[Senate Prints 107-59]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session 107-59
_______________________________________________________________________
``WHAT'S NEXT IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM?''
__________
A COMPILATION OF STATEMENTS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman
FEBRUARY 14, 2002
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Introduction........................................... v
Berger, Samuel R., former National Security Advisor, statement
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 7,
2002........................................................... 1
Joulwan, Gen. George A., former NATO Supreme Allied Commander,
statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
February 7, 2002............................................... 5
Kristol, William, Editor, The Weekly Standard; Chairman, Project
for the New American Century, statement before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, February 7, 2002............... 9
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, February 14, 2002.
Dear Colleague,
As part of our series of hearings on the role of foreign
policy in securing America's future, the Foreign Relations
Committee held a hearing on February 7, entitled ``What's Next
in the War on Terrorism?'' The witnesses for this hearing were
former National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger, former NATO
Supreme Allied Commander Gen. George A. Joulwan (Ret), and
William Kristol, head of the Project for the New American
Century. Because the topic of this hearing is at the forefront
of public debate, we wanted to make it available to you and
your staff.
Please let us know if you have any questions or comments
regarding this hearing or the other hearings in this series.
Sincerely,
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman.
Jesse Helms, Ranking Republican Member.
testimony of
SAMUEL R. BERGER
Former National Security Advisor
before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
february 7, 2002
----------
``What's Next in the War on Terrorism?''
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I welcome your invitation to participate in this important
and timely series of hearings and to address, in particular,
the next stages in the war against terrorism.
Let me begin with what we already have accomplished with
decisive and courageous leadership from President Bush,
skillful diplomacy and a military that has demonstrated
superbly the strength it has gained and the lessons learned
over the past decade. The Taliban regime is gone, its demise
unlamented by the Afghan people, its first victims. An interim
coalition, fragile but representative, has taken over in Kabul.
Al Qaeda has been shaken and dispersed, for now disrupted as a
functioning network.
September 11th was a watershed for our country and the
world. It breached the boundaries of the unimaginable. A
horrified world stood with us. The response by the United
States was fierce and focused--directed at those who
perpetrated the crimes and those who support them. This
response thwarted bin Laden's fundamental objective: to provoke
indiscriminate actions by the U.S. that would have further
polarized the West and the Islamic world, collapsing not just
the Twin Towers but governments linked to us from Pakistan to
Saudi Arabia. We were not just the object of these attacks but
also the potential instrument of the terrorists' purpose: to
advance the vision of a radical pan-Islamic region from central
Asia to the Gulf and beyond.
Americans, led by the President, have responded with
unified purpose. We have known that our cause is both right and
necessary, and so has the world.
So where do we go from here? We have an historic
opportunity--if we show as much staying power as fire power . .
. if we are unrelenting but not overreaching . . . if we
exercise not only the military power necessary to protect our
people but also the moral authority necessary to demonstrate
that our strength serves a purpose broader than self-
protection--to build a safer world of shared well-being.
Our first task, as the President has said, is to finish the
job of destroying al Qaeda. That job necessarily involves
getting bin Laden. We must not define him out of existence; we
must dictate his destiny. After all, he is the man most
responsible for the crime against humanity nearly five months
ago. We cannot permit him to reemerge--in a month, or a year.
We do not want the legend of bin Laden--a symbol of defiance.
We want the lesson of bin Laden--a symbol of defeat.
It may take months or years. But the victims cannot rest in
peace until that justice is done.
And we must continue to take down al Qaeda cells, and hunt
down al Qaeda operatives elsewhere--in Asia, Europe, Africa,
here and elsewhere in this Hemisphere. Disruption will be an
ongoing enterprise--a priority that will require international
intelligence, law enforcement and military cooperation for the
foreseeable future. These cells of fanatics will reconstitute
themselves. We must treat this as a chronic illness that must
be aggressively managed, while never assuming it has been
completely cured.
