albeit to a limited degree. The President of the
Chamber of Deputies is a woman, as are two cabinet secretaries. Women
fill 5 of the 15 seats on the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Nongovernmental human rights organizations generally operate freely
without government interference. In addition to the Dominican Human
Rights Committee, the National Human Rights Commission, and the
nongovernmental Truth Commission (dealing with the Narciso Gonzalez
case), several Haitian, church, women's, and labor groups exist.
The Government established the Reform Commissions for the police
and armed forces in the latter part of the year, and allowed limited
civil society or NGO representation. The most credible human rights and
civil society organizations are not represented. At year's end, there
was no public information available nor discussion in civil society
about the objectives of the two reform commissions.
There is no ombudsman's office. However, at year's end, legislation
was pending in Congress to create a human rights ombudsman's office as
well as a special prosecutor for human rights abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on race and sex; however,
such discrimination exists, the Government seldom acknowledges its
existence or makes efforts to combat it.
Women.--Domestic violence is widespread. Under the 1997 Law Against
Domestic Violence, the State can prosecute for rape, incest, sexual
aggression, and other forms of domestic violence. Penalties for these
crimes range from one year to 30 years in prison, and have fines
ranging from $30 to $6,000 (500 to 100,000 pesos). The State can
prosecute a suspect for rape even if the victim does not file charges.
This law also allows a rape victim to press charges against her husband
without having her marriage annulled. The Secretariat of Women, as well
as various NGO's, have outreach programs on domestic violence and legal
rights. In 1998 the Government opened a center in Villa Juana (National
District) for the legal support and forensic examination of abused
women, which handled 35 to 50 cases per day in its first year. Since
its opening, it has handled over 7,000 cases and now averages 60 to 90
cases per day. Due to the success of this first center, the Government
opened two additional centers during the year in San Francisco de
Macoris and Santiago. The Ministry of Women has begun a project, in
coordination with a local NGO, to open a fourth Services Center for
Victims of Domestic Violence in San Cristobal. At year's end, there
were still no shelters for battered women.
Rape is a serious problem and is believed to be widely
underreported. From January through October, the Santo Domingo district
attorney's office received only 203 reports of rape in the National
District. The penalties for committing rape are 10 to 15 years in
prison and a fine of $6,097 to $12,195 (100,000 to 200,000 pesos).
Victims often do not report cases of rape because of fear of social
stigma, as well as the perception that the police and the judiciary
would fail to provide redress. The police are reluctant to handle rape
cases and often encourage victims to seek assistance from NGO's.
Sexual harassment is widespread.
Prostitution is illegal; however, the Government does not enforce
vigorously prostitution laws, except in cases involving child
prostitution and international trafficking in women and girls, which is
a serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Sex tourism is a
growing industry throughout the country as the number of international
visitors increases. NGO's have ongoing HIV/AIDS and sexually
transmitted disease prevention programs for male and female
prostitutes, as well as for hotel and industrial zone workers. The 1997
Domestic Violence Law prohibits acting as an intermediary in a
transaction of prostitution, and the Government has used the law to
prosecute third parties that derive profit from prostitution.
Divorce is easily obtainable by either spouse, and women can hold
property in their own names apart from their husbands. Traditionally,
women have not shared equal social and economic status or opportunity
with men, and men hold the majority of leadership positions in all
sectors. In many instances women are paid less than men in jobs of
equal content and equal skill level. Some employers reportedly give
pregnancy tests to women before hiring them, as part of a required
medical examination. Union leaders and human rights advocates report
that pregnant women often are not hired.
Children.--Despite the existence of government institutions
dedicated to child welfare, private social and religious organizations
carry the principal burden. The Oversight Organization for the
Protection of Children, created by the executive branch, is the primary
government institution covering issues of child welfare. Private
institutions receive 35 to 40 percent of the budget of the Oversight
Organization. The Mejia administration created a new Ministry of Youth
soon after the election.
The 1994 Minor's Code requires 8 years of formal education. The
Oversight Organization works with NGO's, law enforcement personnel, and
the general public to publicize children's rights. In the National
District, the Department of Family and Children, in the Office of the
Prosecutor, administers the Minor's Code and arranges conciliation of
family conflicts to execute court decisions with respect to child
protection, and to interview children whose rights have been violated.
Abuse, including physical, sexual, and psychological, is the most
serious human rights violation affecting children. The Department of
Family and Children estimates that 50 percent of the children in the
country are victims of some sort of abuse. No statistics were available
from the National Police's Department of Sexual Abuse regarding rapes
of children between 4 and 11 years of age, and few such cases reached
the courts. In 50 percent of the cases, the accused is a person close
to the child: a father, grandfather, uncle, brother, cousin, or close
family friend. The criminal law provision on sexual abuse and
intrafamily violence provides for a penalty of 10 to 20 years
incarceration and a fine of $6,600 to $13,200 (108,000 to 216,000
pesos) for persons found guilty of sexual abuse of a minor, and up to
30 years if the victim is a family member of the abuser.
Typical cases of child abuse include that of a 4-month-old child
whose arm and rib were broken by his parents. The child was separated
from his parents and sent to a shelter until the parents completed
required counseling and psychological treatment. An 8-year-old child's
father burned his child's hand after the child was caught stealing.
There also have been reports of children being left tied up and without
food in their homes while their parents go to work. The law prohibits
the press from reporting on all cases of child abuse, which results in
a diminished public perception of it.
The Minor's Code contains provisions against child abuse, including
physical and emotional mistreatment, sexual exploitation, and child
labor. It also provides for removal of a mistreated child to a
protective environment. According to local monitors, instances of child
abuse were underreported because of traditional beliefs that family
problems should be dealt with inside the family. However, child abuse
is receiving increasing public attention.
The Ministry of Health gave conservative estimates that, from
January through October, there were 887 deliveries by female
adolescents under age 15, and 15,491 deliveries by adolescents between
the ages of 15 and 19. This information is preliminary and conservative
in light of 1999 statistics, which estimated deliveries by adolescents
below age 15 at 1,529, and by adolescents from 15 to 19 at 33,332 for
that full year. Many of these pregnancies were reported to be the
result of rape or incest and often are accompanied by sexually
transmitted diseases.
Some in the tourist industry have facilitated the sexual
exploitation of children; particular areas of concern are Boca Chica
and Puerto Plata. Tours are marketed by foreigners overseas with the
understanding that boys and girls can be found as sex partners.
According to an official in the District Attorney's Office, the
Association of Hotels has asked to participate in government
initiatives to combat the exploitation of children in the tourist
industry. Journalists reported that the majority of prostitutes in
brothels visited around the National District appeared to be between 16
and 18 years of age. There are several church-run shelters that provide
refuge to children who break free from the prostitution trade.
Prostitution is the principal area of exploitation of underage girls in
the informal economy. The Oversight Organization carried out community
information campaigns on children's rights, including the prevention of
child abuse, child labor, and family violence. It also provided
training to persons and groups providing social services to children,
judicial officials, and other children's advocates.
Poor adolescent girls and boys sometimes are enticed into
performing sexual acts by the promise of food or clothing; sometimes
they are forced into unsafe relationships with strangers by the need
for money. Once involved, they may be held against their will by
individuals who sell their sexual favors to others. Some of these
minors are lured from their parental homes; others are already on the
street.
Trafficking in girls is a serious problem (see Section 6.c. and
6.f.).
The judicial system sometimes fails to protect the status of minors
in criminal cases. The authorities sometimes treated minors as adults--
most often when physical forensic examinations indicated that the
person claiming to be minors were probably adults--and incarcerated
them in prison rather than juvenile detention centers. In 1997 the
Government began implementing the 1994 Minor's Code, laying the
groundwork for a juvenile court system. The Supreme Court inaugurated
the first of 11 juvenile courts in August 1999 and chose judges for the
other 10 courts, some of which were functioning by year's end. Although
these juvenile courts are organized with a focus on rehabilitating
offenders, very few social services are available for minors. In
practice, juveniles are detained in excess of the time permitted by
law, and then are sent to jail rather than referred for rehabilitative
services. There are legal advocates especially for juveniles in Santo
Domingo and La Vega to provide them with representation in delinquency
cases.
Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.). It is not uncommon for
minors to be put on the street to fend for themselves as younger
siblings claim the parent's meager resources. Homeless children called
``palomas'' (doves) are frequently at the mercy of adults who collect
them and put them to work begging and selling fruit, flowers, and other
goods on the street. In return for their work they are given basic
housing. The ages at which these children work, the hours they put in,
and their failure to comply with compulsory school attendance all
violate the law, but the Government has not been able to combat this
practice.
People with Disabilities.--Disabled persons encounter
discrimination in employment and in the provision of other services.
Although the law provides for physical access for the disabled to all
new public and private buildings, the authorities have not enforced
this law uniformly. There is a Subsecretariat for Rehabilitation under
the Ministry of Public Health, a recreation center for the disabled in
Las Caobas, and a department in the Sports Ministry to facilitate
athletic competition for the disabled. However, there is little
consciousness of the need to make the daily lives of the disabled safer
and more convenient. For example, new street construction makes few
provisions for the disabled to cross the streets safely.
The Dominican Rehabilitation Association (ADR) has grown from a 1-
room operation to a large complex with 17 affiliates throughout the
country. It provides services for 2,500 persons daily. The Government
provides about 30 percent of the ADR's budget. The Government also
distributed 25,000 wheelchairs donated by a foreign athletic team.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A strong prejudice against
Haitians runs through society and disadvantages many Haitians and
Dominicans of Haitian ancestry, as well as other foreigners of African
descent. The Government has not acknowledged the existence of this
discrimination nor made any efforts to combat it. Darker-skinned
Dominicans also face informal barriers to social and economic
advancement.
Efforts to stem the influx of Haitian immigrants have made it more
difficult for those Haitians already in the country to live peacefully.
Police regulations threaten those offering transportation to illegal
immigrants with confiscation of their vehicles, and have discouraged
taxi and bus drivers from picking up dark-skinned persons. In roundups
of illegal immigrants, authorities pick up and expel darker Dominicans
as well as legal Haitian residents.
Perhaps 500,000 Haitian immigrants--or 7 percent of the country's
population--live in shantytowns or sugar cane work camps, in harsh
conditions with limited or no electricity, running water, or schooling.
There are estimates that as many as 1 million Haitians live in the
country. Human rights groups regularly charge the Government with
unlawful deportations of, and police brutality toward, these legal and
illegal immigrants (see Sections 1.d and 2.d.).
Credible sources also charge that the Government refuses to
recognize and document as Dominican citizens many individuals of
Haitian ancestry born in the country. Since many Haitian parents have
never possessed documentation for their own birth, they are unable to
demonstrate their own citizenship. As a result, they cannot declare
their children's births at the civil registry and thereby establish
Dominican citizenship for their offspring. Some civil registry offices
do not accept late declarations of birth for children of Haitian
immigrants, although they routinely accept late declarations for
children of Dominican parents.
Haitian parents encounter difficulties registering their children
for school. Lack of documentation usually deprives children of Haitian
descent of the opportunity to attend school where there is one
available. Some parents fail to seek documentation due to fear of being
deported. It falls to the discretion of public school principals
whether children may attend, when immigrant parents have no identity
cards or birth certificates to register children formally. Even when
permitted to attend primary school, it is rare that the children of
Haitian parents progress beyond sixth grade.
Sometimes poor Haitian families arrange for Dominican families to
``adopt'' and employ their children. The adopting parents can simply
register a child of any age as their own. In exchange, the parents
receive monetary payment or a supply of clothes and food. They believe
that this ensures their children a more promising future. In many
cases, adoptive parents do not treat the adoptees as full family
members and expect them to work in the households or family businesses
rather than attend school. The effect is a kind of indentured
servitude, at least until the young person reaches majority (see
Section 6.c.). There were reports that Haitian girls between the ages
of 10 and 14 were the most sought after, especially in border areas.
The Government is doing little to improve the conditions of Haitian
immigrants. Most social services in shantytowns are provided by NGO's
and other relief organizations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
freedom to organize labor unions and for the right of workers to strike
(and for private sector employers to lock out workers), and workers in
all sectors exercise this right. All workers, except the military and
the police, are free to organize. Organized labor represents an
estimated 10 percent of the work force and is divided among four major
confederations and a number of independent unions. There are
approximately 190 registered unions in the country. The 1992 Labor Code
provides extensive protection for worker rights and specifies the steps
legally required to establish a union, federation, or confederation.
The Code calls for automatic recognition of a union if the Government
has not acted on its application within 30 days. In practice, the
Government readily facilitates recognition of labor organizations.
Unions are independent of the Government and generally independent
of political parties. The law against companies who fire union
organizers or members is enforced selectively, and penalties are
insufficient to deter employers from violating worker's rights. There
were reports of widespread discreet intimidation by employers in an
effort to prevent union activity. This is apparent particularly in the
FTZ's where foreign companies have located in search of low labor costs
and little interference in their operations. For example, unions in the
FTZ's in San Pedro de Macoris report that their members hesitate to
discuss union activity at work, even during break time, due to fear of
losing their jobs.
Requirements for calling a strike include the support of an
absolute majority of all company workers whether unionized or not, a
prior attempt to resolve the conflict through mediation, written
notification to the Ministry of Labor, and a 10-day waiting period
following notification before proceeding with the strike. The
Government generally respects association rights and places no
obstacles to union registration, affiliation, or the ability to engage
in legal strikes. However, enforcement of labor laws is sometimes
unreliable, inhibiting employees from freely exercising their rights.
In May nurses belonging to the National Union of Nursing Services
and the National Union of Dominican Nursing Services unions went on
strike to protest noncompliance with terms that the Ministry of Health
agreed to in 1997. Issues of contention included a pay raise and a
demand for hospital equipment. Sugar workers struck in La Romana in
August to protest the company's failure to make bonus payments.
Transportation workers struck in the Puerto Plata in September to
protest rising fuel costs.
G & K Services, a company in San Isidro, fired 20 union members in
April. No judicial action was taken because the company paid severance
pay to the workers. A court judgment in April ordered Dennis Fashions,
Inc., which had been closed since 1998, to provide severance pay to its
352 unionized employees. The company failed to comply with the
judgment. A total of 350 unionized workers of Euromodas in Cristo Rey
filed a lawsuit to collect severance pay after the company closed in
1998. In January the court ruled that Euromodas had to pay the workers;
however, the company no longer exists. The owners of Euromodas opened a
new company during the year, and in June former employees protested
outside the new factory. Protesters were dispersed by the police, who
arrested 35 of them and held them for 2 days without charges before
releasing them.
In November 1999, employees of the FTZ company D & P Handbag in
Santiago formed a union and filed the register of union members with
the Director of Labor. This register was rejected because the Director
General of Labor claimed that it did not contain the requisite number
of members. In January the Ministry of Labor reversed this decision;
however, the company did not permit formation of a union. At year's
end, the case was still pending before a labor court in Santiago.
On December 29, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a judgment against
Han Chang company. It upheld the decision of the lower court that the
work contracts of five union leaders fired in 1995 were valid. The
Court ordered that the workers be reinstated and paid back wages. The
Bani company has failed to comply with the decision and the National
Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers (FENATRAZONA) has asked for the
cancellation of the company's export license. Legal authority to cancel
export licenses lies with the National Council of Free Zones and is
dependent on a request from the Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of
Labor reported that this case was being mediated.
Labor unions can and do affiliate freely regionally and
internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is legal and may take place in firms in which a union has
gained the support of an absolute majority of the workers. Only a
minority of companies have collective bargaining pacts, and the
International Labor Organization considers the requirements for
collective bargaining rights to be excessive and finds that in many
cases they could impede collective bargaining. The Labor Code
stipulates that workers cannot be dismissed because of their trade
union membership or activities; however, in practice, workers sometimes
are fired because of their union activities.
The Labor Code establishes a system of labor courts for dealing
with disputes. While cases do make their way through the labor courts,
enforcement of judgments is sometimes unreliable.
The Labor Code applies in the 40 established FTZ's, which employ
approximately 200,000 workers, mostly women. Workplace regulations and
their enforcement in the FTZ's do not differ from those in the country
at large, although working conditions are sometimes better and the pay
is higher. Some FTZ companies have been accused of discharging workers
who attempt to organize unions, but there also have been reports of
union organizers extorting money from business owners. In the FTZ's,
while there may be as many as 10 collective bargaining agreements on
paper, only 3 actually are functioning. The majority of the unions in
the FTZ's are affiliated with the National Federation of Free Trade
Zone Workers or the United Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers.
Many of the major manufacturers in the FTZ's have voluntary ``codes
of conduct,'' that provide for protection against forced labor, freedom
of association, freedom from discrimination, and prohibit the use of
child labor. They also call for a workplace that is safe and healthy.
However, workers rarely have heard of such codes, or the principles
they set out.
Tortoni Manufacturing closed its doors in April after unionized
employees told management they wanted a collective bargaining
agreement. New investors reportedly took control of the company,
renamed it Gramerci Dominicana (a subsidiary of Andover) in July, and
committed to pay the employees their severance pay. As of December 8,
through mediation by the Secretariat of Labor, the employees were
reinstated and had received the first of two installments of severance
pay.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
all forms of forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children; however, such practices still exist to a limited extent in
the adult worker population and, to a limited extent, among children in
the informal sector. Young children ``adopted'' by families work under
a kind of indentured servitude and homeless children are made to beg by
adults (see Section 5). Trafficking in women and girls for purposes of
prostitution is also a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The
FENATRAZONA noted that there were over 40 reports of coerced overtime
in factories. Workers gave examples of their employers locking factory
doors with chains so they could not leave, and taking incentive pay
away from or firing those who refused to work overtime. Union officials
state that newly hired workers are not informed that overtime is
optional. The Association for the Development of Women and the
Environment reported several instances of forced adult labor in the
sugar industry in the shantytowns of La Jagua, Sabana Grande de Boya,
and Los Jovillos. Field guards reportedly kept workers' clothes and
documents to prevent them from leaving. In January a field guard in Los
Jovillos broke a worker's arm when he tried to leave.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits employment of children under 14
years of age and places restrictions on the employment of children
under the age of 16. These restrictions include limiting the daily
number of working hours to 6, prohibiting employment in dangerous
occupations or in establishments serving alcohol, and limiting
nighttime work. A company could face legal sanctions and fines if
caught employing underage children. Children between the ages of 14 and
16 may work in apprenticeship and artistic programs. The law requires 6
years of formal education. Children who do not continue in school often
seek illegal employment before reaching the minimum working age (see
Sections 5 and 6.c.).
In August FENATRAZONA criticized the Overseas Manufacturing
Corporation, in the FTZ in San Pedro de Macoris, for employing underage
workers in the production of computer components. The Ministry of Labor
carried out two investigations and found no workers under age 16.
(FENATRAZONA asserted that the inspectors were denied entry on their
first visit and that when they returned, the children had been removed.
The Secretariat of Labor denied this version and said that the
inspectors were never denied entry.) At the end of August the company
was operating with only 20 workers, rather than the normal force of 60
to 80. According to the owner, the company was undergoing a work ``slow
down'' due to lack of primary materials. At year's end, the company
reportedly had closed.
The high level of unemployment and lack of a social safety net
create pressures on families to allow or encourage children to earn
supplemental income. Tens of thousands of children begin working before
the age of 14. Child labor takes place primarily in the informal
economy, small businesses, clandestine factories, and prostitution.
Conditions in clandestine factories are generally poor, unsanitary, and
often dangerous. The Government largely has eliminated the use of
children for cutting sugar cane; however, there are still reports that
poor Haitian and Dominican children accompany their parents to work in
the cane fields, with the tacit acceptance of sugar companies.
Sexual exploitation of children is a problem (see Section 5).
The Ministry of Labor, in collaboration with the International
Labor Organization's Program on the Eradication of Child Labor, and
other international labor rights organizations, has implemented
programs to combat child labor. These include a national child labor
survey; a program to remove children from dangerous agricultural work
in San Jose de Ocoa, Constanza, and Azua; and an upcoming program in
the area of child prostitution in Boca Chica and Puerto Plata. By
November the Constanza program removed 500 children, twice as many as
the targeted number, from work in hazardous agriculture, and placed
them in schools.
The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children; however,
such practices persist in the informal sector (see Section 6.c.). There
were no reports of forced child labor in the formal sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution empowers the
executive branch to set minimum wage levels, and the Labor Code assigns
this task to a national salary committee. Congress also may enact
minimum wage legislation. The minimum monthly salary is $135 (2,222
pesos) in the FTZ's and ranges from $107 (1,757 pesos) to $176 (2,895
pesos) outside the FTZ's depending upon the size of the company and the
nature of the business. The minimum wage does not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. It only provides
approximately one-third of the income necessary to sustain an average
family. The national poverty level, which is based on a basket of goods
and services consumed by a typical family, is $402 (6,607 pesos) per
month for a family of five.
The Labor Code establishes a standard work period of 8 hours per
day and 44 hours per week. The code also stipulates that all workers
are entitled to 36 hours of uninterrupted rest each week. In practice,
a typical workweek is Monday through Friday plus a half day on
Saturday, but longer hours are common. The code grants workers a 35
percent differential for work totaling between 44 hours to 68 hours per
week and double time for any hours above 68 hours per week.
Conditions for agricultural workers are poor, especially in the
sugar industry. Most sugar cane worker villages have high rates of
disease and lack schools, medical facilities, running water, and sewage
systems. On sugar plantations, cane cutters usually are paid by the
weight of cane cut rather than the hours worked. Employers often do not
provide trucks to transport the newly cut cane at the conclusion of the
workday, causing workers to receive lower compensation because the cane
dries and weighs less.
When the cane is weighed, workers are given tickets indicating the
weight of cane cut (often rounded in favor of the employer) and the
amount of money due. These tickets, issued to a specific person but
payable to the bearer, may be turned in to the employer and redeemed
for cash every 2 weeks. Many cane cutters earn less than $4.00 (60
pesos) per day. Because workers earn so little and sometimes cannot
wait until payday to redeem their tickets, an informal barter system
has evolved in which the tickets also are used to purchase items at
private stores located on the plantations. These private stores make
change by giving back a combination of tickets and cash. However, it is
not unusual for these stores to retain 10 percent of the cash due a
customer.
The Dominican Human Rights Committee and batey residents report
that conditions of work for cane workers have deteriorated since the
industry was privatized in 1999. Workers reportedly are paid less, work
longer hours, and have fewer benefits, according to the Committee. The
Dominican Association of Sugar Technicians reported that before the
October 1999 privatization of the industry, there were approximately
32,000 sugar industry workers, compared to approximately 3,200 at
year's end. While child labor in the sugar industry has decreased
significantly, it still exists according to human rights advocates and
labor federations (see Section 5).
The Dominican Social Security Institute (IDSS) sets workplace
safety and health conditions. The existing social security system is
seriously underfunded and applies to only about 9 percent of the
population. Approximately 13,000 employees work in the IDSS bureaucracy
to support fewer than 20,000 retirees.
Both the IDSS and the Ministry of Labor have small corps of
inspectors charged with enforcing standards. The Secretariat of Labor
has 250 inspectors who seek to improve sanitation, health care, and
safety for workers. Included in this number is a smaller, specialized
corps (eight in the National District) of inspectors for the FTZ's.
Inspector positions customarily are filled through political patronage,
and bribes from businesses are common. In practice, workers cannot
remove themselves from hazardous working situations without
jeopardizing employment (see Section 6.b.).
For example, an FTZ in Bonao, Bi Bong Apparel, fired several
workers who, displeased with the safety of work conditions, cut wires
to stadium lighting under which they were forced to work. In March the
Labor Court held that the company should not have fired the workers and
ordered an inspection. The Department of Hygiene and Safety carried out
an inspection of the lighting, drinking water, bathrooms, and
ventilation. According to the Ministry of Labor, inspectors found
irregularities and made a series of recommendations. In November the
workers returned to their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and a 1998 alien smuggling law increased the penalties for
those found guilty of various phases of this crime; however,
trafficking in women and children from, to and within the country
remains a serious problem. The penalties for trafficking are 3 to 10
years in prison, or, if there is a death, 10 to 20 years in prison,
plus punitive damages.
Laws dealing with domestic violence, as well as the Minor's Code,
create protection under both civil and criminal law against particular
situations that may be conducive to, or acts that may be a part of, the
traffic in persons, whether female or male, minors or adults. The law
also prohibits acting as an intermediary in a transaction of
prostitution, and the Government has used this law to prosecute third
parties that derive profit from prostitution.
The Directorate of Migration estimates that there are approximately
400 rings of alien-smugglers, traffickers, and purveyors of false
documents operating within the country. These individuals profit by
facilitating the trafficking of women to Europe and the Eastern
Caribbean under false pretenses and for purposes of prostitution.
In 1996 the Government created the Interinstitutional Committee for
the Protection of Migrant Women (CIPROM); however, this organization
ceased functioning due to lack of funding. One NGO, the Center for
Integral Orientation and Investigation (COIN), counsels women planning
to accept job offers in Europe and the eastern Caribbean about
immigration, health, and other issues including the dangers of
trafficking, forced prostitution, and domestic servitude. The program
also provides services to returning women. COIN administers the Center
for Health and Migration Information for Migrant Women that carries out
community education campaigns in high risk areas on various issues,
including citizenship, legal work requirements, dangers of trafficking,
forced prostitution, and domestic servitude. It also provides a
information hotline and offers psychological, legal, and health
counseling to returning women.
In January two journalists from the Spanish newspaper, El Mundo,
made public a documentary that exposed a ring of traffickers of women
to Europe. The ring included foreigners as well as local officials. The
authorities arrested one military officer and deported one Dutch
citizen. In July the Public Ministry dismantled a house of prostitution
in which the majority of the prostitutes were from Europe and Russia.
The leader of the operation, as well as the women themselves, fled the
country before they could be prosecuted.
From January through August, the authorities dismissed 42
immigration employees for links with groups trafficking in persons. In
addition authorities have charged at least 45 persons for allegedly
organizing illegal trips under the 1998 antismuggling law. Of these, 30
persons were tried and 15 were convicted. Their sentences range from 3
to 5 years in prison. At year's end, 15 cases were pending.
The Oversight Organization for the Protection of Children
coordinates the approaches of various agencies involved in combating
trafficking in children, whether for adoption, sexual exploitation, or
other purposes. This organization works with the Attorney General's
office, the Public Health Ministry, Migration, and other agencies. In
the National District, the Department of Family and Children in the
Office of Public Prosecutor focuses on identifying children who are
victims of abuse and prosecutes offenders under heightened penalties
contained in the domestic violence law.
A primary concern of the Oversight Organization is preventing abuse
of the child adoption process by those intending to sell or exploit
children through prostitution or child pornography. The Department of
Family and Children is very concerned about kidnapings, especially of
infants, for sale to foreigners who deliberately have sidestepped legal
formalities--including those of their own country. The Government seeks
to protect children from victimization under the rubric of adoption.
Many children leave the country as adoptees, but government officials
have made such adoptions much more difficult and, they hope, have
prevented would-be traffickers from abusing the system.
Poor Haitian and Dominican parents sometimes arrange for more
prosperous Dominican families to ``adopt'' their children, in exchange
for money or goods. Such children often are not treated as full family
members and are expected to work long hours in domestic service,
agriculture, or industry under threat of corporal punishment and
without compensation. Especially in the case of girls, these children
often are abused sexually.
__________
ECUADOR
Ecuador is a constitutional republic with a 123-member unicameral
legislature that was chosen in free elections in May 1998. On January
21, members of the military joined protesters, including indigenous
dissidents, to force President Jamil Mahuad from office. After a brief
period of confusion and the proclamation of a ``People's Parliament''
by the coup leaders, on January 22, Vice President Gustavo Noboa
assumed the presidency and restored order. At the end of May the
Government extended a full amnesty to all those who participated in the
overthrow of Mahuad. The judiciary is constitutionally independent, but
in practice is inefficient and susceptible to outside pressure.
The military enjoys substantial autonomy, reinforced by assured
revenues from the country's oil exports, as well as from civil
aviation, shipping, and other commercial sectors. The National Police
are responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of
internal order and fall under the civilian Ministry of Government and
Police. In early January, then-President Mahuad declared a state of
emergency, which gave him the power to use troops to monitor and react
to public protests. The state of emergency lasted 1 month in most of
the country, and until March in Guayas province. Throughout the year,
the military continued to supplement the police on an ad hoc basis.
Some military officers were forced to resign for their role during the
events of January 21, despite the blanket amnesty. The police and, in
some isolated cases, members of the military, continued to commit
abuses.
The economy is in a severe economic recession, although it began to
improve slightly during the year. The economy is based on private
enterprise, although there continued to be heavy government involvement
in key sectors such as petroleum, utilities, and aviation. The
principal exports are oil, bananas, shrimp, and cut flowers, which are
the country's leading sources of foreign exchange. Most citizens are
employed in the urban informal sector or as rural agricultural workers;
rural poverty is extensive, and underemployment is high. According to a
1999 study, approximately 62 percent of citizens live in poverty and 15
percent are indigent, with an almost total lack of resources. By the
end of 1999, the incomes of approximately 56 percent of households were
below the poverty line. The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of
$1,053 provided most of the population with a low standard of living
during the year. Per capita GDP was $1,101 in 1999. In response to the
recession, the Government announced in January that the country would
adopt the U.S. dollar as its national currency and completed that
process in September. Inflation for the year was 91 percent.
The Government's human rights record was generally poor in a number
of areas, and serious problems remain. There were credible reports that
police committed extrajudicial killings. Police tortured and otherwise
mistreated prisoners and detainees, usually with impunity. Prison
conditions remained poor. In August a law went into effect that is
expected to either free or reduce the sentences of approximately 2,900
prison inmates for humanitarian reasons. Persons often are subject to
arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention is a problem. Once
incarcerated, persons may wait years before being convicted or
acquitted. More than one-half of the prisoners in jail have not been
sentenced formally. The Government failed to prosecute and punish human
rights abusers. The most fundamental human rights abuses stem from
shortcomings in the politicized, inefficient, and sometimes corrupt
legal and judicial system. The Government infringed somewhat on press
freedom and some self-censorship continues. The Government declared
states of emergency during the year that limited freedom of assembly
and movement. Violence and pervasive discrimination against women,
indigenous people, and Afro-Ecuadorians also remain problems. The
Government continued to order participants in nationwide strikes back
to work, and arrested striking members of the National Teachers' Union.
Child labor is a problem. Mob violence and killings persist.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of politically motivated killings; however, there
continued to be credible reports that police committed extrajudicial
killings. Through December the Ecumenical Committee for Human Rights
(CEDHU) reported a total of 15 extrajudicial killings by the police,
security forces, or semiofficial entities such as neighborhood
brigades. However, during the same period, the Permanent Committee for
Human Rights (CDH) reported 20 cases of extrajudicial killings by the
same groups in Guayas province alone. (Neighborhood brigades are civic
defense groups organized by the National Police to provide an anticrime
presence in neighborhoods. They are not authorized to carry firearms,
but often do.) In many of these instances, there was insufficient
evidence to reach a conclusion as to what occurred; however, the
killings sometimes exhibited a suspicious pattern.
On January 6, a crowd of residents from the evacuated town of Banos
forced their way past a military roadblock in order to reoccupy their
homes. (Banos had been evacuated due to the threat from a nearby active
volcano.) A stray bullet fired by security forces struck and killed
Edison Guato, and dozens of persons were injured during the melee (see
Section 2.b.).
On May 13, in a remote northeast section of the Amazon near the
Peruvian border, government security forces clashed with a previously
unknown armed group calling itself the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Ecuador--Defenders of the People (FARE-DP). Two of its members were
killed and five others were wounded and/or captured, including their
purported leader, ``Alex.'' The authorities later maintained that the
FARE-DP was criminal in nature and linked the group to a series of
kidnaping and murder cases.
In Guayaquil on May 31, Guayas Transit Commission police reportedly
shot 24-year-old civil engineer Cesar Matute nine times and killed him.
Matute apparently failed to stop his truck at a police roadblock,
thinking it was set up by robbers. The authorities suspended officers
Alfonso Peasantes and William Jimenez. After an investigation by the
fourth district police court, the two officers were exonerated and
reinstated.
On June 5, in Guayaquil Special Operations Group police confronted
a group of criminals that they were pursuing and killed seven persons;
eight others reportedly escaped. Police stated that the robbers were
armed heavily and strongly resisted arrest.
On August 28, in Portoviejo, police surprised 19 armed robbers
attempting to hold up a local bank. Eleven of the gunmen were killed
during the shootout and 8 escaped. Three policemen also were wounded.
Police stated that all of the suspects refused to surrender. There was
no investigation of the incident.
Also on August 28, in Guasmos Sur, members of an army patrol shot
and killed Sergeant Carlos Lemos as he allegedly fled from them.
Officials reported that Lemos had escaped 12 days earlier from a jail
at the 5th Army Engineers headquarters where he was being held pending
an investigation into the theft of rifles from an armory in Esmeraldas.
Lemos's lawyer and his family dispute the official version of events
and claim that he was tortured and murdered. No official inquiry had
been made by year's end.
On December 4, 60-year-old Josefina Rios Murillos died after
apparently being thrown from a police vehicle in Guayaquil. Her family
said that the city's recent ``greater security campaign'' had increased
police brutality, and it has charged that Rios was struck on the head
before being thrown out of the patrol car. At year's end, the case was
under investigation.
On February 9, the bodies of two men were found in different parts
of Guayaquil. One was identified as a security guard mysteriously
killed at a business from which nothing was stolen; the other was an
unidentified individual whose corpse was dumped along the highway that
circles the city. There have been other unsolved murders along this
highway; for example, in May the bodies of John Merchan and Jacobo
Moreira were found there--both had long criminal histories. Other
bodies found on the highway include: On June 21, Adolfo Perez; on June
23, Francisco Pazmino; and on July 27, Angel Pacucar. Seven other
bodies of suspected criminals also were found on the highway over a 4-
day period in September. Some human rights groups suspect police
involvement in these killings, but no investigation had been undertaken
by year's end.
In January a police court inquiry into the March 1999 killing of
14-year-old Mickey Mendoza concluded; the court charged policeman
Carlos Alberto Iturralde Salazar with unintentional homicide. The court
ruled that he had failed to maintain proper control of the weapon,
which apparently went off when Mendoza tried to grab the gun. Iturralde
was confined to police barracks pending trial. On January 13, the
Mendoza family filed a dissent with the court asking that the second
policeman on the scene also be tried, and that five policemen whom they
believe conspired to cover up the incident be charged as accomplices.
The charges were increased and, on July 17, Iturralde was found guilty
of simple homicide; however, he was transferred to Cuenca and returned
to full duty status pending the court's issuance of a final decision.
Late in the year, the authorities arrested Iturralde and jailed him
pending the outcome of a sentencing hearing. Iturralde faces a sentence
of up to 8 years' imprisonment; however, the Mendoza family believes
that the killing was premeditated and is seeking additional charges
that would carry a longer sentence.
A court dismissed the case against Carlos Alulema, a policeman who
shot and killed a cigarette vendor in July 1999 in Guayaquil, on the
grounds that the policeman was drunk and not responsible when he
committed the crime. No information was available about the
investigation into the killing by two police officers of Richard
Morales Cabrera in November 1999 in Guayaquil, a shooting that also
wounded several other persons.
The investigation continued into the February 1999 killing of Jaime
Hurtado Gonzalez, an Afro-Ecuadorian member of Congress from the far-
left Popular Democratic Movement (MPD) party; Pedro Tapia (Hurtado's
alternate in the Congress); and Wellington Borja near the Supreme Court
in Quito. The killings bore the hallmarks of a professional ``hit,''
and the authorities have brought charges against several suspects,
including police officers and a former police informant, in the
killings. Several suspects were jailed and convicted, and their appeals
were denied; at year's end, the investigation was still active.
There has been no disposition of the November 1998 kidnaping and
killing in Quito of Saul Filormo Canar Pauta, a leader of the
Ecuadorian Confederation of United Working Class Organizations. In
December 1998, a municipal worker found Canar's body in a trash dump.
His hands and feet were tied and his body showed signs of torture. The
authorities suspect that he may have been killed by private landowners
in retaliation for his activities organizing land invasions by
squatters.
There also were instances in which citizens took the law into their
own hands, inciting mob violence that resulted in lynchings and
burnings of suspected criminals (see Section l.e.). Mobs killed at
least 14 crime suspects in the first 11 months of the year; individual
lynchings continued to occur in all parts of the country, especially in
indigenous communities in remote areas of the highlands. For example,
on August 13, in the indigenous community of Quilla Silla in Azuay
province, local residents beat three men whom they accused of cattle
rustling. As a result, 22-year-old Jorge Guanuci died, and two of his
companions were injured seriously before firemen from a nearby town
intervened.
Government officials reported the killings of 20 persons in the
town of Lago Agrio during November and December. Most were killed
execution-style as the result of conflicts between rival Colombian
groups who had entered the country. In addition, in December another
five persons were killed while travelling on a public bus outside of
Lago Agrio when unidentified criminals blew up a section of the oil
pipeline.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
Criminal kidnaping for profit continued to be a problem. By mid-
year the police antikidnaping unit reported 8 kidnaping cases and
another 56 possible cases. On October 12, an unidentified armed group
kidnaped a group of 10 oil workers near Pompeya, in Orellana province.
The Government launched a major operation to find the victims and to
investigate the perpetrators of this act. At year's end, eight oil
workers still were being held.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and similar forms of
intimidation and punishment; however, the police continued to torture
and abuse suspects and prisoners, usually with impunity. Reports of
abuse increased.
The CEDHU published detailed reports on suspects who reported being
tortured by specific policemen. By December the authorities had
registered 33 complaints of some form of torture by security forces. In
most cases, the police appeared to have abused such persons during
investigations of ordinary street crime. The victims reported that the
police beat them, burned them with cigarettes, applied electric shocks,
or threatened them psychologically. By year's end, human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) had received at least 135 reports
of incidents involving physical mistreatment.
For example, on January 29, near Milagros, an 18-year-old woman
accepted a ride and a drink from policeman Freddy Veloz. She later
awoke from a state of unconsciousness in a remote area after having
been raped. The woman lodged a formal complaint in court, but there was
no disposition in the case by year's end.
On March 2, in Guayaquil, off-duty CTG Corporal Miguel Noriega, in
an inebriated state, shot and wounded Anabel Villegas in the hand and
leg. Noriega subsequently was arrested, and the case was pending at
year's end.
On August 24, in Guayaquil, police shot and wounded off-duty
fireman Xavier Barriero, in a case of mistaken identity. Once police
discovered their mistake, they then left the scene without providing
any assistance to Barriero. Eventually, the police admitted their error
and paid his medical bills.
Police corruption is a problem throughout the country. During the
year, the police in Guayaquil dismissed 20 police officers for various
reasons that included corruption.
Conditions in prisons and detention centers generally continued to
be poor. Prisons in the tropical coastal areas tend to be worse than in
the temperate highlands. For example, the Tomas Larrea prison in
Portoviejo was built in 1930 to hold 150 inmates, but its current
population exceeds 300. It has never been repaired or expanded and has
many tunnels, which have contributed to some of the 30 successful
escapes since 1970. Overcrowding also is a chronic problem elsewhere.
There are no separate facilities for hard core or dangerous criminals,
nor are there effective rehabilitation programs. New prisons have not
been constructed due to lack of financial resources.
The Constitution requires that prisoners charged with lesser
offenses (those carrying a maximum sentence of 5 years or less) and who
have been detained for more than 1 year without a sentence obtain their
freedom immediately. In January the National Directorate for Social
Rehabilitation (DNRS) reported that 553 inmates had been released since
the provision entered into force. On August 18, a law went into effect
that is expected eventually to free or reduce the sentences of 2,947
prison inmates for humanitarian reasons.
In September 1999, the DNRS published a report that indicated that
there were a total of 8,520 inmates incarcerated in facilities
originally designed to hold a population of 5,964 prisoners. In 1998 a
total of 26 inmates died in prison. The report stated that traumatic
injuries, reportedly inflicted by fellow inmates, caused 65 percent of
those deaths. It attributed the others to illness and drug use. The
prison authorities routinely investigate deaths in custody. During the
year, a number of prisons experienced serious outbreaks of disease,
including meningitis.
In September 1999, women represented 9.5 percent of the total
prison population. Women are held separately from men, and conditions
are notably better in the women's prison in Quito than in other
facilities. There also are separate facilities for juveniles.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
Penal Code provide that no one may be deprived of liberty without a
written order from a governmental authority; however, the authorities
often violate these legal protections in practice, and arbitrary arrest
and detention remain problems. For example, on January 28, in Azuay,
the authorities arrested Maria Guatama, her daughter, and
granddaughter; they spent a night in jail without any formal charges.
The incident was traced to a disgruntled neighbor who apparently had
friends on the police force. The family's release most likely was due
to the fact that they could afford a lawyer.
The law requires the authorities to issue specific written arrest
orders within 24 hours of detention--even in cases in which a suspect
is caught committing a crime--and the authorities must charge the
suspect with a specific criminal offense within 48 hours of arrest. All
detained persons may challenge the legality of their detention by
petition within 48 hours of their arrest, but in practice few such
petitions are brought forward. The senior elected official (usually the
mayor) of the locality in which the suspect is held reviews any such
petitions. Regardless of the legality of a detention, a prisoner may be
released only by court order. In some cases, detainees who are unaware
of this, or who do not have the funds to hire a lawyer, may remain in
prison for an extended period of time before being released. Bail
generally is not available, and the law prohibits it in narcotics and
major offense cases. Families of detainees sometimes attempt to secure
the prisoners' freedom through illegal means.
Human rights organizations continued to report occasional cases of
incommunicado detention, although the law prohibits this practice. Even
when the police obtain a written arrest order, those charged with
determining the validity of detention often allowed frivolous charges
to be brought, either because they were overworked or because the
accuser bribed them. The system frequently was used as a means of
harassment in civil cases in which one party sought to have the other
arrested on criminal charges. Preventive detention up to and including
trial is legal if a judge determines that it is necessary and if
evidence that a crime has been committed is presented.
As in the previous year, the authorities in Guayas Province
arrested scores of persons under a state of emergency that was imposed
from January until May. The measure was imposed to stem a soaring crime
rate (584 persons died in violent crimes in the city of Guayaquil in
1999, and 104 kidnaping cases were registered.) The police often
arrested persons on mere suspicion or for lack of proper
identification; they released most of them a few days later.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does
not use it as a method of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is
susceptible to outside pressure and corruption. Despite efforts begun
in 1992 to depoliticize and modernize the court system, the judiciary
continues to operate slowly and inconsistently. Judges reportedly
rendered decisions more quickly or more slowly depending on political
pressure, or in some instances, the payment of bribes. There are
lengthy delays before most cases come to the courts.
The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, superior circuit
courts, other courts and tribunals that hear cases in accordance with
the Constitution and other laws, and the Judicial Council. There also
are military and police tribunals that have the same status as circuit
courts, while criminal, provincial, and cantonal courts serve as courts
of first-instance.
The regular court system tries most nonmilitary defendants,
although some indigenous groups try members independently for
violations of tribal rules. The law permits police or military courts
to try police officers and military defendants in closed sessions, in
accordance with the respective military and police court martial
manuals. Only the Supreme Court may try cases involving flag-rank
officers. The police court does not announce verdicts or punishments,
reinforcing the strong impression that the police are immune from
prosecution. The 1998 Constitution placed both police and military
justice under the control of the Supreme Court. However, the three
systems have not yet been integrated.
The Supreme Court that took office in 1997 publicly recognized the
shortcomings of the judicial system and pledged to improve the quality
and training of judges. In May 1998, the Supreme Court supervised the
selection by open competition of all appellate judges. A Judicial
Council, charged with administering the court system and disciplining
judges, took office in the fall of 1998. In November 1999, the
Council's disciplinary committee fired two judges and two court
employees for their role in the release of suspected drug traffickers.
All four faced criminal charges. During the year, the Judicial Council
removed at least two judges and a number of minor officials from their
jobs.
The failures of the justice system contributed to a growing number
of cases in which communities took the law into their own hands. There
continued to be reports of lynchings and burnings of suspected
criminals by outraged citizens (see Section 1.a.). These occurred
particularly in indigenous communities and poor neighborhoods of major
cities where there is little police presence.
The law provides for internationally accepted due process rights
for criminal defendants, but the authorities, including the Chief
Prosecutor's office, often did not observe these rights in practice. By
law, the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and
defendants have the right to a public trial, defense attorneys, and
appeal. They may present evidence, refuse to testify against
themselves, and confront and cross-examine witnesses. Although a public
defender system exists, in practice there are almost no attorneys
available to defend the large number of indigent suspects.
Trial is supposed to begin within 15 to 60 days of the initial
arrest; however, in practice initiation of the trial phase can take
years. Less than 40 percent of all those incarcerated have been
convicted and sentenced. Accused narcotics traffickers and suspects in
major crimes cannot obtain bail or be released on their own
recognizance.
In November 1999, Congress passed a new Criminal Procedures Code.
Then-President Mahuad proposed changes in December 1999, which Congress
accepted in January. The code is scheduled to take effect in July 2001,
and is intended to change the criminal justice system from an
inquisitorial to an accusatorial-style system. The Chief Prosecutor's
office is to investigate and prosecute crimes, while the role of judges
is to change to that of neutral arbiters presiding over oral trials.
The new code is a step toward implementation of provisions in the 1998
Constitution intended to strengthen the justice system by improving due
process and enhancing the rights of the accused, through measures such
as habeas corpus and limits on preventive detention.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanctions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, and the authorities generally respected this
provision in practice; however, there were some notable exceptions.
There are frequent charges of slander and libel brought by and against
public figures, but few result in final decisions or judicial relief.
On April 19, the President of Congress announced that press coverage of
congressional proceedings would be restricted to an audio broadcast;
following vigorous protest by the press, which formerly had enjoyed
wide access to Congress, he announced that separate areas would be set
aside for live coverage of sessions. Some self-censorship continues.
There is a free and vigorous press. Ownership of the media is
broadly based, and editorials represent a wide range of political views
and often criticize the Government. However, some degree of self-
censorship in the print media occurs, particularly with respect to
politically sensitive issues or stories about the military and its
related industries. In addition, most elements of the media were
influenced by economic considerations and tend to reflect the narrow,
regional interests of their owners.
All of the major media organs--newspapers, radio, and television--
are locally and privately owned, except for one governmentowned
national radio station. The law limits foreign investment in broadcast
media. Using a law promulgated by the last military regime that
requires the media to give the Government free space or broadcast time,
the Government can and does require television and radio to broadcast
governmentproduced programs featuring the President and other top
administration officials.
On February 16, in Guayaquil, Rafael Cuesta, the news director of
the Tele Centro television station was injured severely by a bomb
contained inside a videocassette. Congresswoman Cinthya Viteri and
indigenous leader Marco Murillo also received videocassette bombs in
the mail; however, because of the Cuesta incident they were suspicious
and alerted the police, who defused the devices. Police were unable to
discover who sent the bombs.
Near the end of the year, the mayor of Guayaquil banned a guidebook
that contained negative comments about the city.
The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and the Government
does not interfere in issues involving academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of free assembly for peaceful purposes, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice; however, there
were some limits. In February President Noboa decreed a nationwide
state of emergency that lasted until March and limited freedom of
assembly. Public rallies require prior government permits, which
generally are granted, although exceptions occur. In January protesters
took over the congressional building and, joined by military leaders,
forced the resignation of President Mahuad (see Section 3). Numerous
other labor and student demonstrations took place without major
incident in the capital and the outlying regions during the year.
Protesters often blocked roads. On January 6, police in Quito and
Guayaquil arrested 46 protesters, and in Quito 1 student was shot and
injured; some protesters were armed, and the police denied
responsibility. In general the security forces intervened in
demonstrations only when there was violence against bystanders or
destruction of property. Police in Quito used tear gas in January,
March, and September to repel demonstrators who sought access to the
city center (see Section 6.a.). Police also used tear gas against
protesting members of the National Teachers' Union. On April 17,
members of the Evangelical Indigenous Movement (FEINE) and the
Federation of Indians, Campesinos, and Blacks (FENOCIN) occupied the
Government's Indigenous Affairs Office.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Government does not require religious groups to be licensed or
registered unless they form NGO's that engage in commercial activity.
Approximately 90 percent of the population consider themselves to be
Roman Catholic, although most citizens do not regularly practice the
religion or follow a syncretistic version that combines indigenous
beliefs with orthodox Catholic doctrine. The Government allows
missionary activity and religious demonstrations by all religions. The
Government does not permit religious instruction in public schools;
private schools are permitted to teach religion, as are parents in the
home. There are no restrictions on publishing religious materials in
any language. In early 1998, police in Pinchincha suspended the
meetings of a group known as ``Gnostico Cristiano Universal,''
following the suicide of 29 members of the ``Heaven's Gate'' cult in
California, while they investigated possible links between the two
groups. The Government's investigation was inconclusive, and the groups
have resumed their activities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice;
however, frequent military and police roadblocks often present problems
for travelers using public transportation, especially at night. The
Government requires all citizens to obtain exit visas when travelling
abroad, which are granted routinely. Military and minor applicants must
comply with special requirements.
The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of provision of first
asylum did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
According to the UNHCR, since September approximately 1,600
Colombian refugees arrived in the country, most of whom fled due to
fighting between guerrillas and paramilitary forces in the Colombian
department of Putumayo. The Government and the UNHCR have developed a
three-point contingency plan to cope with the refugee influx into
Sucumbios province. In November nine persons occupied offices of a
Catholic Church in Quito that worked with the UNHCR to screen and
register refugees. The occupation ended peacefully after 48 hours.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage; however, on January 21, members of the military
joined protesters, including indigenous dissidents, to force President
Jamil Mahuad from office. After a brief period of confusion during
which the leaders of the coup announced the dissolution of the three
branches of government and the formation of a ``People's Parliament,''
on January 22, Vice President Gustavo Noboa assumed the presidency and
restored order.
On January 19, approximately 6,000 persons including members of the
Confederation of Ecuador's Indian Nationalities (CONAIE), students, and
leftwing political protesters marched in Quito. On January 21,
thousands of protesters, including members of CONAIE, students,
teachers, and union members, occupied and took control of the
congressional building in Quito. The police and military guarding the
building did not oppose the occupation with force, and over 100
soldiers joined the protesters. CONAIE leader Antonio Vargas announced
on television from the floor of Congress that he would head the
People's Parliament. He also said that retired army Colonel Lucio
Gutierrez would join him in a new ``ruling junta'' as the executive,
and that former Supreme Court President Carlos Solorzano would take
over the role of Supreme Court President. The protesters called for
President Mahuad to resign. (There also were protests in Guayaquil,
where a group of students, unionists, and neighborhood associations
seized the provincial government building.)
President of Congress Juan Jose Pons described the small military
group that joined the protests as ``seditious'' and called for support
for the democratically elected Government. Mahuad then spoke on
television and refused to resign. On the afternoon of January 21, the
armed forces service chiefs and joint staff chief General Carlos
Mendoza called for the President to resign. Mahuad resisted the call to
resign but later fled the palace. The junta (also called the
``triumvirate'') originally was composed of Vargas, Solorzano, and
Colonel Gutierrez. Later during the night of January 21, at the palace,
General Mendoza briefly joined the junta, replacing Colonel Gutierrez.
On January 22, President Mahuad appeared again on television and
accepted Vice President Gustavo Noboa as president; on the same day,
Congress ruled that Mahuad had deserted his post. With Noboa's
assumption of office, order was restored.
On January 22, Congress sanctioned two of its membersDemocratic
Left representatives (and former army generals) Paco Moncayo and Rene
Yandunfor their role in the coup and removed them from their seats in
the Congress.
On February 4, General Norton Narvaez, the head of the armed
forces, announced that a military court had found 113 soldiers, 17 of
whom were in jail, guilty of breach of discipline and breaking their
oath for taking part in the coup. They were put on administrative leave
and confined to barracks. General Mendoza resigned.
On May 31, Congress approved an amnesty for army officers involved
in the coup, and those held in prison were released. On June 5, the 17
most senior imprisoned officials were placed on 48-hour administrative
leave. Colonel Gutierrez served 4 days in jail for a ``breach of
discipline,'' i.e., for his interviews with the press. On June 12, the
military forced Colonel Gutierrez and 11 other officers to resign
despite the blanket amnesty.
On July 13, Supreme Court President Galo Pico issued arrest
warrants for former President Mahuad and his former finance minister
for crimes in connection with the freezing of bank assets in March
1999.
Voting is mandatory for literate citizens over 18 years of age and
voluntary for illiterate citizens. The law does not permit active duty
members of the military to vote. The Constitution bars members of the
clergy and active duty military personnel from election to Congress,
the presidency, or vice presidency. The Constitution provides that if a
political party fails to garner a minimum of 5 percent of the votes in
two open elections, the party must be eliminated from the electoral
registry.
In August a dispute arose over who had the right to be elected
president of Congress. After a Constitutional Court ruling forced
Susana Gonzalez from office following a challenge, Hugo Quevedo was
elected. He later defeated a challenge to his own election and remained
in office at year's end.
No specific laws prevent women or minorities from attaining
leadership positions; however, few women, indigenous people, or Afro-
Ecuadorians occupy senior positions in government. Women are
underrepresented in politics and government, although they have made
gains in recent years. Women hold 17 of 123 seats in Congress, the
largest proportion of seats held by women in the country's history.
There is one female cabinet minister.
The indigenous movement, which previously shunned traditional
politics, formed an electoral movement called Pachakutik (which means
``cataclysmic change'' in Quichua) and ran candidates for national,
provincial, and local office in the 1996, 1998, and 2000 elections. A
Pachakutik Congresswoman, Nina Pacari, formerly the Second Vice
President of Congress, is part of an eight-member congressional bloc
whose cooperation with the majority in Congress on some issues has
ensured it significant influence. The politically active Confederation
of Ecuador's Indian Nationalities, headed by Antonio Vargas, was at the
forefront of protests that overthrew then-President Mahuad. Indigenous
members of the National Constituent Assembly and their supporters won
important constitutional protections for indigenous rights in the 1998
Constitution. There are 3 indigenous deputies serving in the 123-member
Congress.
One Afro-Ecuadorian serves as a member of Congress, but none are
found in senior-level government jobs.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases. Domestic human rights groups, such as the CEDHU and
the regional Latin American Human Rights Association (ALDHU), were
outspoken in their criticism of the Government's record on specific
cases. Nevertheless, the Government contracted with the ALDHU to
provide human rights training to the military and the police.
The office of the Ombudsman was created in 1998 to ensure ongoing
attention to human rights problems; however, some observers have
criticized its independence in practice. In May Congress removed the
Ombudsman from office on charges of fraud for acts that he committed
while he was acting Attorney General. As of year's end, Congress had
not named a replacement, and Claudio Mueckay was acting Ombudsman at
year's end.
In 1998 the Government decreed an ambitious National Human Rights
Plan with the goal of preventing, penalizing, and eradicating human
rights violations in the country. The three branches of government, as
well as the independent Ombudsmen's office and a number of NGO's,
contributed to development of this plan. At the end of 1999, the U.N.
had contributed $1.2 million to support the plan. The plan includes
education for the Congress on human rights matters. The Government
began to implement various aspects of its plan, including seminars,
publishing documents, and a contingency plan for refugees.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, religion,
sex, or social status. In addition, the constitutional reforms
explicitly increased the rights of women, children, and minorities, and
required Congress to pass legislation implementing these rights
promptly. However, women, indigenous people, and Afro-Ecuadorians
continue to face significant discrimination.
Women.--Although the law prohibits violence against women,
including within marriage, it is a widespread practice. The 1995 Law
Against Violence Affecting Women and Children criminalized spousal
abuse, including physical, sexual, and psychological abuse; created
family courts; and reformed the Penal Code to give courts the power to
separate an abusive spouse from the home. Although nationwide
statistics were not available, according to an NGO in Guayaquil, that
city registered more than 32,000 official complaints of domestic
violence between May 1998 and May 1999, almost double the previous
period's figure. The NGO's report also said that one out of three women
suffered from some form of domestic violence. Women may file complaints
against a rapist or an abusive spouse or companion only if they produce
a witness. Many rapes also are not reported due to the victims'
reluctance to confront the perpetrators. The penalty for rape is a jail
sentence of up to 16 years. In cases of statutory rape involving
``amorous'' sex with a minor, if the rapist marries the victim the
charges against him, or anyone else who took part in the rape, cannot
be pursued unless the marriage subsequently is annulled. While some
communities have established their own centers for counseling and legal
support of abused women, the Government only began to address this
problem seriously with the 1994 formation of the Women's Bureau.
Although this office can accept complaints about abuse of women, it has
no authority to act on the complaints. However, the Women's Bureau has
doubled the number of its outreach offices and actively referred abuse
cases to prosecutors.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is common.
Adult prostitution is legal.
Discrimination against women is pervasive in society, particularly
with respect to educational and economic opportunities for those in the
lower economic strata. The increasingly active women's movement alleges
that culture and tradition inhibit achievement of full equality for
women. There are fewer women than men in the professions and skilled
trades, and pay discrimination against women is common.
The Ecuadorian Women's Permanent National Forum, founded in 1994,
includes more than 320 women's organizations and promotes social,
economic, and cultural change through various methods, including
increasing political participation by women. In addition the National
Women's Council provides support for approximately 500 women's
organizations, many of which promote social consciousness and greater
participation by women in the political process. The Women's Political
Coordinator, an NGO that operates in 17 provinces, promotes similar
themes relating to women's rights, with an emphasis on political
participation and human rights. It also focuses on young women and
Afro-Ecuadorian women.
Children.--According to the National Statistics Institute, in 1999
approximately 47 percent of the population was under the age of 18. The
Government has not taken effective steps to promote the welfare of
children. The Constitution requires that children achieve ``a basic
level of education,'' estimated at 9 years of school; however, the
Government rarely enforces this requirement in practice (see Section
6.d.). Education is free.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. Government
resources to assist children traditionally have been limited, although
the Government operates a program to care for the children of the
working poor called ``Operation Child Rescue.'' The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has concluded that this program reached only
a small percentage of those affected. Approximately 45 percent of
children under the age of 5 are malnourished. Government spending on
education continued to decline, both in real terms and as a proportion
of GDP. There are more than 20 NGO's that promote child welfare.
Several private organizations are very active in programs to assist
street children, and UNICEF also runs a program in conjunction with the
Central Bank. The children of the poor often experience severe
hardships, especially in urban areas. Children as young as 5 or 6 years
of age often sell newspapers or candy on the street to support
themselves or to augment family income. Also, there are reports of
prostitution by girls and boys under 18 years of age in urban areas,
and there have been reports of cases in which children were forced into
prostitution. In rural areas, young children often must leave school at
an early age to help out on the family's plot of land.
People with Disabilities.--There is no official discrimination
against disabled persons in employment, education, or the provision of
other state services. However, there are no laws to ensure disabled
persons access to public buildings or services, nor are they provided
any other special government assistance. In June the city of Guayaquil
began a modest program to give the disabled better access to public
buildings.
Indigenous People.--While at least 85 percent of all citizens claim
some indigenous heritage, culturally indigenous people make up about 15
to 20 percent of the total population. The vast majority live in rural
areas, including the highlands and the Amazonian provinces, and most
live in varying degrees of poverty. Land is scarce in the more heavily
populated highland areas where high infant mortality, malnutrition, and
epidemic disease are common. Electricity and potable water often are
unavailable. Although the rural education system is seriously
deficient, many indigenous groups participated actively with the
Ministry of Education in the development of the bilingual education
program used in rural public schools.
The Constitution recognizes the rights of indigenous communities to
hold property communally, to administer traditional community justice
in certain cases, and to be consulted before natural resources are
exploited in community territories. Indigenous people also have the
same civil and political rights as other citizens. In the Amazon area,
indigenous groups have lobbied the Government, enlisted the help of
foreign and domestic NGO's, and mounted protests (including kidnaping
oil workers and tourists), in their attempts to win a share of oil
revenues and a voice in exploitation and development decisions. The
Constitution expressly recognizes the indigenous communities' rights to
be consulted on, but not to approve, oil exploration and development.
Oil companies have increased their efforts to minimize the
environmental and social impact of their oil projects in the Amazon but
continue to face criticism from indigenous groups that environmental
damage still is occurring.
Despite their growing political influence and the efforts of
grassroots community groups, which were increasingly successful in
pressuring the central Government to assist them, Indians continue to
suffer discrimination at many levels of society. With few exceptions,
indigenous people are at the lowest end of the socioeconomic scale. For
example, by one UNICEF estimate in 1999, 83 percent of indigenous
children worked at some kind of job (see Section 6.d.).
CONAIE was at the forefront of protests that toppled President
Mahuad (see Section 3). It also has arranged a popular referendum and
public demonstrations to protest government economic austerity measures
and to urge the repeal of economic modernization laws involving
privatization of state-owned enterprises.
Religious Minorities.--Although relations between religious
communities generally have been amicable, in past years there have been
a few incidents of interreligious or intrareligious tension or
violence.
A Baptist clinic in the town of Chachas is operating normally,
following opposition to its establishment from local residents in April
1999.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of the rural,
northern coastal area includes large numbers of Afro-Ecuadorian
citizens. They suffer widespread poverty and pervasive discrimination,
particularly with regard to educational and economic opportunity. There
are no special government efforts to address these problems.
There are five major Afro-Ecuadorian organizations active in the
country; the largest is the Confederacion Nacional Afroecuatoriana,
with headquarters in Quito. It estimates that Afro-Ecuadorians account
for more than 1 million persons, or about 10 percent of the total
population. While the presence of Afro-Ecuadorians has grown in the
fields of sports and culture, their educational opportunities continue
to be limited.
The press has focused on lingering racism among all strata of
society. Afro-Ecuadorian organizations note that despite the absence of
official discrimination, societal discrimination continues to affect
them. For example, they assert that the police stop Afro-Ecuadorians
for document checks with greater frequency than other citizens.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and Labor Code
provide most workers with the right to form trade unions. Members of
the police, the military, and public sector employees in nonrevenue
producing entities are not free to form trade unions. The 1991 Labor
Code reforms sets the number of workers required for an establishment
to be unionized at 30, which the International Labor Organization's
Committee on Freedom of Association considers too stringent a
limitation at the plant workers' council level. Although the Congress
debated additional labor reforms, labor law was in flux at year's end
because the Constitutional Court ruled that some recent labor
legislation was unconstitutional. The court's ruling nullified several
articles that the Government stated provided flexibility to employers,
but that some observers claimed undercut constitutional protections of
worker rights.
While employees of state-owned organizations enjoy rights similar
to those in the private sector, the law technically prevents the
majority of public sector employees from joining unions or exercising
collective bargaining rights. However, most public employees maintain
membership in some labor organization, and there are frequent
``illegal'' strikes. Despite official threats, the Government rarely
takes action against striking public workers. However, in May the
Government ordered striking teachers back to work and arrested and
temporarily jailed National Teachers' Union (UNE) leaders. A November
1997 law prohibits public sector strikes if they paralyze key services,
including schools.
Although the labor confederations are politically independent, the
two largest single labor unions, the UNE and the Union of Social
Security Workers, are allied with the Democratic Political Movement, a
communist party. Approximately 12 percent of the work force is
organized. There are four large labor centrals or confederations. None
of the main labor centrals is connected firmly to any one political
party, and there are no ties between the Government and any labor
union.
There are few restrictions on the right of workers to strike,
although a 10-day cooling-off period is required before a strike can be
declared. The Labor Code revisions limit solidarity strikes or boycotts
to 3 days, provided that the Labor Ministry approves them. In a legal
strike, workers may take possession of the factory or workplace, thus
ending production at the site, and receive police protection during the
takeover. The employer must pay all salaries and benefits during a
legal strike; the Labor Code protects strikers and their leaders from
retaliation.
There were several significant strikes during the year, mainly in
response to government austerity measures. They involved public sector
employees such as teachers and social security and medical workers, as
well as petroleum, electricity, and transportation workers; indigenous
groups also protested during the strikes. Police in Quito used tear gas
in January, March, and September to repel demonstrators who sought
access to the city center (see Section 2.b.). In April public sector
bureaucrats went on strike to demand higher wages. In May the Public
Teachers Union (UNE) began a countrywide strike for higher wages, and a
judge issued an arrest warrant for Arcelly Moreno, the president of the
UNE. The strike lasted more than 2 months; some striking teachers were
detained for as long as 10 days. In December health workers held a
strike for 2 weeks.
Unions may freely form and join federations or confederations, and
three of the large labor centrals maintain international affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor
market is highly segmented, with a minority of workers in skilled,
usually unionized, positions in state-run enterprises or in medium to
large industries. Most of the economically active population is
employed in the agricultural sector or the urban informal sector; the
vast majority of these workers are not organized. The Labor Code
requires that all private employers with 30 or more workers belonging
to a union must negotiate collectively when the union so requests.
Collective bargaining agreements cover only onequarter of the
approximately 12 percent of the work force that is organized. In March
a new labor law allowed businesses to hire workers on ``individual
contracts,'' but the practice did not become prevalent because Congress
was reconsidering the law at year's end.
The Labor Code streamlined the bargaining process in state
enterprises by requiring workers to be represented by only one labor
union. It prohibits discrimination against unions and requires that
employers provide space for union activities upon the union's request.
The law does not permit employers to dismiss a worker without the
express permission of the Ministry of Labor, whose rulings are not
subject to judicial review. If the Ministry of Labor rules that a
dismissal is unjustified, it can require the employer to pay large
indemnities or separation payments to the worker, although the reforms
set a cap on such payments. A fired worker is eligible for
reinstatement and in general would not be blacklisted at other
companies. Workers generally are protected against antiunion
discrimination only by pressure from the union. The Labor Code provides
for resolution of labor conflicts through an arbitration and
conciliation board which consists of one representative of the Ministry
of Labor, two from the union, and two from management.
The 1990 Maquila Law permits the hiring of temporary workers for
the maquila (in-bond processing for export) industries only. While
there is no express prohibition on association rights in the Maquila
Law, in practice it is difficult to organize temporary employees on
short-term contracts. Since temporary workers are not recognized by the
Labor Code, they do not enjoy the same level of protection offered to
other workers. The maquila system allows a company and its property to
become an export-processing zone wherever it is located. Many such
``zones'' have been established; most are relatively small and are
dedicated to textiles and fish processing.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the Labor Code prohibit compulsory labor, and there were no reports of
it in general. There have been reports of children forced into
prostitution (see Section 5), but there were no other reports of forced
or bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits boys younger than 12 years old and girls
younger than age 14 from working, except in special circumstances such
as apprenticeships. It requires children between the ages of 12 or 14
and 18 years to have the permission of their parent or guardian to
work. The law also prohibits children between the ages of 14 and 18
years from working more than 7 hours per day or 35 hours per week, and
it restricts children below the age of 14 years to a maximum of 6 hours
per day and 30 hours per week. In practice the Ministry of Labor fails
to enforce child labor laws, and child labor is prevalent. The problem
has increased in recent years due to the prolonged economic crisis, and
urban child labor has increased with the migration of the rural poor to
the cities. A UNICEF report estimated that in 1997, 37 percent of the
2.1 million children between the ages of 10 and 17 worked; in 1999
almost 1 out of 2 children in this age bracket worked. A 1999 report
based on a joint national and World Bank study found that 45 percent of
children between the ages of 10 and 17 worked at least parttime. Among
children aged 10 to 11, who cannot work legally, 28 percent worked at
least part-time nationwide. More than 60 percent of all children live
in rural areas and do unpaid agricultural work for their families.
The Constitution provides that children must attend school until
they attain a ``basic level of education'' estimated at 9 school years.
However, due to the lack of schools in many rural communities, the
Government's failure to provide adequate resources, and the need for
children to work, this provision rarely is enforced. UNICEF reported in
1999 that one out of three children did not remain in school long
enough to complete the 6th grade. The Constitution provides that 30
percent of the public budget must be devoted to education; however, in
practice only half of that amount is spent. The Government has programs
in 18 urban areas that provide families with educational subsidies as
an incentive to keep children in school. In rural areas, many children
attend school only sporadically after about 10 years of age in order to
contribute to household income as farm laborers.
In the city, many children under 12 years of age work in
familyowned ``businesses'' in the informal sector, shining shoes,
collecting and recycling garbage, or as street peddlers. Others are
employed in commerce, messenger services, domestic service, and
begging. Child prostitution is a problem, and there have been cases
reported of children being forced into prostitution (see Section 5).
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and there were no
other reports of such practices (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor
periodically sets the minimum wage in consultation with the Commission
on Salaries, but Congress also may adjust it. As of August, the minimum
wage plus mandated bonuses provided a gross monthly compensation of
approximately $110, or 50 cents per hour in the case of contract
workers. The statutory minimum wage is not adequate to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. Most organized workers in
state industries and formal sector private enterprises earned
substantially more than the minimum wage and also received other
significant benefits through collective bargaining agreements. However,
the majority of workers work in the large informal and rural sector
without recourse to the minimum wage or to legally mandated benefits.
The Ministry of Labor has the principal role in enforcing labor
laws and carries this out through a corps of labor inspectors who are
active in all 22 provinces. The Labor Code provides for a 40-hour
workweek, a 15-day annual vacation, a minimum wage, and other employer-
provided benefits, such as uniforms and training opportunities. In
March reforms to the labor law nominally gave greater flexibility to
employers by hiring parttime workers, such as accountants, for only a
few hours per week. However, this legislation was affected by a
Constitutional Court decision (see Section 6.a.).
The Labor Code also provides general protection for workers' health
and safety on the job. However, a worker may not leave the workplace of
his own volition, even if there is a hazardous situation. The worker is
allowed to request that an inspector from the Ministry of Labor come to
the workplace and confirm the hazard; that inspector then may close
down the workplace. Response time for inspectors ranges from a few days
in major cities to much longer in the countryside.
The Government enforces health and safety standards and regulations
through the Social Security Institute. In the formal sector,
occupational health and safety is not a major problem. However, there
are no specific regulations governing health and safety standards in
the agricultural sector and in practice there is no enforcement of
safety rules in the small mines that make up the vast majority of the
mining sector. During the year, at least two fatalities were reported
due to accidents in the mines.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is a misdemeanor law that
addresses trafficking in persons; it provides for penalties from 6
months to 3 years in prison, as well as fines. The Migration Law and
the Penal Code provide for the imposition of sanctions on suppliers of
false documents for purposes of travel or work. Other laws dealing with
kidnaping, labor, occupational safety, and slavery apply to and provide
sanctions for trafficking in persons. In June Congress amended the
Criminal Code to strengthen sentences for furnishing or utilizing false
documents and for alien smuggling. Alien smugglers or traffickers can
receive sentences from 3 to 6 years' imprisonment; the penalties range
from 6 to 9 years' if victims are injured, and a penalty of up to 12
years may be imposed if a death occurs. The law specifically exempts
victims from prosecution. There were no confirmed reports of persons
being trafficked to, from, within, or through the country against their
will; however, there were many reports of persons being smuggled
illegally from the country to the United States through Central America
in which trafficking sometimes was suspected. In 1999 police in Spain
reported that they had arrested 50 Ecuadorian women working as
prostitutes who were likely victims of trafficking.
__________
EL SALVADOR
El Salvador is a constitutional, multiparty democracy with an
executive branch headed by a president and a unicameral legislature.
President Francisco Flores of the Nationalist Republican Alliance
(ARENA) was elected in 1999 to a 5-year term. In free and fair
elections in March, the former guerrilla organization Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN) won a plurality of the seats in the
Legislative Assembly. ARENA maintains a working majority in coalition
with the conservative National Conciliation Party. Three other parties
hold seats in the Assembly. The judiciary is constitutionally
independent but suffers from inefficiency and corruption.
The National Civilian Police (PNC) maintains internal security. The
military is responsible for external security. The military provides
support for some PNC patrols in rural areas, a measure begun in 1995 by
presidential executive order in an effort to contain violence by well-
armed, organized criminal bands. In March at the President's direction,
the air force, navy, and selected army units formed Joint Task Groups
with the police as part of an interagency antinarcotics program.
Civilian authorities maintain effective control of the military and
security forces. Some members of the police committed human rights
abuses.
The country has a free-market, mixed economy largely based on
services, agriculture, and manufacturing. Although agriculture accounts
for only 12 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), it is the
largest source of employment, engaging 35 percent of the work force,
estimated at 2.3 million persons. Coffee and sugar are the principal
export crops and important sources of foreign exchange. The
manufacturing sector, which contributes 21 percent of GDP, employs 9
percent of the work force. The textile sector, especially the maquila
(in-bond assembly or processing) plants in free trade zones, represents
about 50 percent of manufacturing sector employment and is the main
source of new jobs. The economy is open, and private property is
respected. The rate of real economic growth was estimated to reach 2.5
percent during the year. Inflation was 3.6 percent. Per capita GDP
reached $2,080. The official unemployment rate averaged 7.7 percent
during the year, 6.5 percent urban and 11 percent rural; however, the
rate of underemployment (less than full-time work or total income below
the minimum wage) was estimated at about 30 percent. Approximately 44
percent of the population lives below the poverty level.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Police
officers committed extrajudicial killings. The Supreme Court found the
1993 Amnesty Law constitutional but noted that certain categories of
crimes were not covered. Police kidnaped persons for profit. The police
used excessive force and mistreated detainees; there were also
allegations that police abused street children. Prison conditions
remained poor. High crime rates, together with police officer
involvement in prominent kidnapings, led to the creation of a
presidential commission to discipline and dismiss corrupt and criminal
police. Police arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The judiciary
remained inefficient and is hampered by widespread corruption. Impunity
for the rich and powerful remained a problem. The authorities used
force to disperse one demonstration; one person was injured. In
February Human Rights Ombudsman Eduardo Penate Polanco resigned over
misconduct charges; the Legislative Assembly had not named a successor
at year's end. Violence and discrimination against women continued, and
discrimination against disabled persons also remained a problem. Abuse
of children, child labor, and forced child prostitution were also
problems. The Government did not adequately protect workers' rights to
organize and bargain collectively. Trafficking in women and children is
a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by agents of the Government; however, the
police committed some extrajudicial killings.
During the year, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office received for
investigation 87 cases alleging killings by the PNC during the year and
in prior years. As of November, the presidential commission
investigating police misconduct identified at least 72 officers
suspected of extrajudicial killings during the year and in prior years.
On February 10, police shot at the tires and windshield of a
vehicle that failed to obey their signal to stop on a major
thoroughfare in San Salvador. When the vehicle halted, passenger
Salvador Hernandez fled, and a police officer shot and killed him. The
prosecutor charged Mario Orlando Franco Duran with aggravated homicide.
He also charged Franco and three other officers with the attempted
murder of Edwin Quintanilla Flores and Ricardo Trejo Stanley, the
vehicle's driver and another passenger. On December 11, a judge
determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the homicide
charge for the trial of Franco to proceed to the next phase; however,
the judge dismissed the attempted homicide charges against the
defendants on grounds that it was impossible to determine which
officers intended to shoot at the vehicle's windshield. The prosecutor
appealed the latter verdict, and the appeal was pending at year's end.
On April 7, police driver Mauricio Enrique Martinez shot and killed
Luis Edgardo Garcia Vasquez after he failed to stop when signaled by
police on the highway between Santa Ana and Ahuachapan. Two police
officers and two police drivers pursued him and shot out his tires.
When the vehicle stopped, Martinez opened the door and shot Garcia in
the head. In December a court convicted Martinez of aggravated murder
and sentenced him to 28 years in prison. The two officers were
acquitted, and charges were dropped against the other driver, who
became a witness in the case.
In June PNC officer Luis Alonso Navarrete was on duty with a Joint
Task Group (composed of soldiers and police) when he allegedly shot and
killed six persons and wounded four others with an M-16. Five of the
victims were soldiers who formed part of his Joint Task Group. Police
arrested Navarrete the same day; he reportedly suffered from mental
illness. The PNC disciplinary committee dismissed Navarrete from the
police in September. He remained in custody awaiting trial on charges
of aggravated homicide and attempted aggravated homicide at year's end.
A total of 13 inmates died in prison due to violence and illness
(see Section 1.c.).
There was mixed progress in resolving cases of extrajudicial
killings from previous years.
In October a court sentenced police officer Jose Miguel Soriano
Melgar to 12 years in prison for the November 1999 shooting of Carlos
Lopez Regalo. The court acquitted police captain Erick Fuentes of the
charge of aggravated homicide. That verdict was appealed in November;
the appeal was pending at year's end.
In July a police disciplinary tribunal removed from the force five
officers charged with the November 1999 beating death of Manuel de
Jesus Parada. In October a jury acquitted four of them of the crime; it
issued no verdict for the fifth officer, who had fled prosecution and
did not appear for the trial.
In October a court found three PNC officers guilty of attempted
homicide for torturing Juan Carlos Miranda before stabbing him and
stealing his vehicle (see Section 1.c.).
In November a court convicted police officer Jorge Alberto Canas
Sanchez of aggravated homicide and sentenced him to 30 years in prison
for the August 1999 murders of Fernando Hernandez and Manuel Aguilar.
Two other officers charged with the crime remained fugitives at year's
end. A judge provisionally acquitted another individual who had been
charged with complicity. The prosecutor's appeal was pending at year's
end.
In February a court dismissed charges against a police officer in
the August 1999 shooting of a protester near Sonsonate during a
confrontation between police and several hundred members of the
Association of Salvadoran Agricultural Producers. The prosecutor
appealed, but the appeals court upheld the verdict.
In October the trial of Jose Ernesto Cordova, charged with the July
1999 murder of William Ernesto Rosales Bonilla, an employee of the
newspaper El Diario de Hoy, began. The trial had not concluded at
year's end. Prosecutors assert that there were other participants in
the crime, including police officers. However, no evidence of police
participation had been found by year's end.
A public prosecutor charged police captain Mariano Rodriguez Zepeda
with aggravated homicide for the 1998 shooting of Jose Antonio
Villalta. The next phase of the trial was scheduled for January 2001.
There were no further developments in the 1998 death of Carlos
Ernesto Lovo who died of drowning after fleeing police custody.
In February four members of the National Action Party (PAN) were
killed in two separate incidents. Masked gunmen shot and killed
Gilberto Cano Gonzalez near PAN headquarters in Metapan while he was
distributing campaign materials to a party sympathizer, Samuel Martinez
Flores. Martinez was killed by his own gun, which he dropped in his
attempt to flee after the first shots were fired. In October a court
found ARENA activist Jose David Murcia and Gilberto Torres not guilty
of aggravated homicide. The prosecutor appealed, alleging procedural
errors in the trial. The appeal was pending at year's end. In San
Antonio de Monte a local resident (reportedly mentally disturbed)
stoned two PAN members to death. The police detained the perpetrator,
and there was no indication of any political connection.
On March 26, Jose Maria Tojeira, rector of the Jose Simeon Canas
Central American University, formally asked the Attorney General to
reopen the case of the 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests, their
housekeeper, and her daughter and prosecute the crime's alleged
instigators. He based his request in part on the December 1999 report
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) which found
the State responsible for violating the right to life of the eight
murdered persons and for failing to conduct an effective investigation.
The report also criticized the 1993 General Amnesty Law, which led to
the release from custody of two military officers found guilty of the
murders in 1992, and called on the Government to reopen the case. In
reply to the IACHR report, the President reviewed the steps taken by
the justice system to investigate and punish the crime; however, he
recommended against reopening the case because that would undermine the
integrity of the post civil war amnesty, which he regarded as essential
to the continuing process of national reconciliation. The Attorney
General deferred action on Tojeira's petition until the Supreme Court
(CSJ) issued its decision on the constitutionality of the 1993 General
Amnesty Law. On September 26, the CSJ upheld the constitutionality of
the 1993 General Amnesty Law. However, the Court also indicated that
certain special cases were not eligible for amnesty and gave lower
courts discretion to adjudicate these matters on a case-by-case basis.
In December the Attorney General brought the matter before a lower
court judge and recommended that the case be closed. The judge ruled
that the accused were not covered under the amnesty law because they
were public officials at the time of the killings. However, she closed
the case because the 10-year statute of limitations had expired.
Tojeira appealed the decision, as did the defense, who wanted the court
to find the accused not guilty based on the facts rather than the
statute of limitations. Both appeals were pending at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed politically motivated
disappearances.
As of mid-November, the presidential commission investigating
police misconduct identified at least 12 officers suspected of
involvement in kidnapings in during the year and in prior years. Most
disappearances were the result of kidnaping for profit, a common
occurrence affecting all levels of society throughout the country.
In May an organized crime group that included police officers
kidnaped businessman Rodrigo Zablah in San Salvador and held him for
more than 2 weeks. Three police officers allegedly stopped his vehicle
and told him to accompany them to the police station because of a
traffic accident that had occurred a day earlier. Once he was in the
police car, they took him to another location. The Attorney General's
office identified 18 persons involved in the crime, including at least
3 police officers. A hearing was scheduled for June 2001. Eight of the
accused remained at large at year's end.
In June another organized crime group that included police officers
kidnaped a couple in Sonsonate and demanded ransom. The PNC's
antikidnaping unit rescued the victims the next day and captured five
persons. The Attorney General's office charged eight persons with the
crime, including PNC sergeant Tomasa Reyes Alvarado and former PNC
sergeant Jose Azcunaga Segura. The latter had been charged with
kidnaping in the past and had been removed from the police force. A
hearing was scheduled for May 2001. Two of the accused remained at
large at year's end.
There were no new developments in the 1999 kidnapings of Margarita
Posada, the director of a domestic nongovernmental organization (NGO),
and Miguel Montenegro, president of the Human Rights Commission of El
Salvador. Both victims were released within a day. The police did not
find the perpetrators.
The Association for the Search for Children who Disappeared as a
Result of the Armed Conflict, a local NGO, advocated the creation of a
national commission to clarify what happened to 383 children who
disappeared during the war, and whose whereabouts remain unknown. The
Legislative Assembly had taken no action on their request at the end of
the year.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, some
members of the PNC continued to use excessive force or otherwise
mistreated detainees.
In February four PNC officers allegedly tortured Juan Carlos
Miranda before stabbing him and stealing his vehicle. The officers had
stopped him as he was driving a minibus. After putting him in the back
of the bus, they kicked, beat, and threatened him for 2 hours. Finally,
they stabbed him and left him for dead. In October a court found three
officers guilty of attempted homicide and sentenced them to 16 years in
prison. The court absolved a fourth officer of all charges.
During the year, the office of the Ombudsman for the Protection of
Human Rights (PDDH) received 724 complaints of violation of the right
of personal integrity by government authorities, a decrease from a
total of 929 complaints in 1999. This category covers torture, inhuman
or degrading treatment, mistreatment, disproportionate use of force,
and improper treatment of detainees. The majority of these complaints
involved the PNC and alleged minor to serious violations of arrest
procedures. The PDDH received a total of 1,198 complaints against the
PNC for all categories of human rights violations during the year. The
number of complaints against the PNC and the cases of violations of
personal integrity by all authorities have declined for the past
several years.
At year's end, 128 police officers were in prison on criminal
charges or serving prison sentences for crimes that included murder,
rape, extortion, and kidnaping.
In June President Flores named a commission to investigate alleged
police misconduct. The commission proposed reforms to PNC regulations
to expedite discipline and dismissals, including the establishment of
special courts to review cases of alleged misconduct. In June the
Legislative Assembly passed authorizing legislation to implement the
measures recommended by the commission. This legislation strengthened
the role of the PNC Inspector General's office, making it a quasi-
independent body within the PNC, charged with investigating allegations
of police misconduct and reporting directly to the chief. In August the
Assembly approved a temporary measure that allowed the chief of police
for 120 days to remove officers charged with crimes or inadequate
performance following an internal PNC investigation by the office of
the Inspector General. In December the Assembly extended the measure
for an additional 45 days. By year's end, the police force had
dismissed more than 1,500 persons under the special decree and
preexisting disciplinary procedures, and the special police courts had
acquitted more than 200 persons. Some assembly deputies and the press
questioned the transparency of the process and the fairness of its
application and charged that high ranking officers remained immune from
scrutiny. The commission identified 14 persons suspected of having
committed torture.
Labor organizations and the Human Rights Ombudsman alleged that in
March the Government used unwarranted force to disperse a demonstration
by striking social security workers. The police used water cannons on
demonstrators who had blocked a busy street for several hours and
refused to move when urged to do so by police and other authorities,
including the Human Rights Ombudsman. The police shot rubber bullets in
the air, injuring one journalist. When the case was brought to court in
March, the judge determined that the use of force by police was
appropriate for the circumstances. The Government did not employ force
during other demonstrations during the year.
In the past there have been allegations from children's rights
groups that street children suffer from police brutality; the PNC
always have denied these charges (see Section 5).
There were no further developments in the 1998 shooting of FMLN
communications adviser Leonardo Mena Marroquin.
Human rights awareness was a standard component of the police
officers' basic training program.
Prison conditions remained poor. From December 1997 to December
1999, the prison population fell about 23 percent as a result of the
implementation of new sentencing and penal codes, which limit
preventive detention to serious crimes. However, it increased again
during the year. The prison system has the capacity to hold 5,794
prisoners in 18 penal facilities. There was still some overcrowding in
individual facilities. At year's end, 7,383 men were held in 17 prison
facilities with a combined capacity of 5,674; there are 371 women in
the single women's prison, which has a capacity of 120; and there are
61 men in 3 secure hospital wards with a combined capacity of 75
persons. Because of a lack of holding cells, pretrial detainees often
are sent to regular prisons, where they may be placed together with
violent criminals.
Gang violence, especially in the country's three largest and oldest
penitentiaries and its juvenile holding facilities, continued to plague
the prison system, despite government efforts to separate different
gangs. In January the media reported incidents of prisoners torturing
other prisoners in La Esperanza in San Salvador in 1999 and earlier.
Prison authorities reported that, during the year, there were 13 deaths
in the prison system, 4 of which were from multiple wounds caused by
violence between prisoners. The remaining deaths resulted from illness.
There are separate facilities for female detainees and prisoners.
The law requires that all juveniles be housed separately from
adults both prior to trial and while serving a prison sentence, and the
Government observes this requirement in practice. Most criminal cases
involving juveniles are brought to trial or conciliation proceedings
within 3 months.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors, NGO's, and the media.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest; however, at times the PNC arbitrarily
arrested and detained persons. During the year, the PDDH received 181
complaints for violations of personal liberty, a decrease from 225
complaints in 1999. The number of complaints in this category has
declined steadily since 1996. The courts generally enforced a ruling
that interrogation without the presence of counsel is coerced and that
any evidence obtained in such a manner is inadmissible. As a result,
police authorities generally delayed questioning until a public
defender arrived.
The law permits the police to hold a person for 72 hours before
delivering the suspect to court, after which the judge may order
detention for an additional 72 hours to determine if an investigation
is warranted. Because of a lack of holding cells, such detainees often
are sent to regular prisons, where they may be placed together with
violent criminals. The law allows 120 days to investigate serious
crimes and 45 days for lesser offenses before a judge is required to
bring the accused to trial or dismiss the case. However, many cases
were not completed within the legally prescribed time frame. During the
year, more than 2,000 inmates were in pretrial detention. From January
through May, the justice of the peace courts, where most court cases
originate, accepted a daily average of 166 cases. Of these, a daily
average of nine cases were resolved through conciliation proceedings.
The Penitentiary Code permits release on bail for detainees who are
unlikely to flee or whose release would not impede the investigation of
the case. Because it may take several years for a case to come to
trial, some prisoners have been incarcerated longer than the maximum
legal sentence for their crimes. In such circumstances, a detainee may
request a review by the Supreme Court of his or her continued
detention.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government
observes this prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. However, the judiciary suffers from inefficiency and
corruption.
The court structure has four levels: justices of the peace, trial
courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
selects justices of the peace, trial judges, and appellate judges from
a list of nominees proposed by the National Judicial Council. The
Council is an independent body provided for in the Constitution to
nominate, train, and evaluate judges. All lower court judges serve
until they voluntarily resign or are dismissed for cause. The
Legislative Assembly elects, by a two-thirds majority, Supreme Court
justices from a list provided by the National Judicial Council and the
National Association of Lawyers. A justice serves for 9 years and may
be reelected. There are separate court systems for family matters and
juvenile offenders; they stress conciliation as an alternative to
adjudication. The Criminal Sentencing Court has responsibility for
executing and monitoring the sentences imposed by the trial courts.
Through its Department of Judicial Investigation, the Supreme Court
regularly receives and investigates public complaints about judicial
performance. This department also reviews the findings and
recommendations of the National Judicial Council, which evaluates
justices on an ongoing basis. The Supreme Court imposes penalties when
warranted.
Judges, not juries, decide most cases. A jury verdict cannot be
appealed. However, the defendant may appeal the sentence to the Supreme
Court for reduction. A jury verdict may be overturned by a mistrial
determination that there were serious problems with jury panel
selection or errors in the trial procedure. A judge's verdict may be
appealed.
The Juvenile Legal Code requires that minors under the age of 18 be
tried only in juvenile courts, limits sentences for minors to a maximum
of 7 years, and includes alternatives to incarceration for minors.
In 1999 the Legislative Assembly approved a number of additional
changes to the Criminal Procedures and Penal and Penitentiary
(Sentencing) Codes. These changes included the establishment of more
severe penalties for some crimes (including increasing the maximum
possible prison sentence from 30 to 35 years), the elimination of
parole for some crimes, and the addition of new crimes to the code. One
of these reforms strengthened the legal protection afforded to children
and the disabled by prescribing 6-to-8-year prison sentences for
persons convicted of sexual aggression against adults incapacitated by
mental or physical conditions or against minors.
The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence,
protection from self-incrimination, legal counsel, freedom from
coercion, and compensation for damages due to judicial error.
Defendants also have the right to be present in court. These rights
were not always respected fully in practice. The Constitution and law
require the Government to provide legal counsel for the indigent;
however, this requirement was not always implemented in practice.
Impunity before the country's civil and criminal laws continued,
especially for persons who were politically, economically, or
institutionally well-connected. In August National Conciliation Party
leader and Legislative Assembly Deputy Francisco Merino shot at police
officers, injuring one officer. (Merino is also a former Vice
President.) Merino settled out of court with the police department and
the injured officer. The Assembly decided not to lift Merino's
parliamentary immunity to allow criminal prosecution.
In October a judge exonerated the individuals accused of the April
1999 rape and murder of 9-year-old Katya Miranda. Investigators
allegedly failed to collect important evidence at the crime scene, and
the judge refused to interview several witnesses identified by
prosecutors. In November a judge ruled that the ex-president and
directors of the Salvadoran Soccer Federation could not be prosecuted
for misuse of funds, document fraud, and other charges because the
organization was not public. More than $4 million (36 million colones)
was missing from the Federation. The Attorney General's office appealed
the judge's decision, and a hearing was scheduled for January 2001.
Inadequate police coverage (due to limited resources and lack of
sufficient personnel) and intimidation of victims and witnesses
(especially by gangs) made it difficult to identify, arrest, and
prosecute criminals, resulting in diminished public confidence in the
justice system.
Corruption in the judicial system and the Attorney General's office
contributed to impunity. In November the Attorney General announced
that he was investigating information that almost 450 prosecutors and
judges might have falsified their credentials or obtained them
illegitimately, and another 83 persons might have been involved in
nepotism. He also was investigating suspicions that prominent defense
attorneys had sources inside the prosecutors' office who provided leaks
that impeded investigations and prevented successful prosecutions.
The Government and the Legislature took steps to address these
problems. At the Attorney General's urging, the Legislative Assembly
passed a law on November 23 that created an expedited process for
dismissing employees of the Attorney General's office. The measure,
authorized for 120 days, was modeled after a law passed in August that
permitted the expedited removal of undesirable persons from the police
force.
Some public officials called for the Supreme Court to begin a
similar initiative to remove corrupt judges. The Court maintained that
its Department of Judicial Investigation and the National Judicial
Council already scrutinized judicial performance on an ongoing basis.
In practice, the Court imposed few sanctions upon judges. During the
year the Court received the Council's evaluations of the performance of
322 justices of the peace, 46 trial court judges, 63 sentencing court
judges, and 28 appeals court magistrates. The evaluations reviewed each
judge's performance over several months in 1998 or 1999. The Council
recommended the dismissal of 3 justices of the peace and 1 trial court
judge, and suspensions ranging from 3 to 60 days for 156 justices of
the peace, 23 trial court judges, 18 sentencing court judges, and 13
appeals court magistrates. The Court exonerated two of the four
officials recommended for dismissal; a third resigned, and the fourth
case remained under review at the end of the year. By the end of the
year, the Court had begun to review 11 cases of judges recommended for
dismissal. It had taken no action in the remaining cases.
The implementation of judicial reforms continued to create
confusion and uncertainty among police, prosecutors, public defenders,
and the courts. Inadequate police coverage (due to limited resources
and lack of sufficient personnel) and intimidation of victims and
witnesses (especially by gangs) made it difficult to identify, arrest,
and prosecute criminals, thus diminishing public confidence in the
justice system.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for a right to privacy, and
government authorities generally respected these rights in practice.
The law requires the police to have a resident's consent, a warrant, or
a reasonable belief that a crime is under way or is about to be
committed, before entering a private dwelling.
In June the Attorney General's office initiated investigations of
reported illegal wiretapping activities conducted by the
telecommunications company, TELECOM. The Legislative Assembly formed a
special commission to conduct parallel investigations. The
Superintendent of Telecommunications and Electricity produced a list of
telephone numbers believed to have been tapped, including those of the
offices of the Attorney General, politicians, journalists, and NGO's.
Neither the commission nor the Attorney General had completed their
investigations, and the purpose of the wiretapping had not been
determined at year's end.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Print and broadcast journalists from all major media outlets
regularly and freely criticize the Government and report opposition
views. Opposition figures are interviewed routinely on television and
radio, and in the press. According to major media associations, the
Government did not use direct or indirect means to control the media.
However, some television stations complained that advertising agencies
responsible for placement of government-funded public service
announcements were biased in favor of media companies that generally
supported government policy.
The Inter-American Press Association identified problems in several
areas, including the absence of a law providing for journalists' right
to maintain the confidentiality of sources. In September some news
organizations criticized the Government for attempting to require all
television and radio stations to broadcast the President's speech and
related events celebrating Independence Day. Several organizations
refused to broadcast events other than the President's speech; however,
the Government took no action against them.
There are 5 daily newspapers, with a combined circulation of more
than 250,000 copies per day, and 12 television stations. Four
independent VHF television stations reach most areas of the country,
while the government-owned and operated VHF station has poor signal
quality even in San Salvador. Seven independent UHF stations serve San
Salvador, and several can be received as far as 30 miles from the
capital. Two cable television systems cover much of the capital, and
other cable companies operate in the major cities of San Miguel, Santa
Ana, and Sonsonate. All carry major local stations and a wide range of
international programming. There are approximately 20 small cable
television companies across the country, serving limited local areas.
While most of them appear to be authorized broadcasters, several are
believed to be pirating signals. Approximately 150 licensed radio
stations broadcast on the FM and AM bands.
A provision in the 1999 Criminal Code allows judges to close court
proceedings if public exposure could prejudice the case. The media and
the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) have asserted that the
provision abridges press freedom. In the past, legislative deputies
have argued that misuse of the provision could lead to impunity and
corruption by limiting the ``watchdog'' role of the press.
There were no instances of censorship of books, other publications,
films, or plays.
The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and the Government
respects this right in practice.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for peaceful assembly for any lawful purpose, and the
Government respects this right in practice. There is no requirement for
permits to hold public meetings, and public demonstrations are common
and generally peaceful. A court determined that the Government's use of
force to disperse a demonstration by striking social security workers
in March was appropriate (see Section 1.c.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice.
The Supreme Court still had not decided a constitutional challenge
to a 1996 law charging the Ministry of Interior with registering,
regulating, and overseeing the finances of NGO's and non-Catholic
religious groups, which a group of affected organizations filed in
1998.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Constitution specifically recognizes the Roman Catholic Church and
grants it legal status. In addition, the Constitution provides that
other churches may register for such status in accordance with the law.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The law does not include specific provisions for granting refugee
or asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
however, the Government has procedures for handling such requests in
accordance with these principles.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum has not
arisen in recent years. There were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The President and Vice President are elected every
5 years. The Constitution bars the President from election to
consecutive terms. Voting is by secret ballot.
Ten political parties, representing the full political spectrum,
fielded 7 candidates in the March 1999 presidential elections. The
Government did not restrict opposition participation, and there were no
violent incidents during the campaign. Observers found that the vote
was without major flaws and proceeded peacefully with fair access to
the polls for all. Francisco Flores, the candidate of the ARENA party,
won a clear majority in the first round of voting.
In March the country held legislative elections that observers
generally reported to be free and fair. The FMLN won a plurality of
legislative seats.
Four PAN members were killed in two separate incidents in February
prior to the March elections (see Section 1.a.).
There are no laws or overt practices that prevent women from voting
or participating in the political and governmental systems; however,
women are not accorded equal respect or stature in these areas and are
under-represented in government and politics. Women head three
ministries (Foreign Affairs, Education, and Environment) and the Social
Security Institute, and hold a substantial number of vice- and sub-
ministerial jobs. Women represented 49 percent of the registered voters
in the March election. In March voters elected 8 women to the 84-seat
legislature, a decrease from the previous Assembly's 14 women. One
woman sits on the Assembly's 11-member governing board; there were 2
women on the board in the previous legislature.
Minorities, including indigenous people, are not barred from voting
or participating in government and politics; however, they are
underrepresented.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally demonstrated a willingness to discuss
human rights issues and problems with international and domestic NGO's.
However, it was sometimes reluctant to discuss worker rights issues
with NGO's. Numerous domestic and various international NGO's operated
freely. Domestic and international NGO's are required to register with
the Government under the terms of the 1996 NGO registration law, and
some reported difficulties.
The principal human rights investigative and monitoring body is the
Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH), elected by the
Assembly for a 3-year term. The Peace Accords specifically created the
PDDH, which was established formally by an amendment to the
constitution that defined its role.
Ombudsman Eduardo Penate Polanco resigned in February. The Attorney
General had charged him with diverting funds from international donors
while he worked in a previous job, and the Legislative Assembly was
preparing to remove him from office for negligence. Following his
resignation, the office continued its work under an acting Ombudsman
while the Legislative Assembly considered other candidates. The
office's investigative capacity remained limited due to resource
constraints. The institution remained handicapped because the interim
official lacked confirmation by the Assembly and therefore did not have
the same authority as a permanent ombudsman.
During the year, the PDDH accepted 2,572 complaints of human rights
violations. The rights most frequently alleged to have been violated
included personal integrity and due process of law; 566 complaints.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law
and prohibits discrimination based on nationality, race, sex, or
religion. In practice, discrimination against women, the disabled, and
indigenous people occurs in salaries and hiring. There were some
instances of violence against homosexuals.
There were no new developments in the 1999 shooting of a man
leaving the office of the domestic homosexual rights organization Entre
Amigos, or in the telephonic death threats against the director of that
organization. There were no new developments in the 1999 murders of
transvestite prostitutes ``Doris'' and Nestor Adonai Marenco (known as
``Gloria'') nor in the murders of transvestite prostitutes in 1998.
There was no new information in the 1999 case of PNC agents in
Chalatenango department charged with hitting, insulting, and
threatening six homosexuals.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, is a
widespread and serious problem. The law prohibits domestic violence and
provides for sentences ranging from 6 months to 1 year in prison upon
conviction. Convicted offenders are prohibited from using alcohol or
drugs and from carrying guns. The law also allows the imposition of
restraining orders against offenders. Once a taboo social subject,
domestic violence increasingly is being recognized publicly and has
become a topic for national debate. Government institutions, such as
the PDDH, the Attorney General's office, the Supreme Court, and the
PNC, coordinated efforts with NGO's and other organizations to combat
violence against women through education, government efforts to
increase enforcement of the law, and NGO support programs for victims.
The National Secretariat for the Family maintains a hot line for
victims to report domestic abuse. The Salvadoran Institute for the
Development of Women (ISDEMU) received 4,017 cases of domestic violence
through August, a number slightly down from the same period in 1999.
Incidents of domestic violence and rape continued to be underreported
for several reasons: societal and cultural pressures against the
victim; a fear of reprisal; poor response to victims by the
authorities; fear of publicity; and the belief that cases are unlikely
to be resolved. The penalties for sexually aggressive rape are 6 to 10
years in prison. The law does not specifically address spousal rape;
however, it could be considered a crime if the actions meet the
Criminal Code's definition of rape. The ISDEMU received 277 cases of
sexual aggression through August, a slight increase above the same
period in 1999.
Prostitution is common. There were credible reports that some women
and girls were forced into prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
Women are trafficked to Mexico to work as prostitutes (see Sections
6.c. and 6.f.).
The law prohibits sexual harassment. In May the authorities
dismissed a deputy police commissioner for having sexually harassed a
female subordinate.
The Constitution grants women and men the same legal rights;
however, women suffer discrimination.
Women suffer from cultural and societal discrimination and have
significantly reduced economic opportunities. Priority generally is
given to male children for schooling, to men for available jobs and
promotions, and to sons for inheritances. Women are not accorded equal
respect or stature in traditional male-dominated areas such as
agriculture and business. On June 15, the Legislature ratified
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention Number 100, on equal
remuneration. However, while there is no definitive evidence available,
it is widely believed that women often are paid less than men for equal
work. The one sector in which there is an exception to this practice is
in the export processing zones and in-bond assembly plants, the largest
source of new jobs, where women made up 85 to 90 percent of the work
force (see Section 6.b.). However, even in this sector, men hold the
majority of management positions. Training for women generally was
confined to low-wage occupational areas where women already hold most
positions, such as teaching, nursing, home industries, and small
businesses. The law prohibits pregnant women from working in strenuous
occupations after the fourth month of pregnancy (see Section 6.e.).
Several NGO's are engaged in promoting women's rights and have
conducted several rights awareness campaigns.
Children.--The Government concentrated more on reducing poverty and
promoting family stability through economic growth than in direct
expenditure on children's programs. The National Secretariat of the
Family solicited public input on a new national policy of comprehensive
attention for children and adolescents.
Education is compulsory through the 9th grade (up to age 14).
Public education is free through high school, and only a nominal fee is
charged to attend the national public university. Rural areas fell
short of providing a ninth grade education to all potential students,
in part because of a lack of resources and in part because many rural
parents withdraw their children from school by the sixth grade to work.
UNICEF data from 1998 show that 14 percent of urban children (ages 7-
17) and 29 percent of rural children were not attending classes.
The Government worked through state institutions and with UNICEF to
promote protection and general awareness of children's rights. However,
children continued to be victimized by physical and sexual abuse,
abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. The Salvadoran Institute for
the Protection of Children (ISPM), an autonomous entity, has
responsibility for protecting and promoting children's rights. The ISPM
estimated that an average of 2,600 children, some abandoned and others
victims of mistreatment, stayed in its shelters. For the year, it
reported 1,126 cases of physical mistreatment, 267 cases of negligence,
and 374 cases of abandonment. All of these statistics were below those
for the same period in 1999 when the ISPM reported approximately 1,500
cases of mistreatment, 650 cases of negligence, and 700 cases of
abandonment. Using different criteria, the ISDEMU recorded 3,071 cases
of abuse during the year, significantly below the 1999 level of 10,070
cases. The difference reflects a change in reporting criteria.
Substance abuse (glue and paint sniffing) was a problem among urban
street children. FUNDASALVA, an NGO, provides drug counseling and
treatment to minors. In the past, there have been allegations from
children's rights advocates that street children suffer from police
brutality. The PNC denied these charges and incorporated PDDH human
rights training into programs for police units that deal with
juveniles.
The ISPM reported 87 cases of sexual abuse, a slight increase from
the 1999 figure of 72. A majority of the victims were female. According
to the PDDH, over 85 percent of all abuse occurs in schools and at
home, and only a small percentage of these cases were reported to the
authorities.
The PDDH estimated that 270,000 minors work, most as street vendors
(see Section 6.d.). In addition to lost educational opportunities, some
of these children fell victim to sexual abuse and were exploited and
forced into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Between 10 and
25 percent of ``visible'' prostitutes are minors, and an estimated 40
percent of the ``hidden'' prostitutes who cater to upper-class clients
are believed to be minors, according to a UNICEF study released during
the year.
Children, especially those living on the streets, are trafficked to
other countries and then forced into prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
Children from Honduras have been used as beggars to support
traffickers in San Salvador (see Section 6.f.).
Infant malnutrition continued to be a problem. A National Family
Health Poll, conducted in 1998 and released in December 1999, found
that 1.1 percent of children under 5 years of age suffered from grave
malnutrition, with an additional 21 percent experiencing less severe
malnutrition. The Ministry of Health listed malnutrition as one of the
10 principal causes of infant mortality in the country. The Government
has a national plan for infants designed to increase access to potable
water, iodized salt, and micronutrients, and to encourage breast
feeding, but all of these remain problem areas, especially among the
rural poor.
People with Disabilities.--Government efforts to combat
discrimination and increase opportunities for the disabled are growing
but inadequate, with the exception of the war wounded, who have secured
both government and international funding for rehabilitation and
retraining programs. In May the Legislative Assembly passed a law
mandating that new or renovated public buildings be accessible to the
disabled. The law also required businesses to employ 1 person with a
disability for every 25 employees, an increase from the preexisting
requirement of 1 to 50. Although the Government had not enforced the
previous law's employment quota, it brought together dozens of
government agencies and nongovernmental organizations to discuss ways
to implement the new law effectively. However, the Ministry of Labor
has only two persons to handle all issues related to the disabled, and
its records are kept on paper files in its regional branches.
Therefore, there are no reliable data on the number of disabled
persons, nor on how many are employed.
Access by the disabled to basic education was limited due to lack
of facilities and appropriate transportation. There was no provision of
state services for the physically disabled. Only a few of the
Government's community-based health promoters have been trained to
treat the disabled, and they rarely provided such service. The Ministry
of Health estimated that 10 percent of the population is afflicted by
some form of disability. Many disabilities are directly attributable to
the civil war. Other contributing factors included lack of prenatal
care, misuse of pesticides in food production, malnutrition, auto
accidents, and criminal violence.
There were several organizations dedicated to protecting and
promoting the rights of the disabled, but funding was insufficient.
Foreign funds for badly needed rehabilitation services channeled
through the Telethon Foundation ProRehabilitation, a local private
voluntary organization, helped address numerous rehabilitation issues
and provided alternatives for the education and rehabilitation of the
disabled population. A semiautonomous institute, the Salvadoran
Rehabilitation Institute for the Disabled, has 10 centers throughout
the country and offers medical treatment, counseling, special education
programs, and professional training courses to the disabled. The
Government and national and international private and nongovernmental
organizations provide its funding.
Indigenous People.--The country is ethnically homogeneous, although
a very small segment of the population still claims indigenous status.
The Constitution states that native languages are part of the
national heritage and should be preserved and respected. In reality,
very few persons speak the indigenous language of Nahuatl. There are no
national laws regarding indigenous rights.
Early in the century, facing active repression, most indigenous
people adopted local customs and successfully assimilated into the
general population, from which they are generally indistinguishable.
There are a few very small communities whose members still wear
traditional dress and maintain traditional customs to a recognizable
degree without repression or interference. There are no special rights
for indigenous people; however, they are allowed to make decisions
regarding their communal lands just as any other landowners under
Article 105 of the Constitution. These small indigenous groups exist in
the poorest parts of the rural countryside where employment
opportunities are few and domestic violence is a problem.
Indigenous people reportedly earned less than other agricultural
laborers. Indigenous women in particular had little access to
educational and work opportunities due to cultural practices, lack of
resources, and rural underdevelopment. As with the poor rural sector in
general, access to land was a growing problem confronting indigenous
people. Few possessed titles to land, and bank loans and other forms of
credit were extremely limited.
There are some small, active indigenous associations. The largest
and best known is the National Association of Indigenous Salvadorans.
Religious Minorities.--There were no new developments in the
investigation of the 1999 burglaries at offices of the Lutheran Church.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
rights of workers and employers to form unions or associations, and the
Government generally respected these rights; however, there were some
problems. There were repeated complaints by workers, in some cases
supported by the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee on
Freedom of Association (CFA), that the Government impeded workers from
exercising their right of association.
Union leaders asserted that the Government and judges continued to
use excessive formalities to deny applications for legal standing to
unions and federations. Among the requirements to obtain legal
standing, unions must have a minimum of 35 members in the workplace,
hold a convention, and elect officers. In March the Government denied
an application from five food industry unions to form a federation,
because they allegedly had made procedural errors in their application.
In a complaint submitted to the ILO, the unions asserted that the
Government had not given them an opportunity, as required by law, to
correct the errors in their application. The CFA, in its November
report, supported the workers' view, observing that it ``deeply
regretted'' that the Government had not worked to overcome procedural
problems that ``could easily have been rectified.'' It criticized the
Government, observing that ``formalities should not be of such a nature
as to impair the free establishment of organizations.'' In September
the unions submitted a complaint to the Supreme Court that remained
pending at year's end.
In 1999 the CFA similarly cited the Government for its failure to
provide protection or remedy for a number of labor leaders fired in
1998 during the process of privatizing the state-owned telephone
company. The finding concluded that the Labor Code imposed excessive
formalities for the recognition of a trade union, and found that the
application of the law repeatedly was used to refuse legal status to a
trade union in the telephone company. The Committee called on the
Government to complete the process for recognition of the
telecommunications union, amend the Labor Code to remove the excessive
formalities that the Committee concluded infringe on the right to form
a union, seek to have the two union leaders who had not yet accepted
severance pay reinstated, and ensure that future changes of company
ownership did not threaten labor leaders or labor organizations.
The Government asserted that the telephone company complied with
the labor code by offering a severance payment to the fired workers.
In September the Supreme Court determined that the Government had
erred in denying legal standing to the telecommunications union and
ordered the Government to grant it legal status. On October 23, the
Government complied with the order and granted legal status to the
union. However, TELECOM, the privatized successor to the state-owned
telecommunications company, dismissed three union leaders in the next 5
weeks. As part of a company restructuring process, it also asked dozens
of employees, many of whom were union members, to submit resignations.
Thirteen employees refused, and the company prohibited their entry to
the workplace. Telecom petitioned the Ministry of Labor to decertify
the union, asserting that the union had failed to follow correct
procedures for obtaining legal recognition. In December the Ministry of
Labor sought to mediate a mutually agreeable settlement between the
parties, but was unsuccessful. The union filed a lawsuit against the
company for violating the rights of the union members. At year's end,
the suit had not gone to trial, and the Ministry of Labor had not ruled
on the company's petition.
There is a small organized labor sector with approximately 150
active unions, public employee associations, and peasant organizations,
representing over 300,000 citizens, approximately 20 percent of the
total work force. Unions generally are independent of the Government,
political parties, and other political forces. The Labor Code prohibits
foreigners from holding leadership positions in unions.
By law only private sector workers have the right to form unions
and strike; some employees of autonomous public agencies may form
unions if they do not provide essential services. Military personnel,
police, and government workers may not form unions but are allowed to
form professional and employee organizations. Some of the most powerful
labor groups are public employee associations. They have the same
responsibilities as unions, including calling technically illegal
strikes and collective bargaining. The Government negotiated with
public employee associations and generally treated their strikes as
legitimate, although the Labor Code provides for mandatory arbitration
of public sector disputes. The November CFA stated that ``denial of the
right of association of public service employees to establish unions is
an extremely serious violation.'' The Committee formally recommended
that the Government amend national legislation to recognize the right
of association of workers employed in the service of the State, with
the possible exception of the armed forces and the police. There was
one public sector strike during the year (see Section 1.c.).
The law prohibits antiunion actions before a union is registered
legally and prohibits the dismissal of workers whose names appear on a
union application. The Constitution provides that union officials may
not be fired, suspended for disciplinary reasons, removed, or demoted
except for legal cause from the time of their election until one year
after the completion of their term of office. However, the Labor Code
does not require the employers to reinstate them, but requires the
employers to provide a severance payment. In practice, some employers
dismissed workers who sought to form unions. The Government generally
ensured that employers paid severance to these workers. However, the
Government did not prevent their dismissal or require their
reinstatement.
The Committee on Freedom of Association cited one case in which a
private firm blocked the formation of a union by coercing the union
founders to resign 1 hour before the union was to be recognized
officially (see Section 6.b.).
Unions can only strike after the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement. Unions must first seek to resolve differences
through direct negotiation, mediation, and arbitration before striking.
To be considered legal, the strike must aim to obtain or modify a
collective bargaining agreement and to defend the professional
interests of workers. Union members must approve a decision to strike
through secret ballot. The union must name a strike committee to serve
as a negotiator and send the list of names to the Ministry of Labor,
who notifies the employer. The union must wait 4 days from the time the
Ministry notifies the employer before beginning the strike.
In June the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Government's
dismissal of striking Social Security Institute workers in 1999 was
illegal. In accordance with that ruling, in August the Social Security
Institute reinstated 187 of the 219 workers. The remaining workers
requested a severance payment in lieu of reinstatement.
The Labor Code prohibits partisan political activity by unions. The
unions routinely ignored this prohibition, but the Government took no
punitive action against them.
Unions and other labor organizations freely affiliated with
international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the Labor Code provide for collective bargaining
rights for employees in the private sector and for certain categories
of workers in autonomous government agencies, such as utilities and the
port authority. However, both private sector unions (by law) and public
sector employee associations (in practice) used collective bargaining.
The Ministry of Labor oversees implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and acts as a conciliator in labor disputes in
the private sector and in autonomous government institutions. In
practice, ministers and the heads of autonomous government institutions
often negotiate with labor organizations directly, relying on the
Ministry of Labor only for such functions as officially certifying
unions. The Ministry often seeks to conciliate labor disputes through
informal channels rather than attempt to enforce regulations strictly,
which has led to charges that the Ministry is biased against labor.
Labor leaders assert that the Government had an unfair advantage in
arbitration of public sector labor disputes, because the Government
holds two of three seats on arbitration panels. (The employer, the
workers, and the Labor Ministry each name one representative to a
panel.) The arbitration panel for the Social Security labor dispute in
March included a representative of the Labor Ministry, although the
Labor Minister sits on the governing council of the Social Security
Institute. Corruption continued to affect labor inspectors and courts.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination against unions. It
provides that union officials at the time of their election, throughout
their term, and for 1 year following their term may not be fired,
suspended for disciplinary reasons, removed, or demoted except for
legal cause. Workers and the ILO reported instances of employers using
illegal pressure to discourage organizing, including the dismissal of
labor activists and the maintenance of lists of workers who would not
be hired because they had belonged to unions.
In reviewing the February firing of 44 union members by the La
Salud Dairy, the Ministry of Labor found that the cooperative had the
legal right to dismiss the workers. It cited a provision of the Labor
Code that allows enterprises to suspend labor contracts when economic
conditions require them to reduce their activities; however, the
dismissals occurred 1 day before a deadline for completing the
renegotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, and in letters to
the fired workers, the company cited the union's negotiating position
as the reason for the dismissals. Labor representatives stated that,
after dismissing the first set of workers, management successfully
pressured the 43 remaining members to resign from the union.
There are approximately 220 maquila (in-bond assembly or
processing) plants, the majority of which are located in the country's
8 export processing zones (EPZ's). The Labor Code applies in the EPZ's;
there are no special EPZ labor regulations.
Most EPZ companies and a large portion of the maquila plants had
voluntary codes of conduct promoted by their parent corporations or
foreign purchasers. In addition, two EPZ's have their own codes of
conducts for all tenants. These codes include worker rights protection
clauses. Some companies in the EPZ's provided salaries and on-site
benefits (e.g. clinics, cafeterias) competitive with the best private
sector enterprises (see Section 6.e.). However, there were credible
reports that some factories dismissed union organizers, and there are
no collective bargaining agreements with the 19 unions that exist in
the maquila sector. The International Confederation of Trade Unions
(ICFTU) contended in its annual report that some EPZ workers also
suffered low pay, health and safety risks, 12- to 14-hour workdays, and
minimal toilet breaks.
In January the clothing assembly factory DOALL reemployed workers
that unions alleged it had dismissed illegally when they tried to form
a union in 1999. The reinstatements followed pressure from DOALL's
major foreign customer and involvement by the Ministry of Labor. In
September the Ministry of Labor approved an application for legal
standing for a union formed by the rehired workers. The Ministry had
denied the union's original application in 1999 based on documentation
provided by DOALL showing that the workers had resigned 1 hour before
they held the union's constituent assembly. Union officials asserted
that company management had falsified the letters of resignation. The
Committee on Freedom of Association noted that the Government had not
responded to the Committee's queries on this incident which it said
included ``antiunion acts of discrimination and interference on the
part of the company.''
In October the Ministry of Labor opened branch offices in EPZ's to
make its services more accessible to its users. The Ministry provided
the staff, and the EPZ's covered other costs.
In the past, there have been credible accusations that some
factories abused their workers, and that some women were not hired
because they were pregnant. Workers have reported mistreatment,
threats, abuse, and sexual harassment. Although the Ministry of Labor
has improved its efforts to increase inspection and follow up on such
complaints, it still has insufficient resources to cover all the EPZ's,
much less the much larger national private sector.
Although a 1996 law gives the Ministry of Economy the power to
withdraw free zone privileges from companies that violate labor
regulations, there have been no instances in which this has been used
or even threatened publicly. The ICFTU has reported persistent problems
facing female employees in EPZ's, including mandatory pregnancy tests
and firing of workers who are pregnant (see Section 5).
On October 23, the Government complied with a Supreme Court order
to provide legal standing to the telecommunications union (see Section
6.a.).
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except in the case of calamity
and other instances specified by law, and the Government generally
enforces this provision; however, there were reports that women were
forced into prostitution (see Section 5).
Although not specifically prohibited by law, forced and bonded
labor by children are covered by the general prohibition. There were no
reports of their use in the formal sector; however, there was strong
evidence that minors have been forced into prostitution (see Sections 5
and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 14; however, child labor is a problem. Minors, age 14
or older, may receive special Labor Ministry permission to work, but
only where such employment is indispensable to the sustenance of the
minor and his or her family. This is most often the case with children
of peasant families who traditionally work during planting and
harvesting seasons. The law prohibits those under the age of 18 from
working in occupations considered hazardous. The law limits the workday
to 6 hours for youths between 14 and 18 years of age and sets a maximum
normal workweek for youths at 36 hours. The PDDH estimated that 270,000
minors work, most as street vendors.
Orphans and children from poor families frequently work for their
own or family survival as street vendors and general laborers in small
businesses, mostly in the informal sector (see Section 5.). Children in
these circumstances often do not complete schooling through the 9th
grade, as the law requires. There were no reports of child labor in the
industrial sector. It does not exist in the EPZ's.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor laws
and made an effort to do so; however, scarce resources and the
difficulty of monitoring the large informal sector limited its
effectiveness outside the urban formal sector. On June 15, the
Legislative Assembly ratified ILO Convention 182 on the elimination of
the worst forms of child labor. In September the ILO's International
Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) opened an office to
help develop and support this effort. The Government continued to
collaborate with IPEC on projects initiated in 1999. In March IPEC
began a project with local NGO's, police, municipal officials, and
fireworks producers to take 1,000 children out of the fireworks
industry and prevent another 1,000 children from entering. The project
includes community awareness programs, increased educational and health
care opportunities for children, creation of alternative economic
opportunities for families, and increased labor enforcement capacities.
Similar programs target children in the coffee and shellfish extraction
industries.
The Labor Code does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded
labor by children, but they are covered by its general prohibition;
however, there were reports that minors were forced into prostitution
(see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is set by
executive decree based on recommendations from a tripartite
(government, labor, and business) committee. The minimum daily wage is
$4.80 (42.00 colones) for commercial, industrial, and service
employees; $3.57 (31.20 colones) plus food allowance for coffee
plantation workers; $2.61 (22.80 colones) plus food allowance for sugar
and cotton plantation workers; and $2.47 (21.60 colones) plus food
allowance for all other agroindustrial workers. The minimum wage with
benefits does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing minimum wage
laws and generally does so effectively in the formal sector. However,
some maquila plants underpaid workers and failed to compensate them in
accordance with the law for mandatory overtime.
The law sets a maximum normal workweek of 44 hours. It limits the
workweek to no more than 6 days for all workers. It requires bonus pay
for overtime. By law a full-time minimum wage employee is paid for an
8-hour day of rest in addition to the 44-hour normal workweek and
receives an average of 1 month's wage a year in required bonuses plus 2
weeks of paid vacation. Many workers worked more hours than the legal
maximum.
The Constitution and the Labor Code require employers, including
the Government, to take steps to ensure that employees are not placed
at risk in their workplaces. These laws prohibit the employment of
persons under 18 years of age in occupations considered hazardous or
morally dangerous, such as bars and billiard halls; the prohibition
also applied to hazardous occupations such as agricultural work with
poisonous chemicals or factory work with dangerous equipment. The Labor
Code prohibits pregnant women from engaging in strenuous physical
exertion at the workplace after the fourth month of pregnancy. Health
and safety regulations are outdated, and enforcement is inadequate. The
Ministry of Labor attempts to enforce the applicable regulations but
has restricted powers and limited resources to enforce compliance.
Workers in some maquilas expressed concerns about unhealthy drinking
water, unsanitary bathrooms, and eating facilities, and inadequate
ventilation (problems with dust and heat). Some of the largest plants
have dust control, air conditioning, on-site medical facilities, and
enforced safety regimes.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons; however, it stipulates that any crime involving
``commerce in women or children'' automatically carries a 30 percent
increase in the prison sentence or fine that otherwise would be imposed
for that crime. The Government enforces this provision.
The country is a source of women and children for trafficking in
prostitution to Mexico and other countries. There are credible reports
that women and children are lured to Mexico by procurers only to be
sold to owners of establishments there who then force the trafficked
persons to work off the debt as sex workers. According to Guatemalan
authorities, street children from El Salvador are lured to border areas
with Guatemala where they are then forced into prostitution by
organized rings.
According to press reports, Honduran children were brought to San
Salvador to beg for their sponsors. The Government investigated and
took a number of children into custody. When their parents could not be
found, they were turned over to the ISPM.
__________
GRENADA
Grenada is a parliamentary democracy, with a Governor General as
titular Head of State. In the January 1999 parliamentary elections,
Prime Minister Keith Mitchell's New National Party (NNP) won all 15
seats and formed a new government. Subsequently, one Member of
Parliament left the NNP and became the sole opposition member. The
elections were conducted openly and fairly and were free of violence.
The judiciary is independent.
The 755-member Royal Grenada Police Force is responsible for
maintaining law and order. It is controlled by and responsive to
civilian authorities. There were occasional allegations of abuse by the
police.
Grenada has a free market economy based on agriculture and tourism.
The projected annual real economic growth rate was 5.3 percent,
compared with about 8 percent in 1999. Per capita gross domestic
product was approximately $3,205.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Violence against
women is common. Child abuse is a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reported incidents of torture. Flogging, a legal form of punishment,
is rare but has been used as punishment for sex crimes and theft cases.
There were no media reports of police brutality during the year.
Allegations of police brutality are investigated internally by the
police. The Police Commissioner can discipline officers in valid cases
of brutality with penalties that may include dismissal from the force.
The Police Commissioner has spoken out strongly against police use of
unlawful force.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides the
police with the right to detain persons on suspicion without a warrant,
but they must bring formal charges within 48 hours. The police adhere
to this time limit in practice. If the police do not charge a detainee
within 48 hours, they must release the person.
The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality of
detention within 15 days after arrest on a criminal charge. The police
must formally arraign or release a detained person within 60 days, and
the authorities generally followed these procedures. There is a
functioning system of bail, although persons charged with capital
offenses are not eligible. Persons charged with treason may be accorded
bail only upon the recommendation of the Governor General.
In January the Government announced establishment of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission with a broad mandate to examine events in the
country from 1976 through 1991. The Commission's terms of reference
specify the objective of recommending ``general amnesty to certain
persons who in the opinion of the Commission have given truthful
information during the hearing of evidence.'' The Commission is
expected to review the convictions of former Deputy Prime Minister
Bernard Coard and other leaders of the former People's Revolutionary
Government for their roles in the 1983 assassination of former Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop and his cabinet colleagues. In 1986 a court
convicted Coard and 18 other revolutionary leaders of murder and
sentenced them to death; subsequently, 2 were pardoned, and the
sentences of the remaining 17 commuted to life in prison. Of these, one
person was granted parole to undergo medical treatment overseas. At
year's end, the Commission was preparing to begin its work.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary, a part of the
Eastern Caribbean legal system, is independent. Final appeal may be
made to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. Those arrested on
criminal charges are brought before a judge to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges; if there is, the
judge remands the defendant for trial.
The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and the
authorities observe it in practice. There is a presumption of
innocence, and the law protects persons against self-incrimination and
requires the police to explain a person's rights upon arrest. The
accused has the right to remain silent and to seek the advice of legal
counsel. A defense lawyer has the right to be present during
interrogation and may advise the accused how to respond or not to
respond to questions. The accused has the right to confront his
accuser.
The court appoints attorneys for indigents only in cases of murder
or other capital crimes. In other criminal cases that reach the
appellate stage, the court appoints a lawyer to represent the accused
if the defendant was not previously represented or reappoint earlier
counsel if the appellant no longer can afford that lawyer's services.
Due to the backlog of cases caused by a shortage of judges and
facilities, up to 6 months can pass before those charged with serious
offenses face trial in the High Court. With the exception of persons
charged with murder and foreign-born drug suspects, the courts grant
most defendants bail while awaiting trial.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
authorities generally respect these prohibitions. The law generally
requires judicially issued warrants for searching homes, except in
cases of hot pursuit. The Firearms Act of 1968 and the Drug Abuse
Prevention Act Number 7 of 1992 contain other exceptions that give the
police and security units legal authority to search persons and
property without warrants in certain circumstances. In practice police
obtain warrants in the majority of cases before conducting any search.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. There are three weekly newspapers, and several
other newspapers publish irregularly. One of the weeklies is affiliated
with an opposition political party, but the three most widely
circulated newspapers are independent and often critical of the
Government. The newspapers routinely carry press releases by the
opposition parties, including regular weekly columns expressing the
opposition parties' views.
There are six radio stations. The main station is part of the
Grenadian Broadcasting Network (GBN), a privately owned organization in
which the Government holds a minority share. The principal television
station is also part of the GBN. A privately owned television station
began broadcasting in 1992. A cable television company operates in most
areas of the country. All newspapers, radio, and television stations
enjoy independence from the State and regularly report opposition
views. The television news often carried reports on opposition
activities, including coverage of political rallies held by various
political parties and candidates, public forums featuring political
leaders of each of the major parties, and other public service
broadcasts.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble for any peaceful purpose, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Supporters of political
parties meet frequently and hold public rallies; the authorities
require permits for the use of a public address system but not for
public meetings themselves.
The Constitution provides for the right to association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country, and all citizens have the right to enter
and leave the country, except in special circumstances as outlined in
and limited by the 1986 Act to Restrict the Freedom of Movement of
Certain Persons. This law allows the Minister for National Security to
restrict travel out of the country by any person whose aims,
tendencies, or objectives include the overthrow of the democratic and
parliamentary system of government; it has not been invoked in the past
few years. Anyone so restricted may appeal after 3 months to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The Chief Justice appoints an
accredited lawyer to preside over such a tribunal.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
exists. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise. There
were no reports of forced return of persons to a country where they
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. General elections must be held every 5 years; in
January 1999, Prime Minister Keith C. Mitchell's NNP was returned to
office, securing all 15 seats in Parliament. Since then one Member of
Parliament changed party affiliation to become the single elected
opposition member, leaving the NNP with a majority of 14 seats.
There are no restrictions in law or practice on participation by
women in government and politics. Four of the 15 elected Members of
Parliament are women; there are no women among the 13 appointed
Senators. Women account for 7 of the 13 permanent secretaries, the
highest civil service position in each ministry; in addition, a woman
is the Cabinet Secretary, the highest civil service position in the
Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Local human rights groups operate without government restriction,
and the Government cooperates with visits from international human
rights organizations. In September Amnesty International established
its regional office for the Eastern Caribbean in Grenada.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, place of
origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex, and the Government
generally adheres to these provisions.
Women.--Women's rights monitors believe that violence against women
remains a serious problem; however, they reported a decrease in such
incidents during 1998, and more recent figures were not available. The
police state that most cases of abuse are not reported, and others are
settled out of court. The law stipulates a sentence of 15 years'
imprisonment for a conviction of any nonconsensual form of sex.
Sentences for assault against a spouse vary according to the severity
of the incident. The Ministry of Women's Affairs was preparing a public
relations campaign to increase awareness of the problem of domestic
violence. In September 1999, a shelter for battered and abused women
and their children opened in the northern part of the island, with
medical and psychological counseling personnel on its staff. The home
accommodates 20 persons.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is a problem.
There is no evidence of official discrimination in health care,
employment, or education. Women frequently earn less than men
performing the same work; such wage differences are less marked for the
more highly paid jobs.
Prostitution is illegal.
Children.--The Social Welfare Division within the Ministry of Labor
provides probationary and rehabilitative services to youths, day care
services and social work programs to families, assistance to families
wishing to adopt or foster children, and financial assistance to the
six children's homes run by private organizations.
Education is compulsory until the age of 16.
Government social service agencies reported a further increase in
the number of child abuse cases, including sexual abuse. Abused
children are placed either in a government-run home or in private
foster homes. The law provides for harsh penalties against those
convicted of child abuse and disallows the victim's alleged ``consent''
as a defense in cases of incest. Women's organizations and other
nongovernmental organizations increased their public awareness efforts
to recognize and combat sexual abuse of women and children.
People with Disabilities.--The law does not protect job seekers
with disabilities from discrimination in employment, nor does it
mandate provision of accessibility for public buildings or services.
The National Council for the Disabled and the National Children's Home
assist the Government in placing disabled students into community
schools. The Council also seeks assistance from architects and builders
in the construction of ramps at hotels and public buildings, and ramps
have been installed at some hotels and government buildings.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers are free to organize
independent labor unions. Labor Ministry officials estimate that 35
percent of the work force is unionized. Union leaders play a
significant role in the political process, and one labor leader serves
in the Senate on behalf of the Grenada Trades Union Council (GTUC).
Workers in the private and public sectors are free to strike, once
legal and procedural requirements are met. There were several incidents
of industrial action, including brief strikes by teachers, port
authority workers, and private sector workers. Workers at the water
company and the telephone company briefly employed ``work-to-rule''
tactics. However, all such actions were short-lived and settled with
the intervention of the Labor Commission, the Minister of Labor, or the
Industrial Court. All unions are technically free of government
control, and none receive government financial support. However, all of
the major unions belong to one umbrella labor federation, the GTUC,
which is subsidized by the Government. The GTUC holds annual
conventions and determines some policies for member unions.
The GTUC and its unions freely affiliate with regional and
international trade union groups.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are
free to organize and to participate in collective bargaining.
Legislation requires employers to recognize a union that represents the
majority of workers in a particular business. The law prohibits
discrimination by employers against union members and organizers. If a
complaint of discrimination arises, mechanisms exist to resolve it.
After all avenues for resolving a complaint have been exhausted between
union representatives and employers, both sides may agree to ask for
the assistance of the Labor Commissioner. If the Labor Commissioner is
unable to find a resolution to the impasse, the Minister of Labor
intervenes and, if unable to reach an agreement, may appoint an
arbitration tribunal if both parties agree to abide by its ruling. The
law requires employers who are found guilty of antiunion discrimination
to rehire dismissed employees, but in most cases the employee accepts
the option of compensation. There were no cases of antiunion
discrimination reported to the Ministry during the year.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that of
children, and it is not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor is illegal; however, children sometimes work
in the agricultural sector. The statutory minimum age for employment of
children is 16 years. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor enforce
this provision in the formal sector by periodic checks. Enforcement
efforts in the informal sector are lax. The Constitution prohibits
forced or bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it
occurred (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no minimum wage laws
in force. Most workers, including nonunionized workers, receive
packages of benefits from employers set by collective bargaining
agreements between employers and labor unions. In many cases, overall
wages and benefits are not sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Many agricultural workers earn only
about $5.37 to $5.55 (EC$14.50 to EC$15.00) per day.
The Constitution stipulates that the maximum number of hours per
week workers may work is 40. The law does not prescribe a standard
workweek, except for the public sector, which is expected to work a 40-
hour week Monday through Friday. The normal workweek in the commercial
sector includes Saturday morning work but does not exceed 40 hours.
The Government sets health and safety standards, but the
authorities enforce them unevenly. Workers can remove themselves from
dangerous workplace situations without jeopardy to continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
GUATEMALA
Guatemala is a democratic republic with separation of powers and a
centralized national administration. The 1985 Constitution provides for
election by universal suffrage of a one-term president and a unicameral
congress. On January 14, Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) candidate
Alfonso Portillo replaced President Alvaro Arzu of the National
Advancement Party (PAN), following a free and fair December 1999 runoff
election. The FRG also holds a majority (63 seats) in the 113-member
Congress. Despite significant pledges, the Portillo administration took
only limited steps to implement the Peace Accords that the Government
concluded with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)
guerrillas in 1996. The judiciary is independent; however, it suffers
from inefficiency, intimidation, and corruption.
The Minister of Interior oversees the National Civilian Police
(PNC), created in January 1997 under the terms of the Peace Accords.
The PNC has sole responsibility for internal security; however, during
the year some members of the predecessor National Police (PN) remained
on duty, and awaited mandated training to become PNC officers. There
are no active members of the military in the police command structure,
but for the past 3 years, the Government has ordered the army to
support the police temporarily in response to an ongoing nationwide
wave of violent crime. On March 21, Congress enacted a law that enabled
the Government to continue this practice. Under the new law, military
personnel were not subordinated clearly to police control during joint
patrols or operations; however, in practice army units generally were
subordinated to police control in situations such as PNC road
checkpoints, security deployments around prisons, and deployments in
response to reported lynchings. The Constitution requires the Minister
of Defense to be either a colonel or a general in the military. On
January 14, a bill was submitted that would enable the President to
appoint a civilian as Minister of Defense; in June Congress asked the
Constitutional Court to determine the constitutionality of the bill. On
October 3, the Court ruled that it would be unconstitutional for the
President, as Commander in Chief, to name a civilian as the Minister of
Defense, with the rank of assimilated general. The President has been
slow to carry out his commitment to dissolve the Presidential Military
Staff (EMP) and to have its functions taken over by a civilian agency.
On October 13, Interior Minister Byron Barrientos announced the
creation of a citizen security brigade in Santiago Sacatepequez as a
pilot project that may be extended to other parts of the country. Some
members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
The mostly agricultural-based, private sector-dominated economy
grew by approximately 3 percent during the year. Coffee, sugar, and
bananas are the leading exports, but tourism, textiles, and apparel
assembly are key nontraditional export industries. According to a study
by the Ministry of Agriculture, 4 percent of producers control 80
percent of the land. About 40 percent of the work force are engaged in
some form of agriculture, and subsistence agriculture is common in
rural areas. According to the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), between
50 and 60 percent of the population depends on subsistence farming.
Officially, inflation was about 5.5 percent during the year, although
most observers acknowledge that the official price index does not
measure accurately actual price movements. There is a marked disparity
in income distribution, and poverty is pervasive, particularly in the
large indigenous community. Approximately 83 percent of citizens live
in poverty; this figure rises to 90 percent among the indigenous
population. According to the UNDP, 59 percent of the population live in
extreme poverty. Combined unemployment and underemployment was
estimated at 46 percent. Per capita gross domestic product was
approximately $1,600 during the year. Remittances from citizens living
abroad continue to grow as a major source of foreign currency.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens
in many areas; despite improvements in some areas, serious problems
remain in others. Some police officers committed extrajudicial
killings. The investigation of the 1998 murder of Catholic bishop and
human rights activist Juan Gerardi Conedera neared conclusion, and five
defendants, including an army captain, a retired army colonel, and a
former EMP specialist, were scheduled to stand trial. In May a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) acting as legal representative for
10 communities whose inhabitants were massacred by government forces in
the early 1980's filed a criminal suit against the high command of the
regime of former President Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia, alleging
genocide and other crimes. There was one credible report of forced
disappearance attributed to the police. There were credible reports
that some police tortured, abused, and mistreated suspects and
detainees. Despite greater numbers of police officers on duty
throughout the country, and less public apprehension about filing
complaints against the police, the total number of such complaints
remained roughly the same as the previous year. Arrests and
administrative sanctions against police officers remained high. In May
the Secretariat for Strategic Analysis (SAE), the President's Peace-
Accords-mandated civilian think tank, announced that it had discovered
a database containing the names and other personal information of over
650,000 persons given to the SAE by Military Intelligence; the database
appeared to have been compiled several years earlier. In June an NGO
released a two-volume publication about the army and its conduct,
personnel, and organization during the internal conflict. Prison
conditions remained harsh. Arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy
pretrial detention continued to be problems. Judges and other law
enforcement officials are subject to intimidation and corruption, and
the inefficient judicial system frequently is unable to ensure fair
trials and due process. Efforts to reform the judiciary continued;
however, the climate of impunity is a serious problem. The Government
achieved convictions in a few important cases involving past human
rights violations; however, more often cases remained pending for
lengthy periods in the courts as defense attorneys took advantage of
the inefficient judicial system and filed numerous, baseless motions
and appeals to delay trial. Threats to and intimidation of witnesses,
victims, prosecutors, and judges continued to be a serious problem.
Although the Government increased the security it provided for judicial
personnel and witnesses in key cases, many observers believe that the
level of protection still is insufficient. From April to June, the
number of threats against judicial personnel, journalists, and human
rights workers increased significantly, further contributing to the
public's already heightened sense of insecurity. Allegations persisted
that the EMP infringed on citizens' privacy rights by monitoring
private communications.
The U.N. Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) continued to
monitor peace implementation and human rights issues. On March 3 and
August 9, the Government signed a series of agreements in which it
accepted responsibility for a number of human rights cases pending
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). By
December 5, the Government was negotiation with the IACHR on 79 of 140
pending cases. The Government began to pay reparations in a number of
key cases. Violence and discrimination against women persisted, as did
societal abuse of children and discrimination against the disabled and
the indigenous population. Workers' efforts to form unions and
participate in union activities are hindered by an ineffective legal
system. Child labor and trafficking in women and children also are
problems. Lynchings and mob violence continued, but at a significantly
reduced rate, due in part to increased action by the PNC to combat
lynchings. The Government conducted anti-lynching campaigns, achieved a
very few convictions in past lynching cases, and made numerous arrests;
however, fewer than a third of the hundreds of past lynching cases have
gone to trial, and at year's end only one person was serving a prison
sentence for taking part in a lynching. There was limited progress in
the criminal case against a group of armed civilians who held the
leaders of the principal banana workers' union at gunpoint in October
1999 and forced them to resign from both their jobs and union
positions.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
allegations of politically motivated killings by government agents;
however, members of the police committed some extrajudicial killings.
The Government demonstrated an increased willingness to arrest and
prosecute those responsible and achieved some convictions in high-
profile cases; however, in many cases, the scarcity of law enforcement
resources and a weak prosecutorial and judicial system prevented the
Government from adequately investigating killings and other crimes or
arresting and successfully prosecuting perpetrators.
The number of reported extrajudicial killings continued to decline.
The office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDH), which generally
compiles data based on personal interviews with victims and their
families, reported 13 complaints of extrajudicial killings during the
year, compared with 16 complaints in 1999 and 32 complaints in 1998.
Based on 20 complaints alleging 21 extrajudicial killings in the 9-
month period between October 1, 1999, and June 30, MINUGUA investigated
15 cases and confirmed 13. It reported 27 such complaints in the first
9 months of the year.