Where we can help our friends suppress terrorist threats,
we should do so, as we are in the Philippines, Bosnia and
elsewhere. We must be careful to distinguish that from
suppressing their legitimate opposition. And where we see
remnants of al Qaeda and its allies regroup in countries with
virtually no governments, it may be necessary to act
militarily, balancing the genuine security gains against
potential allegations that we are assuming the role of world
policeman.
As we move beyond al Qaeda and its allies, we need to be
clear about our purposes, strategies, standing and capacities.
In the State of the Union, the President dramatically expanded
the battlefield. He redefined and expanded the war to embrace
an ``axis of evil.'' Implicit in the ultimatum, I believe, is
the conviction that the threat of American power against
radical regimes--and presumably its exercise--will create a new
dynamic that causes these regimes to abandon activities that
threaten us. It assumes that others will follow our clearly
defined leadership and, if not, we will act alone if necessary.
These are profoundly important premises, which promise a
far more interventionist global American posture. They deserve
serious and open-minded discussion. I do not believe the
President is engaged in empty threats or rhetorical bluff.
Each of the governments singled out by the President pose
unmistakable dangers. Saddam Hussein was, is and continues to
be a menace to his people, to the region and to us. He cannot
be accommodated. Our goal should be regime change. The question
is not whether but how and when.
Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons and advanced
missile systems and to support terrorist and rejectionist
groups like Hezballah, Hamas and PiJ. Its involvement in arms
shipments to the Palestinians is unacceptable.
North Korea's regime, a relic of the Cold War, is
repressive toward its people and promiscuous in peddling its
missile technology.
We ignore the risks these governments pose at our peril.
But each of them, and their context, is very different. Merely
labeling them as ``evil'' does not answer hard questions about
the best way to deal with them to effect needed change.
How do we build support, in the region and among our
allies, to intensify pressure on Saddam Hussein? Can
the Afghan template be applied in Iraq, where Saddam's
power is more entrenched and the opposition is weaker?
Are we prepared to go-it-alone militarily? Is that
feasible and what would it take?
How does our role in the deteriorating Middle East
conflict relate to a more aggressive posture toward
Saddam? Do flames in Baghdad inflame the Middle East,
or quiet it?
Have we given up on the internal struggle in Iran,
where majorities of over 70% have expressed their
desire for change? Does branding Iran part of an evil
axis strengthen those who want to engage the U.S. or
those who seek to demonize us?
Does disengaging from negotiations with North Korea,
which produced a missile moratorium that has held since
1998 and a freeze on nuclear fuel production that has
been continuously verified by outside monitors, make it
more or less likely that we will gain restraint? Does
it make war on the Korea Peninsula more or less likely?
Does it matter that our ally, South Korea, believes
that the policy of cautious engagement with the North
has reduced tensions on the Peninsula to an all-time
low?
Do we lose focus in our war against terrorism, and
the support of our allies for fighting it, when we
redefine the conflict as a war against rogue states?
From the beginning, the President described war against
terrorism as a ``monumental struggle between good and
evil.'' But as our definition of evil becomes more
expansive--from Baghdad to Tehran to Pyongyang--will
our support in the world for the fight against
terrorism become more diffuse?
I think the President is absolutely right to sound the
alarm against the nexus between biological, chemical and
nuclear states and terrorism. The discussion we should have, in
a bipartisan and respectful way, is not whether we deal with
these risks, but how. It must also include reducing the threat
of loose nukes and inadequately secured nuclear material in
Russia. It should include putting teeth in the Biological
Weapons Convention, and, I would argue, ratifying the CTBT. And
it must include stopping friends and allies from selling
dangerous technology to hostile governments. The struggle
against global terrorism is not a fight we can win alone; we
need partners--coalitions built around us not against us.
The President was also right when he said we are usually
better off in the world when we say less and do more. A great
power threatens only if it is prepared to act if intimidation
fails. In an effort to impose new world order, we must be
careful not to contribute to new world disorder.
Let me make one other principal point about what is next in
the war against terrorism. We have been focused since September
11th on the military dimension of this struggle. It is a
necessary part, now and perhaps in the future. But this is not
a war we can fight with military power alone. Our objective
must be not only to destroy the terrorist networks that have
attacked and threaten us; we must do so in a way that makes the
world more stable, not less--that isolates the extremists, not
us.
That means, as Secretary Powell has said, we must
commit our resources to stabilizing and rebuilding
Afghanistan, including the possibility of participating
in an international security force.
It means we must make sure President Musharraf
succeeds. He has ``bought the program''--that he must
take on the terrorists within, or lose his country. If
he fails, no one else in the Islamic world will try
again. And it would be more than ironic if we defeated
the militant extremists in Afghanistan only to see them
prevail in Pakistan, and seize control of nuclear
weapons.
It means supporting the Administration's active role
in defusing the crisis between Pakistan and India--
where confrontation can easily lead to miscalculation
and, with nuclear weapons on both sides, miscalculation
can lead to disaster.
It means that we must fight the terror, and seek to
break the death grip, in the Middle East. Pessimism
about the Middle East is an honest reflection of
reality, but it cannot lead us to fatalism--the view
that we are unable to make a difference. The situation
will only get worse without concerted and sustained
engagement led by the U.S.--on Arafat to defeat the
killers and on the Israelis to respond as he does. The
alternative is a destructive war of attrition and a
radicalization of the entire region.
It means that we must put as much energy into the
Arab world as we take out--but of the diplomatic,
political, economic and intellectual variety. We must
act more purposefully to convince our friends in the
region that pluralism and reform are not the enemies of
Islam; they are the enemies of the extremists.
Finally, we must put at the heart of the U.S. agenda
efforts to enable the poor to reap the advantages of
globalization and opportunity. This too is part of the
war against terrorism--for unless we do so, the world
will become a more divided and bitter place, and our
power--unrivaled as it is--will produce as much
resentment as respect.
In short, Mr. Chairman, ``phase two'' in the war against
terrorism--a long-term struggle as the President honestly has
told us--must be defined not only by what we destroy, but by
what we build, not only by what we stand against but what we
stand for.
Thank you.
Testimony of
GEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN (Ret)
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
February 7, 2002
----------
``What's Next in the War on Terrorism?''
Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to testify here
today. At the outset I want to thank you Mr. Chairman and this
Committee for your support during my time on active duty and
for the important role you have played in the development and
implementation of American foreign policy.
You have asked me to look at several questions as part of
your effort to better understand what we are confronting in
this war to defeat terrorism. Specifically, what are our next
steps in Afghanistan, how do we ``drain the swamp'' of
terrorism, and how do we foster better civilian and military
cooperation.
Let me make some brief points then respond to your
questions.
First we are at war. But it is a different war than
those we fought in the past. There are no front lines.
The enemy is dispersed and operates in small cells. The
underpinnings of this threat are in its religious
radicalism and its hatred of the United States and the
civilization that embraces freedom, tolerance and human
dignity. It is an enemy willing to commit suicide of
its young to achieve its aims and with little regard
for human life. While the enemy may be small in number
it would be wrong to underestimate the threat--or the
depth of their convictions.
Second, the al Qaeda Network has been in place for
years if not decades. We as a Nation have been
surprised at the number of countries from which al
Qaeda operates and the ``sleepers'' who provide
assistance and comfort to terrorist in many democratic
countries including our own. Such is the pervasiveness
of this threat. While it would be wrong to paint al
Qaeda 10 feet tall, it would equally be wrong to
dismiss the pervasiveness of the threat. I adhere to a
very basic principle--never underestimate your enemy.
Third, let me underscore what President Bush and his
advisors have been saying--this will be a lengthy
campaign not of months but years. We have bought some
time in the disruption we have caused the al Qaeda
terrorists but do not for a minute believe we have
eliminated nor greatly diminished the threat to our
homeland and to our allies and friends. We have not.