MINUGUA's 11th Human Rights Report, released on August 31, noted a
number of extrajudicial killings by members of the PNC. Many of these
cases involved accidental discharges of weapons, drunken misbehavior by
on- or off-duty officers, questionable crowd control techniques, or
poor judgment by officers who lost control of unstable situations
involving angry crowds or persons resisting arrest. Other cases
presented signs of premeditation and malicious intent. In many of these
cases, there was effective investigation by both the PNC's Office of
Professional Responsibility (ORP) and the prosecutors of the Public
Ministry; however, in some cases, there was credible evidence of a
coverup by PNC officers, the ORP, or both.
On February 5, PNC officers without a warrant conducted a sting
operation against street vendors of pirated music recordings in an
outdoor market in Guatemala City. When a confrontation ensued with
angry vendors, a combined patrol of additional police and army units
was called to provide backup. As the situation deteriorated, police
forces fired their weapons into the air to regain control of the crowd
that had gathered. During the confusion, street vendor Francisco Ixcoy
Osorio was shot and killed; other persons present were injured. The
authorities investigated the killing and arrested several suspects. On
June 5, the Public Ministry accused six PNC officers and three army
soldiers of homicide. The PNC officers claimed that colleague Alfredo
Saso Perez killed Osorio and that two of their superiors--Commissar
Virgilio Ramos and Chief of Operations Diones Arriaza Solis--used death
threats and false testimony to organize a coverup to impede the Public
Ministry's investigation. In June the judge released the accused on
bail and provisionally closed the case due to lack of evidence. The
Public Ministry appealed this decision, arguing that a case should be
pursued against Ramos and Arriaza, and that Saso Perez should be
arrested. The Fourth Appellate Court rejected the appeal; however, the
Public Ministry continued its investigation, and hoped to reopen the
case if new evidence is found.
On March 6, in San Jose Acatempa, Jutiapa, Byron Florian Yanez and
Jose Mendez Interiano, two police officers in a PNC patrol car, shot
off-duty PNC officer Sergio Barahona Arana from behind and killed him.
MINUGUA found that the local PNC falsified its report of the incident,
in which it claimed that Barahona had a gun in his hand when he died
and that there had been a shootout with the other police officers.
There was credible evidence that police later conducted searches and
fired weapons into the front of a school building to simulate a gun
battle as part of their coverup. MINUGUA also cited evidence that the
ORP participated in the coverup by altering its investigative report.
Florian Yanez was a fugitive until he was found dead of a gunshot wound
on May 31 in Jutiapa. On April 5, the authorities arrested Mendez
Interiano; he was in jail awaiting trial at year's end, accused of
participating in the coverup. In addition, the Police Commissioner of
Jutiapa has not collaborated with the Public Ministry prosecutor in the
case; he refused to turn over photographs of the crime scene and the
weapons used in the crime.
On April 19, in Coban, Alta Verapaz, Denis Fredy Cucul Tun argued
with PNC officers about the fact that his car was parked in a street
that was to be cleared for a religious procession. Officer Rolando
Salvador Rubio Choc took Cucul to the opposite side of the street, held
him against a wall at arm's length, and shot him in the chest at
pointblank range, killing him. Hearing the shot, a crowd quickly
gathered and sought to lynch Rubio, who fled to the nearby police
station. An ORP investigation quickly established Rubio's
responsibility for the killing, despite his argument that his weapon
accidentally discharged, and he was jailed while the Public Ministry
conducted its investigation and prepared to go to trial. MINUGUA
confirmed in its 11th report that PNC officers had tried to cover up
the facts of the case and impede the Public Ministry's investigation.
MINUGUA also noted that Rubio had violated PNC protocols by carrying a
weapon that was loaded and contained unauthorized expanding cartridges.
In some cases, detainees or prisoners died while in the custody of
PNC officers or Criminal Investigation Service (SIC) detectives,
apparently due to torture or abuse (see Section 1.c.).
On March 11, detainee Luis Armando Colindres was found dead in his
cell at a PNC substation in Zone 12 of the capital, apparently the
victim of strangulation. The PNC claimed that Colindres hanged himself,
but the forensic report found injuries consistent with a struggle to
resist being strangled. A judge ordered the detention of PNC officers
Santos Medardo Recinos Moran, Elman Avigail Garcia Pineda, and Jeremias
Santiago Godoy Ramos on charges of homicide. On June 7, the judge
granted a defense motion to modify the charges to material document
fraud (because PNC reports were altered) and abandonment of duty and
released the defendants on bail. A Public Ministry appeal of these
decisions was pending at year's end.
Although most cases from past years remained unresolved, there were
some convictions during the year for past extrajudicial killings by
members of the security forces. In contrast to 1999, there were fewer
judicial setbacks in human rights cases. At year's end, trials
continued in several high profile cases. In many other cases of past
extrajudicial killings, there was little or no progress, often due to
the tactics of defense attorneys who frequently abused the legal system
by filing dilatory motions to derail impending trials against their
military clients.
The investigation entered its final stages and pretrial
preparations began against five defendants in the April 1998 murder of
Bishop Juan Gerardi Conedera, the Coordinator of the Archbishop's
Office on Human Rights (ODHAG). President Portillo promised in his
inaugural address that all state institutions would cooperate fully in
the investigation. Bishop Gerardi was killed just 2 days after his
public delivery of the final report of the ``Recovery of Historical
Memory'' project, which held the military and its paramilitary allies
responsible for more than 90 percent of the human rights violations
committed during the 36-year-long internal conflict. After 2 years
under Public Ministry witness protection, on January 17, former
indigent Ruben Chanax Sontay gave additional testimony before Judge
Flor de Maria Garcia Villatoro in which he implicated several
individuals in Gerardi's murder. Based largely on Chanax's new
testimony, on January 21, Judge Garcia issued arrest warrants for five
suspects: Retired army Colonel Byron Disrael Lima Estrada; his son,
army Captain Byron Miguel Lima Oliva; former EMP Specialist Jose
Obdulio Villanueva Arevalo; Father Mario Leonel Orantes Najera; and
former parish house cook Margarita Lopez. (Lopez, who was charged with
being an accessory after the fact, had been detained briefly in 1998
and then released.) Lima Estrada, Lima Oliva, and Margarita Lopez were
arrested on January 21, followed by Villanueva on January 22. On
February 9, Father Orantes, who had been arrested and charged with the
murder in October 1998, then released in February 1999, secretly
returned to the country and immediately checked into a hospital,
claiming that his health was too poor to be sent to jail. On February
15, Judge Garcia granted Orantes permission to remain in the hospital,
based on a court-ordered medical examination that confirmed his health
problems.
Shortly after Villanueva's arrest, his defense attorney presented
evidence indicating that he was actually in prison in Antigua on the
night of Gerardi's murder, completing the final days of his prison
sentence for the 1996 killing of Pedro Sas Rompich. On February 25,
Judge Garcia released Villanueva, based on this new information and a
lack of Public Ministry evidence to the contrary. On March 15, lead
prosecutor Leopoldo Zeissig released the results of a handwriting
analysis that demonstrated that Villanueva had not signed personally
for his EMP paychecks in prison for several months, including at the
time of the Gerardi murder. (Villanueva had remained on the EMP payroll
while serving his prison sentence.) In early April, Zeissig also
produced a former cellmate of Villanueva's, Gilberto Gomez Limon, who
testified that Villanueva frequently was allowed to leave prison,
including on the night of the Gerardi murder. This new evidence
convinced Judge Garcia to order Villanueva's rearrest, which occurred
on April 7.
On March 16, Judge Garcia ruled that prosecutors had presented
sufficient evidence against Margarita Lopez to send her case to trial
on charges of participating in a criminal coverup. Also on March 16,
Zeissig filed charges against navy Captain Carlos Rene Alvarado
Fernandez for falsifying Villanueva's signatures on his paycheck
receipts and lying to conceal the fraud. On March 21, another court-
ordered medical exam confirmed that Father Orantes should continue to
spend his pretrial detention in the hospital. In April Judge Garcia
ruled that Father Orantes must face trial on charges of murder, based
largely on Chanax's testimony and contradictions in Orantes' own
statements. On April 24, Chanax left the country under Public Ministry
witness protection due to concerns for his safety.
On April 26, the Catholic Church was granted status as a private
plaintiff in the case. ODHAG, as the Church's legal representative,
gained the right under the law to present witnesses and other evidence
at trial and to prosecute the accused alongside the Public Ministry
prosecutors. On May 9, the Fourth Court of Appeals agreed with defense
attorneys representing Father Orantes and Margarita Lopez that ODHAG
did not have sufficient ``juridical standing'' to act as private
plaintiff in the case against them. However, the ruling did not apply
to ODHAG's participation in the case against the three military
suspects.
On May 18, Judge Garcia charged the three military suspects, Lima
Estrada, Lima Oliva, and Villanueva, with the extrajudicial execution
of Bishop Gerardi. The charge of ``extrajudicial execution,'' unlike
the charge of murder, generally is reserved for members of security
forces on active duty, although Lima Estrada was not on active duty in
1998. The judge's decision was based largely on the testimony of
witness Ruben Chanax Sontay, which placed all three military defendants
at or near the crime scene on the night of the murder. In late July,
witness Juana del Carmen Sanabria, the former administrator of Bishop
Gerardi's parish house, left the country due to death threats. A total
of seven judges, prosecutors, and witnesses have left the country due
to threats and intimidation in the case. On August 1, Lima Oliva was
involved in a disturbance in prison and was injured slightly. He
claimed that other inmates were trying to kill him, but the other
inmates claimed that he started the fight and was trying to take
control of the cellblock. During the scuffle, several items, including
a planner/organizer, disappeared from Lima Oliva's cell and later were
found in the possession of Public Ministry prosecutors, whom Lima Oliva
accused of masterminding the disturbance for the purpose of
``stealing'' the documents. On August 7, Judge Garcia granted
conditional freedom to Margarita Lopez, allowing her to await trial
under house arrest rather than in prison. Another courtordered medical
exam in August confirmed that Father Orantes' poor health required that
he remain hospitalized.
After one judge recused herself for a supposed friendship with Lima
Estrada and another resigned after being challenged for bias by ODHAG,
in July a three-judge panel to hear the case at trial was constituted,
with Judge Eduardo Cojulun presiding, joined by Judges Jazmin Barrios
and Carlos Chin. A number of appeals and motions filed by the defense
attorneys in July and August delayed the trial against all five
defendants from October until early 2001. Prosecutors acknowledged
publicly that they are pursuing a political motive theory for the
upcoming trial, arguing that Gerardi was killed by current or former
members of the military with the assistance of Father Orantes and
Margarita Lopez. MINUGUA confirmed multiple complaints by Judge Garcia
and other judicial colleagues, prosecutors, witnesses, and ODHAG staff
of numerous threats and acts of intimidation, including telephone
threats, electronic surveillance, and observation by unknown
individuals following them on foot or in vehicles (see Sections 1.e.
and 4).
Negotiations continued regarding indemnification for the family of
Pedro Sas Rompich, who was killed in 1996 by Jose Obdulio Villanueva
Arevalo, while Villanueva was acting as a bodyguard for then-President
Arzu. Villanueva has since served a commuted prison sentence for the
killing and spent most of the year in jail as one of five suspects in
the murder of Bishop Gerardi. A court-ordered damages award to be paid
by Villanueva to the victim's survivors remained pending.
On April 28, the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) annulled an
appellate court's December 1999 verdict in the Xaman massacre case, in
which an army patrol entered a refugee-returnee community at Xaman,
Alta Verapaz, in October 1995, killing 11 persons and injuring 30
others. The Appellate Court had found 15 members of the patrol innocent
and resentenced the remaining 10 members to 12-year prison sentences.
The prosecutor had appealed the Appellate Court's decision, feeling
that the sentences were too lenient. The CSJ decision remanded the case
back to the trial court for a retrial. At year's end, the case
continued to be delayed by appeals that must be resolved before the
retrial can begin. The original trial was the longest in the country's
history and was marked by numerous death threats and acts of
intimidation against judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and family members
of the victims.
Two former police officers sentenced to death in 1996 in the so-
called Patrol No. 603 case remained on death row pending the outcome of
several appeals by their defense attorney. The case stems from a 1995
murder and attempted murder in what appeared to be a ``social
cleansing'' operation, in which persons deemed socially undesirable
(e.g., gang members, local delinquents, or convicts released from
prison) are found murdered in circumstances suggesting that the killing
was planned and carried out by an organized group. Similarly, there was
no progress in the related case before the IACHR.
The August 1994 killing by police of four workers at La Exacta farm
remained under investigation, and the criminal case remained suspended.
The parties continued to seek a resolution through the IACHR's amicable
settlement procedures. Negotiations continued regarding a settlement of
the pending labor court charges, with intervention from the Labor
Ministry and the Presidential Human Rights Commission (COPREDEH) to
install a Conciliation Court to resolve the dispute. The Center for
Legal Assistance in Human Rights (CALDH) continued to represent the
families of the deceased, the injured, and those who lost their jobs
and homes during the illegal eviction. On August 9, President Portillo
signed an agreement with the IACHR in which the Government acknowledged
its responsibility for failure to provide justice in the case and
promised both to pay reparations and pursue renewed criminal
investigations against those responsible for the violence.
An appellate court ruling remained pending in the case of the 1994
murder of Constitutional Court president Epaminondas Gonzalez Dubon.
Both the prosecution and defense appealed aspects of the May 1998
murder conviction of Marlon Salazar and Roberto Antonio Trabanino, who
were serving 27-year prison sentences for the crime at year's end. A
third suspect, Mario Rene Salazar, remained at large. On August 8,
another suspect implicated in the Gonzalez Dubon murder, Elser Omar
Aguilar, was found dead in the trunk of a car in Guatemala City. His
body showed signs of torture. In February an appellate court reaffirmed
the 14-year jail sentence for narcotics trafficking imposed in July
1999 on former Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rene Ochoa Ruiz, widely
suspected of being the intellectual author of the Gonzalez Dubon
murder.
Defense attorneys in the case of the murder of anthropologist Myrna
Mack Chang continued to file appeals in order to delay the proceedings,
and the courts continued to fail to resolve those appeals in a timely
manner. In January 1999, Judge Henry Monroy ordered a trial of the
three high-ranking military officers accused of ordering the 1990
murder: Retired General Edgar Augusto Godoy Gaitan, Colonel Juan
Valencia Osorio, and Colonel Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera. A trial
originally scheduled for early in the year was delayed by appeals filed
by defense attorneys. On March 27, Myrna Mack's sister, Helen Mack
Chang, met with CSJ representatives to learn why there had been no
decision regarding a defense appeal filed on November 4, 1999, nearly 5
months earlier (the law sets a 30-day time limit for resolving such
appeals). CSJ representatives had no answer at that March 27 meeting,
but on March 29, they announced that they actually had issued a
decision in the appeal on March 23. That decision denied the appeal and
fined the defense attorney approximately $130 (1,000 quetzals) for
filing a frivolous appeal. On March 31, the defense attorney filed
another appeal, this time of the CSJ's March 23 decision. On May 8,
that appeal was recognized by the Constitutional Court, which set a May
11 date for a hearing on the merits. However, the Court still had not
resolved the appeal at year's end. EMP member Noel de Jesus Beteta, who
confessed to the killing, continued to serve a 30-year sentence. On
March 3, the Government signed an agreement with the IACHR in which it
accepted responsibility for Myrna Mack's murder as well as the denial
of justice and proposed an amicable settlement, which was refused by
Helen Mack. A commission composed of a Guatemalan jurist and an
international expert was established under IACHR auspices to monitor
due process in the case.
In November the Government reached a settlement with the
InterAmerican Court of Human Rights to pay reparations to the survivors
of the 1990 killing of three street children--Julio Roberto Caal
Sandoval, Jovito Josue Juarez Cifuentes, and Anstraun Villagran--and
two indigent adults, Federico Clemente Figueroa Tunchez and Henry
Giovanni Contreras, by police officers (see Sections 4 and 5). In
December 1999, the Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence that
police officers Samuel Rocael Valdes and Nestor Fonseca were
responsible for the deaths. The Court also ruled that the Government
failed to protect the rights of the victims and provide them with
justice.
On August 9, the Government signed an agreement before the IACHR in
which it accepted responsibility for its failure to provide justice in
the unresolved disappearances in 1989 of 10 university students, 5 of
whom were later found dead, and pledged to negotiate an amicable
settlement with the victims' survivors, including reparations and
criminal prosecution of those responsible.
On August 11 and 12, the Inter-American Court held hearings to set
the amount of compensation owed to the families of the victims in the
``white van'' case; the Court's decision remained pending at year's
end. Separately, the Government also offered to enter into settlement
negotiations with the victims' survivors. In March 1998, the Court had
found the Government liable in the case, in which members of the now-
disbanded Treasury Police kidnaped and then either released or killed
11 persons in 198788.
In the case of the 1982 military massacre at Dos Erres, Peten,
prosecutors secured relocation abroad for two key witnesses and their
families in exchange for their testimony against their former army
comrades. On March 17, former army Sergeants Favio Pinzon Jerez and
Cesar Franco Ibanez testified before a judge about the massacre of more
than 200 unarmed civilians on December 6-8, 1982, in the village of Dos
Erres. In their testimony, they implicated several former comrades and
gave detailed accounts of the massacre, before departing the country
under witness protection from the Public Ministry. Based on their
testimony, prosecutors obtained arrest warrants against 16 former
members of the implicated army patrol. Defense attorneys eventually
contested 10 of those arrest warrants, arguing that their clients
should be protected from prosecution by the National Reconciliation
Law, which grants limited amnesty for certain acts committed during the
internal conflict. The Constitutional Court granted temporary
injunctions against the arrest warrants so that the petitions could be
decided on their merits. On July 7, an appellate court found the
petitions to be without merit and denied them. The defense appealed
that ruling to the Constitutional Court, where a decision remained
pending at year's end. The PNC did not execute six of the arrest
warrants, nor did they present the warrants to the military, even
though many of the suspects still were on active duty at the time. On
December 4, the prosecutor publicly urged the PNC to act on the
warrants of four military suspects, including Vicente Alfonso Bulux,
Santos Lopez Alonzo, and Fredy Antonio Samayoa Tobar.
Army Sergeant Major Manuel Pop Sun, who was arrested in April and
later released under a temporary injunction, remained the only
individual to have been arrested in the Dos Erres case by year's end.
On June 14, Pop Sun appeared at the MINUGUA offices claiming that the
army had imprisoned him in a military hospital, kept him drugged with
antipsychotic medications, and was trying to kill him because of his
knowledge of the Dos Erres massacre. Pop Sun offered his testimony to
prosecutors in exchange for witness protection, but later jumped from a
secondstory window and fled from Public Ministry protection.
Prosecutors stressed that Pop Sun was free to depart at any time, as
his participation in the witness protection program was voluntary. His
odd behavior raised speculation about the true intent of his offer to
testify, and he remained a suspect in the case at year's end. In its
11th Human Rights Report issued in August, MINUGUA noted the presence
of Military Intelligence observers when it tried to interview Pop Sun
at the Military Medical Center. MINUGUA also found that Pop Sun had
been overmedicated while in the military hospital and concluded that
his treatment there amounted to torture and abuse.
On March 3, the Government signed an agreement before the IACHR in
which it recognized its institutional responsibility for the Dos Erres
massacre. Represented by COPREDEH, the Government pursued settlement
negotiations with the victims' survivors, who were represented by two
NGO's--Families of the Disappeared in Guatemala (FAMDEGUA) and the
Center for Justice and International Law. In those negotiations, the
Government agreed in principle to prosecute aggressively the material
and intellectual authors of the massacre, pay for reparations and other
community assistance for the survivors, create a historical document
that recounts what happened at Dos Erres, and erect a memorial in honor
of the victims. Those negotiations continued at year's end, with
reparations as the central focus. On December 1, in accordance with
recommendations of both the IACHR and the Inter-American Court, the
Government created a Special Commission to Locate and Identify Families
and Victims of the massacre at Dos Erres. On December 7, a monument to
the victims of the Dos Erres massacre was erected at the cemetery of
the Aldea Las Cruces.
On February 1, an appeals court in Coban substituted 50-year prison
sentences for the death penalties handed down by a trial court in
October 1999 against three former Civilian Defense Patrol (PAC) members
in the March 1982 massacres at Rio Negro and Agua Fria, two villages in
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz. The Appeals Court gave the three defendants,
Carlos Chen, Francisco Gonzalez Gomez, and Fermin Lajuj, 30 years in
prison for each of the two murders proven at trial, for a total of 60
years' imprisonment; however, the law sets the maximum prison sentence
at 50 years. In June a survivor of the Rio Negro massacre, who was
adopted and raised by a foreign family, returned for the first time.
She was reunited with surviving members of her family and called on the
Government to provide reparations for the impoverished survivors of the
conflict-era massacres.
On May 2, CALDH filed a lawsuit on behalf of 10 communities in
Quiche and Chimaltenango whose citizens were massacred by government
security forces between October 1981 and March 1982, resulting in over
850 deaths. The suit alleges crimes, including genocide, committed by
high command of the regime of former President Fernando Romeo Lucas
Garcia. In addition to Fernando Lucas Garcia, the suit also names his
brother (and former army Chief of Staff) Benedicto Lucas Garcia and
former Defense Minister Luis Rene Mendoza as defendants. By the end of
the year, prosecutors had made significant progress in their
investigation. The suit is the first genocide case to be brought in a
Guatemalan court and is a precursor to a similar suit that CALDH plans
to file against the regime of former de facto President and current
President of Congress Efrain Rios Montt.
There was no apparent progress in recapturing 12 former PAC members
convicted in 1999 for the 1993 killing of Juan Chanay Pablo in
Colotenango, Huehuetenango, and then freed in April 1999 from a police
station by a crowd armed with sticks, machetes, homemade explosives,
and smoke bombs. Although arrest warrants were issued to recapture the
escapees, they remained at large despite credible reports that they had
returned to their home region of Colotenango and were being protected
by former PAC comrades. There also was no progress in the investigation
of Brigadier General Luis Felipe Miranda Trejo, the alleged
intellectual author of the crime, who was elected to Congress in the
November elections and therefore enjoys legislative immunity from
prosecution. According to the Government, amicable settlement
negotiations between the Government and the victim's survivors,
mandated by the IACHR, neared completion by year's end. The Government
continued to provide security for several human rights activists in
Colotenango in accordance with a resolution of the Inter-American
Court.
The Supreme Court ordered the Public Ministry to conduct a new
investigation into the 1993 murder of newspaper publisher and former
presidential candidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle and three associates.
Suspect Francisco Ixcoy Lopez, former PAC member, remained at large,
despite the fact that the Carpio family had located him at one time and
informed the authorities of his whereabouts. The criminal case remained
open, but the Public Ministry made no efforts to advance the case and
the victim's family withdrew the charges. The case before the IACHR for
the Government's failure to provide justice remained pending at year's
end, as did a motion to send the case forward to the Inter-American
Court. The family of Jorge Carpio requested that the IACHR authorize
that the case be taken up by the Court, since they believed that
justice was not being served in the Guatemalan courts. The Commission's
decision was pending at year's end.
On January 31, a court convicted former PAC member Vicente
Cifuentes Lopez of homicide in the 1985 murder of American journalist
Nicholas Blake and sentenced him to 28 years' imprisonment. In May
police and prosecutors located three other suspects in the case in the
remote Cuchumatanes Mountains; however, the Government made no effort
to recapture the suspects and they remained at large at year's end. On
March 30, the Government paid restitution of $161,000 (1 million
quetzals) to Blake's survivors as mandated by the Inter-American Court.
On February 15, an appeals court upheld the November 1999 trial
verdict in which former military commissioner Candido Noriega was found
guilty of six murders and two cases of manslaughter and sentenced to
220 years in prison. On August 24, the CSJ rejected a similar appeal
and upheld both the guilty verdict and the 220-year sentence. (In 1996
the Penal Code was modified to extend the maximum sentence for murder
from 30 to 50 years' imprisonment. Because the case began prior to this
change, the commuted death sentence for the two murder convictions is
for 30 years.) There was no progress in the court-ordered investigation
of Noriega's alleged accomplice, Juan Alesio Samayoa, or in the
investigation of military officers who served at the so-called Base 20
in Quiche in 1982, the suspected intellectual authors of some or all of
Noriega's actions.
On August 28, a court acquitted Lazaro Obispo Solorzano Lopez and
Henry Orlando Hernandez Montepeque of the May 1999 kidnaping and murder
of oil refinery businessman Edgar Ordonez Porta. Neither prosecutors
nor the private plaintiff, the victim's brother Hugo Ordonez Porta,
pursued a serious case against the accused during the trial; instead,
Hugo Ordonez presented witnesses and evidence that asserted that
members of Military Intelligence may have committed the murder. Ordonez
also claimed that Military Intelligence conducted a parallel
investigation that significantly interfered with the official
investigation and may have led the Public Ministry and the PNC into
conspiring in a coverup. Also on August 28, the trial court
acknowledged the parallel investigation and interference, ordered a new
investigation, and left the case open with respect to additional
suspects, including several high-ranking military and police officials,
as well as the former prosecutor in the case. The motive for the
killing remained unclear. During the year, the Attorney General named
Leopoldo Zeissig as prosecutor; he was reviewing testimony at year's
end.
There was no progress in the 1997 killing of congressional Deputy
Joel Salomon Mendoza Pineda and his nephew. The court case against two
former congressional deputies was dismissed, and there was no case
pending against the former mayor of Escuintla, a suspected intellectual
author. In August 1998, the court of appeals upheld the 50-year prison
sentence for the four persons convicted of the murder. In October 1999,
the CSJ upheld the immunity of Alfred Reyes and Gueillermo Deominguez
and determined that the evidence against the legislators was
insufficient to oblige them to go to trial.
On June 1, the National Security Archive, an NGO, publicly released
its two-volume publication entitled ``The Guatemalan Military: What the
United States Files Reveal.'' Volume One is a database of Guatemalan
military officers and the positions they held during the internal
conflict. Volume Two is a compilation of over 50 key declassified
documents said to be representative of the thousands of documents
collected during the group's ``Guatemala Documentation Project,'' which
was begun in 1994 to support the Historical Clarification Commission's
efforts to catalog the devastation of the 36-year internal conflict.
Human rights activists viewed the report largely as a tool to determine
the responsibility of individual military officers for specific human
rights abuses during the internal conflict.
There was little progress in the investigations into the ``military
diary,'' an apparently genuine military intelligence dossier that
documented the abduction, torture, or killing of 183 persons by
security forces during the 1983-85 period. The National Security
Archive had released that document publicly in May 1999. The Government
responded by appointing 35 prosecutors to handle the cases and a
supervising prosecutor designated with overall coordination. Public
Ministry investigators made slow progress during the year and learned
that some of the victims named in the document still were alive and
living either in the country or abroad. The unit that compiled the
document has not yet been identified.
Exhumations of clandestine cemeteries continued throughout the
year. Most of the bodies recovered have been those of victims of
military or paramilitary killings in the 1980's. Forensics groups use
the information obtained from the exhumations to verify eyewitness
reports of massacres, of which 669 were recorded by the Historical
Clarification Commission, and to determine, at least in general, who
might have been responsible. Forensic research and DNA testing have
identified some of the remains. The forensic evidence has been used in
some criminal cases. During the year, ODHAG's Forensic Anthropology
Unit exhumed bodies from eight sites in Alta Verapaz, Quiche, Santa
Rosa, Huehuetenango, and San Marcos. As of September, workers at these
sites had found 419 skeletons and identified 28. By the end of August,
the forensic team of the Office of Peace and Reconciliation of the
Quiche Diocese conducted excavations of 44 sites in Quiche, where they
exhumed a total of 95 human remains, of which 19 were infants and none
were identified. Twelve of these sites (containing 28 remains) were
found within the grounds of the Joyabaj Parochial Convent, which served
as a military detachment headquarters during the 1980's. Threats and
intimidation against persons working on exhumations continued, but at
lower levels than in previous years. ODHAG reported attempts by
landowners to prevent exhumations on their property and, in some cases,
suspected clandestine cemetery sites had been disturbed just prior to
their investigation. At the end of the year, ODHAG's forensic
anthropology unit had ceased work while waiting for a change in
funding. Through August the Forensic Team of the Office of Peace and
Reconciliation of the Quiche Diocese conducted exhumations at 44
different clandestine cemeteries throughout Quiche department.
In October the prosecutor requested that the judge close the case
of the clandestine cemetery alleged in 1999 to be on the grounds of a
former Mobile Military Police (PMA) facility. An October 1999
excavation failed to produce any human remains. There was little
progress in the investigation into metal fragments found at the site
that prosecutors believe were once license plates used during
clandestine operations. The delays were due in part to the January
resignation of prosecutor Fernando Mendizabal, who feared reprisals
from the new FRG-led Government for his role in the investigation into
the nationwide smuggling ring led by Alfredo Moreno.
In December press reports suggested that the Guatemalan Forensic
Anthropology Foundation (FAFG) recently unearthed the remains of 20
persons in a clandestine cemetery located near San Martin Jilotepeque,
Chimaltenango, in what was used as a military post from 1982 to 1986.
FAFG staff reportedly believe that the cemetery is one of at least
seven in the area.
The criminal case filed in Spain in December 1999 by indigenous
leader and 1992 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchu Tum against
eight former military and civilian leaders for human rights abuses
committed during the 36-year internal conflict was not heard by the
court. The suit alleged that the defendants, including former de facto
President and current president of Congress Efrain Rios Montt, former
President and retired General Fernando Lucas Garcia, former de facto
President Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, and five other defendants were
responsible for ``crimes against humanity,'' including genocide,
torture, and terrorism. The suit cited 3 cases--the 1980 assault on the
Spanish Embassy in which more than 30 persons died, the killing of
Menchu's mother and 2 siblings, and the killing of 4 Spanish priests
over the course of the conflict.
On April 29, Spanish Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco denied the third
motion in 4 months by Prosecutor Pedro Rubira to dismiss the Menchu
suit. This motion was based on the argument that the cases presented by
Menchu effectively were adjudicated by the signing of the Peace Accords
in 1996, which ended the internal conflict. (The earlier motions had
contested Spanish jurisdiction in the case.) During the year, Judge
Ruiz Polanco called several witnesses to testify in Spain, including
Congresswoman Nineth Montenegro, former Spanish Ambassador to Guatemala
Maximo Cajal, former Historical Clarification Commission member Alfredo
Balsells Tojo, and Jesuit author Ricardo Falla.
Early in the year, several organizations and individuals attempted
to join the Menchu suit, sometimes trying to add numerous additional
crimes and defendants. For example, in April Human Rights Ombudsman
Julio Arango attempted to join the suit with additional complaints
against Lucas Garcia and Mejia Victores. Similarly, in April the human
rights NGO the Mutual Support Group (GAM) added 8 additional defendants
from the Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo regime to the Menchu suit, accusing
former civilian and military leaders of the extrajudicial killings of
53 university student leaders between 1984 and 1990. In May the family
of one of the four Spanish priests whose murder constitutes part of the
Menchu complaint joined the suit. On December 13, the Spanish court
decided not to hear the case. The decision was based in part on the
fact that it was not clear that justice in the case could not be
achieved in Guatemala, since a genocide case had yet to be tried by the
Guatemalan court system.
Attorneys for Mejia Victores made little progress in their counter-
charges against Menchu in Guatemalan criminal court, in which they
accused her of treason, violating the Constitution, and failing to
report a crime by filing charges in a Spanish court rather than a
Guatemalan court. In early August, the Spanish court denied a request
by prosecutor Candido Bremer for a copy of Menchu's complaint, which
Bremer intended to use in his investigation of Mejia Victores'
accusations against Menchu. In response, Menchu filed a brief with the
Guatemalan court in which she defended her right to file the Spanish
lawsuit, based on Guatemala's international treaty obligations that
provide for the extraterritorial prosecution of crimes against humanity
and genocide. The press reported in November that the counter-suit
brought against Menchu in Guatemala by attorneys for Mejia Victores had
been closed.
Menchu and various staff members of her human rights NGO, the
Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation, have been targeted with numerous death
threats and other acts of intimidation since the lawsuit was filed in
Spain. The number of death threats against Menchu increased sharply in
April and May, as it did generally among the human rights community and
journalists (see Sections 2.a. and 4.).
Intimidation of witnesses continued to be a problem, although at
less than 1999 levels; there were no reports of the killing of
witnesses. For example, two witnesses in the Bishop Gerardi murder
case, Ruben Chanax Sontay and Juana del Carmen Sanabria, left the
country due to threats and intimidation. Several potential witnesses
were intimidated in the case of murdered Zacapa Municipal Workers Union
leaders Robinson Morales Canales and Angel Pineda. Several witnesses in
the Ordonez Porta case also were threatened.
There were some allegations of politically motivated killings by
nonstate actors during the year, and the authorities demonstrated a
willingness to investigate these murders. In some of these cases, there
was insufficient evidence to conclude whether or not the killing was
politically motivated.
On June 22, Oswaldo Monzon Lima, Secretary General of the 90member
Union of Gasoline Transport Drivers in Escuintla, was killed. His body,
shot once in the back, was found on June 23 in a thicket across the
highway from his abandoned tanker truck. Since 1998 Monzon Lima had
been involved in an ongoing dispute with his employer at the time,
president of the Association of Fuel Transporters Mario Ortiz Barranco.
In 1998 Monzon Lima had filed a complaint with the police that Ortiz
had threatened to have him killed, based on a suit in the labor courts
alleging that Ortiz had fired illegally three union leaders within
weeks of the union's formation. In addition, Monzon had presented the
Ministry of Energy and Mines with a file that outlined irregularities
in Ortiz's conduct of his gasoline transportation business, including
his use of forged permits and licenses. On June 19, Monzon refused to
accept a settlement offer from Ortiz in the suit over the illegal
firings. He was murdered 3 days later. By September the Public
Ministry's investigation was proceeding normally with Ortiz as the
primary suspect.
On February 29, Erwin Haroldo Ochoa Lopez and Julio Armando
Vasquez, two environmentalists working for the National Council for
Protected Areas (CONAP), a governmental environmental protection
agency, were killed outside a restaurant in Puerto Barrios, Izabal.
MINUGUA noted serious mishandling of the crime scene, including the
fact that police would not allow firemen to administer first aid to the
victims, who still were alive when firemen first arrived on the scene,
but who died shortly thereafter. The Public Ministry's investigation
eventually focused on retired army Colonel Sergio Otoniel Ponciano, who
owned a private security firm and a ranch in a protected area. In
August the authorities arrested Ponciano and charged him with murder.
Separate investigations by SIC detectives and Public Ministry
prosecutors underscored the lack of coordination between these two
organizations on both the local and national levels.
In October Maura Ofelia Paniagua Corzantes, civil law coordinator
for the law clinic at San Carlos, was murdered. She was in charge of
receiving criminal complaints, particularly complaints of violence
against women, on behalf of the University, which is recognized under
domestic violence law. The day before Paniagua was killed, someone came
to the door to see her; her maid told the person that she was not
available and the person went away. The following day the same person
returned and shot her repeatedly. At year's end, the Public Ministry
was investigating the case to determine a motive and suspect for the
killing.
On March 2, on a road near Coban, Alta Verapaz, four armed men
attacked a group of attorneys, judicial personnel, representatives of
the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, and farmers, leaving three persons
dead and three wounded. The group was travelling to a meeting where it
planned to mediate a dispute between ranchers and small farmers over
the use of a new road. PNC officers later arrested rancher Hermelindo
Caal Rossi and an unidentified minor for the killings. The case was
under investigation by the Public Ministry at year's end.
On May 4, Jose Anancio Mendoza Garcia was found dead in a well in
Camotan, Chiquimula. His body showed signs of multiple injuries that
indicated that he was murdered. Mendoza Garcia was a former New Nation
Alliance (ANN) candidate for mayor in Camotan, as well as a local
leader of the Council of Ethnic Communities Runujel Junam (CERJ), a
prominent indigenous human rights organization. There was no clear
motive for his killing, but Mendoza's CERJ and ANN colleagues concluded
that his murder was politically motivated. There was little progress in
identifying a motive or a suspect by year's end.
There were some trials resulting in convictions for past cases of
politically motivated killings, but many cases remained unresolved,
including the 1999 murders of Zacapa Municipal Workers Union leaders
Robinson Morales Canales and Angel Pineda.
On July 27, a court convicted former Santa Cruz mayor Silverio
Perez de Leon and former city council member Justo Lopez and sentenced
them each to 50 years' imprisonment for their roles as intellectual
authors of the May 1998 murder of acting mayor Luis Yat Zapeta. Former
treasurer Cayetano Alvarez Velasquez was found innocent. Prosecutors
convinced the court that the crime was committed in revenge for Yat's
successful effort to remove Perez de Leon from office on charges of
corruption. An appeal of the trial court's verdict was pending at
year's end. Bernardino Zapeta Vicenta, Tomas Zapeta Ixcoy, and Manuel
Pacajoj Mejia, the suspected material authors of the killing, were in
jail for an unrelated robbery.
In the case of murdered Retalhuleu Prosecutor Shilvia Jerez Romero
de Herrera, on August 7, the 7th court of appeals upheld the death
sentence handed down by a trial court in October 1999 against Agosto
Negro gang member Tirso Roman Valenzuela Avila. In that decision, the
appeals court modified the trial court's verdict with respect to Jorge
Ever Lopez Monroy, to whom it also gave the death penalty, and Waldemar
Hidalgo Marroquin and Jaime Raul Quezada Corzo, each of whom received
50-year prison sentences for the May 1998 murder. They previously had
been set free by the trial court. The CSJ upheld the death sentence for
Valenzuela Avila and upheld the 50-year sentences for the other three
defendants.
Prosecutors determined that the January 1999 killing of alleged
gang member Olman Alexis Viera Rodriguez, and the May 1999 murder of
New Guatemalan Democratic Front (FDNG) leader Roberto Gonzalez Arias
were not politically motivated.
Prosecutors continued to investigate the 1999 murders of Zacapa
Municipal Workers Union leaders Robinson Morales Canales and Angel
Pineda, both of whom had protested labor rights violations and
corruption in the Zacapa mayor's office. Prosecutors made no apparent
effort to continue to investigate former Zacapa Mayor Carlos Vargas y
Vargas, his driver, or his bodyguard, who were believed widely to be
the intellectual and material authors of the murders. On February 3,
police arrested Carlos Anibal Paz Gordon, a former employee of a
company owned by persons close to Mayor Vargas, as the suspected
material author of the crime. Paz Gordon's alleged accomplice, Carlos
Ramiro Mende Aldana, remained at large at year's end. Paz Gordon's
trial originally was scheduled to begin on February 15, but was delayed
by a change in the prosecutor and a series of pretrial evidentiary
motions and hearings. On October 5, the court convicted Paz Gordon and
sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment. Several other Zacapa Municipal
Workers Union members claimed to have received death threats, as did
several key potential witnesses. MINUGUA reported in 1999 that the
prosecutors in Zacapa seriously mishandled several aspects of the
investigation against the material authors.
Six months after the May 1999 abduction and killing of Tomas Tol
Salvador, an FDNG leader in Quiche and human rights activist for the
CERJ and for the Council of Ethnic Communities, an indigenous
organization, the courts finally ordered the January 18 exhumation of
an unidentified body. The body was confirmed to belong to Tol Salvador.
No suspects were identified and no clear motive had been established by
year's end; the case remained under investigation.
In the May 1999 killing of former Judge Herberto Zapata Gudiel,
prosecutors requested provisional closure of the case while they gather
additional evidence against primary suspect Elmer Ezequiel Hernandez
Salazar. In addition prosecutors ruled out the possibility that Zapata
might have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The case still was
pending at year's end. Two presumed suspects were identified, but the
judge provisionally closed the case against them pending the discovery
of further evidence.
The investigation into the July 1999 murder of Mayan priest Raul
Coc Choc remained provisionally closed for lack of evidence, although
prosecutors continued their investigation. Coc Choc was a leader of the
National Association of Mayan Priests; members of the board reported
that he had received numerous death threats over the telephone prior to
his murder. The Public Ministry has accused Julian Chonay Buc and
Josefina Cristal Costop of the crime, but the judge provisionally
closed the case for lack of evidence. The Public Ministry has requested
a reconstruction of the crime scene in order to reopen the trial.
There were no further developments in the investigation into the
August 1999 murder of sociologist Maria Ramirez Sanchez. Because
Ramirez was an employee for the same organization as anthropologist
Myrna Mack when the latter was killed for political reasons in 1990,
media and human rights groups speculated that Ramirez's murder also was
politically motivated. However, by the end of the year, prosecutors
still had not established a motive or identified the possible killers;
the investigation continued.
A heightened sense of public insecurity fueled by a deteriorating
violent crime situation and a rash of threats against journalists,
human rights workers, and judicial personnel, contributed to some
allegations of social cleansing operations. During the first half of
the year, a number of corpses were found in and around Guatemala City
with signs of torture and violent death, including decapitation. Nearly
all of the corpses were young males, many with gang-style tattoos,
causing some human rights observers to suspect that the Government was
conducting a social cleansing operation against gang members or other
criminals. Others argued that the deaths were the product of an inter-
gang turf war, possibly related to narcotics trafficking. In its 11th
Human Rights Report, MINUGUA noted apparent social cleansing operations
in Siquinala, Escuintla, in which armed groups kidnaped, tortured, or
killed several individuals.
Prison authorities reported that on May 8, convicts Gumercindo
Lopez Salazar and Elvin Arnulfo Sosa Flores escaped from prison and
killed a guard in the process. The next day, Lopez's dead body was
found in a river with signs of torture and mutilation. A preliminary
autopsy by a forensic doctor from the judiciary concluded that the
victim had been murdered--a conclusion that was discarded by the Public
Ministry in a follow-up autopsy by its own doctor. In addition it was
unclear whether Lopez's death might have preceded the time at which he
was alleged to have escaped from prison, thereby raising doubts as to
whether the escape might have been faked to camouflage an extrajudicial
killing. In its 11th Human Rights Report, MINUGUA concluded that the
Public Ministry did not thoroughly pursue the investigation in its
initial stages.
In 1999 ODHAG and CALDH brought criminal charges against former
leaders of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) for the alleged
killings of five former EGP guerrillas. The charges were initiated
after relatives of EGP members who had disappeared in the early 1980's
broke off negotiations with former EGP leaders aimed at determining the
whereabouts of the remains. CALDH later halted the legal process after
negotiations resumed. In August ODHAG reported that the case remained
in the investigation phase, with an exhumation planned in Nicaragua to
search for the bodies of the EGP members, based on information received
from potential witnesses. According to ODHAG and CALDH, at year's end
the case was suspended at the request of the victims' families.
The number of attempted lynchings and resultant deaths decreased
significantly during the year, and the PNC deterred a number of
lynchings. However, popular frustration with the inability of the
Government to control crime and of the courts to assure speedy justice,
as well as a tradition of extrajudicial repression of crime during
years of military rule, led to continued lynchings and mob violence.
Since MINUGUA began tracking lynchings in 1996, it has recorded a total
of 337 cases. Of these, 75 cases have gone to trial, and 17 sentences
have been handed down. Of these sentences, 7 were acquittals and 10
were guilty verdicts. By year's end, only one individual had actually
begun to serve a prison sentence. MINUGUA reported 52 lynchings during
the year (including 24 lynchings and 28 attempted lynchings), which
resulted in 32 deaths and 83 persons injured. These figures are
significantly lower than in 1999, when there were 105 lynchings (71
lynchings and 34 attempts), resulting in 48 deaths and 188 persons
injured. There were fewer lynchings during the first half of the year;
this was attributed by many observers primarily to the elections and
the new Administration's early period in office, and in part to
increased PNC deployment in rural areas and greater intervention by the
PNC and other authorities. While the police were successful in rescuing
some victims of mob attacks, many observers agree that their efforts to
deter or prevent lynchings would benefit greatly were the organization
to establish more effective ties with indigenous communities (see
Section 5). MINUGUA has noted that lynchings increasingly are planned
and premeditated events. There continued to be some cases in which
municipal officials or other local leaders were involved in lynching
attempts. As in past years, mobs generally killed the victims for
either property-related crimes or suspected membership in criminal
gangs. The large majority of the attacks took place in rural areas in
the mostly Mayan communities of the western and central highlands.
Generally these were communities where, during the internal conflict,
PAC's were accustomed to conducting populist summary hearings in the
town square and then publicly executing alleged criminals or
guerrillas.
On April 29, approximately 500 residents of Todos Santos
Cuchumatan, Huehuetenango, stoned to death a Japanese tourist and
burned to death his Guatemalan tour-bus driver. The incident apparently
resulted from local fears based on rumors that a satanic group intended
to hold a conclave in the area at that time. Authorities reacted
quickly, eventually arresting a total of 13 suspects. On August 13,
three of the suspects were accused formally of murder and assault; the
investigation continued at year's end, with no date set for the trial.
On July 8, a crowd trapped eight men at a roadblock near
Xalbaquiej, Chichicastenango, Quiche. The victims were pulled from
their vehicles, doused with gasoline, and burned to death because they
were suspected of running guns and drugs. Authorities quickly
identified and issued arrest warrants for 12 suspected ringleaders of
the mob. Representatives of 30 surrounding communities threatened
unspecified retaliation against the Government should any arrests be
made in the case; at year's end, the PNC had not executed the warrants.
While the justice system has been slow to convict and imprison
perpetrators of lynchings, the Government has demonstrated an increased
willingness and ability to investigate and prosecute lynching
offenders. There were numerous arrests and several convictions against
lynch mob leaders during the year. On May 25, a court sentenced four
men to 41 years and 8 months in prison each for a 1999 lynching of two
victims in Chisec, Alta Verapaz. On May 10, three individuals received
30-year prison sentences and on June 2, one vigilante was sentenced to
50 years in prison and two others were given 33-year sentences for an
October 1997 lynching in Comitancillo, San Marcos. On December 19, the
Sentencing Tribunal of Solola condemned Diego Tzaj Cuc to 50 years in
prison on two 25-year counts of murder for the January 1997 lynching in
Nahuala of Cristobal Tambriz Ixtama and Diego Crisostomo Coti Gomez.
The conviction came after the Solola district prosecutor appealed a
June 14 decision which found Tzaj Cuc not guilty. The Ninth Appelate
Court agreed with the prosecution and ordered a retrial at which Tzaj
Cuc was convicted. Three other suspects in the case were awaiting trial
at year's end: Francisco Boluz Lopez, Cruz Sojom Coti, Alonzo Tulul
Guarchai and Francisco Traj Tay. At year's end, 10 men and 1 woman were
scheduled to stand trial for the June 1997 lynching of 9 persons in
Barreneche, Solola.
With the assistance of MINUGUA, the Government inaugurated a new
anti-lynching campaign targeting those specific areas where lynchings
have occurred. During the year, about 50 workshops had been held in
rural towns, and these towns had not seen a recurrence of lynchings at
year's end. In conjunction with the program's inauguration, CSJ
President Jose Quesada Fernandez strongly denounced lynchings in a
public statement and pledged support and protection for judicial
personnel who are threatened by the local populace when lynching
perpetrators are brought before the courts. In addition the National
Tourism Institute (INGUAT) promotes a campaign that includes
educational workshops to prevent lynchings. The PNC developed an
antilynching operational plan that outlines procedures for officers to
follow when confronted with lynchings. There were some criticisms that
the PNC has yet to meaningfully deploy its operational plan or take
advantage of officers who speak indigenous languages to build
relationships with the communities that they police. Some observers
also have criticized national antilynching campaigns as lacking
sufficient focus or coordination with rural communities.
Despite improvements in the Government's response to deter
lynchings and punish those responsible, growing public feelings of
insecurity in the face of an ongoing wave of violent crime led many
communities to form Local Security Councils--as provided for in the Law
on the National Civilian Police--to protect themselves from criminal
activity. These organizations were created primarily in Quiche
department, with others believed to exist in Baja Verapaz, Solola,
Huehuetenango, and San Marcos departments. At a November press
conference, PNC director Rubio Lecsan Merida announced that the
Councils would be implemented in 31 municipalities as a measure to
extend the effectiveness of the police. In addition there were
unconfirmed reports that armed groups not covered by the Council
statute have organized in numerous other communities. There also were
unconfirmed reports that these unregulated, uncontrolled groups were
responsible for killings, torture, and social cleansing operations.
There continued to be concerns that former PAC members sometimes are
involved in lynchings.
b. Disappearance.--There was one credible report of forced
disappearance attributed to police forces.
On May 7, plainclothes PNC and SIC agents detained Adelso Carrillo
Leiva, Rigoberto Pineda Agustin, and Mynor Pineda Agustin in San
Benito, Peten. During interrogation for suspected participation in a
kidnaping, the suspects were blindfolded and driven to a remote
location, then threatened, beaten, and tortured. They returned to San
Benito without Mynor Pineda, and his whereabouts were unknown as of
June 30, suggesting a forced disappearance. A MINUGUA investigation
indicated that PNC and SIC members tried to frame the three suspects
for the kidnaping by falsifying evidence and documents. In addition the
police apparently drove the suspects to the scene of the crime in order
to claim that they caught the suspects in the act. The Public Ministry
made no serious attempt to investigate or solve the crime. A writ of
habeas corpus submitted on May 10 was answered by the judge in the San
Benito Criminal Court, but did not produce Mynor Pineda or any
information regarding his whereabouts.
There was no progress in the February 1998 disappearance of
Francisco Gonzalez Vasquez, which was attributed to two Zacapa police
officers. Despite an August 1998 arrest warrant for the arrest of
Inspector Marvin Rolando Gomez Noguera on charges of ``abuse of
authority and threats,'' he never has been arrested. The PNC
transferred him to a position in Tecun Uman, San Marcos (on the other
side of the country).
The PDH's office reported 10 complaints of forced disappearance
during the year, compared with 12 in 1999, and 18 in 1998. MINUGUA
reported two complaints of forced disappearance during the year,
compared with one in 1999 and one in 1998.
There was one credible report of a politically motivated
disappearance. On April 7, University of San Carlos (USAC) Professor
Mayra Gutierrez Hernandez disappeared. The human rights community and
Gutierrez's family and friends concluded that her disappearance was
politically motivated, due to her social activism and political
activities, which included social research into international
adoptions, women's rights, and a range of human rights causes. They
also accused prosecutors of sabotaging the investigation by pursuing
inaccurate theories that Gutierrez was an active member of a guerrilla
organization and either left voluntarily or was kidnaped by her
guerrilla comrades. These theories were repeated publicly by high-level
Government officials, including then-Interior Minister Guillermo Ruiz
Wong, thereby adding fuel to suspicions of a rightwing conspiracy.
During its own investigation, MINUGUA found evidence that persons
associated with military intelligence were spreading rumors and other
misinformation to divert the official investigation, while persons
close to Gutierrez inexplicably altered or removed valuable evidence
and gave false information to Public Ministry prosecutors.
Nevertheless, there were strong indications that the Public Ministry's
investigation was neither thorough nor objective. On November 28, the
NGO Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo requested a special mandate from the CSJ to
conduct an investigation into the case due to the lack of information
that has been made available to date by the authorities. On December 7,
the Supreme Court granted the PDH the status of special investigator in
the case until February 2001.
Disappearances in high-profile cases from recent years remained
unresolved at year's end. For example, there was no progress in the
investigation into the April 1999 disappearance of prominent indigenous
leader and FDNG party member Carlos Coc Rax. Nor was there progress in
the disappearance cases of Arnoldo Xi, an indigenous- and peasant-
rights activist who reportedly was shot and abducted in March 1995;
Lorenzo Quiej Pu, a human rights activist who disappeared in January
1994; and Juan Jose Cabrera (``Mincho''), the guerrilla commander
reportedly captured by the EMP in 1996 while taking part in a
kidnaping.
On August 10, ODHAG released its report on children missing since
the armed conflict. The report stated that of the documented cases, 86
percent were of ``forced disappearances'' and the remaining 14 percent
were attributable to diverse causes associated with the conflict, such
as communities fleeing attack. Of the documented cases of forced
disappearances, the military was responsible for 92 percent of the
cases; PAC's were responsible for 3 percent; guerrilla forces were
responsible for 2 percent; and the remaining 3 percent could not be
attributed to anyone. In 68 percent of the forced disappearances, boys
and girls were taken directly to a military post of one kind or
another. Approximately 93 percent of the victims were Mayan children,
the majority of whom were between 1 and 4 years old.
The fate of guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, who
disappeared following a March 1992 clash between army and URNG forces,
remains unknown. On December 5, the Inter-American Court ruled that the
Government was guilty of violating Bamaca's personal liberty and
integrity, and his rights to life, to juridical personality, and to
legal protection. It further found that in the case, the Government
violated international human rights conventions, specifically the
Convention against Torture. The Court ordered the Government to
investigate, publicly identify and try those responsible, and award
damages for its violations.
There was no apparent progress in the 1998 criminal case filed by
Adriana Portillo Bartow for the 1981 abduction and disappearance of her
two children and four other members of her family. The lawsuit named
former Interior Minister Donald Alvarez Ruiz, former National Police
Director German Chupina Barahona, and Pedro Garcia Arredondo, the
former chief of Commando Seis (a plainclothes police urban
counterinsurgency force) as defendants. Garcia Arredondo was reelected
as mayor of Nueva Santa Rosa in the November 1999 elections and
therefore has immunity from prosecution.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the integrity and security
of the person and prohibits physical or psychological torture of
prisoners; however, there were credible reports of torture, abuse, and
other mistreatment by members of the PNC, although at decreased levels
from the previous year. These complaints typically involved the use of
excessive force during arrests, interrogations, or other police
operations. SIC detectives continued to torture and beat detainees
during interrogation to obtain forced confessions. The Government and
the PNC showed increased willingness and ability to investigate,
prosecute, or otherwise punish officers who committed abuses. The PNC
transferred cases of alleged torture to the Public Ministry. There was
a significant increase in the number of murder victims that
demonstrated signs of torture or cruel treatment, in such diverse
locations as the Peten, the border with Honduras, Escuintla, and
Guatemala City, which led some observers to suspect social cleansing
operations (see Section 1.a.).
The PDH's office reported no complaints of torture during the year,
compared with four in 1999 and two in 1998. In its 11th Report on Human
Rights, MINUGUA investigated 13 complaints of torture, of which 12 were
confirmed. The majority of these cases involved abuse or mistreatment
of suspects and detainees by PNC officers or SIC detectives. The PNC
sometimes punished the use of excessive or illegal force by officers,
but more often offenders merely were transferred to a different
location. In several cases, there was credible evidence that PNC
officers and their superiors altered documentation, falsified evidence,
bribed and intimidated victims and witnesses, or otherwise obstructed
the investigation and prosecution of police misconduct. Some PNC
officers accused of crimes evaded punishment by fleeing justice. On
November 25, the PNC director said that the organization has ``zero
tolerance for illegal acts or for human rights abuses on the part of
police officers.'' Through the end of October, 215 PNC officers had
been dismissed from duty, while another 537 officers were under
investigation in the courts.
On February 3, PNC officers in Nueva Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa,
arrested Juan Carlos Zepeda Herrera for public drunkenness. Several
neighbors witnessed the arrest, but when Zepeda's father went to the
police station to inquire about his son, a senior officer denied
knowledge of the arrest. The next day, Zepeda was found in the bottom
of a 15-meter deep ravine with several broken bones and other serious
injuries. The ORP and Public Ministry concluded that the arresting
officers were responsible, but little progress had been made on the
case against them by the end of the year.
On February 9, Augusto Marroquin Carreto was taken from his cell in
the Quetzaltenango detention center by SIC detectives and interrogated
about his alleged involvement in the death of another prisoner. The
detectives beat and tortured him until he confessed. Several high
ranking PNC and SIC officers attended the interrogation. On February 5,
SIC officers from Quetzaltenango tortured Pablo Albani Edelman
Bethancourt and Alex Guillermo Reyes Monterroso into confessing their
membership in a gang of car thieves by asphyxiating them with rubber
hoods and beating them.
On February 13, in Jocotenango, Sacatepequez, Carlos Samayoa Olayo
was arrested inside his home and beaten severely by PNC officers who
did not have an arrest warrant. He was taken to jail despite signs that
his health was deteriorating quickly. Eventually, he was taken to a
hospital, where part of his intestine was removed surgically due to
injuries he sustained from blows to the stomach. PNC officers falsified
his arrest documentation to justify their use of force and hide the
fact that they had arrested him illegally. A judge freed Samayoa and
the PNC initiated disciplinary proceedings against the responsible
officers, but the Public Ministry's investigation failed to produce
criminal charges by year's end.
Casa Alianza reported that although the number of incidents of
abuse of street children roughly was equal to 1999 levels, relatively
few incidents were committed by members of the security forces. Most
acts of violence against street children were committed by individuals,
by private security guards, or in gang- and drug-related violence among
street children. Casa Alianza reported only one case of abuse of street
children by PNC officers, in which several officers were alleged to
have threatened and intimidated five street children. Prosecutions and
convictions for crimes against street children continued to be very
rare.
There were no reports that police used excessive force in evictions
of landless peasants occupying farms in attempts to gain land during
the year. Because of violent confrontations in the past, the Government
continued its policy of securing an eviction order from a court,
informing the occupiers of the coming eviction, and sending in a
lightly armed police contingent to end the occupation by using dialog
and verbal persuasion. The Ministry of Government carried out numerous
evictions without incident during the year using this policy. Despite
these improved tactics, on March 7, police and squatters clashed during
an eviction near Villa Nueva, when police used tear gas to subdue rock-
throwing squatters. In a similar operation, police also clashed with
squatters in the Peten on December 11. Some 21 persons were injured as
violence broke out during the eviction of about 300 squatter families.
Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The public continued to
experience difficulty in demonstrating or securing legal title to land,
and some progress was made toward genuine land reform. On April 27, the
parastatal Fontierras signed a $31 million loan agreement with the
World Bank to provide property titles to landowners in the Peten
department. Cooperation between the parastatals Fontierras and
Contierra brought together the related functions of land purchases with
that of resolving land conflicts, which are at the root of a great deal
of rural violence and lynchings (see Section 1.a.). The alliance
resolved 89 such conflicts during the year. The issuing of land titles
by Fontierras has affected approximately 5,400 families; the estimated
demand for these services is estimated at 55,000 families.
Corruption continued to be a problem, and there were credible
allegations of involvement by individual police officers in criminal
activity; contrary to the previous year, there were no credible
allegations of police involvement in kidnapings. The authorities
arrested some police officers and continued to take action against
officers found to have engaged in illegal activities, referring some
violations to the criminal justice system rather than simply imposing
administrative punishments. However, some observers claimed that rather
than discipline its officers the PNC often just transferred them to a
different part of the country. Transfers are a common practice and are
used to avoid personal problems, corruption, and questions of
mistreatment of detainees. Impunity for police who commit abuses
remained a serious problem.
All PNC members were required to meet minimum education
requirements and pass an entrance examination. Former PN staff who
wished to integrate into the PNC must complete successfully a 3-month
retraining course. According to MINUGUA, there are 1,200 former PN
employees who have yet to receive training. There also were screening
procedures to detect suspected human rights violators and officers
involved in criminal activities. New recruits had to complete a 6month
training course before entering on duty. The training course, developed
with the assistance of MINUGUA, foreign countries, and international
organizations, includes extensive human rights components. However,
some observers claimed that the retraining course was not sufficiently
rigorous and that relatively few members of the PN were screened out
during retraining, allowing the incorporation of some poorly qualified
PN members into the ranks of the new PNC.
Pursuant to the Peace Accords, former members of the military were
eligible to apply for positions in the PNC but were required to apply
like other civilians and complete the 6-month training course required
of all civilian applicants. However, the Government incorporated some
former members of the military and the former PMA into the ranks of the
PNC upon the completion of only the shorter course intended for current
members of the PN. A total number of 10,144 officers from prior
security forces have taken the retraining course since its inception.
The former PMA members were not subjected to a competitive selection
process but were screened carefully before they were allowed to enter
the program. Although government plans called for 20,000 PNC members to
be on duty around the country by the end of 1999, resource constraints
limited that number to about 16,700 by year's end. According to a June
MINUGUA report, PNC officers covered 307 of 331 municipalities.
Approximately 39 percent were new recruits, and 61 percent were
inducted from existing organizations. Approximately 10 percent of the
force is female. In August a class of 999 new recruits graduated from
the Police Academy.
The PNC's Office of Professional Responsibility (ORP) handles
internal investigations of misconduct by police officers. Despite
greater numbers of police officers on duty throughout the country, and
less public apprehension about filing complaints against the police,
the total number of such complaints remained roughly the same as the
previous year. There were signs that the ORP increased its
independence, professionalism, and effectiveness, despite limited
experience and resources. However, there were isolated cases in which
ORP investigators appeared to participate in coverups of police
misconduct. The ORP received a total of 1,581 complaints during the
year, compared to 1,517 complaints for 1999. There were 222 complaints
of abuse of authority, 104 of robbery, 43 of homicide, 141 of
corruption, 108 of improper conduct, 107 of threats, and 72 of illegal
detention. In cases where sufficient evidence suggested that criminal
acts were committed, ORP investigators forwarded them to the Public
Ministry for further investigation and prosecution. Between January and
the end of October, the PNC fired 215 officers. By year's end, charges
were brought against a total of 594 officers. At the end of the year,
the ORP had closed 870 cases, compared to 153 cases in 1999. The
investigations found 345 officers culpable and exonerated 525 officers.
Most observers still considered the PNC to be a significant improvement
over the PN.
In 1998 the PNC accepted some 60 police candidates from indigenous
communities in the Ixil region--approximately 30 of whom graduated on
their first attempt--to ensure that PNC personnel in those communities
would be proficient in the local language and able to operate
effectively in those communities. According to MINUGUA, approximately 7
percent of PNC officers speak an indigenous language. However, it
appears that a very high percentage of officers that do speak
indigenous languages work outside of the geographic area of their
particular linguistic competency.
No active members of the military serve in the police command
structure, but on March 21, Congress enacted a law enabling the
Government to employ the army to continue to support the police
temporarily in response to an ongoing nationwide wave of violent crime.
In 1998 and 1999, President Arzu had ordered the army to support the
police temporarily. While these measures were popular politically,
given the public's preoccupation with crime and security, they left
open the possibility of renewed military involvement in internal
security functions, a role prohibited by the Peace Accords. Under the
new law, military personnel are not subordinated clearly to police
control during joint patrols or operations.
There has been only modest progress in the case of Sister Dianna
Ortiz, who was kidnaped, tortured, and sexually abused by a group of
armed men in November 1989. The prosecutor on the case, Braulio Guzman,
renewed his efforts to finalize the investigative phase of the trial
despite logistical constraints. The court is empowered to close the
case for lack of evidence should nothing further be submitted.
Prison conditions remained harsh but generally not life
threatening. There was at least one death in the prison system that
caused observers to suspect social cleansing by government agents (see
Section 1.a.). The prison system continued to suffer from a serious
lack of resources, particularly in the areas of prison security and
medical facilities. In November the Government reported that prison
capacity nationwide was 6,170 persons and that there were approximately
6,700 inmates. The majority of the prisoners are not serving prison
terms but are being held in pretrial detention. Pretrial detainees
often are separated from convicted criminals. Many are released either
on good behavior or because they never are sentenced. Some institutions
were overcrowded; for example, in August the Preventive Detention
Center for Men in Guatemala City was approximately 75 percent over its
designed capacity. In February a project to improve prison
infrastructure began, involving improvements to fences and walls to
prevent further escapes and installation of better water, electricity,
sanitation, and emergency systems. In the spring, a new maximum
security facility opened. Prisoners continued to complain of inadequate
food. Corruption-especially drug-related--was widespread. Prison
officials reported frequent escape attempts and other manifestations of
prisoner unrest. According to press reports, in December approximately
1,100 prisoners temporarily took control of the interior of the main
detention facility in Guatemala City, calling for better living
conditions and access to visitors. The frequency of jailbreaks
continued to be a matter of serious public concern, although the number
of successful escapes appears to have declined. Several escaped
convicts eventually were recaptured. The military continued to provide
perimeter security for various prisons, as it has done since 1998.
The 433 female prisoners in the penal system generally are held in
facilities separate from men. Immigration detention facilities do not
always keep female detainees separate from the male population. In
August one woman claimed that she had been raped while in detention;
however, she declined to cooperate with authorities willing to
investigate. The Government permitted access to prisons by family
members.
Minor children are held in separate detention facilities. According
to a December MINUGUA report, there are only five juvenile delinquent
facilities in the country; approximately 39 percent of the children
housed in these facilities have sought protection and have committed no
offense.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, there were frequent credible
reports of arrests without judicial warrants, illegal detentions, and
failure to adhere to prescribed time limits in legal proceedings. In
practice, arresting officers frequently fail to satisfy legal
requisites. The Constitution requires that a court-issued arrest
warrant be presented to a suspect prior to arrest unless he is caught
in the act of committing a crime. Police may not detain a suspect for
over 6 hours without bringing the case before a judge. Once a suspect
has been arraigned, the prosecutor generally has 3 months to complete
his investigation and file the case in court. The law also provides for
access to lawyers and bail.
There are no comprehensive, reliable data on the number of
arbitrary detentions, although most accounts agree that the security
forces routinely ignored writs of habeas corpus in cases of illegal
detention. The PDH reported 46 complaints of illegal detention during
the year, compared with 20 in 1999 and 18 in 1998. From October 1999
through June, MINUGUA investigated some 31 cases of illegal or
arbitrary detention, and confirmed 23. According to a December MINUGUA
report, approximately 95 percent of arrested children were arrested by
authorities without a warrant.
Government figures indicated that approximately 61 percent of those
incarcerated are awaiting trial. The law sets a limit of 3 months for
pretrial detention; however, longer detentions still occurred
routinely. Prisoners often were detained past their legal trial or
release dates. Prisoners sometimes were not released in a timely
fashion after completing their sentences due to the failure of judges
to issue the necessary court order or other bureaucratic problems.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judicial system often fails to
provide fair trials due to inefficiency, corruption, insufficient
personnel and funds, and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and
witnesses. The courts' response to human rights violations, as well as
to general criminal activity, has been inadequate, although during the
year the Government achieved convictions in a few important human
rights cases from previous years. However, many high-profile human
rights cases remained pending in the courts for long periods as defense
attorneys abused the system by employing numerous dilatory appeals and
motions, for which they rarely were sanctioned. Courts sometimes took
months to resolve even patently frivolous appeals. There were numerous
credible allegations of corruption, manipulation, and intimidation in
the judiciary. There also were credible allegations of parallel
investigations by military intelligence-in the Bishop Gerardi and
Ordonez Porta murder cases--that interfered with the justice system's
efforts to investigate or prosecute those responsible (see Section
1.a.).
Judges and prosecutors continued to receive threats aimed at
influencing current decisions or as reprisals for past decisions. Death
threats and intimidation of the judiciary were extremely common in most
cases involving human rights violations, particularly where the
defendants were current or former members of the military, military
commissioners, or PAC's; witnesses often are too intimidated to
testify. For example, the lead prosecutor and his staff in the Bishop
Gerardi murder investigation continued to report wiretapping,
surveillance, and frequent death threats. In addition at least two
judges and a judicial staff member in the Gerardi case reported threats
and intimidation, including surveillance (see Section 1.a.). With
relatively few exceptions, plaintiffs, witnesses, prosecutors, and
jurists involved in high-profile cases against members of the military
reported threats, intimidation, and surveillance. A March report at the
U.N. Human Rights Commission noted that many judges and prosecutors are
denied health insurance because the threats and intimidation that they
receive makes their jobs too dangerous. The Government allocated more
resources to the judiciary's physical security, including providing
protective details for the judge and at least some members of the
prosecution team in the Gerardi case and witnesses in the SITRABI and
Dos Erres cases (see Sections 1.a. and 6.a.). The Government also
devoted more resources to providing for witness protection abroad for
key witnesses in the Gerardi and Dos Erres cases (see Section 1.a.).
According to a November press article, the Public Ministry spent
approximately $800,000 (6 million quetzals) on its witness protection
program, and was reviewing the criteria according to which witnesses
are admitted into the program.
The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ),
appellate courts, trial courts, and courts of first instance (which
function like grand juries). There also are courts of special
jurisdiction such as labor courts and family courts; these also are
under the jurisdiction of the CSJ. The Constitutional Court is
independent of the rest of the judiciary. The Constitution requires
that Congress elect all CSJ and appellate court magistrates every 5
years from lists prepared by panels composed of active magistrates,
representatives of the bar association, law school deans, and
university rectors. In October 1999, new CSJ and appellate magistrates
were chosen in a selection process that was more participatory and
transparent than ever before, despite some accusations that political
parties were attempting to fill the courts with their sympathizers
prior to the November 1999 general elections. There are several
community courts in indigenous rural areas (see Section 5). During the
year, 18 judges whose 5-year contracts were not renewed collectively
filed a petition before the Constitutional Court, which still was
pending at year's end.
The 1994 Criminal Procedures Code provides for the presumption of
innocence, the right to be present at trial, the right to counsel, plea
bargaining, and the possibility of release on bail. Trials are public,
allowing victims, family members, and human rights groups to observe
the process. Verdicts are rendered by three-judge panels. The Criminal
Procedures Code introduced oral trials; however, only those attorneys
who have graduated since that time have had real training in oral
trials. The code also provides for language interpretation for those
who require it; however, in practice this provision rarely is honored
due to budgetary and other constraints (see Section 5). During the
year, some new interpreters were hired, and the Public Defender's
Office began hiring attorneys who speak indigenous languages and
assigning them to areas where they can use their language skills to
defend non-Spanish-speaking defendants. The Public Ministry, which is
independent of the executive branch, may initiate criminal proceedings
on its own or in response to a complaint. Private parties may
participate in the prosecution of criminal cases as coplaintiffs.
Lengthy investigations and frequent procedural motions by both defense
and prosecution often lead to excessively long pretrial detention (see
Section 1.d.). Courts showed little willingness to exercise discretion
in dismissing frivolous or patently invalid motions. As a consequence,
parties continued to use such motions as delaying tactics, frequently
holding up trials for several months or even years.
Inefficiency and corruption in the courts, Public Ministry, and
police continued to impede the proper functioning of the judicial
system and undermine the right to due process. The Supreme Court
continued to seek the suspension of judges and to conduct criminal
investigations for improprieties or irregularities in cases under its
jurisdiction. According to government statistics, through August 1999
(the last period for which figures were available), the Supreme Court
imposed 1,215 sanctions against members of the judiciary for offenses
ranging from simple impropriety to illegal conduct. Of those sanctions
against judges, 1,159 were findings of impropriety, 66 were warnings, 9
judges were fired, and 1 was suspended. Magistrates received 13
findings of impropriety. The Public Ministry has been hampered in its
efforts to investigate crimes and prosecute offenders by inadequate
training and equipment, excessive caseloads, and insufficient numbers
of investigators. Prosecutors remained susceptible to intimidation and
corruption. In addition the Government's failure to clearly delineate
responsibility for investigating crimes to either the PNC or the Public
Ministry led to continued infighting and competition between these
organizations, as well as the duplication of investigative resources.
It was difficult to attract qualified personnel to the courts because
of the low salaries offered, but a raise in the salaries of judges
attracted greater numbers of higher caliber candidates.
On December 2, 1999, the new law on legal careers took effect,
fulfilling a major objective of the Peace Accords. That law establishes
a system to regulate the income, terms of office, promotion, training,
disciplinary measures, and other activities of judges and magistrates,
as well as support their professionalism and independence. The new law
was designed to speed up trials and reduce corruption by recognizing
and protecting competent judges while creating mechanisms to remove
incompetent or corrupt ones. A Judicial Career Advisory Committee and a
Disciplinary Committee were established, as called for by the new law,
and a permanent training staff was hired for what is now called the
Institutional Training Unit of the Judicial Career Council. It provides
a mandatory 6-month training course for all newly appointed judges. The
Council is responsible for selecting judges as well as disciplining
them in accordance with the law's criteria for sanctions. The 1999 law
also provided for a Peer Review Council, which has been in operation
since mid-year. The panel reviews accusations brought by the public,
litigants, or other sources, investigates the complaints, and takes
administrative action where appropriate. The panel had reviewed dozens
of cases by year's end, resulting in sanctions ranging from letters of
reprimand to firing.
In cooperation with foreign donors, the Government continued its
efforts to reform the judicial system, and there were some significant
improvements throughout the year. For example, on July 18, a new Public
Ministry Case Intake Unit was inaugurated in Guatemala City, which
reduced the average waiting time for filing a complaint from several
hours to approximately 10 minutes. A new Public Ministry Victim's Unit
was inaugurated with doctors and nurses on call 24 hours a day to
assist rape and other crime victims and to gather evidence for their
cases.
One of the most successful reform efforts has been the creation of
``justice centers,'' which bring together judges, public defenders,
prosecutors, private law practitioners, police, municipal
representatives, military officers, and civil society in a team
approach to dispute resolution and problem solving. The centers have
installed modernized docket and case filing systems in the courts,
thereby increasing efficiency and public service while significantly
decreasing corruption in the disappearance of case files. Centers are
located in Zacapa, Quetzaltenango, Escuintla, Nebaj (Quiche), the
Peten, Santa Eulalia (Huehuetenango), and Santa Cruz del Quiche (which
opened in April). Additional centers in Huehuetenango, Coban,
Chiquimula, Puerto Barrios, San Marcos, and Solola are scheduled to
open by mid-2001. The Supreme Court extended the administrative model
of the justice centers to include the criminal courts in the capital by
creating a new Clerk of Court office, which has streamlined the
processing of cases, increased transparency, and improved customer
service. Under the old system, courthouses resembled marketplaces in
which individuals could bribe a court official to ``lose'' their case
file--a system that resulted in near-complete impunity for those with
sufficient money. Individuals also could bribe the court to lose the
file of a person in pretrial detention, thus assuring that that person
would remain in jail indefinitely. With the implementation of the
centralized, computerized case tracking system, the number of missing
cases has dropped from approximately 1,000 per year to 3 cases since
the new system was introduced. In all three of the misplaced cases, the
individuals named in the complaints have been identified and are under
investigation. Prospective judges and assistant judges attended special
courses at the School of Judicial Studies, from which applicants were
selected to fill vacancies in the judiciary. Since 1994 the Government
has expanded the judiciary's presence throughout the country; at year's
end, there were judges in more than 300 of the 331 municipalities
around the country.
Despite some progress, much remains to be done to reform the
judiciary and establish effective rule of law, as mandated by the Peace
Accords. Many of the structural and procedural weaknesses of the
judiciary would have been addressed by the proposed constitutional
reforms that were defeated in a national referendum in May 1999. The
National Commission for the Strengthening of Justice, which was created
following the Peace Accords, increasingly is active; in July it
announced its strategic plan, and subsequently created a number of
subcommittees to work on implementation. The Commission met weekly
during the year to consider reforms to the penal code in order to
assist justices of the peace in resolving local disputes.
Beginning in August, residents of small towns in Quiche began
holding customary law trials, allegedly based on Mayan indigenous law,
in which community leaders meted out corporal punishment rather than
lynch suspected wrongdoers (see Section 1.a.). For example, on August
17, leaders of several small communities near Zacualpa, Quiche, rounded
up a crowd of 350 residents and summoned representatives from the PNC,
Public Ministry, and the Human Rights Ombudsman's office to serve as
witnesses. They then held a customary law trial and sentenced 2
brothers suspected of thievery to 25 lashes with a whip, shaved their
heads, and made them promise never again to do anything to harm the
community. The two men reportedly accepted responsibility for their
crimes and their father was designated to administer the whippings.
(One of the worst mass lynchings in 1999, in which five suspected gang
members were killed by a mob that also took several PNC officers
captive to prevent them from interfering in the lynching, also occurred
in Zacualpa.) Government and law enforcement officials quickly
criticized the common law trials as illegal and emphasized the need for
all suspected criminals to be processed through the judicial system.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of
home, correspondence, and private documents; however, allegations
persist that the authorities sometimes disregard these provisions.
Elements of the security forces, specifically the EMP, reportedly
continued to monitor private communications. The prosecutor and his
staff in the Bishop Gerardi murder investigation continued to report
wiretapping and surveillance, and other human rights organizations
reported telephone anomalies that suggested wiretapping (see Section
1.a.).
On May 7, Edgar Gutierrez, head of the President's Secretariat for
Strategic Analysis, announced the existence of a computer database
containing names, personal information, and cryptic codes about more
than 650,000 persons. The database appeared to have been compiled by
military intelligence several years earlier and a copy remained on the
SAE computer system. The SAE provided a copy to the Human Rights
Ombudsman, who offered access to the database as a public service for
those who wished to learn if their names appeared on the list.
The military continued to honor the 1994 presidential order to
suspend all conscription, including forced recruitment, as the armed
forces found it relatively easy to recruit young male volunteers from
impoverished areas using pay and education incentives.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression, and the Government generally respected this
right in practice. There were numerous credible reports that members of
the press were targets of anonymous threats and intimidation; and there
were two credible allegations of government-connected censorship. There
were no reports of self-censorship.
In addition to regular and open criticism of government policies,
the print media publicized communiques from human rights organizations,
unions, and groups opposed to the Government or its policies. The press
criticized the military and other powerful sectors. The press also
regularly published stories on reputed drug traffickers, official
corruption, and clandestine intelligence networks.
The Government prepared public information programs, which the
radio and television stations were required to broadcast. The
Government owns the rights to seven national television channels but
used none of them for broadcasts.
All four of the country's national television stations are owned by
a Mexican citizen, Angel Gonzalez, who plays a significant role in
politics and provides free broadcast time to Guatemalan Republican
Front politicians whom he supports. These channels are criticized
strongly as being monopolistic, progovernment, and interested in
broadcasting only uncontroversial news. In exchange for giving
extensive free time to the Guatemalan Republican Front and denying
access to then-ruling National Advancement Party, Gonzalez reportedly
insisted that his brother-in-law, Luis Rabbe, be the FRG's candidate
for mayor of Guatemala City. Despite the FRG's electoral sweep of most
major offices, Rabbe was defeated. Portillo then named Rabbe as his
Minister of Communications. By year's end, both Rabbe and the
Communications Ministry were the subject of numerous corruption
charges.
In February journalist Jose Eduardo Zarco, host of the popular
television political news show ``Evening Issues,'' claimed that his
show had been forced off the air due to political pressure from the
newly inaugurated Portillo Government. Specifically Zarco alleged that
Communications Minister Rabbe pressured Angel Gonzalez to close the
show because it was too critical of the Government. Gonzalez owns the
television station that broadcast Zarco's show as well as several other
stations, despite a law forbidding non-Guatemalans to own radio or
television stations and laws to prevent monopoly control. Human Rights
Ombudsman Julio Arango investigated and concluded that the Government
wrongfully had forced the show off the air. Arango called for
legislation to eliminate the media monopoly held by Gonzalez. The
Government denied responsibility for the show's closure and invited
Organization for American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on the
Freedom of Expression Santiago Canton to conduct an investigation into
the incident.
On April 12, Canton arrived for a 3-day visit, after which he
recommended a ``serious investigation of the possible existence of a
real monopoly on television stations open to public access,'' in
reference to the control by a single individual of all of the private
stations in the country. He also recommended that the Government
implement clear regulations to prevent conflicts of interest between
government officials and the media; suspend the auctions on radio
frequencies until the Peace Accord regarding the rights of indigenous
people is implemented; change the regulations governing television and
radio advertising to ensure equal access; include the recommendations
of civil society in legislation on information access that President
Portillo promised to propose; and launch a campaign to promote and
provide training in freedom of expression, including the passage of a
law to protect the freedom of information. Based in part on Canton's
recommendations, as well as a similar recommendation from the
Historical Clarification Commission, on August 16, the Government
introduced legislation in Congress to create a Freedom of Information
Law. The bill would establish an ombudsman's office to defend the right
to freedom of information, including the ability to petition the
Government for personal records and other information. The bill
languished in the FRG-dominated Congress at year's end.
In September popular radio talk show host Marielos Monzon was fired
from Radio Sonora, allegedly for returning 3 days late from a trip.
Monzon credibly alleged that she was fired because she earlier had
rejected a demand from station management not to interview certain
``leftwing'' members of the Portillo Administration, nor opposition
politicians.
Despite its Peace Accords pledge to enact reforms to the Radio
Communications Law to make radio frequencies available for indigenous
communities, the Government instead passed a law that created a public
auction system for radio frequencies. In August when eight local radio
operators were unable to purchase the frequencies that they already
were using due to the extremely high cost, the Superintendent of
Telecommunications fined them $10,000 (about 78,000 quetzals) for
broadcasting without a license. MINUGUA concluded that the high cost of
the public auction system was an effective barrier to rural indigenous
access to radio frequencies.
On April 27, photojournalist Roberto Martinez of the newspaper
Prensa Libre was killed while covering street demonstrations provoked
by bus fare increases. Martinez allegedly was shot by private security
guards, who opened fire on a group of demonstrators who were
accompanied by a number of professional journalists carrying their
photographic equipment. Two guards were remanded for trial, and
remained in police custody at year's end (see Section 2.b.).
In May and thereafter, there were significant increases in the
number of threats and other acts of intimidation directed against
journalists, which coincided with an increase in threats against
judicial personnel and human rights workers. Various reporters,
columnists, and editors from several daily newspapers complained of
telephone threats and other acts of intimidation. Personnel from one
newspaper, El Periodico, began receiving numerous threats the day
before publishing a series of articles on an alleged clandestine
intelligence network within the military. Some reporters claimed that
they were followed by vehicles with tinted windows and no license
plates. Others alleged that they were the victims of telephone
surveillance. The sudden and significant increase in the number of
threats in April and May led many observers to believe that there was
an organized campaign to intimidate the press by conservative elements
affiliated with the military.
On September 30, 1999, the Chiquimula sentencing court found Jose
Gabriel Lopez Leon and Neftaly Lopez Leon guilty of the 1997 murder of
journalist Jorge Luis Marroquin Martinez; the court sentenced each of
them to 30 years in prison. The same court found that the prosecutors
in the case had presented inadmissible evidence against the suspected
intellectual author of the crime, former Jocoton Mayor Manuel Ohajaca.
The Public Ministry did not bring any new evidence against Ohajaca.
The Constitution provides for academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
respects this right in practice. Peaceful demonstrations were common.
The police acted with restraint, and the authorities sometimes
negotiated the peaceful departure of the demonstrators. On April 24, a
demonstration against an increase in public transportation rates turned
violent, as rioters looted, burned buses, and destroyed property in
downtown Guatemala City. On April 25, the police responded with tear
gas and riot control measures, and arrested over 50 alleged
participants. However, the violence continued on April 27. Many
citizens criticized the police for not responding earlier and with more
force to stop the violence. During the riot, private security guards
killed three persons, including a journalist, and wounded several
others (see Section 2.a.). On October 10, mass protests over land
reform occurred, generally without incident. However, 1 demonstrator
was killed by an unidentified assailant, and 10 protesters were injured
in a clash with police in downtown Guatemala City.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. The Government did not
interfere with political associations. However, organizations must
obtain legal status, a formerly cumbersome and expensive procedure that
was streamlined considerably in 1998. The URNG and several NGO's had
alleged that this law particularly disadvantaged organizations
representing marginalized social sectors, including indigenous groups.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
There is no state religion; however, the Constitution recognizes
explicitly the separate legal personality of the Catholic Church.
Members of a religion need not register simply in order to worship
together. However, the Government requires religious congregations
(other than the Catholic Church), as well as other nonreligious
associations and NGO's, to register as legal entities in order to be
able to transact business.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Director General of Immigration acknowledged publicly that
extortion and mistreatment of persons attempting to cross illegally
into the country are subject to extortion and mistreatment by
government officials. Many observers believe that this mistreatment is
underreported because illegal immigrants almost never have the capacity
to lodge formal complaints, either with the authorities or against
them; and there is little legal assistance available to such
immigrants.
The Government grants refugee status and asylum in accordance with
the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees from other countries.
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared
persecution.
Voluntary repatriation of Guatemalan refugees who had migrated to
Mexico during the internal conflict concluded in 1999, bringing the
total to over 40,000 since 1993. Guatemalans who still remain in Mexico
do so by choice. Forty former refugee families returned voluntarily to
Mexico in August, claiming that the Government was not providing for
their fundamental needs. The Government of Mexico reportedly accepted
their return. Over 1,500 other individuals indicated their intention to
return to Mexico if the Government would not resolve their land issues
and improve living conditions.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government by peaceful and
democratic means, through secret ballot and universal suffrage for
those 18 years of age and older. Members of the armed forces and police
may not vote. Since the return to democracy and civilian rule in 1985,
there have been nine free elections. International observers concluded
that both the November 1999 general elections and the December 1999
runoff presidential election were free and fair. During and after the
November round of elections, political parties lodged numerous
complaints of fraud and misconduct against each other, the vast
majority of which were unaccompanied by evidence and appeared to be
partisan attempts to disqualify opponents or annul election results.
Due largely to unexpectedly high voter turnout, the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal (TSE) was slow to report the November vote count. Public
uncertainty over the delayed count contributed to violence and
disturbances in a number of municipalities with highly contested local
races. Lack of transportation, onerous voter registration requirements,
and elections scheduled during the harvest season prevent many poor,
indigenous, and rural persons from voting.
Voters elect the 113-member, unicameral Congress every 4 years
using a system of proportional representation based on population, with
deputies elected both from districts and from a nationwide list. The
Congress had 91 deputies from districts and 22 from the national list.
The 1999 elections involved 13 political parties, including two 2-party
coalitions. Four parties and both coalitions won seats in the
legislature, led by the FRG with a 63-seat majority, followed by the
PAN with 21 seats, the Bancada Unionista with 16 seats, and the New
Nation Alliance coalition, which includes the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG) party, with 9 seats. Other small parties
hold a total of 4 seats. Voter participation in the 1999 elections was
at a 13-year high. Congress can and does act independently of the
executive, but fragmentation along party lines and a weak support and
staff structure result in a legislature that is relatively ineffective.
Nevertheless, Congress increased its relative power and independence
under the leadership of president of Congress Efrain Rios Montt, a
former de facto President and current leader of the ruling party, the
FRG.
The former Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity guerrillas met
all legal requirements for qualification as a political party and
competed in the 1999 general elections, winning nine seats in Congress
as part of a coalition with a much smaller party.
On December 26, 1999, voters elected FRG presidential candidate
Alfonso Portillo in a runoff election that international observers
characterized as free and fair. He took office on January 14.
The new Government's efforts to implement the Peace Accords were
limited as it struggled to organize itself and set policy priorities
throughout the year. By year's end, the Portillo Administration
established a new timetable for the implementation of the many elements
of the Accords which had yet to be accomplished.
In May 1999, in a national referendum, voters rejected the entire
package of 50 constitutional reforms approved by Congress in 1998,
dealing a significant blow to the peace process. Only 20 percent of the
electorate voted. The defeated amendments included provisions to
recognize, respect, and protect indigenous languages and traditional
customs, professionalize the judicial service, give civilian courts
jurisdiction over military personnel, and define the army as an
apolitical organization. While ordinary laws could be enacted to
accomplish many of the reforms, the constitutional reforms nonetheless
held great symbolic value for the peace process.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in politics
and government, but women are underrepresented in politics. The major
parties nominated and elected fewer female candidates for Congress in
the 1999 elections; however, women's participation as voters was the
highest ever, despite social traditions that inhibit voting by women.
Nevertheless, women held some prominent political positions. Voters
elected 8 women to Congress in November, and that number was increased
to 13 as substitutes took the seats of members of Congress recruited to
serve in the Executive Branch. One woman, Zury Rios de Lopez, is the
Second Vice President of Congress. Women hold two seats on the Supreme
Court and one on the Constitutional Court. There was one female
minister in the Portillo Cabinet--the Minister for Culture and Sports.
The Constitution provides for equal rights for indigenous people.
Some attained high positions as judges and government officials,
including 14 members of the new Congress (15 were elected, but Aura
Marina Otzoy Colaj, an indigenous woman, later was appointed Ambassador
to Norway). There were 6 indigenous members in the 80-member Congress
before the 1999 elections. Indigenous people still are underrepresented
significantly in politics due to limited educational opportunity and
pervasive discrimination (see Section 5). There are two indigenous
members in the Cabinet of the Portillo Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government permits local human rights groups to operate without
restriction. Numerous domestic and international groups investigate and
report freely on human rights issues. Senior government officials also
met with numerous foreign government officials and international human
rights monitors. While many international human rights organizations
and their workers do not enjoy formal legal status, they continue to
operate openly.
During the year, most NGO's credibly reported receiving threats or
being intimidated by unidentified persons. From April to June there was
a very significant increase in the number of threats against human
rights workers, as well as journalists and judicial personnel, in
comparison to 1999 levels (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). Most of these
acts of intimidation involved anonymous telephonic threats,
surveillance, and unknown individuals and cars following human rights
workers or watching their workplaces or residences. In addition at
least two murders and one disappearance allegedly were committed for
political reasons, possibly related to the victims' human rights work.
These cases included the killing of two government environmental
workers in Izabal (see Section 1.a.), and the disappearance of
Professor Mayra Gutierrez (see Section 1.b.). ODHAG personnel reported
frequent and persistent death threats, surveillance, and other acts of
intimidation, as did the prosecutors, two judges, and other judicial
personnel working on the Bishop Gerardi murder case (see Section 1.a.).
1992 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchu and her staff reported
numerous threats in connection with the genocide lawsuit that they
filed in 1999 in a Spanish court against former de facto President
Efrain Rios Montt and seven other former military or government
officials. There were other incidents during the year of possible
political intimidation of human rights workers; however, the reports
could not be verified.
In addition to the increased number of threats, there was a series
of breakins or robberies in human rights NGO offices that some
observers believed was part of an overall campaign to intimidate civil
society. In March unknown persons broke into the offices of former
presidential candidate and leftist leader Alvaro Colom, took files and
computer information, and wrecked the office. They also defecated and
urinated on tables and in hallways and scribbled political graffiti and
insults on chalkboards. In May the National Coordinator of Widows of
Guatemala, an NGO, reported what appeared to be an ordinary robbery of
its daycare center in Santa Cruz del Quiche, which was followed a month
later by a break-in at its Guatemala City office. On June 14, robbers
stole three computers from a branch office of CALDH after drugging the
night watchman. On September 4, four armed men entered the offices of
FAMDEGUA around noon and demanded keys to vehicles and money. They
stole a FAMDEGUA vehicle, four computers, two laptops, a television,
and other electronic equipment. The computers contained sensitive
information about human rights complaints, statistics, and information
regarding specific human rights cases, such as the Dos Erres massacre
(see Section 1.a.). On October 26, an armed group assaulted the
employees and robbed the offices of a group called Women Let's Advance.
The assailants raped one employee, and stole several computers and
other office equipment as well as the money and jewelry of the
employees. On December 22, 2 days after the press reported that ODHAG
would be bringing a genocide suit against former de facto president and
current president of Congress, Efrain Rios Montt, ODHAG's legal
coordinator Mynor Melgar and his family were threatened, tied up, and
robbed at gunpoint in their home. While the event contained elements of
common crime, Melgar was threatened, and the perpetrators' actions
showed premeditation in directing their actions to him specifically.
While each of these incidents, if taken separately, could be explained
as a common crime, the frequency of such incidents was a cause for
significant concern.
Every 5 years, Congress elects the Human Rights Ombudsman from
three candidates chosen by the Congressional Committee on Human Rights;
the next election is scheduled to occur in August 2002. The Ombudsman
reports to Congress and monitors the rights provided for by the
Constitution. The PDH's rulings do not have the force of law. The
Ombudsman, Julio Arango Escobar, operates with a large degree of
independence from other branches of the Government, often passing
judgment on controversial issues not normally considered human rights
topics, such as bus fares and electricity rates. During the year,
Arango continued to complain that the Congress neither funded his
office adequately nor implemented his recommendations on human rights.
The PDH's lack of funding limited the possibility of developing
adequate investigative capabilities. Relations between the Ombudsman's
office and MINUGUA were strained and distant. Upon the expiration of
MINUGUA's mandate at the end of the year, the PDH was to take over
MINUGUA's human rights verification function, but there was no visible
preparation for the transfer of that responsibility by either party.
MINUGUA said that its attempts to engage the PDH in meaningful
preparations were rejected. On November 22, the Secretary General
recommended to the General Assembly that the MINUGUA mission be
extended for another year; it is expected to continue working on a
reduced staff and budget through 2003 in accordance with the
rescheduled Peace Accord implementation timeline.
COPREDEH continued to forge responsive and cooperative
relationships with both domestic and international human rights
monitors, often acting as a liaison between such groups and other
government offices. Unlike in the previous year, COPREDEH took a more
active approach in attempting to resolve cases before the IACHR. Due
largely to the leadership of new COPREDEH president Victor Hugo Godoy,
on March 3, the Government signed a series of precedent-setting
agreements before the IACHR in which it accepted responsibility for
several key human rights cases, including the Dos Erres massacre (see
Section 1.a.); the murder of Myrna Mack Chang (see Section 1.a.); and
the killing of street child Marcos Fidel Quisquinay by a live grenade
placed in a bag of food. COPREDEH sought to negotiate amicable
settlements with the victims or their survivors in these 3 cases and
over 40 others pending before organs of the Inter-American human rights
system. On March 29, the Government, represented COPREDEH, designated
46 cases that had been submitted to the IACHR as priority cases for
seeking settlements with victims or their survivors. Similarly, on
August 9, President Portillo signed an agreement with the IACHR in
which he acknowledged the Government's general responsibility to pay
reparations to victims or their survivors of human rights abuses
committed during the internal conflict in 10 cases. On November 30, the
Government, in compliance with a decision by the Inter-American Court
on Human Rights, agreed to compensate the families of the murdered
street children (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Also on November 11,
President Portillo accepted the Government's responsibility in several
other human rights cases, including the La Exacta Farm case (see
Section 1.a.). During the year, the Government signed agreements
covering 52 cases before the IACHR, out of a total of approximately
130, in which it pledged to indemnify victims or their survivors and
investigate and prosecute those responsible. By December 5, the
Government had entered into negotiations on a total of 79 cases before
the IACHR. Human rights observers described this as a sign of a
fundamental shift in Government policy regarding human rights.
MINUGUA maintained a human rights verification staff of
approximately 70 persons, with 13 regional or subregional offices to
monitor implementation of the human rights provisions of the Peace
Accords and strengthen democratic institutions. MINUGUA stated that the
Government generally cooperated with its investigations but cited
occasional isolated incidents in which government officials or
institutions had obstructed its efforts.
In April the Government hosted a visit by OAS Special Rapporteur on
the Freedom of Expression Santiago Canton, whose visit focused on
allegations of government censorship of a television news show and an
alleged media monopoly by a Mexican businessman (see Section 2.a.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language or Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons are free and equal in
dignity and rights, and that the State must protect the life, liberty,
justice, security, peace, and development of all citizens. However, in
practice the Government frequently is unable to enforce these
provisions, due to inadequate resources, corruption, and a
dysfunctional judicial system.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence,
remained common among all social classes. The 1996 Law on Domestic
Violence provides that the Public Ministry, the national police, family
courts, legal clinics, and the PDH can receive complaints of domestic
violence. Domestic violence is defined as ``whatever action or omission
by direct or indirect manner causes damage, or physical, sexual,
psychological, or patrimonial suffering'' to a person within the family
group. The law provides for the issuance of restraining orders against
alleged aggressors and obligates the PNC to intervene in situations of
domestic violence. Statistics vary significantly. The Procuracy General
of the Nation registered 1,664 complaints in the first 10 months of the
year, compared with 1,548 complaints in all of 1999. During the first
half of the year, the PDH received 1,535 cases of abuse against women.
In 1998 the PDH reported approximately 2,600 complaints of domestic
violence nationwide. Of the total number of cases of domestic violence
of all types (including child abuse), only 33 have gone to trial,
resulting in 28 convictions. On July 28, an appeals court upheld a 2-
year prison sentence for spousal abuse against Amado Morales. The
decision is only the second such conviction in the country's history--
the first reportedly took place 8 years ago.
Complaints of spousal abuse continued to rise due, at least in
part, to increased nationwide educational programs, which have
encouraged women to seek assistance. Judges may issue an injunction
against an abusive spouse or companion, and the police are charged with
enforcing such injunctions. The Women's Rights Department of the PDH
and various NGO's provided medical and legal assistance and information
on family planning. The office of the Ombudsman for Indigenous Women,
led by Juana Catinac Xom de Coyoy, was established in 1999 and began to
provide social services for victims of domestic or social violence, as
well as mediation, conflict resolution, and legal services for
indigenous women. It formed a coordinating committee and other advisory
boards and representative assemblies from each of 24 linguistic groups.
It opened its first branch offices and spent much of its first year
resolving personnel, equipment, and organizational issues. On November
28, the Government announced the formation of the National Coordinator
for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women
(CONAPREVI), which is to be chaired by the Secretary for Women's
Affairs, and include public sector representatives from the Public
Ministry, the judiciary, the National Statistics Institute, and three
representatives from the private sector Network Against Violence
Against Women.
Victims rarely reported criminal sexual violence, although the
number of complaints of such offenses continues to increase
significantly. PNC statistics showed 323 rapes in 1999, (the latest
year for which statistics were available), compared to 220 rapes in
1998. Many observers believed that this increase did not reflect an
increase in the number of rapes committed, but rather an increased
willingness on the part of victims to come forward, greater public
confidence in the PNC, and improved record keeping of crime statistics.
Despite these advances, relatively few rape cases went to court, in
large part because police have little training or investigative
capacity for such crimes and because many rape victims were reluctant
to report and prosecute such crimes. Unofficial statistics suggested
that there were 80 convictions during the year for rape or related
crimes in 1999, compared with 67 convictions in 1998. In July the
Public Ministry created a Special Victim's unit, staffed 24 hours a day
with doctors and nurses with rape test kits to assist rape victims in
gathering evidence to use against their attackers. The law allows a
rapist to be exonerated when the victim is at least 12 years old and
agrees to marry him, but the Public Ministry must approve the marriage
when the victim is below the age of 18.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is common.
On May 23, the Portillo Administration announced the creation of a
Secretariat for Women's Affairs. The Secretariat operates under the
direction of the President, advising him on the coordination of policy
affecting women and their development.
The Constitution asserts the principle of equality between the
sexes. Nonetheless, in practice women face job discrimination, are less
likely to win management positions, and on average receive
significantly lower pay than men. Some women were subjected to
preemployment pregnancy tests. Women are employed primarily in low-wage
jobs in the textile industry, agriculture, retail businesses, and the
public sector. More working women than men are employed in the informal
sector of the economy, where pay and benefits generally are lower.
Women may own, manage, and inherit property on an equal basis with men.
In 1999 the Congress repealed a rarely enforced Civil Code article that
enabled a husband to deny his wife the right to work outside the home
and an article that placed the husband in charge of administering the
family's property.
The National Women's Forum, inaugurated in November 1997, continued
to promote women's issues by participating in local and regional forums
organized by political parties during the general election campaign. In
May the Forum presented its 2-year plan for development and women's
issues to the Government. The plan sets specific targets for
development, including literacy, expanded primary school coverage,
scholarship programs, and integrated women's health. In each of the 24
linguistic communities, women's groups are responsible for implementing
and monitoring the Forum's policies and programs.
Children.--The Constitution charges the Government with protecting
the physical and mental health, as well as the moral well-being, of
minors. However, despite these provisions, the Government in the past
has not devoted sufficient resources to ensure adequate educational and
health services for children. Approximately 80 percent of children
under the age of 18 live in poverty. The Government budgeted
approximately $345 million (2.69 billion quetzals) for education and
$178 million (1.39 billion quetzals) for health care; however, the
percent of the country's GDP that was spent on education decreased from
2.46 percent of GDP in 1999 to 2.3 percent during the year.
A MINUGUA report, issued on December 11, found that 51 percent of
the population is under 18 years old; of this group, 83 percent live in
poverty; 46 percent of children under the age of 5 suffer chronic
malnutrition and another 24 percent suffering periodic malnutrition.
There are approximately 200,000 orphans throughout the country,
approximately 10,000 children in gangs, and 6,000 children living on
the streets. A total of 444 children have disappeared since 1996.
The Constitution provides for compulsory education for all children
up to the 6th grade. However, less than half the population actually
receives a primary education, and only 3 of 10 students who begin
primary school complete it. One-fourth of all children do not attend
school. These are concentrated in rural areas, and a disproportionate
number are indigenous. Only one of eight girls who begin school
graduates from the 6th grade. According to a December MINUGUA report,
the average Guatemalan child receives 2.3 years of education; however,
when only indigenous children are considered, the average drops to 1.3
years of education. Children in rural and indigenous areas are less
likely to complete primary school.
Approximately 2.1 million children between the ages of 5 and 12
were enrolled in schools in 1999, according to the Ministry of
Education. The Ministry also reported that 3,461 communities had access
to educational services for the first time. The PDH reported in 1999
that 38 percent of elementary school-age children and 79 percent of
secondary school-age children do not attend school. There were special
initiatives to promote the education of girls, and about 49,000 girls
received incentive scholarships from PRONADE, a privately run program
under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, during the year, in
addition to approximately 12,000 scholarships from other government
institutions and international organizations.
Most estimates indicated that reports of child abuse continue to
increase, although there are few statistics available to measure the
problem. The Procuracy General reported 1,126 cases of child abuse as
of December 5, compared to 1,478 cases in 1999 and 1,172 cases in 1998.
A total of 70 cases reported during the year concerned physical abuse;
the remainder involved sexual or psychological abuse. Out of a total of
4,250 cases of domestic violence, the PDH investigated 126 complaints
of child abuse during the year. The largest percentage of these
complaints were for physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, as well as
neglect. A Permanent Commission for Children and Youth investigates
cases of mistreatment of children. The Social Secretariat for the
Welfare of Children has oversight for the children's welfare program,
treatment and training for children, and special education assistance
for children. The Secretariat provides shelter and assistance to
children who are victims of abuse; however, due to lack of resources,
these children sometimes are placed with other youths who have
committed crimes.
Abuse of street children remained a serious problem in major cities
(see Section 1.c.). Most credible estimates put the number of street
children at approximately 6,000 nationwide, with about 3,500 of these
youths concentrated in Guatemala City. The NGO Casa Alianza increased
its estimates of the number of homeless persons to 25,000, of whom
8,000 are children. Approximately 1 in every 1,000 children lives on
the street. The majority of street children ran away from home after
they were abused. Criminals--reported to include private security
guards and corrupt police or military personnel--often recruited these
children into thievery or prostitution rings. According to Casa
Alianza, drugs, prostitution, and gangs posed the greatest danger to
this vulnerable group during the year. Most violence against street
children was committed by individuals, private security guards, and
other street children, not by police or other government forces. There
was only one report of abuse of street children by PNC officers, in
which several officers allegedly threatened five street children. The
Government and a number of NGO's operate youth centers, but the funds
devoted to them are not sufficient to alleviate the problem. The
Government maintains one shelter for girls and one shelter for boys in
Guatemala City; these shelters provide housing for the homeless and
incarceration for juvenile offenders. A new phenomenon developed as
street children began giving birth to a second generation of street
children, dubbed ``street babies.'' Casa Alianza reported three cases
of kidnaping or forced disappearance of street babies by unknown
individuals.
On November 30, the Government, in compliance with a decision by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, agreed to compensate the
families of the street children who were killed between 1990 and 1995
(see Section 1.a.). In addition to the modest $11,500 per victim
compensation, the Government also promised to develop programs to
prevent the abandonment of and violence against street children.
In August ODHAG issued its report on children missing in the armed
conflict (see Section 1.b.). A report by ODHAG issued in September
found that children accounted for 20 percent of the victims of
arbitrary extrajudicial executions during the armed conflict, and that
27 percent of the victims of sexual abuse committed during the armed
conflict were children.
On February 29, Congress indefinitely suspended a proposed new
Minors' Code due to strong political opposition from certain powerful
sectors, reportedly led by the adoption attorneys who receive large
financial gains from nonjudicial adoptions that would have been
eliminated under the new code. Other opponents, including religious
leaders, argued that the code derogated parental rights and threatened
the integrity of the family. The bill was to have become law on March
3. Debate on changes to the code continued during the year.
COPREDEH continued weekly meetings of the Permanent Commission for
Children, composed of representatives from Casa Alianza and from the
judicial and executive branches, with the aim of addressing the
problems of street children. The Government continued its program to
train instructors to educate civil society groups and the public about
children's rights.
Sexual exploitation of children is a growing problem, including
child prostitution and the trafficking of children for purposes of
prostitution. The Ministry of Labor noted an increase in child
prostitution in the towns along the borders with Mexico and El
Salvador. Along the border with El Salvador, many child prostitutes
were brought into the country from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras
by organized rings, who force the children into prostitution (see
Section 6.f.). The proposed Minor's Code would have mandated stricter
punishments for parents who force their children into prostitution, and
for adults who solicit child prostitutes.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that the State
should protect disabled persons. Nonetheless, physically disabled
persons are discriminated against in education and employment
practices, and few resources are devoted to combat this problem or to
assist the disabled. The PDH continued to draft proposed regulations to
implement the provisions of the 1996 Law on Protection of the Elderly
and the Law on Attention to Disabled Persons, which mandates equal
access to public facilities, prohibits discrimination based on
disability, and provides other legal protections. The law defines a
disabled person as one whose physical, mental, or emotional
deficiencies limit performance of normal activities. It stipulates
equal opportunity for disabled persons in health, education, work,
recreation, sports, and cultural activities. It also provides that all
disabled persons receive the benefits of labor laws and social security
and have the right to work. In addition the law establishes equal
education opportunities, the requirement that buildings meet access
codes, and the right to equal pay. While implementation of the new law
has been slow, a National Council for the Disabled, composed of
representatives of concerned government ministries and agencies, met
regularly to formulate regulations needed to implement the legislation.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution states that the country is
composed of diverse ethnic groups and obliges the Government to
recognize, respect, and promote the lifestyles, customs, traditions,
forms of social organization, and manner of dress of indigenous people.
In 1999 the Arzu Government created the office of Ombudsman for
Indigenous Women and appointed Juana Catinac Xom de Coyoy as its first
Director.
Indigenous people constitute over one-half the population but
remain largely outside of the country's political, economic, social,
and cultural mainstream. An October U.N. report stated that 73 percent
of indigenous persons, and 72 percent of those living in rural areas,
face an institutional lack of economic possibilities and limited access
to basic services. The 1994 census, the most recent, stated that 42.8
percent of the population is indigenous; however, most observers
believe that this figure is low and that indigenous people constitute a
majority of the population. There is no single indicator of indigenous
status, and there are at least 22 separate Mayan ethnic groups, each
with its own language. In addition to the indigenous Mayan groups,
there is an indigenous Xinca community of some 6,000 persons. The
Garifuna, descendents of Africans brought to the Caribbean region as
laborers and who later migrated to South and Central America, are a
separate minority group.
Indigenous people were the most common victims of extrajudicial
killings and other serious human rights abuses during the internal
conflict. The commissions established to discuss the implementation of
constitutional provisions relating to indigenous rights met during the
year to formulate recommendations to the Government regarding
protection of indigenous culture, languages, traditions, lands, and
sacred sites. Indigenous people continued to organize themselves into
interest groups to promote bilingual education, women's rights, and
community development. Politically, the indigenous groups remained
fragmented, and there was little agreement among the Mayan groups on
common goals or strategies to increase their political representation
and power. The Government devoted marginally increased resources to
bilingual education. Contrary to previous years, there were no reports
of schools denying children the right to wear traditional indigenous
dress, a common complaint under the previous administration.
Rural indigenous people have limited educational opportunities and
thus have fewer employment opportunities. Many indigenous people are
illiterate or do not speak Spanish. Linguistic barriers hinder
interaction with the Government and limit access to public services,
including the judiciary, since few officials speak any of the 24
indigenous languages. In 1998 the Indigenous Languages Officialization
Commission issued a report, in which it recommended that a variety of
public services be provided in the four most widely spoken indigenous
languages (K'iche', Q'eqchi', Mam, and Kaqchikel), with a lesser degree
of services provided in less widely spoken indigenous languages.
Indigenous people arrested for crimes often are at a disadvantage
due to their limited comprehension of Spanish. The Criminal Procedures
Code states that the courts must provide interpretation for anyone
requiring such services during criminal proceedings. In 1999 there were
67 interpreters at all levels of the legal system, from the police to
the formal courts, to assure non-Spanish speakers the means to bring
complaints, resolve conflicts, and provide testimony. Interpreters were
concentrated in former conflict areas of the country; more interpreters
were in training. The Public Defender's Office began hiring attorneys
fluent in indigenous languages and assigning them to areas where they
could serve as translators in addition to defending their clients. The
Government also made efforts to recruit justices of the peace who are
bilingual in Spanish and an indigenous language. In January 1998,
several community courts were created in primarily indigenous, rural
areas to decentralize justice and incorporate customary Mayan law for
minor offenses. In August there were several incidents in which
indigenous common law courts were convened to hand down sentences,
including whippings and other forms of corporal punishment, against
suspected criminals and other delinquents (see Section 1.e.). The
University of San Carlos offers a postgraduate degree in indigenous
customary law. Judges, prosecutors, public defenders, judicial
translators, and others already have received the degree, which
emphasizes criminal law and human rights.
Contrary to the previous year, no indigenous leaders disappeared
during the year. There was one credible report of an indigenous leader
killed for political reasons, Jose Mendoza Garcia (see Section 1.a.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide workers with freedom of association and the right to form and
join trade unions. The Government does not control unions. Although
internal intelligence services allegedly monitor the activities of
politically active union leaders, there is no direct state interference
in union activities. In June the Labor Ministry proposed a package of
major reforms intended to strengthen the Labor Code's protection of
worker rights. In December the Labor Ministry proposed a revised Code
of Labor Procedure aimed at streamlining labor dispute litigation. The
proposed Labor Code reforms would increase the fines for firing workers
who organize unions and define the mission of the Labor Ministry as
that of ``carrying out a national policy of defense and development''
of worker rights. The reforms were pending at year's end. The most
recent reforms to the Labor Code in 1992 mandated steps to improve
worker rights by facilitating freedom of association, strengthening the
rights of working women, increasing penalties for violations of labor
laws, and enhancing the role of the Labor Ministry and labor courts in
enforcing labor law. However, enforcement of the law is weak. Despite
continuing credible efforts to enlarge it, the labor inspection system
remains ineffective, inadequate, and corrupt. All workers have the
right to form or join unions, including public sector employees, with
the exception of members of the security forces. However, retaliation
by employers--including firing, intimidation, and sometimes violence--
against workers who try to exercise internationally recognized labor
rights is common and usually goes unsanctioned. In its November report
to the International Labor Organization (ILO) Governing Body, the ILO's
Committee on Freedom of Association detailed five cases of dismissal of
workers for unionizing activity in which courts ordered the workers
reinstated but the employers never complied. In some of these cases,
appeals and reappeals by employers of court decisions against them have
continued the proceedings for years, revealing the inability of the
courts to dismiss frivolous appeals and have their decisions enforced.
The law provides for a system of labor and social welfare courts to
rule on violations of the Labor Code. Employers often failed to comply
with the decisions of the Labor Courts and suffered no effective
sanctions for having done so. Throughout the economy, employees were
reluctant to exercise their right of association for fear of reprisal
by employers. Workers had little confidence that the responsible
executive and judicial institutions would defend effectively their
rights as employees when employers violated those rights. In addition
the weakness of labor inspectors, the failures of the judicial system,
poverty and lack of education, the legacy of violent repression of
labor activists during the internal conflict, and the deepseated
hostility of the business establishment towards independent and self-
governing labor associations constrained the exercise of worker rights.
In its 4th Report on the Peace Process, MINUGUA noted that ``genuine
trade union freedom does not exist'' due to antiunion violence.
According to the Labor Ministry, less than 2 percent of the work
force (about 60,000 persons) belong to labor organizations. The
approximately 1,300 registered unions and 400 company-sponsored
``solidarity organizations'' were independent of government and
political party domination. However, the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in a September 1999 report described the
solidarity organizations as ``set up by employers to undermine trade
unions.'' The administrative process for unions to obtain legal status
has been simplified progressively over the past decade. In 1996 the
Ministry of Labor reduced the number of steps within the Ministry for
consideration of union applications and established strict timetables
for approval or denial; the time for the procedure was reduced to 20
days from 60. During the year, the Labor Ministry expanded its program
to assist unions with their applications. During the year, the Ministry
also simplified the process for forming federations and confederations.
The Labor Ministry granted legal status to 42 unions during the year.
In 1999 there were 1,389 registered unions, including 401 unions in the
public sector and 988 unions in the private sector.
On October 13, 1999, a group of men, many of them armed, took
control of the union hall of the SITRABI banana workers union in the
town of Morales, Izabal. There were credible reports that leaders of
the vigilante group repeatedly threatened to kill some of the union
leaders. During the incident, which lasted over 8 hours into the
morning of October 14, about 20 rank-and-file union members reportedly
were held captive for much of that time on the bus in which they had
come to the union hall. There were several credible reports that armed
men forcibly entered the home of one of the union leaders and made him
go with them to the union hall. Various union leaders and rankand-file
members were shoved and struck. Union leaders were forced to sign
letters of resignation from their positions in the union and from their
jobs. The Ministry of Labor immediately declared the coerced
resignations to be invalid. MINUGUA's report on the incident called it
``one of the most serious violations of human rights since the signing
of the Peace Accords.''
Despite the availability of dozens of potential witnesses, and
therefore little doubt as to the essential facts, the investigation and
indictment process that followed was lengthy and slow to progress.
According to MINUGUA, law enforcement failures attendant to this
incident included police inaction as the incident took place, lapses in
applying the Code of Criminal Procedures during the indictment phase,
and a weakening of the charges finally placed against the accused. In
June the first instance court rejected charges of abduction,
intimidation, aggravated trespass, and aggravated illegal detention,
which were sought by the prosecution. The first instance court
arraignged 24 defendants on charges of trespass, illegal detention, and
coercion. The trial date is scheduled for spring 2001.
The ILO's Governing Body, sitting as the Committee on Freedom of
Association, published a detailed account of these events in its report
released in November. The report noted that ``the BANDEGUA enterprise
denies any links with the acts of violence while the trade union
accuses it of being responsible for them.'' (SITRABI is the union of
BANDEGUA employees; BANDEGUA is the Guatemalan subsidiary of Del Monte
Fresh Produce). In the background to this violence against these union
leaders was the firing of 897 workers by BANDEGUA in September 1999, in
violation of the contractual agreement ``in force between the
enterprise and the trade union.'' In October the Ministry of Labor
facilitated the completion of a collective bargaining agreement between
the SITRABI union and the lease holding contractors of BANDEGUA who had
taken up operating the plantations on which the 918 workers had worked
as directhire BANDEGUA employees.
Workers have the right to strike, but labor code procedures for
having a strike recognized as legal are cumbersome. Labor organizers
have criticized the law, which requires that twothirds of the work
force must approve a vote to strike, prohibits strikes by agricultural
workers at harvest time, and allows the Government to prohibit strikes
that it considers seriously harmful to the national economy. Employers
may suspend workers or fire them for absence without leave if the
authorities have not recognized their strike as legal. The strike
regulation law calls for binding arbitration if an impasse has been
reached after 30 days of negotiation.
In 1996 Congress approved a law that further restricted the right
to strike for workers employed in a range of essential public services,
including urban and interurban transport, mail, and telegraph. Unions
had opposed the law strongly, and some members of Congress called the
measure unconstitutional and contrary to obligations under ILO
conventions. However, the Constitutional Court declared it
constitutional in 1997. This essential services strike legislation
gives the President the authority to intervene forcefully should
strikes threaten the orderly functioning of society. The Labor Code
reforms proposed in June would undo the provisions of this law that the
ILO regards as incompatible with ILO standards with respect to the
right to strike. The proposed reforms would reduce the number of
workers required to call a legal strike to a simple majority. The
proposed reforms would limit essential services to health,
communications (including air traffic control), and public transport,
and provide for legal strikes in those sectors so long as minimum
services are maintained.
There were no significant strikes during the year.
The law protects workers from retribution for forming unions and
for participating in trade union activities, but enforcement of these
provisions is inconsistent. Many employers routinely seek to circumvent
labor code provisions in order to resist unions, which they view as
disruptive and as a challenge to their full control of the workplace.
An ineffective legal system and inadequate penalties for violations
have hindered enforcement of the right to form unions and participate
in trade union activities. Although the Labor Code provides that
workers illegally fired for union activity should be reinstated within
24 hours, in practice employers often filed a series of appeals or
simply defied judicial orders for reinstatement. Penalties for defying
such orders were increased somewhat in the 1992 Labor Code reform and
further in a decree that went into effect in June 1998. The Labor
Ministry has worked to ``promote the restructuring of labor relations
in enterprises by encouraging labor-management cooperation'' and bring
about a ``culture of negotiation'' as called for by the Peace Accord on
Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation. However,
productive, good-faith negotiations between employer and worker
representatives have been the exception rather than the rule. The
majority of unions that engaged in collective bargaining during the
year reported that employers increasingly rejected the underlying
premise of collective bargaining--that power in the workplace can be
shared equitably according to a contract between the employees and
company management.
Impunity for acts of intimidation and violence against trade union
members remains a problem. In its Fourth Report on the Peace Process,
MINUGUA noted that ``genuine trade union freedom does not exist'' due
to antiunion violence. In its November report, the ILO noted that 12
murders, some of which date back to 1995, of union leaders and union
members, have not yet been investigated credibly nor effectively
prosecuted. In June Mixco city councilman Francisco Rodas left the
country, alleging persistent, credible death threats following his
campaign to have 400 fired municipal workers reinstated by Labor Court
rulings. Mixco Mayor Elmer Morales fired the workers in the months
after he assumed office in February and was the suspected source of the
threats.
An active ``solidarity'' movement claims to have approximately
170,000 members in about 400 companies. Unions may operate legally in
workplaces that have solidarity associations, and workers have the
right to choose between the two or to belong to both. The Government
views these associations as civic organizations that need not interfere
with the functioning of trade unions. The Labor Code stipulates very
clearly that trade unions have an exclusive right to bargain
collectively on work conditions on behalf of workers. However, unions
charge that management promotes solidarity associations to avoid the
formation of trade unions or to compete with existing labor unions.
There were credible reports that some of these associations did not
always adhere to democratic principles in their formation and
management and that workers were unable to participate fully and freely
in decision-making. Similar credible charges were made against some
trade unions.
The Human Rights Ombudsman's office for economic and social issues
receives complaints related to violations of internationally recognized
worker rights. Union leaders and workers filed over 100 complaints with
the PDH in 1999, and the Ombudsman has made public statements about
labor conditions in various sectors of the economy. The PDH can
investigate union complaints and issue a statement, but the office has
no enforcement powers beyond attempting to resolve the situation
through publicity and moral persuasion.
Unions may and do form federations and confederations and affiliate
with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
the right to organize and bargain collectively; however, the practice
of collective bargaining is constrained by legal restrictions,
according to a report by the ILO Committee of Experts (COE). The COE
called on the Government to remove the legal requirement that a
collective bargaining agreement be submitted to the Government and that
it have two-thirds support of union members. The COE report also lists
seven other reforms necessary to provide for full exercise of the right
to organize and bargain collectively. The practice of collective
bargaining also is limited by the weakness of the labor movement; the
requirement that 25 percent of the workers in a factory or business
must be union members in order for collective bargaining to take place;
the lack of experience with collective bargaining; and management's
aversion to sharing power with worker associations. Both management and
labor honored wellwritten collective contracts at some firms; however,
in others management, and sometimes labor, chose to ignore the
contractually binding collective bargaining agreements. Between 1995
and 1999, 153 collective bargaining agreements were concluded between
employers and employees and registered with the Labor Ministry. Nearly
all of these agreements remained in force at the end of the year;
although some had expired and were under renegotiation. Most workers,
even those organized in trade unions, do not have collective contracts
to cover their wages and working conditions nor do they have individual
contracts as required by law. According to a study released in November
by the Association for Research and Social Studies, only 10 percent of
workers have a contract duly registered with the Labor Ministry as
required by law.
Employers legally cannot dismiss workers for helping to form a
trade union; workers file complaints in this regard with the labor
inspectors for resolution; however, the Government does not enforce
this law effectively. The Labor Code provides for the right of
employers to fire union workers for cause, permits workers to appeal
their dismissal to the labor courts, and requires the reinstatement
within 24 hours of any union worker fired without cause. The Labor Code
prohibits employers from firing workers for union organizing and
protects them for 60 days following the official publication of
approval of the union. The Labor Code also prohibits employers from
firing any member of the executive committee of a union and also
protects them for 12 months after they are no longer on the executive
committee. An employer may fire a member of the union's executive
committee for cause only after a trial and issuance of a court
resolution. However, the Government does not enforce these laws in
practice.
Despite governmental, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to
restructure and modernize the labor court system, the system remained
ineffective. There are 20 labor courts, including 7 in the capital and
13 elsewhere around the country. An additional nine courts deal with
labor issues as part of their jurisdiction. The weakness of the
judicial system as a whole, the severe shortage of competent judges and
staff, and a heavy backlog of undecided cases all contribute to the
labor courts' lack of credibility and effectiveness. The small number
of competent and motivated labor inspectors, and the lack of training
and resources devoted to detecting and investigating Labor Code
violations, compound the weakness of the labor courts. However,
government efforts to improve the labor inspection system continued. At
year's end, there were 80 full time, professional labor inspectors on
the rolls of the Ministry of Labor. In September the Ministry hired
another 70 inspectors under temporary contracts. The Ministry of Labor
continued to increase its rate of inspections and fired some
incompetent or corrupt inspectors. Ministry figures show that over
2,000 investigations or inspections were conducted between January and
August 1999. A portion of these inspections was a successful campaign
to improve compliance with labor standards in the inbond processing for
export or ``maquila'' sector. In addition some represented an effort to
ensure compliance with minimum wage provisions. As a result of this
revitalized labor inspection effort, the Labor Ministry filed 1,136
complaints for uncorrected labor law violations during the year, which
was a record number.
The Ministry of Labor has reorganized its labor inspection system
to permit some complaints to be heard at the Ministry of Labor rather
than requiring that inspectors travel to each work site. The Ministry
instituted a set of complaint assistance, small claims mediation, and
informational initiatives designed to provide better services to
workers. The Ministry continued its educational campaign on worker
rights (especially the rights of minors and women), which included a
campaign of radio announcements and the provision of some documents in
indigenous languages. In an effort to improve enforcement of the Labor
Code outside the capital, the Ministry of Labor continued to
decentralize its operations. Seven of the Ministry's offices outside
the capital have been accorded regional authority. These regional
offices, in addition to labor inspectors, also include specialists in
women and workplace issues, managementworker relations/conflict
resolution, and minor workers/child labor issues. The Labor Ministry
plans to give these regional offices supervisory authority over branch
offices in the departmental capitals of each region.
Labor laws and regulations apply throughout the country, including
in the few export processing zones (EPZ's); however, they are enforced
weakly. (Maquilas that make garments for export operate under an EPZ-
like regime, although they are not located in distinctly set-apart
areas.) The laws governing the EPZ's are not discriminatory on the
subject of organizing trade unions or collective bargaining. Union
leaders often blamed their inability to organize workers in these zones
on employer pressures and unofficial restrictions on their access to
the EPZ's. While labor standards in the EPZ's were no different from
those found outside the zones, actual working conditions were often
better.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
bars forced or compulsory labor, and the practice generally does not
exist. The ILO COE urged the Government to ensure the rapidity of
judicial processes and inquiries concerning compulsory labor and to
ensure the imposition of penalties and the strict enforcement of laws.
The law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by
children, but they are covered by the general constitutional provision.
Forced or bonded labor by children generally did not occur; however,
children were trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Sections
5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age forEmployment.--
The Constitution bars employment of minors under the age of 14 without
written permission from the Ministry of Labor. However, children below
this age regularly are employed in the informal and agricultural
sectors, usually in small family enterprises. A MINUGUA report, issued
on December 11, found that 34 percent of children between the ages of 7
and 14 work. The law prohibits minors from night work and extra hours
(the legal workday for minors under the age of 14 is 6 hours; for
minors 14 to 17 years of age, it is 7 hours), from working in
establishments where alcoholic beverages are served, and from working
in unhealthy or dangerous conditions. However, between 3,000 and 5,000
children were employed in the illegal cottagebased fireworks industry.
The Labor Ministry estimated that approximately 10 percent of the
children in this industry work illegally in factories, while younger
children, under the age of 14, typically work at home on piecework
taken in by their families. On July 12, an explosion in a family-run
home fireworks workshop killed three siblings, including a 13-year-old;
all three were working in their father's illegal fireworks factory in
San Raymundo Sacatepequez. The accident was due to carelessness and
inexperience handling explosives; and was typical of accidents that
occur regularly in the informal cottage fireworks industry.
Laws governing the employment of minors are not enforced
effectively, due to the shortage of qualified labor inspectors and the
weakness of the labor court system. The Association for Girls and Boys
in Central America estimates that approximately 2 million children
work. The majority of child laborers work in agriculture (family farms,
coffee, and sugar cane harvesting), while others work in domestic
service, construction, various family businesses, stone quarrying,
rock-breaking, fireworks manufacturing, shining shoes, begging,
performing in the streets, or other jobs. According to Labor Ministry
statistics, between 1995 and 1999, 507 permits were issued authorizing
the employment of minors. The Ministry of Labor's efforts to reduce the
number of these permits issued had the unintended effect of increasing
the number of minors applying for work with falsified age documents.
Many children under the age of 14 work without legal permission and are
open to exploitation. They generally receive no social benefits, social
insurance, vacations, or severance pay, and earn below-minimum
salaries.
The Labor Ministry has a program to educate minors, their parents,
and employers on the rights of minors in the labor market. In 1992 the
Government formed the Child Worker Protection Unit within the Ministry
of Labor. Late in the year, the Ministry of Labor, with the support of
a group of NGO's, finalized a National Plan for the Prevention and
Eradication of Child Labor and Protection of Adolescent Workers.
Implementation of the 1997 Children's and Minor's Code has been
suspended indefinitely because of political controversy over its
provisions (see Section 5). Economic necessity forces most families to
have their children seek some type of employment to supplement family
income, especially in rural and indigenous communities. Children who
work generally do so in family enterprises. Education is compulsory for
all children up to the 6th grade. The law does not prohibit
specifically bonded labor by children, but they are covered by a
constitutional prohibition on forced or compulsory labor. Bonded labor
by children generally did not occur; however, children were trafficked
into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages;
however, noncompliance with minimum wage provision in the rural and
informal sectors is widespread. The Ministry of Labor oversees a
tripartite committee, which includes formal sector representatives of
labor and management, and makes recommendations for increases in the
minimum wage. In the event that agreement is not possible, the
Government may decree such increases. The Executive Branch promulgated
the most recent minimum wage increase by decree, after the tripartite
commission was unable to reach a consensus, and it took effect on
December 16. This decree raised the minimum daily wage for agricultural
work by $0.45 (3.46 quetzals) to $3.24 (25.08 quetzals). It raised the
minimum daily wage for service, industrial, and government sector work
by $0.49 (quetzals 3.82) to $3.57 (27.67 quetzals). In March the
National Legislature mandated by decree an incentive bonus that
augments the minimum wage. This decree increased the minimum wage by
ordering that an incentive bonus be paid for each hour worked--$0.09
(0.6725 quetzals) per hour for agricultural workers and $0.08 (0.64375
quetzals) per hour for industrial and other workers. This raises the
legal minimum wage for a regular 8hour day to $3.93 (30.46 quetzals)
for agricultural work and $4.32 (32.82 quetzals) for service,
industrial, and government sector work. The minimum wage was not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. According to the UNDP, at least 80 percent of the population
live below the poverty line, including approximately 60 percent of
those employed. In November MINUGUA reported that a minimum wage
adequate for feeding a family of six would have to be nearly 80 percent
higher than the current minimum wage. MINUGUA also reported that a
minimum wage also adequate for clothing, sheltering, and educating a
family of six would have to be nearly 225 percent higher than the
current minimum wage.
The legal workday is 8 hours and the workweek is 44 hours, but a
tradition of longer hours remains in place due to economic conditions.
The Labor Code requires a weekly paid rest period of at least 24 hours.
Trade union leaders and human rights groups charge that workers
sometimes were forced to work overtime, often without premium pay, in
order to meet work requirements. Labor inspectors report uncovering
numerous instances of such abuses, but the lack of stiff fines or
strong regulatory sanctions, as well as inefficiencies in the labor
court system, inhibit adequate enforcement of the law.
Occupational health and safety standards are inadequate. Many of
the provisions of the applicable law--which dates back to 1957--are
archaic, making enforcement problematic. During the year, as part of
its effort to address this situation, the Ministry of Labor
participated in a number of international initiatives intended to
sensitize employers and workers to health and safety risks in the
workplace. Enforcement of occupational health and safety standards that
do exist and could be applied reasonably is weak. When serious or fatal
industrial accidents occur, the authorities often fail to investigate
fully and to assign responsibility for negligence, if any. Employers
rarely are sanctioned for having failed to provide a safe workplace,
although the authorities did suspend one maquila operation for safety
shortcomings, and threatened about a dozen others, in some cases
repeatedly, with a suspension of operations if they failed to improve
safety conditions. The Labor Ministry provides training courses for
labor inspectors in health and safety standards, and has given such
training a higher priority despite scarce resources. Legislation
requiring companies with more than 50 employees to provide on-site
medical facilities for their workers has not been well enforced;
however, most large employers provided such facilities for their
employees. Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from
dangerous workplace situations, and the law provides them with
protection for their continued employment. However, few workers are
willing to jeopardize their jobs by complaining about unsafe working
conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons unless that trafficking involves entry into or
departure from the country for the purpose of prostitution. In addition
an immigration law that came into effect in January 1999 made alien
smuggling a crime punishable by imprisonment. The law mandates
sentences of 5 to 8 years in prison for those found guilty of
``promoting or facilitating the illegal entry of persons.''
Prostitution is not illegal; there are certain health code requirements
for persons engaging in prostitution. Pimping and inducing a person
into prostitution are crimes that can result in either fines or
imprisonment, with heavier penalties if minors are involved.
Trafficking in women and children, primarily for the purpose of
prostitution, is a growing problem.
The country is a significant transit country for alien smuggling,
both from neighboring Latin American countries and from China, Taiwan,
and south Asia; aliens often are smuggled to the United States.
Traffickers use force, coercion, fraud, and deception. In one instance,
Chinese male victims apparently agreed to debt bondage to pay off their
transportation costs, while female victims, some of whom were under the
age of 18, apparently were being taken to the United States to work as
prostitutes. The victims were told that their families in China would
suffer if they broke the debt bondage agreement.
The Defense of Children's Rights unit in the PDH and the Minors'
Section of the Public Ministry regularly investigate cases of
trafficking. Officials in the Labor Ministry also raise the issue with
the police and social welfare agencies as part of their efforts to
combat child labor and child exploitation. There are no programs
specifically designed to provide shelter or rehabilitation to victims
of trafficking. NGO's that focus on women and children's rights often
help victims of trafficking and work to educate the population about
the dangers of trafficking; however, there are no NGO's that focus
solely on trafficking.
The Ministry of Labor, UNICEF, and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, who
visited the country in July 1999, have noted a marked increase in child
prostitution over the past 2 years in the towns along the borders with
Mexico and El Salvador. Along the border with El Salvador, many child
prostitutes were brought into the country from El Salvador, Nicaragua,
and Honduras by organized rings, who force the children into
prostitution. In its annual report for 1999 on the state of children,
ODHAG clearly identified the growing problem of child prostitution as
linked inextricably to that of trafficking in persons. The report notes
that no child prostitute ``got there alone'' without inducement and
exploitation by adults.
__________
GUYANA
The Co-operative Republic of Guyana is a small nation struggling
with the problems of consolidating its democratic institutions. It has
a multiparty political system based on proportional representation.
Citizens elect an executive president and a 65-member unicameral
parliament. The President appoints a prime minister and a cabinet. In
December 1997, citizens voted in a free and fair national election to
return the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and its Civic (C) partner
to office. Social unrest and occasional violence marred the post-
election period, with the main opposition party alleging that the
election was fraudulent; charges that international observers
considered unfounded. Nonetheless, as part of a Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) brokered compromise between the two parties, the PPP/C
alliance agreed to shorten its constitutionally mandated 5-year term to
3 years, and a new election is scheduled for 2001. The judiciary,
although constitutionally independent, is inefficient and often appears
subject to government influence.
The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) and the Guyana Police Force (GPF)
are under civilian control. The GPF has the authority to make arrests
and maintains law and order throughout the country. The GDF is a
professional military responsible for national defense, internal
security, and emergency response. Some members of the police force
committed human rights abuses.
Guyana is a very poor country. The economy, which for years was
centrally planned and controlled, is based on a mix of private and
state enterprises. Rice, sugar, bauxite, and gold are the major
exports. There are severe shortages of skilled labor and the economy is
constrained by an inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure for
transportation, power distribution, flood control, and communications.
Real economic growth unofficially was estimated at 0.5 percent,
compared with 3 percent in 1999. Per capita gross domestic product is
estimated at $824, and over half the population lives in poverty.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems remain in several areas. The police
continued to commit extrajudicial killings, and police abuse of
suspects continued to be a problem. The authorities took some steps to
investigate abuses, but in general, the police continued to commit
abuses with impunity. Prison conditions remain poor, and lengthy
pretrial detention remains a problem. The inefficient judicial system
results in long delays in trials. Police infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. Violence against women and children, societal discrimination
against women and indigenous Amerindians, and incidents of
discrimination stemming from the racial tensions between Indo-Guyanese
and Afro-Guyanese are problems, as is child labor in the informal
sector.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The police continued
to commit extrajudicial killings. The Guyana Human Rights Association
(GHRA) reported that the police killed 13 civilians during the year,
compared with 9 in 1999, 11 in 1998, and 27 in 1997. In most cases, the
police shot the victims while attempting to arrest them or while a
crime was being committed.
The GHRA also expressed concern about the death in custody of Shawn
``Big Bird'' Nedd, who reportedly was shot and killed on February 7 by
police after being arrested, while being held in a vehicle of the
``Quick Reaction Squad.'' Eusi Kwayana of the Working People's Alliance
political party filed a private criminal charge against a police
constable for Nedd's death. In July the Director of Public Prosecutions
(DPP) dismissed the case.
On February 9, police shot and killed criminal fugitive Linden
``Blackie'' London, a former army officer wanted for 4 murders and 14
robberies. Television cameras recorded a police officer shooting London
as he appeared to surrender to the GDF. The manner of London's death
led to speculation that he was executed to prevent him from revealing
details of criminal connections within the Government or the security
services. Several thousand persons attended London's funeral on
February 16, including former President Desmond Hoyte, who publicly
condemned extrajudicial killings by police. Rhonda Forde, a female
companion of London's, died when she was shot during the exchange of
gunfire. On February 18, a government official announced that an
independent board would not be established to investigate police
actions during the standoff, but that police and defense forces would
conduct a joint services investigation. However, no results of any
investigation of London's killing have been made public.
On March 18, a police squad shot and killed Hilton Rodrigues,
wanted for murder and robbery; a police constable also was killed in
the shootout. On June 23, a police officer shot and killed 26-year-old
Ramdeo Rampersaud while attempting to arrest him on rape charges.
On August 18, a policeman shot and killed 14-year-old Trevor
Crossman in Ituni, along the Demarara River. The policeman mistook him
for his older brother, with whom the policeman had argued. In order to
express public sympathy for the family, the Police Commissioner
attended Crossman's funeral. The authorities charged the policeman with
manslaughter; on September 8, he was released on bail pending trial.
On September 3, Mohammed Shafeek died in the Brickdam police
lockup. An autopsy revealed that Shafeek was beaten all over his body;
his skull and neck were fractured. The Home Affairs Minister initially
announced that police reports indicated that Shafeek might have been
beaten by other prisoners. However, the Police Commissioner
subsequently announced on September 28 that an investigation revealed
that Shafeek was beaten by the Venezuelan crew of a ship that had since
left the country, and that the police had arrested him for disorderly
conduct. The commissioner added that Shafeek should have been
hospitalized instead of being placed in a prison cell, and that
procedures would be instituted in the future to ensure that injured
prisoners were hospitalized. On October 4, the police submitted a 20-
page report to the DPP. The report noted that disciplinary action would
be taken against police officers involved. At year's end, an inquest
was scheduled for January 2001.
On November 21, a presidential guard allegedly shot and killed
fruit vendor Oscar Daniels in Georgetown. The guard reportedly was
aiming at Daniels' cousin, with whom he had argued, and the guard took
Daniels to a hospital, but he died on the way. Shortly thereafter, the
guard returned to duty until media reports led to his removal. At
year's end, an inquest was pending.
Throughout the year, the Rise Organize and Rebuild (ROAR) political
party complained about threats and harassment from the ruling PPP. ROAR
portrayed the murder on November 12 of a man named Mohan, the father of
ROAR's organizer in the Essequibo region, by a PPP supporter as a
result of the PPP's campaign against it. However, the ROAR presented no
evidence that connected the killing to the PPP.
There were no new developments in most of the extrajudicial
killings by police in previous years, including the police shootings of
Fazal Narine and Colin McGregor in 1999. In April a jury found that no
one could be held criminally responsible for the death of Victor
``Junior'' Bourne in 1998. Two police superintendants were charged with
killing Bourne but defended themselves by asserting that they acted in
self-defense. Human rights monitors questioned the jury's verdict by
noting that the police version of the shooting was contradicted by
eyewitness testimony, which stated that Bourne was in bed asleep when
police shot him. Amnesty International issued a statement criticizing
the verdict and expressing concern over the climate of police impunity
in the country.
On March 30, the U.N. Human Rights Committee made 22
recommendations to the Government, including a call for prompt
investigation by an impartial body of extrajudicial killings and
excessive use of force. It also called for measures to be taken to
ensure the prosecution of offenders and to provide effective remedies
to victims. The Committee recommended that all law enforcement
officials receive thorough training in international human rights
standards.
Many justice authorities and human rights activists say that
because of rising crime and pressure from urban businesses, which are
often the targets of criminals, the Government has taken a lax attitude
toward investigation of alleged police abuses. In general police abuses
are committed with impunity.
The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), established in 1989, is
composed of five members who investigate complaints against police
officers. The statute provided for the independence of the PCA;
however, most members are themselves members of the criminal justice
system, and the PCA is not truly independent. The PCA received 69
complaints during the year (compared with 45 in 1999), completed
investigation of 27 of them, and sent them to the Police Commissioner
for action. However, there is no information publicly available on the
status of these investigations. The PCA has not submitted an annual
report since 1995. Even when police officers do face charges, most of
the cases are heard by lower magistrate courts, where other specially
trained police officers serve as the prosecutors. As a result, human
rights activists question officers' commitment to prosecuting their own
colleagues.
In response to the growing number of complaints against the police,
the police established the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
in 1997. During the year, the OPR received 150 cases; it completed
action on 97 of them and was awaiting instructions from the DPP on 27
cases. Since its inception, the OPR has carried out investigations of
complaints against police, and at least 99 cases have resulted in some
type of disciplinary action being taken against police officers.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police
continued to abuse suspects, although to a lesser degree than in the
previous year. From 1995 to 1997, the GHRA received an average of 20
complaints per year from victims who had been beaten by police while in
custody. The GHRA still considers police mistreatment of prisoners a
problem. Moreover, inmates, attorneys, and judicial authorities
provided credible evidence that police and correctional officers
frequently ignored the actions of other inmates who beat, robbed, or
otherwise mistreated ``problematic'' prisoners.