While we Americans are used to quick action and return
to normalcy, the Congress, the media and our elected
leaders must prepare our Country for a long struggle.
During the Cold War we demonstrated a commitment and
resolve for over 40 years. That commitment and resolve
transcended political party and labels such as liberal
and conservative. And we prevailed. In this fight we
need that same resolve and commitment for however long
it takes--and Mr. Chairman, we will prevail.
Fourth point. The war on terror is being conducted
on three fronts. One front is Afghanistan and the
surrounding region. Another is here in our homeland.
And the third is global in scope.
In Afghanistan we acted swiftly to punish those who
killed so many innocent people in New York, Washington
and Pennsylvania. Indeed our military actions were out
in front, at times, of the political decisions needed
to provide clarity and direction for the campaign plan.
We surprised al Qaeda, Bin Ladin and their supporters
with the swiftness of our action and the resolve of the
American people. The surprise attack on the United
States was answered in weeks not months or years. The
resolve of the American people to take the fight to
this new enemy has been resolute and unwavering.
When the Taliban and al Qaeda chose to stand and
fight they were defeated. The union of Northern
Alliance fighters and U.S. and British Special Forces
has been extremely effective in bringing accurate,
deadly air strikes on the enemy.
But the war in Afghanistan is not over. The
leadership of al Qaeda has still not been killed or
captured. We have disrupted the enemy's activities but
not rendered him ineffective. Without constant pressure
the enemy can reconstitute and pose a threat to the new
interim government and to our troops on the ground.
Intelligence collection and sufficient U.S. ground
troops are needed to ensure the al Qaeda and Taliban
are not just disrupted but defeated.
This means staying in South Asia. It means developing a
stronger relationship with Pakistan that is economic and
political, as well as military. It means involvement in
resolving the potentially dangerous dispute between India and
Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, it was clear from the outset that the only
way we were going to be successful in Afghanistan and beyond
was to enlist global support. That support has been there from
the beginning. The stand up attitude of the British confirms
the special nature of our relationship and NATO's invoking of
Article 5 for the first time in its history are two best
examples. There are others as well. Australia has troops on the
ground and Japan is supplying ships and aid for the war effort,
which is unprecedented.
In addition, Russia, despite the ups and downs in our
relations has been supportive. President Putin, to his credit,
has decided to use this opportunity to seek common ground with
the United States and broaden our relationship. As you know,
Mr. Chairman, I had a Russian Three Star General as my deputy
for Russian forces in Bosnia. We do have common interests and
can build a foundation for better relations in the future.
Also, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are providing bases for
U.S. and Coalition forces. Part of the reason we have had such
immediate access to bases in both these countries is because
Americans have been training there since 1995 as part of the
Partnership for Peace developed between NATO and the states of
the former Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Engagement works,
Mr. Chairman, and our allies and partners are important in this
global fight against terror.
As I said before, Mr. Chairman, we should not be lulled
into thinking we have ``drained the swamp'' of terrorism in
Afghanistan or anywhere else quite yet. Afghanistan is still a
dangerous place. The two priorities in the near term are clear.
One is a combat mission to disrupt and defeat al Qaeda and the
terrorists. The second is an international security force in
Afghanistan to provide security for the interim government and
the multitude of agencies committed to rebuilding Afghanistan
after the devastating years of Taliban rule.
Both efforts are important. Both efforts need to compliment
each other. And both efforts require U.S. leadership and
direction. I believe there are some lessons from Bosnia that we
can apply to Afghanistan.
We went into Bosnia in the winter of 1995 in the worst
terrain in Europe and in six months accomplished all military
tasks--separating 200,000 armed insurgents in 30 days,
transferring land in 45 days and demobilizing all warring
factions in 180 days. NATO did so with a coalition of forces
from 36 nations including, for the first time, a brigade of
Russian troops. Unlike the UNPROFOR--the UN protection force--
we had clarity of mission, unity of command, and clear robust
rules of engagement. The civilian side was not well organized
or as successful. Six years later U.S. and NATO troops are
still in Bosnia and the unemployment rate is higher than it was
in 1995. We are better than that as a Nation and as an
Alliance. Clearly the military can bring about an absence of
war; but it is the civilian follow-on agencies that will bring
true peace.