On September 3, Mohamed Shafeek died in the Brickdam police lockup,
after being arrested the previous day (see Section 1.a.).
Prison and jail conditions were poor, especially in police holding
cells. Georgetown's Camp Street Prison, the country's largest, is
extremely overcrowded. For most of the year, Camp Street held between
900 and 1,100 prisoners in space initially designed to hold 350.
Conditions in the country's four smaller prisons generally are
adequate. In 1997 when the Director of Prisons reported that a prisoner
had died in part due to overcrowding at the Camp Street Prison, the
Government responded by assigning more full-time nurse practitioners
and pharmacists to the prison system and by requiring that doctors
visit prisons more regularly. Prison directors and inmates reported
that, over the course of the year, medical coverage improved. The GHRA
continues to advocate improved health care in the prison system. In
addition to overcrowding and a lack of medical personnel, poor staff
morale is a serious problem within the prison system. Prison staffers
are poorly paid, and their salaries and benefits are insufficient to
compensate for the on-the-job risks; however, they try to assist
prisoners as much as possible. Prison officials lobbied the Government
for increased funding to improve prison conditions; they also
encouraged efforts by local and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) to improve physical and sanitary conditions.
Although sanitary and medical conditions in police station
temporary holding facilities vary, in almost all cases these conditions
are worse than those in the prisons. Some such jails are bare,
overcrowded, and damp. Few have beds, washbasins, furniture, or
utensils. Meals are normally unavailable; friends and relatives must
bring detainees food and water. Cells rarely have sanitary facilities,
and inmates sometimes are escorted by staff members outside the cells
to use holes in the floor for toilets. Inmates generally sleep on a
thin pallet on the concrete floor. The Brickdam lockup in Georgetown
has poor sanitation and dangerous conditions. One cell without plumbing
or other facilities typically holds up to 30 detainees and is often the
site of violence between inmates. Although precinct jails are intended
to serve only as pretrial holding areas, some suspects have been
detained there as long as 4 years, waiting for the overburdened
judicial system to take action on their cases.
In October the GHRA criticized prison authorities for the death of
Michael Ramcharran at the hands of another inmate, which the GHRA said
was the direct result of overcrowding at the Camp Street Prison. To
reduce overcrowding, the GHRA called on the judiciary to consider
alternate sentencing for minor offenses, rejuvenation of the Parole
Board, and the release of ill prisoners who have completed almost all
of their sentences. However, the Government did not adopt any of these
recommendations. Since then, the Parole Board has become more active,
but still is reluctant to release prisoners due to insufficient post-
release resources, including a lack of probationary staff.
The GHRA noted that protest actions on the roof of the central
prison increased significantly during the year; at one point in October
six inmates were on the roof to protest lengthy delays in trials (see
Sections 1.d and 1.e.).
Conditions were generally adequate in the only women's prison,
which is at New Amsterdam, in a facility that holds men and women in
separate dormitory-type buildings. There are a number of vocational and
educational courses, and regular visits by a psychiatrist who provides
counseling were started for female inmates. The GHRA has urged that
female inmates' responsibility for children should be recognized in
terms of length of sentence and facilities for family contact. The East
La Penitence police jail, where female prisoners are held until
sentencing, was upgraded during the year; sanitation improved, and
there is piped water for the inmates. Construction has not begun yet on
the new women's detention center at East La Penitence.
Following widespread criticism caused by the detention in 1999 of
two boys (ages 8 and 11) with adult prisoners who mistreated them,
police have been careful to place juvenile offenders in a separate
facility, in which conditions are adequate. In December 1999, police
moved imprisoned juveniles from Brickdam to the Kitty police lockup,
but conditions were so poor there that they were moved to the Ruimveldt
police station. This station became the only facility holding
juveniles, whose ages range between 14 and 17 years.
Prison officials were receptive to local and international NGO
requests to enter and inspect prison facilities. The GHRA participates
as a member of the prisons' visiting committee, which investigates
prisoner complaints, inspects diets, reviews primary medical care
services, and provides recommendations to prison authorities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that no person may be deprived of personal liberty except as
authorized by law and requires judicial determination of the legality
of detention, a mandate that the authorities generally respected in
practice.
Arrest does not require a warrant issued by a court official.
Police may arrest without a warrant when an officer witnesses a crime
or at the officer's discretion in instances where there is good cause
to suspect that a crime or a breach of the peace has been or will be
committed. The law requires that a person arrested and held for more
than 24 hours be brought before a court to be charged. Bail is
generally available, except in capital offense cases. In narcotics
cases, magistrates have limited discretion in granting bail before
trial and must remand persons convicted of such crimes into custody,
even if an appeal is pending.
Lengthy pretrial detention remains a problem. The GHRA has asserted
that prisoners often are detained for 3 or 4 years while awaiting
trial; however, the authorities denied that delays were this long.
During the year, prisoners protested lengthy trial delays (see Section
1.c.)
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, law enforcement officials and prominent
lawyers questioned the independence of the judiciary and accused the
Government of intervening in certain criminal and civil cases. There
are no institutional checks on the President or the ruling party when
they seek to influence judges. However, the Government generally
respects the independence of the judiciary in human rights cases.
The court system is composed of a high court (the Supreme Court of
Judicature), an appeals court, and a system of magistrate courts.
Magistrates are members of the civil service and are trained lawyers.
The magistrate courts deal with both criminal and civil matters. The
Ministry of Legal Affairs, headed by the Attorney General, is the
principal legal advisor to the State. The Director of Public
Prosecution is statutorily independent and can file legal charges
against offenders. The Constitution provides that anyone charged with a
criminal offense has the right to a hearing by a court of law. This
right is respected in practice.
Delays in judicial proceedings are caused by shortages of trained
court personnel and magistrates, inadequate resources, postponements at
the request of the defense or prosecution, occasional alleged acts of
bribery, poor tracking of cases, and the slowness of police in
preparing cases for trial. The inefficiency of the judicial system
undermines due process. Lengthy pretrial detention remains a problem
(see Section 1.d.). In March the U.N. Human Rights Committee called on
the Government to recruit competent part-time and temporary judges in
order to deal with the backlog of cases. In September four additional
judges were sworn in.
Defendants are granted public trials, and appeals may be made to
higher courts. Appeals of some murder cases may go on for several
years. Trial postponements are granted routinely to both the defense
and the prosecution. Programs designed to improve legal structures,
reform judicial procedures, upgrade technical capabilities, and improve
efficiency of the courts have had only a limited effect, and judicial
staff still need further training in all areas. Although the law
recognizes the right to legal counsel, in practice, with the exception
of capital crimes, it has been limited to those who can afford to pay.
There is no public defender system.
The Georgetown Legal Aid Clinic, with public and private support,
provides advice to persons who cannot afford a lawyer, with a special
interest in cases of violence against women and criminal cases related
to civil cases in such matters (for example, assault as part of a
divorce case). Defendants in murder cases who need a lawyer are
assigned an attorney by the court. The Guyana Association of Women
Lawyers provides free legal services for civil cases only.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for these rights; however,
the authorities often infringed on citizens' privacy. Law enforcement
officials must obtain warrants before searching private homes or
properties. Although the authorities generally respected these
requirements, there were numerous reports of police officers searching
homes without warrants, particularly in neighborhoods where narcotics
trafficking is a problem.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. Citizens openly criticize the
Government and its policies.
The independent Stabroek News publishes daily, and a wide range of
religious groups, political parties, and journalists publish a variety
of privately owned weekly newspapers. The Government's daily newspaper,
the Guyana Chronicle, covers a broad spectrum of political and
nongovernmental groups. However, throughout the year the Chronicle
typically displayed a clear antiopposition bias.
While printed media flourished, a growing number of journalists
charged the Government with failure to respect freedom of the
electronic media. The Government owns and operates the country's sole
radio station, which broadcasts on three frequencies. There are no
private radio stations, and private interests continued to allege that
the Government either denied or failed to respond to more than 20
requests for radio frequency authorizations. The Government maintained
that it was unable to grant frequencies to private stations because
there was no legislation governing their allocation. However, despite a
similar lack of legislation to govern television frequencies, there
were 12 independent television stations in addition to the government
station.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right. The Public Order Act requires police permits for mass
political meetings. The Police Commissioner has the authority to refuse
permission for a public meeting if he believes that it may provoke a
breach of the peace. In cases of refusal, applicants can appeal to the
Minister of Home Affairs, whose decision on the matter is final. After
obtaining authorization, which generally is granted, political parties
and other groups held public meetings and rallies throughout the
country without hindrance.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country, and the Government generally respects this
right in practice. Travel to Amerindian areas requires government
permission, the result of a law dating from colonial times designed to
protect indigenous people from exploitation. However, in practice most
persons travel throughout these areas without regard to the formality
of a permit. Citizens are free to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to
return.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees. The Government does not have a formal policy on
refugees or asylum and has not enacted model legislation prepared by
the UNHCR. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens enjoy this right and exercised it in free and fair
elections held in December 1997. There is a multiparty political system
based on proportional representation. Voters indirectly elect the
President to a 5-year term of office. Any citizen 18 years or older can
register to vote.
The party that wins the most votes for parliament wins the
presidency. A party's presidential candidate must be announced in
advance of the election. The President appoints a cabinet and a prime
minister who, with the President, exercise executive power. Citizens
are free to join or support political parties of their choice. Since
Parliament always is controlled by the party in power, the legislature
typically provides only a limited check on the executive's power.
In December 1997, citizens voted to return the PPP and its Civic
partner to office and elected Janet Jagan, widow of former president
Cheddi Jagan, as President, defeating the People's National Congress
(PNC), which is the main opposition party. As a result of opposition
charges of election fraud that international observers considered
unfounded, the ruling party entered into an agreement brokered by
officials from other CARICOM nations to hold new elections after 3
years instead of 5 years as required by the Constitution. In October
1998, a court began hearing testimony in a civil suit filed by the PNC
in support of its allegation that the 1997 election was rigged;
however, by year's end, no verdict was reached.
In 1999 Finance Minister Bharrat Jagdeo succeeded to the presidency
following the resignation of Janet Jagan due to health reasons. The
CARICOM-brokered agreement also called for constitutional reform of the
electoral process, and Parliament began to debate changes to the 1980
Constitution, but reaching agreement on proposed revisions is a lengthy
process. In December Parliament passed a Constitutional Amendment Act
that imposes a 7-year residence requirement on candidates for the
presidency and sets a limit of two terms. In addition the act removed a
clause that made the President immune from prosecution, and it limits
the number of nonelected ministers to four. Additional constitutional
amendments are expected following the next general elections, which are
scheduled to be held in March 2001.
Guyana is a racially divided society in which the political party
structure polarizes the main ethnic groups. Winner-take-all elections
exacerbate these tensions. The two major parties (the PPP and the PNC)
are formed largely by Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese, respectively.
There are no legal impediments to the participation of women or
minorities in the political process, but women and minorities are
underrepresented in decisionmaking, government, and politics. The 20-
person Cabinet includes 2 women, and the country's second-highest judge
is a woman. The 65-member Parliament includes 12 women and 10
Amerindians, representing both major parties.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Guyana Human Rights Association, the most active local human
rights group, functioned without government interference. The GHRA is
an NGO formed in 1979 with the participation of trade unions,
professional organizations, various ethnic groups, and churches. It
issues periodic press releases and normally publishes an annual report
on human rights. Members of the Government openly discussed human
rights issues and made public statements in response to foreign and
local human rights reports. The authorities did not interfere with the
activities of human rights groups. The new draft constitution provides
for the creation of a human rights commission to investigate abuses and
to promote respect for human rights. An Amnesty International
delegation visited in February and met with senior government
officials.
In 1999 the Government presented its first report since 1981 on the
country's human rights situation to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, as
required by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), of which it is a signatory. However, the Government's report,
which was due in 1987, only covered the human rights situation between
1982 and 1987. In March the Government participated in 2 sessions with
the committee, which then made 22 recommendations on a wide range of
human rights issues (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). In 1999 the
Government withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which had
permitted death row prisoners to appeal their cases to the U.N. Human
Rights Committee. The withdrawal was in response to the Committee's
1996 ruling in favor of two convicted murderers who were to be hanged
in 1997.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides fundamental rights for all persons
regardless of race, sex, religion, or national origin. However, the
Government does not always enforce these provisions effectively.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, is
widespread. Rape, particularly of girls and young women, is a serious
problem but infrequently reported or prosecuted. Health professionals
and NGO's reported a high incidence of incest. Lawyers say that while
more victims are reporting these crimes to the authorities, there is
still a social stigma applied to the victim for doing so. Despite
efforts by NGO's and the Department of Public Prosecutions to sensitize
police officers to domestic violence, the police are often hesitant to
interfere in cases of domestic disputes. According to press reports,
there were 17 deaths as a result of domestic violence between January
and October 16; the actual number was likely to be higher.
In 1996 Parliament passed the Domestic Violence Act. In addition to
defining domestic violence and establishing it as a crime, the law
gives women the right to seek prompt protection. Magistrates can issue
interim protection orders when a victim of abuse, a police officer, or
a social worker fills out an application for protection. A magistrate
then evaluates the case and decides whether to replace interim orders
with permanent orders. The Domestic Violence Act allows victims to seek
protection, occupation, or tenancy orders. Protection orders prohibit
abusers from being anywhere that the applicant lives, works, visits, or
attends school. If protective orders are violated, the abuser can be
fined up to $54 (G$10,000) and imprisoned for up to 12 months. However,
this legislation frequently has not been enforced. Occupation orders
allow the victim and any children to remain at a home previously shared
with an abuser, while the abuser must leave. Similarly, tenancy orders
require an abuser to leave a rented dwelling and continue to pay some
or all of the rent. Although local NGO's that address the issue of
domestic violence are relatively new, they work effectively together
under tight budget constraints. While NGO's consider the Domestic
Violence Act as a positive step, they claim that it has had little
effect on the overall situation of domestic violence in society. NGO's
report that domestic violence crosses racial and socioeconomic lines.
In March the U.N. Human Rights Committee criticized the lack of
information about the effect of the Domestic Violence Act in reducing
the level of violence against women. The Committee called for training
of police and other law enforcement personnel in the importance of
ensuring that women who are victims of violence are accorded equal
protection and that preventive and punitive measures are enforced. By
year's end, the Government had not taken any action in response to the
U.N. recommendations.
Help and Shelter (H&S), the first local NGO dedicated to fighting
domestic violence, focuses on societal reeducation in order to
sensitize the public to domestic violence. By mid-1999, H&S had
counseled 1,768 persons since it began offering counseling services in
November 1995. H&S reported that 68 percent of its cases involved
spousal abuse and 7 percent involved child abuse. Another 10 percent of
cases reported to H&S were rape cases; the vast majority of these--78
percent--were reported by victims age 16 and under.
The 1997 Antidiscrimination Act builds upon the provisions of the
1990 Equal Rights Act. The two laws provide a strengthened framework
under which women and minorities may seek redress for discriminatory
acts or practices. However, no case has ever been tried under the Equal
Rights Act, and critics of the Antidiscrimination Act claim that it is
unlikely to be effective since the act places enforcement
responsibilities on the overburdened Chief Labor Officer.
There is no legal protection against sexual harassment in the
workplace. The law prohibits dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy, and
dismissal on such grounds does not occur in practice. The Women's
Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Labor monitors the legal rights of
women. The Women's Leadership Institute was established by law in
December 1997 and opened in February 1999. The center seeks, through
education and training, to facilitate greater women's participation in
government and the private sector. The center plans to train an average
of 350 women annually on issues such as women's rights, status of
women, violence against women, and leadership development.
A 1990 law protects women's property rights in common-law marriages
and entitles a woman who separates or divorces to onehalf the couple's
property if she had been working and onethird of the property if she
had been a housewife. Divorce by consent remains illegal. The courts
may overturn a husband's will in the event that it does not provide for
his wife, as long as she was dependent on him for financial support.
The new draft constitution provides for a minimum number of women
to be on party slates for parliamentary seats and creates a women and
gender equality commission to promote the enhancement of the status of
women, girls, and gender issues.
Children.--At least half of the population lives in poverty, and
children are affected more severely than any other group. One-third of
the population is under 18 years of age and, although the Government
provides free education through secondary school, the severe
deterioration of the public education and health care systems has
limited children's future prospects. The public health system is
inadequate, and private health care is unaffordable for many children.
Children often do not attend school because their families need them to
contribute to the household by working or providing child care for
siblings or younger relatives.
Concern continues to rise over the effects of domestic violence on
children. It is unclear how many deaths from child abuse take place,
since law enforcement officials believe that the vast majority of
criminal child abuse cases went unreported. The GHRA is concerned that
there are no law enforcement investigative procedures in place to
determine if abuse or parental incapacity were the true causes of death
in some cases of the 400 children under the age of 5 who die each year,
deaths that usually are ascribed to malnutrition or disease. Media
reports of rape and incest further indicated that violence against
children is a significant problem. According to UNICEF, a disturbing
aspect is the concept of the ``girl child,'' in which teenage girls
trade sexual favors for money, a practice condoned by their parents yet
obscured by cultural norms. In a related practice, parents demand
monetary compensation following the rape of a teenage daughter.
The Domestic Violence Act allows police officers or social workers
to file an application on behalf of an abused child. However, there is
a lack of social services or trained experts to deal with children
fleeing sexual, physical, or emotional abuse. Many children suffer from
neglect or abandonment, particularly when 3 percent of the adult
population emigrates each year, often leaving children behind.
The new draft constitution provides for the creation of a
commission on the rights of the child to promote the well-being of
children. This commission would monitor compliance and make
recommendations for compliance with the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child and other international instruments acceded to by the
Government. It also would review legislation affecting children and
investigate complaints relating to children's rights.
People with Disabilities.--There is no law mandating provision of
access for disabled persons, and the lack of appropriate infrastructure
to provide access to both public and private facilities makes it very
difficult to employ the disabled outside their homes. In 1997
Parliament passed a law establishing a council for persons with
disabilities; however, the council has yet to begin its activities.
There are several special schools and training centers for the
disabled, but they lack trained staff and are in disrepair.
Indigenous People.--The Amerindian population, which consists of
nine tribal groups, constitutes an estimated 8 percent of the
population. Most live in reservations and villages in remote parts of
the interior. Their standard of living is much lower than that of most
citizens and their ability to participate in decisions affecting their
lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources is
limited.
Amerindian life is regulated by the Amerindian Act, legislation
dating from colonial times designed to protect indigenous people from
exploitation. Under the act, the Government may determine who is an
Amerindian and what is an Amerindian community, appoint Amerindian
leaders, and annul decisions made by Amerindian councils. It also
prohibits the sale of alcohol to Amerindians and requires government
permission before any Amerindian can accept formal employment; however,
these provisions are not enforced. Both Amerindian individuals and
groups remain free to criticize the Government. In 1998 the Ministry of
Amerindian Affairs admitted that the Amerindian Act was antiquated and
expressed a commitment to update it, although it has taken no action to
do so.
The Government has long maintained that it is committed to
demarcating lands that traditionally have been the home of Amerindians.
However, the Government holds title to almost all the country's land
and is free to act as it wishes without consultation. The Government
identified a total of 75 villages, and reported that it successfully
demarcated the lands of 11 Amerindian communities in 1998. The Ministry
of Amerindian Affairs claimed that, in close consultation with
Amerindian leaders, it would demarcate a total of 40 additional
villages by the end of 1999; however, while a handful of village
leaders have accepted these new titles, most leaders rejected the
demarcations. Local Amerindian NGO's regarded government consultations
as mere public relations exercises and demarcation as a means of
confining Amerindian communities so that the rest of what Amerindians
considered to be their land could be offered as concessions to miners
and loggers. (Most of the titles to demarcated land were granted
decades ago under the Amerindian Act and did not allow for the growth
of Amerindian communities.) The Amerindian NGO's claimed that
Amerindian leaders were not consulted properly and were pressured into
uninformed decisions. The Government maintained that it would consider
granting additional land rights to those communities that agreed to
have their lands demarcated in 1999, but it has not yet taken action to
do so.
In March the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed regret that the
Government had not yet amended the Amerindian Act and expressed concern
that Amerindians did not enjoy fully the right to equality before the
law. The Committee was especially concerned that the right of
Amerindians to enjoy their own culture was threatened by logging,
mining, and delays in the demarcation of their traditional lands, and
that in some cases insufficient land is demarcated to enable them to
pursue their traditional economic activities.
The new draft constitution provides for the creation of a
commission on indigenous people to promote and protect the rights of
the Amerindian community. Among the duties of the commission is to make
recommendations for the protection, preservation and promulgation of
the cultural heritage and language of indigenous people. In addition
the commission is to promote the empowerment of indigenous people
through local government institutions including village councils and
the Council of Toushaos (community elders).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Longstanding ethnic tensions,
primarily between citizens of African descent and those of South Asian
origin, continued to influence society and political life. Racial and
ethnic grouping of social and political organizations has polarized
society along ethnic lines, and discrimination and exclusion continue
to occur. Members of both the largely Indo-Guyanese PPP and the largely
Afro-Guyanese PNC engaged in rhetorical and propaganda attacks that
fueled racial tensions. In August Parliament passed legislation
creating an ethnic relations commission in an effort to reduce
tensions, and in December it approved implementing legislation for the
commission.
The civil service and defense and police forces are overwhelmingly
staffed by Afro-Guyanese. Recruitment efforts targeted at Indo-Guyanese
candidates for the uniformed services generally have met with an
unenthusiastic response, with most qualified Indo-Guyanese candidates
opting for a business or professional career over military, police, or
public service. However, in the aftermath of the 1997 election, the
Government increased its efforts to recruit Indo-Guyanese for the
security forces. The Government sponsored various forums for discussion
of racial problems and to promote inclusion. It supported the work of
NGO's that deal with these concerns.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of association and specifically enumerates workers' rights to
form or belong to trade unions. The Trade Unions Recognition Law, which
requires employers to recognize the union chosen by a majority of the
workers, was passed in late 1997 and came into effect in 1999, but was
not effective in practice. The Trade Unions Recognition Board did not
grant recognition to any new unions; it issued recommendations to
recertify existing unions that previously had represented workers, but
the process was not completed by year's end.
Approximately 34 percent of the work force is unionized. Most union
members work in the public sector and in state-owned enterprises.
Organized labor freely associates in one major national federation, the
Guyana Trades Union Congress (TUC), which is composed of 22 unions.
There is a tradition of close ties between the trade union movement and
political parties. Historically, the two major political parties have
wielded significant influence over the leadership of several unions,
and trade union officials often served in dual roles as party
officials. This arrangement occasionally led to overt politicization of
labor issues. For example, the Public Service Union organized a strike
of customs employees in November 1998, with explicit political support
from the opposition PNC. In 1999 all opposition parliamentary parties
supported the public service workers' strike.
Workers have a generally recognized right to strike. Strikes can be
declared illegal if the union leadership did not approve them, or they
did not meet the requirements specified in collective bargaining
agreements. Public employees providing essential services may strike if
they provide the proper notice to the Ministry of Labor and leave a
skeleton staff in place.
In May workers at the Forestry Commission went on strike. They were
attempting to obtain recognition of their union, but 10 union branch
chiefs were dismissed and had not been paid the severance package due
to them.
In 1999 following a civil service strike, an arbitration panel
awarded government workers an across-the-board 31 percent pay increase
for 1999, an additional 26 percent increase in 2000, and step
increases. While the Government has paid the annual increases, it has
not yet agreed to implement step increases. There is no law prohibiting
retaliation against strikers or antiunion discrimination by employers.
However, this principle always is included in the terms of resumption
after a strike. The Trade Unions Recognition Law defines and places
limits on the retaliatory actions employers may take against strikers.
Arbitration rulings, when agreed to by the contending parties, are
enforceable legally.
Unions and their federations freely maintain relations with
recognized international trade union and professional groups. All three
of the major international trade union federations have affiliates in
the country.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Public and
private sector employees possess and utilize the right to organize and
to bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor certifies all collective
bargaining agreements and has never refused to do so. However, until
enactment of the 1997 recognition law, this right was not codified, and
employers legally were not required to recognize unions or to bargain
with them. Individual unions directly negotiate collective bargaining
status, pursuant to the 1993 repeal of a regulation that required that
all collective bargaining be negotiated through the GTUC. Unions are
dissatisfied with a provision granting the Ministry of Finance veto
power over wage contracts negotiated by other ministries. The Chief
Labor Officer and the staff of the Ministry of Labor provide
consultation, enforcement, and conciliation services.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there is no indication that
it occurs. The Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by children
and enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Factories Act and the Employment of Young Persons and
Children Act set out minimum age requirements for employment of
children. Legally, no person under age 14 may be employed in any
industrial undertaking and no person under age 16 may be employed at
night, except under regulated circumstances. The law permits children
under age 14 to be employed only in enterprises in which members of the
same family are employed. However, it is common to see very young
children engaged in street trading in the capital. While cognizant of
the situation, the Ministry of Labor does not employ sufficient
inspectors to enforce existing laws effectively. According to UNICEF,
child labor in the informal sector is a problem, as is the practice of
teenage girls trading sexual favors for money (see Section 5). The
Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by children and enforces
this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Act and the Wages
Councils Act allow the Labor Minister to set minimum wages for various
categories of private employers. However, there is no legislated
private sector minimum wage. As a result of the civil service
arbitration ruling in 1999 (see Section 6.a.), the minimum public
sector wage increased to $104 (G$19,000) per month. Although
enforcement mechanisms exist, it is difficult to put them into
practice, and unorganized workers, particularly women and children in
the informal private sector, often are paid less than what is required
legally. The legal minimum wage for the public sector is insufficient
to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
The Shops Act and the Factories Act set hours of employment, which
vary by industry and sector. In general work in excess of an 8-hour day
or a 44-hour week requires payment of an overtime rate. However, if the
initial contract stipulates a 48-hour workweek, then the overtime rate
applies only for hours worked in excess of 48 hours. The law does not
require at least a 24-hour rest period each week.
The Factories Act also establishes workplace safety and health
standards. The Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Ministry
of Labor is charged with conducting factory inspections and
investigating complaints of substandard workplace conditions. As with
its other responsibilities, inadequate resources prevented the Ministry
from effectively carrying out this function. Workers cannot remove
themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, and there were occasional reports of
trafficking in persons of Chinese and South Asian origin, who would
immigrate illegally to the United States under conditions amounting to
debt bondage. Persons providing fraudulent documents for the purpose of
facilitating illegal immigration can be charged with obtaining money
under false pretenses, which carries a small fine and a 6-month prison
sentence. Some fraud cases were prosecuted during the year.
__________
HAITI
Haiti is a republic with an elected president and a bicameral
legislature; although the 1987 Constitution remained in force, the
failure to hold legislative elections left the country without a
functioning legislature for over 3 years. The terms of office of the
House of Deputies and most of the Senate expired on January 11, 1999;
however, elections were not held until May 21, 2000. Parliament was not
in session during that period. President Rene Preval, Prime Minister
Jacques Edouard Alexis, and a cabinet governed during the year. The
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), formed in March 1999, delayed the
local and parliamentary elections five times. After first-round
elections were held in May, the CEP adopted a methodology that gave
outright victory to candidates from the ruling Fanmi Lavalas (FL)
party. Opposition parties and the international community objected to
the CEP's method for tabulating votes and refused to recognize the new
Parliament, which was sworn in on August 28. After CEP president Leon
Manus refused to certify the results, he received death threats and
subsequently fled the country. Two other CEP members also resigned in
protest over the tabulation method. In a highly controversial move,
President Preval replaced the three CEP members with FL loyalists on
July 2. This now controversial CEP, whose mandate was expanded in
August to include presidential elections, held presidential elections
on November 26. Opposition parties refused to participate and the
international community refused to support or certify the presidential
elections because the controversy over the May 21 elections was not
resolved. The opposition demanded the formation of a new CEP,
resolution of the May 21 elections disputes, and security guarantees
for future elections. On November 30, the CEP announced that Jean-
Bertrand Aristide had won 91.5 percent of the vote in the November 26
presidential elections and proclaimed him the winner. However,
controversy continued over voter turnout claims. The CEP announced a
nationwide voter turnout rate of 60.5 percent. Other observers,
including the opposition and local and international media, estimated
voter turnout between 5 percent and 20 percent. The judiciary is
theoretically independent; however, it is not independent in practice
and remained largely weak and corrupt, and there were allegations that
the executive branch interfered in politically sensitive cases.
In September 1994, a U.N.-sanctioned multinational force restored
the country's democratically elected president. The Armed Forces of
Haiti (FAd'H) subsequently were disbanded. At that time, the Government
established the Haitian National Police (HNP). Despite substantive
international assistance and some notable progress, the HNP remains a
fledgling institution with inadequate resources. It still grapples with
corruption; the presence of human rights abusers within its ranks and
attrition are serious problems. Allegations of corruption,
incompetence, and narcotics trafficking are leveled against members at
all levels of the force, which now numbers between 3,000 and 3,500
officers for a population well in excess of 8 million. The HNP has a
variety of specialized units, including a crisis response unit (SWAT),
a crowd control unit (CIMO) serving Port-au-Prince and the Western
department, crowd control units (UDMO's) serving each of the remaining
eight departments, a presidential and security unit, a small Coast
Guard unit, and a Special Investigative Unit (SIU), formed to
investigate high-profile political killings. The SIU is no longer ill-
equipped and inexperienced; however, it lacks a mandate from the
country's political leaders. It is making progress on some cases. Some
members of local government councils (CASEC's) exercise arrest
authority without legal sanction. Members of the HNP and other security
forces continued to commit serious human rights abuses, although less
so than in 1999.
Both the mandates of the U.N. Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) and
of the U.N./Organization of American States (OAS) International
Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) have expired. The International
Civilian Mission for Support in Haiti (MICAH) began operations in March
with a limited mandate, largely dedicated to technical training. Its
mandate is scheduled to expire on February 6, 2001. The departure of
MICIVIH removed an objective monitor of the HNP, thereby making the
compilation of human rights abuse statistics very difficult.
Haiti is an extremely poor country, with a per capita income of
around $400. This figure probably does not fully include significant
remittances from the over 1 million Haitians living abroad, as well as
income from informal sector activities that constitute an estimated 70
percent of actual economic activity. The country has a market-based
economy with state enterprises controlling utilities. Aside from the
sale of two previously closed enterprises, the privatization of state-
owned enterprises has come to a halt. A small elite controls much of
the country's wealth. Accurate employment statistics are unavailable.
About two-thirds of the population work in subsistence agriculture,
earn less than the average income, and live in extreme poverty. A small
part of the urban labor force (approximately 20,000 persons) works in
the industrial and assembly sectors, with an equal number in government
or service sector employment. Assembled goods, textiles, leather goods,
handicrafts, and electronics are sources of limited export revenue and
employment. Other important exports are mangoes and coffee. The country
is heavily dependent on international assistance, especially
remittances from expatriates. It imports basic foodstuffs, including
rice and sugar. The economic situation worsened perceptibly during the
year. Political instability, deficit financing, depreciation of the
gourde, and the world fuel price increase contributed to the country's
severe economic problems. Episodes of sharp gourde depreciation in
September-October, combined with a fuel price increase, resulted in
high costs for import-dependent business enterprises, prices for food
and consumer goods remained high at year's end. The International
Monetary Fund estimated the increase in inflation from 1999 in October
at 18 percent.
The Government's human rights record was generally poor, and its
overall effort to respect the human rights of its citizens was marred
by serious abuses and shortcomings in oversight. Contrary to the
previous year, there were no credible allegations of extrajudicial
killing or disappearance. There were several politically motivated
killings during the year. The HNP continued to beat, torture, and
otherwise mistreat detainees. Methodical investigations by the HNP are
rare, and impunity remains a problem. Very poor prison conditions,
arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged pretrial detention
continue to be problems. Many criminal deportees who already served
full sentences overseas are put back in jail for indefinite periods of
time. The judiciary remained understaffed and underfunded; judges are
corrupt and untrained. Judicial dockets are clogged, and fair and
expeditious trials are the exception rather than the rule. The
judiciary is not independent in practice; however, the completion of
the Carrefour-Feuilles and Raboteau trials were signs of improvement.
Security forces carried out illegal warrantless searches. Popular
organization militants and members of the HNP increased their
harassment of political parties, especially the opposition, during and
after the May legislative elections. Opposition candidates were
arrested, beaten, shot, and sometimes killed. Some opposition party
offices were burned or otherwise destroyed. Most media practice some
form of self-censorship, although they are frequently critical of the
Government. Violence and societal discrimination against women, and
government neglect and abuse of children remain problems. Some
government leaders directed their rhetoric against the mulatto segment
of society. The practice of rural families sending young children to
the larger cities to work as unpaid domestics (restaveks) is still a
problem. Child labor persists. Vigilante activity, including killings,
remained a common alternative to formal judicial processes.
The Government made some progress in fighting police impunity and
in addressing the legacy of human rights abuse from the 1991-94 period.
On September 29, the trial of former soldiers involved in the 1994
Raboteau massacre began. On November 10, the court found 16 of the 22
defendants guilty and acquitted 6. The judge sentenced 12 to life
imprisonment with hard labor and 4 others to between 4 and 9 years'
imprisonment. On September 11, a jury found 4 police officers,
including former police chief Jean Coles Rameau, guilty for their role
in the murder of 11 civilians in the Carrefour-Feuilles section of
Port-au-Prince on May 28, 1999. The judge sentenced the defendants to 3
years' imprisonment each.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
credible reports of extrajudicial killings by members of the HNP;
however, it is very difficult to obtain reliable statistics in this
regard because the mandate of MICIVIH has expired. Its successor, the
International Civilian Mission for Support in Haiti (MICAH), has a much
more limited mission that does not include compiling statistics on
human rights abuses. However, there were political killings during the
year.
On January 11, a crowd chased HNP and U.N. CIVPOL officers into the
Fort Liberte Commissariat after police rescued one of two thieves
caught by the local populace seeking to lynch them. The second thief
was beheaded. One 14-year-old was shot and subsequently died. The
source of the bullet is unknown.
There were politically motivated killings during the year. On March
27, unknown persons killed Popular Organization (OP) member Jean Samedi
in the La Saline area of Port-au-Prince. Following discovery of his
body, the crowd lynched one individual suspected of involvement in the
killing; five others were wounded in the confrontation. Samedi's murder
led to further street violence later in the week, during which two
persons were killed and at least three others, including a police
officer, were wounded. On March 28, Legitime Annis, a local opposition
party coordinator, and his wife were murdered at their home in Petit-
Goave. On March 29, Ferdinand Dorvil, campaign manager for an
opposition Senate candidate from Grand Riviere du Nord, was dragged
from his home, shot, and killed. On April 10, Merilus Deus, opposition
candidate in Savanette, was murdered, and his daughter was injured. The
HNP investigated these murders as politically motivated incidents.
On April 3, unknown gunmen shot popular radio host and director
general of Radio Inter Jean Leopold Dominique, known for his criticism
of the Government and of former coup leaders (see Section 2.a.). For
weeks before the attack, Radio Inter employees had received threatening
phone calls. On April 8, following Dominique's funeral, a gang of
approximately 25 persons burned the office of the KID party to the
ground while police watched. The HNP is treating the case as a
politically motivated killing. The investigation was still open at
year's end. Two arrests were made in this case; one man was released
while the other, a former policeman, was still in custody at year's
end. In September Jean-Senat Fleury, a respected judge known for his
impartiality, was removed by the Minister of Justice from investigating
the case. The grounds for his removal were unclear. In November the
Minister named a new prosecutor, Claduy Gassant, who began calling
witnesses, including high ranking HNP officials and FL politicians.
On May 12, Branor Simon, the campaign coordinator for a local
opposition candidate in Grand'Anse department, was shot and killed. His
murder credibly is believed to be politically motivated. On May 21, two
election-related deaths were reported in Croix de Bouquets, a suburb of
Port-au-Prince, where a candidate and policeman exchanged fire in an
altercation away from a polling booth. Police were cooperating with the
investigation at year's end.
On September 6, men wearing police uniforms abducted, tortured and
killed Amos Jeannot, an employee of a local nongovernmental
organization (NGO) called Fonkoze (see Section 4).
Two prominent killings in 1999 remain unresolved. No arrests have
been made in the October 1999 killing of Jean Lamy, an unofficial
advisor to the HNP and longtime political ally of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide or in the March 1999 killing of opposition Senator
Yvon Toussaint.
On September 11, a court found 4 of 6 police officers guilty for
their role in the summary execution of 11 civilians in the Port-au-
Prince suburb of Carrefour-Feuilles on May 28, 1999. The judge
sentenced each to 3 years' imprisonment.
On September 29, 22 former members of the military went on trial
for taking part in the 1994 Raboteau massacre. On November 11, the jury
found 16 of the defendants guilty. The judge sentenced 12 defendants to
life imprisonment with hard labor and 4 others to between 4 and 9 years
imprisonment.
In 1995 Claudette Gourdet Saint Albin was convicted in absentia of
the September 1993 murder of Antoine Izmery. When in April the SIU
attempted to arrest her, the judicial police presented a 1998 document
acquitting her. There has been no further movement on the Gourdet/
Izmery case.
The Government has focused its efforts on investigations into
political killings that happened before the 1994 return of Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, e.g. Raboteau, Cite Soleil. Little progress has been
made in the investigations of political killings after 1994, with the
exception of the Carrefour-Feuilles trial. Judges assigned to
politically sensitive cases complained about interference by the
executive branch of the Government.
There was little movement on the investigation into the 1993
massacre of residents of Cite Soleil, a Port-au-Prince slum, by members
of the FAd'H and its allied paramilitary group, Revolutionary Front for
the Advancement and Progress of Haiti. In November 1999, 23 arrest
warrants were issued; however, soon afterwards, Minister of Justice
LeBlanc terminated the employment of the judge on grounds of
corruption, leaving the 4-year-old case without a judge with
institutional knowledge of the case. By year's end, no arrests had been
made; however, a new judge was appointed in the late summer.
Extrajudicial killings often take the form of vigilante actions. In
general, such incidents occurred without official complicity,
especially in rural areas where there is little or no police presence,
the populace routinely resorts to vigilante actions in the absence of
reliable means of legal redress. In November the Prime Minister called
for the reappearance of vigilante brigades, and several began to
operate. Angry mobs often kill suspected thieves, bandits, murderers,
rapists, and sorcerers, usually by assault with machetes, stoning,
beating, or burning. The HNP tried to prevent instances of vigilante
justice in at least two cases in Port-au-Prince.
On March 30, a mob attacked and severely injured a murder suspect
in Port-au-Prince who had just been arrested by the HNP. The suspect
was in police custody when he was attacked. The HNP did not provide
adequate security but instead drove the suspect through downtown Port-
au-Prince in the back of a pick-up truck, despite a large crowd which
had formed.
In March Amnesty International (AI) released a public statement
expressing concern about reports of politically motivated violent
street demonstrations by individuals said to be calling for, among
other demands, the resignation of the Provisional Electoral Council. On
March 27 and 28, demonstrators, some of whom claimed ties to the Fanmi
Lavalas party, set fire to tires at barricades around Port-au-Prince.
The central market was burned. A police officer in civilian clothes was
shot twice at close range. Local television broadcast a report that a
9-year-old child had been shot and killed in the protests. Local police
response was sporadic and limited; at least six persons were killed and
many wounded. On March 29, Constitution Day, the violence continued in
and around Port-au-Prince. FL supporters threatened Espace de
Concertation party marchers. An opposition party organizer Legitime
Adis and his wife were shot in their Petit Goave home.
Prison administrators and international human rights observers
report a high number of deaths in prison (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no credible reports of politically
motivated disappearances.
On April 27, Claudy Myrthil, the Espace de Concertation candidate
for the post of Delegue de Ville in the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of
Martissant was abducted from his home by unknown persons and held
captive for 10 days. It is not clear whether his abduction was
politically motivated.
In June 1999, recent skeletal human remains were found at Titanyen
(near Croix des Missions), an area that often had served as a dumping
ground for bodies of victims of political killings during the Duvalier
and military eras. The HNP's forensic unit removed the remains with the
assistance of foreign experts. Preliminary findings link some of the
remains with an April 1999 incident in which HNP officers allegedly
arrested eight teenage associates of the gang leader, Hypolite Elysee,
whom HNP agents killed in April. Despite the efforts of their families
to find them at police stations, prisons, and the morgue the youths
were not located. The HNP opened an investigation into the case in
June; at year's end the investigation remained open.
c. Torture or other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The 1987 Constitution prohibits the use of unnecessary
force or restraint, psychological pressure, or brutality by the
security forces; however, members of the security forces continue to
violate these provisions. Police officers used excessive--and sometimes
deadly--force in making arrests or controlling demonstrations and
rarely were punished for such acts. Police frequently beat suspects.
Torture and other forms of abuse are pervasive.
On July 6, members of the HNP questioned, beat, and tortured a
journalist and businesswoman at her home for 2 hours (see Section
2.a.).
According to an opposition political party leader, on July 12, a
police commando unit led by Mayor-elect Willo Joseph and local HNP
Commissioner M. Jose rounded up and beat seven Espace leaders in
Maissade. They were taken to neighboring Hinche where police
authorities imprisoned them. The authorities stated that they were
arrested for ``setting houses on fire.'' One of the detained persons
was dragged through the streets of Maissade by a rope attached to his
neck.
According to Marc-Antoine Destin, president of the Confederation of
Haitian Workers (CTH), on February 22, HNP officers led by Joanna
Lunday, a local judge, kicked and beat a group of about 20 CTH
officials at their headquarters in Petionville. Four CTH officials were
arrested (see Section 6.a.). They were not charged with any crime, and
were later released. The officers and judge have not been disciplined.
Police mistreatment of suspects at both the time of arrest and
during detention remains pervasive in all parts of the country. Beating
with fists, sticks, and belts is by far the most common form of abuse.
However, international organizations documented other forms of
mistreatment, such as burning with cigarettes, choking, hooding, and
kalot marassa (severe boxing of the ears, which can result in eardrum
damage). Those who reported such abuse often had visible injuries
consistent with the alleged maltreatment. There were also isolated
allegations of torture by electric shock. Mistreatment also takes the
form of withholding medical treatment from injured jail inmates. Police
almost never are prosecuted for the abuse of detainees.
There were isolated credible allegations of excessive force on the
part of the CIMO and UDMO crowd control forces.
The Government's record of disciplining police officers implicated
in these offenses is mixed. More often the HNP simply fires officers
caught in flagrant abuses. The Government prosecuted six HNP officers
during the year, and four received a sentence of 3 years in the
Carrefour-Feuilles trial (see Section 1.a.). There are some HNP
officers in prison for other offenses, although no exact figures were
available at year's end. More than 800 officers have been removed since
1996. The lack of an Inspector General's office within the HNP
significantly contributes to a problem with discipline.
There were sporadic instances of brutality on the part of local
officials exercising unauthorized law enforcement functions. Especially
in rural areas, brutality is perpetrated by members and agents of
CASEC's (administrative councils of communal sections), who tend to
assume illegally a law enforcement role in the absence of a regular
police presence.
A Committee to Judge Jean Claude Duvalier lobbied the French
Government for his return to the country. Early in the year, they filed
a complaint in a French court asking for his return, but the court
dismissed their motion. The group was in the process of appealing this
decision at year's end.
Prison conditions remained very poor. The Penitentiary
Administration Management (DAP), with the support of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), struggled to improve conditions in
the country's prisons. Prisoners and detainees, held in overcrowded and
inadequate facilities, continued to suffer from a lack of basic
hygiene, poor quality health care, and 24-hour confinement to cells in
some facilities. Several prisons experienced water shortages. As of
August, the country's 19 prisons held 4,219 prisoners, an increase of
about 350 persons compared with 1999.
The prison system continued to experience food shortages. Prison
administrators and international human rights observers report a high
number of deaths in prison. No official statistics are available;
however, prison administrators report that in the month of November
alone, at least 10 deaths were reported--5 attributable to
malnutrition, 2 or 3 to AIDS, and the remainder to other causes.
International human rights observers report that the number of deaths
attributable to malnutrition rose significantly at year's end. Many
prisons were only able to supply one (as opposed to the required two)
meals a day to inmates. Most severely affected were inmates whose diet
was not supplemented by food brought by family members. Even in those
prisons where two meals were supplied, the food routinely lacked the
minimum nutrients established by international standards; many
prisoners were malnourished.
The ICRC manages a number of humanitarian programs to improve
living conditions within the prison system. It pays for prescriptions
not available in the prison pharmacies. On a quarterly basis, the ICRC
distributes basic hygiene supplies to the prisons, including soap,
bleach, brooms, mops, paper towels, and disinfectants. The ICRC also
provides funding on an as needed basis to clear the prison septic tanks
and renovate prison bathrooms, showers, and water pumps. The ICRC also
donates reading material, sewing machines, wood and other items to help
prisoners pass the time.
The DAP is plagued by budgetary and management problems. The prison
system still operates on the same budget as in 1995. Even when the
administration manages to purchase enough food for all the prisoners,
they experience difficulties in delivering the food to the 19 prisons.
The prison administration does not have a delivery system, so it is up
to the individual prison inspectors to go to the main warehouse and
carry out as much food as they can fit in a taxi or local bus. The
central warehouse also lacks a control mechanism to ensure that each
prison is getting its fair share.
In the past, when the authorities received Haitian citizens
deported from other countries for having committed crimes, they were
processed in 1 week and then released. However, since March 24,
criminal deportees who already have served sentences outside the
country are kept in jail, with no timetable for their eventual release.
Prosecutor August Brutus said that ``preventive measures'' are being
taken to prevent the ``bandits'' from increasing the level of
insecurity and crime in the country.
Health care services offered to inmates is improving slowly.
However, most of the nurses do not receive adequate training. All
receive a minimal 3-month training course before beginning work;
however, of the system's 60 nurses, at most 5 have completed the 3-year
course of instruction necessary to obtain full certification as
registered nurses. In October 1999, a new Chief Physician was
appointed. He instituted monthly meetings of all the prison healthcare
professionals. Every prison has a dispensary, none have hospitals. Only
the National Penitentiary has a nurse on duty 24 hours a day. The
common sicknesses after malnutrition are skin problems, tuberculosis,
and AIDS. In the capital, doctors are available; however this is not
always the case in the provinces. The nurses do not conduct daily
checkups on the physical condition of the prisoners; the prisoners must
first ask and then receive permission to visit the nurse. The
dispensaries have a limited supply of medication. If the needed
medication is not available through the dispensary, family members must
provide it, or in cases when there are no relatives, the ICRC provides
funding for the medication on a routine basis in the capital and on a
quarterly basis in the provinces.
Fort National prison in Port-au-Prince is the only prison facility
expressly for women and juveniles. In other prison facilities, women
are housed in cells separate from the men. However, overcrowding often
prevents strict separation of juveniles from adults, convicts from
those in pretrial detention, or violent from nonviolent prisoners. Many
prisoners were held in police holding cells, particularly in the
provinces. The National Penitentiary is the only prison originally
constructed for use as a prison; all other prisons are former police
holding cells.
International human rights observers and prison officials admit
that there are instances of abuse by prison personnel against
prisoners; however, no statistics were available at year's end. Prison
officials report that prisoners did not file any official complaints
against prison personnel during the year. However, they also admitted
that they are aware that abuse occurs because they have heard oral
reports from prisoners. However, the prisoners are afraid to file an
official complaint because they fear that the abuse may worsen as a
result.
The authorities freely permitted the ICRC, the Haitian Red Cross,
MICAH, and other human rights groups to enter prisons and police
stations, monitor conditions, and assist prisoners with medical care,
food, and legal aid. The Director General of the HNP cooperated with
MICAH and the ICRC.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. The Constitution
stipulates that a person may be arrested only if apprehended during the
commission of a crime, or if a written order by a legally competent
official such as a justice of the peace or magistrate has been issued.
These orders cannot be executed between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., and
the authorities must bring the detainee before a judge within 48 hours
of arrest. In practice, the authorities frequently ignored these
provisions. There were instances of arrests by security forces and
local authorities lacking the authority to do so. In particular,
arrests by mayors and members of local CASEC's occurred in underpoliced
rural areas. Occasionally parents ask a judge to imprison a delinquent
child.
On July 12, police beat and arrested seven leaders of the Espace de
Concertation party (see Section 1.c.).
The requirement that a detainee be brought before a judge within 48
hours of his arrest was disregarded routinely in certain police
jurisdictions, according to NGO's. Although the 48-hour rule is
violated in all parts of the country, it is most often and flagrantly
ignored in Jeremie, Cap Haitien, Petionville, and the Delmas
commissariat of Port-au-Prince. Moreover, arrests sometimes are made on
charges (for example, sorcery or debt) that have no basis in law. The
authorities also detained some persons on unspecified charges or
``pending investigation.''
In 1999 the international community was increasingly troubled by
the authorities' tendency to detain persons in defiance of valid orders
for their release issued by judges. MICIVIH expressed ``extreme
concern'' at these cases, and described the authorities' actions as
``completely arbitrary and illegal.'' Prisoners with histories of
opposition to the Government or affiliation with the Duvalier or de
facto regimes were affected disproportionately by this practice. By
August about half of those prisoners identified in 1999 had been
released. By October prisoners still held despite valid release orders
included Leoncefils Ceance, Esteve Conserve, Calero Vivas Fabien, Jean-
Robert Lherisson, Rilande Louis, Leonard Lucas, Georges Metayer,
Alexandre Paul, Jean-Michel Richardson, and Jean Enel Samedi.
As in previous years, the dysfunctional judicial system resulted in
pervasive prolonged pretrial detentions, with an estimated 80 percent
of the country's prisoners awaiting trial and a third of them for more
than one year (see Section 1.e.). The problem is most extreme in Port-
au-Prince. A February 1999 compilation of statistics on these cases by
MICIVIH showed that of 3,090 prisoners awaiting trial, 1,172 have been
held for more than 1 year. Of these, 775 had been held between 1 and 2
years, 287 had been held between 2 and 3 years, and 110 had been held
for more than 3 years. Sometimes the charges in these lengthy
detentions are minor. Approximately 98 percent of the female and minors
in prison are awaiting trial, indicating that the judicial system moves
even more slowly for women and children (see Section 5).
In late 1999, Minister of Justice Leblanc announced that resolving
the problem of prolonged pretrial detention was a high priority; he
reorganized the Port-au-Prince prosecutor's office and attempted to
implement a more rigorous schedule for hearings for correctional and
criminal affairs. The Government had made little progress at year's
end, as resolution of the problem required thorough judicial reform at
all levels of the penal process: police, justices of the peace,
prosecutors, investigating magistrates, trial judges, and prisons (see
Section 1.e.).
In Cap-Haitien, the second largest city and largest city in the
North, the judicial system has improved somewhat, although serious
human rights violations occur on a routine basis. The Constitution
prohibits police detention in excess of 48 hours; however, lengthy
delays are routine. In some cases, detainees in police holding cells
have been held for more than a month. Those accused of crimes and
awaiting trial face lengthy delays in reaching trial. In many cases,
pretrial detainees spend years awaiting trial. Human rights
organizations note that the average wait before trial has increased
from 3 to 4 years. Nevertheless, they report that beatings of prisoners
have decreased in Cap-Haitien and active efforts are being made to
decrease the lengths of pretrial confinement.
Police in some instances attacked journalists (see Section 2.a.).
The Constitution prohibits the involuntary exile of citizens, and
there were no reports of its use.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, it is not independent in practice.
Years of rampant corruption and governmental neglect have left the
judicial system poorly organized and nearly moribund. The Constitution
sets varying periods of tenure for judges above the level of justice of
the peace. However, in practice the Ministry of Justice exercises
appointment and administrative oversight of the judiciary, prosecutors,
and court staff. The Ministry of Justice can remove justices of the
peace and occasionally dismisses judges above this level as well.
At the lowest level of the justice system, the justices of the
peace issue warrants, adjudicate minor infractions, mediate cases, take
depositions, and refer cases to prosecutors or higher judicial
officials. Investigating magistrates and public prosecutors cooperate
in the development of more serious cases, which are tried by the judges
of the first instance courts. Appeals court judges hear cases referred
from the first instance courts, and the Supreme Court deals with
questions of procedure and constitutionality.
The judicial apparatus follows a civil law system based on the
Napoleonic Code; the Criminal Code dates from 1832, although it has
been amended in some instances. The Constitution provides for the right
to a fair public trial; however, this right was abridged widely in
practice. The Constitution also expressly denies police and judicial
authorities the right to interrogate persons charged with a crime
unless the suspect has legal counsel or a representative of his of her
choice present or waives this right; however, this right was abridged
in practice. While trials are public, most accused persons cannot
afford legal counsel for interrogation or trial, and the law does not
require that the Government provide legal representation. Despite the
efforts of local human rights groups and the international community to
provide legal aid, many interrogations without counsel occur. During
actual trials, however, some defendants had access to counsel.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and the right to be present
at trial, to confront witnesses against them, and to present witnesses
and evidence in their own behalf, and the Government respects these
rights in practice.
A shortage of adequately trained and qualified justices of the
peace, judges and prosecutors, as well as underfunding, among other
systemic problems, created a huge backlog of criminal cases, with many
detainees waiting months or even years in pretrial detention for a
court date. Bail is available; however, it is entirely at the
discretion of the investigative judge (juge d'instruction). Bail
hearings are not automatic. The attorney for the defendant can make an
application based upon a specific need, and the judge then decides if a
conditional release is warranted. This usually is done only in minor
cases when there is an overwhelming humanitarian reason, such as a need
for medical attention. In some regions, there are not enough judges to
hear cases, and judges lack basic resources (such as office space,
legal reference texts, and supplies) to perform their duties.
Professional competence is sometimes lacking as well; some judges are
illiterate. If an accused person ultimately is tried and found
innocent, there is no redress against the Government for excessive time
served in detention.
The Code of Criminal Procedure does not assign clear responsibility
to investigate crimes and divides the authority for cases among police,
justices of the peace, prosecutors, and investigative magistrates.
Examining magistrates often receive files that are empty or are missing
police reports. Autopsies are conducted only rarely, and autopsy
reports are even more rare. The code provides for 2 criminal court
sessions (assizes) per year in each of the 15 first-instance
jurisdictions, each session generally lasting 2 weeks, to try all major
crimes requiring a jury trial. During the year, the Port-au-Prince
jurisdiction--by far the largest in terms of caseload--failed to adhere
to this stipulation due to difficulties in assembling juries. The first
criminal assizes since July 1998 occurred in Port-au-Prince in December
1999. The second was held almost 1 year later in September.
At least 3 classes of approximately 80 students have graduated from
the Magistrates School. The school conducted seminars on human rights
and judicial reform during the year.
There were no official reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits interference with privacy,
family, home, or correspondence; however, police and other security
force elements conducted illegal warrantless searches. In the past
there were reports that the police arrested family members of wanted
persons when the suspects themselves could not be found.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government has in the past
generally respected these rights; however, the Government's respect for
the press deteriorated during the year. Print and electronic media from
opposite ends of the political spectrum often criticize the Government.
However, most media practice self-censorship, wary of offending
sponsors or the politically influential. After the November 26
presidential elections, death threats proliferated against media
figures who questioned the electoral process or outcomes. Although the
threats were anonymous, the Government did nothing to counter them.
Three radio station were forced to stop temporarily news programming
for brief periods in late November and December as a direct result of
threats against the stations for their coverage of the elections.
There are two French-language newspapers in the country, Le
Nouvelliste and Le Matin, with a combined circulation of less than
20,000 readers. Print media in Creole is limited due to regional
variations and the lack of a consistent orthography; however, many
newspapers include a page of news in Creole. Both daily newspapers are
frequently critical of government policies.
The written press is beyond the reach of many citizens, due to
language differences, illiteracy, and cost. The literacy rate is only
about 20 percent, and broadcast media, especially Creole-language
radio, have a preeminent importance. Although most radio stations and
other forms of telecommunications are nominally independent, they are
subject to a 1997 law that names the State as the sole owner and
proprietor of all telecommunications media. Members of the press
believe that the Government refuses to sign the Chapultepec Convention
(on freedom of expression) because the Convention prohibits government
monopolies of the media, which would be in direct violation of the 1977
law. The State leases the right to broadcast to private enterprises but
maintains the right to repossess the airwaves as it sees fit.
Over 200 private radio stations exist, including about 40 in the
capital alone. Most stations carry a mix of music, news, and talk show
programs, which many citizens regard as their only opportunity to speak
out on a variety of political, social, and economic issues. Uncensored
foreign satellite television is available; however, its impact is
limited, as most persons cannot afford access to television. Broadcast
media freely express a wide range of political viewpoints.
Credible reports indicate that the Government's inability or
unwillingness to provide adequate security to media outlets and
prominent members of the press has contributed to an increased
sentiment of vulnerability among those members of the press who
criticize the Government or Fanmi Lavalas.
According to employees of Radio Metropole, on February 11, Prime
Minister Alexis publicly criticized the station for its coverage of
rightwing leader Claude Raymond's death while in prison; however, none
of the reported items were inaccurate.
On April 3, unknown persons killed radio commentator Jean Leopold
Dominique and a security guard (see Section 1.a.).
On December 15 two youths killed sports broadcaster Geral Denoze;
the motive remained unknown at year's end.
Numerous anonymous death threats have been directed at journalists
by name, including the entire news staff of Radio Vision 2000, which is
known for its opposition to the Government. On April 5, Radio Vision
2000 journalists sent a signed letter to Justice Minister Camille
Leblanc, in which they described ``daily threats against their lives.''
They asked the Minister to ensure security for the radio staff and
building. Following Jean Leopold Dominique's funeral on April 8, a
group of at least 100 persons massed outside the station, threatening
to attack it. The CIMO dispersed the crowd. A few days after
Dominique's murder, Daly Valet, a Radio Vision 2000 journalist, went
into hiding after receiving frequent and credible death threats. He
fled the country. In June heavily armed, hooded men painted slogans on
the wall of the station and threatened newsroom employees. In face of
threats, Radio Galaxie suspended its news service the day after the
November 26 elections. That same day Radio Vision 2000 joined Radio
Galaxie in suspending its service following the receipt of threats.
Radio Caraibes shut down its news service on December 23, after
receiving threats to the station and personnel.
On April 4, hooded, armed men attacked the Radio Unite station in
Artibonite province. They stole transmitters and destroyed much of the
recording studios and electrical installations.
According to employees of Radio Echo 2000 in Petit Goave, on April
5, a group of armed men entered the station and threatened to burn the
station down and kill the employees if they did not cease broadcasting.
The police did not respond. In March a group of bandits beat one of the
journalists, Elyse Sincere.
On April 17, presidential staff employee and information officer
Guy Delva organized a march ``to protest attacks against freedom of the
press,'' coercing independent media to take part or else be stigmatized
as antigovernment agitators. He also pressured news directors by
telephone to cease broadcasting on April 17, lest they be branded as
opponents of the event. Radio news sections sent representatives to the
march in small numbers to avoid open defiance, but all refused to shut
down their programming on April 17.
In May unknown persons destroyed radio and television stations in
Petit-Goave.
In June a private radio station, Horizon PM, issued an open
nationwide alert, noting that its editor and several of its employees
had received anonymous verbal threats.
In August unknown persons hurled a fragmentation grenade at the
National Television Building in Port-au-Prince. No one was injured.
On August 22, agents from TeleTimoun, the television station wholly
owned by the FL, entered and offered the news staff quadrupled
salaries, connected cell phones, and freedom from fear of future
harassment to those Telemax employees who accepted the offer. All but
one person accepted. The Telemax news service, previously the country's
most objective and technically advanced, subsequently was staffed with
Lavalas supporters and objective reporting ceased.
Foreign journalists generally circulated without hindrance from the
authorities; however, in July police questioned, beat, and tortured a
dual national journalist in her home (see Section 1.c.). The journalist
identified the officers from a police line-up. The police commissioner
who orchestrated the event was fired on other charges not related to
this incident. At year's end, the Government had not apprehended,
charged, or disciplined the officers, even though the victim had
identified them.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the authorities generally respect
this right in practice. In general, a variety of organizations were
able to exercise this right without hindrance throughout the year. For
example, on September 18, about 6,000 members of the Papaye Peasants'
Movement marched from the central plateau town of Papaye to Hinche in
an anti-Lavalas demonstration. According to observers, the police
played a passive role, except at one point intervening to separate the
demonstrators from pro-Lavalas supporters, and there was no
confrontation.
However, in several instances police inaction allowed organized
political militants to violate the right of freedom of assembly in
practice, and there were numerous violent political demonstrations (see
Section 1.a.).
Olivier Nadal, former president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce,
reported to the press that he and his family had received death
threats, and that they had fled the country. He also had been
threatened with arrest. Nadal was the organizer of a May 1999 rally of
entrepreneurs, which was broken up by a band of unknown persons while
the police stood by and did not intervene.
A peaceful, well-publicized demonstration scheduled for August 29
in Cap Haitien by the opposition Convergence Group never took place.
According to local press reports, the Convergence Group decided to
avoid confrontation with members of the pro-Lavalas OP, who moved into
the area of the Cap Haitien Cathedral chanting antiopposition slogans.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the right to
practice all religions and faiths, provided that practice does not
disturb law and order, and the Government respects this right is
practice.
In many respects, Roman Catholicism retains its traditional primacy
among the country's religions although Protestant denominations
(primarily Methodist and Baptist) have overtaken the Catholic Church in
numbers of members. Voodoo, a traditional religion derived in part from
West African beliefs, is practiced alongside Christianity by a large
segment of the population. While there are associations of voodoo
practitioners and priests, there is no organized hierarchy or
established voodoo church. Accusations of sorcery, particularly in
rural areas, have been known to lead to mob violence resulting in
deaths. Given the prevalence of voodoo in these areas, it appears
likely that voodoo practitioners are targeted in some cases.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government respects the right of
freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
repatriation.
An unknown number of undocumented migrants put to sea during the
year seeking better economic opportunities in other countries. The
Government operated, with international support, the National Migration
Office (ONM) to assist citizens involuntarily repatriated from other
countries, including the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas. That
office stopped providing humanitarian services to involuntarily
repatriated migrants in June, and in August it stopped meeting and
processing the migrants. Although the ONM office still exists, it no
longer provides any services to repatriated migrants but conducts
training courses. According to the International Organization for
Migration, the Dominican Republic deports approximately 500 Haitians
each month across the Border. At the end of August, a mass repatriation
of approximately 3,000 Haitian nationals took place. There were
reliable reports of separation of families and maltreatment of Haitians
by Dominican soldiers during this period, as had been the case in 1999.
The Government has no policy regarding foreign nationals seeking
refuge or asylum from third countries. The question of provision of
first asylum did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return
of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for regular elections for local and
parliamentary offices and for the presidency. Rene Preval, who was
elected in 1995 in an election regarded by the international community
as free and fair, continued in office during the year. On May 21, a
first round of long overdue senatorial, legislative, and municipal
elections to fill vacant posts took place after repeated postponements.
The CEP manipulated the results by its choice of a methodology for
calculating the percentages in determining senate seats, by the faulty
transmission of results, and by the arbitrary treatment of challenges
which had an impact on the results of several races. A continuing
standoff through the rest of the year between the Government and
opposition parties led to an opposition boycott of a second round of
legislative elections in July and of the November 26 elections for
president and remaining Senate seats. Elections to replace President
Preval took place as scheduled on November 26.
The country's constitutional crisis continued through the first
half of the year. The crisis began with the flawed local and
parliamentary elections of April 1997 and Prime Minister Rosny Smarth's
subsequent resignation. A stalemate between the President and
Parliament continued through January 11, 1999, when the terms of office
of the entire 85-seat House of Deputies and of all but 9 of the 27
members of Senate expired. In March 1999, President Preval negotiated
an agreement with a coalition of five small opposition parties to form
a Provisional Electoral Council to organize the overdue local and
parliamentary elections. After many delays, these were fixed for May
21, with a second round on July 9.
There were scattered acts of violence in the months leading up to
the election, as well as several politically motivated killings during
the year (see Section 1.a.). On March 11, supporters of the ruling
Fanmi Lavalas' candidate for deputy in the Delmas region physically
attacked Serge Auguste, an opposition candidate. On March 17, Marie
Laurence Jocelyn Lassegue, an opposition candidate running for Senate,
was shot and injured while campaigning. On March 20, two men shot and
injured Marcel Fils, an opposition party coordinator, in downtown Port-
au-Prince. On March 27, unknown persons killed progovernment Popular
Organization (OP) member Jean Samedi in the La Saline area of Port-au-
Prince. Samedi's murder led to further street violence later in the
week, during which two persons were killed and at least three others,
including a police officer, were wounded (see Section 1.a.). The HNP
investigated their murders as politically motivated incidents.
Opposition leaders reported that while they participated in a
proconstitution march on March 29, seven hostile FL supporters attacked
them, shouting ``Aristide or death,'' and other threats. The attackers
brandished pistols and threw stones and one Molotov cocktail.
AI reported that a group of armed men attacked members of an
opposition party as they handed out pamphlets in Port-au-Prince on
March 29. On April 3, noted journalist Jean Leopold Dominique and one
of his guards were shot and killed (see Section 1.a.). On April 4,
Merilus Deus, an opposition senatorial candidate in Savanette was
murdered (see Section 1.a.); the deputy candidate went into hiding. On
April 6, the Grand'Anse BED legal adviser reported that several
individuals forced their way into his house, dragged out his personal
property and burned it. There was no sign of the HNP during this
incident. On April 8, a group of pro-FL militants attacked and burned
the headquarters of an opposition party. The FL denied involvement
despite several credible reports that its supporters were responsible
for the attack. On April 9, two regional opposition offices in Achaie
and Aquin were burned and destroyed. On April 19, an opposition
candidate for local office in suburban Port-au-Prince allegedly was
kidnaped, but reappeared unharmed on May 3.
On May 21, about 60 percent of the country's 4 million registered
voters went to the polls to select from some 29,000 candidates for
11,000 local and national posts. International and domestic observers
agreed that despite some scattered irregularities (polling booth
intimidation, ballot stuffing, and publication of voting results before
polling booths were closed), the elections were generally free and
fair. Two election-related deaths were reported in a suburb of Port-au-
Prince, where a candidate and policeman exchanged fire in an
altercation away from a polling booth. On May 22, the HNP arrested and
charged Paul Denis, an opposition party leader and former senator, for
possession of illegal weapons. He later was released amidst allegations
the arrest was motivated politically.
While the initial voting was generally free and fair, serious
irregularities in the counting of votes and the computation of winners
in certain senate races compromised the election. A December report by
the Organization of American States (OAS) concluded that the voting
process began to deteriorate after the closing of the polls. For
example, armed groups stole and burned ballot boxes in the departments
of the Center, North, and Artibonite. The delivery of voting materials
(ballots, ballot boxes, pens, ink, and voter registration lists) in
Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien was chaotic and a substantial number of
these materials may have been lost. The election controversy became
serious with the publication of the results of the Senate races. Under
the Constitution and electoral law, a candidate must receive an
absolute majority of votes cast in order to be elected in the first
round of voting. If no candidate receives a majority, a second-round
runoff is required. The Senate results published by the CEP announced
that the ruling Fanmi Lavalas party won 16 of the 17 Senate seats in
the first round. These results were based on what opposition parties
and independent observers termed a flawed interpretation of both the
Constitution and the electoral law. Officials only counted votes cast
for the top four contenders in each Senate race, yielding what both
international and local observers said were false FL victories.
Percentages of votes were calculated imprecisely, by using the total of
votes received by the top four contenders rather than the total of
votes for all candidates. There were 20 to 30 candidates for Senate in
each department. CEP President Leon Manus and two other members (all
representing opposition parties) refused to certify the irregular
results and resigned their posts. A preliminary evaluation conducted by
the OAS found that only 9 Senate seats should have been decided in the
first round, while 10 should have gone to a second round. President
Preval responded to the three CEP resignations by appointing
replacement council members loyal to FL, who immediately certified the
Senate results without addressing the controversial counting method.
The international community, local civic groups, and opposition
parties called on the Government to address the controversy. The CEP
ignored these protests and on July 9, held second-round races for
deputies. There were no senatorial second-round contests. With an
almost unanimous boycott by opposition parties and candidates, voter
turnout for this round was significantly lower than in May, at
reportedly only 5 percent. All international and most domestic
observers refused to participate in monitoring the second round.
Domestic human rights and opposition parties continued to protest
the election results. Following his resignation, CEP president Leon
Manus fled the country after being threatened repeatedly. He then
issued a statement that acknowledged that the methodology used in
counting votes for the Senate was flawed. On June 15 and 16, bands of
pro-FL militants shut down metropolitan Port-au-Prince with barricades
and tire burnings to protest international refusal to certify the
results. International missions led by the OAS unsuccessfully attempted
to encourage resolution of the May 21 elections dispute.
Despite local and international calls not to seat the Parliament
before resolution of the election controversy, on August 28, Parliament
was sworn in formally.
Violence escalated, particularly in Port-au-Prince, during the days
before the November 26 elections for President and for replacements for
the remaining nine Senators whose terms would expire in January 2001.
While some of the violence was attributable to the political situation,
for which the FL accused the opposition of responsibility and vice-
versa, common crime was undoubtedly the source of many episodes;
however, the violence contributed to an overall climate of
intimidation.
On the evening of November 2, in Hinche heavily armed members of FL
attacked a meeting being held by opposition political party leader
Chavannes Jean Baptiste and injured seven persons. A few days later,
the mayor of Port St. Louis fired shots into a seminar being conducted
by a respected opposition politician.
Shootings and robberies became an almost daily occurrence in Port-
au-Prince. On November 3, unidentified persons opened fire on an
evening rush hour crowd, killed at least five, and wounded several
others. That same day three bodies were found in another location. On
November 4 and 5, three more bodies were found in yet another site.
Also on November 4, at least one person was killed and another gravely
wounded during a confrontation between rival gangs at another street
intersection. Ongoing confrontation between rival gangs in the Port-au-
Prince slum of Cite Soleil during the month of November resulted in
numerous injuries and property damage. In general, the HNP did not
respond to the confrontations.
On November 14, a group of approximately 500 pro-FL demonstrators
rallied peacefully in front of a foreign Embassy to protest
international pressure on former-President Aristide to bring about a
negotiated solution to the political stalemate that had developed over
the May 21 elections. The same day, a drive-by shooting killed one
person in front of the Le Nouvelliste newspaper offices in downtown
Port-au-Prince. That evening, residents panicked as unidentified
persons in a pick up truck drove through several neighborhoods shooting
at persons (injuring a number of them) and ordering persons off the
streets.
On November 15, a clearly marked U.N. vehicle was hit in a drive-by
shooting in Gonaives. No one was injured.
On November 22, nine separate explosions occurred in crowded areas
of Port-au-Prince; the explosions killed two children and left many
other persons injured. On November 25, marching FL members in Petit
Goave staged citizen's arrests of several opposition members and
detained several others. Also on November 25, an attempt was made
during the evening to burn the communal electoral office (BEC) in
Ganthiere. Police intervened and were able to save the electoral
materials, although the building was partially destroyed.
The international community and most opposition parties refused to
help or take part in the November 26 presidential elections because of
the unresolved controversy surrounding the May elections. Due to the
lack of international observers, the local press monitored the election
process. Several radio stations were forced to close their news
operations because of threats (see Section 2.a.).
The November 26 elections took place amidst heavy police security
and were characterized by low turnout--accounts vary from the 5 percent
to 20 percent. Aside from a pipe bomb that exploded in the Port-au-
Prince suburb of Carrefour and the burning of ballots during the
morning in the city of Anse d'Hainault, the elections generally passed
without disturbance. With the opposition boycott, former President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide faced only token opposition and was elected to a
5-year term with a reported 91.5 percent of the votes cast.
In the days following the November elections, pro and anti
government violence occurred again in the department of Grand-Anse. In
the cities of Anse d'Hainault, Cotetaux, and Petite Riviere de Nippes,
protest and violence led to the deploying of HNP units from Port-au-
Prince, and in the case of Nippes, the Coast Guard, to restore order.
Throughout the rest of the country, calm generally prevailed.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in politics
or government; however, they are underrepresented, and the low status
of women limits their participation. The Election Law provides that the
monetary deposit required of female candidates for political office is
one-half that required of male candidates, if a recognized party
sponsors them. Three of the 82 deputies are women, and there are 6
women among the 27 senators.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights groups generally operate
without government restrictions; however, threats and intimidation from
unknown sources continued to increase during the year. Justice Minister
Leblanc continued to seek dialog with some groups and solicited their
recommendations on human rights issues such as police impunity and
prosecution of police and former military suspected of committing human
rights abuses. The number of groups that monitor human rights has
grown, as has the scope of those groups; however, most monitoring
groups are hampered by a lack of resources. Human rights organizations
increasingly turn to issues that they have not addressed before,
including prison conditions, the widespread lack of health facilities,
and impunity for criminals.
Following the April 3 killing of Jean Leopold Dominique, members of
the local human rights community, including the National Coalition for
Haitian Rights (NCHR) and the Platform of Haitian Human Rights
Organizations rallied in front of the Haiti Inter radio station. Self-
described members of Fanmi Lavalas beat and shot at several
participants. Riot police were on hand but did not protect the rally
participants (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
On September 6, men wearing police uniforms abducted, tortured, and
killed Amos Jeannot, an employee of Fonkoze, a local NGO (see Section
1.a.). AI and local human rights organizations appealed to the HNP for
a swift and thorough investigation. The investigation continued, but no
arrests had been made by year's end.
There were no arrests or progress made in the investigation of the
1999 attempted murder of Pierre Esperance, NCHR country director. The
HNP's investigation remains open but apparently inactive.
The difficult security climate remained unchanged. Organizations
such as the NCHR, the Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations,
the Human Rights Fund, and the Ecumenical Center for Human Rights
reported receiving repeated threats, most of them anonymous.
The Office of the Protector of Citizens (OPC), an autonomous,
ombudsman-like office provided for by the 1987 Constitution, was
hampered by a cut in funds due to the Government's budget crisis. The
OPC is one of the Government's four independent, autonomous
institutions. Despite budgetary problems, the OPC conducted a number of
seminars throughout the year, including over 20 seminars in schools,
some in the Magistrates School, and others at the local and county
levels of government. In February Dr. Louis Roy, the Director of the
OPC, appointed Florence Elie to a 4-year term as Deputy Director. Dr.
Roy was chosen as the Director by a commission of parliamentarians in
conjunction with the President in 1995. However, his seven-year
appointment only was ratified by Parliament in 1997.
The recently seated Parliament created a Justice and Human Rights
Committee. The chairman of the committee said that his primary goal
would be the improvement and reform of the judicial system. It is not
clear whether the committee would also conduct human rights monitoring.
The mandate of MICIVIH expired on March 15. MICIVIH played a vital
and successful role in monitoring the human rights situation and in
promoting adherence to human rights norms by the authorities. The U. N.
created a new entity, the International Civilian Mission for Support in
Haiti (MICAH), after MICIVIH's mandate expired. MICAH's mandate began
in March and is scheduled to expire on February 6, 2001. This new
entity is much smaller in size and scope than MICIVIH. MICAH's mandate
is limited to training in human rights and to conducting civic
education courses. It does not conduct human rights monitoring.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The 1987 Constitution does not specifically prohibit discrimination
on the grounds of race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social
status. It does provide for equal working conditions regardless of sex,
beliefs, or marital status. However, there is no effective governmental
mechanism to administer or enforce these provisions.
Women.--The law provides penalties for rape and domestic violence;
however, the authorities do not enforce these provisions adequately.
According to women's rights groups, rape and other abuse of women is
common, both within and outside marriage. A 1998 study by the Haitian
Center for Research and Action for the Promotion of Women documented
widespread rape and violence against women. The report also found that
many women do not report these forms of abuse out of fear, shame, or
lack of confidence in judicial remedies. A 1999 survey by UNICEF of
violence against women found that 37 percent of women reported being
victims of sexual violence or reported knowing a woman who had been;
another 33 percent reported being victims of other types of physical
abuse. The law excuses a husband if he murders his wife or her lover
upon catching them in the act of adultery in his home. A wife who kills
her husband upon discovering him in the act of adultery is not excused.
The National Commission of Truth and Justice, formed after the 1991-
1994 period of military rule, recommended several improvements to
existing laws concerning rape and abuse of women, but Parliament
enacted none of the proposed changes. In January U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy released a
report based on her June 1999 visit to the country. She noted, among
other problems, that most women prisoners share living quarters with
male prisoners, exposing them to violence and sexual abuse (see Section
1.c.). In 1998 a national coalition of women's organizations met with
the Ministries of Health, Population, Social Affairs and Women's
Issues. Three proposed changes to the law were submitted to Parliament;
by year's end, Parliament had not voted on the proposals. There are no
government-sponsored programs for victims of violence.
Sexual harassment of female workers is a problem, especially in the
assembly sector (see Section 6.b.).
The Ministry of Women's Affairs is charged with promoting and
defending the rights of women and ensuring that they attain an equal
status in society, but it has few resources at its disposal and was
able to accomplish little in this regard.
The Constitution states that all citizens are equal before the law;
however, women do not enjoy the same social and economic status as men.
In some social strata, tradition limits women's roles. Peasant women,
often the breadwinners for their families, remain largely in the
traditional occupations of farming, marketing, and domestic labor. Very
poor urban women, who head their families and serve as their economic
support, also often find their employment opportunities limited to
traditional roles in domestic labor and marketing. Laws governing child
support recognize the widespread practice of multiple-father families
but are rarely enforced. Female employees in private industry or
service jobs, including government jobs, are seldom promoted to
supervisory positions. However, welleducated women have occupied
prominent positions in both the private and public sector in recent
years. Women's rights groups are small, localized, and receive little
publicity.
Children.--The Government's programs do not promote or defend
children's rights. Government health care and education programs for
children are inadequate. Malnutrition is a problem. The Government has
a school nutrition program administered through the Office of National
Development, with food provided by foreign donors. The Constitution and
the law provide that primary education be free and compulsory; however,
in practice access to public schools is the primary obstacle to most
rural families. Even in public schools there are nominal mandatory fees
associated with sending a child to school (uniform, books, etc.), and
these costs are beyond the means of many rural families. One study
reported that schools are dilapidated and understaffed. An estimated 90
percent of schools are private, and the costs of school fees, books,
materials, and uniforms are prohibitive for most families. According to
the Government, 40 percent of children never attend school, and less
than 15 percent of those who do graduate from secondary school. Poorer
families sometimes ration education money to pay school fees for male
children only. Several international and local NGOs work on children's
issues.
Rural families continued to send young children to more affluent
city dwellers to serve as unpaid domestic labor in a practice called
``restavek'' (which means ``lives with'' in Creole); families of these
children frequently received financial compensation (see Sections 6.a.,
6.d., and 6.f.). Most local human rights groups do not report on the
plight of restavek children as an abuse nor seek to improve their
situation. The Ministry of Social Affairs believes that it can do
little to stop this practice, regarding it as economically motivated;
the Ministry assigned five monitors to oversee the welfare of restavek
children. Society holds such children in little regard, and the poor
state of the economy worsened their situation.
Port-au-Prince's large population of street children includes many
restaveks who have been sent out of employers' homes or who are
runaways. There is some anecdotal information indicating that children
are involved in prostitution or being trafficked.
The Ministry of Social Affairs is aware of the problem, provides
some assistance to street children. In 1998-1999 (last available data),
they assisted 887 children. The Haitian Coalition for the Defense of
the Rights of the Child (COHADDE) promotes children's rights by
conducting awareness raising activities. According to COHADDE, children
work primarily in domesticity (restavek), but some are found working on
the street, and some are involved in prostitution.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that disabled
persons shall have the means to ensure their autonomy, education, and
independence. However, there is no legislation to implement these
constitutional provisions or to mandate provision of access to
buildings for the disabled. Although they do not face overt
mistreatment, given the severe poverty in which most citizens live,
those with disabilities face a particularly harsh existence. Disabled
beggars are a familiar sight on the streets of Port-au-Prince and other
towns.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some 99 percent of Haitians are
descendants, in whole or in part, of African slaves who won their war
of independence from France in 1804. The remaining population is of
European, Middle Eastern, North American, or Latin American origin. The
law makes no distinction based on race. Longstanding social and
political animosities often are tied to cultural identification, skin
color, and overlapping issues of class in this starkly inegalitarian
society. Some of these animosities date back to before the country's
revolutionary period.
Racial distinctions tend to parallel social and economic strata.
Mulattos, generally belong to the wealthiest classes of society. During
the year, various political figures, including the President, used
rhetoric indirectly targeting the mulatto segment of society. Mulattos
historically have been targets of sporadic attack in many cases because
they are perceived to be wealthy.
The Government recognizes two official languages: Creole, which is
spoken by virtually all Haitians; and French, which is spoken by about
20 percent of the population, including the economic elite. The
inability to communicate in French long has limited the political and
economic opportunities available to the majority of the population. The
Government prepares most documents only in French, and judges conduct
most legal proceedings exclusively in French. However, Creole is used
in parliamentary debate in the Lower House of Parliament.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide for the right of association. An article of the 1987
Constitution, which supersedes the labor code, gives legal recognition
to public sector employees. The law protects union activities and
prohibits a closed shop. The law also requires a union, which must have
a minimum of 10 members, to register with the Social Affairs Ministry
within 60 days of its formation in order to obtain legal recognition.
The labor code does not require prior approval before any association
is established. The Labor Code stipulates that ``no labor union can be
formed with less than 10 individuals.'' Article 232 gives unions 60
days after formation to register with the Office of Personnel
Management of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
Unions are independent of the Government and political parties.
Nine principal labor federations represent about 5 percent of the total
labor force of approximately 2,800,000 persons, including about 2 to 3
percent of labor in the industrial sector.
Teachers went on strike for several months in 1999 because they had
been promised a 32 percent pay increase, later renounced by the
Government. The Government denied that public school employees had a
right to strike, suspended some teachers, and garnished the salaries of
public school employees who participated in the strike. At year's end,
19 teachers remained suspended. In October seven teachers, members of
the CNEH, were reinstated. A total of 77 teachers were given financial
penalties that amounted to the number of days they were on strike
multiplied by 1/30 of their gross pay.
The labor code forbids strikes by public utility service workers.
Article 209 of the Labor Code defines public utility service employees
as essential workers who ``cannot suspend their activities without
causing serious harm to public health and security.'' Managers,
administrators, and other heads of establishments are not allowed to
join labor unions and strike.
In August the Government issued rules governing the public school
calendar for the 2000-01 academic year. The Ministry of National
Education moved the opening date back about 3 weeks and reduced the
number of holidays by 1 day, which added 1 month to the school year;
teachers unions were not notified prior to the change nor given
adequate opportunity to bargain prior to implementation. The unions
criticized this unilateral change as an unfair labor practice and a
violation of the contract they signed on June 28, 1999. In the wake of
these confrontations, communication between the unions and the
Government has been limited. Some unions hope to resurrect negotiations
through mediators, while others expanded their lawsuit filed in 1999.
While the school year started on schedule, less than 10 percent of
students attended classes during the week of September 4. Approximately
15 percent of students did not return at all.
On May 15, about 300 technicians of the Government-owned telephone
company (TELECO) went on a 1-day work stoppage to protest management's
slow response in addressing employees' concerns regarding reductions of
employee health insurance and pension benefits. TELECO management paid
its arrears to the insurance fund, and promised to resume its
contributions to the pension fund. However, it later dismissed four
technicians in apparent retaliation.
On August 7, armed temporary employees walked into the TELECO
headquarters and demanded the so-called 14th month salary, which is a
bonus normally paid to full-time employees to pay for school fees.
Temporary employees are normally not eligible. TELECO's offices in the
greater Port-au-Prince area remained closed for 2 days, and telephone
service was reduced. The police took control of the TELECO building and
its environs to restore order. The bonus was not paid. The protestors
resumed normal activity after some were fired, and others threatened.
Using this incident as a pretext, management suspended payment of the
traditional 1-month bonus to full-time employees paid 1 month before
the school opening date.
In August workers at several factories in the Shodecosa Industrial
Zone protested the minimum wage that they received. More than 40
workers were fired, and the protest gradually ended.
On September 11, public transport unions went on strike to protest
the Government's decision to raise fuel prices. They ended their strike
the following day. On October 3, public transport unions called for a
general strike to protest the Government's failure to open a dialog on
new fuel prices. The strike was not successful; drivers and owners of
public transportation vehicles did not participate.
On October 2, the union of the electric company workers conducted a
one-day sit-in inside the Ministry of justice compound. The Ministry
promised workers police protection from angry residents while they are
on the job. The workers were satisfied and returned to work.
Each of the principal labor federations maintained some fraternal
relations with various international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
protects trade union organizing activities and stipulates fines for
those who interfere with this right. No fines were issued during the
year. Unions generally were free to pursue their goals, although the
Government made little effort to enforce the law. Union leaders assert
that some employers in the private industrial sector dismiss
individuals who participate in union organizing activities. The
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions brought a complaint to
the International Labor Organization (ILO) in September 1999, alleging
that a utility company (Electricite d'Haiti) violated freedom of
association in 1996 when it dismissed 30 leaders and more than 400
members of the Federation of Electricity Workers of Haiti, closed trade
union offices by armed persons, and banned any meetings by trade union
members in the company. Additional allegations in this case include the
attempted murder of two trade union officials, and the arrests and
assaults of other trade union leaders. The ILO had not received a
response from the Government on these allegations by year's end, and
the case remained unresolved. According to the current union
(FESTRED'H) leaders, the 1996 union leaders and workers were dismissed
permanently. The Government orchestrated a reorganization of the union
and allowed it to function under new leadership. The workers are not
fighting actively for reinstatement. Some retired, some left the
country, and the rest attempted to find employment in other sectors.
Labor unions reported at least one killing, and several arrests
during the year. On September 4, Elison Merzilus, a member of the
Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers (CATH), was taken from his home
by a group of 10 armed men. He lived in the 7th Section of the Gros-
Morne Commune, in the Artibonite Department. His body was found 2 weeks
later, in a ravine located in the 8th Section of the Gros-Morne
Commune. Merzilus was instrumental in forming a women's organization
affiliated with CATH several days before his disappearance. Around the
same time, 10 other union members were informed that their names were
blacklisted and spent several months in hiding.
On December 19, the authorities arrested Wilson Duverson and Rigaud
St.-Juste in the commune of Anse-a-Foleur, Northwest Department. They
were subjected to severe beatings and other harsh treatment. The
authorities released Duverson on January 8 and released St. Juste on
January 18. Both are members of the Anse-a-Foleur Workers Organization
for Recovery (OTRA).
Several leaders of major Labor Confederation leaders were subjected
to persistent telephone threats and were given ultimatums to rally
behind the FL.
Organized labor activity was concentrated in the Port-au-Prince
area, in state enterprises, the civil service, and the assembly sector.
The high unemployment rate and antiunion sentiment among some factory
workers and most employers limited the success of union organizing
efforts. The ILO has criticized the law for its failure to include a
specific provision envisaging protection against antiunion
discrimination at the time of hiring.
Collective bargaining continued to be nonexistent, and employers
set wages unilaterally. The Labor Code does not distinguish between
industries producing for the local market and those producing for
export. Employees in the export-oriented assembly sector enjoyed
better-than-average wages and benefits. However, frequent verbal abuse
and intimidation of workers and organizers is a problem in the assembly
(maquiladora) sector. Female workers in the assembly sector report that
some employers sexually harass female workers with impunity. Women also
report that while the vast majority of assembly sector workers are
female, virtually all the supervisors are men.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor for adults and minors; however,
while such labor is not known to occur among adults, the Government
failed to enforce this law for children, who continued to be subjected
to forced domestic labor as restaveks in urban households under
conditions that amount to slavery (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum employment age in all sectors is 15 years,
with the exception of domestic service, where the minimum age is 12
years of age. The Labor Code prohibits minors from working under
dangerous conditions, and it prohibits minors under the age of 18 from
working at night in industrial enterprises. There is also a legal
provision for employment of children between the ages of 12 and 16 as
``apprentices.'' Fierce adult competition for jobs ensures that child
labor is not a factor in the industrial sector; however, children under
the age of 15 commonly worked at informal sector jobs to supplement
family income. Children also commonly worked on small family farms
alongside their parents, even though the high unemployment rate among
adults keeps children from being employed on commercial farms in
significant numbers. In these as in many other areas, government
agencies lack the resources to enforce the relevant laws and
regulations effectively. The Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory
labor, which applies equally to minors; however, some children are
forced to work as domestic servants (see Sections 5, 6.c. and 6.f.).
Rural families continued to send young children to more affluent
city dwellers to serve as unpaid domestic labor in a practice called
restavek; families of these children frequently received financial
compensation (see Sections 5 and 6.d.). A 1991 U.N. study cited this
practice as an example of slavery in the 20th century. UNICEF estimated
that 250,000 to 300,000 children, 85 percent of them girls, may be
victims of this practice. According to a 1998 UNICEF study, the average
restavek is between 11 and 14 years of age; however, more than 20
percent are between the ages 4 and 10, and more than 75 percent are
girls. About 23 percent of these girls are raped by a host family
member, and 15 percent of them become pregnant. About 77 percent of
restaveks have never been to school. Among those who have, only 2
percent reach secondary school. The Ministry of Social Affairs believes
that many employers compel the children to work long hours, provide
them with little nourishment, and frequently beat and abuse them. The
law requires that restaveks 15 years of age and older be paid ``not
less than one half the amount payable to hired servant'' to perform
similar work, in addition to room and board. To avoid this obligation,
employers send many if not most restaveks away from the home before the
children reach the age of 15.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum daily wage,
established in June 1995 by the Tripartite Commission of Salaried
Workers, whose six members are appointed by the President of the
Republic, (two representatives each of labor, employers, and
Government), is about $1.52 (36 gourdes). Annually, a minimum wage
worker would earn about $473, an income above the national average but
not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. Some workers are paid on a piece-rate basis, and may earn more
than the minimum wage. The majority of citizens work in subsistence
agriculture, a sector where minimum wage legislation does not apply.
Many women work as domestic employees, where minimum wage legislation
also does not apply.
The Labor Code governs individual employment contracts. It sets the
standard workday at 8 hours and the workweek at 48 hours, with 24 hours
of rest on Sunday. However, the officers of the HNP work 12-hour shifts
6 days per week, in apparent violation of the Labor Code. The code also
establishes minimum health and safety regulations. The industrial and
assembly sectors largely observed these guidelines. The assembly sector
published a voluntary code of conduct in April 1999, committing
signatories to a number of measures designed to raise industry
standards, including payment of the minimum wage and the prohibition of
child labor. Employers in the assembly sector generally pay the minimum
wage or higher amount. However, the real value of the gourde has
diminished, and workers are no longer satisfied with the minimum wage.
Working conditions are also generally better in this sector. There are
no reports of child labor in this sector. However, the Ministry of
Social Affairs does not enforce work hours or health and safety
regulations. There is no formal data, but unions allege that job-
related injuries are prevalent in the construction industry and public
works sectors. With more than 50 percent of the population unemployed,
workers were not able to exercise the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons, and internal trafficking of children is a problem. Rural
families send young children to affluent city dwellers to serve as
unpaid domestic labor; the families of such restaveks frequently
receive monetary compensation (see Sections 5 and 6.d.). An estimated
300,000 children, 75 percent of them girls, may be victims of this
practice.
There were no other reports of trafficking to, from, within, or
through the country. However, there are anecdotal reports on the
practice of families taking restaveks to Europe and the United States
to continue using them as domestic servants.
__________
HONDURAS
Honduras is a constitutional democracy, with a president and a
unicameral congress elected for 4-year terms. President Carlos Roberto
Flores Facusse of the Liberal party took office in January 1998. Since
the country's return to democracy in 1982, the two major political
parties, the Liberals and the Nationalists, both have held power after
free elections. The judiciary is generally independent, but often
ineffective and subject to outside influence.
The Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) include the army, the air force,
and the navy. The national Preventive Police (formerly a paramilitary
force known as the FUSEP) were placed under civilian control in 1997.
The police handle public security, counternarcotics, and border patrol
duties. The Government created a Ministry of Security in 1998 to
oversee police operations and counter a national crime wave. In
November the Government authorized the use of joint armed forces and
police patrols throughout the country to combat rising levels of crime.
The Government has used the military to patrol the streets seven times
in the last 6 years. In January 1999, the National Congress ratified a
constitutional amendment that established direct civilian control over
the armed forces--through a civilian Minister of Defense--for the first
time since 1957. The amendment also replaced the position of the armed
forces commander in chief with that of Chief of the Joint Staff. In
July 1999, the President replaced the Chief of the Joint Staff, the
Vice Chief of Staff, and other senior HOAF officers after they sought,
without prior authorization from the civilian leadership at the Defense
Ministry, to have the Congress amend a draft organic law to govern the
HOAF; that action further cemented civilian control of the military. A
number of versions of the draft law regulating responsibilities between
the Defense Ministry and the HOAF were debated during the year; at
year's end, Congress had not passed legislation. Members of the police
continued to commit human rights abuses.
The market-based economy is based primarily on agriculture and,
increasingly, on the important maquiladora (in-bond processing for
export) industry, which accounts for approximately 130,000 jobs, most
of which are filled by young women. The HOAF play an indirect,
diminishing role in the national economy through their pension fund,
which controls some enterprises usually associated with the private
sector, including a bank and several insurance companies. About 39
percent of workers labor in agriculture, with most of the rest in
industry and manufacturing, commerce, and services. The principal
export crops are coffee and bananas; these, along with ``value added''
income from the maquiladora industry, are the leading sources of
foreign exchange. Nontraditional products, such as melons, pineapples,
and shrimp, play a growing role in the economy. In 1998 Hurricane Mitch
caused widespread flooding and landslides and over $3 billion in
damage, and led to an economic recession during 1999. Most affected
export sectors have recovered, and the economy experienced positive
growth during the year. The Central Bank estimated growth for the year
at between 5.3 and 5.5 percent. Annual per capita income is
approximately $800; about two-thirds of the country's households live
in poverty.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems remained. Members of the security
forces committed some extrajudicial killings. Human rights groups
accused the security forces and the business community of colluding to
organize ``death squads'' to commit extrajudicial killings. Security
force personnel committed acts of torture, and beat and otherwise
abused detainees and other persons, including street children. Prison
conditions remain harsh, lengthy pretrial detention is common, and
detainees do not always receive due process. Considerable impunity for
members of the economic and official elite, exacerbated by a weak,
underfunded, and often corrupt judicial system, contributed to human
rights problems. Although the civilian courts increasingly considered
allegations of human rights violations or common crimes against armed
forces personnel, and some cases went to trial, there were relatively
few convictions. While no senior Government official, politician, or
bureaucrat, or member of the business elite, was convicted of crimes,
the Government removed more than 100 military officials, police
officers, police agents and investigators, and judges from office on
corruption and other charges. The judicial system continued to deny
swift and impartial justice to prisoners awaiting trial. On occasion
the authorities conducted illegal searches. Individual members of the
news media suffered various forms of harassment, including attempted
murder and physical assaults. Other human rights problems included
violence and societal discrimination against women, child prostitution,
abuse of street children, and discrimination against indigenous people.
The Government does not enforce effectively all labor laws. Some
workers are forced to work overtime. Child labor is a problem,
particularly in rural areas and in the informal economy, but not in the
exportprocessing sector.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government agents; however, the
security forces were suspected of an estimated 200 extrajudicial
killings, many involving persons under 18 years of age, during the
year. Human rights groups alleged that individual members of the
security forces worked with civilian (including vigilante) groups and
used unwarranted lethal force against supposed habitual criminals or
suspected gang members. Several groups pushed for investigations into
specific incidents, while others claimed to have provided public
prosecutors with evidence of collusion between police elements and
business leaders with regard to these murders. The Government publicly
denied accusations relating to the security forces as institutions but
investigated allegations against members of neighborhood vigilante
groups. During the year, the authorities sought or detained 11 police
officials for their involvement in the killings of various individuals.
In the spring, a suspected gang member who was arrested by police
died while in the hospital, after the police reportedly ``worked with
him'' at the crime scene to identify suspects who had fled. Another
suspect was executed after the police left him alone in the back of a
pickup truck while they chased his companions.
Prison guards shot and killed one escaping prisoner (see Section
1.c.).
In July the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Covenant House
reported that 302 homeless children and street youths were killed in
``social cleansing'' killings between January 1998 and May. The
majority of the killings occurred in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula.
Covenant House attributed 36 percent of the killings to the police and
members of the military; and private security officers committed other
killings. In August the Public Ministry and the General Directorate of
Criminal Investigation (DGIC) named a joint special commission to
investigate the extrajudicial killing of minors. In October the DGIC
reported that 312 minors were victims of extrajudicial killings between
1998 and 2000. In October Covenant House filed a complaint with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) stating that 360
street children were killed from 1998 through October 2000. In 1997
Covenant House brought charges before the Public Ministry against
unnamed members of the armed forces and the police for the alleged
torture of 63 juveniles or minors, 35 of whom reportedly were murdered,
since 1990. The Government took no action in this instance.
The case of a prison guard who shot and killed a minor who refused
to surrender after escaping from the central penitentiary in
Tegucigalpa in May 1999 went to trial during the year; however, no
further information was available.
Human rights organizations continued to allege that individual
members and former members of the security forces, acting in collusion
with business leaders, committed extrajudicial killings of street
criminals. They also charged neighborhood watch (``vigilante'') groups
with the responsibility for many extrajudicial executions. On various
occasions during the year, the Public (Justice) Ministry and the
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an autonomous government
entity, publicly admitted that individual government employees might be
taking part in such executions; however, the Government asserted that
the individuals were acting without official authorization.
There was no progress in the investigation of the March 1999 murder
of Juan Ramon Alvarado, the late mayor of Cabanas in Copan department.
Two suspects previously detained were released in 1999 due to lack of
evidence.
In September the Third Court of Appeals issued an arrest warrant
for Jaime Raudales, a former member of the now-disbanded Army
Intelligence Battalion 3-16, for the 1988 murders of social activists
Miguel Angel Pavon and Moises Landaverde.
Also in September, a government team exhumed the remains of four
persons from a cemetery in Olancho department; these were the first
official exhumations by the Government (see Section 1.b.).
There were several developments in the investigation of the 1982
murder of Nelson MacKay Echevarria. During the year, a court charged
Colonel Wilfredo Leva Cabrera with the killing. Leva Cabrera, who is in
prison on a drug trafficking conviction, requested protection under the
Amnesty Law; however, during the year the Supreme Court overruled a
lower court decision and rescinded amnesty protection for Leva Cabrera
in this case. At year's end, the murder charge was being initiated in a
criminal court. At year's end, former military official Alexander
Hernandez Santos was being tried for the murder of MacKay, as well as
other crimes related to human rights abuses.
In March Major Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa, who for 5 years had been
a fugitive from justice, surrendered voluntarily to the authorities,
who remanded Trejo Rosa to a prison hospital. In May the court indicted
him for the murder of MacKay; he also was indicted for the kidnaping
and torture of Miguel Francisco Carias, as well as the 1982 kidnaping
and torture of six university students (see Section 1.c.). In June the
court released Trejo Rosa from the prison hospital but ordered him
placed under house arrest due to his age and infirmity.
In February the First Court of Appeals acquitted Captain Billy Joya
Amendola of the 1982 murder of university student Hans Madisson. The
Public Ministry appealed this decision to the Supreme Court in March.
In October a court issued an arrest warrant for Joya Amendola in
connection with the 1982 kidnaping and torture of six university
students (see Section 1.c.).
There was no information available regarding the Public Ministry's
appeal of an October 1999 ruling by a lower court that found former
army chief of staff Oscar Hernandez Chavez not guilty of the 1982
murder of university student Hans Madisson.
In July the Third Court of Appeals acquitted retired General Daniel
Bali Castillo, retired Colonel Manuel Enrique Suarez Benavides, and
retired police Major Marco Antonio Matute Lagos of the 1982 deaths of
Adan Avilez Funez and Nicaraguan citizen Amado Espinoza Paz. The Public
Ministry filed appeals of these decisions with the Supreme Court, which
had yet to rule on the appeals at year's end. The Supreme Court is
required to confirm the ruling of the Third Court of Appeals for a full
acquittal; it had not done so by year's end. Other former military
officials, including Alexander Hernandez Santos (who was in prison and
being questioned about this incident at year's end), still face charges
in this case.
In September a court sentenced police officer Jose Raul Bonilla
Velasquez to 15 years' imprisonment for the murder of Jose Alejandro
Molina. The court acquitted police officer Jose Alfredo Leiva in the
same case.
In November a court sentenced Oscar Esmelin Rivera to 20 years in
prison for the October 1998 killing of Pedro Garcia Villanueva, the
director of Public Ministry attorneys in Santa Barbara department.
Garcia had been investigating alleged human rights violations and other
criminal activities in the region at the time of his death.
In February the Public Ministry named a special prosecutor to
continue its investigation of the 1998 murder of Carlos Antonio Luna
Lopez, a town councilman in Catacamas, Olancho department. A suspect in
the murder of Luna Lopez, Oscar Aurelio ``Machetillo'' Rodriguez
Molina, subsequently was brought before a court, which in March
conducted a ``reenactment'' of Luna Lopez's murder. Several other
suspects remained at large at year's end.
Homicides, armed robberies, and other violent assaults remained
commonplace. Violent crime continued to fuel the growth of private--
often unlicensed--guard services, and of volunteer groups that
patrolled their neighborhoods or municipalities to deter crime. In
February the Security Ministry authorized the creation of approximately
500 neighborhood watch groups, known as Citizen Security Councils
(CSC's), around the country to assist the police in combating rising
crime. Human rights groups during the year criticized the CSC's, which
they viewed as active participants in the increasing number of
extrajudicial killings. However, in June National Human Rights
Commissioner Leo Valladares stated publicly his belief that the CSC's
were not acting as vigilantes or ``death squads.'' The continued
proliferation of private security forces and CSC's nonetheless made it
more difficult to differentiate among homicides that may have been
perpetrated by government security personnel, private vigilantes, or
common criminals. In October the Government ordered all private
security firms to turn in assault rifles, even if acquired legally, in
an effort to decrease the availability of weapons to criminals.
Vigilante justice allegedly led to the killing of known and
suspected criminals, as well as of street children (see Section 5). The
Preventive Police claimed to have investigated 382 of 410 known
killings since 1997, concluding that all police personnel accused of
involvement in such incidents had been placed at the disposition of the
courts, except for 1 fugitive.
Several ``murders for hire'' occurred during the year, usually
related to land disputes or criminal activities. In February the police
arrested Johnny Orlando Funez Funez and Jose Antonio Galdamez for the
murder of social activist Jairo Amilcar Ayala Nunez in Lanza, Colon
department over a land expropriation case. Also in February, four
unidentified gunmen killed community leader Ruben Elvir in El Camalote,
Santa Barbara department. Also in February, unknown assailants killed
Marciano Martinez Ramirez and Victor Manuel Almendares, the president
and the treasurer, respectively, of a forestry cooperative in
Lepaterique.
In March four members of the Chorti indigenous group, Vicente
Arias, Enecon Arias, Antonio Garcia, and Balbino Hernandez died during
a gun battle in Copan. Ines Mejia and Wilfredo Bueso were arrested for
the murders; a third assailant died during the gun battle. Indigenous
activists claimed that the group was killed in a dispute over tribal
lands; however, the police asserted that the killers and their victims
were members of rival criminal gangs involved in the contraband trade
(see Section 5).
In April two gunmen killed Concepcion ``Chonillo'' Alvarez and
three members of his family in Choluteca over a local land dispute; no
one has been arrested in this case. Also in April, the authorities
arrested Julio Cesar Espinoza Mejia for the murder of Copan mayor Hugo
Alvarado over another land dispute.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
Various witnesses, survivors, and former HOAF personnel have
charged that members of the now-disbanded army Intelligence Battalion
3-16 kidnaped, tortured, and killed many of the 184 persons who
disappeared during the 1980's. The Public Ministry and the National
Human Rights Commission kept open their investigations of those
disappearances.
In February the Public Ministry filed an appeal of a December 1999
decision by a lower court that freed former police intelligence
director Carlos Roberto Velasquez Ilovares in the 1988 disappearance of
leftist activist Roger Samuel Gonzalez Zelaya. The appeals court had
not ruled on this petition at year's end.
On June 26, the Supreme Court ruled that illegal detention and
execution committed by military officials were not covered by the 1987
Amnesty law (see Section 1.e.). This ruling allows for the criminal
prosecution of the military officers accused of the 1982 kidnaping and
torture of six leftist university students (see Section 1.c.).
In September a government team of forensic experts from the Public
Ministry and local officials exhumed the remains of four persons from a
cemetery at Dulce Nombre de Culmi in Olancho department. The four
persons were believed to have been guerrillas who died during a
firefight with HOAF personnel in 1983. Government forensic experts
planned to conduct DNA testing on the remains of the four persons in an
effort to verify their suspected identities; those efforts continued at
year's end. Human rights activists noted that these were the first
official exhumations by the Government.
Following charges brought by human rights groups to the IACHR
beginning in 1986, in November the Government made compensatory
payments totaling approximately $1,580,000 (23,800,000 lempiras) to the
families of 17 persons who disappeared between 1981 and 1989. The human
rights groups then dropped their charges before the IACHR. The
suspected perpetrators of those disappearances remain subject to
criminal prosecution in the future, but these payments freed the
Government of further civil liability in these 17 specific cases. Some
human rights activists publicly criticized as inappropriate the
presence among the group of 17 families receiving payments of the NGO
Committee of Families of the Detained-Disappeared of Honduras (COFADEH)
general coordinator Bertha Oliva de Nativi, and of Andres Pavon,
president of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras
(CODEH), since the relatives of the other 167 persons who disappeared
during this time period have not received justice nor any financial
recompense.
The courts adjudicated several pending cases involving
disappearances (see Section 1.a.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were
isolated instances in which officials employed such practices. In
addition, police beatings and other alleged abuses of detainees
remained a problem. The police also engaged in violence, which included
beatings, against street children (see Section 5). During the year, a
court in San Pedro Sula ordered the imprisonment of four police
officers accused of wounding a woman in a vehicle that they allegedly
attempted to stop in late December 1999. On March 30, the authorities
detained the officers.
In February Special Prosecutor for Human Rights Wilfredo Flores
charged publicly that police officers routinely protected torturers and
other human rights abusers in their ranks. In March DGIC Director
Wilfredo Alvarado denied that DGIC agents tortured or abused prisoners.
In May Preventive Police Director Alvaro Flores Ponce made a similar
declaration regarding the Preventive Police. In October the Preventive
Police were singled out in Amnesty International's annual report for
their use of ``torture and excessive force.''
During the year, the Ministry of Security revised the procedures
for internal review of police abuse and misconduct, partly as a result
of public pressure from human rights groups and the Public Ministry,
which in the past had reported that the Preventive Police's reviewing
office was unresponsive to their requests for impartial investigations
of police officers accused of abuse. The police force, which includes
the Preventive Police and the DGIC, is subject to investigation by the
Internal Affairs office regarding public complaints of police behavior;
the Internal Affairs office reports to the Minister of Security. The
Preventive Police and the DGIC each have an Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR), which conduct internal reviews of police
misconduct such as offduty criminal conduct and ethics violations. An
OPR ruling is reported to the Minister of Security, who can take
disciplinary action or direct a supervisor to decide upon disciplinary
action for minor infractions. Some human rights groups indicate that
the new system has increased impartial judgments of police behavior.
Both the DGIC and the Preventive Police suspended or dismissed
numerous agents and officers for corruption and abuse of authority
during the year. The Public Ministry reported that it received 697
complaints of police abuse through August, compared with 421 complaints
during 1999. The authorities dismissed more than 100 police officers
and DGIC agents during the year, compared with nearly 400 officer and
agents in 1999. The authorities accused 16 police and DGIC agents of
torture and other abuses, and charged 4 persons with corruption and
abuse of authority during the year. For example, in October the DGIC
fired chief administrative officer Armando Espinal for alleged
corruption, and a lower court issued an arrest warrant for former FUSEP
Director Julio Cesar Chavez Aguilar for profiting from noncompetitive
FUSEP purchases during his tenure as director.
In February the HOAF announced that three army officers would be
tried in courts-martial for having beaten and threatened eight recruits
in January in an effort to recover a missing weapon. The Defense
Minister, the HOAF chief of the joint staff, and other senior officers
met with the president of CODEH, the country's leading human rights
NGO, to review this incident, which also led the HOAF to create a
Directorate of Humanitarian Law to investigate future human rights
abuses within the HOAF. Also in February, the Defense Ministry
appointed a civilian as its chief financial officer in an effort to
counter a history of corruption among former HOAF paymasters and
announced that it would cooperate with investigations by private human
rights groups of alleged abuses of authority by HOAF personnel. In
March the HOAF inaugurated mandatory human rights training for its
majors and captains. In September the Defense Ministry signed an
agreement with the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights to provide
human rights training for the HOAF.
In May Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa was indicted in the 1982
kidnaping and torture of six leftist university students, as well as
for the kidnaping of Miguel Francisco Carias and the murder of Nelson
MacKay Echevarria (see Section 1.a.). Trejo Rosa surrendered to the
authorities in March; he remained under house arrest at year's end.
On June 26, the Supreme Court ruled that illegal detention and
execution committed by military officials were not covered by the 1987
Amnesty Law (see Section 1.e.). This ruling allows for the criminal
prosecution of the military officers accused of the 1982 kidnaping and
torture of the university students. Seventeen current and former
military and police officials continued to face simultaneous criminal
and civil charges in various courts. As a result of the Supreme Court's
decision, amnesty laws are no longer applicable for: Alexander
Hernandez, Juan Blas Salazar Meza, Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa, Juan
Evangelista Lopez Grijalba, Captain Billy Hernando Joya Amendola,
retired General Amilcar Zelaya Rodriguez, Juan Ramon Pena Paz, Roberto
Arnaldo Erazo Paz, Jorge Antonio Padilla Torres, and Julio Cesar Funez
Alvarez (the current deputy director of the Preventive Police).
In September the First Court of Appeals once again issued arrest
warrants for Raymundo Alexander Hernandez Santos and for Julio Cesar
Funez Alvarez. In September the Supreme Court ruled against a petition
by the Public Ministry for the preventive detention of Joya Amendola
for the 1982 kidnaping and attempted murder of the six university
students. In October the First Court of Appeals issued additional
arrest warrants in this case for Billy Joya Amendola, Amilcar Zelaya
Rodriguez, and Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa. At year's end, Hernandez
Santos, who turned himself in voluntarily, was detained for questioning
regarding his involvement in the case.
In 1998 the Supreme Court had ruled that the country's amnesty laws
protected Juan Blas Salazar Meza from prosecution for the 1982
kidnapings. The June Supreme Court decision overturned that decision.
Salazar Meza is serving a 5-year prison sentence for narcotics
trafficking. In September the First Court of Appeals reinstated an
arrest warrant for Salazar Meza, sought by the Public Ministry in
connection with the 1982 cases as a first step to bringing him to
trial.
In September a judge issued a warrant for the arrest of retired
General Amilcar Zelaya Rodriguez, the owner of the property in the
Amarateca Valley of Francisco Morazan department where the 1982
incidents occurred. An appellate court upheld the arrest warrant for
Zelaya in October.
In August a separate court ruling absolved Captain Billy Joya
Amendola of all charges in the 1982 torture of newsman Oscar Reyes Baca
and his wife, Gloria de Reyes (see Section 2.a.).
The police forces are underfunded and understaffed, and corruption
is a problem. Widespread frustration at the inability of the security
forces to prevent and control crime, and the well-founded perception
that corrupt security personnel were complicit in the high crime rate,
led to continued support among a segment of the general public for
vigilante justice (see Section 1.a.).
In August Security Minister Gautama Fonseca dismissed Preventive
Police Deputy Director Wilfredo Urtecho Jeamborde and DGIC Deputy
Director Saul Bueso Mazariegos from their posts. Human rights and civic
groups noted the dismissals, since both Urtecho Jeamborde and Bueso
Mazariegos have been suspected in the past of profiting from a variety
of illegal enterprises. The Public Ministry reportedly was
investigating both individuals at year's end for possible prosecution.
Prison conditions remained harsh. Prisoners suffered from severe
overcrowding, malnutrition, and a lack of adequate sanitation, and
allegedly were subjected to various other abuses, including rape. The
27 penal centers held over 11,500 prisoners, more than twice their
maximum capacity; more than 90 percent of all prisoners were awaiting
trial for an average of 22 months, with some waiting over 5 years (see
Section 1.d.). Prison facilities are overcrowded, and pretrial
detainees generally are not separated from convicted prisoners. Prison
security was poor. Contrary to the previous year, the Government did
not send the army in to any prisons to maintain order during the year.
Retired military officers do work as guards in some areas, and some
Preventive Police are used as guards. Prison disturbances, caused
primarily by harsh conditions, occurred throughout the year, although
at a lesser rate than in 1999, due to increased manpower and training
of prison personnel. On March 27, a fight at the San Pedro Sula prison
left one prisoner dead and five prisoners and guards wounded. Following
the fight, the authorities transferred 181 prisoners to HOAF
facilities. Prison escapes, through bribery or otherwise, remained a
frequent occurrence. Prison guards shot and killed one escaping
prisoner during the year; there were no other serious injuries to
escaping prisoners.
More often than not, for lack of alternative facilities, wardens
housed the mentally ill and those with tuberculosis and other
infectious diseases among the general prison population. Prisoners with
money routinely bought private cells, decent food, and permission for
conjugal visits, while prisoners without money often lacked basic
necessities, as well as legal assistance. The prison system budgets
about $0.40 (6 lempiras) per day for food and medicine for each
prisoner. Prisoners were allowed visits and in many cases relied on
outside help to survive, as the prison system could not provide
adequate or sufficient food.
In June 1999, the Public Ministry signed an agreement with the
Center for the Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation of Victims of
Torture and their Relatives to establish programs to protect the human
rights of prisoners; to train police and prison personnel to avoid
committing acts of torture; and to arrange for periodic inspections of
prisons. These programs continued during the year. In February a
Tegucigalpa court ordered the central prison in the capital to suspend
disciplining prisoners because of widespread reports of abuse, and
instructed prison authorities to develop a plan to stop the alleged
abuses. In September the Security Ministry and CODEH agreed to
collaborate on a national plan to provide human rights training to
prison guards and to rehabilitate the prison population through formal
education and vocational training.
In July the Government announced that it would build a model prison
farm in the Sula Valley at a cost of $15 million (225 million
lempiras). The 1,500-bed penitentiary, scheduled to open in 2002, would
be one of several to be built to relieve overcrowding and promote
rehabilitation within the country's antiquated penal system.
Women generally were incarcerated in separate facilities under
conditions similar to those of male prisoners; however, female
prisoners do not have conjugal visit privileges.
The Government operates juvenile detention centers in Tamara, El
Carmen, and El Hatillo; all are located in or near Tegucigalpa or San
Pedro Sula. This lack of juvenile detention facilities contributed to
the detention of minors in adult prisons and to vigilante violence
against, and police abuse of, street children (see Sections 1.a. and
5). In February Covenant House alleged that 800 juvenile criminals have
been housed in adult prisons since 1995. Street children in detention
sometimes were housed in adult prisons, where they were abused
routinely. However, in May Covenant House made public its judgment that
the Government no longer routinely houses juvenile offenders in adult
prisons. In October the IACHR ordered the Government to make
compensatory payments to 300 juvenile offenders who served time in
adult prisons from 1995 to 1999. In April the Government announced
plans to permit juvenile criminals to pursue an education while in
prison.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for
protection against arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
authorities occasionally fail to observe these legal requirements. The
law states that the police may arrest a person only with a court order,
unless the arrest is made during the commission of a crime, and that
they must clearly inform the person of the grounds for the arrest. By
law the Preventive Police cannot investigate crimes; that force only
detains suspects. The police must bring a detainee before a judge
within 24 hours; the judge then must issue an initial, temporary
holding order within 24 hours, make an initial decision within 6 days,
and conduct a preliminary investigation to decide whether there is
sufficient evidence to warrant further investigation.
While bail is legally available, it is granted primarily for
ostensibly medical reasons; however, procedures in such cases are
confused and unclear. Poor defendants, even when represented by a
public defender, seldom are able to take advantage of bail (see Section
1.e.). Lengthy pretrial detention is a serious problem; in March an
independent study estimated that 92 percent of prisoners were awaiting
trial, some for over 5 years. The average length of detention was
approximately 22 months, and over 90 percent of all prisoners had been
neither tried nor sentenced (see Section 1.c.).
The 1996 Unsentenced Prisoner Law mandates the release from prison
of any detainee whose case has not come to trial and whose time under
detention exceeds the maximum prison sentence for the crime of which he
is accused. This law also authorizes the parole until trial of persons
over the age of 60 accused of nonfelony crimes, women who are pregnant
or lactating, and the mortally ill. In April the Government estimated
that as many as 3,017 prisoners qualified for release under the
Unsentenced Prisoner Law, that 3 officers were required to monitor each
person, and that the annual cost of enforcing this law was
approximately $6.7 million (100 million lempiras).
However, despite this law, many prisoners remain in jail after
being acquitted or completing their sentences, due to the failure of
responsible officials to process their releases. A significant number
of defendants served the maximum possible sentence for the crime of
which they were accused before their trials were concluded, or even
begun. For example, a man arrested in August 1997 was released without
a trial in October 1999, while his two alleged accomplices, who also
were arrested in August 1997, were released without trials in October
2000. In September the authorities released a man who had been
exonerated of all charges 6 days after his arrest in July 1998. Also in
September, the authorities released another man who had been detained
without a trial since April 1996. In October the authorities released
one prisoner who was arrested in June 1991, and then ordered freed in
March 1995.
Neither the Constitution nor the Legal Code explicitly prohibits
exile, but it is not used as a means of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is poorly staffed and
equipped, often ineffective, and subject to outside influence. While
the Government respects constitutional provisions in principle,
implementation has been weak and uneven in practice. A number of
factors limit the effectiveness of the system. Both the judiciary and
the Public Ministry suffer from inadequate funding; low wages and lack
of internal controls make law enforcement officials susceptible to
bribery; the civil law inquisitorial system is both inefficient and
opaque; and powerful special interests still exercise influence and
often prevail in the courts. Approximately 35 percent of the complaints
received by the National Human Rights Commission concern the judicial
system. Many leading politicians enjoy constitutional immunity.
The court system is composed of a 9-member Supreme Court, 10
appeals courts, 67 courts of first instance with general jurisdiction,
and 325 justice of the peace courts with limited jurisdiction. Congress
elects the nine Supreme Court justices and names the president of the
court; the Supreme Court, in turn, names all lower court judges. The 4-
year term for justices of the Supreme Court coincides with those of the
Congress and the President.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial; however,
the written, inquisitorial trial system is labor-intensive, slow,
opaque, and does not protect the rights of defendants adequately. In
December 1999, the Congress passed a law to modernize the Criminal
Procedures Code; this new law, which is scheduled to take full effect
in February 2002, substitutes an adversarial system for the
inquisitorial system and mandates a speedier disposition of cases. The
new law is designed to change the code into one based upon the
presumption of innocence, the right to a public trial, and respect for
the dignity and liberty of the accused. It also expressly prohibits
incarceration without first receiving a clear sentence from a judge or
tribunal.
Judges legally are in charge of investigations, as well as of
trials and sentencing. Under the 1984 Code of Criminal Procedures,
judges, the police, public officials, and individual citizens can
initiate criminal proceedings. As many as 80 percent of the cases
reported to the police are never referred to the criminal justice
system, but instead are settled administratively by the police or by
municipal courts. A judge may jail an accused person for 6 days before
a determination is made of probable cause to accept charges. If a judge
sustains the criminal accusation, the accused remains in jail, or may
be released on bail while awaiting trial (see Section 1.d.).
An accused person has the right to an initial hearing by a judge,
to bail, to an attorney provided by the State, if necessary, and to
appeal. Although the Constitution recognizes the presumption of
innocence, the criminal code in practice often is administered by
poorly trained judges operating on a presumption that the accused is
guilty; consequently, the rights of defendants often are not observed.
All stages of the trial process are conducted in writing and, at the
judge's discretion, may be declared secret and, thus, even less
``public'' than normal.
Defendants and their attorneys are not always genuine participants
in the process, despite rights accorded under law. Defendants may
confront witnesses against them and present evidence on their own
behalf, but only through the judge. By law defendants and their
attorneys are entitled to review governmentheld evidence relevant to
their cases, but this right is not always respected in practice.
A public defender program provides assistance to those unable to
afford an adequate defense. There are 137 public defenders providing
free legal services nationally to 37 percent of the prison population;
however, public defenders are hard pressed to meet the heavy demands of
an unautomated, inadequately funded, and labor-intensive criminal
justice system. The Supreme Court issued an instruction in 1998 that
holds judges personally accountable for reducing the number of
backlogged cases, and separates judges into pretrial investigative
judges and trial and sentencing judges. The Court also created a
program to monitor and enforce compliance with these measures. The
Court's instruction was intended to ensure more effective protection
for the rights of the accused to a timely and effective defense, but it
has had little effect.
Modest progress was made in previous years towards implementing a
judicial career system to enhance the qualifications of sitting judges;
depoliticize the appointment process; and break the subcultures of
corruption, clientism, patronage, and influencepeddling within the
judiciary. Nonetheless, many courts remain staffed by politically
selected judges and by unqualified clerks who are inefficient and
subject to influence from special interests. The reforms have not been
implemented fully.
On April 7, the National Human Rights Commissioner released a
report that alleged political interference and corruption within the
judiciary. The Supreme Court filed a lawsuit against Valladares, and
charged him with engaging in ``corruption, extortion, and blackmail;''
however, the Supreme Court later dropped its charges (see Section 4).
On May 2, President Flores issued a decree that created a special
commission to draft recommendations for improving the judicial system.
On September 19, the commission presented recommendations to the
President. The Government incorporated many of these recommendations
into a constitutional amendment that was presented to Congress on
October 3. Congress passed the amendment on December 20; it must
approve it a second time in the 2001 session.
On November 7, the Supreme Court announced that it is investigating
500 civil, criminal, administrative, and labor judges in an
anticorruption effort. According to press reports, at least 100 judges
have been charged with corruption or fired for judicial indiscretions
in the past 3 years.
Elements of the armed forces withheld their cooperation from
official efforts to track down military officers wanted in connection
with alleged human rights abuses dating back to the 1980's. The Supreme
Court considered throughout the past decade whether legal amnesties
adopted in 1987, 1990, and 1991 for crimes committed during the 1980's
covered the military, as political deliberations in the Congress had
suggested. In 1998 the Court determined that while the amnesty laws
were constitutional, amnesty appeals would have to be decided on their
individual merits. On June 26, the Court ruled that laws providing
amnesty protection to present and former military officials were
inapplicable to common crimes, such as illegal detention and homicide,
which some officials were alleged to have committed. At the request of
the Public Ministry, on August 1, the Court clarified that its June
ruling applied only to the specific case (the 1982 kidnaping and
torture of six university students) under consideration (see Section
1.c.), and that the amnesty laws would continue to apply to all
military defendants until the prosecutor in a specific case established
the grounds for the exclusion of amnesty for the accused in that case.
Thus, military officials still may benefit from the amnesty laws, but
the Public Ministry now has the right to challenge the applicability of
those laws to specific investigations of past human rights abuses.
Many leading politicians enjoy constitutional immunity from
prosecution because of their membership in either the National Congress
or the Central American Parliament. That immunity extends to acts
committed before taking office. Only the National Congress can deprive
a protected person of his immunity: such a person lacks the legal
capacity voluntarily to surrender his immunity. In April the Congress
passed a General Law of Immunities that reduced the number of
government positions with immunity from an estimated 1,250 to less than
200 positions. The new law continues to require a vote of Congress to
deprive an individual protected under the law of his immunity, but it
permits certain civil suits to be brought against such an individual
without regard to his position in the Government. In March Attorney
General Roy Medina declared that military amnesties and the political
immunity of political leaders combined to make impossible the
prosecution of such individuals for alleged past and present crimes.
Over the past 6 years, the Public Ministry has taken steps to
investigate and charge not only military officers for human rights
violations, but also ranking officials of the two previous governments,
for abuses of power, fraud, and diversion of public funds and
resources. However, at year's end, very few of those accused had been
tried or convicted.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution specifies that a person's home is
inviolable, that persons in the employ of the State may enter only with
the owner's consent or with the prior authorization of a competent
legal authority, and that entry may take place only between 6 a.m. and
6 p.m., or at any time in the event of an emergency or to prevent the
commission of a crime. However, as in previous years, there were
credible charges that police personnel failed at times to obtain the
needed authorization before entering a private home. Coordination among
the police, the courts, and the Public Ministry remained weak. The
Government respects the privacy of correspondence.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities largely
respected these rights in practice. However, journalists admitted to
self-censorship when their reporting threatened the political or
economic interests of media owners. A small number of powerful business
magnates whose business interests, political loyalties, and family ties
often intersect own many news media. Systemic national problems, such
as corruption and conflicts of interest, also have limited the
development of the news media. For example, three of the four national
newspapers are run by presidential candidates or their close family
members. Reporting of events, particularly those related to elections,
is subject to editorializing.
The Government has various means to influence news reporting of its
activities, such as the granting or denial of access to government
officials, which is crucial for news reporters, editors, and media
owners alike. Other methods are more subtle, such as the coveted right
to accompany the President on his official travels. Journalists who
accompany the President on such occasions do so at the expense of the
Government, which grants or withholds invitations for such travel at
will.
The comparatively little investigative journalism that took place
focused on uncontroversial issues, such as illegal immigration. When
the news media attempted to report in depth on national politicians or
official corruption, they continued to run into obstacles, such as
external pressures to desist from their investigations, artificially
tight reporting deadlines, and a lack of access to Government
information and independent sources.
The news media also continued to suffer from internal corruption,
politicization, and outside influences. Payments to journalists to
investigate or suppress certain stories continued, although no
individual journalist was accused publicly of engaging in the practice.
News directors and editors acknowledged their inability to halt the
practice, given their own workloads and the difficulty of discovering
why a given reporter opted to emphasize one aspect of a story over
another, or why a particular name was omitted from a list of suspects
to be made public.
The executive branch continued to make frequent use of the ``Cadena
Nacional,'' a complete preemption of all television and radio
broadcasting, including international channels seen only on cable
television. Originally designed to transmit critical information during
an emergency or crisis, such as Hurricane Mitch, the Cadena Nacional is
used primarily to promote the supposed accomplishments of the
Government, from the inauguration of infrastructure projects to the
transmission of President Flores's audience with the Pope. The
Government also has considerable influence on the print media through
its ability to grant or withhold official advertisements funded with
public monies.
The leading newspaper in the capital of Tegucigalpa, La Tribuna,
was founded by the late father of President Flores. La Tribuna is still
run by his family, and it competes directly with rival publications for
scarce revenues from advertising, much of which comes from the
Government itself.
In March El Nuevo Dia, the smallest of the five daily newspapers,
ceased publication due to rising production costs and a protracted
labor dispute with its production staff.
One potentially abusive practice continued to be the granting of
awards to individual reporters on ``Journalists' Day.'' In May all
three branches of the Government and several private organizations,
including chambers of commerce, bestowed numerous awards, some
accompanied by substantial sums of cash, on the ``best'' journalists.
Rather than being tied to a specific accomplishment--a particular
article or series, or even a lifetime's body of work--most awards were
granted without any published criteria to beat reporters assigned to
the granting institution. Some of these awards appeared to be deserved;
however, many observers viewed the awards as little more than
acknowledgments by the granting institutions of perceived services
rendered. One newspaper editor who regularly rotates news assignments
precisely to avoid any conflict of interest acknowledged that employees
objected to the rotations because the practice effectively eliminated
them from award consideration each year.
Individual members of the news media suffered various forms of
harassment. In February Vica television reporter Allan Montenegro lost
an eye during an altercation with police following an automobile
accident. Montenegro, who is suing the Security Ministry over the
incident, said that a police officer struck him in the face with the
butt of a rifle after Montenegro identified himself as a reporter. In
May Canal El Progreso television reporter Hernan Cubas Padilla filed a
complaint with the National Human Rights Commission alleging that
Deputy Johny Handal had threatened at various times to close Canal El
Progreso and kill Cubas Padilla due to his reporting of alleged corrupt
activities in Yoro department by Handal, deputies Jamil Hawit and Rene
Ramon Robleda, and El Progreso town councilwoman Nelly Soliman. Also in
May, deputy and former president of Congress Rodolfo Irias Navas struck
La Prensa newspaper reporter Ramon Alberto Tejedo while Tejedo
conducted a press interview with a third party.
In April Radio Progreso news director Julio Cesar Pineda Alvarado
survived a drive-by shooting but was injured when a bullet struck his
head; Pineda Alvarado subsequently reported having received death
threats and being followed prior to the attack.
In April El Heraldo newspaper reporter Leonarda Andino filed a
complaint with the National Human Rights Commission because she
received a summons for publishing excerpts from a report on the
judiciary by the National Human Rights Commissioner (see Section 1.e.).
In July a court in San Pedro Sula ordered El Heraldo reporter Sogelia
Alvarado to testify in a defamation suit filed by Supreme Court
President Oscar Armando Avila Banegas against mayoral candidate Oscar
Kilgore. In September a court acquitted La Prensa reporter Arnulfo
Aguilar of credit card fraud, abetting the escape of a prisoner, and
contempt of court; Aguilar had maintained during his trial that unnamed
persons whom he was investigating for alleged corruption had generated
false charges against him. In October Deputy Francisco Herrera
Dominelli filed a lawsuit on behalf of his wife against La Prensa
reporter Serapio Umanzor Diaz, whom Herrera Dominelli accused of
defaming his wife in the course of reporting on her business
activities; Umanzor Diaz avoided a prison sentence by paying a fine of
$192 (2,880 lempiras).
According to the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), during
the year television journalist Rosanna Guevara lost her position as a
manager in Vica Television's news department, allegedly because she
criticized President Flores. In March she reported receiving death
threats over her station's political coverage.
Such attempts by government officials and unidentified assailants
to intimidate journalists increasingly led both local and foreign
observers to call into question the ability of the news media to report
freely on sensitive topics. In May the annual report of the IAPA noted
that 13 reporters had been subjected to various forms of harassment
during the past decade. In October the NGO Freedom House expressed
concern regarding local treatment of the news media. At its annual
conference in October, the IAPA adopted a resolution that called
attention to several of the harassment cases and called upon the
Government to respect the freedom of the press.
In August a court absolved former army captain Billy Joya Amendola
of all charges in the 1982 torture of newsman Oscar Reyes Baca and his
wife, Gloria de Reyes (see Section 1.c.).
The Government respects academic freedom, and has not attempted to
curtail political expression on university campuses.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respects it in practice.
In August the Public Ministry fired Special Prosecutor for Ethnic
Rights Gilberto Antonio Sanchez Chandias (see Sections 4 and 5). Dozens
of persons conducted a hunger strike in support of Sanchez for 9 days
during August and September, and some 1,200 protesters seized the Mayan
ruins at Copan, the country's leading tourist attraction, in September.
On September 7, the police forcibly restored order to the site after 3
days of protests, causing 15 injuries (including 5 police) in the
process.
Also in September, some 300 indigenous persons sought to march from
Copan to Tegucigalpa in support of Sanchez; however, the Security
Ministry arrested all of the marchers in order to prevent them from
entering Tegucigalpa. The Supreme Court subsequently issued a writ of
habeas corpus to compel the Security Ministry to release the marchers.
The protests and the hunger strike ended in mid-September when the
Public Ministry agreed to reinstate Sanchez on the condition that he
immediately would resign his post, receiving the various severance
payments provided for by the Labor Code. In November lawyers for the
demonstrators filed a lawsuit against Security Minister Gautama
Fonseca, which accused him of abusing his authority and violating their
civil rights when he ordered their detention in September. If the
courts accept the protesters' lawsuit, the Minister in theory could
face criminal charges as well; the courts had not made a decision at
year's end.
On December 5-6, protesters clashed with police during a
demonstration in support of opposition presidential candidate Ricardo
Maduro (see Section 3). Protesters attacked police with sticks and
rocks; at least 12 persons were injured, including 3 journalists.
Police used tear gas to break up the demonstration and arrested 20
persons.
In March the Public Ministry announced that it had declined to
prosecute several dozen alleged instigators of a riot in front of the
presidential offices in October 1999. The Ministry also announced that
it was considering pressing charges against senior police officials who
directed the police response against the alleged rioters, 44 of whom
sustained a variety of injuries at the time. In October the Government
made compensatory payments averaging $1,500 (22,500 lempiras) each to
the 44 persons injured during the 1999 protest, including a payment to
the family of 1 individual who died of natural causes in May, and to
the indigenous organization that organized the 1999 demonstration (see
Section 5). The total amount of payment each victim received depended
upon the type of injury suffered.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects it in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for all forms of
religious expression, and the Government generally respects this right
in practice.
In September the Congress adopted a controversial measure requiring
that, beginning in 2001, all school classes begin with 10 minutes of
readings from the Bible. Parents who do not want their children to
listen to the readings may notify school authorities in writing. The
Education Ministry, in consultation with Christian churches, is to
establish procedures to select readings, plan their implementation, and
promote their distribution. However, the law does not stipulate which
segments of the Bible would be used. After the vote, many legislators
also questioned whether the wording of the legislation in fact made
such readings mandatory. Evangelical Christians supported the law;
however, lay constitutional scholars, the Roman Catholic Church, and
other religious leaders opposed the measure as a violation of the
constitutional separation of church and state. A legal challenge to the
constitutionality of this law appeared likely at year's end.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enter and exit the country
without arbitrary impediment, and the Government does not restrict
travel within the country's borders.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, the International Office of Migrations (IOM), and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government
provides first asylum and grants asylum or refugee status in accordance
with the terms of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution. On several occasions during the year,
small boats piloted by persons fleeing Cuba were discovered in Honduran
waters or washed ashore. In each instance, the Government provided
temporary refuge to those Cubans and collaborated with the IOM and
local human rights groups to interview each person to determine whether
the individual had a well-founded fear of persecution. In every
instance, the Government assisted those persons who expressed a desire
to return to Cuba to do so, facilitated voluntary transit by others to
third countries, or granted temporary residence and work permits to
those who wished to remain in the country.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens last exercised the right to change their government
through democratic and peaceful elections in November 1997.
International observers found the elections to be free and fair.
Citizens choose a president, three vice presidents, and members of
the National Congress by free, secret, direct, and obligatory balloting
every 4 years. In 1997 voters for the first time were able to cast
separate ballots for the president, deputies in the National Congress,
and municipal leaders, making individual elected officials more
representative and accountable. Voting was made easier for citizens by
a change that allowed them to vote closer to their homes.
Suffrage is universal; however, neither the clergy nor members of
the military or civilian security forces are permitted to vote. Any
citizen born in Honduras or abroad of Honduran parentage may hold
office, except for members of the clergy, the armed forces, and the
police. A new political party may gain legal status by obtaining 20,000
signatures and establishing party organizations in at least half of the
country's 18 departments.
In June the Congress amended the Law on Elections and on Political
Organizations to permit citizens residing abroad to vote in future
presidential elections. The opposition National Party charged that the
ruling Liberal Party had brought the bill to a vote without prior
notice and when few Nationalists were present, and asserted that the
amendment was illegal because it failed to include Congressional
elections or to provide a role in overseas elections for the National
Electoral Tribunal (TNE), as required by the existing law. When the
Nationalists threatened to challenge the constitutionality of the
amendment, the Liberals agreed to negotiate with the Nationalists over
how overseas voting would be conducted; the status of this legislation
and its implementation continued to be debated at year's end.
The next national elections are scheduled for November 2001;
presidential primaries for the Liberal and National parties took place
in December. President of Congress Rafael Pineda Ponce won the Liberal
primary; Luis Cosenza, a stand-in for the original candidate Ricardo
Maduro, won the National Party's primary. A major political conflict
began in October after the ruling Liberals petitioned the National
Electoral Tribunal (TNE) not to allow National Party presidential
contender Maduro to compete in his party's primary because the Liberals
questioned whether he was ``Honduran by birth,'' a legal requirement
for assuming the presidency. (Maduro was born in Panama of a Panamanian
father and a Guatemalan mother, but Maduro and his mother both received
official documentation of Honduran citizenship in the 1980's, through
Maduro's Honduran maternal grandmother. Since that time, Maduro has
served in several government positions that required ``Honduran by
birth'' nationality.) Despite numerous accusations, an arbitration of
international jurists, and presidential intervention, the TNE refused
to register Maduro for the primary. At year's end, the National Party
continued to express interest in reinstating Maduro as the presidential
candidate, even though the question of Maduro's citizenship was not
resolved.
There are no legal impediments to the participation of women or
minorities in government and politics; however, they are
underrepresented. One of the country's three vice presidents is a
woman, as are four cabinet ministers; approximately a dozen women also
serve as vice ministers or head various government agencies. Women hold
12 of 128 seats in the National Congress, and 2 of 20 Honduran seats in
the Central American Parliament. The Government's Office of Women's
Affairs has cabinet-level status, although the executive president of
that office is not a member of the cabinet. There is one female justice
on the Supreme Court.
In April the Congress enacted a Law of Gender Equality that
mandates that 30 percent of all candidates nominated for public office
by recognized political parties be women. Female legislators and
women's groups criticized this law for not requiring full gender parity
in political party slates. They also complained that, in practice,
electoral slates for general elections would not meet the 30 percent
threshold established by the law because the country's few female
politicians might be defeated during the internal nominating processes
of the political parties. The law is expected to apply to the 2001
elections.
There are few indigenous people in leadership positions in
government or politics. There are no members of Congress who state that
they are indigenous, but there is one indigenous alternate deputy.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operates without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials generally cooperate with these
groups and are responsive to their views.
Anonymous telephone callers continued to threaten human rights
workers. The National Human Rights Commissioner and the leaders of the
CODEH and of the COFADEH all reported receiving numerous death threats
by telephone.
In 1996 the Congress ratified a presidential decree expanding the
functions of the NHRC and unanimously reelected Leo Valladares to a 6-
year term that is scheduled to expire on March 5, 2002. Under this
decree, and in fulfillment of his expanded functions, the NHRC has free
access to all civilian and military institutions and detention centers,
and is supposed to perform his functions with complete immunity and
autonomy. However, in April the Supreme Court filed a lawsuit against
Valladares, and charged him with engaging in ``corruption, extortion,
and blackmail'' over a report issued by the NHRC in April that exposed
corruption within the judicial branch (see Section 1.e.). However, the
Supreme Court later dropped its charges.
In June the NHRC announced that the Commission would close 7 of its
12 regional offices for budgetary reasons. Human rights activists
charged that the Government deliberately underfinanced the NHRC to
hinder its operations. Valladares observed publicly that, while the
NHRC required an annual budget of $1.8 million (27 million lempiras) to
operate on a national scale, the actual NHRC budget for the year 2000
was only $1,067,000 (16 million lempiras). Various aid grants from
foreign governments to the NHRC expired earlier in the year. In
December the Congress passed a budget that provides the NHRC with a
budget of $1.6 million (24 million lempiras).
In August the Public Ministry fired Special Prosecutor for Ethnic
Rights Gilberto Antonio Sanchez Chandias, ostensibly as part of a
reorganization of the Ministry. However, indigenous groups claimed that
Sanchez had been fired for investigating reports of violations of
indigenous rights too diligently (see Section 5).
In March the CODEH publicly accused the INTERPOL unit in Honduras
of conducting research into the CODEH's foreign information and funding
networks, but did not make public any evidence to support those
accusations. In July the CODEH announced that it would close four of
its regional offices due to a shortfall in funding.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution bans discrimination based on race or sex. The
Constitution also bans discrimination on the basis of class; however,
in practice, the political, military, and social elites generally
enjoyed impunity before the legal system. Members of these groups
rarely were arrested or jailed; the President, cabinet ministers, and
legislators all enjoy legal immunity (see Section 1.e.).
Women.--Violence against women remained widespread. The Penal Code
was amended in 1997 to classify domestic violence and sexual harassment
as crimes, with penalties of 2 to 4 years' and 1 to 3 years'
imprisonment, respectively. In February the Pan-American Health
Organization reported that 60 percent of women have been victims of
domestic violence. Most such violence took place within the family. The
penalties for rape are relatively light, ranging from 3 to 9 years'
imprisonment. All rapes are considered public crimes, so a rapist can
be prosecuted even if he marries his victim.
Under pressure from women's advocacy and reform groups, the
Congress in 1997 enacted the Law Against Domestic Violence to
strengthen the rights of women and increase the penalties for crimes of
domestic violence. This law allows the Government to protect battered
women through emergency measures, such as detaining an aggressor or
separating him temporarily from the victim's home. It also imposes such
penalties as a fine of $333 (5,000 lempiras) and 4 years' imprisonment
per incident.
In March the Public Ministry reported that it receives an average
of 200 allegations of domestic violence each month, but that many cases
remain pending because the Government has not yet created the special
courts authorized by the Law Against Domestic Violence. In August the
Public Ministry reported investigating 10,535 cases of spousal abuse
during 1999; male spouses filed 1,267 of those cases. In September the
U.N. Population Fund estimated that 8 of every 10 women suffer from
domestic violence. In October the Public Ministry reported that it had
received 3,000 complaints of domestic violence, averaging 35 per day,
during the year.
The Government attempted to remedy this situation by working with
women's groups to provide specialized training to police officials on
enforcing the Law Against Domestic Violence. There are few shelters
specifically maintained for battered women. The Government operates 1
shelter that can accommodate 10 women and their families. Six private
centers for battered women offer legal, medical, and psychological
assistance, but not physical shelter.
Sexual harassment in the workplace also continued to be a problem.
Women, who make up 51 percent of the work force, were represented
in at least small numbers in most professions, but cultural attitudes
limited their career opportunities. In theory, women have equal access
to educational opportunities; however, family pressures often impede
the ambitions of women intent on obtaining a higher education. The law
requires employers to pay women equal wages for equivalent work, but
employers often classify women's jobs as less demanding than those of
men to justify paying them lower salaries. In July the Government
created the Inter-Institutional Technical Committee on Gender to
coordinate government assistance programs for women.
Some organizations have begun to offer assistance to women,
principally targeting those who live in rural areas and in marginal
neighborhoods of cities. For example, the Honduran Federation of
Women's Associations provided home construction and improvement loans,
offered free legal assistance, and lobbied the Government on women's
causes. The Center for the Investigation and Promotion of Human Rights
continued to operate a program to make women aware of their legal
rights. Programs that provide small loans to microentrepreneurs target
female clients.
Women have advanced significantly in some professions during the
past several years. The HOAF and national police academies have
accepted female recruits since 1998, and the first class of women to
receive aeronautical training at the air force academy graduated in
1999. In 1998 Reyna Dinora Aceituno was elected Secretary General of
the Confederation of Honduran Workers (CTH), the country's second
largest labor confederation. In May the capital city of Tegucigalpa
hired its first female firefighter. In June and July, the Episcopal
Church ordained its first three female religious ministers.
In October tens of thousands of women commemorated World Food Day
by conducting demonstrations against poverty and violence in the
country's major cities. Also in October, the Government announced a new
program to provide ``agricultural equality'' for women through such
measures as recognizing female land ownership separately from male
spouses or family members, increasing the number of government land
titles granted to women, and facilitating access to financial
assistance for female agricultural workers.
Children.--Although the Government allocated 32 percent of its
budget for the year to public education and health care, this was
insufficient to address the needs of the country's youth. The
Government provides free, universal, and compulsory education through
the age of 10; however, the Government estimated that as many as
175,000 children each year fail to receive schooling of any kind,
either due to insufficient financial resources, or because parents rely
on their children to assist in supporting the family by working. Girls
attend primary school in the same proportion as boys. In October the
Government announced its intention to increase its national school
capacity by 5,000 children during 2001.
Media reports indicated that up to 40 percent of children under the
age of 5 years suffer from chronic malnutrition. The Government
estimated that 7,000 children (40 of every 1,000) under the age of 5
die each year because of inadequate health care; to combat these
deaths, in March the Health Ministry announced a 2-year program to
reduce infant mortality by 25 percent.
The Government was unable to prevent the abuse of street children
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.) or child laborers (see Section 6.d.).
During the year, the Government and children's rights organizations
raised their estimates of the number of street children to 10,000, only
half of whom have shelter on any given day. The number of street
children has increased substantially since 1998, due to Hurricane
Mitch. Many street children have been molested sexually, and about 40
percent regularly engaged in prostitution.
Approximately 30 percent of the street children in Tegucigalpa and
San Pedro Sula, the two largest population centers, were reported to be
HIV-positive. Over 75 percent of street children found their way to the
streets because of severe family problems; 30 percent simply were
abandoned. Abuse of street children is a serious problem. Both the
police and members of the general population engaged in violence
against street children (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In September
police arrested the adult son of the Human Rights Commissioner for
burning a child's eyelid with a cigarette. He was charged with a minor
infraction. The Human Rights Commissioner publicly separated himself
from his son's actions and emphasized that his son should be subject to
appropriate legal action.
In May the Public Ministry reported receiving an average of 20
complaints of child abuse every week; in May UNICEF estimated that 17
percent of children have suffered some form of child abuse. In March
the Tegucigalpa city administration opened 12 temporary shelters for
children, with a total capacity of 240 children. In November the
Government announced that it plans to open a 24-hour Street Child
Attention Center in Tegucigalpa, which had not opened at year's end.
The Center, working with the municipal authorities and with children's
rights organizations, would initiate contact on the streets with
abandoned children, meet their basic needs, then offer counseling and
formal or vocational training to help reincorporate them into society.
Human rights groups implicated out-of-uniform security force
personnel, vigilantes, and business leaders in many juvenile deaths
(see Section 1.a.). In February Covenant House alleged that 21 children
were killed and 879 children suffered various forms of mistreatment
from 1994 to 1999.
The 1996 Code of Childhood and Adolescence covers the rights,
liberties, and protection of children, including in the area of child
labor (see Section 6.d.). It established prison sentences of up to 3
years for persons convicted of child abuse.
In September the Government sponsored its eighth annual Children's
Congress in Tegucigalpa, at which children from across the country
discussed issues of national interest. For the first time, several
departmental capitals hosted similar meetings of local children
simultaneously.
People with Disabilities.--There are no formal barriers to
participation by an estimated 300,000 disabled adults in employment,
education, or health care; however, there is no specific statutory or
constitutional protection for them. There is no legislation that
requires access by disabled persons to government buildings or
commercial establishments. In April the Government reactivated the
National Council for the Treatment of the Disabled Minor to coordinate
assistance to an estimated 800,000 disabled youths and appropriated
about $1.3 million (20 million lempiras) to fund its activities.
Indigenous People.--Some 450,000 persons, constituting 11 percent
of the general population, are members of various indigenous groups.
These small communities of indigenous people have little or no ability
to participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultures,
traditions, and the allocation of natural resources. Indigenous land
rights are communal. While the law permits persons to claim individual
freeholding titles, this is difficult to accomplish in practice. Tribal
lands often are defined poorly in documents dating back to the mid-19th
century and, in most cases, lack any legal title based on modern
cadastral measurements. The Government makes all decisions regarding
exploitation of timber resources on indigenous lands, often over
strenuous tribal objections.
The lack of clear title by indigenous groups to public lands that
they occupy often leads to conflicts between such groups and various
government entities. However, such disputes are equally common between
the Government and nonindigenous groups, and the Government is working
with various indigenous groups on management plans for public and
tribal lands that they occupy. In the absence of clear land titles and
unequal access to legal recourse, indigenous groups also are vulnerable
to frequent usurpation of their property rights by nonindigenous
farmers and cattle ranchers. Expanded coverage of the national
cadastral registry, property titling, and government land registries is
reducing this vulnerability.
The courts commonly deny legal recourse to indigenous groups and
often show bias in favor of nonindigenous parties of means and
influence. Failure to obtain legal redress frequently causes indigenous
groups to attempt to regain land through invasions of private property,
which usually provokes the authorities into retaliating forcefully. The
Government generally is responsive to indigenous land claims; however,
numerous cases remained unresolved because of conflicting claims by
influential nonindigenous groups.
In 1997 after a month of nationwide protests by indigenous
organizations that included a hunger strike, the Government signed a
22-point agreement with representatives of various groups that made
available 9 initial land grants of about 22,000 acres each to different
tribes, granted some contested land titles outright to indigenous
petitioners, and set aside about $13,000 (200,000 lempiras) in
government funds for indigenous housing. The Congress also created a
commission to study indigenous land claims, which often conflict with
the claims of small farmers, but the commission was largely inactive.
Since 1997 the Government has distributed tens of thousands of legal
titles encompassing hundreds of thousands of acres of land to
indigenous persons. In September the Congress appropriated about $1.7
million (25 million lempiras) to purchase land for distribution to the
indigenous Chorti community, plus an additional $1,267,000 (19 million
lempiras) in October for its general land redistribution programs.
Indigenous groups nonetheless charged that the Government had failed to
fulfill its commitments under the 1997 agreement.
Members of the Black Carib and Garifuna indigenous groups, backed
by international supporters, objected strenuously to a proposed
constitutional amendment that would permit foreigners to own and
develop land for tourism within 25 miles of the country's coasts and
land frontiers. The amendment was approved on its first reading in 1998
but failed to obtain a constitutionally required second approval in
1999, following an indigenous demonstration in October 1999, that led
to a violent clash near the presidential offices (see Section 2.b.).
The amendment appears unlikely to be considered again in the near
future.
In August the Public Ministry fired Special Prosecutor for Ethnic
Rights Gilberto Antonio Sanchez Chandias, ostensibly as part of a
reorganization of the Ministry; however, indigenous groups claimed that
Sanchez had been fired for investigating reports of violations of
indigenous rights too diligently (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
Indigenous groups petitioned actively during the year for the
Government to carry out more effective investigations into dozens of
murders of indigenous leaders that date back to the 1970's, including
the deaths in March of four Chorti men in Copan (see Section 1.a.).
In August various indigenous groups convened a First Conference of
National Solidarity in Tegucigalpa in preparation for the World
Conference Against Racism, to be held in South Africa under U.N.
auspices in 2001.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the legal right to form
and join labor unions; unions are independent of the Government and of
political parties. Most peasant organizations are affiliated directly
with the labor movement. Unions frequently hold public demonstrations
against government policies and make extensive use of the news media to
advance their views. However, only about 14 percent of the work force
is unionized, and the economic and political influence of organized
labor has diminished in recent years.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) notes that various
provisions in the law restrict freedom of association, including the
prohibition of more than one trade union in a single enterprise, the
requirement of more than 30 workers to constitute a trade union, and
the requirement that trade union organizations must include more than
90 percent Honduran membership.
The labor movement is composed of three national labor
organizations: the General Council of Workers (CGT), the Confederation
of Honduran Workers (CTH), and the Unitary Confederation of Honduran
Workers (CUTH).
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, along with a
wide range of other basic labor rights, which the authorities respect
in practice. However, the civil service code denies the right to strike
to all government workers, other than employees of state-owned
enterprises. The ILO has reported that federations and confederations
are prohibited from calling strikes and that a two-thirds majority of
the votes of the total membership of the trade union organization is
required to call a strike; the ILO asserts that these requirements
restrict freedom of association. Public sector health care employees
conducted illegal work stoppages during the year.
A number of private firms have instituted ``solidarity''
associations, essentially aimed at providing credit and other services
to workers and managers who are members of the associations.
Representatives of most organized labor groups criticize these
associations, asserting that they do not permit strikes, have
inadequate grievance procedures, and neutralize genuine, representative
trade unions.
In May dissident members of some 40 labor, peasant, and social
organizations formed a Popular Bloc (``Bloque Popular'') whose
immediate goals were to pressure the Government to implement social
reforms and cease its efforts to privatize inefficient state-owned
enterprises. During the second half of the year, the Bloc conducted a
series of nationwide, 1-day work and traffic stoppages that brought the
Government, the private sector, and organized labor to the bargaining
table to negotiate a national wage increase outside the formal
framework of the annual minimum wage talks, which normally are held
each December (see Section 6.e.).
The three national labor confederations maintain close ties with
various international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
protects the rights to organize and to bargain collectively; collective
bargaining agreements are the norm for companies in which workers are
organized. The Labor Code prohibits retribution by employers for trade
union activity; however, it is a common occurrence. Some employers have
threatened to close down unionized companies and have harassed workers
seeking to unionize, in some cases dismissing them outright. The labor
courts routinely consider hundreds of appeals from workers seeking
reinstatement and back wages from companies that fired them for
engaging in union organizing activities. However, once a union is
recognized, employers actually dismiss relatively few workers for union
activity. Nonetheless, such cases serve to discourage workers elsewhere
from attempting to organize.
Workers in both unionized and nonunionized companies are protected
by the Labor Code, which gives them the right to seek redress from the
Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of Labor took action in several cases,
pressuring employers to observe the code. Labor or civil courts can
require employers to rehire employees fired for union activity, but
such rulings are uncommon. Agreements between management and unions
generally contain a clause prohibiting retaliation against any worker
who participates in a strike or other union activity.
The Labor Code explicitly prohibits blacklisting; however, there
was credible evidence that informal blacklisting occurred in the
privately owned industrial parks, known as maquiladoras. When a union
is formed, its organizers must submit a list of initial members to the
Ministry of Labor as part of the process of obtaining official
recognition. However, before official recognition is granted, the
Ministry of Labor must inform the company of the impending union
organization. The Ministry of Labor has not always been able to provide
effective protection to labor organizers. There were credible reports,
particularly in the export processing zone (EPZ) sector, that some
inspectors had sold the names of employees involved in forming a union
to companies that then dismissed union organizers before the Ministry
of Labor could recognize the unions.
The same labor regulations apply in the EPZ's as in the rest of
private industry. Unions are active in the Government-owned Puerto
Cortes free trade zone (7 of 11 maquiladoras there are unionized), but
factory owners have resisted efforts to organize the privately owned
industrial parks. The Honduran Association of Maquiladores (AHM)
routinely sponsors seminars and other meetings between its members and
major labor groups in order to reduce potential tensions within the
industry. At year's end, 54 of the country's 434 maquiladoras were
unionized, and 26 of those plants operated under collective bargaining
agreements.
In 1997 the AHM adopted a voluntary code of conduct governing
salaries and working conditions in the industry and recognizing
workers' right to organize. Although local unions were not consulted
during the drafting process and have no formal role in its
implementation, this code nonetheless represented a public commitment
by apparel manufacturers to abide by local laws and regulations
governing their industries. It provided a starting point for a dialog
among the AHM, organized labor, and the Government, which formed a
Tripartite Commission that meets on a monthly basis to discuss and
facilitate solutions for labor problems. The AHM often serves as an
informal arbiter of labor disputes between its member companies and
their workforces. The attitude of the Government towards organized
labor in the EPZ's is the same as in other industries.
In a number of maquiladora plants, workers have shown little
enthusiasm for unionizing, since they consider their treatment, salary,
and working conditions to be as good as, or better than, those in
unionized plants. In the absence of unions and collective bargaining,
several EPZ plants have instituted solidarity associations that, to
some extent, function as ``company unions'' for the purposes of setting
wages and negotiating working conditions. Other EPZ plants use the
minimum wage to set starting salaries, and adjust wage scales by
negotiating with common groups of plant workers and other employees,
based on seniority, skills, categories of work, and other criteria. In
November Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), a private
sector initiative to improve working conditions in maquiladoras around
the world, granted its first overseas certifications of compliance with
WRAP principles to two local companies, Cross Creek de Honduras and
Kellwood de Honduras.
Labor leaders accuse the Government of allowing private companies
to act contrary to the Labor Code and expect the problem to continue
until the Ministry of Labor is reorganized to make it more efficient.
They criticize the Ministry of Labor for not enforcing the Labor Code,
for taking too long to make decisions, and for being timid and
indifferent to workers' needs. Industry leaders, in turn, contend that
the obsolete and cumbersome Labor Code discourages foreign investment
and requires significant amendment. The Ministry of Labor has sought to
address these deficiencies by requesting increased funding from the
Flores administration, by dismissing or transferring Ministry of Labor
employees whose performance was unsatisfactory, by opening more
regional offices to facilitate worker access to Ministry of Labor
services, and by conducting a painstaking, ongoing review of the Labor
Code within the Tripartite Commission.
A 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Ministry of
Labor and the Office of the United States Trade Representative calling
for greater enforcement of the Labor Code has resulted in some
progress. However, labor unions charge that the Ministry of Labor has
not made sufficient progress towards enforcing the Code, especially in
training its labor inspectors and in conducting inspections of the
maquiladora industry. The Government has acknowledged that it does not
yet adhere completely to international labor standards. In 1997 the
country, in conjunction with other Central American nations, agreed to
fund a regional program to modernize the inspection and labor
management functions of all regional labor ministries. In August and
September, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to abide by the
terms of the 1995 MOU and to take additional steps to strengthen
enforcement of the Labor Code.
Kimi de Honduras, a South Korean-owned maquiladora with a history
of labor troubles, closed its doors in May and laid off over 600
employees, most of whom were women. Former Kimi employees complained
that severance payments made by the company did not meet requirements
stipulated by the Labor Code, but a Ministry of Labor examination of
the company's calculations found Kimi's severance payments to its
former workforce in order.
In July 1999, workers at Yoo Yang, another South Korean-owned
maquiladora, sought to establish a union for all maquiladora workers.
Both the Yoo Yang employees and the Ministry of Labor missed various
deadlines stipulated in the Labor Code for the processing of the
workers' petition, which the Ministry of Labor invalidated in April
because the Labor Code precludes the creation of industrial unions once
individual companies in a given industry become unionized. In July Yoo
Yang employees submitted a new petition for recognition as a company
union to the Ministry of Labor, which declined to rule definitively on
the petition because of alleged irregularities contained in the
workers' application for juridical recognition; in the process, the
Ministry of Labor again missed several processing deadlines for labor
petitions established by the Labor Code. The irregularities were
addressed, and in December the Ministry of Labor granted union status
to Yoo Yang employees.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the law prohibit forced or compulsory labor, and this applies equally
to children; however, there were credible allegations of compulsory
overtime at EPZ plants, particularly for women, who make up an
estimated 80 percent of the work force in the maquiladora sector. The
legal prohibitions apply equally to children, and there were no
official reports of such practices in the area of child labor (see
Section 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution and the Labor Code prohibit the
employment of minors under the age of 16, except that a child who is 15
years of age is permitted to work with parental and Ministry of Labor
permission. The Children's Code prohibits a child of 14 years of age or
younger from working, even with parental permission, and establishes
prison sentences of 3 to 5 years for individuals who allow children to
work illegally. An employer who legally hires a 15-year-old must
certify that the child has finished, or is finishing, his compulsory
schooling. The Ministry of Labor grants a limited number of work
permits to 15-year-old children each year.
The Ministry of Labor cannot enforce effectively child labor laws
outside the maquiladora sector, and violations of the Labor Code occur
frequently in rural areas and in small companies. According to the
Ministry of Labor, human rights groups, and children's rights
organizations, an estimated 350,000 children work illegally.
Significant child labor problems exist in family farming, agricultural
export (including the melon and coffee industries), and small scale
services and commerce. Many children also work in the construction
industry, on small family farms, as street vendors, or in small
workshops to supplement the family income. Boys between the ages of 13
and 18 work in the lobster and shrimp industries, where they provide
support to divers from boats while they learn the trade. Hurricane
Mitch exacerbated existing child labor problems in every sector of the
economy.
The employment of children under the legal working age in the
maquiladora sector may occur, but not on a large scale. (Younger
children sometimes obtain legitimate work permits by fraud or purchase
forged permits.) The maquiladoras in recent years have raised their
minimum employment age, and some hire only at age 18 or above, reducing
the number of legal job opportunities available to persons under 18
years of age.
In September 1998, the Government created the National Commission
for the Gradual and Progressive Eradication of Child Labor, which
includes government ministries, official family welfare agencies, and
local NGO's. In August the National Commission sponsored a public
seminar on child labor in the country to assist the Commission in
developing a national plan to combat this problem.
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited, including that performed
by children, and there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In the aftermath of Hurricane
Mitch in December 1998, labor leaders agreed to forgo the customary
January increase in the minimum wage in return for a pledge by business
leaders to control price increases for basic goods and services. In
June 1999, the Roman Catholic Church arbitrated a 25 percent increase
in the minimum wage that the Government implemented in July 1999; an
additional 8 percent increase took effect in January. The minimum wage
in effect prior to July 1999 served as the basis for both increases.
Daily pay rates vary by geographic zone and the sector of the economy
affected; urban workers earn slightly more than workers in the
countryside. The lowest minimum wage occurs in the nonexport
agricultural sector, where it ranges from $2.33 to $2.96 (35.00 to
44.50 lempiras) per day, depending on whether the employer has more
than 15 employees. The highest minimum wage is $3.89 (58.30 lempiras)
per day in the export sector. All workers are entitled to an additional
month's salary in June and December of each year. The Constitution and
the Labor Code stipulate that all labor must be paid fairly; however,
the Ministry of Labor lacks the personnel and other resources for
effective enforcement. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a
decent standard of living (above the poverty line) for a worker and
family.
Under the threat of a nationwide work stoppage by the country's
three labor confederations (see Section 6.a.), in October the private
sector agreed to a monthly wage increase of $23.33 (350 lempiras) for
workers earning up to $116.60 (1,749 lempiras) per month. A monthly
increase of $10 (150 lempiras) would be retroactive to October 1, and
an additional monthly increase of $13.33 (200 lempiras) is scheduled to
take effect on February 1, 2001. This agreement excluded workers in the
nonexport agricultural sector, who instead would receive a monthly wage
increase of $10 (150 lempiras) as of February 1, 2001.
Under this agreement, workers earning between $140 (2,100 lempiras)
and $400 (6,000 lempiras) per month would receive an additional wage
increase of $23.33 (350 lempiras) as of April 1, 2001. This wage
increase excluded: Workers receiving a salary increase equivalent to,
or greater than, $23.33 (350 lempiras) through either an individual
contract or a collective bargaining agreement taking effect 3 months
prior to April 1, 2001; those paid by piecework or based on
productivity; microenterprises, agricultural firms, or ranches
employing 15 or fewer workers; and workers in medicine or petroleum
product sales whose utility margins are regulated by the Government.
This agreement also incorporated various social commitments by the
Government, including the establishment of an Economic and Social
Council within which the Government, the private sector, and labor and
social groups would debate wages and other labor issues, as well as
national social policy. The Congress enacted legislation implementing
this agreement in December, which obviated any need to hold the formal
talks on increasing the minimum wage that had been planned for
December. The CTH, which initially opposed the terms of this agreement,
conducted a protest strike during the first week of October that only
resulted in some success along the country's North Coast.
The law prescribes a maximum 8-hour workday and a 44-hour workweek.
There is a requirement of at least one 24-hour rest period every 8
days. The Labor Code provides for a paid vacation of 10 workdays after
1 year, and of 20 workdays after 4 years. However, employers frequently
ignored these regulations due to the high level of unemployment and
underemployment and the lack of effective enforcement by the Ministry
of Labor. Foreign workers enjoy equal protection under the law,
although the process for a foreigner to obtain a work permit from the
Ministry of Labor is cumbersome.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing national health
and safety laws, but does not do so consistently or effectively. There
are 19 labor inspectors throughout the country. The informal sector is
regulated and monitored poorly. For example, divers for shrimp and
lobster work in hazardous conditions; the lack of medical facilities in
the Mosquito Coast region adds to the problem. Worker safety standards
are also difficult to enforce in the construction industry. Some
complaints alleged that foreign factory managers failed to comply with
the occupational health and safety aspects of Labor Code regulations in
factories located in the EPZ's and in private industrial parks. There
is no provision allowing a worker to leave a dangerous work situation
without jeopardy to continued employment.
In March workers at Chung Sing Textiles, a Taiwanese-owned
maquiladora, alleged publicly that the company maintained a clandestine
``punishment cell'' for employees who violated factory regulations.
Separate investigations by the Ministry of Labor and the AHM of those
charges failed to develop any evidence of the existence of a punishment
cell at Chung Sing. In July a seamstress at Sunny Industries, a Korean-
owned maquiladora, lost the effective use of her left hand when it
accidentally became entangled in a machine. In a lawsuit filed against
Sunny Industries in August, the seamstress alleged that company
management for several hours refused to free her hand from the machine
for fear of damaging the equipment, then delayed referring her to a
public hospital for medical treatment for 8 days because it did not
wish to pay her medical expenses.
In August the Government announced its participation in a regional
program to improve occupational safety and health conditions throughout
Central America. This program aims to strengthen regional labor codes
and the enforcement capabilities of the Central American labor
ministries in these fields.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Legal Code includes provisions that
prohibit trafficking in persons; however, it is a problem. The
Government and Justice Ministry, through its General Directorate for
Population and Migration, is responsible for enforcing the country's
immigration laws. However, weak police and court systems hinder law
enforcement efforts.
Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of aliens smuggled
to the United States involving the use of force or sequestration
(holding persons incommunicado against their will). The most common
practice involves the sequestration of persons until a smuggling fee is
paid. If the fee is not paid, the smugglers normally seek retribution
by turning such persons in for deportation proceedings. Many times,
fees are paid by relatives who fear that smugglers may employ violence
against the smuggled persons. The most common practice involving debt
bondage is the smuggling of indentured persons, through the country
from China or South America, whose smuggling fee is paid by an employer
in the United States in return for free or lowpaid labor. There were
two such cases, involving a total of seven persons.
In January Covenant House of Honduras asserted that some 250
Honduran children in Canada had been coerced into prostitution or the
transportation of illicit narcotics. An investigation of those charges
was ongoing at year's end. In January Canadian authorities arrested
dozens of small-time Central American drugdealers including many
Honduran minors. In February the press reported that Honduran
authorities were working to repatriate those minors.
In February a judge in San Pedro Sula, Alexa Cubero, was arrested
for allegedly kidnaping six minors with intent to sell them to persons
unknown; this case had not come to trial at year's end. In July the
Government announced that it was working with the Government of Mexico
to repatriate over 200 Honduran minors working as prostitutes in
southern Mexico. In September a local children's rights group charged
that 498 children had been reported missing since 1986, including 22
children during the year. The group asserted that local kidnapers
receive an average of $133 (2,000 lempiras) per child, each of whom
subsequently is sold abroad for $10,000 to $15,000.
The Government does not provide economic aid to victims or
potential victims of such crimes. However, in March the Government
inaugurated two centers in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula to assist
citizens deported from other countries to relocate in Honduras. With
the assistance of several international organizations, the Government
hoped to be able to reinsert up to 4,000 persons into society each
year.
__________
JAMAICA
Jamaica is a constitutional parliamentary democracy and a member of
the Commonwealth of Nations. Two political parties have alternated in
power since the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 1944;
a third major party was established in late 1995. Prime Minister P.J.
Patterson's People's National Party (PNP) won 50 of the 60 seats in
Parliament in national elections in December 1997 that were
significantly less violent than previous general election campaigns.
Intimidation of voters and party agents and restrictions on the free
movement of voters was reported. The judiciary is independent but lacks
adequate resources.
The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has primary responsibility for
internal security, assisted by the Island Special Constabulary Force.
The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF--army, air wing, and coast guard) is
charged with national defense, marine narcotics interdiction, and
supporting the JCF. The JDF has no mandate to maintain law and order
and no powers of arrest. The Ministry of National Security and Justice
oversees the JCF and the JDF. Civilian authorities generally maintain
effective control of the security forces; however, some members of the
security forces committed human rights abuses.
The economy is based on primary products (bauxite and alumina,
sugar, bananas), services (tourism, finance), and light manufacturing
(garment assembly). The Government promoted private investment to
stimulate economic growth and modernization, pursuing in the process a
sometimes painful program of structural adjustment. The trade-dependent
economy contracted (by 0.5 percent) for the fourth consecutive year in
1999. In 1999 annual per capita income was $2,531, but there is a large
gap between the wealthy and the impoverished.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Members
of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings and beatings
and carried out arbitrary arrests and detentions.
Although the Government moved to punish many of those police
involved, continued impunity for police who commit abuses remains a
problem. Police investigations often were hampered by lack of
witnesses, and bottlenecks in the judicial systems cause long delays in
resolution of criminal cases. Prison and jail conditions remained poor;
overcrowding, brutality against detainees, and poor sanitary conditions
were problems. The judicial system was overburdened, and lengthy delays
in trials were common. There were allegations that citizens' privacy
rights were infringed upon. Violence and economic discrimination
against women remained problems. There were cases of societal
discrimination against disabled persons and members of the Rastafarian
religion. Violence against suspected homosexuals occurred. Child labor
is a problem. Mob violence against those suspected of breaking the law
remains a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings during the year.
However, there were two killings involving politically connected
victims that produced allegations of possible political motivation. On
December 6, unknown assailants shot and killed an organizer for Sharon
Hay-Webster, a PNP Member of Parliament, in front of Hay-Webster's
constituency office in South Clarendon, after a party event. On
December 12, a PNP area leader was found strangled in St. Andrew
parish. One Member of Parliament said that the victim had been
threatened and that he was ``sure she had been eliminated for political
reasons,'' but another Member of Parliament contended that constituents
had killed her in a dispute over jobs in a public works project.
Although the last two national elections were relatively calm, there is
a history of political violence and killings in the period leading up
to elections (see Section 3).
The police frequently employed lethal force in apprehending
criminal suspects. During the year, there were 140 deaths, including
those of 11 police officers, during police encounters with criminals.
While allegations of ``police murder'' were frequent, the validity of
many of the allegations was suspect. The country faces a crime
situation with a homicide rate exceeding 30 per 100,000 persons. Well-
armed gangs trafficking in narcotics and guns control many inner-city
communities. The gangs are often better equipped than the police force
and have conducted coordinated ambushes of joint security patrols.
There have been targeted assaults against police officers and their
families.
In February police killed a 20-year-old man in Farm district,
Clarendon parish. The police claimed that they encountered a group of
men, were fired upon, and returned fire. At that point, the man was
hit. However, residents said that the police came upon the group, began
firing indiscriminately and hit the victim. The incident led to 2 days
of violent protests in May Pen, Clarendon's capital, which subsided
when the area's parliamentarian visited and appealed for calm. In May
the police concluded their investigation and forwarded it to the Public
Prosecutor's office for action. In September the authorities brought
murder charges against a policewoman involved in the incident; at
year's end she awaited trial.
On April 25, television stations broadcast news footage taken by an
independent cable operator that showed a group of armed police officers
surrounding a house in pursuit of an alleged gang leader, who was shot
and killed by a police superintendent a few moments later. The
videotape did not show the shooting; however, the footage of a woman
crying for help and a violent scuffle in a doorway stirred much
controversy and led to a confrontation on April 27 between heavily
armed gunmen and the police in a volatile area of Kingston. Two
policemen were killed and several injured in a prolonged gun battle;
one gunman was also killed. In a press conference immediately after the
outbreak of violence, security force leaders criticized Jamaicans for
Justice, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) advocating human rights,
for politically motivated involvement in the controversy (see Section
4). During the press conference, the Police Commissioner also
criticized a journalist for questioning possible political motivation
behind the violent events (see Section 2.a.).
The JCF has undertaken an initiative of ``community policing'' in
certain areas to address the problem of longstanding antipathy between
the security forces and many poor inner-city neighborhoods. For
example, designated policemen walk beats and interact with members of
the community on a daily basis. The JCF conducted both administrative
and criminal investigations into all incidents involving fatal
shootings by the police. In July the Government established a special
police body, the Bureau of Special Investigations, specifically to
address police shootings. This group supplements the JCF Office of
Professional Responsibility, which investigates police corruption and
other misconduct, and the civilian Public Complaints Authority that
oversees investigations of the other two bodies and can initiate its
own investigations. In April a prominent human rights activist assumed
the newly created position of human rights advisor to the Minister of
National Security and Justice. She has been engaged in educating JCF
trainees as well as junior officers to respect citizens' rights. The
JCF policy statement on the use of force incorporates U.N.-approved
language on basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law
enforcement officials.
Following a police investigation, in September 1999 the Public
Prosecutor's office charged a police sergeant with murder for the April
1999 killing of an off-duty JDF soldier during island-wide protests. A
preliminary hearing found that there was sufficient evidence to proceed
to trial; at year's end, the case was still before the courts.
The authorities also brought murder charges against a police
officer for the death of a taxi driver killed when police fired on a
taxi carrying passengers in Kitson town in June 1999. The case was
still in preliminary hearings at year's end.
On August 21, 1999, nine soldiers and four policemen severely beat
Michael Gayle, described as a paranoid schizophrenic, after he tried to
pass through a roadblock near his home after curfew. Gayle died as the
result of a ruptured abdomen; at the coroner's inquest, the jury
returned a majority verdict that all police and military personnel on
duty at the roadblock at that time should be charged with manslaughter.
However, in March the Director of Public Prosecutions ruled that there
was not sufficient evidence to bring charges against specific
individuals for Gayle's death. The police opened a new investigation of
this incident, completed it in April, and resubmitted the results to
the Public Prosecutor's office. The police investigation did not
uncover any new information and recommended that the case be closed.
Vigilantism, involving spontaneous mob executions in response to
crime, continued to be a problem. There were 8 known vigilante killings
during the year, compared with 9 in 1999 and 16 in 1998. Official
investigations into such killings generally do not uncover information,
since the persons and the community involved usually band together to
intimidate potential witnesses.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other abuse of prisoners and
detainees; however, reports of physical abuse of prisoners by guards
continued, despite efforts by the Government to remove abusive guards
and improve procedures.
In June police fired on a minibus carrying 16 passengers when the
driver failed to stop at a roadblock. The police reported that they had
received reports of gunmen on the bus. After the bus sped away, the
police pursued and fired on it. One passenger took off his white shirt
and waved it out a window, shouting that passengers were on the bus,
but had to duck back inside when the police continued shooting. Six
persons were injured, including two students. Two policemen involved in
the incident were removed from front-line duty and more training was
mandated for police in the proper use of firearms. The police concluded
an investigation into the incident and sent it to the Public
Prosecutor's office for action.
In December 1998, the court of appeal announced that flogging could
not be imposed as a punishment because the legislative authority for it
had expired. This sentence was used rarely; prior to 1994, no sentence
of flogging had been imposed for 25 years.
There were reports that police sexually harassed women (see Section
5).
A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published in July 1999 detailed
frequent and credible allegations of police abuse, specifically in
lockups, including severe beatings, mock executions, and rape. The
conditions in these lockups are harsh, with severe overcrowding,
intermittent meals, and poor lighting, ventilation, and sanitation. HRW
noted that the Government must undertake a systematic effort to curb
police abuse effectively and bring sanctions against officers who
commit abuses. The police have acknowledged the problem and have stated
they are trying to address it by establishing a police code of conduct
and by increasing human rights training. The police must call a legal
aid attorney when they detain a person.
Prison conditions remained poor; overcrowding, inadequate diet,
poor sanitary conditions, and insufficient medical care are typical.
During the year, the Government secured the services of a dentist for
the prisons. The Government also outplaced food services for the
prisons.
In May a riot at the St. Catherine's district prison led to reports
of beatings by guards and JDF soldiers of 300 inmates. The JDF soldiers
had been in charge of prison security at St. Catherine's following a
work stoppage by guards in January (see Section 6.a.). Guards and
soldiers fired into cells, but caused no injuries. Prisoners alleged
that they were upset with being given spoiled food, and that the guards
and soldiers retaliated against them when they refused to eat it.
Prison officials contended that the disturbance developed during a
search of cells for weapons and contraband (including cellular
telephones brought in with the acquiescence of certain guards). There
were also reports that the prisoners were staging a riot in conjunction
with another prison, coordinated by telephone, in order to facilitate a
jailbreak. Many prisoners had to wait days for medical attention
following these events.
In June the Government convened a one-person Commission of Inquiry
into the incident; the JDF initiated its own internal inquiry. A prison
doctor testified that he saw 15 guards and soldiers repeatedly club and
kick a handcuffed inmate, and that only his presence prevented the
inmate from being killed. The doctor has since been reassigned. A
sentry from a private security company also testified to witnessing
beatings. There were also reports that inmates took a JDF soldier
hostage, and the soldiers acted to recover him. In July the
Commissioner concluded his work but had not reported his findings by
year's end. The authorities did not bring criminal charges against any
of the guards or soldiers.
A separate prison for women--the Ft. Augusta Women's Prison--is
housed in a 19th century fort. Poor sanitary conditions are the norm,
although far less so than in the men's prisons because there is less
overcrowding. Ft. Augusta is also safer and does not have the violence
found in the men's prisons.
The Constitution prohibits the incarceration of children in adult
prisons; however, in practice some juveniles are held with adults. The
July 1999 HRW report criticized the conditions in which juveniles are
held. HRW noted that the Government responded quickly to remove some
children from lockups. The report detailed many cases in which
juveniles were detained improperly, not given access to legal
representation, and held in adult lockups where they were victimized by
adult prisoners.
In July the court of appeals ruled that it was unconstitutional for
juveniles to be held ``at the Governor General's pleasure.'' This
referred to a section of the 1951 Juveniles Act that provides that
persons under the age of 18 who commit a capital crime must have their
death sentence commuted; however, they could be held for an
indeterminate time at the Governor General's discretion and were
subject to incarceration in an adult prison.
In general the Government allowed private groups, voluntary
organizations, international human rights organizations, and the media
to visit prisons and monitor prison conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Jamaica Constabulary
Force Act permits the arrest of persons ``reasonably suspected'' of
having committed a crime, and the police continued to arrest and detain
citizens arbitrarily. In 1997 the Jamaican Bar Association (JBA)
protested that the police unlawfully were detaining and fingerprinting
groups of citizens in poor, inner-city areas. At the time, the Police
Commissioner disavowed the practice and ordered it discontinued;
however, both the JBA and the Independent Jamaica Council for Human
Rights state that the practice continues. In July 1999, police rounded
up 52 men from the Grant's Pen area of Kingston after civil unrest
erupted there. The men reportedly were fingerprinted, photographed, and
then released without being charged. A class action civil suit was
brought and was pending at year's end.
In March a three-person Commission of Inquiry was convened to
investigate the detention and forced transport in July 1999 of at least
25 persons (many of whom were reportedly mentally ill), who were living
on the streets in a Montego Bay business district. In October 1999, the
authorities had charged three persons (including a police inspector and
two public sector employees) with false imprisonment and assault, but
later dropped the charges against the police inspector when he turned
State's witness in the inquiry. In September the commission presented
its recommendations, among them that the victims be granted $500
(J$20,000) per month for life. The Government indicated that it
intended to set up a trust for that purpose but had not yet done so by
year's end. The police inspector said that he was under orders from his
superiors, a claim the commission rejected as perjured. Although it was
believed widely that the police were involved and acted at the behest
of Montego Bay merchants and with the acquiescence of the local
government, the commission exonerated the Montego Bay mayor and parish
council. The commission named the police inspector and civil service
truck driver as key conspirators and criticized the local head of
public works for instituting a coverup. The two public sector employees
were awaiting trial at year's end.
The law requires police to present a detainee in court within 48
hours of arrest, but the authorities continued to detain suspects,
especially those from poor neighborhoods, without bringing them before
a judge within the prescribed period. The Government attributed this
circumstance to an overburdened court system that cannot accommodate
large numbers of such presentations in a timely manner. Magistrates
inquire at least once a week into the welfare of each person listed by
the JCF as detained. There is a functioning bail system.
Foreign prisoners must pay for their own deportation when they have
completed their sentences. If they cannot afford to pay, they are
jailed until relatives or consulates can arrange for transportation. In
effect this constitutes an additional prison term for indigent
foreigners.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and no instances of exile
occurred.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, which exists in practice. However, the judicial
system is overburdened and operates with inadequate resources.
Three courts handle criminal matters at the trial level. Resident
magistrates try lesser offenses (misdemeanors). A Supreme Court judge
tries felonies, except for felonies involving firearms, which are tried
before a judge of the Gun Court. Defendants have the right to appeal a
conviction in any of the three trial courts to the Court of Appeal,
which is the highest court. This appeal process results in frequent
delays. The Constitution allows the Court of Appeal and the Parliament
to refer cases to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the
United Kingdom as a final court of appeal.
The lack of sufficient staff and resources hinders due process.
Trials in many cases are delayed for years, and other cases are
dismissed because files cannot be located. The Government initiated a
night court in 1995, which has had some success in reducing the backlog
of cases. Donations of computers are also expected to assist the courts
in this regard.
The defendant's right to counsel is well established. In February
the Government increased salaries for attorneys appointed by the State,
and in April it created the position of Public Defender, to bring cases
for individuals who have had their constitutional rights violated. The
defender's office would contract private attorneys to represent
clients. However, as of year's end, no cases had been brought as the
defender's office was still securing funds.
In May legal aid was expanded to include prisoners charged with any
offenses, except those covered by certain provisions of the Money
Laundering Act or possession or trafficking of narcotics under the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Although the authorities assert that those who
commit such offenses can afford counsel, the Jamaican Bar Association
has criticized this as presuming guilt.
During the Commission of Inquiry into the beatings of prisoners at
St. Catherine's district prison in June (see Section 1.c.), the judge
ruled that a human rights group could not take notes during the
proceedings. A Supreme Court judge later overturned this ruling.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary intrusion by the
State into the private life of an individual; however, there were
allegations of unauthorized wiretapping by the police. The revised
Jamaica Constabulary Force Act gives security personnel broad powers of
search and seizure similar to those granted by the former Suppression
of Crimes Act. The act allows search of a person on board or
disembarking a ship or boat without a warrant if a police officer has
good reason to be suspicious. In practice the police conducted searches
without warrants.
In October the media reported allegations that the police
wiretapped the telephones of the Prime Minister, two Cabinet members,
and other senior officials. Only the Prime Minister has the authority
to order wiretaps, and on October 24, the Prime Minister stated that
his last authorization for wiretapping had been in April, for 14 lines
associated with 12 different individuals suspected of trafficking in
firearms and narcotics. The head of the Special Intelligence Unit,
which the press alleged had carried out the wiretaps, denied that his
unit placed wiretaps on any telephones. At year's end, it was still
unclear whether any wiretaps had been put in place. In December the
Government introduced a draft Interception of Communications Act, which
would place authorization for wiretapping in the hands of the
judiciary.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice.
The four largest newspapers, all privately owned, regularly report
on human rights abuses, particularly those involving the JCF. Foreign
publications are available widely. The Government privatized the
Jamaica Broadcasting Company in 1997, and the television station and
two radio stations it operated became privately owned. The Government's
broadcasting commission has the right to regulate programming during
emergencies. Foreign television transmissions are unregulated and
available through satellite antennas.
In an April 27 press conference, the Police Commissioner criticized
a journalist who raised a question about political motivation behind a
violent confrontation that occurred the previous day (see Section
1.a.). On the following day, the same journalist was confronted by a
police officer who pointed his gun inside the journalist's vehicle and
asked him what he was doing.
Near year's end, Parliament approved the Corruption Prevention Act,
which the Government had reintroduced without clauses that journalists
had charged would restrict their ability to report about corruption.
The original draft had provided that journalists could be fined up to
$25,000 (J$1 million) and receive 10 years' imprisonment for publishing
information about an ongoing corruption investigation. The new act does
not restrict the media from publication.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice.
There were numerous community protests against police actions
during the year, such as the 2 days of protests in May Pen over a
killing by police (see Section 1.a.). A local human rights group
organized various rallies, including reenactments of the August 1999
beating of a man by security forces (see Section 1.a.) and the July
1999 abduction of homeless persons (see Section 1.c.). Security
personnel generally acted with restraint during public demonstrations.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law
enforcement officials unfairly target them. It is alleged that the
police force Rastafarian detainees to cut their hair and
surreptitiously give them food that they are forbidden to eat.
Rastafarians have no right to prison visits by Rastafarian clergy.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government provides asylum or refugee status in accordance with
the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum; it approved
one application during the year. The Government established a committee
and formal procedures to review claims to refugee status. This
committee has denied all claims to refugee status by Cubans and
Haitians who have arrived in the country since 1994.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in periodic
elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. All citizens age 18
and over have the right to vote by secret ballot. However, voters
living in ``garrison communities'', in inner-city areas dominated by
one of the two major political parties, face substantial influence and
pressure from politically connected gangs and young men hired by
political parties, which impede the free exercise of their right to
vote.
During the 1997 general election campaign, both international and
local observer groups concluded that, although the process was
significantly less violent than recent election campaigns, problems
persisted in the garrison communities. These problems included
intimidation of party agents and voters of nondominant parties and
restrictions on the movement of voters and election workers. Some areas
are so dominated by one party that the polls simply closed early and
vote counts were taken that resulted in 100 percent (or nearly 100
percent) of the votes being awarded to the dominant party. These
problems persisted in the December 1997 election, despite the best
efforts of the security forces, which were credited with controlling
violence, such as the beating of voters, and reducing election
malpractice, such as the theft of ballot boxes from polling places.
There were two killings of politically connected persons late in
the year that produced allegations of possible political motivation
(see Section 1.a.), as well as other acts of alleged intimidation.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
politics; however, they are underrepresented in government and
politics. Women hold about 13 percent of all political offices and 30
percent of the senior civil service positions. Two of the 16 cabinet
members are women, as is the PNP General Secretary.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. The Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights is the
country's only formal organization concerned with all aspects of human
rights. Jamaicans for Justice is a human rights group created in August
1999 in response to concerns about police impunity; the NGO focuses on
the issues of extrajudicial killing and excessive use of force by the
police. Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive
to the views of human rights organizations.
However, in an April press conference, senior police officials
criticized Jamaicans for Justice on the occasion of an outbreak of
severe violence (see Section 1.a.). The organization also reported that
it received threatening telephone calls at its office following the
killing of two policemen that month. The group noted that the police
were cooperative in tracing and stopping threatening calls. In a
newspaper article, the Minister of National Security and a member of
the clergy questioned the sincerity of those defending human rights,
claiming that they cared little for police officers killed in the line
of duty. The Police Federation labeled the human rights NGO
``suspicious,'' and stated that it would monitor the group's actions
closely. Jamaicans for Justice reported that undercover police
regularly attend their meetings.
In August Amnesty International (AI) issued a statement to the
Government expressing concern for a human rights attorney's safety. The
attorney figured prominently in the inquiry into the abduction of
homeless persons from Montego Bay (see Section 1.d.) and represented
prisoners at the inquiry into beatings at St. Catherine's district
prison (see Section 1.c.). AI contended that the attorney fled the
country fearing for her life and that she reported death threats,
surveillance, and illegal wiretapping from agents of prison
authorities. The Police Commissioner stated that the attorney had not
notified police of any such threats. The attorney also is wanted by
police in connection with charges of fraud brought by a former client.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place
of origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex. The Government
largely enforces these prohibitions in practice, except for widespread
discrimination on the basis of political opinion in the distribution of
scarce governmental benefits, including employment, especially in the
garrison communities (see Section 3). Individuals have committed acts
of violence against suspected homosexuals; in April a mob cornered a
25-year-old man in a Kingston church and killed him because they
suspected that he was a homosexual.
Women.--Social and cultural traditions perpetuate violence against
women, including spousal abuse. Violence against women is widespread,
but many women are reluctant to acknowledge or report abusive behavior,
leading to wide variations in estimates of its extent. Reported
incidents of rape and incest have been on the rise, with a 10 percent
increase in rapes during the year. The JCF rape investigative and
juvenile unit, which is headed by a female deputy superintendent,
handles sex crimes.
The Domestic Violence Act of 1995 provides remedies for domestic
violence, including restraining orders and other noncustodial
sentencing. Breaching a restraining order is punishable by a fine of up
to $250 (J$10,000) and/or 6 months' imprisonment.
There have been some reports of sexual harassment of women by the
police.
The Constitution and the 1975 Employment Act accord women full
legal equality; however, in practice women suffer from sexual
harassment and economic discrimination in the workplace. The Bureau of
Women's Affairs in the Ministry of Labor oversees programs to ensure
the legal rights of women. These programs have had limited effect but
have raised the awareness of problems affecting women. In 1996 the
Government established a steering committee, charged with creating a
Commission on Gender and Social Equity. The committee forwarded its
recommendations to Parliament in 1997, which accepted them; Parliament
continued to discuss methods of implementation at year's end.
A number of active women's rights groups exist. They are concerned
with a wide range of issues, including violence against women,
political representation, employment, and the image of women presented
in the media. Their effectiveness is mixed, but the groups were
successful in advocating enactment of the 1995 Domestic Violence Act.
Children.--The Government is committed to improving children's
welfare. The Ministry of Education, Youth, and Culture is responsible
for implementation of the Government's programs for children.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. However, a
number of reported cases of sexual abuse and incest may point to a
growing trend. There were reports of child prostitution in some resort
areas. Inducing prostitution on one's premises of a girl under 12 is a
felony punishable by life imprisonment; of a girl between the ages of
12 and 16 is a misdemeanor punishable by 5 years in prison. The
encouraging of prostitution of a girl under age 16 by a legal guardian
is a misdemeanor punishable by 3 years' imprisonment; procuring a girl
under age 18 is also a misdemeanor punishable by 3 years' imprisonment.
Child pornography is not prohibited by statute, but it is a common law
offense that can be prosecuted as a form of indecency.
The Juvenile Act of 1951 deals with several areas related to the
protection of children, including the prevention of cruelty, a
prohibition on causing or allowing juvenile begging, the power to bring
juveniles in need of care or protection before a juvenile court, the
treatment of juvenile offenders, the regulation and supervision of
children's homes, and restrictions on employment of juveniles. However,
resource constraints have resulted in juveniles ``in need of care or
protection'' being incarcerated in police lockups with adults (see
Section l.c.).
People with Disabilities.--No laws mandate accessibility for the
disabled, and disabled citizens have encountered discrimination in
employment and denial of access to schools. Several government agencies
and NGO's provide services and employment to various groups of disabled
citizens. In 1998 the Prime Minister appointed the first blind member
of the Senate, an action that despite expectations has not brought
tangible benefits to disabled persons, although it helped to increase
public awareness related to these issues. In July 1999, an incident in
which police rounded up a number of persons (many of whom reportedly
were mentally ill) triggered a national debate over police action (see
Section 1.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to
form or join a trade union, and unions function freely and
independently of the Government. The Labor Relations and Industrial
Disputes Act (LRIDA) defines worker rights. There is a spectrum of
national unions, some of which are affiliated with political parties.
Approximately 15 percent of the work force is unionized.
The LRIDA neither authorizes nor prohibits the right to strike, but
strikes do occur. Striking workers can interrupt work without criminal
liability but cannot be assured of keeping their jobs. Other than in
the case of prison guards, there is no evidence of any workers losing
their job over a strike action. Workers in 10 broad categories of
``essential services'' are prohibited from striking, a provision the
International Labor Organization (ILO) repeatedly condemned as overly
inclusive.
Beginning December 29, 1999, prison guards conducted an islandwide
sick-out to protest the proposed reappointment of the Commissioner of
Corrections. When 800 guards failed to comply with an order to return
to work, the authorities put them on forced leave at one-fourth pay
beginning in January. In March the Government brought disciplinary
charges against the guards and declared the work stoppage illegal. In
May court hearings began to examine the charges against the guards on a
case-by-case basis; they still were under way at year's end.
On March 30, members of the Junior Doctor Association (JDA) staged
an industrial action in which they curtailed their hours in retaliation
for nonsettlement of salary negotiations. The Government declared the
action illegal and the Supreme Court ordered the doctors back to work.
They did not comply but subsequently ended their protest on April 4.
The Government brought charges against the doctors who then apologized
for their actions. In April the court sentenced the JDA's executive
members to 200 hours of community service. The JDA appealed the ruling;
in June a higher court overturned the ruling on the grounds that the
JDA is not a legal organization and could not be taken to court. In
July in response to the ruling, the Government declared that it would
no longer conduct negotiations with ``nonlegal entities.'' Unions that
represent teachers and government workers feared that this could
include them, since they are not officially registered with the
Government as trade unions. In protest the three largest registered
trade unions boycotted an unrelated meeting with employers and the
Government in August. However, there have been no consequences for the
unregistered unions following the Government's announcement, reflecting
the fact that various other laws and regulations provide for their
right to bargain.
Unions maintain a wide variety of regional and international
affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There were no
reports of government interference with union organizing efforts during
the year. Judicial and police authorities effectively enforce the LRIDA
and other labor regulations. All parties are committed firmly to
collective bargaining in contract negotiations, even in some nonunion
settings. An independent Industrial Disputes Tribunal (IDT) hears cases
where management and labor fail to reach agreement. Any cases not
resolved by the IDT pass to the civil courts. The IDT generally handles
35 to 40 cases each year. Most are decided within 90 days, but some
take longer to resolve due to the complexity of the dispute or delays
requested by the parties. The LRIDA prohibits antiunion discrimination,
and employees may not be fired solely for union membership. The
authorities enforced this law effectively.
Collective bargaining is denied in a bargaining unit if no single
union represents at least 40 percent of the workers in the unit in
question or when the union seeking recognition for collective
bargaining purposes does not obtain 50 percent of the votes of the
total number of workers (whether or not they are affiliated to the
union). The ILO's Committee of Experts (COE) considers that where there
is no collective agreement and where a trade union does not obtain 50
percent of the votes of the total number of workers, that union should
be able to negotiate at least on behalf of its own members. The COE
requested the Government to take necessary measures to amend this
legislation.
Domestic labor laws apply equally to the ``free zones'' (export
processing zones). However, there are no unionized companies in any of
the 3 zones, which employ 7,703 workers. Organizers attribute this
circumstance to resistance by foreign owners in the zones to organizing
efforts, but attempts to organize plants within the zones continue.
Company-controlled ``workers' councils'' handle grievance resolution at
most free zone companies, but they do not negotiate wages and
conditions with management. Management determines wages and benefits
within the free zones; these are generally as good as or better than
those in similar industries outside the zones. The Ministry of Labor is
required to perform comprehensive factory inspections in the free zones
once each year, and in practice it performs them at 6- to 9-month
intervals. There were no reports of substandard or unsafe conditions in
the free zone factories.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
does not specifically address the matter of forced or compulsory labor
for either adults or children, but there were no reports that this
practice exists.
The ILO COE noted that the Jamaica Shipping Act of 1998 did not
remove the provision that disciplinary offences of seafarers such as
desertion and absence without leave are punishable by imprisonment
(involving an obligation to work). The ILO points out that this is
incompatible with ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor
and requested that the Government amend the legislation. However,
amendments to the law that were enacted in November did not address
this criticism.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Juvenile Act provides that children under the age of
12 shall not be employed except by parents or guardians, and that such
employment may be only in domestic, agricultural, or horticultural
work. However, enforcement is uneven. Children under the age of 12 are
seen peddling goods and services on city streets. There are also
reports that underage children are employed illegally in fishing
communities and in prostitution. The Educational Act stipulates that
all children between 6 and 11 years of age must attend elementary
school. However, due to economic circumstances, thousands of children
are kept home to help with housework and avoid school fees. A 1994
UNICEF report stated that 4.6 percent of children below the age of 16
worked to help support their households. In December 1999, the Minister
of Labor, Welfare, and Sport gave a speech in which she stated that
23,000 children were engaged in child labor. The Government and UNICEF
cooperated on a strategy designed to eliminate child labor, to increase
school awareness through poverty alleviation, and on a public awareness
campaign intended to combat public complacency. However, these efforts
are hampered by economic conditions, lack of resources, and incomplete
information on the full extent of the problem.
In September the Government signed a memorandum of understanding
with the ILO in preparation to ratify ILO Convention 182 on the
prohibition and elimination of the ``worst forms'' of child labor. The
memorandum provides funding and technical assistance to assess the
country's child labor situation. While the Constitution does not
prohibit forced or bonded labor by children, such practices were not
known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage, raised from
$20 (J$800) to $30 (J$1,200) per week in August 1999, is considered
widely to be inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Most workers are paid more than the legal minimum,
except in the tourism industry. Work over 40 hours per week or 8 hours
per day must be compensated at overtime rates, a provision that is
observed widely.
The Labor Ministry's Industrial Safety Division sets and enforces
industrial health and safety standards, which are considered adequate.
Public service staff reductions in the Ministries of Labor, Finance,
National Security, and the Public Service have contributed to the
difficulties in enforcing workplace regulations.
The law provides workers with the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued
employment if they are trade union members or covered by the Factories
Act. The law does not specifically protect other categories of workers
in those circumstances. Industrial accident rates, particularly in the
bauxite and alumina industry, remained low.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, there are laws against assault and
fraud, and other laws establish various immigration and customs
regulations. There were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
from, within, or through the country.
__________
MEXICO
Mexico is a federal republic composed of 31 states and a federal
district, with an elected president and a bicameral legislature. On
July 2, voters elected Vicente Fox Quesada of the opposition Alliance
for Change Coalition president in elections that domestic and
international observers judged to be generally free and fair, and which
ended the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) 71-year hold on the
presidency. Observers described the election as a historic turning
point of the most profound significance and made recommendations for
further electoral reform. Fox began his 6-year term on December 1,
replacing Ernesto Zedillo. Sporadic outbursts of politically motivated
violence continued to occur in the southern states of Chiapas,
Guerrero, and Oaxaca. The peace process in Chiapas between the
Government and the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) remained
stalled throughout most of the year; however, some progress was made in
December after President Fox ordered the dismantling of military
checkpoints, submitted to Congress a bill to implement the peace
accords, and closed two contentious military posts in Chiapas. In
addition, during December the state government released 16 EZLN
prisoners and the EZLN, through its spokesman, set 3 conditions for the
resumption of dialog. The judiciary is generally independent; however,
it occasionally has been influenced by the executive branch. In
addition, judicial effectiveness is hampered by inefficiency, a high
caseload, and limited resources at almost all levels.
The police forces, which include federal and state judicial police,
the Federal Preventive Police (PFP), municipal police, and the various
police auxiliary forces, have primary responsibility for internal
security. However, the military plays a large role in some law
enforcement functions, primarily counternarcotics, and also exercises
internal security responsibilities. Elected civilian officials control
the police and the military; however, corruption is widespread within
police ranks and also is a problem for the military. The military
maintains a strong presence in the state of Chiapas and a lesser, but
still significant, deployment in Guerrero. Military personnel and
police officers continued to commit serious human rights abuses.
The Government continued to deregulate and open the market-based,
mixed economy. The gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 was $484
billion and the inflation rate was 12.3 percent. Per capita GDP in 1999
was about $4,974. The economy still is recovering from the 1994
economic crisis, and real wages are less than before the crisis.
Leading exports include petroleum, automobiles, and manufactured and
assembled products, including electronics and consumer goods. One-
fourth of the population resides in rural areas where subsistence
agriculture is common. Income distribution remained skewed; the top 30
percent of the population received about 67 percent of total income,
while the bottom 30 percent earned less than 7.4 percent.
The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems remain in several areas and in some
states where a poor climate of respect for human rights presents
special concern. Federal and state law enforcement officials were
accused of committing political and extrajudicial killings. There
continued to be credible reports of disappearances. The police
regularly obtain information through torture, prosecutors use this
evidence in courts, and the courts continue to admit as evidence
confessions extracted under torture. The military also has been accused
of using torture. Widespread police corruption and alleged police
involvement in narcotics-related crime continued. Prison conditions are
poor. The police continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily.
Lengthy pretrial detention, lack of due process, and judicial
inefficiency and corruption persisted. Threats and attacks on
journalists--some reportedly by federal, state, or local authorities--
hindered press freedom, and there were reports of some self-censorship.
Drug-related killings and violence, particularly in the northern
states, continued. Violence and discrimination against women,
indigenous people, religious minorities, and homosexuals persisted.
Child prostitution and abuse continued. There were credible reports of
limits on freedom of association and worker rights. Extensive child
labor in agriculture and the informal economy and trafficking in
persons are problems. There were increased reports of vigilante
killings.
The Government's efforts to improve the human rights situation
continued to meet with limited success. Although the Government has
sanctioned some public officials, police officers, and members of the
military, widespread impunity continues to be a serious problem among
the security forces. The Zedillo Government continued to support the
National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), and in April 1999, Congress
amended the Constitution to grant it greater autonomy from the
executive branch. However, the CNDH primarily investigates complaints
against federal authorities and has no enforcement powers.
Armed civilian groups operating in the state of Chiapas committed
human rights abuses. There continued to be a high incidence of
narcotics-related violence, particularly in the northern states, and
human rights abuses, allegedly with the assistance of members of the
security forces. Guerrilla attacks against government property and
personnel continued, but at a lesser rate and intensity relative to
previous years.
On December 2, the day after his inauguration, President Fox and
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR) Mary Robinson signed an
agreement on technical assistance in human rights matters. Commissioner
Robinson also announced the establishment of a human rights U.N.
liaison office to work with human rights organizations to help
implement the technical assistance program. Robinson stated that the
accord was especially significant because the President himself had
signed it on his second day in office in the state of Oaxaca, where
there are notable human rights problems.
Shortly before assuming office, President Fox announced the
appointment of Mariclaire Acosta, former president of the Mexican
Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, to the new
position of Special Ambassador for Human Rights. Her mission is to
ensure that the Government complies with its human rights commitments,
and that it distributes its human rights resources effectively.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Federal and state
law enforcement officials were accused of committing political and
extrajudicial killings. In past years, the military also was accused of
such killings; however, there were no reports implicating the military
during the year.
There were some apparently politically motivated killings by
security force officials. On June 15, Artemio Arturo Perez, a
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) supporter arrested for causing a
public disturbance during a PRI political rally in Mixistlan de La
Reforma, Oaxaca, died in his jail cell. Perez and his family claimed
that PRI party members forced persons to attend the rally, and that
Perez was arrested for voicing his disapproval. The prison authorities
declared suicide to be the official cause of death, but Perez's family
and various human rights organizations claim that he died as a result
of torture (see Section 1.c.). On June 21, two family members began a
hunger strike to demand action against prison employees Alfredo Reyes,
Wilfrido Hernandez Solano, and Luis Faustino Gonzalez for abuse of
authority, illegal detention, and torture. The case is under
investigation by the Oaxaca state attorney general's office and the
state's Human Rights Commission.
In March the president of the Jalisco Human Rights Commission cited
several cases of possible police involvement in the deaths of prisoners
(see Section 1.c.).
The Durango state Human Rights Commission is investigating the
presumed suicide of Jose Manuel Urbina, who was found drowned in a
state security facility in June. National Action Party (PAN) deputy
Victor Hugo Castaneda Soto questioned the manner in which Urbina was
arrested and noted that his body was found in a crouched position, a
difficult position to maintain by someone attempting to drown himself.
On July 19, five men with known drug connections were found hanged
near El Quelite, Sinaloa. On July 16, according to witnesses, armed men
in Federal Judicial Police uniforms kidnaped the five--Fausto Andres
Arellano Vidales, Anacleto Valle Garcia, Gaston Horacio Lopez
Amarillas, Guillermo Gurrola Gutierrez, and Carlos Lopez Torres--from a
store in Mazatlan, Sinaloa. State authorities were investigating the
case, including a drug trafficking connection, at year's end.
There were numerous reports of executions carried out by rival drug
gangs, whose members have included both active and former federal,
state, and municipal security personnel. Throughout the country, but
particularly in the northern border states, violence related to
narcotics trafficking continued. For example, 27 murders with presumed
or proven drug connections occurred in the Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua
area from January 1 to August 31. The modus operandi of the killings
has shifted from the kidnapings and disappearances of the mid-1990's to
armed attacks in public areas throughout the city, in which intended
targets and innocent bystanders are victims. The police and military
were accused of committing serious human rights violations as they
carried out the Government's efforts to combat drug cartels.
Although narcotics-trafficking organizations committed many
killings, human rights groups allege that security forces are
responsible for some killings generally attributed to narcotics
traffickers or other criminals, including some of those whose bodies
were discovered in Chihuahua in December 1999 (see Section 1.b.). The
Association of Families of Disappeared Persons has alleged that the
security forces were behind many of the disappearances and has argued
that the cases were not investigated properly for that reason.
In October 1999, a group of men armed with assault weapons attacked
Acapulco City councilor-elect Marco Antonio Lopez Garcia and his family
while they were en route to a PRD election victory celebration. The
councilor's son was killed, and the councilor seriously wounded. State
authorities charged a PRD activist with the crime and alleged that he
was affiliated with the Popular Revolutionary Insurgency Army (ERPI).
The suspect later repudiated a confession that he alleged was coerced
by torture and was released in November 1999. PRD officials rejected
the results of the state investigation as false and called for federal
intervention. Human rights observers charged that state and federal
authorities used the investigation into electoral violence to repress
opposition parties and peasant organizations by linking the political
opposition to insurgent groups. The case is unresolved and still open.
There were no new developments during the year in the Federal
Attorney General's office's (PGR) investigation into the March 1999
killing in Guerrero of Aurelio Penaloza Garcia, a former state attorney
general and advisor to the PRD's unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate,
by men dressed in Federal Judicial Police uniforms and armed with
automatic weapons. In April 1999, the authorities had charged
Bernardino Alvear Villa and Juan Valdovinos Rodriguez in connection
with this murder. They have been arrested and were in jail awaiting
trial at year's end. An arrest warrant has been issued for Eulogis
Palacios.
On April 29, the Morelos state supreme court upheld the state
congress's decision to bar former governor Jorge Carillo Olea from
holding state office for the next 12 years because of his
administration's connection to a kidnaping ring in the state. In March
1999, a court convicted the former Morelos state attorney general,
Carlos Peredo Merlo, of allowing the cover-up of the kidnaping,
torture, and murder of Jorge Nava Aviles in 1998. He eventually
received a sentence of less than 2 years. The court also convicted
Cuernavaca's former deputy prosecutor and the former director of the
state judicial police on related charges in the same case and sentenced
each of them to 3 years and 3 months. The remaining persons accused in
this case still are awaiting trial.
There were no new developments regarding the October 1999 death of
Cosem Demian Sanchez Sastre, a member of the Zapatista National
Liberation Front (FZLN), the political branch of the EZLN, who was
found dead in his cell in a Tijuana detention facility. There also were
no new developments regarding either the August 1999 case of the arrest
of Tamaulipas PGR officials charged with the murder of fellow PGR
official Jaime Rajid Gutierrez Arreola or the May 1999 killing of 1
immigrant when federal fiscal police opened fire on a van containing 23
persons.
There were no new developments in the June 1999 case of Mauricio
Martinez Hernandez, a municipal worker killed by a police officer in
Naucalpan, in the state of Mexico. There were no new developments in
the May 1999 attack on indigenous rights leader Herberto Pazos Ortiz.
There were no new developments in the case of Gerardo Villarreal
Rodriguez, who died in Nuevo Leon in 1998, after being tortured by four
state police officers; or in the investigation of the 1998 killing of
an alleged migrant smuggler, in which seven members of the Grupo Beta
police unit were detained.
On May 18, a Chiapas state court convicted the thendirector of the
auxiliary police, former General Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz, and his two
chief lieutenants, Roberto Garcia Rivas and Roberto Martin Mendez, of
``homicide by omission'' and sentenced them to 8 years in jail in
connection with the 1997 Acteal massacre. The men were close enough to
hear the shootings, but took no action and reported that all was quiet
in their area when questioned by state officials. Of the 102 persons
detained, 58 now have been convicted and sentenced, although 24 have
had their sentences suspended. There are outstanding warrants for 27
others.
On May 10, 14 former police officers involved in the 1997 killing
of 6 youths during a police operation in the Mexico City neighborhood
of Buenos Aires were convicted in connection with 3 of those killings.
The court sentenced 11 officers to the maximum penalty of 50 years in
jail and 2 others to 18-1/2 years. However, in September a judge denied
an arrest warrant for Moctezuma Ilhuicamina Zaepeda Rodriguez and Jose
Lamberto Ponce Lara, the two former leaders of the police groups
implicated in the murders. The same judge also either acquitted or
denied arrest warrants for 15 other police officers in September.
Investigations were still underway into the killings of the remaining
three youths.
The courts have arrested 44 public officials in connection with the
1995 Aguas Blancas massacre of 17 indigenous farmers. Of the 44, 13
former police officers have been convicted and sentenced to 18 years in
prison, 9 other former government officials have been convicted and
sentenced, and 3 of the accused are fugitives. Fifteen former police
officers have been absolved and freed on appeal, as have 7 other former
officials. Despite recommendations by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR), the U.N. Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions,
and the Supreme Court, then-Governor Ruben Figueroa Alcocer has not
been investigated or prosecuted for his alleged involvement in the
massacre. The Guerrero state government has indemnified the debts of
the victims' families, and both the federal and state governments
consider the case resolved.
On June 12, seven Chiapas state policemen were killed and one other
policeman and a civilian were wounded in an ambush in Las Limas
village, El Bosque municipality, Chiapas. On July 26, the Federal
Attorney General's office announced the arrests of PRI supporter
Alberto Patishtan Gomez and EZLN supporter Salvador Lopez Gonzalez in
connection with the ambush on charges of murder, robbery, and
possession of illegal weapons. The Federal Attorney General's office
charged that Patishtan and Lopez were part of an armed 10-person group
that carried out the attack. However, the Fray Bartolome de Las Casas
Human Rights Center maintains Lopez's innocence, claiming there is
insufficient proof against him.
On July 30, Juan Lopez and Gabriel Luis Hernandez Gomez were
arrested in connection with the June 1999 murder of Jose Hidalgo Perez,
a member of a politically active family in San Cristobal de Las Casas,
Chiapas. They are awaiting trial.
There were no new developments in the January 1999 killing of
villagers in Tzacabel, Chiapas.
On February 27, the authorities arrested two suspects for the
January 1999 murder of Jorge Aguirre Meza, cofounder of the Sinaloa
Human Rights Defense Commission and a mayoral candidate in the
municipality of Navolato. The suspects, who reportedly have ties to
narcotrafficking, are currently in jail and on trial in Culiacan, the
state capital. Arrest warrants for two other suspects were also issued;
however, these suspects are in a Mexicali jail on unrelated crimes.
The number of reports of vigilante killings and violence increased
during the year, as compared to 1999. For example, on July 30,
approximately 2,000 residents of the community Nueva Palestina,
Chiapas, put an indigenous man on trial for a robbery and murder and
killed him. The state attorney general's office dispatched a team to
investigate and to help resolve tensions in the community.
b. Disappearance.--There continued to be credible reports of
disappearances. The CNDH is working to establish a nationwide database
to assist in the identification of unknown remains, some of which may
be those of persons who disappeared. According to press reports, the
CNDH during the year received 37 cases of presumed disappearances; 19
of those reported missing later were found alive and well. In December
1999, nine bodies were recovered from graves outside Ciudad Juarez,
Chihuahua. Six of the nine bodies were identified positively and the
remains released to their families in May. Three of the bodies were
identified as persons not previously listed among the 224 persons
reported missing in the state since 1994. All of the victims are
believed to have had ties to drug trafficking in some way. Federal
authorities confiscated the ranch where the bodies were found but the
courts subsequently ordered it returned to its owner in July. The
Chihuahua-based Committee for the Defense of Human Rights alleges that
military and police forces are responsible for some of the
disappearances. The Association of Families of the Disappeared Persons
also has alleged that the security forces were behind many of the
disappearances and has argued that the cases were not investigated
properly for that reason.
According to the national public security system, there were 607
kidnapings in 1999, 734 in 1998, and 1,047 in 1997. However, kidnaping
is an underreported crime. In Michoacan police have broken 89 kidnaping
rings since 1996, resulting in 500 arrests, including 49 during the
year. On August 18, Mexico City's Legislative Assembly passed a law to
impose mandatory minimum sentences of 15 to 20 years for Mexico City
public servants convicted of kidnaping. Although 6 kidnapings were
reported in Chihuahua State from January to August, all have been
resolved and 11 suspects were arrested and remain in custody. None of
the suspects detained are public officials.
According to the Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Center for Human Rights
(PRODH), on March 13, gunmen allegedly under the order of local bosses
in Ajuchitlan del Progreso, Guerrero, kidnaped Maximino Marcial Jaimes.
He has not been seen since. Marcial was a member of an environmentalist
organization. According to PRODH, the press had reported that Marcial
was in Almoloya prison, but the prison officially denied his presence
there. His whereabouts were unknown at year's end.
According to the January 1999 Human Rights Watch report, many
disappearance cases were in fact cases of prolonged detention by
security forces. The report detailed incidents that occurred in
previous years, and numerous human rights groups credibly asserted that
disappearances continued to occur.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, it continues
to be a serious problem. The Constitution excludes as evidence
confessions obtained in the absence of the accused person's defense
attorney, and the law excludes coerced confessions, including those
extracted under torture. However, the police regularly obtain
information through torture, prosecutors use this evidence in courts,
and the courts continue to admit as evidence confessions extracted
under torture. The military has also been accused of using torture.
According to Amnesty International (AI), many victims do not report, or
do not follow through on complaints against the police due to fear of
reprisals, thereby hampering prosecution of the perpetrators. To combat
torture, the Congress passed laws to prevent and sanction torture in
1991 (amended in 1994), adopted the Law of the Defense Office of Mexico
City in 1998 and the Federal Public Defense Law in 1998.
In her 1999 annual address, the then-president of the CNDH
acknowledged that torture continued to be a serious human rights
problem. She cited the PGR and the Defense Secretariat as the main
organizations associated with the use of torture. In a report published
in July 1999, the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed concern that
laws aimed to prevent torture were inadequate because of the absence of
an independent body to investigate allegations of mistreatment. There
are persistent reports by nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) of the
widespread use of torture by the police and the security forces. In a
June 22 report, AI Mexico claimed to have received numerous complaints
that indicate that torture is a habitual practice in many areas of the
country especially to extract confessions and information in place of
police investigations. In October the same organization reported that
the legal system permits torture, that torture is practiced in the
country, and that urgent action is needed to eliminate it. AI called
for legislative and administrative reforms to enforce the laws against
torture and eliminate the judicial prerogative that permits the
introduction of confessions extracted under torture. Nigel Rodley, the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported in January 1998 that
torture continued to occur despite the fact that the country had in
place an array of legal safeguards. In March Guadalupe Morfin Otero,
president of the Jalisco Human Rights Commission (CEDHJ), attacked the
state attorney general's office for continuing the use of torture when
interrogating prisoners. She cited several cases of possible police
involvement in the death of prisoners (see Section 1.a.).
The authorities punish few officials for torture, which continues
to occur in large part because confessions are the primary evidence in
many criminal convictions. Poorly trained and inadequately equipped to
investigate crimes, police officers often attempt to solve crimes by
rounding up likely suspects and then extracting confessions from them
by force.
In August the police in Nueva Italia, Michoacan, arrested Ivan
Ramirez and Israel Moline and allegedly tortured them into confessing
to the murder of their friend. One of the youths charged that he
confessed only after at least six state police officers had beaten him,
semi-asphyxiated him using plastic bags, and damaged his testicles. The
youths told the judge that they had been tortured; however, he admitted
their confessions as evidence anyway and consigned them to jail. When
the friend returned from an unannounced trip 3 months later, the youths
were released. The Michoacan State Human Rights Commission charged
state legal authorities with fabricating evidence in the case.
On August 4, CNDH report 8/2000 charged that the military falsified
evidence against two environmental activists, Rodolfo Montiel Flores
and Teodoro Cabrera Garcia, tortured them, violated their rights to due
process, and harassed residents in their home village, Pizotla,
Guerrero. The military did not respond publicly to the CNDH report.
Montiel and Cabrera had been arrested in May 1999 on charges of illegal
drug cultivation and illegal possession of arms, and their colleague
Salome Sanchez Ortiz was killed by the military. Montiel and Cabrera
stated that military personnel tortured them to extract their
confessions. The Government stated that on three separate occasions,
Montiel and Cabrera confessed to illegal activities, and that tests had
indicated that both men had fired a gun. However, the defense team
stated that on each of those occasions Montiel and Cabrera were
intimidated by the presence of military personnel. Initial medical
examinations performed in 1999 by government and CNDH doctors did not
find evidence of torture, but a medical examination by independent
doctors on July 29 did find physical evidence consistent with torture.
The CNDH recommended that the army conduct numerous internal
investigations of its handling of the arrests and detentions. On August
28, a judge sentenced Cabrera to 10 years' imprisonment for illegal
possession of arms reserved for the exclusive use of the military.
Montiel was sentenced to 6 years and 8 months on the same charge, as
well as for possession of arms without a license, and illegal drug
cultivation. Defense lawyers cited many irregularities in the judicial
process and are appealing the verdict. On October 19, the press
reported that the PGR requested that the sentences of Montiel and
Cabrera be increased to the maximum of 20 years; however, on October
27, the appeals judge upheld their original sentences.
On April 1, the former president of the Guerrero state PRD, David
Molina Francisco, alleged that he was freed after being held hostage
for 40 hours by military personnel. Molina claims that he was tortured
physically and psychologically, including being beaten and subjected to
electric shocks, and interrogated on activities of insurgent groups.
The PRD lodged a formal complaint with the Guerrero state human rights
commission.
On August 1, the Mexico City human rights commission recommended
that the city's attorney general's office investigate the torture of
Jose Luis Mendez Briano and Fernando Martinez Beltran, who were
arrested by city police on June 24 while making their getaway from a
robbery. One of the men was transferred to the hospital for treatment
of various injuries.
On July 30, in Ecatepec, Mexico state, auxiliary police discovered
four Central American migrants hiding in a rail car. The police
allegedly beat them, stripped them of their clothing, and kept them in
a cell for several hours, before finally letting them go. The federal
prosecutor's office in Ecatepec opened an inquiry into the alleged
violations; the inquiry continued at year's end.
State human rights commissions also received reports of torture
allegedly committed by police. The CEDHJ charged in September 1999,
that the Jalisco state attorney general, Felix Ledesma Martinez, and
the mayor of Guadalajara, Francisco Ramirez Acuna, had impeded an
investigation into an alleged case of torture to protect high-ranking
members of the Guadalajara municipal police force. On January 13,
Jalisco state police arrested former armored car guard Jesus Galvan
Ortiz in Guadalajara, Jalisco. Galvan claimed that police took him to a
house, tortured him, and demanded that he confess to robbing an armored
car. Police released him several hours later and never charged him. The
house where Galvan allegedly was taken and tortured was later found to
belong to the wife of attorney general Ledesma. On February 8, Ledesma
admitted to owning the property but denied any knowledge of the alleged
torture. Nonetheless, on February 14, citing personal reasons, he
resigned from office. The Jalisco CEDH was investigating Galvan's
allegations at year's end.
In September 1999, the president of the Mexico City Human Rights
Commission (CDHDF), Luis de la Barreda, announced that during the
CDHDF's 6 years of existence, the Mexico City attorney general's office
(PDJDF) was the subject of the majority of its recommendations
regarding torture. The commission made 14 recommendations involving 18
alleged perpetrators; 7 against the PDJDF, 6 against the Director
General of Prisons, 3 against the Secretary of Public Security, and 2
against the Director General of Public Health. In its report, the CDHDF
noted that it had investigated 44 security personnel for the use of
torture. It had 17 of these cases still under investigation, dismissed
5, and had found 22 public officials culpable. However, the authorities
did not arrest 11 of those found culpable.
During the year, the Zacatecas state Human Rights Commission issued
several recommendations for punitive action against the state police
for their habitual use of torture. On August 8, the Zacatecas state
legislature requested that Governor Ricardo Monreal Avila order the
state attorney general to designate a special prosecutor to investigate
the local police for the alleged torture of four persons accused of
stealing farm equipment in 1999. On September 20, state prosecutors
issued arrest warrants for two state policemen on charges of torture,
illegal arrest, and abuse of authority. The prosecutors also announced
that they were investigating five other members of the state police,
including the state police chief, for their presumed involvement in
torture. However, despite the public urging of Governor Ricardo
Monreal, neither arrest order had been executed by year's end.
Members of the security forces were charged with committing rape.
For example, on June 10, municipal police in Matias Romero, Oaxaca,
arrested Rolando Jesus Vazquez Vargas, a sergeant in the 6th artillery
regiment, for the rape and beating of Maria de Carmen Dominguez. Two
other men are being sought in connection with the same assault. On July
18, Chihuahua state judicial police arrested three soldiers, Ruben
Villanueva Sanchez, Eleazar Jimenez Flores, and Rosendo Juarez Zenil,
for raping and beating a tourist. A 1998 report by the IACHR described
a definite pattern of rape and sexual assault against women committed
by such officials. The Commission stated that some women had been
assaulted sexually by law enforcement officials, particularly those in
detention, or had been assaulted by others with the officials' consent.
Official corruption and complicity in crime continues to be a
source of human rights violations. For example, on May 25 and 26, the
authorities arrested two Mexico City judicial police agents, Ahui Omar
Castro Hernandez and Gerardo Bustamante Dominguez, and Rene Rodriguez
Monroy, a former employee of the city's public security secretariat, on
extortion charges. They allegedly demanded $16,000 (150,000 pesos) from
narcotics trafficker Jose Rigoberto Caballero, in exchange for his
freedom from city custody. Many citizens distrust the justice system,
including law enforcement officials, and are reluctant to register
official complaints.
On July 23, workers at a hospital construction site in Ciudad
Juarez rioted in protest over mistreatment by police and poor working
conditions (see Section 6.e.). According to the workers, one of the
underlying causes of the incident was persistent petty extortion by the
police.
On August 8, Juan Ramos Lopez, judicial director of the city's
Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), lodged a complaint against the
PGJDF with the Mexico City human rights commission. Ramos alleged that
the PGJDF had been persecuting him since November 1999 when the SSP
approached the PGJDF for information on the diversion of funds in the
city's auxiliary police force. A PGJDF investigation into the diversion
of funds continues, and 26 auxiliary police commanders have been
suspended from duty for their involvement in the scandal.
Police abuse and inefficiency hamper investigations. For example,
in April a court overturned on appeal the 30-year sentence of Abdel
Latif Sharif, convicted in connection with the string of murders of
over 200 women since 1993 in Ciudad Juarez, based on lack of
consistency in the autopsy reports. Sharif remains in custody and is to
receive a new trial. Since his arrest, eight more young women have been
kidnaped, raped, strangled, and their bodies dumped in the same areas
of the desert where previous victims were found. Four bus drivers are
still in detention for allegedly committing the murders while Sharif
was incarcerated. The bus drivers claim that they were tortured into
confessing, and their case remained under investigation at year's end
(see Section 1.c.).
Several human rights organizations and the U.N. Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial Executions, Asma Jahangir, who visited the country in
1999, believe that the Government has made only limited progress in
solving these murders because most of the victims were poor, young
women, few of whom had anyone to press the authorities for intensive
investigation. However, police incompetence, prosecutorial ineptitude,
and lack of investigative resources also hampered the investigation.
To enhance the investigation into the murders in Ciudad Juarez, the
Chihuahua attorney general's office appointed a special prosecutor for
crimes against women in 1998. The special prosecutor's office has 65
cases in process, related to 67 of the victims; the remains of 23 of
the victims required extensive scientific examination to identify them.
In August the court system in Ciudad Juarez had a total of 145 cases in
process against 103 persons for murdering women, including for motives
of domestic violence, crimes of passion, drug connections, and revenge.
Some law enforcement personnel have been known to have drug
trafficking connections. For example, in November 1999, 4 former
Tamaulipas state police officers were among a group of 10 men,
including narcotics trafficker Osiel Cardenas-Quillen, who confronted 2
international law enforcement officers with automatic rifles on a busy
street in Matamoros, Tamaulipas. Carlos-Guillen and his associates went
into hiding and are being sought by the authorities.
On June 21, the PGR arrested Jose Ricardo Rodriguez Torres, Ruben
Cortes Flores, Miguel Angel Crespo Zoloeta, and Carlos Pineda Bernal,
four Tijuana-based agents of the PGR's counternarcotics agency. They
were charged with drug trafficking.
On August 8, the newspaper La Jornada reported that the internal
affairs department of the PGR sanctioned 3,060 public servants between
December 1996 and March 2000 for involvement in illegal activities,
especially drug trafficking.
Narcotics-trafficking organizations also included corrupt public
officials. The former governor of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva
Madrid, is suspected of having aided narcoticstrafficking
organizations. He fled shortly before his term of office expired in
1999 and still was being sought by federal authorities at year's end.
Villanueva Madrid claims that he is innocent and the victim of a
political frame-up.
Government officials have conceded the country's serious human
rights shortcomings. UNHCHR Robinson, who visited the country in
November 1999, said that President Zedillo's admission that serious
human rights violations occur in Mexico was a positive sign. In an
effort to fight corruption and provide better public security, the
Government created the PFP in 1999. The 12,000-person force includes
approximately 5,000 transferred military personnel and another 6,000
from the former federal highway police. The inclusion of military
personnel, who take a leave of absence from the armed forces while
serving in the PFP, led to criticism from some human rights NGO's.
Police extorted money from street children, at times abused
homosexuals (see Section 5), and violated the rights of illegal
immigrants (see Section 2.d.).
Francisco Hernan Cortes, one of the presumed attackers in the May
1999 attempt on the life of PRD Senator Hector Sanchez Lopez and two
companions, remains in jail awaiting trial in Oaxaca.
Prison conditions are poor. Many prisons are staffed by
undertrained and corrupt guards, and some lack adequate facilities.
Prisoners complain that they must purchase food, medicine, and other
necessities from guards or bribe guards to allow the goods to be
brought in from outside. The penal system comprises 444 facilities: 5
federal penitentiaries, 8 federal district prisons, 329 state prisons,
and 102 municipal and regional jails. Prison overcrowding continued to
be a common problem, despite an early release program endorsed by the
CNDH, legal reforms that reduced the number of crimes that carry
mandatory prison sentences, and the construction of new prisons.
Antonio Sanchez Galindo, technical director of the Council for Minors
of the Secretariat of Government, estimated that the prison population
is 50 percent over capacity. The prisons with the largest
overpopulation are: Reclusorio Norte in Mexico City-Capacity 4,506,
actual population 7,419; Reclusorio Oriente in Mexico City-Capacity
4,295, actual population 7,441; Reclusorio Sur in Mexico City-Capacity
2,914, actual population 4,485; La Mesa in Tijuana-Capacity 1,716,
actual population 5,982; Ciudad Juarez-Capacity 1,310, actual
population 2,740. In Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, the state prison
increased its capacity by 400 beds to 1,240, but the facility still has
2,720 inmates. The authorities in Chihuahua State have approved the
construction of a second penitentiary in Ciudad Juarez to ease
overcrowding and begun construction on a new juvenile detention
facility, which is scheduled to be completed in 2001.
In 1998 Federal District prison director Carlos Tornero Diaz
admitted that guards supply 40 percent of the illegal drugs smuggled
into the prisons, and that inmates lacked sufficient drinking water.
While the authorities investigate some prison officials for abusing
prisoners, they more commonly dismiss those who commit abuses or charge
them with only minor offenses. Drug and alcohol abuse is a problem in
prisons. A Baja California State official estimated that 80 percent of
the state's prison population are addicted to drugs. Conflicts between
rival prison groups involved in drug trafficking continue to occur. On
September 5, Federal Judicial police stormed the Torreon prison to end
what they claimed were 20 years of self-government by the prisoners. In
the process, the police seized munitions, drugs including cocaine and
marijuana, and alcohol. In May doctors at a prison in Nuevo Laredo
resigned, citing unhealthy conditions such as inadequate food and water
as the reason for their resignations. They stated that conditions such
as mange, AIDS, and tuberculosis are known to the authorities, who fail
to take any action to treat and segregate sick inmates.
The Oaxaca Human Rights Networks reported that Eugenio Almaraz
Garcia, a Zapotec man, died on February 29 from presumed neglect by the
director of the Pochutla, Oaxaca prison. According to his family and
the Mexican League for the Defense of Human Rights, Almaraz died of
septic shock, multiple organ failure, and tuberculosis after being
denied medical attention 6 days before his death. The Oaxaca state
Human Rights Commission is investigating the case.
In many prisons inmates exercise authority, displacing prison
officials. Influence peddling, drug, and arms trafficking, coercion,
violence, sexual abuse, and protection payoffs are the chief methods of
control used by prisoners against their fellow inmates. Corruption and
poor conditions led to riots and escapes. On September 30, about 60
detainees at the Juarez Juvenile Detention Center were involved in a
clash with authorities. The troubles began when repeat offenders being
held in isolation allegedly exposed themselves to guards and refused to
return to their cells. Ten ringleaders then incited others to join in
the disturbance. Rioters broke lights and tore down power cables before
being subdued by police reinforcements using tear gas.
On May 17, the PFP intervened in the Penitentiary Number 1 in Nuevo
Laredo, Tamaulipas to regain control of the prison, which had been
exercised by a narcotics-trafficker prisoner, Guillermo Martines.
On September 5, close to 1,000 PFP personnel intervened in the
state penitentiary in Torreon, Coahuila, to break the control
established by prisoner Martin Gallardo.
In August the CNDH issued a recommendation to the governor of
Tabasco and requested an immediate investigation into the
administrators of the state penitentiary. Prison riots at the state
penitentiary on October 22 and November 3, 1999, left 11 prisoners
dead. The CNDH report criticized Tabasco prison administrators for
their negligence in not caring for the prisoners during severe flooding
and for failing to maintain order, impartiality, and the physical
integrity of prisoners.
Women are held separately from men and juveniles are held
separately from adults.
Although the Constitution calls for separation of convicted
criminals from detainees held in custody, in practice these
requirements were violated routinely as a result of overcrowding.
There is no specific law or regulation to allow human rights
organizations or other NGO's to visit prisons; however, in practice
such visits are permitted in certain situations, especially by the
CNDH. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
is able to visit prisoners in Chiapas due to a July 1998 agreement with
the Government. For permission to visit prisoners in Oaxaca and
Guerrero, the ICRC must apply to the Ministry of Foreign Relations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the police continued
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. Arbitrary arrest and
detention were among the most common human rights abuses. Legally, a
prosecutor may hold a detainee no more than 48 hours before he must
present the accused to a judge, except when the accused is caught in
the act or within 72 hours of committing a crime. In 1999 Human Rights
Watch reported that a great number of disappearances eventually are
found to be cases of arbitrary detention (see Section 1.b.).
Reports of arbitrary detention occur with greatest frequency in
Tabasco, Guerrero, Chiapas, the Federal District, and Oaxaca. States'
attorney general personnel, state police, and the army are the most
frequent abusers of detention laws.
The Constitution provides that the authorities must sentence an
accused person within 4 months of detention if the alleged crime
carries a sentence of less than 2 years, or within 1 year if the crime
carries a longer sentence. These periods can be extended if the parties
agree. In practice, judicial and police authorities frequently ignored
these time limits. Criminal defendants often were held with convicted
prisoners. Furthermore, many detainees reported that judicial officials
often solicited bribes in exchange for not pressing charges. Those able
to pay were released from custody. Corruption is rampant throughout the
system. For example, in May two judicial police agents along with a
former city government employee were arrested on extortion charges (see
Section 1.c.).
Judges often failed to sentence indigenous detainees within legally
mandated periods. In 1996 the CNDH reviewed 8,661 files of indigenous
persons who were detained and recommended the immediate release of
1,727 persons. Of those states with the largest numbers of indigenous
prisoners, the CNDH reviewed 2,222 cases in Oaxaca, and recommended 407
releases, of which 296 had been accomplished by the end of 1998; 1,219
cases in Veracruz, with 331 recommendations for release and 245
releases; and 639 cases in Puebla, with 157 releases recommended, and
61 releases. In November 1999 the CNDH signed an accord with
Secretariat of Government, the PGR, the Federal Institute of the Public
Defense office, and the National Indigenous Institute (INI), to develop
a program for the anticipated liberty of indigenous prisoners in
federal prisons. Since that time, the CNDH has developed a database of
2,314 registered cases, and 381 persons were released during the year.
Federal prosecutors continued to adhere to the recommendation by
the INI that they drop charges against first-time offenders accused of
drug cultivation, as drug traffickers often forced indigenous
defendants, who were not made aware of the legal significance of their
actions, to grow the crops. The INI also supports programs to provide
translators for indigenous defendants and to assist them in obtaining
bail bonds.
Some human rights groups have claimed that activists arrested in
connection with civil disobedience activities are in fact political
detainees. The Government asserts that the system fairly prosecutes
those charged in sometimes violent land invasions for common crimes,
such as homicide and damage to property.
The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is generally
independent; however, on occasion it has been influenced by the
executive branch, particularly at the state level. Corruption,
inefficiency, and disregard of the law are major problems. Corruption
and impunity are serious problems and tend to benefit the wealthy and
powerful. Lack of training also is a problem. Judicial reforms have
begun to address some of these problems, but full resolution of these
problems awaits more extensive and systemic judicial reform. In
February and March 1999, the Congress and the states passed
constitutional reforms designed to streamline the administration of
justice and repeal archaic laws. Human rights groups criticized these
reforms, claiming that they effectively allow prosecutors to disregard
defendants' allegations of violation of due process during criminal
proceedings. On August 11, the International Jurists Commission
reported that judicial authority has been diminished severely by the
procedural immunity enjoyed by officials of the State, particularly the
military.
The federal court system consists of a Supreme Court, 91 circuit
courts of appeal, 49 courts of appeal, and 185 district courts.
Efforts to implement the 1995 judicial reforms continued. During
the year, the Federal Judicial Council strengthened administrative
control over the judiciary, investigated cases of corruption, and
removed some corrupt judges. In addition, in September the Institute
for Professional Formation of the Mexico City Attorney General's office
initiated new workshops and courses directed at officials who deal with
prosecutions, including the prosecutor's office, official secretaries,
judicial police, and police group leaders. The course material
encompassed case management, scientific investigation techniques, legal
framework, and evidence collection. However, in a report released in
December, Human Rights Watch asserted that deficiencies in the
administration of justice were still a major concern, and repeated its
1999 statement that judicial reforms have done little to improve the
problems that plague the justice system. The December report stated
that prosecutors not only ignored abuses by police but also fabricated
evidence. Judicial oversight was seriously inadequate as the courts
accepted evidence obtained through human rights violations, and judges
cited legal precedents that weakened human rights protections.
Based on the Napoleonic Code, the trial system consists of a series
of fact-gathering hearings at which the court receives documentary
evidence or testimony. Court officials may add notarized documents
(that are not authenticated) into the case file. A judge in chambers
reviews the case file and then issues a final, written ruling. The
record of the proceeding is not available to the general public; only
the parties have access to the official file, although by special
motion the victim may have access to it.
The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to attend
the hearings and challenge the evidence or testimony presented, and the
Government respects these rights in practice. In general, court
hearings are open to the public and it is common to find not only the
accused, but also relatives of the accused and journalists in the
courtroom.
While there is a constitutional right to an attorney at all stages
of criminal proceedings, in practice the authorities often do not
assure adequate representation for many poor defendants. Moreover, the
public defender system is not adequate to meet the demand, although
improvements in salaries and benefits have ameliorated this situation.
Attorneys are not always available during the questioning of
defendants; in some instances a defense attorney may attempt to
represent several clients simultaneously by entering different rooms to
certify formally that he was present, although he did not actually
attend the full proceedings. Prosecutor salaries and benefits vary by
region and agency. Federal prosecutors are usually better paid than
state ones.
In the case of indigenous defendants, many of whom do not speak
Spanish, the situation is often worse. The law calls for translation
services to be available at all stages of the criminal process;
however, the courts do not routinely furnish translators for indigenous
defendants at all stages of criminal proceedings, and thus defendants
may be unaware of the status of their cases. Provision of translators
to non-Spanish speaking defendants, including indigenous ones, is
provided for but poorly implemented, resulting in prisoners being
convicted without fully understanding the documents they have been
required to sign. The CNDH, through the Fourth Inspector General's
office, has a program to assist incarcerated indigenous defendants. The
INI also has judicial assistance programs for indigenous defendants and
provides counsel on their behalf. The INI also distributes legal,
educational, and informational material in indigenous languages.
A particularly egregious abuse of due process is the prosecution's
ability to use evidence gathered by means of torture. While torture
itself is a criminal act, judges routinely allow statements coerced
during torture to be used as evidence against the accused (see Section
1.c.). For example, in August a court convicted two environmental
activists in Guerrero although they allege that they had been tortured
into signing confessions (see Section 1.c.).
The law does not require civil trial of soldiers involved in civil
crimes, and the military continues to handle such cases. The
Constitution provides for military jurisdiction for crimes or offenses
involving any violation of military discipline. In cases in which a
member of the military commits a crime and is arrested by civil
authorities, the military has the right to request transfer immediately
of the case to military jurisdiction. Although the military retains
jurisdiction over its personnel, it has begun cooperating with the PGR
on investigations of counternarcotics cases involving soldiers and
sailors. For example, in late August, Generals Quiroz and Acosta were
arrested by military police on charges of narcotics trafficking and
assisting the Ciudad Juarez-based Amado Carrillo drug cartel. General
Acosta also was accused of complicity in the disappearance and torture
of several persons in Guerrero during the 1960's and 1970's.
In 1999 the Military Judicial Police had arrested five members of a
military dissident group, the Patriotic Command for Raising People's
Awareness (CPCP), a group composed of military personnel protesting
what they had called an unjust military justice system. The authorities
charged the five CPCP members with the crime of sedition and later
arrested the leader of the group, Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez. According
to the Foreign Ministry (SRE), on April 17, the CNDH concluded that
allegations that the military had tortured or violated the human rights
of Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez and the other incarcerated members of the
CPCP were unfounded. At year's end, the authorities held Bacilio Gomez
in jail but had not yet brought him to trial. In December, the 12th
circuit court in Mazatlan, Sinaloa, granted injunctions that in essence
dismissed the charges of insubordination, sedition, and conspiracy
against Juan Francisco Bernal Vasquez, Gerardo Torres Benitez, and
Ignacio Manzano Benitez. Although they still face charges of violating
``common military duties,'' they are eligible for release on bail. The
appeal filed by Hildegardo Bacilio, leader of the December 1998
protest, is still under consideration.
At times lawyers in human rights cases faced harassment. For
example, on January 27, two men physically harassed Juan de Dios
Hernandez Monge and issued threats against Pilar Noriega Garcia. Both
are attorneys for students at the Autonomous National University in
Mexico City (UNAM) detained by the authorities. On March 29, unknown
persons broke into the home of Leonel Guadalupe Rivero Rodriguez,
another attorney for UNAM students. No valuables were taken but his
computer files having to do with the UNAM cases were searched (see
Section 2.a.).
The only political prisoner is General Jose Francisco Gallardo who
maintains that he was sentenced to 28 years' imprisonment for speaking
his mind on the advisability of having a military ombudsman (see
Section 4). During the year, he received visits from Amnesty
International.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of
privacy, family, home, and correspondence, and the law requires search
warrants; however, in the past there have been credible reports that
unlawful searches without warrants were common.
The law allows for electronic surveillance with a judicial order.
The law prohibits electronic surveillance for electoral, civil,
commercial, labor, or administrative purposes.
On September 20, the Mexico City daily newspaper El Universal
reported that President-elect Fox, his transition team, and the
National Executive Committee of Fox's party, PAN, were victims of
eavesdropping on their telephone conversations. To substantiate its
charge, the newspaper printed the transcript of a phone conversation
between Fox and his spokesperson. Fox later verified the authenticity
of the transcript. The persons or person responsible for the taping are
unknown, but the press speculated that it only could have been the
Government's civilian intelligence organization, the Center for
Investigation and National Security (CISEN). However, no evidence was
provided to support that charge, and CISEN denied responsibility. In
December President Fox formed a committee, led by Secretary of
Government Santiago Creel, Secretary of Public Security Alejandro Gertz
Manero, Attorney General Rafael Macedo de la Concha, and security
advisor Aguilar Zinser, to revise the practices and role of CISEN. The
President gave the committee 100 days to evaluate CISEN and propose a
plan for its reorganization and the enhancement of its transparency.
On July 19, Jose Murat Casab, governor of Oaxaca, announced that a
routine check of his office had turned up three listening devices.
Murat blamed three officials of the Federal Secretariat of Government--
Francisco Eduardo de la Vega y Avila, Jose Trinidad Rodriguez
Ballesteros, and Olaf Ivan Corro Labrafor this act. The three officials
then lodged a federal complaint against Murat for character defamation.
Zacatecas governor Ricardo Monreal Avila instructed state attorney
general Gonzalez Navarro to open an investigation into alleged
electronic monitoring of state government officials by federal security
agents. In addition, state police chief Miguel Angel Hernandez advised
state representatives that they all were being monitored
electronically, although the factual basis for this advice was unclear.
On November 29, the PGR announced that it would not initiate legal
action against Jorge Salomon Azar, former governor of Campeche, nor
Antonio Gonzalez Kuir, current governor of Campeche, for their presumed
involvement in the 1998 wiretapping of Layda Sansores, a former member
of Congress. They later were released. However, on December 18,
Sansores petitioned a court to order the PGR to reactivate the
investigation against both men and to investigate Valente Quintana,
coordinator of the state security and police system; Antonio Ayala;
Dante Omana; and Manual Alfaro Isaac, former coordinator of advisors
for then-Governor Salomon Azar.
The Constitution states that all persons have the right to make
free, responsible, and informed decisions on the number of children
they choose to have. The 1984 General Health Law provides for criminal
action against those who pressure a woman to undergo sterilization
procedures or perform such procedures without a woman's consent. There
were no reports of forced sterilization during the year. In 1995 the
CNDH found that the largest number of complaints against health care
institutions involved negligence or abuse during childbirth by medical
personnel and charges of coerced sterilization. It said that the number
of such complaints had grown, in large part due to women's increased
awareness of their rights.
Independent agencies believed that forced sterilization procedures
exceeded by several times the number of known cases, but the overall
scope of the problem was difficult to quantify. Women may not realize
that procedures have been performed until after the fact, and many
victims are reluctant to file complaints, although there are mechanisms
for filing formal complaints with the National Medical Arbitration
Commission and with the national and state human rights commissions.
However, the CNDH office in Chiapas reported that in some indigenous
communities women choose sterilization, but then due to fear of
reprisal from their husbands report that it was forced upon them or
that they simply did not understand the nature of the procedure. In
1999 there were reports of possible violations of informed consent
standards with contraceptive drug use in the state of Guerrero;
however, these charges were not substantiated.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--There were numerous allegations of the use of
excessive force and the violation of international humanitarian law.
Incidents of conflict in Chiapas between the security forces and EZLN
sympathizers and in Guerrero between the army, the Popular
Revolutionary Army (EPR), and the Revolutionary Army of the People's
Insurgency (ERPI) led to many of these accusations. However, the
confused circumstances of these clashes made those allegations
difficult to substantiate. UNHCHR Robinson suggested in November 1999
that the Government consider creating a military human rights ombudsman
to combat impunity in the armed forces. In an interview with the
newspaper La Jornada published on July 27, CNDH president Jose Luis
Soberanes responded that his agency was capable of dealing with
complaints of violations by the military, and he also called for a
restructuring of the military. The Secretariat of National Defense
(SEDENA) has offices in Chiapas and Guerrero, to deal with citizen
complaints of human rights violations. SEDENA, in coordination with the
CNDH and state human rights commissions, provides its officers with
human rights training; however, enlisted troops do not always receive
instruction on human rights (see Section 4).
During much of the year, the Government maintained around 20,000
troops in selected areas of Chiapas to contain the EZLN-backed uprising
that began in 1994, and about half that number in Guerrero to handle 2
much smaller rebel groups there. The EPR and the EPRI maintain a
presence in Guerrero; however, they were less active compared with the
previous year.
On December 1, his first day in office, President Fox ordered the
dismantling of 53 military checkpoints in Chiapas and military camps in
the conflict zone. In less than 10 days, the army withdrew from two
contentious military positions. In addition, the Government lifted
restrictions on previously expelled foreigners and eased visa
requirements for members of human rights organizations. In a December 2
press conference in La Realidad, Chiapas, the EZLN's Subcommander
Marcos stated that President Fox's initial steps were encouraging and
praised his choice of Luis H. Alvarez as his Chiapas Peace Coordinator.
The rebel leader also laid down five conditions for a return to
dialogue with the government: passage of the Congressional Chiapas
Peace and Reconciliation Commission (COCOPA) bill, liberation of all
EZLN prisoners, withdrawal of the army from EZLN territory and
repositioning of the army to pre-1994 positions, closure of seven
specific military posts in Chiapas, and no substitution of state police
for army troops in the newly demilitarized areas. On December 5, Fox
sent to Congress the COCOPA bill to implement the 1996 San Andres
Accords between the EZLN and the Government. Governor Pablo Salazar
Mendiguchia took office on December 8, and declared that he plans to
review the cases of all state prisoners charged with links to the EZLN.
On December 30, he had 16 Zapatista prisoners released from state
custody with a promise that more would follow.
At year's end, an amnesty by the Oaxaca state government led to the
release of 32 persons accused of ties to the guerrillas from state
detention. Of the 55 persons still in custody, 27 are subject to
additional federal charges; and 20 were charged before 1996, the
commencement date stipulated in the amnesty law.
NGO's and others have alleged that in the process of dealing with
rebels in Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca, the Government used excessive
force. For example, on May 25, state police forces and the army entered
San Isidro Miramar in San Agustin Loxicha, Oaxaca, to detain alleged
EPR members. Community residents claimed police and military officers
harassed, threatened, and beat them during the arrest of Octaviano
Hernandez Pacheco and Andres Enrique Hernandez. Since 1996 more than 70
residents of Loxicha have been arrested for alleged involvement with
the EPR. As of July, 24 of these were still in prison. In July AI
claimed that the prisoners had been subjected to torture and death
threats and criticized the absence of due process in the handling of
the cases. The NGO the Christian Action for the Abolition of Torture
has criticized the use of torture against residents of Loxicha since
1996. However, on December 2, President Fox announced his support for
an amnesty for the EPR, the demilitarization of the Los Loxichas area
of Oaxaca State, and a review of the arrests of alleged EPR members. On
December 8, the Oaxaca State legislature passed an amnesty law for
local indigenous persons (Loxichas) accused of having links to the EPR.
As of December 16, eight persons had been released from detention as a
result of the amnesty; 79 Loxichas were still in custody. Of these,
another six persons were acquitted of homicide charges but not released
because of other charges pending against them. Although 27 of these
remaining prisoners are subject to federal charges, the Oaxaca State
government has already petitioned the federal government for an amnesty
on their behalf. Ultimately, up to 50 more prisoners could be released
and 200 other persons still at liberty could have their arrest warrants
cancelled, according to press reports.
In December 1998, the Fray Bartolome de Las Casas center and the
PGR published conflicting reports on the Acteal massacre. The Fray
Bartolome report blamed the Government for sponsoring armed civilian
groups in Chiapas and for failing to protect the victims. The NGO
accused the Government of waging ``lowintensity warfare'' in Chiapas
and stated that the Government was responsible for the massacre. The
PGR attributed the massacre to a history of local confrontation, the
presence of the EZLN, an absence of the rule of law, and the neglect of
local enforcement officials. In May a court convicted former General
Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz and his two chief lieutenants of ``homicide
by omission'' and sentenced each to 8 years in prison (see Section
1.a.). On October 15, the CNDH issued a report on the June 1998 battle
in El Charco, Guerrero between the military and alleged elements of the
ERPI that resulted in the killing of 12 persons. The Commission found
that the army had violated the human rights of the inhabitants and that
various articles of the Constitution, the Federal Criminal Procedure
Code, and the Code of Military Justice had been violated. The CNDH
recommended that the SEDENA investigate the actions of the military
participants in the El Charco events, that the Judge Advocate's office
investigate the official in the military prosecutor's office who first
received evidence in the case, that the Judge Advocate's office
determine if charges should be brought against military personnel, that
SEDENA advise all military personnel regarding their role and
responsibilities in upholding human rights and due process, and that
Sedena issue general instructions limiting the role of military
prosecutors in criminal investigations. SEDENA acknowledged receipt of
the report, accepted its recommendations, and pledged to study how to
implement them. At year's end, there was no information released
regarding the results of any military investigations.
The military continues to deny any responsibility for abuses
committed during the early stages of the Chiapas rebellion in 1994. The
military authorities who have jurisdiction failed to punish any
military personnel or government officials for committing abuses,
although the CNDH issued an interim report in May 1994 finding that
there was reason to believe that the military had injured or killed
civilians in aerial attacks and that there were summary executions,
illegal detentions, and instances of torture.
There were credible reports of violent incidents and murders
committed by armed civilian groups and local political factions in
Chiapas. The National Democratic Federation alleges that the group
``Peace and Justice'', which it described as a paramilitary group, was
responsible for the murders of 53 Zapatista sympathizers since 1995.
Another group that allegedly has committed human rights abuses in
Chiapas is the Revolutionary Indigenous Movement against the
Zapatistas. From January 1998 through August 1999, the army confiscated
431 weapons from civilians in the Chiapas zone of conflict. The Chiapas
state attorney general's office claimed to have disbanded 39 gangs and
confiscated 132 firearms within the same time period. On August 3,
between 30 and 300 members of the Peace and Justice armed civilian
group fired their weapons in the air, set off fragmentation grenades,
and burned at least 6 houses to evict 90 EZLN sympathizers from
Paraiso, Yajalon Municipality, Chiapas. The eviction reportedly was the
result of a 1997 land dispute. The 15 displaced families remain in the
nearby village of Hidalgo Joshil, and 40 military personnel patrol the
area to maintain peace.
Armed civilian groups, controlled or sponsored by local political
bosses loosely affiliated with the PRI, were alleged to have committed
many human rights violations in Chiapas, including the 1997 Acteal
massacre. NGO's such as the PRODH, The Fray Bartolome de las Casas
Human Rights Center in Chiapas, and the Mexican Commission for the
Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (CMDPDH) have identified at least
15 such groups; they identified 9 such groups in 1999. Some NGO's and
press accounts contended that these groups were not only the private
armies of local bosses, but also army surrogates armed by the military
and used to attack the EZLN. The Government denied these allegations
and likewise rejected the existence of paramilitary groups. On April
18, the Federal Attorney General's office opened a new special unit to
investigate possible armed civilian groups in Chiapas. On October 27,
the unit arrested 11 alleged members of Peace and Justice on charges of
illegal weapons possession, organized crime, and terrorism. Among those
arrested were three alleged leaders of the group: Samuel Sanchez, a
former PRI state legislator; Marcos Albino Torres Lopez, a former army
corporal; and Mario Cruz Perez, who reportedly was the link between the
political and military wings of Peace and Justice.
On May 7, four masked men killed three indigenous persons and
wounded one more during their return home by truck to Tzanembolom,
Chenalho Municipality, Chiapas. The survivor was a reported EZLN
sympathizer, while the dead were all members of the same progovernment
family. It is unknown whether the attack was politically motivated, the
result of a family feud, or a random criminal act. The CNDH opened two
investigations that were still in progress at year's end. To maintain
public order, the Chiapas state government adopted preventive measures,
including police patrols and 24-hour police presence to protect local
residents.
In June the municipal authorities of Chenalho, Chiapas, promised to
facilitate the return to the area of almost 3,000 displaced members of
``the Bees,'' a pacifist organization that sympathizes with some of the
goals of the EZLN. The Bees had been displaced from Chenalho since
1997.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. The mass media are not subject to
formal censorship by the Government; however, there were reports of
some self-censorship. In addition, threats and attacks on
journalistssome reportedly by federal, state, or local authorities--
hindered press freedom. Nonetheless, the freedom and independence of
the media continued to expand. Many observers believe that drug
trafficking organizations or corrupt security personnel in their pay
carried out most of the attacks on the media.
The traditional cozy relationship between the Government and the
media that tilted coverage and editorial opinion in the Government's
favor has diminished but not disappeared entirely. The Government no
longer controls the import of newsprint but does retain control over
broadcast licensing, which critics claim led some broadcast media to
practice self-censorship. Accordingly old habits of accommodation
lingered, and the editorial line of some key news organizations
maintained a bias in favor of the Government. The persistence of
official influence--and its greatest concentration--was most apparent
in television. Instead of paying a 12.5 percent tax on advertising
revenues, television broadcasters provided free broadcast time to the
Government, which gave it convenient access to this powerful medium.
Official advertising in the media continues, but disguising it as news
coverage is more common at the state than at the national level. Cash
and noncash payments to journalists persisted but were not as common as
they once were; legislation to end this practice was enacted in 1998.
The many attacks on journalists constituted the most serious
problem for press freedom. The Committee for the Protection of
Journalists and Media Communications reported that in 1999 there was a
decline in the number of acts of intimidation, including physical
attacks, threats, and detentions, against journalists; from 202 in 1998
to 135 in 1999. A report issued by 4 NGO's in 1999 recorded 240 attacks
of various types against journalists during 1998, compared with 187
during 1997. These numbers include all aggressive acts against the
media as reported in the media. According to the report, government
institutions (including federal, state, or local police) or officials
were responsible for 41 percent of the incidents. The Manuel Buendia
Foundation, one of the NGO's, concluded that the vast majority of acts
were intended to intimidate. During the first 7 months of 1999, the
CNDH program on aggression against journalists investigated 22
complaints of attacks on journalists; most were for assault or
intimidation. One, from July in the state of Morelos, was for murder.
The CNDH began an investigation of that case.
There were no new developments in the 1999 harassment cases of
Sergio Haro Cordero or Jesus Barraza Zavala. There was no information
available about the Mexico City attorney general's office's (PGJDF)
investigation of the February 1998 killing of Luis Mario Garcia
Rodriguez, a reporter for the Mexico City daily newspaper La Tarde.
On August 14, the CNDH recommended that the CISEN investigate and
sanction agent Abraham Ponce Calvo for violating the privacy rights of
Miguel Badillo Cruz, a columnist for the newspaper El Universal, and
his wife. Badillo complained that on June 13 and 14, Ponce tracked his
wife's movements from his car. Ponce denied the allegations, stating
that from June 12 to 15 he was in a different location investigating
organized crime.
According to PRODH and the newspaper La Jornada, on May 14, members
of the military harassed journalists at the Las Limas checkpoint in the
state of Chiapas. The journalists were prevented from taking
photographs and were filmed by the soldiers.
On June 15, men dressed in police uniforms kidnaped Freddy
Secundino Sanchez, a writer from the magazine Epoca, outside his home
in Mexico City. The men drove him around in a taxi while they beat and
threatened him at gunpoint before releasing him. On June 7, he received
a death threat via telephone. On June 20, Secundino submitted a
complaint to the Mexico City Human Rights Commission. The Commission in
turn asked the Mexico City Attorney General's office to ensure that no
agent under its command threatened or harmed Secundino, and that it
provide Secundino and his family with protection and investigate
Secundino's complaint. As a result, the Mexico City Attorney General's
office assigned agents to protect Secundino and his family. The case
was under investigation.
On June 22, unknown men opened fire on Lily Tellez, a highprofile
news anchor and reporter for the national network TV Azteca, while she
was driving in Mexico City. Tellez was uninjured, but her chauffeur and
two bodyguards were wounded. The motive for the attack is unknown, but
speculation has focused on Tellez's investigative reporting on
narcotics and the Francisco Stanley murder case. Francisco ``Paco''
Stanley was a television talk show host who was murdered while exiting
a Mexico City restaurant. In its 2001 report, Human Rights Watch (HRW)
reported that in February that the Human Rights Commission of Mexico
City alleged that the principal suspect had been framed by prosecutors.
On April 28, the body of Jose Ramirez Puente, the host of a popular
radio news program in Ciudad Juarez, was found in his car. He was
stabbed to death. State judicial police claimed that they found 17.6
pounds of marijuana in his car hours after the discovery of the body,
although local media organizations disputed any connection to drug
trafficking. Ramirez covered state and local politics and the police
beat; it was not clear whether the killing was related to his work.
On April 9, the body of Pablo Pineda, a reporter and photographer
with the newspaper La Opinion in Matamoros was discovered in the United
States. According to news reports, he had been shot in the back of the
head. In December 1999, Pineda survived an attempt on his life near his
home.
In May Meliton Garcia, a reporter with the Monterrey-based
newspaper El Norte was charged with fraudulently obtaining a voter's
registration card. The charges against Garcia stem from a two-part
series in which he reported on his efforts to obtain voting
registration documents using a false birth certificate. In the article,
he described how unofficial document expediters who congregate outside
government offices sell false birth certificates.
In September the former police commissioner in Ciudad Juarez filed
a criminal defamation suit against Jesus Antonio Pinedo Cornejo and
Luis Villagram, editor and reporter for the weekly Seminario. An
article dated February 28 and entitled ``History of Police Officer and
Drug Traffickers' linked the police commissioner with the drug trade.
On October 2, the commissioner announced that he would drop the suit.
Television news independence has been enhanced by greater political
pluralism, generational change in media leadership, and growing
competition for advertisers and viewers, which continued to separate
government and media interests. Moreover, as much of the national media
has developed higher journalistic standards and independence in recent
years, government influence has declined. The media showed a high
degree of editorial independence, particularly in the capital and other
major urban centers. Direct criticism of the Government, especially in
radio and the print media, was common.
During the course of the year, prior to the July presidential
elections, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and the newspaper
Reforma monitored media access for each of the candidates, especially
broadcast media. The resulting published analysis demonstrated that the
leading candidates enjoyed equal access to the media. National
electronic media covered the candidates far more equitably than in past
elections; however, there continued to be large discrepancies in
coverage in local and state level electronic media. The overall effect
was to give the PRI candidate Francisco Labastida more positive
coverage. After the July 2 election, both the national and local media
provided more balanced coverage overall.
In the middle of the campaign, the Government attempted to change
the procedures for the distribution of government publicity placed in
the media, placing control of all government advertising in the hands
of the Secretariat of Government, which would then funnel the
advertising through the government-owned Notimex news service. Media
outlets protested, voicing concern that spending decisions would be
based on political considerations. The Government retracted its plan
and reverted to the system in which each government entity was
responsible for its own paid advertising.
The Constitution recognizes academic freedom in higher education,
and the Government respected this provision in practice.
In April 1999, a student strike at the UNAM to protest a proposed
tuition increase shut down the university. The strike began when the
authorities announced an increase in tuition but quickly evolved from a
protest by some students into a more generalized attack on the national
political system. The university administration made the tuition hike
voluntary but did not meet other striking students' demands. The
students at time used violence and intimidation to keep the university
closed, and attempts to negotiate an end to the campus occupation
failed. On February 6, several thousand PFP, accompanied by CNDH
monitors, stormed the main campus, breached barricades, and detained
about 600 strikers. Strikers did not resist the police operation, and
the CNDH reported no human rights violations. Most of those detained
were released within 24 hours, and only 251 were actually arrested and
charged with rioting, terrorism, and dispossession. On February 14,
classes resumed; however, on March 6, classes were disrupted once again
when strikers reoccupied the university administration building and
demanded the release from prison of fellow strikers. On April 14, at
the request of UNAM rector Juan Ramon De la Fuente, 3,000 PFP personnel
armed with batons and riot shields positioned themselves in and around
the UNAM campus to forestall a strikers' reoccupation of the
university. The PFP later withdrew from the campus. On June 7, the PGR
released on bail the last six jailed strike leaders.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice. The only requirement for holding demonstrations is
that groups that wish to meet in public areas must inform local police
authorities in advance. Organized, peaceful demonstrations occur
frequently throughout the country.
The police showed restraint and avoided confrontation with UNAM
student strikers, who conducted periodic marches through the streets of
Mexico City (see Section 2.a.).
According to the NGO General Office of Citizenship Participation
and Social Conduct, in the first half of the year, on the national
level there were 83 marches with 291,560 participants and 58 blockages
with 54,552 participants. In Mexico City there were 43 marches with
13,255 participants and 60 blockages with 10,990 participants.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Political parties,
opposition, and independent associations functioned freely without
government interference or restriction. The Federal Electoral Code
recognizes national political parties as well as political
associations. Political associations can participate in elections
through an agreement with a political party but are not allowed to use
their names or symbols during the election campaigns. Political parties
do not have legal status until they receive their official designation
from the IFE. The IFE currently recognizes 8 political parties and 31
political groups. Three parties lost their registration as a result of
the July election because they obtained less than 2 percent of the
vote.
Citizens are free to associate and may form private or charitable
associations. However, in 1998 the Mexico City legislature passed a law
that gave the city government more influence over private charities.
According to the Foreign Ministry (SRE), there are as many as 7,500
NGO's active in the country, which are an important and vocal part of
civil society.
The Government was accused of harassing NGO's, especially in the
state of Chiapas (see Section 4).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, there are some restrictions. In November 1998, the Government
and representatives of many religious denominations signed a religious
code of conduct that reaffirms freedom of religion. The law bars the
clergy from holding public office, advocating partisan political views,
supporting political candidates, or opposing the laws or institutions
of the State.
Religious groups cannot operate legally without registering as
religious associations with the Under Secretariat of Religious Affairs
of the Federal Secretariat of Government. Although the Government does
reject a few applications, usually due to incomplete documentation, the
registration process is routine.
The authorities in the past have used immigration law to restrict
the activities of religious workers, particularly in the state of
Chiapas. To visit the country for religious purposes, foreign religious
workers must secure government permission. The Government limits the
number of visas each religious group is allowed. Some religious groups
claim that it is government policy to keep foreign religious
practitioners out of Chiapas and Oaxaca, thus making it more difficult
for religious workers going to those states to obtain visas. The
Government maintains that it does not deny visas based on religion, and
does not expel religious workers based on their religious activities.
The Government argues that foreign religious workers have been expelled
for inappropriate political behavior. There also have been incidents of
violence between religious groups in Chiapas (see Section 5).
The Government lifted almost all restrictions on religious groups
in 1992. The Catholic Church and other religions maintain their own
schools; however, the Catholic Church complains of government
restrictions on the running of those schools and the raising and
spending of school funds. Although religious associations cannot own or
administer broadcast radio or television stations, the Catholic Church
owns and operates a national cable television channel. Government
permission is required to transmit religious programming on broadcast
radio or television, and permission is granted routinely.
Relations were difficult between the Catholic Diocese of San
Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, and the Government during the tenure
of Bishop Samuel Ruiz, which ended in April. The situation in Chiapas
is a result of a complex mix of economic, ethnic, political, and
religious tensions. The San Cristobal Diocese has complained that its
foreign clergy are unable to get their visa status extended or
rectified (many enter on tourist visas).
The non-Catholic Christian population continued to grow in
Campeche, Chiapas, Yucatan, and along the northern border. There is a
long history of religious intolerance in, and expulsions from, certain
indigenous communities whose residents follow syncretistic (Catholic/
Mayan) religious practices and view other religious practices as a
threat to indigenous culture (see Section 5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of free movement, and the Government does not restrict the movement of
its citizens into, out of, or within the country, except in Chiapas
where the Government attempts to keep persons away from EZLN areas.
The army and federal immigration authorities maintain strict
checkpoints in parts of Chiapas. The focus of the checkpoints is the
verification of tourist activities by persons with tourist visas. They
also serve to stem illegal immigration. Church and human rights
activists claim that the Government is fostering an antiforeigner
climate. In addition, church groups complain about legal requirements
that foreign religious workers must secure government permission to
visit the country for religious purposes, and that the Government
limits the number of visas granted to each religious group.
Corrupt police sometimes violated the rights of illegal immigrants.
Illegal immigrants rarely file charges in cases of crimes committed
against them, because the authorities generally deport immediately such
persons who come to their attention; any pending case brought by an
illegal immigrant is subject to dismissal because the person is no
longer present. In May the CNDH criticized the mistreatment of Central
American migrants by the authorities and society. Studies conducted by
the College of Mexico indicate that human rights violations against
Central American migrants were increasing. On May 2, the newspaper La
Jornada reported that approximately 2,899 complaints of human rights
violations had been filed by Central American migrants in 1999.
There were incidents in which illegal immigrants either were
harassed or injured. On April 11, members of the state auxiliary police
and federal judicial police arrested seven indigenous residents of
Oaxaca State in a bus terminal, mistaking them for illegal Guatemalan
migrants. After being interrogated by federal and state authorities,
they were released. On April 13, the CNDH opened an inquiry into the
victims' claim of cultural discrimination.
On July 30, in Ecatepec, Mexico state, auxiliary police allegedly
beat four Central American migrants hiding in a rail car (see Section
1.c.).
There was no new information available about the alleged beating in
March 1999 of four intending immigrants near Mexicali, Baja California,
by federal fiscal police.
There were also credible reports that police, immigration, and
customs officials were involved in the trafficking of illegal migrants
(see Section 6.f.).
The law provides for the protection of foreigners who might face
political persecution if they were to return to their countries of
origin. The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government accepts
the principle of first asylum and reviews each claim on a case-by-case
basis with the assistance of the office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). In June 1999, UNHCR Sadako Ogata visited the
country and signed agreements with the Government to strengthen
protection for refugees.
On October 3, immigration authorities arrested Pedro Anibal Riera
Escalante, a Cuban national and deported him to Cuba the following day.
The Foreign Relations Secretariat subsequently noted that Riera, a
former Cuban consul general in Mexico City, had applied for asylum on
September 8. There were no other reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully through periodic elections. As a result of
electoral reforms approved and implemented in recent years, the
political process and especially the electoral process have become more
transparent. While elections are open and generally fair, some abuses
continue to occur. Prior to the July 2 presidential election, the PRI
had dominated politics, controlled the Federal Government, and won
every presidential election since its founding in 1929. However, on
July 2, voters elected Vicente Fox, a member of the National Action
Party and presidential candidate of the Alliance for Change Coalition,
president, with 43.3 percent of the vote. Observers, both international
and domestic, judged the elections, which ended the PRI's 71-year hold
on the presidency, to be generally free and fair. The observers
described the election as a historic turning point of the most profound
significance and made recommendations for further electoral reform.
The legislature amended the Constitution to allow the eligible 9
million citizens resident overseas to vote in national elections;
however, the Senate failed to act on the necessary implementing
legislation that would have made voting possible in the 2000 election,
due to differences over the costs and requirements for voting.
Presidents are elected every 6 years and cannot be reelected.
President Ernesto Zedillo supported legislation making the IFE an
independent agency and declined to handpick his party's candidate for
the presidential election. Instead, the PRI held a multicandidate
primary in 1999 and chose Francisco Labastida as its presidential
candidate.
The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), operating with full
autonomy, arranged the July 2 federal elections, which international
observers judged to be generally free and fair. They described the
elections and the resultant overturning of 71 years of dominance by the
PRI as a historic turning point of the most profound significance and
made recommendations for further electoral reform. The IFE had
implemented the extensive 1996 constitutional and legislative reforms
to help prevent electoral fraud and to create more uniform conditions
for political party participation by regulating campaign finance,
advertising, and other areas. It standardized the voter registration
list and recruited and trained thousands of civil society volunteers to
serve as independent electoral workers at the voting booths. The IFE
also has provided support to state electoral institutes in running
state and local elections and was instrumental in overhauling electoral
district boundaries to reflect demographic shifts.
After the July election, in the Chamber of Deputies, the PRI held
211 seats; the PAN 207; the PRD 50; the Green Ecologist Party (PVEM)
17; the Labor Party (PT) 7; Democracy Convergence (CD) 3; the
Nationalist Society Party (PSN) 3; and the Social Alliance Party (PAS)
2. The PRI holds 59 seats in the Senate; the PAN 45; the PRD 17; the PT
1; the PVEM 1; and the CD 1. Legislators can and do change their party
affiliation frequently.
On the state level, the PRI governs 19 states, the PAN 8, the PRD
1, PRD-PT coalitions 3, and PAN-PRD-led coalitions 2. On the municipal
level, opposition strength is well established. The PRD governs the
Federal District, and the PAN governs 13 of the 20 largest metropolitan
areas.
On August 20, Chiapas voters elected the opposition Alliance for
Chiapas candidate Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia to serve as governor, in a
decisive victory over the PRI's Sami David David. As during the federal
elections, the army was confined to its barracks, and the police
presence was restrained. Although there were reports of minor, isolated
irregularities, voting generally went smoothly. In his victory speech,
Salazar supported the demilitarization of Chiapas and the introduction
in Congress of the COCOPA legislation based on the 1996 San Andres
accords between the EZLN and the federal Government.
On August 25, post-election violence in Chimalhuacan, Mexico state,
between local PRI factions left at least 10 persons dead and many more
injured. State police later arrested 62 persons, including the supposed
ringleader, Guadalupe Buendia Torres.
Despite the IFE's efforts, there were still controversies at the
state level over elections. On December 29, in Tabasco, the ultimate
court of appeal on election matters (TEPJF) annulled the results of the
state's disputed October 15 gubernatorial election and directed the
Tabasco state legislature to name an interim governor and prepare for a
new election. In its decision, the TEPJF cited inequitable local media
coverage, diversion of funds for the election for the PRI candidate,
and the blocking or miscounting of opposition votes. The TEPJF was
created in 1987 and had never before invalidated an election.
Yucatan state opposition parties accused PRI Governor Victor
Cervera Pacheco and the PRI-dominated state legislature of stacking the
State Electoral Council to favor the PRI's candidates in the 2001
elections. On December 29, the TEPJF rejected the Council nominated by
the state legislature and named a new Council. PRI state legislators
questioned the legitimacy of this TEPJF-appointed Council and vowed to
fight the ``imposition'' in the courts.
Although there are no legal impediments to their full
participation, women are underrepresented in government and politics.
Women hold approximately 16 percent of the seats in the Congress. No
women serve as governors or justices on the Supreme Court. A woman,
Rosario Robles, served as head of government of the Federal District
from September 1999 to December. Under President Zedillo, 2 Cabinet
Secretaries out of 20 were women. President Fox appointed 9 women to
his 51-member Cabinet. A total of 9 of the 15 members of Mexico City
Mayor Manual Lopez Obrador's cabinet are women, and 13 of the city's 23
key city officials are women.
The Electoral Code provides that no more than 70 percent of
candidates can be of the same gender. All political parties are
attempting to increase the number of women who run for elected office
through formal and informal means. They have utilized quotas requiring
that a certain percentage of candidates on a party list be female.
However, in practice women more often are put forward as substitute
candidates who have little chance of serving unless the titular
candidate leaves office. The PRD leadership is 22 percent female, 24
percent of its representatives and 13 percent of its senators are
female, and it has a female party president. The PAN has utilized more
informal methods to increase female registration. Nonetheless, 23
percent of its leadership is female, and 11 percent of its senators and
representatives are female. PRI party rules mandate that a certain
number of its candidates be women. Twelve percent of the party
leadership, including its president, is female. Fifteen percent of both
its representatives and senators are female.
Constitutional changes in 1996 expanded the rights of indigenous
people to elect representatives to local office according to ``usages
and customs,'' rather than standard electoral law. Only the states of
Oaxaca and Quintana Roo have enacted the implementing legislation.
These traditional customs vary from village to village. In some
villages, women do not have the right to vote or to hold office. In
others, they can vote but not hold office. Women were excluded
systematically from the political process by ``usages and customs'' in
Oaxaca state and expected to face the same phenomenon in the state of
Quintana Roo.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate largely without
government restriction, investigating allegations of human rights
abuses and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government
officials generally have become more cooperative and responsive to NGO
views; however, the Government used vigorous enforcement of its
constitutional prohibition on foreigners engaging in political
activities to hinder the work of foreign human rights monitors, and it
restricted the activities of many human rights observers and religious
workers in the state of Chiapas.
After the December 1997 Acteal massacre, foreign concern over
Chiapas increased significantly, and many foreigners and members of
human rights groups traveled to that area, often on tourist visas, to
learn firsthand about conditions there, to observe the human rights
situation, and donate supplies. However, when individual foreign
activists in Chiapas acted in ways that the Government considered
political and inconsistent with tourist status, the Government issued
them a letter of departure that required them to leave the country upon
expiration of their visas.
On July 4, Deputy Secretary of Government Jose Angel Pescador Osuna
annulled the 2-year expulsion of Tom Hansen, director of Mexico
Solidarity Network, and agreed to reconsider the expulsions of 400
other human rights activists, priests, and foreign development
volunteers. On June 30, Hansen was granted a 15-day election observer
visa.
In 1998 the National Migration Institute (INM) began to require
persons who wished to enter the country to monitor the human rights
situation to go through a new application process, which required,
among other things, that they apply 30 days in advance. The INM also
placed a 10-day limit on visits, set a limit of 10 visitors per NGO,
and required that visitors submit a detailed itinerary and agenda.
Domestic and foreign NGO's objected to these new visa requirements, and
asserted that they actually restrict human rights monitoring and give
the Government the right to decide which human rights organizations are
legitimate. While government officials promised that the process would
improve access for human rights observers, the effect has been the
opposite. Immigration officials have used this visa requirement in the
past to remove from the country religious workers whom they judge to be
engaging in human rights activities. They also used this procedure to
restrict the activities of human rights monitors. Human rights
observers reported that the process is difficult, complex, rarely
results in visa issuance, and interferes significantly with their
ability to monitor human rights violations. As of September 15, 155
applications for human rights observer visas were made and 74 visas
were issued. Of the 100 applications made in 1999, 95 were issued.
NGO's reported that human rights workers in several states received
death threats while working on cases that implicated government
officials. On June 13, Arturo Solis, president of the Center of Border
Studies and the Promotion of Human Rights, publicly accused federal
immigration agents in Tamaulipas of involvement in illegal immigrant
trafficking. He has since received numerous death threats. The case is
under investigation by the Secretariat of Government, the National
Human Rights Commission, the Tamaulipas State Human Rights commission,
and a congressional commission.
On August 3, in Oaxaca, Oaxaca, the home of Angelica Ayala Ortiz,
vice president of the Mexican League for the Defense of Human Rights
(LIMEDDH), was robbed. Missing were Ayala's computer, recording
equipment, and the new television and videocassette recorder that
replaced similar ones stolen from her home last year. Asserting that
the robbery was an act of intimidation, Ayala, who works on indigenous
rights issues, lodged a complaint with the state attorney general's
office, which is investigating. On February 15, an arrest warrant was
issued for Jesus Reynaldo Hernandez Bautista, a bank security guard,
for the July 1999 robbery of the LIMEDDH office in Oaxaca. There had
been no apparent progress in the investigation into the August 3
robbery of Ayala's home by year's end.
In August elements of the army allegedly began to harass Hilda
Navarrete Gorjan, director of the human rights NGO the Voice of Those
Without a Voice in Coyuca de Benitez, Guerrero. On August 18, military
personnel were parked in vehicles outside Navarrete's office with
weapons pointed in the direction of her building. On August 23, unknown
persons broke into the office and stole computer and video equipment;
however, there was no evidence to suggest that the military was
responsible for the break in.
There were no new developments in the investigation into the 1999
threats, harassment, and attacks against the PRODH and human rights
lawyer Digna Ochoa. The investigation was still open at year's end.
Mexico City judicial police provide protection for Ochoa while she is
within the city limits. On May 10, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights stated that the Government was providing the protection for
Ochoa ordered by the court, and that it had received no information
about new threats or evidence of violence against PRODH. However, Ochoa
did receive telephone death threats in June.
The PRODH has criticized the Government's actions to provide safety
to human rights workers as inadequate. The PRODH advocates the adoption
of measures to promote awareness of the importance of human rights work
and to investigate cases of threats, intimidation, and attacks against
human rights workers.
The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), established by the
Government in 1990, has improved its credibility steadily. The Senate,
instead of the President, now appoints the commission's president,
although some NGO's feared that this would make the CNDH more
susceptible to political pressure. In November 1999, the Senate named
legal scholar Jose Luis Soberanes to a 5-year term as CNDH president,
replacing the sitting president prior to the expiration of her term.
Although most NGO's have a favorable opinion of the CNDH, many are
critical of its method of presenting information, especially the
reporting of compliance with recommendations. NGO's also have
criticized the CNDH's reliance on former government security or
judicial personnel as investigators of human rights abuse allegations.
General Jose Francisco Gallardo Rodriguez, who was arrested in 1993
on a range of charges, including embezzlement and dishonoring the
military, was moved in 1999 from a military to a civilian jail.
Gallardo maintained that military authorities were persecuting him
because he wrote an academic dissertation calling for the establishment
of a human rights ombudsman's office in the military. Since 1996 the
IACHR and AI had called for his release. On August 4, Gallardo's lawyer
lodged a complaint with the Federal Attorney General's office to demand
action against the military tribunal for negligence of administration
of justice because it allegedly had issued its resolution against
Gallardo 63 days after the legal time limit.
In 1999 U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or
Arbitrary Executions Asma Jahangir visited the country at the
Government's invitation. Her report stated that the ineffectiveness of
the justice system had led to violations of human rights. In addition,
civilian courts' lack of jurisdiction over members of the armed forces
for violations of human rights committed against civilians erodes the
independence of the courts. The IFE implemented Jahangir's suggestion
to invite international observers for the presidential elections and
accredited 860 persons.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that men and women are equal before the
law, and that education should avoid ``privileges of race, religion,
groups, sexes, or individual;'' however, these provisions are not
enforced effectively, although the Government continues to make
progress in efforts to do so.
Amnesty International has reported that homosexual men and women
are likely to be victims of abuse and violence. In its 1999 annual
report, the Citizen's Commission Against Homophobic Crimes reported
that on average three murders are committed because of sexual
orientation per month, and that there have been 190 such killings in
the last 5 years, mostly in Mexico City, Mexico State, and Veracruz.
The consensus among gay rights groups is that the police fail to
investigate these crimes seriously.
Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involve
domestic and sexual violence, which is both widespread and vastly
underreported. A 1997 law on intrafamily violence criminalized
intrafamily violence, established protective measures for victims, and
provided public education on the domestic violence problem. The law
provides for fines equal to 30 to 180 days worth of pay and the
detention of violators for up to 36 hours. The law also expanded the
definition of rape to include spousal rape, involving married or
common-law couples. According to a 1999 survey by the National
Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Computation, some form of
domestic abuse occurs in one of every three homes. The victim seeks
help in only one of every six homes suffering from domestic abuse. More
than 65 percent of all women suffer some form of abuse, verbal or
otherwise, but only 30 percent lodge formal complaints, according to
the Mexican Association Against Violence Toward Women. In 86 percent of
abuse cases, it is the father or husband who commits the abuse. The
Center for Attention to Intrafamily Violence reports that it receives
between 50 to 60 complaints nationwide every day. Women are reluctant
to report abuse or file charges, and the police are reluctant to
intervene in what society considers a private matter. Many police also
are inexperienced in these areas and unfamiliar with appropriate
investigative technologies, although some have received training on
these issues.
According to the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion
of Human Rights (CMDPDH), over 1 million women each year seek emergency
medical treatment for injuries sustained due to domestic violence,
which is the fourth highest cause of death for women. Groups such as
the NGO Center for Research and Care of Women, are attempting to
counter the widespread view of domestic violence as private, normal
behavior and to deter future violence. On June 1, Mexico City Mayor
Rosario Robles publicized a handbook written by a coalition of feminist
NGO's to reduce domestic violence and to help victims of gender
discrimination.
Under certain circumstances limited to the statutory rape of a
minor between the ages of 12 and 18, the Criminal Code allows a judge
to dismiss charges if the persons involved voluntarily marry. In
practice this provision is invoked rarely.
In the case of the approximately 200 women raped, murdered, and
mutilated in the Ciudad Juarez area since 1993 (see Section 1.b.), the
CNDH determined in 1998 that the Chihuahua state attorney general's
office's inadequate response had violated the human rights of the
victims and their families. The CNDH therefore recommended that the
state attorney general and the mayor of Ciudad Juarez be investigated
for negligence. In the same year, the authorities appointed a special
prosecutor and hired foreign experts in serial killings to advise
investigators. The murders and rapes continued during the year.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution occurs
(see Section 6.f.).