Therefore my fifth point is that we must have an effective
integrated disciplined multinational team with clear objectives
and milestones as the follow-on force in Afghanistan. This is
not nation building but security building. We did not do so 10
years ago in Afghanistan. We must not make that same mistake
again.
As we know, al Qaeda is not confined to Afghanistan. I
uncovered an al Qaeda cell in Bosnia in 1996. It has a global
reach. And President Bush is right; we cannot wait for the next
attack in order to take the next step. We must anticipate. We
must be proactive not reactive. We must take on those who
support terrorist organizations with a global reach. But while
doing this, we must take into consideration several criteria.
What is the best allocation of our resources, what will it take
to succeed, and what impact will this have on the international
support we will need over the long term to defeat terrorism. We
should not make threats we are not prepared to carry out. We
must match requirements with resources. And, while we cannot be
tied to the wishes or judgement of the international community,
we cannot ignore the very important support it has to offer.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that, the most difficult
challenge will be that of Governor Ridge and Homeland Security.
My prior experience as the Commander of U.S. Forces in Latin
America reinforces how vulnerable we are to asymmetrical
threats. While missile defense is important and should be
pursued, a more daunting challenge is to develop a long-range
strategy for the protection of our people here at home. We are
vulnerable. We need to better organize the 40 agencies involved
in homeland defense--particularly along our borders, which are
extremely porous. If the narco traffickers can smuggle 200
metric tons of a chemical called cocaine through our borders
every year, what other chemicals can be brought into our
country? And make no mistake about it; there is a direct link
between the narco traffickers and al Qaeda--not just in
Afghanistan but also in South America.
I would also urge that the U.S. military play a key role in
homeland defense. I support the idea of a homeland defense
CINC. Intelligence collection and sharing is the key to
success. We need to ensure that there is effective coordination
between our military, intelligence, law enforcement, customs
and immigration agencies. The military can help in this effort.
In my view, law enforcement is in the lead, the military is in
support. The military should serve as the operations
coordinator, not the operational commander.
Mr. Chairman, those are the points I wanted to make. In
conclusion, let me say the terrorists who carried out the
attacks of 11 September greatly miscalculated the resolve and
resourcefulness of the American people. I can attest to the
quality of our troops and their ability to carry out any
mission assigned. And I can assure you those who died on 11
September did not die in vain. I truly believe it is a time for
hope not despair. Optimism not pessimism. With the help of this
committee and the continued resolve of the American people, we
will prevail. Failure is not an option.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me here today. I
look forward to your questions.
Testimony of
WILLIAM KRISTOL
Editor, The Weekly Standard; Chairman, Project for the New American
Century
Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
February 7, 2002
----------
``What's Next in the War on Terrorism?''
Thank you, Chairman Biden, Senator Helms, and members of
the committee, for inviting me to testify before you today. You
have asked me to address the question, ``What's next in the war
on terrorism?''
The short answer is that Iraq is next. I am not simply
saying that Iraq should be next--although I think it should be.
I am rather drawing a straightforward conclusion from President
Bush's State of the Union speech, and from the logic of the war
itself. The president sees this war differently from our
European allies and differently, I think, from the way his
predecessor or even his father might have seen it. The
president has chosen to build a new world, not to rebuild the
old one that existed before September 11, 2001. And after
uprooting al Qaeda from Afghanistan, removing Saddam Hussein
from power is the key step to building a freer, safer, more
peaceful future.
To explain my answer, let me address the basic questions
about the nature of the war. Have the events of September 11
fundamentally changed the world? Is our aim to restore the
status quo through limited actions or is it a broader attempt
to reshape the Middle East and the other breeding grounds of
terror? And how and when should we deal with our enemies who
possess or will soon possess weapons of mass destruction?