The Federal Criminal Code includes penalties for sexual harassment,
but victims must press charges. Many female victims were reluctant to
come forward, and cases were difficult to prove. Sexual harassment in
the workplace is widespread.
The CNDH's First Inspector General's office is devoted entirely to
protecting the rights of women.
Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes,
neither the authorities nor society in general respect this in
practice. The legal treatment of women's rights is uneven. Women have
the right to own property in their own names and to file for separation
and divorce. However, in some states a woman may not bring suit to
establish paternity and thereby obtain child support, unless the child
was a product of rape or cohabitation, the child resides with the
father, or there is written proof of paternity.
The Constitution and labor laws provide that women shall have the
same rights and obligations as men, and that ``equal pay shall be given
for equal work performed in equal jobs, hours of work, and conditions
of efficiency.'' However, women in the work force generally are paid
less than their male counterparts and are concentrated in lower-paying
occupations. According to a 1998 academic study, even though girls and
boys attend school at similar rates, a woman on average needs to have 4
more years of education to earn the same salary as a man in a
comparable position.
Labor law includes extensive maternity protection, including 6
weeks' leave before and after childbirth and time off for breast
feeding in adequate and hygienic surroundings provided by the employer.
Employers are required to provide a pregnant woman with her full pay,
are prohibited from dismissing her, and must remove her from heavy or
dangerous work or exposure to toxic substances. To avoid these
expensive requirements, some employers, including some in the maquila
industry, reportedly deliberately violate these provisions by requiring
pregnancy tests in preemployment physicals, by regular examinations and
inquiries into women's reproductive status (including additional
pregnancy tests), by exposing pregnant women to difficult or hazardous
conditions to make them quit, or by dismissing them. In its 2000 and
2001 annual reports, Human Rights Watch indicated that the Government
not only was aware of such practices and failed to prevent them or to
punish the perpetrators, but also made public excuses for companies
that violated the law. The U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO),
under terms of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC), the labor side agreements to the North American Free Trade
Agreement, accepted a challenge to these practices in the maquila
industry and in January 1998 recommended ministerial consultations. As
a result, the U.S. and Mexican Secretaries of Labor participated in a
conference in Merida, Yucatan, in March 1999, on gender discrimination
in employment. In addition, the U.S., and Mexican NAO's organized
cross-border outreach sessions in August 1999 on the rights of women in
the workplace in McAllen, Texas and Reynosa, Tamaulipas. The conference
and the outreach sessions concluded that discrimination exists, that it
is not sanctioned by law, and that the authorities have taken steps to
inform female workers of their right to file complaints about such
practices, by distributing brochures and opening government offices
that work together with NGO's to publicize the problem and available
remedies.
To protect the labor rights of women, the Secretariat of Labor made
9,593 safety and hygiene inspections in private factories and public
institutions through August and estimated that it would complete 13,790
by the end of the year. The Secretariat made 23,138 inspections in
1996. However, while the Government increased the number of federal
inspectors in 1997 and concluded agreements with more states to expand
and better coordinate labor inspections, the number of maquila plants
(approximately 3,500 operating) far exceeds what the less than 700
(approximately 350 state and 341 federal) inspectors can monitor.
In 1995 the CNDH found that the largest number of complaints
against health care institutions involved negligence or abuse during
childbirth by medical personnel and charges of forced sterilization
(see Section 1.f.).
The National Women's Program (PRONAM) monitored the situation of
women, made recommendations to the Government regarding women's issues,
and worked with government agencies, international organizations, and
NGO's to support women's causes. PRONAM and the National Statistics
Institute compiled gender-specific statistics to ascertain more
accurately the status of women. The International Labor Organization
(ILO), the Secretariats of Labor and Foreign Relations, and PRONAM also
promoted the status of women in the workplace. In addition, PRONAM and
UNICEF initiated in 1999 an ongoing advertising campaign attacking
social stereotypes and discrimination against women.
Children.--Children under the age of 15 make up 35 percent of the
population, and the median age of the population is 21. The Government
maintains several programs to promote child welfare that support
maternal and infant health, provide stipends for educating poor
children, subsidize food, and provide social workers; however, problems
in children's health and education remain. The CNDH receives numerous
complaints about the services provided by the Secretary of Health, the
Secretary of Education (SEP), and the Institute of Social Security.
Nine years of education are compulsory, and the legal minimum age for
employment is 14; however, according to SEP and the Sierra Neighborhood
Foundation, only 31 percent of youths between 15 and 20 years of age
attend school.
The problem of child labor is particularly pronounced among migrant
farming families (see Section 6.d.). The Government has attempted to
make schooling easier for the children of such families by making their
educational credentials portable. The National Public Health
Institute's 2000 National Nutrition Survey reported that 3 million
children under the age of 5 suffer some form of malnutrition. UNICEF
also reported that approximately 5 million children, 2 million of which
are under 12 years of age, are working. In 1998 the director of the
National Education Council reported that 1.7 million school-age
children were not in school because their poverty obligates them to
work. About 900,000 children work in agriculture, particularly in the
northern states. UNICEF and the National Institute for Integral
Development of the Family, in a 1999 study of working children in the
100 largest cities, estimated that 150,000 children work in those
cities. (NGO's maintain that the total is higher.) According to a 1999
national nutrition survey, 30 percent of children under 5 years of age,
or about 3 million, suffer anemia, while another 2 million children are
chronically malnourished.
On January 4, the Congress passed a constitutional amendment to
protect the rights of children and teenagers and ensure respect for
their dignity. The new law also increased penalties for the sexual
abuse or exploitation of children. Child prostitution and pornography
are felonies under the law. On May 31, the Congress passed the
Protection of the Rights of Children and Adolescents Law. The law
provides for the right to life, non-discrimination, healthy living
conditions, protection against threats to liberty and physical abuse, a
healthy family life, health services, equal treatment for the disabled,
education, pursuit of happiness, and freedom of thought and expression.
Penalties under the law include fines of 500 to 1,000 times Mexico
City's minimum wage and possible administrative jail time.
The CNDH attempted to protect children by educating them on their
rights and reviewing legislation to ensure compliance with relevant
international conventions. On August 30, the Public Education
Secretariat (SEP) announced the publication of four new books geared to
teach children about discrimination, violence in the home, and
toleration of differing beliefs.
The Mexican Association of Childhood and Youth reported that there
is a large population, estimated at 42,000, of vulnerable street
children in Mexico City. Street children often become involved with
alcohol, drugs, prostitution, petty thievery, and increasingly, violent
crimes. Corrupt police officials sometimes exploit these children by
pressuring them to commit petty crimes and extorting money from them.
A 1998 report by the NGO Center for Research and Advanced Study in
Social Anthropology counted 5,000 minors, 90 percent of them female,
working as prostitutes or subjects of pornography. In April the Mexico
City attorney general's office and the Mexico City Human Rights
Commission reported that nearly 12,000 children in Mexico City are
victims of sexual commercialism, including prostitution. The National
System for the Integral Development of the Family (DIF) receives an
average of about 35,000 complaints per year of physical and mental
abuse against children, the majority in Mexico City, Mexico State, and
Nuevo Leon.
Trafficking in children for the purpose of sexual exploitation is a
problem (see Section 6.f.). On November 22, the Federal Attorney
General's office established the Special Prosecutor's Office for
Attention to Crimes of Trafficking in Children.
The Government and various NGO's have programs directed at children
that address human rights issues. Generally, the purpose of these
programs is not only to protect the rights of children but also to
instill a generational respect for human rights through educational
programs. An example of this educational approach is the Tree House (La
Casa del Arbol), an interactive learning project sponsored by the human
rights commission of Mexico City.
People with Disabilities.--Estimates of the number of disabled
persons range from 2 to 10 million. In Mexico City alone, 124 NGO's
dealt with issues affecting the physically disabled.
Twenty-seven of the 31 states have laws protecting the disabled.
Local law requires access for the disabled to public facilities in
Mexico City, but not elsewhere in the country. However, in practice
most public buildings and facilities in Mexico City do not comply with
the law. The Federal District also mandated access for physically
disabled children to all public and private schools. The Mexico City
secretary of education, health, and social development has maintained
that 78 percent of these children received some schooling. On August 2,
the President's Office announced that 90,000 disabled children were
integrated into a regular education system under the Zedillo
Administration.
In December President Fox established the Citizen's Commission
Against Discrimination to be headed by former Social Democracy
presidential candidate Rincon Gallardo. The Commission's objectives
include ensuring equal opportunities and access for the disabled and
codifying these rights in a legal framework.
Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI), an NGO, discovered
mistreatment and violations of the rights of the mentally disabled
persons in government mental health facilities. Abuses uncovered from
1996-99 included inhuman and degrading treatment, misuse of physical
restraints, and criminal neglect that in some cases led to deaths of
patients. The MDRI further alleged that because the process through
which persons are admitted legally to state institutions is conducted
without oversight by a judicial or independent body, which can lead to
a total loss of independent decision making or consent to treatment by
patients. As a result of its 1999 report and an expose in the January
30 issue of the newsmagazine Proceso, in February the Secretariat of
Health made over $800,000 (8 million pesos) available to improve
conditions in Mexico City's institutions and to provide over $5,000
(50,000 pesos) for each of the 400 persons living in these institutions
to participate in community-based workshops. The Secretariat of Health
also made $1.7 million (17 million pesos) available to improve the
Ocaranza, Hildalgo institution as a pilot project.
Indigenous People.--The indigenous population, long subject to
discrimination, repression, and marginalization, is estimated at 29
million persons of Indian descent, of whom 11 million live in Indian
communities and 5 million are native speakers of Indian dialects. An
estimated 9 million indigenous persons live in extreme poverty.
According to the National Indigenous Plural Assembly for Autonomy
(ANIPA), there are 56 distinct indigenous groups, each with its own
unique culture and language. Indigenous people are located principally
in the central and southern regions and represent a majority in the
states of Oaxaca (53 percent) and Yucatan (52 percent). However, these
groups have remained largely outside the political and economic
mainstream, as a result of longstanding patterns of economic and social
development. In many cases their ability to participate in decisions
affecting their lands, cultural traditions, and allocation of natural
resources is negligible.
The 1994 Chiapas uprising focused unprecedented attention on the
demands of that state's indigenous population for increased economic
and social rights. Among its basic demands, the EZLN called on the
Government to enact measures to protect indigenous cultures, provide
more opportunity for employment, and invest in schools, clinics, and
infrastructure projects. In the 1996 San Andres accords, the Government
agreed with the EZLN on the need to expand indigenous rights. However,
Congress has not yet approved these accords, and the conflict remains
unresolved. The Government maintains a heavy military presence in parts
of Chiapas, a presence that NGO's have called threatening and
intimidating to the indigenous population (see Section 1.g.).
In its report ``The War in Chiapas'', issued in April the Fray
Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center (CDHFBC) reported that the
military was the principal aggressor in its 1999 cases. The CDHFBC also
concluded that the presence of the military put at risk the human
rights of life, physical integrity, liberty, and security of the local
inhabitants. In addition other groups expressed concern during the year
over growing instability and tension within the Indian communities
provoked by the presence of military, police, and paramilitary troops.
In April an ICRC representative stated that thousands of Indians
who fled their homes in Chiapas were suffering from food shortages and
malnutrition. At year's end, the ICRC was feeding over 9,000 persons at
year's end on a continual basis. There still were cases of
malnutrition, and the ICRC addressed those cases with 100 percent
complete food supplements.
At year's end, the federal and state government strove to create a
positive atmosphere for negotiation in Chiapas through troop
withdrawals and the release of Zapatista prisoners (see Section 1.g.).
The Government, through the National Indigenous Institute, the
CNDH, and various NGO's, operates programs to educate indigenous groups
about their political and human rights. The Government generally
professes respect for their desire to retain elements of their
traditional culture. The CNDH's office of the Fourth Inspector General
reviews and investigates violations of indigenous rights. More than 130
NGO's are dedicated to the promotion and protection of indigenous
rights.
Indigenous people do not live on autonomous reservations, although
some indigenous communities exercise considerable local control over
economic, political, and social issues. In the state of Oaxaca, for
example, 70 percent of the 570 municipalities are governed according to
the indigenous regime of usages and customs, which may not follow
democratic norms such as the secret ballot, universal suffrage, and
political affiliation (see Section 3). These communities apply
traditional practices to resolve disputes, including allegations of
crimes, and to elect local officials. In 1998 Quintana Roo's state
Legislature passed a similar usages and customs law. While the laws
allow communities in these states to elect officials according to their
traditions, these usages and customs tend to exclude women from the
political process (see Section 3).
The law provides some protection for indigenous people, and the
Government provides support for indigenous communities through social
and economic assistance programs, legal provisions, and social welfare
programs. However, these were not sufficient to meet the needs of all
indigenous people. Although the national population growth rate has
slowed to less than 2 percent annually, the birth rate among
marginalized indigenous groups such as those in Chiapas is around 5
percent. The General Education Act provides that teaching shall be
promoted in the national language (i.e. Spanish) without prejudice to
the protection and promotion of indigenous languages. However, many
indigenous persons speak only their native languages. As a result, 1999
ANIPA statistics suggest that indigenous people suffer from a high rate
of illiteracy and a low rate of school attendance. Non-Spanish speakers
frequently are taken advantage of in commercial transactions involving
bilingual middlemen and have difficulty finding employment in Spanish-
speaking areas.
Religious Minorities.--There is a long history of religious
intolerance in, and expulsions from, certain indigenous communities
whose residents follow syncretistic (Catholic/Mayan) religious
practices and view other religious practices as a threat to indigenous
culture. In parts of Chiapas, local bosses of indigenous communities
sometimes regard evangelical groups and Catholic lay catechists as
unwelcome outside influences and potential economic and political
threats. As a result, these bosses sometimes acquiesced in, or actually
ordered, the harassment or expulsion of individuals belonging
primarily, but not exclusively, to Protestant evangelical groups. In
many cases, these expulsions involved the burning of homes and crops,
beatings, and, occasionally, killings. These problems more frequently
arise in ``autonomous indigenous areas'' under the influence of the
EZLN, according to evangelical leaders. The abuse related to these and
other incidents, apparently did not occur solely and exclusively on the
basis of religion. While religious differences were often a prominent
feature of such incidents, ethnic differences, land disputes, and
struggles over local political and economic power were very often the
basic cause of the problems.
There were reports of conflict between Catholic/Mayan syncretists
and Protestant Evangelicals in Chiapas. For example, on March 5,
Catholic/Mayan syncretists evicted at least 70 evangelical families
from Plan de Ayala, Chiapas. Later that month, 250 state police
escorted the Evangelicals back to Plan de Ayala, where they remained
for 2 weeks. However, in early April the Catholic/Mayan syncretists
again evicted 20 of the evangelical families from that community. On
April 16, the Catholic/Mayan syncretists drove out the 70 police
officers stationed there to keep the peace and set up roadblocks around
the town. The following day the expelled Evangelicals attempted to
return to the community, but were prevented from doing so by the
roadblock. Expelled evangelical families reported that the Catholic/
Mayan syncretists demanded that they sign a statement renouncing their
faith as a prerequisite for their return to the community. Attempting
to mediate, Governor Roberto Albores offered social programs to the
Catholic/Mayan syncretists if they allowed the Evangelicals access to
the town. The Catholics accepted the offer, but denied blocking access
to community members, claiming that they only wanted to ``prevent
strangers from infiltrating the community and causing problems.'' They
removed the roadblock, but tensions remain.
Tension between Catholic/Mayan syncretists and evangelical groups
continues to be a problem in the municipality of San Juan Chamula. The
Evangelical Commission for the Defense of Human Rights claims that
municipal authorities have expelled 30,000 persons in the last 30
years. The children of Evangelicals have been denied access to the
local public schools in six communities since 1994.
Adventists in Oaxaca report that families who were members of their
denomination were expelled from the community of Santo Tomas Kirri. In
Santo Domingo, Mexico state, Adventists reported that they were forced
temporarily to close their church. In Chiapas the Adventists viewed the
local government as reluctant to intervene in towns governed by
traditional ``practices and customs.''
On May 17, the body of an alleged witch doctor was found in
Comitan, Chiapas. The motive for his death is suspected to be the
victim's practice of witchcraft, which is common in rural areas of
southern Mexico; no suspects were arrested or charged.
Progovernment supporters had in the past accused the Catholic
Church in the San Cristobal diocese in Chiapas of supporting the EZLN.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Federal
Labor Law (LFT) provide workers with the right to form and join trade
unions of their choice. About 25 percent of the total work force is
unionized, mostly in the formal sector, where about one-half the labor
force is employed.
No prior approval is needed to form unions, but they must register
with the Federal Labor Secretariat (STPS) or state labor boards (JLCA)
in order to function legally. Registration requirements are not
onerous. However, the STPS or the JLCA occasionally have withheld or
delayed registration of unions hostile to government policies,
influential employers, or established unions. The STPS and the JLCA
also have registered unions that turned out to be run by extortionists
or labor racketeers falsely claiming to represent workers. To remedy
this, STPS officials required evidence that unions were genuine and
representative before registering them. Genuine unions are those that
can demonstrate that they actually have members and represent the
workers at the workplace. Some labor organizations have complained that
they have found it difficult to obtain registration, especially from
some local conciliation and arbitration boards.
Human Rights Watch criticized the Government's system of labor
tribunals in a December 1999 report that claimed that the right to
freedom of association often was violated even when courts ruled in
favor of organizing workers. The report states that in the case of the
Democratic Union of Workers of the Ministry of the Environment, Natural
Resources, and Fishing the courts allowed workers to organize formally,
but Government officials continued to interfere in such a way that the
union could not function effectively.
Like the Federal Labor Board (JFCA), the JLCA are tripartite.
Although trade union presence on the boards is usually a positive
feature, it sometimes led to unfair partiality in representation
disputes. For example, the board member from an established union may
work to dissuade a JLCA from recognizing a rival organization. Trade
union registration was the subject of follow-up activities pursuant to
a 1995 agreement reached in ministerial consultations under the NAALC.
Unions form federations and confederations freely without
government approval. Most unions belong to such bodies. They also must
register to have legal status. The largest trade union central is the
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), traditionally a part of the
labor sector of the PRI, but affiliation is by individual unions.
The Federal Employee Union Federation (FSTSE), the Revolutionary
Worker and Peasant Confederation, and most of the separate national
unions, smaller confederations, and federations in the Labor Congress
(CT) also are allied with the PRI. However, several unions do not ally
themselves with the PRI, including the large teachers' union, which
severed its PRI ties a decade ago, and freed its minority factions to
cooperate openly with other parties, particularly the PRD. Rivalries
within and between PRI-allied centrals are strong. There also are a few
small labor federations and independent unions outside the CT not
allied with the PRI. One is the small, left-of-center Authentic Labor
Front (FAT). Most FAT members sympathize with the PRD, but the FAT is
independent and not formally tied to the PRD. In November 1997, 160
labor organizations representing workers in the private and public
sectors, led by the telephone workers and social security workers
unions, formed the National Union of Workers (UNT)--a labor central in
competition with the officially recognized CT. In April 1999, the
Mexican Electricians Union (SME) announced that it would withdraw from
the CT over its failure to give full support to the SME's opposition to
the Government's plan to privatize partially the electric power sector.
The SME had not withdrawn officially from the CT at year's end;
however, it currently maintains no contact with the CT.
PRI-affiliated union officers traditionally helped select, ran as,
and campaigned for, PRI candidates in federal and state elections and
supported PRI government policies at crucial moments. This gave unions
considerable influence on government policies but limited their freedom
of action to defend member interests in other ways, particularly when
this might harm the government or the PRI. The CT, especially the CTM,
was well represented in the PRI senatorial and congressional
delegations, although its numbers diminished significantly after the
1997 and the July elections.
The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) has found that certain
restrictions in federal employee labor law, adopted at FSTSE request,
violate ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association. These restrictions
allow only one union per jurisdiction, forbid union members from
quitting the union, and prohibit reelection of union officials. In 1998
the COE and the ILO Committee on Application of Standards reiterated
their criticism and asked the Government to amend the law. The
Government had not amended the law by year's end; however, a May 1999
Federal Supreme Court decision now permits the formation and
recognition of more than one union per federal entity. A 1996 Supreme
Court decision invalidated similar restrictions in the laws of two
states, but the decision applied only in the specific instances
challenged. In May 1999, the Supreme Court extended this interpretation
to unions in federal government entities.
The Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to strike. The
law requires 6 to 10 days' advance strike notice, followed by brief
government mediation. If federal or state authorities rule a strike
``nonexistent'' or ``illicit,'' employees must remain at work, return
to work within 24 hours, or face dismissal. If they rule a strike
legal, the company or unit must shut down completely, management
officials may not enter the premises until the strike is over, and the
company may not hire replacements for striking workers. Provisions for
maintaining essential services are not onerous. The law also makes
filing a strike notice an effective, commonly used threat that protects
a failing company's assets from creditors and courts until an agreement
is reached on severance pay. Although few strikes actually occur,
informal stoppages are fairly common, but uncounted in statistics, and
seldom last long enough to be recognized or ruled out of order. The law
permits public sector strikes, but formal public sector strikes are
rare. Informal ones are more frequent.
During the year, the JFCA reported that 8,282 strike notices were
filed and 26 legal strikes occurred in federal jurisdiction. Federal
labor authorities did not stretch legal requirements to rule strikes
nonexistent or illicit, nor did they use delays to prevent damaging
strikes and force settlements. However, in 1998 strikers at the Han
Young maquiladora plant in Tijuana filed an ``amparo'' (a type of
injunction) action in a Federal District court challenging the ruling
of the JLCA in Tijuana that declared the strike begun on May 22 of that
year to be illegal. On May 3, 1999, the court recognized the striking
union's right to the collective bargaining contract and declared the
1998 strike to have been legal. Acting quickly on that decision, the
union put strike flags at the plant, but the JLCA declared the new
strike illegal because the board had not yet been informed officially
of the court's ruling nor given time to act on that ruling. Efforts to
resolve the conflict through the courts continued throughout the year.
The union's leader and lawyer were the subjects of arrest warrants for
allegedly detaining the plant manager against his will; however, these
individuals had not been taken into custody at year's end.
The dissident leaders of the teachers' union who were charged with
forcing entry into the Senate and holding several senators hostage in
1998 were released within 3 months from pretrial detention when charges
were reduced substantially. There is no record that they were ever
tried on the reduced charges.
During the first major strike in 10 years that occurred at a Ciudad
Juarez plant in July, some protesting workers reported that they were
harassed by police and representatives of the union holding the
contract at the plant. Earlier in the summer, the leader of a group of
workers challenging the existing union at a plant in Tamaulipas
asserted that he had been kidnaped and held for more than 24 hours by
representatives of that union. However, state labor authorities
eventually recognized the new union, which allowed it to negotiate with
plant management.
The Constitution and the LFT protect labor organizations from
government interference in their internal affairs, including strike
decisions. However, this also can protect undemocratic or corrupt union
leaders. The law permits closed shop and exclusion clauses, allowing
union leaders to vet and veto new hires and to force dismissal of
anyone the union expels. Such clauses are common in collective
bargaining agreements.
Employer organizations slowed efforts to push for labor law reform
early in 1999 and entered into ongoing discussions with the Government
and labor unions about reforming the LFT's rules of procedure.
Government, employers, and unions had negotiated reforms through
tripartite national agreements and collective bargaining at the
enterprise level. Reforms were effected also through cooperation in
programs to increase, and compensate for, productivity. Government,
national labor unions, and employer organizations met periodically
throughout the year to discuss ways and means of cooperation to boost
productivity, wages, and competitiveness. The need to reform the LFT
was an issue in the presidential campaign and in the fall session of
Congress.
Unions are free to affiliate with, and increasingly are interested
in actively participating in, trade union internationals. Reflecting
that change in attitude and relationship, the International Federation
of Metalworkers Unions opened an office in Mexico, and U.S., Canadian,
and Mexican autoworker union representatives held meetings in the
country during the year.
A complaint alleging a refusal on the part of the Government to
register the Academic Workers Union of the National College of
Technical Occupational Education (SINTACONALEP) as a union is pending
before the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA).
SINTACONALEP's employer, the National College of Technical Occupational
Education (CONALEP), requires its teaching staff to sign documents
denying the existence of an employment relationship thereby feigning a
type of relationship that is covered under the civil code and not the
LFT even though the form, terms, and conditions all correspond to an
employment relationship. Hence according to STPS, SINTACONALEP members
do not meet the definition of workers under the LFT to be registered as
a union. In 1999 the CFA issued an interim report requesting that the
Government provide a copy of the applicable law that denies trade union
status to SINTACONALEP and that the Government investigate the
allegations of interference and antiunion discrimination on the part of
CONALEP. The ILO had not received a response from the Government by
year's end.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Interest by a few employees, or a union strike notice,
compels an employer either to recognize a union and negotiate with it
or to ask the federal or state labor board to hold a union recognition
election. LFT prounion provisions led some employers to seek out or
create independent ``white'' or company unions as an alternative to
mainstream national or local unions. Representation elections are
traditionally open, not secret. Traditionally, management and union
officials are present with the presiding labor board official when
workers openly declare their votes, one by one. Such open recounts are
prevailing practice but are not required by law or regulation. Secret
ballots are held when all parties agree.
Wage restraints no longer exist, except for those caused by
recession or an employer's difficult situation. Wages in most union
contracts appeared to keep pace with or ahead of inflation, but most
workers had not yet regained buying power lost over the past decade.
The country's record in internal union democracy and transparency
was mixed. Some unions were democratic, but corruption and strong-arm
tactics were common in others.
A disputed 1997 election for the right to the collective bargaining
contract for workers at a Korean-owned maquiladora in Tijuana, Baja
California continued to provoke controversy. Although the parties
reached a settlement in January 1998, allegations that plant management
violated health and safety regulations were considered in a public
hearing by the U.S. NAO that year. The dispute over union
representation at the plant continued, and in May the U.S. and Mexican
Secretaries of Labor signed an agreement on steps to resolve this
dispute; pursuant to that agreement the Mexican Labor Secretariat held
a public NAFTA conference in Tijuana in June to address the issues
raised in the complaint.
In another case involving freedom of association linked to the
right to organize unions, in December 1997, 9 unions and 24 human
rights NGO's jointly filed a submission with the U.S. NAO alleging that
a CTM-affiliated union used strong-arm tactics to intimidate workers so
that they would not vote in favor of a rival union to represent workers
at a plant in Mexico state. This submission also alleged violations of
health and safety regulations. The Canadian NAO also received a
submission on this case in the spring of 1998. The U.S. NAO issued a
report in July 1998 that recommended ministerial consultations. At
year's end, U.S., Mexican, and Canadian labor authorities continued to
discuss the issues raised in both submissions. The May agreement
between the U.S. and Mexican Labor Secretaries and adhered to by the
Canadian Labor Minister provided that the Mexican Labor Secretariat
hold a public NAFTA conference in Mexico City in late fall to address
the issues raised in the complaints. However, the conference had not
taken place by year's end.
In November 1999, the U.S. Association of Flight Attendants filed a
submission with the U.S. NAO alleging violations of worker rights to
freedom of association and to bargain collectively; protection of the
right to organize; minimum employment standards; and prevention of
occupational injuries and illnesses at Executive Air Transport, Inc.
(TAESA). The complaint focused on the voting process employed when the
Mexican flight attendants union sought the right to represent flight
attendants employed by TAESA. The U.S. NAO held a public hearing in
Washington in March and issued a report in July recommending
ministerial consultations.
The public sector is almost totally organized. Industrial areas are
heavily organized. Even states with little industry have transport and
public employee unions, and rural peasant organizations are
omnipresent. The law protects workers from antiunion discrimination,
but enforcement is uneven in the few states with low unionization.
Unionization and wage levels in the in-bond export sector vary by
area and sophistication of the manufacturing process. Wages have been
lower and job creation has been greater in this sector than in more
traditional manufacturing. Wages in the maquiladora sector are still
lower than in the traditional manufacturing sector, although they are
approaching manufacturing sector level. Some observers allege poor
working conditions, inadequate wages, and employer and government
efforts to discourage unionization in this sector. There is no evidence
that the Federal Government opposes unionization of the plants (the
maquiladora sector tends to be under state jurisdiction), but some
state and local governments in the west are said to help employers
discourage unions, especially independent ones, through the use of
protection contracts. Protection contracts, to which the workforce is
not privy, are used in the maquila sector and elsewhere to discourage
the development of authentic unions. These contracts are collective
bargaining agreements negotiated and signed by management and a
representative of a so-called labor organization, sometimes even prior
to the hiring of a single worker.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, which includes forced and bonded labor by
children; however, there were some cases of trafficking in persons for
purposes of forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
There also were cases of abuses of refugees and illegal immigrants in
Chiapas (see section 2.d.). There were no reports of forced child
labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits children under 12 years of age
from working. The law sets the minimum legal work age at 14 years.
Those between the ages of 14 and 15 may work only limited hours, with
no night or hazardous work, which generally makes hiring them
uneconomical. Enforcement was reasonably good at large and medium-sized
companies, especially in export industries and those under federal
jurisdiction. Enforcement was inadequate at many small companies and in
agriculture and construction. It was nearly absent in the informal
sector, despite continued government efforts.
In 1996 the ILO reported that 18 percent of children 12 to 14 years
of age work, often for parents or relatives. Most child labor is in the
informal sector (including myriad underage street vendors), family-
owned workshops, or in agriculture and rural areas. Mexico City's
central market employs approximately 11,000 minors between the ages of
7 and 18, who work as cartpushers, kitchen help, and vendors. The
children do not receive a fixed wage, and most work long shifts,
starting in the early morning hours. The CTM agricultural union's
success years earlier in obtaining free transport for migrant seasonal
workers from southern states to fields in the north inadvertently led
to a significant increase in child labor. The union and employers were
unable to convince indigenous farm workers to leave their families at
home, and many have settled near work sites in the north. The union has
had some limited success in negotiating with employers to finance
education in Spanish and indigenous languages near work sites and in
obtaining social security child care centers, but it has had difficulty
in persuading member families not to bring their children into the
fields. Many urban child workers are migrants from rural areas, are
illiterate, and have parents who are unemployed.
The Federal Government increased the number of obligatory school
years from 6 to 9 in 1992 and made parents legally liable for their
children's attendance, as part of a reform to upgrade labor force
skills and long-term efforts to continue increasing educational
opportunities for and participation by youth. Scholarships offered to
families of the abject poor under the Government's ``Progresa''
antipoverty program kept an additional 100,000 children in school in
1999. According to ``Progresa,'' that number increased by 18 percent
during the year.
In March the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
forms of child labor. The government of the Federal District
implemented a law adopted in July 1999 that increased limitations on
working hours and conditions for children employed as supermarket
baggers and automotive attendants.
The law bans child labor, including forced or bonded labor, and
there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution and the LFT
provide for a daily minimum wage. The tripartite National Minimum Wage
Commission (government, labor, and employers) usually sets minimum wage
rates each December, effective January 1, but any of the three parties
can ask that the Commission reconvene during the year to consider a
changed situation. In December 1999, the wage commission adopted a 10
percent increase effective January 1, based in part on the Government's
projection of a 10 percent annual inflation rate for. For the first
time, all labor representatives on the Commission abstained from the
vote in protest, and also for the first time, the Government stood firm
on its original offer. During the course of the year, wage and benefit
adjustments to collective bargaining contracts averaged about 13 to 15
percent, which was several points above the final inflation rate of 8.9
percent for the year.
In Acapulco, Mexico City and nearby industrial areas, southeast
Veracruz State's refining and petrochemical zone, and most border
areas, the minimum daily wage was set at $3.99 (37.90 pesos). However,
employers actually paid $4.55 because of a supplemental 14 percent
subsidy. These income supplements to the minimum wage, agreed to in
annual tripartite pacts, are for all incomes less than four times the
minimum wage, decreasing as wages and benefits rise. In Guadalajara,
Monterrey, and other advanced industrialized areas, the minimum daily
wage (before the subsidy) was $3.70 (35.10 pesos). In other areas, it
was $3.44 (32.70 pesos). There are higher minimums for some
occupations, such as building trades.
The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Few workers (about 16 percent) earn only the minimum
wage. Industrial workers average three to four times the minimum wage,
earning more at larger, more advanced, and prosperous enterprises.
The law and contract arrangements provide workers with extensive
additional benefits. Legally required benefits include free social
security medical treatment and pensions, individual worker housing and
retirement accounts, substantial Christmas bonuses, paid vacations, and
profit sharing. Employer costs for these benefits add from about 27
percent of payroll at marginal enterprises to over 100 percent at major
firms with good union contracts. In addition, employers frequently
subsidize the cost of meals, transportation, and day care for children,
and pay bonuses for punctuality and productivity.
The LFT sets six 8-hour days as the legal workweek, but with pay
for 56 hours. For most industrial workers, especially under union
contract, the true workweek is 42 hours, although they are paid for 7
full 8-hour days. This is one reason why unions vigorously defend the
legal ban on hourly wages. Workers asked to exceed 3 hours of overtime
per day or required to work overtime on 3 consecutive days must be paid
triple the normal wage.
There are 11 special labor arbitration and conciliation boards (in
Queretaro, Pachuca, Ciudad del Carmen, Zacatecas, Orizaba, Ciudad
Juarez, Cancun, Colima, La Paz, Reynosa, and Tijuana) and 4 more state
offices of the STPS to make it more convenient for workers to file
complaints and bring other actions before the labor court system. In
addition, the Labor Secretary has transferred more personnel to the
JFCA to reduce backlogs. He also has highlighted as special issues
child labor, women in the workplace, and the physically disabled by
assigning responsibility for them directly to one of the under
secretaries. In February 1999, the Labor Secretariat established a
separate office for equality and gender issues.
The law requires employers to observe occupational safety and
health regulations, issued jointly by the STPS and the Social Security
Institute (IMSS), and to pay contributions that vary according to their
workplace safety and health experience ratings. LFT-mandated joint
management and labor committees set standards and are responsible for
workplace enforcement in plants and offices. These committees meet at
least monthly to consider workplace needs and file copies of their
minutes with federal labor inspectors. Federal and state authorities
exchange information.
STPS and IMSS officials continued to report that compliance is
reasonably good at most large companies. However, because smaller firms
are far more numerous and so much more difficult to monitor, these
officials were unable to draw any general conclusions about their
compliance. Federal inspectors are stretched too thin for effective
enforcement if companies do not comply voluntarily and fulfill their
legal obligation to train workers in occupational health and safety
matters. There are special problems in construction, where unskilled,
untrained, poorly educated, transient labor is common, especially at
many small sites and companies. Many unions, particularly in
construction, are not organized effectively to provide training, to
encourage members to work safely and healthily, to participate in the
joint committees, or to insist on their rights.
In July a large group of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican labor
organizations and NGO's filed a submission with the U.S. NAO alleging
the failure of Mexican labor authorities to comply with health and
safety regulations resulting in occupational injuries to a number of
workers at maquiladora plants belonging to a U.S. company in the border
state of Tamaulipas. The U.S. NAO accepted the submission in September
for formal review and conducted a public hearing in San Antonio, Texas,
on December 12.
On July 23, about 150 workers at a construction site for a hospital
in Ciudad Juarez rioted over mistreatment by police and poor working
conditions. The workers complained of low pay and extremely poor living
conditions at the barracks where they were housed.
Many agricultural workers are internal migrants, who often travel
with their families, including young children. They often are paid by
volume of the work they produce, rather than by the day. Working
conditions vary by area of the country and from one locality to
another. Allegations have been made that workers, including young
children accompanying them, have been exposed to pesticides and other
chemicals.
Individual employees or unions also may complain directly to
inspectors or safety and health officials. Workers may remove
themselves from hazardous situations without jeopardizing their
employment. Plaintiffs may bring complaints before the federal labor
board at no cost to themselves.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific laws that
prohibit the trafficking of persons; however, immigration laws, the
federal organized crime law, and federal and state penal codes contain
laws that are used to prosecute traffickers of undocumented migrants,
women, and children, and trafficking is a serious problem. The country
is a transit country for the trafficking of persons, especially from
China, to the United States and Canada. There also are isolated cases
of trafficking Mexican nationals for the purpose of forced prostitution
or sexual services, domestic servitude, forced or bonded sweatshop
labor, or other debt bondage. The Government has strengthened
significantly its cooperation with China, the United States, and other
countries. There were credible reports that police, immigration, and
customs officials were involved in the trafficking of such persons (see
Section 2.d.).
On July 31, the Honduran Government stated that it was working to
repatriate from Mexico approximately 400 Honduran girls, between the
ages of 10 and 16 years, who after having tried to enter the United
States illegally were forced into prostitution in Mexico.
A study that was jointly funded by UNICEF and DIF and released in
June studied the commercial sexual exploitation of children in six
cities. Its author estimated that the number of children involved in
the sex trade countrywide at 16,000. Most are Mexicans, although there
are significant numbers from Central America--principally Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador. The Central American children enter the
country through Chiapas. In many cases they are brought there by
procurers who promise them employment in legitimate occupations. They
are thereafter sold to the owners of bars and other establishments and
then forced into prostitution to ``pay off their debts.'' This debt
peonage often never ends because the children accrue more debt for
their meals and housing. Oftentimes, the owners will sell or trade the
children among themselves. Other children are transported to Mexico
City for training. They are then sent to centers of tourism. Some
children are trafficked to the United States and Canada. The study
concludes that the commercial sexual exploitation of children is a
phenomenon that is present today throughout the whole country.
__________
NICARAGUA
Nicaragua is a constitutional democracy, with a directly elected
president, vice president, and unicameral legislature. President
Arnoldo Aleman was elected in a free and fair election in 1996,
defeating his closest competitor, Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN). The Supreme Electoral Council is an
independent fourth branch of government. A series of political accords
between the governing Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) and the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), though highly
controversial, ceded the FSLN more power in several governmental
institutions in exchange for the avoidance of the use of violent
protests to achieve political ends. FSLN leaders largely refrained from
using or threatening the use of violence. The Constitution provides for
an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is at times
susceptible to political and financial influence.
The President is the supreme chief of the national defense and
security forces. President Aleman established the first-ever civilian
Defense Ministry upon his inauguration. The Ministry of Government
oversees the National Police, which is charged formally with internal
security. However, the police share this responsibility with the army
in rural areas. The National Police recently diminished the role of
voluntary police, private citizens contracted by the National Police to
help fill staffing gaps, in law enforcement. The civilian authorities
generally maintained effective control of the security forces. Some
members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
Nicaragua is an extremely poor country, with an estimated per
capita gross domestic product of less than $480. The economy is
predominantly agricultural; coffee, seafood exports, sugar, beef, and
some light manufacturing are the key sectors. The economy grew at 7
percent in real terms in 1999, but the rate declined in 2000. Real GDP
growth rate for 2000 is estimated at 5 percent. The estimated annual
rate of inflation was 8 percent, marking the second consecutive year of
single digit price increases. While the Government estimated that
unemployment is less than 11 percent, some nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) calculated the rate of unemployment and
underemployment as high as 40 to 50 percent. Private foreign investment
continued to increase during the year; however, economic growth is
hindered by unresolved property disputes and unclear land titles
stemming from massive confiscations by the Sandinista government in the
1980's. The country continued to have a precarious balance of payments
position and remained heavily dependent on foreign assistance and
remittances from citizens living abroad.
The Government generally respected many of its citizens' human
rights; however, serious problems remained in some areas. Members of
the security forces committed six reported extrajudicial killings.
Police continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. There were
allegations of torture by the authorities. Prison and police holding
cell conditions remain harsh, although they improved somewhat. Security
forces arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens at an increased rate.
The Government effectively punished some of those who committed abuses;
however, a degree of impunity persisted. Lengthy pretrial detention and
long delays in trials remain problems; however, the judiciary has made
efforts to reduce the large case backlog. The judiciary also is subject
at times to political influence and corruption. The Supreme Court
continued its structural reform program for the judicial system. A new
Judicial Organic Law, intended to address many of these problems, came
into effect in January 1999; however, the weakness of the judiciary
continued to hamper prosecution of human rights abusers in some cases.
The Human Rights Ombudsman made several publicized recommendations
during the year that openly challenged the policies of the Aleman
Administration. These led to little concrete action. Violence against
women, including domestic abuse and rape, remained a problem.
Discrimination against women is an ingrained problem. Violence against
children is a problem and child prostitution continues. Discrimination
against indigenous people is a problem. Child labor also remained a
problem. There were reports of trafficking for forced labor and
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution.
The civil war formally concluded in June 1990 with the
demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN, or ``Contras'').
However, the rule of law and basic infrastructure do not extend to all
rural areas. Despite the Government's disarmament campaigns, many
citizens, especially in rural areas, are heavily armed. Marauding
criminal gangs, some of which claimed political agendas, continued to
be a problem in the mountainous regions of the north, as well as on the
Atlantic Coast.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials; however, the
police registered six reports of extrajudicial killings by police.
The Inspector General's office (IG) of the National Police reported
6 instances in which a member of the police killed an alleged criminal
and 35 instances in which police seriously wounded criminal suspects
while attempting to arrest them. The IG automatically remands to the
court system for review cases in which police use deadly force;
however, the cases often take considerable time to process. The police
do not make a final decision on cases sent to the courts until the
courts respond with a verdict. While the police await the decisions
from the courts, the IG's office normally applies a mild punishment,
such as suspension or confinement to precinct. Of the 48 cases the IG
remanded to the courts during the year, there were no reports of case
adjudication.
On August 19, in Managua, police officers Juan Ramon Velasquez and
Leonel Antonio Velasquez shot and killed 20-year-old Javier de Jesus
Solorzano Hernandez. Solorzano and his friend Marlon Antonio Obando
Madrigal were leaving a neighborhood block party when two unknown
thieves reportedly attempted to rob them. When Solorzano and Obando
refused to give up their money, the four youths entered into a fight.
The thieves had beaten Solorzano to the ground when the Velasquez
brothers, who were patrolling the neighborhood, arrived on the scene.
The thieves reportedly escaped just before the police arrived, at which
time one of the two policemen approached Solorzano, believing that
Solorzano and Obando were gang members. The officer hit Solorzano with
his police baton until he fell down again. Obando then claimed that one
of the two officers, at close range, fired two bullets into Solorzano's
chest. Juan Ramon Velasquez claimed that when they arrived on the scene
Solorzano was brandishing a gun. The police reported that they shot
Solorzano in an act of self-defense. It remained unclear if Solorzano
indeed was brandishing a revolver, and the preliminary autopsy report
raised questions about the veracity of Velasquez's story. Juan Ramon
Velasquez was suspended from his position and was awaiting trial at
year's end.
In late October clashes between police and members of the Yatama
political party led to one reported death and several injuries (See
Section 5).
The police authorities treated another death involving police
officers as a justified homicide in self-defense. On April 6,
roadblocks on major transit arteries in the Southern Atlantic
Autonomous Region (RAAS) by former members of the Nicaraguan Resistance
resulted in clashes with police and the death of one of the protesters.
The roadblocks were organized allegedly in response to the Government's
failure to follow through on accords to settle longstanding claims for
land titles and other benefits. According to a police report, the
police were in the process of negotiating an end to the roadblock when
five of the protesters attacked a policeman, Rafael Urbina Ortega. One
of the assailants, Mauricio Mendoza, took the policeman's rifle and
started shooting indiscriminately, injuring one policeman and four
protesters. Mendoza, whom the police claim was inebriated, then was
shot fatally by police. The local court in Rama, RAAS had yet to decide
on the culpability of the police in the killing at year's end.
National Police reports indicate that the four policemen involved
in the January 1999 killings of Hilario Briones Arostegui and Santos
Arostegui Torres were never investigated.
There were no further developments in the May 1999 case of Pedro
Gonzalez Talavera who was shot and killed by policemen in Villa
Sandino, Chontales. At year's end, the case was still pending in the
Appellate Court of Juigalpa.
There were no further developments in the 1997 Wamblan case in
which 16-year-old Irma Lopez was killed, after allegedly being raped,
by an army patrol.
There were no further developments in the 1997 La Patriota case, in
which the army allegedly killed five members of a criminal band as they
slept.
In 1997 the Government negotiated the disbandment and disarmament
of over 1,200 members, a majority of them former contras, of the
``Northern Front 3-80'' and promised them food, clothing, seeds, and
small plots of land. It also disarmed 423 members of the proSandinista
``Andres Castro United Front'' (FUAC). Despite these successful
disarmaments, armed bands, including former members of the 3-80 front
and FUAC, engaged in murder, kidnapping for ransom, and armed robbery
in the north and north-central regions. FUAC members have alleged that
they were acting in opposition to the Aleman administration, and FSLN
leaders have made positive reference to the FUAC activities in public
statements. However, law enforcement groups, human rights
organizations, and political analysts described the political
motivations as tenuous and stated that most of these actions were
purely criminal in nature. The violent criminal activities of the FUAC-
related gangs received so much public attention that in June the army
launched an intensive military operation to eliminate the gangs in the
region (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law makes the use of torture a punishable crime;
however, police continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. There
were numerous credible reports that police beat or physically
mistreated detainees, often to obtain confessions. During the year, the
Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights (ANPDH) received 70 complaints
of torture or degrading treatment by the authorities. However,
according to government figures, the Ombudsman's Office for the Defense
of Human Rights (PPDDH) submitted the majority of human rights cases to
the police authorities; 39 of the 40 cases received by the police
investigative bodies resulted from PPDDH inquiries. Police Inspector
General Eva Sacasa proved willing to prosecute abusers. During the
year, her office recorded 177 complaints of physical abuse by police,
including those submitted by the ANPDH and others, and found 50 to have
merit. The Inspector General sanctioned 131 officers in these cases.
Between January and November, 27 police officers were discharged
dishonorably.
The National Police recently diminished the role of voluntary
police in law enforcement. Volunteer police are private citizens who
are contracted by the National Police on a volunteer basis to help fill
staffing gaps in several precincts. The National Police provide them
with a uniform, and in some cases, with a gun, at the discretion of the
police chief. Voluntary police do not receive a salary from the
statealthough they may be ``subcontracted'' to provide security to
businesses and farms--nor do they receive any professional training.
Given the sustained criticism of voluntary police for their involvement
in human rights violations, on August 8, Chief of Police Franco
Montealegre approved a new police statute terminating the employment of
all voluntary police in Managua. Government authorities report that
there still are 3,303 voluntary police located throughout the country.
While the Inspector General's office investigated allegations of
abuse and sanctioned the offenders in many cases, a degree of impunity
persisted. Inadequate budget support for the National Police also
hampered efforts to improve police performance and resulted in a
continuing shortage of officers. However, the police were provided with
extensive training during the year, much of it through international
assistance programs.
The Office of Civil Inspection for Professional Responsibility is
responsible for monitoring allegations of illegal detention and police
abuse and forwarding complaints received to the police Inspector
General for follow-up action. A small budget and a small staff limited
its effectiveness. Police Inspector General Sacasa received a total of
863 complaints of human rights violations by police officers during the
year, including complaints forwarded by the Office of Civil Inspection
for Professional Responsibility, and found 177 of these cases to have
merit. She sanctioned a total of 288 officers for violations of human
rights. Of those sanctioned, 69 officers were discharged dishonorably,
and 48 were remanded to the courts; the rest received lesser
punishments, including demotion, suspension, and loss of pay.
On February 16, voluntary policeman Julio Cesar Montenegro Pacheco
accompanied by Lt. Roger Perez entered the house of Jose Francisco
Fernandez in Managua, allegedly without authorization, after hearing
what sounded like a gunshot. When the police began to beat Fernandez,
he ran out of the house and tried to climb over a fence. Montenegro
then used Perez's gun to shoot Fernandez twice in the legs. Montenegro
later defended his actions, claiming that he only fired in Fernandez's
general direction without intending to hit him when Fernandez tried to
throw a machete at the police to impede their pursuit. However, the
inquiries and site investigation of the Nicaraguan Center for Human
Rights (CENIDH) concluded that Montenegro used unnecessary force and
faulted Perez for allowing the voluntary policeman to use his gun. The
National Police subsequently dismissed Montenegro and subjected Perez
to disciplinary action.
On March 2, several members of the National Police stopped Rene de
Jesus Membreno Calero, a Nicaraguan citizen who was traveling from
Costa Rica to his mother's house in the department of Boaco. Captain
Juan Manuel Chavez and other members of the patrol force, for unknown
reasons, severely beat Mr. Membreno, causing rib fractures and other
lesions. After making an investigation, the National Police concluded
that the officers were innocent of all charges and closed the case.
On March 10, several police officers from San Rafael del Norte
entered the home of Rafael Ubeda Castro to arrest Roger Antonio and
Carmen Rafael Ubeda Castro without showing any type of arrest warrant.
Roger Ubeda reported to ANPDH that when the police officers Mario
Castillo and Mario Rojas took him and his brother Carmen outside the
home of their father, the police officers began to beat them with a
wooden stick and the handles of their pistols. The police officers took
the victims to the police headquarters in Jinotega to interrogate them
about possible involvement in armed gangs. Roger and Carmen remained in
a holding cell for 3 days, at which time the police released them for
lack of evidence and the receipt of good conduct reports by private
citizens who knew the individuals (see Section 1.d.).
On March 11, police allegedly apprehended, handcuffed, and brutally
beat Jesus Ramon Olivas Espinoza as he left a bar in Wiwili. The ANPDH
reported that police officers Antonio Armador Ciclon, Teodoro Vanegas,
and several others punched and kicked Olivas several times. The police
officers reportedly carried Olivas to a freight container and continued
physically abusing him in the presence of six other detainees also held
in the container. Olivas claimed that for 3 days the Wiwili police
transferred him and the six other detainees to the holding cells at
night while during the day they were moved to the container. The
container attracted so much heat from the sun that the detainees were
reportedly close to dying from asphyxiation. The police apprehended
Olivas because he was suspected of destroying the propaganda of
political parties. On March 14, the local judge dismissed the case
against Olivas for insufficient evidence. Olivas filed a complaint of
mistreatment with police captain Alberto Garcia Pineda, but an
investigation remained pending at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
On June 13, CENIDH reported that army soldiers Ricardo Lopez
Navarrete and Jose Danilo Hernandez sexually abused Yadira Mendez
Chavarria and robbed Ismael Reyes in the city of Rosita, Northern
Autonomous Atlantic Region (RAAN). The soldiers were part of a military
operation, carried out in June, to combat the illicit and violent
activities of gangs in the region. The local judge in Rosita ruled in
favor of the soldiers, but the Military Appeals Court found the
soldiers guilty and sentenced them to 4 years in prison.
On August 6, police officer Allan Gonzalez and a police cadet
repeatedly kicked a minor in Managua when the youth would not abandon
the sidewalk in front of a private store. Spectators took photographs
of the abuse, and all the major newspapers and human rights
organizations criticized the event. Police Chief Franco Montealegre
dismissed the officer and the cadet from the police department.
On August 23, four soldiers in civilian clothing, including Eleazar
Miguel Romero, robbed a bus full of civilians in Palacaguina, Madriz,
and then fired their guns at the passengers. After hijacking the bus,
they fired their rifles in the air and began to rob the passengers,
including in one instance shooting one, Jose Santos Cordoba Garcia, in
both his legs. Once they stole everything, they stepped off the bus and
allegedly began to shoot indiscriminately into the side of the bus,
injuring a total of nine persons. Erling Suyapa Figueroa, a 15-year-old
girl, was wounded in her left hand. The only identified assailant,
Eleazar Miguel Romero, said that the soldiers committed the crime to
augment their small salaries. While the military investigation remains
pending, as of September, the case already was presented before the
local judge in the region. In December the court found three of the
four soldiers guilty, sentenced them to 16 years in prison, and
acquitted the other soldier.
On August 26, Miguel Angel Toruno Orozco accused police officer
Lizandro Exiles Moncada of shooting him in the chin at close range on
May 22. Toruno claimed that while he and a friend named Francisco Reyes
were walking home from a restaurant in the northern city of Esteli,
Moncada, who was drunk and in civilian clothing, jumped out of a truck
and pointed a pistol at him. Moncada threatened to kill Toruno and
then, at close range, shot Toruno in the chin and left him lying in the
street. While confined to a hospital bed for 2 months in critical
condition, Toruno contacted local human rights organizations and the
police to investigate the case. The local police allegedly closed the
investigation claiming that Toruno was shot by friend, Francisco Reyes.
However, Toruno flatly denied the police claim because he recognized
Moncada before the incident, and Reyes does not know how to drive. The
police in Esteli advised Toruno to take his case to the Office of
Internal Affairs at the National Police headquarters. The office of
internal affairs sent the case to a local magistrate. The police
forensics team concluded that the bullet used to wound the victim did
not come from the gun of the police officer. Based on that evidence,
the local judge acquitted police officer Lizandro Exiles Moncada of all
charges.
On April 11, three antiriot police were shot and wounded seriously
when police attempted to disperse a group of 500 to 600 former members
of the Resistance. The former Resistance members had established a
roadblock at Boaco, in central Nicaragua. One member of the police,
Ernesto Moises Lopez, lost his right eye, while another was shot in the
stomach and a third in the back. The CENIDH reported that Jose Jesus
Jiron, of the former Resistance, was killed in the incident. An
individual riding on a bus also was shot in the leg. Police arrested 12
to 15 former Resistance members. The protesters allegedly were armed
with grenades and shotguns at the time of the incident. The police sent
three of the protesters to a local court in Boaco and released the
others for lack of evidence.
Prison conditions remained harsh, but improved somewhat. The
Supreme Court (CSJ), the National Police, the Attorney General, the
Department of Prisons, and several human rights organizations worked
together during the year to significantly reduce the number of
prisoners who spent 6 months or more of incarceration without a trial
(see Section 1.d.). The initiative helped to alleviate overcrowded
prisons. As of September, only one of the eight correctional facilities
maintained prison populations significantly higher than the standards
established by U. N. conventions on the treatment of prisoners; the
Granada penitentiary exceeded the U.N. standards by 146 prisoners.
According to government statistics, the prisons had a total inmate
population of 4,903 in September, compared with 5,298 in September
1999.
However, the prison system remains underfunded and medical
attention ranges from inadequate to nonexistent. For example, for all 8
penitentiaries and 4,903 prisoners, prison authorities only maintained
a staff of 22 specialists, which include doctors, psychologists,
teachers, and social workers. Prison authorities also reported that 31
percent of prisoners remained without beds, forcing prisoners to sleep
on concrete beds or floors. The percentage of prisoners without beds or
bed mattresses would likely be higher without the periodic inflow of
privately donated mattresses.
On June 6, then-Minister of Government Rene Herrera appointed
Rosario Gaitan to replace Carlos Quintana as Director of Prisons.
Gaitan previously served as Deputy to Quintana, has maintained a career
in the penal system since 1980, and has earned both the respect of the
prison personnel and the prisoners.
Prison officials calculated that the daily expenditure per prisoner
for food was about $0.50 (6 cordobas) and reported that the annual
budget for food remained constant. There was some improvement in prison
food, but malnutrition remained a problem in local jails and police
holding cells. Many prisoners also received additional food from
visiting family and friends. Medical care available to prisoners fell
far short of basic needs. Some prisons and many police holding cells
were dark, poorly ventilated, and unhygienic. At the Bluefields jail,
there were only 2 showers and 4 toilets for more than 102 prisoners.
Only Managua has a separate prison for women; outside the Managua
area, women were housed in separate wings in prison facilities and were
guarded by female custodians. As of September, females made up 2.6
percent of the prison population. The Public Defender's office assigned
two full-time employees to work with the women's prison system to help
ensure its proper functioning in such areas as timely release of
inmates granted parole.
As of September, 3 percent of the prison population were between
the ages of 15 and 18, compared with 4 percent in 1999 and 8.5 percent
in 1998. All youths were housed in separate prison wings from adults.
During the year the Department of Prisons completed the process of
establishing separate facilities for juveniles or converting part of
their existing prison space into a separate youth wing for all prisons.
Conditions in jails and holding cells remained harsh. Police
station holding cells were severely overcrowded. Suspects often were
left in these cells during their trials, since budgetary shortfalls
often restricted the use of fuel for frequent transfers to distant
courtrooms. At the Corn Island jail, six cells each holding six
detainees frequently were filled to capacity. The authorities
occasionally released detainees when they no longer could feed them.
Several churches and national and international NGO's donate
foodstuffs, beds, and medicine to the prison system to help alleviate
shortfalls. The ANPDH worked with the Director of Prisons in an effort
to ensure that prisoners were released in a timely fashion when their
sentence had been served or they were granted parole (see Section
1.e.). Prison guards received human rights training from NGO's and the
Catholic Church and generally treated prisoners well, although there
were some reports of abuses.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention by the police remains a problem. The Police Functions Law
requires police to obtain a warrant prior to detaining a suspect and to
notify family members within 24 hours of the detainee's whereabouts.
Compliance with this law increased significantly in 1999, largely
because of pressure applied by the police internal affairs office and
support for compliance from Chief of Police Franco Montealegre.
Detainees do not have the right to an attorney until they have been
charged formally with a crime. Local human rights groups are critical
of the law for providing inadequate judicial oversight of police
arrests.
The 1995 constitutional reforms reduced from 72 to 48 hours the
time police may hold a suspect legally before they must bring the
person before a judge to decide if charges should be brought. The judge
must then either order the accused released or transferred to prison.
Although cumbersome, this law was observed more closely than in past
years, and few prisoners were held illegally beyond the 48-hour
deadline (see Section 1.c.).
An interinstitutional effort comprised of the Supreme Court (CSJ),
the National Police, the Department of the Penitentiary System, and
several human rights organizations significantly reduced the number of
prisoners with 6 months or more of incarceration without a trial.
Specifically, on February 4, the Penal Bench of the Supreme Court
passed an order to all local magistrates to give priority to those
cases involving pretrial prisoners with 6 months or more of
incarceration. According to government statistics, only 4 percent of
the 4,958 prisoners have been in jail for 6 months or longer without a
trial; in 1999, 8 percent of the prison population experienced an
unusually long delay before their court hearing (see Section 1.c.).
During the year, ANPDH received 155 complaints of illegal arrest
and arbitrary detention. Of those cases sent to the police IG's office
by ANPDH and other human rights organizations, 28 complaints were found
to merit investigation. Of these, 2 were determined to be without merit
and 26 remained under investigation at year's end. As in past years,
incidents of arbitrary detention were most common in Managua and in the
rural northern and north-central regions, where much of the civil war
was fought.
Exile is not practiced. There were no reports of political violence
against any citizens returning from civil war era self-imposed exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is susceptible at times
to corruption and political influence. The judiciary is hampered by
arcane legal codes, prosecutors who play a passive role, an
underfunded, and understaffed defender's office, judges and lawyers who
often lack sufficient training or education, and corruption. In the
past, many judges were not lawyers. Judges' political sympathies or
acceptance of bribes reportedly often influenced judicial actions and
findings.
The judicial system comprises both civil and military courts. The
16-member Supreme Court is the system's highest court, and in addition
to administering the judicial system, also is responsible for
nominating all appellate and lower court judges. The Court is divided
into specialized chambers on administrative, criminal, constitutional,
and civil matters. Under the Law of the Child and Family, which took
effect in 1998, the Attorney General's office rather than the police
investigates crimes committed by and against juveniles. The 1994
Military Code requires the civilian court system to try members of the
military charged with common crimes.
A 5-year administration of justice reform program, begun in 1997,
continued during the year. A Judicial Organic Law, passed by the
National Assembly in 1997 to overhaul the archaic structure of the
court system, finally was signed by President Aleman in 1998 and took
effect in January 1999. The law contains a provision establishing
minimum professional standards for judicial appointees. The Supreme
Court commission supervising the revision of the country's outdated
criminal codes and procedures continued its work, in coordination with
the National Assembly's Judicial Commission. Reform of these codes is
intended to reduce judicial delays and resulting excessive pretrial
detention. By year's end, the Assembly had begun the process to approve
a new draft Criminal Code. However, the Assembly still must approve
each chapter of the draft Criminal Code before it can go into effect.
At year's end, a special subcommission of the National Assembly
Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court finalized a new draft
Criminal Procedures Code. In 1999 the National Assembly approved a
reform of the Public Ministry's office that streamlined the judicial
process by separating the defense and the prosecution functions.
President Aleman vetoed it in May but later rescinded his veto.
In July the Government opened new property tribunals to handle
cases concerning seized properties (see Section 1.f.). This ends the
nearly 3-year freeze in property-related lawsuits that started when the
processing of such cases in district courts was suspended in December
1997.
Although the civil and criminal courts made significant progress in
expediting the judicial process for those in prison without a prior
court hearing, human rights and lawyers' groups in general continued to
complain about the delay of justice, sometimes for years, caused by
judicial inaction.
Judges appeared susceptible to corruption and political influence.
The shelving of politically charged cases or ruling in favor of the
politically connected party remained the most common manifestations of
judicial corruption. For example, on May 26, Alejandro Carrion
McDonough, the brother of Army Commander General Javier Carrion
McDonough, allegedly killed Pablo salon Leal Aguirre, a rural farmer,
in Masaya when Leal allegedly refused to provide access to the water
pipeline leading to Carrion's farm. The family of Leal took the case to
the police and judicial authorities, but in spite of an arrest warrant,
the police never apprehended Alejandro Carrion. Several weeks after the
incident, including an announcement by Leal's family that the Carrion
family attempted to bribe them in exchange for dropping the charges,
alternate judge Walter Solis in the Criminal Court of Managua dismissed
the charges. Largely due to public pressure, the Supreme Court forced
alternate judge Solis, previously suspected of official misuse of
authority, to retire from the bench. The Leal family appealed the
decision of Solis, but at year's end, the Court of Appeals acquitted
Alejandro Carrion. The case then went to the Supreme Court where it was
pending at year's end.
In an ongoing campaign to reduce incompetence and corruption in the
judiciary, the Supreme Court removed an additional 10 judges during the
first half of 1999, bringing the total removed since the campaign began
in 1997 to 104--more than one-third of the 300 judges in the system.
The Judicial Inspector's office received 238 official complaints
against lawyers, judges, and judicial functionaries in the first half
of 1999.
In criminal cases, the accused has the right to legal counsel, and
defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Judicial
Organic Law provided for the establishment of a Public Defender's
office to represent indigent defendants. The office in Managua
maintained a staff of 13 appointed public defenders throughout the
year; however, more are needed. The Court has requested funding for 26
additional public defenders to be located outside of Managua. Elsewhere
in the country where public defenders have not been available, the
system in effect before the passage of the new law continued in use.
Under that system, the presiding judge appoints attorneys from a
standard list to represent indigent defendants, but, because they are
not paid by the State, many attorneys have paid a fine of about $8.30
(100 cordobas) rather than represent such clients.
According to the ANPDH, despite difficulties in implementing fully
the provisions of the new law, the number of indigent defendants who
went to trial without an attorney to represent them decreased
significantly. However, high-ranking officials in the Public Defender's
office complained that they continued to encounter blatant judicial
corruption and the willingness of several judges to sentence defendants
without a public defender present.
Under the Napoleonic legal system, a trial does not consist of a
public hearing. Rather, there is a desk review by a magistrate of the
file of the accused. An initial hearing usually is held within the
constitutionally mandated 10 days. Although very simple cases or those
with high profile or outside interest may be resolved quickly, many
languish for months. Due to a lack of administrative coordination
between judges and the penal system, many prisoners have remained in
prison after their scheduled release date. The Supreme Court tried to
alleviate the problem by issuing instructions to prison authorities to
release prisoners immediately upon the return of an innocent verdict.
In addition, the ANPDH worked with the Director of Prisons during the
year in an effort to ensure that prisoners were released in a timely
manner after serving their sentence or being granted parole.
Despite improvements to the criminal law system, the country still
lacks an effective civil law system. As a result, cases more properly
handled in a civil proceeding often are transmuted into criminal
proceedings. One party then effectively is blackmailed, being jailed
due to action by the party wielding greater influence with the judge.
In addition, this heavy civil-based criminal caseload claims attention
from an overburdened public prosecutor's office and diverts resources
that otherwise could be directed toward genuine criminal matters.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against these
abuses, and the Government generally respected these provisions in
practice. The Constitution stipulates that all persons have the right
to privacy of their family and to the inviolability of their home,
correspondence, and communications; requires warrants for searches of
private homes; and excludes from legal proceedings illegally seized
letters, documents, and private papers.
In November 1997, the National Assembly passed a law intended to
resolve longstanding property disputes that stemmed from massive
confiscations by the Sandinista government in the 1980's. The
legislation provided for the establishment of new property tribunals
with procedures that include mediation, binding arbitration, and
expedited trials. After numerous delays, the new property tribunals
finally started accepting cases for filing in July. The tribunals'
administrative offices are fully staffed and operational. Any lawyer
interested in serving as a judge may submit his or her resume. The
Supreme Court then selects judges by lottery, after which the names of
the designated judges are published in newspapers for public comment.
The Supreme Court can eliminate from consideration those judges about
whom they received complaints. The judges for Managua and Leon already
have been selected, and the process is continuing for tribunals in
other regions. As of December, the tribunals reported that almost 100
cases have been filed. A total of 35 cases were settled through
mediated settlement agreements. The unsuccessfully mediated cases
passed on to arbitration or expedited trials. By year's end, the
tribunals had not yet issued a final determination in any case, and it
was too early to judge their fairness and efficiency.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. However, several constitutional provisions
potentially qualify freedom of the press. The 1987 Constitution
stipulates that citizens have the right to accurate information,
thereby providing an exception by which the freedom to publish
information that the Government deems inaccurate could be abridged.
Although the right to information cannot be subject to censorship,
there is retroactive liability established by law, defined as a social
responsibility, implying the potential for sanctions against
irresponsibility by the press. Although the legislature did not modify
these provisions in the 1995 constitutional reforms, the Government has
not invoked these provisions to suppress the media.
The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) reported that during
1999, members of the pro-Sandinista Nicaraguan Journalists Union and
leaders and members of the Nicaraguan Journalists' Association
attempted to revive legislation to establish a professional
journalists' guild. Although in 1996 the National Assembly passed a
bill that would have established such a guild, the bill never was
signed into law. The journalistic community was divided sharply over
whether such a law would improve the quality of journalism or merely
restrict freedom of speech and of the press. The IAPA expressed concern
about any attempts to revive this proposal and also about the possible
effect on press freedom of a provision in the new draft criminal code
approved by the Judicial Commission of the National Assembly (see
Section 1.e.) that would increase the possible penalties for libel and
slander.
The privately owned print media, the broadcast media, and academic
circles freely and openly discussed diverse viewpoints in public
discourse without government interference. In April a popular daily
newspaper revealed a corruption scandal that received significant
attention from the Government and the public. Over a period of several
weeks the newspaper provided substantial evidence that the Director of
Internal Revenues Collection (DGI) Byron Jerez misused his position and
authority. The journal's coverage of the scandal forced the Government
to investigate the scandal and take action; in June Byron Jerez was
forced to resign from his office.
The IAPA continued to report that the Government directed a
disproportionate amount of total government advertising in the print
media to publications favorable to the Government and denied to a
newspaper critical of the government certain tax benefits provided to
other media businesses.
Media representatives also charge the Aleman Government with using
other means to retaliate against critics. La Prensa, the newspaper most
active in unearthing government corruption, has been in a tax dispute
with the DGI that the paper claims is based purely on politics. Channel
8 is involved in a dispute over the nonpayment of social security fees
for its employees, a dispute that the owner of Channel 8 also
attributes to political machinations on the part of the administration
for his vocal criticism of the President. The administration also
proposed a bill that would set minimum wage levels for print, radio,
and television journalists. The media claimed that the President had an
ulterior motive in proposing the bill that would set unrealistically
high minimum salaries and force media outlets to either close or
drastically reduce their operations. In February the National
Assembly's Commission on Education, Media, Culture, and Sports rejected
the proposal.
The news medium with the largest national audience is radio, but
polls show that television is the primary source of news in the cities.
There are 117 chartered radio stations in the country; listeners
receive a wide variety of political viewpoints, especially on the 67
stations based in Managua. There are seven Managua-based television
stations, six of which carry news programming, often with noticeable
partisan political content. In addition, there are 60 cable television
franchises that offer services in most large and medium-sized cities.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
recognizes the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission, and
the Government generally respects this right in practice. However, the
Constitution also recognizes the right to public assembly,
demonstration, and mobilization ``in conformity with the law,'' and the
law requires demonstrators to obtain permission for a rally or march by
registering its planned size and location with the police. The
authorities routinely granted such permission, but many groups chose
not to register because, they claimed, the process was too cumbersome.
Throughout the year, several groups threatened to cause civil unrest as
a result of the newly instituted constitutional and electoral reforms.
In August coffee growers held small demonstrations to protest
government policies and a lack of government support.
In late October clashes between police and members of the Yatama
political party led to the reported death of one demonstrator and
injuries to several others (see Section 5).
The Constitution provides for the right to organize or affiliate
with political parties, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Opposition and independent associations functioned freely
without government interference or restriction. Private associations do
not have legal status to conduct private fund raising or receive public
financial support until they receive this authorization from the
National Assembly, which it routinely confers.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
to travel and reside anywhere in the country and to enter and exit the
country freely, and the Government respects these rights in practice.
In December 1998, the Government abolished a requirement that citizens
and residents obtain an exit visa to leave the country. The right of
citizens to return to the country is not established in the
Constitution, but in practice the Government has not restricted
anyone's return.
In May the Government nullified the citizenship application of
former Minister of Defense Jose Antonio Alvarado. This action was
portrayed widely in the media as a response by President Aleman to
Alvarado's aspirations to the presidency in 2001. Alvarado, a
Nicaraguan by birth, relocated abroad during the civil war in the
1980's and acquired foreign citizenship. Alvarado claimed that he
returned to Nicaragua in 1990, and reacquired his Nicaraguan
citizenship. Minister of Government Rene Herrera nullified Alvarado's
application for ``repatriation'' based on allegations of fraud and
other irregularities in the application. This administrative action
effectively removed Alvarado's opportunity to qualify for the 2001
national elections. A new constitutional reform stipulates that elected
positions can be occupied only by Nicaraguans who have maintained their
citizenship for the 4 years immediately prior to the date of the
general elections. In August an appeals court ruled in favor of
Alvarado, thus suspending Herrera's administrative action. The Supreme
Court ultimately is to decide the case.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Constitution provides for asylum, and refugees
cannot be expelled to the country that persecuted them. The issue of
the provision of first asylum did not arise.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens exercised their right peacefully to change their
government in free and fair national elections in 1996 held under the
auspices of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), an independent branch
of government. Over 90 percent of eligible voters registered, and 76
percent of eligible voters voted in 1996. Over 3,000 national and
international observers declared the elections free and fair, despite
some logistical and organizational problems.
The 1995 reforms to the 1987 Constitution established a more equal
distribution of power and authority among the four coequal branches of
government. The President heads the executive branch and a cabinet
appointed by the President, who is both head of state and head of
government, as well as supreme chief of the defense and security
forces. The Vice President has no constitutionally mandated duties or
powers. Both the President and Vice President are elected to 5-year
terms by direct popular vote, with the possibility of a runoff election
between the top two candidates if one does not obtain at least 35
percent of the vote on the first ballot. The Constitution does not
permit the President to hold consecutive terms in office.
A single-chamber National Assembly exercises legislative power. In
October 1996, voters chose 93 members, including 20 deputies from
nationwide lists, 70 from lists presented in each of the 15 departments
and the 2 autonomous regions, and 3 defeated presidential candidates
who obtained a minimum percentage of the national vote. Members elected
concurrently with the President and Vice President in 1996 are to serve
5-year terms. The ruling PLC holds the highest number of deputy seats
with 36; the FSLN has 35; a dissident liberal caucus has 8; the
Conservatives have 5; and a conglomeration of minor parties make up the
remaining 9 seats.
On January 20, the National Assembly approved a package of proposed
constitutional amendments supported by the leadership of both the
governing PLC and the opposition FSLN. Key elements of the legislation
included a change in the requirements that a presidential candidate
must meet to avoid a second-round runoff election; expansion of the
Supreme Court from 12 to 16 judges; expansion of the CSE from 5 to 7
magistrates; an automatic assembly seat for the outgoing President and
Vice President; a requirement for a two-thirds majority vote in the
Assembly, rather than the previous qualified majority vote, to remove
presidential immunity from prosecution; and the replacement of a single
Controller General with the current 5-person collegial body charged
with investigating allegations of wrongdoing or financial malfeasance
by Government officials. The legislation provided for election of the
President and the Vice President in the first round of voting if one
political party wins at least 40 percent of the vote, or if one party
wins at least 35 percent of the vote and the party in second place is
more than 5 percentage points behind the front-runner. In addition, a
party will lose its legal status if it obtains less than 4 percent of
the vote in a general election. The latter provision is expected
greatly to reduce the number of parties eligible to field candidates in
general elections; over 20 parties ran candidates in the 1996
elections.
There are no restrictions in law or practice against women,
indigenous groups, or other minorities voting or participating in
politics; however, they are underrepresented in government and
politics. Women served as President and Vice President until January
1997, and a woman served as president of the CSE until January.
Additionally, 2 of 16 Supreme Court justices are women; women hold
ministerial, vice ministerial, and other senior positions in
government; and voters elected 10 women to the National Assembly in
October 1996. Two members of the National Assembly claim indigenous
heritage.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
With some exceptions, human rights groups operated without
government interference. Major organizations included the Permanent
Commission for Human Rights (CPDH), the (ANPDH), and the Nicaraguan
Center for Human Rights (CENIDH). The ANPDH, the CENIDH, the CPDH, and
the Catholic Relief Services continued to conduct human rights
workshops at the police training academy, at various police
headquarters, and with army units throughout the country. Some military
officers received internationally sponsored human rights training.
On March 29, Amnesty International (AI) reported that the
Government accused Vilma Nunez de Excorcia, President of CENIDH, of
obstructing police. On June 2, AI reported that she had received
telephonic threats to her life. Nunez alleges that the death threats
are because she spoke out against Government complicity in alleged
army-ordered assassinations of FUAC leaders. When she asked the police
to investigate, they concluded that her charges were unfounded and
closed the case.
The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (PPDDH), the only autonomous
government-financed human rights office, continued to focus on filling
staffing gaps and organizing its scope and activities. In 1995 the
National Assembly passed a law creating a Human Rights Ombudsman's
office, with the Ombudsman to be elected by the Assembly. In June,
after a delay of nearly 5 years, the National Assembly elected Benjamin
Perez, formerly the head of the Assembly's Human Rights Commission, as
the country's first Ombudsman and Julian Corrales as Deputy Ombudsman.
Perez relied on the participation of most local human rights
organizations to select the Special Ombudsmen for Children's Issues and
for Women Issues, Carlos Emilio Lopez and Patricia Obregon,
respectively. In December he selected the Special Ombudsman for
Indigenous Affairs, Rev. Norman Bent. The PPDDH also began to
investigate actively human rights violations during the year. Perez
began demonstrating the effective independence of his office from the
Aleman Administration when he publicly criticized the Government for
violating the constitutional rights of former Defense Minister Jose
Antonio Alvarado by nullifying his repatriation application (see
Section 2.d.). However, he has been reluctant to exercise the full
powers of his office.
In July 1997, the Organization of American States' (OAS) Technical
Cooperation Mission (TCM), opened at the request of the Government and
continues to operate. The TCM is a small successor organization to the
OAS International Support and Verification Commission. The TCM focuses
on the 13 municipalities that were affected most adversely by the
decade-long civil war, where the TCM works on conflict resolution,
reconciliation, improving local government, and extending legal
infrastructure. The TCM and Catholic Relief Services help maintain more
than 200 peace commissions in the northern and central parts of the
country, intended to give inhabitants of the area a means of dispute
resolution, a means of monitoring human rights abuses, and a vehicle
for expressing their concerns to government authorities. Many of the
commissions operate in areas that are without any governmental
presence, and serve as surrogates for absent police and courts. The
Government granted legal standing to additional such grassroots
organizations during the year. Some peace commission members initially
reported that soldiers, rural police, and local residents sometimes
misunderstood their efforts at advocacy on behalf of jailed criminals,
interpreting them as challenges to law enforcement officials'
authority. However, during the year, the commissions continued to
report increased support from all elements of the societies they serve,
including law enforcement.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of birth,
nationality, political belief, race, gender, language, religion,
opinion, national origin, economic condition, or social condition;
however, in practice the Government made little or no effort to combat
discrimination. Few, if any, discrimination suits or formal complaints
were filed with government officials.
Women.--The most prevalent violations of women's rights involved
domestic and sexual violence, which were widespread and underreported.
The National Police reported that of 20,905 reports filed by women
between January and August, more than 11,086 concerned physical or
sexual abuse.
The Criminal Code provides punishment for sexual abuse, and
stipulates that any person convicted of physically abusing or raping
another person will face from 9 months to 4 years in prison. The
National Police, as well as local human rights groups, have confirmed
that while police sometimes intervene to prevent domestic violence,
they rarely prosecute perpetrators because victims often refuse to
press charges. Those cases that actually reached the courts usually
resulted in a not guilty verdict due to judicial inexperience with, and
lack of legal training related to, proper judicial handling of such
violence.
The 1996 Law against Aggression against Women reformed the Criminal
Code to make domestic violence a crime and to provide up to 6 years'
imprisonment for those found guilty of such violence. The law also
provided for the issuance of restraining orders in cases in which women
fear for their safety.
According to statistics from the National Police, the police
received 1,181 rape complaints during the year. In 1999 there were
1,367 reported instances of rape. Many women are reluctant to report
abuse or file charges due to social stigmas attached to victims of
rape.
The police manage 18 women's commissariats in 14 cities. Each
commissariat is located adjacent to a police station and is staffed by
six police officers, two social workers, one psychologist, and one
lawyer. However, due to a lack of funding, the staff size is often
limited to a far smaller number. The commissariats provide both social
and legal help to women and mediate spousal conflicts.
In October 1999, with the help of the CENIDH, Zoilamerica Narvaez
filed a complaint with the IACHR against her stepfather, FSLN leader,
National Assembly Deputy, and former President Daniel Ortega. Narvaez
asserted that Ortega sexually molested and harassed her from the time
she was 11 years old until she filed charges against him in 1997. The
case publicized the problems of incest, rape, and women's rights and
also highlighted the issue of immunity from prosecution for
parliamentary deputies. In 1998, Narvaez championed an effort to
persuade the National Assembly to withdraw Ortega's immunity so that
she could bring a lawsuit against him; however, the Assembly did not
take up the issue of Ortega's immunity by year's end. In November 1999,
the IACHR officially opened a case in response to Narvaez's complaint
and advised the Government that it would be required to respond to the
charges. On September 27, the Government responded that the claims made
by Narvaez were unfounded and merited no further investigation. The
Government argued that the State did not violate her constitutional
rights because the legislative and judicial branches gave her case due
consideration. The IACHR has not responded to the Government.
Prostitution is common, and there were credible reports that some
women were trafficked and forced into prostitution (see Sections 6.c.
and 6.f.). In Managua most prostitutes work on the streets,
clandestinely in nightclubs and bars, or offer sexual services in
massage parlors. In towns along the Pan American Highway, women and
girls sell sexual services to truck drivers and other travelers, often
foreigners driving north from Costa Rica. In port cities such as
Corinto, the primary clientele are sailors. Corinto is unusual in that
prostitutes receive medical examinations, and a card certifying their
health if they are free of disease. In addition, prostitutes in Corinto
reportedly often work together to maintain a rudimentary price-setting
structure that enabled them to earn much more than they would in other
areas. However, in most areas, prostitutes do not have access to
medical screening or treatment.
Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes,
reports of discrimination against women are persistent and credible.
According to a poll released on April 16, women comprise about 61
percent of the public labor force, a number much larger than that in
the private sector. It also showed that even with comparable
educational backgrounds, salaries for male and female workers differ
significantly, with men making sometimes twice as much as women in the
same positions. Even with similar qualifications, men advance more
quickly than women do. Women constitute the majority of workers in the
traditionally low-paid education and health service sectors. According
to a 1998 report, women have equal or somewhat better access to
education than men, especially in urban areas.
There are many NGO and government programs that target
discrimination against women, mostly by analyzing the current status of
women in the workplace. The Program for Reform and Modernization of the
Public Sector, directed by the Vice President, collects statistics on
salary differences and hiring techniques in the public sector, thereby
publicizing the issue of discrimination. However, it is unclear what
measures have been taken to actually counteract such discrimination in
practice.
Children.--The Government expresses its commitment to children's
human rights and welfare publicly, but does not commit adequate funding
levels for children's programs or primary education. A constitutional
provision known as the ``6 Percent Rule'' automatically allots 6
percent of the annual budget to a higher education consortium, often at
the expense of funding for primary and secondary education programs.
Children 18 years of age and younger made up approximately 53 percent
of the population. A 1995 study showed that as many as 40 percent of
all children are not registered officially. Education is compulsory
through the sixth grade, but this provision is not enforced. The study
also indicated that 45 percent of children do not attend school.
Primary school enrollment rates for boys and girls are estimated at 73
and 75 percent, respectively; secondary school enrollment rates are 39
and 47 percent.
Children increasingly were involved in crime both as victims and as
perpetrators. From 1993 to 1997, offenders under the age of 17
increased from approximately 1.5 percent to approximately 15 percent.
From January to August, 29 minors died as a result of violent crime.
During the same period, victims of rape included 222 children under the
age of 13, and 351 between the ages of 13 and l7. Children, especially
boys in street gangs, contributed to an ongoing rise in the crime rate,
which resulted in a police crackdown on youth gangs in August that
involved over 500 juvenile arrests. During the year, there were about
3,500 reported cases of child abandonment and abuse, 1,506 cases of
children who were hospitalized for severe burns, and 105 children who
disappeared. It is estimated that about 63 percent of sexual abuse
victims are under the age of 18, and that 36 percent are younger than
13. Over 676,000 children are at-risk and exposed daily to violence,
abuse, exploitation, and neglect. According to UNICEF, this number is
expected to increase because the population of children under 5 years,
living on the streets, is increasing.
As a result of the Child and Family Law, which took effect in late
1998, juvenile prisoners could no longer be held in adult facilities,
or for more than 24 hours without being charged. However,
implementation of the new law proved problematic. In August 1999, 17-
year-old Modesto Perez ambushed and killed his former employer,
National Assembly deputy Jose Cuadra, after Cuadra fired Perez. Public
outrage at the inability of the system to punish Perez effectively was
directed primarily at the new law, in particular the provision that
minors charged with crimes be prosecuted in new juvenile courts, where
the possible penalties for serious crimes are less than those imposed
on adults. In addition, the juvenile courts were operational only in
Managua and Ciudad Dario; consequently, minors charged with crimes
elsewhere in the country often avoided prosecution entirely. The
National Assembly, the Catholic Church, and other organizations spoke
out in favor of reforming the law to allow the prosecution of minors
who commit serious crimes as adults. In September a jury found Perez
guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
The First Lady has established several commissions on children's
issues. Mrs. Aleman headed the National Council for the Protection of
Children and the National Council for the Eradication of Child Labor.
According to local media and the Ministry of the Family, the
incidence of child prostitution increased, especially in Managua, and
near border cities and ports. According to press reports, UNICEF noted
significant growth in prostitution among children between the ages of
12 and 16 in towns where taxi drivers were said to serve as middlemen.
OAS personnel in the country also noted growth in prostitution among
girls as young as 10 years of age; in rural areas, their clients are
often truck drivers and other travelers, including foreigners, who
patronize prostitutes in towns along the Pan American Highway. From
December 1998 to May 1999, the Ministry of the Family sponsored an
investigation into child prostitution in five municipalities. Of the
more than 300 children surveyed, 82 percent reported that they had
started engaging in prostitution within the past year. Many of those
surveyed said that they engaged in prostitution to buy basic
necessities such as food and clothing, or to support a drug habit. A
1999 survey by the NGO Casa Alianza reported that of 520 children, 504
admitted to consuming drugs, usually glue. There have been cases of
adults who exchange sexual favors with street children in return for
glue. There were cases of trafficking in children for the purpose of
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.). In 1999 a National Forum
against the Sexual and Commercial Exploitation of Children and
Adolescents was created to fight for children's rights and bring this
issue to the public attention; however, it failed to take any actions
during the year.
People with Disabilities.--In 1998 the Ministry of Health created a
National Council for Rehabilitation to address the needs of the 600,000
citizens with some type of disability, only 3 percent of whom receive
medical treatment. Through its clinics and hospitals, the Government
provides care to war veterans and other disabled persons, but the
quality of care is generally poor. However, with assistance from
international NGO's, foreign governments, and the public health care
system, the Government has procured thousands of prostheses and other
medical equipment for veterans and former resistance members.
Despite some efforts, the Government's past role in helping the
disabled is minimal and often has been criticized. It has not
legislated or otherwise mandated accessibility to buildings for the
disabled. In the spring, the Ministry of the Family announced that it
would cut a considerable amount of financial support for the Blue Bird
Protection Association that shelters about 100 disabled persons, aged
from 10 months to 40 years old, who are considered unable to care for
themselves. Although the Ministry agreed to cover a significant percent
of the Association's budget, its failure to do so forced the
Association's employees to go without pay, and a significant decrease
in medicinal, clothing, and food supplies. Many organizations centered
on helping the disabled called for the Government to focus more
attention on the needs and interests of the disabled.
Indigenous People.--Indigenous people constitute about 5 percent of
the country's population and live primarily in the Northern Autonomous
Atlantic Region (RAAN) and Southern Autonomous Atlantic Region (RAAS).
The RAAN and the RAAS, which were created in 1987 out of the former
department of Zelaya and which border the Caribbean Sea, constitute 47
percent of the national territory. Based on 1998 information from the
Center for Investigation and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast and
other sources, the four major identifiable tribes are the Miskito (with
approximately 100,000 members), the Sumo (10,000), the Garifuna
(3,000), and the Rama (1,000).
In an effort to encourage indigenous participation in Atlantic
coast regional elections held in 1998, the CSE distributed electoral
and civic education materials in four languages, including Miskito and
Sumo. The indigenous people of the RAAN, primarily the Miskito and the
Sumo, have a political organization known as Yatama, which has
representation in regional and municipal councils. There is also an
armed faction of the same name; the extent to which the two groups are
linked is not clear. Like many armed groups operating since the end of
the civil war, the Yatama groups mix banditry with a genuine desire to
force the Government to devote more resources to their under-developed
region. However, two factors differentiate the armed groups in the RAAN
from those that have operated elsewhere in the country. First, most
participants in these groups are Amerindians who long have seen
themselves as having a separate culture. Second, drug trafficking and
drug money on the Atlantic coast have become far more pervasive than
elsewhere in the country. The total strength of Yatama armed groups was
estimated at 210 men.
In September 1999, President Aleman signed a disarmament agreement
with representatives of the Yatama armed groups. In return, the
Government made a number of promises to the Miskitos including land to
fighters who turned in their arms, support for housing for Yatama-
affiliated families, agricultural credits, protection of traditional
Amerindian fishing rights, and resolution of long-standing disputes
about the boundaries of communal Miskito land. However, these
provisions had not been implemented at year's end which has caused
recent threats of remobilization by the Yatama groups.
The Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) ruled in August that the Yatama
political party did not meet the qualifications to participate in the
November 5 municipal elections. The party attempted to enter into a
political alliance with two other Atlantic-coast parties, but the CSE
determined that the alliance failed to meet the electoral eligibility
requirements for the municipal elections, thus eliminating Yatama's
participation in the November elections. Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera
led protests against the party's exclusion in Puerto Cabezas and other
areas of the RAAN. In subsequent clashes between October 26-29 between
police and Rivera's followers, several followers were injured and
scores were arrested. One person was killed; however, it was unclear
whether his death resulted from the disturbance. There were high levels
of abstention on election day mainly due to dissatisfaction with the
CSE ruling. Consequently, the PLC and the FSLN won all the contested
offices in the RAAN. Since the electoral body ruled late in the year on
the eligibility of the alliance, it granted Yatama automatic
qualification for the 2001 national elections.
The 1987 Autonomy Law requires the Government to consult indigenous
people regarding the exploitation of their areas' resources. Indigenous
people claim that the central Government often made decisions without
adequate community consultation. As in previous years, some indigenous
groups complained that central government authorities excluded the
indigenous people of the Atlantic coast from meaningful participation
in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and the
allocation of natural resources. Government health care exists in the
Atlantic towns of Puerto Cabezas, Siuna, and Bluefields, but a majority
of indigenous people in rural areas have no access to modern health
care. Critics of government policy cited extremely high unemployment
rates, but calculation of reliable employment statistics was
complicated because most of the working indigenous population on the
Atlantic coast is engaged in subsistence fishing, farming, and mining.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most citizens are of mixed
background, and ethnicity is not a barrier to political or economic
success. However, various indigenous groups from both the RAAN and the
RAAS sometimes linked the Government's failure to expend resources in
support of the Atlantic coast population to the existence of ethnic,
racial, and religious (principally members of the Moravian church)
minorities that predominate in that region.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of workers to organize voluntarily in unions, and this right was
reaffirmed in the new Labor Code that entered into effect in 1996 and
replaced the antiquated 1944 code. All public and private sector
workers, except those in the military and the police, may form and join
unions of their own choosing, and they exercise this right extensively.
The Labor Code permits the existence of more than one union,
representing the same group of workers, at any place of employment. To
become a union, a group of at least 20 persons must petition the
Ministry of Labor for legal status and the right to engage in
collective bargaining. The new code legally recognizes cooperatives,
into which many transportation and agricultural workers are organized.
Less than half of the formal sector work force, including agricultural
workers, is unionized, according to labor leaders. Union membership
continued to fall during the year. The unions are independent of the
Government, although many are affiliated with political parties.
The Constitution recognizes the right to strike. The Labor Code
requires a majority vote of all the workers in an enterprise to call a
strike. The Labor Code requires that before a union may strike, it must
first receive approval from the Labor Ministry. To obtain approval, the
union must go through a process that requires good faith negotiation
with management.
The Labor Code prohibits retribution against strikers and union
leaders for legal strikes. However, this protection may be withdrawn in
the case of an illegal strike. In 1999 the national construction
workers' union was about to begin a legal strike after having spent 2
years following all the necessary measures. The Ministry of Labor would
have declared the strike legal, but the strike was avoided when the
construction branch of the Private Enterprise Council finally agreed to
negotiate with the union. Legal strikes are rare, and there was only
one during the year. The Labor Ministry asserts that it would take
approximately 6 months for a union to go through the entire process to
be permitted to have a legal strike. Observers contend that the process
is inappropriately lengthy and so complex that there has been only one
legal strike since the 1996 Labor Code came into effect.
The Labor Code provides protected status to union leaders,
requiring that companies receive permission from the Ministry of Labor
after having shown just cause to fire union executive board members.
Such protection is limited to nine individuals per union. However, the
Labor Code allows businesses to fire any employee, including union
organizers, provided the business pays the employee double the normal
severance pay. This practice is used sometimes by business leaders to
stymie unionization attempts.
Unions freely form or join federations or confederations and
affiliate with and participate in international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right to bargain collectively, and this
right was reaffirmed in the 1996 Labor Code. The Government generally
sought to foster resolution of pressing labor conflicts (usually in the
public sector) through informal negotiations rather than through formal
administrative or judicial processes. According to the reformed Code,
companies engaged in disputes with employees must negotiate with the
employees' union if the employees have thus organized themselves.
However, the possible existence of more than one union at any place of
employment means that several unions, each with different demands, can
coexist at any one enterprise. Similarly, management may sign
collective bargaining agreements with each union.
There are 29 enterprises operating in the government-run free trade
zones (FTZ), employing approximately 24,000 workers. In addition, there
are 4 authorized private FTZ's; the 9 enterprises in these zones employ
some 2,000 workers.
Approximately half the workers in the government-run FTZ are
represented by a union organization; however, only about 10 percent of
them are actual union members. While some of these unions have real
collective bargaining power, others are primarily symbolic.
There have been several allegations of violations of the right to
organize, primarily at the Las Mercedes FTZ, the largest in Managua,
with 15 enterprises and approximately 19,000 workers. The Ministry of
Labor has investigated these allegations and has concluded that
employers have acted within the law. Notwithstanding the legality of
employer actions, the result has been to weaken significantly an
important union in the FTZ, the Sandinista Workers Central (CST). The
CST has declared several strikes without first exhausting the very
lengthy and complex administrative process of getting the required
majority of the workers. Consequently, the Ministry of Labor
consistently has ruled the strikes illegal. Employers then fire the
striking workers based on the Ministry's ruling.
In essence, employers have taken advantage of the extensive
administrative requirements required to declare a strike legal and the
CST's failure to follow the prescribed rules.
In April Chentex, a Taiwanese-owned textile factory, tried and
failed to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with an
independent union, the Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN), and the CST.
Negotiations broke down because the CST demanded an increase in the
factory minimum salary from $62-115 (800 to 1,500 cordobas) per month.
Although management considered this an inordinate increase, 1,500
cordobas falls below the Government's estimate of 1,600 cordobas per
month for a basic basket of goods. After 50 CST workers participated in
a work stoppage, management requested and received permission to fire
11 of the 13 CST board members based on participation in an illegal
strike. All dismissed members filed an appeal before the labor court,
which subsequently found that the workers had been fired properly. The
CST appealed that finding to an appellate court, which had not issued a
decision by year's end. In addition, scores of workers were fired while
many others resigned to show their support for the fired board members.
Meanwhile the CST organized a series of work stoppages leading to
the occupation of the factory on May 2. Chentex then filed criminal
charges against the 9 board members for damaging property, kidnapping
management personnel, and injuring security persons during the
takeover. Chentex also later filed a petition to have the CST's legal
status dropped because after the firings and resignations, they failed
to meet the legal minimum of members. There are ongoing negotiations
between the union and Chentex to resolve these issues; however, these
negotiations were stalled at year's end.
On January 6, Mil Colores, a textile factory, asked the Ministry of
Labor for permission to fire 50 workers as a money-saving measure,
included were 26 of the 34 workers who petitioned, on January 11, to
recertify the CST union. Another union--the Mil Colores Workers Union
(MCWU)--had been certified earlier in the month. The Ministry denied
the CST's request because it claimed that CST failed to meet the 20-
member minimum requirement for certification. The CST alleged collusion
between the Ministry and the company, specifically that the Mil Colores
request to the fire workers was backdated to precede the attempt to
form a union. On January 27, during a CST-organized protest protesters
broke through the factory doors, leading to the hospitalization of over
30 persons and the arrest of another 5. Shortly thereafter the company
filed criminal charges against 68 workers for involvement in the
incident. The president of Mil Colores subsequently dropped all charges
and came to an agreement with the CST to rehire dismissed workers on a
case by case basis.
In October 1999, JEM III, an American-owned company, laid off over
100 workers, reportedly because of the seasonal nature of their
product--flannel shirts. The company began negotiations with the CST
over these and future layoffs. In December 1999, after failure to reach
an agreement, the CST workers went on strike. The company immediately
petitioned the Ministry of Labor to declare the strike illegal, which
would allow the company eventually to fire the strikers. However, the
Ministry declared the strike legal, and the workers went back to work
after obtaining minimum concessions. The JEM III strike is the only
strike at the FTZ ever to be found legal by the Ministry of Labor.
However, in January, another 70 workers were fired, including most CST
board members. Because of various internal problems, the CST did not
grieve the firings and the Ministry had no further involvement.
However, the net effect was that the CST disappeared from JEMIII.
In response to longstanding complaints by union representatives
that the Ministry of Labor did a poor job of enforcing the Labor Code
in the FTZ's, in 1997 the Ministry opened an office in the Managua FTZ
to ensure that the code was being enforced. FTZ officials claim that,
due to memories of the corrupt and ineffective unions of the 1980's,
many workers in the FTZ enterprises simply have no interest in
unionizing. They also claim that wages and working conditions in FTZ
enterprises are better than the national average. For example, some FTZ
enterprises assert that they pay wages that average over $192 (2,400
cordobas) per month, three times the minimum wage.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor but does not specifically address
forced or bonded labor by children, and such practices occur. The
Ministry of Labor continues to report that some children were forced to
beg by their parents, and that some were rented by their parents to
organizers of child beggars (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). There have
been reports this year of trafficking in persons for forced labor or of
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution
(see Section 6.f.).
In July the Labor Ministry investigated charges of forced labor at
a textile factory located outside the FTZ, but which operates under the
same rules and enjoys the same tax incentives as FTZ companies. The
inspector verified that some 34 workers had begun work at 7:00 a.m. the
previous day and were still working at 10:00 a.m. the next day when the
inspector arrived--a total of 27 hours. The company produced signed
documents from the workers stating that they had agreed voluntarily to
work extra hours. Privately, the workers stated that they had signed
the document for fear that they would be fired if they refused.
Moreover, they understood that they would work only 2 extra hours.
Although there is no evidence that the company made any threats, the
fact that all 34 workers who were requested to work overtime agreed to
do so indicates that the workers believed they would be fired if they
refused. The workers were only provided a piece of bread and a bottle
of soda during the night that they spent at the factory. The human
resources manager who allowed the inspector into the factory
subsequently was fired. The Ministry of Labor issued the company a
warning and threatened heavy fines and possible closure if the problem
reoccured.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution provides for the protection of children's
rights and prohibits child labor that can affect normal childhood
development or interfere with the obligatory school year. The country
has comprehensive labor legislation to protect children up to age 18.
The Constitution also provides protection from any type of economic or
social exploitation. The 1996 Labor Code raised the age at which
children may begin working with parental permission from 12 to 14
years. Parental permission to work also is required for 15- and 16-
year-olds. The law limits the workday for such children to 6 hours and
prohibits night work. However, because of the economic needs of many
families, a cultural legacy of child work among peasants, and lack of
effective government enforcement mechanisms, child labor rules rarely
are enforced except in the small formal sector of the economy.
In mid-September, the Government ratified ILO Convention 182
regarding the worst forms of child labor; most of its provisions
already were incorporated in the Labor Code.
There are no reliable figures regarding the number of working
children, but the Government reports that child labor occurs in both
urban and rural areas. The latest official figures estimate that
approximately 161,000 children between 10 and 19 are employed while
CENIDH estimates that there are approximately 322,000 working children.
Over 140,000 children are employed in rural areas at coffee,
tobacco, rice, and banana plantations. In Managua over 6,000 children
work on city streets, selling merchandise, cleaning automobile windows,
or begging.
According to a 1998 UNICEF report, approximately 42 percent of
children between the ages of 6 and 9 work. A study published in 1996 by
the National Commission against Child Labor concluded that over 161,000
children between 10 and 19 years of age work, including approximately
109,000 employed in rural areas such as coffee, tobacco, rice, and
banana plantations. The study found that 6,219 children work in urban
areas as beggars, or selfemployed car washers or parking attendants.
Comprehensive labor legislation, intended to protect children up to 18,
prohibits child labor in areas such as mines and garbage dumps, and
imposes heavy fines for illegal employment. The Ministry of Labor
established an inspection unit to monitor occupational safety and
health in the agricultural sector, signed agreements with nightclubs
and restaurant owners who pledged to comply with labor laws, and issued
a resolution in 1999 prohibiting employment of minors specifically in
the free trade zones. However, there have been some exceptions due to
most families' need of extra income. The 1996 Labor Code authorizes
children to work under certain circumstances, provided they are no
younger than 14 years of age and have parental permission.
Child prostitution is a serious problem. Although national figures
are not available, a study conducted in Managua in 1998 found that 40
percent of the 1,200 prostitutes in the city were under the age of 18.
No numbers were available for other cities, but in 1998 UNICEF reported
that teenage sexual exploitation had increased in recent years in rural
areas, border cities, ports, and in Managua.
The Ministry of Labor has begun to take steps to combat child labor
(See Section 5). It has signed agreements with nightclubs and
restaurant owners whereby these establishments pledged to comply with
child labor laws. In 1999 it issued a resolution specifically
prohibiting the employment of minors in the FTZ's.
The Ministry of Family sponsors several programs that target
working minors. These programs, which cover up to 10,000 children
nationwide, include childcare services, returntoschool programs, and
technical and vocational training. The programs also include training
for parents and teachers. The Ministry of the Family, in conjunction
with the Ministry of Education, established a program to keep 647
children off city intersections where they wash windshields. The
program provides housing for the 75 percent of these children who are
homeless and schooling for the 60 percent who are school dropouts.
Despite comprehensive legislation prohibiting child labor,
structural economic problems have prevented its eradication. The
Government has been able to make progress in combating child labor in
the ``formal sector"; i.e., that sector of the economy which is
regulated by the Government, such as factories, construction,
restaurants, and nightclubs. Most of the problems exist in the
``informal sector,'' which is not regulated by the Government. Workers
in this sector, which is characterized by a lack of an obvious
employer, include street vendors, windshield washers, parking lot
attendants, garbage dump scavengers, beggars, prostitutes, and
agricultural workers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is set through
tripartite (business, government, and labor) negotiations, and must be
approved by the Legislative Assembly. A new minimum wage scale took
effect in August 1999 and, although by law it was to be revisited 6
months later, has not been adjusted since. In November the Ministry of
Labor called for new negotiations on the minimum wage. The various
groups met sporadically, but no new minimum wage had been set by the
year'' end. Minimum wages vary by sector; monthly rates are as follows:
Agriculture, $36 (450 cordobas plus food); fisheries, $56 (700
cordobas); mining, $68 (850 cordobas); industrial manufacture, $48 (600
cordobas); electric, gas, and water utilities, $72 (900 cordobas);
construction, $96 (1,200 cordobas); restaurants and hotels, $72 (900
cordobas); transportation, $72 (900 cordobas); banking, $80 (1,000
cordobas); community and social services, $56 (700 cordobas); central
and municipal government (includes health and education employees), $44
(550 cordobas); and FTZ $64 (800 cordobas). The minimum wage does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. It falls
below the Government estimate of what an urban family must spend each
month for a basic basket of goods ($128, or 1,600 cordobas). The
majority of urban workers earn well above the minimum rates.
The Labor Code incorporates the constitutionally mandated 8-hour
workday; the standard legal workweek is a maximum of 48 hours, with 1
day of rest weekly. The 1996 code established severance pay at from 1
to 5 months, depending on the duration of employment and the
circumstances of firing. However, persons fired for cause may be denied
severance pay through a process that requires employers to demonstrate
proof of worker misconduct. The Code also established an employer's
obligation to provide housing to employees who are assigned temporarily
to areas beyond commuting distance.
The Labor Code seeks to bring the country into compliance with
international standards and norms of workplace hygiene and safety, but
the Ministry of Labor's Office of Hygiene and Occupational Security
lacks adequate staff and resources to enforce these provisions. The
Code gives workers the right to remove themselves from dangerous
workplace situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, the Government does not enforce the law adequately.
There are reports that the country was a source for the trafficking in
women and children for purposes of prostitution in Mexico. According to
the reports, procurers from Mexico induce young people to travel there
on the promise of legitimate employment. Upon their arrival, they are
sold to the owners of brothels and then forced to work as prostitutes
to repay their debts. Children are trafficked in Guatemala by organized
crime rings for the purposes of prostitution. In July 1999, the media
reported that Nicaraguan girls had been lured to Guatemalan clubs to
work as dancers and waitresses but upon arrival were forced into
prostitution.
__________
PANAMA
Panama is a representative democracy with an elected executive
composed of a president and 2 vice presidents, an elected 71-member
unicameral legislature, and an appointed judiciary. In September 1999,
President Mireya Moscoso replaced former President Ernesto Perez
Balladares. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary;
however, the judicial system is subject to corruption and political
manipulation.
Panama has had no military forces since 1989. In 1990 the
Government created the Panamanian Public Forces, which consist of the
Panamanian National Police (PNP), the National Maritime Service (SMN),
the National Air Service (SAN), and the Institutional Protection
Service (SPI). In 1994 a constitutional amendment formally prohibited
the establishment of a permanent military, although it contains a
provision for the temporary formation of a ``special police force'' to
protect the borders in case of a ``threat of external aggression.'' The
Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), a semiautonomous body with leadership
appointed by the Supreme Court, is a separate branch of law enforcement
under the Attorney General's Office, and performs criminal
investigations in support of public prosecutors. The Ministry of
Government and Justice oversees the PNP, the SMN, and SAN; the Ministry
of the Presidency supervises the SPI and the PTJ. Police forces respond
to civilian authority, have civilian directors, and have internal
review procedures to deal with police misconduct. There were reports of
instances of abuse by some members of the security forces.
The service-oriented economy uses the U.S. dollar as currency,
calling it the Balboa. Gross domestic product grew by 3.2 percent in
1999, but growth estimates for 2000 range from 2.3 to 2.8 percent.
While economists predicted higher growth during the year due to the
transfer of the Panama Canal and related property, economic benefits
were not yet evident at year's end. Poverty persists and income
distribution remains extremely skewed with large disparities between
rich and poor. Unemployment is estimated at 13.3 percent; however,
private economists believe that it may be higher.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there continued to be serious problems in several
areas. Abuse by prison guards, both PNP and civilian, is a recurrent
problem of the prison system; however, there were reports that
incidents of abuse decreased during the year in one prison. Overall
prison conditions remained harsh, with occasional outbreaks of internal
prison violence. Arbitrary detention and prolonged pretrial detention
are problems. The judiciary is subject to political manipulation, and
the criminal justice system is inefficient and often corrupt. There
were complaints that in some cases police failed to follow legal
requirements and conducted unauthorized searches. Police conduct
towards public protesters improved. The media is subject to political
pressure, libel suits, and punitive action by the Government. Violence
against women remains a serious problem. Women hold some high positions
in Government, including the presidency; however, discrimination
against women persisted. Discrimination against indigenous people,
blacks, and ethnic minorities continues to be a problem. Worker rights
were limited in export processing zones. Urban and rural child labor
are also problems. Trafficking in persons, particularly Asian and South
American immigrants, is a continuing problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
There was little progress on past cases. Four PNP guards at the
Tinajitas prison were on administrative duty and awaiting trial in the
March 1997 beating death of detainee Jose Luis Alvarado at year's end.
In January 1999, the Supreme Court dismissed the case against the
PNP personnel responsible for the June 1997 shooting death of Ngobe-
Bugle tribe member Juan Santos Chobra in the community of Puente
Blanco. The Court ruled that the shooting was accidental after
reviewing videotaped evidence of the shooting.
In September 1999, President Moscoso cancelled the pardons granted
by former President Perez Balladares to 33 former civilian and military
collaborators of former ruler General Manuel Noriega. One such official
reportedly was involved in the execution of 11 persons following a
failed coup attempt against Noriega in 1989. In this specific case, a
Superior Court confirmed Moscoso's order to cancel the pardon granted
by former President Perez Balladares. It was unknown whether similar
cases were pending at year's end.
In September 1999, the authorities discovered an unmarked grave
containing two bodies on the grounds of a former military base near
Panama City. On August 23, Public Ministry authorities stated that one
set of these remains belonged to leftist leader Heliodoro Portugal.
Portugal had been reported missing since May 1970, during the early
stages of the military regime. The identity of the second body remains
unknown. Long-standing rumors that there are other gravesites scattered
around the country dating from this period continued to circulate
during the year. In December the authorities resumed their search for
remains. At that time, human remains of five individuals were excavated
from a former military garrison site. The investigation continued at
year's end. Also in December, President Moscoso announced plans to
create a ``Truth Commission'' to follow up on such cases.
On October 15, approximately 60 unknown assailants, widely believed
to be members of a Colombian armed group, attacked the village of
Nazaret, near the border with Colombia. One 11-year-old girl was
killed, and approximately 12 persons were wounded, including 3 members
of the PNP. The Government had not established firmly responsibility
for the attack at year's end; however, some observers believe that
members of the guerrilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) were responsible. Following the attack, two police
officers in Darien reportedly tortured an Embera Indian suspected of
aiding Colombian rebel groups (see Section 1.c.).
There were some unconfirmed killings of homosexual men.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The Hector Gallego Committee for Disappeared Relatives maintains a
list of 120 persons who disappeared during the military dictatorships
of 1968-89 and are still unaccounted for.
FARC guerrillas reportedly kidnaped persons in the Darien region
along the border with Colombia. In 1999 three individuals were abducted
and held for ransom; only one had been released by year's end. There
were reports that the FARC harassed and even killed Darien residents.
One girl was killed by an armed group in October (see Section 1.a.).
There were unconfirmed reports that Colombian citizens have been
kidnaped and then retained in Panamanian territory.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of measures that could
harm the physical, mental, or moral integrity of prisoners or detainees
and the public security forces generally performed in a professional
and restrained manner; however, there were reports of excessive use of
force and inhuman punishment against prison inmates. There also were
reports that police used physical violence and psychological threats to
control detainees during the initial arrest, interrogation, and holding
phases.
In December Indian community leader Francisco Olivo complained that
two police officers in Darien tortured an Embera Indian after he was
arrested and accused of aiding Colombian rebel groups. The torture
incident reportedly occurred soon after an October attack on Nazaret
(see Section 1.a.). Police Director Carlos Bares responded by saying
that he would order an investigation and would punish anyone found
responsible. An investigation continued at year's end.
The 1997 legislation providing the legal basis for the PNP includes
specific guidelines for use of force, including deadly force; requires
that police officers respect human rights; and prohibits instigation or
tolerance of torture, cruelty, or other inhuman or degrading behavior.
However, there is no follow-on training in the use of force provided to
the PNP.
The PTJ and the PNP have offices of professional responsibility
that act as internal affairs organs to hold officers accountable for
their actions. Both have staffs of independent investigators as well as
administrative authority to open internal investigations. In both
organizations, a defined legal process is followed in which, upon
completion of the process, the respective director of the PTJ or PNP
has the final authority to determine the disposition of each case. The
PNP deputy director and secretary general address human rights problems
that arise in the police force. The offices of professional
responsibility are well known in the community, and the rate of
complaints has remained roughly constant in both offices.
The PNP Office of Professional Responsibility receives on average
six complaints per week, of which 30 to 35 percent result in some type
of punitive action. Penalties include reduction in rank, dismissal, and
in severe cases, criminal prosecution. By November the authorities had
dismissed 16 officers for corruption, burglary, and/or bribery. A total
of 206 other cases were under investigation as of November; 108 cases
were dismissed; 82 cases were still under investigation.
The PTJ receives complaints from the public, and officers can make
anonymous complaints of corruption and other problems. By October the
PTJ Office of Professional Responsibility had conducted 179
investigations, which resulted in the dismissal of 52 agents. The
majority of the cases were for mishandling official property such as
misplacing guns or radios (22 cases), and personal conduct or improper
behavior when off duty (30 cases).
In May the PNP disciplinary committee exonerated a sergeant and
three officers for the March 1999 shooting in Pueblo Nuevo, and
concluded that they acted in self-defense, and that the victim was not
a minor as originally reported. According to residents of the
neighborhood, the victim was lying on the ground in handcuffs at the
time of the shooting.
Corruption among police officers also remains a problem. By October
the PTJ Office of Professional Responsibility had dismissed 20 agents
for corruption. In some cases, PNP and PTJ directors enforced other
disciplinary measures against officers with proven involvement in
illicit activities; however, both organizations only react to egregious
abuses, due to a lack of staff, independence, and institutional
priority.
During the year, police generally exercised restraint in their
treatment of street protesters, despite an increase in the frequency of
street demonstrations. However, police commonly used tear gas against
protesters.
Police arrested and detained children for minor infractions during
neighborhood sweeps (see Section 5).
The FARC guerrillas and the paramilitary forces of the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) share a long history of spillover of
violence from Colombia into the border area on the Darien peninsula,
including killings, kidnaping, robbery, and various forms of harassment
of innocent bystanders (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
Despite some technical improvements and some training of prison
guards during the year, overall prison conditions remained harsh and in
some cases, threatening to prisoners' health and safety, due largely to
budget constraints. The current prison system has over 9,018 prisoners
but an allotted capacity of only 6,893 persons. Most prisons are
dilapidated and overcrowded. Many of the problems within the prisons
stem not only from the obvious overcrowding but also from the lack of
separation of inmates according to the type or severity of the crime
committed. Medical care is inadequate and sometimes withheld from
inmates. Tuberculosis, AIDS, and other communicable diseases are common
among the prison population. The Corrections Department does not have
an ambulance to take prisoners to hospitals in case of emergencies.
Over the last 4 years, 10 inmates have been killed and 25 injured due
to gang violence. In June gang members at La Joya prison stole keys and
entered the cell block of a rival gang armed with knives, murdering two
prisoners and wounding another five.
Abuse by prison guards, both PNP and civilian, is a recurrent
problem of the prison system. At year's end, there were 8 cases open
with the Public Ministry regarding human rights abuses in the prisons,
involving 25 civilian custodians and 6 members of the PNP. Pending
cases include three custodians awaiting trial for abuses committed in
La Joya prison in 1996 against prisoner Jorge Reyes Alvarez, and PNP
guards awaiting trial for the beating death of prisoner Jorge Alvarado
at Tinajitas prison (see Section 1.a.). In another high profile case,
10 members of the PNP are expected to be tried for beating naked
prisoners with baseball bats in the (now closed) Modelo prison in 1998.
The special prosecutor in charge of the 8 cases has handled 13 others
since 1996. In 1999 six custodians from La Joya each were sentenced to
40 months in prison for having abused La Joya prisoner Carlos Cisneros
Naranjo.
The main prisons in Panama City include La Joya (a maximum-security
facility), Tinajitas, the Feminine Center (women's prison), and the
Juvenile Detention Center. Two additional facilities, La Joyita and El
Renacer, hold inmates generally accused of less serious crimes. In July
foreign experts found that conditions at El Renacer have improved
substantially and that the new prison director is attempting to make
many needed reforms. Conditions at La Joyita remain problematic. The
notorious island prison colony of Coiba is still in operation. There
are also prisons of significant size in David and Santiago, and a large
facility is planned for construction in Divisa in 2001. Small jails
attached to local police stations around the country sometimes house
prisoners for the entire length of their sentence. The authorities
frequently do not address cases of abuse and neglect in these
provincial jails due to their low profile in the prison system. Prison
authorities hope eventually to close down these provincial jails and
house all prisoners in the central jails.
The General Penitentiary Directorate (DGSP) largely depends on PNP
officers to supply both internal and perimeter security at all prisons.
Ideally, civilian corrections officers (or ``custodians'') with
specialized training are supposed to handle inmates in all prisons, but
funding constraints have prevented reform. Newly appointed DGSP
Director Concepcion Corro wants to replace PNP guards with civilians,
but has been granted only enough funding to train and fill 237 of 2,500
potential civilian positions. Custodians do handle inmates within La
Joya, El Renacer, and the central women's prison, which uses only
female guards. Because prison security rests almost entirely with the
PNP, tensions arise between PNP officers and their civilian directors.
In addition, PNP officers are untrained for prison duty and generally
find the assignment distasteful, contributing to tension and abuses
within the prison system. The DGSP does not have authority to
discipline prison guards with criminal or civil sanctions; only the PNP
disciplinary board can sanction a PNP agent or a custodian.
Prison conditions on the island penal colony of Coiba remained
harsh and dangerous. In January 1998, a prison gang reportedly beheaded
four prison escapees who belonged to a rival gang. The authorities
concluded a lengthy investigation, and the case is expected to go to
trial in 2001. Some of the accused prisoners are detained in the Panama
City jail, and others are held in a jail in Santiago. The authorities
have not yet brought anyone to trial in the case of eight murders that
were discovered in 1998 in which both guards and prisoners have been
implicated. In June the remains of three individuals were found on the
nearby island of Jicarita. At year's end, the authorities had not yet
determined the identity of the remains nor the circumstances of their
deaths.
National prison authorities occasionally have discussed plans to
close Coiba, but at year's end there were no definite plans for a
shutdown. Although the facility no longer holds the most dangerous
criminals, it continues to relieve overcrowding elsewhere in the prison
system. The prison population at the island prison colony was reduced
to 130 inmates, compared with 361 in 1999; none are pretrial detainees.
Geographic isolation and lack of communications on Coiba separate
detainees from their attorneys and cause many to miss trials. Prisoners
suffer from malnutrition and shortages of potable water. Medical care
is practically nonexistent; prisoners with AIDS told reporters that
they are isolated in small cells and that medical attention is provided
once a year. Escapes from Coiba reportedly are common.
La Joya is the primary maximum security facility and houses most
prisoners accused of serious crimes. La Joya has a planned capacity of
1,250, but houses over 2,000 inmates. Gang violence is a problem. In
June in La Joya, 22 inmates with AIDS went on a hunger strike to
protest their lack of access to medical treatment and their need for
special permits to receive medicine.
Prison conditions in Colon province also are harsh. The Human
Rights Commission of the Legislative Assembly described the Public
Prison of Colon as a ``time bomb,'' which fails to provide the most
basic health needs. The prison frequently has no running water or
functioning sewage system. The Commission also reported that prisoners
at the Women's Prison of Colon suffer from overcrowding, semidarkness
day and night, constantly wet floors, and virtually no health care.
Colon's main prison, Nueva Esperanza, is under construction and is
expected to absorb inmates from Colon's women's prison and the
dilapidated public prison, both of which are scheduled to shut down.
The new inmates are to be housed in separate sections of Nueva
Esperanza, where construction was quite advanced at year's end, with
some of the new cells already outfitted with bunks and toilets.
However, inmates from the rapidly deteriorating Public Prison
reportedly were apprehensive about being moved to Nueva Esperanza,
where their access to the outdoors is expected to be limited. At year's
end, male prisoners were housed at Nueva Esperanza; approximately 60
female prisoners are scheduled to be transferred there once
construction is complete.
Conditions at women's prisons and at juvenile detention centers
were noticeably better than at adult male prisons. However, female
prisoners, especially those in the primary detention area, reportedly
suffered from overcrowding, poor medical care, and lack of basic
supplies for personal hygiene. Juvenile detention centers throughout
the country suffer from inadequate resources to provide for education
or adequate supervision of children, many of whom spend the majority of
their time in a bare cell.
The law and the Criminal Code provide for conditional release
programs for inmates charged with minor offenses who have served a
substantial part of their sentence, but this provision has not been
implemented consistently in practice. A conditional release program was
part of the organizational reforms that authorities introduced in July
1998. During the year, the DGSP provided information in a more timely
manner to the President for her signature to allow such conditional
releases. The Government released some 800 inmates by year's end. The
release program helped to relieve pressure on the overcrowded prisons.
Accusations by the media of corruption within the DGSP and its
parent organization, the Ministry of Government and Justice, declined
during the year. A criminal complaint filed in June 1999 by former
National Penitentiary Director Enriqueta Davis against then-Minister of
Government and Justice Mariela Sagel never was submitted to court.
The Government generally allows prison visits by independent human
rights monitors. However, the authorities arrange appointments ahead of
time, and monitors generally speak to prisoners in the presence of
guards or administrators. Prisoners may not feel comfortable speaking
freely under such conditions, and they have expressed fear of
retaliation if they complain. Contrary to the previous year, there were
no reports that officials from the Ombudsman's office had trouble
gaining access to prisons. Justicia y Paz, the Catholic Church's human
rights watchdog group, brings prison abuses to the attention of the
authorities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
stipulates that arrests must be carried out with a warrant issued by
the appropriate authorities, and the Government generally respected
this provision. Previously, the authorities often violated the
provision that suspects are to be brought promptly before a judge;
however, this provision was enforced more strictly during the year.
Exceptions are permitted when an officer apprehends a person during the
commission of a crime, or when disrespect by an individual towards an
officer prevents the officer from carrying out his duty. The law
requires the arresting officer to inform the detainee immediately of
the reasons for arrest or detention and of the right to immediate legal
counsel, to be provided to the indigent by the State (see Section
1.e.).
The Constitution also provides for judicial review of the legality
of detention and mandates the immediate release of any person detained
or arrested illegally. The Constitution prohibits police from detaining
suspects for more than 24 hours without bringing them before a judge.
Contrary to previous years, the authorities did not violate often the
24-hour time limit by several days. Under law the preliminary
investigation phase may last 8 days to 2 months, and the followon
investigation phase another 2 to 4 months, depending on the number of
suspects. The courts frequently grant extensions of these limits,
leaving the accused in detention for a long period without having been
charged formally. The law permits these extensions; however, many legal
authorities (including court officials) criticized judges for excessive
use of this measure.
Extended pretrial detention continued to be one of the most serious
human rights problems, due in part to the elaborate notification phase
in criminal cases. According to government statistics, the number of
pretrial detainees increased slightly to 4,851, or about 58 percent of
the prison population. This proportion is roughly the same as 1999,
when 59 percent of prisoners were still awaiting trial. The average
period of pretrial custody was 16 months, and pretrial detention in
excess of the maximum sentence for the alleged crime was common. For
example, a man recently released from La Joyita Prison had spent 4
years in jail for a crime with a maximum sentence of 6 months. A legal
mechanism exists to hold the Government financially accountable in
cases where a detainee spends more than 1 year in jail but subsequently
has all charges dismissed at a preliminary hearing. The dismissal must
be either because the act of which the detainee was accused is not
ruled a crime or because there is no evidence to link the suspect to
the crime. Although this redress procedure is not complicated, few
former detainees have employed it.
Legal alternatives to prison exist but are not implemented widely.
Options such as house arrest have been used in some cases involving the
elderly or minors, but require that the defendants have access to and
understanding of their legal options.
The Constitution prohibits exile; there were no reports of forced
exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is susceptible to
corruption and outside influence, including manipulation by other
branches of government.
The President appoints nine Supreme Court magistrates to 10-year
terms, subject to Legislative Assembly ratification. In July 1999, the
Assembly passed a law that created an additional chamber to the Supreme
Court, allowing then-President Perez Balladares to appoint three
additional Supreme Court Justices before leaving office. However, in
October 1999, the Assembly approved a proposal by the new Moscoso
Administration to repeal the law.
The Supreme Court magistrates appoint appellate (Superior Tribunal)
judges, who, in turn, appoint circuit and municipal court judges in
their respective jurisdictions. Judicial appointments are supposed to
be made under a merit-based system, but the top-down appointment system
lends itself to political tinkering and undue interference by higher-
level judges in lower-level cases in which they often have no
jurisdiction.
The Attorney General appoints the superior and circuit level
prosecutors. Previously, the Attorney General also appointed the
Director and Sub-Director of the PTJ, but a 1998 law transferred this
power to the Supreme Court, and requires Supreme Court approval of
their removal from office. The same law also gave these two officials
the power to name other PTJ officials without consulting the Attorney
General. Opposition and media critics charged that this law increased
the influence of the Supreme Court over criminal investigators, removed
the generally positive oversight of the Attorney General, and made
cooperation between prosecutors and the police much more difficult. On
April 24, the Supreme Court approved Attorney General Jose Antonio
Sossa's request to dismiss Director Alejandro Moncada of the PTJ, and
Sossa did so the following day. Tensions between the Attorney General
and the PTJ under its new director did not completely abate, although
they appeared to have lessened by year's end.
At the local level, mayors appoint administrative judges, or
``corregidores,'' who exercise jurisdiction over minor civil and
criminal cases and who hold wide powers to arrest and to impose fines
or jail sentences of up to 1 year. This system has serious
shortcomings: Defendants lack adequate procedural safeguards;
administrative judges outside of Panama City are usually not attorneys;
many have not completed secondary education; and some engage in corrupt
practices. In practice, appeal procedures are nonexistent. Affluent
defendants tend to pay fines while poorer defendants go to jail, which
contributes to prison overcrowding.
In 1998 the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loaned the
Government $18.9 million to reform the judicial system; the Government
contributed another $8.1 million to the program. The loan is being used
at national and local levels to improve conditions in the court system,
including better information management, revision of judicial
procedures, and training of personnel. The loan also includes the
construction of two ``model courts'' in San Miguelito and David, which
are to hold offices for judges, prosecutors, and the PTJ in one
building. The IDB's database linking prison population data with
prosecutors and the courts, which is intended to facilitate the
systematic release of prisoners who have served time beyond their
potential maximum sentence but still are awaiting trial, was completed
by year's end. Coordination between the IDB and the Government has
improved with the 1999 appointment of Supreme Court Chief Justice
Mirtza Franceschi de Aguilera. The Ministry of Economy and Finance has
approved a second phase of the project and listed funding for the
project in its budget request.
The Constitution provides that persons charged with crimes have the
right to counsel, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, to
refrain from incriminating themselves or close relatives, and to be
tried only once for a given offense. If not under pretrial detention,
the accused may be present with counsel during the investigative phase
of the proceeding. Judges can order the presence of pretrial detainees
for the rendering or amplification of statements, or for confronting
witnesses. Trials are conducted on the basis of evidence presented by
the public prosecutor. Under limited circumstances, the law permits
trials without the accused being present. The Constitution and the
Criminal Procedure Code provide for trial by jury at the defendant's
election, but only in cases where at least one of the charges is
murder.
The Constitution obliges the Government to provide public defenders
for the indigent. However, many public defenders are appointed late in
the investigation, and the prosecutor may have already evaluated the
bulk of the evidence and made a decision to recommend trial or the
dismissal of the charges. Public defenders' caseloads remained
extremely high, averaging some 600 cases per attorney per year,
compared with 550 cases in 1999. Only 3 new public defenders have been
hired since 1992, making a total of 38 nationwide, with a similar
number of assistants. This heavy workload undermined the quality of
representation, with many prisoners meeting their public defender for
the first time on the day of trial.
In July 1999, the Supreme Court upheld a law popularly known as the
``Faundes Law,'' which requires judges and other public officials to
retire at age 75.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home, private papers, and telephonic communications, and the Government
generally respected these rights in practice; however, there were
complaints that in some cases police failed to follow legal
requirements and conducted unauthorized searches. The authorities may
not enter private residences except with the owner's permission, or by
written order from the appropriate authority for specific purposes.
These may include entry to assist the victims of crime or disaster, or
to conduct lawful health and safety inspections. The authorities may
not examine private papers and correspondence, except as properly
authorized by competent legal authority, and in the presence of the
owner, a family member, or two neighbors.
Although the Constitution prohibits all wiretapping, the Government
maintains that wiretapping with judicial approval is legal, and that
the Attorney General may authorize a wiretap when confronted with
probable cause in a serious crime. Under the guidelines established by
1994 antinarcotics legislation, the Public Ministry may engage in
undercover operations, including ``videotaping and recording of
conversations and telephonic communications.'' The Supreme Court has
not issued a final ruling on whether wiretapping is constitutional, but
it remains an established practice.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice; however, the media is subject to
political pressure, and the Government used libel laws to pressure
journalists.
There is an active and often adversarial press and a broad range of
print and electronic media outlets, including foreign newspapers, radio
and television broadcasts, and cable stations. Six national daily
newspapers, 4 commercial television stations, 2 educational television
stations, and approximately 100 radio stations provide a broad choice
of informational sources; all are privately or institutionally owned. A
June 1999 law prohibits newspapers from holding radio and television
concessions, and vice versa. While many media outlets took identifiable
editorial positions, the media carried a wide variety of political
commentaries and other perspectives, both local and foreign. There is a
noticeable concentration of control of television outlets in the hands
of close relatives and associates of former President Perez Balladares,
who is a member of the largest opposition party.
Panamanian and foreign journalists worked and traveled freely
throughout the country. A 1978 law requires directors and deputy
directors of media outlets to be citizens.
Under ``gag laws'' dating from the military dictatorship, the
Government had legal authority to prosecute media owners and reporters
for criminal libel and calumny. A special executive branch authority
had discretionary powers to administer the libel laws, which provided
for fines and up to 2 years in prison. Under the statute, opinions,
comments, or criticism of government officials acting in their official
capacity are exempted specifically from libel prosecution, but a
section of the law allows for the immediate discipline of journalists
who show ``disrespect'' for the office of certain government officials.
In December 1999, President Moscoso ratified the Legislative Assembly's
decision to eliminate these gag laws, improving the legal status of the
media. However, legal actions against many journalists remained
pending, and vestiges of the former gag laws still provide a means for
penalizing journalists. Ombudsman Italo Antinori stated that there were
at least 40 cases of journalists who had been accused of defamation.
Attorney General Jose Antonio Sossa ordered the arrest of El Siglo
newspaper editor Carlos Singares on two occasions during the year for
libel. Frontpage articles in El Siglo had accused Sossa of illicit
activities, but the newspaper presented little proof to back up its
allegations. President Moscoso defused the first arrest attempt, but
upon the second arrest order Singares was jailed for 8 days. During his
detention, he was held with approximately 50 common prisoners. While
Singares was in jail, a court sentenced him to 20 months in prison for
criminal libel against former President Perez Balladares. Singares
appealed the conviction, and the appeal was pending at year's end.
In August police surrounded the homes of three journalists from La
Prensa in an attempt to force them to testify in a criminal libel case
filed against them by Attorney General Sossa; the police left after the
journalists agreed to testify.
On July 14, a court sentenced Jean Marcel Chery, a reporter for the
daily newspaper Panama America, to 18 months in jail or a fine of
$1,800 for criminal libel; Chery had reported a woman's allegations
that police robbed her of $33,000 during a search of her apartment.
Chery appealed, and her appeal was pending at year's end.
In 1998 then-PNP Director Jose Luis Sosa used the libel laws to
bring charges against law professor and former Moscoso adviser Miguel
Bernal for statements that criticized the PNP for allowing the
decapitations of prisoners on Coiba Island (see Section 1.c.). In
November 1999, there was a preliminary hearing on Sosa's charges, but
no trial date was set by year's end. Bernal requested that the judge
accept 37 witnesses; however, the judge rejected 34 of them. Bernal
appealed this decision, which was pending at year's end.
Libel charges against La Prensa journalist Herasto Reyes filed by
then-President Perez Balladares, after Reyes published a story in
August 1998 accusing the administration of trying to cover up a
government embezzlement scandal, still were pending at year's end.
In another 1998 case, a prosecutor acting on behalf of Attorney
General Sossa used the libel laws to charge La Prensa journalists
Gustavo Gorriti and Rolando Rodriguez with a ``crime against the honor
of the authorities'' for a story accusing the Attorney General of
accepting dubious checks in his unsuccessful 1994 campaign for a seat
in the Legislative Assembly. Subsequent press reports suggested that
the story was erroneous. The charges remained pending at year's end.
Gorriti is facing six criminal libel cases.
In October a superior court magistrate sentenced former President
Guillermo Endara to 18 months in jail for libel and slander against
Minister of Canal Affairs Ricardo Martinelli, the former Director
General of the Social Security Institution. The magistrate suspended
the sentence on the condition that former President Endara not commit
any other crime. Endara had not appealed the ruling at year's end.
On July 31, the Legislative Assembly passed legislation that limits
access by citizens to specific information about international
agreement negotiations and national security, to administrative files
within the Solicitor General's office, and to information about such
matters as private citizens' health, political leanings, marital
status, police or prison records, and bank accounts. The measure took
effect on August 2. The Solicitor General's office indicated that these
restrictions already existed in practice, but were codified by the new
law. Nevertheless, some legal experts challenged this interpretation
and the media harshly criticized the measure. A Special Rapporteur from
the Organization of American States also criticized the law during a
September visit to the country. In November the Legislative Assembly
amended Article 70 of the Solicitor General's Organic Law that
regulated press access to files. The amendment states that the
confidential classification of a given piece of information must be
established objectively and pursuant to the conditions contained in the
current laws, in order to prevent public officials from denying the
release of information under the excuse of limited access. President
Moscoso had not signed the amendment at year's end.
The Electoral Tribunal must approve election polling results before
publication. During the year, the Government alleged that the newspaper
El Panama America commissioned Gallup polls that were rigged to portray
the Government negatively. In April 1999, the Tribunal had fined the El
Panama America $10,000 for failing to follow the approval procedure
before printing Gallup poll results.
The press laws provide for the establishment of a censorship board.
The board monitors radio transmissions and has the authority to fine
stations that violate norms regarding vulgar and profane language.
In July Bishop Romulo Emiliani left the Darien region following
anonymous death threats; he had criticized publicly Colombian
paramilitaries, guerrillas, and drug traffickers.
The law provides for academic freedom, which generally was
respected in both public and private universities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice. No authorization is needed
for outdoor assembly, although prior notification for administrative
purposes is required. Throughout much of the year, police showed
restraint and professionalism while monitoring large protests by
students, political activists, prisoners, and workers. While police
commonly used tear gas against protesters, unlike the previous year,
police generally did not break up public demonstrations with birdshot,
rubber bullets, beatings, or other abusive treatment. However, in June
and July, students and workers protested government policy by blocking
traffic for several hours on a major thoroughfare and by throwing rocks
at the police; on those occasions, the police responded with tear gas,
rubber bullets, and water hoses laced with chemical irritants. Injuries
and arrests at other demonstrations were minimal but protesters
nevertheless complained about abuse at the hands of the police.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. Citizens have the
right to form associations and professional or civic groups. New
political parties must meet strict membership and organizational
standards in order to gain official recognition and participate in
national campaigns. In February the Government refused to recognize a
homosexual rights organization as a nongovernmental organization (see
Section 4).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution, although recognizing
Catholicism as ``the religion of the majority of Panamanians,''
provides for free exercise of all religious beliefs, provided that
``Christian morality and public order'' are respected. The Government
generally respects religious freedom in practice, and there is a broad
diversity of religions. The Constitution prohibits clerics from holding
public office, except as related to social assistance, education, or
scientific research. The Constitution dictates that Catholicism be
taught in public schools, although parents have the right to exempt
their children from religious instruction.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The Government
enforced exit permit requirements for foreigners who overstayed their
initial visas. A 9:00 p.m. curfew for unaccompanied minors in the
Panama City area remains in effect although enforcement generally is
poor.
The law provides for granting refugee status in accordance with the
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. In 1998 President Perez Balladares signed a decree granting
protection to all persons entering the country due to ``state
persecution based on race, gender, religion, nationality, social group,
or political opinion.'' The decree grants 2 months of temporary
protection to displaced persons in the case of a large influx; the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has criticized this provision,
on the grounds that it puts persons at risk for forced repatriation
within a few weeks of entering the country, without analysis of their
possible refugee status. However, in practice this has not occurred.
For example, the Government has not forcibly repatriated displaced
Colombians, and many Colombians have lived in the country for years
without formal refugee status. A small number of Colombians were
granted asylum during the year. The Government generally cooperates
with the office of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. However, the Government generally is reluctant to
classify displaced Colombians as refugees, and therefore has opposed a
permanent UNHCR presence in the country, although the UNHCR regularly
visited border areas to aid displaced Colombians.
Large groups of displaced persons periodically flee violence in
Colombia by crossing the border into Panama. In December 1999, some 800
Colombians fled violence in the Colombian town of Jurado and settled in
the Darien town of Jaque. Since their arrival, the Government has
cooperated with the Catholic Church and the U.N. High Commission for
Human Rights to provide these displaced persons with humanitarian
assistance. By the end of the year, some 200 Colombians remained in
Jaque, while others returned to Colombia voluntarily or migrated
elsewhere in Panama. In January President Moscoso granted provisional
refuge to nearly 400 Colombian peasants who had fled fighting between
guerrillas and the Colombian Navy.
The Government has offered Colombians the chance to participate in
a voluntary repatriation program in coordination with the Government of
Colombia, and many agreed to return. The Government worked with the
UNHCR and the Catholic Church to provide displaced Colombians with
food, medical care, and access to public services, including schools
and clinics. The Government provided these services in Jaque and other
areas of the Darien. However, many displaced Colombians living along
the remote Darien border area were beyond the reach of organized
assistance from the Government, the UNHCR, or the Church.
There were reports early in the year that the police set up a small
number of improvised explosive devices in close proximity to their
stations to use against possible attacks by armed Colombian groups;
however, there were no subsequent reports of the devices or of their
use.
Aside from large groups of displaced persons, aliens are also
picked up in the Darien in small groups. These immigrants are usually
Colombian, but many Ecuadorians, Peruvians, and even Asians and
Africans have been detained. All but 15 of a group of some 150 aliens
detained in the Darien town of La Palma were deported or returned
voluntarily to Colombia, despite protests by the Catholic Church that
some of the Colombians in the group should be afforded refugee status.
Colombian migration, whether political or economic, has drastically
increased pressures on local populations in the Darien and caused the
displacement of Panamanian citizens. In addition, the Government
suspects that Colombian migration conceals or attracts the presence of
armed Colombian groups in the Darien Region. The effects of Colombian
migration are also evident in Panama City and Colon, where large
populations of Colombians have settled.
There were no other reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution; however, throughout the year,
there were unconfirmed reports that the police along the border, on an
ad hoc basis, required Colombians to return to Colombia.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
Government, and citizens freely exercised this right in the 1999
general elections. The Constitution provides for a representative
democracy with direct popular election by secret ballot of the
President, two vice presidents, legislators, and local representatives
every 5 years. The independent Electoral Tribunal arranges and
supervises elections. While the Constitution provides for independent
legislative and judicial branches, the executive dominates in practice.
The Government respected the rights of its citizens to join any
political party, propagate their views, and vote for candidates of
their choice.
In May 1999, Arnulfista presidential candidate Mireya Moscoso
defeated Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate Martin Torrijos
and Christian Democratic Party candidate Alberto Vallarino, winning
44.8 percent of the popular vote. Domestic and international observers
characterized the elections as generally free and fair; however,
several local contests were marred by reports of vote buying. The PRD
won 34 seats in the Legislative Assembly; the Arnulfistas, 18;
Solidarity, 4; the National Liberal Party, 3; MOLIRENA, 3; Democratic
Change, 2; MORENA, 1; the Christian Democratic Party, 5; and the Civic
Renewal Party, 1. During President Moscoso's first year in office, she
maintained a one-vote majority in the Legislative Assembly through her
Arnulfista Party members' coalition with other parties. However, on
September 1, the coalition realigned, and the President's party no
longer controls the legislature.
There are no legal barriers to participation by women, members of
minorities, or persons of indigenous descent, but they generally are
underrepresented in government and politics. However, women's
participation has increased in recent years. Mireya Moscoso is the
country's first female president. Women hold 7 of 71 Legislative
Assembly seats; a woman served as the Assembly's first vice president
in 1999-2000, and another woman holds this position for the 2000-2001
legislative season. Three women hold cabinet positions, and a woman is
the director of the Public Registry. Two female judges sit on the
Supreme Court, one of whom was elected Chief Justice in October 1999.
In May 1999, an indigenous person served as President of the
Legislative Assembly from September 1999 until August.
The Government provides semi-autonomous status to several
indigenous groups in their homelands, including the Kuna Yala, Ngobe-
Bugle, Embera Wounaan, Kuna de Madungandi, and Wargandi reserves. There
are two Kuna legislators in the Legislative Assembly, one Ngobe, one
part-Ngobe, and one Embera. Locally, tribal chiefs govern each reserve;
they meet in a general congress at regular intervals. Neither the
Madugandi nor the Embera-Wounaan reserve has its own dedicated
legislators, but each has a separate governor. The Government continued
the process of demarcating electoral districts within a new reserve
created for the NgobeBugle. May 1999 elections allowed many Ngobe-Bugle
to choose their own local representatives in these newly created
electoral districts.
The law prohibits discrimination against any social, religious, or
cultural group; however, naturalized citizens may not hold certain
categories of elective office.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights organizations, including both religious and secular
groups, operated without government restrictions. These organizations
carried out a full range of activities, including investigations and
dissemination of their findings. Organizations generally had access to
government officials while conducting investigations.
The office of Human Rights Ombudsman was created in 1996 and began
to handle cases in 1998. The office receives 15 to 20 complaints daily,
but does not have authority to investigate violations involving the
administration of justice. Human Rights Ombudsman Italo Antinori, the
first person to fill the position, sparred with the Perez Balladares
Government constantly but reduced his public profile after the 1999
election of President Moscoso. Antinori's term runs until June 2004.