Reviving the status quo would mean that we would be
satisfied at having deposed the Taliban, and at having dealt
with Osama bin Laden--presuming we eventually find him--and
having crippled his al Qaeda network. We would not overly
concern ourselves with who's in power in Afghanistan, or
Pakistan, or in Central and South Asia. We would continue to
try to keep Saddam Hussein ``in his box'' and similarly to
contain Iran. We would return to the old Israeli-Palestinian
``peace process.'' We would regard North Korea not as a
Stalinist state organized for war but as an arms control
problem amenable to an ``agreed framework.''
This has been the ``post-Cold War status quo.'' It has been
a period of unprecedented great-power peace. The great
international questions of the 19th and 20th centuries, of
Napoleonic France, imperial Britain and Japan, the Kaiser and
Hitler's Germany, of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, have
all been largely settled. Indeed, the only real unresolved
great-power issue is that of China.
Yet this has also been a violent time, especially in the
region from the Balkans through the Middle East to Southwest
and Central Asia. Even before the final collapse of the Soviet
Union, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Though his army was
defeated and driven back to Baghdad, the failure to remove the
Iraqi tyrant left a problematic legacy.
Since then, the pace of major terrorist attacks--now
directly aimed at America--has increased, as Norman Podhoretz
has chronicled in the most recent issue of ``Commentary''
magazine. The initial attempt to bring down the World Trade
Center was in February 1993; two months later, Saddam tried to
assassinate President Bush when he visited Kuwait. In June
1996, nineteen U.S. airmen were killed and 240 wounded in the
Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. On August 7, 1998, the
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were simultaneously
attacked, killing 12 Americans and more than 200 Africans. On
October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was struck while docked for
refueling in Yemen, killing 17 sailors and wounding 39. And
during the past decade, there have been dozens, if not
hundreds, of smaller attacks--as well as untold numbers of
foiled, failed or postponed assaults.
Despite these escalating costs, American policy has
implicitly considered the costs of significant U.S. action
against terrorists as higher still. As Podhoretz points out,
this is a tradition that began during the Cold War. But it has
persisted through the Soviet Union's final days and through the
Clinton Administration. Even as terrorists and rogue regimes
lost their superpower sponsor, they learned there would be few
consequences from attacking America. President Clinton's policy
was, as his first CIA director James Woolsey has said, ``Do
something to show you're concerned. Launch a few missiles into
the desert, bop them on the head, arrest a few people. But just
keep kicking the ball down the field.'' Maintain the status
quo.
Is that the goal of this war?
No. Since September 11, President Bush has been clear--and
increasingly detailed and articulate--that there has been a
fundamental shift in U.S. policy and strategy. On the evening
of the attacks, he vowed to bring to justice ``those who are
behind these evil acts.'' Yet by September 20, when he
addressed a joint session of Congress, he had determined that
we were at war not only with a group of terrorists directly
responsible for the attacks but with ``every terrorist group of
global reach'' and with the ``nations that provide safe haven
to terrorism,'' as well.
Over the past few months, the president's views of ``our
mission and our moment'' have progressed further still. On
November 6, he assured the Warsaw Conference on Combating
Terrorism that the United States would wage war on terror
``until we're rid of it.'' He also saw the potential threat of
terrorists armed with chemical, biological, radiological or
even nuclear weapons: ``We will not wait for the authors of
mass murder to gain the weapons of mass destruction.'' And
shortly afterward, the president shifted his emphasis from
terrorist groups to terror-loving states: ``If you develop
weapons of mass destruction [with which] you want to terrorize
the world, you'll be held accountable.''
The State of the Union address marked the maturation of the
Bush Doctrine. This war, according to the president, has ``two
great objectives.'' The first is defeating terrorism. The
second objective, marking the most significant declaration by
an American president in almost 20 years, is an unequivocal
rejection of the international status quo. ``The United States
of America,'' said President Bush, ``will not permit the
world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's
most destructive weapons.''
And President Bush singled out three regimes, North Korea,
Iran and Iraq, as enemies; they constitute an ``axis of evil''
that poses ``a grave and growing danger.'' Nor will he ``stand
by, as peril draws closer and closer.'' Time, he said, ``is not
on our side.'' The president is thus willing to act
preemptively and, if need be, unilaterally. This is a matter of
American self-defense.
The Bush Doctrine seeks to eliminate these weapons and the
dictatorial regimes that would use them. The president also
seeks to challenge tyranny in general. ``No nation is exempt,''
the president said, from the ``true and unchanging'' American
principles of liberty and justice. Moreover, our role with
respect to those principles will not be passive. According to
the president, ``America will take the side of brave men and
women who advocate these values around the world, including the
Islamic world,'' and will do so because it is the only lasting
way to build ``a just and peaceful world beyond the war on
terror.'' This is now a strategic imperative as much as a moral
one.
The president's words augur a fundamental departure from
the U.S. policies of the past decade, from the pseudo-
sophisticated ``realism'' of the first Bush Administration or
the evasive ``multilateralism'' of the Clinton years. The Bush
Doctrine rests on a revived commitment to the principles of
liberal democracy and the restoration of American military
power.
If the president has defined a new goal--or reminded us of
what Americans have always regarded as our true purpose in the
world--how do we get there? The president and his lieutenants
have suggested answers to what the next steps should be.
Since September 11, we have all understood that this will
be a large and long war. Already it is being waged on a variety
of fronts. The campaign in Afghanistan is far from complete.
The Taliban has been routed, al Qaeda's safe haven destroyed.
But while bin Laden is on the run, he is still on the loose.
The initial battles have been successful, but true victory in
Afghanistan will be measured in the long-term effort to create
a viable and stable state that protects individual liberties
and promotes justice. Nor can victory in Afghanistan be ensured
without securing Pakistan.
The campaign against al Qaeda now is taking American
soldiers into Southeast Asia. More than 600 troops have been
deployed to the Philippines to help the government of Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo in its war against the Abu Sayyaf group of
Muslim extremists. Singapore and Malaysia both have arrested
terrorists with al Qaeda connections and the Bush
Administration is stepping up pressure on the Indonesian
government to do the same. The trail is also likely to lead
into Somalia and elsewhere in Africa.
The presence of North Korea in President Bush's ``axis of
evil'' underscores his larger view of this war. The
administration previously has taken somewhat contradictory
stands on North Korea, first suggesting it would overturn the
Clinton Administration's policy and then to maintain it. North
Korea may be impoverished and isolated, but it is extremely
dangerous. American policy must be to change the North Korean
regime, not simply to contain it and coexist with it.
The president also makes it clear that he regards the
Middle East as occupying the central front in this war, and
that the problem is political, not religious. What links Osama
bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and the mullahs in Tehran is a
common hatred of America and a desire to drive America out of
the region. President Bush wishes to promote the principles of
liberty and justice especially in the Islamic world.
The principal obstacles to that goal are the regimes in
Iran and Iraq. Ever since the revolt against the shah, experts
have been arguing that eventually shared interests would create
a rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. ``Openings'' to
Iran are like the first blooms of spring. But they are just as
ephemeral. Iran's offer to rescue American aviators hit in
Afghanistan has been more than offset by the discovery of its
arms shipments to the Palestinian Authority. The character of
this Iranian regime is obvious, and implacable.
But, as Charles Krauthammer wrote in the ``Washington
Post'' last Friday, the good news is that Iran ``is in the
grips of a revolution from below. We can best accelerate that
revolution be the power of example and success. Overthrowing
neighboring radical regimes shows the fragility of
dictatorship, challenges the mullahs' mandate from heaven and
thus encourages disaffected Iranians to the rise. First,
Afghanistan to the east. Next, Iraq to the west.''