On December 27, President Moscoso announced her intention to create
a commission to investigate crimes committed during the 1968-89
dictatorship.
In February Minister of Government and Justice Winston Spadafora
denied a petition by the Association of New Men and Women, an informal
gay rights organization, to register as a nongovernmental organization.
Human Rights Ombudsman Antinori publicly supported Spadafora's
decision.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits either special privileges or
discrimination on the basis of race, birth status, social class, sex,
religion, or political views. However, societal prejudices persist.
Cases of discrimination are difficult to prove, and legal remedies for
victims are complicated, time-consuming, and costly. There were some
unconfirmed killings of homosexual men.
Women.--Domestic violence against women continued to be a serious
problem. The 1995 Family Code criminalized family violence (including
psychological, physical, or sexual abuse) but convictions are rare
unless a death occurs. The PTJ registered 610 cases of domestic
violence through September, compared with 451 through June 1999. The
PTJ also registered 408 cases of rape and 102 cases of attempted rape
through September, compared with 514 cases of rape and 135 cases of
attempted rape in 1999. The Center for the Development of the Woman
estimated that victims report as few as 20 percent of sexual assaults
to judicial or law enforcement authorities. A widely acknowledged
characteristic of rape is that it frequently occurs in the home. The
Foundation for the Promotion of the Woman, among other women's advocacy
groups and government agencies, operated programs to assist victims of
abuse, and to educate women on their legal rights.
Trafficking in women for forced labor and forced prostitution is a
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Sexual harassment also is a threat to the equal status of women in
society. According to a report by the Latin American Committee for the
Defense of Women, in 1995, the latest year statistics were available,
about 70 percent of female government employees reported having endured
sexual harassment in the workplace--42 percent by their immediate
supervisors and 18 percent by more senior supervisors. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that many women are propositioned for sexual favors
at the time of their initial job interview. A bill to criminalize
sexual harassment failed to pass the legislature in 1995, and further
legislation has not been introduced.
The 1995 Family Code recognizes joint or common property in
marriages. However, insufficient resources hampered government efforts
to enforce the code's provisions effectively. According to Supreme
Court Justice Mirtza de Aguilera, there should be 80 family judges;
however, only 20 have been appointed due to lack of resources.
The Constitution mandates equal pay for men and women in equivalent
jobs, but wages paid to women are on average 20 percent lower and
increase at a slower rate. There are credible reports of irregular
hiring practices based upon age and ``appearance.'' A 1998 law
reiterates protections laid out in the Constitution and prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex.
In 1998 the Government created the Ministry of Youth, Women,
Children, and Family Affairs. The Ministry is largely a consolidation
of departments previously operating in other government ministries, and
its activities have not attracted a great deal of public attention. A
number of private women's rights groups concentrate on disseminating
information about women's rights, countering domestic abuse, enhancing
employment and other skills, and pressing for legal reforms.
Children.--Minors (under 18 years of age) represent 48 percent of
the population. Education is compulsory through the equivalent of 9th
grade, but children do not always attend school due to traditional
attitudes, the lack of transportation, and insufficient government
resources to enforce the requirement. The problem is most extreme in
the Darien province and among indigenous groups. The Government
furnishes basic health care for children through local clinics run by
the Ministry of Health. A central children's hospital in Panama City
operates on government funds as well as private donations.
The Superior Tribunal for Minors and Superior Tribunal for Families
are judicial authorities charged with overseeing the protection and
care of minors. The Minister of Youth, Women, Children, and Family
Affairs acts much like an ombudsman, and the office proposes and
reviews laws and monitors government performance. Through September the
PTJ registered 130 cases of child abuse, compared with 171 in all of
1999. Neglect of children is a problem. Malnutrition and inadequate
medical care are generalized problems that are most severe among rural
indigenous groups. Rural and urban child labor are problems (see
Section 6.d.).
Juvenile courts continue to report a high incidence of juvenile
delinquency in major urban areas. The authorities report a continued
increase in such crimes as drug trafficking, armed robberies,
kidnappings, car thefts, and murders that are attributed to juveniles.
Youth participation in criminal gangs is an increasing problem. Police
arrested and detained children for minor infractions during
neighborhood sweeps.
People with Disabilities.--The Ministry of Education is responsible
for educating and training disabled minors, while the Ministry of
Youth, Women, Children, and Family Affairs protects the rights of
disabled adults. Disabled children traditionally have been separated
out from the general population; however, on February 4, the
Legislative Assembly passed a law that requires schools to integrate
children with special needs into the student body.
The Department of Labor is responsible for placing workers with
disabilities in suitable jobs. Placement remains difficult despite a
1993 executive order granting tax incentives to firms that hire
disabled employees. Disabled persons also tend to make only the minimum
salary, notably less than employees without disabilities.
The 1998 municipal building code for Panama City requires that all
new construction projects include handicapped accessible features, with
fines from $100 to $500 for noncompliance. In 1999 a national law was
passed with similar requirements for new construction projects, but it
is not yet clear whether the law is to be enforced. Awareness of
handicapped issues has increased over the past 5 years, and commercial
establishments increasingly provide and enforce handicapped parking
spaces. However, basic services such as sidewalks and handicapped
accessible bathrooms are largely unavailable.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution protects the ethnic identity
and native languages of indigenous people, requiring the Government to
provide bilingual literacy programs in indigenous communities.
Indigenous people have legal rights and take part in decisions
affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of
natural resources. Indigenous people number approximately 194,000
persons (8 percent of the population) and have the same political and
legal rights as other citizens. The Government has passed legislation
over the years setting aside indigenous reserves for the country's
native groups, including the Embera-Wounan, Ngobe-Bugle, and Kuna. The
Ministry of Government and Justice in Panama City maintains the low-
profile Office of Indigenous Policy. Federal law is the ultimate
authority on indigenous reserves, but local groups are allowed a great
deal of local autonomy. For example, the Government recognizes
traditional indigenous marriage rites as the equivalent of a civil
ceremony. Despite legal protection and formal equality, indigenous
people generally endure relatively higher levels of poverty, disease,
malnutrition, and illiteracy than the rest of the population.
Discrimination against indigenous people, although generally not overt,
is widespread.
The Indigenous Affairs Commission of the Legislative Assembly,
which was created in 1995, sponsored bills during the year to protect
intellectual property rights, set up regulations for artisan fairs, and
construct a health center. The Commission also sponsored a law that
created the new 190-acre Kuna Wargandi reserve.
Though their population suffers from poverty and malnutrition, Kuna
leaders have had the most success enforcing their territorial
boundaries and maintaining their cultural integrity. There are two Kuna
legislators, (one was President of the 1999-2000 Legislative Assembly);
and they have more financial resources than the other groups. Other
indigenous groups have not succeeded in using their autonomy to
preserve their culture or develop economic independence. Most live in
extreme poverty and isolation. Illiteracy among indigenous groups is at
almost 50 percent, while the figure is only 10 percent among the
population as a whole.
Since indigenous populations infrequently master Spanish and are
unfamiliar with the country's legal system, they often misunderstand
their rights and fail to employ legal channels when threatened. The
problem is exacerbated by government inattention to indigenous issues.
For example, the EmberaWounan in the Darien have been moved out of
their reserves in increasing numbers due to encroachment by settlers,
loggers, and Colombian immigrants. The Ngobe also are under threat due
to the isolation of their reserves, encroachment by settlers, and
generalized poverty. Indigenous workers consistently do not receive the
basic rights provided by the Labor Code, such as minimum wage, social
security benefits, termination pay, and job security. Even when working
in close proximity of each other, indigenous laborers in the country's
sugar, coffee, and banana plantations work under poorer conditions than
their nonindigenous counterparts. Indigenous migrant workers are
unlikely to be provided with housing or food, and their children are
much more likely to work long hours of heavy farm labor than non-
indigenous children.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is racially
diverse, and minority groups generally have been integrated into
mainstream society with overall success. However, discrimination
against the country's newer immigrants, especially Chinese, often is
overt. The ethnic Chinese community is estimated to be about 120,000
persons. Cultural differences and language difficulties hinder and may
prevent many Chinese immigrants from fully integrating into mainstream
society. In addition, Panamanians often resent Chinese immigrants for
their perceived indifference towards the culture of their adopted
country and their perceived clannish behavior. Racial slurs directed at
Asians are used openly among the general population, and substantial
numbers of Panamanian-resident Chinese frequently are treated as
secondclass citizens. On the other hand, second and third generation
Chinese are seen as distinct from recent immigrants, and generally are
accepted in society. These established Chinese generally do not want to
be associated with the recent arrivals from China.
In addition to Chinese immigrants, Middle Eastern and Indian
residents also suffer from racially motivated discriminatory treatment.
All three groups operate much of the country's retail trade,
particularly in urban areas. Legal and illegal immigrants, especially
Chinese, are accorded fewer legal protections than are citizens for
their trade activities. A constitutional provision reserving retail
trade to Panamanian citizens is not enforced in practice; however,
immigrants legally cannot own their businesses, and sometimes encounter
bureaucratic difficulties in practicing their professions.
Racism against blacks occurs, although it generally is expressed in
more subtle terms. Blacks are conspicuously absent from positions of
political and economic power. The country's white elite successfully
marginalizes citizens with darker skin through preferential hiring
practices in the private sector and manipulation of government
resources in the public sector.
Antillean blacks, often identifiable by dress and speech pattern,
are a particular target for racial slurs and poor treatment by citizens
and by Spanish-speaking blacks. Their geographic clustering in the
economically depressed province of Colon and poorer neighborhoods of
Panama City heightens their isolation from mainstream society. Black
Canal workers traditionally commanded significantly higher financial
resources compared with blacks elsewhere in society, but many have
retired or emigrated and there is some anecdotal evidence that the rest
are being replaced by white personnel. Mainstream political elites
generally are unconcerned by the economic issues of black populations
and a concomitant rise in drug use, crime, and gang violence. Colon,
the country's second largest city, suffers from a conspicuous lack of
government services. Indifference among the general population is a
major impediment to change.
Although such practices are illegal, clubs and restaurants often
discriminate against black and indigenous individuals by denying them
admission. In 1999 students protesting in front of Panama City's most
popular nightclubs brought public attention to the issue. A draft bill
to expand and support the Constitution by penalizing cases of
discrimination for reasons of race, birth, social class, gender, and
ideology failed midway through the year, but another bill was being
prepared to penalize establishments that deny entry based on race.
Racial discrimination against all ethnic groups is evident in the
workplace, where light-skinned persons are represented
disproportionately in management positions and jobs that require
dealing with the public (such as bank tellers and receptionists).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Private sector workers have the right
to form and join unions of their choice, subject to the union's
registration by the Government. A 1995 labor code reform package
significantly increased workers' ability to establish unions. It
streamlined the accreditation and registration process for unions, and
established the minimum size at 40 workers. If the Government does not
respond to an application within 15 days, the union automatically gains
recognition and is accorded all rights and privileges under the law.
The package also addressed a longstanding concern of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) by allowing labor leaders to keep their union
positions if fired from their jobs.
Approximately 10 percent of the total employed labor force is
organized. There are over 250 active unions, grouped under 48
federations and 7 confederations representing approximately 80,000
members in the private sector. Neither the Government nor political
parties outwardly control or finance unions; however, the Government
and political parties do exercise political, ideological, or financial
influence over some unions. The labor sector traditionally supports the
Democratic Revolutionary Party.
The 1994 Civil Service Law permits most government workers to form
public employee associations and federations and establishes their
right to represent members in collective bargaining with their
respective agencies. It also provides a small core of civil servants
with the right to strike, bargain collectively, and evade summary
dismissal, except for those in areas vital to public welfare and
security, such as the police and health workers. However, the law has
proven insufficient to protect the country's 150,000 public workers,
because only a small percentage are members of the civil service and
therefore enjoy job security. Public workers are not allowed to form
unions. The ILO's Committee of Experts has observed for some years that
the prohibition of public servants' associations is inconsistent with
the country's obligations under ILO Convention 87, but no changes have
been made.
The law governing the autonomous Panama Canal Authority prohibits
the right to strike for its 10,000 employees, but does allow unions to
organize and to bargain collectively.
In October the authorities detained, then immediately released,
union leaders following protests by the SUNTRACS union.
Union organizations at every level may and do affiliate with
international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
provides most workers, including all private sector workers, with the
right to organize and bargain collectively, and unions exercise it
widely. The law protects union workers from antiunion discrimination
and requires employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
The Ministry of Labor has mechanisms to resolve complaints against
antiunion employers. The Civil Service Law allows most public employees
to organize and bargain collectively and grants some of them a limited
right to strike; however, 130,000 public sector workers do not have the
right to bargain collectively or to strike. While the right to strike
applies to some 10,000 civil servants, it does not apply to the
approximately 140,000 other government workers. The Labor Code
establishes a conciliation board in the Ministry of Labor to resolve
labor complaints and provides a procedure for arbitration. In March
1999, the Supreme Court ruled that an article of the Labor Code that
obligated private sector strikers to submit to binding arbitration
after a given period was unconstitutional.
Employers commonly hire temporary workers to circumvent onerous
labor code requirements for permanent workers. Temporary workers are
excluded from social security benefits, job security, and vacation
time. Labor law requires companies to submit copies of all labor
contracts for permanent workers to the Labor Ministry for review to
ensure compliance and requires the Labor Ministry to conduct periodic
inspections of the work force. The Labor Ministry may levy fines
against companies not in compliance with the law. However, these
measures have proven ineffective in practice. The practice of blank
contracts is, according to union sources, becoming more widespread.
Over the past 5 years, the Government has issued cabinet decrees
restricting labor activity in export processing zones (EPZ's). Current
EPZ legislation provides for collective bargaining with
``representatives of employees'' but makes no specific mention of trade
unions. It requires mandatory arbitration of disputes; and it allows
for the participation of an unrepresentative worker delegate in the
tripartite (government, labor, and industry) arbitration commission. A
strike may be considered legal only after 36 workdays of conciliation
are exhausted; if this requirement is not met, striking workers may be
fined or fired. A 1998 ILO ruling noted that this regulation does not
mention arbitration or specify procedures to resolve disputes in the
courts, and that the Government should amend the EPZ labor regulations
to conform with international norms; however, the Government has not
made any changes in response to the ruling. Minimum wage provisions do
not apply in the EPZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by adults and children, and it
generally does not occur; however, trafficking in women for forced
labor and forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under
14 years of age with some exceptions, and also prohibits the employment
of children under age 15 if the child has not completed primary school.
However, a Government report estimates that 27,000 children between the
ages of 12 and 14 work. Children under age 16 legally cannot work
overtime, and those under age 18 cannot work at night. Children between
the ages of 12 and 15 may perform light farm or domestic work, with the
authorization of the Labor Ministry, as long as it does not interfere
with their schooling. The Labor Code provides that children between the
ages of 14 and 16 may work 6-hour a day shifts that do not exceed 36
hours a week. The Ministry of Labor enforces these provisions in
response to complaints and may order the termination of unauthorized
employment. The Government acknowledges that it is unable to enforce
some child labor provisions in rural areas, due to insufficient staff.
In May the Government ratified ILO Conventions 138 and 182 establishing
the minimum age to work and prohibiting the worst forms of child labor.
The Permanent Committee Against Child Labor asserts that 11 percent
of all children between the ages of 10 and 17 are working or actively
are seeking employment. Most of these children, both rural and urban,
are believed to be working at their parent's insistence. Some of these
children may be providing a substantial part of their family income.
Child labor violations occur most frequently in rural areas, during
the harvest of sugar cane, coffee, bananas, and tomatoes. Farm owners
usually pay according to the amount harvested, leading many laborers to
bring their young children to the fields to help with the work. In many
small rural communities, the entire able-bodied population participates
in a harvest, and parents are not willing to leave their children
behind unattended. Many children also are involved extensively in
subsistence agriculture producing coffee and sugar; they work with
their families or are employed by independent plantations.
The problem of child labor in agricultural areas appears to fall
most heavily on indigenous families, who often are forced to migrate
out of their isolated reserves in search of incomegenerating
activities. These frequent migrations not only interrupt schooling, but
also leave the family vulnerable to sometimes unscrupulous contractors.
The Government claims that it is unable to enforce child labor
provisions in rural areas due to insufficient staff, such as in the
coffee and banana plantations near the border with Costa Rica, where
government resources are especially scarce. However, the lack of
enforcement also can be attributed to widely held beliefs that
indigenous persons are accustomed to poverty and hard work. In April
the Minister of Labor suggested that child labor in the sugar cane
fields was a ``cultural tradition among the indigenous'' and that
children cutting sugar cane received more food during harvest time;
these comments led to a series of critical newspaper editorials. A
series of press reports during the year that exposed primarily
indigenous child labor in sugar cane fields led to a series of letters
to the editor from the public. Children in banana plantations also face
difficult conditions (see Section 6.e.).
Urban supermarkets employ an estimated 1,500 children who bag
groceries for tips. Despite the requirements of the Labor Code, some of
the children are as young as age 9, and many of them work late hours.
Some supermarket managers claim that the children actually are not
employed by their firm, despite the fact that ``baggers'' conform to
schedules, wear uniforms, and must comply with company codes of
conduct. Urban child labor also includes domestic workers, street
vendors, and car washers. The Government has demonstrated little
interest in reducing the general problem of urban child labor, and has
been unwilling to challenge the larger supermarket chains, where large
numbers of children work. Urban child labor problems also include
children working as street vendors or performers, washing cars, and
running errands for businesses or local criminal groups.
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the
Government enforces this provision (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code establishes
minimum wage rates for specific regions and for most categories of
labor. The minimum wage ranges from $0.80 per hour to $1.50 per hour,
depending on the region and sector. This wage is not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
workers formally employed in urban areas earn the minimum wage or
above. However, because unemployment is relatively high at 11 to 13
percent, an estimated 39 percent of the population work in the large
informal sector and earns far below the minimum wage. This is
particularly the case in most rural areas, where unskilled laborers
earn $3 to $6 per day, without benefits; the Government does not
enforce labor laws in most rural areas. In December 1999, a commission
composed of representatives from government, the private sector, and
labor convened to negotiate an increase in the minimum wage. The
commission failed to reach consensus by the mandated date, and
accordingly, in July responsibility for setting the new minimum wage
was passed to the President, who issued a decree that raised the
minimum wage by 13 percent, effective August 1. Public sector workers
do not fall under the Labor Code and do not always receive the minimum
wage.
The Labor Code establishes a standard workweek of 48 hours and
provides for at least one 24-hour rest period weekly.
As is general practice in the country's public offices after
elections, newly elected politicians and appointees began dismissing
public workers immediately upon taking office to free up positions for
loyal followers. The numbers of those dismissed were impossible to
confirm. Despite ILO protest, public workers do not benefit from union
protection or Labor Code standards. They were excluded from the most
recent increase in the minimum wage. The Government has indicated that
it would consider increasing their wages in 2001, if feasible.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing health and
safety standards and generally does so. The standards are fairly broad
and generally emphasize safety over long-term health hazards, according
to organized labor sources. Inspectors from both the Labor Ministry and
the occupational health section in the Social Security Administration
conduct periodic inspections of hazardous employment sites and respond
to complaints. Both agencies suffer from budget constraints and
experience difficulty attracting qualified personnel and resources.
Construction workers and their employers are notoriously lax about
conforming to basic safety measures, usually resulting in several
deaths a year. In rural areas, the most severe oversight in basic
safety measures occurs in the banana industry, where poisoning by
chemical agents is a recurrent issue. Workers have complained of
sterility and more recently of adverse skin conditions as a result of
exposure to the chemicals. In several plantations, indigenous workers
are not provided with shelters, sanitary or cooking facilities, or
fresh water; they also did not have machetes or gloves for their work.
Complaints of health problems also continued in the cement and milling
industries.
The law protects from dismissal workers who file requests for
health and safety inspections. Workers also have the right to remove
themselves from situations that present an immediate health or safety
hazard without jeopardizing their employment. They generally are not
allowed to do so if the threat is not immediate, but may request a
health and safety inspection to determine the extent and nature of the
hazard.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prohibits trafficking in
women and children; however, trafficking remains a problem. The Code
provides for prison sentences of 2 to 4 years for the promotion or
facilitation of the entry to or exit from the country of a person for
the purposes of prostitution. In some circumstances, the penalty is
increased to 6 years. The country is a transit point for aliens seeking
to reach the United States, some of whom are trafficked into indentured
servitude. There were reports of women being trafficked to Israel for
purposes of prostitution. Prosecutions are rare. The authorities held
several persons in custody for trafficking; they remained in prison
awaiting trial at year's end. Corruption, legal technicalities, and
lack of resources contribute to the Government's inability to combat
the problem fully. Traffickers frequently bribe or evade local law
enforcement officials.
Trafficking in women for sexual purposes occurs in the country, but
the extent of the practice is unknown. Public prosecutors are
investigating a case of Panamanian women smuggled into Israel in 1999
to work in brothels. Smugglers deprived the women of their money and
their passports. Some of the women apparently were aware that they were
traveling to work in the sex industry, others were not. The case was
before a criminal court at year's end; one hearing was held during the
year.
An estimated 30,000 aliens transit the country annually, generally
posing as tourists. The majority of aliens transiting Panama originate
in Ecuador and Peru, but a significant and increasing number come from
India and China. Their travel is facilitated by a network of alien
smugglers, travel agents, hotels, and safehouses. Anecdotal evidence
indicates that illegal aliens transiting through the country are
subject to frequent hardship. They commonly are deprived of adequate
food and shelter. Chinese aliens are particularly vulnerable to poor
treatment, and ultimately those trafficked for the purpose of forced
labor are coerced into working off their debt, which may be as high as
$30,000, as indentured servants. The Government does not conduct
educational campaigns to warn of the dangers of trafficking, and there
are no programs to aid victims.
__________
PARAGUAY
Paraguay is a constitutional republic with an executive branch and
a bicameral legislature. The President is the Head of Government and
cannot succeed himself. The bicameral Congress is made up of a 45-
member Senate and an 80-member Chamber of Deputies. The Colorado Party
has a small majority in both houses of Congress; however, factional
differences within the party result in shifting alliances depending
upon the issue. President Luis Gonzalez Macchi's ``National Unity
Government'' was weakened in February when the Liberal Party withdrew
from the Government, claiming that the President's Colorado Party
refused to share power with its coalition partners. On May 18, members
of two army units and a group of National Police officers loyal to
former General Lino Oviedo attempted to overthrow President Gonzalez
Macchi. The coup attempt lasted less than 1 day, and the majority of
the military remained loyal to the Government. President Gonzalez
Macchi declared and Congress ratified a controversial and unpopular
state of exception on May 19, in response to the coup attempt; he
lifted it on May 31. The Government used the state of exception to
imprison those it suspected of involvement in the coup attempt and to
limit public meetings and demonstrations. Although the Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary, and the Supreme Court continued
a reform process, the courts continued to be subject to pressure from
politicians and others.
In general the military no longer plays an overt role in politics;
the attempted coup was an exception to this practice. However, many
citizens remained concerned about possible erosion of the military's
apolitical status. Nonetheless, during the attempted coup in May, all
but two groups within the armed forces remained loyal to the
constitutional order. The national police force has responsibility for
maintaining internal security and public order; while it is nominally
under the authority of the presidency, in practice it reports to the
Ministry of the Interior. The civilian authorities generally maintain
effective control of the security forces. Members of the security
forces committed serious human rights abuses.
Paraguay has a market economy with a large informal sector. The
formal economy is oriented toward services, with less than half of the
$7.8 billion gross domestic product resulting from agriculture and
industry. Over 40 percent of the population are engaged in agricultural
activity, and approximately 10 percent of all families depend on cotton
farming. Wealth continues to be concentrated, with both urban and rural
areas supporting a large subsistence sector. Hydroelectric power and
agricultural commodities (soybeans, cotton, lumber, and cattle) were
the most important export items. The economy grew by approximately 0.5
percent in 1999 but experienced zero real growth during the year.
Annual per capita income was approximately $1,700.
The Government's human rights record remained generally poor, and
there continued to be serious problems. The principal human rights
problems included extrajudicial killings; torture and abuse of criminal
suspects, prisoners, and military recruits; and extremely poor prison
conditions. Arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy pretrial detention,
a general weakness within the judiciary, and infringements on citizen's
privacy rights also were problems. The Government at times restricted
freedom of the press. Following the May coup attempt, the Government
arrested journalists and destroyed two radio stations; several
journalists were threatened. The Government restricted freedom of
assembly, and police used force to disperse protesters on several
occasions, sometimes severely injuring citizens. Violence and
discrimination against women, abuse of children, discrimination against
the disabled and indigenous people, and incomplete protection of worker
rights also were problems. There were instances of forced labor. Child
labor and trafficking in women and girls also are problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The police and
military were responsible for some extrajudicial killings.
On January 8, police killed 3 persons while attempting to evict 400
landless peasants from a ranch that they had taken over. Nine policemen
were injured during the incident.
In December in Itakyry, police shot and killed 10 men suspected of
robbing an armored vehicle. One of the suspects, slightly wounded but
alive when the police transported him to a local medical center, was
dead upon arrival, with eight bullet holes in his body. At year's end
the police were conducting an investigation.
No further information was available regarding the disposition of
extrajudicial killings from previous years, including the following
cases: Jose ``Coco'' Villar, whom police killed in June 1999; Guillermo
Jara Ramirez, whom antinarcotics police killed in July 1999; and
Fernando Aristides Gutierrez and Marcial Torres, recruits killed during
their military service.
At least eight recruits died in questionable circumstances during
the year, including 14-year-old Pedro Centurion, whom the military
allegedly conscripted into service with false documents at 13 years of
age against his wishes. In September he was shot and killed; the
military claimed that he shot himself by accident. It was discovered
later that Centurion was in fact an Argentine citizen. Human rights
monitors, including a support group for families of military recruits,
report that 104 recruits, most of whom were underage, were killed or
died in accidents since 1989 while fulfilling their mandatory military
service. Although military law requires that recruits be at least 18
years of age to serve in the armed forces (or 17 in the year of their
18th birthday), only an estimated 20 percent of those serving during
the year met that requirement, and over 30 percent were 15 or younger.
In November the Government proposed an agreement to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) regarding the deaths of 14-
year-old military recruits Cristian Nunez and Marcelino Gomez. Military
officers abandoned the two boys in the inhospitable Chaco region during
a training exercise in 1998. According to the agreement, the Government
accepted responsibility for the deaths of the boys.
The March 1999 assassination of Vice President Luis Maria Argana,
which has been attributed widely to allies of then-president Raul Cubas
Grau, led to political protests in which the police and civilian
supporters of President Cubas fired on student demonstrators, killing 7
and injuring over 100. The Gonzalez Macchi Government made little
progress in bringing those responsible to justice. Three suspects were
convicted in the assassination; others remained at large. The
authorities charged and imprisoned a number of suspects for the
shootings of demonstrators in the plaza following the assassination,
but the courts have not convicted any of them, and few have been
released from confinement. As a result, many of those charged remain in
legal limbo, with their political rights limited, although their
involvement with the crimes never has been confirmed.
Former army commander Lino Oviedo, who played a prominent role in
the downfall of the Cubas Government in 1999, and whose whereabouts
were unknown after he fled Argentina (where he had received asylum) in
December 1999, was arrested in Brazil in June and remains in prison in
Brasilia. Several extradition requests for Oviedo are at various stages
in the Brazilian justice system. He faces charges stemming from his
alleged involvement in the March 1999 killing of Vice President Argana
and seven antigovernment protesters. Two individuals with long criminal
records, suspected of having participated in the Argana assassination
and who were imprisoned in a federal police facility in downtown Buenos
Aires, escaped from the jail in September. In November the authorities
captured one of them in Ciudad del Este; at year's end he awaited trial
in Asuncion. The other was thought to be hiding in Brazil.
Authoritarian regimes ruled the country until 1989, when dictator
Alfredo Stroessner was overthrown by General Andres Rodriguez, who was
elected President later that year. In 1996 an appellate court affirmed
the convictions for human rights abuses of five Stroessner-era
officials (former police Investigations Director Pastor Coronel and
police officers Lucilo Benitez Santacruz, Agustin Belotto Youga, Camilo
Almada Morel, and Juan Aniceto Martinez). Pastor Coronel died in
detention in September.
The 1998 arrest of former Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet
in the United Kingdom and his subsequent return to Chile drew renewed
attention to extrajudicial killings and other abuses that occurred in
Paraguay under the Stroessner regime. There were renewed allegations
that Stroessner cooperated in Operation Condor, a regional plan to
eliminate leftists. One human rights activist who was a political
prisoner during that time has filed cases with Spanish judge Baltasar
Garzon, who was preparing the case against Pinochet, and has provided
him with documents from Paraguayan archives that he claims implicate
General Stroessner in Operation Condor. There was no progress during
the year on Operation Condor cases.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture as well as cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment; however, torture
(primarily beatings) and brutal and degrading treatment of convicted
prisoners and other detainees continued. A human rights nongovernmental
organization (NGO), the Committee of Churches, reported several cases
of police torture and other abusive treatment of persons, including
women and children, designed to extract confessions, punish escape
attempts, or intimidate detainees. The Attorney General's office and
the Committee of Churches compiled numerous examples of police abuse.
In May during the state of exception several of the persons
arrested reported that they were tortured during their detention. Some
of these persons reported that former Interior Minister Walter Bower
witnessed and encouraged the beatings of suspects in three unrelated
cases. Bower was not charged with any crime related to these
accusations; however, he was removed from his position in October.
Press reports also tied him to the torture of eight peasants in
Concepcion in March; police reportedly beat them in Bower's presence
after they were arrested for illegally chopping down trees.
Police used force to disperse protesters on several occasions,
sometimes seriously injuring civilians (see Section 2.b.). Police also
beat at least one person, a labor union leader, during a strike in June
(see Section 6.a.).
Violence erupted several times during the year when police removed
squatters from lands they occupied. For example, on May 10 and 11, over
400 police officers tried to remove squatters from a ranch in Caazapa
using tear gas. Some shots were fired, and peasants were armed with
Molotov cocktails, machetes, and scythes.
In addition there were several allegations of mistreatment of
military recruits by noncommissioned and commissioned officers.
Recruits commonly charged that the military does not give them enough
to eat and forces them to hunt wild animals or steal cattle to kill for
food. In one case, a 15-year-old recruit, Cesar Francisco Pereira,
reported that he was forced to fight another recruit by two sergeants
who wagered a can of beer on the outcome. When Pereira lost, he was
pistol-whipped by Julio Cesar Alarcon, the sergeant who lost the bet,
and spent a month in a clinic recovering. Many recruits have claimed
that they were tortured or beaten while fulfilling their mandatory
service obligations.
Prison conditions are extremely poor. Mistreatment of prisoners is
a serious problem. Overcrowding and unsanitary living conditions were
the most serious problems affecting all prisoners. Tacumbu prison, the
largest in Asuncion, was built to hold 800 inmates but houses over
1,500. Other regional prisons generally hold about three times more
inmates than originally planned.
Security is another problem in the prison system. There are
approximately 120 guards for over 1,500 prisoners at Tacumbu prison,
and 3 inmates were killed during the year by other inmates. At the
Asuncion women's prison, Buen Pastor, there have been several reported
rapes of prisoners by their guards, although laws governing prisons
forbid male guards in the women's prisons. Conditions in the women's
prison are better than at Tacumbu, with less overcrowding and a
generally safer environment. There is a separate prison for juveniles.
The Congressional Human Rights Commission has criticized the
prisons for their poor nutritional standards. Prisons generally serve
one meal a day, and prisoners seldom get vegetables, fruit, or a meat
protein source, unless they have individual means to purchase them.
Prisons have separate accommodations for well-to-do prisoners, which
ensures that those with sufficient means receive far better treatment
than other prisoners. Pretrial detainees are not held separately from
convicted prisoners.
The Government permits independent monitoring of prison conditions
by human rights organizations. Members of the International Committee
of the Red Cross had access to the detained supporters of Oviedo who
were arrested in March 1999 and to those arrested in May.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are persistent problems. The Constitution prohibits detention
without an arrest warrant signed by a judge and stipulates that any
person arrested must appear before a judge within 24 hours to make a
statement. The police can arrest persons without a warrant if they
catch them in the act of committing a crime but must bring them before
a judge within 24 hours. However, the authorities often violated these
provisions, and the recent introduction of new penal and criminal
procedure codes, which are not yet well understood by prosecutors and
police, has exacerbated the problem.
Following the May 18-19 coup attempt, police detained journalists
(see Section 2.a.).
Following the assassination of Vice President Argana and the
killing of student protesters in March 1999, authorities arrested over
45 persons in connection with these cases. Many of those arrested were
well-known political figures, including legislators allied with the
former Government. There was little evidence presented to support the
charges against most of them, and most of the accused were held without
bail, leading some observers to question whether due process had been
observed. At year's end, many of those detained still remained in jail,
and at least 10 prominent suspects who had been remanded to house
arrest had not yet been cleared of the charges against them and
therefore remained in an uncertain legal status.
Pretrial detention remains a serious problem; 91 percent of persons
in prison were held pending trial, many for months or years after their
arrest. While the law encourages speedy trials, the Constitution
permits detention without trial until the accused completes the minimum
sentence for the alleged crime, which often occurs in practice. A bail
system exists for most crimes, and judges have discretion over it.
Judges frequently set relatively high bail, and many accused persons
are unable to post bond. In March the Supreme Court, the Public
Ministry, and a judicial working group took steps to reduce the large
number of pretrial detainees but achieved only modest results. The
Supreme Court and many criminal court judges also make quarterly visits
to the prisons to identify and release improperly detained individuals.
The Constitution expressly prohibits exile, and the Government does
not use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, judges often are pressured by
politicians and other persons whose interests are at stake. There were
allegations that members of the judiciary who issued arrest warrants
against the Oviedistas following the events of March 1999 were
pressured to do so by politicians who opposed Oviedo. While there are
credible reports of political pressure affecting judicial decisions,
the judiciary is not allied with any one political group.
The nine-member Supreme Court appoints lower court judges and
magistrates, based upon recommendations by the magistrate's council.
There are five types of appellate tribunals: Civil and commercial,
criminal, labor, administrative disputes, and juvenile. Minor courts
and justices of the peace fall within four functional areas: Civil and
commercial, criminal, labor, and juvenile. The military has its own
judicial system.
The judicial system remains relatively inefficient; however, the
1999 enactment of new penal and criminal procedure codes is expected to
improve the judicial system's efficiency over time. The judiciary
continues to suffer from insufficient resources. There is also a large
backlog of cases. The Constitution stipulates that all defendants have
the right to an attorney, at public expense if necessary, but this
right often is not respected in practice. Many destitute suspects
receive little legal assistance, and few have access to an attorney
sufficiently in advance of the trial to prepare a defense. In Asuncion
for example, there are only 26 public defenders available to assist the
indigent, and only 102 nationwide, although 25 new positions are
planned. In practice, public defenders lack the resources to perform
their jobs adequately.
The new Penal and Criminal Procedures Code entered fully into force
in March and replaced the antiquated 1914 code. It provides the legal
basis for the protection of fundamental human rights. The new code
includes procedures for an oral and accusatorial system, as well as a
faster and more transparent criminal trial process. If implemented
effectively, these reforms could improve the credibility of the
judicial system and reduce the number of persons in pretrial detention.
Enactment of the new Penal and Criminal Procedures Code has
introduced gradually oral proceedings. A prosecutor is responsible for
bringing charges against accused persons within 180 days. Defendants
and the prosecutor can present written testimony of witnesses as well
as other evidence. All interested parties have access to all documents
reviewed by the judge, and defendants can rebut witnesses. Defendants
enjoy a presumption of innocence. The judge alone determines guilt or
innocence and decides punishment. During the pretrial phase, the judge
receives and may request investigative reports. The accused often
appears before the court only twice: to plead and to be sentenced.
Defendants have the right to appeal. If the sentence is appealed, an
appeals court reviews the verdict. The law provides for appeals to the
Supreme Court if constitutional questions arise.
There were no reports of political prisoners. More than 45
supporters of former General Lino Oviedo were arrested after the
killings of Vice President Argana and the student protesters in March
1999, and many remained in jail at year's end. They assert that they
are being detained because of their political opposition to President
Gonzalez Macchi (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--At times the Government infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. While the Government and its security forces generally did not
interfere in the private lives of citizens, human rights activists
claimed that local officials and police officers abuse their authority
by entering homes or businesses without warrants and harassing private
citizens. The Constitution provides that the police may not enter
private homes except to prevent a crime in progress or when the police
possess a judicial warrant. There were allegations that the Government
occasionally spied on individuals and monitored communications for
political and security reasons. There were allegations of the forced
conscription of underage youth (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression and the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice during most of the year; however,
there were several exceptions during the state of exception in May and
following the vice presidential election in August.
The print and electronic media are independently owned; however,
some newspapers, radio and television stations are closely tied to
political parties, factions of those parties, or business interests.
The media commonly criticized the Government and freely discussed
opposition viewpoints.
Following the coup attempt of May 18-19, the Government arrested
journalists, and police destroyed two radio stations. During the coup
attempt, Radio Asuncion, whose owners, Miguel and Adriana Fernandez,
had been linked to Oviedo, broadcast appeals to the public to support
the uprising. Early in the afternoon of May 20, as many as a dozen
uniformed officers of the Paraguayan National Police entered Radio
Asuncion's studios, where they destroyed some broadcast equipment and
stole other items, effectively dismantling the station, and detained
both the owners. Radio Asuncion was unable to resume operations and was
off the air at year's end. The Government also detained Juan Carlos
Bernabe of Radio Nanawa. On June 2, the authorities released Bernabe
and the Fernandezes.
Radio 970 in Asuncion, which the Government similarly accused of
supporting the coup attempt while it was in progress, reported being
threatened with closure in the days following the uprising. Senator
Francisco Jose de Vargas said during a public session of the Senate
that he had requested that President Gonzalez Macchi send a helicopter
to bomb the transmission tower of the station during the May 18-19
incidents because it was ``abetting the insurrection.''
Also after the coup attempt, under the decree implementing the
state of exception, President Gonzalez Macchi ordered the detention of
Hugo Ruiz Olazar, editor of the Asuncion daily newspaper ABC Color and
local correspondent for Agence France Presse and El Clarin of Buenos
Aires, on suspicion of having participated in planning the coup
attempt. Police maintained surveillance outside the newspaper,
monitoring movements to and from the building in an evident attempt to
capture Ruiz. He was never arrested and returned to his position at ABC
after the state of exception was lifted.
In addition several journalists were threatened around the time of
the vice presidential election on August 13. On the evening of August
15, a reportedly drunken mob of several dozen Colorado Party supporters
surrounded the studios of the country's leading station Radio Nanduti,
threw stones and bottles, and threatened to storm the building. During
the election campaign, Radio Nanduti's owner and leading commentator,
Humberto Rubin, had been mildly critical of the Colorado Party and a
prominent Colorado political family. Although the station called the
police and also broadcast appeals for assistance, the police took more
than an hour to arrive and disperse the crowd. Some windows were
broken, but no one was reported injured. Then-Interior Minister Walter
Bower later telephoned station owner Rubin on the air to offer
apologies for the slow response.
On December 19, Brazilian journalist Mauri Konig of the O Estado do
Parana newspaper was beaten with chains and severely injured after
photographing a police station in Alto Parana department, near the
border with Brazil. Konig reported that at least one of the three men
who beat him was wearing a police uniform, and a pickup truck
reportedly used by his assailants was linked to several police
officials. At year's end, the authorities had made no arrests in the
case.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of all citizens to peaceful assembly, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice during most of
the year; however, before and during the state of exception in May the
Government restricted this right. Police used gunfire to disperse
protesters on several occasions, sometimes severely wounding civilians.
In 1997 the Government amended a law regulating demonstrations in
Asuncion to further restrict areas where demonstrations may take place
but expanded slightly the hours in which they may be held. Union groups
were the most vocal opponents of the modifications. The law requires
that organizers notify the Asuncion police 24 hours before any rally in
the downtown area. The police may ban a protest but must provide
written notification of such a ban within 12 hours of receipt of the
organizers' request. The law permits a police ban only if another party
already has given notice of plans for a similar rally at the same place
and time. In addition the law prohibits public meetings or
demonstrations in front of the presidential palace and outside military
or police barracks. This law does not apply to religious processions.
In March in San Pedro police removed a roadblock erected by
peasants. During the altercation six persons were shot. However, police
deny that they shot the peasants, claiming that they had only rubber
bullets. Police also beat at least one person, a labor union leader,
during a strike in June (see Section 6.a.).
On April 3, dozens of police in riot gear prevented members of the
UNACE faction of the Colorado Party from holding a meeting to discuss
what position their party should take in the upcoming internal party
elections. Police allegedly violently forced members to leave the area
of the UNACE office and stopped members in cars from completing their
trip. Party leader Luis Villamayor complained that the action violated
the Constitution.
The Government restricted freedom of assembly during the state of
exception imposed in late May after the coup attempt. The Government
prohibited public gatherings of UNACE followers during the state of
exception and required other groups holding meetings or demonstrations
first to receive authorization from the police. The police retained the
right to forbid any meeting and to demand identification from anyone
participating in a meeting or demonstration.
Other political demonstrations and rallies occurred during the
year, generally without major incidents. Labor unions continued to
demonstrate for better working conditions, and peasant organizations
closed roads on several occasions to bring attention to the needs of
the rural population.
The Constitution provides for the right of all citizens to free
association, and the Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Government requires that all religious groups be registered with the
Ministry of Education and Culture, but imposes no controls on these
groups, and many informal churches exist.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--All citizens may travel within the
country with virtually no restrictions, and there are no restrictions
on foreign travel or emigration. There were no travel restrictions
during the state of exception. The alleged coup plotters are not
allowed to leave the country and must sign in with the Justice Ministry
once a month.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Constitution provides for the granting of
asylum; however, there are no established provisions to grant asylum or
refugee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The Immigration Department determines each request on a case-by-case
basis in consultation with the Ministries of Foreign Relations and
Interior and the nongovernmental Committee of Churches. The issue of
the provision of first asylum has never arisen.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens have the right and ability to change their government
through democratic means. Multiple parties and candidates contest the
country's leadership positions. Three parties are represented in the
Congress. The Constitution and the Electoral Code mandate general
elections every 5 years, voting by secret ballot, and universal
suffrage. Debate in Congress is free and frank. The Congress often
rejects the executive branch's proposals.
Three major parties and several smaller political parties are
active. Competing factions within the parties are distinguished by the
personal ambitions of their leaders, not by policy differences. The
opposition's power increased as a result of the changes brought about
by the 1992 Constitution and the subsequent election of a civilian
president and an opposition-controlled congress. President Gonzalez
Macchi's ``National Unity Government'' was weakened in February when
the Liberal Party withdrew from the Government, claiming that the
Colorado Party refused to share power with its coalition partners. The
president of the Liberal Party was elected Vice President in August and
took office in September. International observers from the Organization
of American States characterized the election as free and fair. This
was the first national election won by the opposition in almost 90
years. Interim gubernatorial elections that were scheduled for June
were delayed because of a court challenge by the Colorado Party and
were rescheduled for March 2001.
On May 18, members of two groups of the armed forces and some
National Police officers loyal to former General Lino Oviedo attempted
to overthrow President Gonzalez Macchi. Two cavalry units led by some
former military officers and politicians took over the major cavalry
bases in and around Asuncion and threatened to overthrow the
Government. The coup attempt lasted less than 1 day, and the majority
of the military remained loyal to the Government. However, following
the coup attempt President Gonzalez Macchi declared and the Congress
ratified a controversial and unpopular state of exception on May 19 and
lifted it on May 31.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
government and politics; however, in practice they are
underrepresented. There are 9 women in Congress (7 of 45 senators and 2
of 80 national deputies), and there is 1 woman in the Cabinet. The new
Electoral Code requires that, in their internal primaries, 20 percent
of each party's candidates for elective office be women. Although women
are represented in the judicial system as judges and prosecutors, there
are no women on the Supreme Court.
Members of indigenous groups are entitled to vote, and the
percentage of indigenous people who exercised this right has grown
significantly in recent years; however, members of indigenous groups
are underrepresented in government and politics. The inhabitants of
some indigenous communities report being threatened and prohibited from
fully exercising their political rights.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several human rights groups operate, including the Committee of
Churches (an interdenominational group that monitors human rights,
investigates refugee claims, and provides legal assistance), Tekojoja
(a group dedicated to the protection of children's rights), and SERPAJ
(a group that defends conscientious objectors and provides legal
assistance to those with grievances arising from military service). In
1999 32 NGO's, civil organizations, and trade unions officially formed
the Paraguay Human Rights Coordinator (CODEHUPY). The Government did
not restrict the activities of any human rights group or advocates;
however, it has a mixed record in cooperating with or responding to
recommendations from such groups.
The 1992 Constitution mandates that Congress name a human rights
ombudsman through whom citizens could press claims against the state;
however, the Congress has yet to do so. The Director General of Human
Rights, located in the Ministry of Justice and Labor, chairs the
National Commission on Human Rights. The Commission sponsors seminars
to promote human rights awareness. The Director General's office has
access to the congressional, executive, and judicial authorities. It
does not have subpoena or prosecutorial power but may forward
information concerning human rights abuses to the Attorney General for
action. It also serves as a clearinghouse for information on human
rights and has trained thousands of educators in human rights law.
The office of the Attorney General's Special Adviser on Human
Rights has been extremely active in pursuing justice against human
rights abusers from the Stroessner regime. Although the position has
little real authority, the Adviser is a strong spokesman for the human
rights community and the rights of the disenfranchised and uses his
position to identify and publicize human rights abuses by the
Government. During the year, the Special Adviser heard complaints from
many citizens regarding alleged human rights violations and sponsored
several conferences on different human rights themes.
On October 23, Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan Esteban Aguirre and
Inter-American Institute of Human Rights representative Roberto Cuellar
signed a cooperative agreement between the Government and the San Jose-
based Institute. Under the terms of the agreement, the Inter-American
Institute is to provide assistance in the fields of human rights
education, political participation, and access to justice.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Although the Constitution and other laws prohibit discrimination,
certain groups, such as indigenous people, faced significant
discrimination in practice.
Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved
sexual and domestic abuse, which is both widespread and vastly
underreported. Spousal abuse is common. Although the new Penal Code
criminalizes spousal abuse, it stipulates that the abuse must be
habitual before being recognized as criminal, and then it is punishable
only by a fine. Thousands of women are treated annually for injuries
sustained in violent domestic altercations. Between January and
September, the Secretariat of Women's Affairs registered 426 cases of
violence against women. According to press reports published between
January and August, nearly 60 percent of the cases of violence against
women were rape cases. The authorities were able to detain the alleged
attacker in less than 10 percent of those cases.
According to a 1995-96 national poll on reproductive health, 14
percent of women reported that they were abused physically at some
point in their lives. Most observers believe that this number
understates the reality. According to women's rights activists,
official complaints rarely are filed or when filed soon are withdrawn
due to spousal reconciliation or family pressure. The Secretariat of
Women's Affairs chairs a national committee, made up of other
government agencies and NGO's, which developed a national plan to
prevent and punish violence against women. Under the plan, an office of
care and orientation receives reports on violence against women and
coordinates responses with the National Police, primary health care
units, the Attorney General's office, and NGO's. However, in practice,
these services are available only in Asuncion, and women living
elsewhere in the country rarely benefit from them. The Secretariat also
conducts training courses for the police, health care workers,
prosecutors, and others.
The Women's November 25th Collective, an NGO, operates a reception
center where female victims of violence can receive legal,
psychological, and educational assistance. No shelters for battered and
abused women are available outside the capital of Asuncion.
In July 1999, an IACHR report stated that in 1998 one case of rape
was reported to the press every 3 days. During the first 4 months of
that year, there was one case of rape reported each day. There are no
specialized police units to handle complaints involving rape.
Most women imprisoned reportedly were detained for assault,
including murder, that they committed following domestic violence.
The law prohibits the sexual exploitation of women, but the
authorities do not enforce the prohibitions effectively, and
trafficking in women is a problem. Prostitution by adults is not
illegal, and exploitation of women, especially teenage prostitutes,
remains a serious problem. Law enforcement officials periodically stage
raids on houses of prostitution, and raids on two brothels in June
confirmed that teenage prostitutes were working in both locations. A
ring of traffickers sending women and teenage girls to Buenos Aires
under the guise of working as domestic servants was uncovered during
the year (see Section 6.f.).
Recognizing that a majority of women in the workplace face sexual
harassment, several unions have sponsored an ongoing campaign against
it. Sex-related job discrimination continues to be common and widely
tolerated. The Secretariat of Women's Affairs occasionally sponsors
programs intended to give women free and equal access to employment,
social security, housing, ownership of land, and business
opportunities.
Women have much higher illiteracy rates than men, with an estimated
16 percent of rural women illiterate compared with about 10 percent of
rural men. In addition, maternal mortality rates are high, and as many
as 65 percent of such deaths are related to poor medical care. Several
groups work to improve conditions for women, including Women for
Democracy, which is active in civic and electoral education. Other
groups include SUMANDO, an NGO that promotes educational reform and
voter participation in elections; and SEFEM, which focuses on women and
public policy and the participation of women in local development.
Children.--The Constitution protects certain children's rights and
stipulates that parents and the state should care for, feed, educate,
and support children. The population is very young, with 41 percent
under the age of 15, and 60 percent under the age of 20. Boys and girls
are entitled to equal treatment in education and health care. However,
female access to education is lower, particularly in rural areas. The
educational system does not provide adequately for the educational
needs of the population. However, in 1998 the educational system was
changed to make elementary school education compulsory through the
eighth grade, with plans to extend it through grade nine, although the
Government lacks the money to implement the changes. Families pay a fee
to cover each school's administrative expenses and must purchase books,
uniforms, and other supplies for their children's use.
Abuse and neglect of children is a problem. Children 14 and older
are treated as adults for purposes of arrest and sentencing. According
to UNICEF, 1 in 3 children (some 462,000) between the ages of 7 and 17
work, many in unsafe labor conditions (see Section 6.d.). According to
a study by a local NGO, many of the children who work on the streets
suffer from malnutrition, lack of access to education, and disease.
Some employers of the estimated 11,500 young girls working as domestic
servants or nannies deny them access to education and mistreat them.
Sexual exploitation of children also is a problem. According to the
Attorney General's office, there are approximately 200 complaints per
month regarding the mistreatment and sexual abuse of minors. In the
city of Encarnacion, the authorities arrested a man for selling
pornographic images of young girls over the Internet.
Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
The Government has ordered that all military officers responsible
for recruiting ensure that all conscripts meet the legally minimum
mandated requirement age of 18 for military service. However, there
were many reported violations, including allegations of military
recruiters forcing underage youths to join units and providing them
with false birth certificates and other documentation to show them to
be of age. The military took no significant disciplinary action against
those responsible for underage recruits. Poor families often knowingly
send underage children to the armed forces for economic reasons.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for equal
opportunity for persons with disabilities and mandates that the State
provide them with health care, education, recreation, and professional
training. It further requires that the State formulate a policy for the
treatment, rehabilitation, and integration into society of disabled
persons. However, the Congress never has enacted legislation to
establish such programs or provide funding for them. Many persons with
disabilities face significant discrimination in employment; others are
unable to seek employment because of a lack of accessible public
transportation. The law does not mandate accessibility for the
disabled, and the vast majority of the country's buildings, both public
and private, are inaccessible.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution provides indigenous people
with the right to participate in the economic, social, political, and
cultural life of the country; however, the indigenous population,
estimated at 75,000 to 100,000, is unassimilated and neglected. Low
wage levels, long work hours, infrequent payment (or nonpayment) of
wages, job insecurity, lack of access to social security benefits, and
racial discrimination are common. Weak organization and lack of
financial resources limit access by indigenous people to the political
and economic system. Indigenous groups relied primarily upon
parliamentary commissions to promote their particular interests. The
Constitution also protects the property interests of indigenous people,
but these rights still are not codified fully. The Constitution allows
Public Ministry officials to represent indigenous people in matters
involving the protection of life and property.
Lack of access to sufficient land also hinders the ability of
indigenous groups to progress economically and maintain their cultural
identity. This is made worse by insufficient police and judicial
protection from persons encroaching on their lands.
The Government's National Indigenous Institute (INDI) has the
authority to purchase land on behalf of indigenous communities and to
expropriate private property under certain conditions to establish
tribal homelands. However, there have been significant allegations of
wrongdoing within INDI, and in June a former INDI director was
sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment for embezzlement. Furthermore, many
indigenous people find it difficult to travel to the capital to solicit
land titles or process the required documentation for land ownership.
In August a group of indigenous people who had established a squatters'
settlement on the edge of a highway were attacked by hooded men
presumed to be ranch hands from a nearby property, in an attempt to
dislodge them.
Significant problems facing the indigenous population also include
lack of shelter and medical care, economic displacement resulting from
other groups' development and modernization, and malnutrition. Scarce
resources and limited government attention resulted in little progress
in dealing with these problems. However, there were individual small
successes that benefited indigenous people, including the successful
pursuit in the courts in February and in July by members of the Enxet
group of compensation for the forced labor and unlawful firing of some
of its members (see Section 6.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution allows both private
and public sector workers (with the exception of the armed forces and
the police) to form and join unions without government interference.
The Constitution contains several provisions that protect fundamental
worker rights, including an antidiscrimination clause, provisions for
employment tenure, severance pay for unjustified firings, collective
bargaining, and the right to strike. Approximately 121,000, or 15
percent, of workers are organized in approximately 1,600 unions.
In general unions are independent of the Government and political
parties. One of the country's three labor centrals, the Confederation
of Paraguayan Workers (CPT), traditionally was aligned closely with the
ruling Colorado Party, but these ties appear to be loosening.
All unions must be registered with the Ministry of Justice and
Labor. The registration process is cumbersome and can take several
months. Employers who wish to oppose the formation of a union can delay
union recognition further by filing a writ opposing it. However,
virtually all unions that request recognition eventually receive it.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, bans binding
arbitration, and prohibits retribution against strikers and leaders
carrying out routine union business; however, employers often took
action against strikers and union leaders. Voluntary arbitration
decisions are enforceable by the courts, but this mechanism still is
employed rarely. Senior Labor Ministry officials are available to
mediate disputes.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts has
noted deficiencies in the application of certain conventions ratified
by the Government. These include conventions dealing with minimum wage,
abolition of forced labor, minimum age of employment, freedom of
association, equal remuneration, and employment policy. The ILO
specifically criticized regulations requiring a minimum of 300 workers
to form a union as inconsistent with international norms regarding the
freedom of association.
There were numerous strikes by members of all three worker centrals
and smaller unions. Many of these were related to the firing of union
officials, management violations of a collective contract, management
efforts to prevent the free association of workers, or demands for
benefits such as payment of the minimum wage or contribution to the
social security system. A general strike called for 2 days in late June
only lasted 1 day, and was observed rigorously only by bus drivers,
after several had their buses burned or their windshields smashed for
initially defying the strike. Some violence also occurred during the
month-long strike by Sitrande, the national electric utility workers'
union, including reported acts of sabotage by union members. The
workers went on strike to protest the privatization of the utility
company.
There were unconfirmed allegations of several cases of intimidation
and violence against union members during the year. In one case during
a June transportation strike, union members and police clashed
violently and one union leader was seriously injured.
Unions are free to form and join federations or confederations and
during the year were affiliated with and participated in international
labor bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining, and this provision is respected in
practice. The number of negotiated collective contracts continued to
grow, surpassing 100 contracts by the end of the year. However, they
were still the exception rather than the norm in labor-management
relations and typically reaffirmed minimum standards established by
law. When wages are not set in free negotiations between unions and
employers, they are made a condition of individual offers of
employment.
The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination; however, the
firing and harassment of some union organizers and leaders in the
private sector continued. Union organizers sometimes are jailed for
their role in leading demonstrations. Fired union leaders can seek
redress in the courts, but the labor tribunals have been slow to
respond to complaints and typically favored business in disputes. The
courts are not required to order the reinstatement of workers fired for
union activities. As in previous years, in some cases where judges
ordered the reinstatement of discharged workers, the employers
disregarded the court order with impunity. There are a number of cases
in which trade union leaders, fired as long as 6 years earlier, have
not yet received a decision from the courts.
The failure of employers to meet salary payments also frequently
precipitated labor disputes. Principal problems included bottlenecks in
the judicial system and the inability or unwillingness of the
Government to enforce labor laws. There were also complaints that
management created parallel or ``factory'' unions to compete with
independently formed unions. There were several cases of workers who
chose not to protest because of fear of reprisal or anticipation of
government inaction.
The union representing workers in Antelco, the state-run telephone
provider, asserts that a new privatization law violates the conditions
of a collective agreement between the Government and the bargaining
unit by reducing the amount paid to workers who would be fired after
the company is sold. The workers organized a strike in response to the
privatization law.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced labor, including that performed by children; however, cases of
abuse of national service obligations occurred (see Section 6.d.).
There were reports of conscripts forced to work as servants or
construction workers for military officers in their residences or
privately owned businesses. There also were allegations of forced
conscription of underage youths (see Section 5). Apart from the abuse
of national service obligations, the authorities appear to enforce the
law effectively; however, trafficking in women and girls also is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
It is a common practice for families who cannot afford to raise a
child, most often a daughter, to send her to relatives or colleagues,
where she may be expected to work in exchange for room, board, and
access to education. Sometimes these girls, who can be as young as 5
years old, are abused by those charged with providing for them.
In February and July, courts ordered ranch owners to pay
compensation to members of the Enxet indigenous group for forced labor
and unlawful firing of some members (see Section 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Director General for the Protection of Minors in the
Ministry of Justice and Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor
laws. Minors between 15 and 18 years of age may be employed only with
parental authorization and cannot be employed in dangerous or unhealthy
conditions. Children between 12 and 15 years of age may be employed
only in family enterprises, apprenticeships, or in agriculture. The
Labor Code prohibits work by children under 12 years of age, and all
children are required to attend elementary school through the eighth
grade.
In general the Government does not have the resources to enforce
minimum working age regulations. According to UNICEF, 1 in 3 children
(some 462,000) between the ages of 7 and 17 work, many in unsafe
conditions. Recent studies indicate that 42 percent of these children
began working by the age of 8, and some 37 percent do not attend
school. According to a study by a local NGO, some 6,000 children and
adolescents work in the streets of Asuncion, of whom a third are under
10 years of age. Thousands of children in urban areas, many of them
younger than 12 years of age, are engaged in informal employment such
as selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many of
the children who work on the streets suffer from malnutrition, lack of
access to education, and disease. Some employers of the estimated
11,500 young girls working as domestic servants or nannies deny them
access to education and mistreat them. Employers sometimes file false
charges of robbery against those who seek to leave domestic jobs and
turn them over to the police. In rural areas, it is not unusual for
children as young as 10 years of age to work beside their parents in
the field. Local human rights groups do not regard families harvesting
crops together as an abuse of child labor.
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and generally
it is enforced effectively; however, there were allegations of forced
conscription of underage youths and trafficking in girls for forced
prostitution (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The executive, through the
Ministry of Justice and Labor, has established a private sector minimum
wage sufficient to maintain a minimally adequate standard of living for
a worker and family. The minimum salary is adjusted whenever annual
inflation exceeds 10 percent and was approximately $195 (680,162
guaranies) per month at year's end. However, the Ministry is unable to
enforce the minimum wage, and most analysts agree that 50 to 70 percent
of workers earn less than the decreed minimum. The Labor Code requires
that domestic workers be paid at least 40 percent of the minimum wage
and allows them to work up to a 12-hour day.
The Labor Code allows for a standard legal workweek of 48 hours (42
hours for night work), with 1 day of rest. The law also provides for an
annual bonus of 1 month's salary and a minimum of 6 vacation days a
year. The law requires overtime payment for hours in excess of the
standard. However, many employers violate these provisions in practice.
There are no prohibitions on excessive compulsory overtime. Workers in
the transport sector routinely stage strikes to demand that their
employers comply with the Labor Code's provisions on working hours,
overtime, and minimum wage payments.
The Labor Code also stipulates conditions of safety, hygiene, and
comfort. The Ministry of Justice and Labor and the Ministry of Health
did not effectively enforce these provisions, due in part to a lack of
inspectors and other resources.
Workers have the right to remove themselves from situations that
endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their continued
employment, but they may not do so until such conditions are recognized
formally by the Ministries of Justice and Labor and Health. Although
there are laws intended to protect workers who file complaints about
such conditions, many employers reportedly took disciplinary action
against them.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no specific legislation to
prevent trafficking in persons, and there were sporadic reports of
trafficking of women and girls for sexual purposes. In August the press
reported that a trafficking ring had been uncovered that sent women and
young girls to Buenos Aires, Argentina, under the guise of working as
domestic servants, and then forced them into prostitution. In one
prominent case, two girls escaped from an Argentine brothel in April
and returned to their homes. The authorities brought charges against a
number of Paraguayans under laws criminalizing the forced prostitution
of a minor, but at year's end, none had been convicted. An Argentine
television station also conducted an investigation of prostitutes
working in greater Buenos Aires and discovered a number of undocumented
Paraguayan women and girls working there as virtual slaves, held as
prisoners offering their services as prostitutes in exchange for their
clothing, room, and board.
__________
PERU
Peru is a multiparty republic with a dominant executive branch that
for most of the year used its control of the legislature and the
judiciary to the detriment of the democratic process. In May President
Alberto Fujimori won a third 5-year term in elections that
international and domestic observers judged to be significantly flawed;
however, in November the Fujimori administration collapsed, leading to
a significant opening in the area of political rights. In June the
Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) and a
high level delegation visited the country to discuss the strengthening
of democratic institutions. The visit resulted in talks sponsored by
the OAS, which began in August and included members of civil society,
the Government, and the political opposition. In August President
Fujimori's Peru 2000 alliance gained a majority in Congress after more
than a dozen elected legislators changed their affiliation from
opposition parties to Peru 2000. Charges of corruption against
presidential advisor and de facto head of the intelligence service
Vladimiro Montesinos led President Fujimori to announce on September 16
that he intended to hold new national elections in April 2001, in which
he would not be a candidate. On November 22, President Fujimori sent
his resignation to Congress from Japan, where he remained at year's
end. Congress refused to accept his resignation and instead voted to
remove him from office for ``moral incapacity.'' The President of
Congress Valentin Paniagua of the Popular Action Party succeeded to the
presidency on November 22. He announced that he would uphold
legislation allowing for new presidential and congressional elections
in April 2001, and he accelerated the implementation of democratic
reforms initiated in the OAS-sponsored talks. In November the Congress
restored three judges to the Constitutional Tribunal, and it resumed
its work. The Tribunal had ceased to function in 1997, when Congress
removed three of its judges for opposing President Fujimori's intent to
seek reelection. The Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is inefficient, subject
to corruption, and was for most of the year easily controlled by the
executive branch. By year's end, the Government had taken steps to
implement important judicial reform measures.
The police and military share responsibility for internal security.
In October Congress passed legislation, based on agreements made in the
OAS talks, to dismantle the National Intelligence Service (SIN), and
the Government took action to do so in that same month. The capture or
death of several remaining terrorist leaders marked continuing progress
in eliminating the still lethal threat posed by the terrorist group
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). In February the Government eliminated
the last remaining emergency zones that covered over 5 percent of the
country's territory and restored constitutional protections, including
freedom of movement and of assembly, throughout the country where they
previously had been suspended. Civilian authorities generally maintain
effective control of the security forces; however, there were
allegations that some members of the security forces who were loyal to
Montesinos, were undermining civilian control of the military. In
November President Paniagua appointed a new Defense Minister who
retired dozens of officers, many of whom allegedly were tied to
Montesinos. Members of the security forces committed serious human
rights abuses.
The Government has implemented major economic reforms, transforming
a heavily regulated economy into a market-oriented one. The Government
continued to privatize state enterprises but did not meet its target of
selling those remaining by the end of the year. Inflation remained in
the single digits, and economic growth reached 3.6 percent. Per capita
gross domestic product is estimated at $2,060. Major exports include
copper and other minerals, fishmeal, and textiles. The unemployment
rate is estimated at 9.5 percent; underemployment remains around 45
percent. More than one-half of the economically active population work
in the informal sector. The poor constituted approximately 54 percent
of the population; about 15 percent of the population live in extreme
poverty.
The Government's human rights record was poor in several areas, and
serious problems remain; however, following the change of
administration in November, the Paniagua administration took steps to
implement important democratic reforms, including some which improved
the exercise of civil and political rights, and to address allegations
of corruption surrounding the former intelligence services and other
government officials. Members of the security forces committed
extrajudicial killings and tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
persons. Impunity remained a problem. Lack of accountability within the
armed forces, particularly regarding counter-terrorist operations,
continued to be a problem. Overall prison conditions remained poor and
were extremely harsh in maximum security facilities. Arbitrary arrest
and detention, prolonged pretrial detention, lack of due process, and
lengthy trial delays continued to be problems. Despite extensive
changes to reduce the executive dominance over the judiciary, at year's
end problems persisted, including the general inefficiency of the
system. At year's end, the Government was preparing to return to the
contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
from which it had withdrawn in 1999. The Government inhibited freedom
of speech and of the press, and journalists faced harassment and
intimidation and practiced self-censorship; however, nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) noted significant improvements after President
Fujimori announced the disbanding of the intelligence forces. There
were some limits on freedom of assembly, although political rallies
occurred frequently and most were not impeded. The authorities at times
sought to hinder the operations of human rights monitors. Violence and
discrimination against women were widespread. Violence against children
and discrimination against the disabled, indigenous people, and racial
and ethnic minorities remained problems. Labor advocates argue that
labor laws and practices restrict collective bargaining rights and the
freedom of association. Child labor remained a problem.
The Human Rights Ombudsman expanded its operations to 15 offices
throughout the country. The ad hoc Pardons Commission completed its
work after having reviewed over 3,000 cases of alleged wrongful
conviction by military courts, and recommended and obtained pardons in
481 cases. During the year, the Justice Ministry's Human Rights
Commission approved an additional 32 pardons recommended previously by
the ad hoc Commission. After taking office, the Paniagua administration
reconstituted the ad hoc Commission, which at year's end had
recommended 33 new pardons and was preparing to review additional cases
left over from the previous administration. The Terrorism Division of
the superior court traveled to remote areas outside Lima and dismissed
300 longstanding arrest warrants on terrorism charges.
Sendero Luminoso terrorists were responsible for killings, torture,
and numerous other abuses.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings; however, security forces
committed several extrajudicial killings.
On March 1, police from the Northern Special Services Division
reportedly detained Alejandro Damian Trujillo Llontop in Lima.
Trujillo's father filed a complaint through the National Police
inspector's office and then with the prosecutor. Police denied making
any arrests on March 1. On May 8, officials informed the family that an
unidentified body of a 25-year-old man had been found on March 2 on the
beach in Callao, and delivered to a morgue in Ica. Medical tests showed
that the man had been beaten before dying on or about March 1; he
subsequently was identified as Damian Trujillo. In April the victim's
family filed a case against the National Police, including charges of
crimes against humanity and forced abduction. In August the prosecutors
charged the 10 officers who arrested Llontop with his death, and in
September the judge overseeing the case ordered their arrest. The trial
was underway at year's end.
On May 12, police in Tacna arrested Nelson Diaz Marcos for public
intoxication. Diaz's wife, who was with him at the time of the arrest,
arrived later at the police station to pick up her husband; the police
told her that he was resting. Around 11 p.m., the police informed the
wife that Diaz had died, and that his corpse was in the local hospital.
The prosecutor in Tacna opened a murder investigation, and in June the
provincial attorney filed charges of torture against policemen Victor
Pachas Mamani and Carlos Laqui (see Section 1.c.). The policemen filed
a motion to transfer the case to the military courts, but the Supreme
Court assigned jurisdiction to a civilian court in October. The case
was pending at year's end. According to reports from Amnesty
International (AI), the director of a Tacna human rights organization
representing the interests of the victim and his family received death
threats (see Section 4). Human rights groups continue to represent the
Diaz family.
On November 27, police stopped taxi driver Carlos Lopez Flores in
Ayacucho and accused him of involvement in narcotics trafficking.
Eyewitnesses reported that they saw three ununiformed policemen beat
and shoot Lopez. Lopez died 3 days later. The Public Minister's office
was investigating the case in December, after a complaint was filed
against the three police officers for torture and murder. NGO's
reported that the officers had not been arrested by year's end.
Although military service is no longer mandatory, mistreatment of
military recruits continued to be a problem and resulted in four
reported deaths (see Section 1.c.).
In June 18-year-old Jose Luis Poma Payano voluntarily joined the
Air Force and began service in Lima. He returned home in November and
told his parents that members of the Air Force had abused him
physically. On November 10, Poma's parents requested that military
officials investigate. The military responded that they would
investigate, and that Poma would not be harmed further. However, Poma
was shot and killed upon his return to the base that day. The Air Force
indicated that his death was a suicide. Poma's parents requested a full
investigation, including an exhumation of his body for further
examination. At year's end, prosecutors were investigating the case.
In July military officials accused recruit Ronald Enrique Pena
Garcia of stealing radio equipment and placed him in solitary
confinement. Pena told his parents that military personnel tortured him
during his detention, including submerging his head in water and
burning him with cigarettes. Pena died on August 11 from a bullet
wound. His father filed a complaint with the Human Rights Ombudsman,
and the investigation was pending at year's end.
On September 9, army recruit Lenin Castro Mendoza returned to the
army base in Cerro de Pasco. To punish him for being intoxicated, an
officer beat him and kicked him in the throat while he was laying in
his bunk. Castro was taken to a nearby emergency room, where officials
pronounced him dead on arrival. Police investigated the incident and
concluded that the officer inflicted the injuries that lead to Castro's
death. In September police sent the case to the military court in
Huancayo.
In December Mario Fernandez Sanchez died at a hospital in Lima due
to injuries which were allegedly the result of torture by military
officials. Prior to this incident of alleged torture, military
officials reportedly tortured Fernandez both physically and
emotionally, which drove him to desert his military base. He was
brought before a military court in Concepcion to stand trial for
desertion, where officers reportedly beat and tortured him again. His
family filed a complaint with the Public Ministry and accused the
military of torture. A prosecutor in Huancavelica had begun an
investigation at year's end.
There were no developments in the 1999 case of Carlos Yauri, who
died under suspicious circumstances 5 months into his military service.
With the support of a local NGO, the Huaraz province prosecutor
investigated and requested the military prosecutor expedite an
investigation into the case.
No new information was available on several cases of recruits who
died during their military service in recent years, including the cases
of Juan Salazar Cayetano and Juan Espinoza Rodriquez.
At least two prisoners died during unrest in prisons during the
year. Celso Ponce Torres died in a riot at Yanamayo prison in February.
A fellow inmate reportedly struck him in the head during the violence.
One prisoner died in violent riots at Lima's San Juan de Lurigancho
prison in the same month (see Section 1.c.).
In February five peasants died after armed confrontations with
landowners on land they occupied in Villa El Salvador.
In July six bank security guards died in a fire that erupted during
confrontations between police and protesters in Lima (see Section
2.b.).
In June the press reported that peasants had discovered a mass
grave no older than 10 years containing the remains of 8 to 12 bodies
in the area of Colcabambla, Huacavelica. According to NGO's, the grave
site is located along a trail used frequently by army patrols and
terrorist columns in the 1980s and early 1990s. An investigation headed
by the provincial prosecutor was underway at year's end.
Representatives from the Human Rights Ombudsman's office observed that
a series of irregularities in handling of evidence had compromised the
forensic integrity of the investigation.
The case of Pablo Pascual Espinoza Lome, a jailed inmate killed in
January 1999 by prison guards, remained pending. The courts had not
reached a verdict because the Supreme Court had not ruled on a motion
by prison guard Marcial Pirez, who originally had been acquitted of
violating the 1998 antitorture law, which requested that the Court
nullify a lower court's decision to sentence him to 4 years in prison.
Charges against four prison officials for aggravated abuse of
authority and crimes against humanity in the November 1999 death of
Esteban Minan Castro remained pending at year's end. Minan Castro died
after Tambo de Mora penitentiary guards reportedly used tear gas to
subdue him and put him into solitary confinement after he had allegedly
violated prison rules.
There were no developments in the cases of Tito Mariluz Dolores,
Ronny Machaca Flores, and Jose Antonio Palacios Garcia, all of whom
died in police detention in 1999.
The Chincha criminal court brought charges of torture against
policemen Edwin Alfredo Saravia Torres, Marco Antonio Carrasco, and
Julian de la Cruz Huyarote for the June 1999 death of Mario Clemente
Guillen Mendez, who allegedly hanged himself after being detained by
police. The case was pending at year's end.
In the case of Carlos Arrellano Mallqui, who died in police custody
in 1998 in Ancash, the Supreme Court assigned jurisdiction to a
military court. The military court did not render a decision by year's
end.
There was no progress made in the investigation of the four
soldiers suspected of robbing and killing Genaro Julca Bula and Alberto
Aponte in 1998.
There was no progress in the case of Mariel Barreto, a military
intelligence (SIE) agent whose dismembered and decapitated body was
found in 1997. The Government had promised an exhaustive investigation
into her death in 1998.
Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 17 persons during the year in
the course of over 100 acts of violence.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In the case of Walter Munarriz Escoba, who disappeared in March
1999 after being taken into police custody in Huancavelica, the
provisional prosecutor brought formal charges against and ordered the
detention of National Police captain Roberto Gastiaburu Nakada, Ensin
Claudio Gutierrez Valasquez, and Adolfo Angeles Ramos. The prosecutor
subsequently charged policemen Gunter Cuaresma Ramos and Percy
Salvatierra Laura with torture and requested a 15-year sentence. The
case still was pending at year's end.
No information was available regarding the status of Ernesto Rafael
Castillo Paez, who disappeared in 1990. In 1997 the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights ordered the Government to compensate his family
and to punish the police officers responsible for his death.
In November the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman released an
official report on approximately 4,000 persons who have disappeared
since 1980 in the war against terrorism. The Ombudsman's report noted
that the Sendero Luminoso or Tupac Amaru (MRTA) rebels abducted a
majority of victims, who were mainly indigenous peasants. In 1995
Congress passed a law granting amnesty to members of the security
forces responsible for abuses committed in the war against terrorism.
To date few members of the security forces have been held accountable
for their role in disappearances. A report released in June by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) repeated the IACHR's
previous calls for the amnesty law to be repealed. By year's end, the
Government had not acted on this recommendation. In December President
Paniagua directed the Justice Ministry to create a working group that
would include members of NGO's, religious leaders, and government
officials to make recommendations on the establishment of a truth
commission that would hear evidence on disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and inhuman
or humiliating treatment; however, in practice torture and brutal
treatment by the security forces continued to occur, and the Human
Rights Ombudsman and NGO's contend that it continued to be widespread.
Torture most often takes place during the period immediately following
arrest. The incidence of torture is high during police detention in
part because families are prohibited from visiting suspects while they
are held incommunicado, and attorneys have only limited access to them
(see Section 1.d.).
Such abuse is particularly common in police cells operated by the
National Counterterrorism Directorate (DINCOTE) and in detention
facilities on military bases, where terrorism and treason suspects
normally are held. Psychological torture and abuse, which result from
the harsh conditions in which detainees are held, are more
characteristic of the prisons.
The Human Rights Ombudsman and NGO's reported 35 cases of
aggravated torture by security forces. The majority of cases involved
incidents of police brutality and beatings during detention.
On May 12, police in Tacna arrested Nelson Diaz Marcos for public
intoxication and allegedly tortured him before killing him (see Section
1.a.). A prosecutor filed charges against the arresting officers and
the case was pending at year's end.
In August three police officers in Chinga, Ica, detained Luis
Enrique Rojas Vasques on suspicion of his involvement in a robbery.
They handcuffed, beat, and threatened him with torture if he did not
confess to the robbery. They also threatened him with death if he filed
a complaint against them. The police also allegedly discovered drugs on
the victim, but NGO lawyers claim that the drugs were planted. Rojas
filed a complaint against the three officers for torture and abuse of
authority. In October the local prosecutor dropped the charges of
torture. The charges of abuse of authority still were pending at year's
end.
In December AI released a report reviewing the facts and status of
21 cases of alleged torture in the past 2 years. Supported by a large
number of NGO's, AI called on the Government to stop impunity in cases
of torture; to try all such cases in civilian, rather than military,
courts; and to apply the 1998 legislation against torture to all
security force members implicated in cases of torture. AI called for
more aggressive prosecution of torture cases, noting that since the
1998 legislation passed, only two perpetrators have been sentenced
using the instruments provided in that law. Twenty persons have been
charged under this law, including several cases of police brutality.
However, after initial investigations in four cases, prosecutors either
decided not to charge the alleged perpetrators with torture or dropped
all pending charges. In several other cases, prosecutors filed charges
on lesser offenses and sought milder sentences than required under the
antitorture law. In a number of cases in the AI study, appeals or other
legal action still were pending. A few of the cases were under review
by the Supreme Court, which would rule on military or civilian
jurisdiction. In three cases the accused perpetrators had been arrested
and were awaiting trial.
In April military officials allegedly arrested Amador Carmen
Canchaparan on charges of working with the armed opposition and took
him to a military base in Huanuco department. There members of the army
reportedly tortured him by submerging his head in water, beating him,
and applying electrical shocks in order to force him to confess. The
officials then threatened Canchaparan with death if he brought charges
against them. On May 2, authorities charged officials at Yanag military
base with torture and abuse of authority. The prosecutor opened a
preliminary investigation into the alleged abuses. The victim remained
in custody at year's end, and was being investigated for committing or
conspiring to commit terrorist acts.
On May 25, journalist Fabian Salazar alleged that SIN officers
broke into his office the previous evening, bound him, confiscated
video tapes of government officials that implicated them in corruption,
and sawed his arm to the bone. The Government appointed an ad hoc
prosecutor to investigate Salazar's claims. Salazar fled the country in
June before he was able to provide his testimony, and the investigation
was suspended. Salazar subsequently petitioned the IACHR to
investigate. The Government offered to investigate the case again, but
Salazar refused, claiming that the Government was biased. While there
were a number of inconsistencies in Salazar's account, and even critics
of the Government and journalists suspect that he may have exaggerated
his claims, a full investigation never was conducted.
There continued to be a public perception that the armed forces
operate with impunity in the war against terrorism; however, President
Paniagua made changes in the military command that human rights
activists noted as a sign of increased civilian control over the
military. Prior to these changes, the Fujimori administration had
asserted greater control over the military leadership in order to
reduce the military's loyalty to former de facto SIN director Vladimiro
Montesinos. The new attorney general began conducting investigations
into corruption by former military officers.
Human Rights groups criticized the manner in which police
controlled protests on July 28, noting that they purposely fired tear
gas into crowds at close range, seriously injuring some protesters who
were hit by the cartridges. There were also reports that police used
undue force in arresting protesters and that they beat protesters while
in detention (see Section 2.b.).
In the case of Huber Mendez Barzola, whom police detained in March
1999 on suspicion of terrorism and allegedly stripped naked, beat, and
sodomized with a metal chain weapon in police custody, the Supreme
Court upheld the sentence of policemen Oscar Italo Flores Montanez,
Carlos Palacios Soto, and William Saenz. In November 1999, a court had
found Palacios Soto and Flores Montanez guilty of torture, sentenced
them each to 6 years in prison, and fined them about $650 (2,000
soles). The court reduced Saenz's sentence to 3 years in jail and a
fine of about $150 (500 soles).
In the 1998 case of Pedro Tinta Vera, whom police arrested in Lima
on charges of aggravated terrorism, allegedly tortured, and to whom
they neglected to provide medical treatment, prosecutors filed charges
in October 1998 against police officers Domingo Arnaldo Gil, Guillermo
Osorio, and Ricardo Loli for the crime of torture, and a judge ordered
their arrest. In June a superior court judge suspended the arrest
warrant against the officers but issued an order to appear at the
Court. By year's end, the trial had not begun.
In the case of Antero Espinoza Alzamora, whom police detained and
allegedly beat in April 1999, the prosecutor in Piura had opened an
investigation but did not file charges. In the 1999 case of Catalino
Daga Ruiz and Bernardo Daga Ruiz, whom police arrested on suspicion of
robbery, then allegedly beat, took to a cemetery, and buried up to
their necks, the victims filed torture and illegal entry charges, and
the prosecutor began an investigation.
There were no updated reports on investigations and judicial
proceedings on charges of torture or abuse of authority against members
of the National Police in several cases brought to the public's
attention in 1999: Jesus Natividad Roman Portocarrero, arrested in
Piura in March; Mario Jimenez Roque, arrested in Pasco in April; Julio
Armando Uribe, arrested in Moquergua in July; Moises Paco Mayhua,
arrested in Puno in August; and Victor Valle Cabello, detained in Pasco
in September.
In 1999 a special prosecutor charged several naval officers under
the antitorture law for allegedly torturing Raul Teobaldo in 1998.
Personnel from the Aguaytia Naval Base detained and allegedly tortured
Andahua by beating him, applying electric shocks, and sodomizing him,
in order to force him to sign a confession indicating that he was a
terrorist. However, the court issued an arrest warrant in 1999 against
Julio Spencer Guido Davalos, on a much lesser charge of committing
bodily harm. In January the Supreme Court ruled that the civilian
courts had jurisdiction over the case. In September the prosecutor
concluded that Andahua was the victim of torture and filed charges of
torture against the implicated military officers. The trial had not
begun as of year's end.
No progress was made in the case of the 1998 beating and torture of
Pablo Waldir by policeman Elmer Perez Arna.
In October 1999, an Ayacucho court acquitted a policeman in the
1998 case of torture that led to the death of Lucas Huaman Cruz. In
November 1999, the Supreme Court prosecutor filed a motion to nullify
the Ayacucho court's decision. The Supreme Court had decided to hear
arguments on the case, but still had not taken action on the case by
year's end.
In the 1997 case of Leonor La Rosa, a military intelligence (SIE)
officer who was beaten and tortured by four of her colleagues (and who
now resides in Sweden), the Supreme Council of Military Justice awarded
La Rosa approximately $1,500 (5,250 soles) as an indemnity in 1999. La
Rosa's attorney considered the amount seriously inadequate, since she
is a paraplegic as a result of the torture. The IACHR continued to
facilitate a settlement between La Rosa and the Government.
In addition to beatings, common methods of torture and other
inhuman or degrading treatment included electric shock, water torture,
asphyxiation, and the hanging of victims by a rope attached to hands
tied behind the back, and, in the case of female detainees, rape.
Common forms of psychological torture included sleep deprivation and
death threats against both detainees and their families. Interrogators
frequently blindfolded their victims during torture to prevent them
from identifying their abusers. In some cases, the Government took
action to investigate and prosecute security force personnel charged
with torture, but impunity persisted. Crowded dockets and disputes over
civilian or military jurisdiction contributed to long delays in legal
proceedings in cases where officers were charged under the 1998
antitorture law. At year's end, the cases of several officers whom the
authorities had charged under the legislation were still pending a
verdict.
As in previous years, NGO's and the Human Rights Ombudsman received
complaints that the military beat or otherwise mistreated some members
of the military service. Mistreatment of military recruits continued to
be a problem and resulted in several deaths (see Section 1.a.). The
authorities failed to resolve a number of cases of torture and
mistreatment from previous years, including the cases of Jaime Palacios
Sanche and Elvis Lopez Tuya.
On February 12, the army dropped tear gas from helicopters and used
the force of gusts from helicopters to disperse squatters who had
settled in Villa El Salvador.
There continued to be credible reports that Sendero Luminoso was
also responsible for acts of torture, including cases that resulted in
death (see Section 1.a.).
Prison conditions are poor and extremely harsh in maximumsecurity
facilities, especially those operating at high altitudes. Low budgets,
severe overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and poor nutrition and health
care are serious problems within the prison system. Prison guards and
fellow inmates routinely victimized prisoners. Corruption is a serious
problem among poorly paid prison guards, many of whom participate in
sexual abuse, blackmail, extortion, narcotics and weapons sales, and
the acceptance of bribes in exchange for favors that ranged from
providing a mattress to arranging an escape. Since prison authorities
do not supply adequate bedding and budget only about $0.75 (2.5 soles)
per prisoner per day for food, the families of prisoners typically must
provide for these basic needs. In high-security prisons, female inmates
are allowed to see their children once a week. In prisons that house
only common criminals, such as Lima's Chorrillos women's prison,
children 3 years of age and younger live with their jailed mothers.
Overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure hamper efforts to
improve the living conditions of prison inmates. There are 28 prisons
in the country that held approximately 27,305 prisoners during the
year. At Lima's San Juan de Lurigancho men's prison, the country's
largest, more than 6,000 prisoners live in a facility built to
accommodate 1,500 persons. Inmates have only intermittent access to
running water; bathing facilities are inadequate; kitchen facilities
are unhygienic; and prisoners sleep in hallways and common areas due to
lack of cell space. Illegal drugs are abundant in many prisons, and
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS are reportedly at near-epidemic levels.
Detainees held temporarily while awaiting arraignment in Lima are not
allowed outside for fresh air and have restricted access to bathrooms.
At year's end, the Government was preparing to implement new
regulations regarding prisoners' access to visitors and prisoners time
outside of cell.
In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman published a report on prison
conditions and administration, which highlighted many serious
shortcomings, including a shortage of trained medical personnel,
unreliable legal representation for prisoners, and insufficient numbers
of social workers. The Ombudsman and the IACHR have reported that the
Government fails to supply enough lawyers, medical staff, or
psychologists to service the prison system, resulting in serious
problems for treatment and adequate legal counsel. The Ombudsman noted
that the operating philosophy in the prison system is one of punishment
rather than rehabilitation. Roughly half of all prisoners performed
some form of voluntary work, and only 28 percent participate in some
kind of educational activity.
According to human rights monitors, the Challapalca prison in
Tarata, Tacna, seriously violates international norms and standards,
particularly with respect to its isolation and high altitude. Located
at an altitude of about 14,000 feet, Challapalca's freezing
temperatures and oxygen-thin air have unavoidably detrimental effects
on prisoner health. The prison can be reached only after an all-night
bus ride from the nearest population center, limiting inmates' contact
with family. Hospital care is 8 hours away by overland transportation.
Face-to-face consultations by inmates with their attorneys are rare. To
relieve some of the isolation, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), and to a lesser extent the Government, fund a monthly
visit by families to inmates. In 1998 the International Federation of
Human Rights, as well as visiting members of the IACHR and the
Ombudsman, called on the Government to shut the prison down.
There were a number of protests and hunger strikes in various
prisons, including the high security prisons at the Callao Naval
Station and Yanamayo. In February prison inmates rioted and took over
Yanamayo prison for roughly a week before authorities reestablished
control. Conflicts between prisoners resulted in one death and several
injuries. A wave of prison protests followed all over the country,
including in Lima's Lurigancho prison, where security forces intervened
to reestablish control. One prisoner died in the violence at
Lurigancho, and over 40 prisoners were injured either by fellow inmates
or by the security forces who acted to restore order. The Human Rights
Ombudsman asked prison authorities to allow his staff to visit the
prison following the riots, but was denied such access until after the
riots ended. Some prison protests in Lima continued in September,
October, and November, resulting in minor injuries but no reported
deaths. Imprisoned Sendero Luminoso leaders began a hunger strike in
December.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors, including the ICRC. For most of the year, prison authorities
did not grant representatives of the Human Rights Ombudsman access to
the military prisons; however, that practice began to change under the
Paniagua administration. Members of the Ombudsman's office were allowed
to visit the naval facility in Callao in December (see Section 4).
During the year, the ICRC performed 115 visits to prisons, detention
facilities, and juvenile detention facilities, visiting a total of
3,061 prisoners. The ICRC also visited seven prisoners in custody at
the maximum security naval base facility in Callao every 2 months.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. The Constitution, Criminal Code, and
antiterrorist statutes delineate the arrest and detention process. The
Constitution requires a written judicial warrant for an arrest unless
the perpetrator of a crime is caught in the act. However, the Organic
Law of the National Police permits the police to detain a person for
any investigative purpose. Although the authorities must arraign
arrested persons within 24 hours, they often violate this requirement.
In cases of terrorism, drug trafficking, or espionage, arraignment must
take place within 30 days. Military authorities must turn over persons
they detain to the police within 24 hours; in remote areas of the
country this must be accomplished as soon as practicable. However, the
authorities often disregard this requirement. In December Congress
passed legislation allowing the authorities to detain suspects in
investigations of corruption for up to 15 days without arraignment. The
law also permits authorities to prohibit suspects under investigation
of corruption from traveling.
In February the President suspended all remaining emergency zones
and restored the constitutional protections in those areas. Previously,
the Government suspended constitutional protections against arbitrary
arrest and detention in emergency zones, and security forces did not
need an arrest warrant in order to detain a suspect.
Police may detain terrorism and treason suspects for a maximum of
15 days, and hold them incommunicado for the first 10 days. Treason
suspects, who are handed over automatically to military jurisdiction,
may be held incommunicado for an additional 30 days. When suspects are
held incommunicado, the authorities prohibit families from visiting
suspects, and attorneys have access to them only during the preparation
and giving of sworn statements to the prosecutor.
By year's end, the special terrorism division of the superior court
dismissed 300 arrest warrants of the estimated 5,228 persons still
subject to detention orders. These cases involved many who were forced
against their will to participate in terrorist activities during the
internal conflict, or who were accused falsely of links with terrorist
groups. In 1998 the Human Rights Ombudsman called on the Government to
rescind all outstanding detention orders that were more than 5 years
old, and to cancel all orders that did not comply with legal
specifications.
By year's end, the Government had approved 65 pardons recommended
by the ad hoc Pardons Commission and the Justice Ministry's Council on
Human Rights, which evaluated and recommended pardons for persons
convicted of terrorism, bringing the grand total to 546 pardons (see
Section 1.e.).
Detainees have the right to a prompt judicial determination of the
legality of their detention and adjudication of habeas corpus
petitions; however, according to human rights attorneys, judges
continued to deny most requests for such hearings. In Lima and Callao,
detainee petitions for habeas corpus are restricted severely, because
under a 1998 executive branch decree issued as part of the war on
crime, only 2 judges are able to hear such petitioners, instead of the
40 to 50 judges in previous years, thereby significantly delaying
justice. In December the Paniagua administration restored the number of
judges able to hear habeas corpus petitions to its original level as
part of the restructuring of the court system. Judges rarely allow the
unconditional release of suspected terrorists, even if there is
insufficient evidence to bring a case against them, despite 1993
amendments to antiterrorism laws that gave lower court and superior
court judges the power to do so. As a result, persons charged with
terrorism sometimes must wait until their cases have been reviewed and
dismissed by the Supreme Court before they are freed. This process can
last more than a year.
In December figures from the National Penitentiary Institute (INPE)
showed that approximately 46 percent of a total prison population of
27,305 had been sentenced. Over 50 percent of the prison population
remained in Lima; of these prisoners, 74 percent remained unsentenced.
The June IACHR report and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights report in
July both expressed concern about the large number of unsentenced
prisoners. The problem of prisoners who have served their terms and
still have not been released continued. In December President Paniagua
committed the Ministry of Justice to assess procedures for reviewing
cases with pending sentences. By year's end, the Justice Ministry had
recommended better ways to track the status of prisoners in the penal
system.
In 1998 the Catholic Bishops' Social Action Commission called for
implementation of a system that would allow first-time detainees to
post bail. According to the INPE, the elapsed time between arrest and
trial in civil, criminal, and terrorism cases averages between 26 and
36 months. Those tried by military courts on treason charges generally
do not have to wait more than 40 days for their trial; however, since
trial procedures in military courts are largely devoid of due process
protections, the speed with which trials are concluded offers little
benefit to the defendants involved. Once trials have concluded,
prisoners have to wait long periods before receiving their sentences.
According to two human rights organizations, police routinely
detain persons of African descent on suspicion of having committed
crimes, for no other reason than the color of their skin, and rarely
act on complaints of crimes against blacks (see Section 5).
The Constitution does not permit forced exile, and the Government
respects this prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is
inefficient, subject to corruption, and easily controlled by the
executive branch. As a result, public confidence in the judiciary
remains low. In November the Government abolished an executive
commission of the judicial branch and an executive commission of the
Public Ministry. The duty of these commissions was to reform the
judiciary; however, its members regularly ruled in favor of the
executive branch under the Fujimori administration, compromising the
independence of the judicial system and furthering the executive's
control of it.
Previous attempts to reform the judiciary did little to restore its
independence from the executive, and the lack of a fully functioning
Constitutional Tribunal overshadowed procedural improvements. In
November Congress restored to the Constitutional Tribunal three judges
whom Congress removed in 1997 after they had opposed the application of
a law allowing President Fujimori to seek a third term. This had
paralyzed the court's ability to rule on any constitutional issues for
lack of a quorum. Other serious problems affecting the judiciary
included the curtailment of the authority of the National Council of
Magistrates (CNM) to investigate, discipline, and remove judges, the
continuing large number of provisional judges in the court system, and
the transfer of jurisdiction of sensitive cases to courts more inclined
to rule in the Government's favor.
Throughout most of the year, roughly 80 percent of the country's
approximately 1,700 civilian judges were provisional appointments,
meaning that they had received temporary appointments that did not
correspond to their rank, including 21 of the 33 judges on the Supreme
Court. In some cases, the judges were assigned independently and
without having gone through the proper channels for training. Critics
charged that since these judges lacked tenure, they were more
susceptible to outside pressures.
Working with opposition and civil society representatives in the
OAS democratization dialog (see Section 3), the Government began taking
steps designed to restore the judiciary's independence from the
executive. In October Congress passed legislation that eliminated
eligibility of provisional judges to hold administrative positions,
such as posts on the National Elections Board (JNE) or the CNM. In
November the Paniagua Administration began a comprehensive review of
the court system, including the assignment of judges and prosecutors.
By year's end, the Government had reassigned hundreds of provisional
judges and prosecutors to positions more appropriate to their actual
rank. Several provisional judges and prosecutors resigned or were
removed from their positions permanently and were not reassigned.
The Government's reliance on untenured, provisional and temporary
judges was demonstrated when the executive commission of the judicial
branch created two specialized chambers of the Supreme Court in 1998.
These chambers, staffed by provisional and temporary judges, assumed
control over tax, customs, and narcotics crimes previously under the
jurisdiction of the tenured judges of the Lima superior court. This
practice enabled the executive branch to supervise closely such cases
as that of Baruch Ivcher, his family, and associates (see Sections 2.a.
and 2.d.). In December the Supreme Court eliminated these two
specialized courts. In the same month, evidence emerged that showed how
former intelligence advisor Montesinos improperly influenced cases
through provisional judges on the Supreme Court and through the
Attorney General, who was also a provisional appointee. The majority of
implicated officials have either resigned or been suspended, and
several investigations into corrupt judicial practices were underway at
year's end.
There is a three-tier court structure that consists of lower and
superior courts and a Supreme Court of 33 judges. In November the
Constitutional Tribunal resumed its mandate to rule on the
constitutionality of congressional legislation and government actions;
the National Judiciary Council tests, nominates, confirms, evaluates,
and disciplines judges and prosecutors; and the Judicial Academy trains
judges and prosecutors.
The justice system generally is based on the Napoleonic Code. In
civilian courts criminal cases move through three distinct phases.
First, in a lower court a prosecutor investigates cases and submits an
opinion to the examining judge, who determines whether there is
sufficient evidence to issue an indictment. If there is, the judge
conducts all necessary investigations and prepares and delivers a case
report to the superior court prosecutor. Second, the superior court
prosecutor reviews the lower court decision to determine if formal
charges should be brought and renders an advisory opinion to another
superior court, where a three-judge panel holds an oral trial. All
criminal case convictions in civilian courts must proceed to a third
phase, where the Supreme Court hears appeals and confirms or rejects
the previous sentences. All defendants have the right to be present at
their trial. Defendants also have the right to counsel; however, the
public defender system often fails to provide indigent defendants with
qualified attorneys.
Under the military justice system, judges in the lower courts have
the power to sentence and are required to pass judgment within 10 days
of a trial's opening. Defendants may then appeal their sentences to the
Superior Military Council, which has 10 days to make its decision. A
final appeal may be made to the Supreme Council of Military Justice,
which must issue its ruling within 5 days. At the Superior Military
Council and Supreme Council levels, a significant number of judges are
active-duty line officers with little or no professional legal
training.
In December 1999, Congress abolished the classification of acts of
extreme violence such as criminal gang activity, homicide, kidnaping,
and the use of explosives as aggravated terrorism. Under new law, such
cases are designated as ``special terrorism'' and jurisdiction over
such crimes falls under the civilian courts. In October Congress
disbanded the SIN, including the National Intelligence Directorate for
Social Peace and Safety, which had investigated such crimes.
While simple terrorism cases for civilians are tried in civilian
courts, cases of treason, which is defined as being a terrorist leader
or participating in a terrorist group's attack or activities, for
civilians are tried only before military courts. Human rights groups
and legal experts charge that the vaguely worded definitions of certain
crimes in the antiterrorism statutes often lead military judges to
issue sentences disproportionate to the crimes committed. Moreover,
defendants in treason cases who are found not guilty by a military
court may be remanded to a civilian court for a second trial on
terrorism charges based on the same facts.
Human rights groups and legal experts strongly criticize the power
of the military courts to try civilians in cases of treason or
aggravated terrorism and the powerlessness of the civilian judicial
system to review military court decisions. In 1997 Gustavo Adolfo Cesti
Hurtado, an insurance broker who had retired from military service 13
years earlier, was arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to
prison by the military justice system in a complicated case involving,
in part, alleged insurance fraud in a military purchase of helicopters.
When a civilian court approved a habeas corpus petition and ordered the
military court to release Cesti, the military court not only refused to
do so, but also charged the civilian judges with usurpation of power
and sought to have them reassigned. The case was brought before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which rejected a government
motion to dismiss it. The Court ruled in September 1999 that the
Government had violated the American Convention on Human Rights, and
ordered that the habeas corpus petition be honored and that the
reparations stage be initiated in order to compensate the victim. In
November 1999, the authorities released Cesti from military prison;
however, Cesti's legal status remained unresolved at year's end,
pending a request from the Government to the Inter-American Court for
further clarification of its ruling.
In August the case of Lori Berenson, who was tried for terrorism by
a military tribunal without sufficient guarantees of due process, was
transferred to the civilian courts pursuant to a Military Supreme Court
review based on new evidence. At year's end, a civilian prosecutor was
investigating to determine if charges should be brought.
Proceedings in these military courts--and those for terrorism in
civilian courts--do not meet internationally accepted standards of
openness, fairness, and due process. Military courts hold treason
trials in secret. Such secrecy is not required legally, but in some
cases the courts deem that circumstances require it. Defense attorneys
in treason trials are not permitted adequate access to the files
containing the State's evidence against their clients, nor are they
allowed to question police or military witnesses either before or
during the trial. Some military judges have sentenced defendants
without even having notified their lawyers that the trials had begun.
Since the creation of the special military courts in 1992, 747
civilians have been sentenced for treason or aggravated terrorism, and
by year's end 180 civilians still had cases pending. In December the
Minister of Justice created a commission charged with reviewing the
laws governing the military justice system.
The Council of Magistrates (CNM), established by the 1993
Constitution, regained many of its original functions in December. A
March 1998 law had transferred the CNM's power to investigate and
dismiss Supreme Court judges and prosecutors to the executive
commissions of the judicial branch and the Public Ministry,
respectively, both of which were controlled by strong allies of
President Fujimori. Critics pointed to this action as a further example
of executive branch control of the judiciary. A September 1998 law
partially restored the CNM's powers, while leaving the Public Ministry
in charge of determining whom the CNM could investigate.
Responding to OAS dialog recommendations, in November the
Government and opposition agreed to establish a transitory judicial
council, with all the legal powers of the CNM, in order to restore full
power to the CNM, including sanctioning and ratification of judges and
magistrates. The council is expected to work for 90 days reviewing laws
and regulations put in place by the executive commission since 1998.
Three judges and three jurists, appointed by consensus within the OAS
dialog, compose the council. Since it began operating on December 6,
the council has dismissed judges, reinstated others judged to have been
unfairly discharged, and returned to lower courts judges who were
serving provisionally in higher courts.
The first class of judges that the CNM selected was scheduled to
graduate in the fall; however, their nominations to judgeships were
delayed by the restructuring that resulted from the OAS talks. The
Academy continued its in-service training program for judges and
magistrates, which consists of a few hours of classes each week during
the first year, and practical training during the second. The Academy's
training program, originally scheduled to last 6 months but later
extended to 2 years, was strongly criticized as further prolonging
reliance on provisional and temporary officials, who are more
susceptible to manipulation by the executive.
In June 1999, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled
against the Government in the case of four Chileans convicted of
treason by a military tribunal and sentenced to life in prison. The
Court found that the military had denied the defendants' due process
rights provided by the American Convention on Human Rights and ruled
that a civilian court should have had jurisdiction. It also ruled that
military authorities held the suspects too long in pretrial detention;
and that defense attorneys lacked access to witnesses and evidence and
did not have sufficient time to review the case. The Court directed the
Government to provide the four with new, civilian trials.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court delegated to the Supreme Military
Council the final decision regarding enforcement of the Court's
decision. The Council ruled that it could not grant the Chileans new
civilian trials because laws passed after signing the Convention
required military trials in cases of treason and aggravated terrorism.
However, the Government refused to accept the Inter-American
Court's jurisdiction in cases involving terrorism, including the case
of the Chileans, because laws passed after signing the Convention
establishing the Court required military trials in cases of treason and
aggravated terrorism. The Government's decision to withdraw from the
Court's jurisdiction in these cases effectively restricted citizens'
constitutional rights to seek redress in the hemisphere's preeminent
international tribunal. The Court continued to process pending cases
and stated that the Government could not withdraw immediately from the
Court's contentious jurisdiction. In August the Government agreed to
discuss the full integration of the country into the Inter-American
human rights system, and the issue was discussed as a priority in the
OAS-sponsored dialog. At year's end, the Government was preparing to
return to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court.
In the civilian jurisdiction, a specialized terrorism division of
the superior court tries cases. The division is based in Lima, but its
judges travel to the provinces as needed. During the year, judges from
this court traveled around the country to hear several hundred cases of
persons with old warrants outstanding for terrorism charges. Of these,
judges found 300 persons innocent and ordered the suspension of their
warrants. Human rights NGO's and the Human Rights Ombudsman noted that
this addresses the concerns of those who considered themselves
innocent, but who feared coming forward for an abbreviated and unfair
trial. However, approximately 5,000 warrants remain in effect (see
Section 1.d.).
The ad hoc Pardons Commission, which consisted of the Human Rights
Ombudsman as chairman, the Minister of Justice, and President
Fujimori's representative Father Hubert Lanssiers, ended its work on
December 31, 1999. The Commission's mandate was to consider
applications of those who believed themselves to be accused unjustly of
terrorism. By the end of 1999, 3,056 of a total of 3,878 persons
accused of these crimes had applied for clemency, and 481 had received
the Commission's recommendation for pardon. A December 1999 law
assigned the Commission's functions to the Justice Ministry's National
Human Rights Council. Between January and November, the Council
recommended (and President Fujimori granted) 32 pardons. After the
Paniagua Government took office in November, the Government established
a new ad hoc Pardons Commission that had by year's end recommended 33
additional pardons that were granted, bringing the total to 546. At
year's end, the new Commission continued to review petitions not
previously recommended. NGO's advocated that the new commission expand
its review to include all convictions and sentences rendered by
military courts, but by year's end, the Government had not made a
decision on the matter.
There was no congressional action on the Human Rights Ombudsman's
1999 recommendation for legislation for monetary compensation of
innocent persons released through the Pardon Commission's program. The
matter was added to the agenda of the OAS talks in October, but
Congress had not taken any action by year's end.
The Extrajudicial Conciliation Law, which Congress passed in 1998,
was to have made conciliation a mandatory first step in most civil
cases by January; however, due to administrative and other delays,
partial implementation of the law was not scheduled to begin until
January 2001 in Trujillo, and is scheduled to begin in Lima and Calloa
in March 2001, expanding progressively to other cities during the year.
There were no reports of political prisoners. Sendero Luminoso and
MRTA members charged with terrorism are not considered to be political
prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires security forces to have a
written judicial warrant to enter a private dwelling; however, NGO's
indicate that this requirement is not always observed in practice. In
February the Government eliminated emergency zones that covered
approximately 5 percent of the country. Prior to that constitutional
protections, including freedom of movement and other due process
guarantees, had been suspended in those areas.
In the past, the Human Rights Ombudsman and human rights NGO's
received complaints regarding the forced conscription of young men,
including minors, by security forces as part of the constitutionally
mandated system of compulsory 2-year military service. A law went into
effect in January that makes military service voluntary and prohibits
the practice of forced conscription. Registration for military service
remains obligatory for men aged 18 and older. The President retains the
authority to decree the reestablishment of mandatory service. The Human
Rights Ombudsman monitors implementation of the law to ensure that the
military abides by it, since past efforts to prohibit forced
conscription did not prevent it.
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to private
communication, but the media, politicians, some government officials,
and private individuals continued to report that the Government
violated this right. The case of former SIE agent Luisa Margarita
Zanatta Muedas, who fled the country in 1998, after allegedly providing
information regarding SIE wiretapping operations, remained pending at
year's end. In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman recommended that the
Government pardon Zanatta, that the Public Ministry investigate the
wiretapping, and that Congress broaden the investigation conducted by
its committee on defense. By year's end the Government had not taken
action on those recommendations.
In May the IACHR recommended that the Inter-American Court hear the
wiretapping case filed by opposition Congresswoman Anel Townsend and 13
journalists. They charged that the Government had violated their
constitutional right to privacy and sought civil damages. The Supreme
Court had dismissed the charges in 1998. The congressional Committee on
Defense, Intelligence, and Internal Order conducted a summary
investigation of the charges in 1999. The investigation not only
exonerated the intelligence services and security forces, but concluded
that the aggrieved journalists had wiretapped themselves and
recommended that they be charged with having fabricated and
disseminated false information that tainted the honor of the military.
Having exhausted their domestic resources, the journalists took their
case to the IACHR in November 1999.
Opposition politicians continued to report credible incidents of
wiretapping and surveillance. Although high-level government officials
denied government involvement in any of these incidents, there was
little effort to investigate the allegations. In 1999 presidential
candidate Luis Castaneda Lossio accused David Pinedo Torres of being a
SIN agent and charged that Pinedo was surveilling him. The case against
Pinedo was dropped during the year, as was the case against Castaneda
for detaining Pinedo.
Reports of forced conscription by the MRTA (most of whose surviving
members are jailed) and the greatly weakened Sendero Luminoso terrorist
groups diminished significantly. However, Sendero Luminoso continued to
coerce indigenous people to join its ranks (see Section 5).
During the year, the Ombudsman's office received isolated
complaints of abuses committed by family planning personnel.
Allegations first arose in 1997 that a number of health workers in
public hospitals and family planning clinics administered by the
Ministry of Health had induced female patients to opt for sterilization
by promising them food or another type of good or service, or by not
providing them with complete information about available alternatives.
In a 1999 report, the Ombudsman recommended that family planning
practitioners provide all clients with complete information about
alternatives available to them, that they pressure no client into using
any particular contraceptive method, and that if a patient chose
sterilization, that the patient be afforded a 72-hour waiting period
during which to consider that option. The Ombudsman also recommended
that the Ministry integrate men fully into its family planning program,
thereby disseminating reproductive and contraceptive information more
equitably across gender boundaries. The Ministry of Health accepted the
Ombudsman's report and implemented many of his recommendations.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and press; however, in practice the Government
inhibited the full exercise of these freedoms for most of the year.
Manipulation of opposition journalists through the judicial system and
the use of government advertising revenues to influence reporting in
print and broadcast media were serious problems. Human rights groups
contend that government harassment of and alleged attacks against
journalists also were problems. As a result, much of the media,
especially the financially vulnerable broadcast television networks,
practiced self-censorship. Many in the press regard the Fujimori
administration's harassment of the media as a key reason for his
victories in presidential elections. Following the establishment of the
OAS dialog in August and the deactivation of the SIN in October, the
climate of press freedom improved. Television stations began to show
more balanced political coverage and allowed opposition views to be
presented. Tabloids that were suspected of being financed by the SIN
discontinued publication, and the remaining tabloids changed their
coverage to nonpolitical reporting.
The press represents a wide spectrum of opinion, ranging from left-
leaning opposition views to those favoring the Government. In the
greater Lima area alone, there are 20 daily newspapers, 7 television
stations, 65 radio stations, and 3 news channels on 2 commercial cable
systems. There are numerous provincial newspapers and radio stations.
The Government owns one daily newspaper, one television network, and
two radio stations, none of which has a particularly large audience.
Several international press groups, including the Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ), the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA),
and Freedom House, as well as the OAS, reported various cases and types
of press harassment and accused the Government of being responsible for
some of it. The CPJ named former President Fujimori as one of the
world's ``Top Ten Enemies of the Press'' for the second year in a row.
In October the media advocacy group Prensa Libre issued a report in
which it cited numerous instances of surveillance and harassment of
journalists, which it attributed to the Government and intelligence
services. The group also noted limitations on access to airtime for
opposition candidates, as well as a defamation campaign against the
political opposition and independent journalists in tabloid newspapers
allegedly funded by the Government.
Media outlets can, and do, criticize the Government; however, under
the Fujimori administration, they risked reprisal through the loss of
government advertising (often a major source of revenue), libel suits,
or other judicial action on apparently unrelated issues. The Fujimori
administration filed lawsuits against owners or managers of many
antigovernment media outlets whose content appeared to depend as much
on political as much as legal criteria. Incidents such as the high-
profile 1997 loss by television owner Baruch Ivcher of his station and
his citizenship (see Section 2.d.), TV Channel 13's co-owner Genaro
Delgado-Parker's loss of his station in 1999, and the February seizure
of Radio 1160's transmitters and sound equipment restricted press
freedom and encouraged journalists and media owners to practice self-
censorship.
The limitations on press freedom were particularly evident during
the election campaign season that dominated the first half of the year,
when broadcast television tilted heavily in favor of the Government and
against the opposition in its news coverage and public affairs
programming. On March 8, a month before the first round of voting, the
OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Santiago Canton,
noted his concern and that of the IACHR over freedom of expression in
the electoral process. On June 4, shortly after the final round of
elections, the IACHR issued a statement describing the violations of
freedom of expression. It specifically noted government pressure on the
media to suppress coverage of and sale of airtime to opposition
candidates, and government financing of pro-government tabloid papers
that harassed opposition candidates and supporters.
The Government agreed to address freedom of the press issues as
part of the OAS democracy talks, and in August the OAS dialog,
established a working group to resolve former television owner Baruch
Ivcher's Peruvian nationality, revoked by executive order in 1997, and
to examine ways to resolve disputed ownership claims over Channel 2 and
Channel 13. In October the Government agreed to restore Ivcher's
citizenship and did so in December (see Section 2.d.). In early
December, Ivcher returned to the country and regained control of
Channel 2. Several days later, Delgado-Parker regained control of
Channel 13. By year's end both stations were providing independent
political reporting and analysis.
Journalists and media outlets also have been intimidated
physically. According to the National Journalists Association (ANP),
there were many cases of media harassment by the National Police and
the military, and by local political and commercial organizations. The
ANP reported 104 cases of journalist harassment through August, of
which 61 percent were in the provinces and two-thirds involved
violence.
The CPJ reported that in April an unidentified person fired shots
at journalist Hernan Carrion, who directs a daily news program in
Chimbote. Carrion requested protection from the provincial authorities,
but continued to receive threatening phone calls following his
continued criticism of the Government on his program. At the same time,
the Government told the owner of the radio station that broadcasts
Carrion's program to resubmit tax papers or be charged a substantial
fee. The station suspended Carrion's program, asserting that it was for
his own protection.
The Fujimori administration and its supporters used libel laws to
suppress criticism of political leaders or offices. In August the pro-
government newspaper Expreso and the director of the National Reserve
Bank (who is the executive chairman of Expreso) filed a libel suit
against Carlos Hildebrandt, the director of opposition newspaper
Liberacion and an outspoken critic of the Government, and a journalist
who wrote an article criticizing the management of Expreso. The
plaintiffs sought monetary damages amounting to $1 million, a sum that
appeared designed to bankrupt Liberacion. The case was pending at
year's end. In another August incident, the Government's intellectual
property rights administration filed a libel complaint against the
majority owner of a web site specializing in publishing investigative
reports critical of the Government on an unrelated matter.
In August the pro-government weekly news magazine Gente filed a
libel suit against cable television news channel Canal N; Hugo Guerra,
a senior editor of El Comercio (Canal N's parent newspaper); and
opposition journalist Gustavo Gorriti for describing Gente as having
ties to the intelligence service and the Government. Gente withdrew the
lawsuit on September 20, 4 days after President Fujimori's September 16
announcement calling for new elections and the deactivation of the SIN.
The political opposition, press organizations, and rights groups
charged that the Government used improper influence over the judiciary
to intimidate and harass the press. Government manipulation of the
legal system in these cases is difficult to prove, and in some cases,
genuine legal disputes may have occasioned the lawsuits against media
outlets. Opposition or independent media seem to encounter a
disproportionate number of legal difficulties, including prosecution on
tax issues, compared to media outlets that are uncritical of or
favorable to the government in their coverage. Prominent cases included
a March lawsuit filed by minority shareholders against leading daily
newspaper El Comercio shortly after the paper exposed a massive
signature forgery scheme used to register one of President Fujimori's
electoral parties. In the El Comercio case, an investigation was opened
despite the fact that the statute of limitations on the alleged crime
of fraud had expired. The case was closed in July after stockholders
reached an agreement on the matter.
In April a judge ordered the seizure of the printing press used to
print opposition newspapers Liberacion and Punto Final as part of a
bankruptcy proceeding. In a similar action, a judge ordered the seizure
of bank accounts and real estate belonging to Editora Correo, a company
that publishes a chain of independent papers in the provinces and whose
shareholders also have a financial interest in a leading Lima tabloid
newspaper Ojo. For several months thereafter, Ojo cut back
substantially on its previously independent political coverage and
later stopped publishing editorials.
Journalists continued to be intimidated by potential criminal
prosecution when the Government leaves charges against them pending. By
year's end, prosecutors had not closed their case for falsification of
official documents against Guillermo Gonzalez, director of the NGO
Prensa Libre, who broke a 1999 story on government wiretapping of
opposition political candidates. In May the IACHR issued a
recommendation that charges against him be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
Throughout the electoral process, a number of tabloid newspapers
made character assaults on opposition candidates in what appeared to be
a coordinated campaign to tarnish President Fujimori's political
opponents and critical members of the press. Intelligence agents
allegedly orchestrated this campaign. The six tabloids that carried
such attacks had almost identical headlines and text, and similar text
also appeared on the Internet.
Suspicious infrastructure problems also seemed to plague opposition
or independent media outlets during the election campaign and
immediately thereafter, and some suggested that it was a form of
harassment against the press. In one incident in February, an
electrical failure prevented Radio Miraflores, a Lima opposition radio
station, from reporting on a provincial tour by opposition candidate
Luis Castaneda Lossio. In May a similar electrical outage prevented
Canal N from broadcasting a rally for opposition presidential candidate
Alejandro Toledo. At the height of the campaign period, from March to
May, the Institute for Press and Society, an organization advocating
press freedom, suffered systematic attacks on its e-mail system.
In July the Government limited a cable news channel's helicopter's
access to the downtown Lima area by banning all civilian aircraft from
flying below 9000 feet over the city. This occurred only days before a
large-scale protest against President Fujimori's inauguration ceremony
was to take place. Critics assert that this prohibited the media from
monitoring the protests. CPJ noted that in September the Government
prohibited flights over downtown Lima, which according to the Committee
to Protect Journalists was a measure promulgated to prevent news
agencies from providing aerial news coverage of protests after a
scandal involving former de facto SIN head Vladimiro Montesinos became
public. The Government stated that the flight restrictions were
necessary for public security during the inauguration and protests.
In May Fabian Salazar, a former Channel 2 employee and associate of
Baruch Ivcher, and a collaborator for opposition newspaper La
Republica, alleged that agents from the SIN broke into his office and
tortured him by sawing his wrist to bone (see Section 1.c.). This
occurred after he had received a videotape that he claimed compromised
high government officials. A full investigation into the matter never
was conducted.
The Government does not censor books or publications, films, plays,
or limit access to the Internet.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities
generally respect this right in practice; however, police used force to
disrupt protests during the year, injuring several protesters. The law
does not require a permit for a public demonstration; however,
organizers must inform the political authority (Prefecto) about the
kind of demonstration and its location. Permission may be denied only
for reasons of public safety or health. Municipal authorities usually
granted permission for demonstrations.
Major demonstrations and political rallies were common throughout
the year. Most were peaceful; however, in some cases, police and
demonstrators clashed. In those instances, police usually use water
cannons and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. In February over
3,000 labor union, student, and opposition political party
representatives protested unfair election conditions. When several
protesters carrying sticks and throwing rocks confronted police, police
used a powerful water cannon and tear gas to disperse the marchers. The
police briefly detained a number of protesters who were throwing rocks
and attempting to destroy private property.
On April 9, election day, nearly 100,000 persons gathered in Lima
to celebrate the fact that President Fujimori had not won an absolute
majority in elections. The event continued into the early morning of
April 10, when protesters, led by Peru Posible leader and presidential
candidate Alejandro Toledo, marched on the presidential palace. Police
dispersed them with tear gas. Clashes between protesters and police
were reported throughout the major cities. Some protesters sustained
minor injuries.
During the period between April 9 and May 28, when second round
presidential elections were held, Toledo led rallies and protests
around the country. In mid-April a large protest in central Lima
resulted in significant damage to the National Board of Elections (JNE)
office building from rocks thrown by protesters, who were believed to
be members of the Civil Construction Union. Several injuries were
reported.
On July 26-28, approximately 100,000 persons gathered in Lima from
all parts of the country to protest the inauguration of President
Fujimori. On July 26 and July 27, these demonstrations were peaceful,
with no confrontations. However, on July 28, the protests became
violent. Small groups of protesters clashed with police at different
points of a security perimeter formed to protect politicians and
visiting dignitaries attending the inauguration. Unidentified
individuals set fire to the National Bank building and the Justice
Ministry and caused hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage during a
day of confrontations that left six bank security guards dead from a
fire. Police used tear gas and water cannons, and charged several
persons with arson. The authorities also charged protest organizers for
damage. Protest organizers alleged that government agents infiltrated
the protests and set the fires. Police officials alleged that extremist
groups used the protest as a pretense to provoke violence. Human rights
groups allege that police prohibited human rights observers from
entering the area of the violent protests to document the events, and
that police used excessive force to control demonstrators (see Section
1.c.). The police maintained that they acted in order to ensure the
safety of those attending the inauguration.
The Human Rights Ombudsman continued to promote dialog between
protest groups and police on basic rules of conduct. Monitors from the
Ombudsman's office served as official observers to ensure adherence to
these rules by police and protesters alike. The Ombudsman's office
reported that these measures reduce significantly tensions and the
level of arbitrary arrests, while diminishing the risk of damage to
public and private property. According to the Ombudsman, with some
exceptions, groups were able to express their opinions publicly, while
the National Police generally maintained order in a lawful manner.
The Human Rights Ombudsman worked with groups of protesters to
inform authorities of their activities and work out rules of conduct
prior to the protests against President Fujimori's inauguration in
July. However, during large-scale demonstrations on July 28, the
authorities and demonstration organizers failed to agree on ways to
reduce the likelihood of confrontations and violence.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
authorities generally respect this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, the Catholic Church receives preferential treatment from the
State. Although the Constitution establishes the separation of church
and state, it also acknowledges the Catholic Church as ``an important
element in the historical, cultural, and moral development'' of the
nation. The preferential status accorded to Roman Catholicism in public
life is apparent in the special treatment and tangible benefits the
Church receives from the State, including remuneration to certain
clergy and church personnel, and tax exemptions on clergy salaries and
real estate holdings. Teaching about Roman Catholicism in primary and
secondary schools is mandatory. Conversion to other religions is
permitted, and missionaries are allowed to enter the country and
proselytize. By law, the military may hire only Catholic clergy as
chaplains and Catholicism is the only recognized religion of military
personnel.
In April 1998, the President issued an executive order that
established basic Catholic religion courses for all public and private
primary school students. Religion teachers must be approved by the
bishop presiding over the local diocese. Most schools devoted 1 hour a
week to such study. Parents who do not wish their children to
participate in the prescribed religion classes must submit a written
request for an exemption to the school principal. Non-Catholics who
wish their children to receive a religious education in their own
particular faith are usually free to organize such classes during the
weekly hour allotted by the school for religious education, but must
supply their own teacher. The Freedom of Conscience Institute
(PROLIBCO), an NGO that favors the strict separation of church and
state and opposes the preferential treatment accorded to the Catholic
religion, opposes the requirement for Catholic teaching in the school
curriculum and claims that the alternatives made available to non-
Catholic parents violate the constitutional protection of the privacy
and confidentiality of persons' convictions and beliefs.
PROLIBCO and other religious groups legal had challenged the
mandatory teaching of Roman Catholicism, but in October the Supreme
Court dismissed their claim. PROLIBCO maintains that the ruling was
issued in an irregular manner and without prior notice to its lawyers.
PROLIBCO claims that the financial subsidies and tax benefits that the
Government provides to the Catholic Church and its clergy are far more
widespread and lucrative than publicly acknowledged. PROLIBCO also has
alleged discrimination against non-Catholic groups who must pay import
duties and a sales tax on Bibles brought into the country. At year's
end, PROBLICO was preparing to take its case to the IACHR.
Sendero Luminoso rejects religion and in the past has threatened
and intimidated religious workers.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of free movement; however, passengers on public transportation and
drivers in private vehicles may be checked at control points throughout
the country. Until February the Government suspended the right of free
movement in emergency zones, which had covered approximately 5 percent
of the country in 1999, and travelers, including human rights monitors,
could be prohibited from traveling to those areas. The Government
eliminated all emergency zones in February.
There are no political or legal constraints on foreign travel or
emigration; however, the authorities legally can restrict persons with
pending criminal and, in some cases, civil charges against them from
leaving the country. Repatriates, both voluntary and involuntary, are
not treated differently from other citizens.
The Constitution prohibits the revocation of citizenship; however,
according to the Nationality Law, naturalized Peruvians can lose their
citizenship for, among other reasons, committing crimes against the
State, national defense, and public security, as well as for reasons
that ``affect the public interest and the national interest.'' Critics
believe it was the Nationality Law that provided the Government with
the legal basis for its 1997 invalidation of the citizenship through
naturalization of Israeli-born television owner Baruch Ivcher. However,
the Government claimed that its decision was based upon irregularities
in Ivcher's original naturalization petition 13 years earlier. In
October the Government agreed to restore Ivcher's citizenship and
subsequently did so (see Section 2.a.).
Sendero Luminoso occasionally interrupts the free movement of
persons by setting up roadblocks in sections of the Upper Huallaga
Valley.
Political violence in the 1980's and early 1990's resulted in the
internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons from their
original homes, and massive migration. Most families migrated to Lima
or to one of several other department capitals. This movement created
problems which, for the most part, remain unresolved despite continued
efforts by the Government and NGO's to address them.
According to the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human
Development (PROMUDEH), since 1995 the Program for the Repopulation and
Development of Emergency Zones (PAR) has supported the return of
between 450,000 and 600,000 displaced persons. The PAR has assisted
thousands of these persons to returned to their homes; however, the PAR
and NGO's agree that the majority of displaced persons have not
returned permanently to their original communities due to various
factors, including economic changes and social ties.
Despite governments and NGO efforts, many displaced persons lack
basic documentation, such as birth certificates and voter registration
cards. The Government established a PAR office to provide documentation
that can be used both to request PAR assistance to return to one's
community of origin and to apply for a national identity card. In 1999
the Government conducted a national registration drive to provide
displaced persons with identity documents, which are required for a
variety of social and other government services, and to register them
to vote in the April national elections. According to NGO's and
election monitors, this program was successful in reaching millions of
voters across the country.
Another unresolved problem related to the displaced persons are
pending arrests warrants against approximately 5,000 such persons, who
fall into the category of ``requisitoriados''--persons who were forced
to join terrorist groups and who were accused falsely of voluntarily
joining such groups and continue to have outstanding detention orders
against them. Judges from the special Terrorism Court traveled from
Lima and dismissed 300 such warrants during the year (see Section
1.d.). The pending legal status of such persons, along with the fact
that the majority of these individuals speak only Quechua, increases
their vulnerability and reduces even further their capacity for
economic and social integration into urban areas.
Sendero Luminoso continued to coerce indigenous people to join its
ranks during the year, which resulted in further internal displacement.
There is also a large population of indigenous Ashaninkas who have
faced not only a terrorist threat, but also the encroachment of oil
exploration companies on their tribal lands (see Section 5).
The law includes provision for granting refugee and asylee status
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in granting
asylum and refugee status and recognizes the Catholic Migration
Commission as the official provider of technical assistance to refugees
and applicants for asylum. The Commission also advises citizens who
fear persecution at home and seek asylum abroad. The Government
recognized 24 persons as new refugees during the year. There were
approximately 756 refugees in the country. Refugees are allowed to live
and work without restrictions and can apply for naturalization. The
status of refugees is reviewed annually. The question of first asylum
did not arise.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government; however, serious problems in the process of elections held
in April and May, including questions about President Fujimori's
constitutional eligibility to be a candidate, the registration of
candidates, allocation of Government resources to influence voters, and
intimidation of the opposition, led domestic and international
observers to call attention to the flawed nature of the process and to
question the validity of election results and the state of democracy in
the country. In September President Fujimori announced that he would
exercise his constitutional power to convoke new national elections, to
be held in April 2001, and in which he would not be a candidate. In
November Congress removed President Fujimori for ``moral incapacity,''
and President of Congress Valentin Paniagua succeeded to the
presidency. Voting is by secret ballot and mandatory for all citizens
between the ages of 18 and 70. Members of the armed forces and the
police, as well as felons, are ineligible to vote. The law bars groups
that advocate the violent overthrow of the Government from
participating in the political process.
The Constitution establishes three bodies to administer elections:
the National Board of Elections (JNE); the National Office of Electoral
Processes (ONPE); and the National Registry of Identification and Civil
Affairs (RENIEC). The JNE sets the legal parameters and rules on
election-related disputes and challenges. ONPE administers elections
and the RENIEC issues election identity documents. Many complaints
about the elections centered around the executive branch's dominance of
the JNE and ONPE, and their inability to administer elections in an
unbiased manner. In October and November, Congress passed legislation
that allowed the Government to appoint new leadership for these
institutions. By year's end, ONPE had a new director who had replaced
over 100 of the organization's 180 permanent employees; 4 of 5
magistrates of the JNE also were replaced. In December Congress
approved the creation of multiple district representation for electing
members to Congress, which was designed to provide more specific
geographic representation.
The Constitution stipulates that the President can be elected to a
term of 5 years and may be reelected for one additional successive
term. On December 27, 1999, President Fujimori announced his candidacy
for a third term, on the grounds that he had completed only one full
term under the 1993 Constitution. On December 31, 1999, the JNE
dismissed 18 objections filed by opposition groups, political parties,
and other civic groups who argued that a third term would be
unconstitutional; the JNE claimed that it rendered its decision on
technical grounds. The Human Rights Ombudsman subsequently stated that
the JNE's decision did not correspond to constitutional law, but that
because the Constitution vested the JNE with the final decision on
electoral matters, citizens had to respect the JNE's decision.
The undermining of the Constitutional Tribunal by congressional
action in 1997 (see Section 1.e.) set the stage for Fujimori's ability
to seek a third term. Constitutional challenges to Fujimori's candidacy
for a third successive term rested largely on a series of controversial
actions taken by the executivedominated Congress. In 1996 Congress
passed the Law of Authentic Interpretation, which declared President
Fujimori's 1995 victory as his first under the 1993 Constitution. In
1997 opponents of the law challenged its constitutionality, but the
Constitutional Tribunal was unable to obtain the six of seven votes
needed to overturn the law. Congress subsequently voted to remove three
members of the Tribunal who had announced their nonbinding opinion that
the law could not apply to Fujimori, leaving the Tribunal effectively
unable to rule on any constitutional issues for lack of quorum.
In the April 9 elections, in accordance with the 1997 election law,
10 registered political parties presented 120-candidate slates for
Congress, and 9 parties presented presidential candidates; the Peru
2000 alliance presented President Fujimori as a candidate. Local NGO's,
the Human Rights Ombudsman, and international groups monitored the
electoral campaign and the first round of elections. These groups
enjoyed access to electoral institutions and government officials.
However, there were attacks in pro-government media against some of
these groups at various points in the campaign (see Section 2.a.). At
the Government's invitation, the OAS sent observers for the April 9
elections. OAS observers also worked with local electoral institutions
in preparations for the second round runoff, but none of the observer
groups fielded monitors for the May 28 runoff elections because of the
Government's unwillingness to postpone the election date so that vote
tabulation software could be tested.
International and domestic observers viewed the general elections
on April 9 and presidential runoff elections on May 28 as significantly
flawed. Conditions for free and fair elections fell short of
international standards. Several factors created a seriously flawed
electoral process: disagreement over the legitimacy of President
Fujimori's candidacy for a third consecutive term; complaints by
opposition candidates of unfair campaign conditions that favored pro-
government candidates; lack of public confidence in electoral
institutions; and lack of transparency in vote tabulation and
reporting. Although the Government took steps to improve the electoral
environment, they were insufficient to ensure a level playing field.
Preelection conditions heavily favored government candidates.
Several groups of electoral observers reported that government
resources were used to the benefit Fujimori's candidacy and others in
his coalition. There were credible reports that military and police
personnel worked on behalf of the pro-government candidates. The NGO
Transparencia filed 170 formal complaints regarding use of government
resources; the Public Ministry dismissed all but 2 of the complaints.
In one case, prosecutors dismissed a complaint that employees of a
public welfare and nutrition service distributed pro-government
campaign literature. In another, the national tax authority conducted a
surprise audit of one of the opposition candidate's businesses.
The JNE refused to investigate opposition complaints in many of
these cases, stating that it did not have the resources or mandate to
investigate. When the JNE or the Public Ministry did investigate,
charges frequently were dismissed for lack of evidence. Only after
repeated complaints from electoral observers did the JNE pledge to
investigate use of government land for pro-government party paintings
and signs. The President also issued a nationwide executive order
against use of government resources. However, these measures were
adopted too late in the campaign to overcome a widespread impression of
preferential treatment enjoyed by the Peru 2000 alliance.
The preelectoral period also lacked impartiality and effectiveness
in the administration in some significant areas. In late February, the
newspaper El Comercio reported that a member party of the President
Fujimori's Peru 2000 alliance had falsified over 1 million voter
signatures in its registration drive. Accounts by 4 participants in the
scheme detailed a large operation in which over 400 persons
participated. The group allegedly worked for 1 month in a building
behind the offices of pro-government legislator Oscar Medelius. Others
accused of involvement included Peru 2000 official Luis Navarrete and
Peru 2000 Secretary General Daniel Chuan. ONPE, the JNE, and the
Attorney General pledged to investigate the allegations. ONPE concluded
that the JNE had jurisdiction, and in March ONPE sent the JNE its
report, along with the forged documents in question. In April the JNE
deferred to the special prosecutor appointed to investigate the case.
The JNE also ruled that Congress would have jurisdiction over
legislatorselect with alleged links to the scandal. In July Congress
absolved the legislators linked to the forgery scandal.
In June the prosecutor filed charges against the witnesses who had
exposed evidence implicating government employees, and who had
themselves participated in the falsified signatures scheme. In
September a judge dismissed charges against the informers, while the
National Council of Magistrates opened an investigation against ONPE
director Jose Portillo for allegedly investigating the case improperly.
In October a judge ruled that no crime had been committed because
official documents had not been falsified. However, the CNM removed
Portillo from office.
Opposition candidates did not receive equal access to broadcast
television station news coverage, and the pro-government tabloid press
conducted smear campaigns against them (see Section 2.a.). The JNE
claimed that it could not intervene because media laws did not give it
authority to dictate programming on privately owned television
stations. Formal complaints by candidates to the JNE often were
dismissed for lack of evidence. Beginning in late March, broadcast
television stations provided broadcast time to opposition candidates,
but these spots were usually not aired during peak viewing hours.
Though the opening reflected a government response to electoral
observer criticism, the measure came too late to reverse the ill
effects that opposition candidates had suffered from earlier lack of
media access. Throughout the campaign, broadcast television coverage
favored President Fujimori.
The April 9 elections were largely peaceful, and millions of
citizens participated as voters, election workers, political party
observers, and election monitors. Over 31,000 volunteers affiliated
with local NGO's worked as poll monitors. International monitors found
no specific instances of fraud during the polling.
However, there were widespread irregularities in the voting and
vote tabulation processes. Observers cited illegal propaganda in or
around polling areas as the most common irregularity. They also
reported irregularities in voting materials, such as premarked ballots
and some missing the name of the leading opposition candidate as a
choice. Observers reported several instances of attempted intimidation
of political party observers by police and military officials demanding
their names and identification documents. Several hundred voting sites
reported that more ballots were cast than the number of voters who had
signed in. (Under the electoral law, the authorities count the extra
votes unless the number of ballots exceeds the number of registered
voters at that site.)
Several problems marred the vote tabulation and computation.
Several vote tabulation centers did not open until late in the day.
There were problems with the computer systems used to count the vote,
and ONPE was unable to conduct a successful simulation of its data
collection and tabulation process until shortly before polls closed.
Although observers and party monitors were allowed to watch the
computation at ONPE and regional collection centers, the systems used
did not allow for independent verification of the results.
ONPE presented only partial results of the presidential returns on
April 9, and an inexplicable delay in the computation created
widespread allegations that politicians or others influenced the count.
Election day exit polls and quick counts by the NGO Transparencia and
polling firms showed that no candidate had won over 50 percent of the
vote and that a runoff would be necessary. Electoral authorities
released additional election results on April 12, and announced that it
was ``mathematically impossible'' for any of the candidates to have won
the first round. The next day officials confirmed definitively that
there would be a second round. Final official results of the first
round presidential elections were declared on April 28. Electoral
monitors concluded that the vote tabulation and announcement process
lacked transparency and created a lack of confidence in the official
results.
After the announcement that no presidential candidate had won in
the first round, the Government negotiated with second place candidate
Alejandro Toledo and the OAS regarding measures to improve electoral
conditions. Several working groups formed by the Human Rights
Ombudsman, ONPE, the OAS, and the political parties worked to address
access to the media and media coverage, reform of ONPE's vote
tabulation computer programs, and training of electoral personnel.
While these groups made significant progress, the OAS sought
postponement of the second round election to test ONPE's voting data
computer programs.
Toledo withdrew from the race 10 days before the May 28 runoff,
citing unfair electoral conditions and the Government's refusal to
postpone the elections at the OAS's request. However, the JNE rejected
his petition to remove his name from the ballot, and Toledo urged his
supporters to purposely spoil their ballots in protest. On May 28,
according to ONPE's unverifiable results, President Fujimori won 51
percent of the popular vote. Toledo won 17.68 percent of the votes and
29.93 percent were spoiled ballots of null. Observers, with the
exception of one group, refused to monitor the vote, and Toledo and
other opposition groups charged that the results were fraudulent.
Definitive results from congressional elections were not released
until May 12, which also raised questions about the validity of those
results. The JNE ratified the congressional results the same day,
despite a number of pending challenges, including some claiming fraud.
On April 12, initial returns had indicated that no party had won a
controlling majority; however, in subsequent result announcements,
there were significant changes in the results that favored pro-
government candidates. There were, moreover, many changes of party
affiliation that drew many representatives elected from opposition
party lists to the pro-government coalition in Congress. By the time
the new Congress was sworn in on July 24, nearly a dozen legislators
elected on opposition slates had changed parties to join the Peru 2000
alliance, which gave it a majority in the 120-seat unicameral Congress.
There were widespread allegations of bribery, blackmail, and other
illegal and questionable practices; however not all party affiliation
changes were necessarily the result of illegal actions. For example,
the promise of a position as committee chair or the potential of being
able to help a regional constituency was a factor cited by some who
changed party affiliation. However, circumstantial evidence suggests
that questionable practices were used in a number of instances. Luis
Caceres Velasquez was declared ineligible for Congress due to a
previous felony conviction. After he declared his intent to change from
an opposition to the government party, the Supreme Court overturned the
conviction and the JNE gave him back his seat. Edilberto Canales,
implicated in a vote buying scandal, changed alliances and his legal
problems were settled. Jorge Polack, who complained that he had been
harassed by criminal legal proceedings because of antigovernment views
broadcast on his radio station, had charges against him dropped after
he changed his membership to the ruling party.
There were also widely reported irregularities in ONPE's tabulation
of preferential votes for individual Congressional candidates. Several
parties alleged that ONPE employees had been bribed to alter voting
results. The Attorney General appointed a special prosecutor to
investigate these allegations. In June JNE officials declared that
Congress would be responsible for investigating newly elected
legislators who allegedly benefited from manipulated results. On July
6, Congress approved a report that found 31 ONPE data entry officials,
several regional ONPE center managers, and ONPE's information chief
responsible for altering voting returns. The report concluded that five
legislators representing government and official parties who benefited
from the altered vote bore no responsibility. A television news program
reported that of the 30 congressional candidates who benefited from
alteration of the individual preferential vote count, 10 eventually
were elected. By year's end, none of these elected legislators had been
investigated for violating election laws.
In June the OAS General Assembly discussed the country's elections.
OAS election monitoring mission head Eduardo Stein reported that the
elections had been carried out in accordance with international
standards. The OAS foreign ministers concluded that ``the credibility
of both the process and the outcome of those elections has been
undermined by persisting reports of irregularities'' and agreed to send
OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria and Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy to Peru to establish a dialog on reforming the country's
democratic institutions.
The OAS mission met with government officials, members of the
opposition, and civil society representatives in late June and
developed 29 recommendations grouped in 5 categories: (1) ensuring
judicial independence; (2) freedom of expression and the media; (3)
electoral reforms; (4) supervision and balance of powers among the
executive branch and congress; and (5) measures to strengthen
congressional oversight, reforms to the intelligence and military
services. Although opposition and some civil society groups continued
to call for new elections, the OAS delegation noted that the OAS
General Assembly mandate explicitly precluded discussion of new
elections. However, delegates of the OAS added that local figures were
not precluded from continuing to advance new elections.
The OAS dialog began in August. At the opposition's insistence, the
Government agreed to form four working groups to address priority
issues including the return to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, the reestablishment of the Constitutional Tribunal, the
resolution of Baruch Ivcher's nationality and ownership of television
stations 2 and 13 (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.), and the reorganization
of the intelligence services.
In September Moral Independence Front party leader Fernando Olivera
presented a videotape showing opposition legislator-elect Alberto Kouri
taking a $15,000 payment from then-de facto intelligence service chief
Vladimiro Montesinos. The video showed Montesinos presenting Kouri with
a contract committing him to switch party alliances. Montesinos was
recorded remarking that he was aiming for a pro-government majority of
at least 70 seats. When asked about the transaction, Kouri claimed that
the money was a personal loan. Congress formed a committee to
investigate Kouri and suspended him for 120 days. Kouri left the
country when he learned of the investigation.
The airing of the tape also apparently influenced President
Fujimori to announce on September 16, that there would be new national
elections in which he would not be a candidate. He later appointed a
special prosecutor to investigate Montesino's role in illegal
activities. By year's end, the investigation had expanded to include
investigation into his role in money laundering, illegal arms sales,
narcotics trafficking, and bribery of public officials. Montesinos fled
the country in October in order to avoid prosecution in these matters.
On November 22, President Fujimori sent his resignation to Congress
from Japan, where he remained at year's end. Congress refused to accept
his resignation and instead voted to remove him from office for ``moral
incapacity.'' The President of Congress Valentin Paniagua of the
Popular Action Party succeeded to the presidency on November 22. He
announced that he would uphold legislation allowing for new
presidential and congressional elections in April 2001, and he
accelerated the implementation of democratic reforms initiated in the
OAS-sponsored talks.
By November participants in the OAS talks had agreed upon, and
Congress had ratified, amendments to the Constitution that would end
the term of the President and Congress in July 2001, thereby making new
elections possible. The OAS dialog also produced agreement on
deactivating the SIN, with provisions for including a civil society
member in the executive branch's oversight commission and for creating
a bipartisan congressional oversight committee.
The OAS dialog drew to a close after Paniagua assumed the
presidency in November. Congress approved and the Paniagua
administration continued to implement many of the OAS recommendations.
By year's end, the Government made significant legal and electoral
reforms (see Section 1.e.).
Legal actions against potential opposition candidates for
congressional campaigns removed some of them from eligibility for
public office. In 1999 Congress passed a law prohibiting candidacies
for certain offices such as president or congress by anyone who had
served in high office and had been charged with a crime against the
State. In effect this law presumes the guilt of any persons charged but
not convicted of a crime and removes the right to compete for office.
This law disqualified former Labor Minister Jorge Mufarrech and
Representative Beatrice Merino from standing as candidates. Congress
annulled the law in October.
Women and some minorities participate actively in government and
politics, although they are under-represented in both fields. From
August to November, the president and three vice presidents of Congress
were women. In December Congress amended the electoral law to include
provisions requiring parties to include at least 30 percent of
candidates on their slates to be of each sex; previously the level was
25 percent. At year's end there were 26 women in the 120-seat Congress.
One of 15 cabinet ministers and several vice ministers are women, as
are 3 of the 36 judges of the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General.
In conjunction with the year's election campaign, four women's
organizations sought to identify female candidates, promote women's
interests, increase the number of female voters, prepare a woman's
political agenda, and train women who were elected to office.
Citizens of Asian descent hold numerous leadership positions in
government; former President Fujimori is of Japanese descent and one
recent president of the Council of Ministers was of Chinese descent.
Several members of Congress have mixed ancestry, and a recent Vice
President was a Quechua speaker, as was a recent Minister of
Transportation and Communications. However, it is rare for indigenous
people, who make up more than one-third of the population, to hold high
public offices. The Afro-Peruvian minority, unofficially estimated at 3
to 5 percent of the total population, is not represented in the
leadership of any branch of the Government. There are three Afro-
Peruvian members of Congress.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
In general the Government permitted numerous NGO's dedicated to
monitoring and advancing human rights to operate freely; however, the
authorities at times sought to hinder the operations of human rights
monitors, including harassment of members of the National Human Rights
Coordinator.
Military commanders often did not grant access to local and
international human rights monitors to investigate alleged abuses on
military bases. However, by year's end, this policy began to change
under the Paniagua administration. In December members of the Human
Rights Ombudsman's office were granted access to the naval military
prison in Callao for the first time ever.
Government, military, judicial, and police officials, as well as
some members of Congress publicly accused NGO's and the IACHR of being
overprotective of criminals and terrorists to the detriment of victims.
These statements at times created a hostile environment for human
rights groups but did not appear to hamper their ability to carry out
their work. For much of the year, communication between the human
rights community and the military ranged from strained to nonexistent.
However, dialog between the NGO human rights community and civilian
authorities improved significantly with the opening of the OAS
sponsored dialog in August (see Section 3). By year's end, human rights
organizations and the Government were represented in a number of the
working groups which were examining legal reforms and pursuing the idea
of a truth commission to examine past human rights abuses. Human rights
community members reported that the Paniagua administration had
initiated improvements in government-civil society relations, including
the appointment of several former NGO leaders to his cabinet.
Most human rights NGO's are independent, thorough, and generally
objective. The National Coordinator for Human Rights (Coordinadora),
established in 1985, provides an umbrella organization for 60 human
rights NGO's. The Coordinadora does not politicize its positions on
human rights issues, although its constituent members may do so in
their own names. A number of other human rights groups associated with
the Catholic Church or with government institutions operate on the
margins of the Coordinadora.
The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, created in 1993, receives
funds from the Government and foreign governments and is considered an
independent and effective institution for bringing citizens justice.
The Ombudsman has investigative independence and the ability to inform
the public of his conclusions and recommendations. However, the office
has no enforcement mechanism other than moral suasion. Because of its
reputation and role in society, the Ombudsman's office was asked to
join in the OAS dialog to address the problems of the election and the
ongoing process of democratization. The Ombudsman's office issued
reports throughout the year on the elections, freedom of the press, the
activities of the ad hoc Pardons Commission, the situation of 4,000
unresolved disappearance cases, and an annual report on the overall
human rights situation, among others.
The Human Rights Ombudsman has a legal mandate to monitor prison
facilities. However, until December, Ombudsman representatives
continued to be denied access to the military prison in Callao (see
Section 1.c.).
In July the IACHR published a report updating its 1998 factfinding
mission. Although the Government welcomed the Commission's recognition
of action it had taken, such as the creation of the Human Rights
Ombudsman's office and the abolition of faceless judges, the report
concluded that the Fujimori administration continued to reject the
Commission's call to return to the Inter-American Court (see Section
1.e.). The IACHR report also noted the existence of impunity,
restrictions on the freedom of expression, significant problems
regarding the free practice of political freedoms and flawed elections,
and the subjugation of the other branches by the executive branch under
the Fujimori administration. In addition, the report stated that the
significant problems that occurred during the electoral process were
the ``foreseeable outcome of several years in which the arbitrary will
of the Government has prevailed over the law and democratic
institutions.''
Human Rights Watch and other groups reported on harassment or
attacks on human rights workers. Among such attacks were telephonic
threats against Jesus Agreda Paredes, who investigated the death of a
detainee in police custody, and death threats against members of the
Legal Defense Institute. NGO's reported that such harassment and
threats dropped significantly after the Paniagua administration took
office in November.
In July 1999, the Government announced its decision to withdraw
from the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights after the Court determined that the Government failed to provide
due process in the case of four Chileans convicted of treason by a
military tribunal. Members of the OAS dialog discussed with the
Government terms for its return to the Court beginning in August. By
year's end, legislation approving a return to the Court's jurisdiction
had been approved by committees and was waiting for a plenary vote, and
the Government was preparing to return to the Court's contentious
jurisdiction.
At least two human rights organizations reported theft of their
documentation during the year. On November 1, burglars stole computers
and other documentation that the Human Rights Commission collected
regarding human rights violations. On November 4, armed burglars broke
into the office of the NGO Peace and Hope in Lima. The burglars held a
security guard at gunpoint while they removed information from
computers. In both cases burglars did not take valuable items or
machines. AI alleged that the burglaries were organized by the SIN, and
that their objective was to intimidate the human rights community.
Police investigations had not identified those responsible by year's
end.
There were no reports of Sendero Luminoso hampering the work of
human rights monitors.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and
specifically prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, race,
sex, language, religion, opinion, or economic condition. Nevertheless,
discrimination against women, the disabled, indigenous people, and
racial and ethnic minorities continued, although progress is being made
in a number of areas. In December Congress passed legislation that made
racial discrimination a crime.
Women.--Violence against women, including rape, spousal abuse, and
sexual, physical, and mental abuse of women and girls, continued to be
a chronic problem. Such abuses are aggravated by insensitivity on the
part of law enforcement and judicial authorities toward the female
victims of abuse. A 1999 Population Council study estimated that 80
percent of women surveyed were beaten by their husbands. Human rights
organizations believe a large number of domestic violence cases remain
unreported. Nationwide in 1998 there were 27,935 complaints of domestic
abuse (77 percent for violence and 23 percent for psychological abuse).
Although official figures for the number of arrests and convictions in
abuse cases are unavailable, NGO sources contend that the vast majority
of reported cases do not result in formal charges due to fear of
retaliation from the accused spouse, or because of the cost involved in
pursuing a complaint. In addition, legal and physical protection is
limited by delays in legal processes, ambiguities in the law, and lack
of alternative shelter and income for victims.
The 1997 domestic violence law gives judges and prosecutors the
authority to prevent the convicted spouse or parent from returning to
the family's home. The law also authorizes the victims' relatives and
unrelated persons living in the home to file complaints of domestic
violence. Whereas previously victims of domestic violence had to have a
specialist in legal medicine certify their injuries and had to pay for
the report, the new law eliminated the required fee and stipulated that
the report may be prepared by any health professional. In March Human
Rights Watch called on the Government to improve legislation on
domestic violence by eliminating mandatory conciliation sessions
between victims and abusers, and by providing law enforcement and
social service providers with training to improve their sensitivity to
victim's needs.
In March 1999, PROMUDEH created the Women's Emergency Program to
call attention to the legal, psychological, and medical problems facing
women and children who were victims of violence. The program received
approximately 9,000 cases during the year. PROMUDEH continued its
public education campaign to sensitize government employees and the
public on domestic violence.
According to the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, many women
complain that police officers react indifferently to charges of
domestic violence, even though the law requires all police stations to
receive such complaints. The Ministry of Women's Advancement and Human
Development, with NGO assistance, educates police about domestic
violence and trains officers in all police stations in processing
domestic violence cases. The Ministry also runs over 30 facilities,
staffed entirely by women, that bring together in one place
representatives of all government institutions--police, prosecutors,
counselors, and public welfare agents--to which abused women might have
recourse.
According to the Human Rights Ombudsman, many rape victims complain
that court-appointed medical examiners inappropriately delved into
their past sexual histories. They also accused judges of looking more
favorably on rape victims who were virgins prior to the rape and of
believing that a woman who was raped must have enticed her attacker.
In 1999 Congress responded to an appeal from the Human Rights
Ombudsman and amended the Criminal Code to provide greater protection
to victims of sexual violence. The amendments eliminated provisions
that had allowed rapists and other sexual predators the opportunity to
avoid prosecution if they reached a private settlement with their
victims. In addition, the Ombudsman recommended rescinding the
provision that specifies that, in cases of sexual abuse of victims over
14 years of age, only victims themselves may file a complaint; in
November, the Government rescinded that provision of the law. Many
victims are afraid of personally filing a complaint of sexual abuse,
particularly in cases where the perpetrators were police officers.
In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman published an updated report on
sterilization without informed consent of women in public hospitals and
family planning clinics, and the Government took action on some of its
recommendations during the year (see Section 1.f.). Acting on the Human
Rights Ombudsman's findings, clinics implemented procedures to insure
that patients are fully apprised of their options and their
consequences. There were isolated complaints regarding this problem
during the year.
The Constitution provides for equality between men and women, and
the 1995 amendments to the Employment Promotion Law, as well as other
laws relative to marriage, divorce, and property rights, prohibit
discrimination against women. Racial and sexual discrimination in
employment advertisements or announcements of educational training
opportunities is prohibited; however, it continues to occur in
practice. In 1998 Congress removed the police rank of health-care
professionals in police hospitals and accorded them civilian status
only. Since over 80 percent of such professionals are women, the Human
Rights Ombudsman challenged the constitutionality of the new law and
its implementing regulations, on grounds of discrimination. The
Superior Court of Lima ruled against the Ombudsman, who then appealed
to the Supreme Court. By year's end, the Supreme Court had determined
that the workers were stripped improperly of their police rank but had
not made a decision concerning damages. In 1999 the Congress passed
legislation protecting pregnant women against arbitrary firing.
Traditional assumptions and misconceptions often impede access by
women to leadership roles in both the public and private sectors.
Because of societal prejudice and discrimination, women historically
have suffered disproportionately from the country's pervasive poverty
and unemployment. ``Mibanco,'' a program supported by the Government
and a consortium of NGO's, represents an effort to improve women's
ability to generate income by providing credit to small businesses
started by enterprising women. More than 60 percent of its clients are
women.
Children.--The Government provides free, compulsory education
through secondary school. Education is generally available throughout
the country. However, approximately 6 percent of children between the
ages of 6 and 12, and 17 percent of adolescents between the ages of 12
and 17, either never have attended school or have abandoned their
education. Among children and adolescents who live in poverty or
extreme poverty, the corresponding figures are 47.7 percent for
children under 5 years old, 51 percent for children ages 5 to 9 years
old, and 49.9 percent for children age 10 to 14. School nonattendance
is highest in rural and jungle areas and affects girls more than boys.
In 1998 Congress amended the Child and Adolescent Code to provide
pregnant school-age girls with the right to begin or continue attending
school. The law also provided for regional offices to enforce
children's rights.
The Children's Bureau of the Ministry of Women's Advancement and
Human Development coordinates child and adolescent related government
policies and programs. The National Initiative on the Rights of the
Child is the largest NGO of its kind and coordinates the work of 27
groups concerned with the problems of children throughout the country.
At the grassroots level, 1,010 Children's Rights and Welfare
Protection Offices receive and resolve complaints ranging from physical
and sexual abuse to child support, abandonment, and undetermined
guardianship. Provincial or district governments operate some 55
percent of these offices, while schools, churches, and NGO's run the
remaining 45 percent. Law students staff most of the units; only the
offices in the wealthiest districts of the country have professionally
trained lawyers, psychologists, and social workers. When these offices
cannot resolve cases, officials typically refer them to the local
prosecutors' offices of the Public Ministry. Settlements adjudicated by
these offices are binding legally and have the same force as judgments
entered by a court of law.
Violence against children and the sexual abuse of children are
serious problems. It is estimated that only 10 to 20 percent of
mistreatment and abuse cases are reported, since many persons believe
that such problems belong within the family and should be resolved
privately. Nonetheless, in Lima alone, at least 400 rapes of minors are
reported annually.
According to the 1993 Census, 69.6 percent of children 6 to 17
years old lived in poverty. Of these, roughly half live in rural areas.
Of all children and adolescents under 17 years of age, 20 percent live
in extreme poverty. In 1996 the infant mortality rate was 43 per 1,000.
However, this figure masks wide regional disparities: it is 30 per
1,000 in urban areas, compared with 62 per 1,000 in rural areas.
Approximately 26 percent of children under age 5, and 48 percent of
children ages 6 to 9, suffered from chronic malnutrition. In those
homes where the mother has a low level of education, as many as 50
percent of the children suffer from chronic malnutrition, and 114 per
1,000 die from preventable causes before they reach age 5.
According to a study by the National Institute of Statistics,
children who live in poverty are less likely to reach high levels of
education. The study indicated that approximately 75 percent of
children not living in poverty attend school through the high-school
level, whereas, only 43 percent of children living in poverty reach
high school. Children living in poverty average only 4.5 years of
education, compared to 9.3 years for children living above the poverty
line. Only 1.2 percent of children living in extreme poverty attain
university-level education, compared with 25.6 percent of children who
live above the poverty line.
Street crime committed by children and adolescents, including
robbery, physical assault, and vandalism, is often gang-related.
According to a 1998 congressional commission study, gangs carry out 75
percent of all acts of vandalism, 29 percent of assaults, and 23
percent of robberies. The majority of these crimes are committed under
the influence of drugs and alcohol, and their underlying causes are
unemployment, nonattendance at school, and difficult family
relationships.
In 1999 the Government repealed a series of measures that had been
used to reduce street crime, including prosecuting 16- to 18-year-old
criminal gang members in military courts and sentencing those convicted
to no less than 25 years in adult prisons.
As many as 1.9 million children work to help support their
families. Of this total, some 500,000 children are under the age of 14,
while 700,000 are between the ages of 15 and 17 (see Section 6.d.).
Although laws exist that prohibit sexual abuse of minors and police
enforce such laws, there continued to be reports that minors work in
the sex trade.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that severely
disabled persons have ``the right to have their dignity respected and
to be provided by law with protection, care, rehabilitation, and
security.'' In 1998 comprehensive legislation established the National
Council for the Integration of People with Disabilities and specified
the rights, allowances, programs, and services that should be provided
for the disabled. The statute prohibits discrimination, mandates that
public spaces be barrier-free and that buildings be architecturally
accessible, and provides for the appointment of a disability rights
specialist in the Human Rights Ombudsman's office. However, in practice
the Government devotes little attention and resources to the disabled,
and they remain economically and socially marginalized.
The Government does not allocate sufficient funds to make genuine
integration of the disabled into the economy possible. According to the
National Coordinator of the Association of Disabled People, the
Government allocates an annual budget of approximately $250,000 (1
million soles) to integrate the disabled into the economy. Although the
law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, it is vague regarding
the source of funds to pay for the human assistance, technological
support, and environmental adaptations that often are necessary to
enable disabled workers to be productive. As a result, disabled
individuals and the private agencies serving them generally must rely
on public charity and on funding from international organizations.
The 1993 census counted 288,526 disabled persons, or 1.3 percent of
the population; however, the Ministry of Health and the Pan American
Health Organization estimate that the actual number of disabled persons
could be as high as 3 million, or 13.8 percent of the population.
It is difficult for many disabled persons to obtain insurance
coverage because carriers typically believe that a severe disability
necessarily increases a person's vulnerability to accidents and
illnesses.
Although construction regulations mandate barrier-free access by
persons with physical disabilities to public service buildings, no
effort has been made to implement this provision. Nor do accommodations
exist, such as accessible polling stations, interpreters for the deaf
in government service offices, and Braille or recorded versions of the
Constitution, which would facilitate the participation of the disabled
in the basic processes of democracy and citizenship. The Government
made efforts to make voting easier for disabled persons in the April
and May elections, although there were many complaints about inadequate
access. In November the Human Rights Ombudsman's office announced a
program to facilitate voter education and access for the handicapped
for elections scheduled for April 2001.
According to officials of the Institute for Social Security, less
than 1 percent of severely disabled citizens actually work. Among those
who do, many have been channeled into a restricted number of
occupations traditionally assumed to be ``suitable'' for the disabled,
such as telephone switchboard operation and massage, in the case of the
blind. Some private companies have initiated programs to hire and train
the disabled, and a private foundation provides small loans to the
disabled for the purpose of starting their own businesses.
Nevertheless, disabled persons faced discrimination by potential
employers. For example, the statute governing the policies and
procedures of the judicial branch specifically prohibits the blind from
serving as judges or prosecutors, a discriminatory provision that the
National Judiciary Council has interpreted to apply to all persons with
disabilities. In 1998 SEDAPLA, Lima's water utility, dismissed all its
blind switchboard operators, ostensibly as part of a nondiscriminatory,
across-the-board cost-cutting measure. However, the chief advocate for
the disabled in Congress reported that all the blind operators
immediately were replaced by younger, sighted recruits. The disabled
only recently have begun to organize and demand equal rights and
opportunities as a minority.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination based
on race and provides for the right of all citizens to speak their
native language; however, the large indigenous population still faces
pervasive discrimination and social prejudice. Many factors impede the
ability of indigenous people to participate in, and facilitate their
deliberate exclusion from, decision making directly affecting their
lands, culture, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources.
According to indigenous rights groups, the provisions in the 1993
Constitution and in subsequent implementing legislation regarding the
treatment of native lands are less explicit about their inalienability
and unmarketability than were earlier constitutional and statutory
protections. Pervasive discrimination and social prejudice intensify
feelings of inferiority and second-class citizenship. Many indigenous
people lack such basic documents as a birth certificate or a voter's
registration card that normally would identify them as full citizens
and enable them to play an active part in society.
Persons of indigenous descent who live in the Andean highlands
speak Aymara and Quechua, which are recognized as official languages.
They are ethnically distinct from the diverse indigenous groups that
live on the eastern side of the Andes and in the tropical lowlands
adjacent to the Amazon basin. A 1998 regulation stipulating that all
school teachers be certified initially caused fears that uncertified
indigenous teachers would lose their jobs, and that the continued use
of Aymara and Quechua as languages of instruction, as well as the very
survival of indigenous cultures, had been put in jeopardy; however, due
to the unwillingness of many certified teachers to work in rural areas,
uncertified Aymara and Quechua-speaking teachers continue to work.
The native population of the Peruvian Amazon, estimated at between
200,000 and 300,000 persons, faces pervasive discrimination and social
prejudice. In accordance with local culture and traditions, most of the
native communities have a spiritual relationship with their land, and
the concept of land as a marketable commodity is alien to them.
Nevertheless, according to the director of the Human Rights Ombudsman's
Native Communities Program, the only right still statutorily set aside
for this native population with respect to its land is that of
``unassignability,'' which prevents the title to such lands from being
reassigned to some nonindigenous tenant by right of tenure. However,
the marketing and sale of the lands are no longer prohibited.
Many other factors also contribute to the marginalization of
indigenous people in society. Poor transportation and communications
infrastructure in the highlands and in the Amazon jungle region makes
political mobilization and organization difficult. The geographic
isolation of much of the indigenous population and the centralization
of government action in Lima further limit the access and participation
of indigenous people in society.
In many jungle areas, encroachment on native lands comes from a
variety of sources, including colonists and coca growers, terrorists,
and business interests in search of exploitable natural resources. For
example, there are approximately 25 oil exploration fields and numerous
gold mining operations on indigenous lands in the Amazon region. The
45,000 Aguaruna and the 5,000 Huambisa people, who inhabit the area
near the Peru-Ecuador border are only two of many indigenous groups
that complain about intolerable living conditions and inaccessible
public services. In the same region, along the Pastaza River, the 4,700
Achuar people live in 36 communities, only 12 of which have title to
their land. In addition, the Achuar are fighting an incursion by oil
exploration and drilling interests, as well as against a government-
sponsored influx of colonists. Title to land does not include mineral
or other subsoil rights; this condition leads to conflicts between
mining interests and indigenous communities. Such encroachment often
can damage the environment and negatively affect the health of the
native people. About 20 indigenous groups in the Amazon Basin have
requested communal reserves to hunt game, which is allowed under the
law, but the Government took no action on this request.
The two principal NGO's that represent the interests of the native
population of the Peruvian Amazon are the Inter-Ethnic Association for
the Development of the Peruvian Jungle (AIDESEP) and the Confederation
of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP). Both organizations joined
the Permanent Conference of Indigenous Peoples, an umbrella body that
coordinates the activities of the country's indigenous population. Both
AIDESEP and CONAP are critical of the 1995 land law, which permits
Amazonian land to be bought and sold if no one is living on it or
otherwise making use of it. However, CONAP believes that mining and
other development operations are inevitable and, therefore, wants
native communities to share appropriately the benefits of that
development. AIDESEP remains opposed to territorial encroachments by
government, commercial, and other interests.
Although indigenous rights advocates protest the low priority
assigned by the Government to the socioeconomic condition of indigenous
people and the lack of consultation regarding matters affecting their
welfare, the Human Rights Ombudsman believes that the Government's
attitude has changed. The Government's Indigenous Affairs Commission,
formed in November 1998, is working to fulfill its mandate to
coordinate all available state services to meet the needs of indigenous
people better. The Commission, which is chaired by the Ministry of
Women's Advancement and Human Development, has among its members
officials from a variety of relevant ministries as well as four
representatives of the indigenous peasant population in the highland
and coastal areas and the native population of the Amazon jungle. In
1999 Congress created an Indigenous Affairs Committee; however, the
Committee was largely inactive during the year.
Sendero Luminoso continued to be a leading violator of the rights
of indigenous people. Isolated primarily along the Ene River in Junin
department, Sendero Luminoso continued to coerce indigenous Ashaninkas
to join its ranks, which resulted in further internal displacement in
this region.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In December Congress passed
legislation that made racial discrimination a crime. The minority
population includes several racial minorities, the largest of which are
persons of Asian and African descent. Afro-Peruvians, who tend to be
concentrated along the coast, often face discrimination and social
prejudice, and they are among the poorest groups in the country.
Afro-Peruvians generally do not hold leadership positions in
government, business, or the military; however there are three Afro-
Peruvian members of Congress. Both the navy and the air force are
widely believed to follow unstated policies that exclude blacks from
the officer corps. The law prohibits employment advertisements in the
newspapers from specifying the race of the candidates sought, but
employers often find discreet ways to relegate blacks to low-paying
service jobs. The law prohibits various forms of discrimination by
retail establishments against prospective customers. However, the law
has not deterred significantly discriminatory practices. In one
reported case, a foreign diplomat and his family were denied membership
to a prestigious Lima social club because of race.
According to two organizations specializing in the rights of
persons of African descent, police continue to detain persons of
African descent on suspicion of having committed crimes, on the basis
of their skin color. Similarly, police rarely act on complaints of
crimes against Afro-Peruvians. Afro-Peruvians are portrayed
unflatteringly by the entertainment industry as individuals of
questionable character.
Although Peruvians of Asian descent historically have suffered
discrimination, their social standing has improved markedly during the
past decade, as the country has sought to emulate Asia's earlier
economic growth and as the Asian community achieved financial success.
In addition to former President Fujimori, who is of Japanese descent,
many other persons of Asian descent hold leadership positions in
business and government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide
for the right of association; however, worker rights advocates claim
that the laws are overly restrictive. About 5 percent of the total work
force of 8.5 million belong to organized labor unions. More than half
of all workers participate in the informal sector of the economy.
Workers are not required to seek authorization prior to forming a trade
union, nor can employers legally condition employment on union
membership or nonmembership. However, groups including the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) assert that
laws promulgated by the Fujimori administration in 1992, as well as
provisions included in the 1993 Constitution, fail to protect the
rights of workers to form unions. Labor rights advocates claim that
many workers are reluctant to organize due to fear of dismissal.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) indicated that several
aspects of the labor law are not consistent with the international
standard of freedom of association. The ILO specifically criticized a
provision that permits businesses to employ youth workers between the
ages of 16 to 25 as up to 30 percent of the workforce; workers in this
age bracket are precluded from union membership and participation. The
ILO requested modifications to the laws that regulate the right to
strike, including a requirement that a majority of workers in an
enterprise, regardless of union membership, must vote in favor of any
strike.
Unions represent a cross section of political opinion. Although
some unions traditionally have been associated with political groups,
the law prohibits unions from engaging in explicitly political,
religious, or profit-making activities. The several union leaders who
ran for Congress in the April elections all did so in their own names,
without official union sponsorship. Nevertheless, some union activists
who run for public office receive unofficial backing from their unions.
The main union confederations have criticized the Employment
Promotion Act, amended in 1995 and 1996, for restricting the rights of
workers, including the freedom of association. Unions also complain
that the law eliminates the right of dismissed workers to compulsory
reinstatement if they prove that employers dismissed them unjustly. In
practice, the legislation allows companies to offer financial
compensation instead of reinstatement. Although the law prohibits
companies from firing workers solely for their involvement in union
activities, this provision has not been rigidly enforced. In practice,
the legislation continued to have a negative impact on the right of
association by making it easier for companies to fire workers involved
in union activities. There is no legal protection against employer
interference in trade unions.
The Peruvian General Workers' Union (CGTP) and other labor groups
held several general strikes throughout the country during the year.
According to press accounts, one strike in August drew support from
civil service workers, health providers, and construction workers, as
well as support from a broad range of religious and social
organizations and opposition politicians. In September a work stoppage
culminated in protest marches around the country, including a large
gathering of up to 20,000 persons in downtown Lima. The Government took
no actions to prevent the strikes or reprimand participants.
On July 25, unknown persons broke into the headquarters of the
United Worker's Center (CUT) and stole printed material and other items
just before the Four Quarters March. The ICFTU noted that the police
refused to register the CUT's complaint or begin an investigation.
Moreover, the ICFTU asserted that police officers attempted to
infiltrate union and other demonstrators who were planning the march.
Confrontations in Lima between union-affiliated protesters and
police occurred in several different instances. In some cases these
confrontations were reportedly provoked by protesters who burned tires,
threw rocks, and tried to destroy public and private property. Police
action resulted in injuries in several cases.
In August medical workers undertook a 2-day strike to protest low
wages and working conditions. In November the Paniagua administration
met with labor leaders in the health care sector to try to resolve
wages and benefit related complaints. The Paniagua administration
leaders also met with union leaders from the education sector to
discuss their long standing grievances.
There are no restrictions on the affiliation of labor unions with
international bodies. Several major unions and labor confederations
belong to international labor organizations such as the ICFTU, the
international trade secretariats, and regional bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution recognizes the right of public and private sector workers
to organize and bargain collectively; however, it specifies that this
right must be exercised in harmony with broader social objectives.
Labor regulations provide that workers may form unions on the basis of
their occupation, employer affiliation, or geographic territory. The
regulations prohibit probationary, apprentice, and management employees
from union membership. The law does not prohibit temporary employees
from joining a union, but they cannot join the same union as permanent
workers.
According to the regulations, union officials must be active
members of their union, but the number of individuals each union may
designate as ``official'' is limited, as is the amount of time they may
devote to union business on company time. The Labor Code requires
employers to reinstate workers or compensate financially those whom
companies have fired. It is illegal to fire workers for union
activities, though reports from labor activists indicate that this is a
common practice.
To become an official collective bargaining representative, a union
must represent at least 20 workers. Representatives may participate in
collective bargaining negotiations and establish negotiating
timetables. Management negotiating teams cannot exceed the size of
union teams, and both sides are permitted to have attorneys and
technical experts present as advisers.
Proposals for a strike require secret ballot approval of a majority
of all workers in a company, whether union members or not; labor
activists find the requirement to be onerous. A second vote must be
taken, if petitioned by at least 20 percent of the workers. However,
labor rights advocates complain that many workers are reluctant to
participate even in secret ballots, due to fear of employer
retaliation, particularly since a full list of workers who attend
meetings in which such ballots are taken must be submitted to
management. Strikes can only be called in defense of labor rights.
Unions that employ workers in public services deemed essential by the
Government are further restricted from striking.
In November the ILO's Committee of Freedom of Association issued a
report in response to allegations of antiunion discrimination. It
recommended that the Government enact and enforce legislation
protecting workers from dismissal on account of membership in a union
or participation in union activities.
The labor movement criticizes the amended Employment Promotion Law,
which it asserts makes it easier for employers to dismiss employees and
thereby to impede the right of workers to bargain collectively. There
are no legal restrictions that prevent unions from negotiating for
higher levels of worker protection than the baseline standards provided
for by law.
Labor regulations permit companies unilaterally to propose
temporary changes in work schedules, conditions, and wages, and to
suspend collective bargaining agreements for up to 90 days, if obliged
to do so by worsening economic circumstances or other unexpected
negative developments, provided that they give their employees at least
15 days' notice of such changes. However, worker rights advocates
allege that, in practice, few employers respected this provision. If
workers reject an employer's proposed changes, the Ministry of Labor is
required to resolve the dispute based on criteria of ``reasonableness''
and ``economic necessity.'' Whether the changes proposed by employers
in such instances are upheld in full or in part, employers are required
to adopt all possible measures, such as the authorization of extra
vacation time, in order to minimize the negative economic impact on
their employees.
In December the Paniagua administration established a national
labor council to promote dialog among business, labor, government, and
international organizations. The dialog focused on discussing reforms
to legal provisions regarding dismissal policies and collective
bargaining rights.
Although a conciliation and arbitration system exists to resolve
management and labor disputes, union officials complain that their
proportionate share of the costs of arbitration often exceeds their
resources. In addition, union officials claim that, as the law
prohibits temporary workers from participating in the same union as
permanent workers, companies have resorted to hiring workers on
temporary, personal services contracts to prevent increases in the
number of union members. Although the law restricts the number of
temporary workers hired to 20 percent of a company's work force, worker
rights advocates allege that this quota rarely is respected. Employers
deny that they are biased against unions, and argue that the labor
stability provisions of the legislation have made long-term commitments
to workers too expensive.
Special regulations aimed at giving employers in export processing
and duty free zones a freer hand in the application of the law provide
for the use of temporary labor as needed, for greater flexibility in
labor contracts, and for setting wage rates based on supply and demand.
As a result, workers in such zones have difficulty in unionizing,
although worker rights advocates admit these zones are few in number
and do not contribute substantively to labor's unionizing difficulties.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of
forced labor during the year. The law specifically prohibits forced or
bonded labor by children. Forced labor previously was found in the gold
mining industry in the Madre de Dios area; however, the changing nature
of the industry and government efforts to regulate it seem to have
addressed the problem. During the year, the Ministry of Energy and
Mines reported that the number of registered dredging companies fell,
while informal operations continued. NGO sources and the ILO reported
in 1999 that mechanization largely has replaced manual labor, and the
Ministry of Labor inspection programs helped deter illegal child labor
in this industry. According to the ILO, PROMUDEH, and the Ministry of
Labor, there were no reports of forced child labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Child and Adolescent Code of 1992 governs child and
adolescent labor practices. The legal minimum age for employment is 14.
However, children between the ages of 12 and 14 may work in certain
jobs to help support their families if they obtain special permission
from the Ministry of Labor and certify that they also are attending
school. In certain sectors of the economy, higher minimums are in
force: age 14 in agricultural work; age 15 in industrial, commercial,
or mining work; and age 16 in the fishing industry. Certain types of
employment are prohibited, such as work underground; work that involves
the lifting and carrying of heavy weights; work where the child or
adolescent is responsible for the safety of others; night work; or any
work that jeopardizes the health of children and adolescents, puts at
risk their physical, mental, and emotional development, or prevents
their regular attendance at school. The ILO and NGO's report that child
labor remained a problem nationwide, and especially in the informal
sector.
Human and labor rights groups criticized the modification of the
Child and Adolescent code, passed in August, that maintained the
current minimum age for work at 12 years old (with permission), and
argued that it contradicts international guidelines on the minimum age
of child workers.
The Constitution provides for compulsory, free education through
secondary school. Nevertheless, largely because of widespread poverty,
approximately one-third of all school-age children and adolescents work
during daytime hours rather than attend classes, and only a few of them
attend classes at night.
Many children are pressed to help support their families from a
very early age by working in the informal economy, which escapes
government supervision of wages and working conditions. Other children
and adolescents work either in formally established enterprises, or as
unpaid workers at home, or at times in the sex trade (see Section 5).
Adolescent workers must be authorized to work and must be
registered unless they are employed as domestic workers or as unpaid
family workers. Adolescents may only work a certain number of hours
each day: 4 hours for ages 12 through 14, and 6 hours for ages 15
through 17. Adolescent employment must be remunerated in accordance
with the principle of equal pay for equal work. In practice, the Child
and Adolescent Code provisions are violated routinely, especially in
the informal sector. Child and adolescent laborers work long hours in
the agricultural sector. Many other children are at times reportedly
employed in dangerous occupations or in high-risk environments, such as
gold mining, garbage collection, loading and unloading produce in
markets, and brick making, or work in stone quarries and fireworks
factories, among others.
In recent years, government surveys have estimated the number of
child and adolescent workers at anywhere from 500,000 to 1.9 million. A
1996 government study found that 8 percent of the work force is between
the ages of 6 and 14 (see Section 5). Child and adolescent labor tends
to be seasonal, with the highest survey statistics reported during
school vacation periods.
There were two allegations of child labor in the informal gold
mines of Madre de Dios department in during the year. The authorities
investigated the incidents and intervened with the families involved.
The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded
labor by children, although there are laws which prohibit this practice
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides that
the State promote social and economic progress and occupational
education. It states that workers should receive a ``just and
sufficient'' wage to be determined by the Government in consultation
with labor and business representatives, as well as ``adequate
protection against arbitrary dismissal.''
In March the Government raised the statutory minimum wage to $117
(410 soles) a month, which is not considered sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. That year the
Government estimated the poverty line to be about $45 (157 soles) a
month per person. According to some estimates, as much as half the work
force earns the minimum wage or below.
The Constitution provides for a 48-hour workweek, a weekly day of
rest, and an annual vacation. In addition, it prohibits discrimination
in the workplace; however, it continued to be a problem in practice.
The labor code provides for a 48 hour work week for women. Labor
advocates state that workers have been pressured to work longer hours
to avoid dismissal.
While occupational health and safety standards exist, the
Government lacks the resources to monitor firms or enforce compliance.
Labor advocates continued to argue that the Government dedicated
insufficient resources to enforce existing legislation. The Ministry of
Labor employs a force of 100 inspectors to carry out unannounced visits
throughout the country. When firms are found to be in violation of the
law, the Government sanctions them with fines or, in some cases,
closure. In cases of industrial accidents, the level of compensation
awarded to the injured employee usually is determined by agreement
between the employer and the individual involved. The worker does not
need to prove an employer's culpability in order to obtain compensation
for work-related injuries. No provisions exist in law for workers to
remove themselves from potentially dangerous work situations without
jeopardizing their continued employment. The Ministry of Labor
continued to receive worker complaints and intervened in hundreds of
cases.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. In November 1999, the Government
adopted legislation that criminalized alien smuggling, which is defined
as promoting, executing, or assisting in the illegal entry or exit of
persons from the country. Prostitution is legal, but the law prohibits
and sanctions activities of those who would obtain benefits from
prostitution, such as pimping. Laws prohibiting kidnaping, sexual abuse
of minors, and illegal employment are enforced and could be used to
sanction traffickers in persons. Available information suggests that
trafficking in persons to, from, within, or through from the country is
not a significant problem.
__________
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS
Saint Kitts and Nevis is a multi-party, parliamentary democracy and
a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Constitution provides the
smaller island of Nevis considerable self-government under a premier,
as well as the right to secede from the Federation in accordance with
certain enumerated procedures. The Government comprises a prime
minister, a cabinet, and a bicameral legislative assembly. The Governor
General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of
state, with largely ceremonial powers. In national elections held on
March 6, Denzil Douglas of the ruling St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party
remained Prime Minister; his party won 8 of 11 seats in the
legislature. The judiciary is independent; however, intimidation of
witnesses in high-profile, drug-related cases is a problem.
Security forces consist of a small police force, which includes a
50-person Special Services Unit that receives some light infantry
training, a coast guard, and a small defense force. The forces are
controlled by and responsive to the Government. There were occasional
allegations of abuse by the police.
The mixed economy is based on sugar cane, tourism, and light
industry. Most commercial enterprises are privately owned, but the
sugar industry and 85 percent of arable land are owned by a state
corporation. In 1998 and 1999, hurricanes caused an estimated $450
million damage, affecting over 85 percent of the houses and buildings,
greatly reduced sugar production, and caused significant losses in the
tourism industry. However, during the year, construction, small
manufacturing, and the services sector registered some improvement. Per
capita gross domestic product remained about $7,000 in 1999.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
there were problems in a few areas. Poor prison conditions, apparent
intimidation of witnesses and jurors, government restrictions on
opposition access to government-controlled media, and violence against
women were the principal problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture or other
forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the
authorities observe this prohibition in practice. However, there were
occasional allegations of excessive use of force by the police,
particularly during the annual Carnival celebration or other special
events. The police force conducts its own internal investigation when
complaints are made against members.
Prison conditions are poor. Prisoners suffer from severe
overcrowding and poor food, and security is lax. These conditions have
contributed to riots in the past, although none has occurred since
1994. The prison, built in 1840, was designed to accommodate 60 inmates
but houses over 100 prisoners. A prison on Nevis houses 20 inmates.
Female inmates are segregated from male prisoners; however, there are
no separate facilities for juveniles.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects
this provision in practice. The law requires that persons detained be
charged within 48 hours or be released. If charged, the police must
bring a detainee before a court within 72 hours. Family members,
attorneys, and clergy are permitted to visit detainees regularly.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, intimidation of witnesses and potential
intimidation of jurors in high-profile, drug-related cases threatened
this traditional independence. The Government is exploring the
possibility of a program to protect witnesses, judges, and jurors
through the Caribbean Community.
The court system comprises one high court and four magistrate's
courts at the local level, with the right of appeal to the Eastern
Caribbean Court of Appeal. Final appeal may be made to the Privy
Council in the United Kingdom. Free legal assistance is available for
indigent defendants in capital cases only.
The Constitution provides that every person accused of a crime must
receive a fair, speedy, and public trial, and these requirements
generally are observed. In the latter part of the year, approximately
29 persons were being held on ``remand'' (detention pending trial or
further court action). The length of remand varies according to offense
and charges; persons may be held for days, weeks, or months.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
authorities generally respect these prohibitions. The law requires
judicially issued warrants to search private homes.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and, for the most part, the
authorities respected these provisions in practice.
There are no daily newspapers; each of the major political parties
publishes a weekly or biweekly newspaper. A third weekly newspaper is
nonpartisan. The publications are free to criticize the Government and
do so regularly and vigorously. International news publications are
readily available.
The Government owns the only radio and television station on St.
Kitts, and these media generally did not adequately publicize rallies
and other events held by opposition parties. A Trinidadian company
manages the station; however, the Government appoints three of its five
board members. There is a religious television station and a privately
owned radio station on Nevis.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly. Political parties
organized demonstrations, rallies, and public meetings during the March
election campaign without government interference.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
exists. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise. There
were no reports of forced return of persons to a country where they
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government by peaceful means, and citizens exercise this right in
practice through periodic elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. A vigorous multi-party political system exists, in which
political parties are free to conduct their activities. All citizens 18
years of age and older may register and vote by secret ballot. Despite
some irregularities, orderly general elections were held in March.
The Legislative Assembly has 11 elected seats; 8 for St. Kitts and
3 for Nevis. The Government holds 8 of the 11 seats; opposition parties
hold the other 3 seats. In the March elections, Douglas' St. Kitts and
Nevis Labour Party won all eight seats on St. Kitts; the People's
Action Movement (PAM) lost the one seat it had held. The Concerned
Citizens Movement won two of the three Nevis seats; the Nevis Reform
Party won the remaining one. The island of Nevis has considerable self-
government, with its own premier and legislature.
In accordance with its rights under the Constitution, the Nevis
Island Assembly in 1996 initiated steps towards secession from the
Federation, the most recent being a referendum in August 1998 that
failed to secure the required two-thirds majority for secession.
However, the matter of secession remained open, and in October the
newly appointed opposition leader publicly stated his desire to have
``two separate governments.''
Although the Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of
political opinion or affiliation, the former opposition party PAM
alleges widespread employment discrimination by the St. Kitts and Nevis
Labour Party against public sector employment of persons perceived to
be PAM supporters. PAM alleged that the ruling party dismissed or
demoted many PAM supporters from their jobs in order to replace them
with its own supporters. The Government acknowledged that it had
withheld pension benefits from opposition members of Parliament voted
out of office but asserted that it had paid pension benefits to those
entitled to them.
There are no impediments in law or in practice to the participation
of women in leadership roles in government or political parties. There
are 3 women in the Cabinet, 3 of 4 magistrates are women, the court
registrar is female, and 7 of 20 permanent secretaries are female.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human rights
groups have been formed. There were no requests for investigations or
visits by international human rights groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place
of origin, birth out of wedlock, political opinion or affiliation,
color, sex, or creed, and the Government generally respects these
provisions in practice.
Women.--According to a government official, violence against women
is a problem, but many women are reluctant to file complaints or pursue
them in the courts. Despite this reluctance, there were publicly
reported cases of both domestic violence and rape, and a few
convictions. There is no legislation addressing domestic violence.
The role of women in society is not restricted by law but is
circumscribed by culture and tradition. There is no overt societal
discrimination against women in employment, although sectoral analyses
suggest that women do not yet occupy as many senior positions as men.
The Bureau of Women's Affairs, under the Ministry of Health and Women's
Affairs, is active in promoting change in the areas of domestic
violence, poverty, health, institutional mechanisms to advance the
status of women, and leadership positions for women. Since 1997 the
Bureau has also been active in training the police and school guidance
counselors on issues of domestic violence, sexual crimes, and child
abuse.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare and has incorporated most of the provisions of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child into domestic legislation. The
law mandates compulsory education up to the age of 16; it is free and
universal.
People with Disabilities.--Although there is no legislation to
protect the disabled or to mandate accessibility for them, the
Government and the Constitution prohibit discrimination in employment,
education, and other state services.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions. The law
permits the police, civil service, and other organizations to have
associations that serve as unions. The major labor union, the St. Kitts
Trades and Labour Union, is associated closely with the St. Kitts and
Nevis Labour Party and is active in all sectors of the economy. There
is also a newly active teachers' union, a union representing
dockworkers in the capital city, and two taxi drivers' associations.
The right to strike, while not specified by law, is well
established and respected in practice. Restrictions on striking by
workers who provide essential services, such as the police and civil
servants, are enforced by established practice and custom, but not by
law. There were no major strikes during the year.
Unions are free to form federations or confederations and to
affiliate with international organizations. The islands' unions
maintain a variety of international ties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
are free to organize and to negotiate for better wages and benefits for
union members. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination but does not
require employers found guilty of such action to rehire employees who
were fired for union activities. However, the employer must pay lost
wages and severance pay. There is no legislation governing the
organization and representation of workers, and employers are not
legally bound to recognize a union, but in practice employers do so if
a majority of workers polled wish to organize. Collective bargaining
takes place on a workplace-by- workplace basis, not industrywide. The
Labor Commissioner mediates all types of disputes between labor and
management on an ad hoc basis. However, in practice few disputes
actually go to the Commissioner for resolution. If neither the
Commissioner nor the Ministry of Labor are able to resolve the dispute,
the law allows for a case to be brought before a civil court.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids slavery and forced labor, and they do not occur in practice.
While neither the Constitution nor the law specifically address bonded
labor, it has not been a problem in practice.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1966 Employment of Children Ordinance outlaws slavery,
servitude, and forced labor, and prescribes the minimum legal working
age, which is 14 years. The Labor Ministry relies heavily on school
truant officers and the community affairs division to monitor
compliance, which they do effectively. The law mandates compulsory
education up to the age of 16. Although the law does not specifically
address bonded labor, it has not been a problem in practice (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage rates for various
categories of workers, such as domestic servants, retail employees,
casino workers, and skilled workers, were last updated in 1994, and
manufacturing sector wages were revised in 1996. The minimum wage
varies from $56.18 (EC$ 150) per week for full-time domestic workers to
$74.91 (EC$ 200) per week for skilled workers. These provide a barely
adequate living for a wage earner and family; many workers supplement
wages by keeping small animals such as goats and chickens. The Labor
Commission undertakes regular wage inspections and special
investigations when it receives complaints; it requires employers found
in violation to pay back wages. The Government provides unemployment
benefits to workers who lose their jobs temporarily or permanently.
The law provides for a 40- to 44-hour workweek, but the common
practice is 40 hours in 5 days. Although not required by law, workers
receive at least one 24-hour rest period per week. The law provides
that workers receive a minimum annual vacation of 14 working days.
While there are no specific health and safety regulations, the
Factories Law provides general health and safety guidance to Labor
Ministry inspectors. The Labor Commission settles disputes over safety
conditions. Workers have the right to report unsafe work environments
without jeopardy to continued employment; inspectors then investigate
such claims, and workers may leave such locations without jeopardy to
their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons.
An ``economic citizenship'' program allows foreign investors to
purchase passports through loosely monitored procedures involving cash
inflows ranging from $200,000 (EC$540,000) to $285,000 (EC$770,000).
This program reportedly has facilitated the illegal immigration of
persons from China and other countries to North America where, in some
instances, criminal organizations that provided the funds to such
persons force them to work under conditions similar to bonded labor
until their debt is repaid.
__________
SAINT LUCIA
Saint Lucia is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member
of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Government is composed of a prime
minister, a cabinet, and a bicameral legislative assembly. A Governor
General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of
state, with largely ceremonial powers. In general elections in 1997,
the Saint Lucia Labour Party (SLP) defeated the incumbent United
Workers Party (UWP), gaining 16 of 17 seats in the House of Assembly.
Dr. Kenny Anthony of the SLP assumed the prime ministership from the
UWP's Dr. Vaughan Lewis. The judiciary is independent.
The Royal Saint Lucia Police is the only security force and
includes a small unit called the Special Services Unit (which has some
paramilitary training) and a coast guard unit. They are controlled by
and responsive to the Government. There were occasional allegations of
abuse by the police.
The economy is based on tourism and on the export of bananas, which
represent the principal sources of foreign exchange earnings. Saint
Lucia is diversifying its economy into other types of agriculture,
light manufacturing, and construction. Unemployment, estimated at 21
percent, remains a source of potential instability. Per capita gross
domestic product for 1999 was provisionally estimated at $3,648.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
there were problems in a few areas. The major problems included an
extrajudicial killing by police; occasional credible allegations of
physical abuse of suspects or prisoners by the police; very poor prison
conditions; some censorship; long delays in trials; and recurring
domestic violence against women. Child neglect and abuse are problems.
On December 31, a deadly attack on parishioners in a Catholic church,
although believed to be an isolated act by disturbed persons, raised
concerns about religious tolerance.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, there was one extrajudicial
killing by police.
On November 19, police shot and killed an escaped prisoner, Alfred
Harding, who was jailed on charges of armed robbery and attempted
murder. Harding, a Barbadian national, had escaped from prison in that
country and also escaped from prison in Castries in July 1999. The
police reported that he was killed while trying to flee, armed with an
ice pick; some witnesses contradicted police reports and said that the
police shot the prisoner after recapture, while he was subdued and held
on the ground. Human rights groups criticized the police action as an
example of the use of excessive force by police. The Minister for Home
Affairs stated that an international group would be invited to conduct
an impartial investigation; results still were pending at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and there
were no reports of such abuse. However, human rights groups assert that
the police occasionally use excessive force.
In July 1999, when the police recaptured escaped prisoner Alfred
Harding (see Section 1.a.), they detained him in chains and shackles
and kept him continuously in solitary confinement amid the general
prison population. He filed a court case asserting that his rights were
violated, but he was held in this manner until his human rights case
was decided. In August the High Court awarded him $9,250 (EC$25,000) in
compensation, stating that prison authorities were wrong in keeping him
in shackles and solitary confinement for so long.
Prison conditions are very poor. The island's only prison, built in
the 1800's to house a maximum of 101 prisoners, was subject to severe
overcrowding with over 340 inmates. The prison's conditions,
overcrowding, and lengthy trial delays led to a prison riot in June
1997; prisoners set fires that destroyed over half of the antiquated
prison. The inmates asserted that the fires were part of a protest for
improved prison conditions. Following the fires, the authorities
transferred about 250 inmates to a factory shell outside the capital
and stationed the paramilitary Special Services Unit at the prison. The
prison since has been repaired, the majority of prisoners have been
returned to the prison, and the Special Services Unit has ceased
guarding the prison.
Following the riots, the Government invited Penal Reform
International (PRI), a London-based nongovernmental organization, to
study the prison and make recommendations. Its recommendations included
the release of prisoners awaiting trial for minor offenses and the
introduction of noncustodial alternatives as a sentencing option. As a
result of the PRI report, the authorities selected a new superintendent
of prisons who took over in February 1998, established a permanent
Complaints Board composed of prominent citizens to meet every month to
hear prisoners' complaints, hired 24 new prison officials, and made
some limited improvements to the facility. Despite these measures,
inmates made another attempt to burn down the main prison facility in
September 1998 but caused only limited damage. According to the
superintendent, both the 1997 and the 1998 incidents of unrest occurred
prior to the start of a new session of the High Court when prisoners on
``remand'' (detention pending trial or further court action) discovered
that their cases were not on the published list of cases to be heard.
At any given time, there may be 100 or more prisoners on remand who
have been denied bail and are awaiting trial.
The Government started the groundwork for a new $17 million (EC$50
million) prison in the more remote eastern part of the island in 1998.
It was scheduled for completion during the year, but progress was
delayed and officials expect it to be completed in 2001.
The Government maintains a separate facility for women and in
September there were 11 female prisoners. Conditions in the women's
facility are somewhat better than those at the men's prison. Detained
juveniles are held in the same facility as women.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government adheres
to the constitutional provisions that prohibit arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment and require a court hearing within 72 hours after
detention. However, the authorities frequently have held prisoners for
years on remand after charging them (there is no constitutional
requirement for a speedy trial). At the time of the 1997 prison riot,
about 160 of the prisoners were on remand. For example, two foreign
nationals, a Ghanaian and a Nigerian, have been held on remand since
1996. These individuals are detained for immigration violations,
pending resolution of who is to pay the expense of their deportations.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
There are two levels of courts: Courts of summary jurisdiction
(magistrate's courts) and the High Court. Both levels have civil and
criminal authority. The lower courts accept civil claims up to about
$1,850 (EC$5,000) in value and criminal cases generally classified as
``petty.'' The High Court has unlimited authority in both civil and
criminal cases. All cases can be appealed to the Eastern Caribbean
Court of Appeal. Cases may be appealed to the Privy Council in London
as the final court of appeal.
The Constitution requires public trials before an independent and
impartial court and, in cases involving capital punishment, provision
of legal counsel for those who cannot afford a defense attorney. In
criminal cases not involving capital punishment, defendants must obtain
their own legal counsel. Defendants are entitled to select their own
legal counsel; are presumed innocent until proven guilty in court; and
have the right of appeal. The authorities observe both constitutional
and statutory requirements for fair public trials.
However, the court system continued to face a serious backlog of
cases. In the latter part of 1998, the magistrate's courts had a
backlog of over 6,000 cases. Following an official study, in July 1999,
the Government hired a new director of public prosecutions and provide
him an assistant to attempt to speed up the trial process and reduce
the backlog. His work and the flow of cases through the court system
continue to be hampered by a shortage of magistrates and resources, and
the backlog likely has not diminished. Previously, the Government had
invited a team of justices from Australia to conduct a study and to
make recommendations for reducing the backlog. The team issued a report
(the Bauer report) in 1998. At year's end, the Government still was
reviewing the report's recommendations.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanctions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice; however, some censorship is
practiced. In September a representative of a small foreign publishing
house arrived in the country from Martinique with a number of books.
Customs authorities seized 57 of them under a law that bans certain
books. The authorities returned 37 of the books but kept the others for
further review. The publisher questioned the banning and confiscation
as a violation of freedom of speech. A number of the books seized were
on religion or religious themes (see Section 2.c.).
There are five privately owned newspapers, two privately owned
radio stations, and one partially government-funded radio station. They
carry a wide spectrum of political opinion and are often critical of
the Government. The radio stations have discussion and call-in programs
that allow persons to express their views. The two local television
stations also are owned privately and cover a wide range of views. In
addition there is subscription cable television service, which provides
programming from a variety of sources.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice. The law requires permits for public meetings
and demonstrations if they are to be held in public places, such as
streets, sidewalks, or parks. The police routinely grant such permits;
the rare refusal generally stems from the failure of organizers to
request the permit in a timely manner, normally 48 hours before the
event.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. However,
a number of the books customs authorities seized in September were on
religion or religious themes, including titles such as The Egyptian
Book of the Dead, The Greater Key of Solomon, The Lost Books of the
Bible, and The Ancient Mysteries of Melchizedek (see Section 2.a.).
On December 31, two men alleged to be members of the Rastafarian
movement attacked a Sunday Mass in a Catholic Church. They killed a
nun, set the priest on fire, and wounded 12 other persons. At year's
end, the authorities brought charges of murder and arson against the
two men, and the investigation continued. Rastafarian leaders
criticized the attack, and Archdiocese representatives criticized what
they termed ``an atmosphere of intolerance'' and a ``callous disrespect
for authority'' in the country. The Government criticized the attack as
the work of mentally disturbed persons who underscored the plight of
``impoverished and marginalized youth'' alienated from societal norms.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
exists. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There
were no reports of the forced expulsion of anyone having a valid claim
to refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government and exercised
that right in 1997 when the SLP defeated the UWP, which had governed
with only one interruption since 1964. The SLP won 16 of 17 seats,
campaigning on a platform of job creation and economic diversification
and appealing explicitly to women and younger voters. In response to
concerns about the size of the SLP's parliamentary majority, Prime
Minister Anthony publicly emphasized that the Government would make
efforts to reach out to the opposition to ensure that the country's
democratic traditions were not undermined by the small size of the
parliamentary opposition. The 1996 merger of smaller parties--the
Concerned Citizens' Movement, the Saint Lucia Freedom Party, and the
Citizens' Democratic Party--into the SLP left the country with only two
major political parties. The Governor General, who had been affiliated
with the UWP, stepped down following the elections. He was replaced by
Pearlette Louisy.
Under the Constitution, general elections must be held at least
every 5 years by secret ballot, but may be held earlier at the
discretion of the government in power. Two members of the Senate are
independent, appointed by the Governor General.
There are no legal impediments to participation by women and
minorities in government and politics; however, they are
underrepresented. Two of the 13 members of the Cabinet are women, as is
the Governor General.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally does not restrict international or
nongovernmental investigations of alleged violations of human rights.
In some cases it has requested international organizations to
investigate possible abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution does not address discrimination specifically;
however, government policy is nondiscriminatory in the areas of
housing, jobs, education, and opportunity for advancement. There are no
legal restrictions on the role of women or minorities.
Women.--There is increased awareness of the seriousness of violence
against women. The Government does not prosecute crimes of violence
against women unless the victim presses charges. If the victim chooses
for any reason not to press charges, the Government cannot bring a
case. Charges must be brought under the ordinary Civil Code. In 1997
the Government established a family court to hear cases of domestic
violence and crimes against women and children.
The police force conducts some training for police officers
responsible for investigating rape and other crimes against women, but
there is no special unit that handles crimes against women. Police and
courts enforce laws to protect women against abuse, although police are
hesitant to intervene in domestic disputes, and many victims are
reluctant to report cases of domestic violence and rape or to press
charges.
The 1994 Domestic Violence Act allows a judge to issue a protection
order prohibiting an abuser from entering or remaining in the place
where the victim is. It also allows the judge to order that an abuser's
name be removed from housing leases or rental agreements, with the
effect that the abuser would no longer have the right to live in the
same residence as the victim.
The Saint Lucia Crisis Center for women was established in 1988 in
Castries, the capital; a second opened in the southern town of Vieux
Fort in January 1999. These centers monitor cases of physical and
emotional abuse and help clients deal with such problems as incest,
alcohol and drug abuse, homelessness, nonpayment of child support,
custody, and visitation rights. The Crisis Center has publicized the
plight of battered women and has protested the rare deaths of women who
were victims of domestic violence. The organizers continued to work to
establish a shelter for battered women and homeless girls; however, no
progress had been made at year's end. The Crisis Center reports that
the number of new cases declined since the establishment of the family
court because women can seek help in two places. Some secondary schools
address the problems of sexual harassment and battering in their
curriculum topics.
Women's affairs come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Health, Human Services, Family Affairs, and Women. The Minister is
responsible for protecting women's rights in domestic violence cases
and preventing discrimination against women, including ensuring equal
treatment in employment.
Children.--Since independence, successive governments have given
high priority to improving educational opportunities and health care
for the nation's children. Education is free and compulsory from age 5
through 15. However, only about one-third of primary school children
continue on to secondary schools, and the drop-out rate from primary to
secondary school is higher for boys than for girls. Government clinics
provide prenatal care, immunization, child health care, and health
education services throughout the island.
A broad legal framework exists for the protection of children
through the Criminal Code, the Children and Young Persons Act, the
Family Court Act, the Domestic Violence Act, and the Attachment of
Earnings Act. Although the Government adopted a national plan of action
in November 1991 for the survival, protection, and development of
children, it still has not fulfilled this program by implementing
effective programs. The Saint Lucia Crisis Center reported that the
incidence of child abuse remains high. There were reports of abandoned
children at times roaming the streets with no organized, fully
functioning safety net or adequate supporting institutions to assist
them. There are no specific laws enacted to cover foster care,
adoptions, and child welfare social services.
People with Disabilities.--No specific legislation protects the
rights of the disabled, nor mandates provision of access to buildings
or government services for them. There is no rehabilitation facility
for the physically disabled, although the Health Ministry operates a
community-based rehabilitation program in residents' homes. There are
schools for the deaf and for the blind up to the secondary level. There
is also a school for the mentally retarded.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution specifies the right
of workers to form or belong to trade unions under the broader rubric
of the right of association. Most public sector employees are
unionized; about 20 percent of the total work force is unionized.
Unions are independent of government and are free to choose their own
representatives in often vigorously contested elections. There are no
restrictions on the formation of national labor federations. In 1994
several of the major unions formed an umbrella grouping called the
Industrial Solidarity Pact.
Strikes in both the public and private sectors are legal, but there
are many avenues through collective bargaining agreements and
government procedures that may preclude a strike. The law prohibits
members of the police and fire departments from striking. Other
``essential services'' workers--water and sewer authority workers,
electric utility workers, nurses, and doctors--must give 30 days'
notice before striking.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations, and
some have done so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--On January 11,
the Registration Status and Recognition of Trade Unions and Employer
Organizations Act entered into effect. Unions have the legal right to
engage in collective bargaining, and they fully exercise this right.
Although union representatives have reported attempts by the Government
and other employers to undermine this process, the new law is viewed
widely as prounion, and it has resulted in increased organizational
activity by unions.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and there
are effective mechanisms for resolving complaints. It also requires
that employers reinstate workers fired for union activities.
Labor law is applicable in the export processing zones (EPZ's), and
there are no administrative or legal impediments to union organizing or
collective bargaining in those zones. However, in practice many firms
resist union efforts to organize in the EPZ's, but there has been some
progress because of the new law.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur.
While there is no specific prohibition of forced or bonded labor by
children, there were no reports of such practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--While the Children and Young Persons Act permits a minimum
legal working age of 14 years, education legally is required through
age 15. Ministry of Labor officials are responsible for enforcing the
law. There were no reports of violations of child labor laws. The
Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Wages Regulations (Clerks)
Orders, in effect since 1985, set out minimum wage rates only for
clerks. These office workers receive a legislated minimum wage of about
$300 (EC$800) per month. The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide
a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but some
categories of workers receive more than the legal minimum for clerks,
which is used only as a guide for setting pay for other professions.
There is no legislated workweek, although the common practice is to
work 40 hours in 5 days. Special legislation covers hours that shop
assistants, agricultural workers, domestics, and young people in
industrial establishments may work.
Occupational health and safety regulations are relatively well
developed. The Labor Ministry periodically inspects health and safety
conditions at places of employment under the Employees' Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1985. The Ministry enforces the act through
threat of closure of the business if it discovers violations and the
violator does not correct them. Workers are free to leave a dangerous
workplace situation without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a multiparty, parliamentary
democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime
minister, a cabinet, and a unicameral legislative assembly compose the
Government. The Governor General, appointed by the British monarch, is
the titular head of state, with largely ceremonial powers. During the
spring, divisive general strikes were settled only because Prime
Minister Sir James F. Mitchell, whose New Democratic Party (NDP) had
won an unprecedented fourth term in June 1998 by a slim margin, agreed
to resign, with elections to be held by March 31, 2001. On October 27,
Mitchell resigned, and Arnhim Eustace, an NDP parliamentarian, replaced
him. The judiciary is independent.
The Royal St. Vincent Police, the only security force in the
country, includes a coast guard and a small Special Services Unit (SSU)
with some paramilitary training, that is often accused of using
excessive force. The force is controlled by and responsive to the
Government, but police continued to commit some human rights abuses.
St. Vincent has a market-based economy. Much of the labor force is
engaged in agriculture. Bananas are the leading export and a major
source of foreign exchange earnings. However, the banana industry is
declining, and the growing tourism sector is becoming the leading
earner of foreign exchange. Unemployment is estimated to be 35 percent,
and the 1999 per capita gross domestic product was approximately
$2,550.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
there were problems in a few areas. The police SSU was accused of an
extrajudicial killing. Other principal human rights problems continued
to include occasional instances of excessive use of force by police,
the Government's failure to punish adequately those responsible for
such abuses, poor prison conditions, and an overburdened court system.
Violence against women and abuse of children also were problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In March the police SSU shot and killed David Browne as they were
taking him into custody for building a shack on the grounds of a
secondary school. The police said he sustained an accidental but fatal
shot to the temple when he resisted arrest. Human rights activists
called for an inquiry and claimed that the police SSU used excessive
and injudicious force leading to the death.
On December 14, 1999, a police antidrug patrol shot and killed
Junior Harry, who they said was fleeing while the patrol conducted a
search for narcotics in buildings near the town of Barrouallie. A
police spokesman said that Harry was armed with a shotgun. Although the
authorities planned to hold an inquest to establish whether police used
excessive force, there was no information as to the results of any such
inquiry.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other forms of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. However, regional
human rights groups have noted that a high percentage of convictions
are based on confessions. One human rights group believes that some of
these confessions resulted from unwarranted police practices, including
the use of physical force during detention, illegal search and seizure,
and failure to inform properly those arrested of their rights.
There is no independent review board to monitor police activity and
to hear public complaints about police misconduct. Human rights
advocates recommend such a board to protect the rights of citizens who
complain about police misconduct.
Prison conditions are poor. Prison buildings are antiquated and
overcrowded, with one holding an average of 300 inmates in a building
designed for 75, which results in serious health and safety problems.
An inmate who wishes to speak with his lawyer must do so by written
correspondence, and the authorities sometimes monitor and censor such
correspondence.
In July 1999, prisoners rioted and seized control of the prison,
protesting poor conditions and treatment. The Government acceded to a
number of the prisoners' demands; however, conditions did not change
significantly. In the spring, prisoners again demonstrated, and the
Government appointed a former SSU commander as the new Superintendent
of Prisons. Local human rights activists have acknowledged that he has
tried to improve internal communications and training for prison
personnel. However, the Government has not implemented any of the
recommendations made by a Commission of Inquiry following the July-
August 1999 disturbances.
In August identified prisoners whipped another prisoner, burned him
with acid, and cut a piece of his ear off with a knife. The assaulted
inmate asserted that this action was carried out as punishment when he
had not supplied them with drugs after he had been released earlier
from jail. Prison officials asserted that police failed to respond to
arrest the inmates who had tortured and mutilated this prisoner.
Prison officials expressed frustration with the lack of resources,
proper training, personnel, and progress in securing a new facility.
The jail is in the center of the capital city with low walls that are
accessible to passers-by. Prison guards are known at times to
collaborate with prisoners in corrupt and illegal practices. Some
guards have been disciplined for engaging in sexual acts with inmates.
Reportedly, guards also supply drugs and other contraband or stand by
while rough, abusive, or inhuman prison punishment is meted out either
by fellow prisoners or other guards.
There is a separate section for female inmates in the prison.
Conditions are inadequate for juvenile offenders. There is a small
facility for delinquent boys; however, it is not financed by the
Government and depends upon donations. As a result, it is in disrepair
and only houses a small number of boys. Youngsters may be charged and
convicted as criminals from the age of 8. In such cases, youngsters may
then be jailed with older criminals. Although separate legal statutes
exist for youthful offenders, there are no separate magistrates,
prosecutors, or procedures to handle such cases.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that persons detained for criminal offenses must receive a
fair hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial court. Although
there are only two official magistrates, the registrar of the High
Court and the presiding judge of the family court effectively serve as
magistrates when called upon to do so. While this practice reduced the
backlog, complaints continue regarding police practices in bringing
cases to court. Some defense attorneys claim that this has caused 6- to
12-month delays in preliminary inquiries for serious crimes.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent and impartial court, and the judiciary is independent in
practice.
The judiciary consists of lower courts and a High Court, with
appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal and final appeal to the
Privy Council in the United Kingdom. There are three magistrates, as
well as one magistrate who serves only the family court.
The Constitution provides for public trials. The court appoints
attorneys for indigent defendants only when the defendant is charged
with a capital offense. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven
guilty and may appeal verdicts and penalties. There is a large backlog
of pending cases. In January a fire destroyed offices with records in
the magistrates' court. The family court handled some cases, but the
backlog increased. The court reopened in September with 1 day per week
set aside to handle an increasing workload of drug-related cases. The
court docket may average 55-60 cases a day, when reasonably only 5 to 7
may be heard, adjudicated, or disposed.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary search and
seizure or other government intrusions into the private life of
individual citizens, and there were no reports of such abuses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice.
There are two major newspapers and numerous smaller, partisan
publications; all are privately owned, and most are openly critical of
the Government's policies. There were no reports of government
censorship or interference with the operation of the press. However,
individual journalists believe that government advertising, a
significant source of revenue, sometimes is withheld from newspapers
that publish articles that are less than favorable to the Government.
The lone television station in St. Vincent is privately owned and
operates without government interference. Satellite dishes are popular
among those who can afford them. There is also a cable system with
mainly North American programming that has over 300 subscribers. The
Government controls programming for the government-owned radio station.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
exists. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There
were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone having a valid claim to
refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through
regularly scheduled free and fair elections. St. Vincent has a long
history of multiparty parliamentary democracy. During the June 1998
election, the ruling New Democratic Party won a slim 1-seat majority (8
of 15) in Parliament, despite losing the popular vote by a 55 to 45
percent margin to the opposition Unity Labour Party (ULP). Calling this
outcome an ``overt manifestation of rejection by the public'' of Prime
Minister Mitchell's Government, the ULP made claims of election fraud
and demanded new elections.
The Prime Minister refused the ULP demand and instead proposed a
constitutional review to consider possible amendments, such as a
provision for proportional representation. Lingering dissatisfaction
led to thousands of persons participating in rallies and strikes in
April and May calling for the Prime Minister's resignation. A rally by
the Organization in Defense of Democracy, comprised of leading private
and public sector unions, said new elections should be held immediately
and threatened ``a total shutdown of the country'' on May 3. After
mediation by regional figures, the Prime Minister and his ruling NDP
signed a six-point agreement known as the Grand Beach Accord, which
confirmed that the Prime Minister would resign by January 2001 and call
early elections before March 31, 2001. On October 27, Mitchell resigned
and was replaced by Arnhim Eustace, an NDP parliamentarian. In November
leaders of the three political parties signed a ``Code of Conduct''
intended to govern the campaign period. It includes a pledge of equal
time on local radio and other electronic media and an agreement not to
incite or encourage violence.
There are no legal impediments to women's full participation in
politics or government; however, they are underrepresented. There is
only one woman in Parliament, as a member of the opposition.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Opposition political groups and the Vincentian press often comment
on human rights matters of local concern. The St. Vincent and the
Grenadines Human Rights Association (SVGHRA) monitors government and
police activities, especially with respect to treatment of prisoners,
publicizing any cases of abuse. The Government generally is responsive
to public and private inquiries about its human rights practices.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law
regardless of race, sex, or religion, and the Government adheres to
this provision.
Women.--Violence against women, particularly domestic violence,
remains a major problem. The Government took legislative steps to
address this problem through the Domestic Violence/Matrimonial
Proceedings Act (1994) and the more accessible Domestic Violence
Summary Proceedings Act (1995). Both laws provide for protective
orders, as well as occupation and tenancy orders; the former only is
accessible through the High Court, but the latter can be obtained
without the services of a lawyer in family court. Since passage of the
laws, the SVGHRA has conducted numerous seminars and workshops
throughout the country to familiarize citizens with their rights under
these acts. Increasing numbers of women are coming forward with
domestic violence complaints.
Depending on the magnitude of the offense and the age of the
victim, the punishment for rape is generally 10 or more years in
prison.
A 1995 amendment to the Child Support Law allows for payments
ordered by the courts, even when notice of an appeal has been filed.
Previously, fathers who had been ordered to pay child support could
appeal decisions and not pay while the appeal was being heard. This
resulted in a huge backlog of appeal cases and effectively reduced the
number of mothers and children receiving support payments. There is a
family court in the capital city of Kingstown with one magistrate.
According to the SVGHRA, because there is only one bailiff to service
all the country, summonses often are not served on time for cases to be
heard as scheduled in court.
The Ministry of Education, Women's Affairs, and Culture has a
women's desk that assists the National Council of Women with seminars,
training programs, and public relations. The minimum wage law specifies
that women should receive equal pay for equal work.
Marion House, a social services agency established by the Catholic
Church in 1989 and staffed by four trained counselors and three foreign
volunteers, provides counseling and therapy services.
Children.--Education is not compulsory, but the Government states
that it investigates cases in which children are withdrawn from school
before the age of 16. Although the Government has played a more
prominent role in legislating health and welfare standards since
independence, the infant mortality rate is still very high. One
underlying cause is the large number of children born to teenage
mothers.
The Domestic Violence Summary Proceedings Act provides a limited
legal framework for the protection of children. Nevertheless, reports
of child abuse remain high and are on the increase. The Social Welfare
Office is the government agency responsible for monitoring and
protecting the welfare of children. The police are the enforcement arm;
the Social Welfare Office refers all reports of child abuse to the
police for action.
People with Disabilities.--There is no specific legislation
addressing persons with disabilities, and the circumstances for
disabled individuals are generally difficult. Most severely disabled
persons rarely leave their homes because of the poor road system and
lack of affordable wheelchairs. The Government partially supports a
school for the disabled which has two branches. A separate, small
rehabilitation center treats about five persons daily.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides citizens
the right to form unions and to organize employees, and the Trade
Unions and Trade Disputes Act allows the right to strike. Employers
often ignore the constitutional provisions that provide for union
rights, and claim that they have a constitutional right not to
recognize a trade union. However, some employers seek a good industrial
relations environment and cooperate with trade unions.
In April and May, thousands of persons, including members of
leading private and public sector unions, participated in rallies and
strikes calling for the Prime Minister's resignation (see Section 3).
Other than these, there were no major strikes during the year.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines joined the International Labor
Organization in 1997 and assumed all its obligations for enforcement of
labor standards.
Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There are no
legal obstacles to organizing unions; however, no law requires
employers to recognize a particular union as an exclusive bargaining
agent. Some companies offer packages of benefits with terms of
employment better than, or comparable to, what a union normally can
obtain through negotiations. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination
by employers. Generally effective mechanisms exist for resolving
complaints. The authorities may order employers found guilty of
antiunion discrimination for firing workers without cause (including
for participation in union activities) to reinstate the workers or give
them severance pay.
According to press reports in August and September, seven workers
at the East Caribbean Group of Companies (ECGC--an agricultural
manufacturing concern)--six of whom were executive members of a newly
formed, government-registered ECGC Workers Union--were fired for
``undisclosed reasons'' following a 2-day sick-out. Shortly thereafter,
Labor Minister Jerry Scott intervened in an attempt to resolve the
matter, but the ECGC board refused to reinstate the workers. Instead,
they provided fired workers with a severance package that included a
statement that these workers had conspired to close down the company.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
Government does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by
children, but there were no reports that it occurred.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum working age at 16 years of age,
although a worker must be 18 years of age to receive a national
insurance card. The labor inspection office of the Ministry of Labor
monitors and enforces this provision, and employers generally respect
it in practice. The age of leaving school at the primary level is 15
years; when these pupils leave school, they usually are absorbed into
the labor market disguised as apprentices. There is no known child
labor except for children working on family-owned banana plantations,
particularly during harvest time, or in family-owned cottage
industries. The Government does not prohibit specifically forced or
bonded labor by children, but there were no reports that it occurred
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages,
which were last promulgated in 1989. They vary by sector and type of
work and are specified for several skilled categories, including
attendants, packers, cleaners, porters, watchmen, and clerks. In
agriculture the wage for workers provided shelter is $0.82 (EC$2.25)
per hour; skilled industrial workers earn $7.36 (EC$20) per day, and
unskilled workers earn $3.68 (EC$10) per day. In many sectors the
minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family, but most workers earn more than the minimum.
The Wages Council, according to law, should meet every 2 years to
review the minimum wage, but it has not met since 1989.
There is no legislation concerning the length of the workweek;
however, the general practice is to work 40 hours in 5 days. The law
provides workers a minimum annual vacation of 2 weeks.
According to the Ministry of Labor, legislation concerning
occupational safety and health is outdated. The most recent
legislation, the Factories Act of 1955, has some regulations concerning
only factories, but enforcement of these regulations is ineffective.
Workers enjoy a reasonably safe working environment; however, the trade
unions have dealt with some violations relating to safety gear, long
overtime hours, and the safety of machinery. There were some reports of
significant visual deficiency by visual display unit workers, and some
reports of hearing impairment by power station and stone crushing
employees. It was not clear under present legislation whether workers
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger
health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
SURINAME
After over a decade of predominantly military rule, Suriname
installed a freely elected Parliament and inaugurated a democratically
chosen president in 1991. After free and fair elections in May, the new
51-member National Assembly elected Ronald Venetiaan of the National
Party of Suriname (NPS) as President in August with the necessary two-
thirds majority required by the Constitution; he replaced Jules
Wijdenbosch of the National Democratic Party (NDP). Venetiaan had
previously served as President in 1991-96. The Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary, and previous disputes over appointees by
the former president were alleviated when the appointees in question
resigned from the judiciary; by year's end, the judiciary appeared to
be acting independently.
The armed forces are responsible for national security and border
and immigration control; they are under the control of the civilian
Minister of Defense. Civilian police bear primary responsibility for
the maintenance of law and order; they report to the Ministry of
Justice and Police. The first Venetiaan Government had reformed the
military in 1995-96 by purging military officers and supporters of
former dictator Desi Bouterse, who ruled the country in the 1980's.
Although in the May elections Bouterse's party won 10 seats in the
National Assembly, 1 of which he occupies, the party's influence within
the military has declined steadily. Members of the security forces
continue to commit some human rights abuses.
The economy depends heavily on the export of bauxite derivatives.
Unregulated gold mining is an increasingly important economic activity
that highlights a lack of land rights for indigenous and tribal people,
and it has a serious environmental impact. The Government and state-
owned companies employ over half the working population. Overall
economic conditions deteriorated during the year, and estimated gross
domestic product declined by approximately 4 percent. The inflation
rate was 82 percent, compared with 113 percent in 1999. Per capita
annual income was about $1,000.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems still remain in some areas. Police
mistreat detainees, particularly during arrests; guards abuse
prisoners; and local detention facilities remain overcrowded. The
judiciary suffers from ineffectiveness and a huge case backlog. There
was some harassment and media self-censorship, and societal
discrimination against women and indigenous and tribal people persists.
Violence against women and trafficking in women and girls are problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
While there have been no recent reports of political killings, the
Government has not addressed past abuses, and they continue to be a
focus of concern. The authorities have not taken action against prison
guards who allegedly beat a prisoner to death in 1993. Late in the
year, the Government began an investigation into the December 1982
executions by the Bouterse regime of 15 opposition leaders; there has
yet to be an investigation into the 1986 massacre of civilians at the
village of Moiwana.
In December 1997, the Wijdenbosch administration appointed a
``committee to establish the framework for a commission to investigate
past human rights abuses.'' Human rights groups, which had been
pressing since 1995 for an independent human rights commission to
investigate violations committed during the 1980's, neither were
informed nor consulted prior to the establishment of the committee.
Moreover, the chairman of the committee was reportedly a member of
Bouterse's team of legal advisers; his appointment raised questions
regarding the objectivity of the group's work. Although the committee's
report was presented to the former President in September 1999, the
Government did not release its contents or recommendations. In view of
the human rights record of the Bouterse regime, many of whose members
participated in the Wijdenbosch Government, human rights organizations
remained concerned about the potential for a deterioration of civil
liberties.
After the elections, there were calls for the new Government to
investigate the December 1982 murders before the 18-year statute of
limitations expired in December. In October the Court of Justice began
hearings on the murders in response to a request from relatives of the
victims. Bouterse's lawyer sought to postpone the hearings, but the
court denied his request. The court heard testimony from the victims'
relatives, human rights activists, and the prosecutor's office, which
had not yet made any investigation into the killings. Previously,
Bouterse himself had requested an investigation, after the victims'
relatives asked a Dutch court to prosecute him in that country.
Following an order from the Court of Justice, an examining judge called
for a full investigation into the 1982 murders, including the actions
of 36 suspects.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
However, the new Government has yet to take any action to
investigate allegations of some disappearances that occurred under
previous regimes.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits inhuman treatment or
punishment, but human rights groups continue to express concern about
official mistreatment and have documented cases of police mistreatment
of detainees, particularly during arrests, and guard abuse of
prisoners.
Prison conditions are poor. There are three state prisons and
several detention facilities at police stations, where arrestees are
detained until they appear before a judge for trial. Human rights
activists are concerned about conditions in the prisons and especially
about conditions in local detention facilities. They report that the
jails are overcrowded, that guards mistreat prisoners, and that medical
care and living conditions are inadequate. Police officers, who are not
trained in prison work, serve as the jailers at local detention
facilities, a situation that human rights groups assert contributes to
the abuses.
Women's jail and prison facilities and conditions are, in general,
better than the men's facilities and conditions. There is a wing of an
adult prison for boys under age 18 who have committed serious crimes.
Juvenile facilities for boys between the ages of 11 and 18 within the
adult prison were adequate; educational and recreational facilities
were provided.
In February 1999, the human rights group Moiwana '86 issued a
report that accused prison officials at two of the federal prisons of
using electrical shocks to discipline prisoners. The report further
asserted that different ethnic groups receive different forms and
degrees of punishments. Prison officials denied the accusations, and
the Government took no investigative action. Moiwana '86 did not pursue
the issue further.
The completion of a new prison and renovation of existing jails
have reduced somewhat the problems and improved overall health and
safety conditions. However, the older jails remain seriously
overcrowded, with as many as four times the number of detainees for
which they were designed. In addition these older prisons are
unsanitary. At police stations, guards allow detainees no exercise and
only rarely permit them to leave their cells. Detainees and human
rights groups also complain about inadequate prison meals, although
families are permitted and encouraged to provide food to incarcerated
relatives. Local detention facilities remain overcrowded.
Since 1996 Moiwana '86 has monitored the condition of prisoners.
Representatives of the group report that in general they have access to
prisoners and receive cooperation from prison officials on routine
matters. Moiwana '86 and the police cooperated to develop a detention
officer training program for police guards working at the local
detention facilities. The program consists of lectures given at the
state prison to both guards and prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities generally respect
these provisions in practice. However, delays have caused prisoners who
appeal their sentences to remain in prison until a ruling is reached on
their appeal, even if they have served the full term of their original
sentence. Lawyers have filed complaints, but the problem has not been
resolved.
The law provides that the police may detain for investigation for
up to 14 days a person suspected of committing a crime for which the
sentence is longer than 4 years. During the 14-day period, the law also
permits incommunicado detention, which must be authorized by an
assistant district attorney or a police inspector. Within the 14-day
period, the police must bring the accused before a prosecutor to be
charged formally. If additional time is needed to investigate the
charge, a prosecutor may authorize the police to detain the suspect for
an additional 30 days. Upon the expiration of the initial 44 days, a
judge of instruction may authorize the police to hold the suspect for
up to 120 additional days, in 30-day increments (for a total of 164
days), before the case is tried. The judge of instruction has the power
to authorize release on bail, but that power is used rarely, if ever.
Pretrial detainees, who constitute a large percentage of inmates,
routinely are held without being brought before a judge. They often are
held in overcrowded detention cells at local police stations. Of those
held in police custody or detention cells, a steadily growing number
already had been convicted but not yet placed in prisons.
The military police continued to observe the requirement to hand
over to the civil police civilians arrested for committing a crime in
their presence. The military police continued to maintain
responsibility for control of the country's borders and airports, but
it no longer investigated civilian crimes.
The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced exile;
however, it is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary, an ongoing dispute between the previously
sitting judges and a new slate appointed by the former Government
severely damaged the concept of an independent judiciary. However, the
change in government led to the resignations of the disputed judges.
The new Government appointed an acting president of the Court of
Justice and named the Solicitor General to act also as Attorney
General. As a result of the conflict, the effectiveness of the civilian
and military courts still was limited in practice, but at year's end,
the judiciary appeared to be acting independently.
The judicial system consists of three lower courts and an appeals
court, which is called the Court of Justice; there is no Supreme Court.
In July 1998, President Wijdenbosch named a new President of the Court
of Justice and Prosecutor General without consulting with, and over the
objections of, the sitting justices. Most legal authorities interpret
the Constitution to require that consultation, and the members of the
court refused to recognize the named President of the court or
Prosecutor General. In spite of the continued objections, President
Wijdenbosch named additional justices without consultation in December
1998. In May 1999, the appointed President of the Court of Justice
first swore in himself, and then he swore in the new justices. With the
change in Government, the President of the Court and other disputed
judges resigned. The 1987 Constitution calls for the establishment of
an independent constitutional court. Although the previous Government
did not take any steps to set up such a court, at year's end the
Venetiaan Government was assembling a group of judges to sit on the
court.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial in
which defendants have the right to counsel if needed. The courts assign
lawyers in private practice to defend indigent prisoners and pays
lawyers from public funds. However, the court-assigned lawyers usually
only appear at the trial, if they appear at all. The courts must, and
in practice do, free a detainee who is not tried within the 164-day
period. In one instance, a court levied a fine against the Government
for failing to release detainees as directed by the court. Trials are
before a single judge, with the right of appeal. Due to the conflict
over the legitimacy of the president of the Court and the justices,
there is a large backlog in the judicial system.
Military personnel generally are not subject to civilian criminal
law. A soldier accused of a crime immediately comes under military
jurisdiction, and military police are responsible for all such
investigations. Military prosecutions are directed by an officer on the
public prosecutor's staff and take place in separate courts before two
military judges and one civilian judge. The military courts follow the
same rules of procedure as the civil courts. There is no appeal from
the military to the civil system.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy.
The law requires warrants for searches, which are issued by quasi-
judicial officers who supervise criminal investigations. The police
obtain them in the great majority of investigations. There have been
complaints of surveillance of human rights workers by members of the
military police and the division of central intelligence. There is
still a threat of forced resettlement of indigenous populations due to
the granting of timber and gold concessions (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights; however, in practice there were reports of
intimidation and harassment.
The parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition criticize the
Government freely. Some media members continue to practice some self-
censorship because of the history of intimidation and reprisals by
certain elements of the former military leadership.
The Wijdenbosch Government publicly reprimanded radio stations and
newspapers for their negative coverage of protest demonstrations that
took place in May 1999. Although the Government threatened to censor
the press, it ultimately took no action, and there continued to be
reports unfavorable to the Government.
In April one of the two daily newspapers, De West, was firebombed
one night. At year's end, the incident remained under investigation.
On July 24, a group of Bouterse supporters harassed and attempted
to beat a journalist outside the National Assembly. The journalist was
known to be critical of Bouterse, and the attack took place the first
day Bouterse occupied his new seat in the Assembly. The police
intervened, but the Bouterse supporters threatened to find the
journalist anywhere in the country.
The two daily newspapers, five television stations, and most of the
radio stations are owned privately. Two television stations and two
radio stations are owned publicly. Four companies provide cable
television, which includes international channels. Two companies, one
private and one public, offer unrestricted access to electronic media.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice. However, in response to a series of public
demonstrations in May 1999, the Government announced that it intended
to begin enforcing a 1930's law requiring a permit to hold a public
demonstration or gathering. After the announcement, in late July 1999,
the authorities detained two opposition leaders for demonstrating
without a permit but quickly released them. Subsequent public marches
were allowed to proceed without permits.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens may change their residence and
workplaces freely and may travel abroad as they wish. Political
dissidents who emigrated to the Netherlands and elsewhere during the
years of military rule are welcome to return. Few of them have chosen
to do so, generally for economic reasons. Citizenship is not revoked
for political reasons.
Although it is possible for persons to be granted refugee status
under special circumstances, there are no provisions in the law for
granting asylum or refugee status in accordance with the standards of
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
arise. There were no reports of forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for this right, but in the past the
military prevented its effective exercise. Although the military twice
has transferred power to elected civilian governments following coups,
2000 marked the second time since independence from the Netherlands in
1975 that one elected government succeeded another in accordance with
constitutional provisions. The Government is still in the process of
institutionalizing democratic, constitutional rule.
The Constitution stipulates that power and authority rest with the
citizens and provides for the right to change the government through
the direct election by secret ballot of a National Assembly of 51
members every 5 years. The National Assembly then elects the President
by a two-thirds vote. If the legislature is unable to do so, as was the
case both in the 1991 and 1996 national elections, the Constitution
provides that a national people's assembly, composed of Members of
Parliament and regional and local officials, shall elect the President.
The Constitution provides for the organization and functioning of
political parties. Many parties and political coalitions are
represented in the National Assembly. After the May elections,
President Venetiaan formed a cabinet from members of the New Front
coalition, comprised of the NPS, a predominantly Creole party; the
Progressive Reform Party, a predominantly Hindustani party; the
Suriname Labor Party, a political wing of the largest labor union; and
Pertjaja Luhur, a predominantly Javanese party.
There are historical and cultural impediments to equal
participation by women in leadership positions in government and
political parties, and they are underrepresented in government and
politics. In the past, most women were expected to fulfill the roles of
housewife and mother, thereby limiting opportunities to gain political
experience or position. Participation by women in politics (and other
fields) generally was considered inappropriate. While women have made
limited gains in attaining political power in recent years, political
circles remain under the influence of traditional male-dominated
groups, and women are disadvantaged in seeking high public office. In
the May elections, voters elected nine women to the National Assembly,
compared with six who held seats in the previous assembly, and the
Assembly appointed a woman as vice chairperson. The Cabinet includes
one woman as Minister of Foreign Affairs, another as Minister of
Internal Affairs, and a third as Deputy Minister of Social Affairs.
Although the Constitution prohibits racial or religious
discrimination, several factors limit the participation of Maroons
(descendants of escaped slaves who fled to the interior to avoid
recapture) and Amerindians in the political process. Most of the
country's political activity takes place in the capital and a narrow
belt running east and west of it along the coast. The Maroons and
Amerindians are concentrated in remote areas in the interior and
therefore have limited access to, and influence on, the political
process. Voters elected the first Amerindians to the National Assembly
in 1996. After the May elections, there are eight Maroons and one
Amerindian in the National Assembly. There are no Maroons or
Amerindians in the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases;
however, government officials generally are not cooperative or
responsive to their views. There have been complaints of surveillance
of human rights workers by members of the military police and the
division of central intelligence.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and laws, with the exception of ethnic marriage
laws, do not differentiate among citizens on the basis of their ethnic
origins, religious affiliations, or other cultural differences.
However, in practice several groups within society suffer various forms
of discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The law does not
differentiate between domestic violence and other forms of assault. The
Government has not addressed specifically the problem of violence
against women. According to a national women's group, victims continue
to report cases of violence against women and complain of an inadequate
response from the Government and society to what appears to be a trend
of increasing family violence. Although the police have been reluctant
to intervene in instances of domestic violence, a national women's
group noted that police attitudes have improved significantly as a
result of training conducted in 1999.
There are no specific laws to protect women against trafficking and
sexual exploitation. Prostitution is illegal; however, the police lack
the resources to enforce these laws effectively. There were credible
reports of trafficking in women for prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Women have the right to equal access to education, employment, and
property. Nevertheless, social pressures and customs, especially in
rural areas, inhibit their full exercise of these rights, particularly
in the areas of marriage and inheritance. Women experience economic
discrimination in access to employment and in rates of pay for the same
or substantially similar work. The Government has not made specific
efforts to combat economic discrimination.
The National Women's Center is a government agency devoted to
women's issues; there is also a women's policy coordinator. Their
effectiveness is limited severely by financial and staffing
constraints. The principal concerns of women's groups are political
representation, economic vulnerability, violence, and discrimination.
Children.--School attendance is free and compulsory until 12 years
of age, but some school-age children do not have access to education
due to a lack of transportation, facilities, or teachers. There is no
legal difference in the treatment of girls and boys in education or
health care services, and in practice both are treated fairly equally.
Both students and parents complained about the Government's decision to
double enrollment fees for public school, which occurred both in 1999
and 2000. Children face increasing economic pressure to discontinue
their education in order to work.
The Government allocates only limited resources to ensure
safeguards for the human rights and welfare of children. There are
continuing reports of malnutrition among poor children, but it is
difficult to quantify the extent of the problem. In the capital, where
most of the country's population is concentrated, there are several
orphanages and one privately funded shelter for sexually abused
children. Elsewhere, distressed children usually must rely on the
resources of their extended families. There were credible reports of
hospitals refusing to hand newborns over to their mothers until
hospital bills were paid in full, sending them instead to a state
facility. The Government denied that such refusals occurred and stated
that there was no such policy; one human rights group continued its
investigation into the matter.
There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children;
however, some children are exploited sexually, and there were credible
reports of trafficking in girls for prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
The legal age of sexual consent is 14; however, it is not enforced
strictly, and the Asian Marriage Law lowers the marriage age for
children of Asian descent to 12 years for girls and 15 years for boys.
Otherwise, one must be 31 years old to marry without parental
permission.
People with Disabilities.--There are no laws concerning disabled
persons and no provisions for making private or public buildings
accessible to them. There are also no laws mandating that they be given
equal consideration when seeking jobs or housing. However, there are
some training programs for the blind and others with disabilities. In
practice disabled persons suffer from discrimination when applying for
jobs and services.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution affords no special protection
for, or recognition of, indigenous people. Most Amerindians and Maroons
suffer a number of disadvantages and have only limited ability to
participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, traditions,
and natural resources. The country's political life, educational
opportunities, and jobs are concentrated in the capital and its
environs, while the majority of Amerindians and Maroons live in the
interior. Government services in the interior became largely
unavailable, and much of the infrastructure was destroyed during the
1986-91 domestic insurgencies; progress in reestablishing services and
rebuilding the infrastructure has been very slow.
The Government appointed the Consultative Council for the
Development of the Interior in September 1995. This council, provided
for in the 1992 peace accords that formally ended the insurgencies,
includes representatives of the Maroon and Amerindian communities.
However, the Government did not consult with representatives of these
communities about the granting of gold and timber concessions on
indigenous and tribal lands. Early in the year, the Widjenbosch
Government made an attempt to grant some land rights to indigenous
people. Tribal leaders rejected the proposal, asserting that it was too
weak. In November the new Government's Minister of Natural Resources
met with tribal leaders and promised to work with tribal authorities
toward a solution regarding land grants.
Organizations representing Maroon and Amerindian communities
complain that small-scale mining operations, mainly illegal Brazilian
gold miners, dig trenches that cut residents off from their
agricultural land and threaten to drive them away from their
traditional settlements. Mercury runoff from these operations also
contaminates and threatens traditional food source areas.
Maroon and Amerindian groups continued to cooperate with each other
in order to exercise their rights more effectively. Two summits, or
``gran krutus,'' bringing together Maroon and Amerindian tribal
leaders, have been held, the most recent in September 1996. During
these summits, indigenous leaders reiterated their demands for the
right to participate in decisions concerning the use of natural
resources on land they claim as their own and for greater autonomy from
the Government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution protects the right
of workers to associate and to choose their representatives
democratically. Nearly 60 percent of the work force is organized into
unions, and most unions belong to one of the country's six major labor
federations. Unions are independent of the Government but play an
active role in politics. The small Labor Party historically has been a
very influential force in government.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Civil servants
have the right to strike, and strikes in both the public and private
sectors are common as workers try to secure wage gains to protect their
earning power from inflation.
There are no restrictions on unions' international activities.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution explicitly recognizes these rights, and the authorities
respect them in practice. Collective bargaining agreements cover
approximately 50 percent of the labor force. Bauxite industry workers
are organized, but gold miners are not. The law prohibits antiunion
discrimination by employers, and there are effective mechanisms for
resolving complaints of such discrimination. Employers must have prior
permission from the Ministry of Labor to fire workers, except when
discharging an employee for cause. The Labor Ministry individually
reviews dismissals for cause; if it finds a discharge unjustified, the
employee must be reinstated.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it generally is not known to
occur. However, there were credible reports of trafficking in women and
girls for prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The law prohibits forced and
bonded labor by children, and such practices generally are not known to
occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 14 years;
however, the Ministry of Labor and the police enforce this law only
sporadically. Children under 14 years of age work as street vendors,
newspaper sellers, or shop assistants. Working hours for youths are not
limited in comparison with the regular work force. School attendance is
compulsory until 12 years of age. The law prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children, and there were no reports of such practices,
although trafficking of girls for prostitution does occur (see Sections
6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage
legislation. In October 1999, civil servants were granted a tax-free 60
percent pay increase for those with the lowest wages, a 55 percent
increase for middle wage earners, and a 50 percent increase for the
highest wage earners. Including that pay increase and a cost of living
allowance of about $12 (Sfl 30,000), the lowest wage for civil servants
is about $40 (Sfl 102,000) per month. This salary level makes it very
difficult to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. Government employees, who constitute approximately 50 percent
of the work force of 100,000, frequently supplement their salaries with
second or third jobs, often in the informal sector. The President and
Council of Ministers set and approve civil service wage increases.
Civil service and other wages are not keeping pace with inflation.
Work in excess of 9 hours per day or 45 hours per week on a regular
basis requires special government permission, which is granted
routinely. Such overtime work earns premium pay. The law requires one
24-hour rest period per week.
A 10- to 12-member inspectorate in the Occupational Health and
Safety Division of the Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing
legislated occupational safety and health regulations. Resource
constraints and lack of trained personnel preclude the division from
making regular inspections of industry. Accident rates in local
industry do not appear to be high, and the key bauxite industry has an
outstanding safety record. However, there is no law authorizing workers
to refuse to work in circumstances they deem unsafe. They must appeal
to the inspectorate to declare the workplace situation unsafe.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The only laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons are old ``white slavery laws'' that are
enforced only rarely.
There were credible reports of trafficking in women and girls for
prostitution. Women and girls from the interior are brought to the
capital city and also to various gold mining locations in the interior.
Several clubs in the capital also are known for recruiting women from
Brazil and the Caribbean. There were credible reports of individuals
using the country as a transit point to transport Brazilian women to
Europe and the United States for purposes of prostitution.
In addition alien smuggling organizations use the country as an
intermediate destination to smuggle Chinese nationals, including women
and girls, to the United States, where frequently they are forced into
bonded-labor situations.
__________
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Trinidad and Tobago, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, is a
parliamentary democracy in which there have been free and fair general
elections since independence from the United Kingdom in 1962. A
bicameral parliament and a prime minister govern the country.
Parliament elects a president, whose office is largely ceremonial. In
elections on December 11, voters returned the ruling United National
Congress (UNC) party led by Prime Minister Basdeo Panday to power with
19 seats in the 36-member Parliament. A 12-member elected House of
Assembly handles local matters on the island of Tobago. The judiciary
is independent but inefficient.
The Ministry of National Security controls the police service and
the defense force, which are responsive to civilian authority. An
independent body, the Police Service Commission, makes all personnel
decisions in the police service, and the Ministry has little direct
influence over changes in senior positions. Police and prison guards
committed some abuses.
Oil and natural gas production and related downstream petrochemical
industries form the basis of the market-based economy. The service
sector is the largest employer, although continued industrialization
has created many jobs in the construction industry. Agriculture, while
contributing only 2 percent to gross domestic product, remains an
important employer, both at the subsistence and commercial level.
Although per capita income is approximately $5,700 annually, 12.5
percent unemployment contributes to a skewed income distribution, which
has not improved despite economic growth of 6.7 percent. Government
efforts to address this problem by further diversification into
manufacturing and tourism have been only partially successful.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Nonetheless, police and guard abuse
of prisoners, poor prison conditions, long delays in trials, and
extensive violence against women remain problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In the December 31, 1999, murder of politician Hanraj Sumairsingh,
which some thought might have had a political motivation, the police
arrested and charged a member of Jamat al Muslimeen, a radical group.
However, bribery and corruption were believed to be motives behind the
killing.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them; however, there were credible
reports of police and prison personnel abusing prisoners in incidents
that involved beating, pushing, and verbal insults.
A 1999 ruling permits corporal punishment for certain crimes,
including aggravated assault, rape, deliberate shooting, and robbery
with violence. During the year, the courts sentenced 5 persons to
corporal punishment (ranging from 5 to 10 birch strokes) in addition to
prison terms. The law also was changed to increase the corporal
punishment for rape from 15 strokes to 20.
Prison conditions at the women's prison and two of the three men's
prisons meet minimum international standards. However, conditions are
worse in the Port of Spain prison, which dates from the 1830's. It was
designed for 250 inmates but houses about 1,000. Diseases such as
chicken pox, tuberculosis, AIDS, and other viruses spread easily, and
prisoners generally must purchase their own medication. Overcrowding is
a problem for the entire prison system, which housed 4,700 inmates in
prisons built to accommodate 1,800. A new maximum security prison
opened in 1998 houses about 850 prisoners, but it is not yet fully
functional. With an eventual capacity of 2,100, this prison is expected
to help alleviate the problem.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government generally
observes this prohibition.
A police officer may arrest a person either based on a warrant
issued or authorized by a magistrate or without a warrant when the
officer witnesses commission of the alleged offense. For less serious
offenses, the authorities typically bring the accused before a
magistrate within 24 hours; for indictable offenses, the accused must
appear within 48 hours. At that time, the magistrate reads the charge
and determines whether bail is appropriate. Magistrates may deny bail
to violent or repeat offenders. If for some reason the accused does not
come before the magistrate, the case comes up on the magistrate's
docket every 8 to 10 days until a hearing date is set. The courts
notify persons of their right to an attorney and allow them access to
an attorney once they are in custody and prior to any interrogation.
However, the authorities do not always comply with these standards.
Allegations of corruption among justices of the peace also raised
concerns about compliance; the Government pledged to dismiss and
prosecute any justice found to have violated these standards (see
Section 1.e.).
The Minister of National Security may authorize preventive
detention in order to prevent actions prejudicial to public safety,
public order, or national defense, and the Minister must state the
grounds for the detention. A person detained under this provision has
access to counsel and may have the detention reviewed by a three-member
tribunal established by the Chief Justice and chaired by an attorney.
The Minister must provide the tribunal with the grounds for the
detention within 7 days of the detainee's request for review, which
shall be held ``as soon as reasonably practicable'' following receipt
of the grounds. There have been no reports that the authorities abused
this procedure.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process.
After the Chief Justice warned in 1999 that the executive branch was
encroaching upon judicial independence, the Government appointed two
independent commissions to review the issue. A Commonwealth commission
concluded that the judiciary was not threatened by the Attorney
General's involvement in judicial administration; however, a law
association group recommended that executive requests should be handled
by the Prime Minister, not the Attorney General.
The court system consists of a court of appeal, a high court, and a
magistrate's court. A criminal offense first is sent to a magistrate's
court for a preliminary inquiry to determine if it can be heard before
a magistrate without a jury. If the magistrate determines that the
offense is a serious one, it is referred to the High Court, where it is
heard before a judge and jury. All civil matters are heard by the High
Court. Appeals can be filed with the local court of appeal and
ultimately to the Privy Council in London. There is considerable
support for abolishing appeals to the Privy Council and establishing a
Caribbean Court of Justice, located in Trinidad and Tobago, to serve as
the final court of appeal.
An October decision of the Privy Council ruled that all death row
prisoners throughout the Caribbean have a right to be heard before its
Mercy Committee, which can stay death sentences. The Council decided
that prisoners should be given access to all material put before the
Mercy Committee. In addition procedures followed by the Mercy Committee
now can be subject to judicial review.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right. All criminal
defendants have the right to an attorney. In practice the courts
sometimes appoint attorneys for those persons charged with indictable
offenses (serious crimes) if they cannot retain one on their own
behalf. The law requires a person accused of murder to have an
attorney. An indigent person may refuse to accept an assigned attorney
for cause and obtain a replacement.
Despite serious efforts to improve the judiciary, severe
inefficiency remains in many areas. Several criminal cases were
dismissed due to judicial or police inefficiency. Despite significant
progress, lengthy trial delays remain a serious problem.
The Government continued to take steps against corruption in the
criminal justice system. Over a 2-year period, the authorities charged
at least 80 persons with various offenses after a presidential
commission's investigation found collusion among justices of the peace,
bailiffs, and police officers in the granting and fixing of bail. The
Government revoked the licenses of 25 justices of the peace. However,
at year's end, the charges brought against these individuals were still
before the court. Only one of those indicted as a result of the
commission's inquiry had come to trial. In that case, a court convicted
one of the justices of the peace and sentenced him to 4 years'
imprisonment.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects this
right in practice. An independent press and a functioning democratic
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
The three major daily newspapers freely and often criticize the
Government in editorials. Widely read weekly tabloids tend to be
extremely critical of the Government. All newspapers are privately
owned. The two local television newscasts, one of which appears on a
state-owned station, are sometimes critical of the Government but
generally do not editorialize.
Over the past several years, the Media Association of Trinidad and
Tobago and the Publishers' Association have expressed concern about
media treatment and access to the Government. For its part, the
Government sometimes charges unfair treatment by the media, which the
press views as unwarranted criticism. When the Prime Minister labeled
Ken Gordon, head of a major media corporation, a ``pseudo-racist'' for
editorials about the rise of the ruling UNC party, Gordon filed suit
for libel. In November a court found the Prime Minister guilty of libel
and ordered him to pay damages to Gordon.
A Board of Film Censors is authorized to ban films that it
considers to be against public order and decency or contrary to the
public interest. This includes films that it believes may be
controversial in matters of religion or race, or that contain seditious
propaganda. In practice films rarely are banned.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice. The police routinely grant the required advance
permits for street marches, demonstrations, or other outdoor public
meetings. In 1998 the Government amended the Summary Offences Act to
put greater controls on holding public rallies. The amendments require
that permits for public meetings and rallies be applied for 48 hours in
advance instead of 24 hours, and make it an offense to hold a public
meeting without a permit under the guise of conducting an exempted
religious, educational, recreational, or sports function. In practice
the amendments have not restricted unduly public meetings,
demonstrations, or exempted events. One planned political youth
demonstration was postponed when the police denied a permit due to
concerns about size and safety.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Registration or other
governmental permission to form private associations is not required.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
In October Parliament passed an Equal Opportunities Bill that
prohibits acts that offend or insult another person or group on the
grounds of race, origin, or religion, or which incite racial or
religious hatred. In November Parliament passed a separate bill that in
part removed certain legal provisions interfering with the religious
practices of the Spiritual Shouter Baptist and Orisa faiths.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
There is no provision for persons to claim or be classified as
refugees or asylum seekers; the Ministry of National Security's
Immigration Division handles any such requests on a case-by-case basis.
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Parliamentary elections are held at intervals not
to exceed 5 years. Elections for the 12-member Tobago House of Assembly
are held every 4 years. The Constitution extends the right to vote to
citizens as well as to legal residents at least 18 years of age who are
citizens of other Commonwealth countries.
In the 1995 general elections, the former opposition UNC and the
ruling People's National Movement (PNM) each won 17 seats in the 36-
member Parliament. The National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) won
two seats and joined with the UNC to form a new government. Basdeo
Panday became the country's first Prime Minister of East Indian
descent. The PNM is primarily but not exclusively Afro-Trinidadian; the
UNC is primarily but not exclusively Indo-Trinidadian. In general
elections in December, voters returned Prime Minister Panday and his
UNC party to power with a 19-seat majority. The PNM won 16 seats and
the NAR 1 seat. Election observers noted that the elections were
wellorganized, peaceful, free, and fair. Several recounts were
requested and proceeded without incident. By year's end, opposition
challenges to election results in two districts had not yet been
decided.
There are no specific laws that restrict the participation of women
or minorities in government or the political parties. Women hold many
positions in the Government and political party leadership but are
still under-represented. Four of 36 elected members of the House of
Representatives and 9 of 31 appointed Senators are women, with 2 women
serving as ministers. Prime Minister Panday appointed the first woman
to serve as Attorney General; she since has moved to the position of
Minister of Education. Prime Minister Panday also appointed the first
female acting Prime Minister.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. While government officials are cooperative, the
Government has bitterly attacked Amnesty International's criticism of
prison conditions and due process. An independent Ombudsman receives
complaints relating to governmental administrative issues and
investigates complaints of human rights abuse. The Ombudsman can make
recommendations but does not have authority to force government offices
to take action.
The Government sought to curtail appeals by death row inmates to
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the U.N.
Human Rights Committee. In 1999 it withdrew from the IACHR following
its required 1-year notice. The Government also withdrew from the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, but reacceded with the reservation that the U.N. Committee
would not have jurisdiction over death penalty cases.
The Government's moves were prompted by a Privy Council ruling that
failure to execute a condemned prisoner within 5 years of sentence
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Constitution. To meet this 5-year deadline, the Government established
time limits for appeals to courts and human rights bodies. Local
appeals are now disposed of within an average of 16 months compared
with the previous average of 7 years.
The Government asked the IACHR and the U.N. Committee each to agree
to dispose of petitions within 8 months. According to the Government,
both bodies responded that they could not provide such assurances. The
Government stated that the conflict between a binding Privy Council
ruling and its obligations to the human rights organs had to be
resolved in favor of the Constitution and the Privy Council. The
Government indicated that it would execute condemned prisoners who have
exhausted all their appeals and have unresolved petitions pending more
than 8 months before one of the human rights bodies.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Government respects in practice the constitutional provisions
for fundamental human rights and freedoms for all without
discrimination based on race, origin, color, religion, or sex. In
October Parliament passed an Equal Opportunities Bill that makes
discrimination illegal on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, religion,
marital status or disability. It also establishes a commission to
investigate cases of alleged discrimination and a tribunal to judge
complaints.
Women.--Physical abuse of women continued to be an extensive
problem. There has been increased media coverage of domestic abuse
cases and signs of a shift in public opinion, which held that such
cases were a private matter. The Government has taken action to improve
aid to victims. Murder, rape, and other crimes against women are
reported frequently; 30 percent of all female homicide victims were
believed to have been killed by their husbands or lovers. Rape, spousal
abuse, and spousal rape are criminal offenses. The 1991 Domestic
Violence Act was intended to facilitate court-issued restraining orders
to protect victims and extended protection to common-law relationships,
a frequent form of marital union. However, some observers say that the
number of restraining orders issued has not increased at the rate
expected since the enactment of the law. The establishment of a
community police division improved police responsiveness to reports of
domestic abuse, but some police officers are reported to be
unsympathetic or reluctant to pursue such cases, resulting in
underreporting of crimes of violence against women. There were more
than 4,000 complaints of spousal abuse during the year; police handled
an average of 9 cases a day that led to reports by victims, with the
actual incidence of such abuse considered to be much higher. Two
government ministries, operating independently, direct the
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that run most of the country's
social programs addressing domestic violence, including five shelters
for battered women. A rape crisis center offers counseling for rape
victims and perpetrators on a voluntary basis. A government-sponsored
hot line receives about 300 calls per month.
In 1999 a new Domestic Violence Act came into effect. That law
strengthened provisions of the 1991 law and allows easier access for
police in instances of domestic violence. Parliament approved
amendments to the Sexual Offences Act that broaden the definition of
sexual offenses, increase the punishment for such crimes, and require
the police to keep a register of sexual offenders.
Many women hold positions in business, the professions, and
government, but men tend to hold the most senior positions. There is no
law or regulation requiring equal pay for equal work; during the year,
a bill containing such provisions was introduced into Parliament, but
no action was taken on it.
The Division of Gender Affairs in the Ministry of Culture and
Gender Affairs is charged with protecting women's rights in all aspects
of government and legislation. Several active women's rights groups
also exist.
Children.--The Government's ability to protect children's welfare
is limited by a lack of funds and expanding social needs. Education is
free and compulsory through primary school. Some parts of the public
school system seriously fail to meet the needs of the school age
population due to overcrowding, substandard physical facilities, and
occasional classroom violence by gangs. There is no societal pattern of
abuse directed at children. The Domestic Violence Act provides
protection for children abused at home. Abused children are usually
placed with relatives if they are removed from the home. If there is no
relative who can take them, there are several government institutions
and NGO's that accept children for placement.
People with Disabilities.--There is no legislation that
specifically enumerates or protects the rights of disabled persons or
mandates the provision of access to buildings or services, although
NGO's lobbied Parliament to pass such legislation. The lack of access
to transportation, buildings, and sidewalks is a major obstacle for the
disabled. The Government provides some public assistance and partial
funding to a variety of NGO's which, in turn, provide direct services
to disabled members or clients.
Indigenous People.--Members of a very small group in the population
identify themselves as descendants of the original Amerindian
population of the country. They maintain social ties with each other
and other aboriginal groups and are not subject to discrimination.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Various ethnic and religious
groups live together peacefully, generally respecting one another's
beliefs and practices. However, at times racial tensions appear between
Afro-Trinidadians and Indo-Trinidadians. Each group comprises about 40
percent of the population. The private sector is dominated by Indo-
Trinidadians and people of European, Middle Eastern, or Asian descent.
Indo-Trinidadians also predominate in agriculture. Afro-Trinidadians
tend to find employment in disproportionate numbers in the civil
service, police, and military. Some Indo-Trinidadians assert that they
are excluded from equal representation in the civil service due to
racial discrimination. Since Indo-Trinidadians constitute the majority
in rural areas and Afro-Trinidadians are in the majority in urban
areas, competition between town and country for public goods and
services often takes on racial overtones.
In 1996 there were reports that several popular recreational clubs
refused entry to Afro-Trinidadians and dark-skinned Indo-Trinidadians.
The reports led to criticism of racism by the local press, and the
Government pledged to implement a law banning racial discrimination in
entry policies for private clubs. However, the Government has not yet
taken such action.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1972 Industrial Relations Act
provides that all workers, including those in state-owned enterprises,
may form or join unions of their own choosing without prior
authorization. Union membership has declined in recent years, with an
estimated 25 to 30 percent of the work force organized in 19 active
unions. Most unions are independent of the Government or political
party control, although the Sugar Workers' Union historically was
allied with the UNC. The Prime Minister formerly was president of the
Sugar Workers' Union.
The law prohibits antiunion activities before a union is registered
legally, and the Ministry of Labor enforces this provision when it
receives a complaint. A union also may bring a request for enforcement
to the Industrial Court. All employees except those in ``essential
services,'' which include the police and many other government
employees, have the right to strike.
The Labor Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and
provides for grievance procedures if needed. A special section of the
Industrial Court handles mandatory arbitration cases. Arbitration
agreements are enforceable and can be appealed only to the Industrial
Court. Most observers consider this court to be impartial; it consists
of government, business, and labor representatives.
Unions freely join federations and affiliate with international
bodies. There are no restrictions on international travel or contacts.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Industrial
Relations Act establishes the right of workers to collective
bargaining. The Ministry of Labor's conciliation service maintains
statistical information regarding the number of workers covered by
collective bargaining agreements and the number of antiunion complaints
filed.
The Industrial Court may order employers who are found guilty of
antiunion activities to reinstate workers and pay compensation, or it
can impose other penalties including imprisonment. When necessary the
conciliation service also determines which unions should have senior
status.
There are several export processing zones (EPZ's). The same labor
laws apply in the EPZ's as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not
prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor, but there were no
reports that it was practiced. There were also no reports of forced or
bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum legal age for workers is 12 years. Education
is compulsory through primary school. Children from 12 to 14 years of
age may work only in family businesses. Children under the age of 18
legally may work only during daylight hours, with the exception of 16-
to 18-year-olds, who may work at night in sugar factories. The
probation service in the Ministry of Social Development and Family
Services is responsible for enforcing child labor provisions, but
enforcement is lax. There is no organized exploitation of child labor,
but children are seen begging or working as street vendors. The
Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1998 Minimum Wages Act
established a minimum wage of about $1.10 (TT$7.00) per hour. The
minimum wage is not sufficient to support a worker and family, but most
workers earn more than the minimum. The Ministry of Labor enforces the
minimum wage regulations.
The Minimum Wages Act also established a 40-hour workweek, time-
and-one-half pay for the first 4 hours of overtime on a workday, double
pay for the next 4 hours, and triple pay thereafter. For Sundays,
holidays, and off days, the act also provides for double pay for the
first 8 hours and triple pay thereafter. Daily rest periods and paid
annual leave form part of most employment agreements.
The Factories and Ordinance Bill of 1948 sets requirements for
health and safety standards in certain industries and provides for
inspections to monitor and enforce compliance. The Industrial Relations
Act protects workers who file complaints with the Ministry of Labor
regarding illegal or hazardous working conditions. If it is determined
upon inspection that hazardous conditions exist in the workplace, the
worker is absolved for refusing to comply with an order that would have
placed him or her in danger.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--While there are no laws that
specifically address trafficking in persons, the illegality of such
acts is covered broadly in a variety of legislation dealing with
kidnaping, labor conditions, pimping and prostitution, slavery, and
indentured servitude. There were no reports of persons being trafficked
to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
URUGUAY
Uruguay is a constitutional republic with an elected president and
a bicameral legislature. In November 1999, voters elected Senator Jorge
Batlle of the Colorado party President, and he assumed office on March
1. In legislative elections in October 1999, the left-of-center Broad
Front coalition won approximately 40 percent of the vote in a four-
party race, thus constituting the largest congressional bloc. The two
traditional parties, the Colorados and the Blancos, which collaborate
in a coalition-style arrangement, together control over half of the
seats in the legislature. The judiciary is independent.
The Interior Ministry administers the country's police departments
and the prison system and is responsible for domestic security and
public safety. The military is responsible for external security within
the prison system. The civilian authorities exercise effective control
over the security forces. The police at times committed human rights
abuses.
The economy is a mixture of private and state enterprises and is
heavily dependent on agricultural exports and agroindustry. The leading
exports are meat, leather, and rice. The Government respects private
property rights. The unemployment rate was estimated at 14.4 percent in
November. The economy shrank by between 0.5 and 1 percent during the
year, following a decline of 3.2 percent in 1999. Annual per capita
income was about $6,348 in 1999.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary generally provide effective means
of dealing with individual instances of abuse. However, there were
problems in some areas, principally instances of police abuse and
mistreatment of detainees, poor prison conditions, and delays in the
justice system. Court cases sometimes last for many years, resulting in
lengthy pretrial detention. In August the President created a Peace
Commission to clarify what happened to about 160 persons who
disappeared for political reasons during the 1973-85 military
dictatorship. Violence against women and societal discrimination
against women and the black minority are problems. In September the
police arrested the leader of a small neo-Nazi group.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
The 1986 Amnesty Law prohibits criminal prosecution of members of
the security forces who perpetrated extrajudicial killings, torture,
and other abuses during the 12 years of military rule in 1973-85.
However, some victims and relatives of victims had success using the
civilian courts to seek redress.
In the case initiated in 1999 by the widow of a criminal suspect
who in 1998 died under suspicious circumstances while in police
custody, the court dismissed charges against the principal suspect.
Although an appellate court ordered the trial court to investigate the
causes of the criminal suspect's death, the judge and prosecutor
shelved the investigation.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Justice was pending in the
case of 12 former political prisoners and their families who sued the
Government for damages suffered as a result of their imprisonment,
torture, and in three cases death in custody during the military
dictatorship. Although in 1998 a trial-level court ordered the
Government to pay each plaintiff approximately $93,600 (1.17 million
pesos) in damages, an appellate-level court later reduced this award to
approximately $16,850 (210,600 pesos) per person for 11 of the cases
and $23,640 (295,500 pesos) for the other case. The plaintiffs have
appealed the appellate court's decision to the Supreme Court of
Justice.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
Although the 1986 Amnesty Law required the Government to
investigate the fate of those citizens who were detained and who then
disappeared during the dictatorship, the first three administrations
following the return to democracy consistently refused to do so. During
the year, the new Government for the first time undertook such an
effort.
On August 9, President Batlle created a Peace Commission in order
to clarify the fate of the approximately 160 Uruguayans believed to
have disappeared for political reasons during the dictatorship (115 in
Argentina, 36 in Uruguay, 6 in Chile, and 2 in Paraguay). The
Commission was charged with receiving and analyzing information
relevant to the disappeared persons. It is to prepare individual
summaries of its conclusions as to the fate of each person and to
recommend legal measures that the Government should adopt to compensate
the families of the victims and resolve the victims' legal status, such
as by declaring them legally dead. The Commission consists of six
members appointed by the President and operates under the supervision
of the office of the President. One retired military officer told the
press that ``hundreds'' of current and retired officers serving during
the period of military rule had adopted a pact of silence with regard
to the disappearances. Although the Commission was created for an
initial mandate of 120 days, in early December its mandate was extended
for an additional 4-month period.
Shortly after taking office, President Batlle personally intervened
to resolve one of the most high-profile cases of a disappeared person,
that of the granddaughter of Argentine poet Juan Gelman. By combining
information provided by Gelman with information obtained from other
sources, Batlle succeeded in locating the young woman, who had been
born in captivity in Uruguay to Gelman's daughter-in-law and adopted by
an Uruguayan family after her mother died in prison.
Since the 1986 Amnesty Law precludes criminal actions against
suspected participants in human rights violations during military rule,
some persons have sought justice in non-Uruguayan courts. In March
1999, Sara Mendez filed papers in an Argentine court formally accusing
five present and former members of the Uruguayan military with the 1976
kidnaping of her infant from her Buenos Aires home. The case remained
pending in Argentine courts and, during the course of the year, Mendez
gave testimony on several occasions. A DNA sample taken in May from a
young man believed possibly to have been Mendez' kidnaped son indicated
that he was not related to Mendez. An Italian prosecutor continued to
investigate charges brought in an Italian court in 1999 against four
present and former members of the military and one police officer
accused of responsibility in the disappearance of eight Italian-
Uruguayan dual nationals.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits brutal treatment of prisoners,
but the police continued at times to commit abuses. On occasion such
abuse resulted in forced confessions (see Section 1.d.).
The judicial and parliamentary branches of government are
responsible for investigating specific allegations of abuse. An
internal police investigative unit receives complaints from any person
concerning possible noncriminal police abuse of power, but it is
understaffed and only can issue recommendations for disciplinary
action. While the courts seldom convicted and punished law enforcement
officials for such abuse in the past, such prosecutions were occurring
more frequently. In the first 5 months of the year, the authorities
prosecuted approximately 40 police officers for a variety of crimes,
typically involving corruption, excessive use of force, or theft of
suspects' property. They brought homicide charges against one officer,
who shot and killed a neighbor who had a dispute with the officer's
brother-in-law.
Police officers charged with less serious crimes may continue on
active duty; those charged with more serious crimes are separated from
active service until a court resolves their cases. A 1999 Ministry of
Interior study reported that courts had investigated or convicted 179
police officers, and that 117 of these cases were linked directly to
the exercise of their jobs. The 1995 Public Security Law requires a
proportional use of force by the police and the use of weapons only as
a last resort, in accordance with U.N. codes regarding the use of
force.
Some torture victims and relatives of victims continued to use the
courts to seek redress for their grievances. A group of 12 former
political prisoners (and their survivors) appealed the decision of an
appellate court to reduce the award made by a trial court for the
damages that they suffered due to their imprisonment and torture (see
Section 1.a.).
Conditions in prisons for the approximately 4,450 prisoners remain
poor but not life threatening. A 1997 legislative human rights
commission report criticized the ``excessive use of force and abuse of
authority'' by prison guards and officials, and stated that sanitation
and health standards in the prison system were ``unacceptable.'' This
report reflected the work of a previous commission that in 1996
published a report to the Government citing overcrowding, lack of staff
training, corruption, and physical violence as problems. Prisoners
often find that they must supplement prison provisions with bedding,
medicines, and toiletries brought by friends or relatives. According to
press reports and a study conducted by SERPAJ, a nongovernmental
organization (NGO), HIV-positive inmates sometimes received inadequate
medical treatment. There were several incidents of prisoner unrest
during the year, including at least one hunger strike in which several
hundred prisoners demanded better prison conditions, but none were as
serious as the incidents of unrest that occurred in 1999.
Female prisoners are held in separate facilities from male
prisoners; most are held in a women's prison in Montevideo. Some
provincial prisons have separate facilities for their small number of
female prisoners. In general conditions for female prisoners are
significantly better than for male prisoners, in large part because of
the small number of female inmates.
Minors are held in institutions operated by the National Institute
for Minors (INAME). The most controversial aspect of the 1995 Public
Security Law would allow the Government to put minors with a record of
violent crimes in adult prisons if INAME has no room in its own
institutions. Even though the law stipulates that minors would occupy
separate facilities within the prisons, human rights groups adamantly
opposed this provision. As a result, INAME has decided that it will not
send minors to adult prisons. Juvenile offenders are separated
according to their gender, age, and the severity of their crime. Those
juveniles who commit serious crimes are incarcerated in juvenile
detention centers, which resemble traditional jails and have cells.
Conditions in these facilities are generally better than those in
ordinary jails, in part because they are less crowded. Juvenile
offenders who pose less of a threat to society are placed in halfway
house facilities, oriented toward rehabilitation, in which a group of
offenders lives together with adult counselors. These facilities
provide educational, vocational, and other opportunities, and the
juvenile offenders are able to enter and leave without restriction.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors,
although prisoner unrest, as well as the requirement to route all such
requests through the Ministry of Interior, at times caused delays.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
requires the police to have a written warrant issued by a judge before
making an arrest, and the authorities generally respect this provision
in practice. The only exception is when the police apprehend the
accused during commission of a crime. The Constitution also provides
the accused with the right to a judicial determination of the legality
of detention and requires that the detaining authority explain the
legal grounds for the detention. In June the President signed a new law
that obligates police officers to inform individuals of the reason for
their arrest. Police may hold a detainee incommunicado for 24 hours
before presenting the case to a judge, at which time the detainee has
the right to counsel. It is during this 24-hour period that police
sometimes abuse prisoners, occasionally resulting in forced confessions
(see Section 1.c.).
A 1980 law stipulates that police confessions obtained before a
prisoner appears before a judge and attorney (without the police
present) have no validity. Further, should a prisoner claim that he has
been mistreated, by law the judge must investigate the charge.
If the detainee cannot afford a lawyer, the courts appoint a public
defender. If the crime carries a penalty of at least 2 years in prison,
the accused person is confined during the judge's investigation of the
charges unless the authorities agree to release the person on bail
(which seldom happens). As a result, as of mid-year approximately 73
percent of all persons incarcerated were awaiting a final decision in
their case (compared with 68 percent in mid-1999). However, this
proportion used to be 90 percent; declines in recent years are due to
the Government's efforts to improve the functioning of the criminal
justice system. Because of the slowness of the judicial process, the
length of time prisoners spend in jail before the judge issues a
verdict may exceed the maximum sentence for their crime. The
uncertainty as to how long one will be imprisoned is a factor creating
tension within the country's prisons.
The Government does not use forced exile as a means of punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The Supreme Court heads the judiciary system and supervises the
work of the lower courts. A parallel military court system operates
under a Military Justice Code. Two military justices sit on the Supreme
Court but participate only in cases involving the military. Military
justice applies to civilians only during a state of war or
insurrection.
Trial proceedings usually are based on written arguments to the
judge, which are not made public routinely. Only the prosecutor and
defense attorney have access to all documents that form part of the
written record. The courts introduced oral argument in 1990, but
individual judges use it at their option. Most judges choose to retain
the written method, a major factor slowing the judicial process. There
is no legal provision against self-incrimination, and judges may compel
defendants to answer any question they pose. Either the defense
attorney or the prosecutor may appeal convictions to a higher court,
which may acquit the person of the crime, confirm the conviction, or
reduce or increase the sentence.
A 1997 law to reform and modernize the Criminal Code provides for
more oral argument by prosecution and defense attorneys, less
investigative responsibility for judges, and is expected to accelerate
the pace of criminal trials. Although the law was to take effect in
1998, budget constraints have resulted in repeated postponement of its
implementation, and it is not scheduled for implementation until 2004.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, but the authorities may abridge
these rights if persons are deemed to be inciting violence or
``insulting the nation.''
All elements of the political spectrum freely express their
viewpoints in both print and broadcast media.
Montevideo has 5 daily newspapers and 9 important weeklies; there
are also approximately 80 other weekly and a few daily newspapers
throughout the country. Montevideo has one government-affiliated and
three commercial television stations. There are about 150 radio
stations, 25 television stations, and 250 cable television stations in
the country.
A 1989 law stipulates that expression and communication of thoughts
and opinions are free, within the limits contained in the Constitution,
and it outlines methods of responding to ``inexact or aggravating
information.'' The law calls for 3 months' to 2 years' imprisonment for
``knowingly divulging false news that causes a grave disturbance to the
public peace or a grave prejudice to economic interests of the State''
or for ``insulting the nation, the State, or their powers.'' The
authorities use this law intermittently to set and enforce certain
limits on freedom of the press.
Human rights activists and journalists have alleged that state
enterprises such as the telephone and electric companies on occasion
have withheld advertising from independent media that are critical of
the Government and have favored media friendly to the Government with
extensive paid advertising.
In February Nery Colombo, a former local official seeking
reelection, shot and killed journalist and radio station owner Julio
Cesar da Rosa, after the latter suggested in a broadcast that the
former was unfit to run for public office. Colombo committed suicide
immediately after the killing. On the night of May 2, unknown
assailants shot at journalist and political activist Julio Cesar
Sanchez Padilla while he was driving his car. Sanchez was not injured,
and the authorities were unable to identify the perpetrators of, or a
motive for, the attack.
In August the press association criticized the newspaper
distributors' union for a 1-day refusal to distribute one newspaper
(see Section 6.a.).
The national university is autonomous, and the authorities respect
academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
In May, as in prior years, thousands of persons marched in memory
of the persons who disappeared during the rule of the dictatorship.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government grants refugee status in accordance with the 1951
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. The Government grants asylum only for political crimes as set
forth in the 1928 Treaty of Havana, the 1889 Treaty of Montevideo, and
the 1954 Caracas Convention. The Government cooperates with the office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government grants
first asylum in cases in which a refugee's claims are verified by the
UNHCR. The Government works actively with international organizations
in the provision of temporary protection to refugees from Colombia.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The country is a multiparty democracy with
mandatory voting for those 18 years of age or older, and there are no
suffrage restrictions regarding race, sex, religion, or economic
status. The Colorado party, the National (Blanco) party, the Broad
Front coalition, and the New Space party are the four major political
groupings.
Women and minorities are under-represented in politics and
government. None of the 13 cabinet ministers are women, and only 3 of
30 senators and 13 of 99 deputies are women. There are no female
justices on the Supreme Court. There has never been a black
parliamentarian or cabinet-level official except in July when, for the
first time, an Afro-Uruguayan elected as an alternate deputy
substituted in legislative sessions for an absent deputy for
approximately 10 days.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
cooperative and responsive to their views.
In August the President created a Peace Commission to clarify what
happened to the persons who disappeared for political reasons during
the 1973-85 military dictatorship (see Section 1.b.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and the law prohibit discrimination based on race,
sex, religion, or disability. Despite these provisions, discrimination
against some groups exists.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a serious problem. A
1999 Ministry of Public Health study projected that within 5 years,
domestic violence would constitute the second most prevalent threat to
public health, after traffic accidents. In a 1997 poll of 545 urban and
suburban households, 47 percent of respondents reported physical or
psychological abuse from their partners, with 23 percent reporting
severe abuse. The law provides for sentences of 6 months to 2 years in
prison for a person found guilty of committing an act of violence or of
making continuing threats to cause bodily injury to persons related
emotionally or legally to the perpetrator. The Montevideo city hall's
hot line for victims of domestic violence received about 4,500
complaints during the year, compared with 5,975 complaints in 1999.
Persons calling the hot line are provided counseling, free legal
advice, and may be referred to NGO's that can provide further social
services. A new law signed in June increased sentences for rape and
certain other sexually related crimes. The Criminal Code covers spousal
abuse and spousal rape, although criminal charges rarely are initiated
for those crimes. Similarly, although the law prohibits sexual
harassment in the workplace, few complaints are ever filed under this
provision.
The Government has established an office of assistance for victims
of domestic violence that trains police how to resolve complaints of
violence against women. A directorate within the Ministry of Interior
instituted a public awareness campaign about domestic violence and
founded community assistance centers where abuse victims receive
information and referrals to government and private organizations in
their area that aid abused women. Both the Ministry of Interior and
NGO's operate shelters in which abused women and their families can
seek temporary refuge.
Women enjoy equality under the law but face discrimination stemming
from traditional attitudes and practices. The work force exhibits
segregation by gender. Women, who make up almost one-half the work
force, tend to be concentrated in lower paying jobs. Women's salaries
average two-thirds those of men, a figure that reflects gradual
improvement in recent years with respect to pay equity. In 1999 about
60 percent of the students at the public university were women. Women
often pursue professional careers but are underrepresented in
traditionally male-dominated professions. In 1997 the Government
approved regulations to implement a 1989 law for equality in the
workplace that had previously gone unenforced, and it formed a national
commission for workplace equality that includes representatives from
the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Education and Culture, chambers
of commerce, and the umbrella labor organization. However, there never
have been any cases brought under the new regulations. There were 13
female cadets enrolled in the Air Force Academy's 75-member student
body, representing nearly a doubling of the female enrollment since
1999. Four female cadets are expected to receive commissions as pilots
or navigators in the air force during the year. The Army Military
Academy has 27 female cadets, out of a total enrollment of
approximately 225. The Naval Academy admitted its first female cadet
during the year.
A small institute in the Ministry of Education coordinates
government programs for women. There are a number of active women's
rights groups, and many of their activities remained centered on
followup to the platform of action of the 1995 U.N. Conference on
Women.
Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting
children's rights and welfare, and it regards the education and health
of children as a top priority. An institute in the Ministry of Interior
oversees implementation of the Government's programs for children but
receives only limited funding for programs. An estimated 40 percent of
children under the age of 5 live in the poorest 20 percent of homes.
The Government is attempting to extend proper health care and education
to them with the help of UNICEF. The Government provides free,
compulsory primary and secondary education, and 95 percent of children
complete their primary education. Girls and boys are treated similarly.
Free education is available through the undergraduate level at the
national university.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Minors under the
age of 18 are not subject to criminal trial but receive special
treatment with special judges and, when sentenced, stay in institutions
run by the National Institute for Minors for the period determined by
the judge. The INAME-run institutions emphasize the rehabilitation of
minors. INAME maintains an extensive network of programs, including
shelters for at-risk children. INAME also operates a confidential hot
line for children who are victims of domestic abuse.
A draft Code of the Child, intended to bring the law into
compliance with the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child, was introduced into the new legislative session during the
year. The previous legislative session ended before a prior version of
the bill could be enacted into law.
People with Disabilities.--A national disabilities commission
oversees implementation of a 1989 law on the rights of the disabled.
Although the law mandates accessibility for disabled persons only to
new buildings or public services, the Government is providing access to
a number of existing buildings. The law reserves 4 percent of public
sector jobs for the disabled. There is no governmental discrimination
against disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision
of other state services. The country has a generally excellent mental
health system and an interest in the rights of persons with mental
disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's black minority,
estimated at 5.9 percent of the population, continues to face societal
discrimination. A government study conducted in 1996-97 found that the
unemployment rate for blacks was 1.5 times the rate for whites. The
National Institute of Statistics found that blacks earn an average of
20 percent less than whites who perform the same job. According to a
recent study published by Mundo Afro (an NGO), the illiteracy rate
among black women is twice the national average, and the percentage of
black women who have pursued higher education is one-third the rate in
the population at large. According to the same study, one-half of Afro-
Uruguayan women work as household domestics. Blacks are practically
unrepresented in the bureaucratic and academic sectors.
Religious Minorities.--Isolated neo-Nazi elements have carried out
occasional, limited attacks and activities since 1997. Law enforcement
authorities have responded vigorously to such activities. In August
1999, an intensive police investigation resulted in the arrest of eight
members of a very small neo-Nazi group suspected of creating racist and
anti-Semitic Internet websites. The authorities charged five of the
suspects with subversive association; two also were charged with
inciting hate or violence towards a particular group. Pending the
court's final decision in the case, the defendants were released after
serving approximately 3 months of imprisonment, the minimum statutory
penalty for first offenders in cases of this nature. In September the
police arrested and charged with inciting racial hatred the leader of
another small neo-Nazi group believed responsible for pro-Nazi
propagandizing.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution states that laws
should promote the organization of trade unions and the creation of
arbitration bodies; however, there is almost no legislation concerning
union activities. Unions traditionally organize and operate free of
government regulation. Civil servants, employees of state-run
enterprises, and private enterprise workers may join unions. An
estimated 15 percent of the work force is unionized. Labor unions are
independent of political party control but traditionally have
associated more closely with the Broad Front, the leftist political
coalition.
The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike, and
there were numerous strikes during the year. The Government may legally
compel workers to work during a strike if they perform an essential
service which, if interrupted, ``could cause a grave prejudice or risk,
provoking suffering to part or all of the society.'' In June the
umbrella labor confederation PIT/CNT organized a 1-day general strike.
In December the PIT/CNT organized a second 1-day general strike to
protest the Government's 5-year austerity budget proposal.
In August after the newspaper El Pais printed a story reporting on
high costs charged by the newspaper distributors' union, the union
refused to distribute El Pais for 1 day in protest. The union asserted
that it was being blamed for the demise of newspapers, while the press
association called the protest an assault on freedom of the press.
There are mechanisms for resolving workers' complaints against
employers, but unions complained that these mechanisms sometimes were
applied arbitrarily. The law generally prohibits discriminatory acts by
employers, including arbitrary dismissals for union activity. Unions
maintain that organizers are dismissed for fabricated reasons, thus
allowing employers to avoid penalty under the law.
There are no restrictions on the right of unions to form
confederations or to affiliate with international trade union groups;
however, the one national confederation has chosen not to affiliate
officially with any of the world federations. Some individual unions
are affiliated with international trade secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining between companies and their unions determines a number of
private sector salaries. The executive branch, acting independently,
determines public sector salaries. There are no laws prohibiting
antiunion discrimination, but a 1993 executive decree established fines
for employers engaging in antiunion activities. The law does not
require employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
However, in cases of legal challenges by union activists, courts tend
to impose indemnization levels that are higher than those normally paid
to dismissed workers.
Union members continued to file claims of discrimination with the
Ministry of Labor, which has a labor commission that investigates all
claims. In 1999 there were 16 claims of antiunion discrimination
submitted to the Ministry of Labor. (The Ministry's mediation service
received a total of 353 laborrelated complaints that year, of which it
successfully mediated 307 cases and failed to resolve 31 cases; 15
remained open at the end of that year. Nearly half of all complaints
related to workers' wages.) While there was no specific information on
the antiunion discrimination complaints, most were resolved through
rehiring the employee with full rights or compensation of the employee
(without being rehired). Most complaints are resolved within a few
months, but a few cases remained unresolved at year's end. Labor unions
have complained that some businesses have encouraged formation of
worker cooperatives, which serve to reduce their labor costs. Although
such cooperatives do not necessarily affect workers' social insurance
and other public benefits, they can reduce workers' job security and
result in a loss of seniority. They also weaken the power of trade
unions and of collective bargaining.
All labor legislation fully covers workers employed in special
export zones. There are no unions in any of these zones, but the few
workers in these zones are not in traditionally organizable
occupations.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Child Labor Code protects children; the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security is responsible for enforcing the law. Some
children work as street vendors in the expanding informal sector or in
the agrarian sector, which generally are regulated less strictly and
where pay is lower; however, illegal child labor is not a major
problem. By law minors under the age of 14 may not be granted
permission to work, and this is enforced in practice. Minors between
the ages of 14 and 15 are granted permission to work only in extremely
rare circumstances and even then usually only to work with other
members of their families. Minors between the ages of 15 and 18 require
government permission to work, and such permission is not granted for
dangerous, fatiguing, or night work.
Permission to work is only granted to minors who have completed 9
years of compulsory education or who remain enrolled in school and are
working toward completing the period of compulsory education. A total
of 95 percent of children complete primary school education, which is
free and compulsory. Controls over salaries and hours for children are
more strict than those for adults. Children over the age of 16 may sue
in court for payment of wages, and children have the legal right to
dispose of their own income. In conjunction with an NGO, in March INAME
began a pilot program to pay families $83 (1,000 pesos) per month to
parents who take their children off the streets and send them to
school. This amount approximates what a child might earn working on the
street. On December 8, the Government created a National Committee for
the Eradication of Child Labor, which is to create a national action
plan to combat it.