This summarizes the strategic implication of President
Bush's war aims. We may never definitely know, for example,
whether Saddam had a hand in the events of September 11; the
relationship between Mohamed Atta and Iraqi intelligence may be
lost in the mists of Prague. But Iraqi involvement would come
as no surprise. After all, Saddam Hussein has remained at war
with the United States since 1991. Every day, his air defenses
target U.S. and British aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones
over northern and southern Iraq. He flouts the UN resolutions
agreed to following the Gulf War. And we know that Iraqi-
sponsored terrorists have tried to kill an American president
and Saddam's agents were likely involved in the effort to bring
down the World Trade Center in 1993.
And Saddam's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction
have ruled out a return to the status quo strategy of
containment. President Bush has asked himself how this man will
behave once he acquires these weapons. The delicate game of
nuclear deterrence, played with Saddam Hussein, is an
unacceptable risk.
A military campaign against Iraq is also something we know
how to do. Other than the Euphrates River and Saddam's palace
guard, nothing stood between the U.S. VII Corps and Baghdad in
March 1991; the Army even developed a plan for encircling and
reducing the city in one move. Despite the weakness of the
sanctions regime over the past decade, and Saddam's care and
feeding of his army at the expense of the Iraqi people, the
Republican Guard is probably less formidable now than it was
then.
Moreover, as operations in Afghanistan show, the precision-
strike capabilities of U.S. forces have improved. While the
Iraq campaign would be far larger and would demand the
immediate and rapid commitment of substantial American ground
troops--and though we should not underestimate the lengths to
which Saddam will go once he understands that the goal is to
remove him from power or kill him--the military outcome is
nearly certain.
The larger question with respect to Iraq, as with
Afghanistan, is what happens after the combat is concluded. The
Iraqi opposition lacks the military strength of the Afghan
Northern Alliance; however, it claims a political legitimacy
that might even be greater. And, as in Kabul but also as in the
Kurdish and Shi'ite regions of Iraq in 1991, American and
alliance forces will be welcomed in Baghdad as liberators.
Indeed, reconstructing Iraq may prove to be a less difficult
task than the challenge of building a viable state in
Afghanistan.
The political, strategic and moral rewards would also be
even greater. A friendly, free, and oil-producing Iraq would
leave Iran isolated and Syria cowed; the Palestinians more
willing to negotiate seriously with Israel; and Saudi Arabia
with less leverage over policymakers here and in Europe.
Removing Saddam Hussein and his henchmen from power presents a
genuine opportunity--one President Bush sees clearly--to
transform the political landscape of the Middle East.
Conversely, the failure to seize this opportunity, to rise
to the larger mission in this war, would constitute a major
defeat. The president understands ``we can't stop short.'' But
imagine if we did: Saddam and the Iranian mullahs would be free
to continue their struggle for dominance in the Persian Gulf
and to acquire world-threatening weaponry. Our allies in the
region who have truly stood with us--like Israel, Turkey and
now Pakistan and Hamid Karzai's nascent government in
Afghanistan--would feel a lonely chill. And our allies in
Europe, who may enjoy a moment's smugness at the defeat of the
U.S. ``hyperpower,'' would soon begin to worry about their own
prospects in a world in which terrorists and terrorist states
have acquired weapons of mass destruction. Very shortly, for
lack of confidence in America's willingness to preserve and
shape a global order, our friends would start appeasing our
adversaries, and our adversaries' ambitions would grow even
greater. Whether we want it or not, we are at a crossroads. We
can either take up the task the president has laid out before
us, or we can allow the development of a world that will soon
grow far more unstable and dangerous.
In short, even if we wished to, it is now impossible to
recover the world of September 10, or to find a stable balance
of power with the likes of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Nor can
we afford, as the president said, to ``wait on events, while
dangers gather.'' And while there are risks involved in
carrying out the president's strategic vision, the risks in not
doing so are all the greater.