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the
Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor
effectively enforces a legislated minimum monthly wage which is in
effect in both the public and private sectors. The Ministry adjusts the
minimum wage whenever it adjusts public sector wages. The minimum wage,
which was set in January at about $86 (1,060 pesos) per month,
functions more as an index for calculating wage rates than as a true
measure of minimum subsistence levels, and it would not provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The vast majority of
workers earn more than the minimum wage.
The standard workweek is 48 hours in industry and 44 hours in
commerce, with a 36-hour break each week. The law stipulates that
industrial workers receive overtime compensation for work in excess of
48 hours and that workers are entitled to 20 days of paid vacation
after a year of employment.
The law protects foreign workers and does not discriminate against
them. However, in order to receive official protection, the companies
that employ foreign workers must report them as employees. Many
workers--both native and foreign--work off the books and thus forfeit
certain legal protection.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Security enforces legislation
regulating health and safety conditions in a generally effective
manner. However, some of the regulations cover urban industrial workers
more adequately than rural and agricultural workers. Workers have the
right to remove themselves from what they consider hazardous or
dangerous conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that
persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
__________
VENEZUELA
Venezuela is a republic with an elected president and a unicameral
congress. The Constitution, which entered into effect on December 30,
1999, also provides for a ``Citizen Power'' branch of government, which
includes the Ombudsman, the Public Prosecutor, and the Controller
General, and an ``electoral power''--the National Electoral Council
(CNE). On July 30, voters reelected President Hugo Chavez Frias of the
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR). The MVR also won 92 seats in the 165-
member legislature. According to international observers, the year's
general elections were generally free and fair; however, there were
localized technical problems and irregularities, and the process
leading to the elections was a controversial and difficult one. The
date for the elections originally was set for May 28, but as that date
approached it became increasingly apparent that the CNE had failed to
organize the elections adequately. Constant changes to the voter
database--which both the opposition and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) alleged were intended to offer electoral advantage to President
Chavez's supporters--made it impossible to complete programming of the
electronic voting machines or carry out other necessary steps. The
Supreme Court ordered a delay and gave responsibility for setting the
new date to the National Legislative Committee (a panel serving as the
country's legislature pending election of the National Assembly). The
civilian judiciary is legally independent; however, it is highly
inefficient and sometimes corrupt, and judges are subject to influence
from a number of sources.
The security apparatus includes civilian and military elements,
both accountable to elected authorities. The Interior and Justice
Ministry controls the Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), which conducts
most criminal investigations, and the State Security Police (DISIP),
which is primarily responsible for investigating cases of corruption,
subversion, and arms trafficking. The Defense Ministry controls the
General Directorate for Military Intelligence, which is responsible for
collecting intelligence related to national security and sovereignty.
The National Guard, an active branch of the military, has arrest powers
and is largely responsible for guarding the exterior of prisons and key
government installations, maintaining public order, monitoring
frontiers, conducting counterdrug operations, and providing law
enforcement in remote areas. It also supplies the top leadership for
various state and municipal police forces, which fall under the
authority of the respective state governors or municipal mayors. The
Metropolitan Police is the main civilian police force in and around
Caracas. There was continued controversy during the year over the use
of the armed forces in traditionally nonmilitary roles in government
and society, including the appointment of military officers to high-
ranking government positions. Some 70,000 members of the military
continued to participate in a public works program begun in 1999,
including conducting a census of the unemployed; providing medical care
to the needy; renovating schools, playgrounds, and medical care
centers; and removing garbage. At year's end, 3 of the 14 members of
the President's Cabinet, including the Minister of Defense, were either
active or retired career military officers, as were the presidents of
the major state-owned corporations Petroleos de Venezuela, CITGO, and
Corporacion Venezolana de Guyana. There are also a number of military
officers in high and mid-ranking government positions in agencies
responsible for social development, public works, and finance. Both
police and military personnel were responsible for human rights abuses
during the year.
The country has abundant natural resources, and its per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) is $4,302. However, income is distributed
unevenly with approximately 80 percent of the population living at or
below the poverty line, which is $1,986 per capita. Oil accounted for
27 percent of GDP, 53 percent of government revenues, and 84 percent of
the country's exports during the year. Nonoil exports also are
dominated by natural resources, with some basic refining. Iron,
aluminum, steel, and petrochemical products together comprise nearly
half of the country's nonoil exports. The vast majority of all natural
resource extraction and production is done by entities owned and
operated wholly or in part by the Government. During the year, the
economy began to recover from its deepest recession in 10 years as oil
prices increased from historic lows to the highest prices since the oil
crises of the 1970's. Growth for the year is estimated at 3.2 percent;
the economy contracted by 6.1 percent in 1999.
The Government's human rights record remained poor in some areas;
although there were improvements in some areas, serious problems
remain. During the year, the police and military committed
extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects at an increased rate.
Excessive use of deadly force by police and security forces was a
serious problem; over 2,000 suspected criminals were killed in
shootouts with the police during the first 8 months of the year.
Investigations continued into the forced disappearances of criminal
suspects by the security forces. Torture and abuse of detainees
continued, and the Government failed to punish police and security
officers guilty of abuse. While overcrowding was reduced in some
prisons, prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh due to
underfunding, poorly trained and corrupt prison staff, violence, and
overcrowding in some prisons so severe as to constitute inhuman and
degrading treatment. Arbitrary arrest and detention increased. Lengthy
pretrial detention, and corruption and severe inefficiency in the
judicial and law enforcement systems also were problems. The Government
struggled to implement the Organic Criminal Procedures Code (COPP),
which required a major shift from a secretive inquisitorial system to
an open adversarial system; however, there were successes including a
reduction in the number of prisoners who had not been convicted of a
crime. The authorities suspended a number of judges for incompetence or
corruption. The December 1999 Constitution established civilian trials
for soldiers accused of abuses and committed the Government to the
rulings of international courts. Security forces committed illegal
searches. Concern over freedom of the press increased, and some critics
charged that the Government intimidated the media. Self-censorship was
reportedly widespread. Concern over freedom of association increased,
due in part to a Supreme Court ruling that could limit the legal rights
of some associations. The Government described some refugees as
``displaced persons in transit'' and restricted their ability to
request asylum. The new Constitution created a national Ombudsman, who
repeatedly and frankly advocated for the respect of human rights.
Violence and discrimination against women, abuse of children,
discrimination against the disabled, and inadequate protection of the
rights of indigenous people continue to be problems. Concern over labor
rights increased, and on December 3, voters approved a referendum to
``overhaul'' union leadership. Child labor persisted, and there were
reports of trafficking in children for forced labor. Killings due to
vigilante justice increased significantly.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of targeted political killings; however, the security forces
continued to commit extrajudicial killings, primarily of criminal
suspects, at significantly increased levels. The Venezuelan Program of
Action and Education in Human Rights (PROVEA), a highly respected human
rights NGO, documented 170 extrajudicial killings from October 1999
through September, compared with 101 killings from October 1998 to
September 1999. The killings involved summary executions of criminal
suspects, indiscriminate or excessive use of force, and death resulting
from mistreatment while in custody. According to PROVEA, state police
forces other than the Metropolitan Police were responsible for 82
killings; the Metropolitan Police were responsible for 25 killings; the
PTJ, 25 killings; the National Guard, 9 killings; the municipal police
forces, 8 killings; the army, 6 killings; the DISIP, 4 killings; and
other security forces, 11 killings. These figures reflect a range of
killings in very different situations committed by organizations with
varying levels of control and responsibilities. The majority of the
killings were attributed to various state and municipal police forces
that report to local officials and usually have little training or
supervision. Excessive use of deadly force was a problem; according to
the Government, over 2,000 suspected criminals were killed in shootouts
with the police during the first 8 months of the year. There are
reports that police fire on criminal suspects who disobey orders to
halt. Many politicians contributed to a climate of official acceptance
of the excessive use of force when, during the national election
campaign, they employed slogans such as ``bullets for the underworld''
and ``the only good criminal is a dead criminal.''
The perpetrators of extrajudicial killings act with near impunity,
as the Government rarely prosecutes such cases. The police often fail
to investigate crimes allegedly committed by their colleagues and
characterize incidents of extrajudicial killings as ``confrontations,''
even when eyewitness testimony and evidence strongly indicate
otherwise. In addition, the civilian judicial system still is
struggling to implement the new Organic Criminal Procedures Code and,
in the meantime, remains highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt (see
Section 1.e.). In the small number of prosecutions in which the courts
convict perpetrators of extrajudicial killings and other abuses, the
sentences issued are frequently light, or the convictions are
overturned on appeal. The December 1999 Constitution established that
trials for military personnel charged with human rights abuses would be
held in civilian courts; however, the provision does not apply to
military trials for cases that predate the new Constitution (see
Section 1.e.). Unlike common criminals, members of the security forces
charged with or convicted of crimes rarely spend much time in prison.
Red de Apoyo, an NGO, reported that on January 6, the Yaracuy state
police detained Jaime Hilarion Palima and Richard Lucambio on a city
street in San Felipe. Hilarion's and Lucambio's bodies were found 5
days later on a river bed and a highway, respectively. The case was
under investigation at year's end.
On April 8, the Metropolitan Police fired indiscriminately at a
group of individuals who had just seen them shoot and kill a suspected
criminal, and also killed one of the witnesses, Guillerma Colmenares.
The police also tortured another witness, Donis Ramirez (see Section
1.c.). The case was under investigation at year's end.
On June 30, the Metropolitan Police arrested Ronny Tovar, age 17,
Francisco Mister, age 14, and Luis Hernandez, age 21, in their homes.
Witnesses heard shots and saw the bodies of the three young men being
taken from the scene in a police vehicle. The bodies later were
recovered, and the case was under investigation at year's end.
Security forces committed some killings in prisons; however, the
majority of the 338 inmate deaths during the year resulted from gang
confrontations, riots, fires, and generally unsanitary and unsafe
conditions in prison facilities (see Section 1.c.).
The authorities continued to investigate allegations of human
rights violations by the military and security forces sent to Vargas
state in December 1999. The forces were sent to restore order after an
outbreak of looting following heavy rains, which triggered flooding and
landslides that killed an estimated 20,000 persons. Witnesses claim
that military and security forces beat, detained, and killed alleged
criminal suspects and other individuals between December 19 and
December 25, 1999 (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., and 4). On May 22,
Foreign Minister Jose Vicente Rangel stated that confirmed cases of
these abuses were ``numerous and important.''
For example, on December 25, 1999, National Guard Corporal Lorenzo
Badillo Cano shot and killed Luis Bastardo as he celebrated the
Christmas holiday on a street in La Guaira. The Prosecutor General,
with the cooperation of the PTJ and the National Guard, successfully
prosecuted Badillo, who pled guilty to murder and, on September 6, was
sentenced to 10 years in prison, less than the 15 to 25 years
established by law. The authorities also are investigating four
disappearance cases from the same time period in Vargas (see Section
1.b.).
There were no prosecutions for the June 1999 death of Jhon Linares,
who was detained by the Metropolitan Police and later was found dead
from three bullet wounds at the hospital, or Oswaldo Blanco, who died
in February 1999 due to abuse by the National Guard.
At year's end, the trial of a police officer for the February 1999
death of Angel Castillo Munoz was ongoing. Castillo died when Sucre
state police broke up a peaceful student demonstration; he was hit in
the head by a rubber bullet and fell unconscious into an area saturated
by tear gas. Police reportedly continued to fire, despite students'
attempts to surrender, resulting in a delay of medical care to the
injured students.
The PTJ made no progress in the investigation of the May 1998
killings of Carlos Alberto Colmenares Garcia, Richard David Palacios
Garcia, and Avelino Rafael Vega, who died after the Sucre municipal
police opened fire on their car. There has been no further
investigation into the January 1998 killings of Harold Michael Zambrano
Gonzalez and Arturo Jose Hernandez Ramirez by the Metropolitan Police.
There was no further information on the appeal by the prosecution
of a court's 1999 decision to exonerate a PTJ member implicated in the
1995 execution-style killing of 21-year-old Hector Rojas, despite
evidence of the officer's guilt.
On August 4, a court convicted two National Guardsmen and one
prison guard and sentenced them to terms ranging from 15 to 30 years in
prison for the 1996 deaths of 25 inmates in a fire started by prison
guards at La Planta prison.
In March the victims' families and the Government reached an out-
of-court settlement in the case of the 1992 killings of at least 63
prisoners at Catia prison.
In November 1999, before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
the Government accepted its responsibility in 44 cases of extrajudicial
killings by security forces during and after the civil unrest of
February-March 1989, in which some 300 alleged extrajudicial killings
were committed. The Government also agreed to compensate the families
of the victims and to identify and punish those responsible; however,
during the year there was considerable disagreement regarding
compensation, and an agreement had not been reached at year's end. The
Committee of Family Members of Victims of the Unrest had referred a
total of 45 cases to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) in 1995. In 1991 a police officer was found guilty of one
killing, but the courts released the officer from prison 1 year later.
In October 1997, the IACHR called on the Government to investigate this
case, provide compensation to the victim's family, and bring to justice
those responsible for the death. By year's end, the Government had
complied partially; it had investigated and made a payment, but it had
not punished any of those responsible.
Mob lynching of supposed criminals increased significantly due to
the public's perception of increased impunity resulting from the
difficult implementation of the COPP. The victims were almost always
known criminals who preyed on residents of poor neighborhoods. Between
October 1999 and September, PROVEA recorded 22 lynchings and 107
attempted lynchings, compared to 2 lynchings and 24 attempted lynchings
between October 1998 and September 1999. Vigilante groups known as
``brigadas'' continued to operate.
b. Disappearance.--The December 1999 Constitution prohibits forced
disappearance, obliges an individual to disobey an order to carry out a
disappearance, and provides for the prosecution of the intellectual
author of the crime. There were no reports of targeted political
disappearances; however, there were reliable reports of persons who
disappeared after being detained by the security forces at the end of
1999.
The authorities are investigating allegations that the military and
security forces carried out forced disappearances of alleged criminal
suspects and other individuals in Vargas state during a crackdown on
looters in December 1999. On December 21, 1999, army paratroopers
separately arrested Oscar Blanco Romero and Marco Monasterio without
explanation, in their homes in Caraballeda, Vargas state. Following the
filing of habeas corpus petitions, the army made a formal response in
which they acknowledged detaining the men but stated that they were
immediately turned over to the DISIP. The DISIP first stated that they
had no agents in the area at the time, then reversed that position, but
stated that they did not have Blanco and Monasterio in detention.
On December 21, 1999, army paratroopers beat and arrested Jose
Rivas Fernandez on a city street in Caraballeda, Vargas state,
according to reliable reports. The army command states that it did not
detain Rivas. On December 23, 1999, DISIP agents seized Roberto
Hernandez Paz in his uncle's home in La Guaira, Vargas state. The uncle
subsequently heard Hernandez plead to the security agents and a gunshot
coming from the family's garden. Neighbors witnessed the injured victim
being placed in a DISIP vehicle and driven away. The DISIP stated that
it did not arrest Hernandez. Neither individual had been located at
year's end; investigations into both cases continued.
The Government's investigation of the Vargas cases has been slow
and disorganized, and charges have been filed in only one case (see
Section 1.a.). The investigating team has been changed three times,
with each new team starting a new inquiry afresh. The Government has
been unable to compel the cooperation of the DISIP. In response to a
request to provide photographs of the agents who operated in Vargas at
the time of the disappearances, the DISIP supplied an album that
included photographs of retired agents, deceased officers, and
prisoners. Prosecutors also are investigating whether DISIP agents
broke any laws when they visited army paratroopers and asked questions
about army officers who had served in Vargas in December 1999. Since
investigation of the paratroopers is the responsibility of the
Prosecutor General and the army, the possibility that DISIP agents were
engaged in witness intimidation is under investigation. Human right
groups called for obstruction of justice charges to be brought against
the DISIP to compel its cooperation.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The new Constitution prohibits torture and the holding of
detainees incommunicado, provides for the prosecution of officials who
instigate or tolerate torture, and grants victims the right to
rehabilitation. Under the COPP, detainees have the right to a judicial
determination of the legality of their detention within 3 days, a
reduction from the previous 8-day period that human rights groups
argued was the principal time in which detainees were tortured (see
Section 1.d.); however, the security forces continue to torture and
abuse detainees physically and psychologically. Credible human rights
groups report that this abuse most commonly consists of beatings during
arrest or interrogation, but there have been incidents when the
security forces used near suffocation and other forms of torture that
leave no telltale signs. Most victims come from the poorest and least
influential parts of society.
PROVEA documented 429 cases of torture, beatings, and other abuse
from October 1999 through September, compared with 424 cases from
October 1998 through September 1999. According to PROVEA, the
Metropolitan Police of the Caracas federal district were responsible
for 94 of the reported incidents; other state police forces were
responsible for 147 incidents; the National Guard, 93 incidents; the
municipal police forces, 58 incidents; the DISIP, 22 incidents; the
army, 9 incidents; and the PTJ, 6 incidents. In April 1999, human
rights NGO's presented a report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture
in which they documented 120 torture cases since 1987 that they have
investigated and reported to the Prosecutor General and the National
Human Rights Commission, but that still have not been investigated
fully by the Government.
Torture, like extrajudicial killings, continues because the
Government does not ensure the independent investigation of complaints
needed to bring those responsible to justice. In addition to lack of
vigor by the judiciary, the fact that the Institute of Forensic
Medicine is part of the PTJ also contributes to a climate of impunity,
since its doctors are unlikely to be impartial in their examinations of
cases that involve torture by members of the PTJ. Very few instances of
torture have resulted in convictions.
On March 1, according to Red de Apoyo, the Zulia state police
arrested Jose Matheus in his home and accused him of involvement in a
kidnaping. The police held Matheus incommunicado for 11 days and
severely beat him and tortured him psychologically.
On April 8, the Metropolitan Police tortured and threatened to kill
Donis Ramirez if she spoke to the authorities. Ramirez had seen the
police fire indiscriminately at a group of individuals who had just
witnessed them shoot and kill a suspected criminal, also killing one of
the witnesses, Guillerma Colmenares (see Section 1.a.).
There was no prosecution for the August 1999 torture of Juan de la
Cruz Bravo by the PTJ in Guasdualito. Bravo, who had been accused of
murder, allegedly was drugged, beaten, and subjected to electrical
shock. There was also no prosecution for the March 1999 beating of
Andres Flores by the Metropolitan Police.
No action ever was reported against some 50 Baruta municipal police
officers who attacked residents of the poor working class Caracas
suburb of Petare in December 1997, injuring 43 persons. There was no
reported progress from the criminal court investigation or the internal
investigation by the chief of the Baruta municipal police.
The police used tear gas and pellet guns against peaceful
demonstrators, resulting in some injuries (see Section 2.b.).
In the Colombian border area where some constitutional protections
had been suspended since 1994, the National Guard and army acted with
near impunity until the suspension of the protections was lifted in
1999. Complaints against the security forces in this area subsequently
decreased. The Support Network for Justice and Peace has documented
many human rights abuses in this region by amassing detailed witness
testimony. There has been no resolution of the border area cases from
1995, in which members of the military, in separate incidents in
reaction to guerrilla attacks, tortured 23 rural workers near Cararabo
and 19 peasant farmers in La Victoria, both in Apure state. The
investigations into these incidents continued at year's end.
Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh due to
underfunding, poorly trained and corrupt prison staff and National
Guard members, violence, and overcrowding in some prisons so severe as
to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. During the year, the
prison population decreased to 84 percent of capacity, due to the
implementation of the COPP. However, because of the poor distribution
of inmates, approximately 40 percent of prisoners still are housed in
seriously overcrowded facilities.
The Government failed to provided adequate security in prisons,
resulting, according to PROVEA, in 338 deaths and 1,255 injuries from
violence in jails from October 1999 through September 2000--a decrease
from a total of 390 deaths and 1,695 injuries from violence between
October 1998 and September 1999. The majority of the 338 inmate deaths
resulted from prisoner-on-prisoner violence, especially during clashes
between rival gangs, riots, fires, and generally unsafe conditions in
prison facilities. Many others died as a consequence of poor sanitary
conditions, poor diet, and inadequate medical care. Security forces
committed a small number of the killings in prisons. Prisoners also had
false expectations with respect to the benefits of the COPP, which
resulted in increasing levels of tension and violence. Funding for
prisons remained extremely low, preventing significant improvement in
most penitentiaries.
Inmates often have to pay guards as well as each other to obtain
necessities such as space in a cell, a bed, and food. Because of the
prison food's low quality and insufficient quantity, only about 30
percent of inmates consume it. Most prisoners get their food from their
families, by paying prison guards, or in barter with other prisoners.
Many inmates also profit from exploiting and abusing others. This
problem is exacerbated by the absence of a rational system of prisoner
classification: convicted murders and rapists are housed with
unsentenced first-time petty offenders. Gang-related violence and
extortion is fueled by the substantial trafficking in arms and drugs
that occurs in the prisons.
Female prisoners are detained in separate prisons, where conditions
generally are better than those in the men's facilities. Security
forces and law enforcement authorities often detain minors together
with adults; however, separate facilities exist for juveniles. Because
reform institutions are filled to capacity, hundreds of children
accused of infractions are confined in juvenile detention centers where
they are crowded into small, filthy cells, fed only once a day, and
forced to sleep on bare concrete floors.
On August 31, the prison emergency, which had been declared on
September 30, 1999, was ended, and the Interinstitutional Commission
managing it was disbanded. Despite resistance from the Catholic Church
and NGO's, the Government sporadically used the National Guard,
normally charged with guarding the outside of the prisons, to maintain
internal control of the prisons.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
COPP provide for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; however,
the security forces routinely continued to arrest and detain citizens
arbitrarily at an increased rate.
There continued to be arbitrary detentions by the Metropolitan
Police of the federal district of Caracas, the DISIP, municipal police
forces, the National Guard, and the PTJ--especially during anticrime
sweeps in impoverished sections of major cities. The authorities
detained persons during the sweeps for up to 2 days while they checked
criminal records; most were released without charges. PROVEA documented
8,981 persons detained in sweeps from October 1999 through September,
an increase from the 6,236 persons detained in sweeps from October 1998
through September 1999.
Amnesty International reported that in September, police in
Valencia, Carabobo state, detained four transgendered persons, who were
held incommunicado for 2 days without food or drinking water (see
Section 5).
In December 1999, security forces arbitrarily detained suspected
looters in Vargas state (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., and 4).
The COPP states that a person accused of a crime cannot be
incarcerated during criminal proceedings unless that person is caught
in the act of committing a crime, or a judge determines that there is a
danger that the accused may flee or impede the investigation. Under the
previous system, the police could hold persons without an arrest
warrant for up to 8 days, and in many cases, the police abused
detainees physically and psychologically during that period and
illegally held them incommunicado (see Section 1.c.). The law provides
for the right to a judicial determination of the legality of the
detention within 72 hours. Persons accused of crimes must be brought
before a judge within 24 hours of arrest or be freed pending charges.
In early March, the Government announced that pretrial hearings would
be held on weekends to allow the authorities to process detainees in
accordance with the COPP's provisions, rather than release suspected
criminals. In no case can the detention of a person accused of a crime
exceed the possible minimum sentence for the crime committed, nor can
it exceed 2 years. Confusion over the new code still exists, and
arbitrary arrests continue to be common. Prison officials often
illegally demand payment from prisoners for transportation to judicial
proceedings. Those who are unable to pay often are forced to forgo
their hearings.
Before the COPP came into effect in 1999, roughly 70 percent of
prisoners had not been convicted of a crime because, under the old
procedural code, most criminal defendants were incarcerated rather than
granted provisional liberty while their prosecutions were pending. In
addition, the slow and secretive inquisitorial justice system of the
old code had led to an inefficient, overwhelmed, and corrupt justice
system, which resulted in cases languishing an average of 4 to 5 years
in the courts, during which time the accused usually remained in jail.
Under the COPP, prisoners accused of petty crimes who have not been
convicted but already have served 2 years or the minimum sentence
possible for that crime (whichever is lesser) are to be released if
they pass a psychiatric examination. During the year, approximately
9,000 prisoners were released under the new provisions and benefits
provided by the law. There were approximately 14,200 prisoners at
year's end, 45 percent of whom have not been convicted of a crime--a
decrease from 57 percent in 1999.
Prisoners carried out protests to demand that the Government
expedite the review of the cases of inmates who might benefit from the
COPP's provisions. While there were still some prisoners who had not
been convicted but already had served 2 or more years in prison,
prisoners also had false expectations with respect to the benefits of
the COPP, which resulted in tension and violence (see Section 1.c.).
Forced exile is illegal and is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The civilian judiciary is legally
independent; however, it is highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt,
and judges are subject to influence from a number of sources, including
the executive branch.
The judicial sector consists of the Supreme Court, which is the
court of final appeal; the Prosecutor General, who provides opinions to
the courts on prosecution of criminal cases and brings public employee
misconduct and violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners or
accused persons to the attention of the proper authorities; the
Ministry of Interior and Justice, which manages the national police
force, oversees the prisons, and files complaints in criminal courts;
and the executive directorate of the magistrate, which oversees the
lower courts as well as the selection and training of judges. The lower
court system includes district and municipal courts as well as trial
and appeal courts that deal with civil and criminal matters.
Both the old code and its 1999 replacement, the new Organic Code of
Criminal Procedures, provide for the right to a fair trial and consider
the accused innocent until proven guilty in a court. However, under the
old secretive inquisitorial code, the presumption of innocence was
ineffective in the justice system, which became overburdened,
inefficient, and corrupt under a paper-intensive, costly, and time-
consuming judicial process. Judges are underpaid, poorly disciplined,
and susceptible to political influence. The COPP introduced for the
first time open, public trials with oral proceedings and verdicts by
juries or panels of judges. This new adversarial system of justice
gives practical effect to the presumption of innocence and eliminates
the secret stage of trial that had existed in the previous system. It
also establishes the right to plead guilty and make reparation
agreements, a statute designed to clear the overburdened justice system
of simple cases and minor offenses. Lengthy delays in trials were still
common, although there has been some improvement.
The Government continued to struggle to implement the COPP, which
required a major shift in the fundamental concept of how justice is
carried out, the legal procedures involved, and the respective roles of
the police, the judge, and the lawyers. The police no longer may detain
persons arbitrarily for up to 8 days and now must work under the
supervision of a prosecutor; judges have ceased to be investigators and
are now arbiters of law; and prosecutors and defense attorneys confront
one another in open court. For the second year, open, oral trials took
place around the country despite a shortage of trained personnel and
resources. The COPP's successful implementation over the long term is
expected to require further progress, including increased training for
police and lawyers and a significantly increased number of prosecutors
and defenders to handle the workload.
The law provides for public defenders for those unable to afford an
attorney; however, there are not enough public defenders to handle the
caseload. The Executive Directorate of the Magistrature (DEM), which
replaced the Judicial Emergency Commission, reported that there are
approximately 275 public defense attorneys for the entire country.
The Government ended the Judicial Emergency created in 1999 to
bring about reform of the judicial system; however, significant
attempts to reform the judicial system continued. During the year, the
DEM--which oversees the selection, training, and discipline of judges--
removed 100 judges from office based on charges of incompetence or
corruption and suspended an additional 350 judges. Suspended judges
continued to receive salaries; however, some observers charged that
their right to appeal was restricted. The Government announced that it
expected to hold the first competitive examinations for judicial
vacancies, a process established under the COPP, in January 2001 in
Miranda and Vargas states. Judges with pending cases against them were
not eligible to take the examinations, and judges who had been
reprimanded had points deducted from their scores.
In July legal experts expressed concern about interference with the
independence of the judiciary when a politician close to the President
telephoned the Inspector General of the courts, Rene Molina, and asked
him to ``take care'' with the process to suspend a judge handling a
politically sensitive libel case against editor Pablo Lopez Ulacio (see
Section 2.a.). In August Molina resigned, claiming that he lacked the
political support needed to continue his duties.
The military courts implemented a similar reform of the military
justice system and are making the transition to the new system. The
December 1999 Constitution established that trials for military
personnel charged with human rights abuses would be held in civilian
courts; this represented a fundamental change in human rights policy.
However, the provision does not apply to military trials for cases that
predate the new Constitution. Human rights NGO's expressed concern that
the Supreme Court's selection of military judges from a list of
candidates provided by the Minister of Defense links the careers of
military judges to the high command, making them more responsive to the
views of their military leaders and influencing them to act slowly in
cases in which the military is implicated. As a result, military judges
trying human rights cases that predate the new Constitution can be
subject to improper influence, and offenders might evade punishment for
extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Constitutional provisions prohibit arbitrary
interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence; however,
the security forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Security
forces often conducted searches of homes without warrants, especially
during anticrime sweeps in impoverished neighborhoods. There were no
complaints during the year by human rights NGO's of illegal wiretapping
by the security forces.
In April DISIP announced that it had dismissed some 50 agents for
engaging in illegal wiretapping of other government agencies. In July
during a dialog the DISIP held with the national Ombudsman's office and
NGO's about a proposed restructuring of the National Intelligence
System (which was not carried out at year's end), the agency stated
that it had files on 1 in every 19 citizens (or 520,000 individuals).
During the campaign for the July 30 elections, DISIP agents
searched offices of an opposition governor, despite a 1999 promise by
President Chavez that the DISIP would not be used for political
operations (see Section 3).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and while the Government generally
respects these rights in practice, some media critics charge that the
Government intimidates the media and report that self-censorship is
widespread. Individuals and the media freely and publicly criticize the
Government; however, concern over freedom of the press increased during
the year. A provision in the December 1999 Constitution states that all
persons have the right to ``timely, truthful, and impartial''
information, without censorship. This ``truthful information'' article
has raised concerns among many in the domestic and international media
that it could be used by the Government to censor or intimidate the
press. In April the governor of Apure state issued a decree requiring
``true information'' within the state. There were immediate protests,
and the governor withdrew the decree. Also in April, officials of the
National Electoral Council stated that the Council was considering
possible regulations governing the publication of political polls.
There were strong protests from the media, and no regulation or
legislation ever was proposed formally.
There were numerous allegations of inappropriate government
pressure against the media. In January the DISIP questioned two
reporters from the daily El Nacional about articles they had written
about beatings and extrajudicial killings in Vargas in December 1999
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). A subpoena was issued that required one
reporter to name her sources. She was threatened with imprisonment or
fines for noncompliance; however, no action was taken against her when
she refused to provide the information. In May the television program
24 Hours, hosted by Napoleon Bravo on the Venevision station, was
canceled. Bravo charged that government pressure was to blame;
government and network officials denied the accusation. Individual
journalists and editors have reported receiving intimidating or
threatening phone calls.
The Constitution also provides for the ``right to reply'' for
individuals who believe they are portrayed inaccurately in media
reports. President Chavez demanded a right to reply on several
occasions. However, certain individuals named by the President in his
weekly national radio show have complained that they have not been
granted the right to reply.
In September a court dismissed a long-running criminal defamation
suit against a journalist and editor of the monthly magazine Exceso.
The Inter-American Press Association had protested the case, in which
it was alleged that a businessman who was the subject of a critical
article in Exceso used improper influence over the judiciary to
retaliate against the magazine. A separate criminal defamation suit,
against weekly newspaper La Razon, continued at year's end; the
International Committee to Protect Journalists has protested this case.
On July 8, a judge ordered Pablo Lopez Ulacio, the editor of La Razon,
placed under house arrest for failure to appear in court to answer
libel charges brought against him by Tobias Carrero Nacar, a
businessman and friend of President Chavez. In the spring, La Razon
published articles that alleged that Luis Miquilena, president of the
National Legislative Committee (CLN), had influenced improperly
insurance contracts to Carrero. The DEM sanctioned the judge who issued
the house arrest order, and he eventually recused himself from the
case. In July legal experts expressed concern about interference with
the independence of the judiciary when a politician close to the
President telephoned the Inspector General of the courts, Rene Molina,
and asked him to ``take care'' with the process to suspend the judge
(see Section 1.e.). Lopez was released from house arrest after 1 week;
however, a new arrest order was issued, and Lopez went into hiding.
Because of the lengthy process and considerable legal costs, both
lawsuits have been interpreted by some observers as examples of the use
of criminal defamation or libel lawsuits, or the threat of such
lawsuits, to intimidate journalists and discourage investigative
journalism.
There were no reports of government-sponsored attacks on
journalists; however, several journalists were assaulted physically or
verbally for what appear to have been political motives. Some observers
assert that President Chavez's aggressive rhetoric in criticizing the
media as having portrayed him unfairly has contributed to a climate of
intimidation and hostility toward the media that encourages such
attacks. At one presidential press conference in Maracay in March,
reporters refused to ask President Chavez questions in protest of what
one termed ``the President's constant attacks against the media.''
During a May 1 campaign march by President Chavez, some partisans
attending the campaign chanted slogans that characterized reporters as
``traitors'' and ``enemies,'' pushed or hit journalists, and attempted
to destroy their equipment. President Chavez later condemned these
assaults. In February anonymous leaflets were distributed throughout
the Caracas subway that criticized journalists as ``enemies of the
revolution'' and named certain prominent journalists.
In September 1999, government officials complained that
international media coverage of events was unfair, and some made
allegations of ``an international media conspiracy.'' Also during that
month, a small group of activists occupied the offices of the
Associated Press in protest of the news service's supposed
antigovernment stance. A regional radio station alleged that state
security agents searched its offices in what the radio viewed as an
effort to intimidate.
Instances of bomb threats--and on two occasions in December 1999,
discoveries of small explosive devices in or near newspaper buildings--
have contributed to what some journalists have called ``a climate of
intimidation'' of the media. In February the Venezuelan Press
Association publicly commented on the deteriorating situation for press
freedom in the country.
There is no statutory censorship. The Government has tools to
influence the press, such as licensing requirements for journalists,
broadcast licensing concessions for television and radio stations, and
lucrative public sector advertising. However, in practice, the media
environment is free and open, although some journalists believe that
self-censorship is becoming more widespread. Few newspapers regularly
publish editorials that reflect the view of the newspaper, but signed
articles on opinion pages carry abundant and varied perspectives, often
highly critical of the Government. Radio and television stations do not
broadcast overt institutional political opinions, although opinion and
talk shows are common.
A 1994 law requires practicing journalists to have journalism
degrees and be members of the National College of Journalists. These
requirements are waived for foreigners and for opinion columnists, on
the grounds of tolerance of free speech. Media owners challenged the
law in November 1995, but the Supreme Court still had not ruled on this
matter at year's end.
Print and electronic media are independent. There are state
television and radio stations whose directors are named by the
President but whose broadcast policies are autonomous. The Government
financed and published the newspaper The President's Post during the
first 6 months of the year. The President has a weekly call-in radio
show on state-run Radio Nacional. At the President's discretion, his
speeches or other public appearances may be declared a ``national
broadcast.'' All television and radio stations are required by law to
preempt scheduled programming and transmit the national broadcasts in
their entirety (on occasion, 2 or more hours) instead. A documentary-
style ``news program,'' varying in length from 5 to 15 minutes,
produced by the President's staff, began airing in June. The program,
which focuses heavily on the activities of the President and the
Government, is produced one or more times a week. It is broadcast
before regularly scheduled evening news programs. Like the national
broadcasts, by law every television station must broadcast these
programs.
The International Association of Broadcasting and domestic media
figures criticized provisions of a telecommunications law enacted in
June. The parts of the law related to broadcast content and frequency
concessions were particularly controversial. Article 209 establishes
that the President, ``when he judges it convenient to the interests of
the nation, or when required for reasons of public order or security,
can suspend telecommunications broadcasts, in conformity with the
Constitution.'' Some observers believe that this article might allow
the suspension of media broadcasts for vague and arbitrary reasons.
In April Monsignor Baltazar Porras, the president of the Roman
Catholic Episcopal Conference of Venezuela (CEV), publicly criticized
the Government regarding a lack of electoral transparency, growing
social instability, and the supra-constitutional activities of the CLN.
Following these criticisms, the press reported that DISIP videotaped a
Mass said by Monsignor Porras. The Director of DISIP immediately
apologized, the agent was suspended, and the national Ombudsman's
office opened an investigation of the incident. Bishops also reported
receiving telephone threats during the CEV's assembly. In October the
governor of Merida state announced that he had made a formal request to
the public prosecutor to begin a criminal investigation of Monsignor
Porras for alleged financial irregularities relating to the Church's
administration of a publicly funded hospital. Because Monsignor Porras
has criticized the Government, some observers interpreted the
investigation as retaliation for that criticism.
There is no state censorship of books, films, or other media
products. Internet access is completely free and uncontrolled.
The Government traditionally has respected academic freedom;
however, there have been isolated allegations that individual
professors at state universities have been removed or warned of
possible removal from their academic positions because of outspoken
political views.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. Public meetings, including those of
all political parties, generally are held unimpeded. The Government
requires permits for public marches but does not deny them for
political reasons.
The December 1999 Constitution prohibits the use of firearms to
control peaceful demonstrations; however, as in previous years, some
demonstrations turned violent and were quelled by security forces.
According to PROVEA, no persons were killed, but 139 persons were
injured during demonstrations from October 1999 through September,
compared with 2 persons killed and 77 injured from October 1998 through
September 1999. The student and teaching sectors carry out the largest
number of protests, and the security forces quell the majority of their
demonstrations.
On April 5, residents of Cojedes state protested threats by the CLN
to remove Governor Alberto Galindea for alleged financial
irregularities. The protests in San Carlos and Tinaquillo turned
violent, and the National Guard and state police intervened with tear
gas. Approximately 18 persons were wounded and affected by tear gas;
the state legislative assembly building was destroyed.
On November 5-6, students in Merida protested the death of a fellow
student under suspicious circumstances at the hands of the police. The
protest became violent and security forces sent tanks, 350 soldiers,
and 150 police to stop the demonstration. Police detained 18 persons.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice; professional and academic
associations generally operate without interference. However, on
November 21, the Supreme Court ruled that (1) Nongovernmental
organizations that receive funding from foreign governments or whose
leaders are not Venezuelan are not part of ``civil society'' and
therefore may not represent Venezuelan citizens in court or bring their
own legal actions; (2) Religious organizations are not part of civil
society and are subject to the same restrictions; and (3) The
Government has an obligation to ensure that NGO's are ``democratic in
nature'' and therefore that the internal elections of nonprofit groups
(such as for boards of directors) can be regulated by the National
Electoral Council. While there is ambiguity as to how the ruling is to
be implemented, NGO's, labor unions, and other members of civil society
expressed serious concerns about the ruling. The national Ombudsman's
office questioned the constitutionality of the ruling and argued that
it was up to civil society itself to define its members, not the
Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, on the condition that the practice of a religion does not
violate public morality, decency, and the public order, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice.
Each local church must register with the Directorate of Justice and
Religion in the Ministry of Interior and Justice in order to hold legal
status as a religious organization and to own property. The
requirements for registration are largely administrative. However, some
groups have complained that the process of registration is slow and
inefficient. Foreign missionaries require a special visa to enter the
country, which is obtained through the Ministry. Missionaries are not
refused entry generally, but many complain that the Government often
takes months or years to process a request.
In 1964 the Government and the Holy See signed a concordat that
underscores the country's historical ties to the Roman Catholic Church
and provides government subsidies to the Church, including to its
social programs and schools. Other religious groups are free to
establish and run their own schools, but they do not receive subsidies
from the Government.
On November 21, the Supreme Court ruled that religious
organizations are not part of civil society and that their legal rights
therefore were restricted (see Section 2.b.).
On several occasions, leaders of the Roman Catholic Church were
monitored or threatened by state agents for political reasons (see
Section 2.a.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of citizens and legal residents to travel within the country and to go
abroad and return, and the Government generally respects these rights.
However, the Government can suspend the freedom to travel, as it did
from June 1994 to July 1995. The Government also restricts foreign
travel for persons being investigated for criminal activities. For 3
weeks in December 1999 and in January, the security forces sometimes
restricted movement in and out of the areas hardest hit by the floods.
The Constitution recognizes and provides for the right to asylum
and refuge and mandates the passage of an organic law to codify this
right. However, there is no domestic legislation regarding
determination of refugee status, the procedure or criteria to be
applied, and no independent organization to handle asylum requests
exists. In the absence of any such legislation, the Government
established an Interministerial Technical Commission (CTI) in 1999 to
address cross-border movements and allows the Venezuelan Bishops'
Conference to coordinate with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in assisting refugees. In 1999 there were a total of 188
persons in the country who had been granted refugee status.
Approximately 100 individuals filed asylum claims during the year;
however, the CTI did not rule on any requests.
The Government in theory provides first asylum. However, in August
500 Colombians entered the country following a paramilitary attack in
the La Gabarra-Tibu area of Colombia. The Government provided
humanitarian aid but, in coordination with the Colombian Government,
quickly repatriated all of the Colombians. The Government determined
that the Colombians were not refugees but ``displaced persons in
transit.'' This term does not exist in international humanitarian law,
and its use appeared to be designed to avoid the Government's
international obligations to ``refugees.'' The accelerated procedures
adopted by both governments for the return of the Colombians limited
their opportunity to seek asylum, despite the intention previously
stated by some members of these groups to different NGO's and the
UNHCR.
A similar episode occurred in June 1999, when some 3,500 Colombians
entered the country in 3 waves following a paramilitary offensive in
the Catatumbo area of Colombia. These individuals also were termed
``displaced persons in transit,'' and quickly repatriated in
coordination with the Colombian Government. There are reports that some
of those returned subsequently were killed by paramilitary forces in
Colombia. There were no other reports of the possible forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
The 1999 Constitution provides citizens with the right to change
their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. The Constitution provides for the direct election of the
President and unicameral National Assembly, as well as of state
governors, state legislative councils, and local governments. Political
parties organize, and their candidates are allowed freely to run for
office and to seek the support of voters. The President has extensive
powers; however, the legislature appoints the members of the Supreme
Court, the National Electoral Council, and the so-called Citizen Power
consisting of the Prosecutor General, Ombudsman, and Controller
General.
At President Chavez's behest, the National Constituent Assembly
(ANC) decreed general elections in order to ``relegitimize''
authorities elected under the (now-defunct) 1961 Constitution. The new
Constitution, which went into effect on December 30, 1999, replaced the
previous bicameral legislature with a unicameral body, and membership
in the former could not simply be carried over to the latter.
The CNE, whose members were appointed on a temporary basis by the
ANC at the end of December 1999, organized the elections. In making
these appointments the ANC, citing an earlier Supreme Court decision
acknowledging that it had ``super-constitutional'' powers, made no
attempt to apply even in spirit the procedures set forth in the new
Constitution regarding civil society participation in the selection
process. This unilateral selection by the ANC (which easily approved a
slate provided by its leadership) of the members of the CNE was
criticized widely by the political opposition, media, and NGO's. These
groups also criticized similar measures taken by the ANC in choosing
its replacement body--the National Legislative Committee, as well as in
making interim appointments to the Supreme Court and the Citizen Power.
The CLN was an unrepresentative 21-member panel given responsibility in
January for serving as the country's legislature pending election of
the National Assembly. The CNE invited representatives from the
campaign teams to participate in their work.
Elections were scheduled by the ANC for May 28 for every elected
office in the country; more than 35,000 candidates ran for some 6,000
offices. On March 28, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court
dismissed two suits that challenged the constitutionality of the
election law and consequently the scheduled date of May 28 for the
elections. However, as the scheduled date approached, it became
increasingly apparent that the CNE had failed to organize them
adequately. Constant changes to the voter data base--which both the
opposition and NGO's have alleged were intended to offer electoral
advantage to President Chavez's supporters--made it impossible to
complete programming of the electronic voting machines or carry out
other necessary steps.
Faced with the prospect of a chaotic and highly contested election,
the CNE decided at the last minute to serve as a friend of the court in
a pending suit by two NGO's before the CNE seeking delay of the
election. On May 25, the Supreme Court ordered the delay and gave
responsibility for setting the new date to the CLN. This decision also
gave the Controller General oversight powers over the CNE.
The members of the CNE resigned following the delay, after the CLN
formally requested their resignations. After some initial reluctance
the CLN agreed that a ``national roundtable,'' on which some of its
members and representatives of civil society would sit, would choose
the new Council. That new Council included nonpartisan civil society
members, including its president. Observers generally agree that the
new National Electoral Council, chosen by the CLN on June 3, organized
the elections in a competent and fair way.
The CLN set the date for the elections at July 30. It also decreed
that, for practical reasons, those elections would be limited to
president of the republic, national and state legislators, governors,
and mayors, with election of municipal and parish councils to be held
on October 1. The CLN noted that July 30 was the earliest date by which
even the smaller-scope elections it had now decided on could be held,
as the new CNE had to redo almost all the preparatory work of its
predecessor. The CLN also noted that to include municipal and parish
councils in the July 30 vote would triple the number of candidates and
offices and, for organizational reasons, would postpone the vote for
several months and further prolong the country's period of
constitutional transition. Citizens, including many members of the
opposition and media, generally regarded these arguments as valid.
However, leading presidential challenger Francisco Arias Cardenas
criticized the decision of the CLN to split the elections and hold the
first component on July 30, a decision that he alleged was intended to
put him at a disadvantage. In July a confidential report by the
Controller General was leaked to the press; the report identified
deficiencies in the work of the CNE.
During the election campaign, DISIP agents carried out searches of
the offices of the opposition governor of Merida state, despite the
fact that, upon taking office in 1999, the Chavez Government declared
that the DISIP and other intelligence agencies no longer would be used
for domestic political purposes. While the stated reason for the
operations was to gather evidence for corruption investigations, the
timing of the searches gave the impression of political harassment.
On July 30, voters reelected President Chavez with 59 percent of
the vote. His challengers, Francisco Arias Cardenas and Claudio Fermin,
received 38 percent and 3 percent respectively. Chavez's supporters won
a majority (92 seats) in the 165-seat National Assembly, although not
the two-thirds majority required to pass most important pending
legislation. His supporters also won half the governorships. The
Organization of American States and observers from various countries
were of the opinion that, despite some technical irregularities, the
vote was generally free and fair. A limited number of voting machines
failed to accept ballots or otherwise broke down, and there was
disorganization at some polling places, but in the opinion of observers
these were localized problems. Standard backup procedures for voting
machine failure, such as placing ballots in sealed boxes for later
manual counting or processing by functioning voting machines, were
followed. However, some of the losing candidates alleged fraud. For
example, Arias maintained, among other things, that voting machines
were programmed to undercount votes received by him. He and other
disappointed candidates were pursuing existing administrative and
judicial remedies at year's end. Losing candidates for several
governorships alleged that fraud or irregularities affected the outcome
of the voting. The CNE investigated these allegations, ordered recounts
in some cases, and determined that the disputes were valid in several
states, in which it ordered partial revotes. The CNE's follow-up work
to the July 30 elections continued at year's end.
On December 3, voters participated in elections for municipal and
parish councils and voted on a controversial referendum on labor issues
(see Section 6.a.).
In December the President and the National Assembly replaced the
interim appointees to the Supreme Court and the Citizen Power in a
process that was criticized by the political opposition, the media, and
NGO's, who argued that the procedures set forth in the new Constitution
regarding civil society participation in the selection process were not
followed. The Ombudsman and others challenged the selection procedure
in the courts; however, the appointments were made and the new
officials took office in December, despite the fact that the Supreme
Court had not yet ruled on the legal challenge.
In November the National Assembly passed an ``enabling law'' that
gave President Chavez the authority to legislate by decree on selected
issues related to the economy, reorganization of government ministries,
and crime. However, only one law had been passed using these new powers
by year's end.
Women and nonwhites participate fully in government and politics;
however, they remain under-represented in senior leadership positions
and national elective office. The National Assembly's Family, Women,
and Youth Committee promotes political office-holding opportunities for
women. In the July 30 elections, women won 20 seats as deputies in the
165-seat legislature. In August President Chavez named 3 women to his
14-member Cabinet as Ministers of Labor, Trade, and Environment. In
December President Chavez appointed Adina Bastidas as vice president.
Indigenous people traditionally have not been integrated fully into
the political system due to their limited knowledge of politics, low
voter turnout, geographic isolation, and fewer economic and educational
opportunities. During the year, 300 Yanomami, with the assistance of
the Amazonas state ombudsman, filed suit over obstacles they faced in
registering to vote. The Yanomami argued that the Government's slowness
in providing national identity cards, which are required to register to
vote, was infringing on their right to suffrage. The Supreme Court
ruled against the group's request for an exception to be made to the
registration deadline, and they were unable to vote in the July 30
elections. The group of Yanomami subsequently was able to register, and
they voted in the December municipal elections. The new Constitution
reserved three seats in the National Assembly for indigenous people,
and these seats were filled in the July 30 election. There are no
indigenous members of the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups generally operate without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases.
In January President Chavez criticized a report by PROVEA on the
human rights violations in Vargas state as ``suspicious and
superficial'' and said that the NGO's refusal to name the witnesses on
which the report was based was irresponsible. The President later
pledged to investigate the abuses and met with the victims' families,
and the Government invited the IACHR to make an on-site visit to the
country, which had not taken place at year's end.
On November 21, the Supreme Court ruled that NGO's that receive
funding from foreign governments or whose leaders are not Venezuelan
are not part of ``civil society'' and therefore may not represent
Venezuelans in court or bring their own legal actions (see Section
2.b.).
A fundamental change in the Government's own human rights bodies
was made when the December 1999 Constitution created the position of
``Defender of the People'' (Ombudsman). The Ombudsman is responsible
for compelling the Government to adhere to the Constitution and laws
and, together with the Prosecutor General and Controller General, makes
up the Citizen Power branch of government. Throughout the year, the
country's first Ombudsman, Dilia Parra, repeatedly and frankly
advocated for the respect of human rights and assisted investigations
of abuses by acting as a liaison between complainants and the
Prosecutor General. Despite a limited budget, the Ombudsman's office
established branches and public attention centers in all 23 states. On
December 20, in a process that some observers charged was
unconstitutional, the National Assembly named attorney German Mundarain
as the new Ombudsman to replace Parra (see Section 3). The new
Constitution also obliges the Government to make amends to the victims
of human rights violations and commits it to implement decisions of
international bodies on individual cases of abuse.
Human rights groups remained concerned about the Chavez
administration's lack of a human rights agenda and a lack of support
for the national human rights agenda formulated by the previous
Government in a July 1997 symposium with NGO's. Unlike the previous
year, President Chavez did not meet with NGO's to discuss human rights
issues. The Government continued to fail to support the National Human
Rights Commission created by former President Rafael Caldera in 1996 as
a mechanism to coordinate the Government's human rights programs and to
serve as a forum for dialog with NGO's. Despite the commission's
paralysis, NGO's have developed good relationships with specific
government bodies such as the Ministry of Education to develop
educational materials on human rights, and the Foreign Ministry to
discuss the resolution of existing human rights cases against the
Government in international courts.
The Defense Ministry's human rights office expanded its staff from
one to three officials and continued to carry out training courses as
part of the armed force's curriculum. The Defense Ministry continued to
reject the validity of NGO reports of alleged human rights violations
by the armed forces and remained unwilling to provide evidence to
refute the charges, citing confidentiality regulations.
Following the July 30 elections, the National Assembly established
an Interior, Justice, Human Rights, and Constitutional Guarantees
Committee.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The 1999 Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination on the
basis of politics, age, race, sex, creed, or any other condition, and
the law prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, sex, or
disability. However, the Government does not protect women adequately
against societal and domestic violence, ensure the disabled access to
jobs and public services, or safeguard adequately the rights of
indigenous people. Amnesty International reported that in September
police in Valencia, Carabobo state, detained four transgendered
persons, who were held incommunicado for 2 days without food or
drinking water (see Section 1.d.). The family of one of the detainees
filed a formal complaint with the Public Ministry.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and women face
substantial institutional and societal prejudice with respect to rape
and domestic violence. Domestic violence against women is very common
and has been aggravated by the country's economic difficulties. A total
of 14,683 cases of domestic violence were reported to the authorities
in 1997, the most recent year for which statistics were available.
According to local monitors, the police generally are unwilling to
intervene to prevent domestic violence, and the courts rarely prosecute
those accused of such abuse. In addition, poor women generally are
unaware of legal remedies and have little access to them. On January 1,
the 1999 Law Against Violence Toward Women and Children came into
force. The PTJ opened the division against violence to accommodate its
provisions. This law requires the police to receive reports of domestic
violence and obligates hospital personnel to advise authorities of
abuse.
The law makes rape extremely difficult to prove, requiring at a
minimum medical examination within 48 hours of the violation. A
provision in the Penal Code provides that a man guilty of rape can
avoid punishment if, before sentencing, he marries the victim. Few
police officers are trained to deal responsibly with rape victims. In
1997, the most recent year for which statistics were available, the
police received 7,426 reports of sexual crimes, of which over 3,600
were cases of rape. However, women's organizations assert that such low
figures do not accurately portray the problem of rape and sexual
assault. They claim that many victims do not report the incident or
press charges due to societal pressure and their own feelings of guilt.
There were reports that a number of rapes were committed in Vargas
state in December 1999 during the lawlessness that followed the
flooding.
In 1996 the National Women's Council (which was reorganized during
the year and renamed the National Institute for Women), an agency of
the presidency with representation from the Ministries of Justice,
Education, Family, Health, and Labor, prepared a manual on violence
against women and children, which includes information on where the
victims might obtain assistance. There are a number of NGO's concerned
with domestic violence, sex education, and economic discrimination.
However, the recommendations of these groups have not been implemented
widely by the police or other concerned governmental agencies.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is a common problem.
There were reports that women were trafficked to Spain for purposes
of prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Women and men are legally equal in marriage. Women account for
roughly half the student body of most universities and have advanced in
many professions, including medicine and law. In June the Government
announced its intention to allow women to attend military academies and
serve in expanded roles as officers in the armed forces; however, this
had not occurred by year's end. Women gradually have surmounted many of
the barriers to their full participation in political and economic
life; nonetheless, they still are underrepresented in the higher ranks
of labor unions and private industry and, on average, earn 30 percent
less than men.
The 1999 Constitution provides for sexual equality in exercising
the right to work. The Labor Code specifies that employers must not
discriminate against women with regard to pay or working conditions,
must not fire them during pregnancy or for a year after giving birth,
must grant them unpaid leave and benefits for 6 weeks before the birth
of a child and 12 weeks after, and must provide them with 10 weeks of
unpaid leave if they legally adopt children under 3 years of age.
According to the Ministry of Labor and the major labor federation,
these regulations are enforced in the formal sector, although social
security payments often are delayed.
Children.--Government expenditures on education, health, and social
services increased during the year due to an improved economy and a
larger government budget. While the law provides for universal free
education, about one-third of the Ministry of Education budget was
dedicated to post-secondary education, leaving both primary and
secondary education chronically underfunded. According to UNICEF, only
75 percent of eligible children enter the first grade. During the year,
some 500,000 children attended school for the first time when the
Government prohibited registration fees. However, the 2000 annual
report of the Community Centers for Learning (CECODAP) stated that
500,000 children are not eligible to receive government assistance,
including public education, because their births are not documented
properly. In 1998 the Government attempted to remedy this problem by
adopting a new regulation that requires hospitals to register the
births of all children; during the year, the Government sent mobile
teams into poor neighborhoods to register minors.
According to CECODAP's study, an estimated 500,000 children, most
under the age of 5, have an average of 2 episodes of gastroenteritis a
year, a sickness that is the ninth leading cause of death in the
country. According to a 1999 study by the National Nutrition Institute,
23 percent of children under the age of 15 have a nutritional deficit.
Approximately 76 percent of minors live in poverty. These conditions
contribute to the increase in preventable diseases that are leading
causes of infant mortality. Children living in Vargas state suffered
the effects of the flooding in that area, particularly with regard to
sanitation and schooling.
An increase in poverty has raised the level of stress within
families and led to a rise in the number of abandoned children and to
more child abuse. A 1994 survey by the National Institute for Minors
determined that 206,000 children were involved in illicit activities,
principally begging but also petty theft, prostitution, and drug
trafficking. Some 40,000 children were exploited sexually, according to
a 1994 study.
The authorities in Caracas and several other jurisdictions tried to
cope with the phenomenon of street children by continuing to impose
curfews for unsupervised minors. Children's rights advocates claim that
curfews permit the police to act arbitrarily in detaining persons who
have committed no crime. Because reform institutions are filled to
capacity, hundreds of children accused of infractions are confined in
juvenile detention centers (see Section 1.c.).
In October 1997, Amnesty International reported past incidents in
which minors were subjects of extrajudicial killings and abuse, as well
as deficiencies in law and practice with regard to the detention of
children. For example, security forces and law enforcement authorities
often detain minors together with adults (see Section 1.c.). In April
Congress passed the Organic Procedural Law on Adolescents and Children
(a criminal code); however, observers expressed concern over the slow
implementation of the law's provisions.
Reports of child abuse are rare due to a fear of entanglement with
the authorities and ingrained attitudes regarding family privacy. The
overburdened judicial system, although very slow, generally ensures
that in most situations children are removed from abusive households
once a case has been reported. However, public facilities for such
children are inadequate and have poorly trained staff.
Children's rights advocates criticized the Government's efforts to
reunite children and parents who had been separated in the flooding in
Vargas state. At year's end, some 12 months after the natural disaster,
some children still were separated from their families. CECODAP
estimates that there are 120 children in refugee centers who have not
yet been returned to their families. The national Ombudsman's office is
investigating whether some of these children may have been trafficked.
There were also reports of trafficking in children from other South
American countries to work in Caracas as street vendors and housemaids
(see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The physically disabled have minimal
access to public transportation, and ramps are practically nonexistent,
even in government buildings. According to local advocates, the
disabled are discriminated against in many sectors, including
education, health care, and employment.
A 1993 comprehensive law to protect the rights of the disabled
requires that all newly constructed or renovated public parks and
buildings provide access for the disabled. The law also forbids
discrimination in employment practices and in the provision of public
services. However, the Government has not made a significant effort to
implement the law, to inform the public of it, or to try to change
societal prejudice against the disabled.
Indigenous People.--Although the law prohibits discrimination based
on ethnic origin, members of the country's indigenous population
frequently suffer from inattention to and violation of their human
rights. Many indigenous people are isolated from modern civilization
and lack access to basic health and educational facilities. High rates
of cholera, hepatitis B, malaria, and other diseases plague their
communities. There are approximately 316,000 indigenous people in 27
ethnic groups.
The Constitution provides for special laws governing ``the
protection of indigenous communities and their progressive
incorporation into the life of the nation.'' Nonetheless, local
political authorities seldom take account of the interests of
indigenous people when making decisions affecting their lands,
cultures, traditions, and allocation of natural resources. As farmers
and miners intrude on their habitats, indigenous communities are
threatened by deforestation and water pollution. Few indigenous people
hold title to their land, but many do not want to since most indigenous
groups reject the concept of individual property and want the
Government to recognize lands traditionally inhabited by them as
territories belonging to each respective indigenous group.
At year's end, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on a lawsuit
filed by environmental and indigenous organizations challenging a 1997
decree that permitted the expansion of legal mining activities in the
Imataca forest reserve. The groups charged that only Congress can
change the nature of the reserve, that there was an inadequate public
review process prior to the change, and that expanded mining activities
would affect adversely the health of the Warao, Arawako, Karina,
Akawaio, and Pemon indigenous communities that inhabit the Imataca
watershed area. In November 1997, the Supreme Court ordered the
Government not to issue any new mining concessions in the Imataca
reserve until the court ruled on the constitutionality of the
presidential decree. In 1999 President Chavez said that he planned to
enact a new law to regulate the use of the reserve and that the 1997
decree would be annulled, but at year's end no action had been taken.
The controversy over infrastructure development and the maintenance
of traditional indigenous lifestyles is most evident in Bolivar state,
where the Pemon continued to protest the building of power lines that
export electricity to Brazil through Canaima national park. On July 20,
a total of 55 of the 58 Pemon communities affected by the power lines
signed an agreement under which the Government pledged, among other
commitments, to establish a commission for the demarcation of native
lands and to create a development fund for indigenous people. However,
many Pemon remain highly skeptical of the Government's willingness and
ability to comply with the accord's provisions.
The Yanomami, among the most isolated of the indigenous people,
have been subject to persistent incursions into their territory by
illegal gold miners. The miners have introduced not only new diseases
but social ills as well. In December 1996, a number of human rights
organizations, acting on behalf of the Yanomami community of Haximu,
petitioned the IACHR in connection with the 1993 massacre of 16 members
of the community by Brazilian miners. The petition alleged that the
Government failed in its obligation to protect the Yanomami and to seek
appropriate punishment of the killers, who were released by the
Brazilian authorities after 3 months' detention. In May 1998, the
Government agreed to work with the NGO's under IACHR mediation to
resolve the case. In late 1999, an out-of-court settlement was reached
under which the Government pledged, among other commitments, to provide
better security and to carry out health care projects in the area.
During the year, 300 Yanomami, with the assistance of the Amazonas
state ombudsman, filed suit over obstacles they faced in registering to
vote (see Section 3).
Since 1998 hundreds of members of the Warao indigenous group have
migrated from their traditional homelands in the swampy Orinoco delta
region to the capital of Caracas where they live in the streets,
selling their traditional crafts and begging. The Warao say that
flooding and petroleum exploration have eroded their traditional means
of survival, which are fishing and horticulture. In addition, many
Warao no longer want to or no longer possess the knowledge required to
survive in their traditional manner. However, the Caracas city
government and the Metropolitan Police have maintained a policy of
forcing the Warao to return to the delta by rounding them up and
loading them onto buses. In 1998 they returned, on average, groups of
100 Warao, at least 15 times. Many of the Warao return to Caracas,
citing lack of jobs and money in the delta and their ability to receive
approximately $225 (130,000 bolivars) per week in handouts in Caracas.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Both the Constitution and labor law
recognize and encourage the right of workers to organize; however,
concerns over labor rights increased during the year. According to the
new Constitution, all workers, without prejudice or previous
authorization, have the right to form freely unions that they believe
can help them defend their rights and interests, as well as to join--or
decide not to join--these organizations in accordance with the law. The
Constitution provides that these organizations are not subject to
intervention, suspension, or administrative dissolution, and workers
are protected against any discrimination or measure contrary to this
right. Additionally, labor organizers and leaders may not be removed
from their positions during the period of time and under the conditions
that they exercise their leadership functions. However, Articles 23 and
95 of the 1999 Constitution, which provide for freedom of association,
are contradicted by Article 293, which gives the National Electoral
Council the authority to administer the internal elections of labor
confederations, in violation of the Government's commitments to
Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
charter. On December 3, a referendum was held that was followed by the
resignation of the leaders of the country's major labor union
confederation.
At year's end, labor law pursuant to the 1999 Constitution had not
yet been drafted. The existing comprehensive 1990 Labor Code extends
the right to form and join unions of their choosing to all private and
public sector employees (except members of the armed forces). The code
mandates registration of unions with the Ministry of Labor, but it
reduces the Ministry's discretion by specifying that registration may
not be denied if the proper documents (a record of the founding
meeting, the statutes, and membership list) are submitted. Only a judge
may dissolve a union, and then only for reasons listed in the law, such
as the dissolution of a firm by agreement of two-thirds of the
membership.
The ILO repeatedly has expressed concerns that the Organic Labor
Act violates freedom of association by requiring a high number of
workers (100 workers) to form self-employed workers' trade unions and a
high number of employers to form employer trade unions (10 workers).
The ILO also notes that the long and detailed list of duties entrusted
to workers' and employers' organizations and the requirement that
foreign workers must be in residence for more than 10 years in order to
hold trade union offices also are in violation of the Convention on
Freedom of Association.
In early March, the National Legislative Committee passed a decree
that suspended collective bargaining in the petroleum and public sector
for 180 days (see Section 6.b.) and suspended internal labor leadership
elections for the same period of time. On July 14, the CNE prohibited
labor leadership elections until February 2001. In late March, the CLN
passed a decree that violated the Campesino Federation's right to
associate freely by intervening in the federation's right to hold
internal elections, embargoing federation property, and placing it in
the custody of the national Ombudsman.
One major union confederation, the Confederation of Venezuelan
Workers (CTV), three small union confederations, and a number of
independent unions operate freely. About 20 percent of the national
labor force is unionized. The CTV represents most of the unionized
workers and has a membership of 800,000 workers. The CTV is especially
strong in the public sector. The CTV's top leadership includes members
of several political parties, but the majority are affiliated with one
of the traditional parties, Democratic Action (AD) or the Christian
Democrats (COPEI). The CTV and the AD traditionally have influenced
each other.
On December 3, the Government held a public ``workers referendum''
to consider the ``overhaul of union leadership'' and the ``suspension''
of union officials. International labor authorities, including the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the ILO, declared
the referendum to be a violation of freedom of association and an
unacceptable government intervention in organized labor affairs. The
fact that the referendum included the participation of all registered
voters on an issue affecting independent labor organizations was viewed
as particularly offensive to international labor standards and the
right of freedom of association. A CNE spokesman defended the
participation of all registered voters, observing that all citizens
``are workers or related to workers.'' The Public Prosecutor and
Ombudsman both declared the measure unconstitutional as violations of
freedom of association and the Government's international agreements,
as provided for in the 1999 Constitution, and recommended that the
Supreme Court do the same; however, the Court ruled in favor of moving
forward with the referendum.
In the referendum voters were asked to approve an ``overhaul of
union leadership in 180 days, under a special law drafted by the
electoral council, in accordance with the principles of term limits and
universal, direct and confidential suffrage'' in accordance with the
Constitution and to suspend ``the function of union officials'' during
that time. Approximately 65 percent of those citizens who voted
approved the question. The CNE later announced that voter turnout was
23 percent.
On December 6, the CTV leadership voluntarily resigned and was
replaced by a transitional committee consisting of a broad spectrum of
labor and civil society representatives that included individuals
connected with the CTV as well as other labor organizations not
traditionally aligned with the CTV. Following this change in
leadership, the parties involved began to prepare for discussions on
reforming the country's labor union structure.
On September 3, President Chavez announced the creation of the
``Bolivarian'' Worker's Force (FTB) as a new labor federation allied
with the ruling MVR to displace, or at least compete with, the CTV.
President Chavez said that the FTB was preparing an ``all out war'' to
``demolish'' the CTV. Seats on the new ``transitional committee''
heading the CTV had been set aside for members of the FTB.
The new Constitution and the comprehensive 1990 Labor Code
recognize the right of all public and private sector workers to strike
in accordance with conditions established by the law, which still was
being drafted at year's end. However, public servants may strike only
if the strike does not cause ``irremediable damage to the population or
to institutions.'' Replacement workers are not permitted during legal
strikes. The Labor Code allows the President to order public or private
sector strikers back to work and to submit their dispute to arbitration
if the strike ``puts in immediate danger the lives or security of all
or part of the population.'' During the year, most strikes were brief
and occurred among government employees such as petroleum workers,
health workers in public hospitals and clinics, firefighters, teachers,
and transportation workers. In mid-October, the main petroleum workers'
union, FEDEPETROL, held a successful 4-day strike against the state oil
company PDVSA and persuaded the Government to concede to strikers'
demands for a 30-month contract. The strike was settled through
tripartite negotiations, which included the active participation of
then-Vice President Isaias Rodriguez, who noted the ``historic role''
of labor leaders in gaining benefits for workers.
There are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor
organizations, and many union organizations are active internationally;
however, a November Supreme Court ruling regarding the legal abilities
of NGO's that receive funding from foreign sources potentially could
restrict the international affiliations of union organizers (see
Section 2.b.).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--According to
the December 1999 Constitution, all public and private sector workers
have the right to voluntary collective bargaining and to arrive at
collective bargaining agreements, without any additional requirements
other than those established by the law. The Constitution provides that
the State is to ensure development of collective bargaining and to
establish conditions favorable to collective relationships and the
solution of labor conflicts. The 1990 Labor Code stipulates that
employers must negotiate a collective contract with the union that
represents the majority of their workers. The ILO repeatedly has
expressed concerns that this provision restricts freedom of association
and in March requested that the Government amend it so that ``in cases
where no union organization represents an absolute majority of workers,
minority organizations may jointly negotiate a collective agreement on
behalf of their members.'' The code contains a provision stating that
wages may be raised by administrative decree, provided that the
legislative body approves the decree.
The law also prohibits employers from interfering with the
formation of unions or with their activities or from stipulating as a
condition of employment that new workers must abstain from union
activity or must join a specified union. The 1999 Constitution
prohibits measures that ``alter the sanctity and progressiveness'' of
labor rights and worker benefits, declares labor rights to be
irrevocable, and provides that ambiguities regarding the application or
interpretation of norms are to be applied in the manner most favorable
to the worker.
Ministry of Labor inspectors hear complaints regarding violations
of these regulations and traditionally have been able to impose a
maximum fine of twice the monthly minimum wage for a first infraction.
Under the 1999 Constitution, union officials have special protection
from dismissal. Under the 1990 Labor Code, if a judge determines that
any worker was fired for union activity, the worker is entitled to back
pay plus either reinstatement or payment of a substantial sum of money,
which varies according to his years of seniority.
The right to bargain collectively was violated in early March, when
the National Legislative Committee passed a decree that suspended
collective bargaining in the petroleum and public sector for 180 days
(see Section 6.a.). On July 14, the CNE extended the decree until
October 15.
Labor law and practice are the same in the sole export-processing
zone, located in Punto Fijo, as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1990 Labor Code
states that no one may ``obligate others to work against their will,''
and such practices generally are not known to occur. Apart from the
general prohibition of compulsory labor, the law does not prohibit
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, and such practices
generally are not known to occur; however, there were reports of
trafficking in children (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1990 Labor Code and the Tutelary Law for Minors
contain provisions to protect children from exploitation in the
workplace. The Ministry of Labor and the National Institute for Minors
enforce child labor policies effectively in the formal sector of the
economy but less so in the informal sector, in which an estimated 1.2
million children work. According to UNICEF, approximately 47 percent of
children are in the labor market, and work in agriculture, as artisans,
in offices, and in the services sector.
Primary school education is compulsory, free, and universal (see
Section 5). However, 64 percent of children leave school before the
ninth grade. In a 1996 survey of working children conducted by the
National Institute for Minors, 45 percent of those polled stated that
they were not in school. The actual figure is probably much higher
considering that those who stated that they attended school also
reported that they worked on average 7-1/2 hours per day, 4 to 7 days a
week.
The 1990 Labor Code allows children between the ages of 12 and 14
to work only if the National Institute for Minors or the Labor Ministry
grants special permission. It states that children between the ages of
14 and 16 may not work without the permission of their legal guardians.
Minors may not work in mines or smelters, in occupations that risk life
or health, that could damage intellectual or moral development, or in
public spectacles. The 1999 Constitution prohibits adolescents from
working at jobs that will affect their development, protecting them
from economic and social exploitation.
Those under 16 years of age must by law work no more than 6 hours a
day or 30 hours a week. Minors under the age of 18 may work only
between the hours of 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. The estimated 1.2 million
children who work in the informal sector, mostly as street vendors,
generally work more hours than the total permitted under the law. In
the National Institute for Minors survey of working children, half the
children worked both morning and afternoon, and 64.5 percent worked 6
or 7 days a week. The Government's Central Office of Statistics and
Information reports that 12 percent of the country's children between
the ages of 10 and 17 are working, have worked at some time, or are
seeking work. Of that number, approximately 70 percent work in the
informal sector of the economy. Less than 300,000 of children who work
in the informal sector have permits.
Apart from the general prohibition of compulsory labor, the law
does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but
such practices generally are not known to occur; however, there were
reports of trafficking in children (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1999 Constitution provides
workers with the right to a salary that is sufficient to allow them to
live with dignity, and provides them and their families with the basic
material, social, and intellectual necessities. The Constitution
obliges the State to provide public and private sector workers with an
annually adjusted minimum wage, using the cost of the basic basket of
necessities as a reference point. The monthly minimum wage is $206
(142,000 bolivars) in the private sector for urban workers and $170
(118,000 bolivars) for rural workers, effective May 1.
Total take-home pay in the private sector, the product of a
presidential decree, was at least equal to that received by public
sector minimum wage workers. Fringe benefits are added to these minimum
figures; they vary with the worker's individual circumstances but in
general increase wages by about one-third. However, even with these
benefits, the minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. Unions point out that a
worker's income is often less than the cost of a family's basic monthly
food basket, estimated by the Center for Documentation and Analysis for
Workers in August at $308 (212,205 bolivars). The basic basket, which
includes medical care, transportation, clothing, and housing, in
addition to food, stood at $905 (624,413 bolivars) for August.
Under the 1990 Labor Code, minimum wage rates are set by
administrative decree, which the legislature may suspend or ratify but
may not change. The law excludes only domestic workers and concierges
from coverage under the minimum wage decrees. The Ministry of Labor has
enforced minimum wage rates effectively in the formal sector of the
economy, but about one-half of the population works in the informal
sector where labor laws and protections generally are not enforced.
The 1999 Constitution also stipulates that the workday may not
exceed 8 hours daily or 44 hours weekly and that night work may not
exceed 7 hours daily or 35 hours weekly. Managers are prohibited from
obligating employees from working extraordinary hours, and workers also
have the right to weekly time away from work and annual remunerated
vacations. Some unions, such as the petroleum workers, have negotiated
a 40-hour week. Overtime may not exceed 2 hours daily, 10 hours weekly,
or 100 hours annually, and may not be paid at a rate less than time-
and-one-half. The Ministry of Labor effectively enforces these
standards in the formal sector.
The 1999 Constitution provides for secure, hygienic, and adequate
working conditions; however, the authorities have not yet promulgated
regulations to implement the 1986 Health and Safety Law, which is not
enforced. The delay is due largely to concern that the law provides
penal sanctions against management when violations of health and safety
occur and that there is ambiguity in the law over what constitutes a
violation. The 1990 Labor Code states that employers are obligated to
pay specified amounts (up to a maximum of 25 times the minimum monthly
salary) to workers for accidents or occupational illnesses, regardless
of who is responsible for the injury.
The code also requires that workplaces maintain ``sufficient
protection for health and life against sickness and accidents,'' and it
imposes fines ranging from one-quarter to twice the minimum monthly
salary for first infractions. However, in practice Ministry of Labor
inspectors seldom close down unsafe job sites. Under the law, workers
can remove themselves from dangerous workplace situations without
jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The new Constitution prohibits
trafficking in persons, and this provision was codified in legislation
during the year. There were reports that women were trafficked to Spain
for purposes of prostitution. The national Ombudsman's office is
investigating whether some of the children separated from their parents
in the flooding in Vargas state may have been trafficked (see Section
5). There also were reports of trafficking in children from other South
American countries to work in Caracas as street vendors and housemaids.
The ease with which fraudulent government documents of nearly all types
are obtained contributed to the trafficking problem. The Government's
efforts to prevent trafficking are the responsibility of the Prosecutor
General's family protection directorate (which also handles
prosecutions) and the National Institutes for Women and Minors. NGO's
such as CECODAP also are involved in activities to combat trafficking.
APPENDIXES
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APPENDIX A.--NOTES ON PREPARATION OF THE REPORTS
We base the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on
information available from all sources, including American and foreign
government officials, victims of human rights abuse, academic and
congressional studies, and reports from the press, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) concerned with
human rights. We find particularly helpful, and make reference in most
reports to, the role of NGO's, ranging from groups within a single
country to those that concern themselves with human rights worldwide.
While much of the information that we use is already public,
information on particular abuses frequently cannot be attributed, for
obvious reasons, to specific sources.
By law we must submit the reports to Congress by February 25. To
comply with this requirement, we provide guidance to U.S. diplomatic
missions in July for submission of draft reports in September and
October, which we update at year's end as necessary. Other offices in
the Department of State provide contributions, and the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor prepares a final draft. Because of
the preparation time required, it is possible that yearend developments
may not be reflected fully. We make every effort to include reference
to major events or significant changes in trends.
We have attempted to make these country reports as comprehensive as
space will allow, while taking care to make them objective and as
uniform as possible in both scope and quality of coverage. We have
given particular attention to attaining a high standard of consistency
despite the multiplicity of sources and the obvious problems related to
varying degrees of access to information, structural differences in
political and social systems, and trends in world opinion regarding
human rights practices in specific countries.
It is often difficult to evaluate the credibility of reports of
human rights abuses. With the exception of some terrorist
organizations, most opposition groups and certainly most governments
deny that they commit human rights abuses and often go to great lengths
to conceal any evidence of such acts. There are often few eyewitnesses
to specific abuses, and they frequently are intimidated or otherwise
prevented from reporting what they know. On the other hand, individuals
and groups opposed to a particular government sometimes have powerful
incentives to exaggerate or fabricate abuses, and some governments
similarly distort or exaggerate abuses attributed to opposition groups.
We have made every effort to identify those groups, for example,
government forces or terrorists, that are believed, based on all the
evidence available, to have committed human rights abuses. Where
credible evidence is lacking, we have tried to indicate why it is not
available. Many governments that profess to oppose human rights abuses
in fact secretly order or tacitly condone them or simply lack the will
or the ability to control those responsible for them. Consequently, in
judging a government's policy, it is important to look beyond
statements of policy or intent in order to examine what in fact a
government has done to prevent human rights abuses, including the
extent to which it investigates, brings to trial, and appropriately
punishes those who commit such abuses. We continue to make every effort
to do that in these reports.
To increase uniformity, the introductory section of each report
contains a brief setting, indicating how the country is governed and
providing the context for examining the country's human rights
performance. A description of the political framework and the role of
security and law enforcement agencies with respect to human rights is
followed by a brief characterization of the economy. The setting
concludes with an overview of human rights developments in the year
under review, mentioning specific areas (for example, torture, freedom
of speech and press, discrimination) in which abuses and problems
occurred.
We have continued the effort from previous years to expand
reporting on human rights practices affecting women, children, and
indigenous people. We discuss in the appropriate section of the report
any abuses that are targeted specifically against women (for example,
rape or other violence perpetrated by governmental or organized
opposition forces, or discriminatory laws or regulations). In Section
5, we discuss socioeconomic discrimination; societal violence against
women, children, or minority group members; and the efforts, if any, of
governments to combat these problems.
To obtain more information on governmental policies on the welfare
of children, readers may wish to consult ``The State of the World's
Children 2000,'' published by the U.N. Children's Fund. The report
provides a wide range of data on health, education, nutrition, rates of
infant mortality, and mortality under 5 years of age in 193 countries,
as well as information on the degree of progress that these countries
are making in reducing the key mortality rate for persons under age 5.
The following notes on specific categories of the report are not
meant to be comprehensive descriptions of each category but to provide
definitions of key terms used in the reports and to explain the
organization of material within the format:
Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Includes killings in
which there is evidence of government instigation without due process
of law or of political motivation by government or by opposition
groups; also covers extrajudicial killings (for example, deliberate,
illegal, or excessive use of lethal force by the police, security
forces, or other agents of the State whether against criminal suspects,
detainees, prisoners, or others), as well as killings committed by
police or security forces in operations or while in the performance of
their duties that resulted in the death of persons without due process
of law (for example, mistargeted bombing or shelling or killing of
bystanders); excludes combat deaths and killings by common criminals,
if the likelihood of political motivation can be ruled out (see also
Section 1.g.). Although mentioned briefly here, deaths in detention due
to official negligence are covered in detail in Section 1.c.
Disappearance.--Covers unresolved cases in which political
motivation appears likely and in which the victims have not been found
or perpetrators have not been identified; cases eventually classed as
political killings in which the bodies of those missing are discovered
also are covered in the above category, while those eventually
identified as arrest or detention may be covered under ``Arbitrary
Arrest, Detention, or Exile.''
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Defines torture as an extremely severe form of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, committed by or at the
instigation of government forces or opposition groups, with specific
intent to cause extremely severe pain or suffering, whether mental or
physical. Concentrates discussion on actual practices, not on whether
they fit any precise definition, and includes use of physical and other
force that may fall short of torture but which is cruel, inhuman, or
degrading. Covers prison conditions, including information based on
minimum international standards, and deaths in custody due to
negligence by government officials.
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Covers cases in which
detainees, including political detainees, are held in official custody
without charges or, if charged, are denied a public preliminary
judicial hearing within a reasonable period. Also discusses whether,
and under what circumstances, governments exile citizens.
Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Describes briefly the court system
and evaluates whether there is an independent judiciary and whether
trials are both fair and public (failure to hold any trial is noted in
the category above); includes discussion of ``political prisoners''
(political detainees are covered above), defined as those convicted and
imprisoned essentially for political beliefs or nonviolent acts of
dissent or expression, regardless of the actual legal charge.
Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Discusses the ``passive'' right of the individual to
noninterference by the State; includes the right to receive foreign
publications, for example, while the right to publish is discussed
under ``Freedom of Speech and Press;'' includes the right to be free
from coercive population control measures, including coerced abortion
and involuntary sterilization, but does not include cultural or
traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation, which are
addressed in Section 5.
Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--An optional subsection for use in describing
abuses that occur in countries experiencing significant internal armed
conflict. Includes indiscriminate, nonselective killings arising from
excessive use of force, for example, by police in putting down
demonstrations, or by the shelling of villages (deliberate, targeted
killing is discussed in Section 1.a.). Also includes abuses against
civilian noncombatants. For reports in which use of this section would
be inappropriate, that is, in which there is no significant internal
conflict, lethal use of excessive force by security forces (which
herein is defined as a form of extrajudicial killing) is discussed in
Section 1.a.; nonlethal excessive force in Section 1.c.
Freedom of Speech and Press.--Evaluates whether these freedoms
exist and describes any direct or indirect restrictions. Includes
discussion of academic freedom.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Evaluates the
ability of individuals and groups (including political parties) to
exercise these freedoms. Includes the ability of trade associations,
professional bodies, and similar groups to maintain relations or
affiliate with recognized international bodies in their fields. The
right of labor to associate, organize, and bargain collectively is
discussed under Section 6, Worker Rights (see Appendix B).
Freedom of Religion.--Discusses whether the constitution or laws
provide for the right of citizens of whatever religious belief to
worship free of government interference and whether the government
respects that right. Includes the freedom to publish religious
documents in foreign languages; addresses the treatment of foreign
clergy and whether religious belief affects membership in a ruling
party or a career in government.
Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration,
and Repatriation.--Includes discussion of forced resettlement;
``refugees'' may refer to persons displaced by civil strife or natural
disaster as well as persons who are ``refugees'' within the meaning of
the Refugee Act of 1980, that is, persons with a ``well-founded fear of
persecution'' in their country of origin or, if stateless, in their
country of habitual residence, on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their
Government.--Discusses the extent to which citizens have freedom of
political choice and have the legal right and ability in practice to
change the laws and officials that govern them; assesses whether
elections are free and fair.
Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.--Discusses whether
the government permits the free functioning of local human rights
groups (including the right to investigate and publish their findings
on alleged human rights abuses) and whether they are subject to
reprisal by government or other forces. Also discusses whether the
government grants access to and cooperates with outside entities
(including foreign human rights organizations, international
organizations, and foreign governments) interested in human rights
developments in the country.
Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language,
or Social Status.--Contains a subheading on Women, Children, and People
with Disabilities. As appropriate, also includes subheadings on
Indigenous People, Religious Minorities, and National/Racial/Ethnic
Minorities. Discrimination against groups not fitting one of the above
subheadings is discussed in the introductory paragraph(s) of Section 5.
Addresses discrimination and abuses not discussed elsewhere in the
report, focusing on laws, regulations, or state practices that are
inconsistent with equal access to housing, employment, education,
health care, or other governmental benefits for members of specific
groups. (Abuses by government or opposition forces, such as killing,
torture and other violence, or restriction of voting rights or free
speech targeted against specific groups would be discussed under the
appropriate preceding sections.) Discusses societal violence against
women, e.g., ``dowry deaths,'' wife beating, rape, and government
tolerance of such under the subheading on women. Discusses the extent
to which the law provides for, and the government enforces, equality of
economic opportunity for women. Discusses violence or other abuse
against children under that subheading. Discusses female genital
mutilation, which is most often performed on children, also under that
subheading.
Worker Rights.--See Appendix B.
__________
APPENDIX B.--REPORTING ON WORKER RIGHTS
The 1984 Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act requires
reporting on worker rights in GSP beneficiary countries. It states that
internationally recognized worker rights include ``(A) the right of
association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a
minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health.'' All five aspects of worker rights are
discussed in each report in a final section under the heading ``Worker
Rights.'' A final category, listed as (F), addresses trafficking in
persons. The discussion of worker rights considers not only laws and
regulations but also their practical implementation, taking into
account the following additional guidelines:
A. ``The right of association'' has been defined by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) to include the right of workers
and employers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing
without previous authorization; to draw up their own constitutions and
rules, elect their representatives, and formulate their programs; to
join in confederations and affiliate with international organizations;
and to be protected against dissolution or suspension by administrative
authority.
The right of association includes the right of workers to strike.
While strikes may be restricted in essential services (that is, those
services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal
safety, or health of a significant portion of the population) and in
the public sector, these restrictions must be offset by adequate
guarantees to safeguard the interests of the workers concerned (for
example, machinery for mediation and arbitration; due process; and the
right to judicial review of all legal actions). Reporting on
restrictions affecting the ability of workers to strike generally
includes information on any procedures that may exist for safeguarding
workers' interests.
B. ``The right to organize and bargain collectively'' includes the
right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention and
settlement of disputes with employers; the right to protection against
interference; and the right to protection against acts of antiunion
discrimination. Governments should promote machinery for voluntary
negotiations between employers and workers and their organizations.
Reporting on the right to organize and bargain collectively includes
descriptions of the extent to which collective bargaining takes place
and the extent to which unions, both in law and practice, are
effectively protected against antiunion discrimination.
C. ``Forced or compulsory labor'' is defined as work or service
exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for which the
person has not volunteered. ``Work or service'' does not apply in
instances in which obligations are imposed to undergo education or
training. ``Menace of penalty'' includes loss of rights or privileges
as well as penal sanctions. The ILO has exempted the following from its
definition of forced labor: compulsory military service; normal civic
obligations; certain forms of prison labor; emergencies; and minor
communal services. Forced labor should not be used as a means of (1)
mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development; (2)
racial, social, national, or religious discrimination; (3) political
coercion or education, or as a punishment for holding or expressing
political views or views ideologically opposed to the established
political, social, or economic system; (4) labor discipline; or (5) as
a punishment for having participated in strikes. Constitutional
provisions concerning the obligation of citizens to work do not violate
this right so long as they do not take the form of legal obligations
enforced by sanctions and are consistent with the principle of ``freely
chosen employment.''
D. ``Minimum age for employment of children'' concerns the
effective abolition of child labor by raising the minimum age for
employment to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental
development of young people. ILO Convention 182 on the ``worst forms of
child labor,'' which has been ratified by over 60 countries, identifies
anyone under the age of 18 as a child and specifies types of employment
as ``the worst forms of child labor.'' Worst forms of labor include
slavery, debt bondage, forced labor, forced recruitment into armed
conflict, child prostitution and pornography, involvement in illicit
activity such as drug production or trafficking, and ``work which, by
its nature, or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely
to harm the health, safety or morals or children.'' ILO Convention 182
permits employment of children between the ages of 16 and 18 in what
the convention describes as an ``unhealthy environment,'' if adequate
protective measures have been taken.
E. ``Acceptable conditions of work'' refers to the establishment
and maintenance of machinery, adapted to national conditions, that
provides for minimum working standards, that is, wages that provide a
decent living for workers and their families; working hours that do not
exceed 48 hours per week, with a full 24-hour rest day; a specified
annual paid holiday; and minimum conditions for the protection of the
safety and health of workers. Differences in the levels of economic
development are taken into account in the formulation of
internationally recognized labor standards. For example, many ILO
standards concerning working conditions permit flexibility in their
scope and coverage. They also may permit countries a wide choice in
their implementation, including progressive implementation, by enabling
countries to accept a standard in part or subject to specified
exceptions. Countries are expected to take steps over time to achieve
the higher levels specified in such standards. However, it should be
understood that this flexibility applies only to internationally
recognized standards concerning working conditions. No flexibility is
permitted concerning the acceptance of the basic principles contained
in human rights standards, that is, freedom of association, the right
to organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced labor,
and the absence of discrimination.
F. ``Trafficking in persons'' is defined as all acts involving the
recruitment, harboring, provision, or obtaining of a person (man,
woman, or child) for labor or services, through the use of force,
fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Sex trafficking is
defined as an act in which a commercial sex act is induced by force,
fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act
has not attained 18 years of age. Reporting describes legal
prohibitions against trafficking; the extent to which the government
enforces these prohibitions; the extent of trafficking in persons to,
from, within, or through the country, other geographic regions or
countries affected by the traffic; and aid or protection available to
victims.
__________
APPENDIX C--INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS
[See Appendix D for a description of the various Human Rights Conventions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COUNTRY A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afganistan p p p p p p p p p p p s p p
Albania* p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Algeria p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Andorra p p p p p
Angola p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Antigua & Barbuda p p p p p p p 1 p p p p p p p p p p p
Argentina p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Armenia p p p s p p p p p p p p p p
Australia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Austria p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Azerbaijan p p p p p p p p s p p p p p p p p p p p
Bahamas p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Bahrain p p p p p p p p p p p
Bangladesh p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Barbados p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Belarus p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Belgium p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Belize 1 p p p p p p 1 p s p s p p p p p p p p
Benin 2 p p p p p p s p p p p p p p p p
Bhutan* p p s p p
Bolivia p p s p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Bosnia & Herz. p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Botswana 1 p p p p p 1 p p p p p p p p p p p
Brazil p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Brunei* 1 p p 1 p p p
Bulgaria 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Burkina Faso p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Burma p p p p p p s s p p
Burundi p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Cambodia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Cameroon p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Canada p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Cape Verde p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Cen. African Rep. 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Chad p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Chile p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
China p p p p p s s p p p p p p p p
Hong Kong p p p p p p p
Macau p p p p p p p p p p p
(to 12-19-99)
Macau p p p p
(from 12-20-99)
China p
(Taiwan only)* p p p p p s s
Colombia s p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Comoros p p p p p p s p p p s p
Congo, Dem. p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Rep. of
Congo, 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Republic of
Costa Rica p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Cote D'Ivoire 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Croatia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Cuba p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Cyprus p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Czech Republic 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Denmark p p p p p p p s p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Djibouti p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Dominica p p p p p p 1 p p p p p p p p p p p p
Dom Republic p p p s p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p s p
Ecuador p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Egypt p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
El Salvador p p p p s s p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Equatorial p p p p p p p p p p p
Guinea
Eritrea p p p p p p p p p
Estonia 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Ethiopia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Fiji p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Finland p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
France p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Gabon p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Gambia* 1 p p p 1 p p p p p p p p s p
Georgia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Germany p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Ghana 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Greece p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Grenada 1 p p 1 p p p 1 1 p s p p p p p p p
Guatemala p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Guinea p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Guinea-Bissau p p p p p s s p p p p p p s p
Guyana 1 p p p p p 1 p p p p p p p p p p
Haiti 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Holy See p p p p p p p p
Honduras p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Hungary p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Iceland p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
India p p p p p p p p p p p p p s p
Indonesia p p p p p p p p p p p p
Iran s p p p p s p p p p p p p s s p
Iraq p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Ireland p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p s p
Israel p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Italy p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Jamaica p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Japan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Jordan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Kazakhstan p p p p p p p p p p p p
Kenya p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Kiribati* 1 p p 1 1 1 1 1 p
Korea, Dem. p p p p p p p
Rep. of*
Korea, Rep. of p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Kuwait p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Kyrgyzstan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Laos p p p p p p p p s s p p p p
Latvia 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Lebanon p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Lesotho p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Liberia p p p p p p p s s s p p s s p p p p p p
Libya p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Liechtenstein* p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Lithuania s p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Luxembourg p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Macedonia, F.Y.R.O. 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Madagascar p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Malawi p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Malaysia p p p p p p p p p p
Maldives* p p p p p p p p
Mali p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Malta p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Marshall Islands* p
Mauritania p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Mauritius p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Mexico p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Micronesia* p p p p p
Moldova p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Monaco* p p p p p p p p p p p
Mongolia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Morocco p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p s s p p p
Mozambique p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Namibia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Nauru* p
Nepal p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Netherlands p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
New Zealand p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Nicaragua p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p s p
Niger p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Nigeria p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p s p
Niue p
Norway p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Oman* p p p p p p
Pakistan p p p p p p p p p p p p s s p p
Palau p p p p p
Panama s p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Papua p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
New Guinea
Paraguay p p s p p p p p s p p p p p p p p p p
Peru p p p p p p p s p p p p p p p p p p p p
Philippines p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p s p p p p
Poland 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Portugal 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Qatar p p p p p p p
Romania p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Russia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Rwanda p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Samoa* p p p p p p p p
San Marino p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Sao Tome p p p p s s s p p p p s s p
& Principe
Saudi Arabia p p p p p p p p p p p p
Senegal 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Seychelles 2 p p p p p p p 1 p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Sierra Leone p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p s p
Singapore p p p p p p p p p
Slovak Republic 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Slovenia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Solomon Islands p p p p p p 1 1 p p p p p
Somalia p p p p p p p p p p
South Africa* p p p p p p p p s p p p s p p p p p p p p
Spain p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Sri Lanka p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
St. Kitts 1 p p p p p 1 1 p p p p p
& Nevis*
St. Lucia p p p 1 p p p 1 p p p p p p p
St. Vincent* p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Sudan p p p p p p p p p p p p s p
Suriname 2 p p p p p 1 p p p p p p p p p p p p
Swaziland 1 p p p p p p 1 p p p p p p p
Sweden p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Switzerland p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Syria p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Tajikistan * p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Tanzania p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Thailand p p p p p p p p p
Togo 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Tonga* 1 p p p 1 1 1 p p
Trinidad p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
& Tobago
Tunisia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Turkey p p p p p p p p p p p s s s p p p p p p
Turkmenistan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Tuvalu* 1 p p 1 1 1 p p p p
Uganda p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Ukraine p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
United Arab Emir. p p p p p p p p p
United Kingdom p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
United States p p p p p p p p p s p s s s s p s
Uruguay s p p p p p p s p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Uzbekistan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Vanuatu* p p 1 p p p p
Venezuela p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Vietnam* p p p p p p p p p p
Yemen p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Zambia p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
Zimbabwe 1 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P = Party.
S = Signatory.
* designates a non-ILO member.
1 = Based on general declaration concerning treaty obligations prior to independence.
2 = Party to 1926 Convention only.
----------
APPENDIX D.--INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS
A -- Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of
September 25, 1926, as amended by the Protocol of December 7, 1953.
B -- Convention Concerning Forced Labor of June 28, 1930 (ILO
Convention 29).
C -- Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize of July 9, 1948 (ILO Convention 87).
D -- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of December 9, 1948.
E -- Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively of July 1, 1949 (ILO
Convention 98).
F -- Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of August 12, 1949.
G -- Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949.
H -- Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of March 21, 1950.
I -- European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950.
J -- Convention on the Political Rights of Women of March 31, 1953.
K -- Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of
September 7, 1956.
L -- Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor of June
25, 1957 (ILO Convention 105).
M -- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination of December 21, 1965.
N -- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
December 16, 1966.
O -- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
of December 16, 1966.
P -- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28,
1952.
Q -- Protocol Relating to the Status Of Refugees of January 31,
1967.
R -- American Convention on Human Rights of November 22, 1969.
S -- Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
of June 26, 1973 (ILO Convention 138).
T -- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 8, 1977.
U -- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of June 8, 1977.
V -- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women of December 18, 1979.
W -- Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of December 10, 1984.
X -- Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 20, 1989.
__________
APPENDIX E.--SELECTED U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: FY2000 ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
[BA $ thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Export Peace
DA/DFA CSD ESF IMET FSA SEED INCLE\1\ MRA NADR Control ATA CT Corps FMF PKO Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional Allocations:
Africa
Angola, Luanda......................................... 5,096 4,900 -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,096 -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,092
Benin, Cotonou......................................... 3,826 10,058 -- 356 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,950 -- -- 16,190
Botswana, Gabonone..................................... -- -- -- 479 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 479
Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou.............................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,915 -- -- 1,915
Cameroon, Yaounde...................................... -- -- -- 189 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,923 -- -- 3,112
Cape Verde, Praia...................................... -- -- -- 123 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,159 -- -- 1,282
Central African Republic, Bangui....................... -- -- -- 103 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 103
Chad, N'Djamena........................................ -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- 622 -- -- -- -- -- -- 722
Congo, Democratic Republic of the, Kinshasa............ 830 8,980 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,810
Cote D'Ivoire, Abidjan................................. -- -- -- 22 -- -- -- -- 1,600 -- 1,600 -- 2,731 -- -- 4,353
Djibouti, Djibouti..................................... -- -- -- 163 -- -- -- -- 746 -- -- -- -- -- -- 909
Eritrea, Asmara........................................ 4,694 4133 -- 27 -- -- -- -- 500 -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,354
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa.................................. 12,439 27,299 -- 152 -- -- -- -- 250 -- -- -- -- -- -- 40,140
Gabon, Libreville...................................... -- -- -- 47 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,460 -- -- 2,507
Gambia, The, Banjul.................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,509 -- -- 1,509
Ghana, Accra........................................... 22,381 15,220 -- 450 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,728 -- -- 40,779
Guinea, Conakry........................................ 8,634 9,930 -- 179 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,548 -- -- 21,291
Guinea-Bissau, Bissau.................................. -- -- -- 22 -- -- -- -- 99 -- -- -- 173 -- -- 294
Kenya, Nairobi......................................... 21,503 8,370 -- 422 -- -- -- -- 37 -- 37 -- 3,520 -- -- 33,852
Lesotho, Maseru........................................ -- -- -- 86 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,957 -- -- 2,043
Liberia, Monrovia...................................... 4,140 2,552 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,692
Madagascar, Antananarivo............................... 12,916 4,050 -- 160 -- -- -- -- 494 -- 494 -- 1,914 -- -- 19,534
Malawi, Lilongwe....................................... 19,048 11,356 -- 345 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,716 -- -- 32,465
Mali, Bamako........................................... 22,370 12,876 -- 270 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,576 -- -- 38,092
Mauritania, Nouakchott................................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 461 -- -- -- 1,539 -- -- 2,000
Mauritius, Port Louis.................................. -- -- -- 79 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 79
Mozambique, Maputo..................................... 37,569 11,450 -- 178 -- -- -- -- 3,840 -- -- -- 1,212 -- -- 54,249
Namibia, Windhoek...................................... 7,237 4,002 -- 175 -- -- -- -- 485 -- -- -- 2,285 -- -- 14,184
Niger, Niamey.......................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,173 -- -- 2,173
Nigeria, Lagos......................................... 20,500 17,000 20,000 525 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 -- 68,025
Rwanda, Kigali......................................... 9,820 6,300 -- 164 -- -- -- -- 285 -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,569
Sao Tome, Principe..................................... -- -- -- 45 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 45
Senegal, Dakar......................................... 17,153 6,400 -- 764 -- -- -- -- 55 -- 55 -- 2,762 -- -- 27,134
Seychelles, Victoria................................... -- -- -- 72 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 72
Sierra Leone, Freetown................................. -- 500 1,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000
Somalia, Mogadishu..................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,400 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,400
South Africa, Pretoria................................. 32,979 13,188 -- 904 -- -- -- -- 1,133 -- 1,133 -- 2,284 -- -- 50,488
Swaziland, Mbabane..................................... -- -- -- 105 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 105
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam................................ 14,322 9,500 -- 167 -- -- -- -- 89 -- 89 -- 2,206 -- -- 26,284
Togo, Lome............................................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,683 -- -- 1,683
Uganda, Kampala........................................ 29,544 19,468 -- 247 -- -- -- -- 18 -- 18 -- 276 -- -- 49,553
Zambia, Lusaka......................................... 16,000 15,228 -- 137 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,432 -- -- 33,7974
Zimbabwe, Harare....................................... 6,926 5,200 -- 286 -- -- -- -- 1,152 -- -- -- 1,710 -- -- 15,274
REDSO/ESA/GHAI......................................... 17,360 6,900 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 24,260
PEGO/ATRIP............................................. 12,004 -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,004
Sahel Regional......................................... 8,085 200 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,285
West Africa Regional................................... 7,200 9,900 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17,100
SADC/ISA............................................... 23,907 -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 24,907
Other AFR Regional..................................... 38,650 35,838 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 74,488
Education for Development and Democracy (EDDI)......... 9,855 200 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,055
Africa Regional Democracy Fund (ARDF).................. -- -- 6,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000--
Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI).................. -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000
Africa Regional Peacekeeping (ARP)..................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,654 16,654
Africa Crisis Response Initiatve (ACRI)................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,000 20,000
East Africa Regional Fund (EARF)....................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Safe Skies for Africa Initiative (SSK)................. -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000
Countries in Transition Fund (CIT)..................... -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000
Regional ATA Training--Africa.......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Migration/Refugee Assistance--Africa................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 177,127 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 177,127
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Africa.......................................... 446,988 280,998 62,500 7,543 -- -- -- 117,127 16,352 -- 3,426 -- 52,341 10,000 36,654 1,090,513
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
Regional Allocations:
East Asia & Pacific
Burma, Rangoon......................................... -- 3,000 3,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,500
Cambodia, Phnom Penh................................... -- 3,550 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- 2,580 -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,130
China, Beijing......................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,458 -- -- 1,458
Fji, Suva.............................................. -- -- -- 78 -- -- -- -- 79 -- 79 -- -- -- -- 157
Indonesia, Jakarta..................................... 53,050 18,950 23,000 -- -- -- -- -- 197 -- 197 -- -- -- -- 95,197
Laos, Vientiane........................................ -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 -- 1,486 -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,486
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur................................. -- -- -- 740 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 740
Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar.................................. -- -- 6,000 512 6,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,578 -- -- 14,090
Papua New Galnea, Port Moresby......................... -- -- -- 177 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,441 -- -- 1,618
Philippines, Manila.................................... 22,500 7,200 -- 1,415 -- -- -- -- 3,258 -- 1,258 2,000 1,738 1,437 -- 37,548
Samoa, Apia............................................ -- -- -- 85 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,242 -- -- 1,327
Solomon Islands, Honiara............................... -- -- -- 53 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 991 -- -- 1,044
Thailand, Bangkok...................................... -- -- -- 1,730 -- -- 3,000 -- 2,370 -- 1,150 -- 1,198 -- -- 8,298
Vanuatu, Republic of, Port Vila........................ -- -- -- 63 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,251 -- -- 1,314
Viet-Nam, Hanoi........................................ 1,250 1,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,750
Other Asia Regional.................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Accelerating Economic Recovery in Asia (AERA).......... 11,750 1,000 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17,750
East Asia and Pacific Environment Initiatives.......... 15,000 -- 3,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 18,500
Asia Regional Democracy Fund (Asia RDF)................ -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000
South Pacific Multilateral Fisheries Treaty............ -- -- 14,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,000
Regional Security...................................... -- -- 250 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 250
Migration/Refugee Assistance--East Asia & Pacific...... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,485 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,485
East Timor............................................. -- -- 25,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,500 33,500
China NGO (Tibetan Culture)............................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Regional Women's Issues................................ -- -- 2,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,500
Regional--KEDO......................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 55,307 -- -- -- -- -- -- 55,307
Regional ATA Training--East Asia & Pacific............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Kiribati............................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,055 -- -- 1,055
Micronesia & Palau..................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,609 -- -- 1,609
Tonga.................................................. -- -- -- 103 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,114 -- -- 1,217
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, East Asia & Pacific............................. 103,550 35,200 95,750 4,956 6,000 -- 7,000 14,485 66,277 -- 2,684 2,000 14,675 1,437 8,500 357,830
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
Regional Allocations:
Russia & Independent States
Armenia, Verevan....................................... -- -- -- -- 102,550 -- -- -- 300 -- -- -- 1,418 -- -- 104,268
Azerbaijan, Baku....................................... -- -- -- --31,968 -- -- 607 100 7 -- -- -- -- 32,575
Belarus, Minsk......................................... -- -- -- -- 8,489 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,489
Georgia, Tbilisi....................................... -- -- -- 409 108,533 -- -- -- 27 -- -- -- 318 3,000 -- 112,287
Kazakstan, Almaty...................................... -- -- -- 567 44,826 -- -- -- 1,081 1,050 31 -- 2,186 1,500 -- 50,160
Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek.................................... -- -- -- 358 30,064 -- -- -- 385 -- 385 -- 1,246 1,000 -- 33,053
Moldova, Chisinau...................................... -- -- -- 487 50,436 -- -- 50 50 -- -- 1,654 1,250 -- 53,877
Russia, Moscow......................................... -- -- -- 717 186,631 -- -- -- 4,125 4,125 -- -- 3,898 -- -- 195,371
Tajikistan, Dushanbe................................... -- -- -- -- 9,926 -- -- -- 50 50 -- -- -- -- -- 9,976
Turkmenistan, Ashgabat................................. -- -- -- 313 6,195 -- -- -- 235 235 -- -- 1,360 600 -- 8,703
Ukraine, Kiev.......................................... -- -- -- 1,338 174,154 -- -- -- 1,256 1,090 166 -- 2,739 3,250 -- 182,737
Uzbekistan, Tashkent................................... -- -- -- 547 20,042 -- -- -- 63 -- 63 -- 1,724 1.750 -- 24,126
Regional Export Control................................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 300 300 -- -- -- -- -- 300
Regional FSA........................................... -- -- -- -- 55,998 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 55,998
Regional ATA Training--Russia & NIS.................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Russia & the Independent States................. -- -- -- 4,736 829,812 -- -- -- 8,479 7,000 652 -- 16,543 12,350 -- 871,920
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
Regional Allocations:
Europe
Albania, Tirana........................................ -- -- -- 646 -- 32,000 -- -- 1,135 -- 1,135 -- -- 1,600 -- 35,381
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Saraevo........................ -- -- -- 601 -- 100,000 -- -- 405 -- 405 -- -- -- 51,271 152,277
Bulgaria, Sofia........................................ -- -- -- 1,000 -- 32,000 -- -- 560 560 -- -- 1,785 4,800 -- 40,145
Croatia, Zagreb........................................ -- -- -- 514 -- 36,200 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 -- 40,714
Cyprus, Nicosia........................................ -- -- 14,950 -- -- -- -- -- 1,576 310 1,266 -- -- -- -- 16,526
Czech Republic, Prague................................. -- -- -- 1,441 -- -- -- -- 1,335 540 795 -- -- 6,000 -- 8,776
Estonia, Tallinn....................................... -- -- -- 789 -- -- -- -- 565 265 -- -- 664 4,000 -- 6,018
Greece, Athens......................................... -- -- -- 25 -- -- -- -- 15 -- 15 -- -- -- -- 40
Hungary, Budepest...................................... -- -- -- 1,398 -- -- -- -- 430 430 -- -- -- 6,000 -- 7,828
Ireland, Dublin........................................ -- -- 23,525 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 23,525
Latvia, Riga........................................... -- -- -- 749 -- -- -- -- 420 420 -- -- 997 4,000 -- 6,166
Lithuania, Vilnius..................................... -- -- -- 750 -- -- -- -- 730 730 -- -- 996 4,400 -- 6,876
Macedonia, Skopje...................................... -- -- -- 504 -- 30,000 -- -- 1,263 335 928 -- 810 -- -- 32,577
Malta, Valletta........................................ -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- 375 375 -- -- -- 450 -- 925
Poland, Warsaw......................................... -- -- -- 1,670 -- -- -- -- 1,751 891 861 -- 2,100 8,000 -- 13,521
Portugal, Lisbon....................................... -- -- -- 656 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 656
Romania, Bucharest..................................... -- -- -- 1,093 -- 35,000 -- -- 505 505 -- -- 2,128 6,000 -- 44,726
Slovakia, Bratislava................................... -- -- -- 633 -- -- -- -- 200 200 -- -- 1,528 2,600 -- 4,961
Slovenia, Ljubljana.................................... -- -- -- 579 -- -- -- -- 375 375 -- -- -- 2,000 -- 2,954
Turkey, Ankara......................................... -- -- -- 1,554 -- -- 48 -- 872 -- 872 -- -- -- -- 2,474
Yugoslavia, Belgrade (Serbia).......................... -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000
OSCE Regional.......................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Partnership for Peace.................................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Regional ESF........................................... -- -- 21,139 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 21,139
Regional SEED.......................................... -- -- -- -- -- 85,470 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 85,470
Kosovo................................................. -- -- -- -- -- 164,800 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 33,375 198,175
Montenegro............................................. -- -- -- -- -- 42,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42500
Regional ATA Tralning--Europe.......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Migration/Refugee Assistance--Europe................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 171,329 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 171,329
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Europe........................................... -- -- 59,614 14,702 -- 582,970 48 171,329 12,512 5,935 6,277 -- 11,008 53,850 84,646 990,679
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
Regional Allocations:
Near East
Algeria, Algiers....................................... -- -- -- 115 -- -- -- -- 146 -- 146 -- -- -- -- 261
Bahrain, Manama........................................ -- -- -- 216 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 216
Egypt, Cairo........................................... -- -- 727,267 1,006 -- -- -- -- 909 -- 909 -- -- 1,300,000 -- 2,029,182
Egypt Supplemental................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 -- 25,000
Israel, Tel Aviv....................................... -- -- 949,056 -- -- -- -- 60,000 57 -- 57 -- -- 1,920,000 -- 2,929,113
Israel--Wye.......................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,200,000 -- 1,200,000
Jordan, Amman.......................................... -- -- 149,500 1,679 -- -- -- -- 2,241 -- 730 -- 1,535 150,000 -- 304,955
Jordan--Wye.......................................... -- -- 50,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 74,715 -- 124,715
Kuwait, Kuwait City.................................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 35 -- 35 -- -- -- -- 35
Lebanon, Beirut........................................ -- -- 15,000 582 -- -- -- -- 1,282 -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,864
Morocco, Rabat......................................... 7,250 3,000 -- 904 -- -- -- -- 631 -- 531 -- 2,271 1,500 -- 15,456
Oman, Muscat........................................... -- -- -- 230 -- -- -- -- 2,683 -- 1,686 -- -- -- -- 2,913
Tunisia, Tunis......................................... -- -- -- 906 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 -- 3,906
UAE.................................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 930 15 915 -- -- -- -- 930
Yemen, Sanaa........................................... -- -- -- 125 -- -- -- -- 2,183 -- 947 -- -- -- -- 2,308
Migration/Refugee Assistance--Near East................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 108,250 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 108,250
Multinational Force and Observers...................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,902 15,902
Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group........................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 450 450
North Africa Trade and Investment...................... 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000
Regional ATA Training--Near East....................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 140 -- 140 -- -- -- -- 140
Middle East Democrary Fund (MERDF)..................... -- -- 6,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000
Iraq Opposition........................................ -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000
Middle East Multilaterals.............................. -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000
Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC)................ -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000
West Bank/Gaza......................................... -- -- 85,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 85,000
West Bank/Gaza--Wye.................................... -- -- 400,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 400,000
U.S.-North Africa Partnership.......................... -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Near East....................................... 8,250 3,000 2,410,823 5,763 -- -- -- 168,250 11,137 15 6,076 -- 3,806 4,674,215 16,352 7,301,596
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
Regional Allocations:
South Asia
Afghanistan, Kabul..................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000
Bangladesh, Dhaka...................................... 31,063 14,836 -- 456 -- -- -- -- 185 -- 185 -- 998 -- -- 47,538
India, New Delhi....................................... 28,700 22,750 -- 480 -- -- -- -- 1,014 285 729 -- -- -- -- 52,944
Maldives Islands, Male................................. -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100
Nepal, Kathmandu....................................... 9,900 7,000 -- 216 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,775 -- -- 18,891
Pakistan, Islamabad.................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,250 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,250
Sri Lanka, Colombo..................................... 3,250 300 -- 203 -- -- -- 394 -- 394 -- -- -- -- 4,147
Migration/Refugee Assistance--South Asia............... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 33,074 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 33,074
Regional ATA Training--South Asia...................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
South Asia Anti-Trafficking............................ 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000
South Asia Regional Programs........................... -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000
South Asia Energy & Environment........................ 7,600 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,600
South Asia Regional Democracy Fund (SARDF)............. -- -- 8,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, South Asia...................................... 81,513 44,886 11,000 1,455 -- -- 3,250 33,074 4,593 285 1,308 -- 2,773 -- -- 182,544
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
Regional Allocations:
Western Hemisphere.....................................
Antigua-Barbuda........................................ -- -- -- 113 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 515 -- 628
Argentina, Buenos Aires................................ -- -- -- 740 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 450 -- 1,190
Bahamas, Nassau........................................ -- -- -- 112 -- -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- 1,162
Barbados, Bridgetown................................... -- -- -- 71 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 55 -- 126
Belize, Belize City.................................... -- -- -- 161 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,277 100 -- 1,538
Bolivia, La Paz........................................ 25,538 7,583 -- 548 -- -- 158,000 -- -- -- -- 2,865 -- -- 194,534
Brazil, Brasilia....................................... 8,490 2,900 -- 223 -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,613
Chile, Santiago........................................ -- -- -- 499 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 499
Colombia, Bogota....................................... -- -- -- 900 -- -- 894,429 -- 2,071 -- 2,071 -- -- -- -- 897,400
Costa Rica, San Jose................................... -- -- -- 280 -- -- 1,900 -- -- -- -- -- 501 -- -- 2,681
Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo...................... 6,800 3,300 -- 487 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,501 400 -- 14,488
Ecuador, Quito......................................... 11,720 550 -- 518 -- -- 21,200 -- 1,011 -- 11 -- 2,358 -- -- 37,357
El Salvador, San Salvador.............................. 19,508 10,495 -- 523 -- -- 3,000 -- 80 -- 80 -- 2,004 -- -- 35,610
Grenada, St George's................................... -- -- -- 47 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 165 -- 212
Guatemala, Guatemala City.............................. 13,150 7,810 20,000 225 -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- 3,334 -- -- 47,522
Guyana, Georgetown..................................... 3,200 200 -- 168 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 802 100 -- 4,470
Haiti, Port-au-Prince.................................. -- -- 60,000 222 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,367 300 3,800 65,689
Honduras, Tegucigalpa.................................. 12,633 7,400 -- 548 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,075 -- -- 24,656
Jamaica, Kingston...................................... 7,810 3,357 -- 461 -- -- 800 -- -- -- -- -- 2,290 500 -- 15,218
Mexico, Mexico City.................................... 9,462 4,400 -- 865 -- -- 4,071 -- 1 -- 1 -- -- -- -- 18,799
Nicaragua, Managua..................................... 14,450 7,932 -- 194 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,405 -- -- 24,981
Panama, Panama City.................................... 3,500 -- -- 117 -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- 1,795 -- -- 9,412
Paraguay, Asuncion..................................... 5,175 -- -- 210 -- -- -- -- 740 -- 740 -- 2,925 -- -- 9,050
Peru, Lima............................................. 27,902 7,000 -- 455 -- -- 80,000 -- 1,020 -- 20 -- -- -- -- 116,377
Suriname, Paramaribo................................... -- -- -- 102 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 889 -- -- 991
Trinidad and Tobago, Port-of-Spain..................... -- -- -- 132 -- -- 2,100 -- -- -- -- -- -- 250 -- 2,482
Uruguay, Montevideo.................................... -- -- -- 326 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 326
Venezuela, Caracas..................................... -- -- -- 384 -- -- 4,200 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,584
Central American Regional Development.................. 8,200 3,150 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,350
Latin America Regional (LAC)........................... 33,792 14,080 -- -- -- -- 8,793 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 56,665
Migration/Refugee Assistance--Western Hemisphere....... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,456 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,456
Administration of Justice/ICITAP....................... -- -- 6,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,500
Regional ATA Training--Western Hemisphere.............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
St. Kitts--Nevis....................................... -- -- -- 67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 125 192
St. Lucia.............................................. -- -- -- 79 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 165 -- 244
St. Vincent & Grenadines............................... -- -- -- 52 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 125 -- 177
Dominica............................................... -- -- -- 58 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 150 -- 208
Eastern Caribbean...................................... 540 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,289 -- -- 2,829
Western Hemisphere Regional Democracy Fund (WRDF)...... -- -- 27,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 27,000
Peru/Ecuador Peace..................................... -- -- 11,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,000
OAS/IADB Demining...................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,903 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,903
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Western Hemisphere.............................. 211,870 80,157 124,500 9,890 -- -- 1,191,493 16,486 6,826 -- 2,923 -- 34,677 3,450 3,800 1,683,149
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
Total Regional Allocations............................. 852,171 444,241 2,764,187 49,045 835,812 582,970 1,201,791 580,752 126,186 13,235 23,346 2,000 135,823 4,755,302 149,952 12,478,232
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
Global Programs........................................ 358,089 280,207 28,000 765 -- -- 120,550 41,873 89,594 1,295 7,654 -- 108,246 32,995 -- 1,060,319
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Foreign Operation Accounts.......................
Export-Import Bank--Loan Subsidy....................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 756,064
Export-Import Bank--Administrative Expenses............ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 54,900
Export-Import Bank--Direct Loans, Negative Subsidies... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (15,000)
OPIC--Administrative Expenses.......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 34,934
OPIC--Net Offsetting Collections....................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (108,776)
OPIC--Credit Funding................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 23,842
Trade and Development Agency........................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 43,833
Development Credit Authority........................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [3,000]
IDA--Int. Disaster Assistance.......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 227,014
Micro/Small Enterprise--Subs........................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,500
Micro/Small Enterprise--Admin.......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 500
Urban/Environment Credit--Subs......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,500
Urban/Environment Credit--Admin........................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,990
USAID Operating Expenses............................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 518,960
USAID OIG Operating Expenses........................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 24,950
IAF--Inter-American Foundation......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [4,981]
African Development Foundation......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [14,345]
ERMA................................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12,452
Treasury Technical Assistance.......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,500
Debt Restructuring..................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 123,000
IBRD--Global Environment Facility (GEF)................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 35,800
IDA--International Development Association............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 771,290
MIGA--Mutilaterial Investment Guarantee Agency......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000
IDB--Inter-American Development Bank (Ord. Cap.)....... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,611
Asian Development Bank................................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,728
Asian Development Fund................................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 77,000
African Development Fund............................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 127,000
African Development Bank............................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,100
EBRD--European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel....... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 35,779
Inter-American Investment Corporation.................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,000
MDB Arrears............................................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [104,000]
IO&P--International Organizations and Programs......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 188,300
Assistance to Plan Colombia--FY 2000................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [1,018,500]
Balkans/Southeast Europe Supplemental.................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [250,875]
Debt Restructuring (HIPC).............................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [210,000]
ESF--Wye............................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [450,000]
FMF--Grant--Wye........................................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [1,375,000]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Other Foreign Operation Accounts................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,004,771
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
Grand Total, FY 2000 Foreign Operations................ 1,210,260 724,448 2,792,187 49,810 835,812 582,970 1,322,341 622,625 215,780 14,530 31,000 2,000 244,069 4,788,297 149,952 16,543,322
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ INCLE allocations include funds appropriated for Plan Colombia.
APPENDIX F.--56th UNHRC VOTING RECORD
Resolutions Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its Fifty-
Sixth Session
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Method of Agenda
Year/No. Title adoption \1\ item
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000/1 Strengthening of the without a vote 4
Office of the United
Nations High
Commissioner for Human
Rights.
2000/2 Question of Western without a vote 5
Sahara.
2000/3 The use of mercenaries as roll-call vote 5
a means of violating [35/11/5]
human rights and
impeding the exercise of
the right of peoples to
self-determination.
2000/4 Situation in occupied roll-call vote 5
Palestine. [44/1/6]
2000/5 The right to development. without a vote 7
2000/6 Question of the violation roll-call vote 8
of human rights in the [31/1/19]
occupied Arab
territories, including
Palestine.
2000/7 Human rights in the roll-call vote 8
occupied Syrian Golan. [31/1/19]
2000/8 Israeli settlements in roll-call vote 8
the occupied Arab [50/1/1]
territories.
2000/9 Question of the without a vote 10
realization in all
countries of the
economic, social and
cultural rights
contained in the
Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and in the
International Covenant
on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and
study of special
problems which the
developing countries
face in their efforts to
achieve these human
rights.
2000/10 The right to food........ roll-call vote 10
[49/1/2]
2000/11 Human rights and roll-call vote 10
unilateral coercive [36/9/7]
measures.
2000/12 Human rights and extreme without a vote 10
poverty.
2000/13 Women's equal ownership without a vote 10
of, access to and
control over land and
the equal rights to own
property and to adequate
housing.
2000/14 Racism, racial without a vote 6
discrimination,
xenophobia and related
intolerance.
2000/15 Situation on human rights without a vote 9
in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
2000/16 Human rights situation in roll-call vote 9
southern Lebanon and [51/1/1]
west Bakaa.
2000/17 Situation of human rights roll-call vote 9
in Iraq. [32/0/21]
2000/18 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in Afghanistan.
2000/19 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in Equatorial Guinea and
assistance in the field
of human rights.
2000/20 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in Burundi.
2000/21 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in Rwanda.
2000/22 Cooperation with without a vote 9
representatives of
United Nations human
rights bodies.
2000/23 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in Myanmar.
2000/24 The Situation of human without a vote 9
rights in Sierra Leone.
2000/25 Situation of human rights roll-call vote 9
in Cuba. [21/18/14]
2000/26 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), the
Republic of Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2000/27 Situation of human rights roll-call vote 9
in the Sudan. [28/0/24]
2000/28 Situation of human rights roll-call vote 9
in the Islamic Republic [22/20/11]
of Iran.
2000/29 Hostage-taking........... without a vote 11
2000/30 Human rights and roll-call vote 11(f)
terrorism. [27/13/12]
2000/31 Extrajudicial, summary or without a vote 11(b)
arbitrary executions.
2000/32 Human rights and forensic without a vote 11
science.
2000/33 Implementation of the without a vote 11(e)
Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief.
2000/34 Conscientious objection without a vote 11(g)
to military service.
2000/35 Draft optional protocol without a vote 11(a)
to the Convention
against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.
2000/36 Question of arbitrary without a vote 11
detention.
2000/37 Question of enforced or without a vote 11
involuntary
disappearances.
2000/38 The right to freedom of without a vote 11
opinion and expression.
2000/39 Human rights in the without a vote 11
administration of
justice, in particular
juvenile justice.
2000/40 The incompatibility without a vote 11
between democracy and
racism.
2000/41 The right to restitution, without a vote 11
compensation and
rehabilitation for
victims of grave
violations of human
rights and fundamental
freedoms.
2000/42 Independence and without a vote 11
impartiality of the
judiciary, jurors and
assessors and the
independence of lawyers.
2000/43 Torture and other cruel, without a vote 11(a)
inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
2000/44 Traffic in women and without a vote 12
girls.
2000/45 Elimination of violence without a vote 12
against women.
2000/46 Integrating the human without a vote 12
rights of women
throughout the United
Nations system.
2000/47 Promoting and roll-call vote 11
consolidating democracy. [45/0/8]
2000/48 Human rights of migrants. without a vote 14(a)
2000/49 International Convention without a vote 14(a)
on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of
Their Families.
2000/50 Tolerance and pluralism 14
as indivisible elements
in the promotion and
protection of human
rights without a vote.
2000/51 Human rights of persons without a vote 14
with disabilities.
2000/52 Rights of persons without a vote 14
belonging to national or
ethnic, religious and
linguistic minorities.
2000/53 Internally displaced without a vote 14
persons.
2000/54 Violence against women without a vote 14
migrant workers.
2000/55 Human rights and mass without a vote 14
exoduses.
2000/56 Working Group on without a vote 15
Indigenous Populations
of the Sub-Commission on
the Promotion and
Protection of Human
Rights and the
International Decade of
the World's Indigenous
People.
2000/57 Working Group of the without a vote 15
Commission on Human
Rights to elaborate a
draft declaration in
accordance with
paragraph 5 of General
Assembly resolution 49/
214 of 23 December 1994.
2000/58 Situation in the Republic roll-call vote 9
of Chechnya of the [25/7/19]
Russian Federation.
2000/59 Question of draft without a vote 13
optional protocols to
the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on
involvement of children
in armed conflict and on
the sale of children,
child prostitution and
child pornography.
2000/60 Abduction of children without a vote 13
from northern Uganda.
2000/61 Human rights defenders... roll-call vote 17(b)
[50/0/3]
2000/62 Promotion of the right to roll-call vote 17
a democratic and [30/17/6]
equitable international
order.
2000/63 Human rights and human roll-call vote 17
responsibilities. [22/21/10]
2000/64 The role of good roll-call vote 17
governance in the [50/0/2]
promotion of human
rights.
2000/65 The question of the death roll-call vote 17
penalty. [27/13/12]
2000/66 Towards a culture of without a vote 17
peace.
2000/67 Status of the without a vote 17(a)
International Covenants
on Human Rights.
2000/68 Impunity................. without a vote 17
2000/69 Fundamental standards of without a vote 17
humanity.
2000/70 Enhancement of without a vote 17
international
cooperation in the field
of human rights.
2000/71 United Nations Decade for without a vote 17(c)
Human Rights Education.
2000/72 Adverse effects of the roll-call vote 10
illicit movement and [37/16]
dumping of toxic and
dangerous products and
wastes on the enjoyment
of human rights.
2000/73 Composition of the staff roll-call vote 18
of the Office of the [35/17/1]
United Nations High
Commissioner for Human
Rights.
2000/74 Regional cooperation for without a vote 18
the promotion and
protection of human
rights in the Asian and
Pacific region.
2000/75 Effective implementation without a vote 18
of international
instruments on human
rights, including
reporting obligations
under international
instruments on human
rights.
2000/76 National institutions for without a vote 18
the promotion and
protection of human
rights.
2000/77 The protection of United without a vote 18
Nations personnel.
2000/78 Situation of human rights without a vote 19
in Haiti.
2000/79 Situation of human rights without a vote 19
in Cambodia.
2000/80 Advisory services and without a vote 19
technical cooperation in
the field of human
rights.
2000/81 Assistance to Somalia in rights without a 19
the field of human. vote
2000/82 Effects of structural roll-call vote 10
adjustment policies and [30/15/7]
foreign debt on the full
enjoyment of all human
rights, particularly
economic, social and
cultural rights.
2000/83 Work of the Sub- without a vote 16
Commission on the
Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights.
2000/84 Defamation of religions.. without a vote 6
2000/85 Rights of the child...... without a vote 13
2000/86 Human rights and thematic without a vote 18
procedures.
2000/87 Establishment of a roll-call vote 15
Permanent Forum on [43/0/9]
Indigenous Issues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In the case of a vote, the figures in brackets represent: votes in
favour/votes against/abstentions
__________
APPENDIX G.--HUMAN RIGHTS VOTING TABLE: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CHR) 56 [Part I]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cuba China (No Action) Iran Democ.
COUNTRY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
97 98 99 2000 95* 95* 97 99 '00 97 98 99 GA '00 99 '00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICA (15)
Algeria........................................................ A -- -- -- Y N Y -- -- Y -- -- A -- -- --
Burundi........................................................ -- -- -- N -- -- -- -- Y -- -- -- -- A -- Y
Cameroon....................................................... -- -- -- -- Y N -- -- -- -- -- -- A -- -- --
Djibouti....................................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- N -- -- --
DROC........................................................... N N N -- -- -- Y Y -- Y A A N -- Y --
Liberia........................................................ -- -- A N -- -- -- A A -- -- Y A N Y Y
Libya.......................................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- N -- -- --
Madagascar..................................................... A A A N -- -- Y Y Y A A A -- A Y Y
Mauritius...................................................... -- -- A A A A -- A A -- -- Y Y Y Y Y
Niger.......................................................... -- -- N N -- -- -- A Y -- -- A -- N Y Y
Nigeria........................................................ -- -- -- N -- -- -- -- Y -- -- -- A A -- Y
Senegal........................................................ -- A A A -- -- -- A A -- A N N N Y Y
South Africa................................................... N N N -- -- -- N N -- A A A A -- Y --
Swaziland...................................................... -- -- -- A -- -- -- -- N -- -- -- A A -- Y
Zambia......................................................... -- -- -- N -- -- -- -- Y -- -- -- A A -- Y
Botswana....................................................... -- A A A -- -- -- Y Y -- Y A A A Y Y
Congo-B........................................................ -- N N N -- -- -- Y Y -- N Y N N Y A
Morocco........................................................ -- A Y Y -- -- -- Y Y -- N N N N Y Y
Rwanda......................................................... -- N N A -- -- -- N A -- A Y -- Y Y A
Sudan.......................................................... -- N N N Y N -- Y Y -- N N N N Y A
Tunisia........................................................ -- A N N -- -- -- A A -- A N N N Y Y
========================================================================================================================================================
Asia (12)
China.......................................................... N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N N A A
India.......................................................... N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y
Indonesia...................................................... N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y
Japan.......................................................... Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Korea.......................................................... Y Y Y Y A A A A A A A A A A -- Y
Malaysia....................................................... A N -- -- Y N Y -- -- N N -- N -- -- --
Pakistan....................................................... A N N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N N Y A
Qatar.......................................................... -- -- N A -- -- -- Y Y -- -- N N N Y A
Saudi Arabia................................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- N -- -- --
Syria.......................................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- N -- -- --
Thailand....................................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- A -- -- --
Vietnam........................................................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- N -- -- --
Bangladesh..................................................... A A A A Y N Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y
Bhutan......................................................... N N N N Y N Y Y Y A N N N N Y A
Nepal.......................................................... A A A A Y N Y Y Y A A A N N Y Y
Philippines.................................................... A A A A N A A A A A N N N N Y Y
Sri Lanka...................................................... A A N A Y N Y Y Y A A N N N Y Y
========================================================================================================================================================
GRULAC (11)
Argentina...................................................... Y Y Y Y -- -- A A A Y Y A A A Y Y
Brazil......................................................... A A -- A A A A -- A Y Y -- Y Y -- Y
Colombia....................................................... A -- A A A A Y Y N A -- N N A Y Y
Costa Rica..................................................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Y -- -- --
Cuba........................................................... N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N N A A
Ecuador........................................................ A A Y A N Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Guatemala...................................................... -- A A Y -- -- -- A N -- Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mexico......................................................... A A N A A A A A A Y A A A A Y Y
Peru........................................................... -- A N N Y N -- Y Y -- Y A A A Y Y
Uruguay........................................................ Y -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Y -- -- A -- Y A
Venezuela...................................................... -- A N N A A -- Y Y -- Y N N N Y Y
Chile.......................................................... Y A Y Y A A N A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
El Salvador.................................................... Y Y A Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
========================================================================================================================================================
E. EURO. (5)
Czech Repub.................................................... Y Y Y Y -- -- N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Latvia......................................................... -- -- Y Y -- -- -- N N -- -- Y Y Y Y Y
Poland......................................................... -- Y Y Y N Y -- N N -- Y Y Y Y Y Y
Romania........................................................ -- -- Y Y N Y -- A A -- -- Y Y Y Y Y
Russia......................................................... A N N N N N A Y Y Y Y A A N Y Y
========================================================================================================================================================
WEOG (10)
Belgium........................................................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Y -- -- --
Canada......................................................... Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
France......................................................... Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Germany........................................................ Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Italy.......................................................... Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Norway......................................................... -- -- Y Y -- -- -- N N -- Y Y Y Y Y Y
Portugal....................................................... -- -- -- Y -- -- -- N N -- -- Y Y Y -- Y
Spain.......................................................... -- -- -- Y -- -- -- -- N -- -- -- Y Y -- Y
UK............................................................. Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
US............................................................. Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Luxembourg..................................................... -- Y Y Y -- -- -- N N -- Y Y Y Y Y Y
========================================================================================================================================================
Yes............................................................ 12 13 16 17 9 11 10 12 14 16 17 17 20 18 40 45
No............................................................. 5 9 13 14 11 9 9 13 16 6 6 10 16 12 0 0
Abstain........................................................ 9 7 6 8 6 6 6 10 8 4 6 9 14 10 2 4
========================================================================================================================================================
Final CHR Vote
Yes............................................................ 19 16 21 21 22 20 27 22 22 26 23 23 -- 22 51 45
No............................................................. 10 19 20 18 22 21 17 17 18 7 14 16 -- 20 0 0
Abstain........................................................ 24 18 12 14 9 12 9 14 12 19 16 14 -- 11 2 8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*China 95 had a tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
**Sudan was not a roll call vote so there is no official count. People raised their hand and the chair counted silently.
Countries in bold are new to the Commission this year.
Countries in italic are no longer on the Commission.
Y = Yes.
N = No.
A = Abstain.
C = Agreed to by consensus.
-- = Absent.
APPENDIX G.--HUMAN RIGHTS VOTING TABLE: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CHR) 56 [Part II]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq Sudan FRY Chech
COUNTRY -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
97 98 99 GA '00 97 98 99 GA '00 97 98 99 GA '00 '00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICA (15)
Algeria......................................................... A -- -- A -- C -- -- N -- C -- -- Y -- --
Burundi......................................................... -- -- -- -- A -- -- -- -- ** -- -- -- -- Y Y
Cameroon........................................................ -- -- -- A -- -- -- -- A -- -- -- -- A -- --
Djibouti........................................................ -- -- -- A -- -- -- -- N -- -- -- -- Y -- --
DROC............................................................ Y A A -- -- C A C N -- C A Y A -- --
Liberia......................................................... -- -- Y -- A -- -- C -- ** -- -- Y -- Y A
Libya........................................................... -- -- -- N -- -- -- -- N -- -- -- -- Y -- --
Madagascar...................................................... A A A -- A C A C -- ** C A Y Y A N
Mauritius....................................................... -- -- Y Y Y -- -- C Y ** -- -- A Y Y Y
Niger........................................................... -- -- A -- A -- -- C -- A -- -- Y Y Y Y
Nigeria......................................................... -- -- -- A A -- -- -- A A -- -- -- Y A A
Senegal......................................................... -- A A A A C A C A ** -- Y Y Y Y A
South Africa.................................................... Y Y Y Y -- C Y C Y -- C Y A Y -- --
Swaziland....................................................... -- -- -- Y Y -- -- -- A ** -- -- -- A Y A
Zambia.......................................................... -- -- -- Y A -- -- -- A ** -- -- -- Y A Y
Botswana........................................................ -- Y Y Y Y -- Y C Y Y -- Y Y Y Y Y
Congo-B......................................................... -- A A A A -- A C A ** -- A A A A N
Morocco......................................................... -- A A A A -- A C N ** -- Y Y Y Y A
Rwanda.......................................................... -- A Y -- Y C A C -- ** -- A Y -- Y Y
Sudan........................................................... -- A A N A C N C N A -- Y Y Y Y A
Tunisia......................................................... -- A A A A C A C A ** -- Y Y Y Y A
========================================================================================================================================================
Asia (12)
China........................................................... A A A A A C N C N A C A A A A N
India........................................................... A A A A A C N C N A C A A A A N
Indonesia....................................................... A A A A A C N C N A C Y Y Y Y A
Japan........................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y A
Korea........................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y A
Malaysia........................................................ A A -- A -- C A -- A -- C Y -- Y -- --
Pakistan........................................................ A A A A A C N C N A C Y Y Y Y Y
Qatar........................................................... -- -- A -- A -- -- C N A -- -- Y Y Y Y
Saudi Arabia.................................................... -- -- -- Y -- -- -- -- N -- -- -- -- Y -- --
Syria........................................................... -- -- -- A -- -- -- -- N -- -- -- -- Y -- --
Thailand........................................................ -- -- -- A -- -- -- -- Y -- -- -- -- Y -- --
Vietnam......................................................... -- -- -- A -- -- -- -- N -- -- -- -- A -- --
Bangladesh...................................................... A A A A A C A C A A C Y Y Y Y A
Bhutan.......................................................... A Y Y Y Y C A C A A C Y Y Y Y A
Nepal........................................................... A A A A A C A C A A C Y A Y A A
Philippines..................................................... A A Y A Y C A C A ** C Y Y Y Y A
Sri Lanka....................................................... A A A A A C A C A A C A Y Y Y A
========================================================================================================================================================
GRULAC (11)
Argentina....................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y
Brazil.......................................................... Y Y -- Y Y C Y -- Y ** C Y -- Y Y A
Colombia........................................................ Y -- Y Y Y C -- C Y ** C -- Y Y Y A
Costa Rica...................................................... -- -- -- Y -- -- -- -- Y -- -- -- -- Y -- --
Cuba............................................................ A A A A A C N C N A C A A A A N
Ecuador......................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y ** C Y Y Y Y A
Guatemala....................................................... -- Y Y Y Y -- Y C Y Y -- Y Y Y Y A
Mexico.......................................................... Y A Y Y Y C Y C Y A C Y A Y Y A
Peru............................................................ -- Y Y Y Y -- Y C Y ** -- Y Y Y Y A
Uruguay......................................................... Y -- -- Y -- C -- -- Y -- C -- -- Y -- --
Venezuela....................................................... -- A Y Y A -- Y C Y ** -- Y Y Y Y A
Chile........................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y ** C Y Y Y Y Y
El Salvador..................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y ** C Y Y Y Y Y
========================================================================================================================================================
E. EURO. (5)
Czech Repub..................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y
Latvia.......................................................... -- -- Y Y Y -- -- C Y Y -- -- Y Y Y Y
Poland.......................................................... -- Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y -- Y Y Y Y Y
Romania......................................................... -- -- Y Y Y -- -- C Y Y -- -- Y Y Y Y
Russia.......................................................... Y A Y Y A C Y C Y A C A N N N N
========================================================================================================================================================
WEOG (10)
Belgium......................................................... -- -- -- Y -- -- -- -- Y -- -- -- -- Y -- --
Canada.......................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y
France.......................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y
Germany......................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y
Italy........................................................... Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y
Norway.......................................................... -- Y Y Y Y -- Y C Y Y -- Y Y Y Y Y
Portugal........................................................ -- -- Y Y Y -- -- C Y Y -- -- Y Y Y Y
Spain........................................................... -- -- -- Y Y -- -- -- Y Y -- -- -- Y Y Y
UK.............................................................. Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y
US.............................................................. Y Y Y Y Y C Y C Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y
Luxembourg...................................................... -- Y Y Y Y -- Y C Y Y -- Y Y Y Y Y
========================================================================================================================================================
Yes............................................................. 18 18 26 33 25 C 20 C 30 -- C 23 28 43 32 20
No.............................................................. 0 0 0 1 0 C 5 C 13 -- C 0 1 1 1 5
Abstain......................................................... 8 11 9 13 14 C 4 C 6 -- C 6 6 7 6 13
========================================================================================================================================================
Final CHR Vote
Yes............................................................. 31 32 35 -- 32 C 31 C -- 28 C 41 46 -- 44 25
No.............................................................. 0 0 0 -- 0 C 6 C -- 0 C 9 1 -- 1 7
Abstain......................................................... 22 21 18 -- 21 C 16 C -- 24 C 12 6 -- 8 19
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*China 95 had a tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
**Sudan was not a roll call vote so there is no official count. People raised their hand and the chair counted silently.
Countries in bold are new to the Commission this year.
Countries in italic are no longer on the Commission.
Y = Yes.
N = No.
A = Abstain.
C = Agreed to by consensus.
-- = Absent.
__________
APPENDIX H.--UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly
relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-
operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of
the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,
Now, therefore, The General Assembly, proclaims this Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international,
to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance,
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of an kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust,
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.
Article 4
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 6
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before
the law.
Article 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
Article 11
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public
trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
2. No one shall be held guilty without any limitation due to race,
of any penal offence on account of nationality or religion, have the
any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.
Article 13
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.
Article 14
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 15
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor be
denied the right to change his nationality.
Article 16
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and
at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Article 17
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.
Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.
Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his
country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 22
1. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality.
Article 23
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay
for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration insuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of
human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social
protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
Article 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to
all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of
peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that
shall be given to their children.
Article 27
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.
Article 28
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.
Article 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms set forth herein.
Hundred and eighty-third plenary meeting
Resolution 217(A)(III) of the United Nations General Assembly,
December 10, 1948
0(this material is in the public domain and may be reprinted without
permission; citation of this source is appreciated.)
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